MAGALONA VS. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011 FACTS : The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act 3046 in 1961. The law’s purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. More so, it has identified the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands", generating their own maritime zones. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. To their opinion, the law has effectively reduced the maritime territory of the country. With this, Article I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated. The petitioners also worried that that because of the suggested changes in the maritime baselines will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to traverse the Philippine territory freely. In effect, it steps on the state’s sovereignty and national security. Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in no way will the amendments affect any pertinent power of the state. It also deferred to agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over Sabah. Lastly, they have questioned the normative force of the notion that all the waters within the rectangular boundaries in the Treaty of Paris. Now, because this treaty still has undetermined controversies, the Congress believes that in the perspective of international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it. Thus, this case of prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is filed before the court, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522.
ISSUE: Is R.A. 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law, violative of Section 2, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution? RULING: No. The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it clear that it has merely demarcated the country’s maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. Secondly, the Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines’ enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and the Scarborough. Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah remained even with the adoption of the amendments. Further, the Court importantly stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories. With regard to the petitioners’ assertion that RA 9522 has converted the internal waters into archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to be persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the political branches of Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the competent security measures and policies that will regulate innocent passage. Since the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary law, it also believes that no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged by modern states. In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required the imposition of innocent passage as a concession in lieu of their right to claim the entire waters landward baseline. It also made it possible for archipelagic states to be recognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III.
Dizon Copper vs. Dr. Dizon, GR 183573, July 16, 2012 Facts: Celestino Dizon (Celestino) filed with Declarations of Location over 57 mining claims in Zambales. In 1966, herein petitioner Dizon CopperSilver Mines, Inc. was organized. Among its incorporators were Celestino and his son, herein respondent Dr. Luis D. Dizon. Celestino assigned their 57 mining claims to petitioner. Petitioner entered into an Operating Agreement with Benguet Corporation (Benguet). In such agreement, petitioner authorized Benguet to, among others, “explore, equip, develop and operate” the 57 mining claims. In 1978, the 57 mining claims became the subject of a mining lease application with the Bureau of Mines. Consequently, the government issued 5 Mining Lease Contracts (MLCs) covering 6 out of the 57 mining claims. Benguet filed an MPSA application with the DENR. Benguet and petitioner terminated their Operating Agreement. In 2004, Benguet assigned MPSA-P-III-16 in favor of the latter. And this was recorded in the name of petitioner. Petitioner sent a letter to the DENR MGB RO-III, requesting the said office to include the 6 mining claims under MLCs in MPSA-P-III-16. The request was approved. Despite the pendency of MPSA-P-III-16, petitioner nonetheless filed with the DENR another MPSA application designated as MPSA-P-III-03-05 and covers all 57 of its mining claims, inclusive of the 6 under MLCs. On the other hand, respondent filed with the DENR his MPSA-PIII-05-05, an MPSA application covering 281.9544 hectares of mineral location in Zambales. It includes the 6 mining claims under MLCs. Subsequently, the DENR MGB RO-III verified that several areas applied for by respondent in MPSAP-III-05-05 overlaps with those in petitioner’s application. The DENR Secretary issued an Order
declaring petitioner’s MPSA-P-III-16 and MPSA-PIII-03-05 void ab initio. Issue: What is a mineral production sharing agreement? Is it violative of sec. 2, par. 2g, Article 12 of the Constitution? Ruling: A Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) is one of the mineral agreements innovated by the 1987 Constitution by which the State takes on a broader and more dynamic role in the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s mineral resources. By such agreements, the government does not become a mere licensor, concessor or lessor of mining resources—but actually assumes “full control and supervision” in the exploration, development and utilization of the concerned mining claims, in consonance with Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. 2006 BAR: True or False A law creating a state corporation to exploit, develop, and utilize compressed natural gas. SUGGESTED ANSWER: The law is valid as under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. It is also provided that the State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture or sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations, at least 60% Filipino-owned. Furthermore, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, according to terms and conditions provided by law. A state corporation, unlike a private corporation, may be created by special law and placed under the control of the President, subject to such conditions as the creating statute may provide. 2004 BAR: EAP is a government corporation created for the purpose of reclaiming lands including foreshore and submerged areas, as well as to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. A law was passed transferring title to EAP of lands already reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of MM Bay, particularly the so-called Liberty Islands, as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Titles were duly issued in EAP's name. Subsequently, EAP entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with ARI, a private foreign corporation, to develop Liberty Islands. Additionally, the JVA provided for the reclamation of 250 hectares of submerged land in the area surrounding Liberty Islands. EAP agreed to sell and transfer to ARI a portion of Liberty Islands and a portion of the area to be reclaimed as the consideration for ARI's role and participation in the joint venture, upon approval by the Office of the President. Is there any constitutional obstacle to the sale and transfer by EAP to ARI of both portions as provided for in the JVA? SUGGESTED ANSWER: ARI cannot acquire a portion of Liberty Islands because, although EAP has title to Liberty Islands and thus such lands are alienable and disposable land, they cannot be sold, only leased, to private corporations. The portion of the area to be reclaimed cannot be sold and transferred to ARI because the seabed is inalienable land of the public domain. (Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 [2002]).
Section 4. Forest Lands and Parks: Apex Mining vs SMGM 152613,November 20, 2009
Corp.,
G.R.
No.
Facts: Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SMGM) assails the Court’s Decision dated 23 June 2006, which held that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SMGM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. In view of this, and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the “Mining Act of 1995,” mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified. Issue: Is PP No. 297, declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as a mineral reservation, valid and constitutional, on the ground that it lacks the
concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution? Ruling: PP No. 297 is valid and constitutional even without concurrence from Congress. The Court recognized that the questioned proclamation came from a co-equal branch of government, which entitled it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. The presumption of its constitutionality stands inasmuch as the parties in the instant cases did not question its validity, much less present any evidence to prove that the same is unconstitutional. Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution provides that the area covered by forest lands and national parks may not be expanded or reduced, unless pursuant to a law enacted by Congress. SEM does not allege nor present any evidence that Congress had already enacted a statute determining with specific limits forest lands and national parks. Considering the absence of such law, Proclamation No. 297 could not have violated Section 4, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. In addition, there is nothing in the constitutional provision that prohibits the President from declaring a forest land as an environmentally critical area and from regulating the mining operations therein by declaring it as a mineral reservation in order to prevent the further degradation of the forest environment and to resolve the health and peace and order problems that beset the area. **you can opt not to write the 3rd paragraph in the index card** 1998 BAR: Express your agreement or disagreement with any of the following statements. Begin your answer with the statement: "I AGREE" or "DISAGREE" as the case may be.
1. Anyone, whether Individual, corporation or association, qualified to acquire private lands is also qualified to acquire public lands in the Philippines. 2. A religious corporation is qualified to have lands in the Philippines on which it may build Its church and make other improvements provided these are actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes. 3. A religious corporation cannot lease private lands In the Philippines. 4. A religious corporation can acquire private lands in the Philippines provided all its members are citizens of the Philippines. 5. A foreign corporation can only lease private lands in the Philippines. SUGGESTED ANSWER: 1.) I disagree. Under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution, a corporation or association which is sixty percent owned by Filipino citizens can acquire private land, because it can lease public land and can therefore hold public land. However, it cannot acquire public land. Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private corporations and associations can only lease and cannot acquire public land. Under Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship may acquire private land only and cannot acquire public land. 2.) I disagree. The mere fact that a corporation is religious does not entitle it to own public land. As held In Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58, 61, land tenure is not indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession of worship. The religious corporation can own private land only if it is at least sixty per cent owned by Filipino citizens.
3.) I disagree. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 471, corporations and associations owned by aliens are allowed to lease private lands up to twenty-five years, renewable for another period of twenty-five years upon agreement of the lessor and the lessee. Hence, even if the religious corporation is owned by aliens, it can lease private lands. 4.) I disagree. For a corporation' to qualify to acquire private lands in the Philippines, under Section 7, Article Xn of the Constitution in relation to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, only sixty per cent (60%) of the corporation is required to be owned by Filipino citizens for it to qualify to acquire private lands. 5.) I agree. A foreign corporation can lease private lands only and cannot lease public land. Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of public lands may be undertaken through co-production. Joint venture or production-sharing agreements only with Filipino citizen or corporations or associations which are at least sixty per cent owned by Filipino citizen. 2009 BAR: True or False Aliens are absolutely prohibited from owning private lands in the Philippines. SUGGESTED ANSWER: False, Aliens may own private lands in the Philippines if they acquire the property through hereditary succession. Also, natural-born Filipino citizen who lost their Philippine citizenship may be transferees of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
2011 BAR: Althea, a Filipino citizen, bought a lot in the Philippines in 1975. Her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot since 1940, in the concept of owner. In 1988, Althea became a naturalized Australian citizen. Is she qualified to apply for registration of the lot in her name? The answer is C A. Yes, provided she acquires back her Filipino citizenship. B. No, except when it can be proved that Australia has a counterpart domestic law that also favors former Filipino citizens residing there. C. Yes, the lot is already private in character and as a former natural-born Filipino, she can buy the lot and apply for its registration in her name. D. No, foreigners are not allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Section 8. Property Rights of former natural born Filipinos: 2000 BAR: State whether or not the following law is constitutional. Explain briefly. No XVIII. – a) Andy Lim, an ethnic Chinese, became a naturalized Filipino in 1935. But later he lost his Filipino citizenship when he became a citizen of Canada in 1971. Wanting the best of both worlds, he bought, in 1987, a residential lot in Forbes Park and a commercial lot in Binondo. Are these sales valid? Why? (3%)
Answer: No, the sales are not valid. Under Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, only a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who lost his Philippine citizenship may acquire private land. Since Andy Lim was a former naturalized Filipino citizen, he is not qualified to acquire private lands. Section 10. Filipinized Areas of Investments: Espina vs. Bautista, G.R. 143855, Sept. 21, 2010 On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens. On October 11, 2000 petitioners filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the grounds that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment. Issue: Does R.A. 8762 [Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000], violate the constitutional mandate in Filipinization of areas of investments?
Ruling: No, there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. The the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy. 2006 BAR: State whether or not the following laws are constitutional. Explain briefly.
A law prohibiting Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The law is invalid as it singles out and deprives Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade. In Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31,1957, the court held that the Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country.” Thus, the court ruled therein that the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. In the case at bar, the law discriminates only against Chinese citizens and thus violates the equal protection clause. Gamboa vs. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by
PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Issue: Is section 11, Article XII, enabling or selfexecuting? Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article refer to the total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility? Ruling: a.) Self-executing. Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is selfexecuting. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS. To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as not self-executing would mean that since the 1935 Constitution, or over the last 75 years, not one of the constitutional provisions expressly reserving specific areas of investments to corporations, at least 60 percent of the “capital” of which is owned by Filipinos, was enforceable. In short, the framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions miserably failed to effectively reserve
to Filipinos specific areas of investment, like the operation by corporations of public utilities, the exploitation by corporations of mineral resources, the ownership by corporations of real estate, and the ownership of educational institutions. All the legislatures that convened since 1935 also miserably failed to enact legislations to implement these vital constitutional provisions that determine who will effectively control the national economy, Filipinos or foreigners. This Court cannot allow such an absurd interpretation of the Constitution b.) It refers to the total Common shares. The petition and rule that the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is directed to apply this definition of the term “capital” in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law. **Indisputably, construing the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has
expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, “a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”** Section 16. GOCC and Economic Viability: BSP vs. COA, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011 Facts: The COA issued a resolution in 1999 defining its policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippine, which was created as a public corporation and that in BSP vs.NLRC, the SC ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a GOCC within the meaning of Art. IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution, and that the BSP is regarded as a government instrumentality under the Administrative Code. For the purposes of audit supervision, the BSP shall be classified among the government corporations to be audited by employing the team audit approach. The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter signed by then BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay, saying that it is not subject to the COA’s jurisdiction. Issues: a.) Is CA. no. 111, as amended by R.A. 7278 constitutional and consistent with section 16, Article XII of the constitution? b.) Does the test of economic viability apply to public corporations dealing with governmental functions? Ruling: a.) Yes. The BSP (CA no. 111, as amended by RA 7278) is a public corporation or a government
agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exist another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as "public corporations." These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices. b.) No. Section 16, Article XII deals with “the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations,” which should be done through a general law enacted by Congress, provides for an exception, that is: if the corporation is government owned or controlled; its creation is in the interest of the common good; and it meets the test of economic viability. The rationale behind Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution was explained in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, Art. XII, Sec. 16 bans the creation of private corporations by special law, however said constitutional provision should not be construed so as to prohibit the creation of public corporations or a corporate agency or instrumentality of the government intended to serve a public interest or purpose. This should not be measured on the basis of economic viability, but according to the public interest or purpose it serves as envisioned by par. 2, Art. 44 of the Civil Code, and of the Administrative Code.
Republic vs. City of Paranaque, G.R. no. 191109, July 18, 2012 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on pure questions of law, assailing the January 8, 2010 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 195, Parafiaque City (RTC), which ruled that petitioner Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), a taxable entity, and, therefore, . not exempt from payment of real property taxes. The pertinent portion of the said order reads: In view of the finding of this court that petitioner is not exempt from payment of real property taxes, respondent Parañaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo did not act xxx without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the warrants of levy on the subject properties. On August 3, 2009, after an exchange of several pleadings and the failure of both parties to arrive at a compromise agreement, PRA filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Supplemental Petition which sought to declare as null and void the assessment for real property taxes, the levy based on the said assessment, the public auction sale conducted on April 7, 2003, and the Certificates of Sale issued pursuant to the auction sale. On January 8, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRA’s petition. In ruling that PRA was not exempt from payment of real property taxes, the RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1084. It was organized as a stock corporation because it had an authorized capital stock divided into no par value shares. Not in conformity, PRA filed this petition for certiorari assailing the January 8, 2010 RTC Order based on the following GROUNDS
Issue: Is the Philippine Reclamation Authority a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) under Sec. 16, Article XII? Ruling: A GOCC must have been organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. The Philippine Reclamation Authority is neither. It is not a GOCC. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not necessarily become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a nonstock corporation. Furthermore, there is another reason why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows: “Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.” **The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of common good but failed the second one – economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it created to compete in the market place considering that there were no other competing reclamation companies being operated by the private sector. As mentioned
earlier, PRA was created essentially to perform a public service considering that it was primarily responsible for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and operation of lands belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with the public interest.** Section 17. Temporary Take – Over: 2011 BAR: The President issued an executive order directing all department heads to secure his consent before agreeing to appear during question hour before Congress on matters pertaining to their departments. Is the executive order unconstitutional for suppressing information of public concern? The answer is D. (A) No, because those department heads are his alter egos and he is but exercising his right against self-incrimination. (B) Yes, the President cannot control the initiative of the department heads to conform with the oversight function of Congress. (C) Yes, the President cannot withhold consent to the initiative of his department heads as it will violate the principle of check and balance.
