LIMJOCO v Estate if Fragante FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality. HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Vda. De Celis vs. Vda. Dela Santa G.R. No. L-5294. September 30, 1953 FACTS Asuncion Vda. de la Santa is one of the instituted heirs in the will of her deceased brother, Teofilo Roque, together with her other brothers and sisters, Marcela, Catalina, Sofronio, Joaquin, Manuela and Francisco, all surnamed Roque, and was given a one-seventh (1/7) undivided share in a house and lot located in the City of Manila. The said will was allowed to probate in the CFI of Manila. Sofronio Roque, one of the heirs, is the
executor (note: he was also referred to as the administrator in the case) of the estate. The instituted heirs, with the exception of Asuncion Roque who was very ill in the provinces, had prayed for the sale of the house and lot in question for the price of P350,000; the administrator asked that the said authority be not given until after 2 weeks; in view of the fact that Asuncion Roque had not appeared before the court; and, that the difficulty of her nonappearance might be avoided in view of the fact that Asuncion Roque had already executed a special power of attorney in favor of her son, Ricardo. The judge ordered that notice should be given to Ricardo de la Santa, as attorney-in-fact of Asuncion. However, Ricardo failed to appear in court to manifest his acceptance of the proposal to sell the property in issue, hence, the hearing were postponed several times. The judge issued another order, which authorized the administrator to sell the property for a price of not less than P350,000 within one month from the date thereof, which authority shall automatically be cancelled if the sale is not realized within said period of time. Asuncion filed a petition to the effect that the allegedly undervalued personal properties of the deceased valued at P2053.83 be sold to cover the debt of the deceased to her amounting to P1600, since the sale was not realized within the period provided in the order. The other heirs, on the other hand, asked the court for another order to authorize them to sell the property P245,000 to P300,000. The court gave them the authority to sell the property for not less than P245,000. The said Judge issued another order approving the deed of sale of the property in controversy, executed by the administrator in favor of Luisa Avecilla Vda. de Celis, for the price of P320,000, which order also authorized the administrator to receive the purchase price from appellant and to deposit one-half thereof in the PNB. No copies of the orders were received by Asuncion or Ricardo, in spite of the fact that the orders contained directives that notice of the same be served upon the Asuncion or Ricardo. Asuncion filed an action to ANNUL THE SALE. CFI granted in so far as the 1/7 share of Assuncion is concerned, CA affirmed. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the order issued by the judge can be attacked collaterally. W/N the sale should be annulled due to the lack of notice to an heir
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO. The validity of a judgment or order of a court entered in a special proceeding cannot be assailed collaterally unless the ground for the attack is lack of jurisdiction of the court entering such judgment or order or fraud by the party sought to be charged with it in its procurement. If the nullity of the judgment or order assailed is for failure to adhere to or comply with the statutory requirements which must be followed before such judgment or order may be entered, the remedy for the agreed party is to appeal from such order or judgment, or if final, to apply for relief under Rule 38 which is also applicable to special proceedings. The order in question in so far as Asuncion Roque Vda. de la Santa is concerned is not final and executory because, as found by the Court of Appeals, she has not been notified not only of the petition, filed not by the executor but by five of the heirs and devisees named in the will of the late Teofilo Roque duly probated, praying for authority to the executor named in the will and duly appointed to sell the lot and buildings erected thereon but also of the orders granting such authority and approving the sale made by the executor pursuant to such authority. Hence this action is improperly brought because the plaintiff has still the remedy of appeal to assail directly the validity of the order. NO.Pursuant thereto, the notice caused by the court to be made may be given to the person interested personally or by mail or by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper. If the interested party to whom the notice was mailed at his residence, as it appeared on the record of the special proceedings, had absented himself therefrom and failed to receive it, that fact would not deprive the court of the power to proceed with the hearing of the petition of the executor or administrator seeking authority to sell property of the estate of the deceased and to grant or deny it. The question then that arises is: Granting that she objected to the sale of the lot and buildings erected thereon and her objection considered, as it must be presumed for it was in the record of the special proceedings when the hearing of the application for authority to sell was heard, but was disregarded, by the probate court, could her objection be sufficient to prevent the probate court from granting the executor authority to sell the property? The Rules of Court do not deprive the probate court of the power to grant license to the administrator or executor to sell personal or real property of the deceased even if there be an objection to it by an heir, devisee or legatee, provided that such license to sell will redound to the benefit of the interested persons and hasten the winding up or the final settlement of the estate. The intent of the framers of the rules to grant more power to probate courts in dealing with the settlement and administration of the estate of deceased persons.
Consequently, neither the objection of Asuncion Vda. de la Santa to the application for authority to sell the lot and buildings erected thereon belonging to the estate of the deceased Teofilo Roque nor the failure to receive the notice of such application caused to be served upon her personally or upon her son Ricardo de la Santa as her attorney-in-fact, it appearing that she had actual knowledge thereof, is sufficient legal cause to annul the sale, because the probate court had authority under the provisions of sections 4 and 7, Rule 90, (Now Rule 89) to grant authority to the executor or administrator to sell the property of the deceased. LIM V CA G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000 Petitioners, heirs of Cresencia, alleged that since the demise of the spousesTan Quico and Josefa Oraa, the subject properties had been administered by respondent Lorenzo. They claimed that before her death, Cresencia had demanded their partition from Lorenzo. After Cresencia’s death, they likewise clamored for their partition. Their efforts proved fruitless. Respondent Lorenzo and Hermogenes adamant stance against partition is based on various contentions. Principally, they urge: (1) that the properties had already been partitioned, albeit, orally; and (2) during her lifetime, the late Cresencia had sold and conveyed all her interests in said properties to respondent Lorenzo. They cited as evidence the “Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa” and a receipt of payment. ISSUE: Whether or not the late Crescencia sold her inheritance share in favor of the respondent Lorenzo. The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court which voided the Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa and Sale on the ground that it was not understood by the late Cresencia when she signed it. As to the receipt, it speaks of the late Cresencia’s pro-indiviso share of the subject properties or her share before division. The SC noted that the subject lots are still covered by tax declarations in the name of their parents. If these lots had already been partitioned to the different heirs and then occupied by them, it appearsstrange that their tax declarations have not been adjusted to
reflect their ownership considering the long time that has elapsed since 1930. Respondent Lorenzo testified that he took possession of the lot supposed to belong to the late Crescencia in 1966, yet, he himself did not cause any change in its tax declaration.. To say the least, the omission buttresses the conclusion that the properties have not been partitioned. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ismael Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, November 22, 2000 (345 SCRA 541) The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.18 The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.19 Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.20 Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.
Crucillo vs. IAC (317 SCRA 351) FACTS: Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. They had eight (8) children, namely, Elena, Maximino, Perpetua, Santiago, Adelaida, Miguel, Rafael, and Vicente, all surnamed Crucillo. Balbino A. Crucillo died intestate in 1909. Juana Aure died on November 19, 1949. Balbino A. Crucillo left, among other things, two(2) parcels of unregistered land situated at General Luna Street, Mendez-Nunez,Cavite. He was survived by his heirs, who became co-owners of the aforesaid lots and thereafter, entered into the possession thereof with each one of them possessing their respective shares and exercising acts of ownership. Rafael had sold two other lots belonging to
the estate. Nicasio Sarmiento (son of Perpetua Crucillo) has caused a residential lot situated at Gen. Trias St., Mendez, Cavite to be registered in his name alone, Miguel Crucillo is in exclusive possession ofa residential lot located at General Trias St., Mendez, Cavite. An agriculturalland located at Sitio Niko, Mendez, Cavite, covered by Tax Declaration No. 1179 is owned in common by Vicente Crucillo, Buenaventurada Sarmiento (daughter of the deceased Perpetua Crucillo), Adelaida Crucillo, and Atty. Conrado Crucillo (son of the deceased Santiago Crucillo). Another agricultural land situated at Pulong Munti, is owned in common by the Heirs of Elena Crucillo, Adelaida Crucillo,and Nicasio Sarmiento. Still another property covered by Tax Declaration No. 653 is owned in common by Buenaventurada Sarmiento and Vicente Crucillo, whose share was acquired by Miguel Crucillo. Additionally, Primitiva Mendoza is in possession of an agricultural land in Pulong Munti and also in Niko, Mendez, Cavite, while Carlomagno Crucillo possesses an agricultural land at Sitio Maykiling, Mendez, Cavite, Miguel Crucillo is exclusively occupying an agricultural land at Pulong Munti and Ulo ng Bukal, and the remaining portion another agricultural land after the other portion thereof had been sold by Rafael Crucillo. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a partition of the disputed property. RULING: Yes. From the foregoing facts, it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to orally partition subject estate among themselves, as evinced by their possession of the inherited premises, their construction of improvements thereon, and their having declared in their names for taxation purposes their respective shares. These are indications that the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to divide subject estate among themselves, for why should they construct improvements thereon, pay the taxes therefor, and exercise other acts of ownership, if they did not firmly believe that the property was theirs. It is certainly foolhardy for petitioners to claim that no oral partition was made when their acts showed otherwise. Moreover, it is unbelievable that the possession of the heirs was by mere tolerance, judging from the introduction of improvements thereon and the length of time that such improvements have been in existence. Then too, after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate, petitioners are estopped from denying or contesting the existence of an oral partition. The oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid, binding and enforceable on theparties
