1. GR NO NO. 1828 182839 39,, JUNE JUNE 02, 02, 201 2014 4 PNB VS. JOSE GARCIA ET. AL. DIGEST Facts:
Jose Sr Sr., ., !"#o$" "#e %&o'e()e *&( +o&se&" o #!s +#!'(re&
e-e+$"e( SPAs *$"#or!!&) s/o$ses G*r+!* "o +o&e * /ro/er" +oere( !"# TCT T CT No. T44422 T44422 "o se+$re se+$re * 'o*& ro PNB * * o or")*)e *&( *& Ae&(e&" o Re*' Es"*"e 5or")*)e !& *or o PNB #!+# ere !&s+r!e( !& "#e "!"'e. T#e res/o&(e&"s 6'e( 6'e( * Co/'*!&" or N$''!" o "#e s*!( Ae&(e&" *)*!&s" s/o$ses G*r+!* *&( PNB *''e)!&) "#*" "#e /ro/er" *s +o&7$)*', e!&) *+$!re( ($r!&) "#e *rr!*)e o Jose Sr. Sr. "o L!)** *&( "#e e+*e o&ers /ro !&(!!s!o $/o& "#e (e*"# o L!)** o& 198. PNB +o&"e&(s "#*" "#e s$7e+" /ro/er" *s re)!s"ere( "o Jose Sr Sr.. *'o&e, *&( * &( #o *s (es+r!e( !& "#e *s * :!(oer. D$r!&) "#e /ro+ee(!&)s, Nor*, Jose Jr, Bo B o *&( J! e-e+$"e( *& SPA (*"e( 5* 31, 199; *$"#or!!&) Jose Sr. "o *+" *""or&e!&*+" ($r!&) "#e /re"r!*' o "#e +*se.
Issue: <#e"#er "#e s$7e+" /ro/er" *s * +o&7$)*' or *s *+$!re( ($r!&) *rr!*)e or "#ere*"er.
Ruling: = =es. es. Ar"!+'e 119 119 o "#e C!!' Co(e !& '!&e '!&e !"# Ar"!+'e 1;0 1;0 *//'!es. A'' /ro/er"!es *+$!re( ($r!&) *rr!*)e *re +o&7$)*' *&( "#e re)!s"r*"!o& o !" !& "#e &*e o o&e s/o$se (oes &o" (es"ro "#e /res$/"!o& /res$/"!o& "#*" !" !s +o&7$)*'. <#*" !s *"er!*' !s "#e "!e #e& "#e /ro/er" *s *+$!re(. T#e +o&7$)*' /*r"&ers#!/ *s +o&er"e( +o&er"e( !&"o *& !/'!e( or(!&*r or(!&*r +o o&ers#!/ $/o& "#e (e*"# o L!)** "#$s )oer&e( Ar"!+'e 493 o C!!' Co(e.
T#e e>e+" o "#e or")*)e !"# !"# res/e+" "o "#e +oo&ers +oo&ers s#*'' e '!!"e( "o "#e /or"!o& #!+# * e *''o""e( * ''o""e( "o #! !& "#e (!!s!o& $/o& "#e "er!&*"!o& o "#e +oo&ers#!/. T#$s, Jose Sr. +*&&o" or")*)e "#e e&"!re /ro/er".
T#e e>e+" o "#e or")*)e !"# !"# res/e+" "o "#e +oo&ers +oo&ers s#*'' e '!!"e( "o "#e /or"!o& #!+# * e *''o""e( * ''o""e( "o #! !& "#e (!!s!o& $/o& "#e "er!&*"!o& o "#e +oo&ers#!/. T#$s, Jose Sr. +*&&o" or")*)e "#e e&"!re /ro/er".
2.
REP RE PUB UBLI LIC C VS. VS. HE HEIR IRS S OF OF FRA FRANC NCIS ISCA CA DIG IGNO NOSS-S SOR ORON ONO O
REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORO DIGNOS-SORONO NO G.R. N. !"!#"! $a%c& '() '**+
FAC,S: 2 ere *(7$(!+*"e( "#e "#e& Co$r" o ?!rs" I&s"*&+e o Ce$ !& *or o "#e o''o!&) !& o$r e$*' s#*res@ * ?r*&+!s+* D!)&os, *rr!e( "o B'*s Soro&o
s#*re !&
"#e "o 'o"s ,it Digns s&a%e in t&e t lts/ + /re(e /re(e+essors!&!&"er +essors!&!&"eres" es" o "#e res/o res/o&(e&"s &(e&"s
s#*re !&
"#e "o 'o"s *&( ( /re( /re(e+essors!&!&"er e+essors!&!&"eres" es" o "#e res/o&( res/o&(e&"s e&"s
s#*re !&
"#e "o 'o"s
I" *//e*rs "#*" "#e "o 'o"s ere &o" /*r"!"!o&e( "#e *(7$(!+*"ees. I" *//e*rs $r"#er "#*" "#e #e!rs o T!"o D!)&os, #o *s **r(e( s#*re !& "#e "o 'o"s, so'( "#e enti%e t lts "o "#e "#e& C!!' Aero&*$"!+s Aero&* $"!+s A(!&!s"r*"!o& CAA !* * /$'!+ !&s"r$e&" e&"!"'e( E-"r*7$(!+!*' Se""'ee&" Se""'ee&" *&( S*'e !"#o$" "#e %&o'e()e o res/o&(e&"s #ose /re(e+essors! /re(e+essors!&!&"eres" &!&"eres" ere "#e *(7$(!+*"ee *(7$(!+*"ees s o "#e res" o "#e F /or"!o& o "#e "o 'o"s.
I& 199;, CAAs s$++essor s$++essor!&!&"eres", !&!&"eres", "#e 5*+"*& Ce$ I&"er&*"!o&*' A!r/or" A$"#or!" 5CIAA, ere+"e( * se+$r!" e&+e o&e o "#e 'o" *&( re'o+*"e( * &$er o *!'!es, #o #*( $!'" "#e!r (e''!&)s !"#!& "#e *!r/or" /er!e"er, "o * /or"!o& o s*!( 'o" "o e&#*&+e *!r/or" se+$r!" se+$r!".. 5CIAA '*"er +*$se( "#e !ss$*&+e !& !"s &*e o * T*- De+'*r*"!o&s o "#e 2 'o"s. Res/o&(e&"s Re s/o&(e&"s soo& *s%e( "#e *)e&"s o 5CIAA "o +e*se )!!&) "#!r( /erso&s /er!ss!o& /er!ss!o& "o o++$/ "#e 'o"s $" "#e s*e *s !)&ore(. Res/o&(e&"s "#ere$/o& 6'e( * Co/'*!&" or $!e"!&) o T!"'e, Le)*' Re(e/"!o& !"# Pr*er or *
T#e Re/$'!+, Re/$'!+, re/res re/rese&"e( e&"e( "#e 5CIAA 5CIAA !& !"s A&ser !"# Co$&"er+'*!, Co$&"er+'*! , *!&"*!&e( "#*" ro "#e "!e "#e 'o"s ere so'( "o !"s /re(e+essor /re(e +essor!&!&"eres" !&!&"eres" CAA, !" #*s ee& !& o/e&, +o&"!&$o$s, e-+'$s!e, e-+'$s! e, *&( &o"or!o$s /ossess!o& "#ereo "#ro$)# *+$!s!"!e /res+r!/"!o&, /res+r!/ "!o&, !" #*( *+$!re( *'!( "!"'e "o "#e 'o"s s!&+e !" *s * /$r+#*ser !& )oo( *!"# *&( or *'$e *&( *ss$!&) arguendo arguendo "#*" "#*" !" (!( &o" #*e 7$s" "!"'e, !" #*(, /ossess!o& or oer 30 e*rs, *+$!re( o&ers#!/ "#ereo e-"r*or(!&*r /res+r!/"!o&. A" *'' ee&"s, /e"!"!o&er +o&"e&(e( "#*" res/o&(e&"s *+"!o& *s *rre *rre( ( es"o//e' *&( '*+#es.
T#e "r!*' +o$r" o$&( or res/o&(e&"s. res/o&(e&"s. "#e CA *Hre( *Hre( "#e "r!*' "r!*' +o$r"s (e+!s!o&. e&+e, "#e /rese&" /e"!"!o& or re!e o& +er"!or*r!
ISSUE: 1.
2.
HELD: "#e /e"!"!o& !s (e&!e(
1. NO. Ar"!+'e 493 o "#e C!!' Co(e /ro!(es@
E*+# +oo&er s#*'' #*e "#e $'' o&ers#!/ o #!s /*r" *&( o "#e r$!"s *&( e&e6"s /er"*!&!&) "#ere"o, *&( #e * "#ereor "#ereore e *'!e&*"e, *ss!)& or or")*)e !", *&( ee& s$s"!"$"e *&o"#er /erso& !& !"s e&7oe&", e-+e/" #e& /erso&*' r!)#"s *re !&o'e(. B$" "#e e>e+" o "#e *'!e&*"!o& o "#e or")*)e, !"# res/e+" "o "#e +o o&ers, s#*'' e '!!"e( "o "#e /or"!o& #!+# * e *''o""e( "o #! !& "#e (!!s!o& $/o& "#e "er!&*"!o& o "#e +oo&ers#!/.
Apropos !s Apropos !s "#e o''o!&) /er"!&e&" /or"!o& o "#!s Co$r"s (e+!s!o& !& Bailon-Casilao v. CA:
As e*r' *s 1923, "#!s Co$r" #*s r$'e( "#*" ee& ! * +oo&er se''s "#e #o'e /ro/er" *s #!s, "#e s*'e !'' a0ect nl1 &is n s&a%e
2ut nt t&se 3 t&e t&e% c-ne%s & 4i4 nt cnsent "o "#es*'e.T#!s !s e+*$se $&(er "#e *oree&"!o&e( +o(*' /ro!s!o&, /ro!s!o &, "#e s*'e or o"#er (!s/os!"!o& *>e+"s o&' #!s $&(!!(e( s#*re *&( "#e "r*&seree )e"s o&' #*" o$'( +orres/o&( "o #!s )r*&"or !& "#e /*r"!"!o& o "#e "#!&) o&e( !& +oo&.
?ro "#e ore)o!&), !" * e (e($+e( "#*" s!&+e * +oo&er !s e&"!"'e( "o se'' #!s $&(!!(e( s#*re, * s*'e o "#e e&"!re /ro/er" /ro/er" o&e +oo&er !"#o$" "#e +o&se&" o "#e "# e o"#er +oo&ers !s NOT &$'' *&( o!(. He5e%) nl1 t&e %ig&ts 3 t&e c-ne%-selle% a%e
t%ans3e%%e4) t&e%e21 6a7ing t&e 2u1e% a c-ne% 3 t&e 8%8e%t1.
Pe"!"!o&ers /re(e+essor!&!&"eres" CAA "#$s *+$!re( o&' "#e r!)#"s /er"*!&!&) "o "#e se''ers#e!rs o T!"o D!)&os, #!+# !s o&' $&(!!(e( s#*re o "#e "o 'o"s.
2. NO. Re)!s"ere( '*&(s +*&&o" e "#e s$7e+" o *+$!s!"!e /res+r!/"!o&. Pe"!"!o&ers !&s!s"e&+e "#*" !" *+$!re( "#e /ro/er" "#ro$)# *+$!s!"!e /res+r!/"!o&, ! &o" or(!&*r, "#e& e-"r*or(!&*r, (oes &o" '!e. I" e*rs e/#*s!s *" "#!s 7$&+"$re "#*" !& "#e E-"r*7$(!+!*' Se""'ee&" Se""'ee&" *&( S*'e or)e( CAA CA A *&( T!"o D!)&os #e!rs "#e o''o!&) *"er!*' /or"!o&s "#ereo 5ali4ate t&e clai6 3
%es8n4ents "#*" "#e t lts e%e %egiste%e4@ - - - -
1.
T#*" s!&+e "#e OC, o T!"'e o "#e *oe e&"!o&e( 8%8e%t19ies #*sK#*e ee& 'os" *&(Kor (es"roe( *&( "#e VENDEE #ere !&(s !"se' "o re+o&s"!"$"e s*!( title9s *" !"s o& e-/e&se *&( "#*" "#e EIRSVENDORS, "#e!r #e!rs, s$++essors *&( *ss!)&s !&( "#ese'es "o #e'/ !& "#e re+o&s"!"$"!o& o title so "#*" "#e s*!( 'o"Ks * e re)!s"ere( !& "#e &*e o "#e VENDEE !& *++or(*&+e !"# '* - - - -
NO,ES: As or /e"!"!o&ers *r)$e&" "#*" "#e re(e/"!o& /r!+e s#o$'( e o "#e /re*!'!&) *r%e" *'$e, &o" o "#e *+"$*' /$r+#*se /r!+e, s!&+e, so !" +'*!s, 1 "#e res/o&(e&"s re+e!e( 7$s" +o/e&s*"!o& or "#e /ro/er" *" "#e "!e !" *s /$r+#*se( "#e Goer&e&" *&(, 2 "#e /ro/er", ($e "o !/roee&"s !&"ro($+e( /e"!"!o&er !& !"s !+!&!", !s &o or"# seer*' #$&(re(s o !''!o&s o /esos, "#e '* !s &o" o& !"s s!(e.
T#$s, Ar"!+'e 1088 o "#e C!!' Co(e /ro!(es@
S#o$'( *& o "#e #e!rs se'' #!s #ere(!"*r r!)#"s "o * s"r*&)er eore "#e /*r"!"!o&, *& or *'' o "#e +o#e!rs * e s$ro)*"e( "o "#e r!)#"s o "#e /$r+#*ser 21 %ei62u%sing &i6 3% t&e 8%ice 3 t&e
sale) /ro!(e( "#e (o so !"#!& "#e /er!o( o o&e o&"# ro "#e "!e "#e ere &o"!6e( !& r!"!&) o "#e s*'e "#e e&(or. T#e Co$r" * "*%e 7$(!+!*' &o"!+e o "#e !&+re*se !& *'$e o "#e 'o"s.
As e&"!o&e( e*r'!er, #oeer, "#e #e!rs o T!"o D!)&os (!( nt &o"! res/o&(e&"s *o$" "#e s*'e. A" *& r*"e, s!&+e "#e E-"r*7$(!+!*' Se""'ee&" *&( S*'e s"!/$'*"es, "#$s@
T#*" "#e EIRSVENDORS, "#e!r #e!rs, *ss!)&s *&( s$++essors, $&(er"*%e *&(ag%ee t a%%ant an4 4e3en4 t&e 8ssessin
an4 ne%s&i8 3 t&e 8%8e%t19ies &e%ein sl4 against an1 an4 all ust clai6s 3 all 8e%sns &6se5e% *&( s#o$'( "#e VENDEE e (!s"$re( !& !"s /ossess!o&, "o /rose+$"e *&( (ee&( "#e s*e !& "#e Co$r"s o J$s"!+e.
Pe"!"!o&er !s &o" !"#o$" *& ree(. T#!s (e+!s!o& !s, "#ereore, !"#o$" /re7$(!+e "o /e"!"!o&ers r!)#" "o see% re(ress *)*!&s" "#e e&(ors#e!rs o T!"o D!)&os *&( "#e!r s$++essors!&!&"eres"
3.
Metropolitan Bank vs Pascual Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 163744
February 29 2!!"
METROPO#IT$N %$N& $ND TRUST CO. petitioner, vs.
NIC'O#SON P$SCU$# a.(.a. NE#SON P$SCU$# respondent. DECISION VE#$SCO )R. J .* Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on anuar! "#, "#$%. &uring the union, Florencia bought from spouses 'larito and Belen (ering a )%*+suare meter lot with a three+door apartment standing thereon located in Makati 'it!. (ubseuentl!, -ransfer 'ertificate of -itle -'-/ No. (+"*"0132-+%"* covering the purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, -'No. "%)$3" of the Registr! of &eeds of Makati 'it! was issued in the name of Florencia, 4married to Nelson Pascual4 a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual. 5n "##0, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullit! of marriage under 6rticle 3 of the Famil! 'ode, docketed as 'ivil 'ase No. 7+#%+)3%33. 6fter trial, the Regional -rial 'ourt R-'/, Branch #0 in 7ue8on 'it! rendered, on ul! 3", "##%, a &ecision, ) declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of ps!chological incapacit! on the part of Nicholson. 5n the same decision, the R-', inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liuidation of the e9+spouses: con;ugal partnership of gains. (ubseuent events saw the couple going their separate wa!s without liuidating their con;ugal partnership.
aiver4 that Nicholson purportedl! e9ecuted on 6pril #, "##%. -he waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the con;ugal properties of the e9+spouses listed therein, but did not incidentall! include the lot in uestion. &ue to the failure of Florencia and the spouses
'ivil 'ase No. **+1$# and eventuall! raffled to Branch % of the court. 5n it, Nicholson alleged that the propert!, which is still con;ugal propert!, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,0 alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia:s name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementar! period and, hence, was subseuentl! declared in default.
T+e RTC De,-are /+e REM I0a- 6fter trial on the merits, the R-' rendered, on (eptember )0, )**", ;udgment finding for Nicholson. -he falloreads@ PR=M5(=( '
Metrobank:s motion for reconsideration was denied. Dndeterred, Metrobank appealed to the 'ourt of 6ppeals '6/, the appeal docketed as '6+?.R. 'E No. 10$10.
T+e C$ $re 5/+ Mo,a/o0 /+e RTC De,o0 =R=F5- M<&5F5'6-5hether or not the A'6 erred in declaring sub;ect propert! as con;ugal b! appl!ing 6rticle "" of the Famil! 'ode. b. >hether or not the A'6 erred in not holding that the declaration of nullit! of marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of communit! of propert! of the spouses. c. >hether or not the A'6 erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value.1
Our Ru-08 6 modification of the '6:s &ecision is in order.
T+e Du/e Proer/y Co0:u8a5t is Metrobank:s threshold posture that 6rt. "* of the 'ivil 'ode providing that 4Aall propert! of the marriage is presumed to belong to the con;ugal partnership, unless it be proveAn that it pertains e9clusivel! to the husband or to the wife,4 applies. -o Metrobank, 6rt. "" of the Famil! 'ode could not be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage b efore the effectivit! of the Famil! 'ode on 6ugust 3, "#$$. 'iting Manongsong v. Estimo,$ Metrobank asserts that the presumption of con;ugal ownership under 6rt. "* of the 'ivil 'ode applies when there is proof that the propert! was acuired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for the presumption of con;ugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to prove that not onl! was the propert! acuired during the marriage b ut that con;ugal funds were used for the acuisition, a burden Nicholson allegedl! failed to discharge. -o bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed propert!, Metrobank cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals# and Jocson v. Court of Appeals,"* among other cases, where this 'ourt held that a propert! registered in the name of a certain person with a description of being married is no proof that the propert! was acuired during the spouses: marriage. e find for Nicholson. First, while Metrobank is correct in sa!ing that 6rt. "* of the 'ivil 'ode, not 6rt. "" of the Famil! 'ode, is the applicable legal provision since the propert! was acuired prior to the enactment of the Famil! 'ode, it errs in its theor! that, before con;ugal ownership could be legall! presumed, there must be a showing that the propert! was acuired during marriage u08 ,o0:u8a- u0. 'ontrar! to Metrobank:s submission, the 'ourt did not, in Manongsong,"0 add the matter of the use of con;ugal funds as an essential reuirement for the presumption of con;ugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that onl! proof of acuisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the propert! is con;ugal. 5ndeed, if proof on the use of con;ugal is still reuired as a necessar! condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the l aw would veritabl! be a superfluit!. 6s we stressed in Castro v. Miat @
Petitioners also overlook 6rticle "* of the New 'ivil 'ode. 5t provides that 4all propert! of the marriage is presumed to be con;ugal partnership, unless it be proveAn that it pertains e9clusivel! to the husband or to the wife.4 -his article oe 0o/ re;ure roo /+a/ /+e roer/y 5a a,;ure 5/+ u0 o /+e ar/0er+. -he presumption applies even when the manner in which the propert! was acuired does not appear."% =mphasis supplied./ $econd, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobank:s theor!. Metrobank would thrust on the 'ourt, invoking the two cases, the argument that the registration of the propert! in the name of 4Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson Pascual4 operates to d escribe onl! the marital status of the title holder, but not as proof that the propert! was acuired during the e9istence of the marriage. Metrobank is wrong. 6s Nicholson aptl! points out, if proof obtains on the acuisition of the propert! during the e9istence of the marriage, then the presumption of con;ugal ownership applies. -he correct lesson of Franciscoand Jocson is that proof of acuisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine %ua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of con;ugal ownership. > hen there is no showing as to when the propert! was acuired b! the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the propert! belongs e9clusivel! to said spouse. " -he 'ourt, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholson:s arguments regarding Metrobank having implicitl! acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to uestion, the con;ugal ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named the former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia or her co+mortgagor. 5t is felt, however, that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the same having been raised onl! for the first time in this petition. Besides, however Nicholson was designated below does not reall! change, one wa! or another, the classification of the lot in uestion.
Ter0a/o0 o Co0:u8a- Proer/y Re8e oe 0o/ ipso facto E0 /+e Na/ure o Co0:u8a- O50er+ Metrobank ne9t maintains that, contrar! to the '6:s holding, 6rt. ")# of the Famil! 'ode is inapplicable. 6rt. ")# in part reads@ 6rt. ")#. Dpon the dissolution of the con;ugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall appl!@ 9999 1/ -he net remainder of the con;ugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided euall! between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntar! waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this 'ode. 6propos the aforeuoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver e9ecuted b! Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the con;ugal propert! regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acuired during the marriage. Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullit! of marriage, without more, does not automaticall! result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liuidation of the con;ugal assets.
>e again find for Nicholson. >hile the declared nullit! of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the con;ugal partnership, the character of the properties acuired before such declaration continues to subsist as con;ugal properties until a nd after the liuidation and partition of the partnership. -his conclusion holds true whether we appl! 6rt. ")# of the Famil! 'ode on liuidation of the con;ugal partnership:s assets and liabilities which is generall! prospective in application, or (ection 1, 'hapter 0, -itle 5E, Book 5 6rts. "1# to "$%/ of the 'ivil 'ode on the sub;ect, 'on;ugal Partnership of ?ains. For, the relevant provisions of both 'odes first reuire the liuidation of the con;ugal properties before a regime of separation of propert! reigns. 5n Dael v. #ntermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liuidation following its dissolution, the con;ugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinar! co+ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased. "1 5n this pre+liuidation scenario, 6rt. 0#3 of the 'ivil 'ode shall govern the propert! relationship between the former spouses, where@ =ach co+owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he ma! therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its en;o!ment, e9cept when personal rights are involved. %u/ /+e ee,/ o
/+e a-e0a/o0 or /+e or/8a8e 5/+ ree,/ /o /+e ,o
5n view of our resolution on the validit! of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there is hardl ! a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith. (uffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land n eed not look be!ond the four corners of the title is inapplicable.)* Dnlike private individuals, it behooves ba nks to e9ercise greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. -he ascertainment of the status or condition of the propert! offered as securit! and the validit! of the mortgagor:s title must be standard and indispensable part of the bank:s operation. )" 6 bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a !ona fide mortgagee,)) as here. But as found b! the '6, however, Metrobank:s failure to compl! with the due dil igence reuirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliuit! or breach of a known dut! for some interest or ill+will that partakes of fraud that would ;ustif! damages.
='EREFORE the petition is P$RT#> GR$NTED. -he appealed &ecision of the '6 dated anuar! )$, )**0, upholding with modification the &ecision of the R-', Branch % in Makati 'it!, in 'ivil 'ase No. **+1$#, is $FFIRMED with the MODIFIC$TION that the R=M over the lot covered b! -'No. "%)$3 of the Registr! of &eeds of Makati 'it! is hereb! declared valid onl! insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is concerned. 6s modified, the &ecision of the R-' shall read@
PREMISES CONSIDERED the real estate mortgage on the propert! covered b! -'- No. "%)$3 of the Registr! of &eeds of Makati 'it! and all proceedings thereon are NU## and VOID with respect to the undivided "2) portion of the disputed propert! owned b! Nicholson, but V$#ID with respect to the other undivided "2) portion belonging to Florencia. -he claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorne!:s fees are DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
4.
C*rer* Vs =s**+
(!)es", /ero /*r*&) "$&)%o' s* s*'es *&) (!)es" &* "o. Re*( &*r!& $&) $'' "e-" s* &e-" *!%'! (!& &**&
JUAN P .CABRERA vs .HENRY YSAAC G. R.No.166790NOVEMBER 19,2014
FACTS: Henr yYsaaci soneoft hecoowner sofapar ce lofl andcov er edbyOCT No.506 wi t h an ar eaof5, 517 squar emet er s.Hel ease d outapor t i on oft he proper t yt o se ve r all es se es i ncl udi ng Juan Cabr er a who l ease d a 95squar e met erport i on oft hel and.I n need ofmoney ,Henryoffer ed t osel lt he95 sq. met erl otbutJuan demur r edbecauset hel otwast oosmal lf orhi sneedssi nce t her ewasnoparki ngspacef orhi svehi cl e. To dealwi t h Juan’ sneed,He nr ye xpanded hi soffert oi ncl udet wo adj oi ni ng l andswhi ch wast hen l ease d by t wof ami l i esbutwarned t hatt hesal ecoul d onl ypr oceedi ft het wof ami l i eswoul dagr ee. The dealwas al mos tcl osed wi t ht he agr eed pr i c e ofP 250/sq. m butJuan st at edt hathecoul donl ypayt hef ul lpri ceaf t erhi sr et i r ement .Henryagre ed butde mandedf orani ni t i alpayme ntofP1,500. 00whi c hJuanpai d. I SSUE:Whet herornott her ewasaval i dcont r actofsal ebet weenpet i t i onerand respondent. RULI NG: Wefindt hatt her ewasnocont r actofsal e.I twasnul l a bi n i t i o . Asdefined byt heCi v i lCode ,“ [ a]cont r acti same e t i ngofmi ndsbe t ween t wo per sonswher ebyonebi ndshi msel f ,wi t hr espectt ot heot her ,t ogi vesomet hi ng ort or endersome ser vi ce. ” Fort her et o be a val i d cont r act ,t her e mustbe consentoft he cont r act i ng part i es,an obj ectcer t ai n whi ch i st he subj ect mat t e ro ft hec o nt r ac t ,andc aus eo ft heo bl i g at i o n whi c hi s e s t abl i s he d. 76
Sal ei s a speci al cont r act . The sel l er obl i gat es hi msel ft o del i ver a det ermi nat et hi ngandt ot r ansf eri t sowner shi pt ot hebuyer .I nt urn,t hebuyer pays f ora pri ce cert ai ni n money ori t s equi val ent . 77 A “ cont r actofsal ei s per f ec t edatt hemomentt her ei samee t i ngofmi ndsupon t het hi ngwhi ch i s t heobj ectoft hecont r actand upon t hepr i ce. ” 78 Thesel l erand buyermust ag r e east ot hec er t ai nt hi ngt hatwi l lbes ubj e c to ft hes al easwe l last hepr i c e i n whi ch t he t hi ng wi l lbe sol d.Thet hi ng t o be sol di st he obj ectoft he c ont r a ct w , hi l et hepr i cei st hec auseorc ons i der at i on. Theobj ec toft hesal e scont r actbe t we enpe t i t i one randr espondentwasa defini t eport i on ofa coowned parc elofl and.Att het i meoft heal l eged sal e be t ween pe t i t i oner and r e spondent ,t he ent i r e pr ope r t y was s t i l l he l di n common.Thi si sevi dencedbyt heori gi nalcer t i ficat eoft i t l e,whi chwasunder t henamesofMat i l deYsaac,Pr i sci l l a Ysaac,Wal t erYsaac,r espondentHenry Ys aac,El i z abe t h Ysaac,Nor maYs aac,Lui sYsaac,Jr . ,Ge or geYsaac,Fr ankl i n Ys aac,Mar i sonYs aac,Hel enYs aac,Er l i ndaYsaac,andMar i delYs aac. 85 Ther ul e sal l ow r espondentt osel lhi sundi vi dedi nt er es ti nt hecoowne r shi p. Howev er ,t hi swasnott heobj ectoft hesal ebet ween hi m and pet i t i oner .The obj ectoft hesal ewas a defini t eport i on.Eve ni fi twas r espondentwho was benefit i ngf r om t hef r ui t soft hel easecont r actt ope t i t i oner ,r e spondenthas“ no ri ghtt o sel loral i enat e a concr et e,speci fic ordet ermi nat e partoft het hi ng ownedi n common,becausehi sr i ghtove rt het hi ngi sr epre sent edbyquot aor i de alpo r t i o nwi t ho utanyphy s i c aladj udi c at i o n. ”
(FULL TEXT)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila (='
G.R. No. 16679!
Noeber 19 2!14
)U$N P. C$%RER$ Petitioner, vs.
'ENR> >S$$C Respondent. &='5(5
#EONEN J.: Dnless all the co+owners have agreed to partition their propert!, none of them ma! sell a definite portion of the land. -he co+owner ma! onl! sell his or her proportionate interest in the co+ownership. 6 contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio. 5n this petition for review on certiorari, uan P. 'abrera assails the 'ourt of 6ppealsI decision dated une "#, )**3 and resolution dated anuar! 3, ) **%. -hese decisions ruled that a specific performance to e9ecute a deed of sale over a parcel of land is not available as a relief for uan 'abrera. "
)
3
5t appears that the heirs of Guis and Matilde Jsaac co+owned a %,%"1+suare+meter parcel of land located in (abang, Naga 'it!, covered b!
enr! Jsaac leased out portions of the propert! to several lessees. uan 'abrera, one of the lessees, leased a #%+suare+meter portion of the land beginning in "#$. %
1
5n order to address uan 'abrera:s concerns, enr! Jsaac e9panded his offer to i nclude the two ad;oining lands that enr! Jsaac was then l easing to the Borbe famil! and the =spiritu famil!. -hose three parcels of land have a combined area of 03#+suare+meters. owever, enr! Jsaac warned uan 'abrera that the sale for those two parcels could onl! proceed if the two families agree to it. uan 'abrera accepted the new offer. enr! Jsaac and uan 'abrera settled on the price of P)%*.** per suare meter, but uan 'abrera stated that he could o nl! pa! in full after his retirement on une "%, "##). enr! Jsaac agreed but demanded for an initial pa!ment of P",%**.**, which uan 'abrera paid. $
#
6ccording to uan 'abrera, enr! Jsaac informed him that the Borbe famil! and the =spiritu famil! were no longer interested in purchasing the properties the! were leasing. (ince Mamerta =spiritu of the =spiritu famil! initiall! considered purchasing the propert! and had made an initial deposit for it, uan 'abrera agreed to reimbursethis earlier pa!ment.
""
(ometime in (eptember "##3, uan'abrera alleged that enr! Jsaac approached h im, reuesting to reduce the area of the land sub;ect of their transaction. Part of the 03#+suare+meter land was going to be made into a baranga! walkwa!, and another part was being occupied b! a famil! that was difficult to e;ect. uan 'abrera agreed to the proposal. -he la nd was surve!ed again. 6ccording to uan 'abrera, enr! Jsaac agreed to shoulder the costs of the resurve!, which uan 'abrera advanced in the amount of P3,***.**. "3
-he resurve! shows that the area now covered b! the transaction was 3)" suare meters. uan 'abrera intended to show the sketch plan and pa! the amount due for the pa!ment of the lot. owever, on that da!, enr! Jsaac was in Manila.
"%
"1
"$
"#
)*
&ue to uan 'abrera:s inabilit! to enforce the contract of sale between him and enr! Jsaac, he decided to file a civil case for specific performance on (eptember )*, "##%. uan 'abrera pra!ed for the e9ecution of a formal deed of sale and for the transfer of the title of the propert! in his name. e tendered the sum of P#,%*.** to the clerk of court as pa!ment of the remaining balance of the original sale price.
))
)3
)0
5n his answer with counterclaim, enr! Jsaac pra!ed for the dismissal of uan 'abrera:s complaint. e also pra!ed for compensation in the form of moral damages, attorne!:s fees, and incidental litigation e9penses. )%
)
)1
Before the Regional -rial 'ourt decided the case, the heirs of Guis and Matilde Jsaac, under the administration of Franklin Jsaac, sold their propert! to the local government ofNaga 'it! on Februar! "), "##1. -he propert! was turned into a pro;ectfor the urban poor of the cit!. &uring the trial, 'ora8on Borbe 'ombe of the Borbe famil! testified that contrar! to what uan 'abrera claimed, her famil! never agreed to sell the land the! were formerl! leasing from enr! Jsaac in favor of )$
)#
uan 'abrera. -he Borbe famil! bought the propert! from Naga'it!:s urban poor program after the salebetween the Jsaacs and the local government of Naga 'it!. 3*
3"
33
30
A6fter the said refusal of enr! Jsaac:s wife, plaintiff Auan 'abrera did not bother to write tothe defendant Aenr! Jsaac or to an! of the co+owners his intention to pa! for the land or he could have consigned the amount in court at the same time notif!ing Aenr! Jsaac of the consignation in accordance with 6rticle ")% of the 'ivil 'ode. Furthermore, in (eptember, "##3 Auan 'abrera was able to meet Aenr! Jsaac whenthe latter allegedl! talked to him about the reduction of the areahe was going to bu!. -here is no showing that Auan 'abrera again tendered his pa!ment to enr! Jsaac. 5nstead, he allegedl! made his offer after he had the land resurve!ed but defendant was then in Manila. -here is no evidence as to what date this offer was made. . . . . . A-he court does not see an! serious demand made for performance of the contract on the part of Auan 'abrera in "##) when he allegedl! promised to pa! the balance of the purchase price. Neither could he demand for the sale of the ad;oining lots because the occupants thereof did not manifest their consent thereto. 6t the most, he could have demanded the sale of the lot which he was occup!ing. 5f his pa!ment was refused in "##%, he cannot demand for damages b ecause the rescission of the contract was rela!ed to him in writing in =9hibit 404. 3%
-he Regional -rial 'ourt dismissed uan 'abrera:s complaint and enr! Jsaac:s counterclaim. uan 'abrera appealed the Region al -rial 'ourt:s decision. 3
31
-he 'ourt of 6ppeals agreed with the Regional -rial 'ourt that there was a perfected contract of sale between uan 'abrera and enr! Jsaac. 6ccording to the 'ourt of 6ppeals, even if the sub;ect of the sale is part of enr! Jsaac:s undivided propert!, a co+owner ma! sell a definite portion of the propert!. 3$
3#
-he 'ourt of 6ppeals also ruled that the contract of sale b etween uan 'abrera and enr! Jsaac was not validl! rescinded. For the rescission to be valid under 6rticle "%#) of the 'ivil 'ode, it should have been done through a ;udicial or notarial act and not merel! through a letter. 0*
0"
owever, due to the sale of the entire propert! of the Jsaac famil! in favor of the local government of Naga 'it!, the 'ourt of 6ppeals ruled that the verbal contract between uan 'abrera and enr! Jsaac cannot be sub;ect to the remed! of specific performance. -he local government of Naga 'it! was an innocent purchaser for value, and following the rules on double sales, it had a preferential right since the sale it entered into was in a public instrument, while the one with uan 'abrera was onl! made orall!. -he onl! recourse the 'ourt of 6ppeals could do is to order enr! Jsaac to return the initial pa!ment of the purchase price of P"*,**.** P",%**.** andP,"**.** as evidenced b! the receipts issued b! enr! Jsaac to uan 'abrera, a nd P3,***.** for the surve!ing e9penses/ as pa!ment of actual damages. -he 'ourt of 6ppeals likewise awarded attorne!:s fees and litigation costs. -o wit@ 0)
03
>=R=F
0%
0
5n the resolution dated anuar! 3,)**%, the 'o urt of 6ppeals denied enr! Jsaac:s motion for reconsideration.
0$
0#
%*
5n a letter addressed to the 'hief ustice, petitioner argued that it would be unfair to him if a clerical error would deprive his petition from being ;udged on the merits. Petitioner emphasi8ed that the registr! receipts show that he filed the petition on Februar! )0, )**%, not March )0, )**%, as noted b! this court in his pleading. -his court treated the letter as a second motion for reconsideration. 5n the resolution dated March 3", )**, this court found merit in petitioner:s letter. -he petition was reinstated, and respondent was ordered to file h is comment. Respondent filed his comment on (eptember "$, )**. -his court reuired petitioner to file a repl!, which petitioner complied with on anuar! "%, )**1. %"
%)
%3
%0
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-he issues raised b! petitioner and respondent are summari8ed as follows@ ". >hether this court could take cogni8ance of issues not raised b! petitioner but b! respondent in his comment to the petition for reviewC ). >hether there was a valid contractof sale between petitioner and respondentC 3. >hether the contract ofsale still subsistedC a. >hether the contract was terminated through rescissionC
b. >hether the contract was no lo nger enforceable due to the supervening sale of the propert! to the local government of Naga 'it!C 0. >hether petitioner is entitled to the e9ecution of a deed of sale in his favorC and %. >hether petitioner is entitled to actual damages, attorne!:s fees, and costs of litigation. -he petition should be denied. 5 -his court can resolve issues raised b ! both parties Petitioner stated that the errors inthis case are@ "/ 4the A'ourt of 6ppeals erred in holding that the relief of specific performance is not available to Apetitioner supposedl! because of the supervening sale of Athe propert! to the 'it! ?overnment of Naga4C and )/ 4conseuentl!, the A'ourt of 6ppeals erred in not ordering the e9ecution of the necessar! deed of sale in favor of Apetitioner.4 Petitioner argues that this court should limit its ad;udication to these two errors. %1
%$
%#
For petitioner, if respondent wanted to raise issues regarding the 'ourt of 6ppeals: decision, respondent should have interposed a separate ap peal. "
Petitioner:s position is erroneous. -his court can resolve issues and assignments of error argued b! petitioner and respondent. -his court 4is clothed with ample authorit! to review matters, even if the! are not assigned as errors in their appeal,if it finds that their consideration is necessar! to arriveat a ;ust decision of the case.4 >e can consider errors not raised b! the parties,more so if these errors were raised b! respondent. )
Respondent raised different issues compared with those raised b! petitioner. owever, the assignment of error of respondent was still responsive to the main argument of petitioner. Petitioner:s argument works on the premise that there was a valid contract. B! attacking the validit! of the contract, respondent was merel! responding to the premise of petitioner:s main argument. -he issue is relevant to the final disposition of this caseC hence, it should be considered b! this court in arriving at a decision. 55 -here was no valid contract of sale between petitioner and respondent Petitioner agrees with the decision of the 'ourt of 6ppeals that there was a perfected contract of sale between him and respondent. 3
Respondent, however, argues that there was no contract between him and petitioner because under 6rticle "01% of the 'ivil 'ode, there has to be a meeting of the minds as to the price and the ob;ect
of the contract. Respondent argues that there was no meeting o f the minds as to the final price and si8e of the propert! sub;ect of the sale. 0
%
5n addition, while respondent admits that he was willing to sell the propert! being leased from him b! the Borbe famil! and the =spiritu famil!, petitioner presented no evidence to show that these families agreed to the sale in favor of petitioner. &uring trial, 'ora8on Borbe 'ombe of the Borbe famil! testified that her famil! never agreed to allo w the sale of the propert! i n favor of petitioner . Respondent likewise alleged that Mamerta =spiritu of the =spiritu famil! eventuall! bought the propert! occupied b! her famil !, which is contrar! to the claim that pe titioner obtained the consent of Mamerta =spiritu to have the land sold in his favor. Petitioner replied that respondent sold ""3 suare meters of the 3)"+suare+meter propert! to the =spiritu famil! on anuar! "1, "##. Petitioner argued that Mamerta =spiritu was not a bu!er in good faith because in "##*, she voluntaril! agreed to surrender the lot for sale in favor of petitioner because she did not have the mone! to pa! for the lot. ence, the sale in favor of Mamerta =spiritu should not supersede the sale in favor of petitioner . 1
$
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-he Regional -rial 'ourt ruled that there was a valid contract of sale, although it found that there was no evidence to support petitioner: s claim that he was able to secure the consent of the =spiritu famil! and the Borbe famil! to the sale of the land. -here was a valid contract of sale sub;ect to a suspensive condition, but the suspensive condition was not complied with. 1"
For the 'ourt of 6ppeals, there was a valid contract of sale. -he 'ourt of 6ppeals: ruling was based on the idea that a co+owner could sell a definite portion of the land owned in common, and not because the suspensive conditions of the contract were complied with. 5n ruling this wa!, the 'ourt of 6ppeals relied on Pamplona v. Morato, which stated that@ 1)
13
. . . A6 4co+owner ma! validl! sell his undivided share of the propert! owned in common. 5f the part sold happens to be his allotted share after partition, the transaction is entirel! valid/. Now then if there has been no e9press partition as !et, but the co+owner who sells points out to his bu!ers the boundaries of the parthe was selling, and the other coowners make no ob ;ection, there is in effect alread! a partial partition, and the sale of the definite portioncan no longer be assailed.4 10
>e find that there was no contract of sale. 5t was null ab initio. 6s defined b! the 'ivil 'ode, 4Aa contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereb! one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.4 For there to be a valid contract, there must be consent of the contracting parties, an ob;ect certain which is the sub;ect matter of the contract, and cause of the oblig ation which is established. (ale is a special contract. -he seller obligates himself to deliver a determinate thing and to transfer its ownership to the bu!er. 5n turn, the bu!er pa!s for a price certain in mone! or its euivalent. 6 4contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the ob;ect of the contract and upon the price.4 -he seller and bu!er must agree as to the certain thing that will be sub;ect of the sale as well as the price in which the thing will be sold. -he thing to be sold is the ob;ect of the contract, while the price is the cause or consideration. 1%
1
11
1$
-he ob;ect of a valid sales contract must be owned b! the seller. 5f the seller is not the owner, the seller must be authori8ed b! the o wner to sell the ob;ect. 1#
(pecific rules attach when the seller co+ownsthe ob;ect o f the contract. (ale of a portion of the propert! is considered an alteration of the thing owned in common. Dnder the 'ivil 'ode, such disposition reuires the unanimous consent of the other co+owners. owever, the rules also allow a co+owner to alienate his or her part in the co+ownership. $*
$"
-hese two rules are reconciled through ;urisprudence. 5f the alienation precedes the partition, the co+owner cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co+owners. e or she could onl! sell the undivided interest of the co+owned propert!. 6s summari8ed in Gope8 v. 5lustre, 4Aif he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has a right to sell and conve! an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and conve! the whole of one part b! metes and bounds.4 $)
$3
$0
-he undivided interestof a co+owner is also referred to as the 4ideal or abstract uota4 or 4proportionate share.4 alter Jsaac, respondent enr! Jsaac, =li8abeth Jsaac, Norma Jsaac, Guis Jsaac, r., ?eorge Jsaac, Franklin Jsaac, Marison Jsaac, elen Jsaac, =rlinda Jsaac, and Maridel Jsaac.
%$-he rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interestin the coownership. owever, this was not the ob;ect of the sale between him and petitioner. -he ob;ect of the sale was a definite portion. =ven if it was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has 4no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over the thing is represented b! uota or ideal portion without an! ph!sical ad;udication.4 $
-here was no showing that respondent was authori8ed b! his coowners to sell the portion of land occupied b! uan 'abrera, the =spiritu famil!, or the Borbe famil!. >ithout the consent of his co+ owners, respondent could not sell a definite portion of the co+owned propert!. Respondent had no right to define a #%+suare+meter parcel of land, a 03#+suare+meter parcel of land, or a 3)"+suare+meter parcel of lan d for purposes of selling to petitioner. -he determination of those metes and bounds are not binding to the co+ownership and, hence, cannot be sub;ect to sale, unless consented to b! all the co+owners. 5n finding that there was a valid contract of sale between petitioner and respondent, the 'ourt of 6ppeals erred in the application of Pamplona v. Moreto. -he ruling in Pamplona should be read and applied onl! in situations similar to the conte9t of that case. $1
Pamplona involved the (pouses Moreto who owned three 3/ parcels of land with a total area of ),30 suare meters. -he spouses had si9 / children. 6fter the wife had died, the husband sold one of the parcels to the Pamplona famil!, even if the con;ugal partnership had not !et been liuidated. -he parcel sold measured 1$" su are meters, which was less than the ideal share of the husband in the estate. -his court allowed the sale to prosper because of the tolerance from the husband:s co+heirs. -his court ruled@ -he title ma! be pro+indiviso or inchoate but the moment the coowner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without ob;ection, protest or complaint b!the other co+owners, on the contrar! the! acuiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, >e rule that a factual partition or termination of the co+ ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not onl! the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, butalso his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees petitioners an! right or title in derogation of the deed of sale e9ecuted b! said vendor Flaviano Moreto. =mphasis supplied/ $$
5n Pamplona, the co+heirs of Flaviano Moreto o nl! uestioned the sale to the Pamplona famil! nine #/ !ears after the sale. B! then, the Pamplona famil! had e9ercised several acts of ownership over the land. -hat is wh! this court considered it acuiescence or tolerance on the part of the co+heirs when the! allowed the Pamplonas to take possession and build upon the land sold, and onl! uestioned these acts several !ears later. -he ruling in Pamplonadoes not appl! to petitioner. -here was no evidence adduced during the trial that respondent:s co+owners acuiesced or tolerated the sale to petitioner. -he co+owners tolerated petitioner:s possession of a portion of their land because petitioner was a lessee over a #%+suare+ meter portion of the propert!, not the bu!er of the 3)"+suaremeter portion. -here was also no evidence of consent to sell from the co+owners. >hen petitioner approached respondent in "##% to enforce the contract of sale, respondent referred him to Franklin Jsaac, the administrator over the entire propert!. Respondent:s act suggests the absence of consent from the co+owners. Petitioner did not show that he sought Franklin Jsaac:s consent as administrator and the consent of the other co+owners. >ithout the consent of the co+owners, no partial partition operated in favor of the sale to petitioner. 6t best, the agreement between petitioner and respondent is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. 6 contract to sell is a promise to sell an ob;ect, sub;ect to suspensive conditions. >ithout the fulfillment of these suspensive conditions, the sale does not operate to determine the obligation of the seller to deliver the o b;ect. $#
6 co+owner could enter into a contract to sell a definite portion of the propert!. owever, such contract is still sub;ect to the suspensive condition of the partition of the propert!, and that the other co+owners agree that the part sub;ect of the contract to sell vests in favor of the co+owner :s bu!er. ence, the co+owners: consent is an important factor for the sale to ripen. A non-e&istent contract cannot !e a source of o!ligations, and it cannot !e enforced !' the courts (ince petitioner believes that there was a perfected contract of sale between him and respondent, he argues that a deed of sale should be formall! e9ecuted. Petitioner agrees with the 'ourt of 6ppeals: finding that there was no valid rescission of the contract in accordance with 6rticle "%#) of the 'ivil 'ode. owever, petitioner disagrees with the 'ourt of 6ppeals when it ruled that the #*
contract was no longer enforceable due to the supervening sale with the local government of Naga 'it!. Petitioner argues that the sale in favor of the local government of Naga 'it! was not made in good faith. Before the sale was finali8ed between the local government and the heirs of Guis and Matilde Jsaac, petitioner had a notice of lis pendens annotated to <'- No. %*. 5t was presumed that the local government had due notice of petitioner:s adverse claim, thus, it cannot be considered an innocent purchaser. #"
For respondent, due to the ine9istence of a valid contract of sale, petitioner cannot demand specific performance from respondent. Respondent disagrees with the 'ourt of 6ppeals when it stated that 6rticle "%#) of the rescission of contract of sale applies. -here is no need to appl! 6rticle "%#) because there was no contract to begin with. -he contract between respondent and petitioner was terminated b! virtue of the letter dated (eptember )", "##0. #)
#3
#0
>e rule in favor of respondent. -he absence of a contract of sale means that there is no source of obligations for respondent, as seller, orpetitioner, as bu!er. Rescission is impossible because there is no contract to rescind. -he rule in 6rticle "%#) that reuires a ;udicial or notarial act to formali8e rescission of a contract of sale of an immovable propert! does not appl !. -his court does not need to rule whether a letter is a valid method of rescinding a sales contract over an immovable propert! because the uestion is moot and academic. =ven if we assume that respondent had f ull ownership of the propert! and that he agreed to sell a portion of the propert! to petitioner, the letter was enough to cancel the contract to sell. ?enerall!, 4Athe power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not compl! with what is incumbent on him.4 #%
For the sale of immovable propert!, the following provision governs its rescission@ 6rticle "%#). 5n the sale of immovable propert!, even though it ma! have been stipulated that upon failure to pa! the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee ma! pa!, even after the e9piration of the period, as long as no demand for rescissionof the contract has been made upon h im either ;udiciall! or b! notarial act. 6fter the demand, the court ma! not grant him a new term. -his provision contemplates "/ a contract of sale of an immovable propert! and )/ a stipulation in the contract that failure to pa! the price at the time agreed upon will cause the rescission of the contract. -he vendee or the bu!er can still pa! even after the time agreed u pon, if the agreement between the parties has these reuisites. -his right of the vendee to pa! ceases when the vendor or the seller demands the rescission of the contract ;udiciall! or e9tra ;udiciall!. 5n case of an e9tra ;udicial demand to rescind the contract, it should be notari8ed. ence, this provision does not appl! if it is not a contract of sale of an immovable propert! and merel! a contract to sellan immovable propert!. 6 contract to sell is 4where the ownership or title is retained b! the seller and is not to pass until the full pa!ment of the price, such pa!ment being a positive suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simpl! an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to conve! title from acuiring binding force.4 #
5n a similar case entitled Manuel v. Rodrigue8, =usebio Manuel offered to bu! the land owned b! Pa!atas (ubdivision, 5nc. -he (ecretar! -reasurer of Pa!atas (ubdivision, =ulogio Rodrigue8, (r., agreed to sell the land to =usebio Manuel after negotiations. (imilar to this case, the agreement was onl! made orall! and not in writing. 6n initial pa!ment was made, and a final pa!ment was to be #1
madenine #/ to ten "*/ months later. Manuel never paid for the latter installmentC hence, =ulogio Rodrigue8 cancelled their agreement and sold the land to someone else. 5n Manuel, this court categoricall! stated that 6rticle "%#) 4does not appl! to a contract to sell or promise to sell, where title remains with the vendor until fulfillment to a positive suspensive condition, such as full pa!ment of the price.4 -his court upheld that the contract to sell was validl! cancelled through the non+pa!ment of =usebio Manuel. -he same conclusion applies in this case. #$
-he law does not prescribe a form to rescind a contract to sell immovable propert!. 5n Manuel, the non+pa!ment operated to cancel the contract. 5f mere non+pa!ment is enough to cancel a contract to sell, the letter given to petitioner: s law!er is also an acceptable form of rescinding the contract. -he law does not reuire notari8ation for a letter to rescind a contract to sell immovable propert!. Notari8ation is onl! reuired if a contract of sale is being rescinded. Petitioner argued that he was willing to compl! with the suspensive condition on the contract to sell because he was read! to pa! the balance of the purchase price on une "%, "##). owever, his argument is unmeritorious. 6s ruled b! the Regional -rial 'ourt, petitioner should have resorted to the various modes of consignment when respondent:s wife refused to accept the pa!ment on respondent:s behalf. ##
"**
-herefore, even if we assumed that the contract between petitioner and respondents were perfected, the strict reuisites in 6rticle "%#) did not appl! because the onl! perfected contract was a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. -he courts cannot enforce the right of petitioner to bu! respondent:s propert!. >e cannot order the e9ecution of a deed of sale between petitioner and respondent. -he uestion of double sale also becomes moot and academic. -here was no valid sale between petitioner and respondent, while there was a valid sale between the local government of Naga 'it! and respondent and his coowners. (ince there is onl! one valid sale, the ruleon double sales under 6rticle "%00 of the 'ivil 'ode does not appl!. "*"
Compensator' damages, attorne'(s fees, and costs of litigation Respondent argued that petitioner is not entitled to the compensator! damages that the 'ourt of 6ppeals awarded. 6ccording to respondent, petitioner continues to occup! the #%+suare+meter propert! that he has been leasing since "#$ because the parcel was not included in the sale to the local government of Naga 'it!. (ince 6pril 3*, "##*, petitioner has not been p a!ing rent to respondent despite his continued occupation of the propert!. -herefore, there was no un;ust enrichment on the part of respondent when he applied petitioner:s initial pa!ment over the sale of the propert! as pa!ment for rent. "*)
"*3
Respondent argued further that the award of attorne!:s fees and litig ation e9penses in favor of petitioner was also erroneous because prior to this litigation, respondent alread! informed petitioner that his claim has no basis in law and fact. Jet, petitioner persisted on filing this case. "*0
"*%
>e rule that petitioner is entitled to the return of the amount of mone! because he paid it as consideration for ownership of the land. (ince the ownership of the land could not be transferred to him, the mone! he paid for that purpose must be returned to him. < therwise, respondent will be un;ustl! enriched.
Respondent:s claim for rent in arrears is a separate cause of action from this case. For petitioner:s earnestmone! pa!ment to be considered pa!ment for his rent liabilities, the rules of compensation under 6rticle ")1# of the 'ivil 'ode must be followed. )*wphi)
"*
5t was not proven during trial if petitionerIs rental liabilit! to respondent is due, or if it is alread! liuidated and demandable. ence, this court is limited to uphold the ruling of the 'ourt of 6ppeals, but such pa!ment could be sub;ect to the rule on compensation. owever, petitioner is not entitled to attorne!Is fees and the costs of litigation. -he 'ourt of 6ppeals awarded attorne!Is fees to petitioner 4;ust to protect his right Abecause petitioner reached this court to seek ;ustice for himself.4 "*1
'ontrar! to the 'ourt of 6ppealsI ruling, we find that petitioner did not have a clear right over the propert! in uestion. -he 'ourt of 6ppeals awarded attorne!Is fees and litigation costs on the premise that the contract between petitioner and respondent was perfected. >ithout a valid contract that stipulates his rights, petitioner risked litigation in order to determine if he has rights, and not to protect rights that he currentl! has. ence, the award of attorne!Is fees and litigation costs was not properl! ;ustified. >=R=F
M.
;ui68 5s A2a4 4e Belt%an
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila
T'IRD DIVISION G.R. No. 16!9?6
February 13 2!!"
)O$@UIN @UIMPO SR. ub//u/e by 'er o )oa;u0 @uo Sr. petitioners, vs.
CONSUE#O $%$D VD$. DE %E#TR$N IRENEO $%$D D$NI#O $%$D M$RITES $%$D $NIT$ $ND 'E#EN $%$D respondents. RESO#UTION N$C'UR$ J .* -his Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the ul! )), )**3 &ecision " of the 'ourt of 6ppeals in '6+?.R. 'E No. %"$1, and the
owever, no document of partition was e9ecuted, because oauin refused to e9ecute a deed. 'onsuelo and 5reneo occupied their respective shares in the (an ose propert!, and installed several tenants over their share in parcel 5E. oauin, on the other hand, became the administrator of the remaining undivided properties and of the shares of respondents &anilo, Marites, 6nita and elen, who were still minors at that time. 5n "#$#, &anilo, Marites, 6nita and elen wanted to take possession of the portions allotted to them, but oauin prevented them from occup!ing the same. oauin also refused to heed respondents: demand for partition of parcels 5 and 55, prompting respondents to file a complaint for ; udicial partition and2or recover! of possession with accounting and damages with the Regional -rial 'ourt R-'/ of 'amarines (ur .3 oauin denied the material allegations i n the complaint, and averred, as his special and affirmative defenses, lack of cause of action and prescription. e asserted absolute ownership over parcels 555 and 5E, claiming that he purchased these lands from =ustauia in "#0, evidenced b! deeds of sale e9ecuted on 6ugust )3, "#0 and &ecember ), "#0. e, likewise, claimed continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of these lots since "#0, and alleged that 'onsuelo:s occupation of the portion of the (an ose propert! was b! mere tolerance. 0 &uring the pendenc! of the case, oauin died. 6ccordingl!, he was substituted b! his wife, =stela -ena+7uimpo and his children, namel!, ose, 6delia, oauin, 6nita, 6ngelita, 6melia, 6rlene, o! and 6leli, all surnamed 7uimpo the 7uimpos/. =R=F
paragraph 1 of the complaint, and therefore, entitled to its possession and ordering the said substituted defendants to deliver that portion to them as their share theretoC 3. N=R(5P 6J N=R(5P =5(-( 6MN=R N=R(5P ell+entrenched is the rule that the (upreme 'ourt:s role in a petition under Rule 0% is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedl! committed b! the appellate
court. Factual findings of the trial court, especiall! when affirmed b! the 'ourt of 6ppeals, are conclusive on the parties. (ince such findings are generall! not reviewable, this 'ourt is not dut!+ bound to anal!8e and weigh all over again the evidence alread! considered in the proceedings below, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support from the evidence on record or the assailed ;udgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. $ Petitioners fail to convince us that the '6 committed reversible error in affirming the trial court an d in giving no weight to the pieces of evidence the! presented. -he stated consideration for the sale are P%,***.** and P,***.**, respectivel!, an amount which was so difficult to raise in the !ear "#0. Respondents established that at the time of the purported sale oauin 7uimpo was not gainfull! emplo!ed. e was stud!ing in Manila and =ustauia was the one supporting himC that when =ustauia died two )/ !ears later, oauin was not able to continue his studies. -he 7uimpos failed to override this. =9cept for the incredible and unpersuasive testimon! of oauin:s daughter, 6delia Magsino, no other testimonial or documentar! evidence was offered to prove that oauin was dul! emplo!ed and had the financial capacit! to bu! the sub;ect properties in "#0. 5n Rongavilla v. Court of Appeals,# reiterated in Cru+ v. ancom Finance Corp,"* we held that a deed of sale, in which the stated consideration has not been, in fact, paid is a false contractC that it is void a! initio. Furthermore,ceo v. Flores,"" ruled that a contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no effect whatsoever where it appears that the same is without cause or consideration which should have been the motive thereof, or the purchase price which appears thereon as paid but which in fact has never been paid b! the purchaser to the vendor. Gikewise, both the trial court and the '6 found that =ustauia was #" !ears old, weak and senile, at the time the deeds of sale were e9ecuted. 5n other words, she was alread! mentall ! incapacitated b! then, and could no longer be e9pected to give her consent to the sale. -he R-' and '6 cannot, therefore, be faulted for not giving credence to the deeds of sale in favor of oauin. Petitioners also presented -a9 &eclaration Nos. 3%*, ") 31*$,"3 and 3%#"0 to substantiate oauin:s claim of absolute dominion over parcels 555 and 5E. But we note that these ta9 declarations are all in the name of =ustauia Perfecto+6bad. -hese documents, therefore, do not support their claim of absolute dominion since "#0, but enervate it instead. Besides, the fact that the disputed propert! ma! have been declared for ta9ation purposes in the name of oauin 7uimpo does not necessaril! prove ownership for it is well settled that a ta9 declaration or ta9 receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership."% -he '6, therefore, correctl! found this proof inadeuate to establish oauin:s claim of absolute dominion. For fort!+three 03/ !ears, 'onsuelo and 5reneo occupied their portions of the (an ose propert! and significantl!, oauin never disturbed their possession. -he! also installed tenants in parcel 5E, and oauin did not prevent them from doing so, nor did he assert his ownership over the same. -hese unerringl! point to the fact that there was indeed an oral partition of parcels 555 and 5E. 5n Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot ," we held, vi+.@ APartition ma! be inferred from circumstances sufficientl! strong to support the presumption. -hus, after a long possession in severalt!, a deed of partition ma! be presumed. 5t has been held that recitals in deeds, possession a nd occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of !ears, and acuiescence for * !ears, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either b! deed or b! proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded.
Furthermore, in /ernande+ v. Andal ,"1 we e9plained that@ ilfredo and 'onsuelo, all surnamed 6badC that oauin 6bad has onl! one "/ child, a daug hter b! the name of 6mparoC that >ilfredo has four 0/ children, namel!, &anilo, elen, Marites and 6nitaC 6mparo has one child, son oauin 7uimpo, 9 9 9 "$
'onsuelo was the grandchild of =ustauia, while respondents &anilo, elen, Marites, 6nita and also oauin 7uimpo were =ustauia:s great grandchildren. 6s such, respondents can rightfull! ask for the confirmation of the oral partition over p arcels 555 and 5E, and the partition of parcels 5 and 55. urisprudence is replete with rulings that an ! co+owner ma! demand at an! time the partition of the common propert! unless a co+owner has repudiated the co+ownership. -his action for partition does not prescribe and is not sub;ect to laches. "# Finall!, petitioners challenge the attorne!:s fees in favor of respondents. -he grant of attorne!:s fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court. 5t ma! be awarded when a part! is compelled to litigate or to incur e9penses to protect its interest b! reason of an un;ustified act b! the other, )* as in this case. 5n fine, we find no reversible error in the assailed rulings of the 'ourt of 6ppeals.
='EREFORE the petition is DENIED. -he &ecision and Resolution of the 'ourt of 6ppeals in '6+ ?.R. 'E No. %"$1, are $FFIRMED . SO ORDERED.
.
6D(-R56 E( G5'6D'<
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila (='
G.R. No. 17!!"!
$r- 4 2!!7
CONSO#$CION @. $USTRI$ Petitioner, vs.
CONST$NCI$ @. #IC'$UCO CONSUE#O @. )$#$NDONI )OSE $#%ERTO #. @UINTOS RIC$RDO M. @UINTOS )R. $I#EEN M. @UINTOS a0 T>RONE M. @UINTOS Respondents. &='5(5
TING$ J.: Petitioner 'onsolacion 7. 6ustria assails the &ecision" of the 'ourt of 6ppeals in '.6. ?.R. 'E No. $%#" dated une )", )**% and its Resolution ) dated
plaintiffs+appellees filed a complaint with the Regional -rial 'ourt of Makati 'it!, Branch "0), which was docketed as Civil Case 0o. 12-)345, against the defendant+appellant 6ustria and two other defendants namel! Benedicto 7uintos and 6ntonio 7uintos as unwilling co+plaintiffs/ for partition of the sub;ect propert!. >ithin the period for filing an answer, the defendant+appellant 6ustria filed an mni!us Motion to Dismiss. 5n its order dated November "*, "##1, the lower court denied the omnibus motion to dismiss of the defendant+appellant 6ustria, and directed the defendants to file their answer within the remaining period provided b! the Rules. >ithin the prescriptive period, the defendant+appellant 6ustria filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November "*, "##1 order, which the lower court denied i n an order dated Februar! ), "##$. Not satisfied, the defendant+appellant 6ustria filed before the 'ourt of 6ppeals a 6etition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule % of the Revised Rules of 'ourt which was docketed as CA-7R $6 0o. 38192, seeking to annul the orders of November "*, "##1 and Februar! ), "##$. 5n a Resolution dated ul! #, "##$, the 'ourt of 6ppeals reuired the plaintiffs+appellees to comment, and temporaril! restrained the respondent ;udge, his agents, representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf from proceeding with Civil Case 0o. 12-)345 in order that the petition ma! not become moot and academic.
main case is pending, a motion dated 6pril , "##$ pra!ing that a declaration of default be issued against all defendants and for plaintiffs to be allowed to present evidence e9+parte. 5n an order dated ul! "3, "##$, the Presiding udge of the Regional -rial 'ourt of Makati 'it! held in abe!ance the proceedings before it while awaiting the resolution of the motion for reconsideration pending before the 'ourt of 6ppeals. Notwithstanding the order holding in abe!ance the proceedings in the lower court, plaintiffs+ appellees filed a Manifestation and Motion dated (eptember "0, "##$ pra!ing for the resolution of their Motion dated 6pril , "##$. 5n its order dated (eptember )%, "##$, the lower court deemed the incident submitted for resolution. >hile the motion for reconsideration filed b! the appellant is still pending before the 'ourt of 6ppeals, the lower court in its order dated ul! , "### declared the defendants in default, set the reception of e&-parte evidence, and commissioned the Branch 'lerk of 'ourt to receive the e& parte evidence and to submit her corresponding report thereon as soon as the same is concluded.
hile we are not dissuading parties from availing of the ;udicial remedies outlined in the Rules of 'ourt, the! should be cautioned
to be ;udicious in availing of these remedies. 6fter all, rules of procedure are intended to be, not tools of dela!, but of prompt and ;ust disposition of ever! part!:s cause. aving full! availed of, even e9ploited, these remedies, petitioner cannot feign denial of her da! in court. (he has been given ever! opportunit! to full! ventilate her side. Now, we turn to the second issue raised b! petitioner, i.e., the validit! of the trial court:s decision alternativel! directing the partition of the sub;ect properties or authori8ing their sale to a third part!. -here are two stages in ever! action for partition. -he first phase is the d etermination of whether a co+ownership in fact e9ists and a partition is proper, i.e., not otherwise legall! proscribed, and ma! be made b! voluntar! agreement of all the parties interested in the propert!. -his phase ma! end either@ a/ with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co+ ownership does not e9ist, or partition is legall! prohibitedC or b/ with a determination that a co+ ownership does in truth e9ist, partition is pr oper in the premises, and an accounting of rents and profits received b! the defendant from the real estate in uestion is in order. 5n the latter case, the parties ma!, if the! are able to agree, make partition among themselves b! proper instruments of conve!ance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. ") -he second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed b! the court. 5n that event, partition shall be done for the parties b! the court with the assistance of not more than three 3/ commissioners. -his second stage ma! well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval b! the court after the parties have been accorded opportunit! to be heard thereon, and an award for the recover! b! the part! or parties thereto entitled of their ;ust share in the rents and profits of the real estate in uestion. "3 -he proceedings in this case h ave onl! reached the first phase. 5t must be mentioned as an aside that even if the order decreeing partition leaves something more to be done b! the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, i.e., the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for the determination of ;ust compensation b! the appointed commissioners, the submission of their reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of the partition, it is considered a final order and ma! be appealed b! the part! aggrieved thereb!."0 -here is no uestion that a co+ownership e9ists between petitioner and respondents. -o this e9tent, the trial court was correct in decreeing partition in line with the 'ivil 'ode provision that no co+owner shall be obliged to remain in the co+ownership."% owever, the trial court went astra! when it also authori8ed the sale of the sub;ect properties to a third part! and the division of the proceeds thereof. >hat makes this portion of the decision all the more ob;ectionable is the fact that the trial court conditioned the sale upon the price and terms acceptable to plaintiffs respondents herein/ onl!, and ad;udicated the proceeds of the sale again onl! to plaintiffs. -he pertinent portion of the trial court:s disposition states@ >=R=F
)/ 6uthori8ing the sale, conve!ance or transfer of the above+described properties to a third+ part! a/ u,+ r,e a0 u0er u,+ /er a,,e/ab-e /o -a0/ a0 /+erea/er
08 /+e ro,ee o a a-e ao08 /+e 0 a,,ora0,e 5/+ /+er roor/o0a/e 0/ere/." A=mphasis supplied. 5t is true that petitioner did not assign this error on appeal resulting in the appellate court:s failure to rule on the matter. Nonetheless, we cannot simpl! brush this issue aside considering that its resolution is necessar! in arriving at a ;ust disposition of the case. "1 -he rectification of the trial court:s decision is accordingl! in order. >=R=F
7. V$#EROSO VS V$#EROSO G.R. No. 163!"1
)u0e 1? 2!!7
$NIT$ UNG$%
$M$NCI$ UNG$%hen the case was called for trial, the parties submitted a written compromise agreement. =R=F
segregated and plaintiffs cannot as !et en;o! the produce, and income thereof, until the suatters will be e;ectedC and all e9penses of the e;ectment suits against the suatters will b e borne b! Margarito Dngab and his wife, sub;ect to the reimbursement with receipts upon the final e; ectment of the suatters b! all nine sets of heirs aforementionedC / the portion pertaining to (imona Dngab is acknowledged to have been sold under Pacto de Retro for the sum of P3,***.** more or less the Pacto de Retro (ale consideration controls/ unto Margarito Dngab and wife which should be paid likewise b! the nine sets of heirs both plaintiffs and defendantsC $/ all other pra !ers and remedies invoked in the complaint and counter+complaint are hereb! denied, and #/ no costs is ad;udged in this proceeding. (< =R=F
(<
='EREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated &ecember )*, "###, of the Regional -rial 'ourt of 5ligan 'it!, -welfth udicial Region, Branch 3, in 'ivil 'ase No. 0*0$ is hereb! $FFIRMED with MODIFIC$TION as to attorne!:s fees, the award thereof is de leted. 'osts against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.# Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated March ), )**0. Petitioners now come before us raising the foll owing issues@ 5. >=-=R =-=R e rule in the negative. Petitioners point that the propert! was registered in the name of -imoteo. -he! assert that b! the law of intestate succession, 6nita, being the sole heir of -imoteo, is the sole owner of the land. Petitioners maintain that respondents could not base their claim on -imoteo:s affidavit dated March "3, "#3# because this referred to a different parcel of land. 'onsidering that the description of the propert! in the <'- and in -imoteo:s affidavit differed, petitioners maintain that respondents bear the burden of proving that these lots in the affidavit are the same as those under <'- No. P+0"/+",%%*. owever, according to petitioners, respondents failed to discharge this burden. Respondents counter that the case is not about succession. -he! are not claiming as heirs of -imoteo, but as his co+owners. -he! assert that where one does not have an! rightful claim over real propert!, the -orrens s!stem of registration can confirm or record nothing. -he! claim that the land was alread! governed b! a state of co+ownership even before the title was issued. 6ccording to respondents, this fact is shown b! the 6ffidavit of 6cknowledgment signed b! 6nita herself.
6t the outset, we agree that the instant case does not involve successional rights as correctl! pointed out b! respondents, who are claiming an alleged right of co+ownership e9isting prior to the issuance of the land title in the name of -imoteo. -he threshold issue is whether respondents are trul! co+owners of the land. -he records lack evidence sufficientl! showing that the land covered b! omestead 6pplication No. )"$%% referred to in the 6ffidavit of -imoteo is the same land covered b! <'- No. P+0"/+",%%* which originated from omestead Patent No. E+0111. -he records do not show whether omestead 6pplication No. )"$%% was the one granted in omestead Patent No. E+0111. -he court cannot ;ust fill in the deficienc! in the evidence submitted b! the concerned parties. >e note, however, that even without the 6ffidavit of -imoteo, there is still evidence on record proving that the respondents and -imoteo indeed own the land in common. For one, there is the 6ffidavit of 6cknowledgment dated 6ugust 0, "#*. Petitioners contend that respondents cannot use the 6ffidavit of 6cknowledgment signed b! 6nita and her mother as 6nita was misled in signing it. 6 uestion involving the due e9ecution of the 6ffidavit of 6cknowledgment would reuire an inuir! into the appreciation of evidence b! the trial court, a matter which this 'ourt cannot do i n a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 0%. "" -he truth or falsehood of the 6ffidavit of 6cknowledgment is a uestion of fact, of which this 'ourt cannot take cogni8ance.") Moreover, the 6ffidavit of 6cknowledgment, being a notari8ed document, en;o!s the presumption of regularit!."3 Petitioners: mere allegation that 6nita was misled b! her mother into signing the affidavit could not overcome this presumption. Petitioners claim that b! respondents: failure to e9ecute the ;udgment within the ten+!ear prescription period, the ;udgment had prescribed. 5t could not be used to conve! an! right. -his claim, in our view, is unmeritorious. >hen the parties started sharing the proceeds of the land, the! had in effect partiall! e9ecuted the compromise agreement and the ;udgment in 'ivil 'ase No. 55+10. (uch partial e9ecution weighs heavil! as evidence that the! agreed on the co+ownership arrangement. Note also that the ;udgment did not e9plicitl! order the partition of the land itself, but merel! identified the rights to and respective shares of the parties in said land. Petitioners argue that the co+ownership was alread! e9tinguished b ecause the 'ivil 'ode provides that an agreement to keep a thin g undivided shall not e9ceed ten !ears. 5ndeed, the law limits the term of a co+ownership to ten !ears, but this term limit ma! nevertheless be e9tended. "0 -he action to reconve! does not prescribe so long as the propert! stands in the name of the trustee. -o allow prescription would be tantamount to allowing a trustee to acuire title against his principal and true owner."% Moreover, as properl! held b! the trial and appellate courts, the e9ecution of the 6ffidavit of 6cknowledgment and the compromise agreement established an e9press trust wherein the respondents, as trustors, reposed their confidence on petitioner 6nita and her mother, as trustees, that the! will hold the land sub;ect of the co+ownership. -here are no particular words reuired in the creation of an e9press trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearl! intended. " -his e9press trust is shown in the two documents. =9press trusts do not prescribe e 9cept when the trustee repudiates the trust."1 Petitioners contend that an affidavit of acknowledgment is not one of the modes of acuiring ownership recogni8ed under the 'ivil 'ode. -he! cite Acap v. Court of Appeals,"$ where we held that
a stranger to succession cannot conclusivel! claim ownership over a lot on the sole basis of a waiver document which does not cite the elements of an! of the derivative modes of acuiring ownership. But we find that the ruling in Acap is not applicable to this case. 5n Acap, the claim of a right over the propert! was based on a 4declaration of heirship and waiver of rights,4 and a notice of adverse claim. -herein we held that the 4declaration of heirship and waiver of rights4 relates to an abdication of a right in favor of other persons who are co+heirs in the succession. 6 stranger to a succession cannot conclusivel! claim ownership over the propert! on the sole basis thereof. >e also held that a notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of claim adverse to the registered owner, the validit! of which is !et to be established in court. ence, the 4declaration of heirship and waiver of rights4 and a notice of adverse claim did not sufficientl! show how a stranger to the succession acuired ownership of the propert!. 5n the present case, the 6ffidavit of 6cknowledgment and the compromise agreement were presented not to show how respondents acuired their rights over the propert! but as proof that their rights therein e9ist.
='EREFORE, the petition is &=N5=& for lack of merit. -he &ecision dated (eptember "#, )**3 and the Resolution dated March ), )**0 of the 'ourt of 6ppeals in '6+?.R. 'E No. $$#% are $FFIRMED . 'osts against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
". R$MIREB VS R$MIREB G.R. No. #<22621
Se/eber 29 1967
)OSE M$RI$ R$MIREB plaintiff+appellee, vs.
)OSE EUGENIO R$MIREB RIT$ D. R$MIREB %E#EN T. R$MIREB D$VID M$RGO#IES M$NUE# U> a0 SONS INC. %$N& OF T'E P'I#IPPINE IS#$NDS 0 / ,aa,/y a :u,aa0/ra/or o /+e Te/a/e E/a/e o /+e -a/e )oe Ve0,o Rare defendants+appellants, $NGE#$ M. %UTTE defendant+appellee. $'cip, $ala+ar, una and Associates for plaintiff-appellee. Ramire+ and rtigas for defendants-appellants.
CONCEPCION C.J.: 6ppeal b! the defendants from a decision of the 'ourt of First 5nstance of Manila. Plaintiff, ose Maria Ramire8, brought this action " against defendants ose =ugenio Ramire8, Rita &. Ramire8, Belen -. Ramire8, &avid Margolies, Manuel D! (ons, 5nc., the =state of the late ose Eivencio Ramire8 represented b! its ;udicial administrator, the Bank of the Philippine 5slands, and 6ngela M. Butte Q hereinafter referred to collectivel! as defendants Q for the partition of a parcel of land situated at the Northwestern corner of =scolta street and Pla8a (ta. 'ru8, Manila Q otherwise known as Got " of Block )")* of the 'adastral (urve! of Manila and more particularl! described in -ransfer 'ertificate of -itle No. %3#0 of the Register of &eeds for said 'it! Q and belonging pro indiviso to both parties, one+si9th "2/ to the plaintiff and five+si9ths %2/ to the defendants. Manuel D! (ons e9pressed its conformit! to the partition, 4if the same can be done without great pre;udice to the interests of the parties.4 &efendant Butte agreed to the partition pra!ed for. -he other defendants ob;ected to the ph!sical partition of the propert! in uestion, upon the theor! that said partition is 4materiall! and legall!4 impossible and 4would work great harm and pre;udice to the co+owners.4 B! agreement of the parties the lower 'ourt referred the matter to a 'ommission composed of@ "/ &elfin ?awaran, &eput! 'lerk of said court, as 'hairman, )/ 6rtemio D. Ealencia, President of the Manila Board of Realtors, as commissioner for plaintiff, and 3/ Ramon F. 'uervo, President of the Perpetual 5nvestment 'orporation, 5nc., as commissioner for defendants, to determine whether the propert! is susceptible of p artition, and submit a plan therefor, if feasible, as well as to report thereon. (ubseuentl!, the commissioners submitted their individual reports with their respective plans for the segregation of plaintiffIs share.
6fter due hearing, the 'ourt rendered a decision declaring that plaintiff is entitled to the segregation of his share, and directing that the propert! be partitioned in accordance with the plan submitted b! commissioner Ealencia, and that the e9penses incident thereto be paid b! both parties proportionatel!. ence, this appeal b!, the defendants, e9cept Mrs. Butte. 6ppellants maintain that the lower court has erred@ "/ in holding that said propert! is leg all! susceptible of ph!sical divisionC )/ in accepting the recommendation of commissioner Ealencia, instead of that of commissioner 'uervo, or a proposal made b! the ver! plaintiffC and 3/ in not ordering that the incidental e9penses be borne e9clusivel! b! him. >e find no merit in the appeal. >ith respect to the first alleged error, it is urged that a ph!sical division of the propert! will cause 4inestimable damage4 to the interest of the co+owners. No evidence, however, has been introduced, or sought to be introduced, in support of this allegation. Moreover, the same is predicated upon the assumption that a real estate suitable for commercial purposes Q such as the one herein sought to be partitioned Q is likel! to suffer a proportionatel! great diminution in value when its area becomes too small. But, then, if plaintiffIs share of )*.) suare meters were segregated from the propert! in uestion, there would still remain a lot of ",3*".30 suare meters for appellants herein and Mrs. Butte. 6 real estate of this si8e, in the ver! heart of Manila, is not, however, inconseuential, in comparison to that of the present propert! of the communit!. 5n other words, we do not believe that its value would be impaired, on account of the segregation of plaintiffIs share, to such an e9tent as to warrant the conclusion that the propert! is indivisible. 6ppellants argue that, instead of making the aforementioned segregation, plaintiffIs share should be sold to them. 5n support of this pretense, the! cite the provision of 6rticle 0#% of our 'ivil 'ode, to the effect that@ . . . Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co+owners cannot demand a ph!sical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co+ownership ma! be terminated in accordance with article 0#$. -he! apparentl! assume, once again, that the alleged 4inestimable damage4 to be suffered b! the propert!, if plaintiffIs share were segregated, is euivalent to rendering it 4unserviceable for the use for which it is intended.4 5ndependentl! of the fact that the minor premise of this s !llogism Q the alleged 4inestimable damage4 Q has not be en established, the conclusion drawn b! appellants does not follow necessaril!. 5ndeed, the record shows that there are two )/ buildings on the land in uestion, namel!@ "/ a two+store! commercial building Q known as 4(ta. 'ru8 Building4 Q abutting on the one "/ side, ) on the =scolta, and, on the other 3 on Pla8a (anta 'ru8C and )/ a small two+ store! residential building, on the Northwestern end of the lot, and behind the first building, ad;oining the =stero de la Reina, which constitutes the (outhwestern boundar! of the propert!. -here is nothing to show that, after segregating plaintiffIs share, the buildings left on the remaining ",3*".30 suare meters, representing defendantsI share, would be unserviceable, either for commercial or for residential purposes.
-his brings us to the second issue raised b! appellants@ whether the lower court should have adopted the plan submitted b! their o wn commissioner, or 4in not taking into consideration,4 at least, a proposal made b! plaintiff herein. 5n this connection, it appears that said commissioner % recommended that plaintiffIs share be given a frontage of ."0 lineal meters at Pla8a (ta. 'ru8, whereas the commissioner for the 'ourt favored a frontage of "). suare meters at said Pla8aC that defendantsI main ob;ection to the plan recommended b! commissioner Ealencia 1 and adopted b! the lower court, is that it left !ehind the portion awarded to plaintiff, a lot of "# suare meters, which would have to be divided among the defendants, should the! later wish to have their individual shares segregatedC and that, in order to offset this ob;ection, plaintiff e9pressed Q in one of the pre+trials held in the lower court and in order to 4facilitate earl! termination4 of the case Q the willingness 4to bu! from the other co+owners the remaining portion of the land behind his lot at P",*** per suare meter.4 )awph;l.n
-he record does not show that this offer of the plaintiff had not been 4taken into consideration4 b! the lower court. Moreover, defendants had not accepted it. 6nd neither do the! accept it now, for the! would want the plaintiff to pa! a price higher than that offered b! him. Dpon the other hand, the disadvantage resulting to the defendants from the e9istence of said lot of "# suare meters, behind that awarded to the plaintiff, is offset b! the fact that the remaining portion of the land in uestion Q representing defendantsI collective share Q has, in addition to a frontage of around 0* meters on Pla8a (anta 'ru8, a frontage of =3.)> meters on Escolta $treet , which apart from being, admittedl!, the most valuable one, is totall! denied to the plaintiff. -hen, again the 'uervo plan giving plaintiff a ."0 meters frontage of Pla8a (ta. 'ru8, goes all the wa! down to the >estern end of the propert!, the =stero de la Reina, and would reuire a partition of the residential building, on that part of the propert! in uestion, which the ver! plaintiff sa!s is indivisible, because it would render said building 4unserviceable for the purpose for which it is intended.4 $ 6s regards the last alleged error, it is obvious that the segregation of plaintiffIs share inures to the benefit not onl! of the plaintiff, but, also, of the defendants, and that both should, conseuentl!, defra! the incidental e9penses. >=R=F
<. AGUILAR VS CA =DIGES,>
AGUI LARv .CA-Coowner s hi p Anyoft heCoowner smaydemandt hes al eoft hehous eandl otatanyt i meandt heot herc annot obj ec tt os uc hdemand;t her eaf t ert hepr oc eedsoft hes al es hal l bedi v i dedequal l yac c or di ngt ot hei r r es pec t i v ei nt er es t s .
FACTS: Pe t i t i one rVer gi l i oandr es ponden tSe ne nboughtah ou seandl o ti nPar a ňa quewher et h ei rf a t h er c ou l ds penda ndenj o yhi sr emai ni n gy ear si napeac ef u lnei ghb or hood.Th eyi ni t i al l yagr eedt hat Ver gi l i owi l l get2/ 3andSenenwi l l ge t1/ 3;butl at ert he yagr eedonequal s har es .Senenwasl ef ti n t hes ai dl ott ot ak ec ar eoft hei rf at hers i nc eVer gi l i o’ sf ami l ywasi nCebu.Af t ert hei rf at her ’ sdeat h pet i t i onerdemandedf r om pr i v at er es pondentt hatt hel at t erv ac at et hehous eandt hatt hepr oper t y besol dandpr oc eedst her eofdi v i dedamongt hem butt hel at t err ef us ed.Pe t i t i onert henfi l edt o c ompe lt hes al eoft hepr oper t y . Thec hun koft hei s s uet a ck l edb yt h ec ou r t swa sr eg ar di n gt hepr et r i al .Res pondentfi l edamo t i ont oc anc el Pr et r i al s i nc et hec ouns el hadt oac compan yhi swi f ei n Du ma gu et eCi t ywh er es h ewo ul db eap r i n c i p al s p on s ori nawe dd i n g.CFId en i e dt h emo t i o n;a nd t hepr et r i a lpr oc eed edont h es c hedul e ddat e.Th er es pond en t sdi dno tappeart hu st he ywer e dec l ar edi ndef aul t .Thet r i al wentone xpar t ewi t houtt her es pondentandhel dt hatt hepr oper t y s houl dbes ol dt oat hi r dpar t yandt hatt hepr oc eedsbedi s t r i but edt ot hepar t i es ;i naddi t i on r e sp on de ntwa sma det opa yr en tf r om t h et i met h ea ct i o nwa sfi l e d.Re sp on den t sa pp ea l e dt h i sa nd t hedec i s i onwasr ev er s edb yt heCAs ay i ngt hatt heTCer r edi ndec l ar i ngr es pondent si ndef aul t ;t he c as ewast henr eman dedt ot het r i al c our t .He nc et hi sappeal .
I SSUE: A)W/ NCAer r ed( 1)i nhol di ngt hatt hemot i onofr es pondentt hr oughc ouns el t oc anc el t hepr et r i al wasdi l at or yi nc har ac t erand( 2)i nr emandi ngt hec as et ot het r i al c our tf orpr et r i al andt r i al ? I SSUERELEVANTT O PROPERTY:
B)W/ Nt r i al c our twascor r ec twi t hr egar dst ot hes al eandr ent ?
RULI NG: A)YES,CAe r r e di ng r a nt i n gt h er e sp on de nt smo t i o na ndr ema nd i n gt hec a se .Th el a wi sc l e art h at t heappear anc eofpar t i esatt hepr et r i al i smandat or y .Apar t ywhof ai l st oappearatapr et r i al c onf er enc emaybenons ui t edorc ons i der edasi ndef aul t .I ti st hedi s cr et i onoft hec our tt ogr antt he mo t i o ni fi ts eest hatt her eas onf ort h ec anc el at i onoft hes amewoul dber ea son abl e .SCf oundt hat t her eas onf ort hec anc el at i onoft hepr et r i al wasi ns uffic i entandt hatt het r i al c our twasnoti ngr av e abus eofdi s cr et i onwhent he ydeni edi t . B)YES,wi t haf e w modi fi c at i on.Pe t i t i one randr es po ndent sar ecoo wner sofs ub j ec tho us ean dl o t i ne qu al s h ar e s;e i t h ero neo ft h em ma ydema ndt hesa l eoft heho us ea ndl o ta ta nyt i mea ndt h e ot herc annotobj ec tt os uc hdemand;t her eaf t ert hepr oc eedsoft hesal es hal l bedi v i dedequal l y ac cor di ngt ot hei rr es pec t i v ei nt er es t s . BASI S:Ar t i c l e494oft heCi v i l Codep r o vi dest hatnoc oo wners hal l beob l i gedt or e mai ni nt h ec oo wn er s h i p ,a ndt h ate ac hc oo wn erma yde ma ndata nyt i mepa r t i t i o no ft h et h i n go wn edi nc ommo n i ns of arashi sshar ei sc onc er ned.Cor ol l ar yt ot hi sr ul e,Ar t .498oft heCodes t at est hatwhene ver t het hi ngi ses sent i al l yi ndi v i s i bl eandt hec oowner scannotagr eet hati tbeal l ot t edt ooneoft hem whos hal l i ndemni f yt heot her s ,i ts hal l bes ol dandi t spr oc eedsac cor di ngl ydi s t r i but ed.
SChel dt ha t½ oft h epr o ceedss houl dgot ot hepe t i t i on eran dt her emai ndert ot h er e spo nd ent ( 1 , 200eac h. )Al s or entwa sa war ded1 , 200p es ospermont hwi t hl e gal i nt er e stf r om t het i met het r i al c our tor der edt her es pondentt ov ac at e,f ort heus eandenj o ymentoft heot herhal foft hepr oper t y . BASI S:Whenpe t i t i onerfi l edanac t i ont oc ompel t hes al eoft hepr oper t yandt het r i al c our tgr ant ed t h ep et i t i o na ndo r de r e dt h ee j e c t me nto fr e s po nd en t ,t hec oo wne r s hi pwa sd ee me dt e r mi n at e da nd t her i ghtt oenj o yt hepos ses si onj oi nt l yal s oc eas ed.
$GUI#$R VS C$ FU## TEAT G.R. No. 763?1 O,/ober 29 1993 VIRGI#IO %. $GUI#$R petitioner, vs.
COURT OF $PPE$#S a0 SENEN %. $GUI#$R respondents. Jose F. Manacop for petitioner. $iruello, Mu'co ? Associates aw ffice for private respondent.
%E##OSI##O J.: -his is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the &ecision of the 'ourt of 6ppeals in '6+?R 'E No. *3#33 declaring null and void the orders of )3 and ) 6pril, "#1#, the ;udgment b! default of ) ul! "#1#, and the order of ))
5n his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no ob;ection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtainedC that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided euall!C and, that being a co+owner, he was entitled to the use and en;o!ment of the propert!. Dpon issues being ;oined, the case was set for pre+trial on ) 6pril "#1# with the law!ers of both parties notified of the pre+trial, and served with the pre+trial order, with private respondent e9ecuting a special power of attorne! to h is law!er to appear at the pre+trial and enter into an! amicable settlement in his behalf. 1 hen the case was called for pre+trial as scheduled on ) 6pril "#1#, plaintiff and his counsel appeared. &efendant did not appearC neither his counsel in whose favor he e9ecuted a special power of attorne! to represent him at the pre+trial. 'onseuentl!, the trial court, on motion of pl aintiff, declared defendant as in default and ordered reception of plaintiffIs evidence e& parte.
counsel for defendant in his motion t o cancel pre+trial as satisfactor! and devoid of a manifest intention to dela! the disposition of the case. 5t also ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion for postponement filed b! counsel for defendant who should not have been declared as in default for the absence of his counsel. Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the 'ourt of 6ppeals erred "/ in not holding that the motion of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre+trial was dilator! in character and )/ in remanding the case to the trial court for pre+trial and trial. -he issues to be resolved ar e whether the trial court correctl! declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the pre+trial and in allowing petitioner to present his evidence e&-parte, and whether the trial court correctl! rendered the default ;udgment against respondent. >e find merit in the petition. 6s regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre+trial is mandator!. 3 6 part! who fails to appear at a pre+trial conference ma! be non+suited or considered as in default. 4 5n the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre+ trial, the trial, court has authorit! to declare respondent in default. ? 6lthough respondentIs counsel filed a motion to postpone pre+trial hearing, the grant or denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which should take into account two factors in the grant or denial of motions for postponement, namel!@ a/ the reason for the postponement and b/ the merits of the case of movant. 6 5n the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for respondent to cancel the pre+trial to be without merit. 'ounselIs e9planation that he had to go to b! boat as earl! as )% March "#1# to fetch his wife and accompan! her to a wedding in &umaguete 'it! on )1 6pril "#1# where she was one of the principal sponsors, cannot be accepted. > e find it insufficient to ;ustif! postponement of the pre+trial, and the 'ourt of 6ppeals did not act wisel! in overruling the denial. >e sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in den!ing the postponement for lack of merit. 'ertainl!, to warrant a postponement of a mandator! process as pre+ trial would reuire much more than mere attendance in a social function. 5t is time indeed we emphasi8e that there should be much more than mere perfunctor! treatment of the pre+trial procedure. 5ts observance must be taken seriousl! if it is to attain its ob;ective, i.e., the speed! and ine9pensive disposition of cases. Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three 3/ da!s before the scheduled pre+trial. 5f indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend the pre+trial on the scheduled date, respondent at least should have personall! a ppeared in order not to be declared as in default. But, since nobod! appeared for him, the order of the trial court declaring hi m as in default and directing the presentation of petitionerIs evidence e& parte was proper. 7 >ith regard to the merits of the ;udgment of the trial court b! default, which respondent appellate court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the 'ourt holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented e& parte, petitioner and respondents are co+owners of sub;ect house and lot in eual sharesC either one of them ma! demand the sale of the house and lot at an! time and the other cannot ob;ect to such demandC thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided euall! according to their respective in terests.
Private respondent and his famil! refuse to pa ! monthl! rentals to petitioner from the time their father died in "#1% and to vacate the house so that it can be sold to third persons. Petitioner alleges that respondentIs continued sta! in the propert! hinders its disposal to the pre;udice of petitioner. e uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, e9cept as to the effectivit! of the pa!ment of monthl! rentals b! respondent as co+owner which we here declare to commence onl! after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of ) ul! "#1#. 6rticle 0#0 of the 'ivil 'ode provides that no co+owner shall be obliged to remain in the co+ ownership, and that each co+owner ma! demand at an! time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. 'orollar! to this rule, 6rt. 0#$ of the 'ode states that whenever the thing is essentiall!, indivisible and the co+owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnif! the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingl! distributed. -his is resorted to "/ when the right to partition the propert! is invoked b! an! of the co+owners but because of the nature of the propert! it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would pre;udice the interests of the co+owners, and b/ the co+owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the e ntire propert! upon proper reimbursement of the co+owners. 5n one case, " this 'ourt upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to 6rt. 0#$ of the 'ivil 'ode. owever, being a co+owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without pa!ing an ! compensation to petitioner, as he ma! use the propert! owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not in;urious to the interest of the other co+ owners. 9 =ach co+owner of propert! held pro indiviso e9ercises his rights over the whole propert! and ma! use and en;o! the same with no other limitation than that he shall not in;ure the interests of his co+ owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and ever! co+owner e9ercises, together with his co+participants ;oint ownership over the pro indivisopropert!, in addition to his use and en;o!ment of the same. 1! (ince petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co+ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the propert! b! his continued occupanc! of the premises, ;ustice and euit! demand that respondent and his famil! vacate the propert! so that the sale can be effected immediatel!. 5n fairness to petitioner, respondent should pa! a rental of P",)**.** per month, with legal interestC from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and en;o!ment of the other half of the propert! appertaining to petitioner. >hen petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the propert! and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the e;ectment of respondent, the co+ownership was deemed terminated and the right to en;o! the possession ;ointl! a lso ceased. -hereafter, the continued sta! of respondent and his famil! in the house pre;udiced the interest of petitioner as the propert! should have been sold
and the proceeds divided euall! between them. -o this e9tent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthl! rentals until he and his famil! vacate. >=R=F
!*. ;uints Vs. NICOLAS =DIGES,> Ci5il La: P%8e%t1 G.R. N. '!*'#' ?une !@) '*!( Pa%titin/ ;uieting/ Res ?u4icata/ A%t. (<( =NCC> as an ece8tin t Rule !") Sec. 3 t&e Rules 3 Cu%t VIL$A ;UIN,OS s. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS Pe"!"!o&ers *&( res/o&(e&"s *re s!'!&)s. I& 1999, o"# "#e!r /*re&"s /*sse( **, 'e*!&) "o "#e!r 10 +#!'(re& o&ers#!/ oer "#e s$7e+" /ro/er". A& *+"!o& or /*r"!"!o& *s s$se$e&"' ro$)#" eore "#e RTC. oeer, or *!'$re o "#e /*r"!es *&( "#e!r +o$&se's "o *//e*r (es/!"e ($e &o"!+e, "#e +*se *s (!s!sse(. T#ere*"er, "#e res/o&(e&" s!'!&)s e-e+$"e( * Dee( o A(7$(!+*"!o& "o "r*&ser "#e /ro/er" !& *or o "#e 10 s!'!&)s. As * res$'", "#e o'( TCT *s +*&+e''e( *&( "#e Re)!s"r o Dee(s !ss$e( * &e o&e. T#e res/o&(e&"s s$se$e&"' so'( "#e!r K10 $&(!!(e( s#*re !& *or o "#e s/o$ses C*&(e'*r!o. T#e /e"!"!o&ers 6'e( * +o/'*!&" or $!e"!&) o T!"'e *&( D**)es *)*!&s" "#e res/o&(e&"s. Res/o&(e&"s +o$&"ere( "#*" /e"!"!o&ers +*$se o *+"!o& *s *'re*( *rre( es"o//e' #e& soe"!e !& 200;, o&e o /e"!"!o&ers o>ere( "o $ "#e K10 $&(!!(e( s#*re o "#e res/o&(e&" s!'!&)s. T#e /o!&" o$" "#*" "#!s !s *& *(!ss!o& o& "#e /*r" o /e"!"!o&ers "#*" "#e /ro/er" !s &o" e&"!re' "#e!rs. I& *((!"!o&, "#e +'*!e( "#*" B!e&e&!(o *&( Es+o'*s"!+* I*rr* or")*)e( "#e /ro/er" $" e+*$se o 6&*&+!*' +o&s"r*!&"s, res/o&(e&" s/o$ses C*&(e'*r!o #*( "o re(ee "#e /ro/er" !& "#e!r e#*'. No" #*!&) ee& re/*!( B!e&e&!(o *&( Es+o'*s"!+*, "#e C*&(e'*r!os *++e/"e( ro "#e!r +ores/o&(e&"s "#e!r s#*re !& "#e s$7e+" /ro/er" *s /*e&". L*s"', res/o&(e&"s so$)#", * o +o$&"er+'*!, "#e /*r"!"!o& o "#e /ro/er". T#e RTC (!s!sse( "#e /e"!"!o&ers +o/'*!&", r$'!&) "#*" "#e res/o&(e&" s!'!&)s ere e&"!"'e( "o "#e!r res/e+"!e s#*res *&( "#*" "#e s$se$e&" "r*&ser o !&"eres" !& *or o "#e res/o&(e&" s/o$ses C*&(e'*r!o *s $/#e'(. L!%e!se, "#e +o$r" or(ere( "#e /*r"!"!o& o "#e s$7e+" 'o"s e"ee& "#e #ere!& /'*!&"!>s *&( "#e (ee&(*&"ss/o$ses C*&(e'*r!os. CA *Hre( "#e (e+!s!o& o "#e RTC.
ISSUES: 1. <#e"#er or &o" "#e /e"!"!o&ers ere *'e "o /roe o&ers#!/ oer "#e /ro/er" 2. <#e"#er or &o" "#e res/o&(e&"s +o$&"er+'*! or /*r"!"!o& !s *'re*( *rre( '*+#es or res 7$(!+*"* *&(
3. <#e"#er or &o" "#e CA *s +orre+" !& *//ro!&) "#e s$(!!s!o& *)reee&" *s *s!s or "#e /*r"!"!o& o "#e /ro/er".
RULING: T#e /e"!"!o& !s er!"or!o$s !& /*r". 1. Pe"!"!o&ers ere &o" *'e "o /roe e$!"*'e "!"'e or o&ers#!/ oer "#e /ro/er" ?or *& *+"!o& "o $!e" "!"'e "o /ros/er, "o !&(!s/e&s*'e re$!s!"es $s" +o&+$r, &*e'@ 1 "#e /'*!&"!> or +o/'*!&*&" #*s * 'e)*' or e$!"*'e "!"'e "o or !&"eres" !& "#e re*' /ro/er" s$7e+" o "#e *+"!o& *&( 2 "#e (ee(, +'*!, e&+$r*&+e, or /ro+ee(!&) +'*!e( "o e +*s"!&) +'o$( o& "#e "!"'e $s" e s#o& "o e !& *+" !&*'!( or !&o/er*"!e (es/!"e !"s /r!* *+!e *//e*r*&+e o *'!(!" or eH+*+. I& "#e +*se *" *r, "#e CA +orre+"' osere( "#*" /e"!"!o&ers +*$se o *+"!o& $s" &e+ess*r!' *!' *!&' !& !e o "#e *se&+e o "#e 6rs" re$!s!"e. T#e!r *''e)e( o/e&, +o&"!&$o$s, e-+'$s!e, *&( $&!&"err$/"e( /ossess!o& o "#e s$7e+" /ro/er" !s e'!e( "#e *+" "#*" res/o&(e&" s!'!&)s, !& 200M, e&"ere( !&"o * Co&"r*+" o Le*se !"# "#e A!+o Le&(!&) I&es"or Co. oer "#e s$7e+" 'o" !"#o$" *& o7e+"!o& ro "#e /e"!"!o&ers. T#e +*r(!&*' r$'e !s "#*" *re *''e)*"!o& o "!"'e (oes &o" s$H+e. T#e $r(e& o /roo !s o& "#e /'*!&"!> "o es"*'!s# #!s or #er +*se /re/o&(er*&+e o e!(e&+e
2. T#e +o$&"er+'*! or /*r"!"!o& !s &o" *rre( /r!or 7$()e&" D!s!ss*' !"# /re7$(!+e $&(er R$'e 1, Se+. 3 o "#e R$'es o Co$r" +*&&o" (ee*" "#e r!)#" o * +oo&er "o *s% or /*r"!"!o& *" *& "!e, /ro!(e( "#*" "#ere !s &o *+"$*' *(7$(!+*"!o& o o&ers#!/ o s#*res e". Per"!&e&" #ere"o !s Ar"!+'e 494 o "#e C!!' Co(e. Be"ee& (!s!ss*' !"# /re7$(!+e $&(er R$'e 1, Se+. 3 *&( "#e r!)#" )r*&"e( "o +o o&ers $&(er Ar". 494 o "#e C!!' Co(e, "#e '*""er $s" /re*!'. To +o&s"r$e o"#er!se o$'( (!!&!s# "#e s$s"*&"!e r!)#" o * +oo&er "#ro$)# "#e /ro$')*"!o& o /ro+e($r*' r$'es. S$s"*&"!e '* +*&&o" e *e&(e( * /ro+e($r*' r$'e. T#!s $r"#er 6&(s s$//or" !& Ar". 49; o "#e Ne C!!' Co(e. T#$s, or "#e R$'es "o e +o&s!s"e&" !"# s"*"$"or /ro!s!o&s, e+" "#*" ee& ! "#e or(er o (!s!ss*' or *!'$re "o /rose+$"e !s s!'e&" o& #e"#er or &o" !" !s !"# /re7$(!+e, !" s#*'' e (eee( "o e !"#o$" /re7$(!+e. I& "#e +*se *" *r, "#e +oo&ers#!/, *s (e"er!&e( "#e "r!*' +o$r", !s s"!'' s$s!s"!&) 300 !& *or o res/o&(e&" s/o$ses C*&(e'*r!o. Co&se$e&"', "#ere !s &o 'e)*' *r /ree&"!&) #ere!& res/o&(e&"s ro /r*!&) or "#e /*r"!"!o& o "#e /ro/er" "#ro$)# +o$&"er+'*!.
3. T#e CA erre( !& *//ro!&) "#e A)reee&" or S$(!!s!o& A)reee&" o S$(!!s!o& *''e)e(' e-e+$"e( res/o&(e&" s/o$ses C*&(e'*r!o *&( /e"!"!o&ers +*&&o" sere *s *s!s or /*r"!"!o&, or, *s s"*"e( !& "#e /re"r!*' or(er, #ere!& res/o&(e&"s *(!""e( "#*" "#e *)reee&" *s * *'s!" *&( "#*" /e"!"!o&ers &eer "oo% /*r" !& /re/*r!&) "#e s*e. I", "#ereore, '*+%e( "#e esse&"!*' re$!s!"e o +o&se&". <ERE?ORE, /re!ses +o&s!(ere(, "#e /e"!"!o& !s #ere PARTL= GRANTED. T#e *ss*!'e( De+!s!o& *&( Reso'$"!o& o "#e Co$r" o A//e*'s !& CAG.R. CV No. 98919 (*"e( J$' 8, 2013 *&( Noeer 22, 2013, res/e+"!e', *re #ere A??IR5ED !"# 5ODI?ICATION. T#e +*se !s #ere RE5ANDED "o "#e RTC, Br*&+# ;8 !& C*!'!&), T*r'*+ or /$r/oses o /*r"!"!o&!&) "#e s$7e+" /ro/er" !& *++or(*&+e !"# R$'e ;9 o "#e R$'es o Co$r".
11. Pa--a Ma8ua FU## TEAT ba ba yu08 /o, 08 8e/ re8ar08 /+ ,ae ay ob-,o0 a0 ,- ro,eure o I 8ue rea u-- /e/ 0a-a08 ara a(u+a o yu08 /o, re8ar08 roer/y G.R. No. 176"?"
Se/eber 1? 2!1!
'EIRS OF )U$NIT$ P$DI##$ reree0/e by C#$UDIO P$DI##$ Petitioners, vs.
DOMIN$DOR M$GDU$ Respondent. &='5(5
C$RPIO J.: T+e Cae Before the 'ourt is a petition for review on certiorari " assailing the
T+e Fa,/ uanita Padilla uanita/, the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in (an Roue, -anauan, Ge!te. 6fter uanita:s death on )3 March "#$#, petitioners, as legal heirs of uanita, sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia Ricardo/ regarding their plans for the partition of the land. 5n a letter dated % une "##$ written b! Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared the land for himself, pre;udicing their rights as co+heirs. 5t was then discovered that uanita had allegedl! e9ecuted a notari8ed 6ffidavit of -ransfer of Real Propert! 0 6ffidavit/ in favor of Ricardo on 0 une "# making him the sole owner of the land. -he records do not show that the land was registered under the -orrens s!stem.
&ominador filed a motion to dismiss o n the ground of lack of ;urisdiction since the assessed value of the land was within the ;urisdiction of the Municipal -rial 'ourt of -anauan, Ge!te. 5n an =R=F
T+e Iue -he main issue is whether the present action is alread! barred b ! prescription.
T+e Cour/ Ru-08 Petitioners submit that the R-' erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners insist that the 6ffidavit e9ecuted in "# does not conform with the reuirement of sufficient repudiation of co+ownership b! Ricardo against his co+heirs in accordance with 6rticle 0#0 of the 'ivil 'ode. Petitioners assert that the 6ffidavit became part of public records onl! because it was kept b! the Provincial 6ssessor:s office for real propert! ta9 declaration purposes. owever, such cannot be contemplated b! law as a record or registration affecting real properties. Petitioners insist that the 6ffidavit is not an act of appropriation sufficient to be deemed as constructive notice to
an adverse claim of ownership absent a clear showing that petitioners, as co+heirs, were notified or had knowledge of the 6ffidavit issued b! their mother in Ricardo:s favor. Respondent &ominador, on the other hand, maintains that uanita, during her lifetime, never renounced her signature on the 6ffidavit or interposed ob;ections to Ricardo:s possession of the land, which was open, absolute and in the concept of an owner. &ominador contends that the alleged written instrument dated "% Ma! "#1$ e9ecuted b! uanita !ears before she died was onl! made known latel! and conve!s the possibilit! of being fabricated. &ominador adds that the alleged Thighl! uestionable signature: of uanita on the 6ffidavit was onl! made an issue after 3% !ears from the date of the transfer in "# until the filing of the case in )**". 6s a bu!er in good faith, &ominador invokes the defense of acuisitive prescription against petitioners. 6t the outset, onl! uestions of law ma! be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 0% of the Rules of 'ourt. -he factual findings of the lower courts are final an d conclusive and ma! not be reviewed on appeal e9cept under an! of the following circumstances@ "/ the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or con;ecturesC )/ the inference is manifestl! mistaken, absurd or impossibleC 3/ there is grave abuse of discretionC 0/ the ;udgment is based on a misapprehension of factsC %/ the findings of fact are conflictingC / there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are basedC 1/ the finding of absence of facts is contradicted b! the presence of evidence on recordC $/ the findings of the 'ourt of 6ppeals are contrar! to those of the trial courtC #/ the 'ourt of 6ppeals manifestl! overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properl! considered, would ;ustif! a different conclusionC "*/ the findings of the 'ourt of 6ppeals are be!ond the issues of the caseC and ""/ such findings are contrar! to the admissions of both parties.$ >e find that the conclusion of the R-' in dismissing the case on the ground of prescription based solel! on the 6ffidavit e9ecuted b! uanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the propert! from whom &ominador asserts his ownership, is speculative. -hus, a review of the case is necessar!. ere, the R-' granted the motion to dismiss filed b! &ominador based on (ection ", Rule # of the Rules of 'ourt which states@ (ection ". Defenses and o!ections not pleaded . H &efenses and ob;ections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. owever, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no ;urisdiction over the sub;ect matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or /+a/ /+e a,/o0 barre b! a prior ;udgment or by /a/u/e o -/a/o0, the court shall dismiss the case. =mphasis supplied/ -he R-' e9plained that prescription had alread! set in since the 6ffidavit was e9ecuted on 3" Ma! "# and petitioners filed the present case onl! on )
cogent evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to, acuiesced in, or ratified the sale made b! his daughters to &ominador. 5n its $ (eptember )**
ith regard to the issue of the ;urisdiction of the R-', we hold that the R-' did not err in taking cogni8ance of the case. Dnder (ection " of Republic 6ct No. 1#" R6 1#"/,"0 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. ")#, the R-' shall e9ercise e9clusive ;urisdiction on the following actions@ (ection ". (ection "# of Batas Pambansa Blg. ")#, otherwise known as the 4udiciar! Reorgani8ation 6ct of "#$*4, is hereb! amended to read as follows@ 4(ec. "#. urisdiction in civil cases. H Regional -rial 'ourts shall e9ercise e9clusive original ;urisdiction. 4"/ 5n all civil actions in which the sub;ect of the litigation is incapable of pecuniar! estimationC 4)/ 5n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real propert!, or an! interest therein, where the assessed value of the propert! involved e9ceeds -went! -housand Pesos P)*,***.**/ or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value e9ceeds Fift! -housand Pesos P%*,***.**/ e9cept actions for forcible entr! into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, origin al ;urisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan -rial 'ourts, Municipal -rial 'ourts, and Municipal 'ircuit -rial 'ourtsC 9 9 9
999 43/ =9clusive original ;urisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real propert!, or an! interest therein where the assessed value of the propert! or interest therein does not e9ceed -went! thousand pesos P)*,***.**/ or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not e9ceed Fift! thousand pesos P%*,***.**/ e9clusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorne!:s fees, litigation e9penses and costs@ Provided, -hat in cases of land not declared for ta9ation purposes, the value of such propert! shall be determined b! the assessed value of the ad;acent lots.4 5n the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land was P%#*.** according to the &eclaration of Propert! as of )3 March )*** filed with the R-'. Based on the value alone, being wa! belowP)*,***.**, the M-' has ;urisdiction over the case. owever, petitioners argued that the action was not merel! for recover! of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. (ince a nnulment of contracts are actions incapable of pecuniar! estimation, the R-' has ;urisdiction over the case. "% )avvphi)
Petitioners are correct. 5n (ingson v. 5sabela (awmill, " we held that@ 5n determining whether an action is o ne the sub;ect matter of which is n ot capable of pecuniar! estimation this 'ourt has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remed! sought. 5f it is primaril! for the recover! of a sum of mone!, the claim is considered capable of pecuniar! estimation, and whether ;urisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. owever, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of mone!, where the mone! claim is purel! incidental to, or a conseuence of, the principal relief sought, this 'ourt has considered such actions as cases where the sub;ect of the litigation ma! not be estimated in terms of mone!, and are cogni8able b! courts of first instance now Regional -rial 'ourts/. >hen petitioners filed the action with the R-' the! sought to recover ownership and possession of the land b! uestioning "/ the due e9ecution and authenticit! of the 6ffidavit e9ecuted b! uanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land to the e9clusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and )/ the validit! of the deed of sale e9ecuted between Ricardo:s daughters and &ominador. (ince the principal action sought here is something other than the recover! of a sum of mone!, the action is incapable of pecuniar! estimation and thus cogni8able b! the R-'. >ell+entrenched is the rule that ;urisdiction over the sub;ect matter of a case is conferred b! law and is determined b! the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the part! is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. "1 5n sum, we find that the 6ffidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon b! the R-' to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription, insufficientl! established &ominador:s rightful claim of ownership to the land. -hus, we direct the R-' to tr! the case on the merits to d etermine who among the parties are legall! entitled to the land.
='EREFORE, we GR$NT the petition. >e REVERSE $ND SET $SIDE the
(<
!'. ;uian Vs. A6ante *!%'! *&) $'' "e-" *" /*r*&) (!)es"e( &*r!& (*#!' * *+"s !ss$e *" r$'!&). G*&!"o $&) "re&( s* )* &eer 7$r!s/r$(e&+e e# %** &*"$"$* *%o *) *s* &)*o& &) )* &e +*ses, $&) )* 2010 /*"**s *(*(*'! &* !&"!&(!#!& *" /*r*&) +*se (!)es" '*&) (!&. <*) %* &* *) (!)es" (!"o.
G.R. No. 164277
O,/ober " 2!14
FE U. @UI)$NO Petitioner, vs.
$TT>. D$R>## $. $M$NTE Respondent. &='5(5
%ERS$MIN J.: >here the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendantIs occupation, the possession is deemed illegal from the beginning. ence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper remed!. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entr! without an! allegation in the complaint that the entr! of the defendant was b! means of force, intimidation, threats, strateg! or stealth. 6ntecedents -he petitioner and her siblings, namel!@ =liseo, ose and ?loria, inherited from their father, the late Bibiano 7ui;ano, the parcel of land registered in the latterIs name under
6 portion of a parcel of land located at the back of the Pleasant omes (ubdivision and also at the back of &on Bosco (eminar!, Punta Princesa, 'ebu 'it!, to be taken from m! share of the whole lotC the portion sold to 6tt!. 6mante is onl! ** suare meters which is the area near the boundar! facing the Pleasant omes (ubdivision, 'ebu 'it!. )
3
"), "##0 the Register of &eeds issued -ransfer'ertificate of -itle -'-/ No. %%%, -'- No. %%, -'- No. %%1 and -'- No. %%$ to the petitioner, ?loria, ose, and =liseo, respectivel!. -he partition resulted in the portions earlier sold b! =liseo to the respondent being ad;udicated to the petitioner instead of to =liseo. %
&ue to the petitioner:s needing her portion that was then occupied b ! the respondent, she demanded that the latter vacate it. &espite several demands, the last of which was b! the letter dated November 0, "##0, the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file against him on Februar! "0, "##% a complaint for e;ectment and damages in the Municipal -rial 'ourt in 'ities of 'ebu 'it! M-''/, docketed as 'ivil 'ase No. R+300). (he alleged therein that she was the registered owner of the parcel of land covered b! -'- No. %%%, a portion of which was being occupied b! the respondent, who had constructed a residential building thereon b! the mere tolerance of =liseo when the propert! she and her siblings had inherited from their father had not !et been subdivided, and was thus still co+owned b! themC and that the respondent:s occupation had become illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands. 1
$
-he respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had been b! mere tolerance of =liseo. e even asserted that he was in fact the owner and lawful possessor of the propert!, having bought it from =liseoC that the petitioner and her siblings could not den! knowing about the sale in his favor because the! could plainl! see his house from the roadC and that the deed of absolute sale itself stated that the sale to him was with their approval, and that the! had alread! known that his house and fence were e9istingC that before he purchased the propert!, =liseo informed him that he and his co+heirs had alread! orall! partitioned the estate of their father, and that the portion being sold to him was =liseo:s shareC and that with his having alread! purchased the propert! before the petitioner acuired it under the deed of e9tra;udicial partition, she should respect his ownership and possession of it. #
udgment of the M-''
-he M-'' disposed as follows@ >=R=F
)/ pa! the plaintiff the rentalof P",***.** a month for the portion in litigation from November )", "##0 until such time that the defendant shall have vacated, and have removed all structures from said portion, and have completel! restored possession thereof to the plaintiffC and 3/ pa! unto the plaintiff the sum of P"*,***.** as attorne!:s feesC and the sum of P%,***.** for litigation e9pensesC and 0/ to pa! the costs of suit. (<
""
&ecision of the R-'
5n the case at bar, b! virtue of the deed of absolute sale e9ecuted b! =liseo 7ui;ano, one of the co+ heirs of Fe 7ui;ano, in "##* and "##", the defendant 6tt!. 6mante took possession of the portion in uestion and built his residential house thereat. 5twas onl! in "##) that the heirs of Bibiano 7ui;ano e9ecuted the deed of e9tra;udicial partition, and i nstead of giving to =liseo 7ui;a no the portion that he alread! sold to the defendant, the same was ad;udicated toplaintiff, Fe 7ui;ano to the great pre;udice of the defendant herein who had been in possession of the portion in uestion since "##* and which possession is notpossession de facto but possession de ;ure because it is based on ) deeds of conve!ances e9ecuted b! =liseo 7ui;ano. -here is, therefore, a serious uestion of ownership involved which cannot be determined in a summar! proceeding for e;ectment. (ince the defendantis in possession of the portion in uestion where his residential house is built for several !ears, and before the e9tra;udicial partition, the possession of the defendant, to repeat, is one of possession de ;ure and the plaintiff cannot e;ect the defendant in a summar! proceeding for e;ectment involving onl! possession de facto. >hat the plaintiff should have done was to file an action publiciana or action reinvindicatoria before the appropriate court for recover! of possession and ownership. owever, since there is a pending complaint for uieting of title filed b! the defendant against the plaintiff herein before the Regional -rial 'ourt, the matter of ownership should be finall! resolved in said proceedings. Dndaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the R-' denied her motion on November "3, "##. "3
"0
&ecision of the '6 -he petitioner appealed to the '6 b! petition for review.
-he '6 observed that the R-' correctl! dismissed the e;ectment case because a uestion of ownership over the disputed propert! was raisedC that the rule that inferior courts could pass upon the issue of ownership to determine the uestion of possession was well settledC that the institution of a separate action for uieting of title b! the respondent did not divest the M-'' of its authorit! to
decide the e;ectment caseC that =liseo, as a coowner, had no right to sell a definite portion of the undivided estateC that the deeds of sale =liseo e9ecuted in favor of the respondent were valid onl! with respect to the alienation of =liseo:s undivided shareC that after the e9ecution of the deeds of sale, the respondent became a co+owner along with =liseo and his co+heirs, giving him the right toparticipate in the partition of the estate owned in common b! themC that because the respondent was not given an! notice of the pro;ect of partition or of the intention to effect the partition, the partition made b! the petitioner and her co+heirs did not bind himC and that, as to him, the e ntire estate was still co+owned b! the heirs, givi ng him the right to the co+possession of the estate, including the disputed portion. 5ssues -he petitioner has come to the 'ourt on appeal b! certiorari, contending that the '6 grossl! erred in holding that the respondent was either a co+owner or an assignee with the right of possession over the disputed propert!. "
"1
-he petitioner e9plains that the respondent, being a law!er, knew that =liseo could not validl! transfer the ownership of the disputed propert! to hi m because the disputed propert! was then still a part of the undivided estate co+owned b! all the heirs of the late Bibiano 7ui;anoC that the respondent:s knowledge of the defect in =liseo:s title and h is failure to get the co+heirs: consent to the sale in a registrable document tainted his acuisition with bad faithC that being a bu!er in bad faith, the respondent necessaril! became a possessor and buil der in bad faithC that she was not aware of the sale to the respondent, and it was her ignorance of the sale that led her to believe that the respondent was occup!ing the disputed propert! b! the mere tolerance of =liseoC thatthe partition was clearl! done in good faithC and that she was entitled to the possession of the disputed propert! as its owner, conseuentl! giving her the right to recover it from the respondent. "$
-o be resolved is the issue ofwho between the petitioner and the respondent had the better right to the possession of the disputed propert!. Ruling -he petition for review on certiorarilacks merit. 6n e;ectment case can be eitherfor forcible entr! or unlawful detainer. 5t is a summar! proceeding designed to provide e9peditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to p ossession of the propert! involved. -he sole uestion for resolution in the case is the ph!sical or material possession possession de facto/of the propert! in uestion, and n either a claim of ;uridical possession possession de ;ure/nor an averment of ownership b! the defendant can outrightl! deprive the trial court from taking due cogni8ance of the case. ence,even if the uestion of ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here, the court ma! pass upon the issue but onl! to determine the uestion of possession especiall! if the uestion of ownership is inseparabl! linked with the uestion of possession. -he ad;udication of ownership in that instance is merel! provisional, and will not bar or pre;udice an action between the same parties involving the title to the propert!. "#
)*
)"
'onsidering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed propert!, the '6 properl! ruled on the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining who between them had the better right to possess the disputed propert!.
-he disputed propert! originall! formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano 7ui;ano, and passed on to his heirs b! operation of law upon his death. Prior to the partition, the estate was owned in common b! the heirs, sub;ect to the pa!ment of the debts of the deceased. 5n a co+ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the propert! pro indivisoand e9ercising her rights over the whole propert!. =ach co+owner ma! use and en;o! the propert! with no other limitation than that he shall not in;ure the interests of h is co+owners. -he underl!ing rationale is that until a division is actuall! made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and ever! co+owner e9ercises, together with his co+participants, ;oint ownership of the pro indiviso propert!, in addition to his use and en;o!ment of it. ))
)3
)0
=ven if an heir:s right in the estate of the decedent has not !et been full! settled and partitioned and is thus merel! inchoate, 6rticle 0#3 of the 'ivil 'odegives the heir the right to e9ercise acts of ownership. 6ccordingl!, when =liseo sold the disputed propert! to the respondent in "##* and "##", he was onl! a co+owner along with his siblings, and could sell onl! that portion that would beallotted to him upon the termination of the co+ownership. -he sale did not vest ownership of the disputed propert! in the respondent but transferred onl! the seller:s pro indiviso share to him, conseuentl! making him, as the bu!er, a co+owner of the disputed propert! until it is partitioned. )%
)
6s =liseo:s successor+in+interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right under 6rticle 0#1 of the 'ivil 'odeto take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken without his consent. 6rticle 0#1 states@ )1
6rticle 0#1. -he creditors or assignees of the co+owners ma! take part in the division of the thing owned in common and ob;ect to its being effected without their concurrence. But the! cannot impugn an! partition alread! e9ecuted, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without pr e;udice to the right of the de btor or assignor to maintain its validit!. -he respondent could not den! that at the time of the sale he knew that the propert! he was bu!ing was note9clusivel! owned b! =liseo. e knew, too, that the co+heirs had entered into an oral agreement of partition vis+U+vis the estate, such knowledge being e9plicitl! stated in his answer to the complaint, to wit@ )*wphi)
"). -hat defendant, before he acuired the land from =liseo 7ui;ano was informed b ! the latter that the portion sold to him was his share alread!C that the! have orall ! partitioned the whole lot before defendant acuired the portion from him. )$
is knowledge of =liseo:s co+ownership with his co+heirs, and of their oral agreement of partition notwithstanding, the respondent still did not e9ercise his right under 6rticle 0#1. 6lthough =liseo made it appear to the respondent that the partition had alread! been completed and finali8ed, the co+heirs had not taken possession !et oftheir respective shares to signif! that the! had ratified their agreement, if an!. For sure, the respondent was no stranger to the 7ui;anos, because h e himself had served as the law!er of =liseo and the petitioner herself. 5n that sense, it would have been eas! for him to ascertain whether the representation of =liseo to him was true. 6s it turned out, there had been no prior oral agreement among the heirs to partition the estateC otherwise, =liseo would have uestioned the deed of e9tra;udicial partition because it did not conform to what the! had supposedl! agreed upon. ad the respondent been vigilant in protecting his interest, he could have availed himself of the rights reserved to him b ! law, particularl! the right to take an active part in the partition and to ob;ect to the partition if he wanted to. 5t was onl! on (eptember 3*, "##), or two !ears and )#
five months from the time of the first sale transaction, and a !ear and two months from the time of the second sale transaction, that the co+heirs e9ecuted the deed of e9tra;udicial partition. aving been silent despite his ample opportunit! to participate in or toob;ect to the partition of the estate, the respondent was bound b! whatever was ultimatel! agreed upon b! the 7ui;anos. -here is no uestion that the holder of a -orrens title is the rightful owner of the propert! thereb! covered and is entitled to its possession. owever, the 'ourt cannot ignore thatthe statements in the petitioner:s complaint about the respondent:s possession of the disputed propert! being b! the mere tolerance of =liseo could be the basis for unlawful detainer. Dnlawful detainer involves the defendant:s withholding of the possession of the propert! to which the plaintiff is entitled, after the e9piration or termination of the former:s right tohold possession under the contract, whether e9press or implied. 6 reuisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originall! lawful, but turned unlawful onl! upon the e9piration of the right to possess. 3*
-o show that the possession was initiall! la wful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established. >ith the averment here that the respondent:s possession was b! mere tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance di d not suffice. 6t least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her or her predecessor: s tolerance, or her co+heirs: permission for him to occup! the disputed propert!. But she did not adduce such evidence. 5nstead, she appeared to be herself not clear and definite as to his possession of the disputed propert! being merel! tolerated b! =liseo, as the following averment of her petition for review indicates@ 3"
.#. -heir ignorance of the said transaction of sale, particularl! the petitioner, as the! were not dul! informed b! the vendor+coA+owner =liseo 7ui;ano, Aled them to believe that the respondent:s occupanc! of the sub;ect premises was b! mere tolerance of =liseo, so that upon partition of the whole propert!,said occupanc! continued to be under tolerance of the petitioner when the sub;ect premises became a part of the land ad;udicated to the latterC emphasis supplied/ 5n contrast, the respondent consistentl! stood firm on his assertion that his possession of the disputed propert! was in the concept of an owner, not b! the mere tolerance of =liseo, and actuall! presented the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the propert! to him. 3)
33
'onsidering that the allegation ofthe petitioner:s tolerance of the respondent:s possession of the disputed propert! was not established, the possession could ver! well be deemed illegal from the beginning. 5n that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail. =ven so, the 'ourt would not be ;ustified to treat this e;ectment suit as one for forcible entr! because the complaint contained no allegation thathis entr! in the propert! had been b! force, intimidation, threats, strateg! or stealth. 30
Regardless, the issue of possession between the parties will still remain. -o finall! resolve such issue,the! should review their options and decide on their proper recourses. 5n the meantime, it is wise for the 'ourt to leave the door open to them in that respect. For now, therefore, this recourse of the petitioner has to be dismissed. >=R=F
13. C*r*7*' Vs. C* *!%'! '*&) (!& "o..
G.R. No. #<44426 February 2? 19"2 SU#PICIO C$RV$)$# petitioner, vs.
T'E 'ONOR$%#E COURT OF $PPE$#S a0 EUTI@UI$NO C$M$RI##O a0 #I%ER$T$ C$C$%E#OS respondents.
TEE'$N&EE J.: -he 'ourt reverses the appellate courtIs decision affirming in toto the ;udgment of the 'ourt of First 5nstance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs+respondents the lawful owners of the land i n uestion and ordering defendant herein petitioner/ to pa! P3*.** monthl! rentals until possession of the propert! is surrendered to respondents, for unless there is partition of the estate of the deceased, either e9tra ;udiciall! or b! court order, a co+heir cannot validl! claim title to a specific portion o f the estate and send the same. -itle to an! specific part of the estate does not automaticall! pass to the heirs b! the mere death of the decedent and the effect of an! disposition b ! a co+heir before partition shall be limited to the portion which ma! be allotted to him upon the dissolution of the communal estate. >hat a co+heir can validl! dispose of is onl! his hereditar! rights. Private respondents, who are husband and wife, had instituted a complaint before the 'ourt of First 5nstance for e;ectment and recover! of possession against herein petitioner, docketed as 'ivil 'ase No. -+""3, alleging that the! are the owners in fee simple of a parcel of commercial land, pro+ indiviso, consisting of "%*.$ s. meters, more or less, situated in Poblacion, -a!ug, Pangasinan, having bought the same from =varisto ?. =spiue b! virtue of a &eed of 6bsolute (ale e9ecuted on 6pril "%, "#0. -he! also demand that petitioner pa! a monthl! rental for the use of the propert! all P0*.** until the propert! is surrendered to them. -he propert! in uestion is a "2% portion of a 1%0 s. meter land originall! owned b! ermogenes =spiue and his wife, both dead. 6fter their death their five children, namel!@ Maria, =varisto, Faustina, =stefanio and -ropinia succeeded them in the ownership of the who le lot. Petitioner presentl! occupies two+fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso b! the =spiue children. Petitioner alleges that he purchased the northern one+half portion of the lot he is occup!ing which is also claimed b! respondents/ from =stefanio =spiue and that the southern one+half portion of the lot he is occup!ing which is also claimed b! respondents/ from =stefanio =spiue and that the southern one+half portion is leased to him b! -ropinia =spiue. -he land sub;ect of the controvers! is the most southern portion of the whole lot inherited b! the =spiue children which petitioner claims he had bought from =stefanio on 6pril ), "#1 and which respondents claim the! had bough from =varisto on 6pril "%, "#0. Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed b! =varisto =spiue was still pending before the 'ourt of First 5nstance of Pangasinan, docketed therein as 'ivil 'ase No. -+#. -he 'ourt finds merit in the petition for setting aside respondent appellate courtIs decision finding for respondents+plaintiffs, for the following considerations@
-he action for e;ectment and recover! of p ossession instituted b! herein respondents in the lower court is premature, for what must be settled frist is the action for partition. Dnless a pro;ect of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. >ithout partition, either b! agreement between the parties of b! ;udicial proceeding, a co+heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate such heirs. 1 Dpon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left wtih respect to the part of portion which might be ad;udicated to him, a communit! of o wnership being thus formed among the co+owners of the estate or co+heirs while it remains undivided. 2 >hile under 6rticle 0#3 of the New 'ivil 'ode, each co+owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he ma! alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its en;o!ment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co+owners, shall be limited, b ! mandate of the same article, to the p ortion which ma! be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co+ownership. e has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the e9clusion of the other co+owners because his right over the thing is represented b! an abstract or 5deal portion without an! ph!sical ad;udication. 3 6n individual co+ owner cannot ad;udicate to himself or claim title to an! definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition b! agreement or ;udicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co+owner has is an 5deal or abstract uota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common b! all the co+owners. 4 >hat a co owner ma! dispose of is onl! his undivided ali%uot share, which shall be limited to the portion that ma! be allotted to him upon partition. ? Before partition, a co+heir can onl! sell his successional rights. 6 5n the case at bar, the fact that the sale e9ecuted b! =varisto ?. =spiue in favor of respondents and the sale e9ecuted b! =stefanio =spiue in favor of petitioner were made b efore the partition of the propert! among the co+heirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. owever, the interests thereb! acuired b! petitioner and respondents are limited onl! to the parts that ma! be ultimatel! assigned to =stefanio and =varisto, respectivel!, upon the partition of the estate 7 sub;ect to provisions on subrogation of the other co+heirs to the rights of the stranger+ purchaser provided in 6rticle "*$$ of the 'ivil 'ode. " Respondent courtIs ruling that the sale b! =stefanio in favor of petitioner is not valid because of lack of notice to his co+heirs is erroneous. (uch notice in writing is not a reuisite for the validit! of the sale. 5ts purpose is merel! to apprise the co+heirs of the sale of a portion of the estate, for them to e9ercise their preferential right of subrogation under 6rticle "*$$ of the New 'ivil 'ode, that is, the right to redeem the propert! sold within one month from the time the! were notified in writing of the sale b! a co+heir. -here is nothing in the record to indicate that such right of subrogation was in effect sought to be e9ercised upon the co+heirsI having learned of the sale, which is not in issue here./ -hus, respondents have no right to e;ect petitioners nor demand pa!ment of rentals for the use of the propert! in dispute. Dntil the partition of the estate is ordered b! the 'ourt of First 5nstance of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co+heir is determined b! metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor respondents can rightfull! claim that what the! bought is the part in dispute. 6ccordingl!, respondent courtIs ;udgment is set aside and ;udgment is hereb! rendered dismissing the complaint of respondents+plaintiffs in the court below. No pronouncement as to costs.
!(. PNB 5s CA ?*+"s@ Petition for review of the decision of the 'ourt of 6ppeals on “Pedro Bitanga, et al., Plaintifs-Appellees, versus Philippine National Bank, et al., &efendants+6ppellants, Melitona Gagpacan, assisted b! her husband, orge Malacas, 5ntervenors 6ppellees. -he respondents Pedro, Fernando, ?regorio, ?uillermo and 'larita, all surnamed Bitanga, filed a complaint before the 'ourt of First 5nstance of 5locos Norte against the Philippine National Bank, the Register of &eeds of 5locos Norte and Feli8ardo Re!es, for reconve!ance of real propert! and damages, with a pra!er for the issuance of an e9+parte writ of pre in;unction restraining and en;oining the PNB and Feli8ardo Re!es from consummating the sale of the propert! in uestion and prohibiting the Register of &eeds from registering the sale in favor of Feli8ardo Re!es. ith costs against the defendants. 3 6nd to cap his argument, petitioner contends that mortgagor Rosa Eer and her heirs had alread! benefitted from the loan and the mortgage transaction and that the! should not be allowed to enrich themselves at the e9pense of the petitioner. 5ssue@ >hether or not Rosa Eer could mortgage the entire Got #*$ to petitioner PNB. eld@ -he court ruled that the mortgage deed was valid and e9isting onl! with respect to the one+half portion of the lot in uestion belonging to the mortgagor Rosa Eer as her share in the con;ugal partnership with her husband 5igo Bitanga. ence, petitioner:s assumption that the mortgage of the whole lot was valid, is erroneous. -he 'ourt held that the mortgagor, Rosa Eer, as surviving spouse, could conve! in mortgage to the petitioner bank one+half X/ of the entire propert! being her share in the con;ugal partnership with her deceased husband, the other half
being the lawful share of the respondent heirs as inheritance from their deceased father, 5igo Bitanga. Ratio@Dnder 6rticle )*$%, New 'ivil 'ode 6rt. "$%1,
1M. ?e'!+!*&o s C*&o* +orre'*"e o &*'*&) !"# $'' "e-" '$!e %$&) s*e '*&) s!'* &) #!&*#*&*/ &* !ss$es. Pero I "#!&% /*so% &**& !"o..
Remedial aw $pecial 6roceedings 6rescriptive 6eriod Fraud in E&traudicial $ettlement
Fa,/* 5n Ma! "#3*, 6ntonio Feliciano died leaving behind a parcel of land. 5n "#1), an e9tra;udicial settlement was e9ecuted b! Geona Feliciano, Maria Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, and (alina Feliciano. -he four declared that the! are the onl! heirs of 6ntonioC the! did not include the heirs of their dead siblings =steban and &oroteo Feliciano. -hereafter, Pedro sold his share to acinto FelicianoC (alina sold her share to Felisa FelicianoC and Geona and Maria sold their share to Pedro 'ano8a. (ubseuentl!, acinto and 'ano8a applied for their respective titles covering the lands the! purchased. 5n November "#11, a free patent was issued to acinto. 5n Februar! "#1#, a free patent was likewise issued to Pedro 'ano8a. 5n
ISSUE* >hether or not the action filed b! =ugenio et al is barred b! prescription. 'E#D* Jes. 5t is undeniable that the e9tra;udicial settlement e9ecuted b! Geona Feliciano, Maria Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, and (alina Feliciano in "#1) to the e9clusion of =steban and &oroteo:s heirs is attended b! fraud. 6s such, the deed of e9tra;udicial settlement can be attacked in action for annulment in court. owever, such action should be filed within 0 !ears from the discover! of the fraud. 5n this case, the fraud was actuall! committed in "#1) but it was onl! deemed discovered in "#11 and "#1#. 5n "#11, because this was the time when a free patent was issued to acinto and in "#1#, when a free patent was issued to 'ano8a. -hese !ears are the reckoning point because the free patents released to acinto and 'ano8a served as constructive notices to =ugenio et al and to the whole world. 6nd so, when =ugenio et al filed their complaint in "##3, the complaint was alread! filed out of time " !ears late in case of acintoC and "0 !ears in case of 'ano8a/.
!@. Pa%el Vs. P%u4enci (!)es" *//*re&"', !&!!)* (!& "o&) +*se &* "o s* ree(!*' '*.. So +#e+% o &*'*&) (!&..
OFFER OF EVIDENCE PAREL v. PRUDENCIO Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: On Feb. 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against anilo Parel wit! t!e "#$ %aguio. Prudencio is claiming t!at !e is t!e owner of a two&storey residential !ouse located at 'o. (1 Forbes Par) 'ational "eservation near epartment of Public Service *PS+ compound, %aguio $ity e also claims t!at t!e !ouse was constructed in 1972&197- from !is own funds and declared in !is name in a ta declaration and t!at !e !as been paying t!e taes on it ever since /n 1970, w!en t!e 2 nd floor of t!e !ouse was already !abitable, !e allowed Parels parents to live t!ere and supervise t!e construction below. !en t!e !ouse was finis!ed, t!e Parel family was allowed to live t!ere since t!ey !ave no !ouse of t!eir own. Parels dad, Florentino, now deceased, was Prudencios wifes younger brot!er. /n 'ovember 193-, Prudencio wrote Florentino a notice for t!em to vacate t!e said !ouse as t!e former was due for retirement and !e needed t!e place. anilos parents !eeded t!is w!en t!ey migrated to 4S in 193(, !owever, anilo and !is family unlawfully entered and too) possession of t!e ground floor of t!e !ouse5 and refused to leave despite many demands So Prudencio filed an action for recovery of possession, and also as)ed from Parel for a mont!ly rental *0)+ from 6pril 1933 until !e leaves t!e premises, plus moral and eemplary damages and costs. Parel filed !is 6nswer wit! $ounterclaim alleging t!at !is parents are co&owners of t!e !ouse *ground floor to Parel, 2 nd floor to Prudencio+, and t!at !is parents spent t!eir own resources in improving t!e !ouse and t!at t!e construction wor)ers were !ired by Florentino, and t!at Florentino was an awardee of t!e land on w!ic! t!e !ouse stands. e also claims t!at Prudencio !ad filed eectment case as well as criminal cases against t!em involving t!e subect !ouse, w!ic! were all dismissed. Parel as)ed for t!e dismissal of t!e complaint and prayed for damages and attorneys fees. "#$ declared t!at t!e !ouse is co&owned by Parel and Prudencio, so Prudencio cannot evict Parel. Parel was also ordered to pay moral and actual damages, atty.s fees, and costs. "#$ concluded t!at t!e land was allocated to Florentino as part of a program of t!e former mayor of %aguio *8ardiabal+ to allow lowly&paid govt wor)ers to construct t!eir own !ouses on t!e reservation5 t!at Prudencio failed to s!ow proof of any contract, written or oral, epress or implied, t!at t!e late Florentino and !is family stayed on t!e !ouse not as co&owners but as mere lessees, nor any ot!er proof t!at would clearly establis! !is sole owners!ip of t!e !ouse5 and, t!at t!e late Florentino was t!e one w!o gat!ered t!e laborers for t!e construction of t!e !ouse and paid t!eir salaries. #!us, t!e "#$ ruled t!at co&owners!ip eisted between respondent and petitioners fat!er, Florentino. From t!is, "#$ concluded t!at Florentino and Prudencio !ad an agreement t!at Florentino would contribute money for t!e construction and once t!e !ouse is completed, !ati sila. "#$ also :uestioned t!at Prudencio only claimed sole&owners!ip after 1- years. "#$ did not give credence to t!e ta declaration as well as t!e several documents s!owing t!e $ity 6ssessors assessment of t!e property all in respondents name since ta declarations are not conclusive proof of owners!ip. It rejected the affdavt e!ec"ted #$ F%&re't'& dec%ar' the h&"e a &*'ed #$ re+&'de't a$' that the affdavt h&"%d #e read ' t e'tret$ t& deter,'e the +"r+&e &f t e!ec"t&'that t *a e!ec"ted #eca"e &f a' adve,e't addreed t& the %ate F%&re't'& #$ the Ct$ Trea"rer c&'cer'' the +r&+ert$ ta! ae,e't a'd F%&re't'&/ th&"ht the' that t h&"%d #e the re+&'de't *h& h&"%d +a$ the ta!e- a'd that the affdavt ca''&t #e acce+ted f&r #e' heara$. From t!is decision, Prudencio appealed, decision reversed by $6, declaring !im t!e sole owner. #!e $6 found as meritorious respondents contention t!at since petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any documentary evidence, t!ere is not!ing to refute t!e evidence offered by respondent. /t ruled t!at t!e #$s statement t!at defendants occupancy of t!e !ouse is due to a SP6 eecuted by !is parents is wanting of any concrete evidence on record5 t!at said power of attorney was never offered, !ence, could not be referred to as petitioners evidence to support !is claim5 t!at ecept for t!e bare testimonies of $andelario "egua, t!e carpenter&foreman, t!at it was Florentino w!o constructed t!e !ouse and $oraon ;arcia, t!e former barangay captain, w!o testified t!at t!e lot was allocated to petitioners fat!er, t!ere was
no supporting document w!ic! would sufficiently establis! factual bases for t!e trial courts conclusion5 and t!at t!e rule on offer of evidence is mandatory. The CA f&"'d the affdavt dated Se+. 01/ 2345 &f F%&re't'&/ +ett&'er father/ tat' that he '&t the &*'er &f the "#ject h&"e #"t re+&'de't/ a c&'c%"ve +r&&f &f re+&'de't &%e &*'erh+ &f the "#ject h&"e a t a dec%arat&' ,ade #$ F%&re't'& aa't h 'teret. /t also gave weig!t to Prudencios ta declarations as sufficient to establis! !is case w!ic! constitute at least proof t!at t!e !older !as a claim of title over t!e property. Parel filed an
ISSUES: 1. O' Parel was able to prove by preponderance of evidence t!at !is fat!er was a co&owner of t!e !ouse. NO. 2. O' it was necessary to formally offer Parels documentary evidence. 6ES. 5. 7ON F%&re't'& affdavt h&"%d #e ve' *eht a c&'c%"ve +r&&f &f Pr"de'c& &%e &*'erh+. 6ES. /SS4= 0 muna> Petitioner argues t!at t!e $6 erred in finding t!e affidavit of petitioners fat!er declaring respondent as owner of t!e subect !ouse as conclusive proof t!at respondent is t!e true and only owner of t!e !ouse since t!e affidavit s!ould be read in its entirety to determine t!e purpose for w!ic! it was eecuted. Prudencio !ad s!own sufficient evidence to support !is complaint for recovery of possession of t!e ground floor of t!e subect !ouse as t!e eclusive owner t!ereof. e presented t!e affidavit dated September 2?, 1970 eecuted by Florentino and sworn to before t!e 6ssistant $ity 6ssessor of %aguio $ity, ;.F. 8agasca, w!ic! reads>
/, F8O"='#/'O P6"=8, ?2 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Par), "eservation 'o. 1, after !aving been sworn to according to law depose and say> #!at !e is t!e occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Par), "eservation 'o. 1, %aguio $ity w!ic! is t!e subect of an advicement addressed to !im emanating from t!e Office of t!e $ity 6ssessor, %aguio $ity, for assessment and declaration for taation purposes5 #!at / am not t!e owner of t!e building in :uestion5 #!at t!e building in :uestion is owned by
The the&r$ "'der *hch dec%arat&' aa't 'teret are receved ' evde'ce '&t*thta'd' the$ are heara$ that the 'ecet$ &f the &cca&' re'der the rece+t&' &f "ch evde'ce adva#%e a'd/ f"rther that the re%a#%t$ &f "ch dec%arat&' aert fact *hch are aa't h &*' +ec"'ar$ &r ,&ra% 'teret. %ased on t!e affidavit, it is safe to presume t!at !e would not !ave made suc! declaration unless !e believed it to be true, as it is preudicial to !imself as well as to !is c!ildrens interests as !is !eirs. A dec%arat&' aa't 'teret the #et evde'ce *hch aff&rd the reatet certa't$ &f the fact ' d+"te. #!ere is also no evidence t!at Florentino revo)ed suc! affidavit, even w!en t!e criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling was filed by Prudencio, alt!oug! t!is was dismissed because of absence of evidence t!at Florentino entered t!e !ouse against Prudencios will and t!at and action for eectment s!ould be !is remedy5 and even w!en a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and !is wife also in 1933 w!ic! was subse:uently dismissed on t!e ground t!at respondents action s!ould be an accion publiciana w!ic! is beyond t!e urisdiction of t!e <#$. #!e building plan of t!e !ouse was in t!e name of Prudencio and !is wife and t!e !ouse was built in accordance to said plan. Prudencio was t!e one paying t!e real estate property taes on t!e !ouse under !is name since 197?, and t!e Parels did not pay t!is any time in t!eir name. !ile ta receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of owners!ip, t!ey constitute at least proof t!at t!e !older !as a claim of title over t!e property. %ut in t!is case, t!e taes, ta)en wit! t!e ot!er circumstances, S$ concludes t!at Prudencio is t!e sole owner of
t!e !ouse. /SS4= 1> Since Prudencio !as establis!ed !is claim of sole owners!ip, t!e burden of disproving so was s!ifted to Parel. So !e !as to prove t!at Florentio was a co&owner of t!e !ousel. /n Jison v. Court of Appeals, t!e S$ said t!at> A!e w!o alleges t!e affirmative of t!e issue !as t!e burden of proof, and upon t!e plaintiff in a civil case, t!e burden of proof never parts. owever, in t!e course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff ma)es out a prima facie case in !is favor, t!e duty or t!e burden of evidence s!ifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffBs prima facie case, ot!erwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
/SS4= 2> Parel cited Bravo vs. Borja to support !is claim t!at t!e rule t!at t!e court s!all consider no evidence w!ic! !as not been formally offered is not absolute, and t!at !is evidence, t!oug! not formally offered were mar)ed as e!ibits in t!e presentation of testimonies of petitioners witnesses, and were part of t!e testimonies, and also t!at t!e evidence were part of a memorandum filed before t!e court. Parel also insists t!at even wit!out t!e documentary evidence, !is testimony as well as t!at of !is witnesses substantiated !is claim. Parels counsel as)ed t!at !e be allowed to offer !is documentary evidence in writing, !e, !owever, did not file t!e same. #!us, t!e $6 did not consider t!e documentary evidence presented by petitioner. Section 0? of "ule 102 of t!e "ules of $ourt provides> Section 0?. Offer of evidence. D #!e court s!all consider no evidence w!ic! !as not been formally offered. #!e purpose for w!ic! t!e evidence is offered must be specified. 6 formal offer is necessary because it is t!e duty of a udge to rest !is findings of facts and !is udgment only and strictly upon t!e evidence offered by t!e parties to t!e suit. /t is a settled rule t!at t!e mere fact t!at a particular document is identified and mar)ed as an e!ibit does not mean t!at it !as t!ereby already been offered as part of t!e evidence of a party Parel cannot rely on t!e Bravo case because t!ere, t!e court allowed evidence on minority by admitting t!e certified true copy of t!e birt! certificate attac!ed to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in evidence, because it was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioners minority w!ic! was never c!allenged by t!e prosecution and it already formed part of t!e records of t!e case. #!e rule referred to in t!e Bravo case was Section 7 of "ule 100 of t!e "ules of $ourt w!ic! provides> ASection 7. Evidence on motion.& !en a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, t!e court may !ear t!e matter on affidavits or depositions presented by t!e respective parties, but t!e court may direct t!at t!e matter be !eard w!olly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.C 'ot Section 0? of "ule 102 of t!e "ules of $ourt w!ic! is t!e one applicable to t!e present case. =ven if t!e documentary evidence would be considered, t!e evidence s!owing t!at t!e cases filed by Prudencio were dismissed, and t!e SP6 of Parels parents did not establis! co&owners!ip. #!e construction wor)ers testimony t!at Florentino was t!e one w!o !ired !im, and t!e barangay captains allegation t!at !e was allocated a lot does not overcome Florentinos own affidavit naming Prudencio as owner of t!e !ouse. #!e fact t!at not one of t!e witnesses saw respondent during t!e construction of t!e said !ouse does not establis! t!at petitioners fat!er and respondent co&owned t!e !ouse.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ="=FO"=, t!e decision of t!e $ourt of 6ppeals dated
FU## TEAT G.R. NO. 146??6
$r- 19 2!!6
D$NI#O #. P$RE# Petitioner, vs.
SIMEON %. PRUDENCIO Respondent. &='5(5
$USTRI$
6fter trial on the merits, merits, the R-' rendered a &ecision &ecision 3 dated &ecember "%, "##3, the dispositive portion of which reads@ >=R=F
also ordered petitioner to pa! respondent a monthl! rental of P),***.** for use or occupanc! thereof from 6pril "#$$ until the former actuall! vacates the same and the sum of P%*,***.** as attorne!:s fees and cost of suit. -he '6 found as meritorious respondent:s contention that since petitioner failed to formall! offer in evidence an! documentar! evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered b! respondent. 5t ruled that the trial court:s statement that 4defendants: occupanc! of the house is due to a special power of attorne! e9ecuted b! his parents most speciall! the deceased Florentino Parel who is in fact a co+owner of said building4 is wanting of an! concrete evidence on recordC that said power of attorne! was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as petitioner:s evidence to support his claimC that e9cept for the bare testimonies of 'andelario Regua, the carpenter+foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the house and 'ora8on ?arcia, the former baranga! captain, who testified that the lot was allocated to p etitioner:s father, there was no supporting document which would sufficientl! establish factual bases for the trial court:s conclusionC and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandator!. -he '6 found the affidavit dated (eptember )0, "#13 of Florentino, petitioner:s father, stating that he is not the owner of the sub;ect house but respondent, as conclusive proof of respondent:s sole ownership of the sub;ect house as it is a declaration made b! Florentino F lorentino against his interest. 5t also found the ta9 declarations and official receipts representing pa!ments of real estate ta9es of the uestioned propert! covering the period "#10 to "##) sufficient to establish respondent:s case which constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the propert!. Petitioner:s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November )$, )***.
)avvphil.net
ence, the instant petition for review on certiorari with the following 6ssignment of =rrors@ ". -= N=R 5-(-6N&5N? -= F5N&5N? N=R(5P B=->==N -= G6-= FGe agree with the '6 that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recover! of possession of the ground floor of the sub;ect house as the e9clusive owner thereof. Respondent presented the affidavit dated (eptember )0, "#13 e9ecuted b! Florentino and sworn to before the 6ssistant 'it! 6ssessor of Baguio 'it!, ?.F. Gagasca, which reads@ 5, FG
(='. 3$. Declaration against interest . H -he declaration made b! a person deceased, or unable to testif!, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrar! to the declarantIs own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, ma! be received in evidence against himself or his successors+in+interest and against third persons. -he theor! under which declarations against i nterest are received in evidence notwithstanding the! are hearsa! is that the necessit! of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence a dvisable and, further that the reliabilit! of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniar! or moral interest. # -he affiant, Florentino, who died in "#$# was petitioner:s father and had adeuate knowledge with respect to the sub;ect covered b! his statement. 5n said affidavit, Florentino categoricall! declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned b! respondent who is residing in 7ue8on 'it!. 5t is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is pre;udicial to himself as well as to his children:s interests as his heirs. "* 6 declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certaint! of the facts in dispute. "" Notabl!, during Florentino:s lifetime, from "#13, the !ear he e9ecuted said affidavit until "#$#, the !ear of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed b! respondent against him Florentino/ and petitioner in "#$$ regarding the sub;ect house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that petitioner entered the house a gainst the latter:s will and held that the remed! of respondent was to file an action for e;ectmentC ") and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in "#$$ which was subseuentl! dismissed on the ground that respondent:s action should be an accion pu!liciana which is be!ond the ;urisdiction of the Municipal -rial 'ourt. "3 Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated anuar! ", "#13 was in the name of respondent and his wife. 5t was established during petitioner:s cross+e9amination that the e9isting structure of the two+store! house was in accordance with said building plan. "0 Notabl!, respondent has been religiousl! pa!ing the real estate propert! ta9es on the house declared under his name since "#10. "% 5n fact, petitioner during his cross+e9amination admitted that there was no occasion that the! paid the real estate ta9es nor declared an! portion of the house in their name." >e agree with the '6 that while ta9 receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, the! constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the propert!."1 -he house which petitioner claims to be co+owned b! his late father had been consistentl! declared for ta9ation purposes in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances above+mentioned, ine9orabl! lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house sub;ect matter of the litigation. Respondent having established his claim of e9clusive ownership of the sub;ect propert!, it was incumbent upon petitioner to contravene respondent:s claim. -he burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove that his father was a co+owner of the sub;ect house. >e held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, to wit@ "$
999 (impl! put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. owever, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case i n his favor, the dut! or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffIs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the part! having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rel ! on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant:s. -he concept of 4preponderance of evidence4 refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to itC at bottom, it means probabilit! of truth. "# 5n this case, the records show that although petitioner:s counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his documentar! evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. )* -hus, the '6 did not consider the documentar! evidence presented b! petitioner. (ection 30 of Rule "3) of the Rules of 'ourt provides@ (ection 30. ffer of evidence. H -he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formall! offered. -he purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. 6 formal offer is necessar! because it is the dut! of a ;udge to rest his findings of facts and his ;udgment onl! and strictl! upon the evidence offered b! the parties to the suit. )" 5t is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an e9hibit does not mean that it has thereb! alread! been offered as part of the evidence of a part!.)) Petitioner insists that although his documentar! evidence were not formall! offered, the same were marked during the presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properl! be taken cogni8ance of rel!ing in ravo, Jr. v. ora.)3 (uch reliance is misplaced. 5n ravo Jr ., we allowed evidence on minorit! b! admitting the certified true cop! of the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formall! offered in evidence. -his was due to the fact that the birth certificate was properl! filed in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioner:s minorit! which was never challenged b! the prosecution and it alread! formed part of the records of the case. -he rule referred to in the ravo case was (ection 1 of Rule "33 of the Rules of 'ourt which provides@ (ection 1. Evidence on motion.+ >hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court ma! hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented b! the respective parties, but the court ma! direct that the matter be heard wholl ! or partl! on oral testimon! or depositions. and not (ection 30 of Rule "3) of the Rules of 'ourt which is the one applicable to the present case. =ven assuming arguendo that the documentar! evidence of petitioner should be considered in his favor, the evidence showing that respondent had filed civil and criminal cases against petitioner which were dismissed as well as the alleged (pecial Power of 6ttorne! of petitioner:s parents whereb! the! authori8ed petitioner to sta! in the ground floor of the house, did not establish co+ ownership of Florentino and respondent of the sub;ect house. -he testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses failed to show that the sub;ect house is co+owned b! petitioner:s father and respondent.
'andelario Regua merel! testified that he was hired b! petitioner:s father, Florentino, to construct the residential building in "#1)C)0 that he listed the materials to be used for the construction which was purchased b! FlorentinoC)% that he and his men received their salaries ever! (aturda! and >ednesda! from Florentino or his wife, respectivel!C ) that he had not met nor seen respondent during the whole time the construction was on+going. )1 e also find that the '6 did not err in ordering petitioner to pa! respondent being the sole owner of the sub;ect house a monthl! rental of P),***.** from 6pril "#$$, the date of the e9tra+;udicial demand, until petitioner actuall! vacates the sub;ect house. 6lthough the '6 made no ratiocination as to how it arrived at the amount of P),***.** for the monthl! rental, we find the same to be a reasonable compensation for the use of the ground floor of the sub;ect house which consists of a living room, a dining room, a kitchen and three bedrooms. -he rental value refers to the value as ascertained b! proof of what the propert! would rent or b! evidence of other facts from which the fair rental value ma! be determined. 33 >e likewise affirm the '6:s award of attorne!:s fees in favor of respondent. 6rticle ))*$ of the 'ivil 'ode allows the recover! of attorne!:s fees in cases whe n the defendant:s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur e9penses to protect his interest 30 and in an! other case where the court deems it ;ust and euitable that attorne!:s fees and e9penses of litigation should be recovered 3% which are both shown in the instant case. >=R=F
1. Rees s. J$()e Co&+e/+!o& *'*&) (!)es" /ero $%#* &*!&) !&"eres"!&) "o&) +*se &* "o.. #*// re*(!&) &*'*&) 'o'
G.R. No. ?6??! O,/ober 1 199! M$RIN$ B. RE>ES $UGUSTO M. B$%$##ERO a0 SOCORRO B. FR$NCISCO petitioners, vs.
T'E 'ONOR$%#E $#FREDO %. CONCEPCION Pre08 )u8e CFI o Ca/e Ta8ay/ay %r. IV SOCORRO M$R@UEB VD$. DE B$%$##ERO EUGENI$ B. #UN$ #EON$RDO M. B$%$##ERO a0 E#EN$ FROND$ B$%$##ERO respondents. aw Firm of Ra'mundo A. Armovit for petitioners. eonardo M. Ba!allero for private respondents.
CORTHS J.:
instituted b! the National ousing 6uthorit! N6/ now pending before this 'ourt in 'ivil 'ase Nos. -?+3#), -?+3# and -?+0"1C 3. -hat based on the evidence presented b! the herein parties in the aforecited e9propriation cases, the current valuation of the land and the improvements thereon is at P#%,"3).** per hectareC 0. -hat on " 6pril "#$*, the plaintiffs received a written notice from the defendants and the intervenor that the E=GE= %*2"** P").%*/ P=(<( per suare meter, or a total price of N5N= M5GG5< 1)/ ='-6R=( < M5GG5=GE= and %*2"** P").%*/ P=(<( per suare meter and under the afore+uoted termsC 999 999 999 A6nne9 4'4 of the Petition, pp. "+), Rollo, pp. 03+00.
-he parties laid down their respective positions, as follows@ 6A#0#FF$ ". -hat the sub;ect properties are incapable of ph!sical partitionC ). -hat the price of P").%* per suare meter is grossl! e9cessiveC 3. -hat the! are willing to e9ercise their pre+emptive right for an amount of not more that P#%,"3).** per hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value of said propertiesC 0. -hat the statutor! period for e9ercising their pre+emptive right was suspended upon the filing of the complaintC DEFE0DA0$ A0D #0ER@E0R ". -hat the reasonable price of the sub;ect properties is P").%* per suare meterC ). -hat plaintiffsI right of legal pre+emption had l apsed upon their failure to e9ercise the same within the period prescribed in 6rt. ")3 of the 'ivil 'ode of the PhilippinesC 3. -hat, assuming the soundness of plaintiffsI claim that the price of P").%* per suare meter is grossl! e9cessive, it would be to the best interest of the pl aintiffs to sell their shares to the E
-hereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for petitioners another subdivision plan prepared b! a geodetic engineer. (till, no definite communication was sent b ! petitioners signif!ing their approval or disapproval to the subdivision plans. 5n order to settle once and for all the controvers! between the parties, private respondents filed a motion dated &ecember ", "#$* reuesting that petitioners be reuired to formall! specif! which of the two options under 6rticle 0#$ of the New 'ivil 'ode the! wished to avail of@ that petitionersI shares in the sub;ect properties be sold to private respondents, at the rate of P").%* per suare meterC or that the sub;ect properties be sold to a third part!, E R=( R=( R=( R=(
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order. Respondent trial ;udge reset the hearing on petitionersI motion for reconsideration to 6pril , "#$", and moved the scheduled public sale to 6pril "0, "#$". >ithout awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari , alleging that the respondent trial ;udge acted without ;urisdiction, or in grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack of ;urisdiction, in issuing his order dated March ", "#$" which denied petitionersI claim of a pre+emptive right to purchase private respondentsI pro-indiviso shares and which, peremptoril! ordered the public sale of the sub;ect properties. ith the comment and repl!, the 'ourt considered the issues ;oined and the case submitted for decision. -he 'ourt finds no merit in the present petition. -he attack on the validit! of respondent trial ;udgeIs order dated March ", " #$" is ultimatel! premised on petitionersI claim that the! had a pre+emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co+owners, private respondents herein, at a 4reasonable price4. 5t is this same claim which forms the basis of their complaint for in;unction and damages filed against private respondents in the court a %uo. -his claim is patentl! without basis. 5n this ;urisdiction, the legal provisions on co+ownership do not grant to an! of the owners of a propert! held in common a pre+emptive right to purchase the proindiviso shares of his co+owners. PetitionersI reliance on 6rticle ")* of the Ne w 'ivil 'ode is misplaced. 6rticle ")* provides@ 6 co+owner of a thing ma! e9ercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the co+owners or of an! of them, are sold to a third person. 5f the price of the alienation is grossl! e9cessive, the redemptioner shall pa! onl! a reasonable one. (hould two or more co+owners desire to e9ercise the right of redemption, the! ma! onl! do so in proportion to the share the! ma! respectivel! have in the thing owned in common A=mphasis supplied. 6rticle ")* contemplates of a situation where a co+owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger. B! the ver! nature of the right of 4legal redemption4, a co+ownerIs light to redeem is invoked onl! after the shares of the other co+owners are sold to a third part! or stranger to the co+ ownership A$ee =strada v. Re!es, 33 Phil. 3" "#"%/. But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for in;unction and damages against private respondents, no sale of the latterIs pro-indiviso shares to a third part! had !et been made. -hus, 6rticle ")* of the New 'ivil 'ode finds no application to the case at bar. -here is likewise no merit to petitionersI contention that private respondents had acknowledged the pre+emptive right of petitioners to purchase their shares at a 4reasonable price4. 6lthough it appears that private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the offer was made at a fi9ed rate of P").%* per suare meter A $ee Pre+trial
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to en;oin private respondents from alienating their proindiviso shares to a third part!. -he rights of a co+owner of a propert! are clearl! specified in 6rticle 0#3 of the New 'ivil 'ode, thus@ Art. 31>. =ach co+owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he ma! therefore ali enate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its en;o !ment, e9cept when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co+ owners shall be limited to the portion which ma! be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co+ownership. -he law does not prohibit a co+owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the propert! held in common. -he law merel! provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be limited onl! to the portion of the propert! which ma! be allotted to hi m upon termination of the co+ownership A$ee Mercado v. Giwanag, ?.R. No. G+"00)#, une 3*, "#), % ('R6 01)C PNB v. -he onorable 'ourt of 6ppeals, ?.R. No. G+300*0, une )%, "#$*, #$ ('R6 )*1C ?o
No prescription shall run in favor of a co+owner or co+heir against his co+owners or co+heirs so long as he e9pressl! or impliedl! recogni8es the co+ownership. None of the legal e9ceptions under 6rticle 0#0 applies to the case at bar. Private respondentsI counterclaim for the partition of the sub;ect properties was therefore entirel! proper. owever, during the pre+trial proceedings, petitioners adopted the position that the sub;ect properties were incapable of ph!sical partition. 5nitiall!, private respondents disputed this position. But after petitioners ine9plicabl! refused to abide b! the pretrial order issued b! respondent trial ;udge, and stubbornl! insisted on e9ercising an alleged pre+emptive right to purchase private respondentsI shares at a 4reasonable price4, private respondents relented and adopted petitionerIs position that the partition of the sub;ect properties was not economicall! feasible, and, conseuentl!, invoked the provisions of 6rticle 0#$ of the New 'ivil 'ode APrivate respondentsI 4Motion -o 6llot Properties -o &efendants henever the thing is essentiall! indivisible and the co+owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them who shall indemnif! the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed. -he sale of the propert! held in common referred to in the a bove article is resorted to when "/ the right to partition the propert! among the co+owners is invoked b! an! of them but because of the nature of the propert!, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision A $ee 6rticle 0#% of the New 'ivil 'ode would pre;udice the interests of the co+owners $ee (ection % of Rule # of the Revised Rules of 'ourt/ and )/ the co+owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire propert! upon reimbursement of the shares of the other co+owners. Petitioners herein did not have ;ustifiable grounds to ignore the ueries posed b! respondent trial ;udge and to insist that hearings be conducted in order to ascertain the reasonable price at which the! could purchase private respondentsI pro-indiviso shares APetitionersI 4'ompliance and Motion4 dated Februar! )1, "#$", 6nne9 44 of the PetitionC Rollo, pp. %1+*. (ince at this point in the case it became reasonabl! evident to respondent trial ;udge that the parties could not agree on who among them would be allotted the sub;ect properties, the 'ourt finds that respondent trial ;udge committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the holding of a public sale for the sub;ect properties with the opening b id pegged at P").%* per suare meter/, and the distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the co+owners, as provided under 6rticle 0#$ of the New 'ivil 'ode. 'ontrar! to petitionersI contention, there was no need for further hearings in the case because it is apparent from the various allegations and a dmissions of the parties made during the pre+trial proceedings, and in their respective pleadings, that the legal reuisites for the application of 6rticle 0#$ of the New 'ivil 'ode were present in the case. No factual issues remained to be litigated upon.
>=R=F
18. PA5PLONA VS 5ORETO DIGEST P*/'o&* s ore"o s!* *&( &o" 5ORATO..
Pamplona v. Moreto No. G+33"$1
March 3", "#$*
Facts@ Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, a husband and wife, who acuired ad;acent lots nos. "0#%, 0%0%, and "0# of the 'alamba Friar Gand =state covered b! certificates of title issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto married to Monica Maniega. -he! had children who left heirs after their death as well as became co+heirs with respect to the propert! owned b! Flaviano and Monica. More than !rs after Monica Maniega:s death, Flaviano sold lot "0#% for P#** to spouses Pamplona without the consent of his heirs and without an! liuidation of the con;ugal partnership. -he spouses Pamplona constructed their house on the eastern part of lot "0# as it was pointed out b! Flaviano which was a mistake on the part of both seller and bu!er. Flaviano died intestate on 6ugust "), "#% and in "#", the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where the! had their house and pigger! on the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Pamplona as the same belongs to the con;ugal partnership. -he spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises and this suit was instituted b! the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of nullit! of the deed of sale e9ecuted in the former:s favor. -he R-' ruled in favor of the plaintiff declaring null and void the sale with respect to 3#*.% s.m. of the total 1$" s.m. of which is rightfull! owned b! the plaintiffs. -he R-' decision was affirmed b! the '6C hence, this petition was instituted appealing the decision of the '6.
Iue* =+e/+er or 0o/ /+e e//o0er are e0//-e /o /+e u-- o50er+ o /+e roer/y 0 -/8a/o0 or o0-y o /+e aeJ 'e-* >e the! are entitled to the full ownership of the propert! in litigation because at the time of the sale, the co+owner Flaviano/ as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without ob;ection. &espite the fact that at the time of sale, there was no partition of the sub;ect propert! between the co+owners and Flaviano, as vendor, had ownership of an undetermined portion of the hereditar! estate which he had a perfect and legal right to dispose of to the (pouse Pamplona. 6ccording to 6rt. 11, the inheritance which private respondents ma! receive from their deceased parents includes all the propert!, rights and obligations of a person which are not e9tinguished b! their parent:s
death. 5n addition, under 6rt. "3"" of the N'', the contract of sale e9ecuted b! Flaviano took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs which includes the private respondentsC therefore, the! must compl! with said obligation. -he petition is affirmed with modification with respect to the fact that the sale e9ecuted in favor of (pouses Pamplona is legal and valid in its entiret!.
!<. DE CAS,RO VS A,IENA =alang 4igest at 6a%a6ing i2ang sa6e case na6e na lu6ala2as 8e% 4i0e%ent ang g% nu62e%) 8e% 6ai7li lang t su8e%. Full tet na.>
G.R. No. #<2?!14 O,/ober 17 1973 DO#ORES #$'OR$ VD$. DE C$STRO $RSENIO DE C$STRO )R. =I#FREDO DE C$STRO IRINEO DE C$STRO a0 VIRGINI$ DE C$STRO $#E)$NDRO 0 ub//u/o0 or /+e e,eae ee0a0/
GREGORIO $TIENB$ respondent. Arsenio de Castro, Jr. and F.. 6apa for petitioners. Da:ila Castro and B.D. de Mesa for respondent.
TEE'$N&EE J.: -he 'ourt re;ects petitionersI appeal as without merit and affirms the ;udgment of the appellate court. PetitionersI predecessor+in+interest as co+owner of an undivided one+half interest in the fishpond could validl! lease his interest to a third part!, respondent 6tien8a, independentl! of his co+owner although said co+owner had also leased his other undivided one+half interest to the same third part!/ and could likewise b! mutual agreement independentl! cancel his lease agreement with said third part!. (aid predecessor+in+interest and petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs/ therefore stands liable on his e9press undertaking to refund the advance rental paid to him b! the lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non+cancellation of the co+ownerIs lease to elude such liabilit!. -he 'ourt of 6ppeals, in its decision affirming in toto the ;udgment of the Manila court of first instance ordering therein defendant+appellant 6rsenio de 'astro, (r. now deceased and substituted b! above+named petitioners as his heirs/ 4to return to the plaintiff respondent/ ?regorio 6tien8a the sum P),%**.** with legal interest from the date of the filing of complaint until full! paid plus the sum of P)%*.** as attorne!Is fees and the costs of the suit4, found the following facts to undisputed@
6ccording to the contract of lease =9h. "/ the term of the lease was for five !ears from anuar! )0, "#% at a rental of P%,*** a !ear, the first !earIs rental to be paid on Februar! ", "#%, the second on Februar! ", "#%1 and the rental for the last three !ears on Februar! ", "#%$. -he first !earIs rental was paid on time. 5n the meantime, -omas de 'astro died. 5n the month of November, "#%, plaintiff as lessee and defendant 6rsenio de 'astro, (r. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and annul the contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement =9h. 6/ was signed b! them, =9hibit 6 as signed b! plaintiff and defendant shows that Felisa 'ru8 Eda. de 'astro, widow of -omas de 'astro, was intended to be made a part! thereof in her capacit! as representative of the heirs of -omas 'astro. 'ondition No. ) of =9hibit 6 reads as follows@ 4). Na sa pamamagitan nito a! pinawawalang kabuluhan namin ang nasabing kasulatan at nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin ni 6rsenio de 'astro at Felisa 'ru8 Eda. de 'astro a! isauli ka! ?R=?
-he issue is simpl! reduced to whether 6rsenio as co+owner of the fishpond owned pro-indiviso b! him with his brother -omas succeeded b! Felisa Eda. de 'astro/ could validl! lease his half+interest to a third part! respondent 6tien8a/ independentl' of his co+owner, and in case his co+owner also leased his other half interest to the same third part!, whether 6rsenio could cancel his own lease agreement with said third part!O -he appellate court correctl! resolved the issue thus@ 4
20. Es"o$e s /*7!$'*. *'* (!& (!)es" /ero s#or" '*&) (!& "o. Loe o$ *e !%* &*'*&) *) e(!" #* #e#e /*r* $!%'! $&) $o&) (o+$e&".
G.R. No. #<24419
)u-y 1? 196"
#EONOR$ ESTO@UE plaintiff+appellant, vs.
E#EN$ M. P$)IMU#$ a/e by +er +uba0 CIRI$CO P$)IMU#$ defendants+appellees. Jesus 6. Mapanao for plaintiff-appellant. @ergara and Da'ot for defendants-appellees.
RE>ES ).%.#. J.: &irect appeal from an order of the 'ourt of First 5nstance of Ga Dnion, in its 'ivil 'ase No. "##*, granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for legal redemption b! a co+owner retracto legal de comuneros/ on account of failure to state a cause of action. -he basic facts and issues are stated in the decision appealed from, as follows@ Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co+owner of Got No. $*), for having purchased "23 portion thereof, containing an area of 0* suare meters as evidenced b! a deed of sale, 6nne9 464, which was e9ecuted on
-he action of the plaintiff is premised on the claim of co+ownership. From the deed of sale e9ecuted in favor of the plaintiff, it can be seen that the "23 portion sold to plaintiff is definitel! identified as the "23 portion located on the southeastern part of Got No. $*) and specificall! bounded on the north b! &e ?u8man (treet, on the east b! Posadas (treet, on the south b! Pere8 (treet, and on the west b! re maining portion of the same lot, which contained an area of 0* suare meters. 6nd in the deed of sale e9ecuted b! 'rispina Pere8 and her children in favor of defendant =lena Pa;imula over the remaining )23 portion of Got No. $*), said portion is identified as the western portion of Got No. $*) which is bounded on the north b! &e ?u8man (treet, on the east b! pr operties of Geonarda =stoue, on the south b! the national road and on the west b! Gots Nos. 1## and $*", containing an area of %#$ suare meters. -he appellantIs stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to conve! the southeastern third of Got $*) of the Rosario 'adastre notwithstanding the description in the deed itself, for the reason that the vendor, being a mere co+owner, had no right to sell an! definite p ortion of the land held in common but could onl! transmit her undivided share, since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co+owner is not known u ntil partition takes place Gope8 vs. 5lustre, % Phil. % 1C Ramire8 vs. Bautista, "0 Phil. %)$/. From this premise, the appella nt argues that the sale in her favor, although describing a definite area, should be construed as having conve!ed onl! the undivided "23 interest in Got $*) owned at the time b! the vendor, 'rispina Pere8 Eda. de 6uitania. >herefore, when the ne9t da! said vendor acuired the )23 interest of her two other co+owners, Got $*) became the common propert! of appellant and 'rispina Pere8. -herefore, appellant argues, when 'rispina sold the rest of the propert! to appellee Pa;imula spouses, the former was selling an undivided )23 that appellant, as co+owner, was entitled to redeem, pursuant to 6rticle ")* of the New 'ivil 'ode. 6R-. ")*. 6 co+owner of a thing ma! e9ercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co+owners or of an! of them, are sold to a third person. 5f the price of the alienation is grossl! e9cessive the redemptioner shall pa! onl! a reasonable one. (hould two or more co+owners desire to e9ercise the right of redemption, the! ma! onl! do so in proportion to the share the! ma! respectivel! have in the thing owned in common. -he lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the deeds of sale show that the lot acuired b! p laintiff =stoue was different from that of the defendants Pa;imulaC hence the! never became co+owners, and the alleged right of legal redemption was not proper. =stoue appealed. >e find no error in the order of dismissal, for the facts pleaded negate the claim that appellant =stoue ever became a co+owner of appellees Pa;imula. "/ -he deed of sale to =stoue 6nne9 6 of the complaint/ clearl! specifies the ob;ect sold as the southeastern third portion of Got $*) of the Rosario 'adastre, with an area of $ 0* suare meters, more or less. ?ranting that the seller, 'rispina Pere8 Eda. de 6uitania could not have sold this particular portion of the lot owned i n common b! her and her two brothers, Goren8o and Ricardo Pere8, b! no means does it follow that she intended to sell to appellant =stoue her "23 undivided interest in the lot forementioned. -here is nothing i n the deed of sale to ;ustif! such inference. -hat the seller could have validl! sold her one+third undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she did choose to sell the same. A! posse ad actu non valet illatio. )/ >hile on the date of the sale to =stoue 6nne9 6/ said contract ma! have been ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed, the transaction was validated and became full! effective when the ne9t da!
