DEPARTMENTAL SYLLABUS I.
PRACTICE OF LAW In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
Ponente: CASTRO, C.J.: Violation: Penalty: Disbarment Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. ISSUE: Can the court compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP? HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
A.C. No. 6792
January 25, 2006
ROBERTO SORIANO
vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON PER CURIAM Violation: frustrated homicide Penalty: disbarment
Doctrine: The purpose for a proceeding of disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable — lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. FACTS Complainant was a taxi driver who overtook the accused’s car on his way home after gassing up.
Accused was drunk at that time and tailed the taxi until it rounded r ounded by the Chugum and Carino Car ino streets. The accused stopped his car and berated Soriano. There resulted an altercation, but Soriano merely tried to stop Dizon from attacking him, because he was the older guy and he smelled of liquor. Dizon dropped his eyeglasses, and Soriano picked them up. However, when Soriano attempted to return the eyeglasses, Dizon had gotten a gun and wrapped its handle with a handkerchief and fired a shot at Soriano. The bullet got Soriano’s carotid artery, but he survived due to prompt medical treatment. Dizon was convicted
of frustrated homicide and applied for probation, which was granted. However, he obstinately refused to satisfy civil liabilities with Soriano. He also tried to settle with Soriano’s family with the vice mayor’s help, but that got nowhere. He also fabricated stories that Soriano with two others beat him up. Also, he was found to be in possession of an unlicensed firearm. ISSUE Whether or noy Manuel Dizon’s disbarment was proper. HELD
Yes. Accused displayed dishonestly and moral turpitude by his behavior. Among others, the following facts prove that he lacks good moral character: He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car; He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him; Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant, who was unarmed; When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled; Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant; Apart from his denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one m auled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and, Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has, to date, not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ Ponente: BENGZON, C.J.: Doctrine: A bar exam-taker must have successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education previous to the study of law. Dispositive: The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered. Facts:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications . The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education , specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Answering this official report and complaint, com plaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education,".
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975 IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975 IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975 IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee Ponente:MAKASIAR, J. Violation: unauthorized re-evaluation of bar exam answers;g uilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. Penalty: revocation of his license to practice law Doctrine:
Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked his license. The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion. In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to. FACTS
Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about the startling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year and that there are grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects that underwent alterations to raise the grades prior to release of results. The Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954, Ramon Galang, underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or rechecked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized , and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations. Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial). An investigation conducted by the NBI also showed that Ramon Galang, was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the same university. Confronted with this information, respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case .
It must also be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo’s statement of assets and liabilities were not taken up d uring the investigation but were examined as parts of the records of the court. ISSUES
1.
Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into re-evaluating Galang”s exam notebooks.Yes.
2.
Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the court his pending case. Yes. HELD
1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince the examiners to individually re-examine the grades of Galang to help him pass even without the authority of the Court. All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly that indeed the examiners made the re-evaluation in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever. But the favorable reevaluations made by the examiners were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration. There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. 2. Yes. Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath. That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled. Furthermore, respondent’s persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
In Re: Cunanan
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks: 1946-1951………………70% 1952 …………………….71% 1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73% 1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%. Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.” ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional. RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, t he Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary. As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons: 1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II; 2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates; 3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and 4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation. As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
G.R. No. L-19450
May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA Ponente: PAREDES, J . Violation: None Penalty: None FACTS
Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with crime of Malicious Mischied, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was representedy by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. Counsel for the accused presented a Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing. ISSUE
Whether of not City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. HELD No. The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
June 30, 2008 ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, vs. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, RTC, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.: Doctrine: An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the CourtAdministrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of ―demeaning, humilating, and berating‖ him during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al. where Mane was counsel for the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen asked Mane about the latter’s law school. When Mane answered that he came from Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him: ―Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equateyourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance. ‖ Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latter’s person, seemingly disregarding the case at hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon evaluation, found that Belen’s insulting remarks were unwarranted and inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of Belen. ISSUE: Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute
conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct HELD: The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which the Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and
signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem. A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the counsel. If Judge Belen felt that his integrity and dignity were being ―assaulted,‖ he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse. The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.
II.
Canon 1
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA
vs. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG Ponente: AQUINO, J. FACTS
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang. In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s parent about the pregnancy. They also m ade Arciga’s parents believe that they were already married but they would have to have the church wedding
in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license. In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwang’s wife and t his irked Maniwang so he infli cted physical injuries upon Arciga. Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently Arciga had an
illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born. ISSUE
Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred. HELD No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga was not
so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”.
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007 CYNTHIA ADVINCULA vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent. Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J. Violation: Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNI NG that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future. Facts:
The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the ground of gross immorality. It was alleged that sometime in December 2004, complainant seek for legal advice from peitioner regarding her collectibles from a travel company. Respondent sent Demand Letter and sometime in February 2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss the possibility of filing complaint against the travel company because the latter failed to settle the accounts. That after that said meeting, the respondent "held her arm and kissed her on the cheek while embracing her very tightly." The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint and while on their way home after the said meeting, the respondent suddenly stopped the car and things went out of hand. Thus she decided to refer the case to another lawyer. Issue: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral which would warrant the
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law Ruling:
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 1 Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but all throughtout their legal career as lawyers belong to an exclusive and honored fraternity. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession and should adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest standard of morality. The respondent admitted to the act of kissing the complainant on the lips as evidenced as well of his asking for apology from complainant in his text message. Regardless of the fact that the respondent admitted that he kissed the complainant but the Court held that this was not accompanied by malice because the respondent immediately asked for forgiveness after sensing the annoyance of the respondent after texting him. Thus the Court held that this is not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible which will warrant disbarment or suspension. But the Court reprimanded respondent to be more prudent and cautious.
A.C. No. 389
February 28, 1967
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA
vs. ARMANDO PUNO Ponente: REGALA, J. Violation: gross immorality and misconduct Penalty: disbarment FACTS
Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M. Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958, which was duly identified by the respondent to be his. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital. ISSUE
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred. HELD Yes. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said: An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: ... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963 JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent. Ponente: BARRERA, J.: Violation: Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys. FACTS:Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the latter. In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident because Oblena threatened to kill her family. As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child.
Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with him. The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of attorney even though the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the incident. The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also has a legal husband in the province. Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from those originally charged in the complaint but the court overruled his petition After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring any c riminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to take the bar. ISSUE: W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblena’s disbarment RULING: YES Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice and can be exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes.
American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly specify that as a ground of disbarment. Oblena’s argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when he filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong. One’s own approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is. His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law. Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royong’s trust on him. Oblena’s contention that the Solici tor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complain which is entirely different from the original complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation.
[G.R. No. 137378. October 12, 2000] PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. vs. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC. Ponente: VITUG, J .: Facts:
In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of California, USA, entered into a contract with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a Philippine corporation, whereby the latter agrees to deliver 8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI received the wheels and so it paid PAWI $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that the wheels are defective and did not comply with certain US standards. So in 1979, FASGI sued PAWI in a California court. In 1980, a settlement was reached but PAWI failed to comply with the terms of the agreement. A second agreement was made but PAWI was again remiss in its obligation. The agreement basically provides that PAWI shall return the purchase price in installment and conversely, FASGI shall return the wheel in installment. PAWI was only able to make two installments (which were actually made beyond the scheduled date). FASGI also returned the corresponding number of wheels. Eventually in 1982, FASGI sought the enforcement of the agreement and it received a favorable judgment from the California court. PAWI is then ordered to pay an equivalent of P252k plus damages but FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was not able to comply with the court order in the US. So in 1983, FASGI filed a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with RTC-Makati. Hearings were made and in 1990, the trial judge ruled against FASGI on the ground that the foreign judgment is tainted with fraud because FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining wheels (unjust enrichment) and that PAWI’s American lawyer entered into the agreements without the consent of PAWI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Issue:
Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in the Philippines. Held:
Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California court. PAWI’s insistence that its American lawyer colluded with FASGI; that he entered into the compromise agreement without PAWI’s authority is belied by the fact that PAWI initially complied with the agreement. It did not disclaim the agreement. It sent two installments (though belatedly) but failed to comply on the rest. It cannot now aver that the agreement is without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for the California court not to order FASGI to return the remaining wheels because of PAWI’s arrears.
A.C. No. 9881 June 4, 2014 (Formerly CBD 10-2607) ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner vs. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent. Ponente: SERENO, CJ: Violation: Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Facts:
For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors of the administrative Complaint for DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty. Manuel Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients t o enforce a contract on the complainant's client who had never been a party to the agreement. The facts are as follows: The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan. The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements. On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty1 with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina2 for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract. In his Answer,3 Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble4 was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.5 Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent, were dismissed.6 Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latter’s egress to Times
Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579. According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12 December 2008.7 Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his answer t o the Complaint. On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the
complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith.8 On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210, adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9 Atty. Paguia filed a Motion f or Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by the IBP Board of Governors on 29 December 2012.10 Notices of the denial were received by the parties on 21 March 2013.11 No petition for review has been filed with this Court. It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant does not file a petition with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution. This rule is derived from
Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states: (c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied) In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Board’s resolution on 21 March 2013, as evidenced by a
registry return receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for review from Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review with the Court within 15 days, this case is deemed terminated pursuant to the above mentioned Section 12(c). Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason to deviate from the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant.12 In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia charges Atty. Molina with providing legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble is binding on complainant’s client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement. The allegation of
giving legal advice, however, was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not proof.13 Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows: An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law. x x x.14 The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed. It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and is evidentiary.15 There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands in this case. The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of evidence.
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015 ARCATOMY S. GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Violation: filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility Penalty: we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision
Facts:
Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI. Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR. Held:
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR. We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR. However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in submitting a false document we
see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law.
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015 MELVYN G. GARCIA vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO PER CURIAM
Violation: Homicide Penalty: DISBARRED Facts:
A.C. No. 7973 Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was eventually granted. Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro
bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273) A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973. In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court. Issue: Whether or not the conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude. Held: Yes. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
In People v. Sesbreño, the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when the
latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreño when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’
house in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado. We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights. There was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights. There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty
for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral character. A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.
A.C. No. 6760 January 30, 2013 ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III vs. ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES, Respondent.
DECISION BRION, J.: Facts:
Anastacio Teodoro filed a complaint against Gonzales for allegedly intentionall y committing forum shopping. Gonzales is the counsel of Araceli in two civil cases filed against Anastacio. The first involved the settlement of the estate of Manuela Teodoro and while the case was pending, Gonzales assisted in filing the subsequent case for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages without indicating the special proceeding earlier filed. According to Anastacio, this was a deliberate act of forum shopping made by Gonzales. Initially, the commissioner found that Gonzales was indeed guilty of forum shopping for the ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other and that he instituted the subsequent case without indicating the pending case. The commissioner ruled that Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the code for he disregarded the SC circular prohibiting forum shopping.Hence, suspending him for 1 month. However, the board of Governors of the IBP reversed the Commissioner’s recommendation and
dismissed
the
case.
Issue: Whether Gonzales committed forum shopping and thereby violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Ruling: Yes. The court held that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers should be
reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the CPR which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. However, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in the light of all the circumstances of this case.
A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014 FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA A.C. NO. 4728 FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J . Violation: breach of the Lawyer’s Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the
Court and causing undue delay of these cases Penalty: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, reckoned from receipt of this
Decision Facts:
Accused representing himself as the owner of a parce l of land known as Lot No. 7661 of the Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor and owner at that time was private complainant Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which accused executed in favor of private complainant on 2nd December, 1981, without first redeeming/repurchasing the same. [P]rivate complainant knowing of accused[’s] unlawful act only on or about the last week of February,
1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him of the property, the mortgage having been foreclosed, private complainant thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced by accused[’s] unlawful transaction and misrepresentation. Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases against respondent by filing before this Court an Affidavit-Complaint dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental Complaintdated February 27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both complaints, complainant sought the disbarment of respondent. Respondent denied that his agreement with complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He claimed that it was an equitable mortgage and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of the land, the total amount would have exceeded P15,000.00. Held:
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for which respondent should be held administratively liable. When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to “obey the laws,” “do no falsehood,” and “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion.”18 He gravely violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” as he was the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument . Respondent could have simply
denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as “mortgagor” and “mortgagee,” respectively, rather than as “vendor a
retro” and
“vendee a retro.” If only
respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed, then the controversy between him and complainant could have been avoided or, at the very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion.”
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of
the said certificate of title, when the truth is that the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982, or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant. Respondent’s infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a disciplinary sanction before. In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga,respondent was held liable for conduct unbecoming an
attorney for which he was fined P2,000.00.
III. Canon 2 G.R. No. 173188
January 15, 2014
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOYCADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO
vs. VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados BRION, J .:
The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued Homestead Patent No. V15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames. The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action 5 before the RTC(then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya. On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads: 10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6 In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA. On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames’ TCT No. T -4792 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in t heir children’s names. On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children. On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses Ames null and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ame s’ TCT No. T -4792 and to reissue another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via the spouses Ames’ petition for review on
certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-25984(under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cada vedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 14, 1981. With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint 7 before the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one- half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo. Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352was pending. On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10, 1982. Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC subsequently denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the CAvia a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of January 31, 1984. The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the name of the spouses Cadavedo concerning the subject lot. On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an actio n9 against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one- half portion from 1981;and that the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No. 41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352. Issues/Held:
We resolve to GRANT the petition. The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the present controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of discussion, we
summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings pertinent to each) as follows: Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981. Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23, 1981. Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed on May 21, 1982. Civil Case No. 215 – Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), f iled between the latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement on May 13, 1982. Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case). The agreement on attorney’s fee
cons is ting of one-half of the s ubject lot is void; the petitioners are entitled to recover pos s ess ion The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one -half of the subject lot is
valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed below.
A . The wri tten ag reement providi ng for a conting ent fee of P 2,000.00 s hould prevail over the oral ag reement providing for onehalf of the s ubject lot The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor. Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the court
would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a representation to the court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his ser vices in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the
former prays from the court as an incident to the main action. At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by both parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor
of the former .17 Hence, the contingency fee of P2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot.
B . The conting ent fee ag reement between the spous es C adavedo and Atty. Lacaya, awarding the latter one-half of the s ubject lot, is champertous Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void. In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.18 Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was directed "against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation."22 The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of public policy."24 In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for public policy considerations.25 As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct th e litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law."26 The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him
and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."27 In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy. There, the Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is against public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client. 29 In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree
with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same reasons discussed above underlie this rule. C. The attorney’s fee consisting of
one-half of the subject lot is exces s ive and uncons cionable We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being excessive and
unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two other civil cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as observed by the RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition. That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases did not and could not otherwis e justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the
petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of Based on these considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and unreasonable. D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of
the one-half portion contr avenes A rti cle 1491 (5) of the Ci vi l Code Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession . 32 The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics . 33 A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the judicial action.34Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the compromise agreement. From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion (which was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721were already pending before the lower courts. Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the compromise agreement –independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find them to be prohibited and void35by reason of public policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are considered in existent and void from the beginning.37 What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer violated the
provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the transfer and the execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the compromise agreement and in so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent fee agreement. While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position, however, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation.40 The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled
by the lawyer .41 In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement. Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of the alleged
oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his clients.42
E .The compromis e agr eement could not validate the void oral conting ent fee agreement; neither did it s upers ede the written conting ent fee agr eement The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and possession of the
disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the compromise agreement, which had for its object a void transaction, should be void. A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contr ary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is in existent and void from the beginning. 43 It can never be ratified44 nor the action or defense for the declaration of the in existence of the contract prescribe; 45 and any contract directly resulting from such illegal contract is likewise void and in existent. 46 Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee agreement providing for attorney’s fee of P2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from questioning its validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject m atter of the void compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case could not have attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of possession de facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of possession founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners– in filing the present action and praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-
half portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –were not barred by the compromise agreement. Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive at torney’s fees on a quantum mer uit basis
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation"48 for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.49 Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Cour t50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,51f actors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled. In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty. Lacaya’s
fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third (Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares. All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification on valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one -half portion. The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a property right over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed property, which in this case, the Court properly accords.
IV.
Canon 3 EN BANC [A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003]
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner, vs. EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent. [A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. April 4, 2003 EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, petitioner, vs. Judge ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, respondent. [A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC. April 4, 2003] [In Re: Use by Atty. Renerio G. Paas as an Office in His Private Practice of His Profession the Office of His Wife, Pasay City MeTC Judge Estrellita M. Paas.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas administratively charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with discourtesy, disrespect, insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil Service Law. The case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P. In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to do so, thus amounting to insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually absent from work or made it appear that he reported for work by signing the logbook in the morning, only to stay out of the office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their Release Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what was necessary for the purchase of stamps and pocketed the difference; once failed to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the amount given to him for the purpose; and divulged confidential information to litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). [1] Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit,[2] and members of the court staff,[3] by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing with Judge Paas and his co-employees. Doctoleros affidavit also corroborated Judge Paas allegation that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in the morning and thereafter stay out of the office. Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August 2, 2000,[4] attested that the alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July 11, 2000 was not included in the list of registered mails posted in the Pasay City Post Office on said date. Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag, both assigned to the Pasay City Jail, by their respective affidavits,[5] attested that on several occasions, they saw Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in consideration of the release of their Release Orders. Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000,[6] denied Judge Paas charges, and alleged that t he real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any information from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him the following invectives before the other employees of the court: Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong; and she insisted that he sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep. Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the following incidents of oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by the Judge to her chambers where she berated him
as follows: Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng estafa at falsification; the next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told him Bakit ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa Lunes; and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called him again to her chambers and told him Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil driver kita. Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the foregoing incidents to Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised him to report the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn statement-complaint[7] against Judge Paas and went to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it, but he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her who then told him that they should forget all about it. On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money in exchange for the release of court orders and alleged that both Hernandez and Macabasag executed their respective affidavits because Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective weddings; Hernandez was in fact indebted to the Judge for helping him cover-up the escape of a detainee under his charge; the courts mail matters were always sealed whenever he received them for mailing and he never tampered with their contents; the alleged unmailed printed matter was actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via ordinary instead of registered mail, because the money given to him for the purpose was insufficient; and on the days when he was out of the office, he was actually performing personal errands for the judge and her husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him as their personal driver and messenger. As further proof of Judge Paas oppressive behavior towards him, Almarvez claimed that she ordered him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated September 7, 2000,[8] even if he had no history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of his examination.[9] The Court treated respondents Answer as a counter-complaint against Judge Paas and docketed it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA, which assigned them to Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for investigation. In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed that Judge Paas husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wifes office as his office address in his law practice, in support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to the case of People vs. Louie Manabat, et al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City,[10] the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44. Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B[11] of the Rules of Court which allows the Supreme Court to motu proprio initiate proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the matter as A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM No. MTJ-01-1363. In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution[12] of the Court en banc, Judge and Atty. Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit[13] wherein they vehemently denied the charge that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutors Office, or when he lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such as Christmas party and her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit were the separate sworn statements of Atty. Paas law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez[14] and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula[15] attesting that he is holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel[16] attesting that Atty. Paas visits to the court are neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in the practice of his profession.
On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit[17] wherein she admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 981198, People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y Salita, (now docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta. By Resolution of February 12, 2002,[18] the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, Judge Yap submitted his Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002.[19] On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated March 1, 2002.[20] I. OCA Findings and Recommendations A. On the charges against Almarvez: The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Almarvez of exacting money from detainees, violating confidentiality of official communication, absence without official leave, discourtesy and insubordination. Given Almarvez unsatisfactory performance ratings for three rating periods covering January to June 2000,[21] July to December 2000,[22] and January to April 2001,[23] however, the OCA recommended that he be duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One (1) Month suspension without pay, instead of dismissal as warranted under Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his supervisor having failed to observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of employees from the rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later portion of this decision. B. On the charges against Judge Paas: With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of supporting evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse. It found, however, that Judge Paas had used her administrative power of supervision and control over court personnel for her personal pride, prejudice and pettiness[24] when she issued her September 7, 2000 Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had already filed an administrative case against him. It thus concluded that, in all probability, the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against him. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of simple miscondu ct in office, and be penalized with reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. II. This Courts Findings: A. On the charges against Almarvez: Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of confidentiality of official communication against Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in Judge Paas complaint-affidavit which reads: That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations which is confidential in nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized release date before the release of Court Order and Decision for consideration of a sum of money thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party detrimental to the due administration of justice,[25]
in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to intelligently meet the same. As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and insubordination which were echoed in the affidavits of court personnel, they are also too general to support a conviction and are contrary to what is reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees. On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): Absent any evidence to support the charge, the affiants-jail officers who claimed to have witnessed Almarvez receive money from detention prisoners in exchange for the release of their Release Orders not having been presented, hence, their claim remains hearsay, Almarvez categorical denial and counter-allegation that these affiants executed their affidavits only out of fear of or favor to Judge Paas gain light. As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and would thereafter leave the office, again Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr. While she submitted in evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000 memorandum[26] requiring Almarvez to explain why he was not in the office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000, despite his affixing of his signature in the logbook on those dates indicating that he reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he submitted himself to drug testing as required by her in her September 7, 2000[27] memorandum, which explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000 letter of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug Board.[28] As to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000, Almarvez explanation that he was actually present in the morning but left in the afternoon for the Supreme Court[29] was not controverted. On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following findings of the OCA that he should be faulted therefor: The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods covering January to June 2000, July to December 2000 and January to April 2001 evidently shows that he failed to perform his official duties. The fact that respondent Almarvez never disputed the performance ratings given him is tantamount to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book V of Executive Order No. 292, quoted as follows: Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his performance rating. Failure to file an appeal within the prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such right. The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds to drop him from the Rolls. However, considering that his superior/supervisor failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that he was able to make up and cure his inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to improve his performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by his performance rating for the period April to June 2001 with a very satisfactory rating, dropping him from the roll will no longer be appropriate[30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the above-quoted findings of the OCA reads: 2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance. (a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee concerned is informed in writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended by the OCA, is thus in order. B. On the charges against Judge Paas: Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failed to substantiate the same. Judge Paas order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Per Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997, public employees are required to undergo a drug test prior to employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a pre-employment prerequisite but is a continuing requirement to ensure the highest degree of productivity of the civil service. However, considering that the order was issued after Judge Paas filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it was only a fishing expedition against him. This is conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded. C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas: By Judge Paas own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit,[31] she was aware that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a case lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA puts it, [w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a subtle way of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel.[32] The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against the judge and her spouse, Atty. Paas: SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice and Promoting Respect for their Officials and Employers reads: As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be preserved and enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees must: 1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute grounds for disciplinary action under, as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully comply with the norms of conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713); 2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices; xxx 6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court or judicial functions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that: Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.) SC Circular No. 3-92,[33] dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession. Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving unauthorized and improper use of the courts premises for dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of the service, and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the courts premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage. (Underscoring supplied.) By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other courts, Judge Paas indeed allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct[34] and of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which violation is classified as a less serious charge under the Rules of Court[35] and is punishable under the same Rule.[36] A judges official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his behavior not only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This is premised on the truism that a Judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a Judges attributes depend the public perception of the Judiciary.[37] On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Canon 3A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Canon 10A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Canon 13a LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPERITY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT. Canon 15A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body. The need for relying on the merits of a lawyers case, instead of banking on his relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be
overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyers prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible and improper conduct. This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his court notices sent to office of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used his office address but there is no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to that address. While a lawyer should make the necessary arrangements to ensure that he is properly informed of any court action, these should not violate his lawyers oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member of the judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct. WHEREFORE, this Court finds: (1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay; (2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely; (3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC, (a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC Circular No. 3-92 and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely; and (b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. This Decision shall take effect immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and appended to respondents personal record.
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985 ADRIANO E. DACANAY
vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR. AQUINO, J . Facts:
In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented by Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres’ client. The letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”. Dacanay denied Clurman’s liabili ty and at the same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead “Baker & McKenzie”, a foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using “Baker & McKenzie”.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law firm is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities all over the world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that they can render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment. Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed. Held:
No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines. Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law firm are enjoined from using “Baker & McKenzie” in their practice of law. V. VI.
Canon 4 Canon 5
VII.
Canon 6 [G.R. No. 125440. January 31, 2000]
GENERAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (GBTC); WORLDWIDE INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANY (WORLDWIDE); MIDLAND INSURANCE CORPORATION (MIDLAND); and STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. (STANDARD), petitioners, vs. THE OMBUDSMAN; OMB-GIO RAUL E. TOTANES and ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON, respondents.
DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: olanski This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman Resolution dated May 15, 1995 in OMB-CRIM-0-93-1597 which dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners against respondent Assistant Solicitor General (ASG) Magdangal M. de Leon, and the Ombudsman Order dated March 13, 1996 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners. Petitioners General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), Worldwide Insurance and Surety Company (Worldwide), Midland Insurance Corporation (Midland) and Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard) filed a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon on July 5, 1993. Docketed as OMB-CRIM-093-1597, the complaint accused respondent ASG de Leon of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), for allegedly x x x causing undue injury to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the GBTC Stockholders in giving Lucio Tan unwarranted benefit or advantage in the discharge of his official functions by protecting and defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank relative to (sic) verbatim adoption of the Lucio Tan Bid as the Liquidation Plan of GBTC under Monetary Board Resolution No. 677, March 29, 1977.[1] and charged respondent administratively with malfeasance in office, for his alleged Sdaadsc x x x deliberate and adamant refusal to comply with his statutory duty to protect and defend the interest of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank relative to the verbatim adoption of the Lucio Tan Bid as the Liquidation Plan of GBTC under Monetary Board Resolution No. 677, March 29, 1977.[2] OMB-CRIM-093-1597 was assigned to respondent Raul E. Totanes, Ombudsman Graft Investigation Office II, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB). Respondent Totanes dismissed the criminal case against respondent ASG de Leon in the assailed Resolution dated May 15, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned investigator respectfully recommends that the above-entitled case be forthwith DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence to hold respondent CRIMINALLY liable for the acts complained of in the instant complaint. SO RESOLVED.[3] Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 10, 1995 that was denied in an Order dated March 13, 1996. Hence, this petition. The relevant facts as summarized by the Office of the Ombudsman are: On March 27, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed Resolution No. 677 to the effect that GBTC is insolvent and therefore has to stop its banking business operations. It designated a Liquidator
and approved a Liquidation Plan whereby (sic) Lucio Tan Group shall purchase all the assets and assume all the liabilities of GBTC; Slxmis On April 07, 1977, the Central Bank of the Philippines and Arnulfo B. Aurellano in his capacity as the Monetary Board of the Central Bank Liquidator of GBTC filed through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) a Petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking the court's assistance in the liquidation of GBTC. The Court docketed the said petition as Spec. Proc. No. 107812, entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of GBTC"; On May 05, 1982, three minority stockholders of GBTC, namely, Worldwide, Midland and Standard through their counsel, ATTY. ANGEL C. CRUZ, filed an intervention in the said case, praying for the annulment of the closure and liquidation of GBTC by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank as these were allegedly done arbitrarily and in bad faith. Later, GBTC itself joined and adopted the intervention of its aforesaid three minority stockholders; Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo, to whose Team the said case was assigned by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, re-assigned the said case from Solicitor Juan C. Nabong to the herein respondent in view of Juan C. Nabong's appointment as RTC Judge; From that time on, all the pleadings, filed with the Liquidation Court RTC of Manila, were signed by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and the herein respondent in behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). What prompted petitioners to file a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon with the Ombudsman is the alleged "inconsistent position" of said respondent in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and in Civil Case No. 0005 filed with Sandiganbayan. Civil Case No. 0005 is an ill-gotten wealth case filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) through the OSG on July 17, 1987. This case was instituted against Lucio Tan, former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et. al. Petitioners point out that in Civil Case No. 0005, the first of the causes of actions therein as stated in Par. 14 (a)-(1) to (3) alleges that: (A) The Marcos-dominated Central Bank Closure of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 25, 1977; (B) The LUCIO TAN'S (sic) takeover of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 29, 1977; are illegal, fraudulent and arbitrary, made thru conspiracy with and taking advantage of the close relationship between the LUCIO TAN Group and the deposed President and Wife, other CB officials, with the help and manipulation of then CB Governor Gregorio S. Licaros and former PNB President Panfilo O. Domingo xxx.[4] Kortex The charge that respondent ASG de Leon espoused conflicting interests rests on the contention of petitioners that said respondent's act of defending the legality of the Central Bank closure of GBTC amounts to defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank.[5] Petitioners maintain that the position taken by the OSG represented by respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 is "against the 'interest of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines' as contained in the statement of ultimate facts set forth in Par. 14 (a)-(1) to (3) of EDSA-SDB Civil Case No. 0005, ANNEX "C".[6] On December 16, 1992, counsel of petitioners wrote respondent ASG de Leon that he inhibit himself from appearing in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and to defend the interest of the Government of the Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan in Civil Case No. 0005.[7] When respondent ASG de Leon for OSG continued to represent the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812, petitioners then filed the complaint against respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman.
In dismissing the case, the Office of the Ombudsman held: Thus, the records of this case convincingly show that, whenever the herein respondent Assistant Solicitor General appears in court or signs any pleading in the aforesaid case, he is doing so not in his personal capacity but in his official capacity as one of the lawyers in the OSG, which is headed by the Solicitor General. Everything stated in the pleadings filed by the OSG in the aforesaid case is not the personal stand or opinion of the herein respondent but the official stand or opinion of the OSG. Hence, OSG as counsel of the Central Bank of the Philippines in the aforesaid case is defending its client, the Central Bank. It is not defending the interest of Lucio Tan. The fact that, under the Liquidation Plan approved by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, the Lucio Tan Group purchased the assets and assumed the liabilities of GBTC, is merely incidental. What is at issue in the aforesaid case, which is now before the Court of Appeals, is whether or not the Monetary Board of the Central Bank acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in its actions, leading to the closure and liquidation of GBTC. Sclaw As regards the complaint in the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0005, which is an action for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth against Lucio Tan, et. al., the same was signed by Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Chairman Ramon Diaz and Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. While it is true that, the said case is in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, yet it was filed by the PCGG which is the only agency involved in that case. The said PCGG case has nothing to do with Spec. Proc. No. 107812 (CA-G.R. CV No. 39939) which involves the issue of validity of the closure and liquidation of GBTC. Neither the Central Bank nor GBTC Liquidator Arnulfo B. Aurellano of the Central Bank, petitioners-appellants in the said CA G.R. CV No. 39938, are parties in the said Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. With the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution having been denied, petitioners filed this petition raising the following issues: I. THAT RESPONDENT OMB AND RESPONDENT INVESTIGATION OFFICER RAUL E. TOTANES COMMITTED OUTRAGEOUSLY WRONG FINDINGS (A) THAT THE OSG "IS NOT DEFENDING THE INTEREST OF LUCIO TAN" IN SPEC. PROC. NO. 107812, NOW CA-G.R. NO. 39939, AND (B) THAT THE EDSA CASE SANDIGANBAYAN CIVIL CASE NO. 0005 HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH SPEC. PROC. NO. 107812, NOW CA-G.R. NO. 39939, ARE DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED BY THE FACTS ON RECORD. II. THAT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMPLETELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL NOR ANY LEGAL PROVISION NOR ANY DECISIONAL AUTHORITY NOR ANY PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY VESTING UPON OSG THE RIGHT AND OR DUTY TO REPRESENT INTEREST "IN CONFLICT OR OPPOSED" TO THE INTEREST OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OF WHICH OSG IS THE CHIEF COUNSEL, IN ANY ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH CASE SUCH AS THAT ARISING FROM THE ILLEGAL AND FRAUDULENT CB CLOSURE AND LUCIO TAN'S TAKEOVER OF GBTC, AS SET FORTH IN PAR. 14 (a)-(1) TO (3), EDSA-SDB CIVIL CASE NO. 0005, ANNEX "C". Sclex III. THAT RESPONDENT OMB IS TOTALLY WRONG IN NOT FINDING THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE EXISTS AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e), RA No. 3019, AS AMENDED CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, BEING DOCUMENTARY, IS SO CLEAR AND SO PLAIN.[8]
The petition must be dismissed. Not only are the charges against respondent ASG de Leon baseless, they are also misplaced. In accusing respondent ASG de Leon of malfeasance and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, petitioners would like this Court to believe that respondent ASG de Leon, in representing the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. 107812 (now CA-GR CV No. 39939) is also defending the interest of Lucio Tan. Considering that Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 is a complaint against Lucio Tan filed by the PCGG through the OSG and includes averments pertaining to the alleged illegal and arbitrary closure of GBTC, petitioners are convinced that respondent ASG de Leon must be held personally liable for the alleged inconsistent interest or position taken by the OSG in these two cases. To be criminally liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, these elements must be present: (1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[9] Respondent ASG de Leon, in representing the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 was acting in his official capacity as Assistant Solicitor General.[10] As Assistant Solicitor General, respondent was a member of the legal staff of the OSG tasked to represent the Central Bank, an agency of the Government, in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-GR CV No. 39939. Based on the records, the case was originally assigned to Solicitor Nabong, but was re-assigned to respondent who at the time was a Solicitor, in view of the appointment of Nabong as RTC judge. Xlaw In defending the validity of the closure of GBTC, respondent ASG de Leon was merely acting in the interest of the Central Bank, which is the client of OSG. It may be true that a successful defense of the interest of the Central Bank in said case would also inure to the benefit of the Lucio Tan group. However, such benefit would just be an incidental result of the position that the government has taken in justifying the closure of said bank because the approved Liquidation Plan for GBTC provided that the Lucio Tan group shall purchase all the assets and assume all the liabilities of GBTC and such Liquidation Plan would be in force upon a judgment upholding the legality of the closure of GBTC. [11] Whatever benefit the Lucio Tan group would reap upon a favorable judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 is but a natural consequence of a successful defense of the actions of the Central Bank in closing GBTC. Certainly, it cannot be deemed as an act of causing undue injury to a party by giving it unwarranted benefits or advantage. We affirm the finding that respondent ASG de Leon cannot be held criminally liable for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In defending the Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal duty to defend the interest of the Government and was merely pursuing the position taken by it. Whatever legal services respondent ASG de Leon rendered in favor of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were made in his official capacity as a member of the legal staff of the OSG. We note that in all of the pleadings filed by the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, the signature of respondent ASG de Leon appeared therein as Solicitor and later on as Assistant Solicitor General. However, it must be noted that these pleadings also bore the signatures of the Solicitor General and other members of the legal staff of the Office of the Solicitor General.[12] Hence, the acts of respondent ASG de Leon had the imprimatur of the OSG which had consistently defended the interest of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939. Four Solicitor Generals, Estelito Mendoza, Sedfrey Ordoez, Frank Chavez and Raul I. Goco have maintained the policy of defending the closure of GBTC by the Central Bank and respondent ASG de Leon merely acted with the other officials of the OSG in representing the State.
To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the five aforementioned elements must concur. In the absence of proof that respondent ASG de Leon acted with manifest partiality in pursuing the official stand of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, respondent ASG de Leon cannot be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to prove the fifth element is fatal to their cause. Petitioners harp on the alleged conflicting positions of respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 and in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. However, the records fail to disclose the nature and extent of respondent ASG de Leons participation in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. What has been set in detail is the participation of respondent ASG de Leon in Spec Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939. Assuming arguendo that respondent ASG de Leon participated in these two cases, this Court cannot hold him personally liable. The perceived inconsistent positions are the official positions taken by his office as the principal law office and legal defender of the Government.[13] Petitioners have already raised the issue of "inconsistent positions" of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 033642 (Appeal of the Central Bank from the decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch IV in Spec. Proc. No. 107812). In CA-G.R. CV No. 033642, petitioners sought to have then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez cited in contempt and subjected to disciplinary action for said inconsistency. In upholding the position of Solicitor General Chavez, the Court of Appeals stated in its Resolution dated July 19, 1988: Sc The second ground in support of the motion for contempt may have some basis per se, that is, appellants counsel espouses two inconsistent positions or interests: the first, in favor of Central Bank and Lucio Tan, which is the position taken in the case at bar, and the second, in favor of the Republic but against Lucio Tan and his cohorts in the Civil Case before the Sandiganbayan. The situation of the appellants counsel may therefore be likened to one whose choice is between the devil and the deep blue sea. Still and all, we are not ready to condemn appellants counsel because of the fix in which he found himself. On the contrary, we might commiserate with him. He is under the payroll of the State and he represents the State sometimes through its instrumentality like the Central Bank and its officials, as in the instant case. In other words, the State in both cases has knowingly allowed counsel to represent it, and for this reason, the latter may not be held in contempt and subjected to any disciplinary action.[14] This Court agrees that even the Solicitor General cannot be personally liable for the predicament he found himself in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. Basic to a prosecution under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is that public officers must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in performing his legal duty. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of respondent Totanes that there was no prima facie case against respondent ASG de Leon. The perceived conflict of interest or position undertaken by the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 and in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 should be addressed to the OSG or the Solicitor General in particular. Furthermore, in Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, we ruled that the "courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form."[15] Scmis The power of the Ombudsman to determine the merits of a complaint is mandated by the Constitution and courts should not interfere in the exercise thereof. There is also a practical reason behind this rule, to wit: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitioners assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same was that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[16] IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED.
