AGABON VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 442 SCRA 573, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 19922 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims3 and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work, and were not entitled to back wages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence.
ISSUE: The issue before us is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting financial assistance to an employee who was validly dismissed for theft of company property. RATIO: Capor was acquitted in her Criminal Case based on reasonable doubt. They all found substantial evidence to conclude that Capor had been validly dismissed for dishonesty or serious misconduct. The award of separation pay is not warranted under the law and juris prudence. The law is clear. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault. Jurisprudence has classified theft of company property as a serious misconduct and denied the award of separation pay to the erring employee. HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 3, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 76789 affirming the September 20, 2002 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The November 16, 1999 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. (Non-payment of back wages) HODGES V YULO 1948
Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the private respondent refused to give them assignments unless the y agreed to work on a “pakyaw” basis when they reported for duty on February 23, 1999. They did not agree on this arrangement because it would mean losing benefits as Social Security System (SSS) members. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work. Petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to perform installation work for another company. Petitioners also demanded for an increase in their wage to P280.00 per day. When this was not granted, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed the illegal dismissal case. ISSUE: Whether CA erred in the award of compensation to Petitioners. RATIO: It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements of due process were complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal. An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003, in CAG. R. SP No. 63017, finding that petitioners Jenny and Virgilio Agabon abandoned their work, and ordering private respondent to pay each of the petitioners holiday pay for four regular holidays from 1996 to 1998, in the amount of P6,520.00, service incentive leave pay for the same period in the amount of P3,255.00 and the balance of Virgilio Agabon’s thirteenth month pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is further ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for noncompliance with statutory due process. No costs. RENO FOODS, INC. VS. NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA (NLM)KATIPUNAN, 615 SCRA 240 , MARCH 15, 2010
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Rodas, J. FACTS: As attorney-in-fact of Paz Salas and Carlota Salas the herein defendantappellant (Felix S. Yulo) obtained a loan from the herein plaintiff-appellee (C. N. Hodges) in the amount of P28,000 for which a mortgage on certain real estate owned by appellant’s principals was executed In favor of the appellee on March 27, 1926. Of said loan the appellant applied the sum of P10,188.29 to the payment of his personal indebtedness to the appellee consisting of two promissory notes which matured on November 29,1920, and December 7, 1920, and of the first instalment of the price of certain property bought by the appellant from the appellee. Upon breach of the mortgage, a foreclosure action was instituted by the appellee against Paz Salas and Carlota Salas which was in the main decided against the appellee in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court rendered judgment on October 21, 1936, holding that the application by the appellant of the sum of P10,188.29 to his personal account was beyond his authority granted in the power of attorney executed by Paz Salas and Carlota Salas, and that the latter were bound to pay to the appellee the balance that actually inured to their benefit and credit, or only P17,811.71. RATIO: Where the plaintiff in an action fails to secure a judgment because the court in effect has ruled that the action was directed against the wrong defendant, and the time limited for the commencement of the proper action has expired, plaintiff has one year from the conclusion of the first action to bring another against the right defendant, in conformity with section 49 of Act No. 190. HELD: Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendantappellant absolved from the complaint So ordered. MULLER VS. MULLER, 500 SCRA 65, AUGUST 29, 2006 PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS: Respondent Nenita Capor (Capor) was an employee of Reno Foods until her dismissal on October 27, 1998. It is a standard operating procedure of petitioner company to subject all its employees to reasonable search of their belongings upon leaving the company premises. On October 19, 1998, the guard on duty found six Reno canned goods wrapped in nylon leggings inside Capor’s fabric clutch bag. Petitioners accorded Capor several opportunities to explain her side, often with the assistance of the union officers of Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM) Katipunan. In fact, after petitioners sent a Notice of Termination to Capor, she was given yet another opportunity for reconsideration through a labor management grievance conference held on November 17, 1999. Unfortunately, petitioners did not find reason to change its earlie r decision to terminate Capor’s employment with the company.
FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by responden t’s parents but decided to move and re side permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2194385 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila. Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. ISSUE: Whether the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in holding that the respondent herein is entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to
purchase the land as well as the costs for the construction of the house, for in so ruling, It indirectly allowed an act done which Otherwise could not be directly done, Without doing violence to the constitutional proscription that an alien is prohibited from acquiring ownership of real properties located in the Philippines and the court of appeals gravely erred in sustaining respondent’s cause of action which is actually a desperate attempt to obtain ownership over the lot in question, clothed under the guise of claiming reimbursement. RATIO: Equity; It has been held that equity as a rule will fol low the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly —he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Equity; It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly —he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q9421862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS VS. QUIWA, 665 SCRA 479 , FEBRUARY 08, 2012 MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court (Second Division). FACTS: After the Mt. Pinatubo tragedy in 1991, DPWH engaged a number of contractors, including the respondents, for the urgent rehabilitation of the affected river systems. Save for Chiara Construction and Ardy Construction, respectively owned by Efren N. Rigor and Romeo R. Dimatulac, the contractors signed written agreements with Engineer Philip Meñez, Project Manager II of the DPWH. It is undisputed that the contractors have completed their assigned rehabilitation works. But DPWH refused to pay the contractors for the reason that the contracts were invalid due to noncompliance with legal requirements. As such, respondents filed an action for a sum of money against DPWH. ISSUE: Whether the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in holding that the respondent herein is entitled to compensation against petitioner DPWH. RATIO: “A litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.” Jurisprudence recognizes the principle of quantum meruit. Accordingly, in the interest of substantial Justice. This Court will remain true to the rule of substantial justice and direct the payment of compensation to the contractors, who have completed their services for the governmen t’s Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation Project. Otherwise, urgent actions for emergency work in the future would be discouraged. HELD: Contractor’s entitlement to compensation has been and is hereby directed. IN VIEW THEREOF, the 8 November 2011 Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the 12 October 2011 Decision of this Court’s Second Division is denied for lack of merit. AGRA VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, 309 SCRA 509, JUNE 29, 1999 PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS: “On August 30, 1976, an action for collection of a sum of money was filed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB, for brevity) against FilEastern Wood Industries, Inc. (FilEastern, for short) in its capacity as principal debtor and against Cayetano Ferreria, Pedro Atienza, Vicente O. Novales, Antonio R. Agra, and Napoleon M. Gamo in their capacity as sureties. “In its complaint, plaintiff PNB alleged that on July 17, 1967 FilEastern was granted a loan in the amount
of (P2,500,000.00) with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum. Drawings from said demand loan were made on different dates as evidenced by several promissory notes and were credited to the account of FilEastern. To secure the payment of the said loan FilEastern as principal and sureties Ferreria, Atienza, Novales, Agra, and Gamo executed a Surety Agreement whereby the sureties, jointly and severally with the principal, guaranteed and warranted to PNB, its successors or assigns, prompt payment of subject obligation including notes, drafts, bills of exchange, overdrafts and other obligations of every kind, on which FilEastern was indebted or may thereafter become indebted to PNB. It was further alleged that as of May 31, 1976 the total indebtedness of FilEastern and its sureties on subject loan amounted to (P5,297,976.17), excluding attorney’s fees. Notwithstanding repeated demands, the defendants refused and failed to pay their loans. The defendants (herein sureties) filed separate answers. Petitioners admit that PNB’s claim, though filed more than seven years from the maturity of the obligation, fell within the ten year prescriptive period. They argue, however, that the cause was already barred by laches, which is defined as “the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier warranting a presumption that he has abandoned his right or declined to assert it.” laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity; Whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not. ISSUE: Whether petitioners may raise the defense of laches in order to avoid their liability under the surety agreement. Laches is a recourse in equity. Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of statutory law. Thus, laches cannot, as a rule, abate a collection suit filed within the prescriptive period mandated by the Civil Code. RATIO: In the present case, there is no showing of any mistake or any inequity. The fact alone that seven years had lapsed before PNB filed the collection suit does not mean that it discovered the obligation of the sureties only then. There was a Surety Arrangement, and the law says that the said contract can be enforced by action within ten years. HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 189 SCRA 680, SEPTEMBER 18, 1990 PETITION for certiorari to review the decision and resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court. FACTS: On March 20, 1968, Leticia de la Vina Sepe executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB, San Carlos Branch, over a lot registered in her name under TCT No. T31913 to secure the payment of a sugar crop loan of P3,400. Later, Leticia Sepe, acting as attorneyinfact for her brotherinlaw, private respondent Romeo Alcedo, executed an amended real estate mortgage to include his (Alcedo’s) Lot No. 1626 as additional collateral for Sepe’s increased loan of P16,500 Leticia Sepe and private respondent Alcedo verbally agreed to split fifty-fifty (50/50) the proceeds of the loan (p. 94, Rollo) but failing to receive his one-half share from her, Alcedo wrote a letter on May 12, 1970 to the PNB, San Carlos Branch, revoking the Special Power of Attorney which he had given to Leticia Sepe to mortgage his Lot No. 1626. Replying on May 22, 1970, the PNB Branch Manager, Jose T. Gellegani, advised Alcedo that his land had already been included as collateral for Sepe’s sugar crop loan, which the latter had already availed of, nevertheless, he assured Alcedo that the bank would exclude his lot as collateral for Sepe’s forthcoming (197172) sugar crop loan. On the same day, May 22, 1970, PNB advised Sepe in writing to replace Lot No. 1402 with another collateral of equal or higher value. Despite the above advice from PNB, Sepe was still able to obtain an additional loan from PNB increasing her debt of P16,500 to P56,638.69 on the security of Alcedo’s property as collateral. On January 15, 1974, Alcedo received two (2) letters from PNB: (1) informing him of Sepe’s failure to pay her loan in the total amount of P56,638.69; and (2) giving him six (6) days to settle Sepe’s outstanding obligation, as otherwise, foreclosure proceedings would be commenced against his property (p. 33, Rollo). Alcedo requested Sepe to pay her accounts to forestall foreclosure proceedings against his property, but to no avail.
ISSUES: These issues boil down to whether or not PNB validly foreclosed the real estate mortgage on Alcedo’s property despite notice of Alcedo’s revocation of the Special Power of Attorney authorizing Leticia Sepe to mortgage his property as security for her sugar crop loans and despite the Bank’s written assurance to Alcedo that it would exclude his property as collatera l for Sepe’s future loan obligations. RATIO: We agree with the opinion of the appellate court that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel enunciated in the case of Republic Flour Mills, Inc. vs. Central Bank, L23542, August 11, 1979, the act and assurance given by the PNB to Alcedo “that we shall exclude the aforementioned lot [Lot No. 1402] as a collateral of Leticia de la Vina Sepe in our recommendation for her 197172 sugar crop loan” is binding on the bank. Having given that assurance, the bank may not turn Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court around and do the exact opposite of what it said it would not do. One may not take inconsistent positions. Estoppel; A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. HELD: The extrajudicial foreclosure being null and void ab initio, the certificate of sale which the Sheriff delivered to PNB as the highest bidder at the sale is also null and void. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. RUBIO VS. ALABATA, 717 SCRA 554 , FEBRUARY 26, 2014 PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. FACTS: Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo Delicta, and Adriano Alabata (petitioners) and respondent Lourdes Alabata (respondent) were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court (1) voided the “Declaration of Heirship and Sale”; (2) Ordered respondent to reconvey the entire subje ct property to petitioners; (3) Dismissed respondent’s counterclaim; And (4) ordered her to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit. Not in conformity, respondent elevated the RTC43 case to the CA. She, however, later withdrew her appeal which paved the way for the RTC43 Decision to lapse into finality. The CA resolution granting respondent’s motion to withdraw became final and executory on June 20, 1997. On August 20, 1997, The Entry of Judgment was issued and recorded in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments. Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed. Petitioners claim that their counsel at the Public Attorney’s Office, Dumaguete City (PAO Dumaguete), was never informed that the entry of judgment had already been issued. They pointed out that, initially, their case was handled by the PAO Dumaguete, but when the RTC43 decision was appealed to the CA by respondent, their case was handed over to the Special Appealed Cases Division (SACPAO) at the PAO Central Office in Manila. They explained that although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the SACPAO lawyer in charge of their case, she failed to inform petitioners of the issued entry of judgment before she resigned from PAO sometime in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAO Dumaguete of the said development. When petitioners followed up with PAO Dumaguete, it was of the belief that the appeal of respondent was still pending. In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from the date when the RTC43 decision was entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners found out that the said decision had become final and executory when their nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment. ISSUE: the court a quo erred in strictly applying the procedural rules on prescription and dismissing the case based on the said ground, in spite [of] the fact that petitioners will suffer manifest injustice and deprivation of their property, due to a fault not Attributable to them. RATIO: Since the decision became final and executory, she has been in possession of the property which rightfully belongs to petitioners. She will continue to hold on to the property just because of a technicality. Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a
wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 16, 2011 Decision and the September 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 02497 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for appropriate action. SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 278 SCRA 27 , AUGUST 21, 1997 PETITION for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court. FACTS: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the latter escaped from jail. On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits in CUSTODIA LEGIS. This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUES: The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two: May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient? RATIO: It is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro.” “For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes HELD: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 893214, Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bart elli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. TAMAYO V GSELL 1916 APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Del Rosario, J. FACTS: That the boy Braulio Tamayo, whose age neither he nor his father, Paciente Tamayo, knows, nor does it appear of record, but which, in the opinion of the court, is about eleven or twelve years, was one of the workmen employed in the match factory, situated in Santa Ana, Manila, and owned by the defendant, Carlos Gsell. On the 13th of March, 1914, the boy met with an accident which consisted of an injury caused by the knife of one of the machines of the factory which cut the little and ring fingers on the right hand,
the latter of which was severed. That the accident arose by reason of his being assigned by Eugenio Murcia, one of the foremen employed in the factory, to perform work to which he was not accustomed. He was put at the machine of Arcadio Reyes only on the day of the accident, in spite of his persistent and manifest opposition to assist the machinist; his work was to recover the strips, used in the manufacture of match boxes, from the machine, Exhibit 1, which were extracted from the said machine from the wood placed therein. At the same time, he had to clean out the pieces of wood from said strips, which st uck in the machine and obstructed its proper working. Prior to the date in question the only work entrusted to the boy, Braulio Tamayo, was to pick over the piles of wood from which the strips used in the manufacture of match boxes were made and select the best pieces for the purpose. Due to his inexperience in the work to which, for the first time and without any preparation or instruction, he had been assigned in essaying to clean that part of the machine where the pieces of wood from the strips were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine and the ring finger of his right hand was severed. He was thereupon taken to the General Hospital, where he received medical treatment until he was released. We have often had occasion to say that-the question is not for what sum of money would a person submit to such an injury, but what sum of money will compensate for it as far as money can compensate at all; and, where a person asks for pecuniary compensation, he cannot complain if the loss is estimated on a strictly pecuniary basis. ISSUE: Whether the award od P400 is excessive.
The plaintiff's ward, a young, ignorant boy, was employed by the defendant to do ordinary work in the performance of which he did not come into contact with the machinery, and was without any previous warning or instructions and over the objections of the ward, ordered to assist in cleaning a dangerous machine where his fingers were caught in the machine, severing the ring finger at the first joint. That defendant was guilty of negligence and the award of P400 not excessive. RATIO: The obligation of warning is imposed mainly for the sake of the young, or in the case of adults, where there are concealed defects. The instructions must be sufficient to enable the employee to avoid injury by the exercise of reasonable care, unless both the danger and the means of avoiding it are apparent and within the comprehension of the servant. HELD: This opinion is quite long, necessarily made so by the importance of the questions raised. The judgment being strictly in accordance with law and the merits of the case, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. PRIMICIAS VS OCAMPO 1953 ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court Mandamus and prohibition. FACTS: This petition was originally filed with the Court of Appeals, but was later certified to this court on the ground that the main basis of the petition is section 49 of Republic Act No, 409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, approved on June 18, 1949, and respondents assail the constitutionality of said section. Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses, namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth. Act No. 606, which was docketed as criminal case No. 18374, in that he knowingly chartered. a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18375, in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J. 980.) "S ubstantive law is that part of the law whic h creates, defines and regula tes rights„ or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions
ISSUES: The issues now posed by petitioner are: "I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory. "II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a substantive right, cannot be impaired by this court in the exercise of its rule- making power. "III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Old Charter of Manila, creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and were not repealed by Rules of Court. RATIO: The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must be created and defined by express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor. The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. HELD: In view of the foregoing, we hold that the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure are still in force and that the same may still be invoked in the light of the provisions of section 49 of the Republic Act No. 409. It is therefore our opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Wherefore, petition is hereby granted, without pronouncement as to costs. TAN JR V CA 373 SCRA 524 PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS: “Involved in this case is a parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 645-C, with an area of 34,829 square meters, more or less, situated in Bunawan, Davao City. The lot was once covered by TCT No. T-72067 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City in the name of the late Jaime C. Tan (Tan, for short) married to Praxedes V. Tan. On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988. On May 2, 1988, Tan’s heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. Docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. 19049-88, the complaint alleged that, while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage. Barely hours after the complaint was stamped ‘received,’ the Magdangals were able to have Tan’s title over the lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No. T-134470. This development prompted the heirs of Tan, who were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental complaint. ISSUE: We will immediately resolve the key issue of what rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner. RATIO: We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of th e 1997 Revised Rules of Proced ure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested. HELD: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1998 and its Resolution dated November 9, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP-41738 are annulled and set aside. The Orders dated June 10, 1996 and July 24, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 1904988 are reinstated. No costs.
