Labor- digests 3. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al G.R. No. 132805 Feb. 2, 1999
1. 2.
FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company. He was assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
WON the the nullify nullifying ing of of the 3-mon 3-month th suspen suspension sion by by the NLRC erroneous. WON the award awarding ing of moral moral damages damages is proper proper..
HELD: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portion of the assailed assailed decision decision awardin awarding g moral moral damages damages to private private respondent is DELETED. All other aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED
1. The legality of private respondent's suspension: On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was abou t5-minute drive away. A few minutes later, the clinic Dr. Fabros left the clinic that night only to have his dinner at received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. his house, which was only a few minutes' drive away from One of its employeeshad suffered a heart attack. The nurse the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty on duty, Mr. Eusebio, called private respondent at home to so that he could be easily reached in case of emergency. inform him of the emergency. The patient arrived at the Upon Upon being being inform informed ed of Mr. Acosta Acosta's 's cond conditi ition on,, priva private te clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately respondent immediately left his home and returned to the rushed him to the hospital. When Dr. Fabros reached the clinic. These facts belie petitioner's claim of abandonment. clinic clinic at aroun around d 7:51 7:51 in the eveni evening ng,, Mr. Euseb Eusebio io had already left with the patient to the hospital. The patient Petitione Petitionerr argues argues that being being a full-time full-time employee, employee, private private died the following day. respondent is obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may not leave the Upon learning learning about about the incident incident,, PAL Medical Medical Director Director company premises during such time, even to take his meals. ord ordered red the the Chief ief Flig light Surgeon to conduct an investigation. investigation. In his explanation, explanation, Dr. Fabros Fabros asserted that he was entit entitled led to a thirty thirty-mi -minu nute te meal meal break break;; that that he We are not impressed. immediately left his residence upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a Art. 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read: few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him. Art. 83. Normal hours of work. — The normal hours of Finding private respondent's explanation unacceptable, the man managemen ementt charge rged priv rivate ate resp espondent ent with ith abandonm abandonment ent of post while on duty. He denied denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he only left the clinic to have his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening upon being informed of the emergency. After After evalu evaluati ating ng the charge charge as well well as the answer answer of private respondent, he was given a suspension for three months effective December 16, 1994. Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner. On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension of private respondent illegal. It also also order ordered ed petiti petitione onerr to pay privat private e respo respond ndent ent the the amoun amountt equiv equivale alent nt to all the benef benefits its he should should have have received during his period of suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC, however, however, dismissed dismissed the appeal appeal after after finding finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts facts on record record and the law law on the matter. matter. The NLRC likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day. Health Health person personnel nel in citie cities s and and munic municipa ipalit lities ies with with a popu populat lation ion of at least least one milli million on (1,00 (1,000,0 0,000 00)) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigenci exigencies es of the service service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or fortyeight (48) hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an additional additional compensatio compensation n of at least least thirty thirty per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, "health personnel" shall include: residen residentt physici physicians, ans, nurses, nurses, nutritio nutritionist nists, s, dieticia dieticians, ns, pharm pharmaci acists sts,, social social worke workers, rs, labor laborato atory ry techn technici icians ans,, param paramedi edical cal techn technici icians ans,, psych psycholo ologi gists sts,, midwiv midwives, es, attendant attendants s and all other other hospital hospital or clinic clinic personn personnel. el. (emphasis supplied) Art. 85. Meal periods. — Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals. Sec. 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Implementing Implementing the Labor Code further states:
Rules
Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods. — Every employer shall give his employees, regardless of sex, not less than one (1) (1) hour hour time time-o -off ff for for regu regula larr meal meals, s, exce except pt in the the follow followin ing g cases cases when when a meal meal period period of not less than than twenty twenty (20) minute minutes s may be given given by the employ employer er
Labor- digests provided that such shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked of the employee; (a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve strenuous physical exertion; (b) Where the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen hours a day; (c) In cases of actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer; and (d) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods. Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty (20) minutes shall be considered as compensable working time. Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include the meal break . Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within the company premises. Employees are not prohibited from going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Private respondent's act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute abandonment. 2. The award of moral damages: Not every employee who is illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. As a rule, moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy In the case at bar, there is no showing that the management of petitioner company was moved by some evil motive in suspending private respondent. It suspended private respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous, belief that private respondent's act of leaving the company premises to take his meal at home constituted abandonment of post which warrants the penalty of suspension. Under the circumstances, we hold that private respondent is not entitled to moral damages.
Labor- digests 4. PNB V PNB EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 115 SCRA 507 July 30, 1982 NATURE Appeal from decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) FACTS
be paid “at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least 25% additional.” The law did not define what is a regular wage or salary. What the law emphasized is that in addition to “regular wage,” there must be paid an additional 25% of that “regular wage” to constitute overtime rate of pay. Parties were thus allowed to agree on what shall be mutually considered regular pay from or upon which a 25% premium shall be based and added to makeup overtime compensation.
- PNB and PNB Employees Association (PEMA) had a dispute regarding the proper computation of overtime pay. PEMA wanted the cost of living allowance (granted in 1958) - No rule of universal application to other cases may be and longevity pay (granted in 1961) to be included in the justifiably extracted from the NAWASA case. CIR relies on the computation. PNB disagreed and the 2 parties later went part of the NAWASA decision where the SC cited American before the CIR to resolve the dispute. decisions whose legislation on overtime is at variance with the law in this jurisdiction. The US legislation considers work in excess of forty hours a week as overtime; whereas, what is - CIR decided in favor of PEMA and held that PNB should compute the overtime pay of its employees on the basis of the sum total of the employee’s basic salary or wage plus cost of living allowance and longevity pay. The CIR relied on the ruling in NAWASA v NAWASA Consolidated Unions, which held that “for purposes of computing overtime compensation, regular wage includes all payments which the parties have agreed shall be received during the work week, including differentiated payments for working at undesirable times, such as at night and the board and lodging customarily furnished the employee.” This prompted PNB to appeal, hence this case. ISSUE WON the cost of living allowance and longevity pay should be included in the computation of overtime pay as held by the CIR HELD NO Ratio Overtime pay is for extra effort beyond that contemplated in the employment contract; additional pay given for any other purpose cannot be included in the basis for the computation of overtime pay. - Absent a specific provision in the CBA, the bases for the computation of overtime pay are 2 computations, namely:
generally considered overtime in the Philippines is work in excess of the regular 8 hours a day. It is understandably material to refer to precedents in the US for purposes of computing weekly wages under a 40-hour week rule, since the particular issue involved in NAWASA is the conversion of prior weekly regular earnings into daily rates without allowing diminution or addition. - To apply the NAWASA computation would require a different formula for each and every employee. It would require reference to and continued use of individual earnings in the past, thus multiplying the administrative difficulties of the Company. It would be cumbersome and tedious a process to compute overtime pay and this may again cause delays in payments, which in turn could lead to serious disputes. To apply this mode of computation would retard and stifle the growth of unions themselves as Companies would be irresistibly drawn into denying, new and additional fringe benefits, if not those already existing, for fear of bloating their overhead expenses through overtime which, by reason of being unfixed, becomes instead a veritable source of irritant in labor relations. **Overtime Pay Rationale Why is a laborer or employee who works beyond the regular hours of work entitled to extra compensation called, in this enlightened time, overtime pay?
Verily, there can be no other reason than that he is made to work longer than what is commensurate with his agreed compensation for the statutorily fixed or voluntarily agreed hours of labor he is supposed to do. When he thus spends 2. WON the same is intended to be permanent and regular, additional time to his work, the effect upon him is multinot contingent nor temporary as a given only to remedy a faceted; he puts in more effort, physical and/or mental; he is situation which can change any time. delayed in going home to his family to enjoy the comforts thereof; he might have no time for relaxation, amusement or sports; he might miss important pre-arranged engagements; Reasoning - Longevity pay cannot be included in the computation of etc. It is thus the additional work, labor or service employed and the adverse effects just mentioned of his longer stay in his place of work that justify and are the real reasons for the overtime pay for the very simple reason that the contrary extra compensation that is called overtime pay. is expressly stipulated in the CBA, which constitutes the law between the parties. **Overtime Pay Definition The additional pay for service or 1. WON the additional pay is for extra work done or service rendered
- As regards cost of living allowance, there is nothing in Commonwealth Act 444 [or “the 8-hour Labor Law,” now Art. 87 Labor Code] that could justify PEMA’s posture that it
work rendered or performed in excess of 8 hours a day by employees or laborers in employment covered by the 8 hour Labor Law [C.A. 444, now Art. 87 Labor Code] and not
Labor- digests the overtime hourly rate by the number of hours worked in excess of eight. Disposition decision appealed from is REVERSED
Labor- digests 6. SALAZAR VS. NLRC G.R. No 109210 APRIL 17, 1996
FACTS: On 17 April 1990, private respondent Carlos Construction, at a monthly salary of P4,500.00, employed Salazar as construction/project engineer for the construction of a building in Cubao. Allegedly, by virtue of an oral contract, petitioner would also receive a share in the profits after completion of the project and that petitioner's services in excess of 8 ours on regular days and services rendered on weekends and legal holidays shall be compensable overtime. On 16 April 1991, petitioner received a memorandum issued by private respondent's project manager informing him of the termination of his services effective on 30 April 1991. On 13 September 1991, Salazar filed a complaint against private respondent for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, illegal deduction, non-payment of wages, overtime rendered, service incentive leave pay, commission, allowances, profit-sharing and separation pay with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch, Manila. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the instant case for lack of merit. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, where it affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. His MR was likewise dismissed. Hence the instant petition.
(c) Officers or members of a managerial staff xxx That petitioner was paid overtime benefits does not automatically and necessarily denote that petitioner is entitled to such benefits
2.
NO. petitioner insists that private respondent promised him a share in the profits after completion of the construction project. It is because of this oral agreement, petitioner elucidates, that he agreed to a monthly salary of P4,500.00, an amount which he claims is too low for a professional civil engineer like him with the rank of project engineer.
We cannot accede to petitioner's demand. Nowhere in the disbursement vouchers can we find even the remotest hint of a profit-sharing agreement between petitioner and private respondent. Petitioner's rationalization stretches the imagination way too far. Also, as said by the Labor Arbiter: As to the issue of profit sharing, we simply cannot grant the same on the mere basis of complainant's allegation that respondent verbally promised him that he is entitled to a share in the profits derive(d) from the projects. Benefits or privileges of this nature (are) usually in writing, besides complainant failed to (establish) that said benefits or privileges (have) been given to any of respondent('s) employees as a matter of practice or policy.
3. YES. On April 30, he was advised by the Manager to continue supervising the finishing touches to the building until May 15, the date appearing in the Certificate of Service as the date of the termination of the contract between Salazar and the Company. But the Manager insists that ISSUE: Salazar’s services terminated at April 30 according to the Memorandum given the petitioner. 1) WON petitioner is entitled to overtime pay, premium pay The purpose for which the said certificate was issued for services rendered on rest days and holidays and service becomes irrelevant. The fact remains that private respondent incentive leave pay knowingly and voluntarily issued the certificate. Mere denials and self-serving statements to the effect that petitioner 2) WON petitioner is entitled to a share in the profits of the allegedly promised not to use the certificate against private respondent are not sufficient to overturn the same. Hence, construction project;. private respondent is estopped from assailing the contents of 3) WON petitioner rendered services from 1 May to 15 May its own certificate of service. 1991 and is, therefore, entitled to unpaid wages; 4. YES. During the construction of the building, a criminal complaint for unjust vexation was filed against the officers of 4) WON private respondent is liable to reimburse the owner of the building. Petitioner avers that he was petitioner's legal expenses and; implicated in the complaint for the sole reason that he was the construction engineer of the project. 5) WON petitioner is entitled to separation pay. Although not directly implicated in the criminal complaint, Carlos Construction is nonetheless obligated to defray HELD: The assailed decision is modified. petitioner's legal expenses. Petitioner was included in the 1. NO. Although petitioner cannot strictly be classified as a complaint not in his personal capacity but in his capacity as managerial employee, nonetheless he is still not entitled project engineer of private respondent and the case arose in to payment of the aforestated benefits because he falls connection with his work as such. At the construction site, squarely under another exempt category — "officers or petitioner is the representative of private respondent being members of a managerial staff" as defined under sec. 2(c) its employee and he acts for and in behalf of private respondent. Hence, the inclusion of petitioner in the of the abovementioned implementing rules: complaint for unjust vexation, which was work-related, is equivalent to inclusion of private respondent itself. Sec. 2. Exemption. — The provisions of this Rule shall not apply to the following persons if they qualify for exemption under the condition set forth herein:xxx 5. NO. On the last issue, we rule that petitioner is a project
Labor- digests The applicable provision is Article 280 of the Labor Code which defines the term "project employee," thus: Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific period or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. (Emphasis ours.) In the case at bench, it was duly established that private respondent hired petitioner as project or construction engineer specifically for its Monte de Piedad building project. Accordingly, as project employee, petitioner's services are deemed coterminous with the project, that is, petitioner's services may be terminated as soon as the project for which he was hired is completed. There can be no dispute that petitioner's dismissal was due to the completion of the construction of the building. NOTES: 1. Although we agree with private respondent that appeals to the SC from decisions of the NLRC should be in the form of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, this rule is not inflexible. In a number of cases this Court has resolved to treat as special civil actions for certiorari petitions erroneously captioned as petitions for review on certiorari "in the interest of justice."
2. Policy Instruction No. 20 entitled "Stabilizing EmployerEmployee Relations in the Construction Industry" explicitly mandates that: xxx xxx xxx Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the company is not required to obtain a clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection with such termination. What is required of the company is a report to the nearest Public Employment Office for statistical purposes.
Labor- digests 8. GLOBAL INC. vs. ATIENZA ET AL G.R. No.L-51612-13 JULY 22, 1986
after office hours, during Sundays and Holidays unless required by a written memorandum from the General Manager. During the period from Nov. 1, 1974 to Nov. 16, 1976, no employee of the company was never required to work after 5:00 in the afternoon. There is nothing in the FACTS: Rosal, herein private respondent, commenced her record except her bare allegations which would show that employment with petitioner Global Incorporated in she truly and actually rendered said overtime work February, 1970, as a "Sales Clerk." In November 1976 Global Inc. filed with the Department of Labor Regional 2. YES. the NLRC ordered petitioner to pay Rosal "backwages Office, an application for clearance to terminate the from Dec. 2, 1976 to May 31, 1978", the date when Asst. services of Clarita Rosal, for having violated company rules Secretary Leogardo, Jr., rendered his decision lifting the and regulations by incurring repeated absences and preventive suspension of Rosal and ordering petitioner to tardiness. The subject employee was placed under reinstate her to her former position without loss of rights and preventive suspension on November 16, 1976 with full backwages from the time of preventive suspension pending resolution of the application for clearance.c up to the date of her actual reinstatement.c Clarita Rosal filed her opposition to the clearance application as well as a counter-complaint against Global Inc., for illegal dismissal, overtime pay and premium pay.
We agree. We note that this decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering reinstatement had not been complied with. Neither was it appealed by petitioner, therefore, the decision had become final and executory. To exempt petitioner from the The officer-in-charge of Regional Office, Ministry of labor payment of backwages would be to give premium to the Leogardo, Jr. lifted the preventive suspension of Clarita blant disregard of orders of the Ministry of Labor. Moreover, Rosal, finding her suspension not warranted, and it would be in consonance with compassionate justice that reinstated her to her former position without loss of rights Rosal be paid backwages during the period that she was and with full backwages from the time of preventive supposed to be reinstated suspension up to the date of her actual reinstatement. Note that the only ground for the imposition of preventive suspension is provided for under Sec. 4, Rule XIV of the The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision dismissing the Implementing Regulations of the Ministry of Labor which complaint for illegal dismissal, overtime compensation and readspremium pay, and the clearance for the complainant’s termination is granted. Rosal appealed the aforesaid decision to the NLRC.Respondents Commissioners Atienza and Quadra modified the appealed decision, whereby: (a) respondent is ordered to pay complainant overtime pay for the period Nov. 1, 1974 to Nov. 16, 1976 when she was suspended; (b) respondent is likewise ordered to pay complainant backwages from Dec. 2, 1976 to May 31, 1978; (c) the decision of the Labor Arbiter granting clearance to terminate the services of the complainant is affirmed. Respondent Commissioner Villatuya voted to affirm the Labor Arbiter's decision. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: WON 1. 2.
Rosal is entitled to overtime pay Rosal is entitled to backwages
HELD: The assailed decision of the NLRC is modified, where the order to pay overtime pay to Rosal is set aside, the order to pay Rosal backwages affirmed, and the decision granting clearance to terminate the services of Rosal likewise affirmed 1. NO. We agree with the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that the same should be denied for want of sufficient
SEC. 4. Preventive suspension. The employer may place the employee concerned under preventive suspension only if the continued employment of the employee poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of the co-employees. Any preventive suspension before the filing of the application shall be considered worked days, and shall be duly paid as such if the continued presence of the employee concerned does not pose a serious threat to the life and property of the employer or of the coemployees. As aptly held by Asst. Secretary Leogardo Jr., the continued presence of Clarita Rosal never posed a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or coemployees as would warrant her preventive suspension
Labor- digests 9. LAGATIC VS. NLRC ET AL G.R. No. 121004 JAN. 28, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Lagatic was employed by Cityland, first as a probationary sales agent, and later on as a marketing specialist. He was tasked with soliciting sales for the company, with the corresponding duties of accepting callins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. Cold calls refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone directory. Cityland, believing that the same is an effective and cost-efficient method of finding clients, requires all its marketing specialists to make cold calls. Likewise, in order to assess cold calls made by the sales staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland requires the submission of daily progress reports on the same.
TO SALARY DIFFERENTIALS, BACKWAGES, SEPARATION PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY PAY, UNPAID COMMISSIONS, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. HELD: 1. To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the employee must be afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for a valid cause
Petitioner loses sight of the fact that "(e)xcept as provided for, or limited by, special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment." Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and regulations for the government of their employees, and when employees, with knowledge of an established rule, enter the service, the rule becomes a part Cityland issued a written reprimand to petitioner for his of the contract of employment. It is also generally recognized failure to submit cold call reports for some time. This that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be notwithstanding, petitioner again failed to submit cold call grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and reports. Petitioner was required to explain his inaction, with binding on the parties and must be complied with. a warning that further non-compliance would result in his "Corollarily, an employee may be validly dismissed for termination from the company. In a reply, petitioner violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation adopted claimed that the same was an honest omission brought for the conduct of the company business. An employer about by his concentration on other aspects of his job. cannot rationally be expected to retain the employment of a Cityland found said excuse inadequate and suspended him person whose . . . lack of regard for his employer's rules . . . has so plainly and completely been bared." Petitioner's for three days, with a similar warning. continued infraction of company policy requiring cold call reports, as evidenced by the 28 instances of non-submission Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning, of aforesaid reports, justifies his dismissal. petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports. He was verbally reminded to submit the same and was even given Moreover, petitioner made it worse for himself when he up a due date to do so. Instead of complying with said wrote the statement, "TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO directive, petitioner wrote a note, "TO HELL WITH COLD CARES?" When required to explain, he merely denied ally CALLS! WHO CARES?" and exhibited the same to his co- knowledge of the same. Cityland, on the other hand, employees. submitted the affidavits of his co-employees attesting to his authorship of the same. Petitioner's only defense is denial. Petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to The rule, however, is that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear explain why Cityland should not make good its previous and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving warning for his failure to submit cold call reports, as well as evidence which has no weight in law. for issuing the written statement aforementioned. He sent Based on the foregoing, we find petitioner guilty of willful a letter-reply alleging that his failure to submit cold call disobedience. Willful disobedience requires the concurrence reports should trot be deemed as gross insubordination. He of at least two requisites: denied any knowledge of the damaging statement allegedly made by him. a. the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful Finding petitioner guilty of gross insubordination, Cityland and perverse attitude; and served a notice of dismissal upon him on February 26, b. the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties 1993. which he had been engaged to discharge Aggrieved by such dismissal, petitioner filed a complaint against Cityland for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay, damages and attorney's fees. The labor arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the same was affirmed by the NLRC; hence the present recourse.
2. With the finding that petitioner's dismissal was for a just and valid cause, his claims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, must fail.
Also, petitioner failed to show his entitlement to overtime and rest day pay due, to the lack of sufficient evidence as to the number of days and hours when he rendered overtime ISSUE: Petitioner raises the following issues: and rest day work. Entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof that said overtime work was actually 1. WON RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS performed, before an employee may avail of said benefit. DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED; NOTES:
Labor- digests 1. There is no law which requires employers to pay commissions, and when they do so, as stated in the letteropinion of the DOLE dated February 19, 1993, "there is no law which prescribes a method for computing commissions. The determination of the amount of commissions is the result of collective bargaining negotiations, individual employment contracts or established employer practice." Since the formula for the computation of commissions was presented to and accepted by petitioner, such prescribed formula is in order. As to the allegation that said formula diminishes the benefits being received by petitioner whenever there is a wage increase, it must be noted that his commissions are not meant to be in a fixed amount. In fact, there was no assurance that he would receive any commission at all. Non-diminution of benefits, as applied here, merely means that the company may not remove the privilege of sales personnel to earn a commission, not that they are entitled to a fixed amount thereof. 2. In addition to the above, the labor arbiter and the NLRC sanctioned Cityland’s practice of offsetting rest day or holiday work with equivalent time on regular workdays on the ground that the same is authorized by Department Order 21, Series of 1990. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, said D.O. was misapplied in this case. The D.O. involves the shortening of the workweek from six days to five days but with prolonged hours on those five days. Under this scheme, non-payment of overtime premiums was allowed in exchange for longer weekends for employees. In the instant case, petitioner's workweek was never compressed. Instead, he claims payment for work over and above his normal 5 1/2 days of work in a week. Applying by analogy the principle that overtime cannot be offset by undertime, to allow off-setting would prejudice the worker. He would be deprived of the additional pay for the rest day work he has rendered and which is utilized to offset his equivalent time off on regular workdays. To allow Cityland to do so would be to circumvent the law on payment of premiums for rest day and holiday work.
