Hobbes Studies

HOBBES STUDIES By

 G. Wernham

Leo Straus

 E Tlor

iis  love Sta M ow, J C  Macpherson Keth Thoma Joh Pameatz Howad areder J W N Watki J R Pek S Mrr Ege Mao  Ctaeo

 b

K C Brown

OXFOD

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BASIL BACKWE 965

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CNENS FoRWORD

1  T SPIRIT o HoBBss oLITIAL ILOOY by Pror Leo Stra

vi



University of Oio

2.  AYOR I 1 TROUTORY NoT, by Professor trt M Brown Jr .

31

Cell Unersty

(2)  TI ocTRI O HoBB by Pror  E. Tlor

35

3  YOR I: So BJios by Proor Stuart M Brown, Jr.

57

4 1 MR. WRRR HOBB by john Pamena

3

Few of Nueld eld Colege, fod

 A  TO MR ATZ by Proor Howard



































v

ONN

8 HBB's uR MAN, by Psr C B.

Mcpsn   

FORWORD 169

Univsity of Toronto

" . T Soci R O HoBBEss oLCL HO HOUGHT UGHT   b &ih T ih T ho m as

185

Fellow of St. John's College, Ood

10 HOOPHY N OL N HBBE by j W N.

Wkn

Rd n  Histoy o Philosoph n the niesity of London

11. HoBBE HoBBESS's TA BLE BLE O F ABSURD BSURDIT ITY' Y',, by P r r  s or

Mo Egel

237

S.

263

vsit of ou ifa

1 HoBBEss TORY O uNHMN b Prsso ao A Cn       

25

nvers of Mian APPEN PPENDI DIX X



 sve one of the thrteen papers here oeted hve been wrtten n the ears sne te Seond Wod War a perod tat hs seen a remarkabe nrease of nterest n the wrtgs of omas Hobbes Ths revouton n Hobbes studes studes for hat s sare too strong a wa to desrbe t now appears to hve moved nto a perod of onsodaton: a not npproprate tme perhaps for the pubaon of a oeton of s knd ven when not dret oneed th onsodaton  the smpest sense Hobbes shoars toda tend to exhbt a degree and knd of novement wth the work of ther reent predeessors that ders from anthng to be found earer  ve ad frut dsusson has been n prgress for a onsderabe me; ad no one who s seous nterested  Hobbes's work an atogeer aod beg aeted by t no matter how orga or dependt s own approah ma be Yet the present genera one wth ree s b no meas prevenng fresh extensons extensons of the debate rntz for nstae has ony reenty ubshed hs sud of sevententh-nury reatons to Hobbes's matersm and mora phosoph and a new book by one of the ontrbutors to ths present voume exporng rer the st somewhat vexed queson of the reatonshp between Hobbess phosopha deas and hs pot dotrnes dotrnes w probab have appeared b e me these words are prnted Then  e far near ure



































v

FRERD

mes Ths i s not o say o course, ha ese ese acors have al inuenced everone equaly: an undergraduae or insance woud no necessarily come o a ineres in Hobbes b he same roue as e scholars whose work he reads. Indeed a leas wo o he conribuors o his volume were led o an ineres in Hobbes parly by a pror ineres in Spnoza: a kind o moive no covered by he caegories jus suggesed Ye he generalsaion ould seem o hold even so In 93 or example Proessor Laird complained ( he Foreword o his book) ha he ound around m an excessively low level o ineres in Hobbes; and a reading o he academic jouals o ta ime seems o jusi his complain  wihn a ew years he level was already sing plany much o he rise was due o e fors ors o su schoars as Proessor Laird himsel Proessor A E aylor-whose aricle 'The Ehical Docrne o Hobbes is reprined heread roessor roessor Leo Srauss (The laers book Th Polical Philosop  Hobbs Oxord 93 ranslaed or pubcaon om a Germa anuscrp is a remnder oo ha here is a deb owed by Hobbes sudies o German scholarshp ha is a leas as old  he work o T nes in he eighies o  he as ceury ceury Bu oher less direc inuences aso seem o have been a work For one g i is a commonplace ha Hobbes ancpaes i raher crudely some o e insighs and echnques o conem porary lngusc plosophy and nauraly hs agan has helped o ncrse he aenon pad o hs hough (Smilarly o course

FRERD

i

Indeed he genea climae o our age has surely been xremy wel sued o a growh o ineres in Hobbess work His splendid and errible dicu . n the rt place,  pt o a erl ininon

of all mankind a rstls a d onnl sir  powr atr owr that th on( i n dath; akes on a cerain exra plausibiy in an age a has seeno pick only o o a muliude o ilusraions he rse d a o he Third Reich and he evoluion o he hydrogen warhead His conce a he dvision o mens poca loyales beween obedence o heir couns governmen and obedence o wha hey ook o be he pocal implicaons o her region nds a parallel in our own conce a he resh conic in many mens mnds beween he clams o parioism and ose o some ineraonal ideology And in a ime wch ds hghly cvilized communies prepared o comm arociies whose obsceniy would have surised he Dark Ages i becomes less easy han i once was perhaps or he reader new o Hobbess ork o jump o he concusion ha i is discredied rom he ouse by a oo cynical and pesssic view o huan naure he presen ime also is one in whch he orld appears o be dramaisg in inernaional erms he sory which Hobbes hmsel old in inerpersonal ers : every line o he pas weny years debae on he dculies o urng he Uned Naions io an fecve ecve sumen o Word governmen could sand as a gloss upon Hobbess ex Nor is i ver surisng ha one should nowadays nd Levahan voked (as a symbol or he power o he mode Sae) even in he ediorial columns



































OREWORD

OREORD

writers. Yet hs style pclaims it The now classic coent  c on a Metaphysc poet, that 'a togt to   od  by, ales as well to Hobbes as to any of he poets he outlved Hs ought fors readly nto images that are not merely adequate emblems of elements in hs argument, but possess a strng extra vitaity of ther own The mnd seen as a spaniel rangn rangn a eld the crowned ghost enthroned upon ts grave men 'red o rregular jostng nd hewng one another the Kingdom of Faes he man enngled  words, lke a brd n lme-wgs the ucoorably vvd descripon of he state of naure the great extended metaphor of Levathn tsef: such images are apt to aouse n the nd of the reader responses n excess of the stct requre ments of Hobbess arguent; but responses whch hve perhps contrbuted someng, at least to he growh of interest in hs work as a whole Ts s not to suggest that there has lately been some kndly move afoot to have a closer look at Hobbess deas ust because he does aer all, wte rather attracvely the contents of this volue could not really be msaken for the fts of a asual aesthecsm aesthecsm Nevertheless t would seem far to say at the sensblt of many early and midseven teenthcentury wrters does appear to be uepectedly well atued to that of ou own day and among the names of these wrters must be included that of Thoas Hobbes

 uuay mportant to prevent he parttns between the ous academc scplnes becong too opaque opaque o apology  oered, therefore for presentn sde by sde n ths vole

X



Lasly somethng should perhaps be sad about the selection

i

ppers often ognally intended for ve dsslar audences On the oer hand ltatons of space have ade t mpossble to represent the f spectrum of Hobbes studes there is for tce, no theologian here to enlarge upon the view quoted by Professor Glover that Hobbes pracse theology at ts scholrly  best ere s nohng from any of the terary ouls (though e terested reader cn nd references whch will direct him to em) and ere s no discusson of Hobbess theory from the pot of view of the modern psychologist (although ths is a perhaps more ustiable omsson snce rofessor eters study of Hobbes in he P hlosophy Sees s so wdely available urer omssons have been enforced by the need to gve the book some sort of balnce and coherence for it woud have been sleadg to lger too long on ay one issue and the sae requrements have also prevented he arrangement of the papers  stc chronologcal order�somehg whch it s reaised that some readers may regt No doubt regret wll wll be elt too, at e absence of cetain names om the lst of contrbutors  perhaps especy at of rofessor akeshott But one could could not for emple have ncluded hs long Introducton to Lt n a volume of s nd nd n any case no one readg hs boo s lkely to b le uware that rofessor akesho has been an nuence on Hobbes sudes snce the war A slar defence



































ACKNOWLEDGEMETS I would ke to thank the authors of the papers pnted or repnted here both for consenting to the pucation of ther work in ths volume and for the very hepfu interest which they have shown in the whoe project. n exception occurs, however in Cpter 2 Section : where sady my oigation must nstead be t o the auor's iterary Executor Mr F. E  ayor  woud aso ike o hank he ediors ad pubishers who have given prmission o repuish maea rs issue y hem Caper 1 is aken from Pof Srausss book Ntul Rht nd Hito pubshed in 1953 by he Chcago Uvesity Pss Caper 2 Secon ii rst appeared in Philooy 1938 Chapter 3 apeared n h Philoophicl Rvi for 1959 (ad Chaper 11 i he same Rvi in 1961) Boh pars of of Chape 4 appeared appeared in Poticl Studi  1957 and 1960 respecivey Chape r 5 was oginay pubished  h Amicn Policl Scinc Rvi for 1960; whie in he same year huch Hitoy pubished Chapter 7 Caper 8  appeared i h h  nin Joul  conomic conomic nd Polticl Snc for 1945 uder he ie Hobbes oday Cp er 10 is a sighy revise versio of a atice pubished in h ransaion of an PhiloophiclQt i 1955; and Chaper 12 is a ransaion artce which appeared in the aan oura u u in 1960 he further permission of the Carendon Press was required for reproduction of the artices from oliticl Studi





































NOTE The abbreations E. W and L W. used  most chaptes of English Wo rk o Thomas ths ook efe, especivey to The English Hobbe, eded by Sir Wiam Moleswoth, London 839-5 (1 1 vols) and to Hob b Malburini Malburini  Opa Philohic Philohic to Thoma Hobb (5 again edied y Si Wam Moeswo ondon 1 839-5 (5 ols In e case of LEVIATAN (E. W II howee some contbos efe instead to Pof Oakeshot's edio of e Back



































I ON TH SPIRIT F OBBS'S POLTCA PHOSOPY

Leo Strauss

T poica philosophy or pocal science.

HOMAS HOBBES regrded hmsef a the founde o H knew, o corse that the great honour which he claimed fo sef was awded



































2

H  PR O HOBB POLCL PHLOOPHY

LO RU

plesant and are by naure prefeable to  or tere is a natural right at is wholly independent of ay human compact or convenion; convenion; ?r hee is a best oitcal order wic is est becaue it is accor g o ure  e dtes traditoal poitical  loso hy wt te quest fo he bst regime or for the siply JUt soca order and terefore with a pursut that is pocal not erely ecause it deals ith politica atters ut, above all ecause it is anmated by a poliical spirit. He identes tratona p�   ical phosop wit tat paar tradition that was lic s1ted or to plo a ter w ch is loose indeed but at present  elgtat was dealsc stl easy

dl

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

Hobbes rejets the idealisc tradtion on he asis of a fuda mental agreement th th it. He mens to do adequately wht the Socratc trton trton dd  a whoy adequate manner He means to succeed where the Socrac traditon had fled. He traces the faiure of the ideastic tradtion to one undamental msae tradtioal potcal phlosophy assumed that man is y nature a poltcl or social anmal By reecting ths assumpon assumpon Hobbes oins te Epicurean tradon tradon He accepts its view tht  is y nare or originay n apolital and even an a-socal anmal as ell as i ts premse that th e good is fndamentay idenc with he pleasant. u he uses tt apoltic vie for a poltic pupose. He gives tat apoltcl apoltcl vie a pcl meanng. He tries to













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  TYO

TH TO TH

emi mly ue heoem eveywhee ouide he kgdom of God by cove i.e. h hey e oly aws o he Jew d Chii who ecogze he uhoiy of he Sciue o whch Hobbe el el Ye i e e V 5 we mee ohe diee diee heoy Thee we e old h h God h  wofold gdom aua i which he eig by he dice of igh eo; d whch i uivel ove ll who ckowledge he ve owe by eo of h iol ue which i commo o ll d pea i whch he ule lo by he w  pe pe which i eculi becue he hh o give oiive lw o  me bu o hi eculi eole d ome cei me eleced by m. I i he dded h i he auakigdom aua kigdom God igh o ule i fouded olely o hi essbe pwe (whee i he ppea kigdom  i exlied i deil i he ecio of e e d Leaa devoed o he ubjec of eligio God oveeigy ove he eleced e o  ea  eem o follow h ccodig o i veio of he docie he ul lw i  aw aw (d o meely  collecio of ue heoem fo ll me exce hei (whom obbe lwy egd o  diobe die ubjec o God bu  lie ouide God igdom9 We hould i coiecy hve o uoe h he kowledge h he ul lw i he commd of God my be ied deedely of cquice wih he Jewih d Chii Sciue I do o ow whehe hee  y wy of ecoilig he vou ge o how i he view of he e e i doed Hobbe uoe eo ucquied wh he Sci

eeeh h ceuy ceuy The eo whch ued  o be give i he eee fo uoig hee heiic uece o be iicee vebige e elly o ceble o he kowledge o iellgece of he we who ued hem I ubce hey oly mou o h h obbe lwy ii ogly o he icomeheibliy of he dive ue d o he imoibiliy of ou hvig  coceio of God d h he o ou i cul he dge of hoomohim edg he cio of iellec d will o God (The iculy i h i u u ccog o obbe  will i appee pe e  he l eie i delibeio d iellecio h i begiig i ee; bu clely we co cibe eie d ee e e o he iie d ieiible beig.  Uece of hi kid e o f fom beig eceily exeio of heim h hey e he commo ockide of ohodox Chii cholc. I obbe id h we hve o coceio of God i w he uvel cholic docie h he essea of God co be kow o u i hi life; hough we c we h queio a s eus we hve o leve he queio u eus s o be olved i  bee wold. Neihe will o iellec o y hig ele ccog o he gee o he cholc c be Hobbe  i ua eced of God d of y ceue Whe Hobbe e Cpe hew doub o he vlue of hloohic gume fo he begg of he uivee i me he w oly eeig h which hd log befoe bee moe fully uged by S Thom. Whe he yd he wod hve cully bee ued i uo of he llego of heimh heimh we my oly bue o God

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53

  AOR

TH AYO TH

(te aggegate of bodes) no any pat of tsef, and 2) tat, f a Hobbes ed, notng can be conceved but body, ts cause, toug cetany known b y te causa agument to est, must be ncompeensbe o us Te nea consstency of ts doctne seems to me to be te best poof tat t was snceey ed (Tee s, peaps, a cean nconsstency between Hobbes's deton of ause and eect, fo wc t soud foow tat a cause s aways tempoay po to ts eect, and te doub epessed n te  orpor about te vadty of te easons gven fo a begnnng of te wod n tme  But te utmost ta ths poves, I thnk, s ony tat Hobbes ad not tougt out te mpcatons of e pobem to te end He as been auged at fo eavng te queston undecded unt t sa be auto tatvey detemned by te soveegn soveegn But e s ee agan  n te company of St Tomas Bot eave te ast wod wod on te matte to te autozed autozed ntepete ntepete of Scptue Te ony deence deence between tem s ta St Tomas's autozed ntepete s te eccesastca powe, and t as aeady gven ts decson Hobbes's s te tempoa, and ts decson cannot be known unt e swod as ay setted wo s to be te tempoa soveegn n Engand)

Te ncompeensbty' of God, so fa fom beng o sstent wt te tess tat te natua aw s a dvne comand actuay seves seves to emove a possbe possbe obecton If God wee compeensbe, t s concevabe tat accuate kowedge of H natue mgt pove tat natue to be suc tat we cannot tnk of t as te souce of commands wc obge manknd manknd But i te natue of God s an nscutabe mystey, en ths vey nscu abty makes  mpossbe mpossbe o use ou nabty nabty to undestand undestand how God commands us as any agument aganst te fact tat He does so command us, povded tat te fact appeas to be sucenty autentcated autentca ted  a man nds evdence fo te fact ete n te wtness of ou sense of mpeatve obgaton tsef, o n te concdence of te teoems' of gt eason' wt te njunc tons of Scptue, Scptue, a Hobbst cannot etot etot on m by aegng,  use te unovey dcton of moden sangsness, tat utmate eaty s unetca, and teefoe aot be te souce of moa commands and pohbt pohbtons ons As we smpy do not know wa te utmate eaty s a ve no  concepton of t), we ae takn dy wen we petend to know tat  s nonethca' y own beef, fo wateve t may be wot, s tat Hobbes smpy meant wat e sad about te natua aw as a command of God, and tat e was ed to ts convcton not so muc by te Scptua testmoes wc e poduces n suc pofuson, as by te unusua dept of s own sense of moa obgaton obgaton Te mpesson epeated study of s woks eaves on me s tat Hobbes was a fundamenay onest man and a man, as ofesso

 The relevan facs are hese:

(1) Hobbes

says, here agreeing copleely ih S Thoas, ha no goo reasons can g1ven hy he he worl shoul have ha a beginning (De Copoe, 1 261 .  uoe fr? he ex of 66?· Illos igiur qui uni origine aliqua fUsse rabus su1s  rebus naurabus eonsrasse se iacian lauare non possu   . Nonne qui aeerniae uni sic ollun, eae opera opera eia uni



































55

A  TAYOR

 OR 

sees to e that when we make the necessy allowces for ways of hnking wch were current in the middle of the seventeenth centuy but are now obsoete, Hobbes my hve been more in arnest than is usually alowed n supplementing tis region of the duty of a citzen with th one aticle of faith' that Jesus is yet to reappear in Palestne and reign endlessly in teporal felicty over resuscitated beievers beievers Such a faith' faith' woud have no chance of beng accepted as the good Cistaty' if it were to be to-day But I do not tnk it impossible that that a man proclaimed to-day livg in the weter of coitng and bitterly hoste creeds of all knds pvalent i England i the peod 64050 may ave fancied tat sometg of this kd would eerge at last as the smple substance of the faith1 faith1 My srious conce however i not t what ay have been Hobbes's persoa opions on these tngs and I oly make the reks of the last paragraph paragraph by very free free protest aganst the t oo facile assumption that there is notig in the scrptural exegesis with wch hn in paticuar paticuar abounds beyond an ingeous ingeous reating of the ecclesastics with their own ow n wpons The point I am really axous to make is that Hobbess  theory is coony srepseted and unintelligently critized for want of scient cient recognion that it is fro rst to ast a docrine of d a stit deontology It is tre that Charles  ad the good taste to e njoy the philosopher's conversation conversation and hat the White hall of the Restoraton is an ulkely quer in wh to nd a deontologist deontologist But Hobbes Hobbes aer  was not so very often at

wits He is the conteporary conteporary of Clarendon Clarendon Falkand Falkand and elden not of Rochester Etherege and Viliers NI have n the text oed to quote what is perhaps the most mporant single sentence of Hobbes about ogn In view of its deniteness I give it both in the Lan and the ngish fors   XV 2 aotClarus aotClarus ergo hoc dco. Pao obigari homnem id est propter promissionem praestre debere Lege vero obgatu teneri id est metu poenae quae in Lege constitutur ad praestationem cogi Phih Rdin onnng onnng Gonn Go nn nd So XIV 2.ore eary therefore I say thus : tht a mn is obiged by is contracts that is that he ought to perform for hs promse sake; but that the law es hm being oblged that is to say it compels  to ake good hs proise for fear of te punishment apponted by the law The cear distincton thus made between the igon nd the subsequent ouson through the penal snction' (a stnction merely overooked i Benthams statement that a Sacton is a source of obgatory powers or motves) explans at once how Hobbes coud mantan tt the laws of nature' obge n  nn even before the creaton of cvil socety at in civil soety they contnue to oblge wherever the ivl law has issued no nuncos and that they oblige the sovreign isef who is iaenable to the cvi aw. * The obgatory orce of the civil aw itsef is in fact derived entrely from from that of the natura If we are always to obey the civil law eve when in our prvate opiion it is inequitabe that is because we are already obged

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3 THE TAYLOR TESIS: SME OBJECTONS

Stua M. Bon, J (i) LTHOUGH ay oe of several cosideratios ca  be employed to prove the Taylor thesis alse, I shall state oly two. Fs ere is obbes's ow epeaed ad consiste testimoy about wat e is doig i te potical teaises Accordig to Hobbes te picipal doctries o a polical theory have practical ipcaios adverse to the iterests o e ad or his reaso ted to eai eai usettled ad coroversial1 To overcome this diculty ad to gai soe measure o accepace or hs theory the poltcal philosopher must estabish is pcipal doctries by a riorous argumet o preises wose tuth caot be deied I eac oe o the thee political political reatses reatses Hobbes clais to overcoe the dicuy i jus ths way: To reduce ts docrie [o jusice a d policy i geeral]  o the ues ad iallibly o reaso there is o way but s o pu such prciples dow or a oudaio as passio o stustig ay ot seek to dsplace; ad aeward to bld hereo te tu o cases i he law o aure (whch hiheo have bee buil i e air) by degrees ill e whole be iex





































59

STUART M. BROWN JR

THE TYLOR THESIS: SOME OBJECTIONS

In ts maner Hobbes, speaig for imself, direcly cotra dicts the Taylor thesis He explicitly deies, ad o his ow view of poliical theory caot eve in piciple admit, at is ethical teory is is indepedet of his psychology. psycholog y. As an account of Hobbes Hobbe s i terms of what Hobbes imself tiks ad is tryig to accom plish, te Taylor thesis is therefore ase By directy cotradi cotradictg ctg Hobbes tose who adopt te Tayor thesis expound Hobbes o the presumpion that he fails to mae out the logical reatonships equired by is teory O te Taylor thesis, oe does ot estabish Hobbes's failure by a direct examiation of s argumes. Tayor does not even ackowedge that is tesis implies Hobbes's faiure and takes o cogizance

Viewed in is ligt, e Taylor tesis must eitr dey tat Hobbes has a theory or fail to present a signicat alterative t te tradioa interpretatio. Bot Oakesott and Warender Warender seem at times to accept the rst alterati alterative. ve. They both appear to suppose tat Hobbes's tougt is too lackig in carity, precisio, and rgour to state a systematic teory of the sort Hobbes mself nks e i presenting 8 But o this supposition ntepretat ntepretations ions based o he Taylor thesis ae absurd or  Hobbes's hought is so loose as to ustfy ignorig what e presents as his hery it is absurd for a commetator to expou as Hobbes's eal theory a se of doctres which saisfy stric tests o clariy and onsisecy. The oly accepab accepab aleraive aleraive s the

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SUR  BRON R 60 nto a theoy, a contttg the theoy tself; and 2) the po pety of amng wthot poof tha a et of moal docte ha been cty mpoed nto a theoy Ony ot of confon confon can one be led to am what the tadtonal vew dees The vae of wo on the Tayo thess wod be bstantay nceaed athe than dmnhed dmnhed  t wee peented not as a new tepetaton alteatve to the tadtonal one bt a an elcda ton of a sde of Hobbe whch the tadton, wth ts tong phloophca ba, ha tended to gnoe Unencmbeed by the necesty to teat doctne as theoy, the Taylo thess cold then be empoyed to lnate Hobbe, a a ma whose own moa and potcal convcton wee not at evey pont compatbe wth the

T TLOR TSS: SO lCTOS

61

expcated n pychologcal tem Bt B t the moal noon n Hobbe ae so coected, logcally, wth pychoogca one that tey cannot be oated and t mae mae ense Ths the concept of obgaton actaly olated by Taylo and the othe tn ot to be egal athe than moa Bt Tayo, Oaehott , and Waende wsh to expond fo Hobbe a dstnctvely moa theoy of oblgaton oblgaton They theefoe theefoe ntodce moa consdea ton to whch nethe they no Hobbes, on th vew of hm, ae entted; and the moal doctne attbted to Hobbes s ncon tent In Oaehott ths nconstency shows p a a at elfconta dcton Hs t expanaton of the obgaton to obey the



































63

ART  B W J 

TH TYOR H O OBO

tt te w of nture mut be terpreted  oe or te oter of wo logclly dtnct wy Eer tey mut be teeted  te of te pycoogc teory  prdet rue co cerng wt me lly conttuted d mlrly ted w do te te debeo; o tey mut b e tepeted   tem of the leg eory  w prorly o clled nd te commd of God But tee  o mor mor obgto to obey re ttg ow me wl ct er delberon d codeton of l elevt ft Bece Hobbe beleve tt tee e mo obgto   tte of ture to ee pece nd eep covent d becue tee obgon re formuted  tem of turl lw tul lw n Hobbe mut be terpeted  w propely

beween tet d tet tet w repect repect to obgon obgon 7 Te et undertd e w of nture  mm of pudece He doe ot undetd nd  fct dene tt ey e te commd of God d teefore teefore lw n te rt ee ee  Fo t eo e tet tet   no obgo He td to od  n enemy n   te of w Te tet o te oter oter d  oblged jut bece e cowedge e etee of God God oveegnty oveegnty   nturl ngdom nd te lw  of ntr  God'  commnd But on t ccout turl turl lw  o ntnc mor content; otewe te tet would be oblged to obey tem. Moreover lw n te tct ene e commnd commn d of  oveegn one  covennted to obey mple no obgton

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64

TT  BON J

 fa howeve, he second aenative is coect; he Tayo hesis ceaes aogeher new dcuies fo Hobbes and hese diies  based on misakes wich he dd no make (ii)

 a of e poiica eaises he pincipa quesion befoe

Hobbes is, Wy ae men obged o subm uncondionay o e civi sae? sae? Hobbes is fuy convinced convinced at men ae obged o subm unconditionay and is fuy awae ha is convicion s exemey conovesia conovesia His ask, heef heefoe oe is o esabsh his oigaion oigaion by goous agumen agumen fom fom premses wc ae unconovesia. In he poica eatises Hobbes' inees in any ohe

H OR  O OO

6

be eied as a consequence of his enquiy o dene obgaon in ems of aw, he cano inay and decy appea appea o any such deon. Fo is woud beg he quesion and fa fa o convce anyone A peson who seousy doubs whehe i is eve obgao o keep covenans shows, by is doubs,· ha he does no undesand wha wha covenantng covenantng is Bu a pson who doubs he obigaon o uncondiiona submission o aw dos no in any anaogous way, show ha he fas o undesad wa aw o obigaon is is Wha such a peson doubs and dees dees is  ega duies, wch he may acknowedge, ake pecedence ove a ohes, incuding pdenta obigaions ad he daes o pvae consence Hobbess agumen mus be designed designed o



































66

UR  BRO R

TH AYLO THS: O OBJCTO

psychological psycholog ical concets ke desie ad avesion. Whethe or not t s completely successfu, t is eaaby stc In bae outline the aguent is as ollows : 1 Mn stve ceaessy to obtain cean objects ad to avod othes; but dieent en and eve one a at ieent times ste o deent eent thngs 2

 The absence o ciil goeent is-popely caeda sa o naue 2"  The state o naue imlies the absece o situiona situiona esats uo the acuisio o owe ad excet o o selhelp no potecion o esons and goods 2 The ate o naue s a state o wa o each man agans evey ohe wheein no  ca easoaby exect to obtan goods ad  secue in the enjo ymet o them  Any ues statng the codtions necessay  ay a s o oban goods ad speciying the acs euied eualy o all men  these coditions ae to be ed ae aws o ae.

2 The obets e srve to obain they cal good those hey stve to aod they ca ev. 21 2 Each m o ecssty deses s own good. 22 22 What oe a couts as good aothe ay count as evi

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1 10

J• R O L A  D P E   O C K

H O B  E    C O     I  G   L   I   C    O   I B      1 1 1

 appeas hen ha obbes admis, a leas aily, he eed o jus y y mas use of his libety The quesio then aises why in he sae of naue, ma is fee (unde no oay obliaion o use s own power as he will himself, for he pesevaio of Te his ow aue0 aue0 Hobbe ss eply saed moe clearly clearly in Te eme Lw ad in De e ha i Leaha is (1) ha me of ecessiy seek heir ow ood ad seek o avoid all evil, of whih deah is he eaes, and (2) ha herefoe, i anno be agais ih easo (ad whih is no otary o igh easo, ha all men acou o be doe jusly), for a ma o use all his powes o defed defed himself himself 31 While in he sae o f ue, ue, ih o r bey is a wihou limi, sine he aure of ma is such ha i he absee of a soveeig power almos nyhi mgh o easoably b juded eessa o poeg oes life life ad limbs ; ye i is o que so (a leas aodig o he De e agume), A ma mus be his ow jude of wha is ecessy for his peservaio, peservaio, and fom his judmen i he sae of aue hee an be o appeal, bu if ny man peed somewha o end eessarily ee ssarily o his ow peservaio whh ye he doh o ondely believe so he may oend oend aais he laws of aue3 aue3 Tis poviso whch is no epeaed i Leiaha appes o qualify he saemen ha evey man has a ih o every hin' (Le p 85) by he aditio of he cause isofar as he hoesly judes   neessary fo his preseaio preseaio Ye how muh does he proviso mea? Why would a ma ake anyhi if he did o j ude i eessary fo his preservaio  Pesumably beause he judged i in some ohe way proable o

emphasis i s always o he psevaio of life life and limb ah a o ommodious livi ad ohe aids o feliiy) feliiy) For wha wha he has said is (1 ) ha whaeve a ma does, he does of eessiy and (2) ha i no be wron o do wha he ao help bu do so i mus be ih36 om hs poposios i would follow follow ha whaever whaever a ma does is rh and his would hold for civil soiety as well as for he sae of aue37  oher wods if, o he one had, aual libey is o be equaed wih power an ierreaion of Hobbes o whih  do o subscribe), he, as has bee poied out by many wies fom Rousseaus ime o he pesen, here is o basis for ay moral obliaion o for obligaio i any sense oher ha ha ha of ecessiy Ad his his proposiio hol ds as well fo iil iil soiey as for he sae of aure. Bu if, if, aleravey aleravey here are obligaos (eve of he pudeial vaiey) i the sate of aure, aure, he ural bery is o wihou limi : i is o he igh o everyn, as obbes delares  o be.

-

 t s tue that Hobbes appears to be trying to dentify what is right wit h wha is reasonable How he obtains radl conlusions from from this traditonal position appear however when we why it is always reasonabl and right to sek what is good for oneself answer is that one does so necessaly ( by a ertain impulsio of nature no less than that whereby a stone moes downwad') and that it cannot be unrnable f  t do wht he nt hp but d and that therfore it must be right E W'. II pp 89 3 7 Of course this was not Hobbss meanng; but it is my contenton that t is h lgil cncluin of his line f argument Hi itntin o n the e nd was early to deduce and down cetain standards of right conduct conduct Whether these standrds these laws nature were more than prudential rule more than thms about what mns interet i and about hw he woud behave if he reasoned ately is not my present conce It is clear howeer that whateer their



































12

H O B B     C O  F U    G  C L A  I T Y C A   O F L I B   T Y  1  3

 O OK

Moreoer if obbes is misen in concluding tht ntural liberty is limited somethig mst be wrog with t les one of the wo poposiions just stted above, by wich he seeks to sbstaniate tha conclsion: amely (1) that all hma acios are ecessiated and (2) tht wht is ec essitated cano be wrog, and herefore herefore mus be right The error for preset purposes is in he secod o these proposiios Whether or ot ot we accep determism we distngish in morl discouse (as Hobbes himself does betwee voluntary d ivoltry cions d we hol me morally responsible for the former (or rther for that class of volary cios we call free') whehe r n hy are bove ; ad need Ths we dey the secod proposition bove Hobbes mself does so, by implicaio, wheever he reers to ay hma cio s wrong ad explicitly in his cotroversy with Bishop Bramhall 38 Herei lies one of his bsic icosisten cies At one momet he relies o determ determism ism to excse ny ction bu at oher times he is uwllg to excse all actios, as is impied indeed by the eumeratio eumeratio and elaboration of immt able nd eeral natl laws 9 obbes cold hve voided this serious incosistency i either of two ways He might have held at wht wht is ecessited my still be wrong if it is volutry (free' in obbes's sese his lie of agmet wold have bee completely usaisfactory usaisfactory to him, however becuse i wold hve undercut undercut hs j ustcaion ustcaion for cts of selfpresevaton. He cold also hve rged tht cs seeks to gie the impression that he meant and proved more�g., that the contract

wch re necessited may be wrong if they are free in  more commony ccepted sense of that ermfor instace, acts tke fom a desired or netral netral motive. Accoring to sch a dentio acs motivated by fear of violen death wod o be free ad mght be jstied o h grod. grod. Ts escpe from from s dilemma ws deied to Hobbes by hs detio of lbery  \

I IBTY A vIG BY QUIITIO We oticed erlier tht obbes depred from most usu oios of freedom by mking it compable with fer fer e sck rigidly o he ide tht volntry ctions re free refusing to recogze ta the natre of he immediate case of the volitio ws relevat One of hs most signc applicatios applicatios of his his idea ppears  hs discssio of sovereigy by acqusitio here he ses it to suppo he popostion that a sbjec who agrees, expcly, to obey a coqeror as he price of his life has made  bidng contrac contrac ter ll he ws free to go o resisting ! But srey he i s here sg his nsl deni denion on of libety to acheve a resl hat wold o be generally acceptable Normlly we wold ot ackowledge s morally bindig (qite prt from law) a promise constried t sword's point The acto is to be sre volunary, volunary, bt it is ot free' or we wold say if freedom be dened  his peverse way the ot all freely mde corcts corc ts ae bidg Freely acceped obligaions are bidg oy when reely mes more ha voltarily whe i ref refers to a cei class of volntry ctios ctios oly We look



































 ROLAND PEOCK

H O B B E  '  C O  F U  I  G C L A R  T Y - C A  E O    I B E R T  1 15

dbatabe, ad d ot b dcidd for prst pupos s.1 But Hobbes preferred the sharp line betwen voluntary nd involu tary to th ess clear dstictio btwee actios motvated by fear and and those not s o motivated-oen motivated-oen a mater of degree Of course he may use ny dion he like s The point is that, by usng th on he does he tends to confus the reader ad to add a specious persuasiveness to hs argumet.

for hs promise s sak 42 The troub is tha h i constaty obscurig this assumption, ndd contradictng it by sayng that covenants without a sword are but words tht n the stat of nature prot is the measure of right nd not least by assrg that the cotracts by wich sovreignty is established are basd upo f f aloe To th modern rader h woud ave ben much more prsuasiv if he had sought to show tat th whole process of formng civil society is a mattr, almost of pullng onesf up by his bootstraps bootstraps Just a le felg felg that an agrmnt ought to be kept nd hat othrs will hav thi sam feing nd modify their bhaviour even a itte bit i coseuece is nough to make possibe th stabishmt of govrmnt with a mocum of authorit. his rst stp itself incrses incrses the geeral security ad so imiishs far, thrby poviding a csay vadating codition for moral oblgatio43 With the ensung greater oblgato (and genra rcogio throf) scurity is furher incrased ad so on in a asceing spira But this accout of the growing facs of poitcal scurity and poitic obligation, muualy iteractig nd reinrcing is a mattr of degree, of more or less d teds to be obscured by the black and white distictios so ar to Hobbes. For him a act is either volutary volutary or it is not a mn is ithr obliged or he is not, nd he is either free free or he is unree unree Th who contractual apparatus tends to b icompatibl with a phiosophy mor congnal to e mode mind, that makes both librty ad obligation mers of degree

14

IV. HE Soci oTRACT

Fnaly lt us look at the social cotract in th ight of what obbs says o it in his discussio discussio of commoweaths commoweaths by acquisi to W must now thk of te cotracts wch each makes with each othr as though hey wre comped by a coqueror o pain of deathcor deathcorced ced in th strongest sese o that word If we do think of thm that way, most of us woud f they were ot ory indng and that they would control our action only as log as, and i proporion to th apprhsion of dager that promptd them The commo teaching of the hstory o con qusts suppos this viw Byond this, such socia cotras would be ective only to the extent that men had some faith in othe m's tndncy to abide by an agreement for its ow sae or that the conqueror afterward afterward acted beignl But if Hobbes had bn willg to say that freedom and fear wre not compatibe ad that freedom was a matter of dgree it would have foowed that the socl contract itsef woud be morally bidi d prac tically ctve just as far as it was ot the resut of fear ad was



































1 6

 . ND ENNCK

howeve us in erms of his mehodology his addiion o a o-nohin agumens his unwilingness o qualify o o deal i maes of degee. Subsanively i has been my hesis hee ha an examiaio of Hobbes's cocep of libey' and elated noions a leas hows some fesh ligh on he angled web of his sysem Moeove, pehaps e mos pesise ad pevasive of Hobbess conusions gow ou of his belief in deeminismno o of deemnism iself, bu ou of he way in which he ne peed i ad he conclusion he dew fom i. No only is his a mae closely elaed o he idea of libey b Hobbess vey denion of ibey as consisen wih fea, appeas in hs hou o have been a conseence conseence of i Fo if eedom was o be deed compaibly wih deeminsm and a he same ime as a ea and disinc disinc idea (o boow Descaes's Descaes's phase), e saw no ohe way o do i han o make i u on he disincon beween volunay and involuay involuay acios. He wold have done bee o have been coe wih makin i a somewha ess clea and disic idea The vey a ha as gven Hobbes his epaio fo caiy coheece, and loic has conibued mihily o his consion and nconsisencies and o he speciosness of his easoning No belilemen of he impoace impoace ofdeng ems is iende d. Hobbes's deion of libey was a bad deniio: i led him ino inconsisency a ceai poins while a ohes i faciiaed his misleadi he eade eade Why dd he choose i? Paly, i woud appea, because i seemed o lend isef o claiy of demosaion Uoruaely, Hobbes souh a deee of claiy and naliy icompaible wih his subjec mae A deion of libey in

6 LRTY AD OLGATO  O

A G Whm This aicle sas fom he same poin as Pofesso Pennocks (see Chape 5 above), ie fom Hobbes inadequae ocial deiio iio of libey B wheeas Pofess o Pennock goes on o mon an aack on Hobbes  poceed o disiuish vaios ohe senses of lbey in Hobbes wiings and o elae hem o he vaious senses n which he se s he wod obliaion Thouh  die fom Poesso Peo o soe poins of iepeaion I also de fom ohe scholas on ohes and my aice is as muc a cicism of hei wok as i is of his Expc ciicis howeve, I have avoided since my objec is udesandig ahe ha polemic  meely sugges ha Hobbes views o libey ad obliaion ae ae bes sudied oehe Fo whee libey libey ceaseh hee beginneh oligaion (Te Eemens oLw , 15 9 N he s ee paagaphs of Ltn XIV ad again in he he

I s hee aaaphs of Ltn XXI Hobbes denes he wod libey in one way and en poceeds o se i in wo ohe





































118

A. G WRNHA

LIBERTY AND OBLIGATION IN HOBBS

wheel) Hobbes des no singuish ese ese dieren dieren senses, bu his examples indcate he one he has in mnd. The example of he men walking in he way wihou stop o ndin no sop in wal in in the way sugg ests that we can elminate elminate oth i d ii ; sine i impies hat an impedimen is neier something which aes acal movement dicul nor somehing whch would pu a stop o possile movemen ut somehin wch prevents actual movement fom fom coninuing The example of he waer in the vessel is no ojecion to ths intepreation houh the water may not seem to e movin it is 'endeavouing to escape fom its conaine and Hoes dened endeavour (conatus) as moion made in less space and time than can be given (De

fa as he has ade an ed of deliberain, but fre in so far as thee is no exeal impedimen impedimen to his no playing o wch Hobbes answered He Braa) thikeh i a conradicio to call a fee aent hm hat hath not ye made an e nd of delierating ad to call lety a asence of ouward ouward impemens For saith he hee may be ouwad mpediments even while he is deliea delieang ng herein herein he is deceived Fo houh he may deiberate of hat whch is impossible for im o do as in the example he alleeth of hm hat delibeateh wheer wheer he shall play at ennis not nowing hat the doo of the tenniscou is shut aainst im yet it is no impediment to him hat he doo is shut ill he have a will to play whch he hah no ill he hah

1 19



































 G WRH 20 we say a g s free here is o mea any lbery of he gi, bu of he g1ver a was no boud by any law or covenan ee i is n o e lbey of voce o give give . So when we seakee or pronuncaio bu of e man wom no law ah oblge from e use o f e e o speak oewse  e did. Lasly from word ee-w no lbey ca be ierred of he wll desre or inclaion bu e ibey of e ma; wich consise in his ha e nds no sop in dong wa he has  wll desire or ' cinaion o do. obbes' aim here is o show a free toug grammacally applied o accidens of bodes like walkig givg ec. really appes o bodes only. A way of achievin achieving g s wold be o ae seneces were free s grammacally applied o such accidens



d

LBRY  BLG  HB

12  also e case ha   e agen s no oblged o om  and in  ha e is o obliged o do y  for an agen s no free in is sse o make a gf if he is oblged o omi making i o is a agen free free n s sese o say someig  he s oblged o say i Tus freedom  his new sense (absence of oblgao) s also a o way' freedom a freedom freedom o do or forbear forbear I conras absence absen ce of exernal imemen imemens s s a •o eway' freedom freedom sice i  presupposes a e age as wied o do no o forbea Fear and libey are consisen as when a man rowe s goods ino e sea for a e sip sold sink e do i neveheless ve wingly and may refuse o do  if e will i is erefore e aco of one a was ee  so a man some



































1 22



G . W E R N H M M

there was o exteral mpedmet to the agets refrag from payg he oey he he could have reaed from payg f he had wled to refran. refran. Now  the aure of he case here ca be o eera mpedme o refrig from dog  aco; a age ca ways refra refra f he ws Bu t s ot aways re ha he c do he aco f he wlls for i s aways possbe ha hs oo  be sopped by a eera mpede mpede  her of Hobbes' eampes did hs happe, so  boh cases  was e ha wie he age was deberag he coud do or forbear o do he aco accordg accordg as he shoud wl Ad whe Hobbes dscusses   he La verso he mkes s pa: 'b sov qua libeu  era vel sovere vel o sovere .e he pays  freey  ha t

LIBERTY AND OBLIGTION IN HOBBES

23

It s mpossbe for a agent who s motvated by fer to be free  s sese a he same e sce f e ws o do  hrough fear he has aready abadoed hs bery o do or om accordg as he shal w ha Hobbes Hobbes shows s ha a acon ca be a oce free d ovaed by fear free  so fr as he age had bery o om t e coud have oied  i he had wed o omt ; ad ovated by fer  so fr as hs wl o do  was craed craed by fear fear Here e a e s rghy more cauous cauous ha e gsh Ms e ibrta smu cossere  eadem acoe possu .e Fear ad bery ca sad ogeer n th am acon.  s paragraph obbes s dscussg copuso as he udersads copulso a ma s he oy sad o be copeled



































 G NHM

LIBT ND BLIGTIN IN HBB

2 Suppo h h  no obd h o p o no o py h fo xmp h h no md  conn o do ihe If o i  pmiib fo im o p o no p ccodn  h h i Ti I h ced fedom fedom fom obion obion 3 A  u of dibion h  o py nd hi impy fom  die o njoy hmef:  cn no y h h i f fom compuion 4 Fn in on o p h m h no obc no h  f in h n h h  no xn impedimn impedimn o i moon Ce n n cnno b f n  fou n   m m If h  f f n ene 1 nd 2 e cnno b f n en 3

f p o h  o nue modid n oin condiion of bou iby nd . H pk of boue ib in n De Cie XV 3 No rht i natura natura iber iber  ib no coniud bu f b h . Fo f h h aw e mod ber i bou; h  cion on i  h natura nd diine aw     On he oh hnd p cn b quod o ho h Hobb ofn conci h e of nu   condon h mn by i cd by nu nu . Hnc h conoy conoy  o hh obbe  of nu i  condiion of bou by o no u h i  pon nd unpobe conoy  h fc  h Hobbe h o den concpon he  of nue nue hch h u fo den den pupo. Whn h i

14

125



































12 6

 G. WERM

which men have no obigations, and therefore an urestricted naura rigt into a state of nature in which men have oigations an therefore therefore ony a restrcted natua natua rigt. Ths preame may ep to explan wy n iscssing te rst three paragraps of Leiatan XIV I take one view of the right of nature an then ater in deaing with the origin of the oigation invove in natura aw, I take the other TH RIGH OF NURE wic witers comon ca j j natule is te iert eac man at to use is own ower, as he wil wil imsef imsef or the prese preseat ation ion of s own natre; tat tat is to sa of s own ife ife  an conseqent conseqent of oing oing an y ting ting which in is own judgment and reason e sa conceive to e the atest means terento.

IBR D OBIGO I OBBE

 27

Tis pragraph is ustrated by W V p 22: 'he hat is e to prison y force hat eecton an ma eierate, wether he wi e ae an trane on te grond or ke se of hs feet 4 Here te guars are externa impements nd take away pat of te mans power to do wat e w (tey prevent m fro fro runnng away) t do no t tog tey coud) prevent hm from from waking waking to prison f e ws ws to do o. He can wak or not wak accoring as his dgment and reason sha ctate to hm an if his am is s own reservation it is aso perissie for him to do eter In this paragraph Hoes oca denition of iert (sense 4 is simpl an emarrassment to im and e imediatey sides







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 8

II



GE

The legend of Hobbes te ahest s doomed except as a hstorcal curosty, and the task of re-examnng s oltcal losohy  the testc context n w Hobbes developed t has ha s aready begun. Warrender Warrender and an d Oakesho Oakesho have made made esc ally noteohy contrbtons to te necesary re-assessment The later's brant Introducton to the thn s acularly sgnnt for placng Hobbes n a dstncvy Crstan adton of poltcal poltcal hlosohy Oakesot wo credts Hobbes wt wt eng the greatest of Englsh oltcal hlosophes goes so fa as to say: e geatness of Hobbes s    tat he constuced a olica losoy tat reected he canges in te uoean tellectual conscousness c had een oneered cey  te teologans of te eenth and sxteet centuies   te gt o te adcally new apoach to Hobbes suggested y ths satement t s obous that much wok remans to be done, not only on obes but on he ntellectual mleu n wch he ied and rote 67  Oakho Oakho lc t p l   Omson of the fouteenth-century fouteenth-century theologa n fro th teent  hard to plai "'  i are wa wrtt tre ha oe to the atenton of the author an artle b Mr Keth Bow ding te ratoa ba for Hobb e: Hob Ground for Belef n a Det XXXVII (962) pp 6- Bow uppot the preent atle at evl pont although h the tat obb baed  blef n o on a fom of te aruent fro degn (whh he late to e arut o auato)  an apet of obb ought not dlt here

 w

Pi

8 H O B B  S  S B O  RG RG  O  S M A N *

C. B phs OBBES s as renoned a name n poltcal scence as s

H Adam Smt n economc Accordngly Accordngly realng notons

o what Hobs meant to say ae ared from tme to tme Whe s materalst utltaansm as been a strong current snce he oounded t Hobbess moden reutaton dates from the reemhass on soveregnty and utltaran morals by t Bentamsts Bentamsts Te reacton aganst Bentamsm Bentamsm l to strong crt csm of Hobbes by Engls Engls  dealsts dea lsts such as T H Green Ther ccsm of hs hs materalst metapyscs and ofhs beaoust etcs set he tone of the standd teatme�t of Hobbes and seemed to ae rended s potcal ews arless As long as Hobbes as regarded as prmarly a materalst and hs oltcal doctrnes ere seen as consstent deductons from hs materalst oston, t as relavely easy to dspose of hs unpleasant theory o t state for materalsm as ad lttle standng n Engls qtca thnkng snce te egteenth cenury wen te stoca mater



































C    M A C PH PH  R   N

H      '  URG MA

Hobbe' tatue however as too geat o h politca idea to be tiie aa in thi ahion ahion Lae geneation o schoas et out to etac Hobbe poitica theo fom i mateiaim mateiaim Coom Robton Robton n 886 Jon a in 93 and eo Stauss in 96 ae taken the poitio n that Hobb potca phoophy as not eie m i mateiaism o ecie iuenced b hi concept o cience. Wie t is posibe to ho that Hobbe might hae eache hi potca concuon om cetin moa attituds and preconception uneate to matea im o cience hi position aes othe othe dicute. In ie o the emphasi ich Hobbe pace on hs mateaism an n e o h insistence on the cintc natue o i metho t eem unsatisacto to dmi thee attbute o i thouht as mee h shae in the cuent inteectua ahon, especa en the eut  to a a doe John ad3 that h thought is medaea o a th ome cuent text-book te to eae hi theo ootes nd unexpaned except a the eacton o a tmi man to the istubed poitica coniion o hi tme. A cue to a dent unestandin o thee matte  to be ound in a thee o Hobbs constuctions o is poitica phooph.4 It s the act emaked b a e e ite/ that Hobbe s moat i entia a bougeo moait moait Whn ts i ooed back t can be een that Hobbe anas o human natue om hich his oe poitca theo i ed i ea an anai o boueoi boueoi man ; that the asumpon expicit and mpct, upon hch h pchoogica concuson depen e aumption pecuia ad ad o o boueoi boueoi ocet Conideed

om ths pont o e hi mateiasm a into pace une tanab It i not necea necea eithe to minimze its pace in in hi thought o to ake it te hoe epanation. epanation. An thi appoach a aod a ne e o the tength tength an eakne o h potica tinkin and o ts eeance to-da

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Een thoe o daee unamenta ith Hobbes' ana ho a emakabe epect o o it e o e to be aaid aaid o Hobbes he kno too much about u What moe moe accuate accuate and moe ipeaing pctue o ouee cou e hae than that hch Hobbes says the ho sha moe nao ook into te case o ich men come toethe and deiht n each othes compan sha ea d  .   Ho b a t aice aice men o eet i be bet ko ko b obsei obsei those tg hch hch the do he the ae met Fo i the meet o tac it is p ee an ead ot  eo but hi buie i to dcae ome oce a cetain maket-edp i beoten hich hath moe o jeaou i it than tue oe a hence actio ometmes ma aie but ood i nee i o peaue a eceation o mind ee man is ot to peae mse most ith thoe thi hich t up auhte ence he ma accoi to the atue o that ch s dicuous b compaison o aoe m eect eect and iities iities pa the moe cuent i hi o opio opio A athouh ts be someme iocent an ithout oence



































 B MHRN

H  B B     BURGS MAN

abung abung hese chaacescs chaacescs o mans eenal naue The pon h s makng s a mn s no by nau a socal anal We We do do no no    by nau sek socy o s own sake bu ha  may ecev so honou o po om  hos w des pmaly ha secondaly 7 gan all ee conges aseh ehe ehe o o uual povy povy o o o van gloy     Mn co ogehe o he own good whch las ehe o h senses o he nd Bu all h nds pleasu s e glo o o have a good opnon o ons sel o es o gloy n he nd h es ae ae sensual sensual o conduc conducng ng o sensual sensualyy     All socy h oe s he o o gan o o o gloy    Bu no socy can b ga o lasng which bgns om om van gloy Bcause ha gloy s lk honou;  all n hav  no an hah  o hy conss n compason and pecllenc    hough he bns o hs le ay be be uch uhe uhedd by uual uual hlp hlp    y hos ay b e aaned o by domnon han by h soey o ohs Donon ho no soey s naual; whou fea he could be no socey bu only he suggle o ach o pow ove ohes W mus heeoe solv ha h ognal ognal o all ga nd lasng socees conssed no n he muual good wll men d owads ach ohe bu n h uual  hy had o ach oh8 n all hs eans o ovaon as n he passag uod obbes gvs oughly eual pomnence o gan and gloy conupscence and vany Ths h posulas as h basc ves whch l bhind ha sch o poe and s obvese h ea o ohs o wich obbss polcal oy dcly ows

he same ae he ses upon hmsee And upon all sgnes o conp o undvalung naually ndeavous as a as h daes (whch aongs h ha have no comon owe o kep hm n ue s a nough o ak he desoy ach oh o eo a geae valu om hs conns by daage and o o ohs by h xampl11 xampl11 Hobbes s abung abung o human nae n he absac a ualy whch s lagly a poduc o he socal laonships s up aong bs o h upp classes by h Rnssac encoachns o capals capals on h olde socey1  Wh h developn o capals elaionshps wh h ing o moe classs o n om h old soial bonds hs abon o svng o van glo has bcom a wespad caacsc o obbess pcue ay b calld an unpleasanly accua analyss no o an as such bu o an snc h se o bougeos soey ook no a obbss o basc psula  s no mly ha en sk aal gan bu ha e compev sach o gan s a consan dv donaing h whole chaace o he ndvdual ndvdual The os uen uen eason why mn ds o hu hu each oh ash henc ha many n a h sae me hae n appe o h sa hng whch ye vy on hy can nhe enjoy n coon no ye dvde  hen  ollos ha he songs mus hav  and ho s songs s didd by he so d1  Hence agan he ea ea each has o he ohe he hee s no po able o oveawe he all and hnc ah mans nd o b a embe o a soiy hch wll have ha powe

17

1 7



































14

c:

B . M A C P H E R  ON ON

dominated dominated by ths consciousness consciousness Ths is he mar o bourgeois socety in contrast to precapitalst soceties.4 We need not be surprised ten ta to Hobbes a the reations between men tend to be the reations o the make The Valte, or Wort o a man is as o a other tings hs Price that is to sy & o much as woud be given or or th th use o his his Powr and tereore is not abs0ute; but a thing depenent on the need and judgment o anoter anoter  . . And as in other thngs so in men not the seer but the buyer determin determines es the Price15 Price15 And again: The mani maniestation of te Vaue w set on one anothe is that which s commony caed Honou ring or Disonouring To Vaue a man t a hig rate is to Honotr hm hm    Nor Nor dos dos it ate aterr the the case case o Honour wether an action (so it be great and dicut, and consequenty a signe o much power) b ust or unjust: or Honour consisteth consisteth oney in te opiio o Power.16 Thus the reations o powr between men, are se
' HBBE 

BURGEIS



1 75

his abour. Thy must either do as the Jewes did after after eir return rom captivity in reediying the Tempe buid with one an and od the Sword in he oter or ese they must ire oters to ght for for thm For the Impositions Impositions that are aid on the peope by e Soveragn ower are oting ese but te Wage due to them that hod te pubique Swod t o deend deend private private mn in the exercise exercise o severa Trads Trads and Caings 8 Simary Simary in the Rudimens : What is brought by te subects to pubic use is noting ese but but the price price o eir bough peace . .   and taxes are the pament to those who watch in arms or us witout which indvidua me coud no prcue their private ortunes.19 Consistenty with ths eary bourgeois view o the state Hobbes argues that taxation shoud be in proportion to benets. 'though a equay enoy peace yet the benets springing from from thence are not equa to a; or some get greater possessions others ess ; and again again some consume consume ess others more. more. He recom recom mends that taxation be on consumption rather than on income or propert basing his preference on te tendency of consumption taxes to encourage frugaity ad accumuation as we as their seemng east to troube the mind of them that pay it This view o taxation and especiay the recommendation o taxation of consumption reects an entirey dierent view of sciety from the unctiona view whi prevaed as ate as the Tudor period whereby the poor were considered to have fued heir obigation to the state by woring. 22 There is muc other evidence that obbess moraity is the moraity o the bourgeois word and that is state is the bourgeois



































1 

' OBBES S BOURGEOIS MAN

C B MACPHERSON

sell, and otherwse conrac w one anohe; o choose hei own aboad hei own die ei own ade of lfe and nsiue hei chlden as hey hemselves nk ; and e le '25 These indicaions ha Hobbes had a fairly cea iew of he polical needs of e bougeos socey of hs ime need only be menioned hee  is of moe impoance o emphasze ha he pemses fom wch Hobbes deduces hs psycology and hs ew of he sae ae dawn fom fom he pcue of man as he has been shaped by he elaonsips of bougeois soey2 6 The conen n ohe wods of he basic human dies wch Hobbes posulaes is peculialy a bougeos conen Only because of hs does he move o his dasic polical conclusions conclusi ons This mgh be shown n deail a eac sage of his agumen bu  s enoug o summaize hee s s seps he desie fo fo lo s e dese o be ecognzed as a supeo indidual no meely o sae in he pesige cusomaily accoded o a supeio an o saus I leads heefoe heefoe o an unending inddual inddual suggle fo fo powe. The desie fo fo gain is he compeie seac o gay maeal appees necessaily a he expense of ohes snce hee is no enough o saisfy saisfy all all Te novely novely of Hobbess a ssumpo s he novely of e bougeos iew ha maeal appes e boundless and ha no moal esan can o need be placed on em Coeousnesse o gea Rches Rches and a!bon of gea gea Honos ae Honouable as sgnes of pwe o obin hem Rces ae Honouable fo fo hey ae powe'2 powe'2 7 The desies fo gloy and gain wen gien hs peculia conen lead diecly o he famous famous poposon ha he s

17

dea om hese wo poposons and fom fom he pemise h man is aional o he exen ha  e can cculae e consequence consequence of hs acons e whole of Hobbess polcal sucue s in u deduced deduced Even hs aionaliy has a mecanle mecanle aou ou   is no e aionaly pemissed by Aiole o Gous wheeby men wee capable o lng in accodance wh ules of social conduc  s no song enough o whsand e oce of compeiie appeies only song enough o sow men ha hey mus submi o a soeeign o aod wose. Thus he bougeos assumpions whch e ound n he pemses of Hobbess ough lead o he eecon of he soeeign sae 



When Hobbess hough is seen n s lgh i is possble o sugges a new iew of he place of maeasm and science in hs polcal heoy. heoy. e now ha Hobbes wshed s polica phlosophy o be egaded as e nal pa of a conssen sysem he s pa o wich was a echanical maealis saemen of laws of moion He agued ha he scences of human naue and o poliics could be deduced fom he s pa o philosophy namely geomey and physcs2 9 He nee aemped is ask f f he dscoeed a moe feasble feasble way. The pshological prn cples fom whch a polcal scence could be deduced need no he said hemseles be deduced fo he laws of moon o maeal bu could be obined diecly by self-examinaon30 Tis d no mean ha hs maeals phlosophy was cu o





































7 8

C  MACERSN

mehod of mmics, o which Hobbs hd he ighs opion32 opio n32 Suc  mehod eques sl-eviden sl-eviden s incples. Ts Hobbs minined coud b go  dcly dcly o o obsvon; in e nl esenion o his pocl eoy e ounced  slobrvion was sce man es of man pncpes s dew dew is  is  st pncp Hobbs cl ea tat tat Hobb Now it is clea n of vaion m obser observaio on bu fro from spcion from inro inrospci rey from enrey naure naure no en 'th e (p. 171) as to 'the remarks quoted earler (p othrs; his remarks actons of othrs; the actons cear aso aso is I is cear oe examp examp of is sociy'' are oe elg s of sociy rue rue delgs direcy given n o direcy es abou abou man naure were no oslaes a s osla a n n paern s nding nding a paer res of of s were e res on n b were obsevao by any obseva orgeos ormd by th borgeos parn formd aon, a parn obrvaon, al he daa o obrv

    E S  S RES fN

179

by his obsvon o o  bougos sociy sociy The is no cona dcon ee Te pedomnnc o memic nkng n e seveneen ceny s closly eed o e se o cism Qunve ysis o e mel wold o wic memcs is e ues om ws demnded incesingly om e en cenuy n e sevce o cls ecnology nd o e non se e bougeois mnd ws  o be  memcl nd he l memc nd ws gnelly  bougeos nd e l ions o e e on wee  liions o e oe e m mcl meod s conguos wih e edcon o l men o e equiy o e mke Consd scondly e ec o s mis mepyscs on



































  B     H H  R  ON ON

H O B B     BOURO AN

teory. But ts i s an anacrostic judgment judgment Wih a its crudiy s maerialism maerialism was an advance advance It made posible a deeper understanng of te new orces a work in society, as we as elping o desoy e ideological ideological suppos of e old order and o provide foundations for e kind of state necessary to conain and suppor capalis development development

nex two centries generay overooked37 was tat e indvdual in capitaist society is broug under new relaionsips of super iority and subserence apar from te stae in e measue ta e old relaionshps relaionshps ae dissolved e new relaionsips relaionsips are argely determined by te individuals indivi duals relaion to capial ose wo conrol capial ave power over tose wo do no; e laer can ony use teir labour as a commoy oeng i on e make o ose wo ave capial capial s is a relaonsip o social dependence of some idividuals idividuals on oers as real ifno if no  coesive as te feudal feudal reaionsps. reaionsps. Bu i is no so obvious. e relaion relaion beween persons in capialis socety as Ma empasized in is concep of commodiy feissm38 is isgused as a relation

 80

III We ave seen a Hobbes acceped and regarded as aural a pattern of social relaionsips and uman beaviour wc we kow  one aspe of bourgeois socety. To Hobbes e naural naural

 8





































































9 T H E SOCIA ORIGINS OF H O B B E S ' S P O L I TI TI  A L T H O U G  T

Keith Tomas

E

VR

since the Earl o Clarendon comented upon his



































1 86

 HOAS

tere wll he o edavou ere t o refute refute i t altogter. altogter. Ideed te positio uder review is i ay case too iprecise to allow o clear refutatio: bo is ot a tr wic ca be traslated ito Eglis or easily adapted to t ay sectio of seveteet cetury glis soey Proesso Proesso r Strauss's aalysis was based upo Hgels coceptio of te booii, wic derive as is Eglis editor rearks ro a copletey deret political raditio 8 Siialy ro roessor essor Macperso is obviously idebted to Marx yet atepts to t te Maxist patte o class structure to seveteet cetury Eglad usually ivolve classiyig at leat soe o te getry aog te booii wic akes it dicult o see were te ooii eds ad te aristocracy

OIL OIS OF HOES ' S OLIL HO

1 8

ave appealed appealed e esults, owever icolusive, icolusive, ay elp to prevet ture coetators fro autoaticaly caracterisig obbess tougt as booi and tereby over-iplfyig wat is a igly coplex positio 





Coetators usuay begi teir aalyss by drawig atte  ot to obbess recoedatios but to e kd o ua t aure d socety wic is reected cted i s wtgs us it as bee sad tat obbes observed ot a but ourgeois a9 or omo ooom, 1 0 ad tat is cizes iabited a possessive aket society  Oe ust terefore terefore ask ow ar te lieaets o te society wit wc obbes tougt isel cocered







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































228

KH HOMS

synonyous ith mat pi. H blivd in th at as a comial institution onsiding that all anufatus inasd by bing vndibl' and that a an's labou as a comodity xchangabl fo bnt as ll any oth thing'.5 thing'. 5 H as vn capabl of poying ommcial taphos to dscib plitial lationships lationships . 60 Th is also aso to thik that h favoud hat  should gad today as a xtm stat of intal ssj. Thus h obsvig that th libty of th subt copiss thos thgs hih in gulatig thi atios th sovign hath atmttd h its as instans th libty to buy and sll and othis cotact ith on anoth to choos thi on abod thi o dit thi o tad of lif nd institut thi childn childn as thy thy thmslvs think t ad th li 6 It is hadly cssay to mphasis that not on of ths libtis' had bn cognisd by pvious Tudo and tuat govnts hos laboat cods of social ad conomi gulation had xtndd to ths and any oth atts atts But  hav no aso fo thinking that Hobbs himslf itndd thm to stad as unassailabl libtis.6 Thy a psntd as hypothtial hypothtial xampls of fdo fom cotol and a oittd altogth in th Latin vsion of h33 Indd thy a impliitly futd i thos passags h Hobbs advocats suptuay las gulating th consumption of food and cloths6 fo ths masus ould psuably b incomatibl ith ay libty fo m to hoos thi on on dit'. His ducatioal poposals ould similaly conict ith n's libty to institut thi childn as

SCL S  BBES S LCL 

22

to int ith its distibution distibution  h only si limit st to pivat auisitiv activity appas to b th uint that it hal involv no dang o hut to th oonalth' by hih it is psuably ant that dfnc is to com bfo ouln.66 his svation is an ipotant on fo it inds us tha Hobbs put po bfo plnty and as nvisaging no simpl oity of shopps as th ndoduct ndoduct No is h idit idit to th intsts of th consu fo it is fo his point of vi that h objcts to onopolis. onopolis. H as also ppad ppad to count anc piognitu a systm of inhitanc hich Pofsso Machson has lsh dscibd as obstuctiv to th goth of apitalist apitalist lations6 lations6 7 In gnal hov hov his conomc osition as in th contxt of his ag xtly advancd ad it constituts th ost obviously ogos aspct of his thought. His conoic ommdations hov  ot an indis nsabl pat of his olitical thought fo h lft to th sovig th ight to dtin dtin hat  ay contact fo fo and hat not' . 66  his positio i s as uh th ncssay pli pliiay iay to a ogamm of laboat stat intf as to on of ssjr Hobbs's on pfns a la nough but his politial idas  consistnt ith ith ith ous.  altnativ onoi poliy is vald by Hobbs's tat Poo La hich is intndd not only to coml th idl to o but to guaant th nssitis of lif to thos ho by accidnt invitabl bom unabl to aitain thmslvs by thi labou'6  I suh a s ocity h lif lif is aodd th iotnt poo hos labou ill nv b of advantag to th

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23

EH HMA

Fnally t ust be emphasised that Hobbes dd not altogether shae the assumtns anatn the legal code under whse potecton ealy Englsh captal s st oushed. We have alead ntced hw hs cncesson t the starvn an f the rht to steal n te f eerency cncted wth the rw dese to pvde me elabate rtecton fo the hts o property Lke the radcal law refers refers f hs day Hoes hed hat 'thee s n pprtn between ds and le le 386 Unlke he Ensh cmon lawyes he was peped t ecnse that the necesst  sel-esevan was d runds for ds oeng he cmnal law38  It s tue that he des not seccally ue the abltn  those branches f the cmnal law f hs day whch ade lfe the enalt fr nfnements of poet; ndeed he seems t thnk tha captal punshmen culd soe es be a useul useul deterent aanst stealn 38 7 But n eneal he appears more ready to lace lfe abve the equreents o proerty and cmerce tan wee hs conteaes It has soetmes been sad that the stess on cvenants whch ues s lael n Hobess work s an ech of the preoccupa tons of an creasn aptalst socety, where te legal erce abty and netablty f contacts s an essental prelnary to ecnmc expansn388 expansn388 But hs vews vews on cntacts cntacts ae b n ans thse of hs oe bougoi cnteporaes cnteporaes He had the law on hs sde when he aued that a a was bond to endeavur to peorm an oblaton he had ndertaken even when t suse uently tned out to e pssble39 But wheeas cnte pra casusts antaned that a an shuld stck by hs word

S O C I AL AL O R  G r : s O F

' HOBE 

POITC

HOUH

33

coenant o mutual trust n the state f nature s vod upon any reasonable suspcn391 whle n cvl socety the blatn f sujects to the soeregn s undersood to st as lon and no lner than the wer lasteth by whch he s able t ptect the 392 39 2 To ths etent theefoe Hbes dd not beleve n the aslute sanctty f contracts S fa as can be ascertaned ascertaned the law see s t have been ehnd Hbbes n hs vew that contacts could nt bnd t the nt of selfdestucn393 but he pats comay f t at least n sprt when he coes to dene the the ccustances n whch a cntract mht be be set asde  n the con law curts of hs day t as enealy acceted that a cntact ade b duess o ettnthat s b actual r threatened vlence r mpsn entculd nt be upheld f a an makes an oblatn by duess, duess, he shall avod t 394 Hence f a thef thef deanded deanded a ans money or hs fe fe and he chse t hand over hs mne ths wuld nt be a fee fee cntact cntact but robe395 Nr s ths meel a lega lega prncple In Hobess day most orasts would have areed wth ckes susequent assetn tat roses btaned b foce foce d not bnd As Ames put t the consent whch s wrested b etee feae s nt sucen t to a rme cntrac t 39 Eve snce the evastatng analys by Mar t has been enerally realsed that ths deton f duress as cnssng nly f threatened volence r msnment s mssbly narw he fral freedm f the contactn partes cn cnceal a fundaental neualty of agann power whch can eectvely restct feed f choce even thouh no phscal duress s



































234

KEITH THOM

freedo free do of contract so often proimed as an essental lerty, and induitaly essential fo the growth of capitalsm, was thus freedo of the ost formal and deceptive kind.397 It is string, howeve that this artical dstinction etween pbysical duess which is good gounds for voiding a contract and econoic dress which is not, eceives no support from Hoes to whom the distinction is a spurious one Instead he teats contracts as equally inding whateve thei origins 'It is he adits, 'a usual question whethe compacts extoted fom us though fear fear do olige o  not For eampe if to edeem my life life from the power of a oe, I promise to pay hm 100. next day, and that I will do n o act wherey to appreend appreend and ing hi to justice: whethe I am ted to eep promise promise or not398 To this conventional prolem oes gives an unconventional answer mintaining mly that such a pomise is inding 'Covenants entered into y fear in the condition of ere nature, are oliga toy  399 In the civil state they still ind unless the thing promised is specicay foidden y the sovereign 'o whatsoever I ay lawfully do without oligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do throug fear and wat I lawfuly covenant I cannot law fully rea 400 It i s easy t o see wy oes feels feels it necessary to aintain aintain ths paradoxical position Since the covent upon which his com monwealth rests is itself founded upon fear he cannot deny the vaidity of suc agreeents agreeents  If it wee tue [tat all covenants 'as poceed from fear of death o violence were void] no man in any ind of comonwealth cold e oliged to oedience  401

'  O C  L L  R I G I N  O F  O B B   S

POTCAL TOUG T

235

'is the lat appette n dberatng, it foows that not only actions that have heir eginning fo covetousness amition lust or appetites to te tng ppond pponded ed  t aso tose that ave other appetites thei eginng from aversion or fear of tose consequences tt follow te oission are vounay actn. 402 A covenant ade at the point of a pistol is therefoe as voluntay as one made out of friendship or geneosity and there are no gounds for distinguishing etween the two So to employ Aistotles famous famous example when a man thows his goods overoad to stop the ship sining there is nothing there involuntary involuntary ut the hardness of the choice403 Modern philosopers may feel that so elastic a deniton of 'voluntary rises moe prolems than it solves since they have now to search for a fresh analysis of what it is we feel to e unsatis factoy aout a covenant made at the point of a gun But oes has the advantage of a consistent position40 wic seves to remind us that, if we shft o attention fom the volntariness of te act to the appetites o avesions whih pompted it, we will nd no ualitative disinction etween actions ipeled ipeled y pysical fea fea and those prompted prompted  y economic coecion I sum oes fa fom susciing to one of the most fundaental risprdential assuptions of a laisser-faire capitalist socety, has gone a long way towards emoving its phlosopical phlosopical asis altogeter e was not alone aong hs hs contemporaries in manifesting scepticism aout the distinction etween agins aved at y physical force and those dictated y other foms of coercion405 ut it s seldom een emphasised



































236

K 

coercion in dail life. life. But when phsical force force does enter into the makng of a contract, he specicll rejects the common law doctrine of duress, the fundamental doctrine in a sstem of ursprudence which sered to protect the interests of those with superior ecooic power   It seems that no simple formula is adequae to convey the peculiar avour of Hobb es's political thought. He lived in an age of chane and it is not surprising that he should have sub scribed to a variet of what wre to some extent contraictor social assumption An eort eort to disentanle the strands onl serves to reveal how cosel aristocratic ogos and popular elements were interwoven interwoven Some of the resulting resulting paradoes have emerged in this paper. It has been shown that in his eorts eorts to persuade the aristocrac to adapt themselves to a world where militar power was ceasing to be the basis o f personal personal inuence Hobbes went back to ethical standards deriving from the age of chivalr chivalr It has also been seen that although he looked forward forward to the time when a ll men wou ld attain political self-consciousness self-consciousness he nevertheless restricted man of his most imortant polical recomendations recomendations to the gentr and the men of leisure Finall it has been noted that the ver economic trends which his politicl recommendations were perhaps best caculated to advance were precisel those wih wch he was personall most out of smpath. smpath. It is salutar salutar to rec that his ulmate goals for human endeavour peace civilisaton and intellectual proress

/

10 HLSPHY

].

A D

POLCS N HBBES

W N. Wakins (i) INTRODUCON

If a thg s ddd ddd to pat the th e s othg  othg agat agat s ha ha g g th opy o u Plato

OR Bacon the philosophers ob is to discover the principles F common to he specal scences to develop a ata philo

soph or universa scence which stnds to the special scences as a treetnk treetnk to its branches. For Locke on the contrar the plosopher is not a superscientist such as the incomparable incomparable Mr Newon the phlosopher does not examie the externl world even in its most universal aspects. His ob is to examine our own abilities ie to conduct a cca secondorder enquir into the mental processes and methods involved in rstorder enquiries This shft from natual philosoph to critical philosoph is uncompleted in Hobbes thought What he ss about philo soph echoes Bacon; what he does when he is philosophising largel foreshadows foreshadows Locke His dention ntion of philosoph equates it with science D C i 2; E II, p iv;  p 435 and





































238

)•

W. N

\CA TKI NS

Sudents of obbes who hae asked, What do his political doctrines owe to his philosophy? have mostly conned them selves to the queston of a relaton between his politics and his natua plosophy ie. his materialism. 2 This is no doubt largely due to obbes himself s we have seen his denition of philosophy diverts attention to his conception of nature; and in the Preface to the Reader in D Civ Hobbes suggests that he had once intended to derive from s conception of naure his concepton o f human nature and from from his c onception of human nature his conception of government And this does suggest that the ques tion hat do Hobbes' poltical poltical doctrines owe to his ph losophy ? can be refomulated as Did he derive his psychology from hs

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS IN HOBBE

239

were temporally temporally prior to s poltical theor theorising. ising. Then I shall turn from his intellectual intellectual development development to the nished system of ideas at which he arrived. arrived. This I shall reconstruct by showing the connections between his philosophical ideas and by drawg drawg ou in sections (iii to (vi the psychological moral and juridical implicatons of those phlosophical ideas These implications wil be marshalled together in section (vii (ii) HE EVELOPMEN OF OBBES ' HOUGHT obbes published his translation of Tucydides in 1629 here runs through hucydides hucydides o wn work a rough notion of the constanc of human natre and his noton Hobbes later sharp-



































240

J·

W  N  W A  K N N 

cotets-an omiion which, I ha ow how, i fata to hi cai that Hobbe orked out hi poitica heoy o the bai of hi kowedge of e ad ae o he becae iteeted i phiooph. The pupoe of the T i to expai peceptio of tat bodie Hobbe begi by aig dow a efevidet efevidet the ke picipe that 'That hich i i o a oh [ itaic] b aothe, hath othig added to it o take fo itit itit eai i the ae tate it a hat chage i caued b othig but h eaied Hobbe ceta etaphyica beief thoughout ife3 (We ha d that it idiect ipicatio ae ipe hi ife3 ive )  the ight of hi ke picipe picipe Hobbe epai he

HOSOH ND OLICS N OES

241 Ideed the ract i fai butig ith ipicatio which ae da out  Hobbe ubequet poitica itig The Trc aet i o a wod, that a i a pat of ee atue ad that hi behaviou ut be epaied b the ae ot of caua picipe a expai expai othe atua pheoea Sice aue i oe ad oheachica the tate of aue i ceay be ieie ieie Sice the bai i acivated acivated o ae the eeoga eeoga have bee ipged o b the etea od it foo that Hobbe theo  of koedge ut be baica epiicit epiicit d fo hi, togethe ith Hobbe eed to povide a caua epaatio of thikig ad aguage, foo, foo, a I ha ho i ectio iv ad v) Hobbe oai, ith a it ipi



































242

· W  N     K I N 

LOO ND OLIC  OBBE

obviou plical verne (ee ectin (v)) T he Engsh anlaion he pexed an infma accoun f hi mehd, wch he afewad decibed yemacally in De Cpore (n whch Hbbe wked beween 166 and 164 a peid wch embace he he peid dung which e elabaed h poical hey). I wan now o u o h ehod, fo  hnk I ave aid enough o hw a alhugh Hbbe wa a plica oian befe he becae a philphe, he had becme a philophe befe he becae a pliical hei; meve, meve, hi phphical phphical idea ae in he fefn f hi ealy pliical hey

be (ike ha he ade f avey Decare eend hi mechanical inepeain  he whle bdy and even o avey had aid ha ever ever aecn aecn f he mnd mnd    he mnd avey i he caue f an agiain whe inuence eend wad he hea and ee nduce change, a chage wch in un mdie he behaviou of he body (D Mtu XV Hbbe pychlgy i an elabain of hi emak5 The ecd man way in whch a pupi ay be inuenced by mae in he eld i by he exampe f ei ethd f a mehd f enquy may be fuifully eplyed ouide he di cpline cpline in wch i  wa develped In Hbbe ie, phlphe commnly eed he need f a ue ehd f acquiing and

24



































24

J.

W . N  W A T K I NS NS

an hour, the eft ventrice pumped an amount of bood into the aoa at east equa to the amount o bood in the whole body, sucienty reted the theory that blood is continuousy ingested d dgested. The oy hothesis about the nature of the whoe system wch seemed consistent with the observed nature of its parts was at tere tere is ' a moton moton as it were, in a circe Tis hypotheca reconstruction as ten tested and conrmed by observing the eects o, or instance aputations igatures and wound-infections Having shon the resolutive-compositive (or, as it ight be re-named or Harvey, the dissectonreconstruction) metod at work, I wi no outine its previous formuation6

PHILOSOPHY AND POLIIC I HOBBES

245

siuation, that is by iagining certain factors which are actuay aways present in soe degree to be diminished to zero. nerring the consequences o the reaig factors ay ead to the ds cove of a new principe t was in tis manner that, or or eampe Stevinius showed that the pul of equa weights along incined planes of equa heights ust vary inversey wi te engths o the incined panes But the cassic eapes eapes are Gaieos ds covery o his a o neria and his anaysis o the trajectory o a cannonba aving shown at, assuing no riction, riction, a bod y which descends aong any incined pane and continues aong a pane incined upwards wil, on account of te omentum acquired, ascend to an equa height above te horizonta,?



































 • W   . W A  K   

PHSPHY AD PC  HBB

conguaton of elements and ntersecton of prncples, each of whh s sple, unversal, unversal, and 'ore known to nature The causes nto whh we try to resolve the eet are the uiversal and ntal condtons wh are sucent to generate the eet. To understand an eet wth whch whch our sens es have acquanted us s to know a repe or or producng t Knowledge s power 'The subject o phlosophy s ever body o whh we can conceve any geneaton    o r whch s capable o coposon and resoluton (I. 8 The resolutve-opostve ethod can be apped to words, to phscal suatons, to geoetrcal gures, and to ua nsttutons Let us begn wth ts ts applcaton to words

stucted We can only postuate a hypotheta hypotheta generaton o the known whole ro ts known parts D Cop I 5 I enton ths because or Hobbes the ethodologca stuaton n cvl phlosoph s rather aaogous I the Preace to D  Hobbes gves a noral account o the wa he used hs ethod n cvl phlosophy: Coner Coner gg  ethod ethod  .   took y begng ro the ver ater o vl goverent ad thence proceeded to ts gener aton ad r and the rst beggs of justce or ever tng s best derstood by ts consttuve causes For as  a watch, or soe such sal engne the ater gure ad oton  the wees cannot well be known ecept t be tae n sunder and vewed n parts so to ake a ore curous search

246

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MARI A C'AO

H  B B   '  HRY F NHNT

ibery, and hey reresen he general wi, whch is he sum of he indvidua indvidua wills Whoever can can have desired o eave oher oher men wih he he discreon o ll him ? However ca he sg sacrice o each man's bery be made o incude ha of he greaes good of of al al hs hs lilife?   . he deah enaly is herefore no a h indeed i canno be. I is a war of a whoe naion agains one cizen66 In any close comarison beween Hobbes and Beccaria on his on, i wil be useful o consider he oions, o some een een oosed, of wo wo conemorary conemorary scholars: Bobbio and Srauss. Bobbio, on he one hand, emhasizes emhasizes ha ha in in obbes a subjecs righ o resis is in no way me by any duy on he ar of he sovereign no o senence hm o deah if in he sovereign's udgmen he deserves i and he mainains ha Cesare Beccaria sared from he same resuosiion as Hobbes (ie. ha h  sligh sacrice of each man's iber', from which soereigny is consued, canno canno be made o include ha of he greaes good of a, his fe' and hence arrived a a rejecion of he deah enaly: whereas Hobbes simly admis ha he subjec has he awl ower o resis he man who carries he senence ino eec, bu does no deny he sovereign he righ o senence and have he senence carried ou uon he relucan subjec, even if he is lawfully relucan67 Bobbio' Bob bio'ss view is ha in his case wo eq and oosie righs have clashed, hs being elained by he ac ha he covenan has been broen, so ha he subec and he sovereign have revered o he sae of naure, in which he sronger will win 68

from he absoue rimacy of he righ of sef-reservaion he necessiy of abolishing caial unishmen' 69 Bobbo us ends o sress e dierence beween he o wriers on s robem, wie Srauss ends o show u heir subsanial agreemen or similary: a dierence mos easily eained  we consider he dieren aims of he o scholars Bobbio wishes o reresen Hobbes as an iniaor or recursor of legal osiivism, and o indicae how he ends o eiminae any residual residua l inuence of he laws or righs righ s of naure naure from he common wealh Srauss, Srau ss, on he oher hand, wishes o concenrae on obbes as he reresenaive of nonheocraic naural law and recursor of liberalism, and o indicae how he founds hs whoe heor on man's naural righ o self-reservaion dscrepancy in obbess indeed a dscrepancy there is indee cear that the It seems cear nkng theory o between hs theo discrepancy between nkng on this pont: a discrepanc and primary character the basic and concption of the his concption sovereig sovereignty and his con reservation . Each of these two co sel-preservation. right to sel-p of the the natural rig urmountable insurmountab nds an ins absoute, but  ceptions caims to be absou claim of the other. Yet obbes's positon, obsta obstacle in the simlar clai signicant i particuarly signicant signicant. It is particuarly inconcus inconcusive as it is, is signi theorist of absolutHobbes as the th common idea of Hobbe we reer to t o the common ism, for having arrived a a his oin he dd no ae s heory of He stopped there ad set conclusion He logical conclusion sovereignt sovereignty to its logical Beccaria, and way for Becc paving the way absoluteness thus paving a limt to its absolute o development in the eld o lberal develo foundations for a lb laying the the foundations crmnal law In order o comlee he comarison and underne he



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MARO

.

CATTANEO

expression used or e evil nited on those who eognse he auhot o the soeeign. 71 One thus hlp hlp seeing the substantial agreement beween Hobbes's �!i and Beaa's, ad it is dut to avoid the ineene na  it' o Hobbess eoy dos thereore really iply ection o the deah enaty onmation o this thesis thes is let us exane exane the deent deent As  fna onmation o o hat hat to othe wites take u with regard to the death Rousseau and Montesquieu theorists espetiely o and beasm, the orme o ho aso aes and h probem on onatuaisti eses usu ars that at e moent o e soa ontrat a c  c onts to beig klled i he shoud beome a uderer n o to beome beome a urdeers iti. Thus  ag the  . ota,  o dsosng o s own le, he hinks 6� �g t eserng it or it is not to be resed at at � ot o ontra an o the ontrating aties is pedr:g geting hmsel hanged 72 I· Sly, y, although lthough Montesqu ontesquieu ieu stars stars o from non-con non-con a �si remises he ars hat e erssibil o putng n to dea dees rom the at that the la h  s m is ade n hs avour avour A murdere murdere  or eample � �J oyed the laws that ondemn  The hae reseed ag,· . e f h at  ime imes, and he canot therefore therefore prost prost t t e e 7 see the silait beteen these to nes o argu l  isaneseto a <t that he ash as h with eaias 74 nd e i tbe

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' HOBBE S THEORY OF PUNI SHMENT

.

ToRTE

295

As has bee seen obbes denies the alidity o a Covenant to ause onese ad as that he Tesmony o suh an Auser' is not to be eeied We have seen too ho he links u this question th the robe o tortue sayig that Aso Ausations upon Toture ae not to be eputed as Testioes sine hat is in that ase oessed tendeth to the ease o h that is tortued; ot to the inog o the Totures On this point too a opaiso ith Beaia is patiulal iunatig He too nds a nk beteen he interesting and iunatig wo oints Whe Whe he seaks o suggestive questioing ie quesoning that suggests to the oender some imediate anser 75 he noties a ontadio beteen the laws that on e one hand orbid it possibly beause it seems to be aganst ery nature that a oende shoud ieatel ause hmsel and those that on e other hand admit torure In a a e ass hat questonng is oe ugsv than pan pain whih to the eak an wi suggest oessio as a deleane o pesent toent 76 I the seon seal devoted to torure Beaa arms hat it is an attept to ouse al eations i we eque a a to be ause and aused at one ad the sae tie i e eet an to be the melngpot o th 77 So Beaa ds that one o the aguents aganst totue is that it auses the aused to beome the ause whih is leal aganst nature Thus i both ters thee thee is a onexion betwee betwee ausng onese ad tortue' both o whih are ieed wih dsaour dsaour although althou gh ith a dierene dierene o toe and emphasis emphas is Wih



































O  CTTO

OB  THO OF HT

met s he expesson used or he evi incted on those who geneally ecognse the autoy o the soveegn. 71 One tus cannot elp seeing the substanal ageement beeen Hobbess concepon and Beccaa's and t s cut to avod the neence hat te spt' o Hobbess theoy does, heeoe eally mply a ejecon o te dea enalty As a nal conmaton o ths tess let us eamne the deent postons tat wo ote wtes take up wt egad to te dea penalty: Rousseau and Montesqueu teosts esectvely o emocacy and bealsm the ome o whom also aces and solves te poblem on contactualsc emses Rousseau ams hat at he moment o te soca conact a m consents to beng ked  he shoud become a mudee n ode not to become a mudees m m Tus i makig the soa contact a om dsposng o s own e e thnks �' nohng but peservng t o t s not to be pesumed tat at e moment o contac any o te contacng aes s pe meditaing gettng mse hanged 72 Smlaly althoug Montesqueu stats o om non-con tacuastc emses e ams hat the pemssby o puttng a cmal to ea deves om e act hat te aw wc unses h s made n s avou avou  A muee o eample as enjoye e laws that condemn h. ey have peseved s e o h at a tmes and e cannot teeoe otest agast tem73 tem73 It s easy to see the smaty beween ese o nes o agu ment and e way at tey as wt eccaas 74 An we

6 E As as been seen Hobbes deies the valdty o a Covenant to accuse onesel and ams that the Tesony o such an Acuse' s not to be eceved We have seen seen too how he nks u ts queson wth te oblem o totue sayng that Also Acusatons uon Totue ae not to be eute as Testones snce wat s n tat case conesse tendet to the ease o  tat s toued; not to te nong o te Toes On ts ot too a comason w Becca s pacualy umnang He too nds a lnk between te nteestg and umnang wo onts Wen e speaks speaks o suggestve questonng questonng e  questonng tat suggests to te oende some mmedae answe answe 75 e notces a contadcton beween te laws tat on e one and ob t possbly because t sees to be aganst vey naue tat an oende soud mmedatey accuse msel and those thos e that on the the othe hand admt totue totu e n act act he asks wat questonng s moe sti than an an wch to te weak man wll suggest conesson as a deveance om pesen toment 76 In e secton seccally devoted to tote Beccaa ms that t s an ttemt to conse all eatons  we eqe a man to be accuse an accused at one and te same tme  we eec pan to be the melng-ot o tth77 So Beccaa nds tat one o te aguments aganst totue s at t causes e accuse to become te accuse whch s clealy aganst naue Tus n both wtes tee s a conneon between between accusng onese and totue bot o wc ae vewe wt savou althoug wt a eence eence o tone and emass emass Wth

24

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296

MAO A.

C A T T A  O O

socal reformer reformer Once again, as in te case o  the deat penlty Hobbes remans aay on e one and adttng torture as means of conjecture and lgt, n te further examinaton and searc for tu and on te oter and denyng tat confessions based on it may be used as evidence, for te reasons gven above. But in te case of torture, as in te case of te deat penalty it is jus t tese eements eements wich indcate a simlarity simlarity between Hobbes and Beccaria, wic in obbess tnkng sow an opening, almost a breakthroug, towards a fully liberal concepton of cral law I am referrng to te denial that pain is a valid means o learning the trut a denial wic led Beccaa to consider torture as he surest means of acqutting strong rogues

' HOBES  THORY OF PUIHN

29 7

Indeed e great contoersies about te basic problms o cmnal law as seen de jue conn, ave raged witout any reerence to obbess thougt More particularly te development of progressive teores  n the ed of teory of punsent as well as te eecting of concrete penl reforms ave always taken place witout any reference reference to Hobbes s is a matter of historcal fact fact and is probably connected wt te illfame that Hobbes suered for so long among scholars It must be empassed hat  making a comparson beween beween Hobbes and writers ke Bentam and Beccaa, wo were among te greatest advocates of penal reform it as not been my

Hobbes Studies

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