Vivarium - Vol Xliv, No. 1, 2006

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VIVARIUM and Intellectual An International Life of theMiddle Journalfor thePhilosophy and Renaissance Ages Aims & Scope and examinations offundamental Vivarium includes extensive philosophical problems is givento theprofane sideofphilosophy and thehistory ofideas.Specialattention and learning fromthisperiod. withotherareasofthought to itsrelationship has beenestablishing itselfas an unrivalled Sinceas farbackas 1963,Vivarium libraries oftheworldandon the bothin themajorresearch resource forthesubject offers and scholars.Vivarium bookshelvesof professors youan easywayto private stayon topofyourdiscipline. andnotes.Specialconsideration Vivarium shortarticles withintroductions comprises of texts.Reviewarticles is givento studieson manuscript tradition and thehistory in combination withan annualappearance andbookreviews arepublished regularly ofthematic issues. Editors C.H. Kneepkens L.M. de Rijk(Leiden), H.A.G.Braakhuis (Groningen), (Nijmegen), (Madison),E.P. Bos (Leiden),D. Perler(Basel)and L.W. Nauta W.J.Courtenay (Groningen). AdvisoryCommittee TullioGregory (Rome),AlbertZimmermann (Cologne), J.E. Murdoch(Cambridge, MA). is published 3 timesa year ISSN 0042-7543, onlineISSN 1568-5349) Vivarium (print tel+31 (0)715353500, 2, 2321JC Leiden,The Netherlands, byBrill,Plantijnstraat fax+31 (0)715317532. to C.H. Allcommunications, shouldbe addressed nature, exceptthoseofa business Faculteit derLetteren, Mediaevistiek, Groningen, Vakgroep Kneepkens, Rijksuniversiteit P.O. Box 716,9700AS Groningen, The Netherlands. Noticeto Contributors in duplicate shouldbe submitted andbe accompanied Contributions byan electronic text(Microsoft Word)eitheron diskor as an emailattachment (c.h.j.m.kneepkens @let.rug.nl). in eitherEnglish, shouldbe written Frenchor Germanand thetext Manuscripts mustbe and in goodliterary mustbe grammatically correct style.The manuscripts all notes,biblionumbered and complete, including consecutively, double-spaced, references, tables,etc. graphical An English ofno morethan300 wordsshouldaccompany abstract yoursubmisto theediforreading, whichshouldbe returned sion.Authors receivegalleyproofs torwithin are readbytheeditor. one weekofreceipt. Pageproofs The publisher reserves therightto chargeauthorsforchangesmadeto proofs ofcompositor's otherthancorrection or conversion errors. Visit our web site at www.brill.nl/viv

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Introduction

RUSSELL L. FRIEDMANAND CHRIS SCHABEL*

Over the last threedecades, the studyof the philosophyand theologyof the period runningroughlyfromthe death ofJohn Duns Scotus (1308) untilthe Black Death (1348) has reallycome into its own. Figuresfrom thisfruitful time,men likePeterAuriol,WalterChatton,Adam Wodeham, Thomas Bradwardine,Gregoryof Rimini,and, perhapsabove all, William of Ockham and JohnBuridan,have been well servedwithcriticaleditions of theirwritingsand detailedstudiesof theirthoughtand influence.The of the period as well unique philosophicaland theologicalcontributions as the generadcontoursof the intellectualdebate are becomingmore and more evident.As the bibliographyappended to thisIntroductionreveals, the Italian Franciscan Francis of Marchia has also benefitedfromthis renaissancein earlyfourteenth-century studies.In 1990 Marchia's works were nearlytotallyuneditedand mostlyunexamined,and studiesof his of hisrole thoughtwerefewand farbetween,and dominatedby expositions in the creationof the theoryof impetus and in otherissuesin naturalphilosophy.Today, fivevolumesof Marchia's writingshave been editedand printed,along with many editionsof individualquestions;detailed studies of the structure and the manuscripttraditionof Marchia's workshave appeared; and thereare ambitiousplans to edit Marchia's Frenchoeuvre. Moreover,while Marchia's naturalphilosophyis stillan importantobject - it was the of study topic of the only book yet to have been devotedto * ForhelpwiththeIntroduction, we thankPaulJ.J.M.Bakker, Girard J. Etzkorn, Roberto and TizianaSuarez-Nani. AllHarvard are to the Lambertini, stylereferences to thisIntroduction. We havethefollowing addenda etcorrigenda to bibliography appended our2001article on Marchia's Sentences and Schabel2001).On commentary (Friedman tobookI recorded formsM is incorrect Vat.lat. p. 72 theexplicit (M hasno explicit); toPelzer's an abbreviation ofMarchia's II Sent., 901,f.8v,contains (according catalogue) d. 1; msAssisi, Biblioteca delSacroConvento di S. Francesco includes 180,ff.16r-17v, III Sent Marchia's in GerardOdonis'III Sent. to V. Doucet ., q. 8, inserted According surlesSentences: au répertoire deM. Frédéric Florence [Commentaires supplément 1954, Stegmueller. to III Sent, found in msVat.Barb.lat.791is HughofNovoCastro's 31)theprologue andnotFrancis ofMarchia's.

© Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden, 2006 - www.brill.nl/viv Alsoavailable online

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RUSSELL ANDCHRISSCHABEL L. FRIEDMAN

Marchia (Schneider 1991)- , dozens of articleshave been publishedin the last fifteenyears coveringmany other facetsof Marchia's thought: politicalphilosophy,epistemologyand philosophyof mind, metaphysics, philosophicaltheology.These studieshave revealed that Marchia was a creativeand interesting thinker on a wide rangeof topics,and thisundoubtannual increase in the numberof published has contributed to the edly articlesdealing with his thought.It seems that Francis of Marchia is a figurewhose time has come. It is likelythatFrancisof Marchia was born around 1290 in the town of Appignano del Tronto (near Ascoli). Becoming a Franciscan,he rose throughthe order's educationalsystem.Evidence recentlyuncoveredby GirardJ. Etzkornindicatesthat Marchia probably studied theologyat .* Thereafter Paris beforeteachingat one of the order'sprovincialstudia in he returnedto Paris to read the Sentences most , likely 1319-20, and in Paris until around 1324. It was duringthese appears to have remained yearsthatmanyof his scholasticworkswere probablyput together.These include his two Metaphysics commentaries(a long and a shortone) and as well as his mostimportantworkin terms his literalPhysics commentary, comof the breadth of its subject matterand its impact: his Sentences mentary,survivingin several versionsand many manuscripts.Marchia was in Avignonbetween 1324 and 1328, teachingat the Franciscancondates fromthis period. In 1328, Marchia, in vent; possiblyhis Quodlibet the companyof the FranciscanMinisterGeneral, Michael of Cesena, as well as Bonagratiaof Bergamoand Williamof Ockham,fledfromAvignon and Pope John XXII. The very next year Marchia wrote his Improbatio againstthe pope, and thistract,as Roberto Lambertinishowsin his article in this volume, had an influenceon Ockham's political writings. Marchia, like Ockham, took refugein Munich with Emperor Louis of in Munichin 1347,Marchia Bavaria.But whereasOckham died impenitent was capturedby Church authoritiesin 1340 and made a confessionof faith and retractionof errorsbefore the Inquisitionin 1343 (see esp. Wittnebenand Lambertini1999, 2000, and Lambertini'sarticlebelow). We hear nothingmore of Marchia after1344. 1 Vat.lat.943,f.8vb:"Adsextum mododiciquodvisioetauditio sunt secundo posset Itislikely meoParisius." sicutaudiviteneri ab unodoctore essentialiter tempore respectus, version of thefirst thatMarchia is hererecording theviewofDurandofSt. Pourçain, wasavailable at Parisin the whoseSent, commentary by 1308,andwhoreadtheSent, oftheology actaregens at Paris1312-13). (hewasmaster periodca. 1308-10

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INTRODUCTION FrancisofMarchia:Datingand Influence

Marchiawas activein a greatera of Franciscantheology.Many Franciscan survivefromthisperiodfrombothParis(see Schabel Sentences commentaries we can 2002) and Oxford,a fact that presentsus with an opportunity: undertakedetailed doctrinalstudiesthat cover a number of years and the datingof medievalwritingsas well authorsin the hope of confirming as tracingtheirreception.Marchia'sParisianSentences lectures,as mentioned above, have been dated to the academic year 1319-20, but we have, in fact,verylittledirectevidenceforthis,reallyjust an explicitin one manuscript(Naples BN VII C. 27) saying that Marchia was reading the at Paris in 1320. Since we have good reason to assign Francis Sentences lecturesto 1320-21, it would seem that of Meyronnes'Parisian Sentences antequernof Marchia's lecturesis 1320. (Marchia may have the terminus continuedto revisehis work until 1323 or even later, however.)There are severalothermajor Franciscanfiguresfromthe period whose works lecturesand commentary. may help us with dating Marchia's Sentences Peter Auriol's Parisian lecturesare very securelyfixed at 1316-18, and lecturesprobablydate to 1317-19, Williamof Ockham's OxfordSentences while forLandulph Caracciolo two dates have been proposed: 1318-19, to find whichwe have supported,and 1321-22. It is important,therefore, or correctingour hypotheses. evidencecorroborating, clarifying, On a number of issues Marchia clearlyrespondsto Auriol (see e.g. Friedman2002, Schabel 2000 and 2002), as could be expectedgiventhe provocativenature of many of Auriol's views and the fact that he was Franciscanregentmasterin theologyin Parisfrom1318-20,whenMarchia there.What is more, Paul Bakkerhas was probablyreadingthe Sentences his Sentences in IV of book that foundevidence commentaryMarchia also respondsto Ockham on the issue of the accidentsof the Eucharist:2 2 TheOckham VII, ed.R. WoodandG. Gál,StBonaventure, textisin Opera Theologica is to Ockham NY 1984.Another (1999,p. 404,n. 275)seesas referring passageBakker estunusmodusdicendi ad primum d. 13,q. 1, a. 1: "Quantum IV Sentences, Marchia, enimquodquanDicunt suntsinesubiecto. pañisqueibiapparent, quodomniaaccidencia ab aliisgeneribus, realiter ymorescuiuslibet titas, ipsarei,nondifferì que estextensio nonalicoalioa se,sedse ipsa. habens estextensa [et]extrapartem, partem predicamenti Et itaomniaaccidencia putacolor,sapor,etc.,suntsinequolique suntin sacramento, rem nondiffert istorum cuiuslibet extensio betsubiecto, aliquomodosecundum quoniam in fundari accidencia istoshuiusmodi secundum Necestintelligendum eorum. a quolibet - quandosuntin ea- mediante itaquodsubiectum sedimmediate, substancia quantitate, estsubstancia." saltem cuiuslibet immediatum absoluti, accidentis,

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ANDCHRISSCHABEL RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN

IV Sentences , q. 6 (ed.Wood Ockham, and Gài,pp. 71.6-72.12) estquidsitquanIdeoprimo videndum titas.Dico hic,tenendo quodquantitas nullam aliamremabsolutam velrespectivama substantia et a qualitate dicit. nonestaliud Dico tuncquodquantitas reihabentis nisiextensio partesa quarumuna ad aliampotestesse motus localis.Ita quod sicutin secundodicnihil tumestde duratione quodduratio dicitultraremdurantem, sed positivům estquaedamvox vel conceptus significansprincipaliter ipsamremdurantemetconnotat successionem actualem rem velpotentialem, itaquodsignificai coexsistentem successioni vel actualiter, successioni si esset, ita quaecoexsisteret extensio nondicitaliquam velquantitas remabsolutam vel respectivam ultra substantiam etqualitatem, sedestquaedamvoxvelconceptus significans princivel putamateriam palitersubstantiam, vel qualitatem et formam corporalem, connotatmultasalias res interquas potestessemotuslocalis.

d. 13,q. l,a. 1 Marchia,IV Sentences, (Bakker1999,pp. 404-05,n. 276) Pro illa opinione, putaquod quelibet resse ipsasitextensa ethabeatpartem extrapartem, nonalicoalioa se,arguiturprimosic: omneilludquod habet eiusdem racionis situlocaliter dispartes tantesestextensum et perconsequens quantum;sed substancia separataab omnialioa se realiter, etperconsequens a quantitate, si sit ab ipsa distincta habetpartesextrapartessitu realiter, localiter distantes; ergoipsa estperse idempotest ipsamextensa.Preterea, arguide qualibetqualitatesensibili. Maioresteuidens. Sed minorprobatur in effectu sic: Deus potestconseruare in tanto alicamsubstanciam extensam loco existente absquequocumque motulocaliconcomitante, corrumpendo ueladnichilando accidens quodcumque ab ipsa,et ita eiusdistinctum realiter destruendo perconsequens quantitatem, si ponatur realiter distinguitur in eodem ab ipsa;sed ipsa remanente loco,etin tantoin quantoeratprius aliasiamibiconcurreret motus uelmuta- ;ergosequitur extra partes quod substancia est extensa,separatoquorealiter ab ipsa. cumquealio distincto Peridemarguitur de qualitate.

As one can see, althoughthe positiondescribedis the same, the textsare not clearlyparallel. This can be explained, however.First,Ockham is speakinghere in the contextof Eucharistiepresence,and since Ockham's in his questionon the accidents(q. 8) is brief,perhapsMarchia treatment does not cite any specificpassage fromthat questionbut ratherapplies, in a generalway, Ockham's statementson presenceto the issue of accidents.Second, Ockham's viewsin some contextsprobablyarrivedin Paris

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INTRODUCTION

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beforehis actual Sentences commentarydid.3Thus, not only was Marchia one of the firstscholarsto react to Ockham's theologicalviews,but the evidence shows that Ockham's theories crossed the Channel to Paris almost immediatelyafterhis Oxford lectures,just as Auriol's Parisian ideas reached England and Ockham soon aftertheywere publicized. Even more than Marchia, Caracciolo respondedto Auriol's commentary,but Paul Bakkerhas also found evidence in the same contextthat reasonto date Caracciolo's Marchia criticizedCaracciolo,whichis further lecturesto 1318-19, i.e. immediatelyprecedingMarchia's: IV Sentences , d. 12,q. 2 Caracciolo, n. 272) 1999, 403, (Bakker p.

IV Sentences, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1 Marchia, (Bakker1999,p. 403,n. 272)

super Quintaproposicio: quodinherencia acciditpositiuum, nonabsoluaccidens extrinsecus tum,sed quo sitrespectus ... Etpreterea, adueniens quiainherenscilicet enticia requirit duo extrema, etillamcuiinheret, tatemquae inheret uideturrenullumautemabsolutum ex hoc infertur quirereduo extrema, relaimportare quodomnisuniouidetur extremaduo cionemex quo requirit extremaexistencianecessario.Quod adueextrinsecus autemsit respectus niensprobatur, quia ille est respectus extrinsecus adueniens qui nonsequitur fuit necessario, positisfundamentis-ista est sepiusprobata;sed ille respectus huiusmodi; ergoetc.Probaciominorisi etpositoaccidente, quiapositosubiecto possetnonsequiinherencia.

Terciusmodusdicendiest quia illud ab pereiusseparacionem quodtollitur accidentibus etsubiecto nonestaliquid sed quidam respectus predictorum, extrinsecus adueniens, potest quiquidem licetnonillequi esseterminus actionis, est intrinsecus adueniens.Huiusmodi adueniens autemrespectus extrinsecus actualis estipsainherencia qui tollitur ad subiectum, accidentis que non est Illudenimcuius nisiquedamhabitudo. esseestin ordinead aliud,nec potest concipinisiin ordinead aliud,uidetur sivehabiessequidamrespectus precise accidentisnon tudo.Sed inherencia in ordinead potestconcipinisitantum subiectum. Ergoetc.Estenimrespecaduetusnonintrinsecus, sedextrinsecus niens,quia non poniturnecessario, positisextremis.

Finally,Maier has arguedthatMeyronnesrejectedMarchia's teachingon commenprojectilemotion,also propoundedin book IV of his Sentences tary.Althoughit is possiblethatMeyronneswas reactingto GerardOdonis or others,as Schabel relatesin his articlein this issue, it is most likely 3 Thanks communication. whoinformed us ofthisfactviapersonal to PaulBakker,

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RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN ANDCHRISSCHABEL

thathis opponentwas Marchia,whichreinforces Marchia'sand Meyronnes' relativedating.In sum, the evidence supports1319-20 as the academic lectures. year of Marchia's Sentences At the presentstateof research,thisseems to be as faras we can take the use of doctrinalcomparisonsas an aid to datingMarchia's own works. A second use to which doctrinalstudiescan be put is in the tracingof Marchia's influence.Althoughthe main focusin the articlescollectedin thisvolume is on Marchia's thoughtper se, an importanttaskforfuture Marchia studieswillbe to showhis impacton othersas well.That Marchia in fact had an impact can be surmisedjust fromthe numberof manucomscriptcopies that have survivedof his major work, his Sentences mentary:we have some 16 copies of the firstbook of his Sentences commentary,17 copies of the second book, 13 of the third,and 10 of the fourth,along witha not inconsiderablenumberof fragments. In what follows,we would like to offera sketchof some of the ways in which Marchia's impact can be traced in the fourteenth century,and how this can help us withcontextualizing Marchia's own work.We make no claims whatsoeverabout exhaustiveness quite the contrary merelywantingto illustratethat Marchia's receptionis both complex and significant, and hence deservingof much more attention. NaturallyMarchia's Franciscanconfrères paid attentionto his doctrine. BesidesMeyronnesand Ockham,as witnessto thiswe can name Marchia's Parisian reportator com, William Rubio, whose own enormous Sentences mentaryfromthe early 1330s was publishedin Paris in 1518 (see e.g. Schneider1991, 250-52, 313-20; Schabel 2000, 210-14). But the influence of Marchia's philosophyand theologywas not limitedto his own order. While verylittlesurvivesfromParisian Dominicans in the decades after Marchia's Sentences lectures,we do have worksfromseveralAugustinián if most not all of whom employedMarchia explicitlyon several Hermits, as Damasus occasions, Trapp's work clearlysuggests.4Sometimesthese were extremely uses of Marchia. Michael of Massa (d. 1337), sophisticated forinstance,structures around Marchia's defenseof the univocityof the conceptof being betweensubstanceand accidenta greatdeal of his own

4 A.D. Trapp,Augustinián onEditions, Notes , Opinions Theology ofthe14thCentury. Marginalia andBook-Lore 6 (1956),146-274, forcitation listsofthesefigures , in:Augustiniana, (among on Massainparticular, seeidem, onSome Notes Michael others); Manuscripts ofthe Augustinián deMassa(f 1337),in:Augustinianum, 5 (1965),58-133.

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INTRODUCTION

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treatmentof the issue, presentingFrancis' view in fourconclusions.5In additionto Massa's explicitmentioningof Marchia, on severalissues he is a silent"Marchist,"for example in futurecontingents(Schabel 2000, 214-20, and below) and in some aspectsof trinitarian theology(Friedman Similar attention to the detailsof Marchia's 11, Forthcoming, § lb). Chapter in can be found the Sentences of position commentary Gregoryof Rimini d. (read Sent.,1343-44; 1358), Prologue,q. 1, whereMarchia's view about the statusof theologyas a science is subjectedto veryclose scrutiny.6 A fewyearslaterHugolinoof Orvieto(read Sent . 1348-49) tookup Marchia's positionin the same context.7But among the AugustiniánHermits,the is AlphonsusVargas championfordiscussingMarchia's positionsexplicitly of Toledo (read Sent.1344-45),who mentionsMarchia at least thirteen times,once to declare that the Oxford FranciscanJohn of Rodington (read Sent.ca. 1328-29) had stolenMarchia's words. All in all, Marchia is the tenthmost cited author in Vargas, before the likes of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent.8Finally,James of Pamiers (fl. ca. 1330) citesMarchia on occasion,once to reportthat"MasterFrancisof Marchia" determineda question at the Papal curia in Avignon,perhaps a reference to Marchia's Quodlibet .9 Thus, Marchia was a relativelyimportantfigurein Augustiniántheology at Paris in the firsthalf of the fourteenth century.But thereis evidence of further, As influence. mentionedabove, one quite widespread, of the thingsthat has attractedmodern scholars to Marchia's Sentences 5 Trapp,Notes onSome d. 22, q. 1 = msBologna, Biblioteca , 85 (I Sent., Manuscripts ff.193r-195r). Massais replying 2214(1084), toMarchia's treatment as pubUniversitaria, lishedin N. Mariani deMarchia sivédeEsculo, cumquaestioniOFM,Quodlibet (ed.),Francisci busselectis excommentano inlibrum Grottaferrata I Sententiarum, 1997,487-92(= Scriptum super Sent., q. 28 = d. 8, q. 2, art.3). 6 See Rimini's Lectura etsecundum Sententiarum , vol. 1, ed. D. Trappand super primům V. Marcolino, Berlin-New York1981,40-49,andcf.Lang1930,esp.192-93, andZanin 2004. 7 Hugolinus de UrbeVeteri, inquattuor libros Sententiarum OESA,Commentarius , vol.1,ed. W. Eckermann, 1980,72. Würzburg 8 Cf.Trapp'slistin Augustinián , 220-22,withAlphonsus Theology VargasToletanus, Sententiarum Venice1490(rpt.Cassiciacum. , ed.Thomasde Spilimbergo, OESA,Inprimum inSt.Augustine Studies andtheAugustinián vol.2; NewYork1952).SeeMichalski Order, andespecially a 1926,40-41,on Rodington, 1930,whoonpp.59-60presents Kürzinger listof 17 mentions ofMarchia's and (someofwhichareveryclosely related), position dealswithVargas'rejection ofMarchia's viewsoftheology as a science on pp. 141-46, 158-63. 9 SeeTrapp, inSententias TheQuaestiones , 174,andW.J.Courtenay, Augustinián Theology Michael deMassa,OESA:A Redating 45 (1995),191-207, at 195n. 13. , in:Augustiniana, of

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commentaryare the theoriesin natural philosophyhe presentedthere. In fact by the 1310s and 1320s Sentences commentarieshad become so large and broad that they provided ample space and opportunityfor reflectionon physicsand metaphysics,as well as philosophicaltheology. Conversely,since theologians,especiallyParisian theologians,were conto findfrequentrefsideredthe top mindsof the day, it is not surprising commentariesof arts erencesto theirtheologicalworksin the Aristotelian masters.John the Canon's Physicscommentaryis a case in point.John the Canon- Juan Marbes- was a Catalan artsmasterat Toulouse. Given that the latestfigurehe cites is Gerard Odonis (d. 1349), whom he calls simply"Frater" four times but "Generalis MinisterOrdinis Minorum" twice,it is probable thatJohn wroteat the end of the 1320s or the early 1330s.10Despite the fact that he was a Toulouse arts master,almost all of his citationsof scholasticsactive after1250 are of Paris theologians: John Duns Scotus, OFM, 59 citations Peter Auriol,OFM, 53 Francis of Marchia, OFM, 25 Thomas Anglicus(Wylton),12 Landulph Caracciolo, OFM, 9 Gerard Odonis, OFM, 9 Francis of Meyronnes,OFM, 9 Others with 3 citationsor fewer,1711 10Whatfollows ofJohn's is basedon a direct butfora detailed text, reading descripsee P.J.J.M. Bakker andD.-J.Dekker, Antoine Andrée ouJeanle tionofthecommentary, Chanoine de philosophie 42 (2000),101-31.Forthecontroversy médiévale, ?, in: Bulletin and datingofJohntheCanon,see Schabel's article overtheidentity below,note14. Internal evidence clues.He mentions "nostra at onepointhe says Cathalonia"; provides doesnothold:"Johannes estalbusetestcanonicus, thatthefollowing ergoestalbuscanonihe says: cus"(i.e.he is a canon,butnota Premonstratensian motion, canon);discussing ab istolocoqui estTholosaead enimquodaliquodmobiledebeatmoveri "Supposito . . healsorefers to"opinio doctoris locum cuiusdam quiestParisius quaeapudTholosanos whichaddthathe wasa canon articulus fideireputatur." Thisis confirmed byexplicits, ofTortosa andBarcelona andnamed he is alsowrongly calleda JohnMarbes, although andexplicit oftheVenice1520edition. Franciscan at leastin theimplicit 11Walter Ockham ofGhent doctor 3; Henry ), 2; William (frater), (magnus (magister), Burley ofViterbo, theCarmelite I, q. 1),2; GilesofRome(II Physics 2; Gerard (Quodlibet ), 2;James 1; Alexander 1; ThomasAquinas 1; PeterofAuvergne (IX Metaphysics), (Summa (magister), contra subtilis bacchalarii Cathelani gentiles I), 1; opiniocuiusdam qui ita superprimum 1; Francis Bleth(?),1. Thereis alsoa reference Sententiarum . . . (Antonius Andreas?), ponit onEucharistie tocondemned article 194of1277andonetoJohnXXII'spronouncement in relation to Ockham). accidents (probably

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INTRODUCTION

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Perhapsbecause he was writingfroma ScotisticperspectiveafterThomas to Aquinas Aquinas' canonizationin 1323,Johnhas fewexplicitreferences or Thomistae the edition identifies instances of 1520 (4), although many doctoris as referring to SanctusThomas.In contrast,sometimes opiniocuiusdam John mentionsthe opinioScotica(3) or Scotizantes (4), and at least once while Scotus himself receives about 30% of the totalcitations. Formalizantes , Of the almost 200 explicitcitations,about 85% are of Franciscans,and Parisiantheologiansactivefrom1315 to 1330 have over 60% of the overall references. Where he is more explicit,John refersto theologicalworks I and II of Sentences books but he also citesScotus' (usually commentaries), Theoremata and Tractatus deprimo Auriol's deprincipiis Tractatus nat, principio urae AlexanderofAlessandria's , Wylton'sQuaestiones , and, apparently, physicae On the basis of this and otherevidence,we are Metaphysics commentary. entided to say that Francis of Marchia was active in one of the peak periods of the Paris Facultyof Theology,when a seriesof famousmasters,mostlyFranciscan Wylton,Auriol,Caracciolo,Marchia,Meyronnes, and Odonis held interesting and influentialdebates over a wide range of theologicaland philosophicaltopics. Afterthe DoctorSubtilisand the magnusdoctor Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia is the most cited scholasticin John the Canon's work.John the Canon is in factillustrative in European thought of Marchia's significance in the decades afterhis Parisian Sentences lectures.John's 25 directcitations speak to Marchia's impact.John refersto Marchia as magister and as doctor reverendas , citingboth Marchia's commentaryon I Sentences fiater once distinction2) and his commentaryon book times, (three specifying VII of the Metaphysics which Fabrizio Amerinitreatsin his articlein the , volume. But Marchia's influenceon John was much greaterthan present this. Notker Schneider found thatJohn copied entire questions from Marchia'scommentaries on boththeMetaphysics and the Sentences (Schneider in and 1949 Anneliese Maier spottedJohn bor1991, 27-28), already rowingheavilyfromMarchia in the contextof futurecontingents(Maier 1949, 245-47). John the Canon's borrowingin that contextwas in fact even more extensivethan Maier knew.In his book on the receptionof PeterAuriol's solutionto the problem of divine foreknowledge and futurecontingents in these years (Schabel 2000), Schabel identifieda "Marchist School" among theologiansthatincludedthe FranciscansAufredusGonteriBrito, WilliamofBrienne,and WilliamofRubio,and mostnotablytheAugustinián HermitMichael of Massa. Interestingly, all of these authorswere silent

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about theirdebt to Marchia, whose unacknowledgedimpactin thiscontextcontinuedat least to the end of the 15th century.It turnsout that John the Canon was anothermember of this silent"MarchistSchool." Book II of the Physicsprovidesa forumfor discussingcontingencyand fortune,but John the arts masterasks a theologicalquestion (II, q. 4): "UtrumDeus habeat certamet infallibilem notitiamcuiuscumqueobiecti In futuricontingentis." articleoneJohndeals withfuturecontingent propositions,notingthat a "certaindoctor", i.e. Auriol, followsAristotleand denies theirtruthand falsity.Since John will oppose this position,one wonderswhy he does not name his adversary,as is his usual procedure withopponents.The reason is thatJohn is not readingAuriol at all, but ratherFrancisof Marchia's presentationof Auriol,and since Marchia did not name Auriol,neitherdoes John. But John does not name Marchia either,and this time it is because John goes on to adopt, oftenverbaand future tim,Marchia's solutionto the problemof divineforeknowledge contingents.In fact,it is only toward the end of the articlethatJohn - with offers approval what Marchia says "in alia quaestione," apparently an inadvertentrevelationof his source. John mentionsMarchia again twicein the thirdof the threearticles,firstto give Marchia's argumentsagainstJohn's positionand then to refutethe arguments.This is particularly deceptive,because whatJohn actuallydoes is give Marchia's hypothetical objectionsto his own positionand thenMarchia's own refutationof theseobjections!In truth, John is almostin fullagreementwith Marchia, and over halfof the questionis a paraphraseor verbatimquotationfromMarchia's commentaryon book I of the Sentences , mixedwith Scotisticadditionsand briefmentionsof Thomas Wylton'sPhysicscommentaryand of Francis of Meyronnes. in thiscontextJohn does not employthe Scriptum version Interestingly, of the relevantpart of Marchia's commentary,survivingin 13 manuscriptsand perhapsthe productof revisionsdone as late as 1323 or 1324, but rathera reportatio versionthatis preservedin onlytwo witnesses,BAV Ross. lat. 525 and Naples BN VII C. 27, dated (as mentionedabove) 1320. This is also the case with the Sentences commentaryof William Marchia's known and it Rubio, , only reportator suggeststhatJohn the Canon was also close to Marchia.12It serves to remindus that reporta12Dekker discusses inan intertoMarchia 2002,227-30, JohntheCanon'srelationship onJohn's oftimeandmotion, in article theories where toPeterAuriol Johnreacts esting inthisvolume Ourfindings hereandinSchabel's article Dekker's particular. modify slightly

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in fewor no manuscriptwitnesses,frequently tiones , oftensurviving played an importantrole earlyon, whilescripta or ordinationes circulatingin many copies were more importantin the long term. Thus, Caracciolo and of AurioPs lectures,Himbert of Marchia were familiarwith reportationes of Meyronnes'Sentences and othGarda employeda reportatio commentary, ers used a reportatio of Odonis's Toulouse lectures,now lost. This shortsketchof some of the ways in which Marchia's influence was feltin the yearsfollowinghis activityat Paris can serveto show that Marchia was indeed a significant figureat the Universityof Paris in the century.It also shows quite clearlythat in order earlyto mid fourteenth and to traceespeciallythe positiveimpactMarchia had on contemporary later thinkers,furtherstudiesof Marchia's own thoughtand editionsof his worksare an absolute prerequisite,since so oftenpositiveinfluence goes unmentioned.We hope that the articlespublishedhere, in subjectintellectual ing aspectsof Marchia'swide-ranging pursuitsto close scrutiny, will help demonstratenot only the inherentphilosophicaland theological interestof Marchia's thought,but also bring us one step closer to seeing how his influenceplayed out in the later medievalperiod. This Volume works The articlesin thisvolume focus on Marchia's most influential his Sentences commentary,his Metaphysics commentary,and his political - and on various themeshe took tract up in them. It is perhaps fitting thatthefirstthreeof the six articlescollectedhere are devotedto Marchia's naturalphilosophy.As mentionedabove, until recentlyMarchia's work was discussedprimarilyby historiansof science. Indeed such important scholarsas PierreDuhem, AnnelieseMaier, and Marshall Clagetttreated Marchia at some length,he is discussedin standardhistoriesof medieval sciencelike those of Edward Grant or David C. Lindberg,and his name shows up even in broader surveys.Two of Marchia's positionsabove all The firstof thesewas his were singledout as being of greatsignificance. derelicta an version of use of virtus , , to explain how projecimpetus early tilescan continueto move even aftertheyare no longerin contactwith anddating, assertions onJohn'sidentity andalsosuggest thatwe needto see however, incontexts isviaMarchia other whether reaction toAuriol thanfuture John's contingents. Foryetanother ofJohnlifting from seeKraus1936,372,andthelitMarchia, example erature referred to there.

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the source of theirmotion:Marchia claimed that a forceis leftbehind by the moverand thatthisforcegraduallyexhaustsitself,withthe effect thatthe projectileceases its motion.The second of Marchia's mostnoted view thatterrestrial positionswas his rejectionof the generalAristotelian and celestialmatterare of two fundamentally different types,Marchia instead claimingthat the heavens and earth are composed of the same basic kind of matterand that in principlethey obey the same laws of cause and effect.It is on preciselythesetwo viewsthatarticleshere focus. In his article,Mark Thakkar looks at the distinctionbetween matter in the sublunarand in the supralunaryworlds. Thakkar's articlereally showshow farMarchia studieshave come, since it can best be described as revisionist. He analyzesand evaluatesthe argumentsthatMarchia puts forwardforhis claim that these mattersare of the same basic type.But thenhe showsthatMarchia attenuateshis claim so drasticallythatit has no consequenceswhatsoeverforthe workingsand conductof naturalphilosophy. Marchia's view was purely theoretical.Two points mightbe made about Thakkar'sresults.First,as Thakkarhimselfpointsout it will be interesting to see whetherotherthinkersfromthe period priorto and with contemporary Marchia had the same sortof critiqueof theAristotelian divisionbetweencelestialand terrestrial matter;this researchhas yet to be done. Second, in a certainsense Marchia's rejectionof the Aristotelian view is put into greaterreliefgiven Thakkar's results:Marchia had the same basic information that all other medieval thinkershad- the heavens appeared to followunchanging,uniformcircularmotion,while the earthwas a place of change and varied motion.From an empiricalpoint of view, Marchia's big idea could only be theoretical,and to that extent the conceptualbreakthrough (if it was his) appears to remainintact. As mentioned,perhapsMarchia's mostfamouscontribution to natural was the notion of virtus derelitta to other philosophy explain,among things, projectilemotion. Two articlesin the presentcollection,one by Chris Schabel, the otherby Fabio Zanin, take up this issue. The two articles are rathercomplementary. Schabel exploresthe historicalbackgroundto and the receptionof virtusderelicta , concludingthat the theorydid not arise in a vacuum nor was it adopted immediately.Moreover,Schabel looks at virtusderelicta in the contextof Marchia's own philosophyand that Marchia used the tool to explain many different theology,showing phenomena over and above projectilemotion. Zanin's article,on the otherhand, is primarilyconcernedwith a theoreticalconsideration:was Marchia's idea a break with Aristotelianmechanicsand a harbingerof

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the modern theoryof inertia?Zanin argues that Marchia's view does break decisivelywith several essentialprinciplesin Aristotelianphysics; derelicta does not pave the way forinerhe claims that virtus nevertheless mechanics.Althoughhe considersit to be tia and seventeenth-century "one of the most importantcontributionsto the renewal of Western forZanin the best way to look at Marchia's position, scientific thinking," and itsdescendantsinJohnBuridan,Nicole Oresme,and Albertof Saxony, wentundeveloped.Interestingly, is as a new theoryof motionthatultimately views of the relationshipbetween Schabel and Zanin take verydifferent Marchia and John Buridan on the topic of impetus. Schabel, lookingat dereand Marchia's wide-ranging uses, theological philosophical,forvirtus litta,claimsthatBuridanrestricted (i.e. to local motion)theuse of Marchia's derelicta and its descendant, much broadertheory;Zanin, examiningvirtus a of view of from the more , theoryof motion,sees point strictly impetus Buridan as having furtherdeveloped and extended Marchia's theory. Appended to Schabel's articleis the firstcriticaleditionfromall manuderescriptsof the centraltextforthe studyof Marchia's theoryof virtus 1. licta : IV Sentences , q. The remainingarticlesdeal withtopicsthathave receivedfarless scholarly attention.Fabrizio Amerinilooks at Marchia's view on the nature of accidentand accidentalbeing.What is an accident?How does it exist? And how does it relate to the substancein which it inheres?These are the questionsthat Amerini'swide-rangingpaper addresses. In the first part of the paper, Amerini canvasses the thirteenth-and fourteenthcenturydebate over theseissues,isolatinga discussionamong artsmasters that took its point of departurein a difficult question of Aristotleintera discussionamong theologians,especiallyAquinas and pretation,and Scotus, which in addition had to account for the complex case of the Eucharist.In the second part of his article,Amerinilooks at Marchia's commenand his Sentences treatmentof the issues in both his Metaphysics as a develbe seen Marchia's stance can taries.From thisinvestigation, opmentof Scotus' view: he holds that accidentsare absolutebeings and inherencein a subjectis not an essentialfeatureof them (drawingthese conclusionson accountof the Eucharist).In additionto his valuable study, book of Marchia's Metaphysics Amerinioffersthe editio commentary, princeps VII, q. 1. One topic thathas recentlybeen at the centerof attentionin the study of medieval philosophyis weaknessof will. Thus, Andrea A. Robiglio's studyof Marchia'sview on the relationbetweenwilland intellectis timely.

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Robiglio studiesMarchia's solutionto the questionof whetherit is possible forthe will to have its act eitherbeforeor againstthejudgmentof reason, analyzingcloselyMarchia's arguments,e.g. those based on the will as a freepower and on the factthat therewas a firstsin. From this Marchia emergesas a voluntarist,convincedof the will's investigation, to act capacity againstreason'sbestjudgment.Moreover,althoughMarchia's view is set in contrastto more "intellectualist" theoriesof action(i.e. those of Aquinas and Godfreyof Fontaines),nevertheless Robiglio stressesthat Marchia shares with these and other later medieval thinkersa view of mind and selfthat is not descended fromAristotleor any other Greek philosopher.For Marchia, therecan be concurrentacts in the same faculty,and theseacts can be at odds withone another.This, Robiglio contends,is somethingnew to the later Middle Ages. Robiglio's articleis also because it presentsa greatdeal of hithertouneditedtext noteworthy fromboth versionsof Marchia's commentaryon book II of the Sentences. The volume rounds out with Roberto Lambertini'sstudyof the relationshipbetweenMarchia and William of Ockham. Lambertinifirstdiscusses Marchia's apparent rejectionin the fourthbook of his Sentences commentaryof Ockham's view of quantity(see on thisalso above). Most of his paper, however,focuseson the interaction, both personaland texbetween Ockham and Marchia their time in Avignonand tual, during thereafter.In particular,Lambertiniexamines several examples of the influencethat Marchia's Improbatio appears to have had on some of Ockham's politicalworks.This influencewas complex. Thus, in his discussion of the nature of dominium in the prelapsarianstate (whetherit is the same as the type of dominium had after the Fall), Ockham took Marchia's basic positionbut modifiedit in severalsignificant ways. In his discussionof the causal originsof propertyin human "iniquity,"according to Lambertini,Ockham makes Marchia's view "a cornerstoneof his politicalthought."In general,Lambertinipaints a picturein which on variousissuesMarchia's ideas played an importantpart in the genesisof the Venerable Inceptor's politicalthought. * * * The guesteditorswould like to thankthe editorialboard of Vivarium both for acceptingwith enthusiasmour suggestionof a special issue devoted to Francisof Marchia and fortheircommentsand suggestionsregarding the articlescontainedherein.

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INTRODUCTION TotalMarchiaBibliography

neither The bibliography aimsto be exhaustive , exceptthatwe haveincluded encythe mentions Marchia entries nor mere , particularly dozens, of perhapshunclopedia to impetus to Marchia' s virtusderelictacontribution dreds,of studiesreferring we have added to that have since In addition studies 2002, quitea appeared theory. in Friedman and Schabel2001. The bibliogbitofolderliterature to thatreported to indicate editions annotated, fromMarchiai works(all primarily raphyis lightly and Schabel2001). siglaare taken fromFriedman manuscript Works (with editions) major published ofMarchiai Catalogue andSchabel2001,andtheliterversions. See Friedman In IV libros Sententiarum several deMarchia siue deEsculo Commentarius should beaddedFrancisci ature citedthere, towhich etPrologus Petri Lombardi. inIV libros sententiarum , ed.N. Mariani, Quaestiones praeambulae deMarchia OFM (Spicilegium 2003,andFrancisci Bonaventurianum, 31),Grottaferrata Distinctiones libri a sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Commentarius inIV libros sivedeEsculo primi OFM(Spicilegium addecimam, ed.N. Mariani, Bonaventurianum, 32),Grottaferrata prima at workin advanced 2006.Editorial (boththeA andB versions) stageon II Sent, ofFribourg, Switzerland theUniversity (TizianaSuarez-Nani). - Francisci cum selectis sivedeEsculo, deMarchia OFM,Quodlibet Quodlibet quaestionibus (1324-28?) OFM(Spicilegium excommentario inlibrum Sententiarum Bonaventurianum, , ed.N. Mariani, 1997. 29),Grottaferrata - Francisci etcompilatio libros deMarchia sivedeEsculo, In libros OFM,Sententia super Physicorum OFM (Spicilegium Aris toteIis,ed.N. Mariani, Bonaventurianum, 30),GrottaPhysicorum ferrata 1998. - Marchia's tobe datedtobefore inMetaphysicam I-VII;presumably Quaestiones 1323) (books inParis,Bibl.Mazarine, Cod. found commentary. Mosdyunedited, largeMetaphysics di Spagna104,ff.48r-102v 3490,if.l-57r,andBologna, (butforeditions Collegio and forFolge fromtheworksee belowtheentries r-Fonfara, Künzle,Schneider, in thisvolume). article as wellas Amerini's Zimmermann, - Marchia's smallMetaphysics cometsecundum librum Quaestiones Metaphysicorum super primum an abbreviation ofthefirst twobooksofthelarger commentary. mentary, probably in Florence, Bibl.Mediceo-Laurenziana, Fesul.161,ff.67ra-73ra, found Unedited, as wellas several andBAV,Vat.lat.3130,ff.29ra-36vb, cQuiavir 3 fragments. - Francisci deEsculo, Domini contra libellum reprobus (1330) Johannis quiincipit Improbatio (Quiavir contra libellum Domini ' ed.N. Mariani, OFM,Improbatio reprobus Johannis quiincipit 1993. OFM (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 28),Grottaferrata works Studies ofMarchia's volontario nelpensiero diFrancesco amare Dio?Libertà e contingenza dell'atto G.,E' necessario Alliney, suFrancesco del3°Convegno in:D. Priori Internazionale , d'Appignano (ed.),Atti dAppignano, delTronto, forthcoming. Appignano come diPaoloVeneto. Il casodegli accidenti eucaristici , in: Amerini, F, Francesco fonte dAppignano Picenum forthcoming. Seraphicum, etle miracle. Lesdoctrines Bakker 1999= Bakker, La Raison (c. 1250eucharistiques P.J.J.M., c. 1400),Nijmegen 1999,vol.1,86-94and399-408.

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dehocdixerit etCommentator and Balena,M., andD. Priori, , in:Priori Quidquid Philosophus Balena2004,77-96. desNominalismus derSpätscholastik nach demtraktat Borchert, E., DerEinfluss aufdieChristologie de communicatione idiomatum desNicolaus Oresme. undTextausgabe , Untersuchungen ms.W) and82 (III Sent., Münster i. W. 1940,65-66(III Sent., qq. 1,3, 7, 10from ms.W). q. 5 from inthe Middle Madison 526-30(partial M., TheScience 1959,519-21, ofMechanics Ages, Clagett, in Maier1940). trans, ofIV Sent., q. 1,basedon theedition deFrançois deMarchia. A propos d'unlivre in:Bulletin de Counet, récent, J.-M.,La cosmologie 34 (1992),215-20. médiévale, philosophie theCanon A CaseStudy Dekker onTime andMotion. inAristotelian 2002= Dekker, D.J.,John andEarly in:C. Leijenhorst, C. Lüthy, andJ.M.M.H. Natural Scotism, Philosophy Thijssen totheSeventeenth Natural (eds.),TheDynamics ofAristotelian Philosophy from Antiquity Century, Leiden2002,225-48, esp.227-30. derAkzeptations-und Verdienstlehre vonDunsScotus bisLuther, mit W.,DieEntwicklung Dettloff, derFranziskanertheologen, besonderer Münster i. W. 1963,190-92. Berücksichtigung onthePhysics inErfurt , Cod.Amplon. Donati,S., TheAnonymous Q. 312andRichard Commentary in:Recherches de Théologie etPhilosophie 72.2(2005), médiévales, Rufus ofCornwall, 232-362, esp.269-83. sull'Immacolata in: Prioriand Balena2004, Duba,W.O.,Francesco Concezione, d'Appignano 59-75. diMarchia sullaconoscenza intuitiva mediata e immediata Duba,W.O.,Francesco (III Sent., q. 13), in:Picenum all ed. ofthequestion from 22-23(2003-04), 121-57(with Seraphicum, mss). onChrist's Human in:M.C. Pacheco Duba,W.O.,Francis ofMarchia Cognition oftheWord, andJ.F.Meirinhos andImagination inMedieval I. Actes duXIe (eds.),Intellect Philosophy dePhilosophie dela Société International Médiévale Internationale dela Congrès pourl'Étude Médiévale du26 au31 août2002,Turnhout, (S.I.E.P.M. ), Porto, Philosophie forthcoming. ci sarebbe Il rapporto l'incarnazione? Duba,W.O.,Se noncifossela redenzione, frala Separatio humani e la causadell'incarnazione del Verbo secondo Francesco , in: generis' d'Appignano D. Priori del3°Convegno suFrancesco del Internazionale (ed.),Atti d'Appignano, Appignano Tronto, forthcoming. dumonde, voll.6-8,Paris1954-59, indices s.v.François de Marche Duhem,P., Le système ofa portion in Duhem,P.,Medieval translation Theories ofInfinity, (English Cosmology. andthePlurality trans.R. Ariew[Chicago1985]esp. Place,Time,Void, ofWorlds, 200-02and321-23). Peters vonCandia, desPisaner Alexanders i. Ehrle, F.,DerSentenzenkommentar V,Münster Papstes W. 1925,253-60. in:Franziskanische indieManologie derOxforder Studien Emmen, A.,Einfuhrung Franziskanerschule, 39 (1957),99-217(Marchia at:169n.76and216-17). daRimini. e scienza nelpensiero tardo-medievale F., Gregorìo , Rome Fiorentino, futuro Contingenza, 2004,passim. vonMarchia: Die erste einer unddrier S., Franziskus Unterscheidung allgemeinen Folger-Fonfara, e StudisullaTradizione Filosofica 16 besonderen in:Documenti Medievale, Metaphysik, 461-513 oftheProoemium toMarchia's ed.,pp.504-13, (2005), (with byR.L.Friedman from bothextant mss). Metaphysics Commentary - DerEntwurf des unddieSpaltung derMetaphysik S., Das eSuper'-Transzendentale Folger-Fonfara, doctoral ofCologne von 2006. Franziskus Marchia, dissertation, University Unpublished svor' denersten ?- Die Legitimation der'Super' S., Gibtes Begriffe Begriffen Folger-Fonfara, durch Franciscus de in: Archiv fur mittelalterliche Transzendentalien Marchia, Philosophie undKultur, 12 (forthcoming 2006).

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17

'- Francesco delPrimo suiconcetti S., 'Prima , in:D. Priori Folger-Fonfara, d'Appigliano (ed.), primi suFrancesco Atti del3°Convegno delTronto, Internazionale , Appigliano d'Appigliano forthcoming. andJohn DunsScotus onthePsychological Model Friedman, R.L.,Francis , ofMarchia oftheTrinity in:Picenum 18 (1999),11-56. Seraphicum, Friedman ontheEternity andthe 2002= Friedman, R.L.,Francesco d'Appianano oftheWorld Actual , in:Priori 2002,83-99. Infinite andPrologue inFrancesco : The Sentences R.L.,Principia Friedman, d'Appignano's Commentary utrum enssimpliciter esse subiectum alicuius in:Priori Question scientiae', 'Quaeritur simplex possit andBalena2004,123-49. Debate: Durand vs.Thomas Friedman, R.L.,OntheTrailofa Philosophical ofSt.Pourcain Wylton onSimultaneous Acts inthe Intellect T. Kobusch, andT. Dewender , in:S.F.Brown, (eds.), Debates at theUniversity Quarter , Philosophical ofParisintheFirst oftheFourteenth Century Leiden, forthcoming. Mental Friedman, R.L.,Mental , in:J. Biard,etal. (eds.),Le langage Propositions before Language mental duMoyen , Leuven, Ageà lAgeclassique forthcoming. = Friedman, Friedman Traditions attheMedieval The R.L.,Intellectual Forthcoming University: UseofPhilosophical inTrinitarian theFranciscans andDominicans, Psychology Theology among 1250-1350 , Leiden, forthcoming, esp.ch. 11,§ 2. Friedman andSchabel R.L.andC. Schabel, Francis s Commentary 2001= Friedman, ofMarchia' ontheSentences, in:Mediaeval 63 (2001),31-106. Studies, Field. inthePostmetaphysical Era, Leuven2004, Goris, W., TheScattered History ofMetaphysics esp.28-29. De Guimaraens, desthéologiens surl'immaculée de 1250à 1350, in: F., La doctrine conception ÉtudesFranciscaines, ser.4, 10 (1953):23-51at 46. Kraus1936= Kraus, vonderrealen inderälteren Einheit Skotistenschule, J.,DieLehre spezifischen 14 (1936),353-78(Marchia: in:DivusThomas(Freiburg), 369-71). desFranziskaners Petrus ausCodex 3490zumSchrifttum Mazarine Thomae, Kiinzle, P.,Mitteilungen vorab inMetaphysicam', in:Archivům Franciscanum 59 zuseinen 'Quaestiones Historicum, forthelargeMetaphysics (1966),3-37(17-23= fulllistofquestions commentary, which is attributed toPeterThomae[Kiinzle modified hisopinion as to (incorrectly) thecommentary's author in Petrus Thomae oder Franciscus deMaironis? in: Archivům Franciscanum 61 (1968),462-63];23-37= excerpts from Historicum, esp.1.1,II.1, IV.4,andVI.2). 1930= Kürzinger, Toletanus undseine Kürzinger J.,Alfonsus Vargas theologische Einleitungslehre. EinBeitrag derScholastik im14.Jahrhundert, Münster i. W. 1930,esp. zurGeschichte 158-63. 59-60,141-46, storna Lambertini delladefinizione dell'identità minoritica da Evoluzione R., La povertà pensata. Bonaventura ad Ockham ofrevised , Modena2000(a collection VII, VIII, and papers) IX (with studies, 189-95). bibliographical updateon Marchia d'Ascoli e la polemica contro Giovanni XXII:a proposito dei Lambertini, R., Francesco ftancescana tral"Improbatio' e l"Appellatio in: A. Degrandi, O. Gori, monacensis', rapporto magna G. Pesili,A. Piazza,andR. Rinaldi inonore diGirolamo Arnaldi dalla (eds.),Studi offerti Scuola distudi medioevali nazionale , Rome2001,277-308. Clareno e Francesco trapovertà e politica: alleorigini delle disLambertini, R.,Angelo d'Appianano - Religiosità, nella Marche Folklore 5 (2002),39-53. sidenze , in:Le Marche. francescane laproprietà delpotere: Francesco nelpensiero ecclesio, alleorigani Lambertini, R., Oltre d'Appigliano deltrecento , in:Priori 2002,51-66. logico-politico diversorum Francesco dAscoli come Lambertini, R., Nonnumquam impugnantium personas assumpsi: delpensiero di Ockham 1 (2003),97-140. Politico , in:Pensiero Medievale, fonte politico delIV libro delcommento alleSentenze di Francesco la Lambertini, R., A proposito d'Appianano: andBalena2004,9-26. 37,in:Priori Quaestio

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d'Ascoli Giovanni daRipatransone: custodia ascolana , Francesco Lambertini, R., Giacomo d'Appigliano, e cultura scolastica nelTrecento mendicanti nel , in:G. Gagliardi francescana (ed.),GliOrdini Piceno. 1. I francescani dalleorigini allaControriforma, AscoliPiceno2005,pp. 33-52. andEcclesiology toFrancis Law,Religious Lambertini, R.,Natural , in: Poverty according ofMarchia andM.C. Pacheco(eds.),Intellect etImagination dansla philosophie médiéJ. Meirinhos vale. Actes duXI Congrès International dePhilosophie Médiévale dela SIEPM,Porto, du27 au 31 août2002, Turnhout, forthcoming. come di Guglielmo d'Ockham Lambertini, R., Francesco , in:D. Priori, ed.,Atti d'Appignano fonte del3°Convegno suFrancesco delTronto, Internazionale , Appignano d'Appignano forthcoming. derGlaubensbegründung beidenScholastikern des14.Jahrhunderts , Lang1930= Lang,A.,DieWege i. W. 1930,89-100. Münster ad Lombardům: TheSecular andtheSacred inMedieval Commentaries onthe S., Accessus Livesey, Sentences de Théologie etPhilosophie 72.1(2005),153-74, , in:Recherches médiévales, derelicta). esp.165-67(onvirtus Franciscus deMarchia, in: Lohr,C., NewMaterial (Quaestiones Concerning super Metaphysicam' 46 (1971),486-88. Antonianum, Maier1940= Maier,A.,Franciscus deMarchia DieImpetustheorie , in:eadem, , Vienna-Leipzig derscholastischen 1940,45-77,rpt.in:eadem, , 3ded., £weiGrundprobleme Naturphilosophie Rome1968,161-200. dasaktuell über Unendliche inderersten des14.Jahrhunderts Maier,A.,Diskussionen , in: Hälfte DivusThomas(Freiburg), 24 (1947),147-66,317-37,rpt.in: eadem,Ausgehendes Mittelalters I, Rome1964,esp.68-72. Galileis im14.Jahrhundert Maier,A.,Die Vorläufer , Rome1949,133-36and241-47. vonScholastik undNaturwissenschaft Maier,A.,AnderGrenze , 2d ed.,Rome1952,82-87. Problemen derOckhamforschung, Franciscanum Maier,A.,%ueinigen , in:Archivům Historicum, 46 (1953),161-94, Mittelalters I, Rome1964,esp.180-81, rpt.in:eadem, Ausgehendes 188-91. derspätscholastischen Maier,A.,Metaphysische , Rome1955,199-209 Hintergründe Naturphilosophie and250-56(discussing Marchia andtheearlyParisian reaction toOckham's physics). Aristoteleskommentare des14.Jahrhunderts Louvain Maier,A., Verschollene , in:Autour dAristote, Mittelalters 1955,515-41, I, Rome1964,esp.238-41. rpt.in:eadem, Ausgehendes derscholastischen in: Scholastik, Maier,A., Die naturphilosophische Bedeutung Impetustheorie, 30 (1955),321-43;rpt.in:eadem, Mittelalters I, Rome1964,esp.361-64; Ausgehendes trans, in: eadem,OntheThreshold , trans.S.D. Sargent, ofExactScience Philadelphia 1982,85-88. undMechanik Maier,A.,^wischen , Rome1958,350-54. Philosophie edipotesi sulCommento alleSentenze di Francesco dellaMarcaOMin Mariani, N., Certezze ., in: Archivům Franciscanum 95 (2002),93-183. Historicum, attribuiti a Francesco dellaMarca Franciscanum Mariani,N., DueSermoni , in: Archivům 98 (2005),571-95. Historicum, etle scepticisme dansla philosophie Krakow1926, duXIVesiècle, Michalski, C., Le criticisme au XIVesiècle. Sixétudes, ed. K. Flasch, Frankfurt 40-41,rpt.in:idem,La philosophie 1969,108-09. nouvelle etlesdifférents courants au XIVe Krakow Michalski, C., La physique siècle, philosophiques Laphilosophie auXIVe siècle. Sixétudes, ed.K. Flasch, 1928,1-2,47-49,56,rpt.in:idem, Frankfurt Buridan's debtto Marchia's virtus 1969,207-8,253-54,262 (maintaining derelicta ). Berlin1969,23-29. zurSozialphilosophie, Miethke, J.,Ockhams Weg etprologus delCommento alleSentenze diFrancesco dellaMarca, Poppi,A., 'Questiones preambulae in:Archivům Franciscanum 97 (2004),469-80(review ofMariani's text Historicum, edition from 2003).

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INTRODUCTION

19

e scienza divina nelCommentano alleSentenze diFrancesco della Marca(1319 Poppi,A.,Ontologia % in:Miscellania 104.1-2 Francescana, (2004),100-20. Priori2002= Priori, D. (ed.),AttidelIoConvegno su Francesco Internazionale , d'Appignano delTronto 2002. Appianano : Frustra fitperpluraquodfieripotest in: Priori, D., Francesco dAppignano perpauciora, Priori 2002,103-15. Priori andBalena2004= Priori, Atti delIIoConvegno Internazionale D., andM. Balena(eds.), suFrancesco dAppignano, delTronto2004. Appignano di Francesco di Marchia 18 (1999), Schabel, C., Il Determinismo , in: Picenum Seraphicum, ed. ofScriptum all mss). 57-95,and 19 (2000),15-68(with /,dd. 35-38,from ona Recent Edition s Inprimům librum Sententiarum Schabel, C., Notes , in: ofParts ofMarchia' Picenum 19(2000),277-82(review ofMariani's textedition from Seraphicum, 1998). Schabel atParis, 2000= Schabel, 1316-1345 . Peter Auriol andthe Problem C., Theology ofDivine andFuture 324-36. , Aldershot 2000,esp.pp. 189-220, Foreknowledge Contingents C., La dottrina diFrancesco diMarchia sullapredestinazione Schabel, , in:Picenum , 20 Seraphicum ed. ofScriptum all manuscripts). I, dd. 39-40,from (2001),9-45(with Schabel, C., Francis , in: E.N. Zalta(ed.),TheStanford ofMarchia ofPhilosophy Encyclopedia /plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ 1/entries/francis-marchia. win200 (2001),URL: http:/ ed. ofReportado /,dd.39 and42-48). (with Mass?Francesco onResistance andInfinite Schabel, C., OntheThreshold ofInertial dAppignano , in:Priori 2002,175-89. Velocity Schabel2002= Schabel, Commentaries Peter Auriol toGregory and C., Parisian from ofRimini theProblem Commentaries ontheSentences , in:G.R.Evans(ed.),Mediaeval ofPredestination Lombard , Leiden2002,221-65(onMarchia, ofPeter esp.229-37). I ofFrancesco s Commentary ontheSentences Schabel, C., TheRedactions , in: ofBook dAppignano' Priori andBalena2004,97-122. onDivine Ideas Schabel, C., Francis , in:M.C. PachecoandJ.F.Meirinhos ofMarchia (eds.), Intellect andImagination inMedieval /.Actes duXIeCongrès International dePhilosophie Philosophy Médiévale dela Société Internationale l'Etude dela Philosophie Médiévale Porto, pour (S.I.E.P.M.), du26 au 31 août2002, Turnhout, forthcoming. derelicta diFrancesco e il contesto delsuosviluppo Schabel, C., La virtus , in:D. Priori, d'Appignano su Francesco delTronto, Internazionale ed.,Attidel3° Convegno , Appignano d'Appignano ed. ofIV Sent., Vat.lat.943). (with forthcoming q. 1,from desThomas unddieLehrunterschiede zwischen Schmaus, M., Der(Liber propugnatorius' Anglicus Thomas von II Tál:Dietrinitarischen undDunsScotus, , Münster 1930, Aquin Lehrdifferenzen 243-44, 354,536-37. desUnendlichen ineinem zurErkennbarkeit Schneider, N., Eineungedruckte Quästio MetaphysikKommentar des14.Jahrhunderts Erbeimarabisch, in:A. Zimmermann (ed.),Aristotelisches lateinischen Mittelalter mediaevalia, (= Miscellanea 18),Berlin1986,(96-118)104-07 from Marchia's (= excerpt LongMetaphysics commentary, q. II.5). deMarchia über dieWirklichkeit derMaterie VIIq. 5), in: Schneider, N., Franciscus (Metaph. Franziskanische 71 (1989),138-58. Studien, derRahlen. Diearistotelische J^ahlentheorie nach V 14 undihre N.,DieQualität Schneider, Metaph. mittelalterliche undUmdeutung e StudiSullaTradizione , in: Documenti Kommentierung Filosofica 2,2(1991),587-609. Medievale, Schneider 1991= Schneider, desFranciscus deMarchia: und N.,DieKosmologie Texte, Quellen, des14.Jahrhunderts ed. ofII Sent. zurNaturphilosophie , Leiden1991(with Untersuchungen [A],qq. 29-32,andMet.III.9). desNaturbegriffs Schneider, N.,Kontexte , in:Priori 2002,161-73. Vorherwissen beiDunsScotus undseinen ersten Schwamm, H., Dasgöttliche , Innsbruck Anhängern 1934,240-55.

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RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN ANDCHRISSCHABEL

e libertà '. Noteinmargine allequestioni 26 et27 del Suarez-Nani, T., 'Linguaggio , conoscenza commento di Francesco deMarchia al II libro delle Zeitschrift fur Sentenze , in: Freiburger undTheologie, 50 (2003),354-75. Philosophie etdivision: la modalité dela connaissance selon Suarez-Nani, T., Intuition, composition angélique deMarchia ettexte), in:Picenum 24 (2005),103-45(with François (Etude Seraphicum, ed. ofII Sent. [A],q. 23). contributo al problema Francesco deMarchia e l'indell'individuazione: Suarez-Nani, T., Unnuovo dividualità dellasostanze e StudisullaTradizione Filosofica , in: Documenti separate 16(2005),405-59(with II Sent. ofMarchia's Medievale, ed.,pp.437-59, [A],qq. 13-14 on thebasisof6 mss). diconoscenza? alternativo Francesco deMarchia e la spazializzazione Suarez-Nani, T., Unmodello delrapporto conoscitivo furPhilosophie Zeitschrift undTheologie, 53 , in: Freiburger (2006),345-66. intuitive etconnaissance discursive selon deMarchia Suarez-Nani, T., Connaissance , in:M.C. François PachecoandJ.F.Meirinhos andImagination inMedieval I. Actes (eds.),Intellect Philosophy duXIeCongrès International dePhilosophie Médiévale dela Société Internationale l'Étude de pour la Philosophie Médiévale Porto forth, du26 au 31 août2002,Turnhout, (S.I.E.P.M.), coming. e la localizzazione del Suarez-Nani, T., Francesco , in:D. Priori, ed.,Atti d'Appignano angeli degli 3°Convegno suFrancesco delTronto, Internazionale , Appignano d'Appignano forthcoming. edition in Maier1940). Vescovini, G.F.,La teoria , Turin1969,1-21(reprints dell'impeto Wittneben andLambertini 1999= Wittneben, Unteologo E.L.,andR. Lambertini, francescanoallestrette. sultestimone manoscritto delprocesso a Francesco d'Ascoli Osservazioni , in: Picenum 18 (1999),97-122. Seraphicum, Wittneben andLambertini 2000= Wittneben, Unteologo E.L.,andR. Lambertini, francescanoallestrette. II. A proposito dellatradizione manoscritta dellaconfessio diFrancesco d'Ascoli , in:Picenum 19 (2000),135-49. Seraphicum derImpetustheorie. derklassischen Mechanik. zumUrsprung Wolff, M., Geschichte Untersuchungen Frankfurt am Main1978,esp.192-98, 214-15. delconcetto divisderelicta inNicole in:Priori Zanin,F.,La rielaborazione Oresme, 2002,117-59. Zanin2004= Zanin,F.,Gregorio daRimini conto Francesco sullaconoscenza d'Appignano scientifica dellateologia andBalena2004,27-58. , in:Priori dell'oggetto oder Leiden1965;2nded. 1998,56-71(= ed.ofMet. Zimmermann, A.,Ontologie Metaphysik? 1.1andVI.16). undTälmetaphysik nach einem Kommentar zur Zimmermann, A.,Allgemeine Metaphysik anonymen aristotelischen Ersten ausdem14.Jahrhundert fürGeschichte der , in: Archiv Philosophie 48 (1966),190-206. Philosophie, Kommentare undPhysik desAristoteles, zurMetaphysik Zimmermann, A., Verzeichnis ungedruckter Leiden1971,37,140-45 listforthelargeMetaphysics which (full question commentary, is listed as anonymous). 'ens'nacheinem undunivoke desTerminus Zimmermann, A., Analoge Bedeutung anonymen des14.Jahrhunderts, in:Deusethomo ad mentem I. DunsScoti. Acta Metaphysikkommentar tertii Rome1972,723-30(suggesting Marchiawrotethelarge Scotistici, Congressus Metaphysics commentary). Anselmi ineinem des14.Jahrhunderts Zimmermann, A.,DieRatio , anonymen Metaphysikkommentar in:Analecta Anselmiana 4, Frankfurt 1975,195-201 (basedon VI.13).

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FrancisofMarchiaon theHeavens MARK THAKKAR

Abstract Francisof Marchia (c. 1290-fl344)is said to have challengedAristotelian realmsin a way thathas orthodoxy by unitingthe celestialand terrestrial forthe practiceof naturalphilosophy.But thisoverimportant implications whichis actualizbetweenbare potentiality, looksMarchia'svitaldistinction able onlyby God, and naturalpotency,whichis the concernof the natural and to its implicaphilosopher.If due attentionis paid to thisdistinction tions,Marchia'spositionno longerseemsto be revolutionary. 1. Introduction innovations of the matureGalileo was the "One of the mostimportant realmsare made of the same assertionthatthe celestialand terrestial matterand therefore followthe same basic naturallaws. fundamental in his commentary on Francisof Marchiaput fortha similarhypothesis Aristotelian to bookII [oftheSentences], 29-32. Contrary contemporary qq. theory,Marchia arguesthat the heavensare not made up of a fifth, the supranoblerelement,which radicallydifferentiates incorruptible, the basic matter lunarrealmfromthe sublunarone. On the contrary, is thesame everywhere, and just as Marchiaconsidersthenaturalworld to followpredictablepatterns, he also thinksthatthosepatternsare uniforthe These two tenetshave important implications versallyapplicable. of natural philosophy."1 practice Or so we have been led to believe. Francisof Marchia's writingson the natureof the heavenshave been in printforthe past fifteen yearsthanks to NotkerSchneider'sproductionof a criticaleditionwitha commentary.2 But that commentaryhas not yet been supplementedby independent 1 C. Schabel, Francis , in:E.N.Zalta(ed.),TheStanford ofPhilosophy ofMarchia Encyclopedia 2001edition ), §3 (URL = ). 2 N. Schneider, deMarchia: undUntersuchungen DieKosmologie desFranciscus Texte, Quellen des14.Jahrhunderts zurNaturphilosophie , Leiden1991. BrillNV,Leiden, © Koninklijke 2006 - www.brill.nl/viv online Alsoavailable

Vivarium 44,1

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MARKTHAKKAR

claims- thatMarchia deniedAristotle's studies,and itsmain interpretative radical distinctionbetweenthe sublunarand supralunarrealms,and that this allowed him to apply to the heavens physicallaws discoveredon earth- have percolatedthroughto the tertiaryliteratureunchallenged.3 This articleunderminesthose claims. In his concludingchapter,Schneidergivesa summaryof what he calls the importantand fundamentally innovativeresultsof Marchia's cosmolthat the whole cosmos is unifiedand essentiallyhomogeneous, ogy: (1) inasmuchas essentiallythe same principlesand causes are to be found so throughoutit; (2) thatthe whole cosmos can be interpreted uniformly, that thereis no need for a special physicsof the heavens as a separate realm; and (3) that all discoveredand confirmedobservationsand laws are in principletransferable and applicable to all eventsin the cosmos, so that, as a matterof methodology,we can make well-foundedstatementsabout thingswhich elude our directgrasp.4This would of course be in starkcontrastto the standardmediaeval view, derivedultimately fromAristotle,that the sublunarand supralunarrealms are fundamentallydifferent.5 Marchia's own viewsare expressedin his commentaries(henceforth 'S' and 'M') on PeterLombard'sSentences and on Aristotle's where , Metaphysics he asks whetheror not celestialmatteris of the same nature{ratio)as the matterof inferiorgenerablesand corruptibles(S II.32.iv) or the matter of the elements(M III. 9). His answer,to put it briefly, is thatyes, celestial and terrestrial matterare of the same nature.But the devil is in the details,and it is to these that I now turn.

3 See forinstance R.L. Friedman, Francis GraciaandT.B. Noone , in:J.J.E. ofMarchia toPhilosophy intheMiddle Oxford 2002,254,and§3 ofSchabel, (eds.),A Companion Ages, Francis ofMarchia (cit.n. 1 above). 4 Schneider, Die Kosmologie sollnurgezeigt (cit.n. 2 above),326-27:"imAugenblick welche Resultate dieseEntscheidung . . . schonbeiihmzeitigte. Formal lassensich werden, vorallemdreiwichtige die allesamt fundamentale benennen, Ergebnisse Neuerungen bedeuteten ... 1. Der Kosmosistin seiner . . . eineinheiüiches und ganzenErstreckung indemanjederbeliebigen wesentlich Stelle wesentlich Ganzes, homogenes gleiche Prinzipien undUrsachen anzutreffen sind.2. DieserGesamt-Kosmos, dasUniversum, kanneinheitlich werden ... es istnichtnötig, fürbesondere, Bereiche eine interpretiert ausgezeichnete besondere miteigenen zu schaffen 'HimmelsPhysik (z.B.einespezielle Erklärungsmustern For(3),seen. 47 below. physik')." 5 See e.g.E. Grant, inthe Middle , in:D.C. Lindberg , Chicago Cosmology (ed.),Science Ages 1978,286-88.

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ON THE HEAVENS FRANCIS OF MARCHIA

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2. MarchiaiArguments There is, as one would expect, a significant overlap between the arguments Marchia gives for his position in the two commentaries.Three argumentsare more or less common to both works,and S providesa furtherone of its own. I label these fourlines of argumentas follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The The The The

ArgumentfromComparativeNobility ArgumentfromMaterial Incorruptibility ArgumentfromMaterial Potentiality ArgumentfromCelestial Quantity

(S (S (S (S

§59, M § 11)6 §60) §61, M §10) §2, M §12)

Let us now examine each of these in turn. 2.1

TheArgument (S §59, M §11) fromComparative Nobility

Marchia's firstargumentmakes extensiveuse of the concept of nobility (ínobilitas ). Roughly speaking,something'snobilityis its closenessto God in the cosmichierarchy.7 The precisesense of the conceptis unimportant here; what mattersforus is the use to which Marchia puts it. ad absurdum of the notion that The argumentpurportsto be a reductio and elementalsubcelestial and incorruptibles corruptibles specifically, that this notionis cornatures. stances have matterof different Suppose naturescannot rect.Then, on the tacitassumptionthatthingsof different mattercannot be equally noble. be equally noble, celestialand terrestrial But Marchia argues that neithertype of mattercan be nobler than the other.So the notion mustbe incorrect. The difficult part of this argumentis the lemma that neithertype of mattercan be nobler than the other. In order to prove this,Marchia helps himselfto some data about comparativenobility:that nobler matter is in potencytowardsnobler form,that (living)intellectivesouls are celestial nobler than (non-living)celestialforms,and that (incorruptible) formsare nobler than (corruptible)elementalforms.He also uses the matteris in potencytowards observationthat terrestrial straightforward both intellectivesouls and elementalforms.His overall strategyis then 6 Section and inSchneider's edition ofS 11.29-32 refer tothehelpful divisions numbers forms 'S §«' and'M §n'to refer M III.9 inDieKosmologie (cit.n. 2 above).I usethebrief to section n ofS 11.32andM III.9 respectively. 7 The idea was derived See A.O. Lovejoy, TheGreat Chain fromAristotle. , ofBeing MA 1936(reprint 1964),58-59. Cambridge,

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MARKTHAKKAR

24

to employa pincer movementagainstany supposed difference in nobilbetween celestial and terrestrial matter. The manoeuvrecan best be ity explainedwith the help of a diagram:

jo

Matter

Form

Celestial?

Intellective

Terrestrial

Celestial

Celestial?

''

^

Elemental

Terrestrialmatter,Marchia argues,cannot be nobler than celestialmatter,because thatwould violatethe matter-form nobilitycorrelationwhen comparingelementalformto celestialform,which is nobler.8And celestial mattercannot be nobler than terrestrial matter,because that would violatethe matter-form correlation when nobility comparingcelestialform to intellectivesouls, which are nobler.9(These correlationviolationsare representedin the diagramby crossingsof the matter-form lines.) So the heavens- whose formis wedged in betweenthose of livingmen and the - must themselveshave matter elements,both of which have terrestrial terrestrial matter. Schneiderpraises the clarityand decisivenessof this argument,and defendsMarchia againstan anticipatedchargethatthe yardstickof nobilityis "mediaevalin the worstsense", claiminginsteadthatit is an excellent way of orderingdisparateobjects by the one thingthat theyhave in common,namely,being.10But as I see it the argumentfaces at least threepossible lines of objection. 8 5 §59,11.448-450; M 811,11.66-68. 9 S §59,11.451-455; M §11,11.68-76. 10See Schneider, DieKosmologie andinparticular n. 271:"han302-03, (cit.n. 2 above), deltes sichumeinwegen seiner Relativität anhand dessen Kriterium, ganzausgezeichnetes sichtatsächlich Verschiedenstes miteinander undin einerelative vergleichen Zuordnung denaberall'diesVerschiedene läßt,undzwarhinsichtlich bringen genaueinesParameters, besitzt: hinsichtlich desSeins." gemeinsam

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The firststemsfroma distinction betweennobilitysimpliciter and nobilsecundum a certain that in Marchia makes S whilst 11.29 ity quid(in respect) arguingthatthe heavensare inanimate.He considersthe followingobjection: livingthingsare nobler than non-livingthings;the heavens,being are nobler than many livingthings;so the heavens must incorruptible, be livingand thus animate.11He responds: I say thatone thingcan be noblerthan anothersimpliciter , and yet be less noble thanit secundum formis nobler quid.Example:any substantial thanprimematterwithrespectto its degreeof being,because simpliciter formis a being simplyin actuality,while matteris a being only in potency.And yet,contrariwise, primematteris noblerthan [a given formsecundum , e.g. withrespectto some measure(jmodus substantial] quid ) of necessity. For primematteris unbegotten and incorruptible, whereas formis corruptible. For everything is as such [substantial] incorruptible noblerthan [anything] corruptible. Likewise,I say in responseto theproblemthatas faras degreeof being is concerned,everylivingthingis noblersimpliciter than any non-living and hence than the but secundum heavens; thing, quidthe oppositeis the as has been said about matter and form.12 case,just Now, the argumentfromcomparativenobilityrelies on two supposed and impossibilities: corruptiblescannot be nobler than incorruptibles,13 the heavens cannot be nobler than intellectivesouls.14But the firstinvolvesnobilitysecundum quid, while the second appears to involvenobility 11S 11.29§15. 12S 11.29§18: "Dicoquodaliquidpotest essesimpliciter nobilius alio et tarnen esse eo secundum forma substantialis estnobilior simignobilius quid.Exemplum: Quaelibet materia ad gradum cumforma sitensinactusimpliciter, entitatis, pliciter primaquantum materia autemensin potentia tantum. Et tarnen e contrario estnobilior ipsamateria forma secundum ad modum necessitatis. quid,putaquantum aliquem Ipsaenimmateria estingenita etincorruptibilis, forma autemcorruptibilis. Omneautemincorruptibile utsic estnobilius Consimiliter dicoin proposito ad corruptibili. quodomnevivumquantum entitatis estnobilius nonvivo,etperconsequens gradum simpliciter quocumque ipsocaelo, tamen secundum sicutde forma etmateria dictum est."Aquinas quideste contrario, gave a similar solution to a similar in Summa Theoloñae 1.70.3ad 2. argument 13To be moreprecise, M §11(11.67f.)callsitabsurd forthematter ofcorruptibles to be nobler thanthematter ofincorruptibles, whileS §59 (11.449f.)saysthatcorruptible forms arenotnobler thanincorruptible forms. (Stricdy speaking, corruption appliesonly to substances, thatis,to composites ofmatter andform. Butin a difficult S §6, passage, - -forma - is corruptible Marchia thata material substantial form substantialis materialis argues inasmuch ithaspartswhich remain after division itdoesnot.) as,beingextended, though 14S §59,11.45If.;M §11,11.70f.

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MARKTHAKKAR

5 Marchia is Heiter.1 simp rightthat the only way to forcethe comparative of celestial and terrestrial matterinto a simultaneouscorrelation nobility withboth of these different hierarchiesof formwould be to lump celestial and terrestrial mattertogether,but his distinctionbetween nobility and nobilitysecundum simpliciter quiddissolvesthe need for such a simultaneous correlation.To put it anotherway, the diagramconceals a third dimension:Marchia's pincersare skew,and thereforecannot close.16 On the otherhand, the hierarchyof nobilitysimpliciter is supposed to to of is and not determined correspond degrees being, simplyby the presence or absence of life. (The above passage, for instance,places form above matterbecause actualitytrumpspotency.)So Marchia mightbe - intellective entitledto use a single hierarchyof forms (men), sensitive celestial and elemental (animals),vegetative(vegetables), (heavens), (minerals) withoutrecourseto nobilitysecundum quid.But in thatcase Marchia would need to argue explicidyforthishierarchy,which he has not done here. The second objectionconcernsthe detailsof Marchia's argumentthat the celestialmatterof incorruptibles cannot be noblerthan the terrestrial matterof corruptibles: [Supposethatit is.] Nobler matteris in potencytowardsnoblerform. But celestialformis notmorenoble,but ratherlessnoble,thanan intellectivesoul. Thereforecelestialmatteris in potencytowardsintellective towardsthe dispositions whichprecedetheintelsoul,and consequently lectivesoul in matter,e.g. towardsactiveand passivequalities.But this is false,because in thatcase the heavenswould be corruptible.17

15I say"appears toinvolve" inneither version oftheargument does because, although Marchia hisassertion thatcelestial form is notnobler thanintellective saywhatgrounds thatitis theinanimation oftheheavens. soul,theabovepassagestrongly suggests 16Thepicture becomes evenmorecomplicated ifwe takeintoaccount thefullrange ofsouls.Intellective, andvegetative forms arenobler thancelestial and sensitive, simpliciter elemental celestial andintellective forms arenobler secundum forms; quidthansensitive, vegandelemental forms. etative, (Cf.S 11.29§7 andS §37.) 17S §59,11.451-455: "Nobilior materia estinpotentia ad nobiliorem formam. Sedforma caelinonestnobilior, immoignobilior animaintellectiva. caeliestinpotenErgomateria tiaad ipsamanimam etperconsequens ad dispositiones intellectivam, ipsamin materia activas etpassivas. Hocautem estfalsum, praecedentes, putaad qualitates quiatunccaelum essetcorruptibile." reads'ad dispositiones (Schneider ipsas'.)

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The troubleis that an opponentcould deny that celestialmatterwould have to be in potencytowardsintellectivesoul if it were noblerthan terrestrialmatter.Marchia himselfsays elsewhere: If celestialmatterwere of a different nature,thenit would not be in soul,because the same formcannotinform potencytowardsintellective severalmattersof different natures.18 But the positionof his opponentsis preciselythat celestialmatteris of a different nature. The thirdobjectionis thatMarchia's reductionof all matterto essentiallyone type casts doubt on one of his premisses,namely,that nobler matteris in potencytowardsnobler form.The most obvious motivation forthispremisswould be the claim that not all matteris equally noble, so thatforinstancethe matterof a man mightbe nobler than the matter of a mineral;but Marchia has takenit forgrantedthat all terrestrial matteris of the same nature and thus equally noble. In order to be clear about this,we must distinguish"between what the scholasticscalled matena , the absolutelyundeterminedsubstrate, prima and materia secunda The objec, likewood, whichhas definiteproperties."19 tion can then be put in the formof a dilemma.If Marchia is concerned withprimematter(as is stronglysuggestedby the next threearguments), his reductionof all terrestrial matterto essentiallyone typeis admissible, but his nobility-correlation premisshas lost its obvious motivation.And if he is concernedwith second matter,his nobility-correlation premissis admissible,but its obvious motivationis incompatiblewith his reduction of all terrestrial matterto essentiallyone type. Decisive or not, theseobjectionssuggestthat the argumentfromcomparativenobilityshould not,pace Schneider,"win us over by the clarity withwhich it proves that the matterof the heavens and that of the elementsmustbe equally noble and thus of the same nature."20 18M §11,11.72-75:"Sedsi materia caeliessetalterius tuncmateria caelinon rationis, essetinpotentia ad animam nonpotest informare intellectivam, quiaeademforma plures materias alterius rationis." 19M.L.Gill,Aristotle's Reconsidered oftheHistory ofPhilosophy, , in:Journal Metaphysics 43.3(2005),235n. 54.SeealsoJ.Owens,TheDoctrine inthe Aristotelian ofBeing Metaphysics: A Study intheGreek , 3rded.,Toronto Background ofMediaeval 1978,334-35. Thought 20Schneider, DieKosmologie . . . Beweis besticht durch die (cit.n. 2 above),302:"Dieser mitderaufindirektem daßdieMaterie desHimmels Klarheit, wird, Wegenachgewiesen undderElemente . . . gleichwertig unddamitgleichartig seinmüssen."

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28 2.2

MARKTHAKKAR TheArgument (S §60) fromMaterialIncorruptibility

The second argument,by contrast,is verysimple.If the matterof incornature to the matterof corruptibles, Marchia ruptiblesis of a different be a then there to difference between their corresponding argues, ought forms,because "even accordingto my opponent,mattersare distinguished in form in accordancewiththeirforms."21 And presumablythe difference has to do withcorruptibility. betweencorruptiblesand incorruptibles So, the matterof corruptiblesought to be corruptibleand correspondingly, But Marchia has already thatof incorruptibles oughtto be incorruptible. is itselfincorruptible. Therefore shown(§§3-7)thatthematterof corruptibles and the matterof corruptiblesmust be of the matterof incorruptibles the same nature. At firstblush,thisargumentlooks double-edged.For givensuch a corin matterand differences in form,we respondencebetween differences could turn the argumenton its head and question Marchia's assertion is also incorruptible: shouldn'tthe difference thatthe matterof corruptibles in formbetweencorruptibles and incorruptibles correspondto a difference in matter? in formcorAn initialrejoinderis that obviouslynot everydifference in form in man an difference a is different essential matter; respondsto matter.22 But in thatcase whywould to a mouse,but both have terrestrial in matterhave to correspondto a difference in form?Why a difference matternot be different fromcelestialmatter,and yet still could terrestrial be just as incorruptible? My tentativeansweron Marchia's behalfis that of terrestrial once we have accepted the incorruptibility matter,we no to that the matters are different, have reason any positive suppose longer and inferred because it was onlythe observedimmutability incorruptibility to us in the firstplace. of the heavens that suggestedsuch a difference We thereforeneed to look at Marchia's argumentfor the incorruptmatter,which he gives in S §§3-7. The argumentis ibilityof terrestrial less complexthan its lengthmay suggest;much of it is devotedto rebuttingthe facile objectionthat matteris corruptiblebecause materialsubstancesare divisible.Marchia deals with this objectionby distinguishing 21S §60,11.457-58: inordine ad formas etiam "Materiae perte."Schneider distìnguuntur is herequoting and(b)Marchia reads'parte', but(a) itis hardtomakegoodsenseofthis, in §53.I thank meto this ChrisSchabelforalerting from a notional verbatim opponent misreading. 22Marchia in§53. inS §63,inreply toanopposing makes a similar given argument point

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betweentwo sensesof corruption,of which the one used by the putative objectorcorrespondsto divisionor resolutioninto constituentparts. He definesthe proper sense of corruptionas follows: if it disintegrates in such a way that Somethingis corruptedsimpliciter one of its componentsdoes notremain:thereremainsonlythe subject or matterin whichthe resolutionoccurs,and not the form.And corFor annihilation is ruptiontakenin thissenseis similarto annihilation. thatby whicha thingis totallycorruptedin such a way thatnothing of it remains;but corruption is thatby whicha thingis corruptedin such a way thatsomething of it remains,such as its matter,and somethingdoes not remain,viz. its form.23 And in thissense,Marchia argues,mattercannot be corruptedbut only annihilated.But annihilation,unlike corruption,is the preservenot of naturalagentsbut of God alone. An obvious responseto thisargumentwould be to complain thatit is question-beggingindeed, thatit is not an argumentat all. Marchia has simplydefinedcorruptionin a way that explicitlydenies its applicability to matter.Likewise,in §4 he had simplydefinedmatterin a way that to corruption: explicidydenies its susceptibility whichis corruptedis corruptedintosome being [whichwas Everything in potency.Thereforeif matteris naturallycorruptible, one previously] can give some being which is in potencytowardsthat matter.I ask whetherthat being is corruptible. Because if it is, then one can give anotherbeingprior[to it], and eitherthiswillgo on ad infinitum [which is impossible],or we can arriveat a firstincorruptible, which I call 'matter'.24 But such a complaintwould be ignorantof the context.Marchia was not beggingthe question,but merelyhelpinghimselfto common definitions 23S §5,11.40-46:"Illudautem corrumpitur simpliciter, quodsicdissolvitur quodalterum nonmanet, tantum manetsubiectum sivemateria in quamfitresolutio, componentium nonautemforma. Et istomodocorruptio annihilationi. sumpta appropinquai Ipsaenim annihilatio estqua ressiccorrumpitur totaliter autem quodnihileiusmanet. Corruptio estqua ressiccorrumpitur sicutmateria, etaliquidnonmanet, quodaliquideiusmanet, videlicet ipsaforma." 24S §4,11.29-33: . . omnequodcorrumpitur inensaliquodinpotentia. corrumpitur naturaliter estcorruptibilis, estdarealiquodensinpotentia ad ipsam, de Ergosi materia quo quaero,si estcorruptibile. Quia si sic,estdarealiquodaliudpriuset itavelibitur in infinitum velestdevenire ad incorruptibile Hoc autemdicoessemateriam." primum.

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of matterand corruptionderivedultimately fromAristotle.Matter,in the Aristoteliantradition,just is the subject that persiststhroughdifferent kindsof change,includingsubstantialchange(generationand corruption).25 In sum, then: Marchia has shown that terrestrial matteris incorruptible by definition, and it is takenforgrantedthatcelestialmatteris incorruptible.So, his second argumentruns, there is no reason to suppose that matterdown here {hie)and matterup there {ibi) are of different natures.This argumentcan only succeed if thereis no alternativeway to distinguishbetweenthe naturesof celestialand of terrestrial matter. 2.3

TheArgument fromMaterialPotentiality (S § 61, M §10)

The thirdargumentis givenin a compressedformin S and a littlemore fullyin M. Prime matteritself that is, matterin the mostproper sense of the term has no actual substantialform,but instead is in potency towardsevery substantialform."Therefore[all] matteris of the same naturein those thingsthat have matter."26 In otherwords,since matter has no essentialnature (except perhaps pure potentiality, which might howeverbe describedas the lack of an essentialnature),the answer to the questionis straightforward and incontrovertible: theresimplycannot be essentiallydifferent of matter.27 types Schneidersays that the argumentfrommaterialpotentiality "pursues an entirelysimilarthought"to the previous one,28but it seems to me that there is an importantdifferencebetween the two. The argument frommaterialincorruptibility leaves open the possibility thatcelestialbodies differfromterrestrial ones in other ways (besides corruptibility) that 25See Owens,TheDoctrine Aristotle's ownconception ofBeing (cit.n. 19above),344-45. ofmatter, which is notourconcern ofmuchdebate. Foran overview, here,is thesubject seeGill,Aristotle's Reconsidered seealsoL.M.de Rijk, 233-37; (cit.n. 19above), Metaphysics Aristotle: Semantics andOntology , vol.2, Leiden2002,384-95. 26M §10,1.63: "Ergomateria esteiusdem inhabentibus rationis materiam." Theother version concludes with"ergoetc."(S §61,1. 467);thisis common forthe prematurely Doctor Succine is itas abrupt andunhelpful as itis here. tus,butrarely 27Schneider, inDieKosmologie as saying (cit.n. 2 above),259,n. 174,quotesMarchia inM VII.5 thatprime matter "hassomeactuality, inasmuch as itisnotinpotency towards natural actualitatis nonestinpotentia ad corruptionem natu{habet corruption" aliquid inquantum ralem hasmoreto itsessential nature thanpurepotentiality. Butifthe *),so thatmatter ofmatter is a conceptual thisis surely itaddsnothing to corruption impossibility, wrong; nature thatitis notinDotencv towards something's beinea roundsauare. 28Schneider, DieKosmologie 304:"Einenganzähnlichen Gedanken ver(cit.n. 2 above), dasArgument". folgt

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in theirrespectivematter.29 But the argumentfrom point to a difference - which is undenimaterialpotentialityis not so lenient:its conclusion able, given an Aristotelianconceptionof matter is that anydistinction in naturebetweencelestialand terrestrial matteris doomed to be a distinctionwithouta difference. 2.4

TheArgument (S §2, M §12) fromCelestialQuantity

The fourthargumentis givenfullyonlyin M, thoughS containsa shorter versionwith similarwording.The general premisson which it relies is thataccidents(inessentialproperties)of the same naturecan only belong to subjects(property-bearers) of the same nature.But quantity,which is an accident,is of the same nature in the heavens and on earth (and, Marchia adds in the fullerversion,in the sea). So the subject of quantityin the heavens must be of the same nature as the subject of quantityon earth. And what is the subject of these quantities?It cannot be natureto terrestrial forms. form,because celestialformsare of a different On the implicitassumptionthat it mustbe eithermatteror form,then, it mustthereforebe matter.30 If the generalpremissworksat all, it mustbe at a veryhigh level of generality.A man and a mineralboth have colour (and can even have exactlythe same colour),but only in a veryfundamentalsense could we conclude fromthisthat men and mineralsare of the same nature.This observationsupportsthe notionthatMarchia's concernis withprimeand not second matter. The othercrucialpremisshere is thatquantitas esteiusdem rationis omnibus in caelo et in terra et in in man.But neitherversionof the arguquantitatibus mentdoes Marchia argue forthis.Moreover,the selfsameassertionundergirdsthreeof his fourargumentsforthe veryexistenceof matterin the heavens(S §§30-32),whereagain it is statedwithoutargument.We might thinkthatat least the existenceof quantityin the heavensis obvious,but

29Onesuchwaymight be thatcelestial bodiesareonlycapableoflocomotion, whereas terrestrial bodiesarealsocapableofaugmentation, andalteration; cf.Aristode, diminution, VIII §4, 1042b5-6. Metaphysics 30Marchia doesnotconsider thepossibility thatthesubject ofquantity be submight stance rather thanmatter or form. Butthispossibility, withhisgeneral together premiss, wouldleadtotheconclusion thatcelestial andterrestrial substances areofthesamenature, which he wouldsurely reject.

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Schneidertells us that Siger of Brabant had maintainedthat "in celestial bodies thereis no quantity."31 I am not sufficiently familiarwithmediaevaldebates on celestialquantityto be sure of this,but it seems to me that Marchia's fourthargument is not strongenough to establishhis conclusion.32 3. Interpreting Marchia'sTheory From the argumentsexaminedabove, we can extracta more preciseversion of the thesisforwhich Marchia is arguing:that celestialand terrestrialmatterare of the same natureinasmuchas theyare equally noble, equally incorruptible, possessedof the same bare {nuda,S) or pure {pura, and M) potentiality, equallyquantified.What I now hope to show is that, in advancingthisthesis,Marchia is not assertingan innovativeand exciting homogeneitybetween the two realms. The reason for this is conin the above summary:celestialand terrestrial tainedembryonically matter share the same bareor purepotentiality, but forMarchia, as we will soon is so emptyas to be of no consequencewithsee, thistypeof potentiality of the firstagent {agensprimům out the intervention ), God. Marchia uses the distinction betweenbare potentiality and natural(naturalis to deal with four based on differences between ) potency objections celestialand terrestrial matter.33 He does not deny that these differences in naturebetween exist,but he does deny thattheypoint to a différence matter.Instead,he says,theypointto a difference celestialand terrestrial in the aptitudes(
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in potencytowardscelestialform,and celestialmatteris not in potency towardselementalform.Thereforeetc.34 Reply.The potencyof matteris of two sorts.One is simplepotency, and essenceof matterwithoutany addiwhichis the bare potentiality tionaldisposition.The otheris naturalpotency,whichincludessome additionalaptitudebesidesthe essenceof matter. Then withregardto the objectionthatmatterof the same natureis of the followedby potencyof the same nature,thisis barepotentiality same nature.And [in thissense]I say thatcelestialmatteris in potency towardselementalform,and elementalmattertowardscelestialform. But thatpotencyor bare potentiality relatesonlyto the firstagent,for God Himselfwouldhave been able in the beginning(just as in factHe is now able) to place celestialmatterunderelementalform,and converselyelementalmatterundercelestialform. But natural whichincludesa dispositionor aptitude,does potency,35 not followimmediately fromthe bare essenceof matter,but onlyvia an additionaldisposition. And therefore such potencyof matterdiffers to the different of according dispositions matter.36

34S §54: "Potentia rationis Ex quo eiusdem materiam eiusdem rationis. consequitur eiusdem rationis suntinpotentia ad formas eiusdem Sed rationis. sequitur quodmateriae materia elementorum nonestinpotentia ad formam caeliad formam caeli,necmateria elementi; ergoetc." 35Thetwosections herearetheonlyonesedited inwhich Marchia bySchneider quoted usestheword'potentialitas' instead of 'potentia' It seemsclear (potentiality) (potency). from hisusagethattheformer covers theoretical whilethelatter covpurely possibilities ersgenuine Schneider's criticus showsthatcertain MSS have indeed, potential; apparatus Ifmyinterpretation instead of'potentialitas'. is correct, thenI think Schneider 'possibilitas' ' is wrong here(1.485)tochoosetheincongruous naturali' B) overpotenjbotentialitate (with tianaturali' (with ACLW).Hencemytranslation. 36S §§64-65: "Dicoquodpotentia materiae estduplex, et haecest quaedamsimplex, nudapotentialitas etessentia materiae sineomnidispositione etaliaestpotensuperaddita, tianaturalis essentiae materiae. Tuncad quaeincludit aliquam aptitudinem superadditam rationem eiusdem rationis eiusdem haecest rationis, quodmateriam consequitur potentia nudapotentialitas eiusdem rationis. Et sic,istomodoloquendo de potentia dico materiae, caeliestin potentia ad formam elementi et materia elementi ad formam quodmateria caeli.Istatamen sivenudapotentialitas solumrespicit potentia agensprimum. Ipseenim a principio, deuspotuisset sicutetiamposset modoponere materiam caelisubforma eleet e contrario materiam elementi subforma caeli.Loquendo autemde potentialimenti, siveaptitudinem, talis [cf.n. 35 above]naturali, tate/potentia dispositionem quaeincludit nonconsequitur nudamessentiam materiae sedmediante immediate, potentia dispositione Et ideohuiuspotentia materiae diversificatur secundum diversitatem superaddita. dispositionum materiae."

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Marchia says nothingfurtherhere about these dispositionsor aptitudes, but thereis a slighthint in an earlierpassage, where he uses the same to argue thatthe existenceof celestialmatterwould not make distinction the heavens corruptible: I replythatit is of twosorts.One Concerningpotencyof contradiction, is bare [potentiality] of matter,by whichmatterof itselfis able to exist underthisor thatformor underthe privationthereof;and thissortis absolute,not comparedor in relationto (inordine ad) thisor thatagent. The othersortis naturalpotencyof contradiction, by whichmatteris in potencytowardsa givenformbecause it has a certaindisposition or inclination towardsthatform.And thissortof potencyof contradiction a naturalagent.37 relatesto (respicit) This tells us that a disposition,aptitudeor inclinationsomehowpredisposes mattertowardscertainforms.But wheredo thesedispositionscome from,and how strongare they?Marchia does not say. Schneidergives only a briefmentionof this omission,and then only His discussionof the argumentof at the veryend of his commentary.38 that it seemed had concluded successful",allow"extraordinarily §§64-65 ing Marchia to assertthe fundamentalhomogeneityof celestialand terrestrialmatterwhilstdenyingthe possibility of "unregulatedand arbitrary transmutation".39 But Marchia's stance is more restrictive than that: all is naturallyimpossible,and can occur celestialterrestrial transmutation The reason forthis,whichwe onlywithGod's supernaturalintervention. now know to involve superadded dispositions,can also be expressedin substances"have matthe intriguing phrase that celestialand terrestrial ter of the same naturedissimilarly":40 37S §44: "De potentia contradictionis dicoquodpotentia contradictionis estduplex: Una nudamateriae de se estpossibilis essesubistaforma vel qua quidemipsamateria subiliaet subprivatione nonin comparatione sivein ordinead eius,et hocabsolute, istudvelilludagens.Aliaautemestpotentia contradictionis naturalis estsic qua materia inpotentia formam velinclinationem ad ipsam. ad talem quodhabetaliquam dispositionem Et talispotentia contradictionis respicit agensnaturale." 38Schneider, DieKosmologie sichallerdings darüber (cit.n. 2 above),312:"erschweigt oder'aptitudines', das unterschiedliche aus,aufwasdie unterschiedlichen Dispositionen 'Haben'derMaterie zurückzuführen ist." 39Schneider, DieKosmologie erscheint außeror(cit.n. 2 above),308-09:"DieseLösung undihre . . . Andererseits istda, wo Prozesse die Materie dendich stattfinden, gelungen daßeineungeregelte undbeliebige Potentialität somodifiziert, Umwandlung ausgeschlossen Wesensbeschaffenheit berührt wäre." ist,ohnedaß diegleichartige 40Schneider DieKosmologie callsthisphrase"hardtounderstand": (cit.n. 2 above),312 zu verstehen"). ("schwer

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Againstthe argumentof the Philosopher,when he says that things whichhave matterof thesame natureare transmutable intoeach other, etc.,41I say. . . thattwo thingscan have matterof the same naturein two ways,thatis, similarly or dissimilarly. To have matterof the same naturesimilarly is to have it in thesame arrangement/manner and (ordo) I And concede that those which have matter of the same equally. things naturein thissense do act when theyare acted upon and are transmutableintoeach other.But thosethingswhichhave matterofthesame naturedissimilarly are not , thatis not in the same arrangement/manner, transmutable intoeach other,nor is it necessarythatone of necessarily themacts on the otherwhenit is acted upon by it. And so it is in the case of the matterof corruptibles and incorruptibles, whichis what is beingasked about here.42 If thisis supposed to be a dramaticrejectionof the Aristotelianposition thatthe sublunarand supralunarrealmsare fundamentally different and have different it calls to mind Austin's remark about physics, J.L. wry the theoryof perceptionas takingplace indirectlyvia sense-data: One mightwellwantto askjust how seriously thisdoctrineis intended, and literallythe philosophers who propoundit mean just how strictly theirwordsto be taken. . . for,strangethoughthe doctrinelooks,we are sometimestold to takeit easy- really,it'sjust whatwe've believed all along. (There's the bit whereyou say it and the bit whereyou take it back.)43 In Marchia's defence,thereis no obvious reason to believe that he did take his theoryto involvea radical break with the Aristoteliantradition. SchneiderhimselfreportsGiles of Rome (d. 1316) as havingargued that if thereis matterin the heavens at all, it mustbe of the same natureas 41Marchia raised thisobjection onAristotle's behalf in§58;cf.OnGeneration andCorruption I §7,324a34f., and§10,328a19-22.Forsomediscussion ofwhatAristotle himself meant, seeC.J.F.Williams, Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione, Oxford 1982,148-49. 42S §69:"AdilludPhilosophi, materiam eiusdem quandodicitquodiliaquaehabent rationis sunttransmutabilia ad invicem etc.Dico. . . quoddupliciter possunt aliquahabere materiam eiusdem veldissimiliter. Haberemateriam eiusdem rationis, quia velsimiliter rationis similiter esthabereipsameodemordine et aequaliter. Et quaeistomodohabent materiam eiusdem rationis concedoquod aguntrepatiendo et suntad invicem transmutabilia. Sed istaquaehabent materiam eiusdem rationis nonsimiliter, seddissimiliter, hocestnoneodemordine, nonoportet ad invicem necquod quodsunttransmutabilia unumeorum ab ipso.Sic autemestinproposito de materia coragitad aliudrepatiendo etincorruptibilium, ruptibilium quarequaeritur." 43J.L.Austin, Sense andSensibilia, Oxford 1962,2.

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terrestrial matter,and as having claimed that only some "more modern teachers"take refugein the compromiseof matterof a different nature.44 If Marchia did make an originalcontribution, then,I thinkit must lie in his attemptto explain the traditionaldistinction betweenthe sublunar and supralunarrealms in the followingway: matterneeds superadded dispositionsof some kind in order to have naturalpotencies,and celesmatterhave superaddeddispositionsof different kinds. tial and terrestrial If I am right,then in order to assess Marchia's contributionwe must naturalis , nuda/ purapoteninvestigatethe lineage of the notionsof potentia in and the ordo which substances tialitas, , aptitudines/ dispositions superadditae have theirmatter. One finalsuggestionconcerningMarchia's theoryof the heavens.Chris Schabel has writtenthat "Schneiderhas shownhow [Marchia] did away withthe notionof the Quintessenceof the supralunaryrealm".45But not once in the textsedited by Schneiderdoes Marchia mentionthe quintessence,the aether,or the fifthelement;moreover,his theorydoes not preclude celestialsubstancesfrombeing made up of the fifthelement. and celestialmatterhave the same bare Marchia takes it that terrestrial but differradicallyin their natural potencies. One consepotentiality, mattercan is that,naturallyspeaking,terrestrial quence of thisdifference and does receiveelementalbut not celestialform,whereascelestialmatform.I hope it is ter can and does receive celestialbut not terrestrial not too far-fetched for me to suggeston Marchia's behalfthat whereas matternaturallycombineswithelementalformto give the four terrestrial terrestrial elements,celestialmattermightnaturallycombine with celescelestialelement.46 tial formto give a fifth, 4. Methodological Consequences ofMarchia'sTheory claims 'the methodI shall call the thirdof Schneider's interpretative and laws all and confirmed observations claim': that discovered ological and applicable to all eventsin the cosmos, are in principletransferable 44DieKosmologie See alson. 46 below. (cit.n. 2 above),159-60. 45C. Schabel, onResistance andInfinite Mass?Francesco OntheThreshold ofInertial d'Appignano suFr.Francesco Internazionale , , in:D. Priori d'Appignano Convegno (ed.),AttidelPrimo Velocity DieKosmologie delTronto2002,176.Cf.Schneider, (cit.n. 2 above),339-40. Appigliano 4bRichard andtheearthhavethe thatthispositionthattheheavens ¡Sorabji suggests - wasactually inthefirst matter Aristotle's elemental sameprime matter butdifferent place. inAntiquity andTheir andMotion: Theories See hisMatter , London1988,15. , Space, Sequel

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so that, as a matterof methodology,we can make well-foundedstatementsabout thingswhich elude our directgrasp.47The aim of this section is to test this claim- firstly in general,by seeing whetherit would hold forany contemporary who accepted Marchia's theory,and secondly forMarchia himself,by examininga passage that seems to confirmthe claim. A 14th-century naturalphilosopherwho accepts Marchia's arguments knowsthat,deep down,thereis somethingin commonbetweenthe heavens and the earth,namely,their(prime)matter.48 But as a naturalphilosohe is in interested how behave pher things naturally,ratherthan in how and he knowsthat theymightbehave under supernaturalintervention;49 celestialand terrestrial substancesdo not behave in the same way simRather,ifhe is to underplybecause theyhave the same (prime)matter.50 stand the behaviourof celestialand terrestrial substances,he must take into account the superadded dispositions,aptitudesor inclinationsthat differentiate the mattersof the two realms. For instance,he must take into account the factthat celestialsubstances,unliketerrestrial ones, are and of or naturallyincorruptible naturallyincapable qualitative quantitativechange.51But thisputs him in the same position,methodologically naturalphilosopher. speaking,as any other 14th-century As for Marchia himself,one aspect of his cosmologythat mightinitiallyappear to supportthe methodologicalclaim is his theoryof celestiallocomotion,in whichhe applies to the heavenshis terrestrially-derived But a theoryof the virtusderelicta (roughly,a self-expending impetus).52 47Schneider, DieKosmologie sichaus (cit.n. 2 above),327:"3. Methodologisch ergibt deruniversalen dieprinzipielle undAnwendbarkeit allergefunKonzeption Übertragbarkeit denenundbestätigten undGesetze aufjedesEreignis imKosmos, so daß Beobachtungen auchübersolches werden das sichdemdirekten können, begründete Aussagen gemacht entzieht." Zugriff 48S §62. 49"Physics in theMiddleAgesconcerned thenormal courseofnature and notthe or whatGod might do miraculously." ThusE.D. Sylla,Physics supernatural , in: F.A.C. Mantello & A.G.Rigg(eds), Medieval Latin: AnIntroduction andBibliographical Guide , Washington DC 1996,359. 50S 8664-69. 51Marchia allowsin S §31thatcelestial substances haveactiveandpassive as qualities wellas quantity, buthe deniesin §59 thattheyarein potency towards activeandpassivequalities. The upshot musttherefore be that(again,naturally speaking) theycannot - or,presumably, in quality in quantity. change 52In thisconnection, FabioZaninwrites ofMarchia's ofunifying celestial and project terrestrial andkinematics. See §2.1.1ofhispaperLa Rielaborazione delConcetto di dynamics

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closer look at the details of this application shows that,if anything,it disconfirms the methodologicalclaim. Marchia argues in S 11.30 that celestialbodies are moved not by an internalprinciple,such as theirform,but by an externalmover,such as an intelligence,53 and thatthisexternalimpositionof motionon the heavens is contingent.54 His argumentsreston commonlyaccepted premisses, such as thatnaturalmotionhas a restfulterminus ad quern and thatnature does nothingin vain, and not on his theoryof the virtus derelicta. For his of this to the we must look to a different conheavens, theory application text:the questionof whetherthereis any supernatural in the sacrapower ments.55 As part of his discussionof thisquestion,Marchia concludesthat "the or form heavens,moved by an angel, receive fromit some force{virtus) whichis neutral,"i.e. producesneithernaturalnor violentmotion,"acciin the heavfromlocomotion,and whichinheresformally dental,different ens."56This forceis his virtus derelicta : If the intelligence stoppedmovingthe heavens,theywould stillkeep or fora timevia thisforce'sfollowing and continuing moving revolving of theircircularmotion,as is clear froma potter'swheel,whichkeeps revolvingfora timeafterits primemoverhas stoppedmovingit. For thereseemsto be the same ratiohere as thereis thereand vice versa, namely,a forceleftbehind{virtus derelicta) by the primemoverin the mobileboth here and there.57

inNicole in: Priori(ed.),AttidelPrimo Vis Derelicta Oresme, (cit.n. 45 above), Convegno ForMarchia's ofthevirtus derelicta 119-20. , seethearticles theory bySchabelandZanin in thepresent volume. 535 11.30§§15-18. 54S 11.30§§8-12. M lhe context Schneider a clearexplanation in Die mayseemunconnected; provides inAccessus adLombardům: TheSecular 226,as doesSteven Kosmologie (cit.n. 2 above), Livesey andtheSacred inMedieval Commentaries ontheSentences de Théologie et , in: Recherches Médiévales 72.1(2005),165-67. Philosophie 56S IV.1.2§1,11.4-6.The section in Schneider, andlinenumbers refer totheextract DieKosmologie newedition ofS IV.1 (cit.n. 2 above),50-52,butseealsoChrisSchabel's in thepresent volume (thesourceofthetextin n. 57 below). 57S IV.1.2 §3, 11.20-25:"intelligentia cessante movere caelum, quodadhuccaelum moveretur ad tempus siverevolveretur huiusmodi circularem virtutem, perhuiusmodi sicutpatetde rotafiguli ad tempus, motum etcontinuantem, exequentem quaerevolvitur movere. Eademenimratiovide cessante movente turessehiequaeestibiete conprimo in mobili videlicet virtus derelicta a primo motore hicetibi." verso,

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In thispassage, the virtus elida is said to be the ratio der , so that the sense of 'ratio' here must be that of a reason for or cause of something namely,the continuationof the mobile's motion afterthe mover has stopped. Now, in order for this admittedlysuggestivepassage to supportthe methodologicalclaim, Marchia's celestial application of his terrestrial derelicta mustbe somehowlicensedby the universality theoryof the virtus of the physicsof motion. But in practice he licensesthe applicationby between the sublunarand tryingto show that the standarddistinctions realms do not a for supralunar present problem thisapplication.To paraa little,his argumentsare: phrase the DoctorSuccinctus (1) The motiveforceof an angelicmoveris more noble and perfect than thatof any inferior moversmanage to mover,and yet inferior in their mobiles a force which continues the motion.Therefore impress all the more does an angelicmovermanage to do this.58 (2) There is no obviousreasonwhythe heavensshouldnot be receptiveof a virtus derelicta derelicta has no contrary. For , because the virtus a virtus or form(such as light)whichhas no contraryis neutral,and therefore would not introduceinto the heavensany alteration.59 derelicta because the lat(3) The heavensmustbe receptiveof a virtus ter,being a principleof locomotion,is no less perfectthan locomotionitself(ofwhichtheheavensare obviouslyreceptive), and so cannot be dismissed fromtheheavensunlessanyotherreasonis given,besides forits beingrepugnantto the heavens.60 imperfection, to and moreproportionate to their (4) The heavensare less resistant moverthanany inferior mobileis to its mover;so theyare moreapt to receivetheirmover'sinfluence.61 These argumentsare specificto the heavens and to theirangelic movers, and make no appeal to a generalclaim about the universalapplicability of physicallaws as revealedby the fundamentalhomogeneityof celestial and terrestrial matter.Marchia clearlyagreeswithhis contemporaries that the heavens cannot naturallyadmit of imperfections or of qualitiesthat 586*IV.1.2§2,11.9-13. 59S IV.1.2§2,11.14-18.Presumably thisis becausedarkness is justtheprivation of light. 60S IV.1.2§4,11.28-32.NotethatSchabelhas'nisidetur'whereSchneider hadthe lessmodest 'nequedatur'. 61S IV.1.2§5,11.34-36.

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have contraries.His strategy is not to appeal to the methodologicalclaim, but instead to argue that celestialbodies can be held to accept a virtus derelicta withoutdoingviolenceto the usual special physicsof the heavens. 5. Conclusion For Francis of Marchia, the heavens and the earth are similaronly in an attenuatedsense: theyhave the same primematterand thusthe same bare potentiality, but theirnaturalpotencies(and presumablytheirsecond matter)are very different. Accordingly,while his cosmologyallows thatphysicalprinciplesmay apply to both the heavens and the earth,it does not guaranteethat theywill. The peculiar dispositionssuperadded to celestial mattermean that Marchia still needs Aristoteliancelestial physicsto determinewhat is naturallypossible in the supralunarrealm, thatis, how the heavens behave withoutdivineintervention. To be sure, he is preparedto apply terrestrial principlesto the heavens,providedthat Aristoteliancelestial physics presents no barrier. But once this vital qualificationis made explicit,Marchia's cosmologyno longer seems to be the radical break with traditionthat we have been led to believe.62 Oxford,England Balliol College(University of Oxford)

62I amverygrateful toRichard ChrisSchabel, CeciliaTrifogli, Cross,RussFriedman, andRachelFarliefortheir comments on earlier ofthisarticle. drafts helpful

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FrancisofMarchiai Virtus derelicta and theContext of Its Development* CHRIS SCHABEL

Abstract This articleoffersthe firstcriticaleditionof the mostimportant versionof Francisof Marchia'sfamousquestion1 of his commentary on Book IV of the Sentences derelicta , in whichthe Franciscantheologianputs forthhis virtus to Marchia's theoryof projectilemotion.The introduction attempts place in itspropercontext.The theorymightseemto us an obviousimprovetheory menton Aristotle, but ratherthan an immediateand completebreakwith tradition thatall scholastics derelicta was more quicklyadopted,Marchia'svirtus a stagein a gradualprocessthathad begun manydecades beforeand did not finduniversalacceptanceamonghis firstsuccessors.Moreover,Marchia himselfdid not take the theoryto what mightseem the obviousconclusion thatJean Buridanwould draw,because Marchia employedthe virtus derelicta to explainmorephenomenathanjust projectilemotion. said thatthroughday and nighttheEarthrotatesaroundthe Pythagoras of the circleof the equator. . . Others,refuting thisopinion,say poles thatif the Earthrotated,the thingsin the air and the birdsand clouds wouldbe leftbehindbythemotionoftheEarth.ButPythagoras maintains that not only does the Earth rotate,but so do the air and whatever or thatof thingsare in it. So, whetherthePythagoreans' opinionis truer, theotherswho positthattheEarthis immobile,no argument can detect. Nicole Oresme, perhaps the most famous scientistof the Middle Ages, expressedthese sentimentsin the mid-14th century,in part based on argumentsbuildingon those of Francis of Marchia.1 Today any child * I wouldliketothank William William O. Duba,Stephen D. Dumont, J. Courtenay, Russell L. Friedman, andMarkThakkar fortheir comments andassistance. 1 Fora passageusing closeto Marchia's, see NicoleOresme, Le Livre du terminology cieletdumonde III, c. 7, eds.A.D. MenutandA.J.Denomy, Madison, Wisconsin, 1968, 612.82-4: "Maisde quelcunque telmouvement ce qui le faitestunequalitéou violent, vertu motive ou corpsainsimeuparle premier motif." See also qui estcauseeet imprimee F. Zanin,La rielaborazione delconcetto divisderelicta inNicole Oresme , in:D. Priori (ed.),Atti delI Convegno suFrancesco Internazionale delTronto2002,117-59. d'Appignano, Appignano © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden, 2006 Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl/viv

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would probablysay that Pythagoraswas "obviously"correct,yet it took almosttwo centuriesbeforeCopernicuspublisheda defenseof the Earth's rotationin his De revolutionibus , and anothercenturybeforethe idea gained wide acceptance among naturalphilosophers.Part of the reason forthe was hesitantand thought "delay,"as we mightcall it,is thatOresmehimself thattherewas no way to decide the questionof the Earth'sdiurnalmotion. In thispaper I would like to returnto Francisof Marchia's notionof virtus dere lieta.Two of the threeissues I wish to discussparallel the delay withthe acceptanceof Oresme'sidea and his own hesitation: first, although did and Oresme Buridan and develop Marchia's adopt eventually John insight,Marchia's immediatesuccessorswho dealt withhis opinionwere not overlysupportive.Second, Marchia has been criticizedfornot taking derelicta to its "obvious" conclusion,makingit a his theoryof the virtus The thirdissue has to do with origias did Buridan. permanentforce, I nality:the words quoted to begin this paper were in fact notthose of Nicole Oresme; David of Dinant penned themover a centuryand a half beforeOresme wrote,as Elena Casadei has discovered.2Likewise,it has recentlybeen claimed that Marchia did not inventthe basic idea of virtusderelicta , but variousauthorshad supportedthe notionformanydecades before Marchia gave his principiailecture on the fourthbook of the Sentences around the beginningof 1320. In short,the virtusderelicta , as "obvious" a theoryas it mightseem todayto a teenager,was not obvious. Originality Let me again quote at some lengthfroma medievaltext,thisone pitting derelicta the virtus theoryagainstthe Aristoteliantradition: I positthreeconclusions.First, thata proEighth,withoutarguments, medium. is notmovedbythecontaining jectileseparatedfromthethrower 2 E. Casadei,Lafilosofia dei edanalisi dottrinale crìtica diDaviddiDinant: dellanatura edizione from testi Oxford, , Università quoting deglistudidi Roma"La Sapienza"1998,65.15-23, circumferri terram "Dicitenim Bodleian per Library, Digby67,ff.96v-97r: circa circapoloscircuii diemetnoctem diei,solemverocircumferri perannum aequatoris et circaaliospolos.Quorum opinionem peralia tempora poloszodiaci,et alia similiter ea quaesuntinaereetavesetnubes si terra sicinquiunt: circumfertur, quidamrefellentes nonsolumterram DicitautemPythagoras a motuterrae. accidit circumferri, praeteriri sitPythagoreorum verior ineo.Utrum sunt etquaecumque immo edametaerem opinio igitur ratio." nullapotest terram esseimmobilem, an aliorum, deprehendere quiponunt

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Second, thatit is not movedby a virtus impressa impressedon the conderelicta leftin it by tainingmedium.Third, thatit is movedby a virtus the thrower. I provethe first conclusion thus:if the projectilewere moved by the partsof the containingmedium,it would eitherbe moved by the partsthatare in frontof the projectile,or thosebehind,or thoseon the sides.Not by thosein front,because no mobileis movedby someit; but the part of the mediumthatis in frontresistsit, thingresisting as appears to our senses. . .; therefore the projectileis not moved by thepartin frontof it. Again,no mobileis movedby something moved in but the front of the is moved part projectile againstit, as againstit; an with arrow shot the etc. wind; therefore, appears against Nor is it movedby the partsbehindthe projectile,because it is not movedby themexceptby a push;but thisis impossible, as I showthus: . . . assumingthatthereis a verylightclothbehinda stone,such that thestonecannotbe movedby theair [behind]unlesstheclothis pushed, throughan impulsionthe yieldingof the cloth [to the air] will be easier than the motionof the stone;yet thereis no yieldingthere,but ratherthe clothcontinually fromthe stoneand fallstoward getsfarther thepartsof the air behindit; therefore it has been shownthatit is not propelledby thoseparts.This is also clear withan arrowwhosefeathers bend towardthe back of the arrowas if pushedby the air thatis at restor movingagainstthe arrow.For theydo not lean towardthe if the arrowwere frontof the arrow,whichwould happen necessarily the of the air that are toward the back of the arrow. propelledby parts Nor is it moved by the partsto the sides,because no principleof movingactivelyor passivelycan be assignedto them,just as it cannot be assignedto the partsof waterarounda ship or carryinga fish.So it has been proventhata projectileis not moved by the partsof the containingmedium. The second conclusion is thatit is not movedby any virtus impressa on themedium,becauseit seemsveryfantasticum forthestring impressed of a bow to impressa virtus on the upper partsof the air. This does not happenin any way,unlessone saysthatthe arrowitselfcarriesthe virtus fromthe stringto the upperpartsof the air, and thatwhenit is in thesepartsit appliesto themthe virtus throughwhichtheymove the thevirtus receivedfromthearrow.But thisseems arrow,[thatis] through absurd. Thereforethe third conclusion is left,namelythat the thrower , throughwhichit is movedcontinuously, impartsto the subjectits virtus while that virtus were inseparablefromthe lasts,because if that virtus the would move ifit foundan infinite forever, projectile, projectile space

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CHRISSCHABEL receives And so in thiswaya projectile and resistance. without repugnance whilethe fromthe throwera virtus, throughwhichit movescontinually is separatedfromthe thrower, whenthe virtus virtus lasts.And therefore, ... the projectileis stillsaid to be movedby the thrower

dereThis is a nice explanationfor and proof of the need for the virtus litta.Yet theseare not Marchia's words,but thoseof his fellowFranciscan Gerard Odonis. The problem is that we do not know who wrote first, Odonis or Marchia. The quotationabove comes frombook II, distinction 3 14, question 8 of Odonis' Parisian Sentences commentaryfrom 1327-28, date fromaround whilethevariousextantversionsof Marchia's treatment the beginningof 1320 to about 1323. But it turnsout that Odonis had at Toulouse in the late 1310s, and althoughthe reportatio read the Sentences that once circulatedfromthose lecturesdoes not survive,many philosophical questionsfromthe years between his two series of theological lecturesare extant in a Madrid manuscript,Biblioteca nacional 4229, includinga questionDe motuthat Paul Bakkerhas published,which contains a versionof the passage just quoted. Althoughthe firstversionof De motuprobablydates fromthe early 1320s, afterMarchia's lectures,it could be based on Odonis' earlierToulouse lectures.4As in the case of David of Dinant's opinion of the problem of the Earth's rotation,there is no argumentthancan determinewhetherMarchia expandedon Odonis, or Odonis summarizedMarchia. We do not even know what Anneliese Maier would have thought,because she did not have access to any pertinentmanuscriptof Odonis' works,which explains her silence on the matter.I do not want to take away fromMarchia his mostfamousidea, however,so it should be stressedthat his treatmentis much longerand twelvein comparison survivesin threetimesas manymanuscript witnesses, 3 FortheLatintext, in ofthisintroduction to an Italianabbreviation seean appendix del su Francesco D. Priori(ed.),AttidelIII Convegno Internazionale , Appignano d'Appignano Tronto2006,forthcoming. 4 ForDe motu De motu Autour dela question Otetlemouvement. Guiral Bakker, , seeP.J.J.M. 4299, in: EarlyScienceandMedicine, Madrid dansle manuscrit conservée nacional, , Biblioteca texton 316-17.FortheToulouseand 8.4 (2003),298-319, esp.307-8andtheparallel Odonis TheSentences andMadrid Parislectures , 4229,seeC. Schabel, ofGerardus Commentary Without the 46 (2004),115-61, de philosophie médiévale, OFM,in:Bulletin esp.119-24. to his ofthearticle ofthefinalversion benefit justcited,in L.M. de Rijk'sintroduction vol.II: De intentionibus OdonisO.F.M.,Opera edition ofGiraldus , Leiden-Boston Philosophica, section ofOdonis'Sentences dateforanother fora 1316-22 2005,8-10,theeditor argues textin Madrid forthecorresponding commentary (partofbookI) andposits1328-34 PeterAuriol's toOdonis'ignoring 4229.FortheSentences date,de Rijkpoints commentary

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to Odonis' four. Moreover, as we shall see, althoughJohn the Canon attributedthe theoryto Gerard Odonis,John himselfremarkedthat the argumentswere notOdonis' own, perhaps a referenceto his debt to Marchia. Regardlessof the answer to the question of the relationshipbetween Marchia and Odonis, however,thereis littledoubt thatMarchia was not the inventorof the basic virtus derelicta theory.While Maier did not find any Christianprecursorwho clearlysupportedMarchia's view, she did point to passages in Bonaventure,Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, and extensive treatment offirst andsecond available also intentions, by1317,andsinceAuriol 1316-19 forOdonis'swork.Against the Odonis,de Rijkprefers ignores this,however, threemssofbookI thatdatethecommentary an explicitly assignit to 1326(probably error for1327)or 1327,andin other contexts OdonisdoesdealwithAuriol him (citing 6 times inbookI). De Rijkalsopoints toa passageinboththeSentences and commentary De intentionibus toPopeJohn, andLegateRobert, with Peter, referring KingPhilip, Bishop ' Count theSentences CountGastonagainst De intentionibus commentary Louis,and having withthree Sentences mssmentioning Proctor Arnald andPrefect butDe intentionibus Gerard, andoneSentences ms(Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional65,whichde Rijk,p. 3, erroneously to theBiblioteca de la Universidad on thebasisofa 19th-century critassigns catalogue, n. 11, myprevious andcorrect statement thatitis nowintheBiblioteca icizing, Nacional) instead Proctor GeraldandPrefect Arnald. FortheSentences de Rijk having commentary, claims that andPhilip V (1316-3 andperJohnXXII (1316-34) January 1322)aremeant, or hissuccessor PeterAuriol(1321-22), hapsBishopPeterofAix-en-Provence (1318-21) whereas heposits thatDe intentionibus is a laterrevision nowreferring to PhilipVI (1328he doesnotputforth a newcandidate forBishopPeter. 50),although this,since Against theextant msscontain Gerard's Parisian lectures of 1327/8, to Philip theywouldrefer VI. Moreover, Aix-en-Provence wasactually an archbishopric, whilePierre (Peter) Roger - wasbishopofArrasand whomGerardwouldcertainly haveknown in Paris residing from late1328tolate1329.Yetitis notcertain thateveryone in thispassageis Odonis' anddocuments oftheUniversity of contemporary: looking JohnXXII'sletters through I havenotbeenabletoidentify theprefect ortheproctor, butRobert couldsimply Paris, be thefamous ofCourçon whowasresponsible forthenotorious LegateRobert University statutes of 1215.Interestingly, thecountsof Foixfrom1301-91 werenamed however, Gaston onecouldguessthattheoriginal (I-III),andsinceFoixis nearToulouse, passage wasin thelostToulouse andsimply On the reportatio copiedintothelaterParisversion. other hasCountLouis,whocouldbe LouisI ofFlanders andNevers hand,De intentionibus moreimportant intheParisregion; thiswouldpointtoa dateafter (1322-46), 1328,given thereference toKingPhilip intheextant I Sentences Odoniscitesother (i.e.VI). However, works in Madrid4229,so de Rijk,pp. 9-10,maintains contained thatthesewereearlier versions ofthetexts andthattheversion ofDe intentionibus andtheseother tracts inMadrid 4229wererevised after 1328.In sum,ifwemust takemostofthenamesas contemporaries, thatFranciscans werenotsupposed toteachartsuntil after their noting studies, theological wecouldclaimthefollowing Sentences inthelate1310s, lectures now sequence: (1)Toulouse ofthephilosophical works contained inMadrid intheearly lost;(2)versions 4229,written is nowlost;(3) ParisSentences in 1327/8, lectures 1320s,ofwhichat leastDe intentionibus theextant written version from1328/9citing theseversions andincorporating material from theToulouse inMadrid4229revised in 1328-34. lectures; (4)at leastDe intentionibus

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especiallyPeterJohn Olivi that revealed theirawarenessof the theory, and Aquinas' own opinion appears to have waveredbetweenrejectingit and consideringit a possibility.5 In 2004 Rega Wood publishedan edition of what she claims is Richard Rufus of Cornwall's Physicscommentary, which she dates to Paris before 1238. If she is correct,it would perhaps make it the firstWesternPhysics commentaryand would change our view of the earlyreceptionof Aristotelian sciencein the West. In the sole manuscript,in Erfurt,the textis anonymous,and one of Wood's main argumentsforattributing the commentary to RichardRufusconcernsMarchia. on book of the , Wood's authordeals withproCommenting eight Physics jectile motion.Rejectingthe mediumas the mover,he concludes:"Then it is necessaryfor somethingto be impressedin the projectileby the thrower.And it seems to me thatthisis true:thatsome qualityand form or something is impressedby the thrower. . ."6 Since in Marchia'squestion on the virtus derelicta there is a marginalreferenceto "Richard," Wood argues that Marchia is citingRichard Rufus of Cornwalland is building on the verypassage just quoted, which would also entailthat the Erfurt commentaryis by Richard Rufus.7 Edith Sylla and Silvia Donati have rightlyrejectedthisconnectionand questionedthe attributionof the text to Richard Rufus,which must be strongerif we are to rewritethe historyof the receptionof Aristotle's in the West.8Moreover,thereis not much more to the exposition Physics of the theorythan the line I quoted above, and the authoreven retains 5 A. Maier, DieImpetustheorie inead.%wei , Vienna-Leipzig 1940,revised reprint Grundprobleme derscholastischen , 3rded.,Rome1968,134-53. Naturphilosophie 6 Richard Rufus ofCornwall, InPhysicam Aristotelis VIII.3.1,ed.R. Wood,Oxford 2004, 240.610-14: "Et si itaest,tuncin ipsoproiecto a proiciente. Et oportet aliquidimprimi mihiquodhocestverum, videtur etforma sivealiquidei imprimatur quodaliquaqualitas a proiciente ..." 7 R. Wood,Introduction to Richard In Physicam Rufus, (cit.n. 6 above),11-12. 8 See E. Sylla'sreview in:NotreDamePhilosophical Reviews 2004.08.09 and (on-line), S. Donati's review TheAnonymous onthePhysics inErfurt, Cod.Amplon. article, Commentary Q. 312 andRichard de Théologie et Philosophie , in:Recherches Rufus ofCornwall médiévales, 72.2(2005),232-362, Donatipoints outthat,although there esp.269-83.In particular, aretwelve a version ofMarchia's text,onlyone(C) hasa marmanuscripts containing toRichard, anditprobably wasnotwritten himself. Moreover, ginalreference byMarchia thereference is to "Bonaventura, Rie',"andit appearsat theveryendofa. 2, where whoever wrotethereference wasprobably notthinking ofthevirtus derelicta in projectile motion at all,butrather celestial I believe(andDonatinowagrees) motion. thescribe wasreferring to a. 3, on thesacraments sincethereis a largenotein the themselves, lower inC, f.177vb, ofthesamecolumn atlength from Thomas margin quoting Aquinas' Summa withthe III, q. 62,a. 4, resp.andad 1 and4, anda. 3, ad 1, dealing theobgiae

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in the medium,too.9Nevertheless, some impressio leavingaside the question of authorship,everyoneagrees thatthe authorof the Erfurtcommentary rejectsthe Aristotelianaccount and holds some kernelof Marchia's virtus and that the textdates fromthe 13thcentury,although derelicta theory,10 not as early as the 1230s. perhaps fora couple ofyears,sparked Wood's claim,whichhad been circulating further. Donati to investigate Althoughpreviousscholars,such as Duhem, Michalski,Maier, and Clagett,had foundsome antecedentsin late-antique and Arab thinkers, John Philoponosand Avicenna,forexample,11among Christiansno trueprecursorto Marchia had been found.Based on mid13th centuryOxford writings,which Donati and Cecilia Trifoglihave Donati Donati discoveredseveralprecursors.13 studiedratherexhaustively,12 found that a commentaryin a Paris manuscript(BnF lat. 16149), an anonymoustextprobablystemmingfroma revisionof Adam of Bocfeld's mid-13th centurycommentaryon the Physics , containsalmost the same from theresponinthesacraments; onf.175ra, thescribe hadquoted virtus earlier, spiritualis ofMiddleton in Summa Richard siones III, q. 60,aa. 1-3and6. Mostprobably theologiae and Maierunderstood, DieImpetustheorie is meant, as Anneliese (cit.n. 5 above),189-91, derelicta. Thusthereis almost wasnotan advocate ofvirtus Richard ofMiddleton surely andMarchia reference andRichard Rufus ofCornwall, noconnection between themarginal theErfurt to Richard Rufus. cannot be usedto attribute commentary 9 Richard "Debemus InPhysicam 240.628-33: VIII.3.1,ed.Wood(cit.n.6 above), Rufus, cumfortis inmedio et in proiecto, utmihividetur, est, quodhaecimpressio ergodicere, etconseenimnaturalem motum etdatei motum duofacit: proiecti oppositum, Impedit facere tantum unumistorum, ettuncsi fuerit debilitatur continue utpossit grave quenter in fineautemdebilitatur et tantum utneutrum facere, sursum, possit quiescit; proiectum sicmotus oppositus." 10Although notto thedegreethatWooddoesin herIntroduction (cit.n. 6 perhaps above),6-12. 11See various surLéonard de Vinci II, Paris1909,andIII, placesin P. Duhem,Etudes in K. Michalski, La philosophie au XIVesiècle. Paris1913,andtheearlier studies reprinted inM. Clagett, aresummarized SixEtudes 1969.Theirthoughts , K. Flasch(ed.),Frankfurt inthe Middle in:Isis,39.1/2(1948),29-44,at 40-42;id., Some General ofPhysics Ages, Aspects Wisconsin TheScience intheMiddle 1959,508-15;andMaier, Madison, Ages, ofMechanics A.B.Franco, DieImpetustheorie (cit.n. 5 above),esp. 119-33.See alsorecendy Avempace, oftheHistory ofIdeas,64.4(2003),521-46, andImpetus in:Journal Motion, Projectile Theory, Whilethedirect ofmostlate-antique andArabfigures andtheliterature citedthere. impact inthisparticular on 14th-century Christians is unlikely FabioZanin,inhispaper context, in the whowasquitewellknown below(pp.87-91),alsodiscusses theroleofAverroes, Marchiaciteshimoften, Averroes doesnot Westbythelater13thcentury. although ofvirtus derelicta. defend thetheory 12See forexample C. Trifogli, in theThirteenth (ca.1250-1270). Oxford Physics Century studies PlaceandTime, Leiden-Boston-Köln Motion, 2000,andthepre-2000 byeadem Infinity, andDonaticitedin thebibliography there. 13See Donati,TheAnonymous (cit.n. 8 above),278-81and360-62. Commentary

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passage verbatimas in the Erfurtcommentary.Wood and Donati point to anothertext,an anonymousDe animacommentaryfromperhaps the moventis that is in late 1240s, which also makes briefmentionof a virtus the moved projectileafterthe throweris no longer in contact.Donati et corruptione also indicatesa commentaryon De generatone , probablyby William of Cliffordand datingto the 1250s, in which the thrower'svirtuscontinuesto be withthe projectileeven afterthe moveris not touchlasts, ing it, and "the motion of the projectilelasts as long as this virtus and no longer." Donati sees yet anotherparallel in Geoffreyof Aspall's commentaryon De cáeloet mundofromthe 1250s. This author speaks of an impressionof a virtusmotivain the projectile,althoughalso in the and with a great impetus medium: "If I stood behind you and forcefully with senses the violence in your would your perceive pushed you, you in be some derelicta and that there would passio you, so you would body the virtus not be able to hold yourselfback," until graduallydiminished. These theoriesare quite undeveloped,nowherenear as sophisticated as Marchia's presentation.But we must rememberthat they date over and much research halfa centurybeforeMarchia's Sentences commentary, remainsto be done on the physicsof the intervening years.We may yet findthat Francis of Marchia and Gerard Odonis were heirs to a more advanced traditionthan we think. Reception makes another At firstsightthisslightreductionin Marchia's originality issue even more puzzling: why didn't everyoneadopt the "obviously" were superiortheory?In the 1320s and early 1330s severalmajor thinkers aware of the virtusderelecta theory,which is understandablegiven that Marchia had held the Franciscanchair of theologyat Paris, at thattime arguablythe top positionin theologyin theworld.A couple of his chronological successorswere perhapslukewarmsupporters;Maier mentionsthe FranciscanNicholas Bonet and John the Canon. In his commentaryon the Physics ,Johnthe Canon presentsAristotle's rejectionof motion,includin a vacuum, concluding that "Gerard Odonis ing projectilemotion, A little to these later,Johnremarks,"To the aforearguments."14 responds 14JohntheCanon,In Physicam IV, q. 4, ed. Venice1520,f.43ra:"Adistasrationes between Gerardus Odonis."The connection Johnand Odoniswasnotedby respondei intheMiddle General Some (cit.n. 11 above),41,andMaier, ofPhysics Ages Aspects Clagett,

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said doctor[GerardOdonis] responds,although ofAristotle said arguments the argumentsnow adduced are not his." To Aristode'sclaim that"somethingthrownin a vacuum would not have the means of being moved that it has in a plenum,"via Odonis- and perhaps Marchia, since the argumentsare not Odonis' John respondsas follows: of thethrower I say thata thingthrownis movedmaterially by thevirtus it is carried.This which the medium the of and not by through parts Whence one cannot the air. an arrow shot with is apparent through understandor claim thatit is moved because of the push of partsof the air. For it is apparentto our sensesthatthe air does not produce thatmotion,but ratherit presentsan impediment.15 in theelectronic theCanon In hisentry DieImpetustheorie John (cit.n. 5 above),199-200. theconF. Brown , NewYork2004,Stephen surveys ofNational Biography Oxford Dictionary andidentity ofJohntheCanon:someput evidence forthecontroversial dating tradictory in various somelabelled others himin theearly14thcentury, partsofthe15thcentury; forexample, callshim tothe1520edition, Franciscan himan English Oxford (theexplicit references and himotherwise. Brown viainternal a Minorite), others explains describing coma Florence oftheeditio thecolophon ms)ofhisPhysics (Padua1475,from princeps masthat hisonlysurviving work, JuanMarbes, JohnwasinfacttheCatalonian mentary, so he oneearlymshasBarcelona), canonofTortosa(actually, terofartsat Toulouse, that(1) hismss himto the15thcentury Brown alsoassigns wasnotFranciscan. claiming in on theEucharist" condemned toWyclif's areall 15thcentury, (2) "herefers teaching scotistica' and suchas 'conclusio 1413,and (3) "he employs 15th-century expressions, however. Allofthesearguments canbe countered, famosa apudscotizantes'." 'propositio Commentaries Latin Aristotle 26 (1970),183-4,which , in: Traditio, (1) C.H. Lohr,Medieval B. Capitolare Brown listsMadridBN 2014,Vat.lat.3013,Viterbo 26,Washington cites, Florence while BNCConv.Soppr. C.8.722as 14thcentury; CUALibrary 169,andFlorence CUA 169is dated1394;Maier,%wei C.8.722is actually 15thcentury, (cit. Grundprobleme 14thcentury; Viterbo thatVat.lat.3013is early 26 hasa noteof n. 5 above), 69,claims thatdate;andMadrid2014,whiledatedtheimpossible salefrom1373,so it preexists sinceit is nextto a 14th-century i.e. 1303,is probably Mllo.ccc°.3°, early14thcentury weshould read inMadrid2015,so perhaps commentary Wylton's Physics copyofThomas andthoughts onViterbo forinformation S.D. Dumont 30 rather than3°,for1330(I thank in bookI, q. 4, andno comreference to Wyclif andMadrid). (2) Thereis no explicit ofthemss wewouldnotexpect reference (which anyway giventhedating pelling implicit in the active are authors as Terms such scotizantes by (3) already employed justgiven). intheintroduction tothisvolume 1310sand1320s.Asdiscussed Johnthe (pp.8-9),what 1329butprobably before toa datesoonafter Canoncitesanddoesnotcitepoints Buridan, OdoniswhenthelaterPhysics ofprojectile motion sincein thecontext JohncitesGerard - survives - muchmorefamous inabout30 manuscripts and ofJohnBuridan commentary in a more on at much expected place. goes greater length 15JohntheCanon,InPhysicam rationes IV,q. 4, ed.Venice1520,f.43ra:"Adpredictas nonsintsue... Etquando licetrationes nuncadducte Aristotelis dictus doctor, respondet invacuononhaberet a quomoveretur sicutinpieno,dicoquod dicitur quodresproiecta medii virtute etnona partibus movetur resproiecta [naturaliter] proiicientis de sagitta intelligi Quodapparet proiecta peraerem.Undenonpotest perquodfertur.

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It is not absolutelyclear thatJohn agrees withOdonis and Marchia, but derelicta is not used. it seems so, althoughthe termvirtus natuNicholas Bonet also bringsup the new theoryin his Philosophia ralis, again in the contextof motionin a vacuum. Much of the general discussionseems to reflectMarchia's influence,althoughhis overallconclusion is not as specificas we would like: Some people assertthattherecan be violentmotionin a vacuumwithout the movingprincipleor throwerbeingin contactwiththe mobile And thereasonforthisstatement is this:because eitherreallyor virtually. but quasi tranin violentmotiona certain formanotlastingpermanently sientis impressedon the mobile,and as long as thatformalaststhere can be motionin the vacuum,but whenit fails,the motionceases.16 It appears fromthis statementthat Bonet is less sure about projectile motionin the void than about the impressedformain projectilemotion, whichis again the varietythatlasts onlyfora time.In a second passage he statesas much: Concerningviolentmotion[in thevacuum]as wellone mustalwayssay - but I underthatit wouldbe weakerat the end thanat thebeginning if it is possible.And the reason standthisforthe motionof projectiles, orformaimpressa on the mobile is this:sincethatvirtus forthisstatement moves failsand weakens,and consequently by the movercontinually [them]moreslowly,so violentmotionproducedin a vacuumhas to be slowerin the end thanin the beginning, just as in a plenum.Yet vioin a vacuum at the beginningand middle would be faster lentmotion than in a plenum,because a mobile [in a plenum]has to dividethe partsof the air thatresisteach other. . .17

enimapparet aeris.Sensibiliter veldiciquodmoveatur quod propter impulsum partium DieImpetustheorie sedmagis aernonfacit ilium Maier, motum, presentat ipseimpedimentum"; on thebasisofmsBAV,Vat.lat. to "materialiter" (cit.n. 5 above),200,n. 58,corrects 3013. 16Nicholas autem naturalis V, c. 1,ed.Venice1505,f.63rb:"Fertur Bonet, Philosophia violentus essein vacuoabsquehocquodmovens ab aliquibus prinpotest quodmotus velvirtualiter. Et ratiohuiusdictiest mobili velrealiter siveproiiciens coniungatur cipium sedquasi nondiupermanens, mobili ista:quiain motuviolento imprimitur aliquaforma in vacuo.Illaautemdeficiente, essemotus illaforma et quamdiu durât, transiens, potest cessâtmotus." 17Nicholas naturalis V, c. 1,ed.Venice1505,f.63va:"De motuetiam Bonet, Philosophia autem infinequaminprincipio. violento estdicendum Intelligo quodessetdebilior semper illaseu virtus Ratiohuiusdictiestista:quoniam si sitpossibilis. de motuproiectorum,

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treatmentof Like John the Canon, Bonet continueswith his interesting what motionin a vacuum would be like, but makes no furtherremark that he appears to supportin all about the nature of the virtus impressa motion. projectile at Paris was Marchia's Franciscansuccessoras bachelorof the Sentences Francis of Meyronnes.As AnnelieseMaier remarked,Meyronnesand a Franciscanfollower,Himbertof Garda, both reacted to Marchia's virtus derelitta , but theyrejectedit explicitly. Meyronnesdevoteda separatequestion of his Sentences to commentary projectilemotion: "Are projectiles moved by any internal forma?""Here some people maintainthattheyare moved by someformaimpressa , by which, as long as it moves, the prois the throweris annihilated,motion is continfor when jectile moved, ued."18This briefdescriptionof Marchia's theorydoes not reflecta close reading of Marchia's question,certainlynot of the long versionof the text,whichmay have been writtenafterMeyronnes'lectures.Meyronnes' do not seem to hit the mark.19For fourargumentsagainstit, therefore, because we see that motiongetsstrongerwithdistance, example: "Third, because when it is veryclose to the thrower,the mobile is moved more weakly."Perhaps he is mixingfallingbodies withprojectilemotion,as in the firstobjection.None of the objectionspertainto Marchia's developed theory.Meyronnesconcludesas follows: ThereforeI say that the mobileis moved by the medium.Thus one shouldknow that thereare fourthingsthat relatein order:first,the motionof the thrower;second, the throwerdividesthe mediumvio-

forma a movente mobili continue deficit etdebilitatur, etperconsequens tardius impressa in vacuohabetessetardior in finequamin princimovet. Motusitaqueviolentus factus invacuoinprincipio tarnen essetmotus violentus etmedio pio,sicutetinpleno.Velocior habetdividere aerisquaese invicem resistunt." quaminpleno,quiamobile partes 18Francis ofMeyronnes, InII Sententiarum, d. 14,q. 7,ed.Venice1505,f.17va:"Utrum moveantur ab aliquaforma intrinseca . . . Hic dicunt proiecta aliquiquodmoventur per illudmovetur, annihilato enim aliquamformam impressam quaequamdiu[17vb]movet motus." Maieractually reads"proiciente," which , continuatur [prohibente] mustbe correct, butshedoesnotsayfrom whatedition or manuscript itcomes. 19Francis ofMeyronnes, In II Sententiarum, d. 14,q. 7, ed. Venice1505,f. 17vb:"Sed contraquadrupliciter: estquodforma eiusdem rationis inclinet primo, quia impossibile mobile ad contrarias eademautemforma rationis et eiusdem partes; imprimitur quando movetur sursum etdeorsum, ibienimestactivum etpassivum eiusdem rationis . . . Tertio, indistantia, invalescit quiavidemus quodmotus quiaquandoestmultum propeproiiciens, mobile debilius movetur."

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CHRISSCHABEL lently;[third,]the mediumcloses behindso therewon'tbe a vacuum; fromthisclosurethe mobileis propelled.20 [fourth,]

Soon afterwards, Himbertof Garda dealtwiththeissuein his own Sentences in similar fashion.For example, "Second, in that case procommentary would be moved more at the beginningbecause such a disposijectiles tion is impressedin the projectile;but theyare not moved more at the etc."21It seems beginning,as is clear with a javelin or arrow; therefore, that neitherMeyronnesnor Himbertwas a close observerof projectiles or a carefulreader of Francis of Marchia. I have inspectedsome of the obvious places in the pertinentwritings of a few other authors of the 1320s who mightbe expected to have reactedto Marchia and Odonis' virtus derelict a, but so farI have not found otherdiscussions. AnnelieseMaier mentioned just one otherfigure:William of Ockham. In a section of Ockham's Sentences commentaryvariously attributedto books II and III, and publishedas part of book III in the criticaledition,thereis a sectionon projectilemotion.22 In the case of a stoneflyingthroughthe air, Ockham agrees thatthe moverof the stone cannot be the thrower,who is no longerin contact,and he accepts the criticismagainst Aristotlethat it cannot be the air either,since the air can actuallymove againstthe stone. But he also rejectsthe idea that a power is in the projectile: 20Francis ofMeyronnes, InII Sententiarum, d. 14,q. 7, ed.Venice1505,f. 17vb:"Ideo dicoquodmovetur a medio. Ubitarnen sciendum estquodquattuor sehabent perordinem: motus secundo istepellens dividit medium a partepostmedium violenter; primo pellentis; clauditur ne sitvacuum; ex iliaclausione mobile." pellitur 21Himbert of Garda,In II Sententiarum , d. 14, a. 2, BAV Vat. lat. 1091,f. 106r: ad secundum dicitCommentator causatin proiecto "Quantum quodproiciens dispositionem Probatio: velmovetur a [forma] vel perquammovetur. quiaproiectum proiciente a forma inproiecto. causata Nona proiciente, immediate quiaproiciens posset postproiectionem et tuncproiectum in virtute moveretur movetur a tali non-entis; corrumpi igitur forma veldispositione a proiciente inproiecto causata. Sedcontra . . . Secundo, quiatunc in principio, estimpressa inproiecto; sed proiecta magismoverentur quiatalisdispositio nonmagismoverentur inprincipio, sicutpatetde iaculovelsagitta; etc.Dicitigitur igitur Franciscus deMayronis ..." SinceHimbert Marchia's toAverroes, assigns opinion perhaps hereas elsewhere he useda different version ofMeyronnes' commentary. Alternatively, hemayhavereadMarchia sinceMarchia seemstoclaimAverroes as an ally(see directly, Zanin's ina. 1 (f.105v)Himbert hadgiven four paperbelow, pp.87-88). Interestingly, arguofa certain ments "Ge"arguing thatheavy andlight areproperly moved things bysomewhiletheopinion couldbe ascribed toGerard, thearguments do notmatch external; thing thosein Gerard Odonis'II Sent., d. 14,q. 7, orin thecorresponding section ofDe motu. 22Guillelmi deOckham inlibram tertium Sententiarum Quaestiones ), q. 4, eds.F.E. (Reportado St Bonaventure, NewYork,1982,142-44; cf.q. 2 (p. 66). KellyandG.J.Etzkorn,

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Nor can it be a virtus in the stone,forI ask whatcauses thisvirtus. Not thethrower, fora naturalagentbroughtto itsobject{passo)in thesame way alwayscauses its effectin the same way; but the thrower,with absoluteand relativein it, can be broughtto a respectto everything stonewithoutmovingit in just the same way as whenit does moveitformyhand can be movedand broughtto some bodyslowly,in which case [myhand] willnot move it locally,or it can be movedswiftly and withimpetus and thenbroughtto [thebody] in the same way as before, in whichcase it will cause motion,unlikethe previouscase; therefore thisvirtus thatyou positcannotbe caused by anything absoluteor relativein the thrower . . . Indeed it wouldbe amazingifmyhand caused some virtus in a stoneby touchingthe stonethroughlocal motion.23 Maier consideredit possible that Ockham was reactingto Marchia. If would be perplexing, so, Ockham'srefutation givenMarchia's and Odonis' clear presentationsof the virtusderelicta theory,for it would seem that Ockham had not paid close attention.Since in at least one other context in book IV Marchia appears to be reactingto Ockham, however, Ockham was probablyreactingto a more basic versionof the theory, whichhad been circulatingalreadyforseveraldecades, as we have seen. In any case, the virtus derelicta idea appears to have stimulatedOckham to put forthhis famous,radical, new theorythat "local motionis nothing but the moveable thing'scoexistingwithvarious parts of space."24

23William ofOckham, III Sent., (cit.n. 22 above),142.17q. 4, eds.KellyandEtzkorn in lapide,quiaquaero:a quo causatur 143.7:"Necvirtus iliavirtus? Nona proiciente, causaieffectum. Sed quiaagensnaturale aequaliter approximatum passoaequaliter semper ad omneabsolutum et respectivum in eo, potest proiciens, quantum aequaliter approximarilapidiet nonmovere sicutquandomovet. Potest enimmanusmeatardemoveri et alicuicorpori, ettunenonmovebit localiter. Etpotest velociter etcum approximari ipsum et tuncapproximatur et tunc moveri, Ímpetu E) eodemmodosicutprius, (approximari causabit motum etpriusnon.Igitur istavirtus nonpotest causari ab aliquo quamtuponis, absoluto velrespectivo in proiciente ... (p. 144.2-4) Mirabile enimessetsi manusmea inlapideperhocquodmotulocalitangit causaret virtutem Thetransaliquam lapidem." lationofthissametextbyWalsh,in A. HymanandJ.J.Walsh(eds.),Philosophy inthe Middle TheChristian, andJewish Traditions Islamic, , 2nded.,Indianapolis 1973,689,is Ages. from an olderedition ofOckham. 24Which iswhytheabovepassage isincluded inHyman andWalsh's reader inmedieval William III Sent ofOckham, ., q. 4, eds.KellyandEtzkorn philosophy. (cit.n. 22 above), 143.18-19: "... motus localis . . . nonestaliudnisiquodmobile coexsistat diversis partibusspatii."

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Hesitation The key passage in Ockham is only one page long. Even the important sectionsin Odonis and Marchia are ratherbrief,althoughMarchia's is probablythe longesttreatmentof the problemin his day, which suggests that he may have provoked the extensivediscussionsin Buridan and Oresme. We must never forgetthat before 1330 medieval thinkerssimply did not pay thatmuch attentionto the problemof projectilemotion. Given the littletimeand thoughtthattheydevotedto the issue,we should not be surprisedat the slow pace of change in medieval naturalphilosophy withrespectto questionsthatbecame crucialin the 16thand 17th centuries. Still,one mightask, why did Marchia hesitate?By makingthe virtus derelicta permanentin the case of the absence of externalresistance,as Buridan was to do in the case of celestialmotion,Marchia would have been morefirmly on thepath to Galilean theoriesand would have received more creditforbeing his famouscompatriot'sforerunner. The explanation probablylies in the context.Marchia's task was more difficult than Galileo's. Marchia treatedthe issue in a Sentences commentary, duringhis theologicallectures.He was tryingto determinewhetherany supernatural virtus inheredin the sacraments.It was only by analogythathe discussedprojectilemotion.Marchia was shootingfora single,unifiedtheory that would explain both naturaland supernaturalphenomena- and not onlyprojectilemotionin nature,but also othernaturalphenomena.This in articletwo of his question, is why,when treatingnaturalinstruments Marchia gives as examples not only a hand, which throwsa projectile, but also a tongue. This explainsMarchia's "hesitation"when dealingwithcelestialmotion. Marchia assemblesall the ingredients fora deistictheoryof the universe, the realm of terrestial combining projectilemotionwiththe celestialrealm of the heavenlybodies, in which God gives thingsan initialshove and then everything workscontinuouslyforever.In the heavens,too, thereis a virtus derelicta leftby the intelligences, and "with the intelligenceceasto move the the heaven would stillmove or revolvefora time heaven, ing " 11. this virtus through [see appendix, 400-1]. But, we ask, why "for a time"? Why not forever?We are then annoyed to be faced with what : "If any such virtus seems to us an odd objection were caused in the heavens, it would be incorruptible"[423-4], namelybecause thereexistsnothThe modern reader is ing in the heavens that would corruptthe virtus.

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withMarchia: whyis thisan objection? Shouldn't puzzled,perhapsfrustrated this be a proofof the permanenceof the virtusderelicta withoutexternal If it were,wouldn'twe almosthave a theoryof inertia?Marchia resistance? solves the objectionas follows[445-9]: This argumentshouldnot troublethe faithful, because we are assured thatin theheavenof theblessedtherewillnotonlybe spiritualor mental praise,but also vocal. Nor will the saintsbe mutethere,not speaking to each othereven vocally.Now it is evidentthatthissound [vox] caused in heavenwill not be perpetual;ratherit will be corrupted. Since nothingelse can be found in heaven to corruptthis vox , it must be corruptedby itselfby nature.One assumes that Marchia means that in heaven, in order for saintsto speak, theirvoices cannot continueto sound, or echo, forever,otherwiseconversationand vocal praise would be impossible.25 Thus the virtus derelicta leftby the tonguesof the saints lasts for a in and like fashion the virtus derelicta leftby the hand time, only in projectilemotion,or the virtus derelicta leftin the heavens by the intelligences,also merelylasts fora time. Marchia gives another,more commonlyused example:the remnantsof somethingbrightremainleftbehind in the eye withthe removalof the object; theyneitherdisappear immebut onlyfora time. "It diatelywiththe object,nor remainpermanently, is thusin thepropositum withthe virtus caused or impressedin the heaven other virtus caused by every by the intelligencemovingit, and also withevery other motor local motion" through [466-9]. To be fairto Marchia, in the sentencethat concludes his discussion, he admitsthat"it could also perhapsbe maintainedthatthisvirtus caused in the heavens would be incorruptible"[475-6]. So he does not actually deny the deist interpretation completely.Nevertheless,his main effortis to show that this virtus would not be permanent,but would only last a time,and the reason appears to be that consistencyrequiresit. In typical, one mightsay beautiful,medieval fashion,Marchia triesto explain projectilemotion,speaking,seeing,celestialmotion,and the conversation

25Thatthesaints isassumed, forinstance, inHenry ofGhent's speakinheaven Quodlibet deGandavo VII, ed. G.A. Wilson, Leuven1991,44-47:"Utrum VII, q. 7, Henrici Quodlibet lausvocalis beatorum eritingloria." answers thatthequestion is notwhether Henry they ofheavenly talk,since"thesaintsin Heavenspeakto eachotherand singthehymns butrather how,giventhatthereis no air. praise"(p. 45.23-24),

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of the saintsin heaven with one, simple,unifiedtheoryof virtus derelicta. Buridan did not extend Marchia's he restricted it. Jean theory; TheEdition As we have seen, Francisof Marchia's discussionof his virtus derelicta theory of projectilemotion occurs in the firstquestion in his commentary on book IV of the Sentences in the contextof the power of the sacraments. Twelve manuscriptscontain the firstquestion of book IV, but seven of them carrywhat looks like a heavilyabbreviatedversion,and Vat. lat. 943 containsa different but parallel redaction.The appendix presentsa criticaleditionof the long version,extantin fourwitnesses.26 Unlike in the seven codices with the brieftext and the singlewitness of the otherredaction,the incipitin threeof the fourwitnessescontainof book ing the long versionassignsthis firstquestion to the Principium IV: Circaprincipium . . . (line 1 in the edition; quartilibri,quaeroprimoutrum the fourthmanuscriptbeginsdirectlywiththe utrum). However,Nazareno Mariani recendypublishedanothertext purportingto be the Principium for book IV, preservedin two Madrid manuscripts,Biblioteca nacional 504 (M) and 517 (D). They bear the incipit: Circaprincipium quartilibri utrum . . .27 Some in at an is order. [pm.M), quaero attempt explanation in The Principium the Madrid is as follows: Utrum question manuscripts sacramentalis instrumentaliter ad gratiae creationem. Then aliquavirtus possitcooperari threearticlesare proposedsecundum triaquaecontinentur in ipsa,scilicet subiecet medium . . .: (1) Quidsit virtus sacramentum,praedicatum, copulansutrumque talisquaeponitur in subiecto sit creatio in ; (2) Quid gratiaequaeponitur praedicato' instrumentaliter in compositione But (3) Quid sit cooperari quodponitur utriusque. then on the basis of these a fourthis added, which is the main question 26ForMarchia's andthemanuscripts ofthisquestion, seeR.L. Friedman commentary andC. Schabel, Francis ontheSentences: ListandState Question ofMarchia's Commentary of Research 63 (2001),31-106,esp.40-47,58-59,and 98-99.Cf. , in: MediaevalStudies, N. Mariani, e ipotesi sulCommento alleSentenze diFrancesco della MarcaOMin Certezze ., in: Archivům Franciscanum 95 (2002), TheredacHistoricum, 93-183, esp.93-94and109-15. in an appendix tionin Vat.lat.943 willbe published to an Italianabbreviation ofthis in Priori(ed.),AttidelIII Convegno su Francesco introduction Internazionale (cit. d'Appianano n. 3 above), andI haveedited inseven theversion found witnesses fora study ofMarchia's bookIV forthcoming in:Picenum Seraphicum. 27See Francis ofMarchia, Commentario inIV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Quaestiones etPrologus Grottaferrata onp. 223.6;cf. , ed. N. Mariani, 2003,223-62, praeambulae incipit Friedman Francis andSchabel, onthe Sentences 61. ofMarchia's (cit.n. 26 above), Commentary

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itself.28 Both Madrid manuscriptsare incomplete,containingonly three of the fourproposed articles,and D breaks offeven beforethe end of articlethree.The firstthree articlesfollowthe plan, althoughafterthe first20 lines of articleone, in the followingca. 830 lines thereare only two furtherreferencesto sacraments,in lines 6 and 12 at the startof in naturalphilosophy,logicallyarticlefour articlethree.Afterthisexcursus oughtto have returnedto answerthe questionitselfabout the sacraments.29 Since the two Madrid witnessesof the Principium in IV contain only threeof the fourarticlespromised,perhaps the twelvemanuscriptswith versionsof the firstquestionof book IV actuallypreservediffering redactionsof the Principium' s "missing"fourtharticle.There are several argumentsin favor of this hypothesis.First,as we have seen, three of the fourmanuscriptsof the long versionexplicitlycall it a Principium. Second, the question itself,utrum in sacramento sit aliqua virtus insistens supernaturalis siveeisformaliter inhaerens , does not depart much fromthe proposed title of article4 in the Madrid manuscripts.Third, the questiondeals extenthemeas called for,and afterdepartingfrom sivelywiththe instrumentum the sacramentaltheme in its own articles one and two, the question returnsto sacramentsand grace in its thirdand finalarticle,thusanswering both thisquestionand the principiaiquestionas foundin the Madrid witnesses.Fourth,in Madrid 517 (D), immediatelyfollowingthe premature end of the Principium? s article3 on f. 37vb, the shortversionof the firstquestionof book IV beginson f. 38ra, as ifto createa unifiedwhole. One could add that, since the question of projectile motion is more dealt within book II than book IV, its presencehere is perhaps fittingly due to its inclusionin a special principiailectureratherthan in a normal lectureon book IV. Seven of the othereightmanuscriptsapparently then abbreviatedthe textand simplydropped the Principium attribution. A more thoroughanalysisof book IV and a criticaledition of the abbreviatedversionwill have to await another time. The sigla used in the editionof the long versionare as follows:30 28See Quaestiones andFriedman , ed.Mariani 223-24.19-25, praeambulae (cit.n. 27 above), andSchabel, Francis ontheSentences ofMarchiai Commentary (cit.n. 26 above),61,forthe text. In thequestion title and11.9, 12,and25Mariani readscreatorem rather thanFriedman andSchabel's creationem creationem is required forsense. , although 29Forthereferences to thesacraments, see Quaestiones , ed. Mariani(cit. praeambulae n. 27 above),257,11.6 and 12.Marianihimself hintsthatthefollowing in D, question oneoftheshorter criticus for1. 129. versions, 261,apparatus maybe related: p. 30Forthemanuscripts, seeFriedman andSchabel, Francis onthe ofMarchia's Commentary Sentences (cit.n. 26 above),41-47.

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58 C P W Z

CHRISSCHABEL Vatican City,BibliotecaApostolicaVaticana, Chigi, lat. B VII 113 Prague, MetropolitniKapituly531 (C 99) Palat. lat. 4826 Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Paris, Bibliothèquenationalede France, lat. 15852

Maier published substantialsegmentsof the firsttwo of this question's threearticlesin 1940, using ms C but providingsome variantreadings fromthe redactioncontainedin Vat. lat. 943 (= E). Clagettmade a partial in 1959,and GraziellaVescovini of Maier's transcription Englishtranslation in 1969. Then in 1991 NotkerSchneider reprintedMaier's transcription the section of Maier's text that deals with heavenly reprinted four-page i.e. most of article motion, two,but he also recheckedms C and showed thatMaier had made severalerrorshere,includinga nine-wordomission perhomoioteleuton (11.394-95 below). Naturally,he repeatedsome of Maier's errors,notablyin lines 76-79 of his text.In 1998, again followingms C, Nazareno Mariani printeda different sectionof the textMaier had tran- fromarticleone- as scribed of his introductionto the editionof part Marchia's Physics commentary. Finally,in 2002, Mariani printedthe entire ms from with the correspondingquestion in ms D, C, question along which he labeled an abbreviation.Since Mariani did not take Maier's text into consideration,he thereforemade different errorsfromMaier, both in interpreting abbreviationsand in punctuation.31 To sum up, there are at presenttwo printingsof Maier's somewhat flawed32 fromms C of a substantialportionof the question, transcription corrected partially againstC itselfin a small sectionby Schneider;a few quotationsfromms E in Maier's notes; Mariani's complete but problematictranscription of C; and Mariani's transcription of ms D. It should also be notedthatthe completerelianceon C forthe main versionentails that any errorsin C have been repeatedin the transcriptions. Given the 31A. Maier, DieImpetustheorie TheScience (cit.n.5 above),166-80; (ed.andtrans.), Clagett Mechanics intheMiddle La teoria dell'imof Ages(cit.n. 11 above),526-30;G.F.Vescovini, - Friedman andSchabel, Francis onthe Sentences , Turin1969,1-21 peto ofMarchia's Commentary haveerroneously claimed thatthisis an Italiantransla(cit.n. 26 above),38,andothers DieKosmologie desFranciscus deMarchia: , undUntersuchungen Texte, tion;N. Schneider, Quellen des14.Jahrhunderts York-Kobenhavn-Köln zurNaturphilosophie , Leiden-New 1991,50-52; Francisci deMarchia sivedeEsculo etcompilato libros Aristotelis , OFM,Sententia , super Physicorum eipotesi ed.N.Mariani, Grottaferrata 131-59. Certezze 1998,66-77;Mariani, (cit.n.26above), 32Examples ofothererrors: sheomits19 words at 11.276-7below; perhomoioteleuton inherline415,instead ofthecorrect shereads"impetus," which worse, "virtus," perhaps in Marchia's is notfound text! anywhere

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importanceof the question,then, there seems littleneed to justifythe followingcriticaledition. Of the manuscripts,C and Z are fromthe firsthalf of the 14th century,C datingto 1327; P and W date closer to the end of the century. C, which earliereditorshave used exclusively,is very good, containing perhaps only two dozen minorunsharederrorsand one unsharedomisof 7 words (1. 94). It does share about threedozen sion perhomoioteleuton minorvariantswithZ, however,of whichabout halfare errors.Although it is a ratherlate manuscript,P is also verygood. P's scribe was adept at improvingthe text'saccuracy and clarity(e.g. 11. 15 and 60), and P containsonly about 30 minor variants,almost all unshared,around a of 4 words dozen being errors.There is one omissionper homoioteleuton (1.540). W and Z are much worse. Besides the 10 or so minorvariantsit W has about 100 minor shareswithone or more of the othermanuscripts, variantsof itsown in additionto over 50 minorunsharederrors,although only 4 major omissionsamountingto 41 words total(11.9-11, 124-5,3978, and 481). It also shows signs of minor abbreviationon a half dozen occasions. Z containsabout 130 minor unsharedvariants,half of those beingerrors.It also had 6 largeomissionsfor44 words,and it sharesclose to 40 minorvariantswithotherwitnesses,most notablyC as mentioned. Since the only obvious familyresemblanceis between C and Z, and Z is ratherpoor, I have generallygone with the majorityof the independentmanuscriptsC, P, and W, W usuallydecidingbetween C and P where these two best witnessesdisagree.Where P and W offerinterestingreadings,however,theyhave been treatedwith caution, because thereis evidence of scribaltampering.Orthographyis classicizedin the edition,and the apparatus criticusis ratherexhaustive,especiallyfor C and P. In addition,I note in parenthesesvariantsof consequence from the previouseditionsas follows: Ml ed. Maier 1940; reprintVescovini 1969 M2 ed. Mariani 1998 M3 ed. Mariani 2002 S ed. Schneider 1991 Abbreviationsin the apparatus are standard;* = lectioincerta. of Cyprus University

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Francisci de Marchia Principium In quartum librum Sententiarum, redactio B

5

10

15

20

Circa principium sit aliqua quartilibri,quaero primoutrumin sacramentis virtussupernaturalis insistenssive eis formaliter inhaerens. Videturquod sic,quia omniscausa concurrens ad aliquemsupernaturalem effectum concurritper virtutemaliquam supernaturalem in ipsa formaliter sed sacramenta concurrunt causaliter ad iustificationem animae existentem; ea suscipientis; in sit eis virtus eis ergo oportetquod aliqua supernaturalis formaliter insistens. vel esset aliqua Contra,quia talis virtus,si ponereturin eis formaliter, formasensibilisvel spiritualis. Non spiritualis, talis non quia potestrecipi in aliquo subiectosensibili, subiective cuiusmodisuntomniasacramenta.Nec sensibilis,quia talis non potestcooperali ad effectum aliquem spirituálem, propterquod tamentantumponiturhic aliqua virtus.Ergo etc. Ad evidentiamhuius quaestionis,est primosciendumquod virtussupernaturalisest duplex,videlicetsubsistens, quae Deus est, de qua diciturAd Hebraeos quod Deus est "portansomnia Verbo virtutissuae"; et insistens sive formaliter inhaerens,puta caritas,de qua loquiturApostolus,primaAd Corinthios, capitulo13: "Si habueroomnemfidem,"etc., "caritatemautem non habuero,nihilmihiprodest."Nunc autemhic non quaeriturde virtute sed tantumde insistente. Constatenim quod in sacramentis est subsistente, virtussubsistens, quae Deus est,modo quodam specialiassistendocuilibetad infusionem gratiaeomni digne ipsumrecipienti.Et sic loquiturPaulus,Ad Corinthios3, dicens:"Ego piantavi,Apollorigavit, Deus autemincrementum Est ergo solumdubium,et de hoc dedit,"supple:'per gratiaeinfusionem'. 14-15Ad Hebraeos1.3. 16-18I Ad Corinthios 13.2-3.21-23I Ad Corinthios 1 circa. . . primoom.W 6 ea suscipientis] Z 8 (virtus causa*iustificantis* om.Ml) 9 (spiritualis noninv.MI) 9-11recipl.. . potest om.perhomoio. W 10 sacramenta] scientiaC (sacramenta inv.Z 12 hicaliqua]istaWZ (hecaliqua M3) 11 effectum aliquem 1 add.P 17capitulo om.W || autemom.C (W) 17-18caritatem ... M3) 15hebraeos] om.utabbrev. W 18 habuero] habeamZ || prodest om.P(W)|| autemhicinv. prodest W 19(tantum om.M3) || de om.W 20 deusestinv.P || speciali] Z || cuilispirituali add.mg.P 21 ipsum] ea W; sacramentum add.s.l.P || paulus]apostobet]sacramento lusW;prima add.mg.P 22 corinthios] timotheum CWZ || dicens] dicebat CZ || apollo] autemadd.W 23 supple] scilicet W || gratiae infusionem inv.W || (solum] solvendum Ml) Il et de hoc]de hocquodW

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subsistentem sitin sacramentis quaeritquaestio,utrumpraetervirtutem aliqua causata ab ipsa virtutesubsistente, 25 virtusinsistenssive inhaerensformaliter ad aliquem quae Deus est.Et ratiohuiusdubiiestquoniamcausa concurrens effectum causandumvideturquod concurratper aliquam supernaturalem virtutemei insistentem sive formaliter et per inhaerentem, supernaturalem aliam a virtute Deus sacramenta autem est; consequens primasubsistente, quae ut 30 concurrunt, videtur,aliquo modo causaliterad effectum supernaturalem, vel saltemad aliquampraecedentem putaad gratiaeinfusionem dispositionem; etc. quare Secundo,iuxtahoc est sciendumquod triplexest genusinstrumentorum. Est enimquoddam instrumentum sicutdolabra [P 164vb],secunartificiale, II De anima.Aliudest connaturale, sicutmanus,quae est, 35 dum Philosophum, secundumPhilosophum,III De anima , organumorganorum.Aliud superiuxtaverbumChristi,Marci ultimo:"Qui credinaturale,ut sacramentum, deritet baptizatusfuerit,salvuserit."Ex quo sequiturquod sacramentum beatitudinisconsequendae. baptismisit quasi instrumentum primarium Tunc ergo,his praemissis, sic est procedendumin quaestioneista: primo 40 enimvidebitur utrumin instrumento artificiali sitsivereeipiatur aliqua virtus a principalisive artificiali instrumento inhaerenssive formaliter agenteipsi inexistens. Secundo,videbituridem de instrumento naturali,utrumvidelicet in manu vel in lingua,et sic de [C 175rb]aliis naturalibus sit instrumentis, influxaa potentiaprincipaliter taliainstrumenta 45 aliquavirtus naturaliamovente, alia a formaipsorumcuiuslibet propria[W 193va] et a motu.Tertio,ex hoc videbiturprincipalepropositum, videlicetutrumin sacramentis, quae sunt instrumenta sive sit virtuseis spiritualia supernaturalia, aliqua supernaturalis inhaerensformaliter. 34-35Aristoteles, Deanima 5. 35-36Aristoteles, Deanima II,c. 1:412b12-1 III,c. 8:432al-2. 37-38Marcus16.16. W 24-25insacramentis 24 sacramentis] sacramento insacraaliquavirtus] aliquavirtus P 25 subsistente] mentis insistente W 29 aliam]alia P || subsistente] subsistentem W 30 aliquomodoom.W || effectum] add.W || supernaturalem] PW aliquem spirituálem 35 (aliud]aliquodMl) 36 (aliud]aliquodMl) 38 salvus eritom.utabbrev. W 39 quasi] sicutadd.CZ || primarium] Z || consequendae] W* (conferende primům consequendo inv.Z || quaestione istainv.WZ 41 utrum] si W || in om. M3) 40 estprocedendum Z (om.M3) II instrumento] Z || artificiali] instrui* accidentali C (artificiali Ml) 42 a iter. C 11 siveformaliter inv.W 44 (lingua] con.adlignoM3) 11 aliisnaturalprincipali ibusinv.Z 45 influxa] Z || potentia] infusa W || principaliter] P 46 primo principali a om.C 47 principale om.Z || videlicet utrum scilicet W || (sunt] istaadd.M3) utrum] 48 instrumenta] W 11 supernaturalis sacramenta virtus inv.W 49 formaliter om. W

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dico quod eademdifficultas estde instrumento artificiali 50 Quantumad primum, et de motu violentolapidisversussursum.Sicut enim motuscuiuscumque gravisversussursumest violentus,ita eadem rationemotusdolabrae seu Et ideo eadem martelliquo elevaturseu qualitercumquemoveturab artifice. artificiali motoab artifice difficultas estvidereutrumin instrumento recipiatur et utrumin lapidemotosursum,sivequocumque 55 aliqua virtusab ipso artifice, alio gravi,recipiaturaliqua virtuscontinuansmotumhuiusmodiab ipso movente.Unde si in lapide violentermoto non recipituraliqua virtusab et si in istoreciartificiali, ipsumalia a motu,nec in instrumento impellente in et ilio. pitur, < Septemconclusiones> 60 Quantumergo ad hoc pono septemconclusiones.Primaconclusioest quod non esta manumovenvidelicetgravisad sursum, huiusmodi motusviolentus, tis.Istamproboprimo,quia manucessantemoveregrave,adhucipsumgrave continuât motumsuum.Secundo,quia estoetiamquod manusessetdestructa ad deorsum,adhucnihilomivel quod moveretaliquidmotuopposito,videlicet 65 nus gravecontinuâtmotumab ipsa inchoatum. a forma Secundaconclusioestquod iste [Z 167rb]motusnon esteffective naturaliipsiusgravisquod movetur.Ista probatur,quoniamomnismotusqui est a principiointrinsecosive a formanaturalimobilisest naturalis;sed sed violentus; ergoetc. Praeterea,quia [P 165ra]istemotusnon estnaturalis, ad 70 formanaturaliscuiuslibetmixtiest determinata unummotumsecundum ad omnemdifferentiam positionis, speciem;sed istemotusest indeterminatus et a et a motu circulari et dextris enim moveri ante sinistris, retro, potest moturecto;ergo etc. a formanatuTertiaconclusioestquod huiusmodimotusnon esteffective 75 rali ipsiusmedii,puta aquae vel aeris,in quo huiusmodicorpusmovetur. Ista probatureadem rationequa secunda,quoniamformamediinaturalisest videlicet 52 (seu]siveMl) 53 (seu]siveMl) || et om.Z 54 (videre] Ml) || in om.Z Z om.perhomoio. . . . virtus inv.W 55-56artifice om.Ml) 55 aliquavirtus Il (artificiali add. octoCZ, Pacmg. 61 ad om.W 62 istam] 58 in1om.Z; s.l.W 60 septem] primam om. Z || ipsum] CZ [om. movetur C II primo om.CZ || movere] M2) || grave2 quantum Z || (alimovetur determinata W 63 etiam]enim*Z || (destructa] M2) 64 moveret] quid]aliudMl) 65 ipsa]ipsoZ 66 secunda]secundoP || quod]quia CZ 69-70 estadd.mg.Z 71 (iste]illeM3) 11 (indetermiom.perhomoio. sed. . . naturalis Z; natura W 75 aquae]aqua determinatus Ml) 72 motuom.P 73 ergoetc.om.utabbrev. natus] Z || (huiusmodi om.M1-2;conveniens Z II aerisiter. M3) 76 (quoniam] quiaM2-3)

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determinata ad unum motumsecundumspeciem;sed iste motusest indeut terminatus, dictumest; ergo etc. Quarta conclusioest quod nec est ab ordinepartiummediise moventium successive.Dicerentenim fortealiqui quod huiusmodimotussic causatur quoniammovenslapidemvel quodcumquealiud graveprimomovetpartem aeris sibi propinquam,et illa primomota secundomovetaliam, et sic per ordinem.Et hincest quod, cessantemanu,non cessâtmotus,quoniam,licet ipsa cessante,cessetprimapars aerissibipropinqua,non tamenomnesaliae. Et ideo aliae aerispartesmotaedeferunt ipsumgrave.Et ita dicuntistiquod, licetiste motusnon sit a manu nec a formagravis,nec etiamdeterminate ab aliqua partemedii,est tamena totomedio indeterminate sumpto. Contrahoc arguiiPhilosophusin fineVili Physicorum , et primosic: illud quod non movetnisi quia movetur,cessantemotionepassiva qua movetur, cessâtmotioactivaqua movet;sed primapars aeris propinquamanuilapidem impellenti non movetactivealiam nisi quia mota [C 175va] a manu, nec secunda pars tertiamnisi quia mota a prima,et sic de omnibusaliis; ergo si [W 193vb]primanon recipita manu virtutem aliquam,et secunda a primavel a manu, cessantepassiva motionequa movetura manu, cessabitomnismotioeius activa;ergo etc. Quinta conclusioest quod non est a se ipso. Ista patet,quoniam nihil a se ipso; ergo etc. potestesse effective Sexta conclusio,quod nec potestesse a formacaeli. Ista patet,quoniam formacaeli est determinata ad unum motum.

88-95Aristoteles, cum Averrois Commentariis Vili,c. 10:266b27-267a20 Physica (Aristotelis Opera IV, ed.Venice1562,f.429vaH-bL). 77 (secundum] siveM2) 79 est1om.P || (nec]nonMI) || ordine partium] aliquaparte Z 80 dicerent] add.mg. Z 11aliqui]aliquis diceret Z 81 aliudom.W 82(illa] Z; partium illaM2) 11 mota]motuC (motaMI) 83 cessât] W 84 sibiom.W || (omnes cesset illaepartes aerisZ aliae]estin aereM2!) 85 ideo]omnesadd.W || aliaeaerispartes] 86 etiamdeterminate] Z (indeterminate indeterminata . . . parte] M2) 86-87determinate ab aliquapartedeterminata P 89 quia]quodW || passiva] Z 90 propinqua] positiva Z || manui] manuCZ 91 nisiom.Z || manu]motuCZ 92 tertiam] secunpropinque damW 93 virtutem . . . manu2 om.perhomoio. aliquamino.P 11 et]necP 94 cessante C II motione] Z (om.C) 96 (est1om.MI) || ipso]ergoetc.add.P 98 sexta] movente aliaZ II conclusio] estadd.W

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estquod Septimaet ultimaconclusioaffirmativa, quae sequiturex praedictis, huiusmodimotusest immediateab aliqua virtuteper modumactus primi derelictaab ipsoprimomovente, puta [P 165rb]a manu.Et haec estsententia in fineVili Physicorum et etiam Commentatoris , commento27. Philosophi Ista conclusiosequiturex praecedentibus. enim dare Oportet aliquid quod 105 sit causa istiusmotussicutet cuiuscumquealteriuseffectus; sed non potest dari aliquid aliud,ut visumest; ergo etc.

< Opinio Philosophi > Sed tuncest dubium:ubi sit huiusmodivirtussubiective, utrumvidelicetsit in corporegravimoto,vel in ipso medio,et quid in se sit formaliter? Ad hoc videturdicerePhilosophusin fineVili Physicorum quod huiusmodi 110 virtusrecipitursubiectiveet formaliter in medio,puta in aere vel in aqua, non autemin corporemoto.ImaginaturenimPhilosophusquod, quia aer et aqua suntvelociorismotusquam lapis vel huiusmodicorporagraviaquae moventurin eis, ideo primapars aeris propinquamanuiimpellenti aliquod gravevelociusmoveturquam illudgravesit natummoverideorsum,et ideo 115 iste motusaeris velociorimpediimotumgravisdeorsum.Et hinc est quod tamdiugraveimpulsumascenditsursumquousque pervenitad partemaliquam aeris quae non moveturvelociusquam illud grave moveaturdeorsum- immomotusgravisdeorsumest velociorilio motu,et ideo non potest ille motusilliuspartismediivinceremotumgravis,propterquod statimtunc 120 incipitdescendereipsumgrave.Et ita dicitibi Philosophusquod huiusmodi in aere. subiective virtuscausata a manu,continuansistummotum,recipitur

In f.429vaI-bL); 100-103 Aristoteles, Vili,c. 10:267a8-12 Averroes, (ed.Venice, Physica Aliaversioin Vat.lat.943 habetcommento VIII, comm.27 (ff.364rbF-365vaI). Physicam Cf.comm.82 (ed.Venice, ff.430raA-431vaI). 109-137 77,sednoninveni. Aristoteles, In Physicam etAverroes, VIII,comm.82 (ed.Venice, VIII,c. 10:266b27-267a22, Physica 1vaG).Cf.Physica ff.429vaH-43 IV, c. 8: 215al3-bll. 100septima] octavaC; aliaZ || conclusio] estW || (sequitur] secuuntur M3) 101alimotore mocionem M2) 102(movente] Ml) || (haec]hocMl) qua] aliaW H (modum] W 107 cuiuslibet Il estom.W 103etiamom.WZ || (27]20 M2-3) 105cuiuscumque] W || videlicet] virtus subiective huiusmodi virtus ubisitom . Z II huiusmodi subiective] W 108gravimoto]sicutin totoW 109opiniophilosophi add.mg.C 110et scilicet P 11 in3om.W; ap exp.W 111enim]autem inmedio]inmedioetformaliter formaliter W 11 lapisvelom.W Z 11 quia om.CZ 11 aer]in aereW 112velocioris] velociores 113manui]manuZ 115gravis om.Z 116 (pervenit] Ml; pervenerit M2-3) provenit om.O 121motum] modum W {om.Z) 118potest exp.C; impedii mg.C 119vincere istum . . . nataeom.Z 121-122

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Unde imaginatur Partesenimaerissuntnataecondensanet rarefieri. Philosophus sicut et etiam Commentator quando lapis proiciturin aqua fiuntet quod, in aqua quidamcircuii,sic consimiliter lapisproiectusin aerefacit generantur in aere quosdam invisibiles circuios,quorumprimus,quia moveturcelerius se descenderei deorsum,ideo defertlapidemad secundum quam lapis per ad et secundus tertium, circulum, usque impediendoeius motumproprium versusdeorsum.Et sic huiusmodicircuiicausati in aere deferuntlapidem ad aliquemcuiusmotusnon sitvelociormotu[Z 167va] quousqueperveniatur cessantcircuii,et grave incipitdescendere,ipsis et tunc deorsum, gravis cessantibus. Et quia isticircuiisuntconsequenterse habentes,non continui [P 165va],ideo concluditPhilosophusquod huiusmodimotusviolentusnon estcontinuus, sed consequenter se habens,nec quod sic moveturmovetur per se, sed per accidens,sicutnautaad motumnavisipsumdeferentis. [C 175vb] Tunc ergodicitquod, quia aer et etiamaqua estrarefactibilis et condensabilis, in una parteet rarefit ideo,ut condensatur [W 194ra] perhuiusmodi impulsum in alia, recipithuiusmodivirtutem per quam motuspostea continuatur. IstudprobatPhilosophus videlicet virtusrecipiatur tripliciter, quod huiusmodi in medio. Primo sic: contrariorum contrariaesunt causae; sed ad sensum apparetquod, quando aliquod non multumgraveproicitursuperius,fiante ventoecontrario,revertitur interdumad proicientem, quod non est nisi ex motucontrario aerisipsumdeorsumimpellentis; eadem rationeet motus ergo eius sursumest ex motuaeris contrario,sive per virtutem receptamin aere ipsumversussursumimpellentem; ergo etc. Secundosic: omnismotusqui esta principiointrinseco estnaturalis, natura II Physicorum' enimest principium motuset quietis,secundumPhilosophum, sed motuslapidissursumnon estnaturalis, sed violentus, sed si esseta virtute in a aliqua recepta lapide, esset naturalis,quia esset principiointrinseco mobilis;ergo etc. 145-146 Aristoteles, II, c. 1: 192b20-23. Physica autemZ 124-125 facit inaereom.perhomoio. W 125(primus] 123fiunt] M2; principio con.adprincipium Z || (eiusom.Ml; scilicet secundum M2) 127secundus] M2-3) 129 scilicet circulum add.mg.P || motu]motus Z Ml) || aliquem] (perveniatur] proveniatur Z 135dicit]dicoW || quiaom.W || etiamaqua]esseaquaeC 134motum] modům iuresicM2) 138videlicet om.W || (virtus vir(etiam aquaMl) 136(rarefit] recipiatur] tutesrecipiantur contrario Ml) 140apparet] M2-3)|| interpatetZ 141(econtrario] dumZ 142eademratione] W 143(sive]s. Ml) 146estprincipium recte dum]movetur motus estW || secundum om.utabbrev. W 148recepta] motus] principium philosophum Z W; recipitur receptiva

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III Ethicorum est cuiusprinPraeterea,secundumPhilosophum, , violentum non conferens est movens cipium extra, passo aliquam vim; ergo gravesursumnullamvimconferì passo,videlicet lapidimoto;ergonec aliquamvirtutem influitsive causai in ipso, sed in medio; quare etc. omnemobilerecipiens virtutem Praetereatertio, aliquama moventeassuescit 155 ad illamsivead actumeius,sicutpatetde manuscribentis; sed lapisproiectus assuescit ad motum sursum,quantumcumquepluriesproiciatur; numquam ergo nullamvirtutem recipita movente.

160

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> < ContraPhilosophum sitinlapide Sed contrahoc arguo,et ostendoquod huiusmodi virtus principalius vel in quocumquealio gravimoto quam in medio. Et arguoprimosic: aut huiusmodivirtusest formahabens contrarium aut non est habens contrarium.Non estformahabenscontrarium, sicutlevitaset gravitas, quod probo estprincipium motuum Primo,quia nullaformahabenscontrarium dupliciter. sive oppositorum, sed unius tantum hoc patet de gravitate contrariorum et levitate[P 165vb]; sed ista virtusest indifferenter principiummotuum est enim motus secundum omnem differentiam oppositorum, principium etc. Praeterea nulla virtus habens contrarium est secundo,quia positionis; ergo motusrectiet circularis; sed per huiusmodivirtutem corpusquod principium motu rectoet circulari,sicutpatet moveturviolentermoveturindifferenter virtusnon esthabenscontrarium. de rotafiguli;ergosequiturquod huiusmodi motivanonhabenscontrarium natarecipiin aereestnatarecipi Sed omnisvirtus in ipso lapidemoto,sivein quocumquealio gravimixto,et multoetiammagis magisnata quam in aere. Probatiohuius:quia formanon habenscontrarium in subiecto habente conest recipiin subiectonon habentecontrarium quam accidentales etiam substantiales elementares sed tam formae trarium; quam suntmagiscontrariae quam formaemixti,magisenimformamixtiestelongata 150-151Aristoteles, Ethica Mcomachea III, c. 1: 1110b15-16(AL 26.1-3,fase.4, trans. ed. R.A.Gauthier, Leiden-Brussels Aristoteles, Grosseteste, 1973,p. 411.26-7).155-156 Ethica Nïcomachea II, c. 1: 1103a20-23 cit.,p.396.8-10). (ed.Gauthier W 151passoaliquam om.utabbrev. 150secundum vim]vimpassoaliquid philosophum W II (ergocon.adsetM2) 155ad2om.Z 156ad] illamsivead add.W 157(movente] add.mg.C || principalius] motoreMl) 158 contraphilosophum priusWZ (prius W* (motivům M1-2-3) 160est2om.W {om.Ml) 162motuum] motivům M2-3) 163 motivům* W 165 (omnem omnes differentiam] (unius]virtus M2-3) 164 motuum] P 172huiusom.Z 174etiam differentias Ml) 171ipsoom.W || quocumque] quolibet Z 175sunt]sedW om.W; formae

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a contrarietate quam formaelementarisunde formamixticomparataad formaselementorum habetrationemformaequasi mediaeet neutraerespectu illarum,sicutcompositum [C 176ra]respectucomponentium. Ergorelinquitur quod magislapis vel quodcumquealiud corpusmixtumest subiectumproportionatum praedictaevirtutis quam aer vel quodcumquealiud elementům. illud est effectus sive motusmoventis Praeterea, quod prius susceptivum est formaecausatae per illum,quod enim est receptivum prius susceptivum motus,et formaequae est [W 194rb]terminus motus;sed lapis priusquam aer estsusceptivus motuslocalisperquemcausaturhuiusmodi virtusa movente; et istius virtutis derelictae motum Probatio minorisi ergo per ipsum. quia manus nonmovetaeremnisimovendolapidem,ergolapispriusrecipitmotummanus huiusmodiderelictam quam aer, et per consequensvirtutem permotum,cum sit capax eius, ut ostensumest. Quod autemvirtushuiusmodicauseturper motumsiveipso mediantepatet,quoniammanusquiescens,sicutnec movet aliquid,ita nec causai aliquidin aliquo,puta in lapidenec in [Z 167vb]aere. subiectumistiusvirtutis Praeterea,illudestmagisproportionatum quod est subiectummotusqui est ab illa virtute,quod enim magisproportionatum effectui magisestproportionatum causae; sed lapis magisest proportionatum estsubiectum istimotuiqui estab huiusmodi[P 166ra] magisproportionatum virtutederelicta;ergo etc. Probatiominorisiillud est magisproportionatum subiectum motusquod quidemperfectius natumestmoveria virtute motiva;sed vel aliud mixtum debiti est facilius et lapis quodcumque ponderis perfectius mobilea virtutemotivaquam aer vel aliud leve,sicutquam palea, perfectius enim movensmovetet proicitlapidemdebitiponderiset longiuset etiam faciliusquam paleamvel quodcumquealiud minusleve; ergosi palea propter sui levitatem non est mobileproportionatum virtuti motivae,nec aer ipse,ex est subiectumproportionatum istiusvirtutis quo sequiturquod lapis magis continuantsmotumhuiusmodiquam sit aer; quare etc. virtuti motivae Praeterea,confirmatur, quia illudestmagisproportionatum 176elementaris] elementalis Z || (mixti] mixtaM2) 176-177 ad formas elecomparata ad formas elementorum W 177(formas] formam mentorum] comparata Ml) 180aliud subiectum aliudW 181prius] CZ 182estsusceptivum] elementům] primo suscepticum esse*Z II (perillum]principii motore M2) 183(quaeexp.utcon.M2) 184(movente] mediiMl) 188 virtushuiusmodi inv.C; istiushuiusmodi Z MI) 185 (minoris] 189(quoniam] cumMl) 190nec2]velW (om.MI) 193magisest1inv.P 193-194 . . . proportionatum om. om.Z 195 proportiona(causae perhomoio. M2) 194 estsubiectum Z 196(perfectius] W 197 tum]proportionaler perficiens M2-3)|| a] ab huiusmodi aliudinv.CW 199etiam] tuncW 202magis] nonW || subiectum] quodcumque magis add.W 203continuantis] Z (continentis consequentis M2-3)11 quareom.W 204illud] quodZ

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205 quod movendominuslaedituripsa virtusmotiva;sed minuslaediturvirtus motivamanus in movendosive pellendolapidemdebitiponderisquam in movendopaleam vel aliquid aliud nimisleve; ergoetc. Praeterea,illudquod defertaliquodcorpusad aliquemlocumantecedenter iliumlocum;sed aer non potestantecedenter ingredialiquemlocum ingreditur violenter sive et 210 ad quem movetur ingreditur motum;ergocorcorpuspulsum existentem. aliquamin eo formaliter per aeremsivevirtutem pus non movetur in quercuet ingreditur Probado minoris:quia iaculumprofunditur quo non aer enim non aer priusingreditur quam partes ingrediantecedenter, potest per iaculumdividanturimmo ordinenaturaedivisiopartiummuri,et per 215 consequensingressus iaculi,per quem fithuiusmodidivisio,praeceditingressum aeris. Si enim ingressusaeris ingressumiaculi antecedere t, cum omne aer a suo possetingrediet sequereturquod posteriori, priuspossitseparali 1 7 sine huiusmodi se [C 6rb] iaculo,quod est falsum. penetrareper partes Tunc ergo potestbreviterarguisic in forma:deferensaliquod corpusad 220 locum aliquem priusest in loco ilio ipsumdeferensquam delatum,ordine saltemnaturae;sed aer non prius ingreditur quercusquam profunditatem iaculum,immoposterius;ergo etc. Ex hoc ultra:illudidemmovetlapidemvel quodcumquealiud corpussursum quod dividitpartes[W 194va] mediiper quod movet,dividendoenim 225 [P 166rb] mediummovetet movendo dividit;sed lapis vel aliud corpus non aer; ergoetc.Minorpatet, motumdividitpartesmediiper quod movetur, quoniamaer non dividitpartesquercus,sed iaculum,ergoeadem rationequa dividitistud,dividitet quodcumquealiud mediumper quod transit. < Opinio propria> saltemnecessariohuiusmodivirSed quicquid sit de subiectoistiusvirtutis, 230 tus motuminchoatumcontinuansest ponendavel in mediovel, quod magis credo,in corporemoto. Unde est sciendumquod est duplexvirtusmovensaliquod gravesursum: Z (minus Z 207nimis] minus 206in1om.^N11pellendo] M2-3) 209aliquem] impellendo sinevirtute aliumZ 210(et]setM2) 211(sivevirtutem aliquaM2-3)|| exisaliquam] itamovemedii W (existente inexistentem Ml) || ingreditur] M2-3) 212(minoris] tentem] W || quo]quodZ 213-214 turCZ; inmovetur partes periaculum periaculum] partes W 218penetrare] P 215quem]quodP 217suoom.W || sequeretur] impensequetur eiusZ 219 breviter C (ipsepenetrare etrare arguiino.W 220 M2-3)|| huiusmodi] P 225vel] movetur om.P 222immo]ergoZ 224movet] Z || ipsum prius] primům aliquidadd.W 227 partes]partemP || quercus]ergoetc.add.Z 232 estduplex ino.W

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et ista quaedam motuminchoanssivegravead motumaliquemdeterminans, virtusest virtusmanus;alia virtusest motumexequensinchoatumet ipsum et ista est causata sive derelictaper motuma prima,nisi enim continuans, estdarecausammotussequentis, ponaturaliqua alia virtusa prima,impossibile ut superiusestdeductum.Et istavirtus, in quocumquesubiectoponatur,continuâtet exequitur motumsecundumproportionem et modumquo determinata esta prima.Et istaestvirtusneutra,non habenscontrarium, cum exequatur motumsecundumomnemdifferentiam positionis. Et si quaeraturqualis sithuiusmodivirtus,potestdici quod nec est forma nec simpliciter fluens,sed quasi media,quia per aliquod simpliciter permanens, Sicut caliditas ab tempuspermanens. ignegenitain aqua non habetesse permanenssimpliciter sicutin igne, nec simpliciter edam fluensut calefactio sed habet esse ad determinatum ipsa, permanens tempus,sic in proposito, huiusmodi virtuspermanetad tempusaliquodsecundumproportionem virtutis a qua derelictaest. Meliustarnenvideturquod huiusmodivirtussitin [Z 168ra]corporemoto et Commentator, tumquia quam in medio,quicquidde hoc dixerit Philosophus "frustra fitperpluraquod potestfieriperpauciora";nuncautemnullaapparet necessitasponerealiquid aliud a corporemoto sive virtutein eo receptaet a principalimoventeesse causam effectivam motus;ergo nec medium. Tum secundo quia, hoc ponendo, melius et faciliussalvanturomnia de isto motu quam ponendo virtutem apparentiaet concessa communiter huiusmodiesse in medio- hoc patet,quoniamponendovirtutem istamesse in lapide moto salvaturquod ipse lapis moveturaliquo modo per formaliter se, non per accidensad [P 166va]motumaerissicutnauta ad motumnavis; non consequenter se habens; secundo,salvaturquod istemotusestcontinuus, movetur a manu tertio, quod lapisprius proicientis ipsumquam aer,cumnecaer ab eo moveaturnisi quia lapis movetur;quarto,quod huiusmodivirtusest 250Aristoteles, Lesauctoritates Louvain1974,p. 141, I, c. 4 (J.Hamesse, Aristotelů, Physica #26);cf.188a17-18. om.perhomoio. Z 237estdeductum 234estvirtus inv.Z 238(et1om.M2-3)|| (secunW 243tempus] dum]inM2) 241(quaeratur] quaerasM2-3) 242simpliciter1] simplex Z 11 ab ignegenita tumu* inaqua]inaquaab ignegenita W 11 habet]habens CZ (habet etiaminv.P; simpliciter W (simpliciter esseadd.W M2) 244 simpliciter M2) || fluens] Z 249quicquid] 245ipsaom.P || tempus] tumu* fitadd.W || tum]verum Z 250fit] sitW H quod]quaeZ 251 eo] ea W 11 recepta] Z 11et]eo Z 252(movente] recipitur motore Z tenendo Ml) 253 (ponendo] positoM2) 254 motu]motoW || ponendo] Z 258 (se habens]sequensM2) 259 quod]quia Z || prius] 255 in medio]metrům CWZ (priusMl) 260quodhuiusmodi] primo quiahaecZ

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virtusneutra,non habenscontrarium; quinto,quod lapis [C 176va]vel quodut aliud cumque corpusproiectum, iaculum,dividitmediumper quod transit. Sed nullumhorumquinqué salvariconvenienter potestponendohuiusmodi virtutem essein medio,putain aere vel in aqua, si fiatmotusin aqua, utpatet 265 discurrendo per accidensad per omnia tuncenimlapis tantummoveretur motumaerissicutnautasivenavisad motummaris;secundoetiam,istemotus se habens,quod non ut patet[W 194vb],sed consequenter non eritcontinuus, videturesse rationabile; tertio,sequiturquod proicienslapidemprimomoveat etnonaeremquam lapidem,cumlapismoveaturab aere per istamvirtutem, 270 nisiab aere primomotoa manu,cum istavirtusper quam movetcausetura manu in ipso mediantemotusiveper motum;quartoetiam,non ita apparet cumsitnata possitesseneutra,nonhabenscontrarium, quomodotuncistavirtus tunc non in subiecto habente contrarium; potestsalvari quinto, recipipraecise dividat mediumper aliud vel corpusproiectum, quod iaculum, quodcumque 275 quod transit.Ergo etc. estsuperius, Praeterea, corpusmixtummagisestsubiecquia, ut declaratum istiusvirtutis tumproportionatum quam aliquod elementům, ergo etc. Hoc tenendo,potestrespondenad rationesPhilosophi.Ad primam,quando revertitur ad proicientem" diciturquod "interdum etc.,concorpusproiectum in virtutem motus aeris 280 cedo, quando Quando proicientis. oppositumsuperai sed moveturultra,et hoc per virtutem autem non superat,non revertitur, te principalisive primamovente,quoniamsicut derelictamin lapide a virtù derelictae motuslapidispraecellitsiveexceditmotumaeris,ita et actiovirtutis in aere actionem virtutis causatae excedit in lapide a manu impellente ipsum in huiusmodi etiam enim virtutem a movente Non 285 medio, nego recipi ipsum.

11.138-144. 278Hic supra, conveZ 263(quinqué] 262perquodtransit] M2-3)|| salvari quietem quodpertransit huiusmodi virtutem add.W 265tantum nienter inv.W 264esseom.Z || ut]ponendo movetur om.W II (moveretur] Ml) 266etiam]tuncW; enimZ 267(erit]estMl) || rationale Ml) 269 M2-3)|| (sequitur] sequeretur (non2]nuncM3) 268 (rationabile] Z (posset Z 271etiam]enimZ 272possit] motum Ml) 274quod] posset moveatur] . . . etc.om. esseZ 276-277 Ml) 278 perhomoio (praeterea quosZ 276utom.Z II est2] concedendo add.mg.C || hoc]sedP; ergoadd.W || (tenendo] ad philosophum responsio W || quoniam om. W 279etc.om.W 282prima] aristotelis primo Ml) II philosophi] etiamadd.W accessionem Z 283(sive]et Ml) 284(actionem] Ml) 285huiusmodi]

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immonec motussuperaimotumnisiquia una virtussuperaialiam,et itaagit fortius quam alia. Ex quo sequiturquod, quando lapis vel aliquod gravemovetur[P 166vb] in medio,siveetiamleve,quod concurrunt ibi duo motus,videlicet motusipsius in est immediate a virtute derelicta et etiam motus aeris, lapidis,qui lapide, - ad motum - licetnon immediate tam enim aer motus etiam facit qui lapidis, quam etiamvirtuslapidiscausata in ipso ab impellentedeferunt lapidem. Exemplum:navisin marimoveturduplicimotu.Moveturenim,trahitur, seu pelliturad pulsummaris;vehituretiamseu moveturmotutrahentis. Quod ad motumalicuiuspraecisenonpotest moveri patet,quoniamilludquod movetur celeriussive velociusilio; sed constatquod interdumnavis multocelerius movetur ad motumearum. quam ipsaeundaemaris;ergonon tantummovetur Consimiliter dico in proposito,quod videlicetlapis defertur et moveturper non tantum aerem sive eius sed etiam aerem, motum, per per motumsive in tis derelictae lapide a primomovente. impulsumvirtù Per hoc patetad rationem. Concedoenimquod, sicutquandolapisproicitur ibi duplexdeferenslapidemsive motor,puta aer motuset sursum,concurrit in lapi[C 176vb]dea movente, ita consimiliter in motucontrario virtusderelicta deorsumversusproicientem concurrit quo lapisrevertitur duplexmotor,puta aer impellenset virtutemillam lapidis vincenset principiumintrinsecum mobilis[Z 168rb],puta gravitas[W 195ra]ipsa. Ex hoc autemnon sequitur, ut infertur, quod motuslapidissursumsittantumab aere,nec per consequens quod huiusmodivirtusmotumistumcontinuanssit in aere praecise. Ad secundam,quando diciturquod "omnismotusest naturalis"etc.,dico naturalemlapidis,et sicest quod motusistepotestcomparalivel ad virtutem cum sit contra eius inclinationem eius violentus, naturalem;vel ad virtutem accidentalem et extrinsecam a derelictam primavirtute, et istomodo estaliquo modo connaturalis, et ita est simpliciter motusviolentus, quia contrainclinationemformae etsecundum secundum inclinationem naturalis, naturalis, quid quia 309Hic supra, 11.145-149. C (surius surus* 287 fortius] Ml; fortius M2-3) 288-289(movetur... leve]siveetiam inmedioMI) 292etiam]esseCZ {exp. levemovetur utcon.M2);ipsaadd.W 294pelZ || etiam]enimZ 295 (quoniam]cumMl) 297 ipsaeom.Z litur]impellitur 298-299peraerem]peralterum motore CZ; om.W 300 a] in Z || (movente] MI) 301enimom.CZ 302ibiom.W || (duplex] add.M2) 304revertitur] vertitur W 305(illam] iliaMl) || lapidis] W 306mobilis] CZ (medioM2-3) mobili* lapidem* 307 infertur] Z || lapidis]lapis*Z || tantum] inferunt W || (consequens] tarnen contrarium eiusadd.Z 11 virtute] v'iiiZ M2) 311 eius2om.W 312extrinsecam]

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a magnete.Iste ergo motus 315 formaeaccidentalis.Exemplum:ferrumtrahitur formam vel ad sive virtutem ferri et sic est vionaturalem, potestcomparali vel ad formamimpressam lentus,quia contraeius naturaleminclinationem; in ferroab ilio lapide,et sic est aliquo modo naturalis.Et hoc est quod dicit Commentator , commento35. superVili Physicorum "violentum Ad tertiam, dicitur 320 [P 167ra]est"etc.,dico quod mobile quando sivepassumpotestconsideralisiveaccipi dupliciter, quia vel secundumsuam essentialem sivenaturalem et intrinsecam, et quod secundamistamest formam ei extrinsecam naturaleestsimpliciter naturale;vel secundumaliquamformam et quod secundumtalemest naturaleest tantumsecundum et accidentalem, vimpasso potestintelligi 325 quid naturale.Tunc dico quod agens non conferre dupliciter, quia vel quod non conférâtsibi vim primam,videlicetnaturalem vel quod nec istamnec aliquam aliam. Et utroqueistorum et intrinsecam, modorumdictumPhilosophi,videlicet"violentumest" etc.,est verum,sane intelligendo.Movens enim seu agens non conferíipsi mobili passo vim, vim seu nec etiamconfert 330 perfectionem aliquam naturalemseu intrinsecam, sed et accidentalem et extrinsecam sibi convenientem, aliquam perfectionem et repugnan tem. Et ideo non dicituraliquid sibi conferre, disconvenientem tionemconvenientem auferre.Dando enim quod sibi dissed magis disposi aufertquod conveniens estet contraeiusnaturaleminclinationem, conveniens non Et hoc modo intendit 335 est,et ideo diciturnihilsibiconferre. Philosophus, nihil nihil sed conveniens. ei tribuat absolute, quod quod violenter calefitab igneet ignisipsamcalefaciens Exemplum:aqua violenter non quod non tribuatei aliquid,sed quia nectribuit diciturnihilsibiconferre, naturalemet intrinsecam, nec etiam accidentalem vim sive perfectionem

if.373vbL-375raB, InPhysicam 35(ed.Venice, 316-319 VIII,comm. Averroes, esp.374vaH). 11.150-153. 320Hie supra, Z 317 (quia]quasiM2-3)|| eiusom.W || natu316ferri naturalem] supernaturalem mobile siveom.W 321considerali] ralemom.C 319viii]4 W 320-321 W; comparali om.C {add.utcon.M1-2-3)|| estom.Z 323vel] om.Z II suamom.W 322secundum Z 324(etaccidentalem intrinsecam quodadd.W || ei] et CZ {om.Ml) || extrinsecam] Z || (intelconfert om.W 325naturale] tantum add.W || conferre] om.Ml) II tantum W 329(seu] scilicet om.W 328videlicet] Ml) 326quodom.Z || primam ligi]intendi add.W 330(seu1]sive seuadd.W {add.utcorr. siveMl) Il mobili] Ml) || vim]scilicet diceretur M3) || Ml) II (seu2]siveMl) 331et2]esseG; etiamP; om.Z 332(dicitur] sibiadd.GZ || enim]ei Z 334 et]eo Z 335 aliquidsibiinv.W 333 dispositionem] dicereinv.P 338(dicitur] nihilsibiinv.W 336quod2]quiaP 337ipsamcalefaciens CZ || (et]ei M2-3) turM3) II nihilsibiinv.W 339vim]naturam

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- immoconvenientem dando 340 aliquamconvenientem removet, putafrigiditatem, sibi disconvenientem, caliditatem. Et sicut calefactio puta qua aqua calida calefitestnaturalis et violenta,naturalis siquidemestaliquo modocomparando ipsamad formamquam aqua recipitab igne,puta ad caliditatem[G 177ra], violentaautemestsimpliciter ad formam naturalem per comparationem aquae, est in propositode motugravissursum.Est enim,ut dictum 345 sic consimiliter ad formamnaturalem est,istemotusviolentussimpliciter per comparationem gravis,sed naturalissecundumquid, comparandoipsum ad illam virtutem accidentalemderelictamin gravia primavirtutemotiva. Ad ultimam,quando dicitur,"omne mobile" etc., dico quod verumest 350 [W 195rb]de ilioquod recipit a movente vimaliquametnonhabetin se formam naturalemipsumad opposituminclinantem, sicutde manu scribentis patet. Habens autemin se formaminclinantem ad aliquemmotumnumquampotest assuefieri ad motumoppositum, quantumcumque recipiata moventealiquam virtutem determinatam ad illummotum,sicutpatetde [P 167rb]ferroquod, 355 quantumcumque et moveatura magneteper virtutem alipluriesattrahatur in a ex hoc assuefieri ad istum quam ipso magneteimpressam, numquam potest motum.Et hoc propterformamnaturalemquam habet ipsum ad motum contrarium inclinantem. Et idempatetde aqua quae nonpotestad caliditatem licetab ignefuerit et hoc proptereandemrationem. assuefieri, pluriescalefacta, est in propositode lapide motosursum.Quia enimgravehabet 360 Consimiliter formamnaturalem, inclinantem puta gravitatem, ipsumad motumdeorsum, ideo quantumcumque ad motumcontrarium, recipiata manu virtutem puta ad illummotum. sursum,numquampotestper illam assuefieri Hoc de primo. 365 Quantumad secundum,quod est de instrumento naturali,utrumvidelicet instrumentum a naturale,sicutmanusvel lingua,recipiantaliquamvirtutem 349Hic supra, 11.154-157. 340aliquam] movet C 341sicut] sicCZ 342calefit] aliquomodoW;om.Z || removet] calefactibilis W (calefacit eritM3) || modo]naturalis add.C CZ; calefacit Ml) || (est1] 343 recipit] et add.C 346 naturalem] Z naturalis C, Wpc(!) 344 simpliciter] recepit 350formam] add.W 351-352 CZ (corr . adpatethabens aliquam patethabens] philosophus Ml; perhibens M2-3) 352aliquem] aliquodZ 353ad motum oppositum] aliquidmotus Z II quantumcumque] C (quantumcumque M2Ml; quacumque oppositus quamcumque motore 3) II (movente] Ml) 354 quod]qui CPZ (quodMl) 356 a om.Z || istum] suumZ 358etom.PW 363illam] illaZ 11assuefieri] W 365articulus calefieri secundus add.mg. articlus add.mg. WZ 11ad. . . instrumento] insacramento estdesecundo W P;secundus

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potentiamoventeipsa,dico quod sic. Et hoc patetex primo,quoniamsi illud ad motumillum,recipita moventevirtutem mobile,quod motumnon assuefit ad illum multo motum continuantem, magisilludquod ex motuassuefit aliquam ut manusvel 370 motum,cuiusmodiestquodlibetnaturalehominisinstrumentum, vel a movente ea. Nisi enim virtutem dispositionem aliquam linguarecipiunt seu habituari actum assuefieri ad nullum formam [Z 168va] aliquamreciperent, possent;ergo etc. ad aliquemmotumassuefit Confirmatur, quoniamomneilludquod assuefit 375 per aliquid derelictumin ipso ex ilio motu,quia praeciseper motumnon sed huiusmodiinstrumenta, puta manus,lingua,et oculus, possuntassuefieri; et proprios;ergo etc. assuescuntad actus determinatos Praeterea,habitusestformaquaedam derelictain habitoalia a dispositione instrumentis sed in istisorganisseu naturalibus primaad habitůmdisponente; in qua ex sive generaturhabitus,ut patet de manu scriptoris 380 derelinquitur in sive eis actu scribendi motu sive habitus;ergo generatur generatur frequenti formaaliqua alia a formispropriisipsorum,quae quidem est derelinquitur inclinansad actus secundosper modumactusprimi. < Excursusde motucaeli> Ex istisduabus conclusionibus quae positaesunt [C 177rb] de instrumento et naturali,videturposse concludiquod caelummotumab angelo 385 artificiali aliam sive formamab ipso neutramaccidentalem, recipiataliquam virtutem inhaerentem. Hoc potestprobari,primoex a motu locali, caelo formaliter sic: quantoaliqua potentiamotivaestnobilior [P 167va]moventis, perfectione in subiectonato eam virtutem tantomagisnata est imprimere et perfectior, motiva virtute 390 recipere;sed virtusmotivailliusmotoris[W 195va]estperfectior seu moventia inferiora tamen et inferioris motoris, imprimunt caucuiuscumque et exequentem; santin hisquae moventvirtutem aliquammotumcontinuantem

motore estadd.Z || (movente] 367potentia] primoW || ipsa]ipsamZ 368motum1] instrucuiusM3) || hominis continentem M3) 370(cuiusmodi] Ml) 369(continuantem] mentum inv.W 371 (recipiunt] Ml) || ea] eamCZ (eumMl) 372reciperent] recipit add.W 375(aliquid] autadd.CZ; aliter W || seu]velP 374motum] aliquem receperit W 379disponente] veladd.W 378habitoalia]habituato disponenM3) 376manus] CZ contrahendi temW (disponentem M3) || seu] organisadd.W 381 scribendi] Z 384duabus] duobus alicuius duos+ ? add.C (duosperadd.M3) || actus2] 383actus1] Z (concedi concedi add.W 385 concludi] M3) || C, Wac (!); om.Z || de] sacramento Z forma animoMl) 386formam] C, Wpe(!)(formam M1-3S) 387hoc]conclusi (angelo] M3) continentem inv.P 391(seu]siveMI) 392(continuantem] 389-390 eamrecipere

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in cáelo, dumhuiusmodivirtutem ergomultomagisilludmovensimprimet modo ipsumcaelum sit capax sive receptivum eius. Sed non videtur ratio quare non sit receptivum ipsius,cum virtusista non habeat contrarium virtusenimsive formanon ponensin caelo alterationem, cuiusmodiest ista sicutlumen,nonrépugnât caelo forma,cumsitneutra,non habenscontrarium, huiusmodi autem virtus est non habens contrarium nec magisquam lumen; in caelo alterationem ponens aliquam magisquam lumen;quare etc. Ex quo sequiturulteriusquod, intelligentia cessantemoverecaelum,quod adhuccaelummoveretur siverevolveretur ad tempusper huiusmodivirtutem, huiusmodicircularemmotumexequentemet continuantem, sicutpatet de rotafiguli, ad tempus,cessanteprimomoventemovere.Eadem quae revolvitur enimratiovideturesse hie quae estibi et e converso,videlicetvirtusderelicta a primomotorein mobilihic et ibi. Praetereasecundo,arguitur ex parteipsiusmobilis,primosic:si caelumnon essetreceptivum talisvirtutis, hoc non videreturesse nisi propterimperfectionemipsius, sed ista imperfectionon obstat,quoniam virtusquae est ilio; sed ista virtusest principium principiumalicuiusnon est imperfectior motuslocalis cuius caelum est receptivum; nisi detur ergo et illiusvirtutis, aliud ab caelo reciperehuiusmodi aliquid imperfectione propterquod repugnet virtutem. moventi Confirmatur, quia quantoaliquodmobilemagisestproportionatum et minusresistitsibi, tantomagis natumest recipereet recipitinfluentiam suo motoriet magisest sibi proportionatum eius; sed caelum minusresistit suo motori;ergo etc. quam aliquod mobilehic inferius Sed contrahoc arguitur, primosic: movenssive agens hic inferius, puta movenslapidem,nonimprimit huiusmodi in lapidemoto,sed inmedio virtutem facit per quod movet,quod [P 167vb]quidem,secundumCommentatorem,

In Physicam 418-420 ff.430vaI-431rbE). Averroes, Vili,comm.82 (ed.Venice, 393imprimet huiusmodi virtutem iter. C 394 sit]fitCZ (sitM1-3S) 394-395(eius. . . om.perhomoio. om.per receptivum MI) 396 (ista]iliaMl) 397-398sicut.. . contrarium W 399quare]ergoW 400sequitur] homoio. etiamadd.W || movere] Z 402 movetur huiusmodi om.CW 11circularem] Z 403(movente] circulationem motore MIS) 11movere] Z 404ratiovidetur movetur essehiequaeest]videtur esseratiohicetW 405a] si W movente W || (inmobili] inmobili Il motore] M3) 406 arguitur] arguoW || si] sitW et add.W || (nisidetur] {om.M3) 407 (virtutis] Ml!) 410 receptivum] impetus neque datur Cpc(a prima W estinv. MI, S/?c!)411 ab imperfectione M3) 413magis perfectione 414 natumest inv.CZ 416 aliquod]aliquidC || motori]motoC (motori MIS) 417 (sive]s. MI) 419 facit] fuitCZ (fitMl, S/?r!)

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420 condensandoet rarefaciendoipsum; sed caelum non est rarefactibile nec cum sit et nec istius virtù tis condensabile, incorruptibile impassibile;ergo receptivum. Praetereasecundo,si aliqua talis virtuscausareturin caelo, ipsa esset Probatio:quia si corrumperetur, vel corrumperetur a contrario, incorruptibilis. 425 vel per corruptionem[C 177va] sui subiecti,vel ad cessationemagentis moventis. Non primum,quia non habetcontrarium. Nec secundum,quia eius subiectumest incorruptibile. Nec tertium, videlicetad cessationem moventis, talis virtus manere ad cessante virtute et quoniam ponitur tempus, ipsamovente, ita eadem rationesemperpoteritmanere,ipsa cessante.Sed non videturquod 430 intelligentia talem,videlicet possitaliquamvirtutem incorruptibilem, producere. Ergo etc. Ad primum,quando diciturquod "movensinferiusaliquod grave non et conimprimitin medio virtutemhuiusmodinisi medianterarefactione dico densatione," quod hoc estper accidens,non per se. Est enimhoc,primo, ad recipiendum 435 ex hoc quia mediumnon estin propinquadispositione huiusmodi virtutem, nec ipsumetiamcorpusmotum,et ideo oportetalterationem et condensationem illam praecedere.Secundo, quae fitper rarefactionem tam [W 195vb] movens [Z 168vb] quam etiam mobile sive motum quia huiusmodiest corpus,et ideo oportetibi esse alterationem, quoniamcorpus 440 non movetcorpusnisiexpeliendo,et per consequensmediumin aliqua parte condensandoet in alia rarefaciendo. Hic autemin isto motuprimimobilis esttotumoppositum, quoniamcaelumestin ultimaet propinquadispositione ad istam virtutem, et ideo non oportetalterationemaliquam praecedere. Movens etiamnon est corpus,sed spiritus.Quare etc. Ad secundum,quod est difficilius, dico quod ista rationon debetmovere 445 constat in caelo beatorumnon tantumerit laus fidelem,quoniam quod sivementalis, sed etiamvocalis.Nec enimsanctieruntibi muti,non spiritualis 11.417-422.445 Hic supra, 432 Hic supra, 11.423-431. om.MIS) || caelum] lumenZ 421 impassibile] 420 (ipsum Z 424 quiaom. impatibile Z II corrumperetur1] Z || velcompeteretur om.perhomoio. Z 425 vel2] corrumpetur* videlicet W || cessationem] suiadd.Z 426 secundum] Z 427 cessationem] subiectum seuadd.W || (moventis] cumMl) || virtute agentis S) 428 (quoniam] agentis ipsainv. W 429ratione] movere Z 434hoc2om.W 435quia]quodC proadd.P || manere] 436 ipsumetiaminv.W || oportet] quod*add.Z 438 etiam]ipsumadd.W || (sive]s. om.Z 441 alia]aliquaC || hic]nuncZ 442 (ultima] Ml) 439 estcorpus multiplici Z || (quoniam] fideliter MIS) 444etiam]etWZ 446fidelem] quiaS) || quodom.W II erit]estW 447 enim]etiamZ

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450

455

460

465

470

475

11

loquentesad invicemetiamvocaliter.Nunc autem constatquod huiusmodi vox in cáelo causatanon eritperpetua,immocorrumpetur. Quaero quomodo vel per quid? Non per corruptionem subiecti,quia caelum in quo recipitur est incorruptibile. Nec per actionemcontrarii,quia non habet contrarium, alias caelumalteraretur recipiendoipsam.Tunc ergodico ad rationemquod ilia virtuscorrumpitur sive destruitur. Et quando quaeris per quid, dico quod non per corruptionem subiecti, nec per actionemcontrarii, quia non habet,sed per cessationemagentis[P moventis.Ubi tamenest advertendum 168ra]seu virtutis quod corrumpiad cessationemvirtutismoventisest dupliciter.Uno enim modo aliquid corad cessationem virtutis moventissic quod, cessanteipsa, simulillud rumpitur et destruitur, sicutmotus.Simul enim,in eodem instantiquo corrumpitur virtusmoventiscessât,corrumpitur sive cessâtet desinitipse. Alio modo alidicitur sive desinere esse cessantealiquo, non quod ilio cesquid corrumpi santesive corruptosimulillud aliud corrumpatur, sed quia non potest,ilio suae entitatis, sicutilli radii cessante,diu manere,propterimperfectionem sive reliquiaederelictaein oculo ex excellentivisibilicorrumpuntur, amoto ilio visibili,non simul,sed ad modicumtempus,quia non possuntdiu perSic est in manere,ilio remoto,propter[C 177vb] eorum imperfectionem. in caelo ab intelligentia moventecausataseu impressa, propositode istavirtute et etiamde quacumquealia a quocumquealio motoreper motumlocalem causata. Unde dico quod triplexest genusformarum. Est enim aliqua formasimsicutmotus,et talissimultransit et desinit, cessantemovente. successiva, pliciter Alia est simpliciter ut albedo. Tertia est permanens, quasi media, quia nec successiva ut nec motus, simpliciter simpliciter permanens,quia non potest cessante causa nisi ad modicumtempustantum,cuiusmodi eius, permanere, est ista virtusmotivaa primavirtutecausata.

448(nunc]nisiM3) 449vox]estadd.C 450recipitur] CW 451(actionem] recipietur accessionem contraria Z 452(alteraretur] abitaretur MIS) || contrarium] M3) || ipsam] rationes accessionem Ml, Spó) || quod]quiaW 455 (actionem] ipsasCZ II (rationem] add.M3) || sed]se C (sedM1-3S) 456(seu]siveMl) || MIS) II (habet] ubi MIS) 457 (moventis] motoris (moventis unde]motoris MIS) || enimom.C 458illud]idemCZ {om. om.Z 460(moventis] motoris MIS) 459in]etiamC || instanti deficit CZ || ipse]esseZ 460-461aliquidom.W 461 aliquo]¿ilioP MIS) Il desinit] 463 entitatis] entisW 465 ilio]primoZ 466 sic]sicutW 468 (etiam] quidemM3) 471simultransit] Z || desinit] esseadd.W 472 est1om.Z W; transit simpliciter

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Posset etiam fortedici quod huiusmodivirtuscausata in caelo esset incorruptibilis. Hoc de secundo.

480

485

490

495

500

dico quod in sacramentis non est aliqua ad tertium articulum, Quantum sive eis inhaerensformaliter, sed tantumest in eis virtussubvirtusinsistens cuiuslibetsacramenti. sistens,quae Deus est,qui immediateagitad effectum Etprimo Istudproboin generalide quolibetsacramento quattuorrationibus. a Deo causata in est huiusmodi virtus sic: si sacramentis [W 196ra] aliqua arguo et extensaextensioneet divisionesubiecti, sive influxa,aut ipsa est divisibilis aut estinextensaet indivisibilis ; sed nullumhorumpotestponi; ergoetc. Probariominoris,et primoquod non possitponi indivisibilis:quoniamhaec est et accidentalem, differentia interformam substantialem quia formasubstantialis licetsecundumquid estnobiliorsuo subiectoet ab eo simpliciter independens, estsuo subiectoignobilior sitdependens,e contrarioautemformaaccidentalis et licet forma substantialis inextensaet et ab eo simpliciter ita, dependens, in divisibili et sicut anima rationalis subiecto indivisibilis extenso, possitrecipi et indivisibilem in corpore,tarnenformamaccidentaleminextensam recipiin et subiectoextensoet divisibiliimpossibileest, quoniam formaindivisibilis et extensa,formaautemaccidentalis non potest inextensaestnobiliordivisibili estdivisibile essenobiliorsuo subiecto;sed quodlibetsacramentum [P 168rb]et Secundo non divisibilis: etc. extensum;ergo possitponi quoniam proboquod subiectiest sivedivisibilis estet extensaextensione omnisformaquae dividitur nonestmaior maiorin maioriet minorin minorisubiecto;sed virtussacramenti in maiorinec minorin minorisubiecto,nec enimvirtusbaptismiestmaiorin maioriaqua vel minorin minori;ergo etc. Secundosic: aut huiusmodivirtus,si ponitur,est corporeaaut incorporea. nonpotestrecipiin aliquosubiecto Non incorporea, quia accidensincorporeum sacramentum cuiusmodi est quantumad suum matecorporeo, quodlibet in unius sicut et verba riale, aqua baptismo.Praeterea,quia accidensproprium add.mg.W 11 add.mg.P; tertius articulus tertius 478hoc]etiamadd.Z 479 articulus Z irai. W 481 deusestqui iter. C 480 inhaerens formaliter rie'add.mg.2 bonaventura W 489 sitom.W 11 accidentalis] om.W 486 possit] 11 qui. . . sacramenti quia potest Z || indivisibilem] inextensa om.W 492inextensam] add.W 490licetom.Z 491recipi Z 11quoniam] W 493quoniam] indivisibili potest quiaZ 496probo]ponoZ 11possit] quia Z 497 estet inv.W 499 enim]etiamW 500 minorom.W 501 sic aut]sic P || aut2]velW 504verba] sicZ || ponitur] W; arguitur C; sicautem ponatur arguitur om.Z verboC || proprium

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505 subiectinon potestesse in alio subiectoilli subiectoopposito;sed accidens est propriumsubiectoincorporeosicutet accidenscorporeum incorporeum corporeo;ergoetc. Nec potestdici quod sitvirtuscorporea,quoniamhuiusnisi ad hoc quod sit ratiocausandi modi virtusnon poniturin sacramentis in anima sacramentum, aliquid spirituale suscipientis quod non potestcom510 peterealicuicorporali;ergoetc. [C 178ra]Confirmatur: quia huiusmodivirnon tus,si ponaturcorporeain baptismovel in quocumquealio sacramento, - immominus est magisproportionata ipsi animae et effectui qui causatur in ipsa quam sintverba et aqua quantumad sacramentum baptismi,ergo - immominus non magis potesteffectum aliquem causarein anima quam 515 ipsa verba et aqua. Gonsequentiapatet.Sed antecedensprobatur,quoniam nulla substantiacorporeanec aliquod quodcumquecorporeummovetanimam rationalemnisimediantesensitiva, medianteautemista,potestmovere sed huiusmodi virtus ipsam; supernaturalis corporeain elementoaquae existensnon est nata moveresensitivám, nec enim sensualiquo est apprehensi520 bilis,quod tarnenfacitipsa formaelementi,et etiamverba ipsa; ergo etc. Tertio sic: aut ista virtusest permanensaut est fluens.Non permanens, in subiectonon quoniam accidenspermanensnon potestrecipiformaliter sed permanente, successivo,cuiusmodisuntomniaverba sacramentalia quae suntprincipaliain quolibetsacramento.Nec fluens,quia virtussacramenti veritatem[W 196rb]sacramenti; Veritasautemsacramentinon 525 praesupponit est nisi in ultimoinstantiprolationisorationissacramentalis, puta in ultimo instanti ultimaesyllabaevel litteraeistiusorationis:"Hoc estcorpus prolationis istiustotiusorationis et non ante,et istius:"Ego te baptizo" meum,"estVeritas ista virtussittantumin ultimovocábulo etc.;ergore[P 168va]linquitur quod 530 sive in ultimasyllabavel litteratotiusorationis,et non in praecedentibus, cum non sintpro ilio instanti.Et ita sequiturquod nomenSpiritusSancii, sive quod poniturultimoin baptismo,est receptivumalicuiusperfectionis virtu nomenPatris,nec etiamFilii.Hoc autem tis,cuius non est receptivum estfalsum,quoniamsicutad quamcumquevirtutem siveeffectum causandum

505alio]aliquoW || subiecto2 om.W || (opposito] obiecto M3) 506(et]estM3) 508 nonom.C 509 aliquid]aliquodW 510 corporali] W || quia]quodZ 512 corpori Z 513-514ergononinv.P 514 causare] creatur creareZ 517 sensitiva om. causatur] lac.W 518 ipsam]ipsaW 523 successivo] successive C || omnia]istaadd.W 525 unitatem unitasM3) 526 instanti om.W [om.Z) 526-527 (veritatem] M3) || (veritas] orationis . . . prolationis Z 528 (veritas] om.perhomoio. unitasM3) 11 istius2 om.Z 529 Z 531sint]sitZ 532ponitur] veritas inadd.CZ || ponitur ultimo inv.W 533 virtus] W cuius]quiaZ || etiam]nomen

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una persona,concurrit et alia. Ita etiamnon est alicuius 535 ad extraconcurrit virtutis nomen unius supernaturalis receptivum personaecuiusnon sitnomen alteriusreceptivum. Ergo etc. Quartoet ultimoarguosic: aut huiusmodivirtusessetuna aut plures.Non una, quia talisnon possetesse in pluribussubiectis,cuiusmodisuntaqua et 540 verba,et ipsa etiamverbainterse. Nec plures,quia tunctalesplures,ex quo eis ponunturad causandumaliquidin anima,per consequenscorrespondent in anima,quod non ponitur.Ergo etc. etiamdiversieffectus Dico ergo quod nulla alia virtusest in sacramentis nisi virtussubsistens, Deus est. Nec aliter sacramenta dicuntur causa esse quae gratiaequam obsersintcausa gloriaeconsequendae.Sicutenimobservatio 545 vantiaepraeceptorum diciturcausa gloriaenon effective, sed tantumex hoc quia Deus praeceptorum statuitcuilibetobservanti dare praecepta gloriam "Si vis,"inquit,"ad vitam sacramentadicunturcausa gratiae ingredi,servamandata" ita consimiliter non effective, quia ista est solus Deus, sed pro quanto ipse Deus ordinavit 550 et statuitcuilibetdignesuscipienti ipsa conferre gratiam[C 178rb] effective. Sic ad quaestionem. ad aliquem Ad rationemin principio, quando diciturquod "causa concurrens ad ilium effectum" concedo de causa effectum. etc., quae agit supernaturalem Sic autemnon concurrunt sacramentaad gratiamsivead iustificationem ani555 mae. Non enimconcurrunt causaliter,ut tu accipisin minori,ut statimdictumest. Quare etc.

19.17. 552Hic supra, 11.3-7. 547-548Matthaeus Z || non]nuncW 539(subiecetalia]etaliaconcurrit 535ad extraom.Z || concurrit P 542ponitur] CZ M3) 540etipsaetiamverbaom.perhomoio. tis]sacramentis potest P (mg.); observantia W 545 sint]sitP (mg.)545-546 544-545observantiae] observatio om. W 546quia]quodW 548serva]suaC (serva sint. . . praeceptorum M3) perhomoio. effectum inv.W 554 concurrunt] concurrent 549quanto]tantoZ 553 supernaturalem C 555statim om.W 556 quareetc.om.utabbrev.

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FrancisofMarchia, Virtus derelicta, and Modifications of theBasic Principles ofAristotelian Physics FABIO ZANIN*

Abstract This articletakesas its pointof departurethe convictionthatlate medieval science should be studiedin its own right,and not merelyto determine whetherit presageddevelopments in earlymodernscience.Case in point: Francisof Marchia's theoryof virtus derelicta , the theorythatthe motionof a projectilethroughthe air is due to a forceleftbehind by the original motiveforce. Certainly,Marchia's view is not a forerunnerof inertia. breaks with two important Nevertheless,it is argued that virtusderelicta Aristotelian of motion: that principles "everything has a beginningmustnecalso have an end" and "form is alwaysindivisible." dereThus, virtus essarily lictais neitheran Aristotelian solutionto the problemof projectilemotion nor a development on theroad to earlymodernscience;it belongsto a new of motion. (butsubsequently undeveloped)understanding It is worthre-examininghow Francis of Marchia analyzes the causes of the motionofjbroiecta, not only because his analysishas originalfeatures, but also because these featuresconflictwith several principlesof the Aristoteliantheoryof motion.In particular,the concept of virtus derelicta plays the main role in Marchia's break with tradition.It mightappear that Anneliese Maier wrote all that could be writtenabout projectile motionin the laterMiddle Ages,withspecial referenceto Marchia's opinion. Most importandy,she removedonce and for all any cause formisvirtus derelicta as identicalto "inertialforce": interpreting * In whatfollows I willrefer to ChrisSchabel's critical edition ofMarchia's Sent. IV, in thisvolume(pp. 41-80),rather thanAnneliese Maier'sfamous text, q. 1, published sincetheformer isbasedontheresults oflaterMarchia studies thatMaiercouldnothave I willsimply known. in squarebrackets as IV.1 followed quotetheedition bylinenumbersafter a colon,e.g.[IV.1:3-17].Thanks toRussFriedman andChrisSchabel forreadon an earlier draft ofthisarticle. ingandcommenting

© Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden, 2006 Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl/viv

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FABIOZANIN The cruciaicontrastbetweenthe principleof inertiaand the theoryof lies in both the above-mentioned elements:in the idea thaton impetus its own account a motionremainsunchangedin the absence of any externalor internalforces,and thatas a consequencethereare (violent) does not showthe tendencyto motionsin responseto whichthe mobile come back to a stateof rest.This idea signalsthe abandonmentonce ab aliquomoveand forall of the Aristotelian principleomnequodmovetur mechantheabandonment ofthefoundation ofscholastic tur,and thereby ics, whichthe impetus theorystillretainedand on whichit was based. This contrastis in any case so strongthatthe new idea could not be developedon the basis of the old theory,but onlyin oppositionto it.1

derelicta is used in order to solve problemsassociThe device of virtus distinction betweennaturaland violentmotion. ated withthe Aristotelian derelicta fitentirelyinto As far as Maier was concerned,Marchia's virtus minor modifications an Aristotelian requiringonly conceptualframework, derelicta of Aristode'sbasic theory.2In Maier's view, then,whenevervirtus the medieval within the Aristotelian a role framework, played specific one. was entirelydependenton the Aristotelian mode of scientific thinking on the is it Maier's considered views that we have matter, So, given really

1 A. Maier,%weiGrundprobleme Das Problem derintensiven derscholastischen Naturphilosophie. zwiRome1951,306:"Derentscheidende Grösse. DieImpetustheorie , 2. Auflage, Gegensatz Momenten: ersten undderImpetustheorie schendemTrägheitsprinzip liegtindenbeiden Kräfte sichvonselbst ohneäußereoderinnere in demGedanken, dasseineBewegung das mobile unddasses folglich erhält, Bewegungen gibt,denengegenüber (gewaltsame) DieserGedanke bedeutet in denRuhezustand zurückzukehren. nicht dasBestreben zeigt, ab aliquo movetur omne desaristotelischen dieendgültige , und quodmovetur Prinzips Aufgabe diedie Impetustheorie derscholastischen derGrundlagen damitdieAufgabe Mechanik, istallerdings so hat.Unddieser undaufdenensieaufgebaut nochfestgehalten Gegensatz ihnentwickeln nurgegen sichnicht ausdemalten, sondern dassderneueGedanke stark, seein particular konnte." On Marchia ibid.,161-200. 2 Maier,%weiGrundprobleme dass vielmehr, (cit.n. 1 above),195: "Marchiaerklärt das dierichtige Aristoteles habe,indemerdieBewegung Lösunggefunden grundsätzlich derprimäre die einAbleger Kraftzurückfuhrt, aufeinesekundäre bewegende proiectum zu korrigieren: derTrägerdersekundäre istnurin einemPunkt Kraft ist.DieseLösung Thereis a largebibliography sondern derbewegte Kraft dasMedium, istnicht Körper." the thereadermight consult of motion, butamongotherworks on Aristotle's theory York1971; Berlin-New H. Happ,Hyle.Studien zumaristotelischen Materie-Begriff', following: Unafisicasenzamatematica: G.A. Lucchetta, Democrito, Arìstotele, , Trento1978; Filopono a inPhysics Aristotle onContinuity D. Bostock, VI, in: L. Judson Physics: (ed.),Aristotle's Causation inthePhysics, D. Charles, Collection 1991,179-212; , Oxford Teleological ofEssays and Method in Cosmology Aristotle andMathematics: in: ibid.,101-28; Aporethic J.J.Cleary, 1995. York-Köln , Leiden-New Metaphysics

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derelicta necessaryto reconsideryet again what Marchia means by virtus as well as the role it plays in his analysisof the causes of violentmotion? From the 1950s to the 1990s, Marshall Clagett and Edward Grant publishedtheir contributionsto the studyof late medieval science. At manyjuncturesin his studiesof medieval science, Clagett adopted the whetheraspects generalperspectiveof PierreDuhem, examiningexplicitly of medievalscience were genuineforerunners of the Galilean-Newtonian ScientificRevolution.With particularreferenceto the problem of virtus derelicta , Edward Grant was not entirelyin agreementwith the view of derelicta had the same meaningas 'inerDuhem, who thoughtthat virtus tial force',at least implicitly; Grant argued thatthe concept nevertheless, of impetus derelicta , but preferredby John (a termsynonymouswith virtus has some characteristics of the Buridan) principleof inertia.3In my opinion we need to re-examinethe issue, because lyingbehind the research of practicallyall those who studylate medievalscience is a highlyproblematic presupposition.This presuppositionis encapsulated in the followingquestion:does latemedievalscienceanticipatetheGalilean-Newtonian ScientificRevolution,or does it stilldepend on Aristotle? I thinkthat it is importantforus not even to attemptto answerthis falsequestion,because it lookslike an either/ or dichotomy:either medieval scienceanticipatedGalileo orit stilldepended on Aristotle.But the apparent dichotomyis only the resultof the diffusionof Duhem's pioneering works arguingfor the essentialcontinuitybetween medieval and early modernscience,on the one hand, and of Kuhn's epistemologicalnotions describingthe structureof scientificrevolutions,on the other.4Duhem and Kuhn seem to leave us with a choice between continuityand disand no middleground.The questionwe mustask,beforeeven continuity, beginningour studyof late medieval science, is as follows:is it really 3 ForClagett, see e.g.his"Introduction" to Nicole Oresme andtheMedieval of Geometiy A Treatise andMotions. ontheUniformity andDifformity Known as Tractatus Qualities ofIntensities deconfigurationibus etmotuum, ed.andtrans. M. Clagett, Madison-Milwaukeequalitatum London1968,105-06.Clagett dealsdirecdy withMarchiaand virtus in hisThe derelicta Science intheMiddle Madison1959,519-20, where on p. 520Clagett folofMechanics Ages, lowsMaierinarguing thatMarchia's virtus derelicta is"a simple emendation oftheAristotelian theprincipal ForGrant's theory, transferring impressed powerto theprojectile." opinion, see e.g. TheFoundations Science intheMiddle and Institutional, ofModern Ages.TharReligious, Intellectual Contexts , Cambridge 1996,95-97. 4 I refer inparticular to P. Duhem, Lesystème dumonde. Histoire desdoctrines cosmologiques dePlaton à Copernic vol.VII, 4, andvol.VIII,542,andtoT.S. Kuhn,The , Paris1954-59, Structure Revolutions , Chicago1962. ofScientific

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possible to answer the question "Does late medieval science anticipate modernscience"? In my opinion it is not possibleto marshalconclusive evidence or rationalargumentsforeitherthe affirmative or the negative responseto this question.We can point out certaindeviationsfromthe or fromthe other,but thatis not the same as answerone way of thinking the ing global question of whethermedieval science anticipatedmodern derelicta an anticipationof to be either science. Given that assumingvirtus ofAristotelian modernscienceora continuation physicsis a falsedichotomy, it seems more usefulto pay attentionto the exact meaningof the conderelicta and the role Marchia gives to it in his explanationof cept virtus If we take the above questionas our pointof departhe motionofproiecta. ture,this will colour the way we understandall the argumentsused by the Franciscantheologian. Marchia analyzesviolentmotionin the contextof his discussionof the consecrationof the Eucharist [IV. 1:1-2]. Maier did not make much of thisfact,as if it were a negligiblepoint.As mentionedabove, her efforts derelicta anticwere directedtowardsansweringthe questionwhethervirtus and she that it did of showed the modern clearly concept 'inertia5, ipated not. On the otherhand, Maier did carefullystressthatlate medievalsciso to speak, in ence was really a heterogeneous"world of thinking,"5 of meanings.Despite derelicta had a multiplicity whichthe conceptof virtus that,however,she did not noticethat thereis a manifestbreak fromthe Aristotelianframeworkin the way that this concept is used to explain the causes of severaldiversekindsof violentmotion.6 I will argue below that virtusderelicta representsa way of conceiving motion that is neitherAristoteliannor Galilean: it can be seen as the startingpoint of a new concept of motion.To be sure, Marchia's ideas when takenup by Nicole Oresme,forexamwere inchoate;nevertheless, about the nature and causes of every soon led to conclusions ple, they fromboth Aristotle'sconclukind of motionthat appear to be different of modern sions and those physicists.Specifically,the concept of virtus to onlysome kinds derelicta , in preciselythe way Marchia takesit, restricts of motionthe applicabilityof the Aristotelian physicalprincipleaccording 5 See Maier,Zjjuei (cit.n. 1 above),114. Grundprobleme 6 I shouldstress from theAristotelian didnotea departure thatMaieractually point andnotviolent, and causesa motion thatis in somewaynatural ofview:virtus derelicta to thispoint, whichis crulittle attention is correct. ButMaierdevoted thisobservation motion thatis both cialinmyopinion, becauseitis therootofa newwayofconceiving See Maier,%wei andnon-Galilean. nonAristotelian (cit.n. 1 above),185-86. Grundprobleme

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to which "everything that has a beginningmustnecessarilyalso have an end."7 In effect,virtus derelicta makes it possible to analyze a broad spectrumof non-violentmotionsthat neverthelessare not natural motions, having no natural tendenciesor aims; since natural,terrestrial motions, on the Aristoteliansystem,always cease when the mobiles come to rest in theirproper places, in this respectvirtus derelicta allows for the possibilityof some motionstakingplace withoutnecessarilycomingto an end. In addition, it will be argued that virtusderelicta opens the door to a of certain of inasmuch as it breakswiththe quantification types motion, Aristotelianprinciplethat formis always indivisible.The very fact that virtus derelicta is a formthat in principledepletesitselfmakes it possible to measureit, and the motionit causes, in a quantitativeway thatis not open to the traditionalAristotelianview of form. Let us begin,then,- as we must- by outliningthe exact contextin which the concept of virtusderelicta was born. Francis of Marchia explains its in his on meaning commentary the Sentences (book IV, question 1), as he triesto understandwhat kind of alterationtakesplace duringthe consecrationof the Eucharist:how can the formsof Christ'sbody and blood inherein the matterof bread and wine [IV. 1:8-12]? Marchia considers the problem of consecrationto be just one of a group of changes that include (1) motionsthat are not completelynatural,such as projectile motion,in which the projectilecontinuesto move afterthe motiveforce ceases to act on the mobile,and (2) artificialchangescaused by an external forcethat leads shapelessmatterto a non-connaturalend (one that is completelycontraryto its essence,for example a shape that it would nevertake on by itself)[IV. 1:50-9]. Put simply:we are dealinghere with changes or motionsthat are not absolutelynatural,since some type of outside force is required to make them occur (in contrastto natural change),and yetare not absolutelyviolenteither,sincetheydo not oppose the natural tendenciesof the object receivingthe action of the motive force[IV. 1:320-7]. On the basis of thesepreliminary dereexamples,virtus lictaclearlyseems to be used as a conceptualtool that makes it possible to explainwhy "hybrid-motions" that are neithercompletelynaturalnor violent completely happen. 7 Thiswastherealpointofdeparture from Aristotelian which as faras I can physics, tellMaierdidnotnotice. FortheAristotelian seeDe cáeloI, 12,282a25;for principle, seehisLe Livre ducieletdumonde Oresme, I, c. 29,eds.A.D. MenutandA.J.Denomy, Madison1968,200-02.

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derelicta is a forma thatthe motive Accordingto Marchia,virtus peraccidens forcegives to the mobile body allowingit to continueforsome time in its movement,withoutanotherpush being necessaryto keep it moving. derelicta is adapted to the dispositionsof what undergoes Moreover,virtus its action, or to be exact, followingwhat Marchia himselfoftensays, it acts proportionatelyto the movable potentialitiesof the moved body. Thus, this is not a formof the sort that leads to the perfectionof the matterto which it is united by reachingthe veryessence of the matter itself[IV. 1:232-40, 329-36, 345-8]. In consequence virtus derelicta is more mixta'in fact,bodies of this type are unceaseasily received by corpora directions.Therefore inglysubjectedto several forcesacting in different virtus derelicta acts againstthe naturaltendenciesof thiskind of body. In otherwords,wheneverthiskindof motiveforce{virtus derelicta alone) acts, no essentialchange is caused, as Marchia explains: What is moreperfectly suitedto be movedby a motivevirtus is a more of but a stone or other mixed motion; proportionate subject any body of sufficient movable by a weightis more easily and more perfectly motivevirtus than air or some otherlightthing,such as chaff,forthe movermoreperfectly movesand throwsfarther and moreeasilya stone of sufficient else lighterthanthis; weightthanhe does chaffor anything if because of its lightness chaffis not a proportionate mobile therefore, fora motivevirtus , thenneitheris air itself,and it followsfromthisthat a stone is a more proportionatesubject of the virtus continuingthis motionthan air is [IV. 1:195-203]. whatis remarkable RegardingMarchia'sanalysisof themotionofproiecta, is that frequendythe Franciscantheologianmaintainsthat virtus derelicta is a formlackingany naturalinclinationor tendency;thereis no ideoderelogical imperativeconnectedto it. The movementimpartedby virtus - thisis motionthat does not lictais indifferent with respectto direction conformto the patternof naturalmotion.At the beginningof any given motionvirtus derelicta can workwith or againstthe particularnaturaldisof the mobile position body withrespectto thismotion.If it worksagainst the mobile body's naturaldisposition,the resultis that virtus derelicta dissipates more quicklythan when it is workingwith the natural disposition. Thus, for Marchia virtusderelicta has no regard for any 'end' of whether 'end' is in taken a movement, temporal,spatial,or essentialsense 1: [IV. 237-40, 258-62, 384-7]. Now, this particularfeatureis common to the motionof proiecta and to purelyviolentmotion.Nevertheless,the

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motion caused by virtusderelicta is not preciselyan example of violent motion. In fact,Marchia never forgetsto stress,when it seems useful, that the motioncaused by virtus derelicta is connaturalis , because it can be it is not in with the (although necessarily) agreement dispositionsof the mobile body [IV. 1:309-15]. A furtherconsequence of thisview is that it underminesthe universal idea thatany motionwithoutan end or a natvalidityof the Aristotelian ural inclinationis forcedor violentmotion. This will have crucial conafterMarchia will think sequencesforthe way severalmedievalphysicists of motionin general,basing theirideas on Marchia's own theoryof virtusderelicta. The conclusionaccordingto which the motiongiven by this kind of forcenot only has no end, but also no temporalstoppingpoint, will be the most importantone that natural philosopherslike Buridan will deduce fromthe particularfeaturesof virtus derelicta. The Franciscantheologianappears to have regardedthe theoryas his own originalinvention.In any eventhe looked upon it as divergingfrom the main auctoritates in the fieldof physics.8Nevertheless,it seems clear thatMarchia drew some inspirationfromAverroes,who in factis quoted threetimesin Marchia's IV Sentences , question 1 [IV. 1:249, 318-19, 417.9 To be the Muslim sure, 20] philosopherdoes not use the concept of virtusderelicta and he may not even have realized the change in the , Aristotelian framework thathe was introducing.Yet Averroesestablished the theoreticalconditionsthat made it possibleto talk about a new kind of motion,beginningwithcelestialmotionand applyingitslaws to someand only some- terrestrial motions.Averroessinglesout a special kind of motionwithparticularfeaturesthatmake it different frommerelynatural motions(motus naturaliter and violent motions(¡motus simpliciter) merely extranaturavi and similar to the motion of that Marchia ), proiecta analyzes. This is the motionof heavenlybodies, which,accordingto Averroes,has no natural tendency:whateverthe formkeeping the heavenlybody in 8 In facthemaintains histheory de hocdixerit etCommentator" "quicquid Philosophus [IV.1:249]. 9 ForAverroes' ofthecontradictions between natanalysis implied bythedistinction uralandviolent seeAristotelis dephysico auditu libri cum Averrois Cordubensis variis motion, octo, ineosdem a summis huius aetatis a mendis commentariis, quaeomnia Philosophis, quamplurimis expurcum Averrois commentariis , VIII, comm.27-35,in:Aristotelis gatecernuntur , apudlunetas, opera Venice1562-1574, vol.IV, ff.364ra-375rb as Averroes, In Physicam , (quotedhenceforth followed ofthecomment andthefolio). bythenumber

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motionmay be, thatformdoes not lead to any conditionof perfection.10 As we saw above, Marchia's virtus derelicta acts in the same way. Indeed, , because accordingto Averroes,the motionof heavenlybodies is connaturali it happenslikeany naturalmotiondoes. There is onlyone crucialdifference between the motion of heavenlybodies and that of proiecta : the former can receiveendlesslythe actionof a virtus extrínseca the angelic (specifically, thatdriveseach heavenlybody),but the matterofproiecta canintelligence not.11 Beyondthat,however,theyare bothneithermotus naturaliter , simpliàter nor motusextranaturante but motus naturam , to use Averroes'words. praeter The potentiallyinfiniteaction of the virtus of heavenlybodies is limited only by the essence of this kind of body, which is essentiallysim- that - fromthe is absoluta is, disengaged ple.12Since thisvirtus body, the formthis virtus constitutesdoes not depend on the matteron which it acts. Thus its action would be endlessand of infiniteforce;it is restricted Averroesmakes a short onlyper accidens by the limitsof matteritself.13 referenceto heavenlymotionin his long commentary on the Physics , book where the under discussion is the cause of the motion of VIII, subject animatedbodies. Here he maintainsthatit is possibleto place alongside the natural formof a movable body qua body anothernatural form anima that is not necessarilycontraryto the formerand that,therefore, togetherwiththe formercan anywaycause a completelynaturalmotion.14 Here again, then,we see Averroesarguingthata forceor formcan exist that sometimescauses natural motion,sometimesviolent,and hence is fromthe causes of either. strictly speakingdifferent Marchia's theoryhas its startingpoint in the analysis of heavenly motions,which Averroesacknowledgedto be special. Marchia definesa betweenvirtus derelicta and virtus coelestis : the latteris perunique difference 10Averroes, In Physicam, 27,f.365vb. 11IV.1:368-77; Averroes Sermo desubstantia orbis 's opera Cordubensis, , cap.3, in:Aristoteli cum Averrois , IX, f. 10va-b. 12Averroes, Sermo desubstantia , 3, f. lOvb. 13Averroes, Sermo desubstantia , 3, f.9ra. 14Averroes, In Physicam "Potest ab , 27,f. 365rb-va: quisdicerequodmotuscorporis estmotus extranaturam, cummoveat anima,verbigratiaad superius, ipsumecontrario suomotunaturali. innatum estmoveri ad inferius, sedtarnen, Corpusenimanimalis quia animaanimalis estforma suicorporis necesse estutmotus eiusa suaanima naturaliter, fitnaturaliter. inventum in eo, itaquodin Sed,si fuerit aliquidmotum perprincipium suocorpore nonsitprincipium contrarium motuianimae, tuncilludmotum eritmotum naturaliter scilicet et percorpus, utdeclaratum eritde corpore simpliciter, peranimam coelesti."

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somewherebetweena feetin se, while the formeris naturallyimperfect, which leads the dispositionsof a for form (colour, example), permanent body to a conditionof perfectionor fullactualization,and a successive form(motionor time, for example) allowingfor a continualsuccession of parts instantafterinstant: So I say thatthereare threetypesof form:one is simplysuccessive, such as motion,and thissortof formdisappearsand goes away at the suchas whitesame timethemoverstops.Anotheris simplypermanent, ness. The thirdis roughlyin the middle,because it is neithersimply successive,like motion,nor simplypermanent,since, when its cause caused ceases,it can onlyremainfora shorttime- and themotivevirtus is of sort the first virtus this [IV. 1:470-5]. by Marchia does not take the step that Buridan will in his commentaryon : if virtus derelicta De cáelo , as Buridan calls it) acted on a body (or impetus thatdid not resistits action,and in so doing it favouredthe dispositions of the body, the resultwould be motionwithoutend. One could imagine thishappeningin the heavens,since thereis no contraryresistance and indeed God restedon the seventhday aftersettingthe spheresin motion.15Francis of Marchia, on the other hand, only admits that the motionofproiecta alwaysdepletesitself,ceasing aftera time,as our expederelicta is a formthat rience tellsus. He draws the conclusionthat virtus has a limitedamount of "power" or "force" in it, and this force can situations spread out eitherwhollyor partiallyaccordingto the different in which it takes effect[IV. 1:423-31, 445-53]. of Marchia's We should turnour attentionto a second characteristic which illustrates the crucial made to the Aristotelian theory, change being framework. Form is an indivisibleprinciplein Aristode'swell-knownopinOf course, one could measure the it is not quantifiable.16 ion; therefore, 15See IoannesBuridanus, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis , lib.XII, q. 9,J. Badius quaestiones unaimaParis1518(reprint Frankfurt Ascensius, 1964),f. 123ra:"Adhucessetponibilis néscioan fatua: vosscitis a proiginario, quodmulti ponunt postexitum quodproiectum fortior iciente movetur ab Ímpetu datoa proiiciente et movetur durâtimpetus quamdiu et in infinitum duraret nisidiminueretur et corrumperetur a quamresistentia; impetus velab inclinante ad contrarium nulresistente contrario motum. Et in motibus celestibus lumestresistens contrarium. mundi Deusquamlibet movit Ideo,cumincreatione spheram a movendo etperimpetum illisspheris semvoluit, quavelocitate ipsecessavit impressum illimotus. Undedictum die requievit estquodDeus septima ab perposteaduraverunt omnioperequodpatraverat." 16See Physics, 194b15. II, 2, 193b23-

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effectsof thisindivisibleprinciple,e.g. in motion,but thiswould onlytell us about the degree to which a body's resistiveforcehinderedthe action of the motiveforces.For example,velocityin local motionis affectedby the resistiveforcethe medium"uses" to preventthe action of any motive force.17On this analysisof motion,if the degree of resistiveforcewere zero, thiswould resultin instantaneous motion,as Marchia himselfnotes.18 Althoughhe may not have known it, Marchia was workingwithina particularpre-Galilean conceptual tradition,somewhat un-Aristotelian, whichthe Byzantinecommentator JohnPhiloponus(d. ca. 570) had helped develop centuriesbeforein discussingat lengththe possibilityof motion in a void in a long note at the end of his commentaryon book IV of .19 Philoponus stressesthat, according to the principles of the Physics Aristotelianphysics,any change that occurs is due to the contributions both of the dispositionsof the body subjectedto the motiveforceand of the motiveforceitself,which has a specificdegree.20If the resistiveforce were zero, the motiveforcewould act accordingto its proper maximal degree and would not undergo any reduction.The Byzantinecommentatoradds that it reallyseems nonsensicalto thinkthat a materialbody could move in an instantover any distance.In fact,the spatial distance betweentwo pointsis itselfa sort of resistance.21 Averroesmaintainedthe same conclusionin his treatiseDe substantia orbis : the matterof heavenlybodies is subiectum tantum , i.e. a heavenly 17In anycase,although on theAristotelian forcecan in principle resistive be theory - ifitever wasa rareoccurrence in thelaterMiddleAges suchmeasurement measured, occurred. 18See Francis ofMarchia, libros Aristotelis, VIII,c. 9, no.3, quotedand Super Physicorum in C. Schabel, discussed OntheThreshold Mass?Francesco onResistance ofInertial d'Appignano andInfinite delI Convegno suFrancesco Internazionale , in:D. Priori (ed.),Atti Velocity d'Appignano, delTronto2002,182-83andnn.20-21. Appignano 19Iohannes InAristotelis libros commentaria: corollaquinqué posteriores Philoponus, physicarum rium deinani inAristotelem et auctoritate , in: Commentaria , vol.XVII, editaConsilio graeca Academiae Litterarum et impensis Berlin1888, regiaeBorussicae, typis GeorgiReimeri, as: Philoponus, Corollarium deinani). Thereis a largebodyof 675-95(quoted henceforth ofmotion; literature on Philoponus' see e.g.M. Wolff, Geschichte derImpetustheorie. theory derklassischen Mechanik zumUrsprung , Frankfurt-am-Main 1978,67-160pasUntersuchungen Unafisica matematica TheTheory senza sim;Lucchetta, (cit.n. 3 above);R. Sorabji, ofImpetus orImpressed Matter inAntiquity Force: Motion. Theories andTheir , Space, , in:R. Sorabji, Philoponus C. Wildberg, , London1988,227-48; , in:E.N.Zalta(ed.),TheStanford Sequel John Philoponus URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/ (Fall2003Edition), Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy as wellas theliterature referred to in thoseplaces. entries /philoponus/; 20Philoponus, deinani Corollarium , 677-78. 21Philoponus, in Corollxmum deinani to Philoponus, motion , 681-84.According happens timein all casesbecauseitsessence is temporal; seeon thisspecific pointibid.,695.

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body's formdoes not bringits matterfrompotencyto act, and as a result the essentiallimitsof its quantityare the unique resistiveforcethat limitself.In any case, even iftherewere infinite its the actionof the vismotrix there would still be finite motion in the heaven, which is caused force, will the of Marchia advances simangelic intelligences.22 by self-limiting ilar objectionsto the Aristotelianideas about instantaneousmotion and derelicta is an entitythat lies beyond the appears to conclude that virtus basic principlesof the Stagirite'stheoryof motion.In fact- and here is - since the action a major break with the traditionalAristoteliantheory of virtus is limitedand observable,it becomes theoretically derelicta possible to quantifythe motionofproiecta and virtus derelicta itself.In thisway, the Aristotelian principleaccordingto whichthe formis indivisibleis rendered null and void. Moreover,as Marchia tellsus [IV. 1: 449-53], given this new theoreticalframeworkwe should not deny the hypothesisof motionin a void,23that is, the motion of a body so disposed that virtus derelicta can act on it withfullforce. 22Averroes, De substantia "Manifestum estenimquod,si incorpore orbis, 3, f.9vb-10ra: ex materia intempore, etforma essetvirtus infinita inipsoessevircomposito sequeretur in ipsaactione tutem infinitam autpassione, et estimpossibile intulit ex quodAristoteles in tempore. coelestia Et estmanifestum possevirtutum, quibusmoventur corpora quod nonsequitur etiamex hoc,quodcorpus in se infinitam in temfinitam recipit passionem ex materia et forma, sicutsequeretur cumactioet passioeius pore,ut sitcompositum in tempore. fuerit finita Primum enimcontingit ei, secundum quodestcorpustantum; secundum autemsecundum noncompositum. in hac Modusdeceptionis quodestcorpus etquodfecit Aristotelem contradicere istorum duosibi,estaequivocatio quaestione, putari rumnominum, finitum et infinitum, cumnondistinguitur distinquoniam, 'sic'Fortasse: et infinitas in tempore finitas a finitate etinfinítate guuntur?] contingentes contingentibus inactione etpassione, istaambiguitas, etex hacfinitate in qua conveniunt corcontingit et materialia, declaravit Aristoteles universaliter omneessefinitum, poracoelestia corpus nonex finitate, secundum ex materia etforma, et quaeaccidit corpori, quodcomponitur dubitationes contra Aristotelem. Etpotest perhaecabscinduntur aliquisdicerequod,cum omnecorpusagitperaliquodet patitur estutomnecorpus fitcomperaliud,necesse ex materia etforma. Et ad hocdicamus esseverum. Sedcorporum est positum quoddam itaquodforma nonconstituitur itaquodmateria estsubieccompositum, permateriam, tumtantum, et nonmateria, cuiusessesitinpotentia, utcorpus coelestae etquoddamestcompositum ex materia, et forma, quae estin potentia, quae constituitur per utcorpora etcorruptibilia. . . . Apparet etiamexhoccorpus coeleste materiam, generabilia nonhaberesubiectum nisitantum motum autemgenerabilia et localem, propter corpora habentmateriam et corruptionem, daturautemeis corruptibilia propter generationem forma seddifferenter, inaltero vero actionem, infinita, propter quiainalteroesttempore finita: illaesuntimmateriales, istaeveroformae materiales. Secundum hocigipropterea turdebetintelligi istaquaestio, diuantelogicam quamignoravi perscrutationem." 23Maierstresses thistheoretical too:%wei (cit.n. 1 above), consequence, Grundprobleme 196-97.

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The innovationof Marchia's concept of virtus derelitta lies not so much in puttingthe new motiveforcein theproiectum ratherthanin the medium throughwhich it moves [IV. 1: 158-80], as in grantingit a crucial role in the analysisof a particularset of natural motions(or motionsthat are non-violentstridosensu)as a formwith no natural tendencyor disposition,which causes the motion.Maier paid so much attentionto the fact that virtusderelicta was in the projectileas opposed to in the medium because she realizedthatthe solutionto thiskindof problemcould make it possible to conceive of motion in a void.24In so doing Maier overlooked the idea of virtus derelicta as a special kind of form.This is a pity, because it is thislatteraspect of virtus derelicta thatreallyshowsa decisive departurefromthe Aristotelianpoint of view concerningnatureand its laws. AlthoughMaier made frequentmentionof Marchia's theory,she did not notice that it containsimplicitlythe theoreticalpossibilityof a of motiveforceas a form.25 quantification Marchia's theoryof virtus derelicta shouldbe consideredthe firststep on - in the road to a new physics ratherits fact,it is no longerAristotelian; featuresare unique. I will supportmy point of view withMarchia's own words.When he triesto give persuasivereasonsin orderto explainwhat virtus derelicta reallyis, he comparesits motiveaction withthat by which attract iron and with that by which light illuminatesbodies magnets 1:3 1518, 352-7, 394-9]. The firstcomparisonis simplypart of a long [IV. traditionof studieson the motion of proiecta and it is easy to findit in : magcommentarieson the Aristotelianlibrinaturales fourteenth-century netsattractiron by inducingan alterationin the iron thatpreparesit for , to which the receivingwithoutresistancethe action of the vis attractiva, 26 iron conformsitself[IV. 1:355-7]. The second comparison,however,cannot be found so easily before Marchia's commentaryon Sentences , at least to my knowledge.Afterwards it seems to be used widely by artistae who became magistři during the 24Maier,£weiGrundprobleme (cit.n. 1 above),225. 25In fact, aboutthequantification Maierdoesnotsayanything ofform. 26See e.g.IoannesBuridanus, degeneratane etcorruptione I, q. 18,msBerlin, Quaestiones lat.fol.387,f. 141va: "De magnete dicendum sed Staatsbibliothek, quodagitin ferrum ut dicitCommentator ita quodaliquam Physicorum, priusin aeremmedium, septimo in aeremet multiplicatur ettuncferrum qualitatem imprimit usquead ferrum, perillam estinnatum moveri ad magnetem sibiimpressam qualitatem propter aliquamconvenieninhislongcommentary tiam." Averroes alsomadethiskindofcomparison onthePhysics , as Marchia knows: In Pkysicam, 35,f.374va.

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derelicta acts in periodJohn Buridan taughtat Paris (ca. 1325-60): virtus the same way as light(lux)when it illuminatesbodies, and thereforeit noncorruptibiles into act: "For a virtus or formlike puts theirdispositions light,which does not posit any alterationin the heavens and thisform [i.e. the virtusderelicta ] is of this sort, since it is neutral and withouta - is not contrary repugnantto the heavens any more than lightis; but thisis a virtus that has no contraryand positsno more alterationin the heavens than lightdoes" [IV, 1:396-9]. Finally,light(lux)becomes lumen as it is reflectedby a non-transparent body. In fact,lumenis the visible that is the of the light reflection lightemanatingfroma per se luminous body.Justas lightdoes not lead a complexbody to the perfectionrelated to any of its qualities,but ratherit bringssome dispositionsinto act, so virtus derelicta bringsdifferent dispositionsinto act.27 Marchia wants to place the action of virtusderelicta in the group of causes of motion that have no natural disposition;in this respect,it is just like light,which does not director aim the changes that it causes towardsa goal thatis contraryto anothergoal (a spatialend, forexample), as generallyhappenswhen a materialbody movesupwardsor downwards. Causes of thiskind are what power "connatural"motions,which do not have theirends in conditionsof perfectionproper to the movingbodies (in contrastto permanentformslike qualities);consequently,thesecauses do not provokeany corruption(or at least it happens merelyperaccidens ), because theybringinto act formsthat are not contraryto otherforms. This reallyis a departurefromthe originalAristotelian theoryof motion, because in Marchia's opinion movementswithoutend are in some way natural.This crucial difference is not renderedexplicitby Marchia, and of course neitherare its consequences,but we can tryto do that,starting fromthe Franciscan'sarguments. 27Among thatcouldbe given, seee.g.C. Kren,TheQuaestiones quitea fewexamples Oresme The University ofWisconsin, , 2 vols.(Ph.D.Dissertation, superde celoofNicole Madison1965),vol.1,book1,q. 22,401:"Secunda conclusio estde accidente quodnon a contrario necperse sicudcaliditas, ut albedo,sed corrumpitur nequeex consequenti absentiam sicudlumen velspecies inmedio. Estigitur conclusio conservantis, propter quod talede natura suaestcorruptibile et tarnen estquodaliquidtalenunquodlibet possible sicudpriusarguebatur de lumine, etcausaestquiataleaccidens non quamcorrumpatur, habetcontrarium ideononindigent a resistendo sed positivům, contrario, aliquavirtute estde se potest si maneatconservans et corrumpitur si recedens." quantum perpetuali NotethatMaierfound thecomparison between theessence oflight andthatofvirtus derelicta in Marsilius ofInghen's on thePhysics thesecondhalf (orimpetus) commentary (from ofthefourteenth %wei century): Grundprobleme (cit.n. 1 above),285.

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naturalis derelicta , such as virtus , causes a motion that is not Any virtus destinedto come to an end- thisin contrastto violentmotions necessarily because it is not in oppositionto the naturaldispositionsof the moved body in any way. Such a motion could in principlelast forever,but in derelicta has temporallimrealityit lastsfora limitedtimebecause a virtus its of action. This is what Marchia maintainsin two different passages of his Sentences IV, q. 1, the second of which bringsout the difference betweenvirtus derelicta and virtus coelestis : And if someoneasks what typeof virtus thisis, one can say thatit is neitheran absolutelypermanentform,nor an absolutely vanishingone, but quasi in between,because it remainsfora time.Justas heat generatedby firein waterdoes not have permanentexistenceabsolutelyas it does in fire,nor absolutely vanishingexistenceliketheheatingprocess but ratherexistencethatremainsfora fixedtime,thusin thematitself, terat hand thistypeof virtus remainsfora timein accordancewiththe proportionof the virtus by whichit is leftbehind [IV, 1:241-7]. But one mustrealizethatbeingcorrupted withthecessationofthemovin virtus is two-fold: one is corrupted withthecessation ing waysomething ofthemovingvirtus suchthat,whenthevirtus that stops, thingis corrupted and destroyed, likemotion,forat theinstantthatthevirtus of themover is the motion or or ceases at the same time.In anostops, corrupted stops therwaysomething is said to be corrupted or to cease to be whensomethingelse ceases not because when that somethingelse ceases or is it itselfis corrupted at thesame time,butbecauseitcannotlast corrupted when the other has on accountof the imperfection of its ceased, long being.Justas the raysor remainsleftin theeye fromsomething excepwhen the visiblethingis tionallybrightare not corruptedimmediately removed,but aftera shorttime,because theycannotlast long withthe becauseoftheirimperfection, itis thuswiththisvirtus caused thingremoved, in theheavenby themovingintelligence, or impressed and also withany othervirtus caused by any othermovervia local motion[IV, 1:456-69]. eliminatethe condiHowever, on the same basis we could theoretically tion thatrestricts the possibilityof an everlastingmotion,if we only consider the dispositionsof that which is undergoingthe non-corruptive motiveaction.These actionsare put into effectby a naturalmotiveforce, such as sunlight,but the action itselfdoes not lead the body undergoing the action to a stateof perfection, forthereis no limitto the degreesof illumination.In effect,these dispositionswould be luminousforever,if outsidecircumstancesallowed it.

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Buridan will take the crucial step in this directionand in this sense will go beyondMarchia's theoryof virtus derelicta ,28Maintainingthatsuch a virtus connaturalis has a limitedforcewith referenceto time and degree of intensity, and therefore thatit can onlycause a simple,limited stressing is an unfounded a change, merely prioridecision. Conceiving a motion withoutnaturaldispositionor aim means ipsofactoconsideringit as potenwithinan Aristotelian I thinkthat tiallyeverlasting conceptualframework. the famouspassage fromBuridan'scommentaryon De cáelo in , whichthe motion of the heavens is as the a particular effect of perpetual imagined virtus derelicta , should be read fromthispoint of view: virtus derelicta-impetus is the correctnaturalcause of that perpetuity,bearing in mind its featuresand the essence of the matterof heavenlybodies. Marchia's theoryof virtus derelicta is one of the most importantcontributionsto the renewalof Westernscientificthinking, because it exceeds the limitationsof the Aristoteliantheoryof motion.Neverthelessit stops at the thresholdof a self-conscious break by maintainingthata perpetual motionis naturallyimpossible(although,we can add, logicallypossible, betweennatfollowingDuns Scotus' well knownviews on the distinction ural and logicalpossibility). In itsessence,virtus derelicta has a limitedduration and consequentlyit can cause only a limitedmovement.Popper would have stressedthat this is clearlyan ad hocprinciple,which does not depend on any otherformalprincipleof the theoryof virtus derelicta .29 In fact,it is onlyused in orderto retainthe Aristotelian principleaccordthat has a beginningmust also have an end." ing to which "everything Buridan gets rid of it, but he is stillable to keep his theoryof motion coherent:in fact, he startsto travel on a new path, along which the meaningof 'motion' itselfchanges.30 Padova Università degliStudidi Padova

28See above,note15. 29See:K.R. Popper, Realism andthe AimofScience , London-Melbourne-Sidney-Auckland1983,partI, chap.1,§ 15,133-35. Johannesburg 30On Buridan's ofmotion Science see,e.g.,Clagett, theory ofMechanics (cit.n. 3 above); Science Giovanni Grant,TheFoundations ofModem (cit.n. 3 above),95-98;A. Ghisalberti, Buridano. Dallametafisica allafisica dumouvement danslaphilo, Milan1975;J. Biard,Le statut naturelle buridanniene duXIVe , in: S. CarotiandP. Souffrin sophie (eds.),La nouvelle physique siècle , Florence 1997,141-59.

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Utrum inhaerentia sit de essentía accidentis. FrancisofMarchiaand theDebateon theNatureofAccidents FABRIZIOAMERINI

Abstract Thispaperattempts to providea generalreconstruction ofFrancisofMarchia's doctrineof accidentalbeing.The paper is dividedintotwo parts.(1) In the the debate on the natureof accidents firstpart,I begin by reconstructing held beforeMarchia,showingthatsuch a debateis characterised by a progressiveshiftconcerningthe way to understandaccidents.While the first modes of Aristotelian ofbeing regardaccidentsespeciallyas inhering interpreters in the secondhalf substances,the majorityof theologiansand philosophers For them,the of the thirteenth centuryregardaccidentsas absolute beings. problemis no longerto explainif and, if so, how accidentscan be distinct can makesomeone thing. buthow accidentsand substances fromsubstances, focus is on their explainingwhattheontologicalstaMetaphysically, primary oftheEucharistie is. Although it is especially theconsideration tusofinherence and theocase thatinducesthischange,I pointout thatmanyphilosophers for in texts the find Aristotle's logians philosophicalsupport takingthisstep. I more In second focus the closelyon Marchia'sdoctrine,arguing (2) part, revisedversionof Scotus's.UnlikeAquinas thatMarchia'spositionis a slightly of accidentsby and Bonaventure, Marchia explainsAristotle's metaphysics of the and not vice versa. of the Eucharist So, in orderto way metaphysics of this miraculous Marchia maintains the case, consistency explain philosophical thatone does not need to modifythe notionof inherenceby distinguishing actual frompotentialinherenceand includingthe latterin the accident's and, essence;ratherit is necessaryto takethe case of the Eucharistseriously on thisbasis,to removeinherencetotallyfroman accident'sessence.In conclusion,theEucharistshowsthataccidentsare absolutebeingsto whichactual inherencepertainscontingently, potentialinherencenecessarily.But like thatremainunresolved. Scotus's,Marchia'sdoctrinefacessome difficulties Remarks Introductory as basicallybipartite. Traditionally, people thinkof Aristotle'smetaphysics we worldfroman Aristotelian If we look at the extra-mental perspective,

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findsubstanceson the one hand and accidentsor qualificationsof substanceson the other.What ontologicalstatusAristodegrantsto accidents, though,is not immediatelyclear. In fact,we could regard accidentsas independentbeings,or perhaps modes of being, that are reallydifferent if not separable fromsubstances;or, alternatively, we could regardthem as substances'modes of being,whichare onlyconceptually different or separable fromsubstances.The problemarisesbecause Aristodepursuesboth theseviewsto a certaindegree.In orderto obtaina generalunderstanding of the nature of Aristotelianmetaphysics,then, a studyfocused on the natureof accidentalbeing is required. In thispaper,I intendto presentMarchia'spositionon accidentalbeing. I will argue thatMarchia maintainsthe same positionin his philosophical and theologicalwritings, and thatin many respectsthispositionis similar to Scotus's. In order to argue for my point, I will startby introducing, in a systematicway, some influentialthirteenthand fourteenth-century treatments of thetopic.Then, I willturnto Marchia'sdoctrine.Specifically, I intendto approach thistopic froma philosophicalpoint of view,while examiningthe traditionof the Commentarieson Aristotle'sMetaphysics. Althoughit is especially(albeit not exclusively)the case of the Eucharist thatcompelsmedievalphilosophersand theologiansto rethinkthe nature of accidents,nonethelessI intendto point out that different theological or philosophicalexplanationsof accidentalbeing are groundedupon differentbut quite legitimate readingsof Aristode'sMetaphysics. Thus, thelabel 'Aristotelianconceptionof accidents',which is oftenused to characterise the conceptionof accidentsendorsedby medievalphilosophers, as opposed to theologians, some requires nuancing.At theend of theday,no theological or philosophicalexplanationof accidental being reallybringsAristotle's intocrisis;nonethelesseveryexplanationexcludesa particular metaphysics versionof it. 1. A Philosophical AreNothing Other Explanation ofAccidental Being:Accidents thanModesofBeinga Substance Exhibits In his worksAristodeprovidesat least two different accountsof what an accidentis. On the one hand, Aristotletellsus that an accidentis not a being in an absoluteway. For an accidentis what it is while also being else, i.e. a substanceof which it is predicated.1On the other something 1 Cf.e.g.Anal.Post., 22 I, 4, 73b5ff.;

passim.

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hand, Aristotledoes suggestthat an accidentis nonethelessa being of a certainkind. For an accidentis something of a substance,since it is predicated of it, and a substancecan lose the accidentwhile stillremaining a substance.2 of acciProbablythe cleareststatementof this twofoldunderstanding dentscan be foundin the Metaphysics in Book ch. 4. This , especially VII, Chapter is devoted to the question of what thingshave essence and In the firsthalfof the Chapter,Aristotlearguesthatonly subdefinition. stances can have essence, since only a substanceis what is properlya "thissomething"(todeti),and essence expressespreciselywhat is properly a "this something".When a thingis predicatedof anotherthing,as in the case of accidents,we do not have a "thissomething".Hence, essence and a definition belongsonlyto thosethingswhose formulais a definition, occursif the thingdefinedis a primarybeing. Here, Aristotledefinesthe propertyof being a "thissomething"in termsof being primary,and this latterpropertyin termsof predicativesimplicity. As a result,only a substance is a primarybeing because only a substanceis a being the nature of which does not consistin predicatingsomethingof somethingelse or simplyin predicatingitselfof somethingelse. For example, a man is a primarybeing because, first,he is not predicatedof anythingmore primary and, second, his very nature does not involve predicatingsomefromit. By contrast, thingof somethingelse that is categoriallydifferent no accidenthas an essence,since no accidentis a primarybeing. In fact, an accident is what it is because of somethingelse (i.e. a substance)of which it is predicated.3 In the second half of the Chapter,by contrast,Aristotlemodifiesthis pictureslightly,by arguingthat each categorialitem can have essence and definition, albeit not in the same way. Substanceshave essence and definitionin an absolute way, while accidentshave them in a qualified and secondaryway.4 In some respect,accidentsare also a "this something"and a primarybeing. For as Aristodetaughtin the Categories and numerically one.5Therefore, theyare beingsthatare perse, indivisible, are at least with to their own category.6 they primarybeings, respect 2 Cf.e.g.Top.,I, 5, 102b4ff.; Met.,V, 30, 1025a30-33. 3 Cf.Met.,VII, 4, 1029b 13-1030a17. 4 Cf.Met.,VII, 4, 1030al7-bl3. 5 Cf.e.g.Cat.,2, lb6-9;4, lb25-27, 2a4-7;5, 3bl8-19.SeealsoMet.,',1,1017a22-27. 6 Cf.Met.,VII, 9, 1034b7-10.

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Nonetheless,accidentsmust always be defined"by addition",i.e. with referenceto substances.For accidentsdo not existapart fromsubstances in the extra-mental world. So accidentsare beings in a secondaryway, since theyneed a substancein orderforthem to actuallyexist.But that does not preventthemfromhavingall the same a certainkind of being. Hence, accidentshave essence and definitionto a certaindegree. Aristotleconcludeshis argumentby sayingthat such explanationsare equivalentto each other.7It does not matterif we say that accidentsare not beings in an absolute way or that they are beings but not in an absoluteway. In spite of thislast claim of Aristotle's,however,the doctrineAristodeproposes in the Metaphysics seems to be open ineluctably to two equallywell-groundedinterpretations. On the one hand, someone could hold that it says that accidentsand substancesare distinct,if not separable, beings. For accidents are distinguishablefrom substancesat least in definition, and if theycan be definedto a certaindegreeon their own, theymust to a certaindegree have some being of theirown. On the otherhand, someone could equallywell insistthataccidentsare nothing other than modes of being that a substanceexhibits.For accidents cannot be separatedfromsubstancesin existence.So theydo not have any separate and absolute being; indeed, they do not have a separate and absolute definition.Let me call these interpretations the Expansive and the Reductive Interpretation, main The respectively. philosophical seems to be concernedwithis explaining problemthe firstinterpretation what unityor relationshipholds between such distinctitems,while the secondinterpretation has to explainhow such itemsare distinguishable from each other. As we shall see, when Marchia composed his works,the debate on accidentalbeing had shiftedsignificantly fromthe firstto the second problem. If we look more closely at the Metaphysics doctrine,we see that the most natural reading of the traditionalAristoteliandictum 'an accident 7 Cf.Met,VII,4, 1030b3-7. Formoredetails onthisargument, seeM. Frede- G.Patzig Aristoteles und 2 vols.,Munich1988, (eds.), Z"-Text,Übersetzung Kommentar, "Metaphysik Aristotle's . TheCategories andMetaphysics esp.vol.2,adloc.;M.V.Wedin, ofSubstance Theory Moregenerally, on Aristode's ofaccidental , Oxford 2000,197ÍT. Zeta theory being,see M. Durrant, Essence andAccident A. Code,Aristotle onEssence , in:Mind,84 (1975),595-600; - R. Warner andAccident Grounds Intentions , in R. Grandy , (eds.),Philosophical ofRationality: Ousia.AnEssayonAristotle's , Ends,Oxford1986,411-39;M.J.Loux,Primary Categories Z andH, Ithaca-London in 1991,104-8;N.O. Dahl,TwoKinds Metaphysics ofEssence A PaleManis NottheSameas His Essence Aristotle: , in: The Philosophical Review,106.2 forfurther (1997),233-65(andseethere literature).

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estensquia entis)8 is is a being because it is somethingof a being' {accidens a subjectivereading. An accident is not a being on its own, but it is i.e. a substance'smode of somethingthat a substancehas or exemplifies, being that the substancecan cease to have withoutceasing to be what it is. Thus, on the subjectivereading,the most importantfact about an accidentis thatit has a subject , i.e. the substance.As some medievalinterif had meantto say thatan accidentis a being Aristotle preterspointout, on its own, he would have said that an accidentis somethingof a being estentisquia ens)and not vice versa.9So, for because it is a being (
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there seems to be no room for a distinctionbetween essence and existence.This is a consequenceof Aristotle'sso-calledessentialism, according a set of essential to which existing,fora thing,amountsto exemplifying properties.Neverthelessif we look at Aristotelianmetaphysicswith such a distinctionin mind, the relationshipbetween the definitionand the being of the thingdefinedbecomes unclear. For in such a case, it can be asked whetherthe definitionof a thinghas to express only the species of being a thingexhibitsor if it furtherhas to explainwhat conditionsa particularthingmust satisfyin order forit to actuallyexist.As a result, it can be asked whetherthe subject (or the referenceto the subject), which is includedin the definitionof an accident,has to be includedin the accident'sessence as well. At firstsight,the classificationwe introducedabove appears rather rigid,insofaras it seems to be unable to capture all cases or to cover themadequately.In fact,ifsomeoneendorsesthe ReductiveInterpretation he is compelled to say that accidentsdo not have essence and strictly, at all. Nor can he even say thataccidentsinherein a substance. definition For he upholds that accidentsare not beings,and as a consequence he mustuphold thattheyare not inhering beings.So whoeveradopts a strong reading of the Reductive Interpretationis compelled to conclude that accidentsare nothingother than modes of being a substanceexhibits. Apart froma fewmasters,however,philosophersand theologiansduring centurieswere unwillingto adhere to this the thirteenth and fourteenth conclusion. deflationary On the other hand, the Expansive Interpretation is open to various The fact that accidents are defined with reference to substances readings. accidents. Even about the status of allowingfor says nothing ontological accidents'definitional dependenceupon substances,someonemightemphasise the accidents'substance-dependent being as well as theirsubstanceIn essence. other he words, mightregard accidents (1) as independent after that can be identified only theyinherein a substance,hence things fromthisthat accidentsare nothingotherthan modes of being inferring of substances,or (2) as thingsthat can be identifiedeven before they fromthisthat accidentsare someinherein a substance,hence inferring These two readingsagree other than modes of of substances. thing being that accidentshave a certainkind of being of theirown, but they disagree on whetherthis kind of being is reducibleto a substance'smode of being. Richard Rufus of Cornwall and Albertthe Great, forinstance,

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emphasise(l),11but some otherphilosophersare more inclinedto follow (2). Roughlyspeaking,theselatterthinkthat accidentscannot existapart fromsubstances,but this does not implythat accidentsare only modes of being that substancesexhibit.The problem of the ontologicalstatus of inherence,then,arises froman alternativereadingof the Aristotelian estensquia entis. dictumaccidens A usefulpresentationof the questionsinvolvedin this topic can be on theMetaphysics found in Geoffreyof Aspall's Questions , composed in Oxfordduringthe 1260s. From Aspall's workwe can inferthat in both the Paris and OxfordArtsFacultiesbasicallytwo typesof questionwere from debated: first,whetheraccidents have essences that are different substances,and second, whetheran accident's essence may be reduced to a certainsubstance'smode of being.The latterquestioncan be regarded For someonecould answerthefirst as quiteindependentfromtheformer.12 in while the positive answeringthe second one in eitherthe posquestion itiveor the negative.But if he answersboth questionsin the positive,he needs to clarifythe relationshipbetween an accident and its inherence, i.e. the way thatthe accidentrelatesto the particularsubstanceof which it is a mode of being. Thus, once philosophersbegin to take the positive answer to the firstquestionfor granted,the debate focusesin a special way on the degreeof being to be grantedto accidents.In thiscase, some commentatorssoon add a thirdquestion,namely whetheran accident inheresin a substancebecause of itselfor because of somethingelse, such in two otherways,namely as inherence.13 This questionis also formulated 11See e.g. RichardRufusof Cornwall, Dissertatio inMetaphysicam, VII, msVatican, Vat.lat.4538,f.45ra:"Adhocdicendum Biblioteca Vaticana, quodaccidens, Apostolica omninatura nichil estaliudnisiesseipsius substantie. substantie, (. . .) Natura circumscripta In the naturam sedestessetantum accidentis nonestdivisacontra substantie, ipsius". im Münster theGreat, samevein,seeAlbert , VII, tr.1,ch. 1,ed. B. Geyer, Metaphyska Westfalia 1964,vol.II, 316,11.66-69,and 317,11.19-24;ch. 4, 320,11.16-28,esp. 1.5; ch. 12,336,1.9-338,1.26. See 25-28;ch.7, 327,11.92-98;ch. 10,333,1.88-334, libros Prime Aristotelis ailsoRogerBacon,Questiones , VII, q. 2, ed. R. Steele, Philosophie supra Oxford 1930,197,11.2-13. 12Cf.Geoffrey utrum ofAspall,Qu.met., ., f. 96ra: Pomoqueritur VII, q. 1, mscit diversam ab essentia substantie. accidens habeatessentiam (. . .)"; q. 4, mscit.,f.97ra-b: hoc utrum accidens sitsolumesseentiset essesubstantie "Iuxtahocqueritur vel,preter idemquod sitaliquodaliudet essein se. Nec esthocquerere quodestessesubstantie, eiusessentia sitessesubhocestquerere utrum seddatoquodhabeatessentiam, prius, stantie". 13See e.g.Radulphus inMetaphysicam , VII,q. 2, respondeo , msFlorence, Brito, Quaestiones Conv.Soppr. E. 1. 252,f.292rb-va; Nazionale Biblioteca Zimmermanni, Centrale, Anonymous

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and second,whether whetheran accidentcan existwithouta subject,14 first, inherenceis part of an accident'sessence. PuttingtogetherGeoffrey'stwo questionsmentionedabove, we could The firstgroup singleout threepartiesamong Aristotelianinterpreters. is composedof thosewho say thataccidentsare not beingson theirown, since theydo not have an essence of theirown.15Many argumentscould be invokedforthisposition.For instance,everyaccidenthas to be defined withreferenceto a substance.But the definition has to mirrorthe essence of the thingdefined.Hence the substance,or at least the referenceto substance,has to be part of an accident'sessence. Moreover,the being of a thingderivesfromits essence. But an accident'sessence consistsin its inherenceand inherenceis not a thingbut a mode or a respect.So the accident'sbeing (esse)is posteriorto its inhering(inesse)and depends if an accident had its own essence, it would have on it. Furthermore, two different beings,i.e. one insofaras it is a substance'smode of being and anotherinsofaras it is somethingon its own, and hence it would have opposite properties.16 As is clear, these thinkersendorse a version of what we called the Reductive Interpretation. But by arguingin this could run into some trouble way they explainingAristotle'smetaphysics. For example, if we say that accidentsinhere,we must allow that they are somethingto which the propertyof inheringhas to pertain.For otherwise accidents could not be said to be inheringin a substance.But thesephilosophersseem to contradictthemselves,because at one and the same time theyclaim that accidentsare not beings on theirown, since theydo not have theirown essences,and nonethelessit seems clear that inherenceexpressestheirwhole essence. The second group is composed of those who, like Albertthe Great, accept that accidents are beings on their own.17If accidentswere not inMetaphysicam incontrarium, msCambridge, Peterhouse , VII, q. 1, argumentum Quaestiones 152,f.33ra. 14On this, seeS. Donati,"Utrum accidens existere sinesubiecto". Aristotelische possit Metaphysik undchristliche ineinigen desausgehenden 13.Jahrhunderts , Theologů ungedruckten Physikkommentaren - K. Emery - A. Speer(eds.), in:J.A.Aertsen von1277.Philosophie NachderVerurteilung und an derUniversität vonParisimletzten Viertel des13.Jahrhunderts. Studien undTexte , Theologie Berlin-New York2001,577-617. 15Cf.Geoffrey ofAspall, dicere Qu.met ., VII, q. 1,ms.cit.,f.96rb:"Quidamsolebant nonhabetessentiam. quodaccidens (. . .)". 16Cf.Geoffrey ofAspall,Qu.met ., VII, q. 4, ms.cit.,f.97ra-b. 17Cf.Geoffrey ofAspall, f.96rb:"Propter hocdicitur Qu.met., VII,q. 1,ms.cit., aliter, scilicet nominai unomodosubiectum et estsubaccidente, alio quodnomenaccidentis

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would be wiped out.18 beings on theirown, the categorialclassification Nonetheless,these thinkersemphasise that accidents are nothingother thansubstances'modes of being,i.e. accidentalqualifications of substances. Accordingly,theytryto save the categorialclassification by considering it as a logical ratherthan a metaphysicalclassification of things.On this one kind of basic things,i.e. substances, approach,the categoriesidentify and nine modes of being of such things,insofaras each mode can be isolatedconceptuallyon its own. But only substanceshave a distinctcorworld. These thinkersendorse a weak version relatein the extra-mental of whatwe called the ExpansiveInterpretation (i.e. version(1)). According this run to Geoffrey, could into some problemsinterhowever, position In the Categories and hence semantics. , indeed, Aristotle's, pretingAverroes's, Aristotlestatesthat an accidentalterm it does not matterwhetherconThis entailsthat an crete or abstract signifiesexclusivelya property.19 accidentaltermnever signifiesthe bearer of the propertyexcept "conseFor the bearer of the propertyis not includedin quently"(ex consequent). the semanticspectrumof an accidentalterm. The thirdgroup, finally,is composed of those who emphasise that accidentsare beings on theirown, since they have an essence of their own.20They argue as follows:An accident can be definedto a certain degree on its own, so it must have to a certaindegree an essence of its of the firstgroup,thinkers own. On the one hand, unlikethe interpreters in this thirdgroup hold that inherencecannot expressthe whole being of an accident.For ifinherencedoes expressthe accident'sbeing,an accident would be a relative.On the otherhand, theyargue thatif an accidentwere not a being on its own, it could not be called a being inhering in a substance.Thus, even allowingthat accidentshave a definition"by addition",thisdoes not entailthattheyare reducibleto substances'modes of being. For the substanceis seen as an essence added to that of the accident.Nor can an accidenthave the same being as a substance.For modonominat essesubiecti sicdispositi. Primo modononsignificant subiectum quoddam et accidens diversam secundo autemmodofacit(prosic)".Forreferences to essentiam, Albert's seen. 11 above. texts, 18Cf.Geoffrey ofAspall,Qu.met ., VII, q. 4, mscit.,f.97rb. 19Cf.Cat.,5, 3b19. 20Cf.Geoffrey ideodicere ofAspall,Qu.met., VII, q. 1, mscit.,f. 96rb:"Possumus . habetetquidditatem, etdifferì eo modoquo (. .) quodaccidens quodammodoessentiam habetab essentia et absolute estin aliquoperse substantie, quia essentia principaliter nonestessentia in dependente utin accidente, utin substantia; autem, absoluta, stante, sedminus proprie".

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otherwisethe substance'spropertiescould be predicatedof the accident as well. These thinkers,then, maintaina strongformof the Expansive (i.e. version(2)). Nonetheless,among philosophersarguing Interpretation versions.Some of themdistinguish forthispositionwe can finddifferent betweenabsoluteaccidents,whichare both somethingof a substanceand somethingon their own, and relativeaccidents,which are only somethingof a substance.Others,by contrast,thinkof all accidentsas beings on theirown.21 Apart fromthe questionwhetherall accidentsare or are not beings on theirown, philosopherslike Geoffreythinkthat accidentsare somethingof a substancewhile also being somethingon theirown. However, theythinkthat no accident,as separatedfroma substance,is naturally Accordsomethingon its own, but onlyas dependentupon a substance.22 assume that does not inherence the whole essence of ingly,they express accidents.Quite the opposite,as some philosopherspoint out, inherence is not an essentialbut a per se secundo modopropertyof accidents,especiallyifwe consideraccidentswithAvicenna'sdoctrineof essencein mind. Avicenna'sviewson essence, Accordingto the standardway of interpreting - it does not matterwhethersubstantialor accidenessence indeed, any tal- can be consideredin threeways, althoughit can existin only two. When an essence is consideredon its own, it does not have its own kind of being. An essence such as humanity,for instance,on its own is neitherparticularnor universal,neitherone nor many. On its own, humanity is only what it is, namely humanity.Such an essence howevercan existin two ways. It existsas particularwhen it is realisedin the extramental world; it existsas universalwhen it is abstractedby the mind. Applyingthis doctrine to accidents, one could say that accidents on theirown are nothingotherthan accidents.They do not have theirown kind of being. When accidents are consideredon their own, they are neitherinheringnor non-inhering, neitherbeing in a substancenor not in a a substance.23 As being consequence,accidents'being or essence (esse) 21Cf.Geoffrey ofAspall,Qu.met., VII, q. 4, mscit.,f.97rb. 22Cf.Qu.met., f.97rb-va: "omneaccidens estaliquidinse preterhoc VII,q. 4, mscit., sed aliquodmagiset aliquodminus. Se accidens essealiquodestessesubstantie, autquodsitaliquidin se ita quodabsolutum aut quidin se potest intelligi dupliciter: ab alio,et hocultimo modoestaccidens quodsitaliquidin se itaquodsitdependens hocquodestessesubstantie". aliquidin se preter 23Cf.e.g.PeterofAuvergne, inMetaphysicam, PeterVII,q. 2,msCambridge, Quaestiones house152,f. 189vb:"Adpropositum secundum Avicennam. arguitur (. . .) Intelligendum

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can be seen as logicallypriorto accidents'inhering(inesse), which can in turn be seen as logicallyprior to accidents' being actuallyin a subject From this perspective,accidentsand substancesshare the (essein effectu). same existentialbeing,but have different essentialbeings.24 Endorsingthis view is necessaryif one does not want to grant two different kinds of to i.e. the accident's own and its accidents, being being being a substance's mode. Hence, according to these philosophers,the traditional Aristoteliandictumaccidens estens quia entishas to be read in an objectiveway, insofaras, on thisreading,the accidenthas being of some kind objectivelyon its own; and indeed these philosophersaim to establish that an accidentis a being on its own precisely because it is somethingof a being.25 As Geoffrey'squestionsreveal,the problemmost frequently discussed in the ArtsFacultyafterthe 1260s did not concernthe existentialseparabilityof accidents,but ratherthe degree of being that can be granted to substances'accidentalmodes of being. Specifically, Geoffrey's questions - all show that it is possible to invoke purely philosophicalarguments ex propria estquodaccidentia raùoneipsorum nechabent essenecnon-esse"; q. 12,f. ad subiectum 195ra-b: fundatur tamennonest accidentis, "Dependentia supernaturam de ratione eiusessentiali, sedaliquidconsequens ipsum, quodinestsibiperse secundo mododicendi perse". 24Cf.Geoffrey ofAspall,Qu.met., VII, q. 1, mscit.,f.96rb:"Duplexestesse,scilicet et esseexistentie. Esseessentie esseessentie etesseessentie sub(existentie ms)accidentis nonsuntidem,sicutnecestessentia eorumeadem.Esseautemactualis stantie existentie eorum estidem.(. . .) Ad aliud,cumdicitur 'accidentis esseestinesse', si perhoc'inesse' falsum cuminherentia solum simul illud inherentia, est;sedoportet intelligitur cointelligere ethocestessentia accidentis". quodinheret, 25Thisideais quitepopular in boththeOxford andParisArts amongphilosophers Faculties the1260sand 1270s.See,forinstance, Zimmermanni, Qu. during Anonymous f.33ra-b; DomusPetri, inMetaphyskam VII, q. 1, mscit., met., , VII, Quaestiones Anonymous Peterhouse Richard ofClive,Quaestiones inMetaphyskam 152,f.314vb; , q. 12,msCambridge, Cathedral f.138rb-va: VII,q. 1,msWorcester, ÇM3,f.138ra; Chapter Library, q. 2,mscit., nonestaliudab inesse. "Soletdiciquodesseaccidentis (. . .) Capiofalsitatem, quia'inesse' duodicit,scilicet esseet in ¿ilioesse,quiaquodinheret aliud ab eo cuiinheret, inherentia nonessetmedium interduo";SimonofFaversham, Quaestiones alioquin super libro Padova1957,73,11.3-10;PeterofAuvergne, Praedkamentorum, q. 2, ed.P. Mazzarella, f. 195rb: "Soletautemhicqueriutrum inesseaccidentis Qu.met., VII, q. 12,mscit., prius sitquamsuumessevelnon.Et solutio ad hocex diffinitione de apparet priusassignata enimde esseessentiali dicoquodilludesseaccidentis esse.Loquendo accidentis, priusest natura estin se,nichil estinalio,utAvicenna (. . .) Quodenimnichil quamsuuminesse. autemde essein effectu, esse sue.Loquendo cum[esse]accidens vult,primo Metaphyske in effectu nonhabeatnisiperessesuisubiecti, et essea suosubiecto nonhabetnisiin hocmodoesseeiusnonestpriusquamsuuminesse". subiecto inheret, quantum

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groundedin Aristoteliantexts in orderboth to affirmand to deny that accidentsare beingson theirown otherthan substances'modes of being. Philosophershoweverdo not go on to discusswhetheraccidentscan naturallyexistapart fromsubstances.For fromthe point of view of the natural world, adopted by philosophers,accidents are always realised as substances'modes of being. Accordingly,with respectto the interpretathe debate appears to focusexclusivelyon tion of Aristotle'smetaphysics, the degree of ontologicalautonomy,but not independence,Aristotlehad grantedto accidents.Nonetheless,the philosophicaldebate on accidental being also permitsmedievalphilosophersto extendthe inquiryto a considerationof the logical possibilityfor accidentsto exist naturallyapart from substances.From this perspective,this debate opens the way to incorporatingthe case of the Eucharistinto an Aristotelianframework. it generatessome puzzles concerninginherBut fromanotherperspective, ence thatare leftunsolvedby philosophers.For one, the majorityof mastersin the ArtsFacultytend to say that accidentsare somethingon their own otherthan substances'modes of beingwhilemaintainingat the same time that accidents'essence is logicallyprior both to accidents'inhering in a substanceand to accidents'being actuallyin thatsubstance.So someto findin one could inferfromthis that it is not logicallycontradictory are not or even accidents that accidents nature non-inhering inhering actuallyinheringin a substance.For another,the philosopherssay that inherenceis in some measure inseparable from an accident's essence, of it. Indeed, accidentscontinue since it is a properpassion (passiopropria) someonecould to be regardedas substances'modes of being.Accordingly, questionhow it is possibleforinherenceto be logicallyinseparablefrom an accident'sessence,if the formerfollowslogicallyfromthe latter,without this entailingthat inherenceis part of an accident's essence. These puzzles are one of the reasons why some theologianswill look for a refinement of the notion of accident. ThomasAquinas' s Solution: 3. Theological of theProblem. Expansions and Accidental between Accidental Essence Being Distinguishing As we have seen, Aristotle'swell-knowndoctrineof the analogyof being, ways viz. priaccordingto which 'being' is said of thingsin different marilyof substancesand secondarilyof accidents , summarisedabove estens quia entis,does not say anythingabout the by the dictumaccidens

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kind of being accidentshave. For the dictumcan be read in at least two ways,i.e. subjectivelyand objectively,so that it can be invokedby supof the Aristotelian metaphysicsof acciportersof oppositeinterpretations dents.Moreover,if we read it in an objectiveway, the ontologicalstatus of inherencebecomes undecided,since inherenceno longerexpressesthe whole essence of accidents. It is the case of the Eucharistthatespeciallyfavoursan objectivereading of the Aristoteliandictum.Accordingto the naturalcourse of events, it seems impossiblefor an accident to exist and not to inherein a substance.For we can findin the worldcreatedsubstanceswithoutaccidents (for instance,separate substances)but no accidentswithoutsubstances. But the case of the Eucharistcompelsus to say thataccidentscan in fact existwithoutinheringin a substance.Thus, whoeverwants to maintain that accidents essentiallyare nothingother than substances'modes of being is compelledto rethinkthe nature of accidents. In the 1250s,Thomas Aquinas formulatedwhat can be consideredthe versionof such a rethinking.26 mostinfluential Generallyspeaking,Aquinas elaboratesa two-steptheologicalstrategy.We can finda firstaccount of on theSentences and a finalaccount in his later it in Aquinas's Commentary or the fourthbook of of the Summa the third like works, Theologiae part Gentiles . the SummaContra The firststep in Aquinas's theologicalstrategyconsistsin demonstrating that it is logicallypossiblefor an accidentto existand not to inhere actuallyin a substantialsubject. Since thereis at least one case, i.e. the Eucharist,in which accidentsactuallyexist withoutinheringactuallyin a substance,such a separate existenceis logicallypossible. This logical possibilityis clearly a supernaturalpossibility,depending upon God's omnipotence.God can cause accidentsthat are not caused by the substancesthatnaturallycause them,since God can cause directlyany effect is regarded thatis usuallycaused by secondarycauses. God's intervention case. In the case at hand, God makesaccias an absolutelyextraordinary concerns dentsquasi-substantial beings.27Specifically,thistransformation the the which after Consecration, becomes, subject of all only quantity,

26On Aquinas's and on hispredecessors, see P.J.J.M. treatment Bakker, theological etle miracle. Lesdoctrines La Raison 1999,vol. 1, % Nijmegen (c. 1250-c.1400 eucharistiques 294-316. 27Cf.e.g.Aquinas, Summa Illa, q. 75,a. 5, ad 4. Theologiae,

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the remainingaccidents.Thus, all the accidentsexceptquantitystillhave a subjectin which theyinhere,even thoughit is not a substantialsubcan two "Aristotelian" prinject. Only withregardto quantity,therefore, ciplesbe rejected,viz. (1) thatan accidentcannotbe the subjectof another accidentand (2) thatan accidentcannot existwithouta subjectin which it inheres.28 The second step in Aquinas's theologicalstrategyconsistsin proving that the Eucharistdoes not fundamentally change our ordinaryunderstandingof accidents.For afterthe Consecrationaccidentsare not substancesbut stillaccidents.29 This is the most importantbut also the most in problematicstep Aquinas's strategy.What kind of being do accidents have after the Consecration?This questiondependsupon how one answers another question: What kind of being do accidents have beforethe Consecration?As to this point, Aquinas's argumentis not particularly on theSentences , Aquinas complicated.Let me considerit. In his Commentary assumes that accidentsbring two relationsto a subject. First,accidents inherein a substanceand second, theydepend upon God. Althoughan accident naturallydepends upon a substanceand remotelyupon God, Aquinas thinksthat 'to be in a substance'and 'to depend upon God' are not definitional featuresof an accident.As a result,an accidentis what it is independently of the factthat it depends upon a substanceor upon God.30When answeringa traditional'philosophical'objection- viz. an accidentcan never existwithouta subject,even if miraculously, because an accidentis definedas what is in a subject- Aquinas points out that 'to be in a subject' cannot expressan accident'sessence because 'to be' (esse)is not a genus, so it cannot be part of a definition,and only a definition can reveal the essence of a thing.Nonetheless,'to be in a subis ject' somethingthatcan pertainto an accident'sessence. For instance, if we definequality as a dispositionof a substance,this definitionsays what quality essentiallyis. This definition,however,does not say that qualityis inheringin a substanceor dependingupon God. Nor does it 28Cf.Aquinas, Sum.theol. a. 2, ad 2. , Ilia, q. 77,a. 1, respondeo; 29Gf.Aquinas, Sum.theol manente ., Ilia, q. 77,a. 1,ad 4: "(.. .) accidentia huiusmodi, substantia sedsubstantia eorum panisetvini,nonhabebant ipsaesse,necaliaaccidentia: habebat huiusmodi esseperea. (. . .) Sedpostconsecrationem ipsaaccidentia quaeremahabent esse.Undesuntcomposita ex esseet quodest";a. 2 c: "Etquia,subtracto nent, remanent accidentia secundum essequodpriushabebant, estquod subiecto, consequens omniaaccidentia remanent fundata dimensivam". superquantitatem 30Cf.e.g.Aquinas, libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1,qa. 1. Scriptum super quatuor

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say thatqualitycan inherein a substance.So if qualityis separatedfrom a substance,quality does not cease to be a dispositionof a substance. to be actuallyor potentiallyin a substanceis somethingthat Accordingly, pertainsto a quality,but it is not part of a quality'sessence. As a matter of fact,Aquinas never says that the accident'sessence includeseven a potential inherencein a substance.In his theologicalwritings, Aquinas maintainsthat it is the accident's mode of being- as distinctfromits inherence.An accidentis what essence- thatincludesan actualor potential it is independentlyof its actual or potentialinherence.For an accident is none other than a qualificationof a substance.Thus, only the reference to substanceis part of an accident'sessence. If we do not allow for be accidents. this conclusion,separate accidentscould not actually If thisreadingof Aquinas's theologicalstrategyis correct,we can state identical fromthe at-first-glance thatAquinas's solutionis quite different one of Bonaventure,who explainsthe Eucharistiecase by distinguishing In fact,Aquinas's distinction between actual and potentialinherence.31 to an essence betweenwhat is partof an essence and what merelypertains but is not part of it seemsto be introducedin orderto removeany inherence froman accident'sessence ratherthan to include an inherenceof some sort (i.e. the potentialinherence)in its essence. As a consequence, 'to inhere'mightbe understoodin Aquinas's textsin two different ways. On the one hand, if cto inhere' is understoodsimplyas 'to be in' neitherthe actual nor the potentialinherenceis part of an accidents'essence but of its mode of being or existence.For the same reason,the property 'to depend upon God' cannot be part of an accidents'essence. On the otherhand, if 'to inhere'is understoodas 'to be of' thisactual tendency item to inhereis part of an accident'sessence. For everynon-substantial Eucharist this the a substance. From is essentiallysomethingof viewpoint, does not modifythe accident'sessence or nullifythe accident'sactual tendency for being somethingof a substance.Thus, it should not be said that, for Aquinas, accidents sometimesare actuallyinhering(i.e. when theyare joined witha subject)and sometimesare not inheringat ¿ill(i.e. - even when theyare disjoinedfroma subject) thoughtheycan be actually inheringat some time or another.Quite the opposite,it should be said that the Eucharistsimplysuspendsthe accident'sactual being in a 31Cf.Bonaventure, Sententiarum libros Commentarla inquatuor , IV, d. 12,p. 1, a. 1,q. 1, in OperaOmnia,vol.IV, Ad ClarasAquas1889,271a.

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as faras the accidentalessenceis concerned,accidents, subject.Nonetheless, becauseoftháressence , maintainthe propertyof being somethingof a subwhich the actual or potentialinherencein a substanceis stance,upon grounded.32 Afterthe Consecrationaccidentsdo not lose the kind of being they had in some way beforethe Consecration.For accidentsstillremainaccidents and, qua accidents,they still have an accidental kind of being.33 Before the Consecration accidents did not have any being on their own; nonetheless theyhad being.Beforethe Consecration,indeed,theaccident's being is the same as the substance's accidental being. But this accidentalbeing is not the same as the substance'sbeing. Therefore,the accident'sbeing is not the same as the substance'sbeing,even thougha substanceand an accident share the same existentialbeing.34Afterthe Consecration,an accident continuesto exist as a substance'saccidental being. But now such a being is a subsistentbeing and not merelythe accidentalbeing of a substance.35 This interpretation of Aquinas's doctrineis not the only one possible. In fact,it is unclear fromAquinas's textshow we are to read the claim that afterthe Consecrationaccidentshave being. On the one hand, this claim could be read as saying(1) that separate accidentshave the same thatsuch beingtheyhad beforethe Consecration,withthe sole difference is After that it is the now self-subsistent all, Aquinas says being. being all of the accidents the of conversion that identity throughout process marksout transubstantiation fromcreation.But accidentscan remainthe same only if theirbeing remainsthe same.36But on the other hand, it could also be read as saying(2) thatseparateaccidentshave a newbeing, 32Gf.e.g.Aquinas, Sum.theol. non , Ilia, q. 77,a. 1, ad 2: "In hocautemsacramento daturaccidentibus sintsinesubiecto, sedex divinavirtute sustenquodexvisuaeessentiae tante. Et ideonondesinunt esseaccidentia." mine). (emphasis 33See n. 32 above. 34Fora slighdy different seeJ.F.Wippel, TheMetaphysical Thought ofThomas explanation, toUncreated From Finite D.G. 2000,265.On thistopic, see , Washington Aquinas. Being Being alsoP.L.Reynolds, PerseAccidents, Accidental andtheTheology inThomas Being oftheEucharist e studisullatradizione filosofica 13 (2002),193-230; , in: Documenti medievale, Aquinas M. McCordAdams, Aristotle andtheSacrament A Crisis inMedieval in: Aristotelianism, ofAltar: - M. Tweedale R. Bosley Aristotle andHisMedieval , Calgary 1991,195-249; (eds.), Interpreters andR. Imbach, deFreiberg a-t-il Thomas surle "De Pourquoi Thierry critique d'Aquin? Remarques accidentibus furPhilosophie undTheologie, Zeitschrift 45 (1998),116-29. "9in:Freiburger 35Cf.Aquinas, Sum.íheol. , Illa, q. 75,a. 5, ad 4. 36Cf.Aquinas, Sum.theol., Illa, q. 75,a. 8, respondeo.

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because beforethe Consecrationthey did not have theirown being at all. According to either reading, separate accidents are still accidents, which do not actuallyinhere.But in the firstcase, accidentscan stillbe consideredas inheringitems,since theymaintaina tendencyto inhere, even thoughGod makes it impossiblefor them to realize thistendency. So they continueto be actuallyaccidentsas to both theiressence and theirbeing. In the second case, on the other hand, accidentsare not actuallyinheringitems.For theydo not maintainan actual tendencyto inhere. So they are accidental items as to theiressence but substantial itemsas to theirbeing. Althoughthe second reading will be the one most followedand the one most criticisedby later theologians,the firstreadingseems to be the correctone. For it fitswith anotherfeatureof Aquinas's thought.When explaining the case of the Eucharist, Aquinas maintains two other "Aristotelian"principles,namely,first,that no accident can pass from one subject to anothersubject and, second, that everyaccident is individuated by its subject.37Now, Aquinas defendsthe miraculouscase of separateaccidentsby citingthe firstof theseprinciplesagainstthosewho looked for another subject of inherence,once the substance of bread changesintothe body of Christ.Aquinas defendsthisprincipleby appealForing to the factthatseparateaccidentsare stillaccidentsoftheHost.38 and here Aquinas appeals to the second principle it is the Host that individuatessuch accidents.We can maintainthis claim, however,only ifwe allow thatthe accidentswe see afterthe Consecrationare stillaccidentsof the Host, and not, say, genericaccidentsor even accidentswith only the appearances of the Host. But we can grantthis if and only if such accidentsare regardedas stillhavingan actual tendencyto perform theirfunctionof qualifyingthe Host. In such a case, God limitsHimself to barringthe actual achievementof thisactual tendency.From thisperspective,the Eucharistdoes not affectthe accident'sessence,but onlythe fulland completeachievementof the accident'sactual existence. Aquinas's philosophicaltreatmentdoes not essentiallychange thispicture. In his philosophicalwritings,fromthe De enteet essentia up to the essence of an maintains that the on the , Aquinas Commentary Metaphysics a a of subthan is other accident,say quality, nothing being qualification esse relies the same time that at the while stance, quality's maintaining 37Cf.e.g.Aquinas, Sum.theol. , Illa, q. 77,a. 1, respondeo. 38Cf.e.g.Aquinas, Sum.theol., Illa, q. 75,a. 5, respondeo.

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upon its actual or potentialinherencein a substance.In his philosophical writings, Aquinas does not discussthe case of separateaccidents,even to do so. Nor does he discuss the logical when he has the opportunity possibilityforan accidentto existwithoutactuallyinheringin a subject. This omissionis not particularlysurprising,however. For, as we have seen, Aquinas thinksthatthe Eucharistis an exceptionalcase thataffects accidents'existence,but does not alter the essence and hence the natural kind of being accidentshave. So it is logicallyimpossibleto imagine accidentsnaturallynon-inheringin a substance,since accidentsare incompletebeingsand, hence, incompleteessences.From thisperspective it is not withoutsignificance thatthe same doctrinesummarisedabove is on theMetaphysics , which is conrepeated by Aquinas in his Commentary on with the third of his Summa Theologiae. Commenting part temporary the accident'sbeing book VII, forinstance,Aquinas clearlydistinguishes fromthe accident'sessence. An accident depends naturallyupon a subject forboth its being and its essence. But the subjectis externalto the accident'sessence. So neitherthe substancenor the propertyof being in a subject is part of an accident's essence. The referenceto a subject, though,is includedin an accident'sessence. This means thatan accident is not reducibleto a substancequalifiedso-and-sonor to an independent on a substance,but ratherto a substance'sbeing qualificationsupervening Even when existingseparately,accidentsdo not lack the actual qualified.39 of substances' accidentalmodes of being. property being 4. FromAquinasto Scotus The distinctionsintroducedby Aquinas in order to integratetransubstantiationinto an Aristotelianframeworkhad a certaindegree of success among theologians of the next generation.In particular,several theologiansattemptto draw a connectionbetweenAquinas's distinction betweenwhat is part of an accident'sessence and what merelypertains 's distinctionbetweenpotential to it, on the one hand, and Bonaventure The mostinfluential and actual inherence,on the other.40 example of this 39Cf.Aquinas, inMetaphysicam , V, lec.9, ed. M.-R.Cathala- R.M. Spiazzi, Expositio n. Turin-Rome n. lec. 1, 1257;lec.4, n. 1352. 1964, 894;VII, 40See e.g.Hervaeus IV Librum Sententiarum , d. 12,q. 1, a. 2, ed. Natalis, Scriptum super Paris1647,f. 355aC-bD;Quodlibeta , IV, q. 9, ed. Venice1513(rpt.Ridgewood 1966), IV Librum Sententiarum f. 109va-b; DurandofSt.-Pourçain, , d. 12,q. 1, ed. Scriptum super Venice1571,f.322rb.

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ofAristotle's attemptcomesfromGiles ofRome.41This line ofinterpretation with of success will meet of accidents varyingdegrees throughmetaphysics At the beginout the traditionof the commentarieson the Metaphysics. ningof the fourteenthcentury,for instance,the Franciscan theologian Alexanderof Alexandriawill adopt it withouthesitation,whereas at the century,the AugustiniánHermitPaul of Venice beginningof the fifteenth Alexanderby way of Francis of will rejectit vigorouslywhile criticising Marchia's arguments.42 Among philosophers,however,apart fromrare exceptions,the most common trend was to reject Aquinas's solution.Althoughthe position statingthat an accident cannot existwithouta subject was criticisedat lengthby Giles of Rome in 1270 and solemnlycondemnedin Paris by Etienne Tempier in 1277,43many philosopherscontinuedto endorse it. Amongthem,we can name Sigerof Brabant,Boethiusof Dacia, Ferrandus of Spain, and Radulphus Brito at Paris,44and William of Bonkys at Oxford.45 Specifically,the philosopherscriticiseboth steps of Aquinas's strategy. Their argumentis that it is logicallyimpossiblefor an accidentto exist and not to inhereactuallyin a substance,because only actual inherence 41See GilesofRome,InIV Sententiarum. Monacensis , q. 9 (d. 12),ed.C. Luna, Reportatio Christi decorpore Florence , prop.41,ed.Rome1554(rpt. 2003,464-65.See alsoTheoremata am Main1966),f.28va-b;Questiones Frankfurt , VII, q. 2, ed. Venice1501 methaphisicales of amMain1966),fol.27va.In thesamevein,seeAugustinus Triumphus (rpt.Frankfurt Universitätsbibliothek inMetaphysicam 192, , VII, q. 10,msInnsbruck, Ancona, Quaestiones f. 115ra-b. 42On thisdebate,see F. Amerini, sullanatura accidenti Alessandro d'Alessandria , in: degli andid.,Francesco filosofica 16(2005),179-235; Documenti e studi sullatradizione medievale, accidenti eucaristici . Il casodegli come diPaoloVeneto , in:Picenum seraphicum, fonte d'Appianano forthcoming. 43Cf.GilesofRome,De erroribus conI, n. 10,andXII,n. 8. Thearticles philosophorum, list(cf.Enquête surles219artito R. Hissette's in Parisarenn.196-99according demned à Parisle 7 mars 1277, Louvain-Paris clescondamnés 1977,287). 44Cf.e.g.SigerofBrabant, inMetaphysicam , , VII, q. 1, Cambridge Quaestiones reportatio Louvain1983,328-29;Parisreportatio ed. A. Maurer, , ed. Maurer, 452,and qq. 5-6, librum ofDacia,Quaestiones III, qq. 1,4, and6, ed. N.J. 454-55;Boethius Topicorum, super ofSpain, Green-Pedersen 1976,167,174,and 177;Ferrandus -J. Pinborg, Copenhagen Merton 281,f. 83va-b;Radulphus , VII, msOxford, College, super Metaphysicam Expositio concreti. Texts Termini accidentales inPorphyrium, Brito,Quaestiones q. 34,in S. Ebbesen, du Moyende l'Institut theLate13thCentury , in:Cahiers Âgegrecetlatin,53 (1986), from VII, q. 2, mscit.,f.292rb-va; Radulphus 37-150, q. 3, in S. Ebbesen, esp.85-6;Qu.met., - K. Emery - A. Speer(eds.),op.cit.(n. 14 inJ. A. Aertsen Brito onthe"Metaphysics", above),450-92, esp.484,§§ 3.1-2. 45Cf.William Gonville inMetaphysicam ofBonkys, , VII,q. 1, msCambridge, Quaestiones andCaiusCollege, 344,f.55vb.

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can be realized, so that, for an accident, cto exist' means precisely'to inhereactually'.So, even ifwe mustbelieve by faiththatthereexistseparateaccidents,inheringonlypotentially, philosophically speakingaccidents cannot be otherthan actuallyinheringitems.This is because- criticising - if we allow for accidents the firststep in Aquinas's strategy , actually we must that accidents are from conclude no substances, separated longer accidentsbut substances.Moreover- and criticisingthe second step- if we allow that inherenceis not part of an accident's essence, we must conclude that inherenceis itselfan accident. In this case, however,we cannot avoid an infiniteregressof the relationsof inherence.As a consequence, God cannot cause accidentswithouthaving them caused by the substancesthatnaturallycause them,fortwo reasons:first,secondary causes exerta special causationthat cannot be bypassedby the primary cause, and second, God cannot cause anythingdirectlywithoutmaking use of somethingelse. In short,God can replace secondarycauses in termsof efficient but not materialcausation. 5. Scotus'sNew Perspectives As has been said, the philosopherstend to criticiseAquinas, while the theologianstend to followhim. But not all theologiansaccept Aquinas's doctrine.Scotus, forinstance,is one of those who rejectAquinas's solution. Like Aquinas, Scotus looks at the Eucharist as an extra-ordinary case thatcompelsus to rethink accidents.But the resultof such a rethinking is quite different fromAquinas's.As forwhetherinherenceis or is notpart of an accident's essence,we have seen that Aquinas answersthis question in a qualifiedlypositivemanner;Scotus, on the otherhand, answers the questionin the negative.Accordingto Aquinas, an accidentis a thing whose metaphysicalnature consistsin being somethingof a substance. Accordingto Scotus, instead,being somethingof a substanceis added accidentallyto an accident,whose metaphysicalnatureconsistsin being a thingon its own. For thisreason, Scotus thinksthatAquinas is wrong in sayingthat accidentspass froma being theylack beforeConsecration to a new being afterConsecration.For neithercreationnor accidental change is involvedin the Eucharist.Nor can the new being be substantial. For otherwiseaccidentswould be absolutelyindependentbeings.46 46See Scotus, Ordinatio, TV,d. 12,q. 1,ed. L. Wadding, Lyons1639(rpt.Hildesheim vol.VIII,703-04, nn.3-4.Fora similar seeFrancis ofMeyronnes, criticism, 1969), Scriptum

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he is quite AlthoughScotus arrivesat his finaldoctrineby degrees,47 in his career that substances and accidents are explicitthroughout saying absoluteand perse beingson theirown.48Nonetheless,substancesare cat, while acciegoriallypriorto accidents,so thatsubstancesare perseprimo Both substancesand accidentsreceivethe property dentsare perse secundo. of being per se directlyfromGod, upon whom both beings depend for their existence.Both substancesand accidents receive the propertyof direcdyfromGod, as well. When God crebeing per se primoet secundo ates an accident,a propertynecessarilyflowsout fromit. Such a propertyis preciselya tendencyor aptitudeto inherein a substance,and an this tendencyor aptitude,which can be actuaccident has primitively alised at some timeor another.Two pointsare entailedby thisview. On the one hand, the fact that such a propertyfollowsupon an accident's essence entails that it is a contingentpropertyof an accident. On the other hand, though,the fact that such a propertynecessarily flows out is a se modo If entailsthat it per secundo property. thispropertyis external to an accident'sessence,an accidentcan have or not have such a property.So the factthat an accidenthas such a propertyis a naturallybut not logicallynecessaryconstraintconcerningan accident'sessence- as the case of the Eucharistreveals. Scotus providesa firsttreatmentof the topic of accidentalbeing in the on theMetaphysics , VII, q. 1 ("whetherinherenceis part of an Questions Scotus will returnto this topic on sevaccident's essence"). Afterwards, eral occasions throughouthis career, but he will provide an extensive treatmentof it only in the later Ordination IV, d. 12. Here Scotus reproin find the the same conclusions we Questions , albeit in different poses clothes.We can summariseScotus's metaphysicsof accidentsas follows. Afterfirstdistinguishing the generalconceptof accident fromthe objects that can be denominatively called accidents(forinstance,a whiteness),49 IV Sententiarum PeterAuriol, , d. 12,q. 5, ed. Venice1520,ff.195vb-196ra; super Scriptum IV Sententiarum , d. 12,q. 5, ed. Rome1605,p. 113a. super 47Foran insightful reconstruction ofScotus's doctrine anditsevolution, see G. Pini, andInherence. Scotus andtheParisDebate ontheMetaphysics Substance , Accident , in oftheEucharist - J.-L.Solére- G. Sondag(eds.),DunsScotà Paris.1302-2002 - E. Karger O. Boulnois , Turnhout 2004,273-311. 48See e.g. Scotus,Quaestiones etal.,St. inMetaphysicam , V, qq. 5-6,ed. R. Andrews N.Y. 1997,vol.III, 466-71; VII,qq. 2-4,vol.IV, 109-29; Parisiensia, Bonaventure, Reportata IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed. L. Wadding, 1969),vol.XI.2,676-79; Lyons1639(rpt.Hildesheim Ord., IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.cit.,703-26. 49Cf.Scotus, IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.dt.,711,n. 5. VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,92,n. 8; Ord., Qu.met.,

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in the Questions and second,actualfromaptitudinalor potentialinherence,50 on theMetaphysics Scotus draws an originaldistinction,i.e. that between what is part of the essence of somethingand what is essentiallyidentical to somethingbut is not part of its essence.51Scotus does not repeat this distinctionin the Ordinatio , where he introducesinstead the distinction betweenwhat is part of the essence of somethingand what followsnecseem to amountto the essarilyfromthe essence. But the two distinctions same thing. In fact,what is essentiallyidentical to somethingwithout being part of its essence is coextensivewith that thing.So it necessarily followsfromsuch a thing.Thus, forexample,animal is part of the essence of man and hence essentially identicalto man; in contrast,risibleis essenman identical to because it followsnecessarilyfromman, but it is tially therenot part of the essence of man. On the basis of such distinctions, Scotus draws three conclusions. fore, The firstconclusionis thatno inherenceis partof an accident'sessence.52 For the foundationof a relationis different fromthe relation,and inherence is grounded upon neitherthe substance (for otherwisesubstance should be said to inhere)nor the compositeof accident and inherence (for otherwiseinherencewould be grounded upon itself),but precisely upon the accident.But inherenceis a relation.Hence inherenceis different fromthe inheringaccidentand posteriorto it. Moreover,inherenceconcerns all the categoriesand nothingessentialis common to them.53 The second conclusionis that the aptitudinalinherenceor essential dependence an accident bringsto a substanceis essentiallyidenticalto For the passionsof being are essentiallyidenticalto being, the accident.54 and 'to be primarily(or per se or even in sèf and cto be secondarily(or inherere or even essein alio)' are passions of being. So cto be secondarily' is essentially identicalto the accident,so thataccidentsare secondaryand less perfectbeings than substances.Moreover,this dependence abstracts fromthe actual existenceof an essence and foundsitselfupon possible 50Gf.Scotus,Qu.met., VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,92, n. 9; Ord., IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit.,711, n. 5. 51Cf.Scotus, Qu.met., VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,93,n. 11. 52Cf.Scotus,Qu.met., VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,93-94,n. 12; Ord., TV,d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit., 711,n. 5. 53Cf.Scotus, VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,94, nn. 13-14;Ord., IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit., Qu.met., 717,n. 9. 54Cf.Scotus, Qu.met., VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,94,n. 15; Ord., IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit.,711, n. 5.

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essences.But thesefoundationsare immutable,since necessarilyGod creates by imitatingthese exemplarymodels. Therefore,the order between substancesand accidentsis also immutable.55 Finally,the thirdconclusionis that actual inherenceis not essentially identicalto the accident.56For eitherextremeof this order can change while the otherextremeremainsthe same, because God's will is contingent with regard to any existencewhatsoever.Thus, for an accident,it is absolutelycontingent thatit inheresactuallyin a substance.Only actual If the subjectwere part of an accidependenceupon God is necessary.57 dent's essence, any accidental compositewould be a substantialbeing. to the subjectwerepartof an accident'sessence, Moreover,ifthe reference an accident could not be made withoutsuch a reference.But it is not logicallyimpossibleto finda counter-example.So the subjectis only an externalcause. Unlike in his Questions on theMetaphysics , in the Ordinatio Scotus narrowsdown this conclusionto absolute accidents.An absolute accident, qua absolute, does not require somethingupon which it is grounded.But a relativeaccident,qua relative,requiresboth a foundation and a terminus. Apart fromthe emphasisScotus puts on the factthat essentialdependence does not belong to an accident'sessence,we see thatScotus'sposition is not particularlyfar fromAquinas's. As we have seen, Aquinas thinksthat the subject,as such, does not fillany formalrole withregard to the essence of a givenaccident.To see the similarity betweenAquinas and Scotus on thispoint,it can be noted that the parallel Scotus draws in his Questions on theMetaphysics betweenthe relationships accidentsbring to substancesand those creaturesbringto God, in order to explain that neitherrelationshipis part of an accident's essence, is the same as the one Aquinas draws in his Commentary on theMetaphysics , book VII, ch. 5. a creature does on a creature is not what it is God, Although depend insofaras it depends on God. Likewise,an accidentis not what it is insofaras it inheresin a substance.As Scotus pointsout both in an addition on theMetaphysics to the text and at the end of the Questions , book VII, upon a substancebecausethesubstance q. 1, an accidentdependsessentially 55Cf.Scotus, VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,94-95,nn.16-17;Ord., IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.dt., Qu.met., 717,nn.9-10. 36Cf.Scotus, Qu.met., VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,96,n. 18. 57Cf.Scotus, VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,96,n. 20; Ord., IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.cit.,721, Qu.met., n. 18.

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existsprimarilywhile the accident exists secondarily.But an accident's formalbeing does not consistin this dependence upon a substance.So, fromthe fact that an accident is a being because it is somethingof a being, it is wrong to inferthat 'to be somethingof a being' expresses preciselythe being an accidentformallyhas. Nor, fromthe factthat an accidentis a being because it is somethingof such a being,is it rightto inferthat an accident is not a being if it is not somethingof such a To conclude:some thing being.Here we have a case offallaciaconsequents. a can be caused by some other thingb while being formallywhat it is of b. Likewise,a can be more perfectthan b with regard independently P a to property while both are P.58 As is clear, Scotus considersaccidents as absolute and autonomous beings.Accordingly, explainingthe ontologica!statusof inherenceis parfor him. As to this,we can distinguishthree stages in ticularlypressing In his on theMetaphysics Scotus's thought. , Scotus confineshimQuestions selfto labellinginherenceas a respect,but he does not go any deeper into the nature of inherence.Scotus focusesagain on this issue in the later theologicalworks,especiallyin the Ordinatio , III, d. 1, q. 1, in the in Parisiensia the Reportata , II, d. 1, q. 7, where he , q. 19, and Quodlibet betweenan accident'sessentialdependence upon substance distinguishes and its actual or causal dependence. Finally,in the Ordinatio , IV, d. 12, to the Fourth Book his definitive Scotus reaches position.According q. 1, if act of subextrinsecus adveniensthe of the Ordinatio , inherenceis a respectus stances' being qualifiedby accidentsis describedas an act of accidents' inheringin the substances.For, just because a particularsubject and a particularaccident are put into the world,the accident does not inhere necessarilyin the subject. But, ratherstrangely,Scotus concludes from this that inherence,qua relative,necessarilyrequiresa subject.59On the other hand, however,if the act of inheringis described as an act of 58Cf.Scotus, Qu.met., VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,97-98,nn.27-28. 59Scotus's Whilewe can define a certain seemsto runas follows. quality, argument a certain such without toa subject, wecannot define suchas whiteness, relative, referring In fact, andthetermoftherelation. as fatherhood, without to botha subject referring to (inthiscase) thata man,whois a father, fatherhood is defined as therelation brings cannot be defined without another inherence, man,whois a son.Therefore, quarelative, fortworeasons. On theonehand, to a subject. Thisargument sounds referring strange, andhenceto define it fatherhood as an absolute itseemsto be possible alsoto consider In hisCommentary without toa subject. ontheCategories , forinstance, JohnBuridan referring andOckham's viewsonrelatives withregard tothispoint criticises bothScotus's precisely inPraedicamenta, Munich1983,92-99,esp.95-96).On (Quaestiones q. 13,ed.J. Schneider,

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then inherencecan be classifiedas an action (of the accident) qualifying, or as a passion (of the subject).In thiscase, inherencerequiresan agent in order to act on a patient.60 On the basis of Scotus's argument,therefore,we can conclude that God can create an accident that does not inhereactuallyin a subject,nor will inhereunlessGod wantsit to inhere. For actual inherencein a subjectis an absolutelycontingentrelationthat is added "later" to the accident. From the opposite side, we can conclude that it is God's will that puts togetheractuallyan accidentand a subject.There is no othercause that linksan accidentand a subjectto each other. In any case, Scotus grantsthat the essentialdependenceupon a substanceis essentiallyidenticalto an accident'sessence,insofaras it follows necessarilyfromit. How mustwe read this claim? Accordingto Scotus, once an accident comes into existence,the accident receivesnecessarily the propertyof inheringpotentiallyin a subject. But puttingthingsthis way, Scotus facestwo traditionalproblemsthathe himselfrecognises.On the one hand, ifinherenceis removedfroman accident'sessence,it must be an accident.But in thiscase inherencerequiresanotherinherencein order to inherein that accident. On the otherhand, if a is not part of the essence of è, then a can be logicallyseparatedfromb. But if a cannot be logicallyseparatedfrom¿, then a mustbe part of the essence of b. This is exactlythe case withpotentialor aptitudinalinherence.Scotus rejectsthe idea thataccidentsare independentbeingslike substances.For the possibilityof inheringcannot be removed,sinecontradictione , froman accident's essence. This entails that it is not possible to have accidents that are unable to inherein a substance.Nonetheless,Scotus denies that being able to inherein a substanceis part of an accident'sessence. As to the firstproblem,in order to block the infiniteregress,Scotus invokesthe rule that a relationis the same as its foundationif the foundationcannotexist,sinecontradictione , withoutthatrelation.This holdsprein of inherence.The same inherenceby the case of the inherence cisely in a which a colour inheres surface,for instance,inheresin the colour as well. For otherwisethe colour could not be said formallyto inherein a surfacebecause of the inherence.On the otherhand, the inherenceby which the inherenceof the colour in a surfacealso inheresin the colour to define evenwhiteness, without theotherhand,it seemsto be impossible quaquality, is always thequality Forwhiteness, toa subject. ofa certain quaquality, subject. referring 60Cf.Scotus, IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit.,711,nn.6-7. Ord.,

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is absolutelythe same as the inherenceby which the colour inheresin the surface.For it is logicallycontradictory to statethatthe inherenceof a colour in a surfaceexistsand that the colour does not inhere in the surface.61 As to the second problem,Scotus repliesthat actual inherenceis not a perse but a peraccidens propertyof an accident,because it involvesthe actual union an absolutebringsto anotherabsolute. Now, such a union is a respectas extrínsecas adveniens , because it does not flow out necessarily fromeitherextreme.Indeed, God can create and preserve,sinecontradictione , an absolutewithoutanotherabsolute. Thus, the actual relationan absolute brings to another absolute is perfectlycontingent.Insofar as potentialinherenceis concerned,though,Scotus is carefulto say thatthe potentialinherenceis not a real and positivepropertythatis superadded to the accident,since it cannot be separatedfromthe accident in existence. Thus, an accident and its potentialinherencedo not give rise to any real composition.Hence inherenceis not another accident that is fromthe former.Saying that an accidentis potentiallyor reallydifferent inheringamounts simplyto sayingthat an accident has a aptitudinally to inherein a subject,i.e. that it is not logicallyimposnon-repugnancy sible forthe accidentto be actuallyin a subject.62 Summing up, Scotus upholds that an absolute a can be essentially ordered to anotherabsolute b insofaras a thirdthingc causes a to be less perfectthan b, withoutthis entailing,first,that the degree of lesser perfectionexpressesa part of the essence of a and, second, that a comparisonof perfectionbetweena and b when concerning,basically,their being requiresa directcomparisonof a to b. If God were to separate froman accident its potencyto inhere,God would make that accident an independentbeing. But Scotus, as has been said, rejectsthis conclusion.63On the otherhand, Scotus argues that actual or potentialinherence in a subjectis not essentialto the account of what kind of created being an accidentis. An accidentis not a certainkind of created being because it can inhere,but it can inhere because it is a certainkind of createdbeing. Nonetheless,it is difficult to understandhow the potency to inhere can be removedfroman accident's essence and not be logically separablefromthe accidentitself.In otherwords,it is unclear how 61Cf.Scotus, nn.14-17. Ord., IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.cit. , 718,nn.11-12;719-20, 62Cf.Scotus, nn.21-22;725,n. 24. Ord., IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.cit.,719,n. 13;723-24, 63See above,n. 46.

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else we can say thatan accidentis less perfectthan a substance,in order to explain that it can inhere in a substance,withoutinvokingprecisely the accident'scapacityto inherein that substance. Treatment: The Questions 6. Marchiai Philosophical on theMetaphysics When Marchia wrotehis Commentary ontheMetaphysics , whichcan be dated 64 on theSentences to about the same period as his Commentary (13 19-23), the debate on accidentsand inherencewas well articulated,as we have seen. In particular,one point of the debate seems to have been set in stone by thistime.Philosophersno longerneeded to questionwhetheran accidenton itsown does or does not have beingand essence.For in Marchia's view the theologicalcase of the Eucharistand many philosophicalarguments clearlyprove that accidentsdo indeed have being of theirown. PeterAuriol,readingthe Sentences at Paris two yearsbeforeMarchia, still discussedthispoint,but the view that accidentshave no degree of being Auriol labels an "old opinion".65As a result,in Marchia's day the main philosophicalproblem at issue concernedthe kind of relationshipholding betweenan accidentand its subject.Specifically,the discussioncentred on the question whethersome sort of inherencemust be included in an accident'sessence.Marchia dealt withthe topic of accidentalbeing on several occasions,but especiallyin his Metaphysics book commentary, VII. At the beginningof the commentaryon thisbook, Marchia immediatelyjoins in thisdebate by asking"whetherinherenceis or is not part of an accident'sessence". Generallyspeaking,Marchia identifiestwo partiesamong Aristotelian On the one hand, there are those who say that some sort interpreters. of inherenceis part of an accident's essence. For being in a subject is an essentialfeatureof an accidentjust as much as being on its own is - C. Schabel, 64On Marchia's lifeandworks, see R.L. Friedman Francis ofMarchia's Mediaeval 63 andC. Schabel, on the Sentences in: Francis , Studies, (2001),31-106, Commentary , in E.N. Zalta(ed.),TheStanford , URL: http: ofPhilosophy ofMarchia Encyclopedia //plato. On thelikely dateofcomposition stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/francis-marchia. ofMarchia's onthe ontherelation between thiswork , andespecially Commentary Metaphysics vonMarchia: Die andMarchia's ontheSentences Franziskus , seeS. Folger-Fonfara, Commentary undeiner Besonderen e studisulla erste einer , in:Documenti Unterscheidung Allgemeinen Metaphysik tradizione filosofica 16 (2005),461-513, medievale, esp.495-501. 65See PeterAuriol, In IV Sent., d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, Rome1605,p. 109a(cf.alsop. 1, of thistextat URL: http://spot.colorado. 11.22ÍT.,ofR. Pasnau'sEnglish translation 12.pdf). edu/~pasnau/research/aureol4-

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an essentialfeatureof a substance.Like Aquinas, these thinkerssay that the generalconcept 'to be' spreadsinto the categorialscheme by way of modes of being and not by way of differentiae , since 'being' is not a genus. But unlikeAquinas, theyalso say thatthe mode of being 'to be in a sub'rational' ject' mustbe part of an accident'sessence,just as the differentia has to be part of the essence of the species 'man'.66 Marchia rejectsthis common opinion. A mode of being has a relational status;hence it requiresa positiveand absolute foundation.If an accidentis distinguished froma substancebecause of that mode, then it must be distinguished beforehandbecause of that positiveand absolute foundation.As a consequence,everymode of being presupposesa certain being. So if an accident is distinguishedfroma substancebecause of a mode, it has to be distinguished beforehandbecause of that being. to from the factthat an accidenthas a mode Thus, according Marchia, is of being it incorrectto inferthe factthatit has being. Quite the opposite.The deductionmustbe: An accidenthas being,hence it has a mode of being.For otherwise,ifaccidentsand substancesare distinguished from each other accordingto a mode of being, it followsthat accidentsand substancesshare the same being.67 The second opinionis not completelydistinctfromthe former.It is a common opinion among theologians.This opinion distinguishes between twowaysof inhering,i.e. actuallyand aptitudinally. it Accordingly, applies the followingrule: If a cannot be separated fromb, sinecontradictione , b must be part of the essence of a. But an accident cannot be separated fromaptitudinal, i.e. potential,inherence,sinecontradictione. Hence the aptitude to inherein a substancemust be part of an accident'sessence.68 Marchia rejectsthis second opinion,as well. The reason is the same. Aptitudinalinherencehas a relationalstatus,so it can belong to an accidentonlybecause of a positiveand absolutefoundation.Hence an accident is distinguishedfroma substancebecause of that positiveand absolute foundation. no aptitudinal itemcan grantactualbeingto someFurthermore, thing.Nor can a thingbe an absolute because of a relationalitem.69 Marchia does not dwell here on this latter remark,confininghimself to recallinga traditionalargument.Nonetheless,Marchia picks out a 66Cf.below,appendix, 11.12-36. 67Cf.below,appendix, 11.43-59. 68Cf.below,appendix, 11.36-42. 69Cf.below,appendix, 11.60-82.

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problematicfeatureof the commontheologicalopinion,whichScotus had alreadypointedout. Clearly,aptitudinalinherenceexpressesnothingbut thatit can fulfil an accident'saptitudeto inhereactually,i.e. a possibility at some time or another.For what is actuallyan accidentcan onlyhave to inhereas if this actual inherence.An accidentcannot have an aptitude that an accident were a actuallyhas. An actuaptitude positiveproperty to inhere has the accident again in the future, aptitude ally non-inhering and hence the aptitudeto be an accidentagain, but actuallyit is not an accident at all. It is simplysomethingfor which it is not logicallycontradictoryto inhere actuallyat some time or another.70In brief,if we say that 'to be aptitudinallyè' is part of the essence of a, then it is sufficient to say thatsomethinghas the aptitudeto be b in orderforthat b is not actuallyé, but it will be to be a. But what is aptitudinally thing will an be realised.For 'to be aptib when such aptitude actually only a V is the condition 0, but not whereby thingis aptitudinally tudinally the conditionwherebya thingis actuallya. Therefore,aptitudinalinherence does not statean accident'spositiveand real property.It statesonly a negativeproperty,which has to be explained in a conditionalway: If a is an accident,then nothingpreventsa frominheringin a subject at some time or another.That is to say that an accidentis a naturemade for it to inherein a in such a way that it is not logicallycontradictory time or another. at some subject Once Marchia has rejectedthese positions,he provideshis own solution. His answersounds 'scotistic'.Like Scotus,Marchia defendsa strong Formally readingof what we above called the Expansive Interpretation. is what it is because of itself. It is a whatsoever accident speaking,any kind and it has its own of its own on (ensperse) being (esseperse) being although,materiallyspeaking,an accident can exist only because of a Consequently, any accidentwhatsoever subjectin whichit actuallyinheres.71 can be identifiedformally,and hence be numericallycounted,because of itself although,materiallyspeaking,an accidentcan be individuated 70Fora similar De accidentibus, ch. 22, ed. of Freiburg, see e.g. Thierry argument, M.R.Pagnoni-Sturlese, 1983,84,nn.4-6. Hamburg 71Cf.Marchia, VII, q. 3, msP, f.49vb-50ra; Qu.met., q. 6, msP, f.52ra: (. . .) íllud autemestensforsineeo; accidens intelligi peraliudnonpotest quodestensformaliter nonestensnisicausaliter" maliter se ipsoetnonpersubiectum, (for quiapersubiectum Formoredetails on thisaspect oftheEdition). thesiglaofthemss,seebelow,Criteria exanalogia adsubstantiam accidentia ofMarchia's see Qu.met., IV, q. 4 (Utrum precise though, sintentia velexse),msP, f.22ra-vb.

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only because of the subject in which it inheres.Throughouthis comMarchia oftenrepeatsthataccidentsand substancesare different mentary, se , i.e. because of their own essences and natures,while subper primo stances and accidentscan be distinguishedonly secondarilybecause of inherence.With regard to this,Marchia's main argumentis that every beingis logicallypriorto any mode of being. But 'to inhere',eitheractually or aptitudinally, expressesa mode of being. Therefore,an accident is distinguished froma substanceprimarilybecause of itself. In the Questions on Metaphysics , VII, q. 1, Marchia is rather explicit about the fact that inherence has to be removed from an accident's essence.For Marchia thinksof aptitudinalinherenceas a properpassion that flows out necessarilyfrom an accident, while actual inherenceis regarded as simply accidental to the accident's essence. Nonetheless, Marchia does not inquire furtherinto the relationshipbetweenan accident and its inherence.Like Scotus,he does not explain what naturean accidentmusthave in orderforaptitudinalinherenceto flowout necessarilyfromit. Nor does he explain what ontologicalstatusactual inherence preciselyhas.72Because of Marchia's conciseness,one could remark that once inherenceis removedfroman accident'sessence,the ontological statusof inherenceis no longerclear. For inherencecould be regarded as no longer necessaryto explain an accidental composite.In fact,an accidentalcompositecould be describedas made up exclusivelyof two someone would see betweena coloured items,so that the sole difference surfaceand a colour plus a surface,forinstance,is that in one case the colour is joined togetherwith the surface,while in the other case it is notjoined to it. No intermediateitem is requiredhere. It is sufficient to invokeGod's will or the course of eventsimplementedby God in order to explain such an accidentalcomposition. From anotherperspective, Marchia's solutionfacessome technicalproblems concerningAristotle'sdoctrine of the categories. For one thing, Marchia thinksthatinherenceis reallydifferent froman accident'sessence. For inherence is an accidental propertyfollowingupon an accident's essence. According to Marchia, indeed, differentaccidents must have different subsubjects,since the same accident cannot qualifydifferent But the of and that of jects. subject quantity quantity'sinherence,for thereforequantity and its inherence must be instance, are different, 72Cf.below, 11.83-114. appendix,

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different. Hence theymustbe different accidents.There can be no doubt For the subjectof quantityis substance, that theirsubjectsare different. while the subject of quantity'sinherenceis quantityitself.In fact,every subject receivesthe denominationfromthe accident that is predicated denominativelyof it. But while a substancecan be called 'quantified5, substancecannot be called 'inhering'.Only quantitycan be called 'inherof quantityand ing'. Thereforeinherenceis predicatedabsolutely{absolute) But if relative of substance.73 inherence is an accident ) only secondarily( that is different, say, fromquantity,then it mustbe explainedto which in factbelongs.Now, it seems thatinherencebelongs inherence category to each accidentalcategory,since any accidentcan inherein a substance. But no singlethingcan belongto more than one category.Nor can inherence be a transcategorial property,since,first,substancedoes not possess it and, second, no accident can exist withoutbelongingto at least one category. For anotherthing,as has been mentionedabove, if we removeinherence froman accident'sessence,we give rise to an infiniteregress.For if inherenceis an accident,it requiresanotherinherencein order forit to inhere in that accident. Moreover, if inherence is a third item in betweenthe subject and the accident,how can we explain the factthat the accident but not the subjectinheres?On the otherhand, if we folinherenceas a passion or as an low Scotus's suggestionof understanding we face the crucial of action, problem explainingthe unityor even the between two co-existingitems,i.e. the substanceand relationshipholding to say the accident.That is to say, it could not be logicallycontradictory thata colour inheresactuallyin a surface,forinstance,and thatthe surface is not actuallycoloured. For a colour is not a thingable to qualify essentiallya surface,since it simplyco-existswiththe surface.As a consequence,givena surfacethatis coloured,we could have some difficulties explainingthe reason why we say that we have a coloured surfaceand not a surfacewith a colour.

73Cf.below,appendix, 11.99-110.See alsoQu.met., habere, V, q. 23 (Utrum quosubiecMarchia for sitinpredicamento habitus tum habet accidens, ), ms.P, f.43rb.Generally, argues andnotmerely ofan accident ofanother thepossibility accident, being beingthesubject in a substance. Marchia folaccident can inhere thatbecauseofwhich{idquo ) another canbe theimmediate butnottheremote thatan accident lowsScotusin saying subject accidens sitpersesubiectum On thispoint, see Qu.met., ofanother accident. IV, q. 8 (Utrum alterius msP, f.27ra-va. accidentis),

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an Accident and Its Subject 6.1. TheRelationship between when commentingon Marchia provides a solutionto these difficulties V. Marchia treats the book , unityholdingbetween Metaphysics Specifically, a subject and an accident when commentingon book V, ch. 6, where he discussesthe questions"whetheran accident is some one thingwith its subject" and "whethersomethingone resultsfroma subject and an accident".74Furthermore,Marchia investigatesthe categorial status of inherencewhen commentingon book V, ch. 23, where he discussesthe question"whetherthe having,by whicha subjecthas an accident,belongs to the categoryof habit".75Let me startwiththe firstof these questions. Afterdistinguishing between unity by union and unityby identity, Marchia observesthat a subjectand an accidentare one only according to the firstsense of 'unity'.This means that when we say, for instance, that a surfaceis coloured,we do not state that the surfaceis the same as the colour,but thatthe surfaceand the colour make some one thing. In particular,the surfaceand the colour are not one peraliudbut perse, because they are one immediately.For an accident cannot be reduced to a substantialsubject,nor do a subject and an accidentmake a third, distinctentity,since such an entitycannot be a substance metaphysically or an accident.76Thus, the unityholdingbetween a colour and a surface has to be perse. For ifthe surfaceand the colour are one on account of somethingelse, i.e. inherence,we would have an infiniteregress.77 Therefore,sayingthat a proper passion P inheresper se in a subject ¿ amountsto sayingthat¿ and P are perse and immediatelyone by union. 74Cf.Marchia, unum cum subiecto accidens Qu.met., V, q. 4 (Utrum faciat ) andq. 5 (Utrum exsubiecto etaccidente resultet aliquid unum). 75Cf.Marchia, habet accidens , sitinpredicahabere, V, q. 23 (Utrum Qu.met., quosubiectum mento Thisis question 8 ofBookVI according toA. Zimmermann's list(Verzeichnis habitus). Kommentare undPhysik desAristoteles. Ausder£eit vonetwa zurMetaphysik 1250-1350, Ungedruckter of Leiden-Köln liststhelast11questions ofbookV as thefirst 1971,143).Zimmermann bookVI. 76Cf.Marchia, nonestidemsubiecto, V, q. 4, msP, f.32vb:"(.. .) accidens Qu.met., necex eis résultat Probo:quia illudtertium nonessetformaliter subaliquodtertium. stantia necformaliter cumcompositum nonsitformaliter accidens, aliquodcomponentium.(. . .) Perhocpatetad primum, dicendum quiapassioperse inestsubiecto, quod estipsampassionem facere unumunitate inessesubiecto cumsubiecto perse passionem unionis". 77Cf.Marchia, faciunt V, q. 4, msP, f. 32vb:"(.. .) quecumque unum,et Qu.met., nonperaliud,faciunt unumperse,quiaunumperse idemquodnonperaliud; sedaccidens etsubiectum uniuntur immediate etperse,etnonperaliud,quiatuncesset in infinitum; unionis". processus ergofaciunt perse unumunitate

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As can be noted,Marchia does not focushere on the special issue of the relationshipbetweeninherenceand its subject,since he confineshimone of Aristotle's text.Specifically, selfto commentingon the Aristotelian goals in book V, ch. 6, is to exclude the existenceof an underlyingsubfromthe substance,in orderto explainthe accident's ject thatis different in a substance. Thus, it is unclear whetherMarchia looks at the being insofaras it is externalto the accident'sessencean aliud inherenceas an accidentwitha substance.Nonetheless, playinga rolein keepingtogether we could reapply Marchia's same argumentto the case of inherence, since Marchia upholds, first,that the aptitudinalinherenceis a per se propertyof an accidentand, second, that an accidentcan be the subject of anotheraccident. The question we have been consideringup to now shows that for Marchia it is not so problematicto allow that an accident and a substance are one perse in an immediateway. This impliesthatthereis not a thirdthingthatlinkstogetheran accidentwitha substancewhilebeing fromthe substanceor the accident.Nor at the same timereallydifferent does the union of a surfaceand a colour,forinstance,give rise to somefroma surfacewith a colour. For a colour is thingessentiallydifferent essentiallynot the qualificationof a surface,but a thingco-existingwith betweena coloured the surface.Thus, thereis not an essentialdifference surfaceand a surfaceplus a colour. But in the lightof a doctrinesuch as this,which describesaccidentalcompositesas mereologicalcombinationsof two reallydifferent items,what is the role played by inherence? In orderto clarifythispoint,let me turnto anotherplace in Marchia's commentary,i.e. to question 6 of book VII, where Marchia Metaphysics asks "whetheran accident can be cognised withoutcognisingthe subject". Traditionally,the problemof the cognitionof accidentsraises two questions: (i) whetheran accident can be cognised withoutcognising, throughthe same act of cognition,the subject,and if thisis not the case, (ii) whether,withina linguisticexpression,adding the accidentto the subject amounts to making a repetition.For our argumentwe can leave aside the second questionand focus on the firstone. The common opinion holds that it is not possible to cognise an acciIn both dentwithoutcognisingthe subject,eitherconcretelyor abstractly. in the accident: in of the definition is included cases, indeed, the subject , if we defineconcrete , if we defineabstractaccidents,or in recto obliquo accidents.The basic reason forsayingthisis that an accidentis a being existingonly by analogy to substance,and, since the modes of cognising

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a thingfollowthe modes of being of that thing,an accident cannot be cognisedwithoutcognising,throughthe same act of cognition,the substance as well. On the other hand, we could argue that the intellectis a more perfectfacultythan sensation,and since sensationcan cognisean accident independentlyof and beforecognisingthe substance,then the intellectcan cognisean accidentwithoutcognisingthe substance.In fact, the only reason we could invoketo rejectthisconclusionis that an accident cannot exist independentlyof a substance,thereforeit cannot be of thatsubstance.But thisis not trueuniversally. cognisedindependently of a species,and nonethelesswe For a genus cannot existindependently can cognise the genus withoutcognisingthe species. Hence the 'modistic' dictumthat the modes of cognitionfollowthe modes of being is not true in an unqualifiedway. An accident Marchia's own answerrelieson an importantdistinction. can be understoodin two ways: either according to its essence, from whichwe derive ) the natureof accident,or accordingto thatwhich (accipere is in somethingelse, and to thiswe attribute ) the natureof acci(imponere dent.78In the firstway, accordingto Marchia, we can say that an accident can be cognisedwithoutcognisingthe substanceat the same time. For an accidentis prior to its inherence,insofaras it is the foundation the accidentis cogof thatinherence.Cognised in such a way, therefore, nised withoutthe substance,because an accident refersto a substance only because of inherence.79 Particularlyimportantfor our argumentis what Marchia says in the lines that follow.Accordingto Marchia, accidents can be arranged in two generalclasses.In the firstclass we findaccidentsthatinhereimmediatelyin a subject,whilein the second class we findaccidentsthatinhere 78Cf.Marchia, essedicendum aliter, Qu.met., VII, q. 6, msP, f.5Ivb:"Ideovidetur a qua vel quantum ad rationem essendi, possumus loquidupliciter, quodde accidente natura velquantum ad illudquodestin alio,cuiimponitur natura accidentis, accipitur accidentis". 79Cf.Marchia, de accidente VII, q. 6, msP, f.5Ivb:"Si loquimur Qu.met., quantum intellectu ad rationem in alio,sicdicendum essendi quodaccidens simplici aliquopotest sineposterinoncointellecto subiecto. Quodsicpatet,quiapriuspotest intelligi intelligi ineo; ergo sicutfundamentum estpriusfundato estpriussuainherentia, ori;sedaccidens Sed intelligendo accidens sineinherentia, accidens sineinherentia. intelligintelligi potest ad subiectum nisimediante inherennonhabetordinem itursinesubiecto, quiaaccidens sinesubiecto. subiectum sineaccidente; tia.Ergoaccidens Item, potest intelligi potest intelligi sueinherentie; sinesuainherensedaccidens estsubiectum ergoaccidens potest intelligi sinesubiecto". tia;si sic,potest intelligi

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in a subject only mediately.Now, in the firstclass we find inherence, understood. while in the second class we findeveryaccidenttraditionally in inherence inheres an accident and that immediately because of Saying itselfis necessaryin order to avoid any infiniteregress.Thus, at the end of Marchia's analysiswe meet with the followingontologicalpicture: (1) An accident is posteriorto a substanceand inherenceis posterior to an accident; i.e. because of itself; (2) Inherenceinheresin an accidentimmediately, in An inheres a i.e. accident substance mediately, because of inher(3) ence.80 Marchia articulatesthispicturea bit more by distributing accidentsinto threefurther fromtheirinherence, groups:(A) accidentsthatare different i.e. absoluteaccidents,(B) accidentsthatare the same as theirinherence, Marchia i.e. respectiveaccidents,and (C) the inherenceitself.Accordingly, that accidents to can be to a certain belonging (A) cognised upholds while accidentsbelongingto (B) or to degree separatelyfromsubstance,81 It cannot be (C) cognisedseparately. is importantto note, however,that in spiteof thislatterthreefoldclassification, Marchia tendsto differentiate in insofar as he fact his positionfromScotus's mergesthe firsttwo groups. For, accordingto Marchia, respectiveaccidentsas well as absolute accidentsinherein a substancebecause of inherence.So in contrastto Scotus, 80Gf.Marchia, estscienQu.met., VII, q. 6, msP, f. 5Ivb: "Ad cuiusintellectum sicut dumquodduplex estaccidens. subiectum, Quoddam quodse ipsoimmediate respicit nonmediante estipsainherentia, subiectum, que se ipsaimmediate respicit aliquotertio, in infinitum. subiecQuoddamveroestaccidens quodrespicit quiatuncessetprocessus tumnonimmediate, ipso,sedmediante sicutestipsum accialiquotertio posteriori, densinherens subiectum nisimediante inherentia sua. Aliterenim quod nonrespicit inherentia subiectum et aliteripsumaccidens inherens inherens, quia accidens respicit inherentia etinherentia immediate subiectum subiectum mediante (seipsam respicit respicit dicendum subiectum se ipsononpotest ms).Adpro-positum quodaccidens quodrespicit et nonintelligendo inherens et cui inheret. nisicointellecto Accidens subiecto, intelligi subiectum mediate sinesubiecto, autemquodrespicit potest intelligi quiapotest intelligi sinemedioposteriori subiectum. Etideoaccidens inherens sine quorespicit potest intelligi In particular, sineipsovelsubiecto". the licetinherentia subiecto, ipsanonpossit intelligi a subject concerns twokinds ofaccidents: ofbeingcognised without (i)absolute possibility or denominative and (ii)abstract accidents. It doesnotconcern accidents (iii)concrete accidents. 81Cf.Marchia, VII, q. 6, msP, f. 5Ivb: "Dicendum Qu.met., quodomneaccidens sinesubstansicutestaccidens absolutum, potest intelligi quodestaliuda suainherentia, et neutro autemnon". tiadupliciter, et in abstracto modo;in concreto

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fromwhom he inheritsthistypeof theory,Marchia extends(3) to all the accidents.82 We are now in a positionto defineMarchia's views on the relationship holdingbetweenan accident and its subject. Saying that inherence inheresimmediatelyin an accident,and hence that an accident and a substanceare perse one, amountsto sayingthat inherencedoes not add fromthe inheringaccident,even though inhera thingreallydifferent ence is not reallythe same as the inheringaccident. Actual inherence does not change the natureof an accident.It simplysays that the accident is actuallyrelated to a substance.So an accident can lose such a propertywithoutceasing to be what it is. An actuallyinheringaccident from and an actuallynon-inheringaccident,hence, are really different each other.Thus, a qualifiedsubstance,such as a whiteman, is not simply the same as the sum of a substanceand a qualification.For when referboth speakingof the sum of man and whiteness,we can rightfully to the case of a whitenessthatactuallyinheresin a man and to the case of a whitenessthat actuallydoes not inherein him. But the firstcase is fromthe second because in the firstcase whitenessis actureallydifferent man. From thiswe can also inferthatan accidentis really related to ally different fromitsinherence.But sinceinherencecannotbe separatedfrom an inheringaccident,we can inferfurtherthat inherenceis not a thing fromthe inheringaccident. reallydifferent Marchia's doctrine,and especiallythe place of inherencein it, has some clear problems.Marchia says that an accidentis to inherenceas a foundationis to a relation.This parallel howeveris quite misleading.As a matterof fact,we can have in nature foundationswithoutrelations, but the oppositedoes not hold. Nonetheless,God can miraculouslyseparate a relationfromits foundation,insofaras God can detach the relation's inherencein the foundationfromthe relationitself.For inherence is somethingadditional to a relation.Accordingto Marchia's parallel, though,we should say that God can also separate inherencefroman 82Gf.Marchia, autemquodestsuainher., VII, q. 6, msP, f.52ra:"Accidens Qu.met necin concreto necetiamneutro necin abstracto sinesubiecto, entianonpotest intelligi nonpotest sine se ipsainheret, Et ideosi relatio modo,sicutnecipsainherentia. intelligi noninheret se ipsa,sedmediSi verorelatio necin concreto necin abstracto. subiecto, - , tuncrelatio - quodcredoesseverius sinesubiecto, etin anteinherentia potest intelligi estpriorsua etneutro abstracto absoluta, modo,sicutaliaaccidentia quiaex quo relatio absoscilicet sineea,quiaeademestratiode utroque accidente, inherentia, intelligi potest accidens estpriussuainherentia". ex quo utrumque lutoetrespectivo,

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accident,since the formeris posteriorto the latter.But it does not seem possibleforGod to be able to make inherenceexistwithoutan accident. In fact,when God separatesan accident froma subject,God does not separatethreeitems,but onlytwo,i.e. the subjectand the accident.The Inherenceis a two cases, therefore,must be regardedas asymmetrical. in because it inheres kind of relation, immediately the accident, special so that it cannot be separated fromthe accident. While a colour, for instance,inheresin a surfaceby way of inherence,inherenceinheresin the colour by way of itself.So while a colour can be separatedfroma surfaceby detachingthe colour's inherencein the surfacefromthe surface, the colour's inherencein the surfacecannot be separatedfromthe colour itself,because thereis not an inherenceof the colour's inherence in the surfacethat can be detached fromthe colour. Moreover,while a surfaceand a colour are per se one insofaras no underlyingsubject is involved,the colour's inherenceand the colour are one only insofaras a surfaceis presupposed.All this entails that, once an accident is put into existence,it would seem to be logicallyimpossiblefor the accident to lack inherence.But this raises a problem.For if inherencecannot be separatedfroman accident'sessence,nothingpreventsan accidentfrom inheringin a substanceimmediately.In fact,if the colour's inherencein a surfaceinheresimmediatelyin a colour,thenthe colour is immediately inheringin the surfacebecause of thatinherence;hence the colourimmediatelyinheresin the surface.But if inherenceis inseparablefromthe to avoid the conclusionthat, once it is put into accident,it is difficult existence,an accident is a thingessentially inhering.And this,of course, thrust of Marchia's the whole position. goes against StatusofInherence 6.2. The Ontological In order to furtherclarifyMarchia's theory,let me considerthe second of the two questionsmentionedabove: book V, q. 23, on "whetherthe having,by which a subject has an accident,belongs to the categoryof habit" (see above at n. 75). To my knowledge,Marchia is the sole comwho connectsin some way the statusof inhermentatoron theMetaphysics In book V, q. 23, Marchia attacksthe of habit. ence to the category opinion claimingthat inherencedoes not belongper se to any category, but belongs,by reduction,only to the categoryof the inheringaccident, since inherenceis part of an accident'sessence. This is why inherenceis an accident'smode of being and no mode belongsperse to any category,

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. Marchia even though a mode can belong to a categoryper reductionem is in the same that inherence with those who categoryas deny agrees an accifrom inherence is different the inheringaccident.For, first, really dent, since the accident can lack inherence.Hence, theycannot belong to the same category.Second, inherencehas a relationalstatusand no relationcan be part of an absolute'sessence. But accidentsare absolute beings.Third,inherenceis formallythe same in each category,so it must be in a determinatecategory.Finally,if a mode of being is part of a thing'sessence,then it mustbe concluded that an accident is part of a substance'sessence as well.83 Accordingto Marchia, inherencebringstwo respectsto a subject. It involves,first,a respectof perfectingand, second, a respectof dependence. If we considerinherenceunder both the respects,i.e. perfecting and dependence,we must conclude that inherenceis not in the same categoryas the accident,because such respectsbelong to the categoryof In fact,what informsand what is informedas well as what relation.84 makes dependentand what is dependentare relatedperse. In particular, adveniens each respectis extrinsecus , because an accident is neitheressenof a substance. a substance nor essentially perfective tiallydependentupon of perHowever, if we considerinherencewith regard to the activity fectionan accidentperforms,we must conclude that inherencebelongs, by reduction,to the same categoryas the inheringaccident.The inherence of a colour, for instance,is the same as the act of inheringon account of which a surfacehas that colour, so that an accident'sinhering in a subject is the same act as the subject's having that accident. and both acts These acts are reallyidentical,but conceptuallydifferent, accident. One as the to the same thing,in fact, inhering category belong has only one immediatemode of being. But ctoinherein a subject' and ťtobe possessedby a subject'are modes of beingof an accident.Therefore, 83See Qu.met., V, q. 23,msP, f.43rb. 84Cf.Marchia, accidentis ad subiecV, q. 23,msB, f.87ra:"(.. .) inherentia Qu.met., et formalem siveperfecinformativum duo.Includit enimprimorespectum tumincludit subiectum in quantum accidens informat et perficit tivum ad perfectibilem, subiectum; accidentis includit ab accidente. auteminformatur et perficitur (. . .) Secundoinherentia inquantum inessendo etfigitur ad subiectum, innititur ipsisubiecto respectum dependentie accidentis hocdicendum quantum (. . .) Et secundum quodinherentia superessesubiecti. In my relationis". sedestinpredicamento estingenere ad neutrum accidentis, respectum di Spagnamanuscript I haveusedtheBologna, from thisquestion Collegio transcriptions available to me are Mazarine becausethecopiesoftheParis,Bibliothèque manuscript in thisquestion. unreadable

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theymustbe reallythe same mode.85Nonetheless,it is not logicallycontradictoryto thinkthatjust one of these modes holds. Let me consider an example.Whitenessbelongsto the categoryof qualityand whiteness's inherencein a surfacebelongs to the categoryof relation. But when whitenesswhitensthe surface,the act of whiteningfulfilled by whiteness to the of action and the act of whitened received belongs category being the surface to the of When whiteness is by belongs category passion. relatedto a surface,it whitensthat surfacenecessarily.Accordingly,the resultof the act of whiteningbelongs to the categoryof habit,because, once this act is fulfilled, a surfacehas the whiteness.Nonetheless,each habit can be classifiedaccording to the item perfectingthe subject. Therefore,a qualitygives rise to a qualitativehabit, so that the inherence of a qualitybelongs,by reduction,to the categoryof quality.This means that the perfectiveaction fulfilledby an accident is absolutely extrinsicto the subject. In fact,whitenessperfectsa surfaceonly secundumquid.The fact that such an action is an extrinsichabit of the subject means thatalthoughwhitenessnaturallywhitensa surface,it is possible to think of whitenessas actuallyinheringin a surfaceand of the surface as not actuallyhavingwhiteness.For whitenessdoes not affector alter, in essence, the nature of the surface.Althoughthe whiteness'sinhering in a surfaceand the surface'shavingwhitenessare in factthe same act, 'to inherein a surface'is conceptuallydifferent from'to be possessedby a surface',insofaras 'to inhere' logicallyprecedes 'to be possessed'. For the act of inheringis groundedin the accidentwhile the act of having is groundedin the subject.Thus, as the Eucharistiecase compels us to admit,it is logicallypossible to say that at the same time the whiteness of a surfaceis actually broughtabout and the surfaceis not actually white.For it is logicallypossible to separate the act of accidents'inhering in a subjectfromthe act of the subject'shavingaccidents,since the formerlogicallyprecedesthe latter.In particular,the case of the Eucharist says somethingmore radical. For in such a case, while the separateaccidentscontinueto play the role of accidentsof the Host, i.e. continueto 85Cf.Marchia, ad secundum membrum V, q. 23,msB, f.87ra-b: Qu.met., "Quantum a subiecto, sitin genere utrum habetur dicitur habitus) (seil, ipsumhabere, quo accidens accidentis estidemcumipsoinherere habetur a subiecto, quo accidens quodinherentia accidentis secundum ita quodipsuminherere estidemquodhaberide subiecto rem, estin genere differens solumsecundum et utrumque accidentis inherentis rationem, per ethaberi, reinonestperse etimmediate etinherere nisiunus reductionem, quiaeiusdem modusessendi".

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be inheringin the Host, the Host no longerpossessesthe qualifications determinedby thoseaccidents,since the Host in whichthe separateaccidents inhere no longer exists.This means that even in separationaccidents do not lack their actual tendencyto inhere in a given subject, unaccomplished althoughGod's will makes such a tendencytemporarily fromthe side of the subject.In conclusion,Marchia seems to thinkthat the logical possibilityof separatingthe act of accidents'inheringin substancesfromthe act of substances'havingaccidentsis the clue to giving a philosophically well-groundedexplanationof the miraculouscase of the of whatwe called the Expansive Eucharist.For it permitsthe reconciliation Aristotle's of of metaphysics accidents accordingto which Interpretation accidentsare independentbeingsto a certaindegree- witha theological of the actual world case thatrevealswhat the deep metaphysicalstructure of the Eucharistallows us to square the is. As a result,thisinterpretation philosophicalprinciplethat a thingis actuallyan accidentif and only if it is an actuallyinheringbeing withthe theologicalprinciplethata thing is an accidentif and only if it has been thoughtby God as an absolute thingforwhich it is not logicallyimpossibleto inherein a substance. on theSentences 7. Marchiai Theological Treatment: The Commentary So far,we have seen what Marchia's positionon accidentalbeing is in his most importantphilosophicalwork. Now let me turn to Marchia's theologicalworks.The firstthingwe mustsay is thathis theologicaltreatdifferent fromthephilosophicalone. In his Commentary mentis not essentially on theSentences , which can be dated to around 1319-23, Marchia's focus is again on what kind of thinginherenceis and hence on what kind of unityholds betweenan accident and its subject.In particular,the main and the ending-point of problemforhim is to establishthe starting-point the act of divineseparation.Withregardto this,Marchia beginsby rejecting two opinions. The firstopinionis thatof PeterAuriol.This opinionholds thatinherence expressesthe unityof a subjectand an accident.But unitydoes not stateanythingpositive,but rathersomethingprivative.For two thingsare one if theyare not dividedfromeach other.Hence unitystatesthe privation of division,because we definesome one thingas somethingthat is undivided.This idea is groundedin Auriol'sconvictionthatan accident is a truereality(estverares),which is not the same as a substance(nonest ipsa substantia ), even thoughit does not existapart froma substance(non

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est ressinesubstantia ).86This entails that inherenceexpressesnot only a an accident's of essence, but ratherthe whole essence of the accipart dent. So inherenceis not regardedby Auriol as a thirdthingin between As a consequence,when God separates the substanceand the accident.87 an accidentfroma substance,the accidentalcompositepasses froma priof vative statusto a positiveone, i.e. froma privationto an affirmation division.88So accidentsremain incompleteand interminatethingseven when theyare separatedfroma substance.For otherwiseaccidentswould Auriol argues for his point thanksto a distinctionthat be substances.89 will be criticisedat lengthby Hervaeus Natalis.90Auriolholds thatif two , they cannot be separated from thingsare connectedper se primomodo if modo each other.But two thingsare connectedperse secundo , theycan . Now, to be in a subject be separatedfromeach other sinecontradictions is a properpassion of an accident,so an accidentcan existwithoutbeing in a subject. Marchia rejectsthis opinion because he thinksthat it is incorrectto defineunityin a privativeway. Quite the opposite:It is the divisionthat mustbe definedas a privationof unity.For if unityis a privativehabit, then,once unityis recovered,substancesand accidentswill have a positivehabit. But divisioncannot be regardedas a positivehabit.91

86Cf.Marchia, inquatuor libros Seritentiarum , IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, msParis, Scriptum Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, Rome1605,p. 109a BnF,lat. 15852,f. 182rb-va; Auriol, translation (Pasnau's [seen. 65 above],1,11.22-27). 87Gf.Auriol, multi Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, Rome1605,p. 110b:"Ethicfaciunt inherentia sitde essentia utrum accidentis. difficultatem, (. . .) Si esseformaliter magnam sedestprecise estaccidere estde essentia accidentis accidentis, (. . .) nonergoinherentia et inherentia estipsamet essentia accidentis" (Pasnau'stranslation [see ipsainherentia, In particular, Auriol seealsoa. 2,p. 112a-b. n. 65 above],5-6,11.180-82, grants 196-201); like'master' isbotha relative andsomea purely relative status. Whilea relative accidents an accident like'colour'is onlya relative i.e. a manwhois a master, absolute, thing (cf.Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 2, ed.cit.,p. 112a). 88Cf.Auriol, translation Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1,Rome1605,p. 110b(Pasnau's [see 11.157ff.). n. 65 above],4ff., 89Cf.Auriol, Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 2, a. 1,Rome1605,p. 113a. 90Cf.Hervaeus, IV, q. 9, ed. Venice1513,ff.106va-108rb. Quodlibeta, 91Cf.Marchia, huiusopinf. 182va:"Fundamentum Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1,mscit., inprimo. nonsitnisiprivatio, falsum videlicet est,utpatuit ionis, Magisenim quodunitas et multitudo, unitasconvenit cumpositivis magis quamcumprivativis percontrarium, inquatuor libros seeLandulphus cumprivativis". Fora similar remark, Caracciolo, Scriptum La Raison etle miracle Sententiarum, IV, d. 12,q. 2 (seethetextquotedin Bakker, [cit. n. 26 above],401,n. 268).

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The second opinion is the oppositeof the first.Accordingto it, when God separatesan accidentfroma substance,he removesa positiveentity. Such an entityis a thirdthingexistingbetween the substanceand the accident.As is clear, this opinion draws a strongparallel between substantialand accidental composites.For it holds that the superveningof an accidental formon a substantialsubject gives rise to a thirdindependententity,i.e. the accidentalcomposite.Like a substantialcomposite, an accidental compositesuch as a white man is not the sum of a man and a whiteness.It is a new entity,which is formallydifferent from both the man and the whiteness.But unlike a substantialcomposite,a white man is one and a being only in a qualifiedway (.secundum quid). Accordingto this opinion,when the whitenessof the Host is separated fromthe Host, the divine separationbreaks not only the unitybetween the Host and the whiteness,since the Host is no longerpresent,but also the entityof the whiteHost. In otherwords,afterthe Consecration,we no longerhave a whiteHost, but only the whitenessof the Host.92 Marchia rejectsthis opinion as well, by way of an argumenthe also on theMetaphysics , employs,in a slightlymodifiedform,in his Questions et accidente resultet book V, q. 5 ( Utrumex subiecto aliquidunum).An accidentalcompositeis eithera self-subsistent subjector is inheringin a subin thiscase, an accidentwill In is a But the first it substance. case, ject. be part of a substance,since it was part of the accidentalcomposite.In the second case, by contrast,the accidentalcompositeis an accident.But in thiscase, a substancewill be part of an accident.The opponentcould reply,however,that the accidentalcompositeis not somethingintermediate insofaras it is a thingconnectingthe accident to the substance. For the compositeis neithera substancenor an accident. In any case, such a compositecan be said to be somethingintermediateinsofaras it fromeach of them.93 is somethingmade up by them and different 92Cf.Marchia, Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1, mscit ., f. 182va. 93Cf.Marchia, V, q. 5, msP, Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, mscit.,f. 182vb;Qu.met., f.33ra:"Quantum ad secundum, dicoquodex subiecto etaccidente nonrésultat aliquod aliudab utroque eorum. Primosic:si ex tertium Quoddeclaratur tripliciter. compositum subiecto et accidente résultat autilludcompositum aliquodtertium, querode iliotertio: tertium estperse subsistens autestalteriinherens, cuminter istanonsitdaremedium. etitaaccidens eritparssubstantie, Si estperse subsistens, quia ergoestperse substantia, Si autem accidens estparsilliuscompositi; illudcompositum sitalteri quodestimpossibile. sitaccidens, etitasubstantia estparsaccidentis, inherens, ergoilludcompositum quiasubnec stantia estparsilliuscompositi; quodestimpossibile. Ergonecestperse subsistens

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Marchia also rejectssuch a reply,by way of an argumenthe employs on theMetaphysics , book V, q. 5. An accidentalcomagain in his Questions is an because it superveneson both a substance posite formally accident, and an accident,whichbothhave completebeingon theirown. Therefore, we can ask ourselveswhetherthe accidental compositeis in something else as in its subject or not. In the firstcase, itsjoining with its subject gives rise to a thirdentity.But in thiscase, an infiniteregresscannot be avoided. In the second case, on the otherhand, the accidentalcomposite is not some one thing.Nor can we say that it is not in somethingelse as in its subject.For if thatwere the case, the accidentalcompositeis a substance.Hence, the conclusionis that a substanceand an accidentdo not give rise to a thirdthingthat is different fromboth the substance and the accident.94 Marchia's solutionis a version of Scotus's. When God separates an accidentfroma substance,what he removesis a respect.Unlike Scotus, however,Marchia thinksof such a respectas intrinsicand extrinsicat the same time,althoughwith regardto different things.With regardto adveniens God, indeed, it is extrinsecus , while with regard to the natural world it is intrinsecus adveniens. This means that once a substanceand an accidentare put into existence,inherenceflowsout necessarilyfromthem. For it is logicallyimpossibleto findan accidentwithouta substancein the actual natural world, even though this is not logicallyimpossible absolutelyspeaking.But if we look at inherencefroma more general perspective,it is only a contingentrespect,because God could detach alteri etperconsequens estnichil, autestensperse aut inherens, quiaomnecompositum estensin alio". 94Cf.Marchia, Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, mscit.,f. 182vb;Qu.met., V, q. 5, msP, f.33ra:"Secundo sic:quidquid advenit reiconstitute in actucompleto ms)est (composito accidens. Sed si ex subiecto et accidente resultet illudteraliquodtertium compositum, tiumcompositum adveniret subiecto et accidenti constituto in actucompleto suigeneris. essetin se formaliter et omneaccidens subiecaccidens, Ergoilludcompositum requirit tertium haberet subiectum cuiinhereret. Etqueram tum;ergoilludcompositum proprium tuncde istocomposito et suosubiecto autex eisrésultat comproprio: aliquodtertium autnon.eademratione necexipsoprimo subiecto etaccidente positum primo Si sic,queramde ilioquartocomposito résultat in et eritprocessus aliquodtertium. in compositis infinitum. in infinitum resultantibus ex subiecto et Ergoveleritprocessus veloportet starein primo, et accidente nonresultet accidente, quodex subiecto aliquod tertium Thefinal intheQuestions Marchia invokes onthe compositum". argument Metaphysics andperfection. concerns The wholeis moreperfect thananyofitsparts.So generation an accidental is formally moreperfect thanthesubstance andtheaccident. But composite ifso,an accidental hasbeengenerated moreperfectly thanthesubstance or composite theaccident, becausegeneration is specified byitsterms.

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inherencefromthe accident,if He should wish to do that. Therefore, with regardto God inherenceis an accidentalpropertyof an accident, while withregardto a naturalsubstanceit is a properpassion.95As can be noted,thisconclusiontendsto confirmMarchia's philosophicalresult. For accordingto Marchia's theologicaltreatment, we mustconclude that it is logicallyimpossibleto findin the actual naturalworld accidentsthat are actuallynon-inheringin a subject,so even separate accidentscontinue to be relatedto the Host to a certaindegree. 8. Final Remarks As we have seen, Marchia takes part in the long debate on the nature of accidents.This debate is characterisedby a progressiveshiftin the way accidents are understood.While the firstAristotelianinterpreters modesof beingof substances,when regardaccidentsprincipallyas inhering discussingthe questionas to whetheraccidentsare or are not beings on theirown, the majorityof theologiansand philosophersin the second halfof the thirteenth For them, beings. centuryregardaccidentsas absolute the problem is no longer to explain whetherand, if so, how accidents can be distinctfromsubstances,but how accidentsand substancescan make some one thing.Metaphysically, theirmain focusis on explaining what the ontologicalstatusof inherenceis. Althoughabove all it is considerationof the case of the Eucharistthat induces this change in view, we have seen that many philosophersand theologiansfindin Aristotle's textsphilosophicalsupportfor takingthis step. In thisdebate, Marchia basicallytakesthe side of Scotus. Nonetheless, Marchia's doctrinereveals an interesting attemptto refineScotus's doctrineand to readjustit to a new doctrinalcontext.In particular,Marchia radicalises Scotus's position. In fact, according to Marchia, not only absolutebut also non-absoluteaccidentscan be separatedfromsubstances by divineomnipotence.As we have seen,unlikeAquinas and Bonaventure, Scotus explainsAristotle'smetaphysicsof accidentsby way of the metaphysicsof the Eucharistand not vice versa. For, accordingto Scotus,the Eucharistis a case that reveals what the real metaphysicalorder of the in actual world is ratherthan a case that violates thisorder.Accordingly, order to explain this case in a philosophicallydefensibleway, one does 95Cf.Marchia, Sent., IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1, mscit.,f. 183ra-b.

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not need to followAquinas in modifying the notionof inherenceby disactual from tinguishing potentialinherence,and includingthis latterin the accident's essence; ratherit sufficesto take this case seriouslyand, to removeanyinherencefroman accident'sessence.In conconsequently, clusion,the Eucharistrevealsthat accidentsare absolutebeingsto which actual inherencepertainscontingently while potentialinherencepertains to them necessarily.Indeed, the case of the Eucharistshows clearlythat God did not thinkto create accidentsessentiallyas qualificationsof substances,but as absolute beings,even thoughabsolute beings less perfect thansubstances.But likeScotus's,Marchia's doctrinefacessome difficulties that remain unresolved. For one thing,Marchia does not clarifyat lengthin what the metaphysical imperfectionaccidents have consists.While Aquinas tried to explainwhy accidentsare less perfectbeingsthan substances answering that they are in some way inheringitems- Marchia seems to consider the factthat accidentsare less perfectbeings than substancesas a primitiveand inexplicablefactconcerningaccidents.An accident,qua created being,is made in such a way that it is not logicallyimpossibleforit to inherein a subject and to perfectit, if God should wish that. But it is not possible to inquire furtherinto how an accident has to be made in order forit to fulfilthislogical possibility. For anotherthing,Marchia thinksof aptitudinalinherenceas a necessaryconditionfor a thingto be an accident.But he denies that such an aptitudeis a positiveand real property.Nonetheless,Marchia allows that such an aptitudeis a proper passion of an accident,which cannot be separatedfromthe accident'sessence. But again he denies that such an aptitude,qua inseparableproperty,is part of an accident's essence. the aptitudinalinherenceappears Accordingto Marchia's claims,therefore, to bear an uncertainontologicalstatus.For it is poised problematically betweenbeing an essentialand a contingent(i.e. non-essential), albeitnatIn one an lack accident Cannot urallynecessary,property. way, indeed, such a propertywithoutceasing to be what it is, since accidentsthatare unable to inhereare not accidentsbut substances.In anotherway, however,an accidentcan lose such a propertywithoutceasing to be what it is, since an accident is not what it is because it can inhere,but it can inherebecause it is what it is. From anotherperspective,we have seen that,unlikeScotus, Marchia extendsthe logical possibilityof being separatedto all the accidents.A froma qualityor a quantity. relation,qua an accident,is not different

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Relation does not inherein a substancebecause of itself,but because of inherence,whichis added to it. But the case of relationseemsto be quite peculiar. For we can thinkof a qualityor a quantityas separatedfrom a substance,but it is difficult to thinkof fatherhoodas separatedfroma man. In fact,unlikequantityand quality,the categoryof relationseems to have a weak ontologicalstatus,so that it requiresnecessarilya nonThis appearsto be a problematicpointforMarchia's relationalfoundation. doctrine. Finally,Marchia thinksthat inherence is posteriorto an accident's essence and that inherence,qua an accident,inheresimmediatelyin the accident.As has been seen, by such a step Marchia intendsto block the infiniteregressof inherences.For an accident inheresin a substanceby way of inherence,but inherenceinheresin the accident in an immediate way. Accordingly,God can separate an accident fromits subject of inherenceby detachingthe accident'sinherencein the subjectfromthe subjectitself.And God can do that because inherenceis a relationthat is posteriorto the accident. Rather strangely,however,Marchia denies that inherenceitselfcan be detached fromthe accident. For inherence cannot existon its own withoutan accidentor a subject,since inherence is definedas the accident'spropertyof being in a subject.This seems to implythat when God separatesan accident froma substance,the relation of inherencebecomes unrealisedfromthe side of the subject,but it remainsintactfromthe side of the accident. In fact,althoughan accident is formallyidentifiedin-and-ofitself,separate accidentscontinueto be seen as the accidentsof a certainsubject,i.e. of the Host. But thisis possibleifand onlyifseparateaccidentscontinueto be regardedas inhering in the Host. If this is true,however,then it seems clear that God can separate the accident's inheringonly from the substance,but not fromthe accident.Accordingto Marchia's doctrine,therefore, we should conclude that beforebeing individuatedmateriallyby a subject,actual inherenceis an absolutelycontingentpropertyaccidentshave, while aptitudinalinherenceis a necessarybut not essentialproperty.For although it is possible for accidentsnever to inhere in a subject,if God should wish that,nonethelessnothingpreventsaccidentsfrominheringin a subject at some time or another.But once accidentsare individuatedmateriallyby a subject,actual inherencetoo has to be seen at least as a proper passion of an accident.For a qualitythat is actuallyseparatedfromthe Host, forinstance,can stillbe the qualityof thatHost and not, say, a genericquality or a qualitywith only the appearances of the Host if

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and only if it maintainsactuallyan aptitudeto inheretowardsthatHost. to avoid the furtherconclusion But in this case, it seems to be difficult that inherenceis part of an accident'sessence to a certaindegree,once accidentsare individuatedmateriallyby a subject. come about basicallybecause Marchia As we have seen,thesedifficulties thinksof a thing'sessence as expressingonly the kind of being a thing formallyexhibits.Accordingto Marchia, not all the materialconditions involvedin theprocessof a thing'scomingintoexistencemustbe included in the essenceof thatthing.This idea, however,encountersa basic objection Marchia does not recognise.In general,it is possible to thinkof a qualitywithoutthinkingof a substance,because it can be grantedthat an accident is not formallywhat it is because of a substance.Afterall, an accidentis an accidentand not a substance.Nonetheless,it is difficult to thinkof an accidentof a givensubstancewithoutthinkingof thatsubstance as well. Althoughit is possible to identify formallyan accidentas to a substance, to its genericor specifickind of being withoutreferring it seems to be impossibleto explain the kind of being an individualaccito all the conditionsinvolvedin its individudent has withoutreferring ation. In fact, an accident separated from a subject is not seen as a genericaccident or even as a particularspecies of accident,but it continuesto be seen as the accidentof the individualsubjectfromwhich it has been separated. From this perspective,the referenceto the subject seems to be necessaryin order to identifyformallya given accident as the accidentof a given subject. In conclusion,while some theologianslike Bonaventure,Aquinas and Giles of Rome seemed to be interestedin dealingwiththe topic of accidental being fromthe point of view of accidentsas theyare realisedin the actual world,hence lookingforthe conditionsaccidentsmust satisfy in order for them to actuallyexist,Scotus and Marchia widen thisperspectiveby consideringaccidentsalso with respectto divine activity.In clearlysoughtto solve some doing so, Scotus's and Marchia's treatments difficultiesassociated with the traditionaltheological doctrine of the of accidentalbeing, Eucharist,by providinga more generalinterpretation which is able to explain the identityof accidentsthroughoutthe process fromcreand hence to differentiate transubstantiation of transubstantiation ation and generation.But at the end of the day, by removingany inherence fromthe accident'sessence,theyseem to nullifyany basic difference betweensubstancesand accidents somethingAquinas and Bonaventure

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betweenactual and potenweretryingto preservethroughtheirdistinction tial inherence. Criteria oftheEdition on In the followingappendix I provide an editionof Marchia's Questions 1 . As is the text of Marchia's theMetaphysics book known, Questions , VII, q. is contained in two manuscripts.I follow the usual way of indicating them: B = Bologna, Bibliotecadel Collegio di Spagna, 104, f. 94ra-vb; P = Paris, BibliothèqueMazarine, lat. 3490, ff.48va-49ra.96 The followingeditionconfirmsthat P is the betterof the two manuscripts.Althougheven P cannot be regardedas a fullyreliable witness, of the text,it must be said because of its occasional oversimplifications B shows a contrast that systematictendencyto banalize the text.As by a matterof fact,B has a total of 60 major errorsand inferiorreadings, whileP contains33 errorsand faultyvariants.In two relevantcases, however,B gives a more extendedtextthan P and in such cases it is P that drops the text(see 11.17, 35-36). The two manuscriptsshare furthermore a common misreading(1. 96) and, probably,two omissions(11.86, 103). In the apparatus , only the variantsin cases where three words or more are involved have been recorded. Trivial or insignificant substitutions, 35 varierrors are not recorded. and material Thus, simple inversions, ants have been suppressed. , I make use of the following Finally,as to the text and the apparatus signsand abbreviations: add. inv. om. [xxx]

addidit/additum invertit/inversum omisit/ omissum addenda esse censeo delenda esse censeo

Parma ofParma University 96Forthesesiglaand fora first evaluation of themanuscripts, see R.L. Friedman, vonMarchia Franziskus , in Folger-Fonfara, (cit.n. 64 above),502. Appendix

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queriturutruminhe/f 48va P; f. 94rb B/ Circa principiumseptimi97 rentia98sit de essentiaaccidentis." distinguit aliquid ab aliquo Quod sic videtur,quia illud quod primo100 accidens primo a substantiaper esse est de rationeeius; sed distinguitur 5 in alio, quia non est dare aliquid aliud per quod primodistinguatur; ergo inherentiaest de essentiaaccidentis. Contra: passio non est de essentiasubiecti;sed inherentiaest quedam passio accidentis;ergo non est de essentiaeius. ab Respondeo. Hie sunttriavidenda. Primo,utruminherentiadifférât in aliquo generedeterminato. 10 ipso accidente.Secundo, utrumsit101 Tertio, in quo genere est. Quantum ad primum,dicunt aliqui102quod aliter descenditgenus in species,aliter/f.48vbP/ ens in decernpredicamenta,quia genus descenens autem descenditin decernpredicadit in species103 per differentias, sed105 15 menta104 non per differentias per modos essendi.Sicutergodifferentie 97principium P librum septimi] septimum 98inherentia add.B ] accidentis 99accidentis add.B ] inherentis 100 illudB primoante 101sitom.P 102 inMetaphysicam Cf.e.g.Anonymous , VII,q. 1,msCambridge, Zimmermanni, Quaestiones hie.Ensenimquoddividitur hocpatetperPhilosophum Peterhouse 152,f.33ra:"Item, cuiuslibet acciinessentia indecern includitur (. . .) ergoinessentia cuiusque, predicamenta substantie et unamessendi communem dentis. (. . .) 'Ens'nonsignificai aliquamrationem in substantiam etaccinondistinguitur accidenti. Ensenimperaliquasrationes speciales scilicet rationem essendi duasrationes sedsignificai diversas, dens;tuncenimessetgenus; ad aliuddietám. et rationem essendi absolutam (. . .) Item,illudquo primoaliquiddisa substantia ab alio estin essentia eius;sed accidens per primodistinguitur tinguitur estaccidens essendi ad aliuddictam rationem perhabitudinem (. . .); ergoaccidens primo subiecfidem secundum ad aliud.(. . .) Si nosponamus possitessepreter quodaccidens inessentia ethocsecunnonincluditur accidentis dicemus accidentis; tum, quodinherentia Cf.etiamAnonymous sednonsecundum dumfidem estconcedendum, philosophiam." Peterhouse inMetaphysicam DomusPetri,Quaestiones 152, , VII, q. 11,ms Cambridge, inMetaphysicam, de Alexandria, f.314va-b; Alexander , VII, q. 3, ed.Venice1572, Expositio sullanatura accidenti diAlessandria Alessandro f. 185rb-vb , in:Documenti degli (cf.F. Amerini, 16 (2005),179-235, filosofica e studisullatradizione medievale, 224-27). praesertim 103 in species om.P 104 P ] genera predicamenta 105sedJquiaensnonhabetdifferentias in ea B cumnonsitgenusseddiscendit

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per quas genus descendit in species sunt de essentia specierum, ita sunt de modi essendi per quos descenditens in decernpredicamenta106 essentia inherentia est de et ita essentia decern107 predicamentorum,108 accidentis.Quod probatur,quia aut ens109descenditin decernpredicaturn aut per modos essendi.Non per differentias, menta per differentias est habet differentias ens esset tunc110 genus, genus, quia quicquid quia autem sunt extra tum quia extra rationementis nichil est, differentie rationemhabentisdifferentias. Ergo ens descenditper modos essendi. Item, sicut se habet esse per se ad substantiam,ita se habet esse111in alio ad accidens; sed esse per se est de ratione substantie;ergo esse in accidentis. alio est de ratione112 accidentis,tunc esset posItem, si esse in alio non esset de ratione113 teriusipso accidentein ilio generepriorinaturequo accidens est, et non est [non] dependere a subiecto,nec esset in subiecto,sed esset ens per se et postmoduminestsubiecto.Igiturnon educiturde potentiasubiecti, quia nichileduciturde potentiasubiectinisi ens in subiecto.Si ergo accidens esset prius natura ipsa inherentiain ipso priori nature,non esset non de subiecto; ens in subiecto,et est generatum.Igituressetgeneratum114 hie Confirmatur et cetera. est per Philosophum115 impossibile;igitur quod in septimo,quod accidentia dicunturentia eo quod taliterentis. Item, accidentisesse est inesse.117 Porphyrius:116 Alii118dicunt quod duplex est inherentia:actualis et aptitudinalis.119 Inherentiaactualis non est de essentiaaccidentis,inherentiaautem apti- ut dicunt- est de essentia accidentis. tudinalis Quod patet, quia illud 106 om.P perquos. . . predicamenta 107 om.P decern 108 itamodiessendi suntprimo distincta differentie specierum ] etsicut predicamentorum add.B decern suntprimo distincti (exdistincta postcorrectionem) predicamentorum 109ensom.P 110tuncom.P 111 esseom.P 112ratione P ] essentia 113ratione ] reB 114 B ] generatur(?) generatum 115Cf.Aristoteles, VII, 1, 1028al8(ALXXV 3.2,132,1. 11). Metaphysics 116Cf.Porphyrius, , cap.De accidenti (ALI 6-7,20,11.13-15). Isagoge 117 Itemsi. . . inesseom.P 118Cf.e.g.Thomasde Aquino, libros Sententiarum , IV, d. 12,q. 1, super quatuor Scriptum inquatuor libros Commentarla a. 1, qa. 1; Summa , Illa, q. 77,a. 1; Bonaventura, Theologiae deCorpore Theoremata Sententiarum Christi, Romanus, , IV, d. 12,p. 1, a. 1, q. 1; Aegidius prop.41. 119aptitudinalis P ] potentialis

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non potestabsolviab aliquo, est de essentiaeius; 40 quod sine contradictione non potestabsolvi ab inherentiaaptised accidens sine contradictione120 inherentia tudinali;ergo aptitudinalisest de essentiaeius.121 Contra primumarguitur:quia ille modus essendi non est magis proprius huic fundamentoquam illi nisi in ratione alicuius positiviproprii 45 magis huic fundamentoquam illi.122Si igiturmodus essendi in alio est et non substantie,hoc non est nisi If 94va BI in propriusaccidenti123 rationealicuius positivi124 magis propriiaccidentiquam substantie.Ergo interse per illud positivůmpriaccidens et substantiaprimo distinguntur mum et non per modos essendi. sicutse habet modus essendiin communiad esse in communi, 50 Item,125 ita se habet modus essendipropriusad esse proprium;sed modus essendi in communipresupponitesse in communi;ergo modus essendiproprius presupponitesse proprium.Ergo prima distinctioaccidentisad substantiam non est per modos essendi,sed per esse proprium. 55 Item,126 precise per modos essendi et non per essenque distinguntur distinsed accidens et substantia128 tiam, habent eandem essentiam;127 accidens et substantia modos essendi per te; ergo gunturpreciseprimoper habent eandem129essentiam; quod est impossibile.Ergo illud ex quo per modos essendi. primo130 sequiturquod distinguntur Contrasecundum:quia nullaaptitudoestmagispropriahuicfundamento 60 quam illi nisi in131rationealicuiuspositivisubstratipropriihuic et non132 illi; sed aptitudoessendi in subiectoest propria accidentiet non133subaccidentiplusquam substantie stantie;ergo illa aptitudonon est propria134 120sinecontradictione B postabsolvi 121eius] accidentis B 122nisi... illiom.B 123accidenti P ] accidentis 124 add.B ] prioris positivi 125item] sicutse habetmodusessendi velsicadd.B ad esseproprium proprius 126item] illaadd.B 127essentiam disdiversas essentias, igitur quodhabeant ] quia tenendo(?) oppositum add.B etnonpermodosessendi tantum, positi quodestoppositum tinguntur peressentiam 128et substantia B 1 ad substantiam 129eandem om.P 130distinguntur P ] distinguantur primo 131m om.B 132etnon] fundamento quamP 133et non] priusquamB 134non. . . propria B ] nonestP, nonpropria

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nisi in135rationealicuiussubstratipropni accidenti.Et ideo136substratum 65 propriumest prima ratio distinguendoErgo accidens distinguitur primo a substantia137 per illud substratumpropriumet non per inherentiam

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aptitudinalem. Item, nichil est138tale in actu per solam aptitudinem,quia aptitudo non dat nisi esse aptitudinale;139 sed quantitasest quoddam ens in actu distinctaa substantia;ergo quantitasnon est actu distincta140 per solam sed aptitudinem, per aliquid prius.141 Item, absolutum non est formaliterabsolutum per respectum; sed quantitas est quoddam ens absolutum; aptitudo autem quecumque est quidam142respectus,quia nichil est aptum natum ad seipsum, sed ad aliud, quia143omnis aptitudo,ut aptitudo,non est ad se, sed ad aliud; a substantiasola aptitudine. ergo quantitasnon144distinguitur in actus et sunt eodem genere,sicut homo in actu et Item, potentia homo in potentiasunt in eodem genere; sed inherentiaactualis et inherentiaaptitudinalis se habentsicutens in actu et ens in potentia;igitursunt in eodem genere. Sed inherentiaactualis non est de essentiaaccidentis, quia potestseparali ab eo, sicut patet in SacramentoAltaris;nec igitur .145 inherentiaaptitudinalis Ideo dico aliterquod decernpredicamentanon distinguntur primoper modos essendi,sed per rationespropriaspriores;per modos autem essendi secundarioet146consequenter.Sicut147 distinguntur species148 distinguntur consequenterper propriaspassiones,Nec distinguntur primo actualemnec aptitudinalem, sed solumsecundario. per propriaminherentiam 135 in] subB 136Et ideo] illudP 137ergo. . . substantia accidens et substantia inter se B ] igitur distinguntur primo 138estom.B 139esseaptitudinale 1 aptitudinalem B 140actudistincta P distinctum ] accidens 141Cf.Franciscus de Marchia, esttalein actu Qu.met., IV, q. 4, msP, f.22rb:"nichil sivepotentiam; sed accidens estensin actuet non persolamaptitudinem separatum habensad subiectum nisianalogiam siveaptitudinalem etnonactualem." potentialem 142quidam] unus(?) B 143quia] exsedpostcorrectionem B 144nonom.B 145Item. . . aptitudinalis om.P 145et om.B 147Sicut] ergoP 148species ] nonadd.P

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Quod sic149patet, quia150accidens habet aliam naturama151substantia, ideo habet alium modum essendi et non e converso.Non enim152 quia 90 habet alium modum essendi,153 ideo habet aliam naturam,sed quia habet aliam naturam,ideo habet alium modum essendi. Et ita prima /f 49ra PI distinctionon est per modos essendi154 proprios,sed per essentias 95

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proprias. Similiter,quia accidens habet aliam naturama substantia,ideo habet talem aptitudinemad substantiam,155 et non e converso:non quia habet talem156 ideo habet aliam157 naturam.Ideo primaratio158 disaptitudinem, non est160 inherentia sed in natura tinguendi159 aptitudinalis, propria, qua fundatur/f 94vbB/ talis161 aptitudo. Istudprobo, quia quorumeumqueaccidentiumsubiectaimmediatasunt diversa,et ipsa sunt diversa,quia idem accidens non perficitimmediate diversa subiecta; sed subiectum immediatumquantitatiset subiectum immediatum162 inherentiequantitatissunt diversa;ergo quantitaset eius inherentiasuntdiversa.Probatiominoris:subiectumquantitatisest substantia,subiectumautem immediatuminherentiequantitatis non est substantia,sed quantitas.Probatio: quia unumquodque subiectum recipit denominationemaccidentis; substantiaautem non inheret inherentiaquantitatis,sed ipsa quantitas,163 quia ipsam denominai;ergo substantianon est subiectumimmediatumillius inherentie,sed quantisubstantiaautem et quantitassuntdiversa;ergo subiectumimmetatis;164 diatum quantitatiset inherentieest diversum. Confirmatur, quia passio secundumtotamrationemsuam est extraradonem totam165 subiecti;sed inherentiaest passio accidentis;ergo inherentia 149sicom.P 150quia] estadd.B 151a ] quamB 152enim] quiahabetaliummodum etnone converso essendi nonenimadd.B 153essendi om.B 154essendi om.P 155talem ... ad substantiam B ] aliam... a substantia 156talem] aliamBP 157aliam] talemB 158ratio] co B 159distinguendi B ] distinguitur(P) 160estom.B 161talis1 illaB 162 immediatum om.P 163sed. . . quantitas om.P 164sedquantitatis om.B lb5suam. . . totam om.B

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est extra rationemsuam, et actualemet aptitudinalem, secundumtotam166 rationemaccidentis. univocum non est169 dicendumquod si ens168 Ad rationemin oppositum167 tuncnon descendit[ergo]ad decernpredicamenta ad decernpredicamenta, nec per modos essendi,sed descenditse ipso; et ita nec170per differentias non sequiturquod descenditper modos essendi.Si autemponaturens uniin decerngenera172 vocum,tuncest dicendumquod ens descendit171 primo modorumessendi,etnon decerngenerumet173 fundamentales per differentias per modos essendi.Nec tamensequiturquod ens sitgenus,quia genusdicit deterens autemnon dicitunam náturám174 unam náturámdeterminatam, náturám. in ad omnem in dicit náturám communi sed minatam, potentia dicendumquod Et cum diciturquod nichilest extrarationem175 entis,176 rationem illud est177 contraeos sicutcontrame, quia si nichilest extra178 et ita extra rationem non sunt decern modi essendi179 tunc entis, entis, se ipso. Si autem ens non descenditper modos essendi,sed descendit180 ens non181descendit182se ipso, ita potest dici quod descendit183per differentias184 prioressicutper modos essendi.185 dicithoc Tunc ad dictumPhilosophi186 respondeoquod Philosophus187 in dicit190 determinando in tertio188 sed oppositum, quarto189 arguendo, 166totam B ] omnem 167 11.12-23. in oppositum om.P | | Cf.supra, 168si ens1 sciens B 169est] sitB 170tunc. . . necJprimo B 171descendit add.B ] permodosessendi 172 B ] predicamenta genera 173 et om.B generum 174naturam om.B 175rationem B ] naturam 176Cf.supra, 11.12-23. 177est] itaadd.B 178extra] contra P 179essendi om.P 180nondescendit B ... estdescendere . . . seddescendit ] descendere 181nonom.B 182descendit ] a add.B 183descendit B ] descendat 184 B differentias ] essentias 185essendi om.B 186Cf.supra, 11.12-23. 187Philosophus ] perhocB 188Cf.Aristoteles, , III, 3, 998b22-27 (ALXXV 3.2,56,11.239-244). Metaphysica 189Cf.Aristoteles, , IV, 1, 1003a20-22 (ALXXV 3.2,67,11.1-2). Metaphysica, 190determinando dicitino.P

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cum dicit quod est quedam scientiaque speculaturens in quantum ens sunt193 et que huic191 insuntpassionesproprie.Et sicutnumeri192 passiones in ens194 sunt in ita entis passiones quantum proprie quantum numerus, proprie. in quarto et sexto libro196 dicit quod sicut sanitatiset convaItem,195 lescentieest aliqua causa, ita entisin quantumens suntprincipiaet cause. pasErgo, secundumPhilosophum,ens habet passioneset principia;sed197 siones sunt extra rationem198 subiecti,ergo aliquid est quod est extra rationem199 entis. Ad secundum200 dicendumconsequenterquod esse per se non est de rationesubstantie,sed est quidam modus essendi201 propriusconcomitans substantiam.202 dicendumquod aliquid est tale per aliud dupliciter: Ad Philosophum203 se ipso et vel causaliter.Accidens est formaliter204 vel formaliter ens per subiectum. autem aliquo modo est206 non subiecto;causaliter205 accidentisestinessenon primo, Ad Porphyrium207 dicendumquod esse208 sed concomitanter.209 De secundo et tertiomembrodictumest in quinto libro,210 capitulode 'habere'.211

191que huic] qua hocB 192numeri B ] numerus 193suntom.B 194ensom.B 195Item] illudB 196sextolibroom.P | | Cf.Aristoteles, VI, 1,1025b3-7 , IV,2, 1003a33-bl9; Metaphysica (ALXXV 3.2,67-68,11.15-37;125,11.1-8). 197sed] secundum B 198extrarationem B ] ensrationis 199quod. . . rationem ] reB 200Cf.supra, 11.24-26. 201essendi om.P 202concomitans B a substantia substantiam ] communicans 203Cf.supra, 11.24-26. 204formaliter 1 causaliter B 205causaliter P . . . realiter . . . causaliter ] realiter 206estante aliquoB 207Cf.supra, 11.24-26. 208esse] causaB 209concomitanter ] coiťB 210libro] supraadd.B 211Cf.Franciscus inMetaphysicam, de Marchia, V, q. 23,msP, f.43ra-va. Quaestiones

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How Is Strength of the Will Possible? Francis Marchia and theAct of the Will* Concerning of ANDREAA. ROBIGLIO

Timemakesoldformulas lookstrange Theproperties andsymbols change But round thefreedom ofthewill centre still Ourdisagreements W.H. Auden Abstract contexts withthenature FrancisofMarchiadealtat lengthin severaldifferent theposof thewilland willing.Here I examinejust one of thosediscussions: final a related to for the will to reason's sibility go against judgment, topic weaknessof will and the sourceof sin. Marchia is clearlyof a voluntaristic ofreason. bent,holdingthatthewillcan indeedact againstthedetermination forhis position,I exploresome of AfterexaminingMarchia'sargumentation latermedievalunderstanding thebackground to Marchia'sviewin a distinctively withthe of the human mind as a systemof internalacts and dispositions, of to the same that several them possibility belong facultysimultaneously. a new,more This increasingly of themindmirrors complexconceptualisation of the "Self". complexconceptualization Presentingan account of Francis of Marchia's conceptionof the will is a difficult task for at least three reasons. First,the secondaryliterature has tendedto focuson otheraspectsof his thought,such as his cosmology (e.g. A. Maier, N. Schneider,F. Zanin), epistemologyand metaphysics (e.g. S. Folger-Fonfara,C. Schabel, T. Suarez-Nani, A. Zimmermann), the debate on Christianpoverty(e.g. R. Lambertini),and other more specificallytheologicalissues (e.g. W. Duba, F. Ehrle, R.L. Friedman, * I amdeeply toTizianaSuarez-Nani, Girard Russell and Friedman, Etzkorn, grateful I owemyacquaintance To thefirst withFrancis's andmuchmore. ChrisSchabel. works In writing oftheentire IIB. Cal Ledsham thispaperI useEtzkorn's Reportatio transcription in Marchia's revised a first draft ofmypaper.Allconjectures text(signalled by<...>) aremine.

BrillNV,Leiden,2006 © Koninklijke - www.brill.nl/viv Alsoavailable online

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C. Schabel). Second, the relevantwritingsof Marchia remain for the mostpart unedited.1A thirdand more generallinguistico-conceptual rearenders treatment of Marchia on the will more son, however, complex still.The philosophicalvocabularyused to describethe will and willing and fourteenth centuries.The censorship changedrapidlyin the thirteenth ofbothacademicand ecclesiastical theinterplay authorities, amongdifferent of the new patterns thought(juridical,theological,"scientific"), conception - all had an of "certainty"and its influenceupon the notion of doctrine impact on the conceptualisationof the will.2 Despitethesechanges,Auden'swordsremainvalid: "Round thefreedom of the will/ourdisagreements centrestill",thoughthisis not obviousfrom a distance."Time makes old formulaslook strange":thatis to say, manners of formulation, symbolsand projectschange over time,and indeed rather changed quicklyin the time period in which Marchia worked.3 For this reason, the historicaldevelopmentof the concept of the will is difficult to trace,requiringas it does a subtlearchaeologyof ideas. Given this state of affairs,this paper will limititselfto presentinga narrowaspect of Marchia's conceptionof the will. Specifically, the paper will focus on one question fromthe second book of his Sentences comthe "Whether the will could act either mentary,namely, question prior to, or against rationaljudgment". This question explicitlyinvolvesthe problemof the weaknessof the will, an often-discussed topic in contemporaryphilosophy.4 1 Thisexplains thepresence in myarticle oflongquotations from Marchia's works. ForthethemeI am goingto deedwith,see particularly C. Schabel, Il determinismo di Francesco diMarchia 19 (2000),15-67, texton (II),in:Picenum seraphicum, esp.Marchia's diFrancesco diMarchia sullapredestinazione 20 63ÍT.; id.,La dottrina , in:Picenum seraphicum, 3diFrancesco e ipotesi sul'Commento alleSentenze Certezze (2001),9-45,esp.9-16;N. Mariani, dellaMarca Franciscanum 95 (2002),93-183, at 106-08. Historicum, , in:Archivům 2 Thelanguage usedinthediscussion onthefreedom ofthewill,forinstance, changed around thetimeoftheParisCondemnations of1270and1277.Scholastic terprofoundly thatmeantonething before theseevents often a different carries senseafter. minology Cf.e.g.A.A.Robiglio, volere. Tommaso i tomisti e la volontà, Milan2002, L'impossibile d'Aquino, 34 n. 67 and96 n. 92.Although itdoesnotfocus onterminology, seeM.W.F. specifically Condemnation Makea Difference toDiscussions Moral 1277.DidtheParisian Stone, After Psychology - K. Emery, in:J.A.Aertsen ofHuman Agency?, Jr.- A. Speer(eds.),NachderVerurteilung von1277,Berlin-New York2001(Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 28),795-826. JThe shift in learned ofmeanings at theverybeginning ofthe14thcenvocabulary in a general alios : scholars turyhasbeenwelltreated {inter wayin theworkofeminent M.-D.Chenu,R.-A.Gauthier, T. Gregory, P. Michaud-Quantin, butwe J.E.Murdoch), needfurther anddetailed research on thematter. comprehensive 4 The widespread ofthistopicdates,at least,from discussion Donald contemporary

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Consideredrightly, the understanding of thisquestionwill nevertheless, an of contours of Marchia's entire overview the permit projectand system. I will presentan explicationof the textof his question,while drawingin other aspects of Marchia's original account when relevant.I will not directly analyzethepositionsheld by Marchia's main sources(Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol,but also Aquinas as read throughthe lens of Godfreyof Fontainesand earlyfourteenth-century authors).5 1. The Text:A "Treatise" on theHumanWill Francisof Marchia deals extensively withthe topic of the human will in his commentaryon the second book of the Sentences. Francis read the Sentences at Paris probablyin 1319-20. For the second book, we possess twoversions, whichare bothperhapsreportationes (studentnotesof Marchia's if raw even are not but appear to have been lectures), reportationes they revisedby Marchia to some extent.6The firstversionof book II, called A (hereafter"The A version"),is preservedin as many as 16 Reportatio B (hereafter"The B version")seems to while the Reportatio manuscripts,7 existonlyin a singlemanuscript,Vat. Lat. 943 (hereafterE).8 The questionson the will's freedomare, in the case of the A version,those from Davidson's influential article Howis Weakness 1970, oftheWillPossible? (originally published nowavailable in:D. Davidson, onActions andEvents 1980,21-42).On the , Oxford Essays medieval ofthedebate, R. Saarinen, Weakness from oftheWillinMedieval Thought aspects toBuridan fundamental. See alsoRobiglio York-Köln , Leiden-New 1994,remains Augustine in thispaper,cf.also Forbibliography on thetheme discussed (cit.n. 2 above),123-52. Dupéché del'ange à la liberté Lessources del'anthropologie J. Schmutz, d'indifférence. angélologiques moderne , in:Les études 2002,169-98. philosophiques, 5 Theseaspects m an article in preparation for:Freiburger willhopefully be surveyed furTheologie undPhilosophie. Zeitschrift 6 Fora moredetailed cf.C. Schabel, Francis account ofFrancis' academic career, of Marchia 2001Edition , in: TheStanford ), EdwardN. Zalta ofPhilosophy (Winter Encyclopedia November (lastconsulted: (ed.),URL - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-marchia 2005). 7 The standard on themanuscripts thevarious versions ofMarchia's study containing - C. Schabel, Sent, is thatprovided Francis ofMarchia's commentary byR.L. Friedman onthe'Sentences': ListandState 63 (2001), , in:Mediaeval Studies, Question ofResearch Commentary 31-106. - Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above),42 and54.Antonino 8 Gf.Friedman Poppiseemsto A that the version is theoriginal Parisian lecture theB version lectures (1319-20), suggest heldin Avignon on the butthereis no evidence thatMarchiaheldlectures (1323-24), ' delCommento Sentences atAvignon etprologus alleSentenze (cf.A. Poppi,'Quaestiones praeambulae di Francesco dellaMarca Franciscanum 97 (2004),469-80).On , in:Archivům Historicum, I tendto consider thebasisofmylimited theB version to be a revision/ comparison,

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q. 42 to the end, and, in the case of the B version,those fromq. 55 to the end (E 38rb ff.). The argumentsfoundin the two versionscorrespondto one another onlyloosely,and the textcontainedin the A versionusuallydevelopsthe issues at greaterlength,but with less attentionto the structureof the question(e.g. openingargumentsare not always repliedto at the end of the question).For textfromthe A versionof Marchia's II Sentences , I will Vat. Barberini lat. 791 late use the (hereafter fifteenth-century manuscript sed nondeterior , correctedoccasionallyby the earlyfourteenthB), recentior centurymanuscriptVat. Chigi B VII 113 (hereafterC).9 Here is the synopticlist of questions:10 : TheA version

TheB version :

sitcausa q. 42: utrumintellectus actusintelligendi, vel voluntasactus volendi,vel tantumobiectum (B 74va-76rb); sit totalis q. 43: utrumintellectus causa actusintelligendi et voluntas actusvolendiet sensusactus sentiendi(B 76rb-79ra); q. 44: utrumvoluntasmoveat vel per se potentiasinferiores tantumper accidens(B 79ra-80rb); q. 45: utrumvoluntasmovendo et alias potentias intellectum inferiores imprimatsive causet in eis (B 80rb-81rb); reale aliquid

q. 55: utrumobiectumsitper se et causa effectiva actusintelligendi volendi(E 38rb-39va); q. 56: utrumvoluntaset intellectus sinttotalescausae suorumactuum (E 39va-40vb); q. 57: utrumvoluntasmoveatse per alias potentiasinferiores (E 40vb-41rb); q. 61: utrumvoluntasaliquid vel in imprimâtin intellectum movet quam aliquam potentiam (E 41rb-vb);

in thenextparagraph in the mentioned abbreviation oftheA version (forthereasons in theA version). it Underanycircumstances, maintext:lackofstructural coherence other thanParis,on thebasis cameintobeingsomewhere seemslikely thattheB version sunt "Adsextum secundo mododiciquodvisioetauditio ofthefollowing remark: posset meoParisius" ab unodoctore essentialiter sicutaudiviteneri (E 8vb). tempore respectus, - Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above),41, andthe 9 Ms B datesfrom1472;cf.Friedman - Schabel2001,41. Ms C datesfrom1327;cf.Friedman literature referred to there. - Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above).It should 10Cf.thefullquestion be listsin Friedman inMarchia's Sent, deadwiththetopicofthewill's notedthatother commentary questions from bookI, d. 1,on fruition freedom anditsrelation to theintellect, (cf. e.g.questions - Schabel2001,63-64), from bookII (qq. 20-21,24 andangelogical Friedman questions cf.ibid.,88-89,94),butI willnotdiscuss and24-25oftheB version; oftheA version, in nn.44 and49 below). theremarks thesequestions here(see,however,

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FRANGIS ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL OF MARCHIA q. 46: utrumaliae potentiaea volúntatemoventesipsam eo modo quo movent voluntatem, earn,causentsive imprimant aliquidin ipsa (B 81rb); q. 47: utrumvoluntaspossitse movereante determinationem sive iudiciumrationisvel contra ipsumvel praeteripsum (B 81rb-84ra); q. 48: utrumprimacausa concurratimmediatein omni actionecuiuscumquecausae secundaesive naturalissive etiam liberae,coagendosecumet determinando ipsam ad agendum (B 84ra-88vb); q. 49: ultimoquaero utrum Deus sitper se causa peccati effectiva (B 88vb-89vb).

155

q. 62: utrumpotentiaealiae moveantvoluntatem aliquid in earn (E 4 Ivb); imprimendo q. 63: utrumvoluntaspossitse moverecontradictamenrationiset contraeius determinationem (E 42ra-42vb); q. 64: utrumvoluntasin omni actu suo determinetur a prima causa (E 42vb-44ra);

q. 65: utrumDeus sit causa effectiva peccati(E 44ra-45ra).

The firstfivequestionsin both versionsdeal with the will's relationship to the otherfaculties,in particularto the intellect,and to the objects of volition.Particularlyremarkablewithrespectto the relationshipbetween will and intellectare questions43 (of versionA) and 56 (of B). The last two questions(48-49 of versionA, 64-65 of B), on the otherhand, concern the relationshipbetweenthe human and the divinewill,a topic destined to have a long lifein earlymodernphilosophyand theologyin, forexample, the post-tridentine disputeoftenreferredto as de auxiliisor in such authorsas Luis de Molina, Leibniz, Malebranche,and Pascal.11This set of questions,then,formsa veritabletreatiseon the will, an identifiable 11On thedeauxiliis andtheeponymous commission established controversy theological at theend of the 16thcentury until1606)to investigate thisissue,cf. (andlasting a lasactasdelTridentino deauxiliis F. Cereceda, Recurso enla lucha , in:Estudios Eclesiásticos, 14 (1935),257-69;R.O. PérezM.,La controversia sobre la definición dela libertad enla teologia moderna dela definición molinista delibertad), Rome1963.On thebackground, (Aproposito cf.R.E. McNally, Freedom andSuspicion at Trent: Bonuccio andSoto, in:Theological Studies, onlaterdevelopments onMalebranche), cf.P. Riley, TheGeneral 29 (1968),752-62; (mainly TheTransformation into theCivic Willbefore Rousseau. , Princeton 1986;andX.-M. oftheDivine Le Bachelet, Prédestination etgrâce Controverses dans la Compagnie deJésus autemps efficace. d'Aquaviva Histoire etdocuments inédits ofMarchia , t. I, Leuven1931.Fora brief (1610-1613). placing onthese seeS.K. Knebel,Wille, undWahrscheinlichkeit. DasSystem dermoralischen issues, Wülfel in derJesuitenscholastik: 1550-1700 , Hamburg 2000,160-61n. 155.In this Notwendigkeit

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sub-sectionof book II of Marchia's Sentences commentary.In thispaper, we will limitourselvesto a detailed discussion(§§ 2-7 below) of question 63 of the B versionon whetherthe will can act againstthe decree and determinationof reason, along with a brieferdiscussionof the correspondingquestion47 of the A version(§ 8). We conclude (§ 9) withsuggestionsforthe best way to understandthe backgroundto what appears to be most innovativein Marchia's discussion. s BestJudgment 2. ActingagainstOne3 The motivationbehind the topic of question63 of the B versionis easily identified.On the one hand there is an analogy between the will and motionin general:the willis to the intellectas the mobileis to its "proper motor"; that is to say, the will can move itselfneitherprior to nor in oppositionto the intellect'sjudgment.12On the other hand, the claim according to which the facultyof the will is completelyfree (simpliciter In thisqueslibera ) excludesany dependenceof the will on the intellect.13 tion, Francis proceeds by firstpresentingan establishedopinion, then in itsfavour,and finally his own perspective excludingthearguments offering itis worthwhile that14th-century thinkers likeDunsScotusandGregory context, noting ofRimini wereimportant sources forbothMolinaandLeibniz. 12Version B: "Proprium mobile nonpotest se movere contra conatum motoris; proprii A: "Proprium sedintellectus siveratioestmotor voluntatis" (E 42ra).Version proprius antenecpostneccontra mobile nonpotest moveri motum suimotoris; sedvoluntas /B 8lva/comparatur ad intellectum sicutmobilead suummoventem proprium; ergonon moveri motum intellectus" ante,necpost,neccontra (B 81rb-va). potest 13Version B: "Potentia liberanonnecessitatur a principio inferiori simpliciter simpliciter et intellectus estpotentia liberasimpliciter, estinferior se; sedvoluntas ea, quianonest A: "Contra. liber"(E 42ra).Version liberanonnecessitatur ab Quia potentia simpliciter inferiori estpotentia liberaetintellectus estinferior se; sedvoluntas aliquoprincipio ipsa A {loc.cit.), cumnonsitliber"(B 8Iva).In version thetraditionell is basedon argument theindependence ofwhatis morenoblewithrespect towhatis lessnoblebyusingtwo of themind,as stipulated 1) thewillis a freefaculty by the 1277Paris postulates: Condemnation andbyother Franciscan authors ofthelate13thcentury, and2) thenobilofitsobjects thanbythemodality ofthe is determined lessbythenature ityofa faculty from a nobler to thefaculty, so thatfreeactsderive As backobject's presence faculty. to Marchia's itcanbe notedthatthe"nobility" ofthewillwasheavtreatment, ground Thomae de la Marein his Correctorium fiatris (inprimam ilystressed byWilliam partem estsimpliciter altiorquamvolun,art.XXXIV):"Quodintellectus potentia to Aquinas's Summa hadbeen , I, q. 82, a. 3 wherethenobility tas",referring Theologiae "excomparatione obiectorum ad invicem". See P. Glorieux established (ed.),Lespremières Kain 1927,16Iff.On theseissues thomistes: I. Le Correctorium (Quare' corruptorii polemiques inthe LateThirteenth moregenerally, seeB. Kent,Virtues oftheWill.TheTransformation ofEthics 1995. , Washington Century

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on the problem.Yet versionsA and B differin the way thattheyexhibit this general structure.I will firstpresentan account of the B version question (revised I think by Marchia before 1325, presumablywhile no longerin Paris),14 because it focusesmore on human action and seems to reveal more on the specifictopic of thispaper. Marchia claimsthathis replyis in agreementwiththe authorityof the . . . aucsaints(namelyAugustine)15 and with dialecticalreasoning{propter rationes toritates sanctorum etpropter ). He statesthat,once the intelprobabiliores lect makes a practicaljudgment,the will could will to act in accordance withthatjudgmentor will to do just the opposite.16 At the foundationof Marchia's view is the positionthat what distinguishesa "freecapacity"fromany non-freecapacityis choice.Insofaras some externalcause does not preventit from acting, a natural, nonIn other uni-directional. rationalfacultyacts necessarily;it is structurally in a that the alternatives must be such its words, goal way only unique, open to it are to succeed in its acting or not to act at all; acting in a different way is not an option.17In fact,the only way the intellectcan fail to act in the one way that it can act is in the case when the relevant externalconditionsforits attainingits object are lacking. In contrast,a rationalfaculty(prohairesim included)18can attain varithat the will is fullyready to ous, even opposinggoals; notwithstanding i.e. that all conditions(both perception in ultimadisposinone), act (exsistens and intellection)are setded and taken into account, it is stillable to act and able not to act. The alternativeof doing somethingelse is always open. What determinesthe specificgoal a rationalfacultychooses,given the possibilityof many goals? Moreover,what permitsthe will even to refuseto choose?19There is only one determining principle,as Augustine 14See n. 69 below. 15MarchiaquotesAugustine's , XII, 6 (cf.E 42va).Cf. on thispassage CityofGod TheDivided 'Civitas' P.L.MacKinnon, , in:D.F.Donnelly ofGod':TheDivided Self/ Augustine's 'City 1995,319-52. , NewYork-Bern ofCritical Essays (ed.),TheCity ofGod.A Collection 16"Dicoquod,factadeterminatione volrationis perintellectum practicum, quacunque untaspotest velieet nonvelieoppositum" (E 42va). 17Thisis thewell-known fac"rational" and"natural" Aristotelian distinction between Ethics andMetaphysics ulties(cf.inter aliabookIII oftheNicomachean IX, 2 (1046b 1-24)). ofitsproper Thealternative ofdoingsomething else(viz.theimmediate goadas opposite in thecaseofnatural faculties. either orunderstood) is always excluded perceived 18On "rational Ethics choice"(prohairesis Nicomachean , III, 2 (1112a16). ), cf.e.g.Aristotle, 19The refusal a leveldistinct and to willis a sortof"choice", butit occupies from, different whichobtains between indeedhigher than,thelevelofthepriorchoice, goals in otherwords, to willis therefusal either bythesensesor bytheintellect; presented

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wrote,whichis simplythe freefacultyitself(i.e., the will).Now, according to Marchia, the finalconditionrequiredby the will in order to be fully ready to act is the rationaljudgment: "The will is only in its finaldispositionto willingwhen the final rationaljudgment is made." At that point the will can elect eitherto act in accordance with the intellect's .20 finaljudgmentor not: ergopro tuncpotestnonagere , quodestpropositum Marchia's argumentforthispositionis a typeof processof elimination. If one inquiresabout the difference betweena freeand a non-freefaculty thereare only two live possibilities.If the powers are fullyready to act (i.e. in theirfinaldisposition),thenthe freepower is able not to act while the non-freepower is not able not to act. If, on the otherhand, the powers are not fullyready to act (i.e. not in theirfinal disposition),then, once again the freepower is able not to act while the non-freepower is not able to act. But the second option can be eliminated,since, outside of its final disposition,a non-freeagent, in point of fact,does not act, and is therefore"able" not to act as well,because of the logical principle ab essead possedaturillatio ; in thisway, if the second optionwere correct, betweenfreeand non-freeagents.So, this therewould be no difference betweenthe two powers leaves us withthe firstoption:thatthe difference is that,withall conditionsin place forthemto act, the freepower is still It seemsfairly able not to act, whilethe non-freepower acts necessarily.21 obvious that at the very foundationof this argumentlies the implicit liberum is the ability ofprincipium assumptionthatthe definingcharacteristic In fact,thisis built non-liberum. to do otherwise,in contrastto a principium Whilediscussing theissue, Marchia does andnotacting. thechoicebetween merely acting distinction between thefreedom iswith notinvoke thescholastic (which quoad specificationem andthefreedom exercitium dealswithacts).Thisdistinction toobjects) (which quoad regard element ofAquinas's hadbeenan essential in,e.g,De malo , q. 6. argumentation 20"Praeterea, unius irrationales necessario quandopossunt, quiaomnes potentiae agunt et nonpossunt Potentiae rationales suntfactivae. contrariorum, non,quia suntfactivae etprorumquoddeterminet haecduo:appetitum simul. Ideooportet essealte utrumque a nonliberum hairesim; distinguitur Quaeroergoquomodoprincipium ergomediate. inultima inqua natum existens libero? Autperhocquodprincipium liberum, dispositione itwas non-liberum nonpotest nonagere[when nonagere, etprincipium estagere, potest liberum non inits"lastdisposition"]. Autquiacitraultimam dispositionem potest nonpotest sednon-liberum modo,quiasicutprotuncliberum agere.Nonsecundo agere, nonagere,immode factononagit.Ergodistinnonagere,itanon-liberum potest potest ad volendum nisifacta modo.Sedvoluntas nonestin ultima dispositione guuntur primo rationis. ultimadeterminatione Ergoprotuncpotestnonagere,quodestpropositum" (E 42va). 21forthetext, seen. 20 above.

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into both optionsthat Marchia gives.22While thispositionspeaks clearly in favourof the independenceof the will, not a particularlyAristotelian elementsin Marchia'sreasoningare clearlyPeripatetic, position,nevertheless 22In addition, Scotus's ofthewillas "causaconcurrens" (earlier) (andnotsimtheory bebackground toMarchia's seeS.D. Dumont, view;onScotus's might theory, ply"totalis") DidScotus HisMindontheWill?, in:Aertsen-Emery-Speer 2001(cit.n. 2 above), Change formula Marchiainterprets theAugustinián 719-94, esp.748-49and 773-84.Moreover, "malaevoluntatis nihilinvenitur" causaefficiens si quaeratur, , XII, 6) (cf.TheCity ofGod diciquodhocfitex obiecto, necquodunustemptet etaliusnon as follows: "Nonpotest refers toAugustine's "unusperseveret animocasto, aliusveromoveatur [Marchia example: in utrique" ad illicite concurrant faciendum"], (E quia supponitur quodomniapariter moreor lesscorresponding to q. 56 oftheB version, 42va).In q. 43 oftheA version, Marchia to whichthewillis butthe"causapartialis" of discusses theopinion according - he writes - médiat volition: "Istaopinio inter duasopiniones extremas, (B 76rb) quarum unaponitobiectum essetotalem causameffectivam et aliapotentiam"; sucha moderate couldbe thatofScotus, evenifitrefers toa doctrine torecent which, opinion according didnotbelongto theParisian oftheSubtleDoctor.Francis scholarship, teaching rejects he does thearguments andstates thatthewillis thetotalcauseofvolition. Nevertheless, notdealdirectly on thebasisofa structural withtheactofthewill,butargues analogy andthewill.He shows, in other howboththesenses and words, intellect, amongsenses, theintellect arethe"totalcauses"ofrespectively theactofsensation andtheactofthe Sucha strategy volintellect. isjustified since"actusintellectus nobissuntnotiores actibus in theotherversion, untatis" at E 40ra);so ifonewereto (B 77ra;butnotexplicidy oftheactoftheintellect, demonstrate thattheintellect is thecausatotalis he wouldipso thatthewillis thecausatotalis ofvolition. As is oftenthecasewith factodemonstrate from thewillto theintellect, andthedevelopment touches theargument shifts Marchia, of "totalcause",see the On thedifferent ofthenotion upongnoseology. interpretation DidScotus hisposition ontherelationship and remarks modify ofintellect judicious byM. Ingham, in: Recherches de theologie et philosophie 69 (2002),88-116.Letme will?, médiévales, Marchia between pointoutat leastonenoteworthy aspectofthisdiscussion. distinguishes iudithe"actus formaliter (asthe"actusiudicandi, cognitivi" quointellectus catde obiecto", whichrefer andseemsto entailtheassentofthe to a precise meaning virtualiter et causaliter do notentailany (which will)andthe"actustantum cognitivi" assent towards thetruth inobiecto). Herecomestheinteresting Notonlysimple point. cogand argumentation can be notional i.e. butalsoreflective nition, judgment knowledge, - I thatdoesnotdemand exercise anyrealassent(as in a sortofdialectical knowledge - saysMarchia-< homo > discurrit wouldadd)."Saepeetiam nectamen tersyllogizando minodiscursus ex quo patetquodactusformaliter suntaliiab actibus assentii, cognitivi et etiamab actibus et dividendi intellectus discurrendi. Actusautemhuiuscomponendi sunttres:estenimquidamactusintellectus modivirtualiter cognitivi simplicis apprehensioet dividendi siveaffirmandi et negandi; et tertius estactus nis;aliusactuscomponendi discurrendi velsyllogizandi" cf.alsoE 40ra).Theargument which fol(B 77ra;myitalics; lowsis,to Francis's eyes,successful, yetit concerns onlythesecondkindofactsofthe B we read:"Probo intellect: the"actusistinoncognitivi formaliter" (B 77ra).In version enimprimo esttotalis causaactuum nonformaliter quodintellectus (E 40ra) cognitorum" andweshould a secundo sucha secondpart,how, a second expect partoftheargument; andthequestion closeswithout touched on the"actusformaliter ever,is missing having See alsobelow, cognitivi". pp. 171-72.

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irrationales e.g. the vocabularyused and the distinctionbetweenpotentiae contrariorum. uniusfactiuaeand potentiae rationales factivae 3. StillNegotiating withtheMedievalAristotle Indeed, Marchia's approach in his questionson book II of the Sentences is stronglymarkedby the presenceof Aristotle.The heavyrelianceupon Aristotleis apparent even when our author deals with an issue or item This is evidentin the first that is not properlyspeakingAristotelian.23 where Marchia unam This opinion is of opinionem. presents part q. 63, "Aristotelian"(at least as thisexistedin the medievalschools),and is one which Aquinas could have held. Francis gives a summaryof it: To act againstour bestjudgmenthappens accordingto a sortof practical syllogism,which presupposestwo premises,one universaland one ) in orderto reach the conparticular,both necessary(ambaesuntnecessariae clusion,which in this practicalcase is equivalentto saying:in order to will. It is possible for the premisesto be entertainedby the intellectin one of two ways: eitheractually(that is to say, in the formof present or merelyimplicitly(that is to say in the formof habits understanding) and "memory").24 Accordingto advocates of thisview, the will is able to go againstthe rationaljudgmentonlywhen one or both of the premises are presentto the will as merelyhabitual knowledge,but not as actual knowledge.In contrast,when the premisesare both existingbeforethe intellect"in act" (i.e. theyare knownactually),thenthe will mustadhere conditionforthewillbeing to their(actual)rationalconclusion.A sufficient able to do otherwiseis forthe particularminorpremiseto be habitual.25 23Indeedtheproblem oftheopposition between theintellect andthewill,as such,is tothemedieval ofAristotle's notanAristotelian issue.Nevertheless, according understanding andreason takento be an Ethics between sensation wasoften Mcomachean , theopposition thewillandtheintellect, as themedieval discussion on Mcomachean between opposition On thisaspect, seeRobiglio Ethics BookVII attests. (cit.n. 2 above),esp.24-27,123-46. 24On these ofethical seeKent(cit.n. 13 above)andalsoO. Boulnois, discourse, aspects - P.-F.Moreau- L. Renault dela volonté?, in:B. Besnier : Existe-t-il despassions DunsScot et médiévales. Théories et despassions Les (1), Paris2003, (eds.), passions antiques Critiques 281-95. 25In presenting which oftheincontinent" the"syllogism (thatis to say,theargument themodaldistinction ofthewill),Marchia stresses between absolute theweakness explains andconditioned subcondicione), assum(necessarium {necessarium simpliciter) necessity necessity kindofnecessity thiskindofviewonlythefirst (stronger) sharing ingthatforscholars oftheincontinent" wouldexclude freedom (cf.E 42ra).The abovementioned "syllogism

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This said, Marchia collectsseveral argumentssupportingthis type of intellectualistic accountofhumanaction;some of themGodfreyof Fontaines could have held as well. a) The will cannot act on what is unknown.But the oppositeof reaSo the will cannot will the opposon's finaljudgmentis unknown.26 site of reason's finaljudgment. goal of the will is the good, since the will can b) The transcendental In ratione boni . otherwords,to will in the shadow of evil, act sub only the natureof the facultyitself.Implicitly subratione would contradict mali, goal, the arguassumingthatthe intellecthas truthas itstranscendental ment continuesin this way: since the true and the good are cornmutablewithone another,what is opposed to rationaljudgmentwould not be good (because not true),and hence the will cannot will it.27

oneparticular is given oneuniversal is framed as follows: bythe byreason, given premise conclusio the(parsenses; now,sinceinsyllogistic sequitur semper partem", logic"peiorem of overreason.On suchan explication conclusion willsee thesensesprevailing ticular) Marchia's La saggezza diAristotele, cf.C. Natali, theincontinent action, Naples1989,202-14. ad primum estunaopinioquodsicutinsyllogismo textisas follows: speculativo "Quantum non etminor etex unaillarum scilicet maioruniversalis sunttrespraemissae, particularis, estmaior simul[...], itaetiamin syllogismo sedex ambabus conclusio, practico sequitur velinactu velinhabitu etutraque universalis etminor tantum, haberi, potest particularis, dicunt istiquod, etalterain actu.Tuncad propositum velunainhabitu secundo elicito, in oppositum in habitu, voluntas existentibus ambabus potest apudintellectum praemissis inactuapudintelmaiori universali existente illarum conclusionis Similiter, praemissarum. in oppositum. Sed in habitu, adhucpotest voluntas tantum lectum et minori particulari in actuapudintellectum, tuncestimpossibile existente quodvoluntas possitin utraque rationonsequideterminationem eiusquodconclusum est,necprotunc potest oppositum Dicunt tamen ulterius conclusum estetiudicatum. vultquodsicultimate nis,sednecessario Tuncdicunt velsimpliciter velsubcondicione. dicitur quod dupliciter: quod'necessarium' necessario determinationem nonsequitur voluntas rationis, quiatalisnecessitas simpliciter subcondicione nontollit necessario excludit sed sequitur , quia talisnecessitas libertatem, ex suppositione, scilicet factadeterminatione vultnecessario et ideovoluntas libertatem, intellectum avertere ab ilioiudicioet ipsumconveretiam voluntas tamen rationis, protunc potest voluntas velie"(E 42ra;italics teread iudicandum oppositum oppositum, quofacto potest see alsonn.30, viewofthesyllogism oftheincontinent, mine).Formoreon Marchia's 53 below. 26"Proistaopinione inaliquid necacceptat nonfertur sic:voluntas incognitum, arguitur sicutpatetX De Trinitate 2; sedilludcuiusoppositum capitulo aliquidut incognitum, estincognitum, velacceptum subratione iudicatum esta ratione quareetc."(E incogniti; 42ra). 27"Voluntas voluntas estboni.Et nonpotest veliesubratione mali,III Ethicorum: ad malum. Sed illudcuiusoppositum iudidicitquodnullus aspirans Dyonisius operatur maliutsic;patetde se.Ergovoluntas habetrationem catum esta ratione essevolendum

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c) On the medieval view, accordingto both the principleof noncontradictionand the Aristotelianprincipleof the singularity of a facit is for the intellect to at the same time have, ulty'sact,28 impossible and upon the same issue, two judgmentscontradictingone another. On the otherhand, wheneverthe will acts, at that verysame instant it "converts"the intellectto the object of the act; that is to say, the actionof the will entailsan intellectual judgmentabout its object.Now, if the actual judgment and the actual act of the will were opposed, there would be ipsofacto two opposite judgments,both actual (one And this opposed to, and the other entailedby the actual volition).29 is not acceptable,accordingto the two principlesmentionedabove. . But if d) The repetitionof the same kind of act generatesa habitus the will has the possibilityof going against the judgment of reason, thenit has the possibility of doing thistwiceor manytimes.Eventually there will be the birth of a habitus , either virtuousor vicious, but in any case discordantwith reason. There could be, in otherwords, intellectualpractical wisdom (prudentia :) withoutcorrespondingmoral virtuein the will (insofaras the latteracts against reason); or even nonpotest illudvelie"(E, 42ra).ForAristotle, seeNicomachean Ethics , III, 4 (1113a15-16): "Thegoodis theobjectofwilling". 28Theideaaccording towhich suntinsingularibus" Ethics , "operationes (e.g.Nicomachean acts III, 1-2,1110b7 and 111lb23)doesnotallowforthesamesubject having multiple inthesamefaculty, at thesametime, underthesamerespect; otherwise theaction would no longer somerareexceptions, be "singular". thisprinciple wascommonly Apartfrom in themedieval Cf.Robiglio In q. 56 oftheB shared schools. (cit.n. 2 above),111-13. version 'eadempotentia circaidem (cf.n. 22 above),Marchia explains: "Quandodicitur obiectum nonpotest habere inquoetcirca Francis introduces a further , concedo". quod. Despitethisconcession, interpretation whichwouldmakethisdistinction Letus ("inquo" vs."circaquod")superfluous. dici Marchia seewhy:"Velpotest eiusdem ordiarguesquodactusomnesintelligendi circaquodcumque sunteiusdem et componuntur nis,putasingulares obiectum, rationis, affirmativa eiusdem rationis inter se etnegativa similiter inter se eiusdem rationis"(E 40vb,italics to thislastpieceofargumentation, Francis seems mine).According toimagine a structural tothejudgment insubiecto doubleness (a sortof"compositio quo" Thispointremains that,at leastto someextent, doubleness). unfortunately presupposes Cf.n. 29 below. undeveloped. 29"Item,impossibile estquodintellectus habeatsimuliudiciaopposita de eodem;sed in eodeminstanti in quo voluntas vultaliquid,convertit ad iudicandum iudicatunum,voluntas vultoppositum, illud;ergosi in eodeminstanti quo intellectus intellectus habebit iudicia etconvertetur ad unum sequitur quodineodeminstanti opposita etad suumoppositum. Probatio scilicet minoris, vult, quodineodeminstanti quovoluntas illud:quia si in alioinstanti convertit intellectum ad iudicandum tuncconconverterei, nonvolendo, alioinstanti vult verterei nisiproquointellectus iudicať(E 42ra, quiapronullo italics mine).

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"moral virtue"togetherwith falsehood.This kind of a split between the virtuesof the will and those of reason should not be possible,since in the constitution of habitsthe human being operatesas a whole (both as a rationaland a willingbeing).Moreover,thisis unacceptableaccording to Aristotle, especiallyifone takesseriouslybook 7 of theKicomachean Ethics , accordingto which to act against one's own actual knowledge scientiam in actu ) seems verydifficult.30 (. Francis proceeds with the strategicdismantlingof such argumentsby estarticulus, immo quoting the Paris Condemnationof 1277: ad oppositum duoarticuli Parisius.31 The specificarticleshe quotes are art. 129 (quodvolin actu, nonpotestagerecontraearn) untas,manente passioneet scientia particulari existente in tali dispositione, in qua nataestmoveri, and art. 131 (Quodvolúntate est non et manente sic disposito , impossibile quodvoluntatem quodnatumestmovere velie)}2It is clear thatthe FranciscanMarchia, teachingat the end of the 30"Si voluntas eadem simulvelieoppositum eiusquodiudicatum esta ratione, potest II Ethicorum, sedexacribus ratione bisvelfrequenter; habitus, potest frequentatis generatur Tuncponamus iudiciorationis. rationis siterroneum; quodiudicium sequitur oppositus inappetitu inratione. moralis Similiter quodvirtus generetur absquehocquodsitprudentia inintellectu morali si ratiositrecta, sinevirtute prudentia peroppositum: poterit generari in appetitu, V Ethicorum in fineubidicit:'Manifestum ex Aristotelem quodestcontra dictis nonestpossibile bonum esseprincipátům sineprudentia necprudentia sine quoniam virtute morali' Ethics . ErgoimposNicomachean , bookVI, ch.17,1144b3 1-32] [cf.Aristotle, iudicium rationis. Et haecestintentio Aristotelis sibileestvoluntatem aliquidveliecontra III Ethicorum 3: 'Ignorât et a quibus ergoomnismalusquae oportet operari capitulo malifiunť[cf.1110,b28-30]. talepeccatum, iniusti etuniversaliter Et,propter fugiendum. tertio talissibifinis videItem,in eodemcapitulo [cf.Ill 4b1] : 'Qualisestunusquisque tur'.Ergo,si voluntas estmala,finis malusvidetur sibibonus, etnonnisi perintellectum; estbona,intellectus beneiudicatur, etsi mala,male.Ergovolergo,etc.Ergosi voluntas a ratione. untasnullomodovultoppositum iudicati ultimate Item,VII Ethicorum capitulo 'de continente et incontinente', a proposito istamquaestionem, Philosophus disputât etsolvit scientiam estdupliciter: velinhabitu velinactu./42rb/ distinguendo quodhabere inhabitu Etdicitquodfacere contra scientiam nullum estinconveniens, veroconoperari in actudurum trascientiam videtur. sineparticulari sub Item,habitamaioreuniversali nonestinconveniens; autemhabitain actu,et ipsaacceptaoppositum operari utraque from admirabile" Notethatthepassages Aristode (E 42ra-b). oppositum operari quoted herebyMarchia weremosdy cf.J. Hamesse florilegio, (ed.)LesAuctoritates commonplaces; ' Unflorilège médiéval: étude etédition Aristotelis , Louvain-Paris 1974,232-49. historique critique 31"Ad oppositum estarticulus, immoduo articuli Parisius. Primus estquodhabita in actuetminore in actu,voluntas nonpossit in oppositum: maiore universali particulari in ultima error. Secundus estquodvolúntate existente velie ipsanonpossit dispositione, contra iudicium rationis: error" (E 42rb). 32See D. Piché(ed.),La condamnation In oneof de1277, Paris1999,118-19. parisienne themsspreserving thetextofthe1277Condemnation, msFlorence, Biblioteca namely Nazionale Conv.Soppr.S.M. Novella, from the14thcentury), E.5.532(dating Centrale,

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second decade of the fourteenth centuryin Paris, regardsTempier's articulias an authorityto which deferenceis required.33 Francisalso criticisesthe aboveWhile certainlyappealingto authority, The mediumby mentionedopinion on the basis of reason {perrationerri). facultiesis merelythe act of the whichthe will moves the other(inferior) will, that is to say, the volition.If this mediumwere itselfmodallynecessary,the contingencyof the human actions consequentupon it could only be illusory: si, finitaultimadeterImpossibileest quod moveataliquid contingenter - ut tu dicisminationerationisde aliquo obiectovolibili,necessario voluntasvultillud (E 42rb). Such a modal necessityat the root of human volitionforcesus to accept one or the otherpart of the followingdisjunction:eitherthe originaljudgment is right,and in that case the will will always be good [factaimpeccabilis ), or the judgment is wrong, and in this case there will be no etimpoenitibilis .34 of repentance,and humanswillbe factaobstinata possibility Thomam". art.129is quotedhere noteat art.129:"contra there is a marginal Similarly, thetitle "unus which seemstobe thatofAquinas; "unaopinio", indeed, byFrancis against Marchia's to refer toAquinas. usedbyMarchia doctor" is sometimes Take,forinstance, animae "Sedad hocrespondet unus doctor tenens 20 (oftheA version): potentias question Summa ittoAquinas's esseaccidentia" , I, q. 77,art.1,ad theologiae (B 43va)andcompare animaenonsiteiusessentia, 5: "Ethocmodo,cumpotentia oportet quodsitaccidens". on thispointas well;cf.Glorieux had focused William de la Mare'sCorrectorium (cit. etcondamnations au Insolente liberté. Controverses Cf.alsoF.-X.Putallaz, n. 13 above),412ff. de la Mare's butnotethatWilliam XIIIesiècle, 1995,93-105and 110-12; Fribourg-Paris in cf.Guillelmus de la Mare,Scriptum thatoftheCorrectorium; didnotmatch ownthought de See F. Caldera, Munich1995,487ff.). II Sent., d. 38,qq. 1-4(ed.H. Krami, Guglielmo testuali e originalità e Pietro di Tarantasia: Tommaso la MaretraBonaventura, dipendenze d'Aquino 98 (2005),465-508. Franciscanum alleSentenze delfCommento Historicum, ' in:Archivům 33One should ofcanonization thatin 1319Aquinas's alsoremember beganin process was contested Court.Thiscanonization by some by theAngevin Naples,sponsored acts thefirst trial's andPopeJohnXXII,twoyearslater,didnotconsider Franciscans, The secondprocesswas heldin 1321at a further butdemanded sufficient, inquiry. ofVercelli, oftheDominican theaccount Fossanova See,forinstance, Raynerus Abbey. in 1901(andlaterpublished first discovered byFeliceTocco):"Scioquod byG. Boffitto dixerunt sibi[toPopeJohnXXII]antecanonizationem: caveatis, quidam unum vobisquodcanonizastis dominepapa,quidfacitis, improperabitur quia semper conwasnota sufficient haereticum" (the"heretical" pointmustbe theviewthatpoverty See F. Tocco,Studi forreceiving dition ßancescani, Naples1909,ch. 12(quotation charity). belown. 69. at 327).See further, - voluntas - uttudicis 34"Si (. . .) necessario intellectum tenet vultillud,ergonecessario ab ilio,sicutnec estquodavertat intellectum in ilio.Et si necessario tenet, impossibile sit sitmalum, ab eo. Et si illudiudicium se ipsamavertere sequitur quodvoluntas potest

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In thispart of his argument,Marchia uses an implicitparallelbetween volitionand motion,betweenactusvolendi and actusmovendi?5 The volition is viewed as a sortof driverconnectingthe mind withthe motionof the The judgmentneeds a "medium"or "middle effects. body and its further term"in order to pass on to action, and such a medium is the act of the will. If such an act followsnecessarilyfromthe intellect'sjudgment, therewould not be any contingency betweenthe startingpoint (thejudgment)and the endingpoint (the motion of inferiorfacultiesvia the first motion of the will). Thus, the necessityattached to the intellect'sjudgment will colour the will's willingand all of the effectsof that willing. Aristotelians Nevertheless, (like Godfreyof Fontaines)would have had a promptanswer to this initial criticism.The modalityof the motion of will,theywould say, is not that of absolute necessity,but ratherthat of a conditionednecessity(necessitas suppositions ), conditionedon the will actin first will the the could ing place (i.e. simplynot will). It appears that Marchia would denythatthisdistinction is relevantto the matterat hand: no matterwhat the modalityof the "driver"is, that modalityis going to affectboth the will and the intellect,so that the final (external)effects will be necessary,if the will's willingthe rationaljudgmentis necessary. In otherwords,if thereis a volition,thentherewill be a necessaryvolition,conditionedby the intellect'snecessaryjudgment.36 At least one possibleobjectionwould appear to speak againstMarchia's of omnipotentGod could break the chain of position:the intervention necessity,and "produce" somethingopposed to the decree of rational factapenitus obstinata etimpoenitibilis; etsi sitbonum, factaestimpeccabilis, quiaab ilio volito nonpotest se necintellectum avertere. Hoc estfalsum, ergoetc."(E 42rb).In fact, "ex certamalitia" entailed the"impoenAquinashaddeniedthata volition necessarily itibilitas De ventate, (e.g.ThomasAquinas, peccati" q. 24,a. 11,ad 4). 35 Quianihilmovet veltenet aliudin aliquovoluntas, nisimediante actuvolendi (E 42rb; italics mine). 36ForMarchia's ofnecessitas subcondicione , seeaboven. 25.Marchia's explicit mentioning lineofreasoning is summed text:"Etperactumvolendi necessarium up in thefollowing estquodmoveat si finita ultima determinatione rationis impossibile aliquidcontingenter de aliquoobiecto volibili uttudicis,voluntas vultillud"(E 42rb).The same necessario, is laterusedbyMarchia, withcharity: "Sic caritas estinfima virtus, argument dealing immo nonestvirtus nisiperaccidens; eo quodvoluntas nonestliberaimmediate quantum volendi sedquantum ad actummovendi, et ilioposito, quidquid deinceps estnecessarium, immonecetiamquantum ad iliumestvoluntas libera.Primo sequitur estquodaliquis actussitlibermediate nisi[neccod.]mediante actuimmequiaimpossibile diatelibero; sedvoluntas nonhabetactumimmediate liberum; quareetc.IstasuntcontraScripturam" seefurther below, (E 42rb).On "charity" p. 167.

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Dei adds no conjudgment.But to Marchia such an hypothesisexpotentia to human action. While Marchia intrinsic accepts the realityof tingency in history,he considersits use in solvingthese probdivineintervention lems of human freedomto be nothingmore than a trick.Ex se, i.e. "in God's intervention does not create any room for itselfand intrinsically", authenticcontingencyin human action qua human. A parallel argument can be made about the effectsof chance on human freedom.Having excluded, then, that either God's interventionor chance events could human agency,Marchia introduceany real contingencyinto specifically can claim thatunder all conditionsifthe will followsnecessarilythe intellect's finaljudgment,then all our actions would be necessary:sic totus estnecessarius?1 in ordine ad voluntatem processus Moreover, according to Marchia, Aristotlehimselfwas also opposed accountof human action,since he affirmed thatfrom to the intellectualist to end human are masters of their own acts: beings beginning Et hoc est contraPhilosophumIII Ethicorum , qui dicitibi quod sumus domininostrarum operationuma principiousque ad finem.Si autem, voluntasnecessariovellet,iam nullumdominium factadeterminatione, haberetsuperactumsuum.38 For all thesereasons,then,Marchia maintainsthathuman beingsshould have in theirpower not only the executiveact of the will, but a fortiori theimperativeact {actusimperatwus ), so thatrationaljudgmentcannotdetermine it.39 4. In theShadowof theScriptures Having dealt with that issue, Francis discussesanothermoral argument. The firstfreeact is the one responsiblefor the moral qualityof human 37"... eodemgenere inilio,etsicestimposnecessitatis tenet intellectum quoilludvult, vela casuavertatur. se ab ilionecetiamintellectum, nisia superiori sibilequodavertat agente in ordine ad voluntatem estnecessarius." Sed exsehocestimpossibile , et sictotus processus Adam'sFall("casus")andtheconsemine).Marchiadoesnotmention (E, 42rb;italics necessitas ofMan'sfirst sinuponthewill(cf.theAugustinián fixturi peccati ); seealso quences n. 49 below. 38E 42rb.The reference is to Mcomachean Ethics , III (esp.Ill 4b30-3 1); cf.alsothe on PeriHermeneias medieval commentaries , II, c. 14. 39"Actus inpotestate nonestmagis voluntatis exsecutivus quamactusimperatives, quia between illenonestin potestate voluntatis nisimediante ipso"(E 42rb).The distinction isthatbetween overall command andexecution. and"actus executivus" "actus imperativus"

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consistit vel vitii.Here action: in ilio actusecundum speciem primaratiovirtutis Marchia thinksabout the volitionin questionas being a firstact of love, i.e. the acceptance or rejectionof God.40This is an Augustiniánmove that,afterPeterJohn Olivi,41and on the verge of the disputeover the polemical conpovertyof Christand the Apostles,could have distinctly notations.42 Now, to make thisvolitiondependentupon the rationaljudgment would effectivelymake charity dependent upon the rational considerationof God. In thisway, charitywould become a cognitiveand - a not an affectivevirtue positionat odds with general (not exclusively the matter. The consequence of thiswould be that views on Franciscan) of would be the lowest virtues,a mere collateraleffectof human charity knowledgeof God: Dei et proximi,sed in actu Virtusnon consistit primoin actu dilectionis ad considerandum Deum et proximum, et sic carimovendiintellectum tas est infimavirtus,immo non est virtusnisi per accidens.(. . .) Ista suntcontraScripturam. (E 42rb; cf. nn. 36, 40 above) of Holy Scripture,specifically But thiswould be at odds withthe authority estcaritas(I Tim. Saint Paul, because- as Marchia mentions -finis praecepti a is out of the end of the commandment 1, 5): charity, pure heart and the it of a good conscience.Since charityis the goal of commandments, mustbe the highestvirtue,based on the willed acceptance of God. A further argumentalong theselinespresentedby Marchia worksfrom the notionof the "desirable"or volibile , accordingto the (even voluntabile If Latin translationsof Aristotle). the intellectdeterminesnot only what is intelligible(iintelligibile ), but also what is desirable,the will cannot hope 40"Inilioactusecundum consistit velvitii, liber; primaratiovirtutis quiprimo speciem ad actumvolendi, nonestliberaimmediate sedfactadeterminatione voluntas quantum virtus nonconsistit ad actummovendi; sedsolumquantum ergoetc.Et perconsequens ad consideranin actudilectionis Dei etproximi, sedin actumovendi intellectum primo immononestvirtus nisiperaccietsiccaritas estinfima dumDeumetproximum, virtus, dens"(E 42rb). 41See on thisissue,M.-Th.d'Alverny, Petrus Ioannis Unadversaire deSaintThomas: Olivi, Commemorative Studies in:St.Thomas 1274-1974: 1974,voi.2, 179-217. , Toronto Aquinas 42It couldbe seenas a strategy touseAquinas thatis to say,pitting Aquinas, against oftheearvalueofcharity theintellectualistic theclaimofthesupreme against approach continentia liest"Thomists". See Glorieux (cit.n. 13 above),298-302: "Quodpaupertas, of On Marchia's ad perfectionem instrumentaliter". et oboedientia conception pertinent in thisvolume, andtheliterature referred to there, see R. Lambertini's article poverty, ownworks. Lambertini's especially

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to change the priorintellectualfocus.The volitioncannothave real alternativesat its disposal when it has no desirableobjects apart fromthose previouslydeterminedby the intellect,since, as Marchia says, the intellect, by the veryact that it determinesthat an object is intelligibleand desirable,"can determinethat the will should hold the intellectto considering"that particularintelligibleand desirable object.43Hence, we would only ever desirewhat the intellectjudged to be desirable. Reflectionon man's firstmorallycharged act then pulls Marchia not towardsthe topic ç>fthe firstangelic sin, and fromthereto surprisingly the fall of man.44 5. The Sin ofAdamas Paradigm for theSin of bothAngelsand HumanBeings The point of departurein any discussionof the moral statusof Adam and his descendentsis the realityof sin. This assumed,Marchia implicitly introducesa common scholasticprinciple:the rejectionof any infinite regress.If sin exists,theremusthave been a firstsin. Man's firstsin could onlyhave been due to passion,ignorance,lack of attention,or even pure malice (ex meramalitiavoluntatis). Using a standardstrategyof arguingby exclusionof the putativealternatives,Marchia shows that only the last one, "malice", could really constitutethe root of originalsin; in other words,he shows that,in all cases, the true cause of sin can only be the will freelywilling.Thus, Francis argues that both passion and ignorance - i.e. are eitherstructural somethinginherentand hence invincible or then therewould not have been any theyare not. If theyare structural, sin as such, because the possibilityof actingdifferently would have been and hence one would not have been excluded, morallyculpable (withit understoodthat moral culpabilityand sin can only apply when thereis a possibilityof avoiding the proscribedbehavior). If passion and igno43"Sicutratiodeterminat et volibile, deterestintelligibile itapotest quodobiectum in consideratione immoeodemiudiminare debettenere intellectum illius, quodvoluntas iudicatur secundum" cio,nonalio,quo iudicatur (E 42rb). primum 44The background forthispointis surveyed in: G. Cervellon, dejustice chez L'affection - E. Karger - J.-L.Solére DunsScot. etluxure danslepéché del'ange , in:O. Boulnois Justice Marchia asks:"Quo G. Sondag(eds.), DunsScot à Paris, 1302-2002 , Turnholt 2004,425-68. homovelangelus?" tohuman Now,thejumpfrom angels beings peccato peccavit primus in hisq. 20 found to Adam)is permitted ofMarchia's, byanother position (specifically inhomine sinteiusdem rationis" "Utrum intellectus etvoluntas etangelo (oftheA version): (B 40va-45va).

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ranee are not structural, however,then theycould be overcomeby the and onus shiftsonto provingthemto actuallyhave been the will, probandi the sourceof sin. Withrespectto attention(and lack thereof)as the cause of thisfirstsin, Marchia arguesin a parallel fashion.Eitherpayingattention was "obligatory"or it was not. If it was not obligatory,then sin is clearlynot the resultof lack of attention.If attentionwas obligatory,on the other hand, then the lack of attentionhas to be attributedto the 5 will: nonconsideravit quia voluit?In all cases, then,the will, and in particular the malice of the will, emergesas the only possible source of the firstsin.46 et tuncde illa Ergo primumpeccatumfuittantumex malitiavoluntatis, non habereiliumactummalum,aut non quaero: aut pro tunctenebatur tenebatur. Si secundo[primocod.]modo,non peccavit.Si primo[secundo codi]modo,ergonecessariomediantealiquo dictaminerationis, quia voluntasnon teneturaliquid non velie nisi praevioaliquo iudiciorationis. Et tunc vel fuitiudiciumactúale rationis,aut fuitiudiciumhabitúale tantum.Si fuitiudiciumrationisactúale,habeturpropositum, quia tunc actúale rationis. Si autem fuit iudicium habitúale fuitcontraiudicium rationissine actuali,tune fuitinconsideratioactualis . Procedaturergo sicutprius:aut potuit vitareaut non, et tandem oportetdevenirequod facitcontrarationempracticamin actu.47 Central to Marchia's argumenthere- and he makes this explicitin the A versionof his Sentences commentary is the notionof obligationas connected to the will: somethingis required insofaras the will is under a

45"Nec considerare etnonconex consideratione, quiaauttenebatur Si nontenebatur, nonpeccavit. Si tenebatur et nonconsiautnontenebatur. sideravit, ergo malavoluntas deravit considerare quaenoluit quandodebuit" quiavoluit, ergopraecessit (E 42va,italics mine). 4b Autpeccavit autex ìnconsideratione, autex autex ignorantia, pnmoex passione, autnon.Si Nonprimo vincere meramalitia voluntatis. modo,quiaautpotuit passionem, malavoluntas vincere et etnonvoluit, passionem, ergopraecessit quaenonvoluit potuit nonfuitex passione. Nec peccavit ex ignorantia eandem sicprimum propter peccatum Necex autinvincibilis, ettuncdeducatur sicutprius. rationem, quiaautillafuitvincibilis consideratione [. . cf.n. 45 above]"(E 42va). 47E 42va.Thepassageconcludes as follows: automnis actusvoluntatis "Item, sequitur autaliquidpraecedit. Si primomodo,et omnistalisestnecessarius, rationem practicam, Si secundo tunc estnecessarius. modo,et illesitcontingens, ergoomnisactusvoluntatis inilioconsistit etpotest sine virtus etvitium. esseinvolúntate Ergovirtus praecedit prima inmedioconsistens rectaratione Hoc estfalsum, esthabitus electivus quiavirtus practica. determinabit". proutsapiens

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certain"law" which de iureobligesit.48Thus, his argumentcan be reconstructedas follows:eitherthe will when willingthe firstsin was under an obligationnot to will somethingevil or it was not under that obligation. If it was not under the obligation,then therewas no sin. But if it was under an obligation,that obligationcould only arise on account of a prior dictateof reason about the proper course of action. Now, if the judgmentof reason were actual, then Marchia has his overallpoint: the will is able to act againstthejudgmentof reason. If, on the otherhand, thejudgmentof reasonwere merelyhabitual,thenthe firstsin musthave come about on account of lack of attentionto the judgmentof reason, and then Marchia can simplyappeal to his earlier argumentson that topic, showingthat the lack of attentionmust have been willed. The demonstration is successful. Moreover,Marchia could argue furtherby generalizingto the entire human race: if in at least one case (i.e. the sin of Adam) the will could act against the dictamen rationis , then it is in general able to act against the (best)judgmentof the intellect.If thiswas true forAdam, it is true foreveryone.The latterassumptionis implicit,but requiredforMarchia's argumentto be sufficient.49 48See e.g.q. 47 (oftheA version): hominis> "Ergosequitur quod movet perse ad actum(. . .), cumenimsitpotentia inregno animaenonhabens se"(B 79vb).Cf.William ofOckham, , suprema superiorem Dialogus estlegibus, nectenetur de 2, bookI, c. 15: "Et rexin regnosuosolutus part3, tract. iudicare necessitate secundum formulas "rexinregno suoprinceps leges".On thejuridical nonrecognoscens", La metamorfosi dellasovranest","rexsuperiorem etc.,seeM. Manzin, itàallalucedeldibattito medievale su intelletto e volontà e metamorfosi , in: M. Basciu(ed.),Crisi dellasovranità : Atti delXIXCongresso dellaSocietà Italiana diFilosofia Giuridica e Politica nazionale 29-30Sept. (Trento, 1994),Milan1996,303-06. 49Interestingly, in Marchia's no argumentative useis made(as faras I can questions tellanddespite ofAugustine) ofAdam'scognitive theauthoritative presence superiority

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someDifficulties 6. 'Divideut imperesSolving The last part of q. 63 containsMarchia's replies to the opening arguments(a, b, c, and d above). In replyto the firstargument(¿z),the link betweenvolitionand knowledgepostulatedin the argumentis not denied, but the notionof "knowledge"is made more nuanced by drawinga distinctionwith respectto it. Marchia makes use of a common scholastic distinction betweentwo acts of the intellectproducingtwo formsof knowlan edge: apprehensiveact, givingraw or simple intellectualcognition, ratioand a judicative act, yieldingcomplex knowledgeand the dictamen nis.50Marchia employsthisdistinction by claimingthatin the absence of all cognition,therecan be no volition;but volition,on the other hand, determinate does notrequirereflective pro actu judicative knowledge{cognitio and sufficient Thus, apprehensiveknowledgeis both necessary iudicandi). for the functioningof the will; judicative knowledgeis neither.This is the case in such a way that the will can be said to depend on the intellect and reason (i.e. intellect's"apprehensive"act), withoutdependingon any (particular)rationaljudgment.51This solution indeed seems more semanticthan real; the point of objectiona had been the independence of thewillin relationto fulland authenticknowledge;such "actual knowledge" cannot be mere apprehensionof reality,ratherat some level or ofhuman whosenatura is theFallincomparison tothediminished before capacity beings La conoscenza di B. Faesde Mottoni, lapsa(cf.forsomeofthe'sameissuesin Bonaventure, 3d. 23,a. 2, 3 diBonaventura DiodiAdamo innocente nelleinII Sententiarum , in:Archivům q. ofthisaspect 91 evaluation Franciscanum Historicum,(1998),3-32).Notethata definitive in willalsoneedto takeintoaccount hisChristological ofMarchia's questions thought thescopeofthepresent fallsoutside bookIII oftheSentences: ; suchan examination paper. 50Aswesawabove(n.22),Marchia within reflective makesa further distinction judgofthefundamental distinction between andthismustbe seenas a development ment, autemhuiusmodi virandreflective A, msB 77ra:"Actus simple judgments, e.g.version alius tualiter sunttres:estenimquidamactusintellectus simplicis apprehensionis; cognitivi et negandi; et tertius estactusdiscurrendi et dividendi siveaffirmandi actuscomponendi velsyllogizandi". 51"Adprimam in oppositum dicoquodactusintellectus estduplex, scilicet rationem etistiactusdifferunt actusapprehendendi etactusiudicandi, (. . .).Etsicdicoquodcognitio veldeterminate tantum actu,velutestcommunis proaltero utrique potest accipidupliciter: actuiapprehendendi et iudicandi, tuncconcedo actui.Si quodvoluntas in incognitum; tamenin opposinonpotest sedutcognitio estcommunis utrique, potest tumcognitione dummodo sitcognitum Item,datoquod iudicativa, cognitione apprehensiva. nonposset velieoppositum, adhuctamen actum suumetnonvelieiudiposset suspendere catum"(E 42va-b;italics mine).At n. 22 above,we sawthat,forMarchia, any"actus whichentails, to some formaliter" has theformofthe"cognitio iudicativa", cognitivus theassent ofthewill. extent,

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anotherit mustmake a judgmentabout reality.Marchia seems aware of the difficulty.52 , book 6, c. 2), Basing himselfon Aristotle(cf.Nic. Ethics he objectsto his own positionthatthe will's impulseto pursue or to flee or negativejudgments,respectively. is based on the mind's affirmative Thus, judgmentis a necessaryprerequisiteforwilling.In responseto this objection,Marchia attemptsto develop and enrichhis arguments. between Accordingto Marchia,in additionto the traditionaldistinction a there is also further disand "judicative"knowledge, "apprehensive" tinctionbetweentwo different judgments,both typesof rationalreflective of which are involvedin the dialecticof human action. This is a point to which we should pay great attention,because Marchia will insiston it in both versionsof his Sentences commentary(see on this also below, § 8), developingthe internaldistinctionand articulationof human mental acts, both volitionaland cognitive: Et ideo dico quod iudiciumestduplex,quia quoddamestiudiciumsuperans et quoddam est iudiciumsuccumbensvel superatum.Tunc dico quod sit tantumunum iudicatum,quod voluntasnon potestin oppositum;tamen non sequiturpropterhoc quod voluntasvelitillud necessario,quia potestsuspendereactumsuum et resilireab actu.53 AlthoughMarchia's discussionon this point is not as elaborate as one could wish, neverthelessthis much seems clear: there are two typesof one of which"pre vails", apparentlyby receivjudgment,both reflective, chosen by the will. Such additional through being strengthprecisely ing a multiplicity of judgmentsbroadens the scope of volition:the choice is not merelybetweenacting and not acting,ratherchoice is expanded to include being able to act againsta judgmentalreadydetermined,thanks to anotherprevailingjudgment. 52"Sed hocvidetur actumiudicandi, nonsufficere, praesupponit quia actuselectivus hocestin appetitu et fuga,VI affirmatio et negatio, persecutio quiaquodestin mente comofMarchia's Ethicorum" passagein theA version (E 42vb).Cf.,fortheparallel belowat n. 77 in themaintext. mentary, 53E 42vb.Atthispoint, beendrawn, Marchia wasableto withthedistinction having "Sedhomovirtuosus habetduoiudioftheincontinent: thewell-known interpret syllogism esseeligendum secundum secundum bonum rationem, cia,unum'simpliciter' quodiudicat bonum delectabile secundum etaliud'secundum quid,quia quodiudicat quid'secundum secundum estprosequendum. Et iudicium scilicet secundum sensum [thatis to saythat voluntas ex sualiberiate in homine nihilominus tamen secundum virtuoso, quid'succumbet iudicatum sive'secundum sive'simpliciter' iudicium, quid'" in utrumque potest (E 42 vb).Cf.n. 25 above.

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These are new medieval developmentswhich we would not be able to find in ancient philosophy,since according to Aristotle(and to the acts cannot belong to the same realm Greeksin general)two "different" I will returnto the growinglater medieval the mind.54 Below of (§ 9), trend,and Marchia's place in it, to representthe mind and individual facultieswithinthe mind as articulatedsystemsof acts and dispositions, so thatvariousaspectsof selfinteractwithone anothercreatingsuch tensions as weaknessof the will. The second argument(è), as already noted,was based upon the concept of the ratioboni.Here Marchia offersan answerwithintheAristotelian framework and endorsesthe strategyused just above. The ratiobonicould be of different sorts,involvingsome ratiomalisecundum quid, so that there is some room forchoice leftto the individualamong thingsthatare more or less good relativeto each other.That is to say, thereis not only an absolute good or evil, but also a slidingscale on which good and evil are to an extentconditionedby the situation.This argumentwas already and became a commonplacein thirteenth cenput forwardby Aristotle55 I in it the More scholastic so will leave to side. debate, interesting, tury in is a which Francis casts doubt the statement very my opinion, upon 54The distinction wasan twokindsofreflective as faras I know, between judgment, Oneofthefirst authors tothink ofsucha distinction innovation of12th-century theology. whiledeeding withtheactsofthewillseemstohavebeenSimonofTournai (d.ca. 1210); inbothPeterofPoitiers andStephen cf.Robiglio wefind significant development Langton; in hintofthiskindofdistinction (cit.n. 2 above),154-55.I do notsee anysignificant AurioPs ontheSentences Peter Commentary (e.g.bookII, dist.25,q. un.,a. 2; ed.P. Capullius, Theexigencies foran internal articulation Rome1605,265bff.), oneofMarchia's sources. in of"theSelf",ofcourse, datesfrom thetimeofAugustine andhasitsmainstimulus ofreflective acts thePauline thesolution nevertheless, bymeansofa multiplicity Epistles; before theelaboration andassimilation ofother ofthemindwouldnothavebeenpossible - to studied notions of"purepossibility", bySimoKnuuttila). Aquinas (e.g.theconcept - proposed in his Marchiaknows sucha twofold structure ofvolitions quotean author onthispoint, anddespite demalo Quaestiones (ca. 1268),q. 16,a. 3,andelsewhere; disputatele ofearly14th-century Thomasstoodon thesame thecontrary "Thomists", interpretation Thisunusual is notnew.It wasproposed by byScotus. interpretation pathlaterwalked Dominican Alfonso de oftheEarlyModern someSchoolmen period, e.g.theSalamancan Luna(d. 1596);on Luna,see Robiglio (cit.n. 2 above),115-19.On thisissue,see also inAncient andMedieval S. Knuuttila, Emotions , Oxford 2004,265n. 33. Philosophy 55"Licetoppositum malialiquo illiusquodiudicatum estrespectu eiushabeatrationem modo ab ilio,quiatarnen iudicatum estbonumsecundum , quiadistrahit quid,ideopotest Ethics voluntas illudeligere" , III, c. 4, 1113a (E 42vb;italics mine).Cf.e.g.Mcomachean andit maybe opposite, 23: "Yetdifferent, things people".Cf. appeargoodto different dellevirtù morali inAristotele M. D'Avenia, delbene Le dimensioni , cognitive L'aporia apparente. Milan1998.

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presuppositionsof the argument.It is in fact not certain,accordingto Marchia, that the will cannot will somethingevil: concedatur aliquomodo, licetdubium ,56Marchia suggeststhat "perhaps"one could will to do somethingevil not onlythroughconsideringit to be a partialgood {subincomalterius mali). pletaratione boni)but to a certainextent"directly"{subratione Dimension 7. The Temporal of theWill and the(Virtually) MultipleSelf The thirdinitialargument{c)- centeringon the law of non-contradiction of the intellectualact- is solved by makingreference and the singularity to the temporalextensionof all human (thoughhastilyand half-implicitly) action. Contradictoryacts only become a problemwhen we are talking about these acts takingplace at one and the same time.Francishintsat natureof the human action. No action lasts only the trans-instantaneous an instant;it always has a duration or a "term" and, throughtime, different judgmentsbecome available.57I will tryto clarifymy interpretationby way of an example.

56"Adsecundum, in malum, cumdicitur nonpotest concedatur aliquo quodvoluntas ofthispointinScotus, seeG.Alliney, 'Velie modo,licetdubium" (E 42vb).Fora discussion / Ethics e la banalità delmale & Politics, malum expuralibertate3: DunsScoto , in:Etica& Politica at:http://www.units.it/dipfilo/etica_e_politica/2002_2/indexalline 2, 2002,on-line toaffirm thatthewillcanwilltheevilqua William Ockham wasprobably thefirst author in an argument) either ofa doubtorofan element evil.Butthissuggestion (intheform ofAquinas's onEvil.Duringthe havealready beenclearto thereaders Questions might in discussing Sentences PeterLombard's 13thcentury, (bookII, dist.7, c. 3), medieval to triedto makecompatible thesinoftheangelandthestatements authors according in-and-of which:1) evilhasno existence itself; 2) "nonpossunt itaqueboniangelivelie malum". Cf.Knuuttila (cit.n. 44 above). (cit.n. 54 above),209n. 99,andalsoCervellon 57 Ad tertium, ineodem instanti estsi quodvoluntas quo vult,etc.,dicoquodverum Sedsiinveniat, nonpotest propter sed intempore sequenti incompossibilitatem, ofthe to mytentative thetwojudgments interpretation, quodvult"(E 42vb).According "in eodeminstanti" and "in tempore distinction between Marchia's (despite opposition in a "simultaneous" evenifeachofthemhad a are bothengaged struggle, sequenti") thestrong formulation to whichthewill different duration. Moreover, according despite thatthewillcan toitspurpose, Marchia's texthereseemstosuggest converts theintellect toward thepurposes ofthewill,buttheproduction knowledge onlyturnalready-produced andsalvo meliori iudithepowerofthewill.In other ofknowledge remains words, beyond ' means ť ofthejudg"whatis understood", thatis to saythe"content" cio,hereintellectum rather thantheintellect as a partner ofthewill. subopposito ment("intellectum iudicio"), ininstanti fiatsubito A closereading "Utrum actusvoluntatis oftheunidentified question in order willbe required whichmight be Marchia's, velfiatin tempore" (E 49ra-50vb), - Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above),42. Cf.Friedman to study thispointfurther.

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One could thinkof two distinctvolitions:to will to eat a piece of cake and to will to diet. There is no intrinsiccontradictionbetweenthesetwo ifthere Nevertheless, volitions,since their"objects"circaquodare different. a to someone's actual is to be any consistency activities, problemarises: the diet is not compatiblewitheatingthe cake now.One way of explaining thissituationis by means of the followingparadigm:thereis a general volition(to diet) and this conflictswith a particularvolitionthat is in some way an exceptionto the carryingout of the first(to eat a piece of cake rightnow as an exceptionto the ongoingdieting).This is the standard paradigm: general volition vs. particularvolition; such a paradigm is , employedby Marchia as well when he says that homohabetduo iudicia unumsimpliciter ... et aliudsecundum quid(cf. n. 53 above). Is this the best way to explainthe situation,however?It does not seem to be (and Francis may have agreed,at least in the passage we are dealingwithnow). Since all the volitionsinvolved are "singular", i.e. particular,what is here describedas a "generalvolition"should in factbe understoodas nothing other than "the particularvolitionfor somethinggeneral", so that the betweenobjects conflictat issue here is yetagain reducedto the difference volitions are in fact that these two vs. But the ("general" "particular"). conflictat all would then lead one to the conclusionthat there is only one particularobject whichis both being willed and not willed.This was consideredstrictly impossibleby the likes of Godfreyof Fontaines. ifthe appeal to a distinction between to How, then, explainthisconflict, use of a distinction between voliOne answer is: the is barred? by objects tions.Such a distinctioncan be allowed, however,only if one maintains thattherecan be more than one volitionor act of the will at once. And this in turn requiresa certaindivisionof the self into several "virtual" selves.58If one were to postulatesuch a divisionof the self,then one could maintainthat each volitionhas an intrinsicdurationto it (and this durationis a characteristicof each virtualself in relationto the same volitionsmightwell coexistwith outsideworld),althoughthe contradictory one anotherin the same objectivetime.A "dietengagement",forinstance, have different and a "cake-eating temporaldurationsabsolutely engagement" correspondingto two virtualselves. speaking(long-termvs. short-term) exists.And virtual:only one selfever actually is therefore The multiplicity 58SomeofJohnElster's aresurprisingly similar. Cf.J.Elster (ed.),TheMultiple arguments Studies inRationality andSocial 1986,aswellas morerecent , Cambridge Change publications. Self.

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when one of the two simultaneously"open" selves runs its course, the two selves collapse into the prevailingone. An explanationavailingitselfof thisparadigmpermits,in my opinion, a fundamentaltypeof freedomwithrespectto variousobjectsthatcannot be offeredby the standardparadigm and, more importantstillfor our presentpurposes,it can explain an aspect of Marchia's own ideas: his kinds of reflective distinctionbetweentwo different judgment,which,as and succumbens . we saw above, he calls respectively superans Such a relationof volitionto time is developed explicitlyneitherby Marchia nor by any othermedievalthinker,but seems extremely promishas to some notions such since it the descriptive capacity charge ing,59 with an intrinsic moral value. as "advance", "delay", "temporising", etc., of habits,eithervirtuousor vicious, Along the same lines,the constitution would operateby changingthe temporal"quality"of action.For a virtuous would be quite easy and, as a person,forinstance,the diet-engagement his not to eat cake would be correspondingly decision quick, consequence, so that the split between a double-termself (long-termvs. short-term) and disappear. would tend to resolveitselfswiftly us These lastconsiderations bring to thefinalpartof Marchia'squestion. The initialargumenttakingitspointof departurefromthe discordbetween of eithervirtuousor volitionand cognitionin relationto the constitution vicioushabits(d) is contestedby Marchia both on the basis of a textfrom (viz. Augustineand of the principleof the moral qualityof intentionality some action contributes that one's intention,good or evil, in performing to the moral statusof thataction).Marchia stressesthe conditionforpro, i.e. "practice".The repetitionof random "atomic" voliducing a habitus each tions, going against the correspondingrationaljudgment,seems to him a mere abstraction.In fact,accordingto Marchia,thewillin isolation esthabitus of virtues:virtus fromthe intellectcannotbe constitutive conformis .60 rationi Moreover,a volitionof somethingthat opposes rational 59On thisneglected in X. Zubiri, Sobre el sentimiento see theseminal reflections point, la , Madrid1992,esp.95 and 137-39.Cf. Robiglio (cit.n. 2 above),80-82, y volición 214-15. 60"Adaliud,quodtuncessetvirtus moralis sineprudentia, dicosecundum Augustinum dicerefalsum et dicitverum, in Enchiridion qui credit quamqui quodmagismentitur dicoquodsi voluntas facitcontra dicereverum. Ad propositum dicitfalsum et credit virtus sedvitium, est rationem erroneam, quiavirtus quodestmala,etnonadgenerabitur Enchiridion rationi "(E 42vb).Cf.Augustine, habitus conformis , ch. 6, 18,ed. iudicandus estquidicitfalsum E. Evans,Turnholt 1969,58: "Nemosanementiens quod in ipsoestnonfallit ipsesedfallitur". quoniam quantum putatverum,

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judgmentmay be possibleinsofaras the will uses or provokesotherjudgmentsthatare alternatives to the firstone.61This pointwas noted above, in Marchia's responseto c (cf. n. 57 above). Anarchicacts, in thissense, would certainlydestroy the habit that would come into the world by a sort of "double-bind"action,62but they could under no circumstances a positivepractice,i.e. generatea new habit: corrumpitur constitute quodgeneratum estet sic nullushabitus .63 generatur Francis also rejectsthe argumentthat was used to supportthe "habit Ethics , Book 7. objection"(d) and was taken fromAristotle'sNicomachean If Marchia is to be believed,the rationalisticaccount of human action given by Aristotlewas not the Philosopher'sfinal,consideredview but In book 7 of hisNicomachean Ethics , according onlya provisionalhypothesis. to Marchia,Aristotleloquitur nonasserendo, sedtantum ratiocinando .64 probabiliter As theseexamplesshow,in our ongoingefforts to understandMarchia's use of his sources,it will be absolutelyessentialto considercarefullythe Ethics , Augustine'swritingsand, interplaybetweenAristotle'sNicomachean in the background,Saint Paul's Epistles. Medieval discussionson the weakness of the will had a more complex traditionand sourcesthan is commonlysurveyedin the modern literature.On the one hand, therewas thewell-knowntextof Aristotle(book 7 ofNicomachean Ethicstogetherwith some passages fromhis treatiseOn theSoul);65on the other hand, there 61"Ulterius dicoquodlicetinprimo instanti velitoppositum iudicii tamen comrationis, muniter avertit intellectum a primoiudicioet convertit illudquod ipsumad iudicandum ettuncpersecundum actum illudquodgeneratum eratexprimo contrario vult, cointelligitur iudicio etsicnonestgeneratus etposteavelitoppositum simili modo habitus; ipsius, estet sicnullus habitus corrumpitur quodgeneratum generatur" (E 42vb:italics mine). 62I alludehereto thetheory advanced Bateson andothers initially byGregory (and laterexpanded on byCarlosSluzkiandEliseoVerón), whichdealswithactsofspeech - J.Beavin - A.Tarnopolskya paradoxical nature. Cf.C.E.Sluzki having (self-contradicting) E Verón,Transactional research onthedouble in: Archives of General bind, disqualification 16(1967),494-504. ofthiskind, as however, Psychiatry, caution, Usinganalogies requires notedbyJ.Elster, andSociety. Contradictions andPossible Worlds York, Chirchester-New Logic Brisban-Toronto 1978(advocem Bateson). 63Seen. 61 above.Also:"Eteodemmodode prudentia sinevirtute morali, quianullus habitus illetamen nonestprudentia, habitus, generabitur. [. . .] Item,estoquodgeneratur > estde hisquae generantur ad finem, tamen< volúntate quiaprudentia praesupposita rectaex terminatione finis" (E 42vb). 64"Adilludde VII Ethicorum diciprimo nonasserendo, sedtanpotest quodloquitur tumprobabiliter ratiocinando" (E 42vb). 65I refer toAristotle's De anima , III, 10(433a10-14).Saarinen (cit.n. 4 above)concenon thisbranch trates ofthetradition. Cf.alsomorerecent works ofSaarinen, e.g.Walter on'akrasia3: Second 37 (1999),60-71. , in:Vivarium, Burle); Thoughts

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were biblical texts(e.g. I Cor. 7, 5), glosses on those texts,and several ecclesiasticalauthoritiesup until the time of Peter Lombard (IV Sent., d. 31, c. 7). Aquinas, forinstance,was aware of such a twofoldtradition when he wrote (In IV Sent ., d. 27, q. 3, a. 1, arg. 2): continentia dupliciter sumitur a diversis. Future studiesof Marchia's ideas on will, action, and moralswill also have to take into account this richnessand diversity.66 8. TheA Version ofMarchia'sII Sentences The generalstructureof the questionwe have been examiningdoes not The considerable varybetweenthe two versionsof Marchia's II Sentences. use of authoritative and Augustinecharacterizes passagesfrombothAristotle the A versionjust as much as it does the B version.Some key definitions are clearlyPeripatetic:the definitionof 'virtue',for instance,as habitus electivus in medioconsistens There is a certainshift proutsapiensdeterminabit. in emphasis,however,for in the A version a number of cosmological aspectsof the issue of the will's relationshipto the intellectare developed at some length,while otherfeaturesof the B versiondo not appear at all in the A version.Thus, the heart of question 47 of the A version voluntas antedeterminationern siveiudicium rationis velcontra (Utrum possitse movere is in fact new, dealing with the relationbetween the firstcause ipsurri) (God) and secondary causes (includinghuman beings). Moreover, the of different ordersof causes) tends vocabularyemployed(e.g. concurrentia to recall more the vocabularyof Duns Scotus, at least as he expresses himselfin his Lectura , book II, question 25.67 66In thisconnection, I wouldliketo mention an interesting and relevant article by Kretzmann: theLawofMyMind: onRomans Norman 7, in: T.V. Warring Against Aquinas andtheChristian Faith ForfurMorris , NotreDame,Indiana1988,172-95. (ed.),Philosophy Thomas onHuman andcriticism, seeR.Pasnau, therdiscussion Nature , CambridgeAquinas NewYork-Oakleigh 2002,443 n. 17,andespecially (cit.n. 2 above),147-52. Robiglio in mind, insomerecent Withthisliterature anddespite theclaims tothecontrary scholI wouldsaythatAugustine's a distinction , book8, doesnotpresent Confessions arship, kinds ofvolition. within theframework between twodifferent indeed, Augustine, operates der oftheChristian ideaofincontinence. P. vanBeek,Das Willensdrama Cf.,forinstance, - D. Hattrup - C. Mayer von 8, in:N. Fischer zurLektüre ,Confessionesc Befreiung. Anmerkungen inAugustins DerSprung inlebendige Leben undGnade , Paderborn}Confessionese. (eds.),Freiheit withL.F. München-Wien-Zürich 2003,97*-113*,whichI wouldreadin conjunction Le Confessioni Pizzolato: , vol.3, Milan1994,231-41. Sant'Agostino, 67Cf.Dumont alsothepointofcontact between this (cit.n. 22 above),whoexplains intellectualism ofAquinas". See alsoIngham ofScotusandthe"balanced earlyapproach (cit.n. 22 above),88-90.

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AlthoughMarchia is criticalof some views of Aquinas (the unusdoctor of the text),neverthelesshis discussionof several points taken fromthe The Paris Condemnationof 1277 goes is respectful.68 SummaTheologiae unmentioned.69 The questiondeals now withthe problemof "causation".70 This is firstconsideredin general(de omnicausasecundain communi ),71then it is consideredfora long while fromthe point of view of naturalagency ),72and finallyit is consideredfromthe point (de agentenaturaliin speciali P Only the last section of view of human voluntaryaction (de causalibera) to question63 of theB versiondiscussed withsome differences, corresponds, in the last sectiondo not so much involvechanges above. The differences in the argumentsthemselves,but ratherchanges in stress,emphasis,and accent.

68The textdeserves a detailed whichI willpresent elsewhere (cf.n. 5 above). study seemsto at thebeginning We couldnotethatthelistofarguments byFrancis presented Marchia tendsto read viae"(cf.B 8Ivbff.).In addition, follow theThomistic "quinqué Averroes. to thefifth ideastakenfrom as having Referring explicitly developed Aquinas in naturali "Secundo de agente Francis says(inart.1 ofthequestion): way,forinstance, MSS have"auctor"] sic:Omne unusdoctor "unus";other primo [C omits arguit speciali finem ab ipsocognitum finem determinatum agitvelpropter aliquem agensquodintendit MSS have"ilio"]ipsum finem ab ipsoincognitum sedab alio[other velpropter cognoscente motaad certum terminům sibia sagitsicut sibipraefixum etpraestitutum, patetde sagitta finem finem siveintendit determisedomneagensnaturale tantepraefixum; agitpropter in ipsumet naturaliter terminům motum deorsum et tendit natum (graveenimintendit insuaactione naturalis causasecunda levesursum); agitdeterminata ergoetc.Ergoomnis finem huiusmodi determinatum causaesecundae a primacausa;causaenimpraestituens "Haec nonpotest essenisiipsaprimacausa;ergoetc.".Marchiaconcludes significantly: commento ratiofundatur a Commentatore 12 Metaphysicae, 19,ubidicitquodnatura a causisuniversalibus" agitformaliter (B 8Ivb;cf.C 160rb). 69We should ofThomasAquinas notforget thecanonization (July1323)anditsconartiBourret revoked inFebruary 1325,theParisian Tempier's Bishop Stephen sequences; salvomeliori on Aquinas' s doctrine. Thissaid,I do notthink, clesas faras theytouched in theA version canbe usedas articuli arenotfound iudicio , thatthefactthatTempier's A In otherwords, as faras I see,version an argument to fixthedateofthatversion. tothe1277 havepreceded version butlesscoherent as well)might B, thereference (richer hisrevision, before beenaddedbyMarchia condemnation February during perhaps having intheA version errores arementioned elsewhere 1325.TheParisian (e.g.B 29va).Gf.also n. 33 above. 70Interestingly, on bookII oftheSentences theA version of Marchia's commentary oftheconcept examination withan extended (unfortunately, abruptly interrupted) begins - Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above), See on thisquestion, Friedman ofcausality (B lra-5va). 85-86. 71Cf.B 81va-b. 72Cf.B 81vb-82rb. 73Cf.B 82rb-84ra.

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Here I will quote a long passage fromthe last sectionof the question, which pulls togethermuch of what we have seen above: Ad primam,quando diciturquod voluntasnon potestvelie (quantumspectatad propositum) ignotumetc.,dico quod actusintellectus et actum appreest duplex. Habet enim intellectusactum iudicandi74 est et aliud aliud enim est hendendi, quod apprehensum apprehendere iudicare.Unde multa intellectusapprehenditquae non iudicat,sicut cum comparetea ad invicem, extremaambo contradictionis apprehendit Per hoc enim probat facere nisi non apprehenderet.75 quod posset sensuumextecommunis sensibilia sensus apprehendit Philosophus76 quod extremaconnec tamen intellectus iudicat riorum,quod comparaiea, etc. tradictionis; quare Tunc ergoad rationemconcedoquod voluntasnon potestvelieignotum, ut ignotumest privatioactus iudicandiet actus apprehendendi simul; potesttamenvelieignotum,ut ignotumprivatpraeciseipsumiudicium, Et tunc dico quod, quando voluntasvult non autem apprehensionem. nonvultignotum, estperintellectum, eius determinatum oppositum quod sed vultignotum, seu inapprehensum hoc estincognitum intellectum, per bene apprehendit illudcuiusoppositum Intellectus hoc estnon iudicatum. licetnon habeat actumiudiciicirca ipsum. dictâtet determinai, in volúntate Sed hoc non videtursufficere, praesupquoniamactuselectionis non tantum actum iudicandi in intellectu actum , apprehendendi; quia, ponit et negatio, secundumPhilosophum, est in intellectuaffirmatio et ideo, licetet actusvoluntatis hoc est in appetitufugaet persecutio;77 tamenactuselectionon praesupponatnisisimplicemactumintellectus, actumcomplexum siveactum vel fugaepraesupponit nissivepersecutionis Et ideo dico aliterquod duplexestiudicium iudicandiipsiusintellectus. etaliudnonpraevalens etpraevalens intellectus: , et ad utrumque superans quoddam istorumpotestsequi voluntas(....)• Ad tertium, quando dicitur"in eodem instantiin quo voluntasvultaliintellectum" etc.,dico quod verumest nisiinveniateum78 quid convertit sub actuiudicandi79 opposito;quando auteminvenitsub oppositoiudicio, eum in eodem instantiin quo vult,propter tunenon convertit incompossiEt tamen sed convertit eum in tempore bilitatem actuum , seguenti imperceptibili. 74iudicandi] inB. videndi 75HereMarchiapostulates butnotjudged; can be apprehended, thatcontradictions existandwork. he accepts thisbecausearguments perabsurdum perhaps 76Cf.Aristotle, OntheSoul , III, ch. 1-2. 77Cf.Aristotle, Ethics Mcomachean , VI, ch.2 (1139a21-22).AL XXVI-3,254. 78eum]earnB. 79iudicandi] B. indicandi

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nisiquando habetactumvolendi,conquando dicisquod non convertit sedpotest nontantum in instanti, habere actum volendi cedo quod voluntas potest ; et sic continuandoactum volendiper tempus per tempus ipsumcontinuare sed in temporesequenti,avertere80 aliquodpotestnon in primoinstanti, et a primo/83va/iudicio;et ita non a primaconsideratione intellectum habeat in eodem instantiiudicia oppositaut sequiturquod intellectus dicebas.81 Here we see Marchia maintainnot only the distinctionbetween appre- that hensive and judicative knowledge,but also- most interestingly This vs. non-praevalens. betweentwo kindsof reflective judgment,superans and it seems necessaryto Marchia to overcomecontradiction, distinction further entailsthe temporalnatureof the volition(propter incompossibilitatem Indeed, Francis speaks of a "continuation"(continuatio per tempus) actuurri). of the act of the will. Withoutsuch a diachronicconceptionof the act of the will, the just-mentioneddistinctionwould reduce itselfto a bare betweentwo different judgmentsof theverysame chronologicaldistinction kind or, in otherwords,between two different "imperceptible"steps of does not exclude this Marchia's text the same reflective judgment (and at This less is, least,my interpretation original,reading). possible,though etpraevalens et : quoddam intellectus of the sentence:duplexestiudicium superans to two kindsofjudgment.I am nevertheless aliudnonpraevalens , as referring consciousthatMarchia's effortto thinkof the act of the will in termsof an "historicalaction" havingits own durationremainsambiguous.82 3 ' 9. Distinctions of theSelf Without presentingany conclusive statementsabout Marchia's own aspect of those areas of his approach,I would like to stressa noteworthy thoughtexaminedhere. The textswe have consideredconfirma tendency to the earlyfourteenth in Westernthoughtof the twelfth centuryto repas an articulatedand "disembodied" resentthe human mind increasingly Crucialto thistendency systemofinternalacts and sub-divideddispositions. of the acts belongingto any one faculty,withthe was the multiplication resultingpossibilityof a "struggle"among these acts, each against the other. 80avertere] evertere B. 81B 83ra-va italics mine. (cf.C 161ra-b); 82Marchia, doesfirmly statethatthewillcanactin an instant. forinstance,

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An examplemay makemylaststatement clearer:thediscussion, throughout the thirteenthcentury,touching on the strugglebetween Christ's human wills,forexample Christ'swillingnessand unwillingness to die. In this particularscholasticdebate, we see the emergenceof the notion of vellátas. This "velleity"can be a volitionthe objectofwhichis unattainable, so that it is also called voluntas .83In the particularexample impossibilium underdiscussionhere,thisallowsan explanationforthe oppositionbetween Christ'swill to die (in orderto accomplishthe plan of Redemption)and his "velleity"to refusedeath,withoutattributing any "weakness"toJesus's will.Maintainingthathuman beingshave the abilityto "chose" something thatcannotbe attainednot onlyrequiresrejectingAristotelian orthodoxy, but requiresa new articulationof the Self as well. In the textsabove, Francis of Marchia does not use the expression velleitas , nor does he deal with unattainablegoals; yet his modalisedand discreteapproach to the will in relationto the other faculties(viz. the the backgroundpresenceof thisnew aspect of intellect)indicatesstrongly medieval thought,an aspect that was being developed already by both Aquinas and Scotus.84 Such a notion of the will and its acts yieldsa concept of weaknessof the will radicallydifferent fromthatfoundin Aristotle's Ethics Nicomachean , book 7. Aristotle's abasia is made possibleby a certainmind-bodyarrangement,whereinthe facultyof reason cannotcope withthe disorderemerging fromthe senses and sensitiveappetite,that is to say, the lower part of the soul. This happens in particularwhen the emotionsovercomethe governanceof reason in such a way thata man acts againsthis own best rationaljudgment.For Aristotle,it would be impossiblefor thereto be with each other, multipleacts of the highestpart of the soul conflicting because each level of the soul can have onlyone act. Conflictsare mapped levels of the soul.85The medieval only Vertically'between the different discussionof incontinence(incontinentia :) representsmore or less the same sort of problem: a type of mind-bodyverticalintegrationproblem.But 83I cannotdevelop thepointhere,butI survey it extensively in Robiglio (cit.n. 2 Forfurther seeA.A.Robiglio, It Hasa Thomistic above),ch. 1 andpassim. developments, Locke ontheConcept RingtoIt:John ofVelleity (inpreparation). 84Gf.Cervellon (citn. 44 above),446-47. 85On thesingularity ofcognitive andappetitive of acts,seeaboven. 28. Theamount literature thistopicis impressive. Letmemention at leastthefollowing studies: studying Natali(cit.n. 25 above);M. Woods, Aristotle on'Akrasia sull'etica ' in:A. Alberti (ed.),Studi diAristotele inthe'Republic': DoesPlatochange , Naples1990,227-61;G.R. Carone,Akrasia3

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is not the only obstacleto "the strength formedievalthinkersincontinentia of the will": thereis anothermedieval discussioninvolvingthe weakness of the will that did not occur in antiquity,and this discussionis tighdy linkedwiththe medievalcoinage of the term'Velleity'.In thiscase, there can arise a conflictin the soul betweendifferent acts of the same faculty or level of the soul. This is because the conflicthere is not a mind-body problem,but instead could be characterised,at least at firstblush (and somewhatanachronistically), as a mindselfproblem. The pictureI am drawingof a mind-selftensionmay also help us to appreciate better the argumentativestrategiesadopted by Francis of Marchia. Francis,by means of the distinctionbetweentwo different acts of reflective both of which are at the of the will, judgment, disposal to explaintheinterplay of multiple(and even opposing)"rational" attempted volitions,away fromany influenceof passion,which,thoughnot rejected, is relegatedto anotherprecinctentirely.86 At the same time,in Marchia's we can see how a "voluntaristic" account of human action, approach, when it does not confineitselfto illusoryrhetoricalclaims but attempts to offerconvincingarguments, the "rationality" proceedswithoutdismissing of acts. Francislooked forthe possibility of independentvolitionsby revising the structureof both the intellectand the will. The intellect,in the way that it is specificallyused, and apart fromnarrow applicationsto particular"regions" of reality,appears to be dependentupon the will, such that the formeris a kind of will-that-argues. Accordingto Francis of Marchia, the formulaforthe strengthof the will mightbe as follows: dividatur ut imperei. Freiburgim Breisgau Universität Albert-LudwigsSeminar Philosophisches hisMind?, in Ancient In contemporary in:Oxford Studies 20 (2001),107-48. Philosophy, ofthewill,on theonehand,andtheso-called debatetheweakness mind-body problem, ontheother, aretwodistinct In contrast, theMiddleAges, philosophical problems. during wereinextricable, as theywerealsoinAntiquity; cf.G.R.Carone, MindandBody in they LatePlato furGeschichte derPhilosophie, 87 (2005),227-69. , in:Archiv 86Marchiadoesnotexcludetheroleplayedby emotions in theeconomy ofmoral he endeavors nevertheless todrawa picture ofthestructure ofthemindablealso action; , toactindependently ofpassions. Seen. 47 above:"Primum apartfrom passions, peccatum In thesamesense, non thecaseofChrist's willis helpful as a philosophical fuitexpassione". model: for thetension between volitions cannot viatheprevabe explained Jesus, opposing lenceofloweremotional forces.

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FrancisofMarchiaand Williamof Ockham: Fragments froma Dialogue* ROBERTO LAMBERTINI

Abstract It is well knownthat Francisof Marchia and Williamof Ockhamjoined MichaelofCesena'srebellion againstthepope,together escapingfromAvignon and signingdocumentssupporting Cesena's defenceof Franciscanpoverty. The relationship betweenthe worksof the two thinkers, on the otherhand, is the subjectof ongoinginvestigation. AfterdiscussingFrancis'rejectionin his Commentary on theSentencesof Ockham'stheoryofquantity, thispaper showshow Francis'Improbatio became a sourceforOckham'sOpusNonaginta Dierum. criticaleditionofthelatterwork, Buildingon Offler's ground-breaking it is argued that Ockham made extensiveuse of Francis'Improbatio , even the arguments of thoughon severalpointshe feltit necessaryto reformulate his confrère or even to substantially modifyhis positions.The two Franciscan differed commitments and theologians deeplybothin theirbasicphilosophical in theirmethodological attitude.These differences emergedeven when they were- so to speak- fighting on the same front. Some decades ago, in her ground-breakingstudy of the receptionof William of Ockham's thought,Anneliese Maier devoted an interesting sectionto Francisof Marchia. She pointedout that Francis,in his treatment of the Eucharist,was probablythe firstauthor to take Ockham's innovativeinterpretation of quantityinto consideration;Francisdiscusses at lengthand eventuallyrejectsOckham's theoryof quantity,whichplays an importantrole in the latter'sinterpretation of the Eucharist.1In 1963 * Thisarticle wasmadepossible ofmanypeople, bythekindness, helpandpatience in particular ChrisSchabelandRussFriedman. I alsowishto thank CarloDolciniand fortheir I havealready Andrea Tabarroni constant someofthe encouragement. presented contents ofthepresent contribution in Italianin Nonnumquam dwersorum impugnantium personas Francesco d'Ascoli come delpensiero di Ockham Politico , in:Pensiero assumpsi: fonte politico 1 (2003),97-140, butin a rather different context. Medievale, 1 A. Maier, derspätscholastischen , Rome1955,199-209; Hintergründe Metaphysische Philosophie cf.also eadem,Zu einigen Problemen derOckhamforschung, Mittelalter , in: eadem,Ausgehendes , © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2006 - www.brill.nl/viv Alsoavailable online

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Hilary S. Offlerwas able to enrichthe apparatus of his criticaledition of Ockham's OpusNonaginta Dierumwith referencesto Francis' Improbatio the then stilluneditedand almost to bull Quia virreprobus),2 (a reply papal unknown.In this way Maier and Offlerrevealed traces of a dialogue betweentwo Franciscantheologianswho also shared an importantpolitical decision,the adhesion to Michael of Cesena's rebellionagainstPope John XXII. The presentpaper presentssome furtherevidence concernfocusing ing this "dialogue," althoughthe pictureremainsfragmentary, in particularon its second phase, thatis on the relationshipbetweenthe Dierum.The stressof this articlewill be and the OpusNonaginta Improbatio on doctrinal but also on parallelpassages that not similarities, only placed show how Ockham used the work of his fellowrefugee. De corpore Christi Since Maier's and Offler'spivotalstudies,manycontributions have enriched our pictureof the discussionbetweenFrancisand Ockham.JürgenMiethke and Gedeon Gài showed thatMaier's importantdiscoverysolved onlyin part the difficult problems of chronologyconnected to Ockham's and Francis' commentarieson the Sentences .3 In particular,theydiscardedthe thatin Maier's opinionwould have explained complexclusterof hypotheses the supposed cross-references between the two commentaries.The only that now seems beyond doubt is that Francis,in writinghis comthing was aware of Ockham's work,and not vice-versa.More recently, mentary, Paul Bakkerwas able to situatethe dissensionbetweenthe two Minorite

in:Archivům Franciscanum Historicum vol.1, Rome1964,188-91, originally published 46 (1953),161-94. 2 Cf.Guillelmus de Ockham, Dierum deOckham Politica , in Guillelmi , Opus Nonaginta Opera xviii:". . . another Manchester II, eds.J.G.SikesandH.S. Offler, 1963,"Introduction," a full-scale in Michaelist Francis ofAscoli, attack on Quiavirwhich theologian, composed ofthetextmaywellhaveprovided Ockham withtheimmediate itssystematic criticism in abundance." In thefolforOND, as it clearly didwithideasandauthorities pattern I willrefer to thisedition as Opus Dierum. Nonaginta lowing, simply 3J. Miethke, Ockhams , Berlin1969,23-29;G. Gài,Praefatio , in: WegzurSozialphilosophie Guillelmi de Ockham in librum Sententiarum eds.R. Wood, Quaestiones quartum (Reportatio), NY 1984,16*G. Gài,andR. Green, St.Bonaventure, Gnade undEucharistie 17*;E. Iserloh, inder desWilhelm vonOckham. Ihre der , Theologie Bedeutung ßirdieUrsachen Reformation philosophischen Wiesbaden andthe London Studium: Ockham, Chatton, 1956,24-26.See alsoW.J.Courtenay, Observations onRecent inOckham's Ockhams , in:DieGegenwart , eds.W.Vossenkuhl Changes Biography andR. Schönberger, Weinheim 1990,327-37.

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theologians in the wider context of competing interpretationsof the Eucharist.Specifically, Bakkershowed thatFrancisof Marchia supported a slightlymodifiedversionof Scotus' theoryconcerningthe inherenceof accidents.4In thiscontext,althoughfar frombeing a faithful followerof of quantity,which is Scotus,5Francis rejected Ockham's interpretation hardly compatible with the basic assumptionsof Scotus' metaphysics. Current investigationsof the various survivingversions of Francis of Marchia's commentaryon Book IV of the Sentences may shed more light on the precisemomentthat Francislearned of the new positionheld by his Englishconfrère at Oxford.6Perhaps in the futurewe will be able to establishwhetherFrancis came across Ockham's opinion while delivering his Parisian lecturesof 1319-20, or whetherthis happened later on, while he was revisinghis lectures into a Scriptum ? In the latter case, Francis' criticismwould be even closer chronologicallyto the year in - which was also relatedto which Ockham was summonedto Avignon, his theoriesconcerningthe Eucharist.8

4 P.JJ.M. La raison etk miracle. Lesdoctrines Bakker, (c.1250-c. eucharistiques 1400).Contribution à l'étude desrapports entre etthéologie 389, vol.1,Nijmegen 1999,especially 122-32, philosophie in thisvolume. Amerini's article andtheIntroduction 408;cf.alsoFabrizio 5 Cf.R.L. Friedman, Francis andJohn DunsScotus onthePsychological Model ofMarchia of theTrinity, in:Picenum 18 (1999),11-56. seraphicum, 6 Gf.R.L. Friedman and G. Schabel,Francis ontheSentences: ofMarchia's Commentary ListandState 63 (2001),31-106.The problems , in:Mediaeval Studies, Question ofResearch from thecomplex tradition ofFrancis' havenotyetbeensolved; stemming commentary theinteresting contribution edipotesi sulCommento alleSentenze di Certezze byN. Mariani, Francesco MarcaOMin., in:Archivům della Franciscanum 95 (2002),93-183, is Historicum, farfrom I ofFrancesco cf.C. Schabel, TheRedactions compelling; ofBook d'Appignano's Commentary ontheSentences, in: D. Prioriand M. Balena(eds.),AttidelII Convegno su Intemazionale Francesco del Tronto2004,97-122;R.L. Friedman, and , Appignano d'Appignano Principia inFrancesco Sentences TheQuestion utrum enssimcQuaeritur Prologue d'Appignano's Commentary: essesubiectum alicuius 123-49. scientiae' ibidem, pliciter simplex possit 7 Forexample, Maierwaspersuaded thatFrancis refers to Ockham's Tractatus decorthiswouldmeanthatFrancis musthave ; giventhechronology poreChristi accepted today, written thisquaestio after thisdateis,infact, theconclusion ofC. Grassi, 1323-4; Introduction in Guillelmi deOckham Tractatus etTractatus deQmntitate deCorpore Christi Theo , X), (Opera logica St. Bonaventure, NY 1986,23*-28*. The problem is thatFrancis' to passagereferring Ockham a freerendering. is nota literal butrather quotation, 8 ForOckham's inAvignon, trial cf.J.Koch,Neue Aktenstücke Wilhelm Ockham zudem Gegen inAvignon de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 7 (1935), Prozess , in: Recherches geführten and8 (1936),79-93.nowin:id.Kleine See 353-80, , vol.2, Rome1973,275-365; Schriften TheAcademic andIntellectual Worlds alsoW.J.Gourtenay, , in:P.V.Spade(ed.),The ofOckham toOckham etalibi1999,17-30. , Cambridge Cambridge Companion

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toMunich FromAvignon At any rate, it seems highlyplausible that Ockham and Francis were both in Avignonby 1324, the formerbecause of the investigationinto his doctrines,the lattermost probablyon account of the task of teach.9 Nevertheless,we have no ing theologyat the local Franciscan Studium evidenceof contactsbetweenthe two theologiansuntilthe dramaticchange in theirlivesthatresultedfromMichael of Cesena's rebellionagainstJohn XXII. As is well known,the Englishfriar,who was on trialin Avignon, and the Italian masterof theology,who most probablyowed at least his titleto Michael of Cesena,10fled fromAvignontogetherand temporarily found safe haven in the Ghibellinecity of Pisa. From this time on theirnames appear togetherin severalcollectivedocumentssignedin support of Michael's denunciationofJohn XXII as a heretic.In the firstof these documents,which Knysh considers althoughwith no compelling - a backdated the rebel friarsto justifytheir made by forgery arguments The and Ockham Francis action expostfacto , appear only as witnesses.11 of both the from Pisa, however,carry theologians signatures Appellations as supportersof Michael's appeal.12Ockham and Francis also appear as 9 See footnote inAvignon. For Francis' 11fora pieceofevidence concerning position in Avignon, cf. of hisactivity dateforthebeginning 1324as a commonly accepted Italiani della Marca P. Vian,Francesco , vol.49,Rome1997,esp. , in:Dizionario degli Biografico theissuedeserves 794.Nevertheless, deeperinvestigation. 10According A History Education ofB. Roest, to theinvestigations (c. 1210ofFranciscan thechoice Michael's thatduring 2000,102,weknow generalate 1517),Leiden-Boston-Köln to themagisterium callthe"degree forwhatspecialists ofthecandidate , course," leading rested withtheminister general. 11EditedinNicolaus Chronica. Documentation onPope Minorita: XXII,Michael ofCesena John A Source Book inEnglish. with Summaries andthePoverty , eds.G. Gài andD. Flood, ofChrist coram at 189:"Acta,gestaetfactafuerunt NY 1996,182-89, St.Bonaventure, praedicta Francisco de Esculo,in sacratheoOrdinis fratribus ethonestis Minorum, viris, religiosis Guillelmo Minorum deAvenione, Fratrum etlectore tuncinconventu Ocham, logiadoctore as Chronica. I willrefer to thisedition ..." Henceforth in sacrapaginamagistro simply Period Ockham' s Avignon G. Knysh, Studies, , in:Franciscan concerning rectifications Biographical oder ineine Ockhams 46 (1986),82-85,and,against Engfiihrung Perspektiven Knysh, J.Miethke, dneneuere Publikation EinePolemik zuOckhams , in:Mittellateinisches Biographie falsche Richtung? gegen Ockham to G. Knysh, Miethke's article is a reaction 29 (1994),77-78.Actually, Jahrbuch, to find;Prof.Knyshhimself 1994,a bookwhichis difficult , Winnipeg very Perspectives I do notsharemany senta copyofthebookto me,andI amgrateful, although kindly seines undWortführer von Cf.E.L. Wittneben, ofhisviews. Franziskanerjurist Bergamo. Bonagratia mitPapstJohannes Ordens imStreit XXII,Leiden-Boston 2003,pp. 282-83. 12Cf.Appellatio et Chronica informa maiori , 423: "Cui appellationi , NicolausMinorita, virifrater Franciscus incontinenti adhaeserunt eteamapprobaverunt religiosi provocationi in sacra de Anglia, in sacrapagina, etGuillelmus de Ockham de Esculo, doctor magister

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co-authorsof the Allegationes virorum ,13These textsof varying religiosorum which most were the result of a team effortled by length, probably da do not allow us to establish,let alone evaluate, Bonagratia Bergamo, the contributionsof the individualco-authors.They merelyinformus that Francis and Ockham agreed on the basic tenetsof Michael's position,which theythemselveswere endeavoringto corroboratewith their arguments. The situationchanges after16 November 1329, the date of publication of the papal bull Quia virreprobus , which claimed to refuteMichael's in a definitive Now the group,which in the meantime arguments way.14 was settlingin Munich, not only reactswith a collectiveworkknownas ,15but also producessome worksthathave onlyone author. Appellatio magna There are severalclues suggesting thatFrancisof Marchia,in his Improbatio , vir have been the first to write even before the Quia , reprobus may against Munich Appeal was made public on 26 March 1330. In particular,the existingparallelpassages in the two treatises,and even more in the rough draftof the Appellatio magnapreservedin Vat. lat. 4009, stronglysuggest that it was Bonagratia who reworkedsome passages fromFrancis into the Appellatio , and not the reverse.Indeed, takinginto consideramagna tion the interpretation of a dialogue between Pontius Pilate and Jesus concerningthe natureof the latter'skingship,it is possible to see a sort is in theAppellatio informa minori 455.It is worth , ibidem, pagina. . thesamewording thattheChronica in sacrapagina";manyscholars callsOckham"magister noting (e.g. Ockhams TheAcademic Miethke, Weg (cit.n. 3 above),29-34,butalsoCourtenay, (cit.n. 8 believe thecontrary The author oftheChronica above),25,seemsto agreewithMiethke) couldhavebeeninaccurate in hiseffort to stress theacademic ofthefriars who prestige rebelled woulddeserve a deeperinvestigation however, JohnXXII; theproblem, against which wouldnotbe appropriate in thiscontribution. It mustbe addedthatthesesubscriptions arenotavailable intheentire tramanuscript thecriteria Gài andFloodin thisedition, dition. followed seeJ. Miethke, by Concerning (Chronik ' von Dererste Druck dersogennanten desNicolaus Minorita vollständige ( 1330/1338). * 3 Präsentation eines Farbbuches des 14. in: Deutsches 54 zur Archiv, Bemerkungen Jahrhunderts^ (1998),623-42. 13Cf.Allegationes virorum Chronica , in Nicolaus Minorita, , 524: "Allegationes religiosorum de Thalheim, fratrum Henrici Francisci de Apponiano virorum, religiosorum [theedition has 'Appomano'], dictide Esculo,Guillelmi in sacrapaginamagde Ockham wrongly istrorum ..." 14Quiavirreprobus Chronica , in Nicolaus Minorita, , 553-613;thispapalbullhas been editedseveral notonlyin Bullarium Franciscanum V byC. Eubel,butalsotogether times, withOckham's Dierum andFrancis' Fordiffering none reasons, OpusNonaginta Improbatio. oftheseeditions canbe considered "criticad." 15Edition in Nicolaus Chronica Henceforth Minorita, , 624-866. "Appellatio magna."

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of evolution from Francis' Improbatio , which describes the episode in termsof a university to the Munich Appeal, which adopts the , disputatio of a instead. The rough draftseems to represetting legal interrogation sent a middle stage in this evolution,since in many passages it changes Francis' disputatio into the processualone.16 terminology If thisis true,then Francismusthave workedat a veryquick pace to have at least part of his work incorporatedin the Munich Appeal.17At to Francis' any rate,inJanuaryof 1331 Michael of Cesena refersexplicitly as an alreadyavailablerefutation ofJohnXXII's Quiavirreprobus , Improbatio - but the tradition transmits an unfinished although manuscript actually - work.18 almostcomplete It is beyond any doubt,however,that Ockham wrotehis OpusNonaginta DierumafterFrancisand afterthe Munich Appeal. As Offlershowed many years ago, the Venerabilis uses both treaInceptor tisesas sourcesforhis own refutation of the papal bull Quia virreprobus.19 The relationshipis thereforepracticallyreversedwith respectto the : thereFrancis, previousone betweentheircommentarieson the Sentences informedof the innovativetheoryof his Englishconfrère , rejectsit as untenable. In Munich, it is Ockham who is acquainted with the work of his fellowrefugeeand uses it for his own treatise.In the lattercase, howon different ever,theyare not fighting sides,but supportthe same position: the defenceof the Franciscantheoryof povertyagainstJohn XXII.

16I arguedin favorof thisthesis, forward evidence in support, in Francesco putting d'Ascoli e la polemica contro Giovanni XXII:a proposito deirapporto tral"Improbatio' e francescana monacensis O. Gori,G. Pesiri, A. PiazzaandR. Rinaldi ' in:A. Degrandi, l"Appellatio magna Studi inonore di Girolamo Arnaldi dallaScuola di nazionale (eds.),Introd. byO. Capitani, offerti studi medioevalL Rome2001,277-308. 17Cf.Lambertini, Francesco dAscoli e lapolemica (cit.n. 16 above),300-5. (Quiavir 18Francisci de EsculoOFM Improbatio contra libellum domini Iohannis quiincipit of ' ed. N. MarianiOFM, Grottaferrata reprobus (Rome)1993;thisis thefirst product Mariani's to makeFrancis' works available to a widerpublic;see praiseworthy attempt alsoFrancisci de Marchia sivede EsculoQuodlibet cumquaestionibus selectis excommentario in librum Sententiarum Grottaferrata etcompilatio , ed. N. Mariani, (Rome)1997;Sententia super libros ed. N. Mariani, Grottaferrata inIV Aristotelis, Physicorum (Rome)1998;Commentarius libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. etprologus, ed.N. Mariani, Grottaferrata Quaestiones preambulae Mariani's see thereview article Notes editions, (Rome)2003.Concerning byC. Schabel, ona Recent Edition s In Primům Librum Sententiarum , in:Picenum ofParts ofFrancis ofMarchia' 19 (2000),277-82, andAtti delII Convegno suFrancesco Internazionale seraphicum, ďAppignano 97-147.Mostrecently Mariani twosermons attrib(cit.n. 6 above),especially published utedto Francis: DueSermoni attribuiti a Francesco dellaMarca Franciscanum , in: Archivům 98 (2005),571-95. Historicum, 19Offler, Introduction de OckhamOpus Dierum , in:Guillelmi , xvii-xviii. Nonaginta

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As I will show, Ockham drawsinspirationfromFrancis'Improbatio , but in to of a As is well known students his rationes new Ockham, way. shapes his OpusNonaginta Dierumattemptsto give a sort of impartialaccount of the discussion,presentingthe opposingargumentsofJohn XXII and his as if Ockham himselfwere not involvedin the debate.John impugnatores Kilcullen speaks of "recitativeworks,"recallingthat, at the same time, Offlerhad alreadyunderOckham is himselfone of these "attackers."20 arises from the linedthe ambiguity that Inceptor.21 approachof the Venerabilis is concerned,Ockham does not confinehimAs faras Francis'Improbatio selfto describingFrancis'rationes , but oftenreshapesthem,in an attempt as it seems to improvethem. Ockham is well aware of the fact that, while concurringin condemningJohn XXII's position,the impugnatores sometimesdisagreeon the reason whyJohn is wrong. Consequentlyhe claims to have exposed on occasion the positionsof different , impugnatores who tryto refutethe pope in divergingways.22Given this kind of disDierumappears even more layclaimer,the structureof OpusNonaginta ered, as Ockham not only presentsthe discussionas if he were not one of the impugnatores , but also reportsthe disagreementsamong them.This he notwithstanding, formulatesanew many arguments,and in so doing he also revealshis own position.23 This second "fragment" of the "dialogue"betweenFrancisand Ockham is thereforeeven more complex than the first,since is not a clear-cut oppositionof two competingaccounts of a fundamentalaspect of the thatare supposed of arguments Eucharistiemiracle,but rathera refinement focuson some to servethe same purpose.In the followingI will therefore some of Francis' which cases in whichOckham further positions, develops will go on to play an importantrole in Ockham's politicalthought. Dominium and dominia In his Ockhams , Miethkerightlystressedthe semWegzur Sozialphilosophie Dierumin which inal importanceof the passages fromthe OpusNonaginta of the criticizes Ockham originsof ownership Pope John's interpretation 20T. Kilcullen, toOckham in: TheCambridge ThePolitical Writings, Companion (cit.n. 8 above),302-25. 21Offler, Introduction (cit.n. 19 above),xv. 22Opus Dierum , c. 124,857. Nonaginta 23Cf.myNonnumquam note diversorum assumpsi (cit.in theasterisk personas impugnantium above).

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, in fact,outlinedhis own among human beings.24The Venerabilis Inceptor of the of and theory origins society power startingfromhis critiqueof views. tenets of Ockham's John's Many position,which not by chance he presentsas the positionof the impugnatores (thatis, those who accuse The disJohn XXII of heresy),in fact derive fromFrancis' Improbatio. cussionconcerningthe natureof the originalrelationshipof mankindto thingsoffersa tellingexample. The firsttextsproduced by the group aroundMichael describedthisrelationship in termsof absence of dominium. In implementing Bonaventure'sdistinction betweenususfactiand dominium , in between the which human state, theydistinguished beings prelapsiarian was intromerelyused things,and the postlapsarianone, where dominium duced as a consequenceof sin.25 JohnXXII reactedto thisaccount:referring to the passages in Genesis where God says: "Dominamini piscibus maris,"John thereforeconcluded that dominium already existed before the Fall. The only difference that was broughtabout by Original Sininto different accordingto John was the divisionof a common dominium dominial Francis of Marchia had to take this objection into account. is the first"Michaelist" text that speaks of two Indeed, the Improbatio dominia.21 While denouncingthe papal positionas heretical,Francisimpliceven in the prelapsarian idy admitsthat it is rightto speak of dominium state. He observes,however,that there are two kinds of dominia , which differradicallyfromeach other.28The firstkind of dominium markedthe 24Miethke, Ockham's Weg(cit.n. 3 above),467-77. 25See e.g.Appellatio informa maiori in 1328,editedin NicolausMinorita, , published Chronica essetpeccatum noneratappropriatio rerum , 239-40:"Et quodsicutantequam sedfuisset habitus ususrerum usuconsumptibilium et nonconintroducta, temporalium tibilium sicfuitin apostolis et apostolicis forcomviris"; sump absquealiquaproprietate, see.B. Töpfer, und indermittelalterlichen undStaatstheorie Urzustand , mentary Sündenfall Geselbchqfis- Apostolisches Paradiesischer 1999,esp. 431-68;J. Miethke, ^justand Stuttgart Zeitalter undGesellschaftstheorie im14.Jahrhundert, Armut. Franziskanische Selbstverständnis, ^eitkritik Religiöses in: F.J.Feiten, N. Jaspert, andS. Haarländer imMittelalter. (eds.),VitaReligiosa Festschrift Elmzum70. Geburtstag, TheState , Berlin1999,505-32;cf.alsoG.L. Potestà, furKaspar of Innocence andPrivate inthePolemic onEvangelical attheBeginning Property Poverty oftheFourteenth Paradise. TheGarden , in:F.R. PsakiandC. Hindley Century (eds.),TheEarthly ofEden from toModernity , Binghamton, NY, 2002,149-63. Antiquity 26Cf.Töpfer, undSündenfall Urzustand (cit.n. 25 above),433-36. 27Cf.myLapovertà storica della dell'identità minoritica daBonaventura Evoluzione pensata: definizione ad Ockham , Modena2000,205-18. 28Improbatio dominium introductum siueproprium , 153:"Consimiliter 'periniquitatem,' siuecommune, estalterius a dominio communi naturali omnium si generis quodfuisset homononpeccasset, et distat ab eo plusquamacetuma uino,quia se habetad illud sicutcorruptibile ad incorruptibile, et diuisibile ad indiuisibile."

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prelapsarianstatein which human beings not only shared thingsin use, but were so deeplytied to one anotherby brotherly love that even their in could be and the shared, everyonerejoiced feelings happinessof the others.Francissummarizeshis positionverywell in the followingpassage: . . . quilibet de comodoalterius sicutde suo,et solacium uniusredundasgaudebat setin singulos: et itagaudium reifuisset cuiuslibet commune omnibus perparticimutueconsolationis, iuxtaillud:"Eccequambonumet quamiocundum pationem in unum."(. . .) Et ita,si homononpeccasset, abitare fratres omniacomfuissent muniatripliciter, utendi etquoadcomscilicet, quoaddominium, quoadpotestatem munesolacium rerum. Et postpeccatum, factaestdivisio: peroppositum, tripliciter iurisutendi etquoadapprodominii, quoadappropriationem quoadappropriationem solatìi etgaudii, maleaifectati nolunt alteri communicare.29 priationem quodhomines In his OpusNonaginta DierumOckham begins his descriptionof the position of the impugnatores withthe distinction betweentwo kindsof dominium. As Miethke remarkedin 1969, Ockham prefersthe expression"alterius rationis"to the "alteriusgeneris"that Francis uses.30This could also be a distantecho of the divergentphilosophicalattitudesof the two theologians;31more relevantdifferences emerge,however,in what follows.First of all, Ockham focuseshis attentionnot on the bonds among human beings, as Francis does, but on the relationshipbetween mankindand nature.Accordingto Ockham,in theprelapsarianstateanimalsand plants obeyed human beings spontaneously,and in this sense the human comthat ceased to exist afterthe munitythen exerted a kind of dominium Fall.32On thisbasis, Ockham can describethe transitionfrominnocence 29Improbatio , 155. 30Miethke, Ockhams Dierum , c. 28,492-93: (cit.n. 3 above),470;cf.Opus Weg Nonaginta "Seddicunt istiimpugnatores Nonenimappelquodhie,sicutin aliis,cavillose procedit. lansnegatin omnisensuprimos in statuinnocentiae dominium parentes temporalium sed negatipsoshabuisse . . . Dominium habuisse; dominium, quodvocatur 'proprietas' in statuinnocentiae, esttotaliter alterius rationis autem, quodhabueřunt primi parentes ab istodominio." ForMarchia's alterius the , seen. 28 above.Surprisingly generis enough, recent G. Geltner, EdenRegained: William andtheFranciscan Return toTerrestrial ofOckham Paradise 59 (2001),63-89,is silent aboutthissourceforOckham , in:Franciscan Studies, andinaccurate in manyrespects. 31Ockham's for"ratio"instead of"genus" couldperhaps be linked to the preference different andsemantical andOckham's Francis' theoontological presuppositions underlying closerscrutiny. logies;thewholeissue,however, requires 32Opus Dierum dicunt , c. 14,432:"Adcuiusevidentiam Nonaginta [seil, impugnatores ] esse sciendum omnium datumprimis fuitpotestas quoddominium temporalium parentibus rationabiliter etgubernandi resistentia itaquod violenta, regendi temporalia absqueeorum homini violentiam velnocumentum inferre nonpoterant." Cf.A. Brett, and Right Liberty, inLater Individual Scholastic etalibi1996,66-68,whoanaNature. , Cambridge Rights Thought deserve further examination. however, lyzesthispoint;herconclusions,

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to thefallenstatein a morenuancedway thanFrancisdid in theImprobatio. Not just two, but three distinctstages should be considered:beforethe Fall mankindalreadyenjoyedan almostunlimiteddominium over creation. in order to obviate the difficulties of the new Immediatelyafterwards, state, God gave human beings the power to distributethingsand to appropriatethem.Remarkingthatone could call thispower "dominium" as well, even thoughit would be an improperuse of the term,Ockham seems not only to criticizeJohn XXII, but also implicitlyto correct Francis. Ockham's thirdstage, which correspondsto the presentsituationin the fallenstate,can be describedin termsof a pluralityof dominiaP To sum up, Ockham is well aware of Francis'responsetoJohn'sobjection regardingthe originaldominium ; while sharingthe basic tenetof his of theprelapsarianstateis radicallydifferent position i.e. thatthe dominium fromthe one thatcharacterizesthe fallenstate- he modifiesit in several ways.In particular,Ockham's stresson the factthatbeforethe Fall nature was at the unconditionaldisposal of mankindavoids the risksof what i.e. the view that the prelapsarianstate can Tierneycalls "primitivism": be completelyrestoredafterthe Fall.34This view could be inferredfrom the writingsof previous "Michaelist" authors,35and had already been 33Opus Dierum scilicet antepeccatum, , c. 14,439:"Etitafuittriplex Nonaginta tempus: inquotempore habuerunt Secundum dominium, qualenumquam aliquihabuerunt postea. fuitpostpeccatum et antererum etin iliotempore habuerunt divisionem; tempus potestatem etappropriandi dividendi sibires,etsi talispotestas vocetur condominium, potest cediquodhabuerunt dominium commune rerum. Tertium fuitpostdivisionem tempus ettuncinceperunt dominia rerum, propria, qualianuncsuntmundanorum." 34B. Tierney, TheIdeaofNatural Studies onNatural , Natural Law,andChurch Rights. Rights critical remarks on Tierney's interLaw,1150-1625 , Atlanta 1997,162.Forinteresting seeWittneben, vonBergamo dispretation, Bonagratia (cit.n. 11 above),298-9.Fora recent ofOckham's cussion see C.J.Fernandez, Ockham's , in: Pensiero theory, Theory ofProperty Politico 2 (2004),147-59. Medievale, 35Thisiswhatonereads, inNicolaus forexample, in:Appellatio informa maiori, Minorita, etsanctus Clemens unacumeisetomnibus 239:". . . apostoli Chronica, eorumque discipuli, volentibus vitam etservaverunt ad hocstatum imitari, apostolicam assumpserunt quantum scilicet introductum essetquodaliquis qui fuitantepeccatum, antequam periniquitatem hocmeumproprium diceret ethoctuum. fuitstatus innocentiae sivelegisnatQui status urae. . L. Öliger, Fr.Bonagratia deBergamo eteiusTractatus deChristi etApostolorum paupertate Franciscanum "Hoc 22 (1929), , in:Archivům Historicum, 487-511; 292-335, esp.496-97: etiamprobatur Namfilius ex ratione. Dei ad hocnaturam humanam utgenus assumpsit, humanum a statuinnocentie Setnonperfecte et exciderat, quodperpeccatum repararet. convenienter nisiassumpsisset naturam Unde innocentem, reparasset ergotalemassumpsit. Iohannem ecceAgnus Dei:Si agnus, Setsiassumpsit natuAugustinus super ergoinnocens. raminnocentem, earnsecundum omnem anime,quamhabuisset assumpsit perfectionem Setinstatuinnocentie fuissent homines sinedominiis distinctis, aliquisinstatuinnocentie.

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rejected by critics of the Franciscan position, such as Durand of St Pourçain.36Ockham, in fact,neveradmitsthatwe can returnto the state thatobtainedbeforethe Fall. Even the Apostoliccommunity, whichrepresentsthe highestlevel of perfectionattainablein this life,had to live in a world where the originalharmonywas irrevocablylost. Per iniquitatem Among the cánonesof the Decretum regardingthe nature and origin of the known as Dilectissimis attrib, takenfroma forgery ownership, passage uted to Pope ClementI, is surelyone of the mostinfluential. In thispassage one reads that "per iniquitatemalius dixit hoc esse suum et alius istud. . ."37There had alreadybeen a livelydiscussionamong the canonistsconcerningthe exact meaningof the expression"per iniquitatem"in thiscontext,and thisdiscussionemergedagain in theconfrontation between the pope and the Michaelists.John attackedthe interpretation Bonagratia had given to this passage in the Appellatio minor , statingthat it is wrong to say, as Bonagratia did on behalf of his MinisterGeneral, that "per iniquitatem"in thiscontextmeans that the divisionof propertydepends on human positivelaw. Instead,John maintainedthat "per iniquitatem" refersto the Original Sin, "peccatumprimorumparentum."38 Francisof sicut Vili di.,c. 1 etc.Igitur siChristus tenuit statum nonhabuit dominium innocentie, patet inspeciali distinctum velincommuni alicuius usumfacti rei,setsolumsimplicem eorum"; a litdelater, habuit inquantum Christus homoetapostoli p. 506:"Iliumstatum postquam statum deiurenature habere, perfectionis assumpserunt, quemfuit possibile quemhomines etdivino etnonquemhabuerunt cumChristus innocens habuissent, propter iniquitatem, etperfectissimus et docuerit suosvitaminnocentissimam et perfecassumpserit apostolos fuitnecexcogitari tissimam, qua perfectior numquam posset." 36Cf.Töpfer, undSündenfall Durandus' textis edited 425-29. Urzustand, (cit.n. 25 above), inJ.Miethke, Das Votum De paupertate Christi etApostolorumdky Durandus von Sancto Porciano imtheoretischen Armutsstreit. Einedominikanische Position inderDiskussion umdieFranziskanische Armut in: S. Jenks, andM.L. Laudage(eds.),Vera LexHistoriae. (1322/3), J. Sarnowsky, Studien 65. Geburtstag, Kölnzu mittelalterlichen Kurze zu seinem Quellen. Festschrift fiirDietrich Wien-Weimar in se et 1993,149-96, verisimile, esp.173:"Nonestigitur quodChristus in apostolis reduxerit mundum ad statum fuitpossibile, immoelegit innocentie, quantum afflictiones et miserias innoprose et apostolis paupertatem, corporales, que suntstatui centie omnino contraria." 37An excursus aboutthistextis in Töpfer, undSiindenfall Urzustand (cit.n. 25 above), abouttheorigin ofproperty, see esp. 174-5.Forthediscussions amongthecanonists R. Weigand, DieNaturrechtslehre derLegaten undDekreüsten vonIrnerius bisAccursius undvon Gratian bisIohannes Teutonicus , München 1967,esp.307-36. 38Quiavirreprobus Chronica , inNicolaus Minorita, , 593-94:"Exhocdicitipsequoddivisiotemporalium estfactaperiushumanum, et contra quoddicitur iniquum, aequitatem

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Marchia, who himselfdoes not entirelyavoid the use of expressionssuch as "dominiumintroductum per iniquitatem"or "introductum per peccaanswersthatthe Sin mustbe consideredthe origin,not the immetum,"39 diate cause, of the institution of the postlapsariandominium .40According to Francis,John XXII, who claims on the contrarythat Original Sin is the immediatecause of dominium , contradictshimselfin various ways.41 Here again Ockham refersto the opinion of the impugnatores ; one pasDierumwe sage is an almostliteralecho of Francis.In the OpusNonaginta read that,accordingto the impugnatores , "hie per propriaverba convinciSuccinctus had written "se ipsumconuincit." tur,"whiletheDoctor Nevertheless, the main objectionOckham directsat John is not the same as Francis5, because Ockham sees the contradictionin the fact that, on one hand, John denies the human origin of propertydivisionand, on the other, insistson its being immediatelycaused by Original Sin.42In contrast, Francis had remarkedthat the pope had spoken of Adam as the first ownerof property, beforeEve was created.43Ockham does not limithimselfto this,but expands on the subject,recallingthe two interpretations of "per iniquitatem"available in the Glossaordinaria to Gratian'sDecretum and already quoted in the Pisan Appellatio informamaiori.The Glossain factlistedthe possible interpretation of iniquitas as a customcontraryto naturalequity,or as sollicitudo. Ockham remarksthat the pope does not / iurisnaturalis. Dicimus nonintelligitur iusgenquodhocestfalsum, quiaperiniquitatem sedintelligitur fuit." This tium, peccatum primorum parentum perquodnatura corrupta inwhich is oneofthefewpassages totheAppellatio informa and maiori, JohnXXII refers known as "appellatio in forma cf.Appellatio not,as usual,to theshorter version, minori"; informa maiori Chronica , inNicolaus Minorita, , p. 239.Mariani, Improbatio, p. 372,footnote to theAppellatio informa minori he remarks thattherefer34,refers , although imprecisely encewas"adsensum." 39Improbatio , pp. 153-54. 40Improbatio uenenum suumin eo quoddicit,quod'istadiuisio , p. 156:"3°,efíundit rerum factaestperpeccatum mediate et origiprimorum parentum': quod,si intelligat uerum uelsuperbie, immediate intronaliter, est,quiapeccatum cupiditatis quoistadiuisio ductaest,descendit ex radicepeccatioriginalis, sicutceteraalia peccata;si originaliter autemintelligat immediate et directe, sicutintelligere uidetur, proutin sequentibus magis falsum esteterroneum, rerum in fuisset factaimmediate apparebit, quiatunctalisdiuisio paradiso: quodnoninuenitur." 41Improbatio , p. 373. 42Opus Dierum , c. 92,p. 669. Nonaginta 43Improbatio nonfuitaliquod , p. 373: ". . . ergoantepeccatum primorum parentum dominium nonhabuitaliquod et,perconsequens, Adam,antequam proprium peccaret, dominium cuiusoppositum temporalium proprium: ipsedicithie.Et ita se ipsumconuincit."

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in his interpretation, but suggestsa meaning, followthe Glossaordinaria of iniquitas with Original Sin, that can be true only in the identification a particularsense, that is that thepeccatum was the occasioof the parentum introductionof propertydivision.The real cause was indeed the human will.44 Followinga different strategy,Ockham comes to the same resultas Francisin thiscase: withoutsin therewould have been no propertydivicannotmean thatsin immediately sion,but the canon Dikctissimis brought propertydivisioninto existence.The substantialagreementof the two Franciscantheologianson this seeminglyabstruseexegeticalproblem is important,because it is connected to a much deeper problem,that of the role of the human will and initiativein establishingdifferent dominia. As we shall see below, this is a core questionof the dispute. Humanuni et divinum , pp. 376-377 Improbatio

Dierum , 88, p. 656 OpusNonaginta

Set quod immediateprima diuisio Secundaconclusio,quam probant,est sitintroducta,quod primumdominiumtemporadominiorum propriorum ante diluuiumet post diluuium,iure lium propriumpost lapsumfuitiure humanaaut humanoet non iurediuinonisimedi- humanoseu ordinatione humanaintroductum. Hanc ate,quo modoomniaiurasunta Deo, volúntate patet,quoniam prima diuisiodomi- probantsic: Prima divisiodominioante rum, quae legiturin scriptura,fuit niorum,que legiturin scriptura, diluuium fuit divisio inter Abel et interAbel et Gain. Sic enim legitur Abelpastorovium Caym: ante quam diuisionem,non Genesisiv: Fuitautem Factumestautempost legituraliqua alia divisiodominiorum et Cain agricola. diesutofferret Gain de fructibus prior.Illa autem diuisionon legitur muitos Deo. Abel quoqueobtulit fuisse facta immediate auctoritate terraemuñera diuina,set magisuoluntatehumana, de primogenitis gregissui, et de adipibus Dominus ad Abel,etad ; et respexit quia quod Caymessetagricolaet Abel eorum iiii muñera dus. Ad Cain etad muñera ovium sicut Genesis autem, , pastor legitur Ex non verbiscolhoc non diuino iussu set hiis capite, magis illius, respexit. humanoinstinctu factumest,eo quod ligiturquo istiduo habueruntrerum dominia.Sed non Caym, terrenuset terrenadiligens, divisarumdistincta 44OpusNonaginta Dierum modopotest sicutisteexponit, , c. 92,p. 669:"tertio exponi, et tuncperiniquitatem ut 'iniquitas' ibipropeccatoprimorum non accipiatur parentum; sed accipitur cf.Miethke, Ockhams causaliter, occasionaliter"; Weg(cit. accipitur proprie n. 3 above),485-87.

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terrenorum cure incepitincumbere. legitur quod istadivisiofuitfactapraehoc . fuerit diuino; ergovolúntatehumana (. .) quod Caym agricola, cepto set fuitprimadivisiointroducta. non auctoritate diuinaimmediate, sua propriavolúntateet cupiditateest factum(. . .) Et sic divisioreruminter ex altero Caymet Abelperiniquitatem latere,scilicetex parte Caym, introducta est. . . Offlerhas alreadyremarkedon Ockham'sdependenceon Francis'Improbatio on this point:45even thoughhe does not copy Francis' exact words in to his model. Provingthat human his own text,Ockham is veryfaithful law, and not divinelaw, is responsibleforestablishingpropertydivision, - on Francis of Marchia refersto the case of Cain and Abel, suggesting - thatthe division the basis of the Glossaordinaria goes back to Cain's corrupted will. As one can easily see from the above example, Ockham reportsFrancis' argumentby "polishing"it, that is droppingthe reference to Cain's evil will, which probably seemed to him superfluousin to show that the the economy of his reasoning.It is indeed sufficient mere fact of the divisionbetween the two brothersdoes not dependaccording to the Holy Scripture on God's will. It must thereforego back to human initiative.Moreover, Francis suggeststhat "per iniquitatem" can apply to Cain's wicked intention,while Ockham avoids this claim completely,since it could conflictdangerouslywiththe above-menof Dilectissimis. tioned Franciscaninterpretations At any rate,here Ockham followsFrancison the path of a well established Franciscantradition,one that had alreadybeen defendedbyJohn Duns Scotus.46For his part, Francis supportedthis doctrinein his comaround , read in Paris in all probability mentaryon Book IV of the Sentences this not by had 1320.47In Quia vir reprobus doctrine, John challenged

45See alsoMiethke, Ockham Weg(cit.n. 3 above),484. 46I havesummarized thediscussion aboutScotus'textin La povertà (cit.n. 27 pensata 3 Political andEconomic seeJohn DunsScotus above),113-22,141-61.Foran introduction, the NY 2001,1-21(unfortunately, A.B.Wolter, St.Bonaventure, , ed.andtrans. Philosophy inthenextedition). errors thatshould be removed Latintextcontains several typographical 47On thistext, toFrancis andEcclesiology seemyNatural Law,Religious of according Poverty dans etImagination in:J. Meirinhos andM.G.Pacheco(eds.),Intellect Marchia , forthcoming dePhilosophie Médiévale dela SIEPM duXI Congrès International la philosophie médiévale. Actes ,

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arguing,as many criticsof the FriarsMinor had done, that the rightof ownershipis foundedon naturallaw, and not on human positivelaw,48 but by claimingthat it restssolely on divine law.49This claim allowed him to deny the validityof the whole Franciscanaccount of the origins of ownershipand to groundownershipin the relationship existingbetween God and human beings even before the Fall. For Franciscans,on the contrary,it was vitalto declare the human originsof ownership,because, as has been noted several times,this was a necessarypremiseof their theoryof the absolute povertyof Christ and, therefore,of theirinterpretationof Franciscanpoverty.50 In Ockham's laterpoliticalwritings, such as his Breviloquium , the human of would become an essential of a origins ownership part politicaltheory that denies the divine originof ownershipin order to counterthe over thingsand politicalcommunipapal claim to a universaldominium as such as Giles of Rome had argued at the ties, Augustiniántheologians In of the this case, Ockham clearlytakesinspiration beginning century.51 fromFrancis' Improbatio , re-elaboratesit in the contextof the directcontroversywithJohn XXII, and then developsit further, makingit a cornerstoneof his politicalthought.52

du27 au 31 août2002, Turnhout delIV libro delCommento Porto, 2006;butalsoA proposito alleSentenze di Francesco la quaestio su Internazionale 37, in:AttidelII Convegno d'Appignano: Francesco d'Appignano (cit.n. 6 above),9-26. 48Cf.V. Mäkinen, Criticism Franciscan andtheBirth Godfrey ofFontaines' Concerning Poverty 19(2000),69-85;cf.alsoV. Mäkinen, , in:Picenum ofIndividual Rights seraphicum, Property intheLateMedieval Discussion onFranciscan , Leuven2001,esp.105-90. Rights Poverty 49Cf.Quiavirreprobus Chronica , in Nicolaus Minorita, , esp.590-94. 50On thisissue,seeA. Tabarroni, Francescanesimo e riflessione sinoad Ockham , in: politica Eticaepolitica: leteorie deifiatimendicanti nelDuee Trecento. Atti delXXVIConvegno intemazionale. 15-17ottobre 1998, Spoleto1999,203-30;cf.Mäkinen, Assisi, Property Rights (cit.n. 48 seealsomyPoverty andPower: Franciscans inLater Mediaeval Political , above),162-90; Thought in:J.KrayeandR. Saarinen Moral ontheThreshold , Dordrecht (eds.), Philosophy ofModernity 2004,141-63. 51Cf.Miethke, Ockhams Aiconfini delpotere. Il dibatWeg (cit.n. 3 above),495-96;idem, titosullapotestas a Guglielmo d'Ockham Padua , trans.C. Storti, papaleda Tommaso d'Aquino Depotestate Diepäpstliche imWiderstreit der Theorie 2005,originally papae. Amtskompetenz politischen vonThomas von bisWilhelm vonOckham 2000. , Tübingen Aquin 52A.S.McGrade, Introduction ofOckham, A Letter tothe Friars Minor andOther , in:William eds.A.S.McGrade andJ. Kilcullen, etalibi1995,xiv-xix; Kilcullen, Writings, Cambridge ThePoliticai A History Writings (cit.n. 20 above),308-09; J. Coleman, ofPolitical Thought. From theMiddle Oxford 2000,169-98. AgestotheRenaissance,

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HeathenKings The temporalimplicationsof Christ'skingshipwas long a debated issue in medievalpoliticalthought.53 They play a role in the discussionbetween of Cesena onlyafterQuia virreprobus around Michael and the , group John because in this decretalthe claim that,fromhis conception,Christthe man was temporallord of everythingis used to reject the thesis that Christwas absolutelypoor in his earthlylife. Afterthe publicationof , thisthesisoccupiesan importantplace in the listof errors Quia virreprobus the Michaelistsattributeto the pope.54Their endeavorsto show that,on the contrary,Christ the man renounced every sort of temporalpower over thingsand over human beings focusednot only on scripturalpassages statingthat Christwas poor, but also on the relationshiphe seems to have had with the politicalauthoritiesin the Palestineof his day. In theirview, if Christ can be said to have recognizedthe legitimacyof Roman rule and its governors,he cannot reallyhave been king in any To temporalsense of the term,because thiswould implya contradiction. this end they had to challenge another pillar, so to speak, of curialist doctrine,i.e. that no power can be legitimateoutside the Church. This themewould acquire a special relevancein Ockham's later works,such From the followingsynopsisit is highlyprobable that as the BreviloquiumP : Ockham took one of the keyargumentsforthisthesisfromthe Improbatio , p. 408 Improbatio

Dierum , 93, pp. 683-84 OpusNonaginta

... in eodem regno temporalinon In eodemregnosaecularinon possunt possuntnec debentesse simulreges esse pluresregesveri,non habentes a pari et inconnexi,quia Nemopotest regnumpro indiviso,quorumneuter scilicet duobus dominis inconnexis, cognoscit regnum ab altero. Sed sentire, Christi Romanorum secundumMatheum vi. capite: set imperator tempore Cesar, imperatorRomanorum,fuit fuitverusrexIudaeae, quamvisfuisset et constatquod in tempo- rexaliorumregnorum; licetinfidelis, uerusdominus, ralibus,aliterenimChristusuerbo et Christuset imperatornon tenebant 53Aboutthisissuecf.J. Leclercq, auMoyen duChrist dela royauté L'ideé , Paris1959; Age cf.alsomyLa povertà (cit.n. 27 above),249-68. pensata 54Cf.C. Dolcini, Gloriosus Il diploma Marsilio e Ockham. Deus,la memoria politica imperiale epolitologia in dipoteri Minor , il Defensor , Bologna1981, nowin idem,Crisi Quoniam Scriptum d'Ockham Fieschi a Guglielmo Da Sinibaldo crisi. , Bologna1988,343-98. 55William etalibi Oxford 1.III (Opera Ockham, IV), ed.H.S. Offler, politica, Breviloquium, ThePolitical On thisissue,seeA.S.McGrade, ofWilliam ofOckham. Thought 1999,161-93. etalibi1974,esp.96-103. Personal andInstitutional , Cambridge Principles

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non con- regnum Iudaeae pro indiviso,nec exemplosibi dari tributum suluisset. Christus autema Cesarereg- Christuscognoscebat regnumIudaeae num temporalenon recognouit, licet ab imperatore nec imperator a Christo. sibitributum, nonin recognitione regni ErgoChristusnon fuitverusrexsaecsed pro uitationescandali et futuri ularisIudaeae. misterii,dederit,nec Hic videnturtriaprobanda.Primům significatione Cesar recognouitregnumtemporale est quod Caesar seu imperatorfuit a Christoin quantumhomo,setpotius rex Iudaeae. Hoc ex Evangelioelicieius ministriexigebanttributuma turevidenter, Christodicente:Reddite Christo,ut patetMatheixvii.capite. quae suntCaesaňs, Caesari ; ex quibus verbiscolligitur quod ilia,quae Caesar vendicavitin Iudaea, vere erantsua. Sed Caesar tanquamrex Iudaeae et dominus vendicavittributum;ergo vere tributumerat ipsius tamquam regiset domini;ergovereipsefuitrex. Secundumhic probandumest,quod Caesar non recognoscebat regnuma Christonec recognosceretenebatur. Nam ante nativitatem ChristiCaesar fuitrex verus; sed per nativitatem ChristiregnumCaesaris non fuitin nec immutatum nec aliquodiminutum in aliquam subiectionemredactum; ergo, sicut ante nativitatemChristi nontenebatur ab aliquohornině recognoscereregnumquodcunque,ita post nativitatem Christinon tenebaturab hornině homorecognoscere inquantum et ita non tenebaturrecogregnum; noscereregnuma Christoinquantum erat homo. Tertiumquod videturprobandumest, non recognoscebat quod Christus regnum a Caesare. Sed hoc probatione non indiget:cum numquamregnum aliquod vindicaverit,sed rex fieri recusavit ... Again in this context,Ockham re-elaboratesFrancis' ratio , givinga probatiofor some presuppositions that were implicitin the argumentof his ; on the otherhand, he drops the referenceto the tributepaid by confiere

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that Christ. Indeed, this episode fromMatthew evoked interpretations denied Christ's submissionto the emperor,because Jesus says, in the Vulgate, . . ergo liberisuntfilii.Ut autem non scandalizemuseos vade of this conad mare.. . ."56 Obviously this suggestedan interpretation troversialepisode which could riskweakeningits value as prooffor the thesisFrancissupported.It is true,in fact,that Francisuses thispassage fromthe Vulgate to show that Christwas not obliged to pay a tribute to the emperoras a subordinatedkingwould have had to. On the other hand, the same episode could be interpretedin the sense that Christ obeyed the Roman emperornot because the latterwas a legitimatesovereign,but simplyto "avoid scandal". In thisperspective,the papal claim could be well founded:Christwas trulya temporalsovereign,but chose, "in order to avoid scandal," to act as if he were not. There are traces of such a use of thisepisode in the politicaldebate.57In the face of this Inceptor probablypreferredto avoid the quotacomplexity,the Venerabilis to the evidence that Christnever laid claim to a tion, simplyreferring

56Mt. 17,26,Bibliasacraiuxta versionem , eds.R. Weberet alii,Stuttgart 1994, vulgátám in theAppellatiti in theparallel 1553.Thisis evenclearer , in magna passagecontained a Iudaeisrequisitus utrum Chronica fuisset Nicolaus Minorita, , pp. 637-8:"CumChristus Caesari etquae Reddite Caesari tenerentur de iuredaretributum Caesari, quaesunt respondit, manifeste sunt DeiDeo, (. . .) Ex quibusverbis Christi apparet quodCaesareratverusrex sicutregi,tributum dariiussit.Quod in temporalibus, et dominus quia sibiChristus, tribfecisset nisiipsum habuisset, quiaprestare proregeverointemporalibus nequaquam c. 2. Et perconsequens Christus nonerat subiectionis utaestprobatio X, De censibus, in temporalibus, rexetdominus cumduoin solidům immediati, quorum regesetdomini in eodemregnoessenequeant, duobus dominis servire neuter subsit , ut alteri, potest quianemo 'Romacondita duosfratres habetur Matthaei , dicitur: 6, 24. Et 7 causaq. 1,c. In apibus autemquodChristus nonrecognovit nonpotuit.' Constat habere aliquodregregessimul mincensum a Caesare, Petrosolvere numnecdominium temporale quialicetmandaverit in recognitione alicuius hocfecit istris Caesaris regninec prose etproipso,nontarnen ut patet ab ipsoCaesare,sedproevitatione dominii scandali, temporalis quodteneret dicitur Nec Caesarrecognovit Matthaei 28,q. 1 c. Iamnunc. 17,26 et expresse aliquod a Christo secundum nec dominium temporale quodhomo,sedpotiusministri regnum a Christo, ut patetin dictocapitulo Matthaei Caesarisexigebant tributum 17,23." In I am thatOckham tookhisinspiration from theAppellatio; itis notimpossible principle, inclined tobelieve thatFrancis washismodel. 57See forexample etpapali , c. 8, ed. F. Bleienstein, Johnof Paris,De potestate regia evoked as usedbysupporters ofeccle1969,101,wherethispassageis at first Stuttgart from "Sidicatur nontenebatur sedsolvit vitare siastical quodsolvere exemption laypower: de didrachmate census . . thepassage wasalready usedfor volens scandalum utdicitur in Gratian's different Decretwrv. cf.C. XXIII,q. 8, c. 22,andc. XXVIII,q. 1, purposes cols.961 and 1082. c. 8, ed. E. Friedberg, Leipzig1879,respectively

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kingdomin his life and even refusedto accept the positionwhen it was offered. Ockham derivedyet anotherproofthatChristwas From the Improbatio never kingin a temporalsense: the factthat the Gospels never describe his dutiesas a temporalking. Given this situation,to Christas fulfilling claim that he was neverthelessking would amount to accusing him of , a commonlydiscussedissue in being somethingsimilarto a rexinutilis and the Opus political theory.58From a comparison of the Improbatio Dierumit becomes clear that,here again, Ockham insertedin Nonaginta his Opusan argumenthe found in the Improbatio ,59formulating it, howin a rather different ever, way: , pp. 411-12 Improbatio

Dierum , 93, p. 683 OpusNonaginta

Quod edam rationeevidentipatet, quoniamuellehaberenomenalicuius officiiet non facereea que spectant ad illud officiumest uelle habere nomen officiisine re: quod non est opus sapientis. Velie enim uocari regemet nolle facereilia que spectantad opuset officium regis,estuelle habere nomen regis sine re et, per consequens,est usurparesibi nomen regis: set constatquod Christusin hac vitamortalinon exercuitilla que ad officium regis spectantet pertinent temporalis.

et Qui regnumsuscipitgubernandum se nullo modo introde regimine ipsius mittit, quamvispossit,est de malitia seu de nequitiavel negligentiameritoarguendus;quia talisvulthabere et quae regis nomenregis,et officium suntminimeexercere,quod malitiae vel negligentiae est penitusascribendum. Sed Christusde saeculariregiminecuiuscunqueregnise nullatenus intromisit; ergovel non suscepitregnec fuitrex per num gubernandum, militiavel negvel fuit de consequens: ligentiaarguendus.

58Cf.C. Dolcini, da Cesena diMichele Il pensiero , 1328-1338 , Faenza1977,now politico incrisi e politologia in idem,Crisi dipoteri esp.196-98. (cit.n. 54 above),147-221, 59The parallel Chronica Minorita, , (inNicolaus magna passagefoundin theAppellatio in Improbatio : Dierum as is theone contained p. 646)is notas closeto OpusNonaginta malebellaprosubiectis, cumad regimen "Praeterea, pugnare regispertineat temporalis et successionibus militibus factores dare,de haereditatibus temporalibus stipendia punire, inquanestquodChristus, facere etsimilia etordinare, (. . .) de quibuscertum disponere nonrexit inhacvitasicse nullatenus tumhomoviator, intromisit, sequitur quodChristus in sedspiritualiter, sibicommissum quarenonfuitrexetdominus temporaliter populum et remissus"; cf.alsoibid.,p. 666. in regendo fuisset negligens alioquin temporalibus,

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Conclusion At a pointin timethatwe have not yetascertained,Francisand Ockham again parted theirways. At the end of a trial duringwhich Francis at firsttried in vain to defend his views, the Franciscan fromAppignano repentedin 1343.60Ockham remained in Munich, faithfulto his positions untildeath. Their legacies in the historyof medieval thoughtalso had differing destinies:Ockham's philosophicalstyleexertedan enormous influence,even thoughmany of his specificsolutionsto philosophicaland theologicalproblemswere rejected.61Francis of Marchia's philosophical theologyplayed an importantrole in debates for many years,but in a much less sensationalmanner,so thathis actual importanceis stillunder In the specificfield of politicalitheory,the success that investigation.62 in an almost Ockham's writingsenjoyedhelped to cast Francis'Improbatio and it is Offler which it was freed from shade, finallyreceiving by perennial the attentionit deservesonly since the publicationof Mariani's edition. At the presentstate of knowledge,we can reconstructthe basic outline of the complex relationshipbetween the two Franciscan authors. Their firstencounter took place in the early 1320s when Francis of Marchia squarelyrejectedthe doctrinesconcerningthe categoriesand the active in England. The commitmentof Eucharistdefendedby a confrère Michael of Cesena changed the situationradboth friarsto the cause of ically. They contributedtogetherto some collectiveworks,but it was Francis,this time,who would be used by Ockham. The attitudeof the On the one was multi-faceted. towardsthe Improbatio Venerabilis Inceptor violent chose a different he hand, avoiding polemicsand strategy, clearly 60Cf.E.L. Wittneben sul allestrette. Unteologo andR. Lambertini, Osservazioni francescano 18(1999), d'Ascoli manoscritto delprocesso a Francesco testimone 97-122, , in:Picenum seraphicum, di manoscritta dellaconfessio dellatradizione allestrette. II. A proposito and Unteologo francescano 19 (2000),135-49. Francesco in:Picenum d'Ascoli^ seraphicum, 61Forinteresting TheReception intothismulti-faceted issue,seeW.J.Courtenay, insights et at theUniversity , in:Z. KaluzaandP. Vignaux (eds.),Preuve ofParis ofOckham's Thought in raisons à l'Université deParis , Paris1984,43-84;idem,TheReception ofOckham's Thought Oxford Ockham toWycltf, 14thCentury , in:A. HudsonandM. Wilks(eds.),From England and inthe andCertitude 1987,89-107;K.H. Tachau,Vision Optics, Epistemologa AgeofOckham: 1250-1345 theFoundations , Leiden1988. ofSemantics, 62Scholars in influence of Francis' ofmedieval thought possessa deepinvestigation andtheProblem Peter Auriol atParis, 1316-1345. C. Schabel,Theology Foreknowledge ofDivine andFuture 324-36;butone shouldnotforget 2000,esp. 189-220, , Aldershot Contingents ofthetheologian from contribution to there-discovery Russell Friedman's Appignano.

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LAMBERTINI ROBERTO

manyof Francis'texts personalattacks;on the other,althoughmodifying some keyelements he undeniablytookfromthe Improbatio and arguments, Dierum that were to become centralnot only to his OpusNonaginta , but also to his politicalthoughtin general,as emergesin his later works.If Ockham was among the adversariesimplicitlyreferredto in Francis' is a source, in its , the latter'sImprobatio Commentaryon the Sentences of Ockham's politicaltheory. proper meaning, Macerata Università deglistudidi Macerata

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