Mariquita Sumaya and Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative v. IAC et.al GR 68843-44
Issues: Whether or not the parcel of land donated to Amelia may be subject of collation. Ruling:
FACTS:
NO.
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants two sets of parcels of property, one from his father and the other from his maternal grandmother. Raul died intestate, single and without any issue, leaving Consuelo Balantakbo, his mother as sole heir. Subsequently, Consuelo adjudicated to herself the property in affidavit stating that she is the sole and lone ascendant heir of Raul who left the properties inherited from his father and grandmother. Consuelo sold the properties to Mariquita Sumaya, who sold the same to Villa Honorio Development Corporation which subsequently transferred its right over the property in favor of Laguna AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative. Certificates of title were issuedin Agro’s name. However, such title do not contain any annotation of the property being reservable in character. Two years after Consuelo’s death, Amadeo et al, brothers, sisters, nephew and nieces of Raul filed a civil case for the recovery of the parcels of land sold to Agro alleging that such is subject of reserva troncal. Court a quo ruled in favor of plaintiffs, finding Agro as not innocent purchasers for value. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision and ruled that there is no need to annotate the reservable interest of reserves in property covered by the certificate of title. ISSUE: Whether there is a need to annotate the reservable character of the property subject of reserva troncal RULING: Yes. In a ruling decided by the Court, the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value and hence, the obligation is imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserve viudal. Such obligation is also applicable in reserva troncal. Moreover, the purpose of notation is nothing more than to afford the persons entitled to reservation, if any, due protection against any act of the reservoir, which may make it ineffective. Collation Arellano v. Pascual
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. In the instant case, the decedent left no compulsory heirs, his brothers and sister being collateral relatives only. Hence, the decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to Amelia, his sister, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. G.R. No. 180997
November 17, 2010
SPOUSES MARIANO (a.k.a. QUAKY) and EMMA BOLAÑOS, Petitioners, vs. ROSCEF ZUÑIGA BERNARTE, CLARO ZUÑIGA, PERFECTO ZUÑIGA, and CEFERINA ZUÑIGA-GARCIA, Respondents. FACTS: During his lifetime, Roman owned a residential land with improvements and had the lot declared for taxation purposes in the name of Flavia, Sisters and Brothers. Roman died on August 9, 1976, and his heirs did not settle or partition the subject property. On June 20, 2001, Flavia, without authority from the co-owners of the lot, executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over it in favor of Cresencia. In turn, Cresencia also without authority from the said coowners, executed on the same day a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner-spouses. On October 30, 2001, respondents Roscef Zuñiga Bernarte, Claro Zuñiga, Perfecto Zuñiga, and Ceferina Zuñiga-Garcia (Roscef, et al.) filed a complaint for declaration of partial nullity of deeds of transfer and sale with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner-spouses, Flavia Zuñiga (Flavia), and Cresencia. In essence, Roscef, et al., and Flavia and Cresencia are legitimate half-blood brothers and sisters, all children of the deceased Roman Zuñiga, Sr. (Roman) from his second and first marriages, respectively. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA wrongly applied the law on coownership, specifically Article 484, relative to Article 980 of the Civil Code. RULING: NO.
15 December 2010 Facts: Decedent Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate. His siblings, Amelia, Francisco and Miguel were the only heirs that he left. During the lifetime of Angel, he made a donation of a parcel of land in favor of his sister, Amelia. Upon his death, his brothers, Francisco and Miguel filed a Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate of Angel. In the said petition, the brothers alleged that the donation made by the decedent to their sister should be considered as an advance legitime. They now pray that the parcel of land donated be subject of collation as to not violate their rights as heirs of the decedent.
Upon the death of Roman Zuñiga, Sr. Lot No. 1-P now forms part of his estate. The record has not shown any other property left by Roman Zuñiga, Sr. at the time of his death. In the absence of whatever evidence that he executed a will his legitimate children by his first and second marriages inherit such lot in equal share[s] as intestate heirs (Article 980, The Civil Code). It follows that Lot No. 1P has to be divided among them into eleven equal shares. Until such time that Lot No. 1-P has been partitioned among Roman Zuñiga, Sr.’s eleven legitimate children, as co-owners being co-heirs their shares remain ideal (Article 1078, The Civil Code). Not one of the eleven children can claim as his or hers a specifically identified portion of Lot No. 1-P.
However, the above deed of absolute sale that Flavia A. Zuñiga executed was valid and effective only to the extent of her ideal share in Lot No. 1-P. The validity of the other deed of absolute sale Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague executed in favor of the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaños is limited to her ideal share and the other ideal share she acquired from Flavia A. Zuñiga. In effect[,] the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaños acquired the ideal shares of the sisters Flavia A. Zuñiga and Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague.
been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.
Ferrer vs. Sps Diaz Spouses Tumbokon v. Legaspi G.R. No. 165300
April 23, 2010
Facts:
Facts: Reina Comandante, daughter of the spouses Diaz obtained a loan from Atty. Ferrer through a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by the spouses in favor of Ferrer, for the amount of of P1,118,228.00 which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the spouses Diaz, Comandante’s parents. Subsequently, Comandante executed a waiver of hereditary rights over the property subject of the REM in favor of Ferrer. Then, despite repeated demand by Ferrer, Comandante failed to pay the loan. So Ferrer filed a case of collection of sum of money and the foreclosure of the REM which was based on the waiver of hereditary rights executed by Comandante. The RTC granted Ferrer’s motion and declared that the waiver of hereditary rights executed by Comandante was valid due to the fact that she will subsequently inherit the parcel of land from her parents. Issue: Is the waiver of Comandante valid?
hereditary
rights
executed
by
Ruling: No. Because as provided by Art. 1347 of the New Civil Code that future inheritance cannot be subject of any contract because no right can be derived from such. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1) That the succession has not yet been opened. (2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and, (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet
The subject lot in question is a 12,480 square meter lot located in Aklan. The property was originally owned by Alejandra Sespene. In Alejandra’s lifetime, she was married twice. First with Gaudencio Franco with whom she bore a child named Ciriaca Franco, who then married Victor Miralles and from whom Ciriaca bore a son named Crisanto Miralles. Crisanto Miralles in turn, married Cresencia Inog. Alejandra’s second marriage was with Jose Garcia from whom she bore Apolonia Garcia, who was then married to Primo Legaspi. The problem on ownership and possession arose when the spouses Tumbokon asserted their rights over the property by virtue of their purchase from Victor Miralles. (In fact, the spouses filed a criminal case against respondents and others not parties in the instant case, for qualified theft – stealing coconut fruits from the property. The RTC and CA found respondents guilty for the crime). (Before the judgment of the CA in the criminal case,) The petitioners commenced suit for recovery of ownership and possession of real property with damages against respondents. It was alleged that Victor, being a son-in-law and the only heir, inherited the property from Alejandra as sole heir. Victor then allegedly sold the property to Cresencia Inog, who in turn sold the property to the Spouses Tumbokon. Issue: Did Victor have a right over the property? Ruling: No. The CA correctly ruled that Victor, being a mere son-in-law of Alejandra could not have had acquired a right over the property much less the right to transfer ownership over the property. Being a mere son-in-law, he was not an intestate heir. Also, he was not the sole heir since the rightful forced heirs are Crisanto, the grandchild of Apolonia, and Apolonia, the daughter of Alejandra. The enumeration in Article 887 on compulsory heirs is exclusive. Therefore, a son-in-law, who is not included in the enumeration cannot acquire rights over the property by succession. (The issue and ruling in the criminal case in favour of petitioners cannot be considered as res judicata because the issues in the criminal and civil case are different. The criminal action dealt with the issue of whether the respondents were guilty of qualified theft while the issue in the civil case dealt with the ownership and possession over the property.)
Nazareno vs. CA G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000
LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents.
Facts:
FACTS:
The husband and wife, in order to avoid paying estate tax, while they are alive, executed several Deeds of Sale in favor of their children. The sale was proven to be without consideration.
The petitioners in their petition to revoke and reduced the insurance proceeds alleged that: petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag, while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family and Eva de Guzman Maramag was a concubine of Loreto thus, disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation and that the illegitimate children of Loreto, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced. However in the insurance policies obtained by Loreto, his illegitimate children were the named beneficiaries.
Issue: Whether or not the subject properties of the Deeds of Sale are part of the estate of the deceased. Held:
No, the children never acquired ownership because the sale was void for lack of consideration. The sale to a Natividad, one of the children, is deemed in trust for the other children of the deceased. The properties should be collated as part of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the insurance policies be governed by the law on donations and law on successions DECISION:
Nazareno vs. CA G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000 Facts: The husband and wife, in order to avoid paying estate tax, while they are alive, executed several Deeds of Sale in favor of their children. The sale was proven to be without consideration. Issue: Whether or not the subject properties of the Deeds of Sale are part of the estate of the deceased. Held:
No, the children never acquired ownership because the sale was void for lack of consideration. The sale to a Natividad, one of the children, is deemed in trust for the other children of the deceased. The properties should be collated as part of the estate. G.R. No. 181132
June 5, 2009
HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA PANGILINAN MARAMAG,Petitioners, vs. EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
NO, because the law to be applied in this case is the Insurance Code. Under Sec. 53 of the Code it states that the insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. It is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Thus the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured. G.R. No. 7890
September 29, 1914
FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al. vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO FACTS: Rosario Mediavillo had allegedly disrespected and raised her hand against her grandfather, Florencio Pecson, after
the latter confronted her regarding her relationship with a certain young man. As a result thereof, Florencio disinherited Rosario on the ground of the latter’s gross disrespect. A motion was filed opposing the last will and testament of Florencio, praying that the court annul the clause containing the disinheritance of Rosario on the ground that the act committed was due to the derangement of Rosario’s mental faculties which occurred soon after the incident with her grandfather. ISSUE: Whether or not Rosario Mediavillo’s disinheritance is contrary to law RULING: YES. Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years old when the alleged act of disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather - the cause for her disinheritance. But the record shows that very soon after the said event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time. Taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, Rosario was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather. The evidence adduced during the trial was not sufficient to show that the disinheritance made was for just cause. ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003 VITUG, J. Facts: Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom decided to legally adopt Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom." Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption. Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, on the other hand, petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply. The lower court renders a decision in favor of the respondent. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review. Issue: May the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? Held: No. While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For
instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. SANTOS V. BUENAVENTURA SEPT. 22, 1966 FACTS: The testator, Maximo Santos left a will which was the subject of a probabte filed by her niece, the Rosalinda. The oppositors, Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia opposed the probate of the will on the grounds that, it was not executed in accordance with law and that undue influence was exerted upon the testator. During the proceedings of the case, Flore withdrew her opposition. Meantime, the case was heard and the will was allowed probate. After the order has become final, Flora filed her petition praying for the delivery to her of a fishpond as a specific devise in her favor. Rosalinda opposed the petition contending that Rosalinda had violated the “no contest clause” of the will, hence, her devise was forfeited. ISSUE: Whether or not Flora was entitled to her specific devise. RULING: YES. The property shall be delivered to her by appellee with all the fruits or rents thereof acquired from the death of the testator until its delivery. In the instant case, Flora did not violate the “no contest clause” by the act of her withdrawal in her opposition for the probate of the will. The Court ruled that, the act of Flora did not impair the true intentions of the testator rather, her action of withdrawing before she rested her case contributed to the speedy diposition of the probate case. Hence, as a result thereof, she must be entitled to whatever devise that the testator had left her. Vera vs Navarro G.R. No. L-27745 18 October 1977 FACTS: Elsie Gaches died without a child. The deceased left a last will and testament wherein she expressed that her properties be distributed to the persons named therein after payment of her debts and funeral expenses. The herein respondent Judge Bienvenido Tan, Sr filed with the CFI a petition for the probate of the said will and he was appointed as executor. On the other hand, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue filed with the probate court a claim of taxes particularly estate tax, inheritance tax, and income tax. The voluntary heirs mentioned in the will were held responsible for all taxes of any nature which may be due the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should be required to pay first the inheritance tax before the probate court may authorize the delivery of the hereditary share pertaining to each of them
RULING: Under the provisions of Rule 90, Section 1, the distribution of the ascendants assets may only be ordered under the following three circumstances namely, (1) when the inheritance tax, among others, is paid, (2) when a sufficient bond is given to meet the payment of the inheritance tax and all the other obligation of the nature enumerated therein, or (3)
when the payment of said tax and all the other obligations mentioned in the said rule has been provided for. None of these three cases insofar as the satisfaction of the inheritance due from the estate is concerned were present when the questioned orders were issued in the case at bar; likewise, the record is bereft of any evidence that sufficient bond has been filed to meet the outstanding obligation. The inheritance tax imposed by Section 86 shall, in the absence of contrary disposition by the predecessor, be charged to the account of each beneficiary, in proportion to the value of the benefit received, and in accordance with the scale fixed for the class or group to which is pertains: Provided, That in cases where the heirs divide extrajudicially the property left to them by their predecessor or otherwise convey, sell, transfer, mortgage, or encumber the same without being the estate or inheritance taxes within the period prescribed in the preceding subsections (a) and (b), they shall be solidarity liable for the payment of the said taxes to the extent of the estate they have received.
Carolina Abad Gonzales v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998 Romero, J.: Facts: Petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad, and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their deceased brother Ricardo de Mesa Abad. They alleged in their petition that Ricardo is a bachelor with no legitimate or illegitimate descendants or ascendants, making them the only surviving heirs. Subsequently, the petitioners amended their petition alleging that two of the properties listed in their original petition was in fact not owned by their brother, as their brother was only an administrator of said properties, the true owner being their mother, Lucila de Mesa. Cesar de Mesa Tioseco was then appointed by the court as the administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo. The petitioners, on May 2, 1972, executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their deceased mother. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled three TCTs in the name of Ricardo de Mesa Abad and was subsequently registered under the name of the three petitioners. The petitioners then executed a real estate mortgage in favour of Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel. The private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside the proceedings and for leave to file an opposition to the proceedings started by the petitioners. Honoria alleged that she is the common-law wife of Ricardo, that they have two children (Cecilia and Marian) and that Ricardo had another child from another woman named Rosemarie Abad. The RTC then rendered a judgement declaring the following: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Said surviving children will inherit from the deceased together with Honoria Denial of the petition of the collateral relatives of deceased (petitioners) Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratix all properties, monies and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of him being appointed as an administrator
Also, the RTC annulled the extrajudicial settlement executed by the petitioners as it was found that Ricardo really did own the lots subject of the extrajudicial settlement and by virtue thereof, cancellation of the TCTs granted to the petitioners. On Appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: W/N Cecilia, Marian, and Rosemarie are acknowledged natural children of Ricardo and thus, making them the legal heirs of the decedent Held: Yes. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the three children, (Private respondents in this case) were not filiated to the decedent by the quantum of evidence required under the law as compared to the evidences presented by the private respondents. At the outset, Article 988 provides that “in the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.” Article 1003 also provides that “if there are no.... illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.” This being the case, the brothers and sisters of decedent are precluded from inheriting from the him. G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990 JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents. FACTS: On September 2, 1981, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son.
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by herein petitioners to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents extinguished any claim against petitioners.The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. Issue: whether or not estrangement is a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Ruling: No. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child.
