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SAMPLE CASE DIGESTS IN PROPERTY RELATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
DONATIONS (ARTICLE 82-87)
DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS>> SERRANO V . SOLOMON [105 P 998 (1959)]- Before the marriage, the future husband executed a pur ported donation propter nuptias which provides that (1) he donates all his properties to his future children, if any; or (2) if there are none and he dies before his wife, one -half of his properties and those acquired during the marriage shall go to his brothers and sisters; or (3) if there are no children and his wife dies before him, one half of all his properties and those acquired during the marriage shall go TO THOSE WHO REARED HIS WIFE (plaintiff). The wife prede ceased him and plaintiff filed an action to enforce the donation. The re is no valid donation propter nuptias. While the donation was made before the marriage, it was not made in considera tion of marriage, because marriage was not the only consideration for the donation since other conditions were imposed; and even if in co nsideration of the marriage, it was not in favor of one or both of the spouses, but IN FAVOR OF 3Ps or persons other than the spouses. It is not a valid donation inter vivos because it was not accepted by the donee in the s same ame or a different instru ment. I t is not a donation mortis causa because it did not comply with the formalities of wills. Hence, the donation is void. 1.
Mateo v. Lagua
A donation propter nuptias may be revoked for being inoffi cious. It is wrong wrong to say that a donation propter propter nuptias has an onerous onerous consideration, the marriage in this case being merely the t he occasion or motive, not the t he causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for being inofficious upon the do nor's death if it infringes on the legitime of any of the donor's heirs. The DPN in this case was not annuled in its entirety, but only to the extent that it infringed on the legitime of the donor's heir. Note that under Art 43(3), a donation is revoked by operation of law, under the circumstances therein provided. provided. However, Art. 86(1) provides provides that any revocation in elective, not automatic.
V. BARR OSO OSO [53 P 912 (1928)] -A donation propter nuptias of lands in a private instru ment is not valid va lid because the law requires donations of real property to be made in a public instrument. A donation propter nuptias is not onerous and thus must necessarily be contained in a public instrument. While the marriage is indeed its consideration it is not so in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. In fact, a donation propter nuptias remains valid even if the marriage does not take place provided it is not revoked within the period allowed by law. The marriage in donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condi tion which as such presupposes the existence of the birth of the obligation. SOLIS
2. COMMON LAW MARRIAGES
Matabuena v. Cervantes
The prohibition regarding donations made between spouses during the marriage must apply likewise to a common-law relationship. The policy behind the law, i.e. to protect the would-be donor spouse from the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence by the other spouse, is equally or even more applicable to the case of common-law relationships. 3. VOID DONATIONS V. BIR OG [45 O.G. No. 5, p. 268 (1947)] - A donation made to a grandchild of a wife by a previous marriage falls under the prohibition Article 133 of the Civil Code (Art. 87, FC). Said prohibition applies notwithstanding the fact that the provision mentions only legit imate children. (9 Manresa 236). NAZARE NO
SYSTEM OF 1.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PR OPERT Y
CHARGES UPON ACP.
Luzon Surety vs. De Garcia
Any debt contracted by the husband-administrator with the intention of binding the community property, must redound to the community property's benefit. Any obligation incurred by the husband to be chargeable against the community property, must be incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession, business, and with an honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. Gelano vs. CA
It was an error for the c ourt to hold the spouses liable jointly and severally o n an obligation that redounded to the benefit of the community. The community partnership, as a single and separate ent ity, should be liable for the obligation. G-tractors vs. CA
The obligation incurred here redounded to the benefit of the community partnership, and thus was a partnership obligation. The land where the logging concession was located belonged to the family and not to the husband exclusively. Furthermore, the obligation was incurred to enhance productivity for the logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain, which the husband, as a dministrator had every right to enter into on behalf of the community partnership. The realization of actual profits and benefit on the part of the partnership is not required, it being sufficient to show that the transaction normally benefits the partnership. CONJUGAL PART NER SHIP OF GAINS 1.
ARTICLE 108
Ansaldo vs.
Sheriff
The bank accounts garnished herein were conjugal property and the same may not be levied upon to pay for personal obliga tions. The money in the bank accounts were earned as fruits derived from paraphernal property. As such, they became assets of the conjugal partnership. No proof was shown here that the obligations were contracted for the benefit of the partnership. Furthermore, the sheriff may not levy on 1/2 of the amount in these accounts as the supposed share of the husband. A spouse's share in the conjugal assets is merely inchoate and cannot be determined until after dissolution of the partnership. 2. ARTICLE 109 Castillo vs. Pasco
The fishpond is 1/6 paraphernal and 5/6 conjugal. The first P1000 was paid out of the paraphernal property of the wife. Of this amount, P600 was a debt owed to the wife by the vendor. It is presumed that this debt could bind only the wife since there was no showing that the husband authorized the wife to contract this debt. The P400 was paid out of proceeds from the sale of the wife's paraphernal property. The rest of the purchase price was paid out of partnership funds. The fact that the loan en tered into to pay this purchase price was secured by mortgages over paraphernal property belonging to the wife did not make these obligations (loans) paraphernal. The mortgage was merely an accessory obligation. The principal obligation which is the loa n pertained to the conjugal partnership. NOTES:
paraphernal property: exclusive property of the wife capital: exclusive property of the husband. The owner has absolute dominion over his separate property. With regard to separate property, the owner spouse may sue alone. With regard to the fruits of such separate property, since the same belongs to the partnership, both spouses must join in ini tiating suit. e.g. In a case where the separate property is being leased out...the owner spouse may sue alone for eviction, but must be joined by the other spouse in a suit over rentals. 3. ARTICLE 110 Ong
vs. CA
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax decla ration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conju gal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel of land was de clared solely in the wife's name, although the house built there on was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circum stances, the Court held that the subject lot was the paraphernal property of the wife and thus liable for her personal debts.
4. ARTICLE 111
Palanca vs. Smith Bell When a loan is negotiated by a husband upon property belong ing to his wife, with the consent of the latter, the money becomes conjugal property, and if the funds are later invested in the construction of a house, the building is likewise c onjugal property and is liable for debts of the husband. The property in question was a parcel of land belonging to the wife which was given by the husband as a guaranty for a loan contracted by him. The money obtained through the loan was later used for the con struction of the house. Balane: The proceeds of the loan pertain to the borrower. The borrower in this case was the partnership, regardless of the fact that the separate property of the wife was used as a security in obtaining the loan.
5.
ARTICLE 116
Torela vs. Torela While it is true that all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated, nonethe less, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption.
Mendoza vs. Reyes The presumption of conjugality is a strong one. Proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage suf fices to render the statutory presumption operative.
Magallon vs. Montejo The presumption of conjugality does not apply in a case where there is no proof of marriage between the spouses. 6.
ARTICLE 117
Cheesman vs. IAC Even if the wife used conjugal funds to purchase the lot in question, petitioner, who is an alien, cannot recover or hold the lot so acquired in view of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring residential lots other than by hereditary suc cession. He therefore had no personality to question the subse quent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect to conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. Under 117.1, where conjugal funds were spent, then the property acquired belongs to the partnership
except: 109.3 (pacto de retro acquisition where the right to redemption belongs to one spouse)
7. ARTICLE
118
Notes: in case of property bought on installment, partly from exclusive property and partly from conjugal funds, the test to determine ownership is to look at when ownership vested. If ownership vested before marriage, then the property is exclu sive if ownership vested after marriage, then property is conjugal. e.g. 1985 - A buys property from BF payable in installments...A pays installments with exclusive property 1990 - A marries B. The subsequent amortizations on the property are then paid with conjugal funds. Test: when title was vested. if title was vested before 1990, then the property is exclusive. if title was vested only after full payment of amortizations, then the property is conjugal. 8.
ARTICLE 119 NOTES
Test of when is payment due. Suppose: A lent P1M to B in the promissory note, it is stipulated that payment shall be on 100 equal monthly installments and that interest shall be at 20% p.a. payments start on Oct 1985 A marries B in August 1986 all installments due before August 1986 are paraphernal for installments due after August 1986: principal is exclusive property interest during the marriage pertain to the partnership... already civil fruits. 9.
ARTICLE 120
Caltex vs. Felias
A lot belonging to the parents and later donated by them to their daughter is paraphernal property, and the rule applicable with respect to the building constructed thereon before the donation is that of accessory following the principal. The dona tion transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over a building constructed on it. Padilla vs. Padilla
The mere construction of a building from common funds does not automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land (para phernal) to the conjugal partnership. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The partnerhip maintains a usufructuary right over the said property during the marriage and until liquidation. Padilla vs. Paterno
The separate properties in this case never became conjugal because the conjugal improvements constructed thereon were de stroyed before the value of the paraphernal land on which these improvements were erected was paid to the spouse who owned the paraphernal land. As held in Padilla v. Padilla, payment of such value occurs only at final liquidation.
Canullas vs. Fortun
Where a conjugal house is constructed on land belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the husband is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land. The conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon. They cannot be considered to have become conjugal only as of the time their values were paid to the estate of the widow because by that time, the conjugal partner ship no longer existed and it could not acquire the ownership of said properties.
'Plus value' refers to what the improvement contributes to the increase in the value of the whole thing.
Suppose: land P3M irrigation ditches P2M but because of the irrigation ditches, the value of t he land increases to P4.8M the plus value in this case is P1.8M the net value of the improvement in P3.8 M in this case, the entire property becomes conjugal. Art. 120 applies only on the assumption that the improvement exists at the time of liquidation...if the property is destroyed before liquidation, then 120 does not apply. If prior to dissolution, the property and the improvement thereon is sold--then the right of the CPG under 120 follows the proper ty...the right of the CPG under 120 is inchoate. Notes: The following are the steps to be followed in liquidating the CPG: 1. inventory of CP assets 2. restitution of advances made to each spouse e.g. Art. 122.3
3. payment of debts to each spouse e.g. Art. 120 4. payment of obligations to 3rd parties 5. delivery of exclusive properties 6. payment of losses and deterioration of movables belonging to each spouse reason: CPG is a mere usufructuary of separate properties...not true for ACP 7. division 8. delivery of presumptive legitimes
