Sayson v Singzon December 19, 1973 FERNANDO, J Facts:
In January, 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. It was also approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza A canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 wherein the bid of the Singkier Motor Service owned by respondent Felipe Singson was accepted. After being approved by Secretary of P ublic Works, a voucher for the payment of the parts reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit which later approved it finding it just and reasonable. He approved the payment of for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. His reason for withholding the 20% was to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to respondent Singson. Sayson received a telegram from the Supervising auditor who found that there was an overpricing on the spare parts and equipments as shown in the vouchers. Because of the failure of Singson to receive the balance of the purchase price, he filed for m andamus with the lower court which was granted. Thus this petition with the SC.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in issuing the mandamus sought sought for by respondent Held/Ratio: Yes. mandamus is not the remedy to enforce th e collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific performance. The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. What respondent should have done was to file his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the gov ernment may be filed
Ministerio v Cebu August 31, 1971 FERNANDO, J.: Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for pay ment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, which the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of and used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road. They also allege that demanded either payment or return of the property to which defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General did not reply.
Defendants, through the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit in reality wa s one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. The lower court dismissed the petition and held that it was a suit against the government. It was also held that although the suit was filed in the name of the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, they were filed against them in their official capacity and thus the action is one against the National Government. Thus this petition for certiorari.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on the ground that it is a suit against the National Government Held/Ratio: Yes, The government is immune from suit without its consent. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls for application. However, it is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. An action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an a ssumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment
Department of Agriculture v NLRC November 11, 1993 VITUG, J.: Facts: In 1989, the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. In 1990 a similar contract was made with the same conditions except for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards. In September 1990, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money clai ms. This decision became final and executor.
The Labor Arbiter forthwith issued a writ of exe cution against the vehicles of DA. A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and had of no legal effect for the failure of Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over petitioner. NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. Thus the appeal on certiorari with the SC
Issue: WON the suit against the DA is a suit against the National Government which requires its consent Held/Ratio: No. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent. However, such is rule is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. Moreover the suit filed by the security guards is a money claim entered into in its governmental capacity and thus falls under the purview of Act no. 3 083 provided that the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
Republic of the Philippines v Court of Appeals July 2, 2002 VITUG, J .: Facts: Petitioner Republic instituted expropriation proceedings in the RTC of Bulacan for the land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facili ties for the “Voice of the Philippines” project. RTC condemned the land and had it expropriated upon the payment of just compensation by the Republic. The issue arose in relation 76,589 -square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. They allege that after the lapse of five years, the Republic failed to pay them their just compensation for the expropriated area. During this period, Pres Estrada also issued proclamation No. 22 which transferred 20 hectares of said property to Bulacan State University and another 5 hectares was dedicated for the propagation of Philippine carabaos.
Petitioner filed its manifestation that it would be depositing the amount equivalent to the just compensation of the property. Respondent filed a counter motion to raise the price of the property or an option to have the property returned to them. RTC issued the assailed order of returning the property to the respondents. CA affirmed this decision.
Issue: WON respondents are entitled to the return of the expropriated property for the failure of petitioner to pay the just compensation for it.
Held/Ratio: No, The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning a uthority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is tak ing title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a rig ht to compensation for the taking. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title;] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. The court also cited Valedhueza v Republic, wherein it was held that “both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which a re still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated but only to demand the fair market value of the same.”
The case cited by respondents which is Sorsogon v Vda de Villaroya, wherein the court o rdered the return of the property does not apply in the case a t hand. That case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.
Republic v Vicente Lim June 29, 2005 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .: Facts: The petitioner, Republic instituted expropriation proceedings with the CFI of Cebu for Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City owned by the Denzons, f or the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. RTC ordered the land to be expropriated upon payment of just comp ensation. For failure of the petitioner to pay the just compensation, in 1961, Valdehueza and Panerio, the successor in interest of the Denzons filed a suit for damages and recovery of possession of the land against AFP. CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio but held that they were not entitled to the return of the property because of the
notation in the TCT which stated that, “subject to the p riority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said
parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.” They were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor the Republic. In 1964, since the Republic still failed to pay the just compensation Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged the land to Vicente Lim, who later foreclosed the mortgage in 1976 for the former’s failure to pay. In 1991, Lim instituted a suit for quieting of title against AFP and the Republic. The RTC held that Lim was the absolute and exclusive owner of the property. This decision was sustained by the CA. A petition for certiorari was filed with SC but the SC af firmed the CA decision. A second motion for reconsideration was filed.
Issue: WON the Republic has retained ownership of the land despite its failure to pay re spondent’s predecessorsin-interest the just compensation.
Held/Ratio: As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors -ininterest the sum of P16, 248.40 as “reasonable market value of the two lots in question.” Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy
bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may tak e them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occa sion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation. From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. There are two stages in expropriation. The first stage determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The recognized rule is that title to the p roperty expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation, and that “ non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not enti tle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots.” However, the facts of the present case d o not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice; the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second , in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part . Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years fr om the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.”
Belen v CA A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more o r less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. In the early part of 1978 part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family without Belen’s consent. Belen and Juliano came to an agreement that he would be
allowed to stay temporarily by paying half of the rentals to Manotok Services A fire razed their properties. Upon Juliano’s pleas, he was allowed to build another house in the property for a
period of 2 ½ years. However, after the stipulated period, he still refused to vacate and thus a suit was filed against him wherein the court (MTC) ordered him to vacate the premises. In the appeal to RTC, the decision was reversed. Belen appealed but this was dismissed upon the expropriation of the said property by Presidential Decree No. 1670. His appeal with the CA was also denied. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased t o be the owner of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and disposition of the National Housing Authority (NHA); It also held that Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease between Belen and Juliano. Thus the appeal on certiorari with the SC
Issue: WON there was valid expropriation of the property Held/Ratio: No. PD No. 1670, together with a companion decree, numbered 1669 — which attempted to expropriate by similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called " Tambunting Estate" — was struck down by this Court as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void. The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of la w," failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally, they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just compensation." PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.
Filstream International v CA January 23, 1998 FRANCISCO, J .: Facts: Petitioner Filstream is the owner of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before MTC of Manila against private respondents on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. MTC ordered respondents to vacate the
premises and pay the back rentals. This decision was affirmed by the RTC and CA upon which the decision became final and executory. However, pending the earlier a case, a negotiation has already taken place between Mayor Lim of Manila and Filstream for the acquisition by negotiation of said property. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. Thus the city of Manila filed a suit for eminent domain with the RTC of Manila. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that this was filed only to circumvent the decision in the ejectment suit and that the price offered was too low and thus violative of the just compensation provision. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and held the land expropriated upon payment of just compensation by the public respondents. Appeal to the CA was denied for failure to submit clearer and readable copies. Thus the
petition for review on certiorari with the SC. During this period, Filstream filed for motion for execution for the ejectment suit which became final. The p rivate respondents filed for a motion to quash or stay the execution due to the supervening event which is the expropriation the said property which was denied. Thus private respondents filed for a writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC which was granted. The case for issuance of writ of execution and petition for certiorari with RTC were consolidated. A motion to dismiss was filed by Filstream for violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 (forum shopping). Filstream then filed for writ of demolition which was granted. Private respondents then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which granted a preliminary injunction. Filstream now files a petition for certiorari
with the SC to nullify the r esolutions of the CA. The two cases were consolidated. Issue: WON petitioners were denied due process of law by the CA when it outrightly dismissed its petition for failure to submit clear and readable copies. Held/Ratio: Yes. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law a s it would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. Where substantial rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice. Rather than simply dismissing the petition summarily for non - compliance with respondent court’s in ternal rules, respondent CA should have instead entertained petitioner Filstream’s petition for review on Certiorari, and
ordered petitioner to submit the corresponding pleadings which it deems relevant and replace those which are unreadable.
Biglang Awa v Judge Bacalla November 22, 2000 GONZAGA-REYES, J .: Facts: The Biglang- awa’s are the registered owners of certain parcels of land situated in Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City. The government needed to expropriate part of the aforesaid property of petitioner for the construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Petitioner received notice from the respondent Republic to submit documents to determine just compensation of the property and failure to do so would give rise to an expropriation proceeding for said property. Petitioner failed to submit the said documents and thus the Republic through the DPWH filed with RTC an expropriation suit for the said properties. The respondent deposited the amount for the compensation of the properties of the pe titioners and thus the RTC issued a writ of possession. An order to vacate the premises was also i ssued to petitioners. The petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration on the ground that respondent failed to comply with the provisions of E.O. 103 5 (1985), relating to the conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign, detailed engineering/surveys, and negotiation prior to the acquisition of, or entry into, the property being expropriated. This was denied the RTC. Thus a petition for certiorari was filed with the SC.
Issue: WON the right to due process of the petitioners was violated by respondent Republic Held/Ratio: No. Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997. The trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited , Thus, , the only requisites for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the making of a deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with the requirements the issuance of the writ of possession becomes “ministerial.
The issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Rule 67 of the 1997 R evised Rules of Civil Procedure alone is neither “capricious” nor “oppressive”, as the said rule affords owners safeguards against unlawful deprivation of
their property in expropriation proceedings, one of which is the deposit requirement which consti tutes advance payment in the event expropriation proceeds, and stands as indemnity for damages should the proceedings fail of consummation.
Francia v Municpality of Meycauayan March 24, 2008 CORONA , J .: A complaint for expropriation was filed by respondent Municipality of Meycauayan against petitioners Francia for the purpose of establishing a common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks. Petitioners allege that the land to be expropriated was raw land which was soon to be developed by them and that the price offer was too low. RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose and that it would improve the f low of vehicular traffic during rush hours. It ordered that writ of possession be issued upon deposit of 15% of the fair market value of the property. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for failure to hold a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose. CA nullified the order of expropriation but retained the writ of possession. Thus the appeal to the SC.
Issue: WON prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession
Held/Ratio: Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.
City of Manila v Serrano June 20, 2001 MENDOZA, J .: Facts: The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance no. 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s first district in Tondo . One of the properties sought to be expropriated was Lot 1-C belonging to Felisa De
Guia. After her death, the estate of Feliza de Guia was settled among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement, which was duly approved by the regional trial court, branch 53, manila in its decision, dated May 8 , 1986. The property was subsequently sold on January 24, 1996 to Demetria de Guia to whom TCT no. 226048 was issued. Petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation, with the RTC of Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C),
Respondents allege that they had been the bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would result in their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to them by their deceased mother; and that the said lo t was exempt from expropriation because RA. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation. Dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only about 50 square meters of land. After petitioner had made a deposit, RTC issued a writ of possession to petitioner. Respondents filed for a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held that said properties were not exempt from execution. Nevertheless, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§9-10 of the l aw must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation as was held in Filstream v CA. Th us petitioners were enjoined from expropriating the said property. Hence this petition.
Issue: WON the CA erred when it h eld that there had been no compliance with §§9 and 10 of RA. no. 7279. Held/Ratio: Yes. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case. Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA. no. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in §10 of the law. Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated
City of Iloilo v Judge Le gaspi November 25, 2004 CHICO-NAZARIO, J .: Facts: On 07 March 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo enacted Regulation Ordinance No. 2001-037 granting authority to its City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay On 14 March 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of Manuela Yusay, through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario, Administratrix of the estate made a formal estate to purchase the property for P250 per square meter for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor an d landless residents of the city in line with the city’s housing development program
Later Petitioner City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas, filed an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain against private respondents. On 11 April 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession alleging that since it has deposited 15% of the fair market value of the property may immediately take possession of the property in accordance with Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 Judge Legaspi held in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession until after the trial on the merits of the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was d enied. Thus the filing of this petition.
Issue/Held/Ratio: WON petitioner is entitled to the writ of possession Yes. The requisites for authorizing immediate entry in a n expropriation suit are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the f air market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial In City of Manila v. Serrano this Court ruled that “hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in Rep. Act No. 7279. x x x The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated.” From the foregoing, it is clear that an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted if compliance with the requirements for socialized housing has been made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance with the requirements for socialized housing. For a writ of possession to iss ue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint.
WON there has been a waiver on the part of petitioner to ask for immediate possession since it took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine (9) months and thirteen (13) days from the f iling of the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. No, Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time limit as to when a local government may immediately take possession of the real property. As long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unit cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession.
NAPOCOR v Pobre August 12, 2004 CARPIO, J .: Facts:
Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay which he later began developing as a resort-subdivision, which he named as "Tiwi H ot Springs Resort Subdivision." In 1965, NPC started to become interested in the property after it was certified by the Commission on Volcanology that the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use. NPC is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide and is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain Initially in 1972, it leased 11 lots from Pobre for a period of one year. However, in 1975, it filed an expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property to which the court granted upon payment of just compensation. NPC began drilling operations and c onstruction of steam wells. NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with its dumping. Thirdly, on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Pr operty. This is the property subject of the petition. NPC needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and Republic Act No. 5092 Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of damages. On 1985, NPC also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it had found an alternative site and that it had already abandoned the said project in Pobre’s property.
The RTC granted the motion to d ismiss but without prejudice to P obre’s allegation in relation to damages he incurred. RTC later ruled in favor of Pobre and ordered NPC to pay the value iof the property and for Pobre to execute the deed of sale upon full payment. Motion for reconsideration with the RTC was denied. CA affirmed RTC decision. Thus petition with the SC.
Issue: WON petitioner had the right to dismiss its own complaint in eminent domain cases. 1
No, NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right under this rule to move for the i mmediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal o f the complaint. Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed and served way ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same applies. In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions
1
SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.
