CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 111 AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent. G.R. No. 145391
Auu!" #$, #%%#
&ACTS' Two Cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas Tarlac as a result of a vehicular accident involving two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for Reckless mprudence Resulting in !amage to "roperty. #hile on the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for $uasi%delict. The criminal case was on its preliminary investigation stage when the civil case was filed. &pon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum%shopping, the MCTC dismiss dismissed ed the civil civil case. case. Casupan Casupanan an and Capitul Capitulo o filed filed Motion Motion for Reconsi Reconsidera deration tion insisting that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. MCTC !enied the Motion. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court 'RTC( of Capas, Tarlac and the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
ISSUE' #hether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for $uasi%delict against the private complainant in the criminal case
(ELD' )*+ &nder +ection of the present Rule , the independent civil action in Articles -, --, -/ and 01 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in +ection of the present Rule refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised "enal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 01 of the Civil Code. These two actions arose from the
same act or omission but have different causes of action. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability e2%delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for $uasi%delict3without violating the rule on non%forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other and the civil action re$uires only preponderance of evidence. #hat is prohibited is for a party to recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action as clearly stated in +ection - Rule . The accused in the criminal case can file a civil action for $uasi%delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the said criminal case. This is e2pressly allowed in paragraph 1, +ection of the present Rule which states that the counterclaim of the accused 4may be litigated in a separate civil action.4 This is only fair for two reasons. 5irst, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. f the accused does not file a separate civil action for $uasi%delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for $uasi%delict is filed. Thus, the civil action based on $uasi%delict filed separately separately by Casupanan Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of the Civil Case on the ground of forum% shopping is erroneous.
same act or omission but have different causes of action. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability e2%delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for $uasi%delict3without violating the rule on non%forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other and the civil action re$uires only preponderance of evidence. #hat is prohibited is for a party to recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action as clearly stated in +ection - Rule . The accused in the criminal case can file a civil action for $uasi%delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the said criminal case. This is e2pressly allowed in paragraph 1, +ection of the present Rule which states that the counterclaim of the accused 4may be litigated in a separate civil action.4 This is only fair for two reasons. 5irst, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. f the accused does not file a separate civil action for $uasi%delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for $uasi%delict is filed. Thus, the civil action based on $uasi%delict filed separately separately by Casupanan Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of the Civil Case on the ground of forum% shopping is erroneous.
SPS. BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE C AROLINE SIO) C(ING TENG, petitioners, vs.
VICENTE BALBOA, respondent. G.R. No. 15*1++
anua- #*, #%%*
&ACTS' 6icente 7alboa filed cases against +pouses 7enito Lo 7un Tiong and Caroline +iok Ching Teng. 8ne for Civil case for +um of Money based on - checks issued by Caroline before RTC Manila, and another for a Criminal Case of 6iolation of 7.". covering the same checks before MTC Manila. The RTC found the spouses liable and ordered them to pay the amount. 8n the other hand hand,, the the MTC ac$u ac$uitt itted ed Carol Caroline ine but but held held her civill civilly y liabl liable. e. 8n appe appeal, al, the the RTC RTC modified the decision of MTC by deleting the award of damages. 9erein petitioners contends that the act of 6icente 7alboa constitutes forum shopping by filing both criminal and civil case against them.
ISSUE' #hether or not the act of 7alboa filing both civil and criminal action constitute forum shopping
(ELD' :8. +ection Rule states that ;when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recov recovery ery of civil civil liabi liabilit lity y is implie impliedly dly instit institut uted ed with with the the crimi crimina nall action action,, unles unless s the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action<. &nder the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless= '( there is an e2press waiver of the civil action, or '( there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or '-( the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint. +ince respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case :o. >0%?@ may proceed independently of Criminal Cases :os. 00@01 to 0?, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.
OSE S. CANCIO, C ANCIO, R., -/0-/!/n"/d ROBERTO L. CANCIO, 0/"2"2on/-, !. EMERENCIANA ISIP, -/!0ond/n". G.R. No. 1339+*
No//- 1#, #%%#
&ACTS' 9erein "etitioner, assisted by a "rivate "rosecutor filed - cases of 6iolation of 7.". 7.". and - cases of *stafa against *merenciana sip for allegedly issuing - checks with insuff insufficie icient nt funds. funds. The The 8ffice 8ffice of the "rovinci "rovincial al "rosec "rosecutor utor dismissed dismissed one case case and proceeded with counts of 6iolation of 7.". . The cases were dismissed by MTC "ampanga on the ground of ;failure to prosecute<. Meanwhile, - cases of *stafa were filed with RTC "ampanga. After failure to present its nd witness, prosecution moved to dismiss the case against the accused but reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. The trial court granted the motion without preudice to the refilling of the civil aspect of the cases. "etitioner filed the instant case for Collection of the +um of Money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subect to the *stafa cases. *merenciana sip filed a Motion to !ismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Budicata and that Cancio be held in contempt of court for forum shopping. Trial court granted the Motion.
ISSUE' #hether or not the dismissal of the *stafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subect of the estafa cases
(ELD' :8 An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender= . Civil Civil liability liability e2 delict delicto, o, under under Artic Article le of the R"C R"C . ndepen ndependent dent civil civil liabil liabilitie ities, s, such such as those= those= a. not arising arising from from an act act or omission omission complained complained of as as felonyD felonyD or b. where the the inured party is granted a right to file file an action action independent independent and distinct from the criminal action. &nder &nder the the prese present nt Rules Rules,, the civil civil liabil liability ity e2%d e2%deli elict cto o is deeme deemed d insti institut tuted ed with with the criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence.
8ne of the elements of Res Budicata is identity of causes of action. n the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. CancioEs cause of action is the respondentEs breach of the contractual obligation. There is also no forum%shopping. The essence of forum%shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favourable udgment. Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for *stafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum%shopping in the instant case because the law e2pressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. "etition is Franted and the case was Remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
P(ILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE O& T(E P(ILIPPINES, respondent G.R. No. 14++%3
A0-2 14, #%%4
&ACTS' :apoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of Reckless mprudence Resulting to Triple 9omicide, Multiple "hysical nuries and !amage to "roperty and was sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment and payment of damages to the victims. The court further ruled that in the event of insolvency of the accused, the employer, "hilippine Rabbit 7us Lines shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. The accused, :apoleon Roman, through his counsel filed a :otice of Appeal which was denied by the Court as the accused umped bail and remains at large. +imultaneously, herein "etitioner filed its :otice of Appeal from the udgment of the trial court which the Court gave due course but was later on denied by 8+F.
ISSUE' #hether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused% employee, may appeal the udgment of conviction independently of the accused
(ELD' :8 #hen the accused%employee absconds or umps bail, the udgment meted out becomes final and e2ecutory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the udgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. 7oth the primary civil liability of the accused%employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and e2ecutory. +ection Rule provides that 4#hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.< 8nly the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action. The subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article
- of the Revised "enal Code may be enforced by e2ecution on the basis of the udgment of conviction meted out to the employee. 9erein petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. #hile they may assist their employees to the e2tent of supplying the latterEs lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fi2ed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final udgment rendered by a competent court. Moreoved, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latterEs consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the udgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formerEs civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee
ABS6CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPE7, R., AUGUSTO ALMEDA6LOPE7, and OSCAR M. LOPE7, petitioners, vs.
O&&ICE O& T(E OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,G E8EUIEL B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V. GON7ALES, and SALVADOR :BUDDY; TAN ,G respondent. G.R. No. 13334+
O<"o/- 15, #%%*
&ACTS' This case stems from an all too familiar chapter in "hilippine history, the declaration of martial law by then "resident 5erdinand Marcos and the simultaneous se$uestration of not a few private corporations, including one of the petitioners herein, A7+%C7: 7roadcasting Corporation 'A7+%C7:( The day after the declaration of martial law, ust before midnight, military troops arrived at the A7+%C7: 7roadcast Center ordering the closure of all radio and television stations in the country. #hen it became apparent that petitioners would not be granted a permit to re%open, A7+%C7: terminated all its employees giving them their retirement benefits. At the same time, *ugenio LopeH also wrote to Buan "once *nrile e2pressing his desire to sell the network to the government but he was later on arrested by the military. After such proposal to sell to the government did not materialiHe, A7+%C7: started doing negotiations with other companies. 8n Bune >0-, Ianlaon 7roadcasting +ystem J an umbrella corporation of which operated T6 Channel > % were consumed by fire. Respondent 7enedicto was one of the principal stock holders of R": and at the same time was the Chairperson of the 7oard of !irectors for A7+%C7:. 9e then relayed his plan to temporarily use A7+%C7:Es broadcast studios to operate T6 > until the burnt studio is fi2ed. The parties was not able to arrive at an agreement in terms of monthly rentals. The petitioners met and discussed with respondents the fi2ing of rental rate and having failed to do so, wrote a demand letter to respondents for the payment of rentals. n Bune >?1, "resident CoraHon A$uino, acting on the re$uest of A7+%C7: through +enator TaKada, returned to A7+%C7: the radio and T6 stations on a gradual and scheduled basis. As re$uired by the 8mbudsman, the respondents, e2cept for Farcia, filed their respective counter%affidavits, with 7enedicto adopting that of FonHales, denying petitioners charges. Thereafter, with the issues having been oined, the 8mbudsman issued the herein assailed Boint Resolution dismissing petitioners complaints. To the 8mbudsman, the following circumstances did not give rise to probable cause necessary to indict respondents for the various felonies charged. 8n April >>> and Bune , the respective counsels for respondents Tan and 7enedicto filed a :otice of !eath and !ismissal of the Case
ISSUE' #hether or not separate civil action can be filed by filing an action for recovery
(ELD' )*+ The civil action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of obligation provided in Article @0 of the Civil Code. n such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused founded on other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a separate civil action. n other words, civil liability based solely on the criminal action is e2tinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in the same criminal action. The civil liability of respondents 7enedicto and Tan hinging on the charged criminal acts herein was e2tinguished upon their death. 7ut other civil liabilities founded on other sources of obligations under Article @0 of the Civil Code may still be prosecuted either against the estate of the deceased if based on contract or against the e2ecutors and administrators of the deceaseds estate if based on $uasi%delict. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. #here the civil liability survives, an action for recovery may be pursued filing a separate civil action. "etition is hereby !+M++*!. Roberto +. 7enedicto and +alvador Tan are dropped as private respondents without preudice to the filing of separate civil actions against their respective estates.
Sa!on C=2n ! Ca-2"a N2
A00/a! 5ACT+ 8ctober 1, >>0 % "etitioner Ching instituted criminal complaints against respondent Clarita :icado for violations of 7" , and that even after the latter received a notice of dishonor from the drawee bank, the accused failed to pay the value of the check in the amount of ,,., or to make arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the same. +imultaneously, / other criminal complaints for the same offense was filed against respondent by *mma :uguid, the checks this time amounting to @,.. Respondent pleaded not guilty to all charges. The cases were thus consolidated. The MCTC convicted the respondent, declaring that the conviction of respondent :icdao was warranted. t stressed that the mere act of issuing a worthless check was malum prohibitumD hence, even if the checks were issued in the form of deposit or guarantee, once dishonored, the same gave rise to the prosecution for and conviction of 7" . 8n appeal, the Regional Trial Court of !inalupihan, 7ataan, 7ranch @, in separate !ecisions both dated May , >>>, affirmed in toto the decisions of the MCTC convicting respondent :icdao of and / counts of violation of 7" . The CA however, reversed the decision and ac$uitted respondent based on evidence alluding to the fact that the assailed checks had not been delivered to petitioner, because it was in fact stolen from the premises of respondent. '+ee +ection @, :egotiable nstruments Law( The instant petition is limited solely to the civil aspect of the case, as petitioner Ching argues that nothwithstanding respondent :icdaos ac$uittal in the 7" criminal case, she should be held liable to pay petitioner the amount of the dishonored checks to the total amount of ,>@,.. "etitioner Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent :icdaoEs ac$uittal by the CA, the +upreme Court has the urisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability. 9e invokes +ection , Rule of the Revised Rules of Court. 9e theoriHes that under +ection , Rule of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action for the recovery of damages under Articles -, --, -/, and 01 arising from the same act or omission of the accused is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. ++&* #hether civil liability arises despite the ac$uittal of the accused in an alleged violation of 7"
9*L! n the immediate case, the +upreme Court held that respondent cannot be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. As a general rule, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. &nder the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. 5rom the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent :icdaoEs ac$uittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action. n +apiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not e2tinguished by ac$uittal= 'a( where the ac$uittal is based on reasonable doubt, as a mere preponderance of evidence is re$uired in civil casesD 'b( where the court e2pressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in natureD and 'c( where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is ac$uitted. Applying this principle in the immediate case, the court thus finds= •
•
•
The CAEs ac$uittal of respondent :icdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penaliHed under 7" . n particular, the CA found that the ",,. check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent :icdao to petitioner Ching. n ac$uitting respondent :icdao, the CA did not adudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. n fact, the CA e2plicitly stated that she had already fully paid her obligations. The CA computed the payments made by respondent :icdao vis% %vis her loan obligations. 8n the other hand, its finding relative to the ",,. check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent :icdao of any civil liability thereon as well. #hile petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent :icdaoEs liability did not arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was ac$uitted 'e2 delicto( but from her loan obligations to him 'e2 contractu(, however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the e2istence of these unpaid loan obligations. +ignificantly, it can be inferred from the following findings of the CA in its decision ac$uitting respondent :icdao that the act or omission from which her civil liability may arise did not e2ist.
Sonn Ro/-o Do2nu/? V!. P/o0/ o> "=/ P=22002n/!, I!a/a Padua, R/2na B-/2!, M2n/-a Mon"/! and O>/2a B/ando B-/2! 5ACT+= 8n April , >>, at around noon, the BC Liner driven by petitioner and the Apego ta2i driven by Bimmy "adua collided along Fovernor Bose 5uentebella 9ighway at 7arangay 9ibago, 8campo, Camarines +ur. Conse$uentially, petitioner was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical inuries with damage to property in the MTC of 8campo, Camarines +ur. After trial on the merits, the MTC ac$uitted petitioner of the crime charged. "etitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of "-,@/,> by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity. The RTC affirmed the decision in toto. &pon appealing to the CA, the petitioner contends that his ac$uittal should have freed him from the payment of civil liability. The CA disagreed, claiming that the ac$uittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily e2tinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final udgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not e2ist. ++&*= #hether or not herein petitioner should be held to face civil liability 9*L!= )es. The +upreme Court concurred that petitioner was ac$uitted not because he did not commit the crime charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. "ut differently, petitioner was ac$uitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 9owever, his civil liability for the death, inuries and damages arising from the collision is another matter. #hile petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. n other words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate 'and is in fact compatible with( a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.
a2/ U. Go!2a>?@00 and >>?@0? for "?,,. and ",. respectively. The checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against !7+ 7ank Makati 9ead 8ffice branch. A+7, through a letter dated - March , acknowledged that it owed petitioner the abovementioned amounts. &pon maturity of the A+7 checks, petitioner went to the !7+ 7ank +an Buan 7ranch to deposit the two '( checks. 9owever, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of funds. "etitioner informed respondents, through letters dated 1 and April , about the dishonor of the checks and demanded replacement checks or the return of the money placement but to no avail. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation of 7.". 7lg. before the Metropolitan Trial Court of +an Buan against the private respondents. Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching denied liability and claimed that she was a mere employee of A+7. +he asserted that she did not have knowledge as to how much money A+7 had in the banks. +uch responsibility, she claimed belonged to another department. 8n ? 5ebruary , the MTC ac$uitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not absolve her from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of A+7, was civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks. The RTC subse$uently absolved Ching from civil liability. 8n > Buly 1, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and stated that the amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to A+7 and not to Ching. ++&*= A. #hether or not an officer of a corporation who signed a bouncing check civilly liable under 7" 7. #hether or not the petitioner may implead a uridical entity in a 7" case 9*L!= A. )es. #hen a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on presentment. Moreover, the
personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his personal act. The third paragraph of +ection of 7" states= 4#here the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.4 n theory the 7" criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. 7" itself fused this criminal liability of the signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability not from the corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf. "rior to the amendments to the rules on criminal procedure, it clearly was permissible to pursue the criminal liability against the signatory, while going after the corporation itself for the civil liability. 9owever, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal liability attaching to the bounced check be pursued ointly, the previous option to directly pursue the civil liability against the person who incurred the civil obligationJthe corporation itselfJis no longer that clear. n theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case for 7.". 7lg. should not affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same check, since such implied institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the corporation. 7. A basic ma2im in statutory construction is that the interpretation of penal laws is strictly construed against the +tate and liberally construed against the accused. :owhere in 7.". 7lg. is it provided that a uridical person may be impleaded as an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the litigation of the civil aspect thereof. :onetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations against a debtor%corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure. Technically, nothing in +ection 'b( of Rule prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the uridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. #hat the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil action against the natural person charged with violating 7.". 7lg. , including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.
N/0u, In<. !. E/n O-/!o 5ACT+= 8n > 8ctober >>>, the trial court promulgated its udgment ac$uitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were present during such promulgation. 8n :ovember >>>, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Budgment. Considering that 0 :ovember >>> was a +aturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on > :ovember >>>, a Monday 8n ? Banuary , a 5riday, petitioner received its copy of the / Banuary 8rder of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitionerEs Motion for Reconsideration. 8n - Banuary , a Monday, petitioner filed its ? Banuary :otice of Appeal from the Budgment. 8n the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its ? Banuary Amended :otice of Appeal. The RTC refused to give due course to petitionerEs :otice of Appeal and Amended :otice of Appeal. t accepted respondentEs arguments that the Budgment from which the appeal was being taken had become final, because the :otice of Appeal and the Amended :otice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The @%day period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the !ecision sought to be reviewed. ++&*= #hether or not the period from which a private offended party may appeal from the civil aspect of a udgment in a civil action should be reckoned from the date of receipt of a written notice of udgment 9*L!= :o. 9ad it been the accused who appealed, the Court could have easily ruled that the reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted from the promulgation of the udgment. n n "eople v. Tamani, the Court held that the reglementary period should start from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the udgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a conse$uence of the service of the notice of the decision. 9owever, this ruling does not find application in this case, because it is the offended party which appealed only the civil aspect of the case. The Rules on Criminal "rocedure deleted the re$uirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles -,0 --,? -/> and 01- of the Civil
Code shall remain 4separate, distinct and independent4 of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se 'civil liability e2 delicto(, but not those liabilities from $uasi%delicts, contracts or $uasi%contracts. n fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the e2 delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may %% subect to the control of the prosecutor %% still intervene in the criminal action in order to protect such remaining civil interest therein. And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do= to appeal the civil liability arising from the crime %% the civil liability e2 delicto. 7eing in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings brought to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the e2ercise of the latterEs original urisdiction. Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of appeal. An appeal by virtue of such notice shall be filed within @ days from notice of the udgment or final order appealed from. 5or the private offended party, this rule then forecloses the counting of the period to appeal from the 4promulgation4 of the udgment to the accused. "etitioner posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the Budgment, for 4the parties would always need a written reference or a copy Othereof whichP they can review or refer to from time to time.4 f petitioner or its counsel had never been notified of the Budgment, then the period for appeal would never have run. True, no law re$uires the offended party to attend the promulgation, much less to secure a copy of the decision on that date. 7ut fiction must yield to reality. 7y mere presence, the offended party was already actually notified of the !ecision of ac$uittal and should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that a timely appeal be filed. 7esides, all that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal %% a brief statement of its intention to elevate the trial courtEs !ecision to the CA. There was no reason why it could not have done so within @ days after actually knowing the adverse Budgment during the promulgation. "arties and their counsels are presumed to be vigilant in protecting their interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay and without resort to technicalities.
Pau2no S. A!2o !. P/o0/ o> "=/ P=22002n/! and S0ou!/! V2!2"a<2on and C/!a- C. Boa!2 5ACT+= +pouses 7ombasi filed a criminal complaint against :agcarlan, Laguna Mayor Comendador, Municipal Administrator "aulino Asilo and Municipal "lanning and !evelopment Coordinator Alberto +. Angeles for violation of +ec. -'e( of Republic Act :o. -> otherwise known as the 4Anti%Fraft and Corrupt "ractices Act4 before the 8ffice of the 8mbudsman. &pon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas of 4:ot Fuilty.4 !uring the pendency of the case, Comendador and Angeles died. 8n ? April -, the +andiganbayan rendered a decision finding Comendador and Asilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Asilo contends that there is no liability when a public officer commits in good faith an error of udgment. The counsel of the late mayor alleges that the death of the latter totally e2tinguished both criminal and civil liability. ++&*= #hether or not the death of an accused e2tinguished civil liability in connection with the criminal act 9*L!= :o. The death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have e2tinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed. 9owever, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation, the law on human relations. Art. - of the Civil Code states= #hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. n this case, there was a violation of the right of the spouses 7ombasi to their property when the accused public officials failed to accord due process of law in demolishing the improvements made on the contested property, which was subect to e2ecution by the local government. 7efore the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. +ection 'd(, Rule -> of the Rules of Court provides= 'd( Removal of improvements on property subect of e2ecution. J #hen the property subect of e2ecution contains improvements constructed or planted by the udgment
obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements e2cept upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the udgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fi2ed by the court. The above%stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. f demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a special order of demolition. This special need for a court order even if an eectment case has successfully been litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no case was even filed by the municipality. The re$uirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of ustice and fair play. t frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the e2ecution of an otherwise legitimate act. t is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every person must, in the e2ercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with ustice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. :otably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner 6ictoria who specified in her petition that she has 4substituted him as petitioner in the above captioned case.4 +ection , Rule of the >?@ Rules in Criminal "rocedure mentioned in 7ayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the +andiganbayan was correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it although their consolidation was erroneously based on +ection / of "residential !ecree :o. 11 which deals with civil liability 4arising from the offense charged.4
&-an<2! "=/ P=22002n/! and E/na M. L2-oo 5ACT+= An information for perury was filed against the petitioner 5rancisco Magestrado with MeTC of QueHon City for allegedly e2ecuting an Affidavit of Loss before :otary "ublic falsely alleging that he lost 8wnerEs !uplicate of TCT :o. :%0-1-, which document was used in support of petition for issuance of :ew 8wnerEs !uplictae Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of QueHon City, to which Magestrado signed and swore its verification. The property subect of Transfer Certificate of Title :o. :%0-1- was mortgaged to complainant Libroa as collateral for loan amounting to "0@?, -/./ and as a conse$uence of which, said title to the property was surrender by him to Libroa. Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on preudicial $uestion. "etitioner alleged that a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the RTC of QueHon City, 7ranch ?/ and a case for cancellation of Mortgage, !elivery of Title and !amages pending before RTC of QueHon City, 7ranch 00, must be resolved first since the said civil cases are similarly or intimately related to the issues raised in criminal action. MeTC denied the motion for suspension and a motion for reconsideration was filed but was also denied. ++&*= #8: a preudicial $uestion e2ists to warrant the suspension of criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases. 9*L!= The +upreme court ruled negatively. 5or a civil action to be considered preudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following re$uisites must be present= '( the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be basedD '( in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determinedD and '-( urisdiction to try said $uestion must be lodged in another tribunal. A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that civil cases pending before RTC%7ranch 00 and RTC%7ranch ?/, are principally for the determination of whether a
loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner e2ecuted a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT :o. :%0-1-. 8n the other hand, criminal before MeTC%7ranch /-, involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perury in e2ecuting an affidavit of loss to support his re$uest for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT :o. :%0-1-. t is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his e2ecution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently e2ecuted a false affidavit of loss of TCT :o. :%0-1-.
EDDIE B. SABANDAL VS. (ON. &ELIPE S. TONGCO
&ACTS' "etitioner *ddie +abandal, who entered into a memorandum of agreement on dealership with respondent "hilippines Today, nc. for the distribution of the newspaper "hilippines Today, was charged with violation of 7atas "ambansa 7lg. for issuing dishonored checks to the respondent in payment for the deliveries made. Three years later, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, :egros 8ccidental at 9imamaylan, a complaint against "hilippines Today, nc. for specific performance, recovery of overpayment and damages. And a motion to suspend trial in the criminal cases against him based on a preudicial $uestion was also filed. The trial court denied petitioners motion to suspend trial based on a preudicial $uestion.
ISSUE' #8: a preudicial $uestion e2ists to warrant the suspension of the trial of the criminal cases for violation of 7atas "ambansa 7ilang against petitioner until after the resolution of the civil action for specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and damages.
(ELD' :o preudicial $uestion e2ists. The two '( essential elements of a preudicial $uestion are= 'a( the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal actionD and 'b( the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The issue in the criminal cases for violation of 7atas "ambansa 7ilang is whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages is whether complainant +abandal overpaid his obligations to "hilippines Today, nc. f, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense.
Ru/ 111 Ca!/ 1$ In"/-a"/d Ba- o> "=/ P=22002n/!, -/0-/!/n"/d 2"! Na"2ona P-/!2d/n", o!/ An!/o I. Cad2?, (. (ARRY L. ROUE, and OEL RUI7 BUTUYAN, P/"2"2on/-! V!. Mao- o!/ L2"o A"2/n?a, R/!0ond/n" GR. No. 1+5#41, &/-ua- #%, #%1% &a<"!' 7", through its then :ational "resident Bose Anselmo CadiH 'CadiH(, filed with the 8ffice of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola 7ridge. Respondent issued a permit allowing the 7" to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein "laHa Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola 7ridge. Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA%F.R. +" :o. >/>/>. The petition having been unresolved within / hours from its filing, petitioners filed before +upreme Court a petition for certiorari which assailed the appellate courtEs inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the "ublic Assembly Act of >?@. n the pendency of the case, the rally pushed through at Mendiola 7ridge. The M"! thereupon instituted a criminal action against CadiH for violating the "ublic Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge CadiH filed a Counter%Affidavit. "etitioners argued that the issues presented in CA%F.R. +" :o. >/>/> pose a preudicial $uestion to the criminal case against CadiH.
I!!u/' =/"=/- o- no" 2" 2! 0-o0/- >o- "=/ Su0-// Cou-" "o -/!o/ 0-/ud2<2a Fu/!"2on "=-ou= a 0/"2"2on >o-
$uestion should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before this Court in an appeal from the civil action.
Ru/ 11#, Ca!/ 3 RUT( D. BAUTISTA, petitioaner, vs. COURT O& APPEALS, O&&ICE O& T(E REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION IV, and SUSAN ALOA, respondents. GR. No. 1433+5, u $, #%%1 &a<"!' "rivate respondent filed a complaint%affidavit with the City "rosecutor of Cavite City, charging petitioner for violation of 7". The investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner for violation of 7" , which was approved by the City "rosecutor. "etitioner filed with the 8ffice of the Regional +tate "rosecutor '8R+"( for Region 6 a petition for review of the resolution, which was denied. Then after, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 8R+" also denied. The denied motion was then appealed to the Court of Appeals for review, however, CA issued a resolution denying due course outright and dismissing the petition.
I!!u/' =/"=/- o- no" 0/"2"2on >o- -/2/@ o> d/<2!2on! >-o ORSP "o C A 2! 0-o0/-. (/d' :o. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule /of the >>0 Rules of Civil "rocedure. Rule /- applies to 4appeals from udgments or final orders of the Court of Ta2 Appeals and from awards, udgments, final orders or resolutions of or authoriHed by any $uasi% udicial agency in the e2ercise of $uasi%udicial functions.4 "etitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a $uasi%udicial function. 7ut this statement holds true only in the sense that, like $uasi% udicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the e2ecutive department e2ercising powers akin to those of a court. 9ere is where the similarity ends. A $uasi%udicial body has been defined as 4an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adudication or rule%making.< "reliminary investigation is merely in$uisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. t is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose e2cept that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. #hile the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a $uasi%court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass udgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Ru/ 11# Ca!/ 4 &ERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT O(N SOBREPEA, and RA&AEL PERE7 DE TAGLE, R., P/"2"2on/-! V!. ILSON GO, R/!0ond/n". GR. No. 15$%*1, O<"o/- 19, #%%5 &a<"!' Respondent filed a Complaint%Affidavit for estafa against petitioners before the 8ffice of the City "rosecutor of "asig City against petitioners as officers of 5*". After the preliminary investigation, the City "rosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa. This dismissal was appealed to the +ecretary of Bustice, which rendered a decision modifying the prosecutorEs decision and directed said officer to file an information of estafa against the petitioners. "etitioners then filed a petition for review under Rule /- concerning the resolution of the +ecretary of Bustice in modifying the decision of the prosecutor.
I!!u/' =/"=/- o- no" a 0/"2"2on >o- -/2/@ und/- Ru/ 43 2! a 0-o0/- od/ o> a00/a >-o a -/!ou"2on o> "=/ S/<-/"a- o> u!"2>0 Rules of Civil "rocedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Ta2 Appeals or $uasi%udicial agencies in the e2ercise of their $uasi%udicial functions. The !epartment of Bustice is not among the agencies enumerated in +ection of Rule /-. nclusio unius est e2clusio alterius. +ince the !8B is not a $uasi%udicial body which perform adudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as udgments of a court, and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule /-, the resolution of the
+ecretary of Bustice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule /-. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitionerEs petition for review. Though some case describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as $uasi%udicial in nature, this is true only to the e2tent that, like $uasi% udicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the e2ecutive department e2ercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.
Rule
P/o0/ o> "=/ P=22002n/! ! u2!a
5ACT+=
8n !ecember ?, , the 8ffice of the City "rosecutor of Makati City issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of +ection of Republic Act :o. 'RA(01 otherwise known as the 4+pecial "rotection of Children Against *2ploitation and !iscrimination Act.4 Conse$uently an information was filed before the RTC on Banuary , -. 8n April , -, petitioner moved for the $uashal of the nformation against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. n support of her motion, petitioner pointed out that the resolution issued by the 8C"%Makati was penned by Assistant City "rosecutor approved by +enior Assistant City "rosecutor while the information penned by AC" without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that AC" has prior written authority or approval from the City "rosecutor in filing the said nformation. n this regard petitioner claimed that nothing in the aforesaid resolution and information would show that the AC" andSor +AC" had prior written authority or approval from the City "rosecutor to file or approve the filing of the nformation against her. As such, the nformation must be $uashed for being tainted with a urisdictional defect that cannot be cured. its Comment and 8pposition,the 8C"%Makaticountered that the review prosecutor, was authoriHed to approve the resolution pursuant to 8C"%Makati 8ffice 8rder :o.-.5urther, it maintained that the "abatid +akdal was filed with the prior approval of the City "rosecutor as shown in the Certification in the nformation itself.
++&*=
#hether or not Motion to Quash of the information should be dismissed.
9*L!= :8 +ection /, Rule of the Revised Rules on Criminal "rocedure states that the filing of a complaint or information re$uires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts, Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authoriHed officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subect to $uashal pursuant to +ection - 'd(, Rule 0 of the same Rules. 9ere, aside from the bare and self%serving Certification, there was no proof that AC" !e La CruH was authoriHed to file the information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City "rosecutor of Makati had authoriHed AC" !e La CruH to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of 8C"%Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that AC" !e La CruH sought the approval of either the City "rosecutor or any of those authoriHed pursuant to 8C"%Makati 8ffice 8rder :o. - in filing the information. 9ence, the "abatid +akdal must be $uashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
P/o0/ ! Ga->2n
5ACT+= 8n Bune , , private respondent was charged with violation of +ection 'a( in relation to +ections >'b( and ?'e( of Republic Act :o. ??, otherwise known as the 4+ocial +ecurity Act,4 in an information. The information contains a certification signed by +tate "rosecutor Romulo +B. Tolentino. The case was raffled to 7ranch > of the Regional Trial Court of :aga City presided by respondent udge 9on. Ueida Aurora 7. Farfin. 8n +eptember /, , accused +erafin +aballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre%trial. Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as re$uired under +ection /, Rule of the Revised Rules of Court. The "eople, through +tate "rosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition, against which the accused filed a reoinder. The people filed a reply to the reoinder on !ecember , . A reoinder was filed by the accused on Banuary , . After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first $uestioned 8rder dated 5ebruary 1, . A motion for reconsideration was filed by the "eople contending that as a special prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to handle +++ cases within Region 6, +tate "rosecutor Tolentino is authoriHed to file the information involving violations of the +++ law without need of prior approval from the city prosecutor. 8n April -, , respondent udge issued the second $uestioned 8rder.
++&* = #hether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as an obection before arraignment.
9*L!= :8 The provisions in the Revised Rules of Criminal "rocedure that demand illumination are +ections - and > of Rule 0 in relation to paragraph -, +ection / of Rule , to wit=
Rule 0, +ection -. Frounds.3The accused may move to $uash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds= 'a( That the facts charged do not constitute an offenseD 'b( That the court trying the case has no urisdiction over the offense chargedD 'c( That the court trying the case has no urisdiction over the person of the accusedD 'd( That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do soD 'e( That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed formD 'f( That more than one offense is charged e2cept when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by lawD 'g( That the criminal action or liability has been e2tinguishedD 'h( That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal e2cuse or ustificationD and 'i( That the accused has been previously convicted or ac$uitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his e2press consent.
+ection >. 5ailure to move to $uash or to allege any ground therefor.3The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to $uash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to $uash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any obections e2cept those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs 'a(, 'b(, 'g(, and 'i( of section - of this Rule. 'emphasis supplied(
Rule , +ection /, paragraph - provides, viH= :o complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the 8mbudsman or his deputy. 'emphasis supplied(
"rivate respondent and the 8+F take the position that the lack of prior authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court from ac$uiring urisdiction over the case. +ince lack of urisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an obection anytime even after arraignment, the respondent udge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss based on this ground.
AAA, PETITIONER VS. (ON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, IN (IS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING UDGE, BRANC( #+, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN &ERNANDO CITY, LA UNION AND ENGR. AIME O. AR7ADON, RESPONDENTS &ACTS' "etitioner AAA worked as a secretary at the ArHadon Automotive and Car +ervice Center. 8n May 0, , on her way out she saw ArHadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. 9e told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, through threat and force, she was raped by the accused. 8n Buly /, , petitioner filed a complaint for rape against AHarcon. The Assistant City "rosecutor issued Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of information for rape. 8n March @, -, the petitioner filed another Affidavit% Complaint with a comprehensive account of rape incident which was assigned to nd Assistant "rovincial prosecutor. As per Resolution of the investigating prosecutors, there is a prima facie case of rape e2ists and recommending the filing of information. AHarcon moved for reconsideration to review the case which was denied by panel of prosecutors. The accused appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors before the !epartment of Bustice. The Acting +ecretary of Bustice then issued Resolution directing the withdrawal of the nformation because of absence of probable cause for rape incident. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and the +ecretary of Bustice reversed the Resolution of then Acting +ecretary of Bustice and issued another Resolution that probable cause e2ists. The respondent Budge Carbonell directed the petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand. 9owever, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently established the e2istence of probable cause. The nformation for rape was filed before the RTC, 7ranch 0, +an 5ernando. La &nion which was later transferred the venue to RTC of Manila 7ranch @ upon re$uest of the petitioner. Meanwhile, the respondent Budge Carbonell issued an 8rder dismissing the criminal case for lack of probable cause and denying the petitionerEs motion for reconsideration. The dismissal of criminal case was based on the ground that the petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply his orders to take the witness stand. 9e claims that under +ection , Article of the >?0 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue e2cept
upon probable cause 4to be determined personally by the udge after e2amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.4 9ence, this petition.
ISSUES ' '( #hether or not the respondent Budge Carbonell is correct in dismissing the criminal case because of the failure of the petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand which constitutes lack of probable causeD '( #hether or not the respondent Budge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case :o. 1>?- for lack of probable cause.
(ELD' :o. n Soliven v. Makasiar , the Court e2plained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily re$uire the udge to personally e2amine the complainant and her witnesses. nstead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and re$uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. #e reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon , where we held that before issuing warrants of arrest, udges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. n doing so, udges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the e2istence of probable cause. They ust personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. t is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary in$uiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the udge. The preliminary investigation proper J whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged J is the function of the investigating prosecutor. n 8kabe vs. Gutierrez , the Court stressed that if the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal e2amination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted. t is clear therefore that respondent Budge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in dismissing Criminal Case :o. 1>?- for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand considering that there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause.
Su0-// Cou-" o> "=/ P=22002n/! $4% P=2. $#% T(IRD DIVISION G.R. No. 1*#$++, Auu!" %3, #%1% OSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, PETITIONER VS. (ON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, (ON. RAUL M. GON7ALE7, (ON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, (EIRS O& T(E LATE RA&AEL DE LAS ALAS, RESPONDENTS. &ACTS' "etitioner was, by nformation of Banuary 1, 0, arrested without warrant and charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court 'RTC( of Makati City, 7ranch @. After petitioner posted a "/, cash bond which the trial court approved, he was released from detention. 8n the other hand, the private complainants%heirs of !e las Alas filed an &rgent 8mnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re%e2amine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The petitioner filed an &rgent *2%parte Manifestation and Motion to defer acting on the public prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for inunctive reliefs and to defer action on the admission of the Amended nformation. The trial court nonetheless admitted the Amended nformation for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. "etitioner $uestioned these two orders via supplemental petition before the appellate court which the latter dismissed. The petitioner, in his present petition, posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an investigation or re%evaluation of the case e2cept through a petition for review before the !epartment of Bustice '!8B(. n cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.
ISSUE' #hether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without warrant the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs to the accused.
(ELD' :o. +ection 1, Rule of the Rules of Court reads= ;#hen a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which re$uires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an in$uest has been conducted in accordance with e2isting rules. n the absence or unavailability of an in$uest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. 7efore the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article @ of the Revised "enal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. :otwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen '@( days from its inception. After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five '@( days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.< 5urther, the Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation. n such an instance, before a re%investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. n Abugotal v. Judge iro case, the Court held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation, the Court therein recogniHed that a trial court may, where the interest of ustice so re$uires, grant a motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it.
Ca!/ D2/!" ELVIRA ONG, 0/"2"2on/-, V!. OSE CASIM GENIO, -/!0ond/n". GR. NO. 1*#33$ DECEMBER #3, #%%9 &ACTS' "etitioner 8ng filed a criminal complaint against respondent Fenio for the crime of Robbery, for taking divesting and carrying away the kitchen and canteen e$uipment as well as her personal things worth "0, ., which was dismissed by the City "rosecutor of Makati City on Banuary 1. 9owever, pursuant to a resolution, the !epartment of Bustice charge the respondent of the same crime. 8n !ecember @, 1, the RTC of Makati 7ranch @1 dismissed the case because the other elements of the crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things were not specifically alleged in the nformation filed against Fenio. !espite the dismissal of the case, 8ng filed for a partial motion for reconsideration and it was granted by the RTC. The lower court also dismissed the case for the lack of probable cause to section 1'a(, Rule and held that the evidence on record failed to establish probable cause to charge respondent with the crime of Robbery. +ubse$uently, 8ng filed filed a motion for reconsideration claiming RTC erred in relying on +ec. 1'a( of Rule since the said provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and it does not cover the determination of the probable cause for the filing of the nformation against Fenio, which is e2ecutive in nature, primarily vested in the "ublic "rosecutor.
Again, a motion for reconsideration was filed by 8ng but the RTC denied her motion for holding that the aforementioned provision authoriHes the RTC to evaluate not only the Resolution of the prosecutor who conducted preliminary investigation and eventually filed the nformation in Court, but also the evidence upon which the Resolution was based. n the event that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, the RTC may dismiss the case. Aggrieved, 8ng files a petition for certiorari and mandamus before Court of Appeals. The appellate court observed that the "eople of the "hilippines was impleaded as petitioner without showing the 8ffice of +olicitor FeneralEs '8+F( participation. 9ence, CA ordered 8ng to furnish a copy of the petition and latter to comment thereon. Conse$uently, the 8+F filed its Comment taking the stand that only 8+F can bring or defend actions on behalf of the "eople of the "hilippines filed before the CA or the +upreme Court. The 8+F submitted that, for being fatally defective, the said petition should be dismissed in so far as the criminal aspect was concerned, without preudice to the right of petition to pursue the civil aspect of the case.
CA rendered its Resolution, dismissing the case without preudice to the filing of the petition on the civil aspect thereof on the basis of the arguments raised by both respondent and the 8+F. "etitioner file for Motion of Reconsideration and the appellate court denied it. 9ence, this petition.
ISSUES' . #hether or not 8ng as the private offended party in a criminal case has no personality to elevate that case to the CA without conformity of the 8+F even before the accused is arraigned. . #hether or not RTC has authority to dismiss the nformation on the ground of lack of probable cause when it has previously concluded that the same nformation is defective.
(ELD' The instant petition is 7*R*5T of merit to both issues. +ection -@'(, Chapter , Title , 7ook 6 of the Administrative Code of >?0 states that the 8+F shall represent the Fovernment of the "hilippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter re$uiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the +olicitor Feneral shall represent the Fovernment in this Court and the CA in all criminal proceedings. #hile there may be rare occasions when the offended party may allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this e2ceptional circumstances does not obtain in the instant case.
7efore the CA, the 8+F itself opined that the petition therein was fatally defective for having been files without the 8+FEs participation. 7efore this court, petitioner failed to advance any ustification or e2cuse why she failed to seek assistance of the 8+F when she sought relief from CA, other than the personal belief that the 8+F was burdened with so many cases. Thus, we find no reversible error to disturb the CAEs ruling.
"etitioner, however, is not without recourse. n !odriguez v" Gadiane, we held= t is well%settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the +tate, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. T=u!, 2n "=/ 0-o!/ "=/ o>>/n!/,
"=/ a @2"n/!! >o- "=/ 0-o!/
(o@//-, "=/ !a2d o>>/nd/d 0a-" o- "=/ a<
2n"/-/!" 2n "=/ <22 a!0/<" o> "=/ 2/ !u<= !0/<2a <22 a<"2on Fu/!"2on2n "=/ d/<2!2on o- a<"2on o> "=/ -/!0ond/n" "=/ P/o0/ o> "=/ P=22002n/!. T=/ a<"2on a / 0-o!/ !a2d
+ection 1'a(, Rule of the Revised Rules on Criminal "rocedure clearly provides a udge ;may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.< "ursuant to aforementioned provision, the Budge clearly complied with the case. #herefore, the "etition is !*:*!.
VICENTE P. LADLAD, NAT(ANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. EC(ANIS, and REY CLARO C. CASAMBRE, P/"2"2on/-!, !. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR OSELITA C. MENDO7A, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERRE7, STATE PROSECUTOR IRIN A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. AGA, 2n "=/2- "=/ D/0a-"/n" o> u!"2 0-o!/, P=22002n/ Na"2ona Po2
prosecutor indicted 7eltran and filed the corresponding nformation with the Metropolitan Trial Court of QueHon City 'MeTC(. 8n 0 5eb 1, 7eltran was subected to another in$uest conducted by the !8B panel of prosecutors and issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict 7eltran and +an Buan as 4leadersSpromoters4 of Rebellion. The panel then filed an nformation with the RTC Makati. The in$uest was based on letters from Tanigue and MendoHa. Maza and LadLad %etition
!8B sent subpoenas to petitioners re$uiring them to appear at the !8B 8ffice Vto get copies of the complaint and attachment<. "rior to their receipt of the subpoenas, petitioners had $uartered themselves inside the 9ouse of Representatives building for fear of being subected to warrantless arrest. !uring the preliminary investigation on - March 1, the counsel for the C!F presented a masked man, later identified as Baime 5uentes '5uentes(, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. 5uentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor *mmanuel 6elasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present during the proceedings. The panel of prosecutors gave petitioners days within which to file their counter%affidavits. "etitioners were furnished the complete copies of documents supporting the C!FEs letters only on 0 March 1.
ISSUE' #hether or not the preliminary investigation conducted against Ladlad and MaHa were tainted with irregularity.
(ELD' )es, the "reliminary nvestigation was tainted with irregularities. The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four years, two months and one day is outlined in +ection -, Rule of the Revised Rules of Criminal "rocedure. nstead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier ruling, 4so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage,4 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. They failed to comply with +ection -'a( of Rule which provides that the complaint 'which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents( be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authoriHed to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and MendoHa of the C!F,
":" as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notariHed by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or $ualified government official was unavailable as re$uired by +ection -'a( of Rule . 5urther, +ection -'b( of Rule mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. f there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall 4issue a subpoena to the respondents.4 9ere, after receiving the C!F letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners re$uiring them to appear at the !8B office on - March 1 4to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments.4 !uring the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the C!F to present a masked 5uentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor 6elasco. 6elasco proceeded to distribute copies of 5uentesE affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then re$uired petitioners to submit their counter%affidavits in days. t was only four days later, on 0 March 1, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the C!F letters. These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutorsE statement in the 8rder of March 1 that the preliminary investigation 4was done in accordance with the Revised Rules oOfP Criminal "rocedure.4 ndeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainantEs antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witnessE affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to e2amine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialiHed the investigation but also lent credence to petitionersE claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal ustice system which spells for an individual the difference between months if not years of agoniHing trial and possibly ail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characteriHed the right to a preliminary investigation as not 4a mere formal or technical right4 but a 4substantive4 one, forming part of due process in criminal ustice. This especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non%bailable for those accused as principals. #e find merit in petitionersE doubt on respondent prosecutorsE impartiality. Respondent +ecretary of Bustice, who e2ercises supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an interview on - March 1, the day of the preliminary investigation, that, 4#e Othe !8BP will ust declare probable cause, then itEs up to the OCPourt to decide 2 2 2.4 "etitioners raised this issue in their petition,but respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement. This clearly shows pre%udgment, a determination to file the nformation even in the absence of probable cause.
CASE DIGEST Ma-2o C-/!0o, &etitioner" !. (ono-a/ L/od/a-2o Mou, P-/!2d2n ud/, C2- Lu "=/ P=22002n/!, -/0-/!/n"/d So2<2"o- G/n/-a, R2?0
&ACTS' Mario Crespo was accused for *stafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. #hen the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was pending petition for review filed with the +ecretary of Bustice on the resolution of the 8ffice of the "rovincial 5iscal for filing of the information. 9owever, the presiding Budge Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much later time for the accused to elevate the matter to the appellate court. The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of inunction to the CA. +ubse$uently, the appellate court restrained Budge Mogul from proceeding with arraignment of the accused until the further orders of the Court. A comment was filed by the +olicitor Feneral where he recommended that the petition should be given due course.
Meanwhile, the undersecretary of Bustice, 9on. Catalino Macaraig, Br. resolved the petition for review and reversed the resolution made by the 8ffice of the "rovincial 5iscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. CA rendered a decision granting the writ and perpetually restraining the Budge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused of the case until the !ept. of Bustice have finally resolved the petition for review.
ISSUE' #hether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the "rovincial 5iscal upon instructions of the +ecretary of Bustice to whom the case was elevated for review may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
(ELD' t is a cardinal principle that criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. 9e may or he may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direct control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious and unfounded prosecution by private persons. t cannot be controlled by the complainant.
t is through the conduct of preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the e2istence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscalEs discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. t is not prudent or even permissible of a court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an nformation, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient of information. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency or evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. n a clash of views between the udge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscalEs should normally prevail.
9owever, an action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subect to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the +ecretary of Bustice, who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Conse$uently, the +ecretary of Bustice may direct the motion to dismiss the case to be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case e2ists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon filing of the information in the proper court, which in turn will sets in motion the criminal action against the accused.
The rule therefore in this urisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition as its dismissal or the conviction or ac$uittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion and control on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole udge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within the e2clusive urisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. t does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused of that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the +ecretary of Bustivve who reviewed the records of the investigation.
The petition is !+M++*! for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
NOTE:
his is a landmark case. It is best to read the 'hole te(t.
