CASE DIGEST IN CRIMINAL LAW I BY: Mary Grace P. Arevalo Dayanara A. Rom Romulo T. Espalmado Jr. Danica V. Nol Joemaica P. Combo Victoria Denise M. Monte Sharmaine C. Briz Justine Ria M. Almojuela
SUBMITTED TO: Pros. Rosalito Cimanes
1. Case: PEOPLE Vs QUIACHON G.R. No.: 170236 Date: August 31, 2006 Ponente: J. Callejo Sr.
Facts: The appellant, Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously has sexual intercourse with Rowena, his 8 years old deafmute daughter, against her will and consent. His act was then witnessed by his son, Rowel. After due consideration, the Regional trial Court of Pasig City Branch 159 rendered its decision on September 9, 2003 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape penalized in Art. 266-A and B. He was sentenced maximum penalty of death and to indemnify the offended party of other damages. By reason of the death penalty imposed to the appellant, the case was automatically elevated to the Supreme Court. But it was however transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals. Having done so, the CA, after its thorough review of the case at hand, affirmed the decision of the RTC as regards to the death sentence executed to the appellant with modification on the amount of other damages to be indemnified. The case, then finally raised to the Supreme Court. But even before the appellate court could even decide the case, R.A. 9346 an act that abolishes death penalty law was enacted. Issue: Whether or Not the appellant is entitled of the benefit under Section 2 of R.A. 9346 Ruling: Yes, the appellant is entitled of the benefit under Section 2 of R.A. 9346. It imposed that: a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. Also pursuant to the criminal law principle of favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to
the accused are given retroactive effect) and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the retroactivity of penal laws. In the light of the foregoing instances, however immoral and vicious the crime committed, in the eyes of the law, the appellant was entitled of the benefit granted in R.A. 9346 Section 2. 2. Case: PEOPLE Vs DE LARA G.R. No.: 94953 Date: September 5, 1994 Ponente: J. Quiason
Facts: On December 15, 1986, the National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) of the Western Police District (WPD) conduct a surveillance operation in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila, after receiving reports of rampant drug-pushing in that area. However, none was arrested for it is only a surveillance operation. On January 8, 1987, the WPD held a buy-bust operation of a six-man team with Pfc. Martin Orolfo Jr. as the poseur-buyer. At around 4:45 P.M. of the same day, the team, together with their confidential informant, went to Garrido Street. Pfc. Orolfo and confidential informant proceeded to the house of appellant located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where they saw him standing outside. Pfc. Orolfo buys “Two foils" of marijuana handing at the same time the marked twenty-peso bill to appellant. After receiving the mark money, the appellant went inside the house returning with the two foils wrapped in onion paper. Sensing the presence of the police operatives, the appellant then tried to retrieve the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him from doing so resulting to one foil being torn. Appellant then ran inside his house with Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. in pursuit. The latter was able to subdue appellant. Appellant admitted to the crime and show blue plastic bag with white lining containing prohibited drugs. He then was escorted to the WPD headquarters for investigation. On October 2, 1989, the judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4 Art. II of R.A. 6425 as amended as charged in the4 information and sentences him of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. The appellant then appealed to the highest court. Issue: Whether or Not there is a lawful arrest and seizure Ruling: Yes. There is a lawful arrest in the case following Sec. 5, Rule 113 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure dealing with warrantless arrest. The policemen's entry into the
house of appellant without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. On the other hand, there is a lawful seizure on the ground that the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs seize inside the house was the result of appellant's. As decided in the case of People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376, “A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.” The decision of the trial court is affirmed with the modification following the R.A. No. 7659 amending the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The sentence from life imprisonment was reduced to prision correctional, as minimum, and prision mayor as maximum. This is in accordance to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,”. Thus, appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty.
3. Case: ALBINO CO Vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.: 100776 Date: October 28, 1993 Ponente: C.J. Narvasa
Facts: Petitioner delivered a check on September 1, 1983 to a salvaging firm postdated November 30, 1983 a sum of 361, 528 Php for an agreement to refloat a sunken ship. The check being a guarantee was deposited by the firm only to find it dishonored due to the account being closed. The firm filed a complaint in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Co petitioned that the court erred in its decision for at the time of commission, such act is not punishable yet by the said law as provided in Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice although reversed later by Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 which was then used a basis for petitioner’s conviction. Issue: Whether or Not Circular No. 12 by Ministry of Justice is valid as reference and can be applied retroactively Ruling:
No. The decision of the Court of Appeals and lower courts were set aside. Laws shall be interpreted prospectively especially if such law, if made retroactive, will aggravate the case of the accused. The act therefore, has been committed in innocence. Hence, the prosecution against Co was dismissed and the decision of Court of Appeals reversed.
4. Case: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI INC., Vs IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132. G.R. No.: L-32485 Date: October 22, 1970 Ponente: J. Makasiar
Facts: A petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and the declaration of the petitioner’s rights and duties thereunder. Kay Villegas Kami Inc. actually impugns only on the first paragraph of R.A. No. 6132 Sec. 8(a) on the grounds that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression, and that it is an ex post facto law. Issue: Whether or Not Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is unconstitutional and is in the nature of an ex post facto law Ruling: No, Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional and is not in the nature of an ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is a law that: a) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; b) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; c) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; d) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; e) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful ; and f) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Given such, the constitutional inhibition pertains only to criminal laws which are given a retroactive effect. 5. Case: THE UNITED STATES Vs AH SING G.R. No.: L-13005 Date: October 10, 1917 Ponente: J. Malcolm
Facts: Ah Sing is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu after a direct voyage from the port of Saigon on April 25, 1917. Ah Sing bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon and brought them on board and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making a search found the 8 cans of the prohibited drug. There is no other evidence, direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to illegally import the opium in the country. Issue: Whether or Not the crime of illegal importation can be proven against Ah Sing Ruling: Yes. As applied to the Opium Law, the Court expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. Thus, the Court accordingly found that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.
6. Case: THE UNITED STATES Vs H.N. BULL G.R. No.: L-5270 Date: January 15, 1910 Ponente: J. Elliott
Facts: The defendant, H.N. Bull, captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chinese and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands. He was accused of willfully, unlawfully and wrongly transport and bringing into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, 677 cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing the animals. While in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and were cruelly wounded, bruised and killed. Issues: 1. Whether or Not the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the case 2. Whether or Not the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals Ruling: 1. Yes. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when it came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, it was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before it came to anchor. During that part of the voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the offense and the person of the offender. 2. Yes. The allegation of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio
Grande R.R., "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria, it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel, that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design, done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals."
7. Case: PEOPLE Vs WONG CHENG G.R. No.: L-18924 Date: October 19, 1992 Ponente: J. Romualdez
Facts: Defendant accused of violation of the laws of the land by smoking opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa, though English nationality, while anchored at Manila Bay. The lower court dismissed the case as for the allegation of the lack of jurisdiction in the demurrer presented by the defendant’s party. Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over such act even though committed in a merchant vessel of another nationality Ruling: Yes. Provided that act shall compromise the public order of the land in accordance with the English rule used during the time of commission. Therefore, smoking opium although on a merchant vessel but anchored in the shores of our country shall be punishable, as the smoke produced, having disastrous effect, will compromise public safety. Hence the order appealed from is revoked.
8. Case: PEOPLE Vs LOL-LO AND SARAW G.R. No.: 17958 Date: February 27, 1922 Ponente: J. Malcolm
Facts: On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta for Peta. The first boat had one individual, a Dutch subject. While the second boat, with eleven men, women, and, children, who were subjects of Holland, arrived between the islands of Buang and Bukid in Dutch East Indies. There, the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by 24 armed Moros. The Moros initially asked for food, but once on board, they took all the cargo, attacked the man and brutally violated the two women. Where ideally it would submerge, holes were made on the boat and the persons, with the exemption of the two women, were again placed on it. The Moros, two of which were Lol-lo and Saraw, arrived at Maruro. It was there were the two women escaped. Upon returning home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands, Lol-lo and Saraw were arrested and charged in the Courts of First Instance (CFI) of Sulu the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by the counsel de officio for the Moros based on the grounds that the CFI, nor any courts in the Philippine Islands has no jurisdiction over the offense charged for it did not constitute a public offense under the Philippine laws, but it was overruled. Trial proceeded and judgment was rendered. Issues: 1. Whether or Not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case; and 2. Whether or Not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force Ruling: 1. Yes, the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case. Piracy is a robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done in animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Moreover, it is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.” Given such, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction
over the case at bar because Lol-lo and Saraw were found within the jurisdictional territory of the said court. 2. Yes, the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. Correspondingly, the principle in public law that the political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of the transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. Based on the aforementioned principle in public law, it is right to note that amidst the transfer of the Philippine Islands to the United States, its laws are not jeopardized and still in force. Thus, the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy, particularly Art. 153-154, are hereby applicable.
9. Case: THE UNITED STATES Vs LOOK CHAW G.R. No.: L-5887 Date: December 16, 1910 Ponente: C.J. Arellano
Facts: An inspection by Messrs. Jack and Milliron on the steamship Erroll found among its cargos, Exhibit A which contains 49 cans of opium and Exhibit B containing also cans of the same substance. The defendant admitted that said cargos belong to him as it will be brought to Mexico or Vera Cruz. Upon further search too, another four cans of opium were found where the firemen of said court usually stays. The opium was kept by the first officer of the ship which shall be returned as soon as the ship leaves to avoid use of the substance outside the steamship. It has been noted too as provided by a witness that defendant sold cans of opium upon arrival on the 15th in Cebu. Defendant alleged that said possession and act is not covered by the Philippines laws. Still the court sentenced him the maximum penalty for the reason that the act committed is under the Philippine jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine court have jurisdiction over the case Ruling:
Yes. The court has jurisdiction over the vessel but only in instances when the act is violating the law of the Philippines Islands as provided by the English rule prevailing at the time of commission. Mere possession of the drug in the ship was not punishable but due to the fact that cans of opium were taken from the ship to the Philippine soil, the court shall apply the law of the land. Hence, such circumstance mitigated the sentence to 1000 Php and six months of imprisonment by the Court of appeals.
10. Case: THE UNITED STATES Vs WILLIAM FOWLER ET. AL. G.R. No.: L-4969 Date: December 31, 1902 Ponente: J. Torres
Facts: August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles worth 20 dollars while on board the vessel “Lawton”. The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance that they were without jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it happened in the high seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case be dismissed. However, the prosecuting attorney contended that the court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month's imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board vessel flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil Commission. Issue: Whether or Not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas on board of transport not registered in the Philippines
Ruling:
No. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The transport “Lawton” not being a vessel of this class, our court is without jurisdiction to take a cognizance of a crime committed on board the same. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubt. This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands were organized, reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands.
11. Case: PEOPLE Vs GONZALES ET. AL. G.R. No.: 80762 Date: March 19, 1990 Ponente: J. Sarmiento
Facts: At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. He stated that he clearly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform as the place was then awash in moonlight. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant) Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime.
In the decision dated October 31, 1984 on the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The case then was brought to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or Not the evidence are sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt Ruling: No, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged. Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant. Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
12. Case: THE UNITED STATES Vs AH CHONG G.R. No.: L-5272 Date: March 19, 1910 Ponente: J. Carson
Facts: The defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in the same place and usually slept in the same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the
door, and called out twice. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife, struck and fatally wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Issue: Whether or Not Ah Chong should be acquitted because of mistake of fact Ruling: Under such circumstances, yes, Ah Chong should be acquitted. It is noted that there’s no criminal liability on his part, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to his negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negate a particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases where, under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from that which he intended to commit. The circumstances proved that in Ah Chong’s mind, he was being attacked, regardless of the circumstances outside him. Would the facts been as he though them to be, there would have been no crime. Mistake of fact indicates good faith. Good faith negates intent. Without intent, there is no crime.
13. Case: SORIANO Vs PEOPLE G.R. No.: L-3008 Date: March 19, 1951 Ponente: J. Jugo
Facts: Federico Soriano, the petitioner, was granted power-of-attorney by Emilia Saenz, the creditor, as substitute administrator of rents and lease of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., The Company was later on indebted to the creditor because of the rents due on account of lease during the disturbance of war. In this instance, the disputed properties of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., in the building were lost, and that the lantern slide projector and the "Cyclix" motor generator have been found in the house and in the possession of the appellant after having repeatedly denied any knowledge of the equipment and accessories of the Cine and declined any responsibility for their loss saying that it has been taken by the Japanese.
Federico Soriano was charged on August 22, 1945, with the crime of theft. After trial he was convicted beyond reasonable doubt. Soriano then filed a petition of certiorari to the highest court. Issue: Whether or Not the petitioner is liable of theft Ruling: Yes, because under art. 308 “Theft is committed by any person who, with intent of gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.” It is clear that when the petitioner carried away, concealed, and repeatedly lies from the owner and the police authorities the possession of the alleged lost properties, he acted with intent of gain. Thus, the petition on certiorari was denied.
14. Case: PEOPLE Vs BINDOY G.R. No.: 124360 Date: November 5, 1997 Ponente: J. Villamor
Facts: In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in tuba wine shop in the barrio market of Calunod, Municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas and his wife. Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Paca’s wife from which he threatened to injure if she didn’t accept. This resulted to interchange of words between Bindoy and Paca’s wife. Pacas, in defense of his wife, attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The commotion attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam to cease the fight. In the course of Pacas and Bindoy struggling for the bolo, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the hand towards the left behind the accused from which the point of the bolo reached Omamdam’s chest who was then behind Bindoy. Issue: Whether or Not the defendant is legally responsible for the crime of homicide Ruling:
No, the defendant is not legally responsible for his offense because there’s no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. In US vs. Carlos to wit: In many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which he tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act. Thus, the appellant shall be entitled to acquittal according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Penal Code.
15. Case: GUEVARRA Vs ALMODOVAR G.R. No.: 75256 Date: January 26, 1989 Ponente: J. Paras
Facts: Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence on the ground that the petitioner acted with discernment. On 26 July 1986, Mr. Guevarra present petition for certiorari implying that discernment connotes intent. Issues: 1. Whether or Not an eleven year old boy could be charged with the Crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence 2. Whether or Not the court had jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact that it did not pass thru the barangay Lupon
Ruling: 1. Yes, discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong. Intent on the other hand is a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts. It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two different concepts. In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense. 2. Yes, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional. it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470. Thus the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. 16. Case: THE UNITED STATES Vs CATOLICO G.R. No.: L-6486 Date: March 2, 1911 Ponente: J. Moreland
Facts: The accused, as justice at the peace of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, decided sixteen separate civil cases in favour of the plaintiff. The dependants for said cases appealed from the decision and deposited ₱16 as required by the law and ₱50 as bond. On October 12, 1909, the plaintiff alleged that the bonds were insolvent. The accused then ordered the cancellation of the bonds and required the appellants to file another bond within 15 days. None of the appellants were able to file within the specified time, the plaintiff applied that the judgment be declared final and the sums deposited by the defendants be deliver to him. The accused acceded to the petition of the plaintiff. Issue: Whether or Not the defendant-appellant is guilty of malversation of public funds Ruling:
No, the case lacks many essential elements required by the law to be present in the crime as he did not convert the money to his own use or use of any other person nor did he allow anyone to do the same. Furthermore, to constitute a crime, the act, except in certain crime made by such statute, should be accompanied by criminal intent or negligence or indifference to duty or consequences that may be equivalent to criminal intent, as is stated in the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea. Everything the accused did was in good faith as he believed that he was acting his position judicially and correctly.
17. Case: PEOPLE Vs RENEGADO G.R. No.: L-27031 Date: March 31, 1974 Ponente: J. Muñoz Palma
Facts: It was on August 29, 1966 when accused, Loreto Renegado stabbed Mamerto De Lira with a double blade weapon, and caused his death days thereafter. Accused was held guilty of murder upon a person in authority and was to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The accused and the victim worked at the Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School as clerk and a teacher respectively. One of the duties of the accused is to help type test questions of teachers every periodical tests. With the upcoming examination for September, De Lira asked the accused to have his examination be encoded. However, the latter answered that he had so many other things to do. The teacher reminded of the instructions of the principal that he could be asked by the teachers for such type the test questions especially when the teacher concerned has no knowledge on typing and finished a remark “You can finish your work if only you will sit down and work”. Thinking that he was being bullied and humiliated, the accused got angry and stepped out of the canteen. Several manifestation of his intent to kill De Lira was confirmed by the school guards, some teachers and even the unusual observation of the wife of the accused. Few days later, at the school canteen, accused stabbed the victim from the back and caused death thereafter. For his defense, accused prayed for an acquittal through his written brief “because during the precise moment, accused lost his senses and he simply did not know what he was doing”. He also raised the biased, partial and highly questionable testimonies of the prosecution from the teachers of the school and guards. Issue:
Whether or not the accused was guilty of murder with assault upon a person in authority Ruling: Yes. Considering that the victim as a teacher called the attention of the accused clerk for a reminder of his duty to type such test questions as per instructed by principal constitute the victim as a person in authority. The Court ruled that victim’s remark not to be insulting and slanderous but rather a sort of reminder to the accused. Thus, with the violent character of the accused led him to conceive a plan to attack the victim. In the end, the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for murder with assault on a person on authority and to suffer reclusion perpetua plus to pay indemnity to heirs of the victim.
18. Case: PEOPLE Vs OANIS G.R. No.: L-47722 Date: July 27, 1943 Ponente: J. Moran
Facts: The defendant-appellants, Corporal Galanta and Chief of Police Oanis were instructed to capture the escaped notorious convict Alsimo Balagtas who was a bailarina named Irene, and if overpowered, to capture him, dead or alive. The group of the defendant-appellants took the route leading to the suspected house. The defendants then went to a room where they found her with a man sleeping, whose back was towards the door. They fired at him with their revolvers simultaneously or successively, which led to the man’s death. After reporting the occurrence to the Provincial Inspector, it turned out that the man was an innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson. The defendants have appealed that in the honest performance of their duties, they acted in innocent mistake of the fact. Issue: Whether or Not the defendant-appellant is guilty Ruling: Yes, under the New Rules of Courts Rule109, section 2, paragraph 2, “No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subjected to any greater restraints than is necessary for his detention.” Their action of shooting the supposed Balagtas and eventually
killing him is not justifiable as the latter had offered no resistance, or in fact no resistance can be offered, as he was asleep.
19. Case: PEOPLE Vs FERNANDO DE FERNANDO G.R. No.: L-24978 Date: March 27, 1926 Ponente: J. Villa-Real
Facts: The accused, Fernando de Fernando, a policeman, was informed that three convicts had escaped. When passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, he was called by the latter's daughter Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. While they were talking, in the dark, he saw a person going up the stairs of a house, carrying a bolo and calling for someone inside. Pacencia, who did not recognized the voice of the person at that time, was with the accused who then fired a shot in the air. As the unknown person continued to ascend the stairs and believing that he was one of the escaped convicts, the accused fired directly at the man who turned out to be the nephew of the owner of the house. Issue: Whether or Not the appellant is guilty of the crime murder Ruling: No. He cannot be guilty of murder for there was no malicious intent on his part. However, firing a shot without exercising due diligence in asking or confirming who the person provided by the fact that the victim called out a name which would indicate that the owner of the house might be know the person to be a relative or intimate friend. Thus, failure to act with ordinary precaution rendered him guilty of homicide through reckless negligence and was sentenced with prision correcional and lowered the indemnity to be paid from Php 1,00 to P500.
20. Case: PEOPLE Vs BAYONA G.R. No.: L-42288 Date: February 16, 1935 Ponente: J. Vickers
Facts: The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary, contends that he stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar for the purpose of delivering to Mayor Agdamag a revolver that the defendant had taken that day from one Tomas de Martin, who had no license for aid firearm. He also contended that he did not know there was a polling place near where he parked his motor car and that he was sixty-three meters from the Electoral College when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E. Desiderio, representative of the Secretary of the Interior. The evidence shows, however, that the defendant was only ten or twelve meters from the polling place when he was found standing near his automobile with a revolver on his belt, and that the municipal building could not be seen from the polling place; that the defendant was at the time employed as a chauffeur by a senator for that district, and that he had been sent to Pontavedra, a municipality adjoining Pilar. The defendant did not arrest Tomas de Martin, nor does it appear that he caused him to be prosecuted. Tomas de Martin was not called as a witness to this case. Furthermore, Mayor Agdamag, to whom the defendant claims he intended to deliver the revolver, was not the provincial commander of Capiz, but an officer sent from Cebu, for the purpose of supervising the elections in that province. Issue: Whether or Not appellant’s intent should be taken into consideration in the instant case Ruling: No, appeal is denied. The court does not believe that appellant did not know the location of the polling place in question. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent which he violated is immaterial. Intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. The rule is that an acts mala in se there is must be a criminal intent, but those in mala prohibita it is sufficient if the act was intentionally done, “care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to penetrate the act…’’
