#7 Punzalan vs Dela Pena Facts: Dencio Dela Pena, a boader of the Plata Family, was assaulted by the group of Rainier Punzalan. When he had the chance to escape, he encountered Robert Cagara, the Plata Family's driver, grabbed the gun for the purpose of scaring away the group who was chasing him. Michael Plata, however, intervened and wrestled the gun from Dela Pena, causing to accidentally hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Due to the said incident, Dela Pena, Cagara and Plata locked themselves in the latter's house, to which the group of Punzalan shouted "Lumabas kayo d'yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin naming kayo!" The three then was able to escape through the back door and proceeded to the Police Station for assistance. Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm was filed against Plata and Cagara, while Dela Pena was investigated for Attempted Homicide as per the directions of Department of Justice. Dela Pena filed counter charges against Punzalan, including Grave threats and Attempted Murder. Subsequently, Cagara filed Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, after its remark during a meeting at the Office of the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor dismissed the complaints in regards to the Attempted Murder and Grave Oral Defamation. It was appealed at Department of Justice, to which it only reduced the charges to Attempted Homicide and Slight Oral Defamation. However, upon a motion for reconsideration, it directed to withdraw all the information of the above‐mentioned complaints. It was appealed by Dela Pena at Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, where in the Petition was granted, reinstating the charges against the Punzalans. Issue: (1) Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and against petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted Homicide. Held: (1) No, there is no sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause. Since the alleged defamatory statement was uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor, the City Prosecutor is the best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses to determine probable cause. Since the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Rosalinda Punzalan, it shall be deemed that it properly observed the conduct of the party and properly decided that there is no probable cause to file said charge. On the charge of Attempted Homicide, it was held that it was a nature of counter charge that is not necessary to be pursued. It is because it can be threshed out in proceedings relating to the Attempted Homicide charge filed by Rainier Punzalan.
# 8 People vs Dimaano Facts: Maricar Dimaano filed two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape against her father, Edgardo Dimaano that commenced on September 1993, December 1995 and January 1996 respectively. She and her mother went to Camp Crame to file the complaint, to which the Medico‐Legal of PNP Crime Lab that Maricar have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non‐virgin state. Edgardo denied the accusations contending that he was at the office from 7pm to 9pm and if so, Maricar could have reported the sexual abuses to the authorities when he accompanied her to Paranaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio. The trial court however found Maricar’s Testimony credible and spontaneous and disregarded the compromise agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag‐uurong ng Sumbong since Maricar was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same. CA affirmed with modifications. Issue: (1) Whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution has overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. (2) Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the affidavit of desistance should have been duly considered as a factor which put to doubt the reasons behind the filing of the criminal charges of rape Held: (1) Yes, the evidence adduced by the prosecution has overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. The credibility given by the Trial Court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence. The trial court and CA gave due credence to the testimony of Maricar who was only 12 years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her person. Maricar’s credibility was not diminished by her failure to report the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats and violence cannot be taken against the victim, more so if the lecherous attacker is her father. (2) No, the voluntary and due execution of the affidavit of desistance should cannot be duly considered as a factor. The unreliable character of the desistance is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after the victim goes through all the trouble, will suddenly withdraw or turn around and declare that she is no longer interest. Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she signed the desistance. Close scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance shows that Maricar never retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father and neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the rape.
#9 Saladuga vs Sandiganbayan Facts: Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the actual damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first information. Issue: Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that would warrant a new preliminary investigation. Held: No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that would warrant a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The shift from giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit do not constitute a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information, which pertains to the plan of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of day care centers for barangays Mac‐Arthur, Urdaneta, and Lavezares, Northern Samar. These two (2) different modes of committing the offense may be charged under either mode or under both. Considering the case at bar, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same, hence, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary.
10. Bonifacio v. RTC Makati Facts: Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed in behalf of Yuchenco Family of Yuchenco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance Co., (Malayan), a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel under Art. 355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of Paents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of discontented planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned by the Yuchengco’s, for they previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits of such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments. That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web domains: www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, www.pepcoalition.com, and
[email protected]. Gimenez alleged that upon accessing such websites in Makati he red various article containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family. Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363. Issue: How should an online article be treated in relation to a written defamation/libel with respect to jurisdiction of the case provided by law specifically Art. 360 of the RPC? Ruling: Art. 360 of the RPC provides: “Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. xxxx The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the oofense. xxxx” That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only to: 1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for the venue of the action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the point of its printing and first publication. TO give credence to Gimenez’s argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art. 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It would do chaos wherein website author, writer, blogger or anyone who post messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines. The information is quashed and the case is dismissed.
11. Ramiscal Jr vs SANDIGANBAYAN and People of the Philippines GR Nos 172476-99
September 15, 2010
Facts: Ramiscal Jr (Ramiscal) was a retired officer of AFP and the former president of AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his incumbency, the BOD of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 sq. m. of land for development as housing projects. On August 1, 1997 AFP-RSBS as represented by Ramiscal Jr., and Flaviano the attorney-in-fact of 12 individual vendors executed and signed a bilateral Deed of Sale (1st Deed) over the subject property at the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m. After the payment @ P 10,500.00 per sq. m., Flaviano executed and signed a unilateral Deed of Sale (2nd Deed) over the same property with a purchase price of P 3,000.00 per sq. m. Thereafter the 2nd Deed was presented by Flaviano for registration which became the basis of the Certificate of Title of the said property. Ramiscal Jr filed his first Motion for Reconsideration date February 12, 1999 with a supplemental motion dated May 28, 1999 regarding the findings of the Ombudsman. With this, a panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case, they found out that Ramiscal Jr., indeed participated in an affixed his signature on the contracts and found probable cause. The Ombudsman acted positively on the findings of the prosecutor and scheduled the arraignment of Ramiscal Jr. Howver, Ramiscal Jr., refused to enter a plea for petitioner on the ground that there is a pending resolution of his second Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration is valid and should hold his arraignment. Whether or not there is probable cause to file a case for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and falsification of public documents. Ruling: No, Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filling of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. The arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court are: unsoundness of mind, prejudicial question and a pending petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor in the DOJ in which the suspension shall not exceed 60 days. Ramiscal Jr., failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. With respect to the finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case. Ramiscal Jr., failed to establish that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, thus, there is probable cause in the filing of the case.
12. Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008 Facts: Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail. On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified. To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate. In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit. On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan. However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of
the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for noncompliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. Issue: Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment? Held: It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
13. STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE v. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO 502 SCRA 446 (2006) The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the Rules. Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in a criminal case to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was at that time undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City. On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings conducted in his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses. Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for “Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.” ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing the defense to present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor HELD: As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State. Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter disregard of the Rules.
(3) 37. People Vs Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009) Facts: Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy‐two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB‐Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB‐Visayas, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB‐Visayas' Resolution, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante. The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION and was opposed by The OSP. The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dismissed the case against Amante. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Held: Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the [15] action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG, Petitioners, - versus VICENTE BALBOA, Respondent. Facts: The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners) charge Vicente Balboa (respondent) with forum shopping. Vicente Balboa filed 2 cases against Caroline Shiok Ting Cheng. First, A civil case for collection of sum of money on Feb. 24,1997 based on the postdated checks issued by Caroline filed before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Balboa and affirmed by CA upon appeal. Second, the criminal case of violation of BP 22 on July 21, 1997. The MTC acquitted her but held her civil liability. Issue: Whether or not it constitute forum shopping? Held: No. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.[10] There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia. n Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 effective September 16, 1997, which provides: 1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized. This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. The foregoing, however, are not applicable to the present case. It is worth noting that Civil Case was filed on February 24, 1997, and Criminal Cases 78 on July 21, 1997, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular on September 16, 1997. Thus, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.[14] Since respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case No. 97-82225 may proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.
COMMUNITY RURAL BANK A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909 OF GUIMBA (N. E.), INC., Represented by OLGA M. SAMSON, Present: Complainant, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, - versus - Austria-Martinez, Judge TOMAS B. TALAVERA, Regional Trial Court (Branch 28), Promulgated: Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Facts: Community Rural Bank (Bank) filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office of Cabanatuan charging several persons (the accused) with Estafa. After preliminary investigation, 6 informations for estafa were filed, 2 of which were raffled to the branch where respondent, Judge Talavera, presided. The accused appealed the finding of the Fiscal to the DOJ, which the latter denied, so Judge Talavera issued a warrant of arrest with no bail against the accused. Later, the accused filed with Judge Talavera a motion for reinvestigation and to lift the warrant of arrest. Bank was not notified of this motion. Judge granted the motion without any hearing thereon. When the reinvestigation was conducted, the Bank was still not notified. The assistant provincial prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation reversed the earlier findings of the fiscal. On the same day, a motion to dismiss was filed with Judge, which he granted, and he also ordered the release of the accused. The Bank was never notified of any of these proceedings. Bank then filed an MR arguing it was deprived of due process. It also asked that the criminal information be reinstated. Judge denied this. Hence, Bank filed the present case charging Judge Talavera with (1) serious misconduct and/or gross inefficiency and (2) violation of Rules 1.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance and violation of simple legal precepts. Held: Yes. Respondent judge's gross ignorance and violation of simple legal precepts is clearly shown by his issuance of the Orders granting the Motion for Reinvestigation of the accused and the prosecutor’s Motion to Dismiss. Motion for Reinvestigation First, judge should not have entertained the motion for reinvestigation, since DOJ Secretary Serafin Cuevas already denied with finality the appeal of the accused, finding that there was prima facie evidence against the accused. The secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the respondents should be believed. The provincial or city prosecutor has neither the personality nor the legal authority to review or overrule the decision of the secretary. Section 7 of Department Order No. 223 (the rules governing appeals from resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations) provides:
Sec. 7. Motion for Reinvestigation. – At any time after the appeal has been perfected and before the resolution thereof, the appellant may file a motion for reinvestigation on the ground that new and material evidence has been discovered which appellant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered during the preliminary investigation and which if produced and admitted would probably change the resolution. Here, the motion for reinvestigation was filed 3 months after the DOJ Secretary already denied their appeal with finality. Clearly, therefore, Judge Talavera was wrong in granting the motion. In granting the Motion for Reinvestigation, respondent effectively demolished the DOJ’s power of control and supervision over prosecutors. Newly discovered evidence Also, there was no newly discovered evidence. The one-page Affidavit executed by Ms Gloria Sacramento, one of the co-accused in the criminal case.was clearly not newly discovered; it was already known to the accused even during the preliminary investigation. There was no explanation whatsoever as to why this piece of evidence was never presented during the preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, respondent hastily granted the Motion. Preliminary investigation It must be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of that crime. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence, which needs to be presented only to engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Motion to Dismiss Second, it was also error for the Judge to grant the Motion to Dismiss by relying merely on the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation. In his Order, he merely stated that the motion to dismiss is meritorious, and nothing more. The Order failed to demonstrate an independent evaluation or assessment of the evidence against the accused. The Judge acted with undue haste when he granted the Motion only a day after the reinvestigation was concluded. This leads to the conclusion that the judge did not personally evaluate the parties’ evidence before acting on the Motion.The discretion to grant a Motion to Dismiss rests solely with the court. However, mere approval of the position taken by the prosecution is not equivalent to the discretion required. Once a complaint or an information is filed in court, the judge -- not the prosecutor -- assumes full control of the controversy. A grant of the motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the case itself, which is a subject clearly within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence. When Judge issued the warrants of arrest without bail against all the accused, it is presumed that he had studied the Information and the Resolution of the prosecutor and agreed with the latter’s findings of probable cause. Thus, the grant of the Motion for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss for alleged insufficiency of evidence posed a serious contradiction of the earlier finding of probable cause. Pro forma motions Finally, Judge granted both of the Motions despite the obvious lack of notice to the Bank and lack of hearing. This lapse effectively deprived it of its day in court. The Rules of Court require that, with the exception of motions that the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion should be set for hearing by the movant. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court explicitly require that notices be sent at least three days before the hearing and directed at the parties concerned; and that they state the time and place of hearing of the motion, with proper proof of notice thereof. Without such proof, the motion is considered pro forma; thus, the court cannot act upon it.
The purpose of the notice is to enable the adverse party to appear for its own protection and to contest the motion. Elementary due process mandates that the other party be notified of the adverse action of the opposing party, so as to avoid a capricious change of mind and to ensure impartiality of the trial. Here, the Motions for Reinvestigation and to Dismiss were fatally defective, as neither contained any proper notice of hearing. Respondent thus grossly erred in taking cognizance of these Motions. In criminal proceedings, the word “party” is held to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the orders issued and/or judgment rendered therein.
Due process Undoubtedly, complainant had an interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution. Its right to intervene therein was practically beyond question, as it neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so. Thus, as the party injured by the crime, it had the right to be heard on a motion that was derogatory to its interest in the civil aspect of the case. Due process necessitates that it be afforded this opportunity, especially because of a conflict between the positions of the public prosecutor and of the offended party. All told, respondent showed his lack of understanding, not only of the basic and established superiorsubordinate relationship between the secretary of justice and the provincial prosecutors, but also of the functions and duties of the trial court in “the proper scheme of things” in our criminal justice system.
Serag v. Court of appeals Facts: In the wee hours of May 11, 2001, Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr., a mayoralty candidate in San Joaquin, Iloilo during the 2001 elections, was shot to death in front of his residence. His driver, Norberto Salamat III, was also wounded. The Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Iloilo City filed a criminal complaint for murder and attempted murder against LinoNapao, then incumbent mayor of San Joaquin, and Sebastian Serag.[1] In a Joint Resolution dated May 26, 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimbal, Iloilo: (1) for Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms, and (2) Attempted Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and Napao and seven unidentified persons. Accused Juan Napao and the 14 other additional accused filed on August 16, 2002, a petition for review of the July 26, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The trial court found probable cause for murder and attempted murder against the accused. Consequently, the court issued an Order[7] on September 27, 2001, for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused who were still at large. Pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the said petition for review, the proceedings were suspended. The Secretary of Justice had issued Resolution No. 258 affirming with modification, the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, downgrading the charges from Murder to Homicide, and from Attempted Murder to Attempted Homicide, The Provincial Prosecutor was likewise ordered to amend the Amended Informations accordingly. Amended Information for homicide and attempted homicide in the two cases, and for the court to admit the said second Amended Informations. However, the RTC verbally granted the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor, and admitted the Second Amended Information for Homicide. Motion for reconsideration. The court forthwith arraigned the accused for homicide, who pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On November 22, 2002, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 925 and 926 In the meantime, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution[17] on November 18, 2002, granting the motion for reconsideration of the private complainant, setting aside Resolution No. 258. Issue: Whether he RTC acted with inordinate and precipitate haste when it granted the Provincial Prosecutors motion for the admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide? Held: As the appellate court correctly pointed out in its November 10, 2003 Resolution.the pendency of an appeal before the DOJ is enough reason for the deferment of any proceedings in the trial court and petitioner, through the private prosecutors, correctly moved for the deferment of the admission of the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide. It should be considered that the motion to defer was even with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the appearance of the private prosecutors is pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Besides the oral recitation in open court by the private prosecutors of the grounds cited in the motion to defer the admission of the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide, which the public respondent found unprocedural, petitioner was not really given the opportunity to oppose the motion to admit the same informations. All these facts taken together, there appears to be an undue haste on the part of the public respondent in admitting the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide and ordering the arraignment of the private respondents to the said informations. This is considering that no word of protestation was heard from the petitioner when she waited for nine (9) months for the DOJ to resolve the private respondents petition for review.
#18 Lee vs KBC Bank gr. 164673 Facts: Midas Diversified Export Corp (mdec) obtained a loan from kbc bank. Samuel lee executed a promisory note in favor of kbc bank and deed of assignment. Mdec obtained another loan. Maybelle lim executed aother promisory note and deed of assignment in favor of kbc bank. Mdec defaulted in paying the loan. Kbc bank sent a letter to Otto Versand to verify the validity of the two purchase orders, the subject deed of attachments. Otto V. sent a facsimile message to kbc bank stating that (1) it did not issue purchase orders, (2) it did not order or receive the items covered bybthe purchase order, and (3) it would not pay mdec any amount. Kbc bank charged Lee and Lim of estafa. State prosec Subia found existence of probable cause. Two counts of estafa were filed agiants the petitioners. Lee and lim filed a petition for review with the DOJ. Sec. Perez directed the withdrawal of information filed against lee and lim. He held that the facsimile message constituted hearsay evidence. Assitant city prosec. Sibucao prayed for the withdrawal of the infos filed againts lee and lim. Rtc granted the motion to withdraw. CA set aside the decision of rtc. Issue: whether the trial court did not abdicatr its duty to determine the sufficiency of the prosecution's reason for withdrawing the informations Held: the court is not impressed. When confronted with a motion to withdraw an info, trial court is not bound by the resolutio of the secretary of justice but required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposinh the motion. Whether the facsimile message is admissibke in evidence and whetger the elemnt of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the preliminary investigation.
#19 Okabe vs Gutierrez FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court’s permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent’s counteraffidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for
Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case. ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latter’s documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner. HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counteraffidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
PEOPLE V. LAGUIO G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review to nullify and set aside the resolution of RTC in criminal case, granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of 3 charges filed against him. The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence. Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that in as much as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accused possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful. In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open the trunk of his BMW car to see if he was carrying illegal drugs. ISSUE: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant. HELD: NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted surveillance operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5. The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
VERGARA VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 after dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him during a routine patrol. Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, aside from some pair of jeans, 18 pieces eggplants, they also found dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a newspaper and cellophane. Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law. ISSUE: Was the warrantless arrest as well as the warrantless search and seizure lawful? HELD: No. The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. The Supreme Court held that none of the circumstances to effect a warrantless arrest was present. The suspicion of the tanods cannot be equated with probable cause based on personal knowledge of the commission of an offense. Accused was simply looking around and he was not committing an offense. The alleged attempt of accused to flee cannot be an indication of guilt for flight per se is not always synonymous with guilt, where, as in this case, it was reasonable to expect a person to run away if he was being followed at nighttime. Hence, the arrest without warrant was not lawful. Further, when Valdez was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on Valdez was incidental to a lawful arrest, hence the marijuana seized cannot be admitted in evidence. The inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution, it also failed to convincingly established the chain of custody over the seize marijuana. The Court’s decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the prosecution witnesses. Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus acquitted. The Court added that the petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
Go vs CA G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992 FACTS: Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued. Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not by the San Juan Police effected a lawful warrantless arrest; 2. Whether petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail HELD 1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: “Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person; (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.” Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when the shooting had in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting which does not constitute “personal knowledge.” Hence, there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. 2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.” In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
#24 MABUTAS vs JUDGE PERELLO FACTS: The case involves two admin complaints against Judge Perello by Supt. Mabutas and City Prosec. Togononon regarding Judge’s gross ignorance of the law in granting bail in dangerous drugs cases. In Admin Case 1, Mabutas complains about the granting of bail to accused Omadan who was charged with possession of 57.78 g of shabu, with no bail recommended. However, Judge Perello, in her order, stated that evidence of guilt was not strong for her to deny bail. Additionally, there may have been lapses in carrying out the arrest and preliminary investigation of Omadan (no witness during search of Omadan’s illegal activities). Thus, Judge Perello, allowed bail in the amount of P1M. In Admin Case 2, the Prosecutor likewise complains of Judge Perello’s granting of bail to 4 drug cases. These were done without hearing. Judge Perello reasons out that since the shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor and that the amounts of Shabu involved were less than 1 gram which is not punishable by capital offense and thus bail should be a matter of right without need for hearing. ISSUE: Whether the judge can be administratively liable for granting the bail in the drug cases. HELD: Admin Case 1. No, the Judge cannot be held liable administratively. This case has been dismissed by SC as they found that Judge Perello has complied with her duty. The Dangerous Drugs Act punishes possession of 50 grams or more of shabu with life imprisonment to death. Hence, a capital offense. As such, bail is a matter of discretion pursuant to Rule 114, Sec 7 which states that “No person charged with capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.” A hearing on application of bail is mandatory. In case one is filed, the judge is entrusted to observe the following: (a) In all cases, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application of bail and require him to submit his recommendation; (b) Where bail is matter of discretion, conduct a hearing regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence; (c) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and (d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of bail bond. Otherwise, bail should be denied. In the case at bar, Judge Perello has complied with all the foregoing duties. She conducted hearing; the prosecution has presented their evidence; she based her decision based on the evidence presented; and since it was her conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong, the petition for bail was granted. Admin Case 2. Yes, Judge Perello should be held liable. Respondent Judge explains that she did not conduct any hearings on the motions/petitions for bail filed in the criminal cases subject of the complaint because the crimes charged are not capital offenses as the quantity of shabu involved therein was minimal. Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 all involve selling of less than 5 grams of shabu. Respondent Judge believes that under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling of less than 5 grams is punishable only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years. Such being the case, respondent Judge maintains that bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not required. The SC ruled, for his failure to conduct any hearing on the application for bail, we hold respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law justifying the imposition of the severest disciplinary sanction on her.
#25 LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. ISSUE: The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? RULING: Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the dubious interval, often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused.
#26 DOMINGO VS. PAGAYATAN FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated December 7, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) charged Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46) with Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Criminal Case No. R5075 for Estafa, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto M. Peaflorida. Complainant alleged: On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against Ernesto M. Peaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he is an overstaying and undocumented alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Peaflorida is also a fugitive from justice since he stands indicted in the United States for health care fraud which resulted in more than $1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S. Federal Government. No appeal was filed with the Office of the President. The SDO became final and executory on October 15, 2001. On the same date, respondent issued a Notice of Arraignment requiring the production of Peaflorida on November 19 and 20, 2001. On the scheduled hearing of November 19, 2001, respondent denied the P40,000.00 bail recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused on the ground that the crime Peaflorida was charged with involved large scale estafa, a non-bailable offense. Respondent ordered the commitment of Peaflorida to the Provincial Jail in Magbay, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. However, later on that same day, the BOI received information that respondent had allowed the release from detention of Peaflorida, who is an alien federal fugitive, without the interdepartmental courtesy of affording prior notice to the BOI of such action. ISSUES: Whether or not respondent Judge should be administratively liable for not conducting hearing on bail. RULING: The Court ruled, under the present rules, a hearing is required before granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. The prosecution must always be given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions. Moreover, since the accused was accompanied by the personnel of the Bureau of Immigration when brought to the RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, for his arraignment in Criminal Case No. R-5075 respondent Judge could have easily verified from his escort if the former was being detained for other crimes aside from the one where he was being arraigned in respondent’s sala. Had he done so, respondent could have been informed outright by the B.I. personnel escort that the accused had already been the subject of a Summary Deportation Order and, thus, he could have deferred action on the latter’s (accused) Motion to Fix Bail and afforded the Bureau of Immigration the chance and opportunity to interpose their objection to the grant thereof. A hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused, in cases where the offense is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge’s evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense
27. LACHICA V. TORMIS Facts: In an affidavit dated Oct 2, 2003, Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judged Rosabella M Tormis of the Municipal Trial court of Cebu City, Branch IV, with abuse of authority. On July 3, 2003, complainant was surprised to receive a call from the accused that she was released from confinement on July 2 at 10:00pm. Complainant inquired from the police station if an order of release was issued by the court, but she was informed that the accused was released because of the phone call the respondent judge made telling the desk officer that the accused already posted a cash bail. Complainant checked the case records but the expediente contained no copies of the order of release. She was only shown a copy of such at 1:00pm. Also, it was only on 430pm of july 3, 2003 that the case records was found. The police blotter showed no entry of the order of release received was by the police. Only a notation that there was a posting of the cash bail bond was entered therein. Complainant states that it was improper for the respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as the function belonged exclusively to the office of the clerk of court. Also, she claimed that said judge committed an act of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally order the release of the accused. Respondent judge denied the charges. She states that she issued the order of release at 7pm after accused posted the cash bond. She claimed that such accused was released because of the order of release and not because of the phone call. The investigating judge submitted a report recommending that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000 or suspended for 3 months. OCA agreed with the findings and recommended the suspension of 3 months. Issue: WON respondent judge can be held administratively liable for personally receiving the cash bail bond for the accused. Held: Yes. Section 14, of Rule 114 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that: “The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case…….” Section 14 exclusively enumerates those officials who are tasked to receive such bail bond. A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the judge. Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately misleading the court by making false representations. She is suspended from office for 6 months w/o salary and other benefits and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt more seriously. 28. SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN GR Numbers 148468, 148769, and 149116 January 28, 2003 FACTS: The case is a consolidation of 3 petitions filed by Edward Serapio which assailed
resolutions of the 3rd Division of the Sandiganbayan in denying his petition for bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus in relation to a plunder case against him. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He received a Php200 million donation from Chavit Singson. He received the donation and turned it over to the treasurer of the Foundation and it was deposited to the account with the Equitable PCI Bank. In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities triggering the filing with the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Estrada. Petitioner was among the persons included in the criminal charges. Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations against Estrada and other persons and no bail was recommended for the provisional released of the accused. Ombudsman found probable cause for plunder and petitioner filed an MR. It was denied because the information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrests for the accused, including petitioner. Petitioner was detained at Camp Crame for the said charge. Arraignment was set and petitioner filed a petition for Bail. Several other bail meetings did not push through. Even before the Sandiganbayan can resolve the issues, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari praying that the issued Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be declared void because he was denied due process. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner of his right to due process of the law. HELD: No. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but it is a right conferred by a statute. Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to answer the charges against him during the preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence dictates that the Court do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in its conduct of preliminary investigations. It was enunciated in Raro v. Sandiganbayan that in the performance of the task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsman’s discretion is paramount. The lack of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information filed before the court. The denial of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus does not deny him of his right to due process because there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner has voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Habeas corpus does not lie because there was no deprivation of liberty. Also, the delay in the hearing of the bail cannot be solely pinned upon the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is also to be blamed. Habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail.
29. Salta vs. CA Facts: On 1970, Almario T. Salta was charged by the Philippine National Bank before the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Salta filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan against Patrocinio Dayrit, Renato Tayag and others. In support of his complaint and as part of his defense in Salta submitted his affidavit . On 1973, Salta filed a complaint against Patrocinio Dayrit, Renato Tayag, Adoracion Tayag and Montano Bundad directly with Judge Ancheta for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. The complaint, docketed, alleged the same grounds and issues raised by Salta in the earlier complaint against Dayrit, Tayag and the others filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The complaint had been dismissed by both the Provincial Fiscal and District State Prosecutor Kliatchko. On the other hand, the Philippine National Bank charged Salta before the Provincial Fiscal in Pampanga for alleged violations of the Anti-Graft Act committed by Salta in the PNB Guagua Branch where he was transferred after his Malolos assignment. After an investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga found a prima facie case against Salta and filed the corresponding information with the Circuit Criminal Court presided by Judge Ancheta. Judge Ancheta issued an order ruling that "unless otherwise restrained by higher courts, the requisite preliminary investigation thereon on Salta's complaint shall be conducted. Judge Ancheta further held that "until such time when the preliminary investigation shall have been terminated, the hearings on the merits of the criminal case is hereby suspended." The scheduled preliminary investigation was postponed upon motions of respondents Adoracion S. Tayag, Renato D. Tayag, Montano Bundad and Patrocinio Dayrit. Subsequently, these respondents filed their respective motions to dismiss, premised on the principle that under Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, the judge may take cognizance of and conduct preliminary investigation of a complaint filed directly with him only if there has been no "... previous preliminary examination and investigation conducted by fiscal ... ." Judge Ancheta denied the motion to dismiss. A joint motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents was likewise denied. The judge then reset the preliminary investigation. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court presided by Judge Ancheta to conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by Salta against Tayag, Dayrit and others when the previous Identical complaint filed by Salta with the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan had already been dismissed by the fiscal and, later, by the district state prosecutor for insufficiency of evidence. Judge Ancheta acquitted Salta in Criminal Cases. On March 22, 1974, Judge Ancheta issued a resolution in connection with the preliminary investigation he conducted. The Dayrit petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Tayag petition was granted and the resolutions and orders complained of were set aside and declared as null and void. A motion for reconsideration filed by Dayrit was denied. Likewise, a motion for reconsideration filed by Salta was denied. Hence, both Dayrit and Salta filed the present petitions for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Ancheta had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over Salta's complaint against petitioner Dayrit and Renato Tayag, the respondent Ruling: We have in the past viewed with disfavor the unseemly interest of Judges of Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary investigations in cases they will later try. We stated in Collector of Customs v. Villaluz (71 SCRA 357) that the authority given to regular Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. However, we made it clear that even as said courts may have such authority, they must concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before them instead of discharging a function that could very well be handled by the provincial or city fiscal. A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal trial until the reasonable probability of his guilt has first been ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. It is also intended to protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. (Section 1, Rule 112 of the present Rules of Court states that it is conducted for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The preliminary investigation proper is, therefore, not a judicial function. It is a part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive. Wherever there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them. The fact that a certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised. Cognizant of the above, Section 37 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 reiterates the removal from Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. There are enough fiscals and prosecutors in the region to do the job. Similarly, Section 2 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer authorizes Regional Trial Judges to conduct preliminary investigations. The respondent Judge conducted the questioned preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. Even if we assume that there had been no prior investigations and granting that Judge Ancheta had jurisdiction to conduct another preliminary investigation, the record shows that he behaved in such a manner that the respondents, among them Tayag and Dayrit, were virtually deprived of due process of law. The death of Renato D. Tayag has rendered the said petition moot and academic. This however, does not preclude this Court from cautioning trial judges on their obligation to observe "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" at all times to satisfy the requirements of due process. The petition is granted. The questioned decision of CA is reversed and set aside
#30 Yapdiangco v. Buencamino Facts: On February 1, 1965, the fiscal diled information for slight physical injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner on December 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after the prescribed 60‐day period petitioner moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground of prescription. Respondent denied the motion contended that it was filed within the prescriptive period since the last day fell on a Sunday or legal holiday, therefore should not be counted. Issue: Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or Legal Holidays. Held: No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop the running of the prescriptive period as a matter of statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the only exception is the offender’s physical absence and no other cause can be sufficient to interrupt prescription. The Court ruled that where the sixtieth and last day to file information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty‐day period cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically set in.” The fiscal cannot file the information on the next following working day as it would tantamount to extending the prescriptive period fixed by law. Criminal Statutes are to be strictly construed. Statutes of limitations in criminal suits is essentially different from statute of limitations in civil suits. Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecution was granted on the valid ground on the valid ground of prescription.
#31 Gozo vs Tac-An In a school party in Batangas, Gilbert Dyogi was killed while he an a member of PNP grappled for the possession of his gun. The PNP members were charged with murder but files a motion to quash which was granted by the judge who ruled that there is a probable cause to hold Blanco to stand in trial for homicide only while co-accused were discharged for insufficiency of evidence. He then directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file an Ammended information as a matter of convenience.
Issue: W/N a judge can conduct a preliminary investigation
Held: No. Rule 112 of Rules of Court enumerated the officers authorized to conduct PI. Judges of RTCs is not one among those mentioned. They nno longer have authority that was once given under 1964 Rles of Court. 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure did not eestore such athority. Art. 3 sec. 1 is dfferent from PI by Prosecutors. The purpose of PI is whether a crime has been commited and w/ntheres a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof PI is not a trial of a case on merits, it is only inquisitorial. It is not an occation for the full and exhaustive display of evidence
#32 People vs Pareja Pareja was charged with two counts of rape and one attempted rape. He is the stepfather of four including the victim who was 13 years old at the time the three abuses took place. On the first incident, she never told anyone about it for fear after respondent threatened to kill her. In Feb, she was molested again and in March it was her mother who saw the act of lifting the skirt of her
daughter while the latter was asleep. Her mother filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
Issue: W/N Pareja can be found guilty of rape
Held: No, even though it was proven during the trial since the charge in the information for the December 2003 incident was rape through carnal knowledge.Article 266 A is different from Article 266 B. It is important to note that there is a material difference and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape, thus the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice versa. To convict Pareja of rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his conatitutional rigjt to be informed of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation againts him.
Case no. 33 Leviste v. Almeda, GR No. 182677, August 3, 2010 Facts: Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA and filed an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. This was denied on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. Leviste contends that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court would justify CA’s denial. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. Issue: Whether or not the CA is justified in denying the application for bail of Leviste? Ruling: Yes, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty imposed is more than 6 years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances: 1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; 2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; 3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; 4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or 5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. Case no. 34 Facts: Ricarze was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents, was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, after arraignment and pretrial and after the private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence, the prosecution presented its witnesses and changed the name of the offended party from Caltex to PCIB. Petitioner contends that the amendments of the Information to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy. Issue: Whether or not allowing the substitution of the private complainant after the arraignment and after the prosecution has terminated is violative of Rule 110 Section 14? Ruling: No, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Information, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
Case 35 Facts: On October 29, 2009, the trial court has acquitted the accused from the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. On 29 November 1999, petitioner, who is the offended party filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment and considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29 November 1999, a Monday. Such motion was denied being filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed. Issue: Whether or not the period within which a private offended party may appeal from, or move for a reconsideration of, or otherwise challenge, the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action should be reckoned from the date of promulgation? Ruling: No, civil actions are allowed to proceed separately from criminal ones. the Rule on the promulgation of judgment refers to the accused, not to the private offended party, who is not even required to be present during the proceedings. Since the judgment may be promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will be inequitable to count from that date the period of appeal for the said party. It is but logical to begin tolling such period only upon service of the notice of judgment upon the offended party, and not from its promulgation to the accused. Rule 122 Section 6 does not apply to civil case appealed by the offended party. In civil cases, it is required that motions be filed 15 days from the actual knowledge or notice.
36. Foz vs People (2009) G.R. 167764
Facts: Petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr and Danny Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel. Upon arraignment, they were assisted by counsel de parte and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued, finding both of them guilty. Petitioners moved for recon but was denied. Dissatisfied, they appealed to CA who affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They then filed a motion for recon which CA denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City. Issue: WON the RTC of Iloilo City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged. Held: SC ruled on the negative. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation: The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: The allegations in the Information that “Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region” only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
