CASES FOR RULE 110
1.
SEC. 1 RULE 110 ANARNA 1, 23, 45
RULE 111 1, 23
SALAZAR VS. PEOPLE, SEPT 10, 2002, 391 SCRA 162 RULE 110 SEC 1 - #1 ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Salazar is correct in claiming that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action as estafa against him, since Skiva is not the offended party. HELD: No, petitioner Salazar is not correct in claiming that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action as estafa against him, since Skiva is not the offended party. The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by a fiscal. It I t is not necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation. Thus, as a general rule, a criminal criminal action action is commenced commenced by a complaint complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva. The Supreme Supreme Court Court rendered decision, the the instant instant petition petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment of the court a quo finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. 2.
ANTIOJO – 2, 24, 46
2, 24
Susan V. Llenes vs. Hon. Isaias P. Dicdican, Amado Bajarias and Vivian Ginete [G.R. No. 122274. July 31, 1996] ISSUE: whether the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of a complaint against a government official for grave oral defamation interrupts the period of prescription of such offense.
HELD: YES. The filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral defamation against the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of the period of prescription of the said offense. The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended, for those penalized by special laws. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave oral defamation prescribes in 6 months. Since Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood to be of 30 days, then grave oral defamation prescribes in 180 days. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides: ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words were directly uttered in the presence of the offended party on 23 September 1993. Hence, the prescriptive period for the offense started to run on that date. The Supreme Court in the the case case of People vs. Olarte Olarte resolved resolved once and and for for all all what what should be the doctrine, viz., that the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court even for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Thus: x x x conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits. Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, this Court not only reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by holding that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of the prescriptive period. As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed: In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of First Instance x x x. The procedural law articulating Francisco case is the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Rules of Court:
HELD: YES. The filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral defamation against the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of the period of prescription of the said offense. The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended, for those penalized by special laws. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave oral defamation prescribes in 6 months. Since Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood to be of 30 days, then grave oral defamation prescribes in 180 days. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides: ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words were directly uttered in the presence of the offended party on 23 September 1993. Hence, the prescriptive period for the offense started to run on that date. The Supreme Court in the the case case of People vs. Olarte Olarte resolved resolved once and and for for all all what what should be the doctrine, viz., that the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court even for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Thus: x x x conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits. Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, this Court not only reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by holding that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of the prescriptive period. As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed: In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of First Instance x x x. The procedural law articulating Francisco case is the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal actions shall be as follows: (a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purposeof conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein; (b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint or information directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal. In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged. The rule, however, is entirely different under Act No. 3326, as amended, whose Section 2 explicitly provides that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the institution of judicial proceedings, i.e., the filing of the complaint or information with the court. The said section reads: SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. And so, in Zaldivia vs. Reyes, this Court held that the proceedings referred to in said Section 2 are "judicial proceedings," which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution provide: SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: 1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Corollarily, Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which Congress enacted pursuant to paragraph 8 of the aforementioned Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Constitution, provide as follows: f ollows: SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where
the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: 1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage from any investigatory agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases. SEC. 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure in office. Needless to state, these broad constitutional and statutory provisions vest upon the Ombudsman and his Deputies the power to initiate or conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases filed against public officers or employees, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Thus, in Deloso vs. Domingo,[27] this Court held: The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any illegal act or omission of any public officer is not an exclusive authority; rather, it is a "shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged." A public officer, as distinguished from a government "employee," is a person whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government. The petitioner, being an Education Supervisor II of the Regional Office of Region VII of the DECS, is a public officer. The OmbudsmanVisayas then has authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the private respondent's complaint against the petitioner for grave oral defamation. Accordingly, the filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral defamation against the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of the period of prescription of the said offense. Since the complaint was filed on 13 October 1993, or barely twenty days from the commission of the crime charged, the filing then of the information on 28 March 1994 was very well within the six-month prescriptive period. 3.
ALDEH – 3, 25, 47
3, 25
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs.HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR. ISSUE: Whether the offense has prescribed
RULING: YES. That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. 4.
CASTRO – 4, 26, 48
4, 26
Arambulo vs Laqui
Issue: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred in holding that the offense of libel in the instant case has not yet prescribed. Held:
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal code, in declaring that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second , even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 5.
DELOS REYES – 5, 27, 49
5
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN ISSUE: Whether or not the information filed against petitioner was valid to justify his suspension. HELD: YES. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that: SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the
suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged under avalid information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused. 6.
DINGLASAN – 6, 28, 50
6
SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO VS. JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of Bulacan A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005 Issue: Whether or not the court has authority to review and reverse the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a respondent for the purpose of amending the Information. Held: The function of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. However, while prosecuting officers have the authority to prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime they have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the prosecutor who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of the prosecutor's should normally prevail.
7.
EUGENIO – 7, 29, 51
7
Ebarle vs. Sucaldito Issue:
Whether or not Anti-Graft League is an "offended party" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Held: The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the AntiGraft League of the Philippines to bring suit is equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. 20 The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself. 21 For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended party; with respect to information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. 8.
GALICINAO – 8, 30, 52
8
People vs. Mendez, 335 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 132546, July 5, 2000 Issue Whether the accused can be validly convicted despite the defective information. Held Yes. The case of People vs. Oso19 also established the principle that in case of variance between the complaint filed by the offended party and the information in crimes against chastity, the complaint controls.20 The failure of the information to state th at ROSENDO raped VIRGINITA “through force or intimidation” is not a fatal omission in this case because the complaint alleged the ultimate fact that ROSENDO raped VIRGINITA “by means of force.” So, at
the outset, ROSENDO could have readily ascertained that he was being accused of rape committed through force, a charge that sufficiently complies with Article 335. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates three ways of committing rape, to wit:
1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. 9.
HIPOLITO – 9, 31, 53
9
Visitacion L. Estodillo, et al. v. Judge Teofilo D. baluma ISSUE: Whether there is a need for the information to be sworn under oath by the prosecutor. RULING: No. Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. If an information should be sworn under oath, the rules would have so provided as it does for a complaint which is defined as a “sworn written statement charging a person with
an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public of ficer charged with the enforcement of the law violated.” The information need not be under oath, the reason therefore being principally that the prosecuting officer filling it is charged with the special duty in regard thereto and is acting under the special responsibility of his oath of office. Clearly, Judge Teofilo had confused and information from a complaint. 10.
JACINTO – 10, 32, 54
10
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALYNN PLEZETTE DY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BILLY CERBO and JONATHAN CERBO, 301 SCRA 475 ISSUE: W/N the determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. (No) HELD: The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. This broad prosecutorial power is however not unfettered, because just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be circumspect in filing criminal charges against the innocent. Thus, for crimes cognizable by regional trial courts, preliminary investigations are usually conducted. A judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor’s determination of probable
cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case. 11.
PACSON – 11, 33, 55
11
12.
PALILEO – 12, 34, 56
12
ENRIQUEZ VS VALLARTA 378 SCRA 12
ISSUE: WON respondent judge cannot be faulted for allowing the intervention of a private prosecutor in the trial of Criminal Case No. 215-98. RULING: YES, The Court agrees with the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent judge cannot be faulted for allowing the intervention of a private prosecutor in the trial of Criminal Case No. 215-98. Rule 110, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000) provides: All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. . . . (emphasis supplied) Absent any showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that official duty was regularly performed. This presumption is reinforced in this case by the fact that complainant, as counsel for the accused, failed to object to the absence of the public prosecutor, giving rise to the presumption that the intervention of a private prosecutor was due to the unavailability of the public prosecutor. By failing to make a timely objection, complainant must be deemed to have waived his objection to the proceedings before respondent judge. 13.
PASCO – 13, 35, 57
13
Salazar vs Romaquin Issue:
W/N the Provincial Prosecutor is the proper party to serve the copy of petition by Salazar? Held: No. The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and represent the respondent People of the Philippines is confined only to the proceedings before the trial court. This is based on Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides, viz:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. The pleadings of the accused and copies of the orders or resolutions of the trial court are served on the People of the Philippines through the Provincial Prosecutor. However, in appeals before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court either (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition for review; (c) on automatic appeal; or, (d) in special civil actions where the People of the Philippines is a party, the general rule is that the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines. This is provided for in Section 35 (1) Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, viz: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. A copy of the petition in such action must be served on the People of the Philippines as mandated by Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, through the Office of the Solicitor General.11 The service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Provincial Prosecutor would be inefficacious. The petitioner’s failure to have a copy of his petition served on the
respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Unless and until copies of the petition are duly served on the respondent, the appellate court has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. 14.
PAVICO – 14, 36, 58
14
Sta. Rosa Mining vs. Zabala Issue: Whether or Not mandamus lies, in other words, Whether or not the fiscal has the right to inhibit himself to prosecute the case. Ruling: YES(mandamus) No (inhibition) There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addresses to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the information according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides not to file the information,
in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court" (U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, supra). Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings wig be null and void (People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361). Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties. 15.
RIEGO – 15, 37, 59
15
PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ JULY 11, 2002 – 384 SCRA 375 ISSUE: WON the complaint of rape is valid. HELD: Yes, the complaint of rape is valid. As to the validity of complaint — A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family. It has been held that “[w]hen it is said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is
jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.”
The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The assistance of JONALYN’s aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. JONALYN’s signature alone suffices to validate the complaint.
The Court agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully considered filed by a minor. As to the Competence to testify — The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an oath. The prosecution has proved JONALYN’s competency
by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-yearold child, does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to consider her testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness. JONALYN, who may be considered as a mental retardate but with the ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a competent witness under Section 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. As to the Credibility as witness — The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYN’s competency
but also her credibility. Moreover, considering her feeble mind, she could not have fabricated or concocted her charge against BIENVENIDO. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that no improper motive was shown by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against BIENVENIDO. A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has
absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. It has been held that no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. As to the Propounding of leading questions — The Court likewise agree with the trial court’s conclusion that JONALYN’s
testimony should be taken and understood from the point of view of an 8-yearold child. JONALYN’s testimony is consistent with the straightforward and
innocent testimony of a child. Thus, the prosecution’s persistent, repetitious and painstaking effort in asking leading questions was necessary and indispensable in the interest of justice to draw out from JONALYN’s lips the basic details of the
grave crime committed against her by BIENVENIDO. The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN. It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental equipment; confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith. The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which she merely confirmed as true. The questions were indeed carefully phrased and sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN understand the import of the questions. In the same vein, the prosecution’s referral to JONALYN’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay to refresh her memory was also reasonable. The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court. It is, therefore, beyond doubt that JONALYN’s lone testimony, which was found to be credible by the trial court, is enough to sustain a conviction. At any rate, medical and physical evidence adequately corroborated JONALYN’s testimony.
Time and again we have held that the laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of forcible defloration. Dispositive portion — WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96 finding accused-appellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in the reduced amount of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000. REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS: Criminal Law; Rape; Criminal Procedure; A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. — A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family
decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; When it is said that the requirement of Article 344 (that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. —It has been held that “[w]hen it is said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.”
Same; Same; Same; As signed by the offended party, the complaint starts the prosecutory proceeding, and the assistance of her aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. — The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The assistance of JONALYN’s aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. JONALYN’s signature alone suffices to validate the complaint.
Same; Same; Same; If a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, an offended party, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. — We agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully considered filed by a minor. Same; Same; Witnesses; Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness. — The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an oath. The prosecution has proved JONALYN’s competency by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial
court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-year-old child, does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to consider her testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness. JONALYN, who may be considered as a mental retardate but with the ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a competent witness under Section 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Same; Same; Same; A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible
where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the
accused. —The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYN’s competency but also her credibility. Moreover, considering her feeble mind, she could not have fabricated or concocted her charge against BIENVENIDO. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that no improper motive was shown by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against BIENVENIDO. A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where
she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. It has been held that no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. Same; Same; Same; It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature, aged and infirm, in bad physical condition, uneducated, ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings, inexperienced, unsophisticated, feeble-minded, of sluggish mental equipment, confused and agitated, terrified, timid or embarrassed while on the stand, lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand, deaf and dumb, or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar there with. — We likewise agree with the trial court’s conclusion that JONALYN’s testimony should be taken and un derstood from the point of view of an 8-year-old child. JONALYN’s testimony is consistent with the straightforward and innocent testimony of a child. Thus, the prosecution’s persistent, repetitious and painstaking effort in asking leading
questions was necessary and indispensable in the interest of justice to draw out from JONALYN’s lips the basic details of the grave crime committed against her
by BIENVENIDO. The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN. It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental equipment; confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith. Same; Same; Same; The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court. — The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which she merely confirmed as true. The questions were indeed carefully phrased and sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN understand the import of the questions. In the same vein, the prosecution’s referral to JONALYN’s Sinumpaang Salaysay to refresh her memory was also reasonable.
The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the
witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court. Same; Same; The laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of forcible defloration. — It is, therefore, beyond doubt that JONALYN’s lone testimony, which was found to be credible by the trial court, is enough to sustain a conviction. At any rate, medical and physical evidence adequately corroborated JONALYN’s testimony. Time and again we have held
that the laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of forcible defloration. 16.
ROBINOS – 16, 38, 60
16
People vs. Nicolas (387 SCRA 638, 22 August 2002) Issue/s: Whether or not it is indispensable for the prosecution to present the complainant, the daughter of the victim, who subscribed to the complaint of rape. (No) Held: The rule is that when the offended party has executed and subscribed to a complaint, the prosecution before the court may be initiated by means of an information signed by the prosecutor alone. But there is nothing in the rule that requires the complaint to still be identified in court during trial. The rule, in our view, is not vitiated by the fact that the complaint was signed by the daughter of the disabled and mentally ill victim. Otherwise the rule would be requiring the impossible, which is absurd. The daughter's affidavit-complaint is sufficient compliance with the rules. She swore to the contents of her affidavit-complaint, which was duly filed. Moreover, all of the other children of the victim have shown their intent to proceed with the case by actively participating in the trial. They were in fact presented as witnesses. In our view, it is clear that the offended party's children are firm in their resolve to seek judicial redress. It must be also noted that, even if considered in the light of current provisions of law and the rules, the same ruling would be reached. Under R.A. 8353,rape has been reclassified from being a private crime into a crime against persons. As a result, the prosecution of the crime of rape has been effectively removed from the ambit of the requirements of Chapter Five, Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. We note further that on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect and, following the amendments brought about by R.A. 8353, Section 5, Rule 110 thereof has correspondingly been amended. Rape may now be prosecuted de oficio. 17.
SANTILLANA – 17, 39, 61
17
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. VIRGILIO TAMAYO, ARTURO GARCIA alias "Zoro", RODRIGO IMBUIDO alias "Isong", accused. VIRGILIO TAMAYO, accused-appellant. Issue: In this appeal, appellant assails whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case as the complaint is null and void, having been filed not by the offended party who was already eighteen (18) years old at the time the offense was committed but by her father Raymundo Fabia The appellant maintains that in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction to try a criminal case for rape, the complaint must be filed by the offended woman even if she be a minor, and if she does not want to file the complaint, her, parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same. Appellant submits that there is no showing in the instant case that Rosario refused to file the complaint; hence, the complaint filed by her father did not vest jurisdiction on the trial court. Ruling: (No) We find the appeal devoid of merit. The law is clear that "[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian . . . In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf. The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is competent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same." There is no doubt that 18-year old Rosario is still a minor, not having reached twenty-one (21) when the crime was committed on her. The records also fail to disclose that she filed a complaint on the outrage done to her. Consequently, when she failed to file her complaint, the filing by her father was justified under the Rules. Thus, when appellant filed a motion to dismiss in the court below for lack of jurisdiction, it was not error for the trial court to deny the same. 18.
TITO – 18, 40, 62
18
People vs. Goles, 192 SCRA 663, G.R. No. 91513 December 21, 1990 Topic - Rule 110 sec.5 Issue: WON sworn complaint of the offended party filed with the fiscal by the phrase "on complaint under oath." complied the requirement of Rule 110 Sec. 5 Held:
YES. ln the case at bar, the prosecution for the crime of rape was commenced by the filing of the criminal complaint which was signed not only by the complainant but also by her mother in accordance with Rule 115, Section 5 considering that the complainant is mentally incompetent. This criminal complaint was the basis for the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal and the subsequent filing of the information in court. Nowhere in the law is it required that the complainant likewise sign and verify the information for rape filed by the fiscal. The Court takes note of the reference in the first paragraph to the sworn complaint of the offended party filed with the fiscal by the phrase "on complaint under oath." This goes to show that said criminal complaint was in effect reproduced as part of the information. During the trial said complaint of the offended party was presented in evidence.There was thus sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law and the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. Indeed, in the case of People vs. Sunpongco, where the criminal complaint filed by the offended party for the purpose of preliminary investigation was not presented in evidence during the trial and where the information was filed by the fiscal, this Court ruled that the trial court can take judicial notice of the complaint that was forwarded with the records of the preliminary investigation to the court, without necessity of its formal introduction in evidence. Rule 110, Sec. 5 Rules of Court NOTE: Rule 110, Sec. 5 Rules of Court Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. (This Section was repealed by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC effective May 1, 2002) "Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. x x x ."
This amendment to Rule 110 shall take effect on the first day of May 2002 following its publication in two newspapers of general circulation on or before 30 April 2002. 19.
UNAS – 19, 41, 63
19
Gonzales vs. Arcilla, 203 SCRA 609, G.R. No. 27923 November 18, 1991 ISSUE: WON the alleged defamation imputes the crime of adultery which cannot be prosecuted de office. HELD: No. The Court agreed with respondents-appellants that “mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa,” even if translated as “one who grabs another’s husband,”
does not necessarily mean an adulteress. At most, it may imply that the person to whom it is addressed is a “flirt, a temptress, or one who indulges in enticing other husbands;” hence, it is more of an imputation of a vice, condition or act
not constituting a crime. The other remarks are by themselves defamatory and are not at all related to the first portion. They were uttered to impute a condition, defect, status or vice intended to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the offended party. They were uttered merely to expose all the possible vices, defects, real or imaginary, status, or condition of the offended party. None of these, however, imputed any crime. Accordingly, the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that:“ No criminal action for defamation which consist in the
imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.” which has specific reference to the crimes against chastity, and the
second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides: “The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. x x x” are not applicable in this case
since, as above discussed, the alleged slanderous utterances subject of the assailed information do not impute any crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio. WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from in SP Civil Case No. 5270 of the court below dated 7 June 1967 is hereby REVERSED. The Order of the City Court of Davao City of 27 July 1966 in Criminal Case No. 2273-B denying the motion to quash is hereby REINSTATED and said court is directed to proceed with the arraignment, if one has not yet been had, and the trial of the case on its merits. Note- same same: Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in writing. In both, there is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether the offense has been committed, the defamatory words are to be construed in their entirety, and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading or hearing them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. In short, the language used must be understood “in its plain and popular sense— to read the sentences as would the man on the street.” The intent or purpose then of the speaker or
writer is not relevant. 20.
VALLEJO – 20, 42, 64
20
FLOREZIL AGUJETAS and SALVADOR BIJIS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. ISSUE: W/N Rabat may file a complaint against the petitioners? YES HELD: Remedial Law; Actions; Party; Except where the law specifically provides to the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed may be laid by any competent person. — On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the present case was filed by Francisco Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate in the Province of Davao Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings; that she was merely presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo was a patent error. We find petitioners’ allegations
untenable. Except where the law specifically provides to the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed may be laid by any competent person. The Omnibus Election Code does not specifically provide that a particular person must file the complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco Rabat is valid. Same; Same; Same; Unless the injured party has expressly waived the civil liability of the accused or reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is error for the court to refuse a request of the injured party during the course of the criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his damages. — In U.S. v. Henry, this court held that “If the injured party has not expressly waived the civil liability of the accused nor reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is error for the court to refuse a request of the injured party during the course of the criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his damages.” Thus, the arguments of the petitioners notwithstanding, respondent court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs. Irigo. 21.
VALLEJOS – 21, 43, 65
Avecilla vs People
21
Issue: Whether or not the complaint against the petitioner was sufficient to convict him of qualified Theft? Held: Yes, From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had not been deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Moreover, he may be convicted of a crime and sentenced to the corresponding penalty as long as the facts alleged in the information and proved at the trial constitute the crime for which he is convicted although different from the crime designated and charged in the information. The allegations in the complaint against petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt at the trial. 22.
VILLORIA – 22, 44, 66
22
PEOPLE v QUITLONG 292 SCRA 360 Issue:
Whether or not conspiracy can be considered even if it is not allege in the original complaint. Held: NO An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. [21] Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
23.
ANARNA 1, 23, 45
1, 23
PEOPLE VS. ARBIOS AUG 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 24 RULE 110 SEC 6 - #23 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can question the lack of preliminary investigation certificate in appeal? HELD: No, the accused cannot question the lack of preliminary investigation certificate in appeal. Suffice it to state in this connection that the certification by the fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been conducted in accordance with law is not an essential part of the information and its absence cannot vitiate it as such. Besides, the failure to make a preliminary investigation of a criminal charge to which no objection was raised in the court below, may not be questioned for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the accused in a criminal case has a right to waive preliminary investigation and the appellant herein had in fact waived preliminary investigation. Supreme Court’s decision with the modification that the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim should be increased to P30,000.00, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. With proportionate costs against the appellant. 24.
ANTIOJO – 2, 24, 46
2, 24
People (appellee) vs. Joel Perez y Adornado (appellant) [G.R. No. 140772. December 10, 2003] ISSUE: Whether the inconsistencies in Isidro’s statement weaken his credibility as
a witness? NO. Whether the kind or nature of the weapon used is needed to be stated in the complaint/information? NO. HELD: The inconsistencies catalogued by the appellant referred only to peripheral or minor details which do not destroy or weaken the credibility of the witness of the prosecution. Such inconsistencies are even indicia of honest and unrehearsed declarations and responses of witnesses and thus enhanced their credibility. We note that Isidro sufficiently explained his use of itak and kutsilyo when he was cross-examined by the appellants counsel: Q In your statement marked as Exhibit F, I am referring to the statement given to the police, there is a question and which I quote: Nasabi mo nakita si Joel Perez ang siyang sumaksak kay Agapito, nakita mo rin ba naman kung anong klaseng patalim ang ginamit niya? and your answer was: Isa pong matulis na itak po ang pinangsaksak niya kay Agapito. Do you remember having given this statement?
A Yes, sir. Q A while ago during the direct examination you were asked what kind of weapon was used and you said, at first kutsilyo then later on a pointed weapon. Which is which now? A Because in our place a knife is called Dipang. The dipang, hindi itak na gaano yon. Dipang, this is the smallest itak in our place, sir. Q Did I get it from you that itak and kutsilyo are one and the same in your place? A Yes, sir. They are one and the same.[35] Case law has it that an affidavit given to the police investigator at the police station is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another person invariably by the police investigator who uses his own language. Omissions and misunderstandings by the writer usually result. And in case of discrepancy between the sworn statement and those made by the affiant on the witness stand, the latter deserves full faith and credit.[36] On the apparent inconsistency of Isidros testimony during the preliminary investigation that his sworn statement to the police investigators on May 3, 1996 was voluntary is not enfeebled by the fact that it was given eight days after the crime was committed when Isidro arrived at the police station to give his statement. Isidro testified that he was then busy helping the family in the burial of the victim. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall. Isidro’s testimony that he saw the appellant pull out the bladed weapon
from the chest of the victim is not inconsistent with his sworn statement to the police that it was the appellant who stabbed the victim. Even if Isidro did not see the appellant stab the victim, there can be no other conclusion that it was the appellant who stabbed the victim given the fact that it was the appellant who pulled out the knife from the chest of the victim and fled from the scene thereafter. Isidro saw no other person at the crime scene. He categorically and positively identified the appellant as the assailant of Agapito. He and the appellant never had any misunderstanding, thus no ill motive can be attributed to Isidro for him to testify against the appellant. This Court has held that absent evidence showing any reason for the prosecution witness to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and his testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit. With the positive and straightforward identification by Isidro of the appellant as the perpetrator, the latters defense of alibi must fall. ***That the Information does not describe the weapon used by the appellant either an itak or kutsilyo in stabbing the victim is inconsequential. The kind or nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime need not be alleged in the complaint or Information.
What must be alleged in the Information or complaint are those enumerated in Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.: SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. DISPOSITION: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant Joel Perez y Adornado is found guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Agapito Saballero the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity. Costs de oficio. 25.
ALDEH – 3, 25, 47
3, 25
Vasquez vs CA (based on the topic given in the syllabus) ISSUE: Whether the information filed in court was sufficient RULING: No but it was cured by the evidence presented in trial and was not objected by herein petitioner Petitioner points out that the information did not set out the entire news article as published. In fact, the second statement attributed to petitioner was not included in the information. The general rule is that the information must set out the particular defamatory words verbatim and as published and that a statement of their substance is insufficient, however, a defect in this regard may be cured by evidence. In this case, the article was presented in evidence, but petitioner failed to object to its introduction. Instead, he engaged in the trial of the entire article, not only of the portions quoted in the information, and sought to prove it to be true. In doing so, he waived objection based on the defect in the information. Consequently, he cannot raise this issue at this late stage. 26.
CASTRO – 4, 26, 48
People vs Cagadas Issue:
4, 26
Whether or not the appellate court erred in convicting Roberto Cultura even if he was not one of the charged in the information? Held: No. Appellants' contention that the trial court erred in convicting Roberto Cultura for he was not one of those indicted in the information but "Jose" Cultura (his father's name), has no merit. The erroneous designation of his name in the information will not vitiate it, as it was clearly proven that the accused, Roberto Cultura, was part of the group that arrested, hogtied and killed the victim. Besides, Cultura did not raise this question of his identity during the arraignment. His acquiescence to be tried under the name "Jose" at that stage of the case is deemed to be a waiver on his part to raise the question of his identity as one of the accused for the first time on appeal. 27.
DELOS REYES – 5, 27, 49
5
AVECILLA VS. PEOPLE
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him for the alleged vagueness of the information filed. HELD: NO. A thorough examination of the information reveals that it contains all the essential elements of the crime of theft, to wit: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. 20 While it is true that petitioner could not have been "bewildered" as to the nature of the charge against him had the information been more accurately crafted, it nonetheless contains all the elements of the crime of theft. Thus, it is alleged therein that petitioner, with the aid of and in conspiracy with an unidentified woman, willfully took away Registered Letter No. 24341 belonging to Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson to her damage and prejudice. Although intent to gain is not explicitly alleged in the information, it may be presumed from the allegation that the said mail matter was unlawfully taken. 21 Since there is no allegation that the taking was accomplished with violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things, it is apparent that the charge is for the crime of theft rather than robbery. The allegation that the subject of the taking is a registered letter categorizes the theft as a qualified rather than a simple one. This is clear from the provision of Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code which states that qualified theft is committed if the property stolen is mail matter. In this regard, petitioner's contention that not all registered letters are mail matter is incorrect. Under Sec. 1945 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, first class mail matter includes
letters. For the greater security of valuable mail matter, Sec. 1962 of the same Code established a registry system "under which the senders or owners of registered matter may be indemnified for losses thereof in the mails, the indemnity to be paid out of postal revenues . . . From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had not been deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Moreover, he may be convicted of a crime and sentenced to the corresponding penalty as long as the facts alleged in the information and proved at the trial constitute the crime for which he is convicted although different from the crime designated and charged in the information. 22 The allegations in the complaint against petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt at the trial. In this regard, it should be pointed out that absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law as basis for conviction of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. Moral certainty convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience that a crime has indeed been committed. This quantum of proof has been satisfied in this case. 28.
DINGLASAN – 6, 28, 50
6
PEOPLE VS GUTIERREZ
ISSUE: WON the motion to reopen the case should be granted. HELD: NO. Ely's testimony is concededly corroborative and not newly discovered. In fact, counsel for the defense in the lower court expressly waived the introduction of said testimony upon the ground that it is merely cumulative in nature. The granting of a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of abuse in the exercise thereof 29.
EUGENIO – 7, 29, 51
7
People vs Sayaboc Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense Held: The court held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules on Crminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. Nevertheless, the court find that neither evident premidatation nor treachery has been sufficiently proved to qualify the crime to murder. Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. Evident premeditation exists when it is shown that the execution
of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of evident premeditation are (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to kill Galam, the testimony that the former inquired about the latter while waiting in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. of that fateful day does not prove the time when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before that plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward, even if proved, can neither be considered because they were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the information specify the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for it to be considered in the imposition of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an accused and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect. 30.
GALICINAO – 8, 30, 52
8
People vs Dacillo 427 SCRA 528, G.R. No. 149368, April 14, 2004. Issue 1. Whether Dacillo is guilty of murder. 2. Whether there is abuse of superior strength. Held 1. Yes. It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged.22 Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other pursuant to a common purpose or design. 2. Yes. A cursory reading of the information reveals that appellant was sufficiently informed of the charges against him, including the use of superior strength in killing the hapless and defenseless female victim. Two grown-up men against a young fragile woman whose ability to defend herself had been effectively restrained revealed a shocking inequality of physical strength. 31.
HIPOLITO – 9, 31, 53
People v. Bali Balita
9
ISSUES: Whether or not the insufficiency of information shall prevent a judgement of conviction for qualified rape. RULING: The filiation of the appellant to the victim was not properly alleged in the information. Sections 7and 9 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states: Sec. 7 Name of the accused. - A complaint or information must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is known, or if his name cannot be discovered he must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is unknown. If in the course of the proceeding the true name of he accused is disclosed b him, or appears in some other manner to the court, the true name shall be inserted in the complaint or information and record. Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. - The acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce judgment. The Information upon which the appellant was charged states as follows: The undersigned accuses MELENCIO BALI-BALITA, common law husband of the complainants mother, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows: That on or about the 26th day of August, 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undressing the undersigned, a minor, 11 years of age, and at knife point inserted his fingers at her private part, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent. It appears that the relationship of the accused to the victim is stated as a more detailed description of the identity of the party who committed the crime charged. Such relationship is not stated in the cause of the accusation or in the narration of the act or omissions constituting the offense. Every element of the offense must be alleged and if the accused is being charged of a crime in its qualified form the qualifying circumstance must likewise be stated with certainty to enable a person of common understanding to be apprised of the acts or omissions of which he is charged, although the legal designation of the crime committed need not be specifically stated. Due process requires that the accused is duly informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. Such a requirement is primarily intended to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense as he is presumed innocent and of no independent knowledge of the acts constitutive of the crime charged against him. What is controlling is the description of the criminal act and not, as in this case, the description of the
identity of the accused. It has been held that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or the preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, But from the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information. In this case the information upon which the appellant was arraigned does not state in the specification of the acts constitutive of the offense that he is charged as the live-in partner of the mother of the alleged victim. This insufficiency prevents a judgment of conviction for qualified rape and thus, the death penalty cannot be imposed. The victim being under 12 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, the crime committed is statutory rape and the proper penalty under Art 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The victim is entitled to indemnity of P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence, in addition to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. This is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages which is automatically granted in rape cases. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it finds the accused-appellant Melencio Bali-balita guilty of the crime of rape with the modification that the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the accused-appellant is directed to pay the victim P50,000.00 by way of indemnity, in addition to P50,000.00 as moral damages. 32.
JACINTO – 10, 32, 54
10
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO MENDOZA, JR. y DELA CRUZ, 407 SCRA 563 ISSUE: W/N the right of the accused was violated. HELD: Yes. The vicitm’s age at the time of the filing of the complaints appears in
the caption or preamble thereof as a description of her as the private complainant. Her age at the time the incidents occurred was, however, not specified in the accusatory portion of each of the complaints. Such omission is prejudicial to the right of appellant to be informed of the nature of the accusations against him. Thus, in several cases, this Court held that it is not sufficient to simply allege the qualifying circumstances in the caption or the preamble but, more importantly, these must be alleged in the body or the accusatory portion of the information. It has been held that “the real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or the preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated . . . but from the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information. In this case the information upon which the appellant was arraigned does not state in the specification of the acts constitutive of the offense that he is charged as the live-in partner of the mother of the alleged victim. This insufficiency prevents a judgment of conviction for qualified rape and thus, the
death penalty cannot be imposed. As for the special qualifying circumstance of Monaliza’s relationship with appellant, the prosecution failed to prove it beyond
reasonable doubt. The complaint alleged that he is the father of Monaliza. Monaliza testified that appellant is her father.51 And appellant admitted during the pre-trial52 and the trial53 that he is victim’s father. The bare testimony of the complainant and the admission of the accused as to their relationship do not suffice, however,54 for an accused cannot be condemned to suffer the supreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions.55 This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death. The fact that appellant is the father of Monaliza must be sufficiently established by competent and independent evidence.56 This the prosecution failed to discharge. 33.
PACSON – 11, 33, 55
11
34.
PALILEO – 12, 34, 56
12
PEOPLE VS. TIGLE 420 SCRA 424 JANUARY 21, 2004
ISSUE: WON there is need to be preceded by the words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, or qualified by to be considered as qualifying circumstances. RULING: NO, The Court ruled in a recent case of People v. Rodelio Aquino y Roda: [S]ections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, or qualified by to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in proper cases. xxx The words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, qualified by, aggravating, or aggravated by need not be expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the Information. (Emphasis supplied) The resolution in People v. Aquino obviates the requirement of additional verbiage put forward in People v. Alba. The manner the Information in the present case stated the circumstances satisfy the standard set in People v. Aquino. The Information specified the circumstances allegedly attending the
commission of the crime. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words “qualifying” or “qualified by” to be considered as such. 35.
PASCO – 13, 35, 57
13
People vs Agudez Issue:
1. W/N there is a need to specify in the information that the five men used treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength as qualifying circumstances in the case at bar? 2. W/N the aggravating circumstance of band and uninhabited place may be used against appellants? Held: 1. No. It is the specific allegation of the attendant circumstance, and not the use of the words aggravating or qualifying circumstances, that raises a crime to a higher category. Thus, the words qualifying, qualified by, aggravating, or aggravated by need not be expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the information. We reiterate our pronouncements in said case that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure merely require that the information allege, specify, or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law that qualify or aggravate the offense.[47] Hence, in the present case, while the two Informations charging appellants with separate crimes of murder did not use the words aggravated by or qualified by, the presence of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength in the killing of Dominador and Mamerto is alleged therein. Such specification, enumeration or allegation sufficiently satisfies the requirements of Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. The qualifying circumstance of treachery having been alleged and proved by competent evidence, the trial court correctly found appellants guilty of Murder beyond reasonable doubt. 2. No. The aggravating circumstances of band and uninhabited place although established by the prosecution evidence should not have been
appreciated by the trial court because they were not alleged in the two Informations as required by the aforequoted Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It may be noted that the crime was committed in 1998, before the effectivity of the said Revised Rules on December 1, 2000. However, the Rules may be applied retroactively because they are more favorable to the appellants 36.
PAVICO – 14, 36, 58
14
People vs. Lucas Issue:
Whether or not the variance between the evidence presented and the allegations of the complaint affects the prosecution of respondent. The complaint in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 charges the accused with the crime of rape committed on 26 November 1982. Both Chanda and Cynthia, however, testified that the incident took place on 26 November 1983 Ruling: No! In United States vs. Arcos, this Court ruled: Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appear that the crime was not committed at the precise time or placed alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, providing itappears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations, and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court. (U.S. vs. Smith, and cases cited, 2 Phil. Rep., 20). Also, the accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution. 37.
RIEGO – 15, 37, 59
15
PEOPLE VS. LIZADA JANUARY 24, 2003 – 386 SCRA 657 ISSUE: WON the information filed is defective because of the date in the information. HELD: No, the information filed is NOT defective because of the date in the information. It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date
when the rape was committed does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Significantly, accusedappellant did not even bother to file a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was arraigned. Indeed, accused-appellant was duly arraigned under the Information and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without any plaint on the sufficiency of the Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that accused-appellant questioned for the first time the sufficiency of the Information filed against him. It is now too late in the day for him to do so. REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS: Courts; Judgments; The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution — it should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its decretal conclusion. — The contention of accusedappellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” T his
requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which reads: x x x The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it was reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of the trial court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge. More substantial reasons for the requirement are: “For
one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies.” The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution. Trial courts should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its decretal conclusion.
Same; Same; Remand of Cases; While the Supreme Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the decision of the trial court, for compliance with the constitutional provision, to avert further delay, the Court may decide to resolve the case on the merits where all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had been elevated to the Court. — The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the decision of the trial court, for compliance with the constitutional provision. However, to avert further delay in the disposition of the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering that all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had been elevated to the Court. The parties filed their respective briefs articulating their respective stances on the factual and legal issues. Criminal Law; Rape; Guiding Principles in the Review of the Rape Cases. — In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s
testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element of the crime, and the prosecution is unable to overcome it with its evidence, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt and hence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; The words “on or about” envisage a period, months or even two or four years before the date indicated. — It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are alleged to have been committed “on or about September 15, 1998” and “on or about October 22, 1998.” The words “on or about” envisage
a period, months or even two or four years before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The prosecution may prove that the crime charged was committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998. Same; Same; Same; The presentation by the prosecution, without objection on the part of the accused, of evidence of rape committed two times a week from 1996 until 1998 (which includes September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998) to prove the charges lodged against him constituted a waiver by the accused of his right to object to any perceived infirmity in, and in the amendment of, the aforesaid Informations to conform to the evidence adduced by the prosecution. — Moreover, when the private complainant testified on how accused-appellant defiled her two times a week from 1996 until 1998, accused-appellant raised
nary a whimper of protest. Accused-appellant even rigorously cross-examined the private complainant on her testimony on direct examination. The presentation by the prosecution, without objection on the part of accusedappellant, of evidence of rape committed two times a week from 1996 until 1998 (which includes September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998) to prove the charges lodged against him constituted a waiver by accused-appellant of his right to object to any perceived infirmity in, and in the amendment of, the aforesaid Informations to conform to the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Same; Same; Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape — it is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. — The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused by accused-appellant. The private complainant being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no substantial bearing on accused-appellant’s commission of the crime. Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.In People vs. Baculi, cited in People vs. Gabayron, we held that there could be a finding of rape even if despite repeated intercourse over a period of four years, the complainant still retained an intact hymen without injury. In these cases, the private complainant testified that the penis of accused-appellant gained entry into her vagina. Same; Same; Right to be Informed; The minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that the accused is the common-law husband of the victim’s mother, is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty if alleged in the information and duly proved. — We agree
with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of simple rape, instead of qualified rape. The evidence on record shows that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant. The private complainant, as of October 1998, was still 13 years old, and under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of the victim’s mother, is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the
imposition of the death penalty. However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the accused. Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the accused-appellant being the common-law husband of her mother, accusedappellant is guilty only of simple rape. Under the given law, the penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. Conformably with current jurisprudence, accusedappellant is liable to private complainant for civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P200,000.00. Same; Same; Same; The precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. — The Court does not agree with accusedappellant. It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Significantly, accusedappellant did not even bother to file a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was arraigned. Indeed, accused-appellant was duly arraigned under the Information and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without any plaint on the sufficiency of the Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that accused-appellant questioned for the first time the sufficiency of the Information filed against him. It is now too late in the day for him to do so. Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Elements; Words and Phrases; “Lewd” is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous, signifying that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. — For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements: “1. That
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness. 2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances: a. By using force or intimidation; or b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age.” “Lewd” is defined as obscene,
lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. Same; Same; Attempted Felonies; Elements. — The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: “1. The offender commences the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts; 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own
spontaneous desistance; 4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.” Same; Same; Same; Two elements of the First Requisite of an Attempted Felony. — The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: “(1) That there be external acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense; It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. — An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’ etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the “first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” The act done need
not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. Same; Same; Same; Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end. — Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end. One perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of March 21, 1892, declared that for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that their objective be known and established or such that acts be of such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for designation of the offense. Same; Same; It is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by their nature, by the facts to which they are related, by circum stances of the
persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the offense. — There is persuasive authority that in offenses not consummated as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). Hence, it is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by their nature, by the facts to which they are related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the offense. This Court emphasized in People vs. Lamahang that: “The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the
offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to cause a particular injury.”
Same; Same; Attempted Rape; Where, by the series of overt acts, the accused had commenced the execution of rape and only desisted from performing all the acts of execution because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of a third person, he is guilty of attempted rape. — In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accusedappellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape. 38.
ROBINOS – 16, 38, 60
16
People vs. Espinosa (432 SCRA 86, 15 June 2004) Issue/s: Whether or not the exact date of the offense committed is indispensable in the complaint. (No) Held: In People v. Lizada, this Court declared: The Court does not agree with the accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Significantly, accused-appellant did not even bother to file a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure before he was arraigned. Indeed, accused-appellant was duly arraigned under the Information and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without any plaint on the sufficiency of the Information. Accusedappellant even adduced his evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that accused-appellant questioned for the first time the sufficiency of the Information filed against him. It is now too late in the day for him to do so. Moreover, in People v. Salalima, this Court held that: "Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed ‘before and un til October 15, 1994,’ ‘sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,’ ‘sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto’ and ‘on or about and sometime in the year 1988’ constitute sufficient
compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. …"
Indeed, in the case at bar, the criminal complaint states that the rape was committed "on or about the month of August 1996." Such an allegation in the criminal complaint as to the time the offense was committed is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Besides, if the appellant was of the belief that the criminal complaint was defective, he should have filed a motion for a bill of particulars with the trial court before his arraignment. The appellant failed to do so. It was only when the case was brought to this Court on automatic review that he raised the question of the supposed insufficiency of the criminal complaint, which is now too late by any reckoning. 39.
SANTILLANA – 17, 39, 61
17
FELICISIMO ROCABERTE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ANDRES S. SANTOS, Judge, RTC, Tagbilaran, Bohol, Respondents. Issue: Whether or not the time of the commission of the crime stated in the information is defective and warrant amendment of the information. Ruling: Yes. The rules of criminal procedure declare that —
". . . A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the defendant; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed." and — as regards the time of the commission of the offense, particularly — that: ". . . It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit." In line with this last mentioned rule, a variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the evidence during the trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score. Hence, an amendment of an information so as to change the year therein stated to that following it, was allowed it appearing that the alteration impaired none of the defendant’s rights.
Where, however, there was a variance of several years between the time stated in the information, 1947, and the proof of its actual commission adduced at the trial, 1952, the dismissal of the case by the Trial Court was sustained by this Court, since to allow amendment of the indictment to conform to the evidence would be violative of defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. From all that has been said, the conclusion should be clear. The information against petitioner Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on him and his co-accused the unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make more definite and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case must be dismissed. 40.
TITO – 18, 40, 62
18
People vs. Desuyo, 381 SCRA 235, G.R. No. 140406 April 17, 2002 TOPIC – Rule 110 Sec. 11 - Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a) Issue: WON the Information does not conform substantially to the date of commission of the offense under Rule 110 sec. 11
Held: At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars. The records show that the accused never asked for a bill of particulars in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date when the alleged crime was committed or for the quashal of the Information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could lawfully be introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime.[11] It is indeed too late in the day for the accused to raise this issue because objections to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. At any rate, it is settled that the exact date of the commission of rape is not an essential element thereof and need not be stated in the information. The Court has sustained the following dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient for purposes of complying with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to wit: "from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994, "sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto, “on or about and sometime in the
year 1988, "sometime in the year 1987" and "before and until October 15, 1994." In any event, a review of the evidence presented by the prosecution more than establishes the guilt of the accused for the rape of his daughter. 41.
UNAS – 19, 41, 63
19
People vs. CFI of Quezon, 209 SCRA 704, June 10, 1992 ISSUES: 1. WON the State must be specifically mentioned in the body of the information as an offended party. 2. WON the information was already sufficient in form and substance 3. WON the amendment sought by herein petitioner changing the word "Corporation" to "Operation" is merely formal and thus, does not merit quashal. HELD: 1. No. It is not necessary to name the State as offended party in the body of an information. What is important, as required by the Rules, is that "in criminal action the complaint or information shall be in writing in the name of the People of the Philippines x x x. The rules do not require that the State be specifically mentioned in the body of the information as an offended party. It is sufficient that the People of the Philippines appear in the caption of the information to emphasize that penal laws of the State have been violated. For indeed, a crime is an offense against the State. 2. Yes. The information was already sufficient in form and substance. In crimes against property such as theft of forest products, the name of the offended
party need not be specified. The argument that it was fatal for the prosecution not to have alleged the State as the offended party is without merit for in construing Sec. 11 of Rule 110 (now Sec. 12, Rules of Court of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), the Court have clearly held that in offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. Indeed, the crime of qualified theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was described with particularity in the information as to properly identify the offense charged. Hence, the erroneous allegation as to the person injured is deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which does not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. 3. Yes. The amendment sought by herein petitioner changing the word "Corporation" to "Operation" such that "Aluk Logging Corporation" would read "Aluk Logging Operation" is merely formal. A mere formal amendment does not merit quashal or original information. Even private respondents alternately used the words "corporation" and "operation" in their pleadings. Thus, it was not surprising that this formal defect was glossed over by the lower court. WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 24, 1975 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the lower court for immediate disposition on the merits. 42.
VALLEJO – 20, 42, 64
20
GARCIA vs CA
ISSUE: BIGAMY IS A PUBLIC OFFENSE, CONSEQUENTLY, PRESCRIPTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN COUNTED FROM THE TIME THE STATE DISCOVERED ITS COMMISSION? NO HELD: Same; Same; Same; It is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which expressly provides that “[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”— Article 91 does not define the term “offended party.” We find its definition in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as “the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed.” The said Section reads as follows: SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. — A complaint or information must
state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known, and if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name. More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime,
public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that “[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Invariably then, the private individual to
whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party. This conclusion is strengthened by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with a criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. . . . It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances. 21 The petitioner even admits that he is the offended party in Criminal Case No. (Q-92-27272. The information therein,22 which he copied in full in the petition in this case, describes him as the "offended party" who suffered "damage and prejudice . . . in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code." 23 The distinction he made between public crimes and private crimes relates not to the discovery of the crimes, but to their prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this matter. 43.
VALLEJOS – 21, 43, 65
21
Sanchez Vs. Demetriou Issue:
Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on the grounds that he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. Held: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner and his six co-accused are not
charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta. 44.
VILLORIA – 22, 44, 66
22
People vs Nardo G.R. No. 100197. April 4, 1997 Issue: WON the accused commit complex crime. Held: NO The trial court ruled that the crime committed was the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 48, a complex crime exists “when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.” We have held that where the killing was not shown to have been
committed by a single discharge of firearms, the crime cannot be complex. We are cognizant of the rule that an accused, as established by evidence, may be convicted only of the crime charged in the information, which in this case was for a single crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder, or of an offense which necessarily includes that which was charged or included therein. We note, however, that the information charging the appellants further states that the “accused, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance
of treachery armed with M16 Armalite Rifles, x x x (did) shoot and fire at in a sudden and unexpected manner, Claro Suitos, Micaela Suitos, Clarence Suitos, Anicia Sales, Macario Dela Peña and Luzviminda Pudol x x x.” In effect, it
imputed to the accused the commission of several felonies. Yet, appellants did not move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges. Neither did they object thereto at any other time. Consequently, such defect is deemed waived, and the Court may validly render judgment against them for as many crimes as were alleged and proven.
45.
ANARNA 1, 23, 45
1, 23
GALVEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS, OCT 24, 1994, 237 SCRA 685 RULE 110, SEC 14 - #45 ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal/dismissal of the first information is correct under Rule 110? HELD: Yes, the withdrawal/dismissal of the first information is correct under Rule 110. Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for the prosecution of offenses. Section 14 thereof, quoted infra, provides in its second paragraph the procedure and requisites for the substitution of a defective information by the correct one. Although, just like Section 11 of Rule 119 the permissible stage for effecting that substitution su bstitution is “at any time before judgment,” icient that “it appears x x x that a mistake has unlike the latter situation it is suff icient been made in charging the proper offense, x x x.” The situation under said
Section 14 contemplates a longer time span, inclusive of the period from the filing of the information up to and before trial. Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should institute remedial measures for the dismissal of the original information and the refiling of the correct one, otherwise he would be recreant to his duties. In several cases, we have also impliedly recognized the propriety of such a procedure particularly in those instances where the prosecution is allowed to dismiss or withdraw an information on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. We have even gone further by imposing upon the fiscal, as he was then called, the duty to move for the dismissal of the information if he is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish, at least prima facie, the guilt of the accused. The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information. information. Supreme Court’s judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition
for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus; DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to cite respondent judge and prosecutor for contempt and to annul proceedings; and ORDERING the withdrawal and invalidation of the three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide
against petitioners from the docket of Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 46.
ANTIOJO – 2, 24, 46
2, 24
Federico Poblete et al. vs. Hon. Justice Edilberto Sandoval (2nd Division Sandiganbayan) Sandiganbayan) et al. [G.R. No. 150610 March 25, 2004] ISSUE: Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it admitted the 2nd Amended complaint, even after accused-petitioner Bienvenido Pobre had been arraigned- NO (which may be answered upon knowing)- whether the amendments in the second Amended Information are mere matters of form which do not prejudice the rights of the accused HELD: PETITIONER’s CONTEND: that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing its Resolution of November 8, 2001, petitioners argue that it failed to consider Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused, That their co-accused co-petitioner Bienvenido C. Pobre having already been arraigned under the first Amended Information and cannot thus be made to re-plead to the second Amended Information without his constitutional right to double jeopardy being violated. Petitioners moreover argue that they and their co-accused having been charged of acting in concert, they cannot be convicted on the basis of different informations. The crux of the issue therefore hinges hinges on whether the amendments amendments in the second Amended Information are mere matters of form which do not prejudice the rights of the accused. While petitioners cite People v. Casey[37] which laid down the test in determining whether an amendment is a matter of form or substance, to wit: The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by an amendment has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the new form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 (now Section 14) of the Revised Rules of Court, An objective appraisal, however, of the second Amended Information shows that the amendments are merely formal for they do not touch upon the recital of facts constituting the offense charged nor on the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Instead, the amendments merely involve deletions, transpositions and re-phrasings, thereby raising the same issue and the same operative facts already found in the first Amended Information. As laid down by this Court, an amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. The second Amended Information, while adding the word public officers, does not introduce a new and material fact as the accused in the first Amended Information were referred to as either the Mayor, Vice-Mayor or Members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Likewise, in the second Amended Information, the phrase while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other is but a clearer restatement of the phrase in conspiracy and taking advantage of their official positions found in the first Amended Information. Section 14, Rule 110 moreover provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases where the accused have already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test on whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a compliant or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the second Amended Information which are also alleged in the first Amended Information does not change the basic theory of the prosecution, thus creating no material change or modification in the defenses of the accused. Contrary to petitioners position, it having been established that the questioned amendments are merely formal, there is no longer any need for accused Bienvenido Pobre to be re-arraigned on the second Amended Information. 47.
ALDEH – 3, 25, 47
3, 25
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy, appellant. ISSUE:
Whether the amendment was only as to form (making the act of the court in allowing the amendment correct) RULING: YES. Although the penalty for rape with the use of a deadly weapon under the original Information is reclusion perpetua to death, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed where the victim has become insane by reason or on the occasion of rape as alleged in the Amended Information. Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided: (i) leave of court is obtained; and (ii) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. In Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag,[13] we had occasion to state that a substantial amendment consists of recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following were held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) amendment, which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. We further elucidated in the Teehankee case that the test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of substance as it falls under all of the formal amendments enumerated in the Teehankee case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense different from that charged in the original Information. Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original information for rape committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the amendment.
Furthermore, it is also settled that amendment of an information to charge a more serious offense is permissible and does not constitute double jeopardy even where the accused was already arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge, where the basis of the more serious charge did not exist, but comes as a subsequent event. In this case the basis for the amendment was the psychosis of complainant which was determined after the filing of the information. Insanity of the victim by reason or on occasion of the rape may not be readily discerned right after the commission of the crime. The resultant insanity of the victim could be easily mistaken as a mere initial reaction, such as shock, to the incident. In other cases, it may take some weeks or even months for the insanity of the victim to manifest. Consequently, a psychiatrist would need some time with the victim before concluding that she is indeed suffering from insanity as a result of rape. Under these circumstances, the subsequent diagnosis of insanity by reason or on occasion of the rape is akin to a supervening event; in which case, the corresponding amendment of the information may be allowed, as correctly done by the trial court. Besides, the trial proper started only after appellant had been re-arraigned and appellant never objected to the amendment at any stage of the proceedings. It is basic that objection to the amendment of an information or complaint must be raised at the time the amendment is made, otherwise, silence would be deemed a consent to said amendment. It is a time-honored doctrine that objection to the amendment must be seasonably made, for when the trial was had upon an information substituted for the complaint or information without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. It cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 48.
CASTRO – 4, 26, 48
4, 26
People vs Jaralba Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in proceeding with the trial without the accused being re-arraigned in (sic) the amended information? Ruling: Appellants seek to capitalize on the supposed grave error committed by the court a quo in orally amending the description of the victim's wounds from "lacerated" to "stab" in the autopsy report attached to the information to conform with the testimony of the examining physician. Accordingly, appellants contend that they were placed in double jeopardy for not having been re-arraigned. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, an accused must, among others, first be acquitted or convicted and is being charged anew for the very same offense for which he was previously prosecuted (Rule 117, Section 7, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). Here, appellants were yet to be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged. Hence, no double jeopardy has attached. Besides no information was filed.
What is clear on the record is that the trial court merely ordered a change in the description of some of the victim's wounds from "lacerated" to "stab" in the information in order to conform with the description of the victim's wounds in the autopsy report. Furthermore, a re-arraignment is necessary only where the change or amendment of the information involves a mistake in the charging of the proper offense (Rule 110, Section 14, par. [2], 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). In the case at bar, the change in the information, i. e., the change in the description of some of the victim's wounds from "lacerated" to "stab" was not effected to correct a mistake in charging the proper offense. It did not have the effect of changing the offense charged in the information, which was, and correctly remained as, murder. 49.
DELOS REYES – 5, 27, 49
5
PANGILINAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of amendment in the information was proper. HELD: YES. petitioner maintains that the questioned amendment to the 19 Informations is substantial, not merely formal. The amended phrase "in the vicinity of 1981" is vague for being indefinite. This would prejudice his rights since "he would not know the nature and cause of the accusations against him and would thereby be unduly exposed to surprises during the trial."15 Thus, insofar as the 12 Informations are concerned, the trial court, after his plea, could no longer order their amendments by changing the dates of the commissions of the offenses. The deleted phrase "on or about August 15, 1993" in all the 19 original Informations clearly refers to the date of the "construct(ion) of forty-six (46) dwelling units" which were later found to be defective, thereby causing "damage and prejudice" to the complainants. Consequently, petitioner, who constructed the units, was charged for violating Section 9, in relation to Section 39, of P.D. 957. Obviously, it is impossible to finish the construction of all the 46 units in one (1) day, or "on or about August 15, 1993". It was but proper to amend the date in the original Informations to "in the vicinity of 1981," considering that the housing units were completed in 1981 as shown in the documentary proofs of completion presented by the prosecution in its motion for the amendment of the 19 Informations.16 This fact, was never disputed by petitioner as noted by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.17 Verily, the amended date in the 19 Informations is not at all material to the offenses charged because the basis thereof is not the date of the construction but the defective construction of the 46 dwelling units. We could not conceive how such innocuous amendment may prejudice the rights of petitioner since it would not alter the nature of the offense charged. In fact, the subject amendment is permissible under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
"SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Petition denied. 50.
DINGLASAN – 6, 28, 50
6
GR No: 156747Date: 02/23/2005 BANAL III V. PANGANIBAN Issues: (1) Whether the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the offense. YES (2) Whether the amendment was formal or substantial. IT WAS MERELY A MATTER OF FORM Rationale: 1.Jurisdiction of RTC. The portion of the original information reads: the newspaper column “Breaktime” of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, which is published in English in the
City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and of general circulation in the Philippines and abroad .Thus, it was clearly stated in the information that the newspaper is published in Makati City but circulated throughout the country, which allegation accordingly vests jurisdiction over the offense charged in the RTC of Makati City. 2.Validity of Amendment. The amendment in the informations was one of form. The amendment which states -That the libelous article above-quoted was printed and first published in the City of Makati, more particularly at 3817 Mascardo street, Makati City and/or at 1098 Chino Roces Avenue (formerly Pasong Tamo) corner Yague and Mascardo Streets, Makati City is merely formal. As laid down by this Court, an amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. 51.
EUGENIO – 7, 29, 51
7
Buhat vs CA Issue:
WON the additional allegation o conspiracy is a substantial amendment. Held: NO
1.
On the additional allegation of conspiracy • The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, petitioner's participation as principal not having been affected by such amendment • General rule: the allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents accused, which was not previously included in the original information, is a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court • Exception: where an amendment after plea resulting in the inclusion of an allegation of conspiracy and in the indictment of some other persons in addition to the original accused, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment • The aforegoing principle, by way of exception to the general rule, also appositely applies in the present controversy • Petitioner undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yu whom petitioner is alleged to have stabbed while two unknown persons held the victim's arms. The addition of the phrase, "conspiring, confederating and helping one another" does not change the nature of petitioner's participation as principal in the killing. • Whether under the original or the amended information, petitioner would have to defend himself as the People makes a case against him and secures for public protection the punishment of petitioner for stabbing to death, using superior strength, a fellow citizen in whose health and safety society as a whole is interested. Petitioner, thus, has no tenable basis to decry the amendment in question. • Furthermore, neither may the amendment in question be struck down on the ground that Herminia Altavas, Osmeña Altavas and Renato Buhat would be placed in double jeopardy by virtue of said amendment. In the first place, no first jeopardy can be spoken of insofar as the Altavases are concerned since the first information did not precisely include them as accused therein. In the second place, the amendment to replace the name, "John Doe" with the name of Renato Buhat who was found by the Secretary of Justice to be one of the two persons who held the arms of the victim while petitioner was stabbing him, is only a formal amendment and one that does not prejudice any of the accused's rights. • Such amendment to insert in the information the real name of the accused involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact. In fact, it is to he expected that the information has to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor 52.
GALICINAO – 8, 30, 52
8
Matalam vs. Sandiganbayan 455 SCRA 736, G.R. No. 165751 April 12, 2005
Issue Whether Matalam is entitled to another preliminary investigation. Held No. The causes of action, though different, are nonetheless interrelated, and that the rights of the accused will not be prejudiced since the inquiry to the allegations in the original information will certainly and necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended Information. According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken, the information may be amended in substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended in substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge is related to or is included in the original charge. Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation is not required. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. 53.
HIPOLITO – 9, 31, 53
9
People v. Montenegro
ISSUES: Whether or not said information should be admitted. RULING: Rule110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the Amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision
Something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime. The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case are clearly substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment.Moreover, the change in the items, articles and pieces of jewelry allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. 54.
JACINTO – 10, 32, 54
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL SANDOVAL, 348 SCRA 476 ISSUE: W/N the amendment sought before the presentation of the evidence in this case is proper. HELD: The amendment sought by the prosecution of the five informations, in order to allege the relationship of accused to the victim, were clearly substantial in character as they had the effect of changing the crime charged, thereby exposing accused-appellant to a higher penalty. Such amendment can no longer be done after accused-appellant has pleaded to the Information for simple rape, without violating his constitutional rights. Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, provides: The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at anytime before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done, without prejudice to the rights of the accused, x x x. In sum, the failure of the prosecution to allege the relationship of the accused to the victim has effectively removed the crime from the ambit of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, which prescribes the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim 55.
PACSON – 11, 33, 55
11
56.
PALILEO – 12, 34, 56
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PEOPLE VS. GROSPE
157 SCRA 154 JAN. 20, 1998 Issue: Whether or not Judge Grospe was correct in dismissing the case. Ruling: No. He had jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Estafa is a transitory crime. There are the elements of deceit and damage. Deceit took place in Pampanga and damage was done in Bulacan where the check was dishonored. While the check was issued in Bulan, it was not completely drawn. It was in Pampanga where the check was uttered and delivered. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to the consummation of the obligation. Although the check was received by San Mig in Bulacan, it was not the delivery contemplated by the law to the payee (San Mig). Mr. Cornelio is not the person who could take the check as a holder. Thus, he had to forward the check to the regional office of San Mig in Pampanga. Deceit took place in Pampanga where the check was legally issued and delivered. A person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others (Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People vs. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624). 57.
PASCO – 13, 35, 57
13
People vs De Guzman Issue:
W/N the Quezon City trial court is the proper venue in the case at bar? Held: No. As the court ruled “We are not unaware of a number of instances when
the Court would allow a change of venue in criminal cases "whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice." Here, however, we do not see the attendance of such compelling circumstances, nor are we prepared to state that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in its questioned orders.”
58.
PAVICO – 14, 36, 58
14
BARRAMEDA VS. CA - Where to file criminal action. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC OF PASAY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court. The appellate court correctly ruled that a demand was made by the mother of the private respondent at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. A query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to a demand. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. In the case at bench, if one of these elements is proven to have occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay, then the said court made a valid exercise of its jurisdiction. On this point, respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a demand was made by the mother of the private complainant at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport ("NAIA"), which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. It must be noted that the specific word "demand" need not be used to show that demand had indeed been made upon the person charged of the offense. A query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to a demand. Thus, the trial court validly exercised its jurisdiction over the crime charged against accused-petitioner inasmuch as one of the elements of estafa, that of demand, occurred within its territorial jurisdiction. The findings of the trial court regarding the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great respect and are accorded the highest consideration by the Supreme Court. The prosecution had conclusively shown that petitioner received money from private respondent, in trust and under the obligation to deliver the same to her mother. The petitioner denied having received the said amount, which denial has been proven to be false. The denial made by petitioner was to the prejudice of private respondent and her mother. Finally, demand was made for the return of the money from petitioner, which she failed to do so. Under these circumstances, petitioner was clearly guilty of the crime of estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Hence, the Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner with modification as to penalty imposed 59.
RIEGO – 15, 37, 59
RULE 110 | SECTION 5 PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ JULY 11, 2002 – 384 SCRA 375
15
ISSUE: WON the complaint of rape is valid. HELD: Yes, the complaint of rape is valid. As to the validity of complaint — A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family. It has been held that “[w]hen it is said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.”
The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The assistance of JONALYN’s aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. JONALYN’s signature alone suffices to validate the complaint.
The Court agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully considered filed by a minor. As to the Competence to testify — The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an oath. The prosecution has proved JONALYN’s competency
by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-yearold child, does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to consider her testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness. JONALYN, who may be considered as a mental retardate but with the ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a competent witness under Section 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.
As to the Credibility as witness — The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYN’s competency
but also her credibility. Moreover, considering her feeble mind, she could not have fabricated or concocted her charge against BIENVENIDO. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that no improper motive was shown by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against BIENVENIDO. A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has
absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. It has been held that no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. As to the Propounding of leading questions — The Court likewise agree with the trial court’s conclusion that JONALYN’s
testimony should be taken and understood from the point of view of an 8-yearold child. JONALYN’s testimony is consistent with the straightforward and innocent testimony of a child. Thus, the prosecution’s persistent, repetitious and
painstaking effort in asking leading questions was necessary and indispensable in the interest of justice to draw out from JONALYN’s lips the basic details of the
grave crime committed against her by BIENVENIDO. The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN. It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental equipment; confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith. The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which she merely confirmed as true. The questions were indeed carefully phrased and sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN understand the import of the questions. In the same vein, the prosecution’s referral to JONALYN’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay to refresh her memory was also reasonable. The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court. It is, therefore, beyond doubt that JONALYN’s lone testimony, which was found
to be credible by the trial court, is enough to sustain a conviction. At any rate, medical and physical evidence adequately corroborated JONALYN’s testimony.
Time and again we have held that the laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of forcible defloration. Dispositive portion —
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96 finding accused-appellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in the reduced amount of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000. REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS: Criminal Law; Rape; Criminal Procedure; A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. — A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; When it is said that the requirement of Article 344 (that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. —It has been held that “[w]hen it is said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.”
Same; Same; Same; As signed by the offended party, the complaint starts the prosecutory proceeding, and the assistance of her aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. — The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The assistance of JONALYN’s aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. JONALYN’s signature alone suffices to validate the complaint.
Same; Same; Same; If a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, an offended party, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. — We agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of
an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully considered filed by a minor. Same; Same; Witnesses; Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness. — The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an oath. The prosecution has proved JONALYN’s competency by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-year-old child, does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to consider her testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness. JONALYN, who may be considered as a mental retardate but with the ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a competent witness under Section 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Same; Same; Same; A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible
where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. — The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYN’s competency but also her credibility. Moreover, considering her feeble mind, she could not have fabricated or concocted her charge against BIENVENIDO. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that no improper motive was shown by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against BIENVENIDO. A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where
she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. It has been held that no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. Same; Same; Same; It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature, aged and infirm, in bad physical condition, uneducated, ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings, inexperienced, unsophisticated, feeble-minded, of sluggish mental equipment, confused and agitated, terrified, timid or embarrassed while on the stand, lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand, deaf and dumb, or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar there with. — We likewise agree with the trial court’s conclusion that JONALYN’s testimony should be taken and understood from the point of view of an 8-year-old child. JONALYN’s testimony is c onsistent
with the straightforward and innocent testimony of a child. Thus, the prosecution’s persistent, repetitious and painstaking effort in asking leading
questions was necessary and indispensable in the interest of justice to draw out from JONALYN’s lips the basic details of the grave crime committed against her by BIENVENIDO. The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be
propounded to JONALYN. It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental equipment; confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith. Same; Same; Same; The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court. — The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which she merely confirmed as true. The questions were indeed carefully phrased and sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN understand the import of the questions. In the same vein, the prosecution’s referral to JONALYN’s Sinumpaang Salaysay to refresh her memory was also reasonable.
The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court. Same; Same; The laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of forcible defloration. — It is, therefore, beyond doubt that JONALYN’s lone testimony, which was found to be credible by the trial court, is
enough to sustain a conviction. At any rate, medical and physical evidence adequately corroborated JONALYN’s testimony. Time and again we have held
that the laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of forcible defloration. 60.
ROBINOS – 16, 38, 60
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Calme vs. Court of Appeals (261 SCRA 285, 30 August 1996) Issue/s: Whether or not the RTC of Oroquieta City has no jurisdiction over the case. (Yes) Held: The exact location where the alleged offense was committed was not duly established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. In transit simply means on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the course of transportation. Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which
provides that (w)here an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international law. Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City would still be excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for determining the venue under the aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the municipalities/territories through which the ship passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No. 400.[5] 61.
SANTILLANA – 17, 39, 61
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VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3; ANTHONY DE LEON and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Issue: The issues in the present petition are (1) whether or not the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the four Informations on the premise that the Informations are defective; and (2) whether the Informations may be amended to cure the said defects. Ruling: (Yes) The petition is meritorious. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The court cited Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for the crime of libel. The rules on venue in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
In this case, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed. 62.
TITO – 18, 40, 62
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Uy vs. Mercado, 154 SCRA 567, AM No. R-368-MTJ September 30, 1987 Topic: Rule 110 - Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. (b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival. (c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law. (d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a) Issue: WON respondent Judge is administratively charged with abuse of judicial power and discretion and gross ignorance of the law.ch Held: YES. The limitation of choice of venue is clearly intended to minimize or limit the filing of out-of-town libel suits to protect the alleged offender from hardship, inconvenience, and harassment and to protect the interest of the public service where one of the offended parties is a public officer. Hence, the proper court to hear the libel case, in this instance, was either the court in Quezon City where former MP Orlando C. Dulay held office, or the court in
Manila where the allegedly libelous matter was printed and first published, but not the court in Quirino Province. While preliminary investigation should be simple and speedy to protect the substantial rights of the accused and that the judge acts only upon probable cause and reasonable belief in issuing a warrant of arrest, it is equally mandated that preliminary investigations should secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. — When respondent judge, in the libel case filed by MP Dulay, conducted the preliminary investigation on Dulay, he issued the warrant of arrest against the accused on the same day. While it is mandated by law that preliminary investigations should be simple, speedy and should not drag on for weeks and months, to protect the substantial rights of the accused, and that the investigating judge acts only upon probable cause and reasonable belief in issuing a warrant of arrest, it is equally mandated that preliminary investigations should secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution to protect him from public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of public trial and to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. Considering that libel suits are often intended to harass an alleged offender, the judge should have satisfied himself not only that probable cause exists, but also made certain that venue is properly laid and jurisdiction legally acquired before taking cognizance of the case and issuing the warrant of arrest. — Considering that libel suits are often intended to harass an alleged offender, respondent judge should have satisfied himself not only that probable cause exists, but likewise made certain that venue is properly laid and jurisdiction legally acquired before taking cognizance of the case and issuing the warrant of arrest. This, he did not do, Reference may be made, at this point, to cases where despite the existence of probable cause, the investigating judge does not issue a warrant of arrest when there appears to be no necessity therefor. 63.
UNAS – 19, 41, 63
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Dichaves vs. Apalit, 333 SCRA 54 , June 08, 2000 ISSUES: 1. WON the suspension of the hearing in the criminal cases was proper on the ground that the issues in that case and those in the civil case are intertwined. WON the participation of complainant’s counsel in the criminal cases was 2. not justified because the civil aspect of those cases was already being litigated in Civil Case No. Q-94-21343. HELD: 1. No. A prejudicial question is a question which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.1 As provided in Rule 111, §5, a civil case constitutes a prejudicial question only if: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue is determinative of whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, even if Navarro prevailed in the civil case filed by him against Uyboco and GCDC, this result would not be determinative of his guilt in the criminal prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for it is now settled that the mere issuance of worthless checks is punishable under B.P. Blg. 22, and it is immaterial whether the checks have been issued merely to guarantee another person’s obligation. Indeed, at the time respondent
ordered the suspension of the proceeding in the criminal case, complainant was not a party to the civil case. It is difficult to imagine how such case could affect Navarro’s criminal liability for issuing to complainant the checks which had been
dishonored. Respondent ordered the suspension of proceedings in the criminal cases without even explaining how the resolution of the issues in the Civil Case No. Q-94-21343 would determine the issues in the criminal cases. 2. No. There are three instances when the offended party in a criminal case cannot take part in the criminal prosecution, to wit: (1) if the civil action has been waived; (2) if the right to institute a separate civil action has been reserved; and (3) if the civil action was filed prior to the criminal action. None of these actions was done by complainant so as to bar him or his counsel from taking part in the criminal prosecution. Complainant did not bring Civil Case No. Q-9421343. It was Navarro who did, and he simply dragged complainant into the case by impleading him as a defendant or an unwilling co-plaintiff. What is more, Civil Case No. Q-94-21343 was not the civil action arising from the crime. WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Billy M. Apalit, Presiding Judge of Branch 43, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, is declared GUILTY of partiality and grave abuse of discretion and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS without pay, with a WARNING that commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. 64.
VALLEJO – 20, 42, 64
20
RAMISCAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE PRIVATE INJURED PARTIES ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES. HELD: SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Allowing the AGFOI to intervene would open the floodgates to any person similarly situated to intervene in the proceedings and, thus, frustrate the speedy, efficient and inexpensive disposition of the cases.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused,[55] or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.[56] Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have a legal right to intervene in the criminal cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of such members to have access to the records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to intervene therein simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS are public or government funds. It must be stressed that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds or property is merely inchoate and incidental. Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality separate and independent of its members/beneficiaries. As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government, which was allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based on the actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the AFPRSBS. The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not the offended party in the said cases. We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that in the felony of falsification of public document, the existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a third person.[57] However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is underpriced by a public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal the correct amount of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing
undue injury to the government, the offenders thereby commit two crimes (a) falsification of public document defined in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, a special penal law. The offender incurs civil liability to the government as the offended party for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but not for falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the correct amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the government, and the petitioner and his co-accused pocketed the difference between the correct amount of taxes and the amount entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may be considered the offended party entitled to intervene in the above criminal cases, through the Government Corporate Counsel. 65.
VALLEJOS – 21, 43, 65
21
Agujetas vs. CA Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages to a person not a party to the case? Held: The petitioners maintain that the present case was filed by Francisco Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate in the Province of Davao Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings; that she was merely presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo was a patent error. We find petitioners’
allegations untenable. Except where the law specifically provides to the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed may be laid by any competent person. The Omnibus Election Code does not specifically provide that a particular person must file the complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco Rabat is valid. In U.S. v. Heery, this court held that “If the injured party has not expressly
waived the civil liability of the accused nor reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is error for the court to refuse a request of the injured party during the course of the criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his damages.” Thus,
the arguments of the petitioners notwithstanding, respondent court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs. Irigo. 66.
VILLORIA – 22, 44, 66
22
PEOPLE VS AMACA
ISSUE: W/N the court is correct when it declined to make a finding on the civil liability? YES
HELD: Same; Same; Same; Desistance; Well-settled it is that the desistance of the victim’s complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. —The facts of this case show that the victim’s mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the “financial help” extended to her family by the accused-appellant. Such “financial help” when viewed as an offer
of compromise may also be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant’s criminal liability. Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her son’s death was an accident attributable to the latter, has no basis. It is inconceivable that the victim’s two gunshot wounds at the back were self inflicted. Well-settled it is that the desistance of the victim’s complaining mother
does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court’s refusal to include
a finding of civil liability. CASES FOR RULE 111 1.
ANARNA 1, 23, 45
1, 23
MANIAGO VS COURT OF APPEALS ISSUE: Whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for t hose of persons for whom one is responsible. HELD: No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, S1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, S1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense charged.” In other words the right
of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. On the basis of Rule 111, S 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) When such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) The right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) Such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. 2.
ANTIOJO – 2, 24, 46
2, 24
Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado vs. CA, Wenceslao Polo (Presiding judge of RTC Manila) G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990 ISSUE: Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action HELD: YES. A civil action instituted after the criminal action has been files can prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others. The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages. In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. (1a) Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively to the present case. Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded. The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a quasi delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused. ***Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.
The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission. Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the separate civil action brought before it. Petition denied. 3.
ALDEH – 3, 25, 47
3, 25
HONESTO GENERAL, petitioner, vs. HON. GRADUACION REYES CLARAVALL ISSUE: whether the rule should now be that the filing fees for the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense should first be paid in order that said civil action may be deemed to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal and prosecuted in due course. RULING: NO. The Court adopted the further amendments of the 1985 Criminal Procedure. CONTENTIONS of DEFENSE Manchester - the specific amounts of claims of damages must be alleged both in the body and the prayer of the complaint, and the filing fees corresponding thereto paid at the time of the filing of the complaint; that if these requisites were not fulfilled, jurisdiction could not be acquired by the trial court; and that amendment of the complaint could not "thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court." Sun Insurance and Tacay - affirmed the validity of the basic principle but reduced its stringency somewhat by providing that only those claims as to which the amounts were not specified would be refused acceptance or expunged and that, in any case, the defect was not necessarily fatal of irremediable as the plaintiff could on motion be granted a reasonable time within which to amend his complaint and pay the requisite filing fees, unless in the meantime the period of limitation of the right of action was completed. Now, at the time of the promulgation of the Manchester decision in 1987, Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended in 1985, 4 read as follows: 5 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. However, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk
of Court of the court where the criminal case is filed. In all other cases, the filing fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the court shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award and no payment by execution or otherwise may be made to the offended party without his first paying the amount of such filing fees to the Clerk of Court. (1a) The purpose of the Resolution (re: 2nd paragraph of the amendment), according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, 7 was to discourage the "gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal's office to include in the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple millions of pesos without paying any filing fees." This Court however adopted further amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, with effect on October 1, 1988. Among the provisions revised was Section 1, Rule 111. As thus amended, it now reads as follows: Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. xxxxx When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages. In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. (1a) Under the 1988 Rules, however, it is only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information (that) the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial." This Court's plain intent — to make the Manchester doctrine, requiring payment of filing fees at the time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under Section 1, Rule 111 only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information — has thus been made manifest by the language of the amendatory provisions. In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court — because the offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action — the rule is as follows: 1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information" filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;"
2) in any other case, however — i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages. 4.
CASTRO – 4, 26, 48
4, 26
Perez vs CA Issue:
Whether or not the presiding judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter? Ruling: Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The above quoted Order allowing the amendment of the information to exclude petitioner therefrom effectively dismissed the criminal case against the latter. That the trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case is apparent from the foregoing order. Judge Masadao's reliance on the prosecutor's averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was, to say the least, an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of this Court's pronouncement in Crespo v Mogul. 5.
DELOS REYES – 5, 27, 49
5
SARMIENTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of criminal case without reservation to file later a civil case is a violation under Sec. 1 RULE 111 of Rules in criminal procedure. HELD: NO. Petitioners claim that private respondent’s right to institute separately
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is already barred on the ground that the same was not expressly reserved in the criminal action earlier filed against said respondent. Pertinent to this issue is the then prevailing Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Section 1 thereof provides: "Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. "Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. "A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others. "The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. "x x x." Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000,9 the same Section of the same Rule provides: "Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. "The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. "x x x." While a reading of the aforequoted provisions shows that the offended party is required to make a reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action, jurisprudence instructs that such reservation may not necessarily be express but may be implied10 which may be inferred not only from the acts of the offended party but also from acts other than those of the latter. In the present case, private respondent’s complaint against petitioners was
based on the failure of the latter to comply with their obligation as spelled out in the Trust Receipt executed by them.20 This breach of obligation is separate and distinct from any criminal liability for "misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents or instruments released under trust receipts", punishable under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. 115) in relation to Article 315(1), (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Being based on an obligation ex contractu and not ex delicto, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings instituted against petitioners regardless of the result of the latter. 6.
DINGLASAN – 6, 28, 50
6
OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO VS SPOUSES PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF COMPLAINANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS NOT RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY; NO 2. WHETHER A WITNESS, WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES. NO HELD: A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainant’s civil liability, if any. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.10 A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person who is not a party to the case. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 dated 26 January 1995 in Criminal Case No. 85961 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. The order to reimburse the P300,000 to respondent spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela is deleted; 2. The award of P50,000 as moral damages and the award of P40,000 as attorney’s fees are likewise deleted. 7.
EUGENIO – 7, 29, 51
7
Casupanan vs Laroya Issue:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. Held: Petition for review is GRANTED. Civil Case is REINSTATED. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action. Filing of a separate civil action Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability exdelicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows: Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others. The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. 8.
GALICINAO – 8, 30, 52
8
Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada 465 SCRA 338, G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005 Issue Whether the private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the proceedings of the estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is also subject matter of the pending B.P. 22 cases. Held Yes. An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so, or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainant’s interest in the case
disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit. The possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the institution of a civil action without need of election by the offended party. 9.
HIPOLITO – 9, 31, 53
9
Cojuangco Jr. v. Court of Appeals ISSUES: Whether the award for damages against Carrascoso is warranted by evidence and the law. RULING: The Court ruled that Carrascoso acted in good faith. Bad faith, to be recognized by court, should be constituted by dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, and conscious doing of a wrong. The Court further stated that a public official shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of their official duties unless there is no clear showing of bad
faith, malice and gross negligence. But Carrascoso should still be liable under Article 32(6) which states that “rights against deprivation of property without due process of law”. There was a violation of Cojuangco’s consti tutional right
even if done in good faith since no writ for the sequestration of his racehorse winnings. Therefore, Cojuangco’s petition was granted and Carrasco is obliged
to pay nominal damages worth P/ 50,000.00. 10.
JACINTO – 10, 32, 54
10
ANAMER SALAZAR, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, 411 SCRA 598 ISSUE: W/N the acquittal of the accused prevents a judgment on the civil aspect of the case. (No) HELD: The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former. Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits. 11.
PACSON – 11, 33, 55
11
12.
PALILEO – 12, 34, 56
12
BONITE VS. ZOSA 162 SCRA 173
ISSUE: Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action. RULING: Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused in a criminal case, where the acquittal is based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted and requires only a preponderance of evidence. This is pursuant to the express provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, the criminal case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages The court held that the petitioners may also base such separate civil action for damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Acquital of the accused from the charge of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for the recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts "not punishable by law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damage in both scores (delict and quasi-delict). Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite to file a civil action from damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. When the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish. Contrary to private respondent's claim, Article 33 of the Civil Code cannot apply in this case for it assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to be the result of criminal negligence, i.e., not inflicted with malice. Criminal negligence under the Revised Penal Code punishes the negligent or reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be instituted under said article. It is, therefore, not applicable to the case at bar. The court a quo's ruling that the petitioners did not reserve the right to file an independent civil action is without merit. Article 29 does not include any reservation requirement to institute an independent civil action. It allows an
action for damages against the accused upon the latter's acquittal in the criminal case based on reasonable doubt. The reservation requirement of the Rules on Criminal Procedure has also been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. This provision has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declaring such requirement of reservation as ineffective. Petitioners active participation in the prosecution of the criminal action does not bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code. The Orders dated 25 February 1971 and 27 March 1971 of the court a quo was reversed and set aside, and a new one is entered reinstating the action for recovery of damages by the petitioners and directing the said court to proceed trial with the case. 13.
PASCO – 13, 35, 57
13
BUnag vs CA Issue:
W/N plaintiff may file a separate action for civil liability? Held: Yes. Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12 In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only.
14.
PAVICO – 14, 36, 58
14
Phil. Rabbit Bus Line vs People Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. Ruling: No! Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accusedemployee. Ratio: Finality of RTC Decision As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote: A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executor. Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution( main issue ) At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.[18] Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[20] 33,[21]34[22] and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission: 1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein. 2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action. 3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.[24] What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.[25] This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[26] Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -including the appeal. The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.[28] Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. Effect of Absconding on the appeal process There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executor As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues.
Peition denied 15.
RIEGO – 15, 37, 59
15
BERMUDEZ VS. MELENCIO-HERRERA FEBRUARY 26, 1988 – 158 SCRA 168 ISSUE: WON the lower court can properly suspend the hearing of the civil case based on the pendency of the criminal case. HELD: No, the lower court CANNOT properly suspend the hearing of the civil case based on the pendency of the criminal case. As to the basis of claim for damage — In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 21762194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligence act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal cases to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. As to the aspect of criminal procedure — The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule III, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. Pertinent Provisions — Rules of Court, Rule 111; Section 1. — Institution of criminal and civil action. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. Section 2. — Independent civil action.-In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Civil Code; Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS: Quasi-Delict; Actions; Damages; Injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasidelict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. — ln cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligence act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. — In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal cases to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Even without reservation under Section 2 of Rule ///, Rules of Court, injured party in a criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused is allowed to recover damages based on quasidelict. — The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule III, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. 16.
ROBINOS – 16, 38, 60
16
Issue/s: Whether or not a civil case may proceed independently of the criminal case. Held: Petitioners have apparently lost sight of Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides that in cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. It is worth noting that this civil case was instituted four years before the criminal case for estafa was filed, and that although there was a move to consolidate both cases, the same was denied by the trial court. Consequently, it
was the duty of the two branches of the Regional Trial Court concerned to independently proceed with the civil and criminal cases. It will also be observed that a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action. It is clear, therefore, that this civil case may proceed independently of the criminal case especially because while both cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the parties liable therein differ. Thus, it is improvident of petitioners to claim that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in the present case would be preemptive of the outcome of the criminal case. Their fancied fear of possible conflict between the disposition of this civil case and the outcome of the pending criminal case is illusory. 17.
SANTILLANA – 17, 39, 61
17
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents. Issues: 1. WoN the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent. 2. WoN petitioner's conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage. Ruling: Petitioner's contentions are inorrect. 1. In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. 2. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement,
under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal action. 18.
TITO – 18, 40, 62
18
People vs. Abungan, 341 SCRA 258, G.R. No. 136843 September 28, 2000 TOPIC – Rule 111 - Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased. If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n) NOTE: The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed. Issue: What is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on the case and on the appeal. Held: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e. , civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.’ ” “
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) e) Quasidelicts. Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of the criminal case against him. Necessaril y, the lower court’s Decision — finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased — becomes ineffectual. 19.
UNAS – 19, 41, 63
19
Yap vs. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 , January 30, 1992 ISSUE: WON a judge may motu proprio dismiss a criminal case on the ground that there is a prejudicial question to a civil action. HELD: No. under Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure: “Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.— A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.” It plainly says that the suspension may be
made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge. 20.
VALLEJO – 20, 42, 64
20
ARK TRAVEL VS PRESIDING JUDGE ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS PROPERLY FILED? YES HELD: The issue raised in the present petition concerns the jurisdiction of the RTC in ordering the dismissal of the criminal cases pending before the MTC and therefore, the proper remedy is certiorari. As such, the present petition for certiorari ought to have been dismissed for late filing. SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. in which case, the filing of the petition on January 26, 1999 was filed on the 60th day from November 27, 1998, Ark Travels date of receipt of notice of the order denying Ark Travels motion for reconsideration. We have consistently held that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[13] In view of such retroactive application of procedural laws, the instant petition should be considered as timely filed.[14] Further, herein case is a clear exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. The Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised.[15] This case commenced in the MTC way back 1996 and still pends. We therefore set aside such principle for this particular case, in the interest of speedy justice.[16] Anent the substantive aspect. The general rule is that the denial of a motion to withdraw information, just like a motion to dismiss a complaint, is an interlocutory order and therefore it cannot be the proper subject of an appeal or certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.[17] However, there are certain situations where recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, to wit: a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would notpromptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.[18] All three situations are present in this case. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed with this Court is the proper remedy. 21.
VALLEJOS – 21, 43, 65
21
Apa vs Fernandez Issue:
Whether the question of ownership is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the criminal case against petitioners. Held: Yes, A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case
would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Rule 111, §5 provides: Sec. 6 Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Private respondents argue that even the owner of a piece of land can be ejected from his property since the only issue in such a case is the right to its physical possession. Consequently, they contend, he can also be prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law. The contention misses the essential point that the owner of a piece of land can be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to possession based on her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended. 22.
VILLORIA – 22, 44, 66
22
ABUNADO VS PEOPLE
ISSUE: W/N the annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question? NO HELD: A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[16] The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.[17] The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.[18] Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.[19] In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 23.
ANARNA 1, 23, 45
1, 23
BELTRAN VS PEOPLE, JUNE 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106 ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar. HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge
of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. 24.
ANTIOJO – 2, 24, 46
2, 24
People vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. [G.R. No. 148193. January 16, 2003] ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of Civil Case for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment is a prejudicial question which would justify the suspension of preceedings in the criminal case of estafa HELD: NO. The SC found no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document. A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document. Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence. Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. I n no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.. In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar. Petition granted 25.
ALDEH – 3, 25, 47
3, 25
MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY ISSUES: (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights? (RTC) (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02108043-44 on the ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question (NO) RULING: 1. The RTC has jurisdiction. Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall
be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis added) The use of the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293. Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof. In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws9 conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.10 Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00. In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts. 2. No. There is no prejudicial question. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. He made no discussion in support of said prayer for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question. At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
