Criminal Law 2 Case Digest

TECSON, Mary Joie S.

Case Digest PIRACY

PEOPLE V. LOL-LO SARAW Facts: A boat in which there were eleven men, women and children arrived between the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Ducth East Indies and was subsequently surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty four moros all armed. They first asked for food but once on the boat, took themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men and brutally violated two of the women. All of the persons on the boat placed on it holes were made on it with the idea that it would submerge, but after eleven days of hardship they were succoured. Two of the moro marauders were Lol-lo and Saraw who later returned their home in Sulu, Philippines where they were arrested and charged with the crime of piracy. Issue: Did the court of first instance in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw? Held: Yes, piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional three-mile limit of a foreign state. Lol-lo who raped one of the women was sentenced to death. There being the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, abuse of superior strength and ignominy.

PEOPLE V. TULIN Facts: A cargo vessel owned by the PNOC shipping and transport corporation, loaded with barrels or kerosene, regular gasoline and diesel oil was absorbed by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola and Andres Infante detained the crew and completely took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes where unloaded, transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the Bessel returned to the Philippines. All the accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation of PD 532. The accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were executed outside the Philippine waters and territory. Issue: Whether or not the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the Philippine waters and territory. Held:

Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva

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As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused, appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside the Philippine waters suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on M/T Tabangco and its cargo were committed in PH waters, although the captive vessel was later brought to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded and such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong’s direct supervision. Although PD 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in PH waters. The disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy. Hence, the same need not to be committed in Philippine waters.

PEOPLE V. CATANTAN Facts: The Pilapil brothers Eugene and Juan were fishing in the sea around 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogan, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught with them. They were later identified as the accused Emilio Catantan and Jose Ursal alias “Bimbo”. They boarded the pump boat of the Pilapils and pointed his gun at Eugene. They hogtied Eugene and covered him up and ordered Juan to ferry them to Daan Tagobon using their pump boat. However, as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stopped running. They saw another boat operated by Juanito and ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat. Catantan boarded Juanito’s pump boat and ordered him to take them to mungaz. Pilapil brothers took the change and escaped. The regional trial court found Catantan and Bimbo guilty of violating PD 532. Issue: Whether or not Emilio Catantan violated PD 532 and not grave coercion. Held: There were piracy and not grave coercion where as part of the act of seizing their boat. The occupants of the vessel were forced to go elsewhere other than their place of destination. This case falls squarely within the concept of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was part of the act of seizing their boat.

ARBITRARY DETENTION

ASTORGA V. PEOPLE Facts: The offended parties together with SPO3 Andres Cinco Jr and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian were sent to the Island of Daram Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible


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illegal logging activities. There they met petitioner Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats found at around 4:30 to 5:00pm being constructed at Brgy. Locob-Locob. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcement and moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then bought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00am. Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention. Held: Petitioner Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. The determinate factor in Arbitrary detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. The court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that the petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

CAYAO V. DEL MUNDO Facts: An administrative complaint was filed by Fernando Cayao with the office of the Court Administrator for charging Judge Justiano Del Mundo with abuse of authority, Cayao, a bus driver overtook another bus and as a consequence, Cayao almost collided head on with an oncoming owner-type jeepney owned by Judge Del Mundo. Cayao was brought by the policemean in the Sala of Judge Del mundo and was compelled by Judge Del Mundo to choose from 3 alternative punishment: a) to face charge of multiple homicide b) revocation of is driver’s license c) to be put in jail for 3 days. Cayao chose confinement for 3 days and was forced to sign a “waiver if detention” by Judge Del Mundo. Issue: Whether or not Judge Del Mundo is guilty of the charge of warrantless arrest and arbitrary detention. Held: Judge Del Mundo used and abused his position of authority in intimidating the complaint as well as the members of the police force into submitting to his excesses. The complaint was not accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is entitled. Cayao was deprived from the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the right to an impartial and public trial.

MILO V. SALONGA Facts:


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Accused Captain Tuvera Sr. was charged with Arbitrary Detention together with other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez and for deliberately depriving the same of his constitutional liberty without any legal ground. Accused respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Fiscal Milo filed an opposition, averring that the accused respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with arbitrary detention. Issue: Whether or not the accused respondent, being a barrio captain, can be liable for the crime of arbitrary detention Held: Yes, the public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not to be a police officer to be chargeable with arbitrary detention. It is accepted that other public officer like judges and mayors who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and functions vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller.

PEOPLE V. GARCIA Facts: Carlos Garcia, Patricio Botero and Luisa Miraples were accused of illegal recruitment. It was alleged that they represented themselves as incorporators and officers of Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc. and that Ricorn is a recruitment agency for seamen. It was later discovered that Ricorn was never registered with the securities and exchange commission and that it was never authorized to recruit by the POEA. Both were convicted but Botero appealed. Issue: Whether or not Botero is a mere employee of Ricorn. Held: No, it was proven by evidence that he was introduced to the applicants as the vice president of Ricorn. When he was receiving applicants, he was receiving them behind a desk which has a nameplate representing his name and his position as a vice president of Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc.

REBELLION OR INSURRECTION

PEOPLE V. VELASCO


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Facts: Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and Beltran was later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial determination of probable cause. Issue: Whether or not Beltran can be charged with Rebellion Held: No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed — By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. The elements of the offense are: 1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and 2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either — (a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws: (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives. Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 February 2006, and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran. In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were


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purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP. The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion. In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes' affidavit, dated 25 February 2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings with Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others. However, what the allegations in Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran in the criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.

PEOPLE V. SILONGAN Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldona went to Sultan Kudarat with three other men to meet certain macapagal Silongan. They arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagal’s relative and he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City. Around 8:30 pm. As they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his other companions were tied up and blindfolded. He described the abductors as Macapagal’s brothers. Alexander’s companion were able to escape but Alexander was released after the payment of P12,000,000 ransom. Issue: Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of kidnapping. Held: No, it is not necessary for the crime to be committed. At least one overt act of demanding ransom is enough. What the law requires is the purpose of extorting money as ransom.


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PEOPLE V. OLIVA Facts: Lorenzo Oliva, father of the complainant M, was charged with rape and was convicted of the said crime. Accused filed an appeal questioning the testimony of his daughter M and further alleged that it was not him who had raped his daughter but his brother-in-law, Benjamin, who has committed the act. Issue: Whether or not the testimonies and credibility of the complaint witness is in doubt and questionable. Held: Courts usually give credence to the testimony off a girl who is a victim of sexual assault particularly if it constitutes incestuous rapes, because normally no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation of public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal, were it not to condemn injustice. The grave man of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under any circumstances provided by law. In addition, mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given any greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a rape victim.

PEOPLE V. LOVEDIORO Facts: Elias Lovedioro with three other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while the latter was walking along Burgos St. Albay public market. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder and was subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the decision contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant committed rebellion or murder. Held: The killing of the victim, as observed by the solicitor general, offered no contribution to the achievements of the NPA’s subversive claims, in fact there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA. Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.

PEOPLE V. AMADO HERNANDEZ


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Facts: About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellant were accuse of conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in the criminal cases of CFI of Manila. They were accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which was actively engaged in armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP, they committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder, etc. enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by HUKS. Issue: Whether or not the crime of rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. Held: The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means “necessary” for perpetration of the offense. In Hernandez Doctrine, rebellion cannot be complexed wit common crimes such as killings, destruction of property, etc., committed on the occasion and in furtherance thereof. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME. PEOPLE V. DASIG Facts: Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nunez and six others were charged together of shooting Redempto Manadtad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nunez killed Pfc. Manadtad. He likewise admitted that he and Nunez were members of the Sparrow unit and their aliases were “Armand” and “Mabi”. The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends that it is legally defective. He claimed that the custodial interrogation was done while he was very sick. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and participated in the act of rebellion. Held: Yes, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years imprisonment.

SEDITION

PEOPLE V. CABRERA Facts:


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Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation against appellant after receiving information from residents of Sitio Galaxy, Tangke, Talisay, Cebu and a report from a confidential asset of the illegal drug activities of appellant. At about 4:30 p.m., poseurbuyer, together with the confidential asset, approached appellant who was standing outside his house. PO1 Palconit gave appellant two marked P50.00 bills, while the latter handed to him two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Thereupon, PO1 Palconit made the pre-arranged signal by touching his head with his right hand. His back-ups then rushed to the scene and simultaneously therewith PO1 Palconit arrested the appellant. He then put the markings "EC" on the two plastic sachets and brought the same to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for forensic examination. The chemistry report from the PNP Crime Laboratory later revealed that the white crystalline substance with a total weight of 0.11 gram inside the two plastic sachets marked with "EC" tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Issue: Whether or not there is compliance with Section 21 of the implementing rules of RA 9165 Held: With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers with Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165 as alleged by appellant in his Supplemental Brief, particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof, the Court notes that appellant raised the same only in this appeal. The records of the case is bereft of any showing that appellant objected before the RTC regarding the seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the failure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody of the said drugs. The only time that appellant questioned the chain of custody was before the CA but not on the ground of lack of physical inventory or non-taking of photograph, but on the alleged gap between the time of confiscation of the specimen and the time of its submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory. But even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to do so. Appellant should have raised the said issue before the trial court. In similar cases, the Court brushed aside the accused's belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person were inadmissible because the arresting officers failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165. "Whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because [appellant] did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.

PEOPLE V. UMALI Facts: The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and


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9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians. During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery? Held: Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. PEOPLE V. NABONG Facts: The appellant is an attorney and he had been retained to defend one Juan Feleo against a charge of sedition that had been preferred against him. Feleo was in those days a recognized leader of the communists in Nueva Ecija, and was related by marriage to the appellant. After Feleo had been arrested and taken away, Ignacio Nabong delivered a speech in a meeting. In the course of this speech Nabong criticized the members of the Constabulary. While Nabong was talking his words were attentively listened to by deputy fiscal Villamor, as well as Captain Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo, all of whom understood the Tagalog language. At the same time Captain Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo took notes of the substance of this part of the speech. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of inciting to sedition


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Held: Yes. The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood. It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. The words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the people to resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the order of the Government. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities.

DIRECT ASSAULTS

GELIG V. PEOPLE Facts: Petitioner Lydia Gelig impugns the decision promulgated by the court of appeals that set aside the decision of RTC. Lydia was convicted of committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion but the court of appeals found her guilty of the crime slight physical injuries. On July 17, 1981, Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result, Gemma suffered contusion in her maxillary area and continued experiencing abdominal pain and started bleeding two days after the incident. Gemma later on suffered incomplete abortion. Issue: Whether or not the honourable court of appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of slight physical injuries under the information changing her for direct assault with unintentional abortion. Held: Lydia Gelig was liable for direct assault and not unintentional abortion. It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against a person in authority. One mode of committing it is; without public uprising, by attacking, employing force or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or his agent. Gemma, being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority. Gelig was not liable for unintentional abortion for the absence of proof that such incident was the proximate cause of her slapping and pushing.

RIVERA V. PEOPLE Facts:


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Ruben Rodil sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital for being ganged up by the accused Edgardo Rivera and his brother Esmeraldo Rivera. Because of fist blows and coup injury, Ruben sustained slight injuries. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, changing the crime to attempted murder. Issue: (1) Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder (2) Whether or not there was an intent to kill.

Held: (1) Yes, article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some causes other his own desistance. (2) Yes, the court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim.

PEOPLE V. ABALOS Facts: In the evening of March 20, 1983, while acciised Tiburcio Abalos and his father were having a heated argument, a woman shouted “police officer, help us! Somebody is making trouble here.” The victim P/Pfc. Labine,, then appeared at the scene and asked Major Abalos what’s happening. The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos levelled his carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood which is about two inches thick. He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of his head. Labine collapsed and sustained head fracture. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of complex crime of direct assault with murder. Issue: Whether or not the court erred finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with murder. Held: The appellant committed the second mode of committing direct assault. The elements of which are that there must be attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon authority or his agent; that the assault was made when the said person was performing duties. In this case the victim was performing his duties, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in barangay. The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia.


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PEOPLE V. DURAL Facts: On January 31, 1988, while two prosecution witnesses were on their way to Tupadahan, they head gunshot and immediately hide. From the place they were hiding, they saw three armed men firing upon the two Capcom soldiers. The three gunmen positioned themselves as to immobilize the two Capcom soldiers. Two days after, eyewitnessed voluntarily went at the Capcom headquarters to narrate what they have witnessed, consequently the investigator brought them at the Capcom headquarters at Bicutan then at the camp Panopio Hospital. At the said hospital, they identified one of the three gunmen referring to accused Dural who shot two Capcom soldiers. Issue: Whether or not appellants are guilty of direct assault. Held: Yes, the Supreme Court held that there is no doubt that appellant Dural and the two other gunmen knew that the victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mahiglot, were members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims were agents and persons in authority. The crimes he committeed are two complex crimes of murder with direct assault upon an agent of the person in authority.

ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR BANK NOTES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF CREDIT

TECSON V. CA Facts: On April 28, 1990, a buy-bust operation was held by the Central Bank Operatives in order to capture a certain Mang Andy who is involved in a syndicate engaging in the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. Labita and Marqueta (members of the buy-bust operation team) acted as poseur-buyer, approached Mang Andy inside the Jollibee restaurant. When the civilian informer introduced them to Mang Andy, the latter was convinced and drew 10 pieces of US dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment, Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended Mang Andy whom they later identified as herein petitioner, Alejandro Tecson.


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Petitioner denies liability for the crime of illegal possession and use of false treasury bank notes and other instruments of credit as defined in Art, 168 of the Revised Penal Code. According to him, to make him liable under the said provision, his possession of counterfeit dollar notes should be coupled with intent to use. In other words, petitioner contends that possession without intent to use counterfeit US dollar notes would not make him criminally liable. Issue: Whether or not from the facts of the case, Alejandro Tecson is liable under Art. 168 of the Revised Penal Code Held: It is true that in Art. 168, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled with intent to use the same by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime. However, from the facts of the case it can be inferred that the accused had the intent to use the fake dollar notes. In the course of the entrapment, petitioner’s natural reaction from the seeming interest of the of the poseur-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly shows his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to note that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement with the petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actually the petitioner who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer did was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the intention to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that he was only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overcome the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official duties.

CLEMENTE V. PEOPLE Facts: The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner gave a fake P 500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail bakery but was refused because it was found out that it was fake. So, Francis de la Cruz reported the matter to jail officers. Consequently,the jail guards conducted a surprise inspection and found out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet of the accused. The defense of the accused was the defense of frame up. Issue: Whether all the elements of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note in this case are present Held:


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In this case, the Supreme Court, citing People v. Digoro, reversed and set aside the findings of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. In Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use the P500 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.

HOW FORGERY IS COMMITTED

HERNANDEZ V. HERNANDEZ Facts: PMRDC entered through its president into various agreements with co-respondents Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), in connection with the construction of the Isabel Homes housing project in Batangas and of the Monumento Plaza commercial and recreation complex in Caloocan City. PMRDC entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby it was given the option to buy pieces of land owned by petitioners. Petitioners insist that the obligation of PMRDC to deliver back the TCTs arises on its failure to exercise the option to purchase the lands according to the terms of the MOA, and that the deliberate refusal of PMRDC to perform such obligation gives ground for the rescission of the MOA. This thesis is perched on petitioners argument that the MOA could not have possibly been novated by the DAC because Demetrios signature therein has been forged Issue: Whether or not there was forgery in this case Held: No. Firmly settled is the jurisprudential rule that forgery cannot be presumed from a mere allegation but rather must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging the same. The burden to prove the allegation of forgery in this case has not been conclusively discharged by petitioners because first, nothing in the records supports the allegation except only perhaps Demetrios explicit self-serving disavowal of his signature in open court.

TAMANI V. SALVADOR


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Facts: On July 29, 1986, a complaint for quieting of title was filed by respondents spouses Roman Salvador and Filomena Bravo against petitioners Tamani et, al. over a 431 sq. m. parcel of land located at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. They were co-ownders of an undivided land. On August 17, 1959, Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz. RTC rendered decision ruling in petitioner’s favour. Court of Appeals issued a decision ruling in favour of the respondents. Issue: Whether or not court of appeals erred in overturning the factual findings of RTC. Held: Yes, even though the discussion of CA is binding, they are recognized exceptions, among which is when the findings of the trial court and appellate court is conflicting. The CA was thus correct when it declared that the judge must conduct his own independent examination of signature. While it was improper for the RTC to solely rely on Sorra’s credentials. Her superior credentials, compared to that of Albacea, give added value to her testimony. Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is granted.

FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE, NOTARY PUBLIC OR ECCLESIASTICAL MINISTER

GUILERGAN V. PEOPLE Facts: Petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptrollers Office, to cause the preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with supporting time record and book. Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of signatures of the payees, Guillergan would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon (Butcon), the Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to affix his initial on the Remarks/Sig column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and facilitate the processing of the time record, book, and payrolls. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of public document


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Held: Yes. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. His work as comptroller did not include the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official custody of the pertinent documents. His official function was limited to keeping the records of the resources that the command received from Camp Crame.

GALEOS V. PEOPLE Facts: On February 14, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, the accused, a former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, in such capacity, falsified a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong. Issue: Whether or not Galeos is liable of publication of public document. Held: YES. Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Such crime is committed in any of the following acts: 1.) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 2.) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; 3.) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; 4.) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26 In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in


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the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.27 Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.28 All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by the prosecution.

GONZALUDO V. PEOPLE Facts: In 1985, Ulysses Villaflor took one Rosemarie Gelogo as her mistress into his house in Bacolod City. After Ulysses’ death, said mistress offered to sell the 2-storey for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner Gonzaludo but the petitioner was not interested so he introduced Gelogo to Spouses Canlas. Gelogo ang Gregg Canlas executed a Deed of Sale and it was witnessed by Gonzaludo. Gelogo represented herself as the lawful owner of the house by using the name of Rosemarie Villaflor. Issue: Whether or not of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document having conspired with Gelogo Held: No. For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. To secure conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court has time and again ruled that the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (2) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to part with his money or property; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. In this case, the third element is absent. While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. However, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring


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Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public document.

GARCIA V. CA Facts: The accused, being in possession of a receipt for P 5,000 dated January 21, 1991 issued by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down payment of the sale of a house and lot to accused, made alterations on the said receipt and made it appear that it was issued on January 24, 1991 in the amount of Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in truth and in fact, the said accused fully well knew that the receipt was only for the amount of Five Thousand Pesos. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC Held: : Yes. The elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it was made on a genuine document; (3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (4) that the changes made the document speak something false. When these are committed by a private individual on a private document the violation would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and without convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is readily apparent as it was made to appear that Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he did not.

MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTION

OANI V. PEOPLE Facts: During the school year 1988-1989, the Panabo High School in Panabo, Davao del Norte, headed by its Principal, Leopoldo Oani, implemented the free secondary school program of the government. During the period of November 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, the high school received the amount of P648,532.00 from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE).[1] Of the said amount, P551,439.13 was earmarked for the purchase of various supplies, materials and


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equipment. On March 1, 1990, the DECS Secretary received a letter from the Parents Teachers Association of the Panabo High School regarding the investigation of Principal Oani and Bonifacio Roa, the Resident Auditor regarding, among other things, the alleged overpricing of 12 fire extinguishers for P15,000.00 each. The Regional Office of the COA then issued Assignment Order No. 90-137 dated March 2, 1990 to a team of auditors, composed of Jaime P. Naranjo, as Chairman, and Bienvenido Presilda and Carmencita Enriquez, as members. The amount of P55,000.00 was certified as available for the purpose. Instead of conducting a public bidding, Oani decided to purchase the fire extinguishers from the Powerline Manufacturing Industry (Powerline, for brevity) for P54,747.00. Powerline was owned by Francisco Cunanan and had its business address at Km. 5, Carnation St., Buhangin, Davao City. The enterprise was authorized by the Department of Trade and Industry to manufacture and refill stored pressure type (Light Pink only) mono-ammonium phosphate for ABC fires. On June 27, 1989, Oani approved Purchase Order No. 2 for nine units of fire extinguishers and requested Powerline to deliver the supplies. Upon delivery thereof, Oani approved a disbursement voucher in favor of the supplier for the amount of P54,747.00. The supplier acknowledged receipt of the said amount through check. The members of the Audit Team that conducted a re-canvass for fire extinguishers of the same brand and features as those supplied by Cunanan discovered that each unit could be purchased for only P2,970.00, inclusive of 10% allowance. The purchase of the nine units of fire extinguishers was, thus, overpriced by P23,040.00. Issue: Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict him of violation of RA 3019. Held: Yes. The Certification is dated January 1988, making it appear that it had been issued before the subject fire extinguishers were purchased on June 27, 1989. However, Cunanan could not have executed the Certification in January 1988 because paragraph 4 thereof indicates that it was issued pursuant to COA Circular No. 91-368. It bears stressing that COA Circular No. 91-368 was issued only on December 19, 1991, long after Cunanan signed the Certification. In fine, Cunanan could not possibly have issued a certification pursuant to an administrative circular which did not as yet exist. Hence, no such certification was issued on June 27, 1989, the most plausible explanation being that it was executed and signed by Cunanan only after December 19, 1991. Besides, the petitioner never submitted the certification when the auditing team conducted its investigation. If the certification was indeed issued as early as January 1988, the petitioner should have submitted the same to the auditing team. The trial court saw through the petitioners chicanery and declared in its decision:

Accused Oani submitted for the purpose a Certification dated 10 July 1988 issued by the Panabo Fire Station, Panabo, Davao and the Certification dated January 1988, issued by a certain Francisco R. Cunanan, proprietor of Powerline, that the latter is an exclusive


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distributor of the purchased fire extinguishers and that no subdealer was appointed to sell the same.

After a careful evaluation of the respective evidences submitted by the parties on this issue, the Court finds for the People and brushes aside as incredible the claims of the defense, particularly of the accused Oani. It appears that the theory of the accused that bidding and canvass may be dispensed with in view of the exclusiveness of Powerline in the manufacture and distribution of the purchased fire extinguishers, finds no leg to stand on, at the least, or a mere afterthought, at the most. The penultimate paragraph of the said certification of Powerline proprietor, Francisco R. Cunanan, states,

THAT, I am executing this Certification pursuant to Article 7, section 442 of the Government Auditing Rules & Regulations (GAAM Volume I under COA Circular No. 91368 governing the procurement from Duly Licensed Manufacturers and Exclusive Distributors).

CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS

PEOPLE V. MORALES Facts: Roldan Morales was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The trial court and the Court of Apelas found Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Issue: What is the nature of appeal in criminal cases? Held: Appeal in criminal cases possess a unique nature. The appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be


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disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.The identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecution’s case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales.

PEOPLE V. PERALTA Facts: Elmer Peralta was arrested after the District Drug Enforcement Group (DDEG) staged a by-bust operation with one police officer (SPO1 Alberto Sangalang) acting as poseur-buyer. An informant introduced the police officer to Peralta and the former informed Peralta that the police officer was a dance instructor in need of shabu for himself and his fellow dance instructors so they could endure the long nights. The police officer gave Peralta a marked P500.00 bill for a sachet of shabu. At a signal, Sangalang told his informant to go out and buy cigarettes. On seeing the informant come out of the house, the police back-up team rushed in. They arrested accused Peralta, took the marked money from him, and brought him to the police station. Meanwhile, the sachet of shabu was marked "AS-1-210702" and taken to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for testing. The contents of the sachet tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The prosecution presented the police officer. He alone testified for the government since it was thought that the testimonies of the other police officers would only be corroborative. The prosecution also dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist after the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of Chemistry Report D-332-02, which showed that the specimen tested positive for shabu.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution presented ample proof that the police officers involved caught accused Peralta at his home, peddling prohibited drugs.

Held: NO. The elements of the sale of illegal drugs are a) the identities of the buyer and seller, b) the transaction or sale of the illegal drug, and c) the existence of the corpus delicti. With respect to the third element, the prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been preserved. This is crucial in drugs cases because the evidence involved—the seized chemical—is not readily identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or substituted. The prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs. It must present testimony about every link in the chain of custody of such drugs, from the moment they were seized from the accused to the moment they are offered in evidence. But here the prosecution failed to show the chain of custody or that they followed the procedure that has been prescribed in connection with the seizure and custody of drugs. To begin with, the prosecution did not adduce evidence of when the sachet of shabu was marked. Consequently, it could have been marked long after its seizure or even after it had been tested in the laboratory. While the records show that the sachet bore the markings "AS-1210702," indicating that Sangalang probably made the marking, the prosecutor did not bother to ask him if such marking was his. Sangalang identified the seized drugs in a manner that glossed


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over the need to establish their integrity. Since the seizing officer usually has to turn over the seized drugs to the desk officer or some superior officer, who would then send a courier to the police crime laboratory with a request that the same be examined to identify the contents, it is imperative for the officer who placed his marking on the plastic container to seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that usually cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. If the drugs were not in a plastic container, the police officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this way the drugs would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician has tested and verified the nature of the powder in the container, he should seal it again with a new seal since the police officer’s seal had been broken. In this way, if the accused wants to contest the test made, the Court would be assured that what is retested is the same powder seized from the accused. The prosecutor could then ask questions of the officer who placed his marking on the plastic container to prove that the suspected drugs had not been tampered with or substituted when they left that officer’s hands. If the sealing of the seized article had not been made, the prosecution would have to present the desk officer or superior officer to whom the seizing officer turned over such article. That desk officer or superior officer needs to testify that he had taken care that the drugs were not tampered with or substituted. And if someone else brought the unsealed sachet of drugs to the police crime laboratory, he, too, should give similar testimony, and so on up to the receiving custodian at the crime laboratory until the drugs reach the laboratory technician who examined and resealed it.

PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ Facts: At around 5:00 p.m. on June 16, 2003, while on duty at the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Force, SPO3 Matias received information via telephone from a concerned citizen that a certain alias Nick, later identified to be appellant, was peddling shabu along San Agustin Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On the instructions of SPO3 Matias, PO1 Espares and PO1 Mapula proceeded to, and surveilled, the area and confirmed the information. SPO3 Matias thus formed a buy-bust team, which he headed, with PO1 Espares as poseur-buyer, and PO1 Mapula and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 Familara) as members. Five marked twenty-peso bills were given to PO1 Espares as buy-bust money. The team thereafter went to the target area and met with a confidential asset who was to assist them in the operation. While the other members of the team were strategically positioned, the asset, accompanied by PO1 Espares, approached appellant and asked him Pare, meron ka ba diyan? Bibili kami. Bibili ako ng piso. Apparently not having heard the entire utterances, appellant replied, Magkano ba bibilhin mo? (How much are you buying?), to which PO1 Espares replied Piso lang, eto pera at the same time tendering the buy-bust money which appellant took and placed in his right front pocket. Appellant then drew from his pants back pocket a black plastic case, opened it and took one plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Espares. PO1 Espares thereupon executed the pre-arranged signal, apprehended appellant, and confiscated the black plastic case which appellant was holding. The case yielded a pair of scissors, an unsealed plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, and five empty plastic sachets. Heeding the pre-arranged signal, the other members of the team closed in to assist PO1 Espares who then marked all the seized items including the plastic sachet containing the substance subject of the sale. Appellant was brought to the police station wherein the confiscated items were surrendered to an investigator.


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Appellant was charged with illegal sale of 0.05 gram of shabu and illegal possession of paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking . . . or introducing any dangerous drug into the body by two separate Informations Issue: Whether or not accused violated Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Held: The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Nicolas Gutierrez y Licuanan, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. At this juncture, the Court notes another lapse of the members of the buy-bust team their failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs. There was no physical inventory and photograph of the shabu allegedly confiscated from appellant. There was likewise no explanation offered for the non-observance of the rule. Coupled with the failure to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted, the buy bust teams disregard of the requirements of Section 21 is fatal. It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing on record suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. PEOPLE V. QUE MING KHA Facts: On May 16, 1997, members Central Police District received a phone call from an informant that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in the transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. A tem was immediately dispatched to the reported place. Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite side of the street going toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit. A concerned motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital. When the police finally intercepted the van, they introduced themselves as police officers to the driver and passenger of the van and informed them that they committed the crime of reckless imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police noted that Go was on the driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat. The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and noticed that it contained several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance.


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The arresting officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which contained around one kilo of the white crystalline substance. Upon examination, the substance was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.5 Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the van. Issue: Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act Held: The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but acquitted appellant Que. It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the time of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated drug without authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated drug." To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband at the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum. In such case, the lack of criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the accused from criminal liability. Thus, Go's contention that he did not know that there were illegal drugs inside the van cannot constitute a valid defense. Mere possession and/or delivery of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act Regarding the criminal liability of appellant Que, the Supreme Court acquitted Que. Que had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it hit Elmar Cawiling. No less than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of Que and recommends his acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's guilt, the Court should listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong. In People v. Pagaura, the Supreme Court made a cautionary warning that "the court must be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually heavy penalties for drug offenses. In our criminal justice system the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

DIRECT BRIBERY

MARIFOSQUE V. PEOPLE Facts:


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This is a petition for review on certiorari, which assails the September 23, 2002, decision and the January 3, 2003, Resolution of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner averred that said money was not for him but as “reward money” for the police asset who demanded that he be given 350 pesos per cylinder tank. Petitioner further averred that he was only collecting on behalf of the police asset and that he already gave an advance of 1,000 pesos to said asset and only collecting the balance of 4,800. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery. Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed Direct Bribery? Held: Yes. Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him, which showed that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. His solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident, even though he was no longer on duty, betrays an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer complaining about the 1000 pesos that he supposedly received earlier.

MANIPON V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery, dated September 30, 1981. Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court dismissed the petition, "the question raised being factual and for lack of merit." 1 However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave due course to the petition. 2 Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor. Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon sent a notice to the COMTRUST garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.


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Manipon's help was sought by Dominguez in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn. However, when the two met again, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then authenticated, Xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder. Issue: Whether or not accused committed direct bribery? Held: Yes. Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said that in 1978 he and Flora had levied execution against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the latter had openly resented. The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind that Manipon is guilty of the crime charged. It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final judgment, no one took the bother of putting it down on paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution? Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no such agreement in the first place. The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not interested in getting said temporary receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation. Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings. That was also the same excuse he gave for not informing the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly, Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment order.


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Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized because there was no valid March warrant and therefore inadmissible. The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view. This falls on the first exception.

SORIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The City Fiscal of Quezon City lodged a complaint with the accused Thomas N. Tan of qualified theft. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as follows: The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal in the Information, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of Bribery? Held: Yes. The principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit. The petitioner states: Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused


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is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.) Upon the other hand, the respondents claim: A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and other party wherein the public officer would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.) It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

INDIRECT BRIBERY

FORMELIZA V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government service for around 20 years.She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National IrrigationAdministration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her duties include theprocessing of the appointment papers of employees.A certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was employed with NIA on a project basis and she wasterminated on December 31, 1983. Pursuant to the verbal instructions of the regional directorof the Administration, however, she continued working.


According to Mrs. Mutia, she tooksteps

to

obtain

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TECSON, Mary Joie S. either a

permanent

Case Digest or

at

the least

a

renewed

appointment.

When

sheapproached the regional director about it, she was advised to see the petitioner but the latterrefused to attend to her appointment unless given some money. On February 27, 1984, Mrs.Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the province.The PC officials, who are colleagues of Mrs. Mutia’s husband, arranged for an entrapmentwith marked money bills worth P100 as the entrapment equipment. On February 29, 1984,the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia agreed to meet at the canteen at 9:00am. Mrs. Mutia thennotified the PC authorities, Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong aboutthe arrangement. At the canteen, petitioner and Mrs. Mutia occupied a table and were joinedby some officemates – Mrs. Florida Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano, while the PC officials occupiedseparate tables. Sergeant Abanes brought along a camera to document the entrapment.Mrs. Mutia maintains that after taking the snacks she handed the marked money bills underthe table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the money with her left hand. Atthat moment, the PC officials approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the money.Sergeant Abanes took photographs of the sequence of events. The petitioner was arrestedand was brought to the PC crime where she was found positive for ultra-violet powder. The respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and sentenced her tofour months of arresto mayor, suspension from public office, profession or calling, includingthe right of suffrage, and public censure.

The

petitioner elevated the case to the SupremeCourt by way of the Instant Petition for Review. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner accepted the supposed bribe money. Held: Petitioner Leonor Formilleza is ACQUITTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan isSET ASIDE. An exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition ofthis character calls for application in this case. There are substantial facts and circumstanceswhich appear to be favorable to the accused but which were not carefully considered by theSandiganbayan. The failure to do so is most unfortunate considering that the Sandiganbayanis the first and last recourse of the accused before her case reaches the Supreme Courtwhere findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding. essential

The

ingredient ofindirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal

Code is that the public officerconcerned must have accepted the gift of material consideration.

There must be a clearintention on the part of the public officer to take the

gift so offered and consider the same ashis own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing thesame. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstances or act to showsuch acceptance is not sufficient to lead the


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court to conclude that the crime of indirect briberyhas been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or otherproperty. If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at thecanteen, the petitioner would not have invited her officemates Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaanoto join them. According to Mrs. Sevilla she did not see the alleged passing of the moneyunder the table. What she was sure was that when they were about to leave the canteen, twomen approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures and the petitioner shouted at Mrs.Mutia, “What are you trying to do to me?” The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guiltyconscience. Without the standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of the accusedin a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL

CHUA vs. NUESTRO Facts: Rina V. Chua being the complainant, filed an administrative charge against the respondent for allegedly delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her favor after demanding and getting from her the sum of 1500 pesos. The court issued a writ of execution, On September 12, 1988, Chua and counsel asked respondent Deputy-Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro to immediately enforce the writ of execution against the defendant, and for the purpose, they agreed to give 1000 pesos to the respondent. Respondent received the amount of 1000 pesos on September 12, 1988; however, the next day, they saw the respondent talking with counsel of defendant and that the respondent was hesitantin proceeding to carry out the writ of execution. Respondent even asked for a additionalamount of P500.00; consequently, in the afternoon of the same day, respondent went to the premises in question and when he arrived there, but he was told by the judge not to proceed because a supersede as bond was filed. Nevertheless, he found the premises locked, and at the insistence of the complainant, they broke the padlock and entered portion B of the premises. Later, counsel for defendant arrived and showed them the official receipt of payment of the supersede as bond and so he discontinued the execution proceedings. Issue: Whether Chua and counsel be charged of corruption of public official when they gave to therespondent the amount of 1500 pesos in consideration of enforcing the writ of execution. Held:


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While we cannot fault the sheriff for his hesitance to immediately carry out the writ of execution because the defendant still had time to file supersedeas bond to stay execution, we find duly proved by preponderance of evidence that the respondent Deputy Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro received the amount of P1,500.00 from the complainant and her lawyer as a consideration for the performance of his work. This amount is distinct from the sheriffs fee and expenses of execution and was not intended for that purpose. It was indeed a bribe given and received by respondent deputy sheriff from the complainant.

RA 3019 – ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

CHANG V. PEOPLE Facts: Roberto Chang, the Municipal Treasurer of Makati and Pacifico San Mateo, the Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division, Makati Treasurer's Office found out that GDI has a tax deficiency of P494,000. The Office of the Treasurer then issued an Assessment notice to GDI to pay the unpayed taxes. GDI asked for a validation of the assessment and petitioners asked for a meeting with GDI representatives. On that meeting, petitioners offered GDI that if they could pay P125,000, the tax would be “settled.” Thinking that it was the right tax assessment, GDI prepared P125,000 in check. Petitioners made it clear that it was not the tax due and gave two options: either to pay the petitioners P125,000 or pay the Municipality P494,000. GDI then alerted the NBI and the petitioners were caught in an entrapment operation. Issue: Whether petitioners were indeed guilty of corrupt practices by illiciting bribe to fix tax deficits. Held: Yes. The fact that petitioners willingness to meet with GDI representatives despite the receipt of the latter of deficiency assessments notices to settle tax deficiencies, refusal to accept of the initial payment of P125,000 for the municipality, and the petitioners' handing over to GDI representatives the Certificate of Examination on which was annotated "NO


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TAX LIABILITY INVOLVED" establishes that the criminal intent originated from the minds of petitioners to illicit bribes.

BUSTILOO V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner Anuncio Bustillo, then incumbent mayor of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, and his daughter Rowena Bustillo in the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Official Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that municipal funds were expended for the purchase of lumber from Estigoy Lumber when, in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, said lumber were actually purchased from Rowena Woodcraft, a single proprietorship owned by accused Rowena G. Bustillo. In view of the criminal charges against the petitioner, Sandiganbayan then suspended the petitioner from office for 90 days. The petitioner argues that Sandiganbayan has no basis to suspend him because he contends that the Information filed against him and his co-accused is invalid because it failed to allege the element of gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification, or that the "integrity of the [falsified] document was tarnished.” Issue: Whether the Information charged against the accused was valid to justify the Sandiganbayan’s resolution of suspending the accused. Held: The information is valid. The allegation of intent to gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification, or tarnishing of a document’s integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of official documents. Such charge stands if the facts alleged in the Information fall under any of the modes of committing falsification under Article 171. Suspension from office is mandatory whenever a valid Information charges an incumbent public officer with (1) violation of RA 3019; (2) violation of Title 7, Book II of the RPC; (3) any offense involving fraud upon government; or (4) any offense involving fraud upon public funds or property. While petitioner correctly contends that the charge filed against him and his co-accused does not fall under Title 7, Book II but under Title 4, Book II of the RPC, it nevertheless involves "fraud upon government or public funds or property.

TEVES V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental, Philippines, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary


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interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.

Issue Whether a public official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for unlawful intervention, in his official capacity, in the issuance of a license in favor of a business enterprise in which he has a pecuniary interest may be convicted, together with his spouse, of violation of that same provision premised on his mere possession of such interest.

Held: Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design. Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. For a spouse or any person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators. We find no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused, her husband to commit the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly pass as acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the violation of the Anti-Graft Law that would render her equally liable as her husband. If ever she did those acts, it was because she herself was an owner of the cockpit. Not being a public official, she was not prohibited from holding an interest in cockpit. Prudence, however, dictates that she too should have divested herself of her ownership over the cockpit upon the effectivity of the LGC of 1991; otherwise, as stated earlier, considering her property relation with her husband, her ownership would result in vesting direct prohibited interest upon her husband. In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was proved, the acquittal of petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.

MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS

BAHILIDAD V. PEOPLE Facts: Accused Amelia C. Zoleta (Zoleta) and Violeta Bahilidad (Bahilidad), are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission of the


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crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. Zoleta appealed questioning the decision of sandiganbayan regarding the presence of conspiracy. Issue: Whether or not sandiganbayan erred in their decision regarding the presence of conspiracy. Held: Yes, The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts. In the instant case, we find petitioners participation in the crime not adequately proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her name. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt

assailed

Decision

is SET

DAVALOS vs. PEOPLE Facts: On January 14, 1988, petitioner Davalos, as supply officer of the Office of the ProvincialEngineer of Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a cash advance of 18000 pesos forthe procurement of working tools for a certain “NALGO” project. Petitioner's receipt of theamount is evidenced by his signature appearing in Disbursement Voucher No. 103-880-08.Two demand letters were received by the petitioner from the Provincial Treasurer to submit aliquidation of the 18000 pesos cash advance. The petitioner failed to do so. Issue: Whether the petitioner be held guilty of malversation of public funds; and- Whether the return of the misappropriated amount extinguish the criminal liability of theoffender. Held: The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with whichhe is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence thathe has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. There can be no dispute about thepresence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying the position of asupply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of


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Marinduque. In that capacity, hereceives money or property belonging to the provincial government for which he is bound toaccount.In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of fundsmisappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accused's civil liability and be considered amitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.

CHAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The petitioner Pamela Chan seeks a reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision of August 28, 2001 finding her guilty of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217. A routine audit examination of the accountability of the petitioner was conducted. The audit was conducted during the leave of the petitioner. A second audit was conducted, where the auditor found a shortage in petitioner’s cash accountability. A demand letter was issued to the petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the shortage. Petitioner was thus indicted before the Regional Trial Court for Malversation of Public Funds. Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds. Held: The burden of proof that the subject audit reports contain errors sufficient to merit a re-audit lies with petitioner. What degree of error suffices, there is no hard and fast rule. While COA Memorandum 87-511 dated October 20, 1987[13] (which, as reflected in the above-quoted Deputy Ombudsman’s Order of July 28, 1997,[14] was cited by COA Director Alquizalas when he opposed petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation before the Ombudsman) recognizes that a re-audit may be conducted in certain instances, it does not specify or cite what those instances are. The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitioner’s account the shortage in the collections actually done by Bas. Petitioner, nonetheless, could have shown that she was not remiss in her supervision of Bas, by way of rebutting the disputable presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which states: The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall beprima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. Petitioner, however, failed to do so. Not only did she omit to report the shortages of Bas to the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having assisted Bas in covering up such shortages

TETANGCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN


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Facts: On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on January 26, 2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial assistanceto the chairman and P1,000 to each tano of Barangay. This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order of public respondent Ombudsman which dismissed the Complaint of petitioner Amando Tetangco against private respondent Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code(RPC). 105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, onMarch 5, 2001, Mayor Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of the financialassistance from the City of Manila when such disbursement was not justified as a lawfulexpense.In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations and sought the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was theCommission on Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over the caseand the same case had previously been filed before the COMELEC. Furthermore, theComplaint had no verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The mayor maintainedthat the expenses were legal and justified, the same being supported by disbursementvouchers, and these had passed prior audit and accounting. The Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidenceand merit. The Ombudsman adopted his recommendation. The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, likewise deniedpetitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether accused committed a violation of the anti-graft law. Held: In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized asarbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to proveprobable cause. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported bycircumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that theperson accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Here, the Complaintmerely alleged that the disbursement for financial assistance was neither authorized by lawnor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cite any law or ordinance thatprovided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the financial assistance citedand that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for. The Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter, Art.220 of the Revised Penal Code provides:Art. 220. llegal use of public funds or property. – Any public officer who shall apply anypublic fund or property under his administration to any public use other than that for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of thesum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shallhave resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penaltyof temporary special disqualification.If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be afine from 5 to 50 percent of the sum misapplied. The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the offender isan accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under hisadministration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds orproperty were applied is different from


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the purpose for which they were originallyappropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it isnecessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other thanthat provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law orordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in this case.

ABDULLA V. PEOPLE Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. On or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: Norma Abdulla and Nenita P. Aguil, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with Mahmud I. DAarkis, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of P40,000.00, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellant’s co-accused, NenitaAguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her Issue: Whether there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part. Whether the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present. Held: There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.


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PARUNGAO V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The petitioner, Oscar Parungao, a public officer, was charged of malversation of public funds for allegedly appropriating to his personal use the amount of P185, 250.00 for the construction of the Jalung road in Porac, Pampanga. Parungao admitted that he received the said amount, but was disbursed for the materials to be used and the rest was used to pay upon the insistence of the municipal mayor of Porac, for the labor of the different barangays in the municipality. Sandiganbayan acquitted him but convicted him for the crime of illegal use of public funds. Hence, this appeal. Parungao claims that he cannot be convicted of a crime different and distinct from that charged in the information. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him for on the violation of Art. 220. Held: The accused has the constitutional right that he can only be convicted of the crime with which he is charged, unless they have both have the same essential elements which are alleged in the information. Whereas, the elements of the crime of malversation of public funds and illegal use of public funds are distinct. Hence, the petition was granted. The decision of Sandiganbayan was reversed. And Oscar Parungao was acquitted.

DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUSTANCES

PEOPLE V. AYUMAN Facts: This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Brach 19, Cagayan de Oro City where the accused, Conrado Ayuman, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000. On April 22, 1997 at around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman, the wife of the accused, rushed her five-year old son Sugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center. When a nurse, took the child's vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on arrival. Ermita's statement was noted in the emergency room record. An autopsy was done to the dead body of Sugar Ray. On April 23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried. The accused was nowhere to be found. Neither did he report for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997. During the burial, Ermita cried and shouted, "Dong, forgive your father. Dong, don't leave us." Afterwards, she went to the precinct and gave a testimony to SPO1 Catulong against her husband for killing their son. At that time, his son was already buried. The couple then went to the Office of the Prosecutor to "tell the truth." Issue:


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Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide. Held: The decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification and the accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages. The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse; The key element here is the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, specifically on the basis of circumstantial evidence. And also, the circumstances cited by the trial court, when viewed in their entirety, were as convincing as direct evidence and as such, negate the innocence of the accused. Otherwise stated, the prosecution established beyond a shadow of doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that accused committed the crime of parricide. Here is a father who mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring him to the hospital, although on the verge of death, for prompt medical treatment. Such a heartless conduct is condemnable and is extremely contrary to human nature. Every father is expected to love his children and shower them with acts of affection and tenderness.

PEOPLE V. PUEDAN Facts: Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his grandson, Reymark, went to the house of appellant Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet. Luceno was fashioning out a mortar for pounding palay near his house when Florencio and Reymark arrived. Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to buy a piglet from him. Appellant suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five times using a sharp pointed knife locally known as plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed, Luceno fled towards the house of his neighbor. Young Reymark ran back to his parents’ house and told his mother, Erlinda, what transpired. Erlinda ran swiftly to Luceno’s place but Florencio was already dead, bathed in his own blood and lying by the side of the rice paddy. The body remained where it had fallen until the arrival of the police later that day. Leah, wife of appellant, admitted having an illicit relationship with Florencio. Their relationship had been going on for two years and was known in their Barangay. In the morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio came to their house, while she was breastfeeding her child, and was looking for her husband. Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to invoke the defense of death under exceptional circumstances under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Held:


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The Supreme Court ruled that by raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as his defense, appellant admitted that he killed the victim. By invoking this defense, appellant waives his right to the constitutional presumption of innocence and bears the burden of proving the following: (1) that a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised his wife and the victim in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter. However, all that appellant established was the victim's promiscuity, which was inconsequential to the killing. What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically opposed to the convincing accounts of the prosecution witnesses.

PEOPLE VS. ABARCA Facts: Accused Francisco Abarca has a wife who had an illicit relationship with Khingsley Paul Koh which started when he was reviewing for the 1983 Bar exam in Manila and his wife was left in Tacloban. Upon reaching home, he found his wife Jenny and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife noticed the accused, she pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was peeping above the build-in cabinet ran away. He went to look for a firearm and got a rifle. He went back to his house but was not able to find his wife and her paramour so he went to the mahjong session where Khingsley hangouts. He found him playing and then he fired at him 3 times with rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying the adjacent room of the mahjong room were hit as well. Koh died instantaneously but the spouses were able to survive due to time medical assistance. Arnold was hit in the kidney. He was not able to work for 1 and ½ months because of his wounds and he was receiving P1000 as salary. He spent 15K for hospital while his wife spent 1K for the same purpose. The lower court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder and sentenced him to suffer death penalty. However, considering the circumstances of the crime, the RTC believes that accused is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of substantial if not radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence. Issue: Whether the trial court is correctly convicted the accused of complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder instead of entering a judgment of conviction under Art. 247 Held:


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The accused is entitled to the defense of death under exceptional circumstance under Art. 247 of RPC. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in the act of illicit copulation. The foregoing elements of Art. 247 of RPC are present in this case: legally married surprises spouse in the act of sex with another person; and that he kills any or both of them in the act or immediately after. Although an hour has passed between the sexual act and the shooting of Koh, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. Articvle 247 only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage. Regarding the physical injuries sustained by the Amparado spouses, the Supreme Court held that the accused is only liable for the crime of less serious physical injuries thru simple negligence or imprudence under 2nd paragraph of Article 365, and not frustrated murder. The accused did not have the intent to kill the spouses. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. In this case, the accused was not committing murder when he discharged rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder.

MURDER

PEOPLE V. QUE MING KHA Facts: On May 16, 1997, members Central Police District received a phone call from an informant that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in the transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. A tem was immediately dispatched to the reported place.

Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite side of the street going toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit. A concerned motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital. When the police finally intercepted the van, they introduced themselves as police officers to the driver and passenger of the van and informed them that they committed the crime of reckless imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police noted that Go was on the driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat.


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The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and noticed that it contained several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. The arresting officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which contained around one kilo of the white crystalline substance. Upon examination, the substance was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.5 Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the van. Issue: Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act Held: The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but acquitted appellant Que. It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the time of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated drug without authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated drug." To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband at the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum. In such case, the lack of criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the accused from criminal liability. Thus, Go's contention that he did not know that there were illegal drugs inside the van cannot constitute a valid defense. Mere possession and/or delivery of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act Regarding the criminal liability of appellant Que, the Supreme Court acquitted Que. Que had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it hit Elmar Cawiling. No less than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of Que and recommends his acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's guilt, the Court should listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.

In People v. Pagaura, the Supreme Court made a cautionary warning that "the court must be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually heavy penalties for drug offenses. In our criminal justice system the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

PEOPLE V. CORICOR Facts:


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Reclusion perpetua was sentenced to the appellant, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Pedro Lego in the sum of P2, 000, and to pay the costs, having been found by the lower court guilty of murder committed on September 15, 1941. The evidence was presented on October 20 and 21, 1941 for the prosecution, and the evidence for the defense on October 21 and 22, 1941. Six witnesses testified for the prosecution. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant committed the crime of murder under Art 248 or death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances under Art. 247 of the RPC? Held: A careful weighing of the evidence both of the prosecution and the defense leads us to the conclusion that appellant's version as to the circumstance under which Pedro Lego was killed is the more credible. That appellant should have gone to the house of Severino Regis to invite Pedro Lego and his wife to come to appellant's house so as to advise Isabel, because she had a paramour, one Saturnino Caaya, as testified to by Catalina Regis, appears not to tally with the fact that, according to the testimony of the accused, not contradicted by the same Catalina Regis, he went twice to her to complain about the illicit relations between Pedro Lego and Isabel, to the extent that appellant manifested to Catalina that if he should surprise Lego in flagrant copulation with Isabel, he will kill them and would forget that Lego is his uncle. The court applied in the case at bar Art 247, the death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Conjugal fidelity committed by a married woman and her paramour is punished, as adultery, by article 333 of the Revised Penal Code with from 4 months to 6 years of imprisonment, and the one committed by a husband and his mistress, as concubinage, by article 334, with imprisonment from 6 months and 4 years and 2 months for the erring husband and banishment for the mistress. Under article 334, not all cases of conjugal infidelity committed by a husband is punishable. The great majority of them are left unpunishable. No fiscal will think of prosecuting the husband who should indulge in sexual intercourse with discreet mistresses or with prostitutes. For such acts of conjugal infidelity, some punishable with short terms of imprisonment, others with simple banishment, and still others not punishable at all, article 247, in effect, confers to the offended spouse the power to inflict the supreme penalty of death. The banishment provided for the killer is intended more for his protection than as a penalty. Such a twisted logic seems possible only in a paranoiac mind. It is high time to relegate article 247 to where it properly belongs, to the memory of the sins that humanity promised to herself never to commit again. The majority of the Court, however, opines otherwise. For all the foregoing, setting aside the appealed decision, appellant is found guilty of the offense of having killed Pedro Lego as punished by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code and, accordingly, is sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of banishment, and to indemnify the heirs of Pedro Lego in the sum of P2,000.

PEOPLE V. MALLARI Facts:


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During the basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Joseph and Liza (wife) were watching as well as Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death. Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted Rufino of murder. Issue: Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for the crime of murder? Held: The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph. The case of People v. Muñoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which caused the latter’s death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over him. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another “by means of a motor vehicle” is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.

PEOPLE VS WHISENHUNT Facts: On or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Elsa Elsie Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping off her head and different parts of her body. Issue: 1.) Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of strength is present.


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2.) Whether or not scoffing of the victim's body is to be appreciated in court to qualify the crime to murder. Held: 1.) The answer is in the negative. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim. Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this case, nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrio’s testimony, and it is not indicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from viewing the photograph of accused-appellant that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.

2.) Yes, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The sight of Elsa’s severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.

PEOPLE VS CONTINENTE Facts: It appears that appellant Donato Continente and several other John Does were initially charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2) separate Information dated June 20, 1989 in connection with the shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on August 27, 1989 in Davao City, the prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended information for murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas, among the other accused. Issue: Whether or not the element of treachery is present qualifying the crime to murder. Held:


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Yes, the shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[74] The evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the crime without the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is murder.

PEOPLE VS ANTONIO Facts: On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of cards for the victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional basketball player and his friend turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other. Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol. Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto Ambet S. Antonio, a one-time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC), located along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities such as a dining room, music bar and gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or pusoy dos, ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos. Issue: Whether or not Treachery is attendant in the case to convict the accused of murder. Held: No, Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused made no preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and specially to insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may take. A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself. The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was arrived at on the spur of the moment.


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There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforeseen. Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no treachery. In People v. Chua, we reiterated our consistent view that: While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard. Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with treachery.

PEOPLE VS TEEHANKEE Facts: Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati, 1991. Roland John Chapman went with them. Upon entering the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio. While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.” When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it. Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why are you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: “Oh, my God, he’s got a gun. He’s gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused’s car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused’s car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.


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For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident. As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER. Issue: Whether or not there is evident premeditation and treachery in the commission of the crime. Held: No, it has been consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.


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PEOPLE VS. MANERO Facts: On the 11th of April 1985, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, together with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades. They were conferring with three others of a plan to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers. Among their targets are: Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead. They later on nailed a placard near the carinderia bearing the names of their intended victims. Later, at 4:00 pm, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. After a heated confrontation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of Bantil who was able to parry and was hit at the lower portion of his ear. Bantil tried to run but he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Though Bantil was able to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez, Norberto Jr. ordered his men to surround the house so that Bantil would die of hemorrhage. Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados. At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km.125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final. Issue: Whether or not the appellants can be exculpated from criminal liability on the basis of defense of alibi which would establish that there is no conspiracy to kill.


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Held: The court did not appreciate the defense of alibi of the Lines brother, who according to them, were in a farm some one kilometer away from the crime scene. The court held that ―It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.‖ There is no physical impossibility where the accused can be at the crime scene in a matter of 15-20 minutes by jeep or tricycle. More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. In this case, there were two eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused. Contrary to the claim of the Lines brothers, there is a community of design to commit the crime. Based on the findings of the lower court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but in fact were vital cogs in the murder of Fr. Fuvali. They performed overt acts to ensure the success of the commission of the crimes and the furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group targeted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. The accused agreed that in case they fail to kill the intended victims, it will be suffice to kill another priest as long as the person is also Italian priest

DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

PEOPLE V. UNLAGADA Facts: On January 27, 1989, Danilo Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City at around 9:00 in the evening to attend a public dance at Negros Occidental. After two hours, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall. While they were outside, they decided to have a drink and bought beer. Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three meters from Danilo who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with half- filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering of seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given medical attention.


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Edwin Selda confirmed the identity of the suspect who was then in the custody of the police. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the police authorities, that the man under detention, Anecito Unlagada, was the same man who stabbed his friend Danilo. The accused assails his conviction. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder instead of tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code? Held: Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitness because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a “tumultuous affray” within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free- for- all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them. Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused- appellant; the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense. Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.

PEOPLE VS MARAMARA Facts: The evidence shows that a benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School PTA of which accused- appellant is the president, was held in the yard of accused- appellant’s house in Brgy. Calpi, Claveria Masbate in the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo Donato was dancing with certain Rowena Del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of the accused- appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened, Rowena ran away while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about two meters away from where Ricardo stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused- appellant took his hand- gun tucked in his waist and fired at the victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter at the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardo’s head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about 3 minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of what happened.


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Their father immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Pio Duran Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day. Before Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato, the father, asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was accused- appellant. The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of Miguelito bore lacerated wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more than two persons. The trial court ruled against the accused- appellant and was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Issue: Whether or not Maramara should be held liable for tumultuous affray instead of murder? Held: There is no merit in the accused- appellant’s position that he should be held liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body- two on the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused- appellant with his hand- gun shot Miguelito. Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witness Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused- appellant as Miguelito’s killer. While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first blush, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelito inflicted upon him these wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider them as a mitigating circumstance because the defense’s version stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as to the circumstances surrounding Miguelito’s death. Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court finds Cresenciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

SISON VS. PEOPLE Facts: Amidst tension and strong hostility between Cory loyalists and Marcos loyalists broke into violence. On July 27, 198, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known “Coryista.” On July 27, 1986, the prosecution established that, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a rally but it was denied. Despite this setback, three thousand gathered at the Rizal Monument led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. No ticket could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres gave them ten minutes to disperse. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said “gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators.” The police pushed the crowds and used tear gas to disperse them.


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At about 4:00 pm, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. Annie Ferrer was there and they informed her of the dispersal and Ferrer angrily ordered them “gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers!” A few minutes later, she was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted “kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon!” a commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking the persons in yellow. The man in yellow t- shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. Thay caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. He was hit on various parts of his body. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them but the maulers pursued Salcedo. Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo but Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. De Los Santas, Tan boxed Salcedo while Pacadar. Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw, Sision repeatedly boxed him. Salcedo managed to get away but accused Tan, Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleadfed for his life. The mauling resumed at the Rizal monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collap[sed and lost consciousness. Sumilang with a help of traffic enforcer brought Salcedo to Medical Center Manila but was refused admission. So they took him to PGH where he died upon arrival. The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard De Los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo. The court convicts Tamayo of homicide. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is murder and not death caused in a tumultuous affray? Held: For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be identified. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.


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As the lower courts found, the victim’s assailant’s were numerous by as much as fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing of murder. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.

DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS

DADO V. PEOPLE Facts: On May 25, 1992, in order to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams, which composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, while petitioner was armed with a caliber .45 pistol and accused Francisco Eraso was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. The team saw somebody approaching who was half-naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Balinas told Eraso to wait, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man before Balinas could beam his flash light. Thereafter, petitioner fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. Petitioner admitted that when he heard the rapid gun burst, he did not turn to face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him purposely to demoralize their enemy. The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas and told him that it was not intentionally done and it was merely an accident. Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Silvestre Balinas testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. She added that the position of the victim at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet. However, on cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.


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The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the other hand petitioner, filed this petition. Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty of homicide. Held: The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence to prove that petitioner had intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Intent to kill must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt. Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm.

UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION

PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA Facts: Filomeno Salufrania by boxing and strangling MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, his lawfully wedded wife and who was at the time 8 months on the family way, caused upon


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her injuries resulting in her instantaneous death and the death of the child who was still in its maternal womb. Thus Filomeno was charged with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion committed. The lower court found Filomeno guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court. Filomeno alleges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion, as there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion is proper? Held: No. Filomeno Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion but of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows: 1. That there is a pregnant woman. 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However, the intent to cause the abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact, Filomeno must have merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause an abortion.

PEOPLE V. GENOVES Facts: Soledad Rivera tried to take back by force from Genoves a yoke of a plow she claims she owned. Genoves however, repeatedly struck Soledad with his fist causing her to fall to the ground several times. During which time, Soledad was heavy with child. Soledad by such fall suffered pains in the abdomen. According to testimony deceased was in good health the day before. From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain, which were symptoms of premature delivery. Soledad remained in said condition for days until it culminated in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way carrying, but the other baby could not be delivered. Soledad and both babies died.


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Genoves was then charged and convicted by CFI Occidental Negros of the complex crime of homicide with abortion. Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the complex crime of homicide with abortion is proper? Held: No, the abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257 of the Revised Penal Code. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault to Soledad’s death. Genoves must be held responsible for the natural consequences of his act.

AGUIRRE VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE Facts: On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of Revised Penal Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre. Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common law brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to mutilation. Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law and medicine.The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ. Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution. Issue: Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation Held: No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Art. 262. Mutilation. “The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.”


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Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods. A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., the vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self.

SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT

LI V. PEOPLE AND CA Facts: Petitioner Li was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of homicide for the death of Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Jane’s boyfriend, Tan. They suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house of the Arugays. Enraged, the deceased shouted something to Li and Sangalang. Then petitioner Li shouted back. An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by petitioner carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. The witnesses Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once. Immediately thereafter, they were able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once. Petitioner Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit first with a baseball bat Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is near the shoulder. The deceased who is armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Li on the head, causing him to lose his hold on the baseball bat and fell semi-unconscious or unconscious. In such a condition, it is highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Aggrieved, Li filed a petition for review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of homicide. Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical injury instead of homicide?


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Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victim’s right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victim’s supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries. What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently remains at large.

RAPE PEOPLE V. OGA Facts: August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were awakened by the loud banging of corrugated GI sheet coming from the barracks of his co-construction worker which was about 3 meters away at around 2:00 a.m. Ignacio and his wife proceeded in haste to investigate but they were surprised and disarrayed to see his co-worker, herein appellant, naked on top of their daughter, Irene, who was also naked. Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the appellant summoned her to his barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she approached him. However, appellant suddenly pulled her and laid her on a wooden bed (papag). The appellant then took off her pants and panty, as well as his clothes. He inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around 2:00 a.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron sheet that enclosed the appellant’s barracks. Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but interposed “sweetheart story”. Issue: Whether or not force and intimidation are attendant in this case? Held: Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled down to the bed, she was not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife, bolo or any object or instrument that the appellant could have employed so as “to create a real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm”. Irene’s overall deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and the reasonable standard of human conduct when faced


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with a similar situation. It is unnatural for an intended rape victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a feeble attempt to free herself despite a myriad of opportunities to do so. This constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the appellant.

PEOPLE VS AGSAOAY Facts: on or about July 15, 1997, at Barangay Malokiat, municipality of Pozorrubio, province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo with intent to have sexual intercourse with his own daughter, Josephine Ferrer Agsaoay, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with JOSEPHINE AGSAOAY, a 17 years old minor and accused’s own daughter, against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said Josephine F. Agsaoay. Furthermore, the victim was again raped by the accused 2 days after using a bolo to scare and threaten the said victim. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority. Held: Yes.The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.35 Consequently, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented. The sole important issue in a rape case is the credibility of the victim’s testimony, in view of its nature in which only two persons are normally involved. Hence, in adjudicating such issue, jurisprudence has established the following guidelines: (1) the victim’s testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but difficult for the accused to disprove it; and (2) when her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. In the case at bar, we find Josephine’s account of her ordeal in the hands of appellant forthright and credible. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta Pangasinan, in Criminal Cases Nos. U-9332 and U-9333, finding appellant Santiago Agsaoay, Jr. guilty of the crimes of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH in each case, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is ordered to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages in each case. Additionally, appellant is ordered to pay P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-9332.

PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS Facts:


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Romeo G. Jalosjos as the accused-appellant, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Issue: Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”. Held: NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.” this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.


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PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN Facts: On April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand. Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained. Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact. Issue: Whether or not the accused committed a consummated statutory rape Held: The records reviewed failed to show the proof whether Primo’s penis was able to penetrate Chrystel’s vagina. Failure to prove such penetration, even the slightest one, cannot be considered consummated rape, however, only attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Also, there were no physical signs of injuries on the witness’ body to conclude a medical perspective that a penetration has taken place. In rape cases, it is important that a valid testimony and medical certificate complements each other, for relying alone on testimonial evidence may create unwarranted or mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully establish a proof that the penis, in reality, entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that the rape was consummated. WHEREFORE, the decision of the court on convicting Campuhan guilty of statutory rape is modified. Hence, convicted of attempted instead. PEOPLE VS ECHAGARAY Facts: The Supreme Court rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed.


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On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accusedappellant. In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659. Issues: 1.) Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority. 2.) Whether or not the crime is punishable by death penalty. Held: 1.) Yes. In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.

2.) Yes, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed, among others, if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1

when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.

2

when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3

when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4

when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old

5

when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.


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6

when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7

when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )

KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION

PEOPLE VS TAN Facts: On the 17th of September 1997, appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom in an Information the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about September 8, 1997 in the evening of Barangay Mamatid, Cabuyao, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused conspiring, confederating, mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there, by force and intimidation, and use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously take, carry away, and deprive Ruiz Saez-Co y Lim of his liberty against his will for purposes of extorting money as in fact a demand for money was made as a condition for his release but before any ransom can be paid, the victim was rescued after eight (8) days in captivity. Based on the victims account, the ordeal he had gone through can be divided into three distinct segments, namely: (1) the forcible taking, (2) the asportation, and (3) the protracted detention. The first segment was the Mamatid (in Cabuyao, Laguna) episode where he was held by armed men at gunpoint and forcibly boarded in a car. The second segment covered the entire forced journey of the victim from Mamatid to the detention house in Taytay, Rizal. And the third segment was the Taytay episode. It covered the full length of the victims involuntary confinement spanning eight (8) days until his stirring rescue. There is no doubt that the victim was deprived of his liberty throughout all the episodes. On arraignment, appellants entered their plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability of the appellants in each and every episode established beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty for kidnapping or illegal detention. Held: We agree with the OSG that the participation of the appellants in the forcible taking and journey of the victim was not clearly established. There were no eyewitnesses who testified on the abduction. While the victim testified on the three episodes, he failed to see and identify any of his captors until he was rescued as he was blindfolded most of the time during his captivity. He did not see the face of the persons who abducted him in Mamatid and those who formed the entourage which brought him to Taytay. To conclude that those


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who were captured during the rescue operation were also participants in the forcible taking and asportation is to lower the level of evidence required for conviction. The third episode, however, is different. The criminal participation of the appellants therein was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG correctly recommended that they should be held liable therefor. The unexplained presence of appellants in the house where the victim was held captive leads to no other conclusion than that they participated in his illegal detention. Not a single appellant could convincingly explain his presence at the crime scene.

PEOPLE V. RODRIGO Facts: Oliver Caparas, then 13 years of age, forcibly seized by four men and boarded him into a car wherein he was blindfolded and taken to Baguio while waiting for a ride to school on the 10th of September 1996. The next day, Eleazar Caparas received a call from the kidnappers asking for Php 10 Million ransom in exchange for the release of his son, Oliver. In the meantime, the kidnappers went to Bonitas Resort in Pangasinan. After three days of negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to lower the ransom money to Php 1.7 Million. Through Oliver’s uncle, the kidnapper were able to receive the money. Then, they brought Oliver to a Petron Gas Station in Meycauayan Highway, gave him money and told him his uncle inside a canteen in the gas station would fetch him. After the kidnapping incident, an investigation was conducted by the Intelligence Section of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan, through SPO2 Epafrodito Aliling and SPO2 Antonio Chungtuyco. It appears that one of the suspects was a member of an NPA rebel returnee group headed by Armando Rodrigo, Jr. Upon the killing of Bert Liwanag, his girlfriend, dela Cruz, who was a suspected member of the group, was invited for questioning. On that occasion, she admitted her participation in the kidnapping of Oliver Caparas and implicated appellants. Issue: Whether or not elements constituting the crime of kidnapping are present to convict appellants of the said crime. Held: Yes. Under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Kidnapping is committed with the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; and (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) that in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five days; or (b) that it is committed simulating public authority; or (c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person


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kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or public officer. It is evident from the testimonies of the witnesses that the essential elements of kidnapping were present. First, appellants are private individuals. Second, Oliver was abducted by four armed men. Third, he was detained in a house in Pangasinan against his will. Fourth, the detention lasted for seven days. Fifth, Oliver Caparas was a minor at the time of the kidnapping incident.

MADSALI, ET AL. V. PEOPLE Facts: After a confrontation between the victim and her aunt Inon Dama while fetching water, the appellant (Maron) and his father (Sajiron) appeared suddenly in the victim’s house with a gun and told the victim to come with them. When she refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, Sajiron had carnal knowledge with the victim against her will while Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest and brought the victim to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard the victim and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape. A day after, the victim’s mother came to get her; unfortunately Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities. Egap asked the victim if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. She was then forced to sign an unknown document, which she was not able to read. Nine days after she and Sajioron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. After the marriage, she and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap. While detained, she did not try to escape because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. Months after the marriage, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police. Issue: Whether or not the crime committed was kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Held: Yes. Further perusal of the allegations in the information appears that the crime charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In this case, although the victim was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.

PEOPLE V. SILONGAN


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Facts: For automatic review is the decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 103, convicting appellants Abdila Silongan, Macapagal Silongan, Akmad Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap and Ramon Pasawilan of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention and sentencing them to suffer death penalty. Appellants, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Alexander Saldana, America Rejuso, Jr., Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco for the purpose of demanding ransom in the amount of Php 12 Million, detaining and depriving Alexander Saldana of his personal liberty. Issue: Whether or not the guilt of the appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. Held: Yes. The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the kidnapping was committed “for the purpose of extorting ransom” from Alexander, as to warrant the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom.

PEOPLE V. SURIAGA Facts: On the 22th of February, 1995, an information was filed with the RTC charging Ruben Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention committed as follows: That on January 22, 1995, accused Ruben Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz, conspiring together, kidnapped and took away Nicole Ramos, a two-year old female child, without the consent of her parents, for the purpose of extorting ransom from the latter, and thereafter, detained her and deprived her of her freedom and liberty up to and until 4:30 in the afternoon of the following day. Joel Isidera, having learned of the kidnapping and without having participated therein as principal or accomplice, took part by assisting the principal accused to profit by the effects of the crime by accompanying and driving for accused Ruben Suriaga to the place where the pay-offs was made and receiving the ransom money in the amount of Php 100,00. Issue: Whether or not Ruben Suriaga is guilty of kidnapping for ransom.


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Held: Yes. The essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the accused’s intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the child’s liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the child’s custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from her father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rosita’s sister lived, without informing her parents of their whereabouts; 2) he detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day; and 4) he demanded a ransom of Php 100,000 through telephone calls and gave instructions where and how it should be delivered.

SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION

PEOPLE V. LLAGUNO Facts: Together with two others, Appellant Judy Reyes, was charged in an Information with the following: that said accused, armed with firearm, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intend, did then and there kidnap and detain one Bienvenido Mercado, and while under detention, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly shot said Bienvenido Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital part of his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries as a consequence of which he died a few days later. Although appellant, was charged with kidnapping with murder, the trial court convicted him only of murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court did not, however, find him liable for serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code because the victim was detained only for one day. Issue: Whether or the trial court is erred in not finding accused liable for illegal detention. Held: Yes. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court, clearly established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so. Banzon testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by the arms in appellant’s room. Banzons testimony significantly jibes with the physical evidence showing that the victim sustained multiple abrasions in both arms. Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza narrated that several employees called her up in the morning of February 5,


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1987 asking for permission to go home because there was a man hanging at the back in one of the buildings of GF International. Dr. Cenizas testimony was unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was deprived of his liberty by appellant.

It must be emphasized that appellant was charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, not of two independent charges of kidnapping and murder. In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, in deciding this appeal, the Court is not confined to the conviction for murder; rather, the scope of its review encompasses the offense charged in the information, which the prosecution sought to prove. It is a well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review and empowers (even obligates) the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been assigned. When an accused appeals, he stands for a new trial of the whole case. Since the information charged the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the acts constituting slight illegal detention were necessarily included in the information, and may thus be validly taken into account in the resolution of the present appeal. Manifestly, appellant was fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of slight illegal detention and granted a fair opportunity to defend himself. At this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court merely made a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal detention for the sole reason that the victim’s detention did not exceed five days. The court a quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention

PEOPLE V. DADLES Facts: Appellant Narito alias Naring Dadles was charged in two separate informations, to wit: That on or about 24th of May 1989, in the Municipality of Binalbagan, Province of Negros Occidential, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first above-named accused, in company of his five other co-accused, whose true names are still unknown and herein designated only as Ka Morito, Ka Willy, Ka Dindo, Ka Mike and Ka Juanito, who are still at large, aremed with assorted firearms of unknown calibers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain, and keep Alipio Tehidor and Dioniso Tehidor and bring them somewhere in the hinterlands of said municipality, under restraint and against their will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victims of their civil liberties since then up to the present. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Issue:


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Whether or not trial court erred in convicting appellant with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Held: Yes. Based from the evidence presented during the trial, the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping the victims. However, since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE V. ROLUNA Facts: Kidnapping with murder were charged to eight person, including accused Roluna. Witnesses claimed that they saw victim Anatalio Moronia stopped by accused and several others. The victim was alleged to have been threatened with firearms and hand bound behind his back. The accused claimed that he was taking care of an ill relative at the time of the kidnapping. The RTC found Roluna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping with murder. The accused raised that the body of the victim has not surfaced and that the unexplained disappearance cannot be blamed on him as there is all possibility that the victim may still be alive. Issue: Whether or not the death of the victim is sufficiently proved and the accused be held liable for it. Held: The Rules of Court provides that the death shall be presumed if a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. However, the Supreme Court decided that there were insufficient circumstances to hold the accused responsible for the death of the victim. The testimony of the witnesses stating that the victim’s hands were bound by a companion of the accused is not enough to prove that the accused killed him. “The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia”. The SC thus decided that “Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.


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KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR

PEOPLE VS PASTRANA Facts: A domestic helper in Canada, Erma Postejo, the mother of Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola and 9year old Willy Garpen, Jr. her son by a common-law relationship. She was introduced to accused-appellant Rubi-Rose who offered to work on the processing of Willy’s travel documents to Canada. Rubi-Rose asked for P 18,300.00 as processing fee. Later on, accused-appellant informed Erma that Willy was suffering from bronchitis. Erma sent P 5,610.00, P 3,000.00 to be given to Doroteo and the remaining balance should pay for Willy’s medical treatment. Then on March 16, 1997, accused-appellant fetched Willy and Aresola from their home in Caloocan and brought them in Tondo. Aresola went home and Willy was left in Tondo. Accused-appellant was asking Erma for sums of money which Erma refused to transmit. March 27, 1997, accused-appellant informed Doroteo that Willy was missing and that he was last seen playing inside her apartment. Erma returned to the Philippines to look for her son. Erma found out that Willy was never treated for any illness. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charges against her but the trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code. Held: No, the Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or


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falsehood. In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial court’s finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit.

PEOPLE V. TY Facts: Accused -Appellants Ty owns, administers and manages St.John's Clinic in Caloocan. In 1987, a sick baby Arabella Somblong was confined by her mother Johanna but since she had no money and no one to leave the child at home, they agreed to keep the baby in the extension building as a boarder for 50 pesos a day. The baby was visited only once in 5 years by the mother and the father. The baby was put up for guardianship to a relative of the Ty's. After five years, Johanna came back to claim the child. The guardians meantime had the child baptized and named Cristine Neri and would not return the child to the mother. It so happened that there were many babies left behind that time and the attending Pediatrician had in that five years relocated abroad. A complaint was filed for kidnapping and failure to return a minor to her parents. The Ty's were convicted by the RTC and subsequently appealed. Issue: Was an abandoned child by mother still be claimed as being kidnapped as in Art 270 RPC? Held: The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child (among the many they took care of and put up for guardianship)clearly negate the alleged deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. It is noteworthy that they were motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child and high regard for her welfare and well-being. The child turned out to be not the same child as claimed by Johanna to be hers. From the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and set aside. The accused-appellants Vicente and Carmen Ty are hereby acquitted.

PEOPLE V. MENDOZA Facts: Angelina Mendoza y Ramos alias "Rosalinda Quintos' was convicted of the crime of kidnapping and failure to Return a minor as defined in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, for wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap and carry away EDWARD POLICARPIO, a one year and three months old baby boy, for the purpose of selling him and separating him from his mother, Mrs. EUGENIA T. POLICARPIO, carrying him away without the knowledge and consent of his said parents, and deliberately failing to return him to his mother. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, as it was not proven that the custody of the minor victim Edward Policarpio had been entrusted to her and that she deliberately failed to return or restore said minor to his parents or guardians.


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Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under article 270 of the revised penal code. Held: Yes, it has been established by the clear, strong and positive evidence of the prosecution that the taking of the minor child Edward was without the knowledge and consent of his parents. Said criminal act was perpetrated while Mrs. Policarpio had her back turned to the child and accused-appellant and while Mr. Policarpio was temporarily away from the group. An essential element that the offender must be entrusted with the custody of a minor person is lacking in the case and the accused-appellant Angelina Mendoza is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

GRAVE COERCION

PEOPLE V. SANTOS Facts: On 10 December 1996, at six o'clock in the morning, Leonida de la Peña was at home in Barangay Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan, with her eight-year old niece, Christine Lovely Mae Delanos, when a passenger jeepney arrived. Five decently dressed men stepped down from the vehicle and entered the house. The first, who was attired in a business suit, introduced himself as Rocky Alberto and his companions as agents of the Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS").[1] Alberto asked Leonida about her unpaid obligation to Josephine Santos. Leonida answered that she had already paid the debt before the barangay captain of Umingan. Moments later, another vehicle, a brown colored car, stopped in front of the house. Henry Salimbay (the barangay captain of Umingan), Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar and two unidentified males and one unidentified female, alighted. Leonida rushed to confront Salimbay, telling him that Josephine had sent the CIS agents to demand payment of her debt and that it was Josephine who should instead be accosted. Sensing an escalating tension between the two women, the barangay captain decided to leave, telling the parties that it was best for both of them to just amicably settle their differences. Issue: Is the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of grave coercion? Held: The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave coercion. Grave coercion carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P6, 000.00. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium term. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law the minimum that can be imposed is anywhere


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from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is MODIFIED. Appellants Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar are ACQUITTED of the crime of Kidnapping; instead, said appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3, 000.00. Costs de oficio.

PEOPLE V. VILLAMOR Facts: On or about and during the period beginning 7:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 to 9:00 a.m. of the same day, in Barangay Cabalantian, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga, accused, MARILYN RAFAEL-VILLAMAR, suspecting that Maria Luz Cortez would not return her daughter Jonalyn Villamar whom she entrusted to said Maria Luz Cortez, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously surreptitiously enter the house of Maria Luz Cortez and by means of force and intimidation and with threats to kill take said Maria Luz Cortez, a woman of 20 years old as the latter entered her house whom said accused detained and kept locked inside the house from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 or a period of two (2) hours, more or less, under restraint and against the will of the said Maria Luz Cortez and said accused during the period of detention maltreated and refused to release said Maria Luz Cortez until her demand for a sum of money and a getaway vehicle was given to her and on the occasion thereof, accused with evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and strike with a deadly weapon to wit: a knife and a chisel, one Maria Luz Cortez who as a result thereof, suffered various lacerated wounds on the head which ordinarily would cause the death of the said Maria Luz Cortez, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely arrival of the authorities who rescued Maria Luz Cortez which prevented her death. Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder. Insisting on her innocence, Villamar has interposed the instant appeal. The focal point of Villamar's thesis is that she cannot be guilty of serious illegal detention since

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding accused-appellant Villamar guilty of serious illegal detention. Held:


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Yes, Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.[9] In the instant case, there is no showing whatsoever that Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation. The act merely constituted grave coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right Contrary therefore to the prosecution's assertions, the court are of the opinion that Villamar had no intention to kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal liberty. This is clearly demonstrated in the testimony of Villamar herself. The appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is convicted only for grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor.

PEOPLE V. ASTORGA Facts: Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the court’s decision on Criminal Case No. 8243 wherein appellant was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor. Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the prosecution’s witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the accusation weakened the case. Astorga claimed that he had no motive to kidnap the 8-year-old Yvonne Traya which should’ve been apparent and proven upon conviction. He claimed that the court erred in convicting him despite the fact that he had not detained nor locked Yvonne up which is an important element in kidnapping. Issue: 1.)

Whether or not the prosecution’s witnesses were credible.

2.) Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is significant in the court’s decision. 3.)

Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion.

Held:


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1.) The delay in the making of the criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of the witnesses especially if it had been satisfactorily explained. In the case, one week was reasonable since the victim was a resident in Binaungan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao. 2.) The court found it irrelevant to identify the motive since motive is not an element of the crime. Motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the appellant himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School. 3.) The court agreed with the appellant’s contention. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lock up”. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed was grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.

LIGHT COERCION

VALEROS V. PEOPLE Facts: About 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila Renato “Chito” Baleros forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.

Chito made an appeal to the CA only to be denied. He moved for a reconsideration but to no avail. He thus made an appeal to the SC arguing that: 1 2 3 4 5

There was not enough evidence to find him guilty of the crime Prosecution failed to satisfy all requisites for conviction Circumstances relied on to convict him were unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory. There was no motive. The awarding of damages to complainant was improper and unjustified.


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TECSON, Mary Joie S. 6

Case Digest

In failing to appreciate in his favour the constitutional presumption of innocence and that moral certainty has not been met, he should be acquitted on the basis that the offense charged has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: 1. Whether the evidence adduced by prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape 2. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape Held: 1. No. The court’s decision was merely based on speculations. 2. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and modifies the decision of the CA, acquitting Chito of attempted rape. He is adjudged guilty of light coercion and is ordered to serve 30 days of arresto mayor and pay PHP 200. Art. 335 of the RPC, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1 2 3

By using force or intimidation When woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious When woman is under 12 years of age or demented

Art. 6 of the RPC defines attempted rape when offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The attempt which RPC punishes is the act that has logical connection to the crime that should it have been successful, the attempt would lead to the consummation of rape. However, there was no carnal knowledge in the case. The pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou did not necessarily constitute an overt act of rape. Moreover, the petitioner did not commence any act that was indicative of an intent to rape Malou. The petitioner was fully clothed; there was no attempt to neither undress her nor touch her private part.

In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential requisite. Therefore for an attempted rape, accused must have commenced the act of penetrating but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration was not completed. Thus petitioner’s act of lying on top of her, embracing and kissing her or touching her private part do not constitute rape or attempted rape.

ONG CHIUN KWAN V. CA


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Facts: Crazy Feet is a business establishment owned by Mildred Ong. On April 24, 1990, Wilfredo Infante was ordered by Ong Chiu Kwan to relocate Crazy Feet's telephone, electric and water lines without a permit from appropriate authorities. Mildred Ong filed a case against Ong Chiu Kwan for unjust vexation and the Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation under Article 287, second paragraph. The Court declared Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation. Held: The court ruled that petitioner is liable for unjust vexation. Having admitted that he ordered the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines without the permit to relocate such, he caused the annoyance and vexation of Mildred Ong. To add, the electric, water and telephone interruption happened during the operation of the business.

ROBBERY

PEOPLE V. REYES

Facts:

On October 12, 1997, at 2:00 a.m., PO1 Eduardo C. Molato of Station 4, Western Police District, Sampaloc, Manila was on his way home on board a passenger jeepney. When he alighted at the corner of Lapu-lapu Street and Northbay Boulevard South he saw the victim being held up by two persons. The one in front of the victim forcibly took his wristwatch while the other one stabbed him at the back. He fired one warning shot which caused the three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu Avenue. He chased them but when he saw the victim, he hailed a tricycle and asked the driver to bring the victim to the nearest hospital. He continued chasing the suspects up to Phase II until he reached Agora, but the


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suspects were gone. The incident happened swiftly but PO1 Molato had a good look at the face of the one who stabbed the victim as he was about 8 to 10 meters away from them. The accused-appellant was the only one arrested. Regional Trial Court of Malabon found Danilo Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime Robbery with homicide. The accused-appellant filed an appeal saying that the court erred in convicting the him notwithstanding the fact that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt and that the court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony and identification made by PO1 Molato. Issue: Whether or not regional trial court erred in convicting Danilo Reyes for the crime of Robbery with homicide.

Held: No, court of appeals affirmed the decision of regional trial court finding Danilo Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime robbery with homicide. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.[4]

The positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defenses are negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law

PEOPLE V. SUELA Facts: On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant Director Nilo L. Rosas was at the masters bedroom located at the second floor of his townhouse in Quezon City. He was watching television thereat, together with his adopted son, Norman Rosas, and his former co-teacher and good friend, Geronimo Gerry Gabilo, who at that time was engaged in the real estate business. Suddenly, three persons sporting


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Case Digest

ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and a knife, barged into the room. Court finds the accused Nerio Suela y Hembra and Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Appellants appealed in Court of appeals saying that RTC erred in convicting them of the said crime.

the assigned errors boil down to four: (1) whether the extrajudicial confessions of appellants are admissible in evidence; (2) whether the wristwatch and the letter (of NerioSuela) are admissible in evidence; (3) whether appellants can be convicted of robbery with homicide; and (4) whether Edgar Suela is guilty of robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay case.

Issue:

1

Whether the extrajudicial confessions of appellants are admissible in evidence.

2

Whether the wristwatch and the letter of Nerio Suela are admissible in evidence.

3

Whether appellants can be convicted of robbery with homicide

4

Whether Edgar Suela is guilty of robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay case.

Held:

1

In People v. dela Cruz, we stated that a confession made in an atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled would be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by noncompliance with the procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further implemented and ramified by statutory law.[23] The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence.

2

Clearly, the watch was taken without a search warrant and not as an incident of a valid arrest. The seizure was irregular. There is also no evidence on record that it was taken under any of the exempting circumstances where a warrantless seizure is permissible. It was not shown if the girlfriend voluntarily and validly consented to the taking x x x. Lacking such evidence, no presumption of regularity can be assumed.


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The wristwatch is clearly a fruit of a fruit of a poisonous tree. As such, it should not have been admitted and appreciated against the accused.

3

Without the wristwatch and the uncounseled extrajudicial confessions, pieces of evidence sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide.

4

There was no showing that appellant Edgar Suela had exerted intimidation on him so as to leave him no choice but to give the money. Instead, what is clear was that the giving of the money was done not out of fear but because it was a choice private complainant opted because he wanted to get the information being offered to him for the consideration of P200,000.00 (TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 5-17; ibid., Decision, p. 15). In fact, the money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of possibly having a lead in solving the case and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.). As such, the elements of simple robbery have not been established in the instant case, hence, appellant Edgar Suela should be acquitted of that charge

PEOPLE V. ROSARIO

Facts: On September 26, 1992, at about 8:10 in the morning, Emelita Paragua and a companion, a Delia Aquino, left their house at 1657 Balic-Balic, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City to go to the formers stall in the public market. Raquel Lopez, the 11-year old niece of Paragua, was left behind as she had no classes that day, a Saturday. Notified of the news that their house was on fire, they went home. Paragua saw that the sala set, their merchandise (stuffed toys that they sell at the public market), and the cassette were burned. When she entered the kitchen, she saw her niece lying on her stomach with a raincoat covering her head and her neck and arms tied with CATV wire. Parts of her hand and her thigh were burned. Raquel Lopez was already dead when her aunt discovered her. The total value of the burned properties was around Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). Emelita Paragua likewise discovered that six pieces of her jewelries were missing. Court finds the accused Donato del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Accused-appellant Donato del Rosario contends that it is essential to prove the intent to rob and that the intent to rob must come first before the killing transpired. He is of the impression that not all the essential requisites of the crime of robbery with homicide were proven. Issue:


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Whether or not it is erroneous and illogical for the trial court to convict appalent when the elemental requisites of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are not present. Held: In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against property and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. xxx (T)he intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

PEOPLE V. HIPONA Facts: AAA was found dead on the morning of June 12, 2000 in her house in Isla Copa, Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City. She was raped, physically manhandled and strangled, which eventually led to her death. Her furniture and belongings were found strewn on the floor. AAA’s necklace with two heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag were likewise missing. Upon investigation, the local police discovered a hole bored into the lawanitwall of the comfort room inside AAA’s house, big enough for a person of medium build to enter. The main electrical switch behind a “shower curtain” located at the “back room” was turned off, drawing the police to infer that the perpetrator is familiar with the layout of AAA’s house. SPO1 Bladimir Agbalog of the local police thus called for a meeting of AAA’s relatives during which AAA’s sister BBB, who is appellant’s mother, declared that her son-appellant had told her that “Mama, I’m sorry, I did it because I did not have the money,” and he was thus apologizing for AAA’s death. BBB executed an affidavit affirming appellant’s confession. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime Robbery with Homicide? Held: Yes, for circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.


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Case Digest

The Court gathers, however, that from the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of appellant, and AAA’s death resulted by reason of or on the occasion thereof. Following Article 294(1) and Article 62(1)1 of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead.

PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ Facts: On December 19, 1994, Cesar Yuzon, a forty-four-year-old sweepstakes ticket vendor, saw his cousin-in-law, the appellant,4 and Catapang dragging his seventy-two-year-old auntie, Natividad Yuzon Mendoza, in the direction of a forested area where there were also mango and coconut trees.Cesar shouted, "Hoy, bakit ninyo kinakaladkad ang aking tiya?" Catapang and the appellant approached and told him not to interfere. Cesar followed them and concealed himself behind a mango tree about ten arm’s length away, and saw them forcibly taking money, a pair of earrings and a necklace from the bag of his aunt, who was lying prostrate on the ground. That afternoon, Natividad’s son, Nemensio Mendoza, had already started looking for his mother. Cesar joined the search at 5:00 p.m. together with the barangay captain and some of the barangay folks. The cadaver of Natividad was found at about 11:00 p.m.

The trial court rendered its decision finding the accused Lito Hernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of complex crime of robbery with homicide. Hernandez appealed contending that the trial court erred in convicting him of the said crime.

Issue:

1

Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in holding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the robbery with homicide despite the uncorroborated, inconsistent and contradictory testimony of the alleged eyewitness Cesar Yuzon.

2

Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in appreciating against him the generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, disregard of age and sex of the victim.

3

Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in failing to appreciate in accusedappellant’s favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.


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Case Digest

Held:

1

Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are sufficient explanations for a witness’ delay in reporting the crime to the authorities. Such failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of the complaint. Likewise, the natural hesitance of the witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case, and their unwillingness to be involved or dragged into a criminal investigation is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect their credibility

2

Moreover, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and disregard of age and sex cannot be appreciated as no evidence was presented to prove the same. To establish the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, there must be a deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater number.

3

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is not present in the case at bar. A surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused spontaneously and made in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.

PEOPLE V. REYES Facts: At around 11:00 p.m. on June 11, 1998, Barangay Captain William Magpantay received a radio report from barangay kagawad that someone managed to gain entry into the house of Dr. Aurora Lagrada, and that she had shouted for help. Magpantay, a barangay councilman and a barangay tanod responded and proceeded to the house of the doctor. The policemen passed by the garage and opened the door. They saw the bloodied Lagrada, naked from the waist up, sprawled sidewise on the floor opposite the sink near the kitchen

Court finds the accused ANTONIO REYES, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as PRINCIPAL of the offense of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. Antonio Reyes appealed saying that the court erred in convicting him of the said crime.


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Case Digest

Issue:

1

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.

2

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide.

Held:

1

The Court rejects the appellants claim that his signature on page 3 of his extrajudicial confession is a forgery and that he affixed his signature on a blank paper, which is now on page 1 of the said confession The extrajudicial confession of the appellant was notarized by Atty. Wilfredo O. Paraiso who certified that he had personally examined the appellant and that he was satisfied that the latter had voluntarily executed the same. The notary publics certification belies the appellants claim that he was forced by the police officers to affix his signature on page 1 of his confession. Atty. Paraiso is an officer of the court. He is presumed to have regularly performed his duties as such notary public.

2

To sustain a conviction of the accused for robbery with homicide, the prosecution was burdened to prove the essential elements of the crime, viz: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandiand (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. The accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery, the homicide being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. The homicide may precede robbery or may occur thereafter. What is essential is that there is a nexus, an intrinsic connection between the robbery and the killing. The latter may be done prior to or subsequent to the former. However, the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of the victims life. Furthermore, the constituted crimes of robbery and homicide must be consummated

PEOPLE V. DANIELA Facts:


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Case Digest

At around 2 am of March 31, 1996, Manuel, armed with a .38 caliber gun and holding fluorescent lamp, entered the bedroom or Ronito and Maria Fe. They ransacked the room and divested Maria Fe of her necklace, rings and earrings. Manuel Daniela ordered Jose Baylosis to kill Ronito while Daniela was raping the house maid. Apellants Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis were convicted of robbery with homicide, sentencing them to death and directing them to pay to the heirs of the victims. Manuel and Jose assail the decision of trial court and insist that the court erred in convicting them for it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

Yes, OSG contends that the prosecutor mustered the required quantum evidence to prove the constitutive elements of robbery with homicide. The evidence on the record shows that the object of the appellants was to rob the victim of their money and personal properties and kill Ronito on the occasion of robbery. A conviction for robbery with homicide required certitude that robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. However, the law does not require that the sole motive of the malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof. In People vs. Tidula, The court ruled that even if the malefactor intends to kill and rob another, it does not preclude his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. A conviction for robbery with homicide is proper even if the homicide is committed before, during, or after the commission of the robbery.

PEOPLE V. NAPALIT Facts: On or about April 3, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Ricardo Napalit, conspiring with others, whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, all armed with unknown caliber firearms, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there barging inside Tondo General Hospital located at Honorio Lopez Blvd., Tondo, announcing a hold-up, ordering the people/employees thereat to lie down on the floor, grabbing the cashier and ordering him to open the vault and filing cabinets and once opened, take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:cash


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Case Digest

money consisting of unions collection, professional fees, patients fees, cash advances and salaries of employees amounting to, more or less --- P1,300,000.00 Accused-appellant was found guilty of robbery in band with homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 (as amended by R. A. 7659). In his brief, accused-appellant ascribes the following errors to the trial court: The trial court erred in finding the accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and even granting that accused-appellant was a co-conspirator in the plan to commit robbery, the trial court, nonetheless, erred in attributing to him and holding him liable for the crime of homicide which happened on the occasion of the robbery. Issue:

Whether or not court erred in deciding the case.

Held:

No, when the issue of credibility is involved, appellate courts generally do not disturb the findings of the trial court since the latter is in a better position to pass on it, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of substance that, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case

In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of witnesses Santos and Saclolo to be worthy of credence. From the transcripts of the stenographic notes of their testimonies, this Court finds that, indeed, they merit credence. They are straightforward and consistent

Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not indispensable in conspiracy. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.[32] From the time accused-appellant and his companions entered the hospital and announced a holdup up to the time they fled, in the course of which security guard Gomez was shot, there can be no other conclusion than that they hatched a criminal scheme, synchronized their acts for unity in its execution, and aided each other for its consummation.

PEOPLE V. CAMPOS Facts:


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Case Digest

On August 16, 1989, at around 10:00 in the evening, Felicidad and Mercelina prepared to sleep. Their bedroom and the kitchen were located inside the mini mart. Felicidad turned off all lights in the store except the kitchen light. Mercelina laid on the bed with her twoyear old son, Christopher, while Felicidad laid on the floor beside them. At around midnight, Felicidad roused from her sleep and stood up. Suddenly, someone stabbed her on her left arm. She started to shout as her assailant continued to stab her. She was hit on her abdomen, left arm, and left side. She fell to the floor in a sitting position and she looked at the person who stabbed her. She recognized accused Alejandro Campos, who worked at the neighboring gravel and sand area and frequented their store to buy gas. She also noticed accused Renato dela Cruz standing near the door of the room. She knew accused dela Cruz because they used to work together in the Cefel's General Merchandise Store, a hardware store adjacent to the mini-mart. Suddenly, accused Campos moved towards Mercelina and started stabbing her. Mercelina, still lying on the bed, woke up and shouted for help. Accused Campos kept stabbing her. Thereafter, the two accused left hurriedly, exiting through the storeroom of the minimart. Court finds the accused Alejandro Campos y Armado and Renato dela Cruz y Borac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide with Frustrated Homicide as charged and hereby sentences each accused to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Only accused-appellant Renato dela Cruz contended that the trial court erred in convicting him because his participation in the crime was not clearly established. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of Robbery with Homicide Held: In order to be convicted of robbery with homicide, four (4) elements are necessary: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against the person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and, (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof the crime of homicide was committed. Court finds insufficient evidence to show that accused-appellant dela Cruz was guilty of the first three elements of robbery with homicide. In robbery with homicide cases, the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.

Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 124, convicting accused-appellant Renato dela Cruz y Borac of robbery with homicide. Accused-appellant Renato dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered released immediately from confinement unless he is held for another case.


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Case Digest

ROBBERY WITH RAPE

PEOPLE V. VERCELES

Facts: On October 19, 1996 at around 2:00 in the morning, Maribeth Bolita was awakened by a man fondling her breast and other private parts. She tried to resist and fight back but her strength proved too weak against her aggressor. She later identified her aggressor as Mamerto Soriano. While she was being ravished, she saw two men standing at the door, whom she identified as accused Mario Verceles and Felix Corpuz. Soriano undressed her then kissed her on the body and fondled her breasts for five minutes. There he removed his pants and laid her on the floor and tried to insert his penis inside her vagina. Maribeth lost consciousness and when she came to, her private part was very painful and the three accused were gone. The Court hereby finds accused Felix Corpuz and Mario Verceles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape. Accused Felix Corpuz and Mario Verceles interposed the instant appeal. They alleged that the trial court erred in discharging Jerry Soriano as a state witness, in appreciating conspiracy among the accused, in not considering as mitigating circumstance the voluntary surrender of Mario Verceles, and in awarding damages to the private complainants.

Issue: Whether or not the appeal lacks merit. Held: The appeal lacks merit. The trial court did not err in discharging Jerry Soriano to be utilized as a state witness. First, the testimony of Jerry Soriano was absolutely necessary as the prosecution has no direct evidence to prove the identity of the malefactors Mamerto Soriano, Felix Corpuz, Mario Verceles and Pablo Ramos. Second, Jerry Sorianos testimony was corroborated in its material points by other prosecution witnesses and physical evidence. These are: (a) the testimony of Maribeth Bolito that there were three malefactors, one of whom sexually abused her and two of whom just stood at the door; (b) the testimony of Rosita Quilates that her properties were stolen; and (c) the testimony of SPO2 Renato Solomon that they were able to recover the stolen properties from a certain Andres Tirano who bought them from accused Mamerto Soriano. Lastly, Jerry Soriano does not appear to be the most guilty for he was not a co-conspirator in the robbery with rape. He merely accompanied the accused and received three hundred pesos as his share in the proceeds of the sale of the stolen properties. Besides, the question of whether Jerry Soriano appears to be the most guilty is a factual issue.


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Case Digest

The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape.

For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.

PEOPLE V. TAMAYO Facts: On or about the 29th day of March 1998, Nelson Tamayo, by means of force, violence against, and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the room and residence of one Mary Anne Guazon, and once inside, poked a fan knife on her throat, covered her mouth and inserted his penis into the mouth of the said victim, held her, undressed her, pulled down her shorts and panty and succeeded in having sexual interoucrse with her against her will and consent. Tamayo, with intent to gain, took and carried away cash money amounting to P500.00 belonging to the said victim.

Tamayo was charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Tamayo appealed insisting that the lower court erred in finding accused appellant guilty of special complex crime of robbery with rape despite his guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in finding Tamayo guilty of the crime charged.

Held:

The court maintains that the trial court did not err in handing down a judgment of conviction. However, it posits that the crime comiitted is not the special complex crime of robbery with rape under Article 294, but two separate crimes of rape and robbery. For a conviction of crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was


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committed by reason or occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belong to another and rape is committed on occasion thereof as an accompanying crime. If the original design was to commit rape but the accused, after committing rape, also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses.

PEOPLE V. DOMINGO Facts: Complainant Raquel Indon and her minor children Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside their house when she was awakened by the sound of appellant kicking their door open. She immediately recognized the accused, since the kitchen light illuminated his face. Armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord of the mosquito net and repeatedly stabbed her, using the six-inch screwdriver. When she tried to escape from the room, four-year-old Marvin rushed towards her. She then grabbed him and ran towards the gate. However, before reaching the gate, she fell down and appellant stabbed her right leg. The appellant then proceeded to stab Marvin, hitting the latter twice on the arm and twice on his left chest. Marvin died on 3 April 2000 as a result of these injuries. After stabbing Marvin, appellant returned back to the house, towards Raquel’s two daughters Michelle and Melissa. Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the appellant inflicted on her; while Michelle, who was able to hide under the papag merely sustained serious physical injuries. The appellant also attacked twoyear-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the screwdriver, but the latter managed to run to the house of Raquel’s sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help, but the appellant followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo Galvez, came to their rescue and tried to subdue the appellant.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime committed is murder

Held: Raquel Indon, Michelle Indon, Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer Indon were merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had not even given the slightest provocation when appellant attacked them without warning. Furthermore, the killing of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, both minors who could not be expected to defend themselves against an adult, was considered treacherous, and would sustain a conviction for murder. The penalties imposed were adjusted accordingly. Appellant’s conviction for frustrated


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homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000 was affirmed, since prosecution failed to prove appellant’s treachery or evident premeditation in his assault against Rolando Galvez, who came to the scene of the crime to subdue the appellant.

Qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established. Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon were both minors when they were killed by the appellant. The killing by an adult of a minor child is treacherous. Moreover, the victims in this case were asleep when appellant barged into their house and attacked their family. The attack was clearly unprovoked, and they were defenseless against him.

PEOPLE V. LAGO Facts: Accused Reyderick Lago testified that accused Cozette Aragon who was his classmate in English approached him and asked him to accompany him to the house of his uncle to get a project and collect his salary. Aragon also invited Lisbog to go with them. Thereafter, he came to know that Diadid also proceeded to the house of Aragon’s uncle at the back of Don Bosco in Kalentong. Upon entering the gate of the house, Aragon opened the jalousie window with the use of a ‘beinte nueve’ balisong and unlocked the door. Aragon let them in. Lisbog was instructed to wait outside. While he was seated on the sofa, Aragon and Diadid went inside the room. Suddenly, he heard somebody was groaning from the room. Afraid, he immediately left the place and went to the house of his grandmother in Mandaluyong who advised him not to leave the place anymore. On cross-examination, he testified that Cozette Aragon was his classmate in one of his back subjects at Jose Fabella Memorial School. Lisbog was also his classmate. He did not know personally Jayson Diadid and Dennis Sison. He admitted that when he heard the groaning inside the room, he did not bother to verify what was happening. He went out of the house immediately and did not attend his classes anymore. He stopped schooling. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Held: Although Aragon avers that it was only Diadid who did the stabbing, the latter’s act is deemed to be the act of all. This Court has ruled that whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as


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principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if they did not all actually take part in the homicide; that is, unless it appears that those who did not do so endeavored to prevent the homicide. The elements of this special complex crime are the following: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed. The records and the pleadings show that all the above-mentioned elements are present in the case at bar. Appellant and his cohorts broke into the house of Aragon’s uncle took the victim’s wallet and cash, wrist watch and several pieces of jewelry amounting to P67,000 and, in the course of the robbery, stabbed and killed the victim.

PEOPLE V. SULTAN Facts: One evening she was on her way home from a visit to her cousin she was accosted by someone, later identified as accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument at her neck and announcing it was a "hold-up." He grabbed her and brought her to his house along where he, through threat and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her. After satisfying his lust, he ordered her to put on her bra and panty, tied her hands and went out of the room to smoke. After ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, he came back, untied her, and once again with threat and intimidation sexually abused her. Thereafter, he tied her hands and told her that he loved her and that he would answer for what he had done to her. In her effort to release herself from his clutches she "agreed" to elope with him. Perhaps convinced that she was going to run away with him, he allowed her to go home at noon to get her things. She immediately reported the abuse to her sister, who immediately reported the same to his friend, a police officer. The accused was arrested the next morning and brought to the police headquarters for further interrogation. Issue: a. Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. b. Whether or not in being raped twice, every count of rape should be treated as aggravating circumstance. Held: A. YES. Accused-appellant might not have employed force in committing the rape but he definitely used intimidation which was sufficient to make complainant submit herself to him against her will for fear of life and personal safety. Intimidation is subjective so it must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces


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fear, as in the present case, fear that if the complainant does not yield to the bestial demands of accused-appellant something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter.

The record shows that the prosecution has established that he committed both robbery and rape with the intent to take personal property of another preceding the rape. Under Art. 294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code, "x x x [a]ny person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of persons shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, x x x when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape x x x x"

B. Complaining witness Juditha Bautista was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. Under this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating circumstance.

THEFT

LAUREL V. ABROGAR Facts: On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto in Makati City, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.

Issue:


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Whether international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone services are considered as personal properties subjected to theft. Held: In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, which denied the Motion to Quash (With Motion to Defer Arraignment) for theft, is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business of the private offended party.

GABLOIA V. PEOPLE Facts: The RTC convicted Alfonso Gaviola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. On September 6, 1997 at 7:00 AM, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay councilman saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees and deliberately took, harvested and gathered 1500 coconuts thru the supervision of Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola from the plantation of Cleto Mejarito without his authority and consent. The said accused admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instruction but insisted that the trees were planted from the lot he inherited from his father. Issue: Whether or not the said accused is guilty of qualified theft.

Held: Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states that theft is committed by any person, who with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of neither persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter‘s consent. Theft is likewise committed by: (1.) Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner; (2.) Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and (3.) Any person who shall enter an enclosed state or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals or other


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forest or farm products. Thus, the elements of theft are: 1). That there be taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner and 5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. According to Article 310: Qualified theft - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degree than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have intent to steal (animu furandi) personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property which intent is apart from but concurrent with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo. Thus, petitioner‘s claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from private complainant‘s land is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability.

LUCAS V. CA Facts: Herminigildo Lucas was charged with theft before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Br. 69, Rizal, together with Wilfredo Navarro and Enrique Lovena. The Information[1]alleged that on or about 8 June 1990 the three (3) accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stole and carried away one stereo component, a 14-inch colored TV, an electric fan, twenty-three (23) pieces of cassette tapes, one (1) box of car toys, four (4) pieces of Pyrex crystal bowls, cash ofP20,000.00 and jewelry worth P10,000.00, valued at P100,000.00 all belonging to Luisito Tuazon.

The accused made an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Lucas alleges that it was impossible for conspiracy to have existed among the accused. He claims he did not know his co-accused Navarro and Lovena; neither did they know him on or before 8 June 1990

Issue: Whether or not conspiracy is essential to make the petitioners liable of committing the crime of theft. Held: No, Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. It may be deduced from the concerted acts of the accused, indubitably


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demonstrating their unity of purpose, intent and sentiment in committing the crime. It is enough that the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense and that they had the same purpose or common design, and that they were united in its execution.

To sustain a conviction for theft, the following elements must be present: (1) personal property of another person must be taken without the latter's consent; (2) the act of taking the personal property of another must be done without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things; and, (3) there must be an intention to gain from the taking of another person's personal property.

The Court of Appeals which affirmed their conviction and even raised the period of their imprisonment to from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum

PEOPLE V. MANERO Facts: At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. Issue: Whether or not there was a conspiracy on the part of all of the accused, hence guilty of the crime of murder, attempted homicide and arson.


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Held: YES. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose and unity in its execution is present. From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.

ABUNDIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: On October, 1985, in Virac, Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a public officer, being then the District Engineer of the Department (then Ministry) of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Office, Virac, Catanduanes, and as such have access and control of the motor pool of the DPWH, committing the offense in relation to his duties, and taking advantage of his official position, with intent to gain and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal, without the consent of the government, the chassis of Willys Jeep valued at P15,000.00 in the Inventory and Inspection Report of Unserviceable Property dated December 2, 1982, of the DPWH, Virac, Catanduanes, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. Issue: Whether the petitioner was properly convicted of qualified theft.

Held: No. It is universally recognized that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession, and this doctrine is well accepted in both the common-law and civil law jurisdictions. It


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follows therefore, that there cannot be theft when the owner has voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. A felonious taking characterizes the crime of theft. The facts clearly show that there was no furtive taking or unlawful asportation, in the criminal sense, of the chassis. The physical and juridical possession of the subject chassis was transferred to the petitioner, at his request, with the consent of the Motor Pool Officer, Engineer Alberto. The delivery of the chassis to the petitioner was properly documented. A taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious. Lack of malice or criminal intent on the part of petitioner was sufficiently established in this case. Since the prosecution failed to prove that theft was committed by Abundo, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the theft was simple or qualified.

PEOPLE V. SALVILLA Facts: The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the establishment, they met Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told the former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages. UItimatums were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated. The medical certificate described her condition as "in a state of hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several major operations during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986." Issue: Whether the crime of robbery was consummated or was merely attempted. Held: The crime of robbery in this case was consummated. There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is known as the element of asportation the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi.


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Those factual allegations of the appellant that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not, are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and control of the Appellant and his co-accused and completed the taking.

QUALIFIED THEFT

ROQUE V. PEOPLE Facts: Antonio Salazar (Salazar) is a member/depositor of the Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) as evidenced by his passbook No. 1359. He was made to sign two ledgers when he opened his savings account. On November 16, 1989, Salazar made a deposit of P2,000 at the BABSLA; however, he did not make any withdrawal, nor did he authorize anyone to do the same on that date or on November 17, 1989 or for the whole month of November of that year. Salazar disclosed that around July 1990 he heard that the funds of other depositors were missing inside the BABSLA and were supposedly clandestinely circulating around the base. Prodded by this news, and considering that the balance in his passbook was P46,000, he went to the BABSLA to withdraw P40,000, but was informed that his balance at the BABSLA was insufficient to cover the withdrawal. He was not allowed to withdraw. Rosalina de Lazo, the general manager, informed him that several withdrawals were made on his account amounting to P30,500, as evidenced by three (3) withdrawal slips. Included among these withdrawal slips is one with the amount of P10,000, dated November 16, 1989. Salazar claimed that the signature appearing on said withdrawal slip was not his signature. He does not personally know who made the withdrawal ofP10,000. Salazar assumed that the one in control of the funds made the withdrawal.

Issue: Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony? Held: YES. In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity of a bank teller. In People v. Locson, the this Court considered deposits received by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business


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day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical possession remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the abovecited cases, beginning with People v. De Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the teller’s possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.

PEOPLE V. BUSTINERA Facts: From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal. In an information dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows: The undersigned accuses Luisito D. Bustinera of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows: That on or about 25 December up to the 9 January 1997 in Quezon City, the said accused being then employed as one of the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs in Diliman, Quezon City, and as such has free access to the taxi he drives, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266worth PHP 303,000.00 belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of PHP 303,000.00. Issues: Whether or not the accused- appellant had intent to gain when he failed to return the taxi to its garage? Held: Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti- carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery. The anti- carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the RPC. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. Since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law


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PEOPLE V. SALONGA Facts: This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR NO. 18551 which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142 in Criminal Case No. 33127, by increasing the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua. Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the crime of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document in an information alleging that on or before 23 October 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding one another, and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company (Metrobank), with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers authorized to sign the said check and have the said check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no such transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a simulated check described as Check No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized, through which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust Company in the total amount of P36,480.30. On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document.

Issues: Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft? Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper? Held: The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accusedappellant in the crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the blank Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed. Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not tally with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check was issued without any transaction. Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appearing in the cashiers check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a letter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accusedappellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00. The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and 1 year of each additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the RPC. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that specified in Article 309 of


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the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the bank officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. Falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that, where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified Theft is more serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its minimum period, the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

PEOPLE V. CARIAGA Facts: Jonathan Cariaga v. CA June 6, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting Jonathan Cariaga of qualified theft Facts: Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the perpetrators. In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the pseudonym “Canuto Duran”. ‘Duran’ became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said that his ‘boss’ needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area. Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to him. ‘Duran’ was able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). ‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis ‘apprehended’ him on February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station and confessed to their participation as “fence” for Jonathan Cariaga. The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latter’s alleged illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether or not Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible as evidence; Siton is a credible witness; guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven Held: the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION (1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure both speak of


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admissibility of a testimony of a witness “unable to testify” in court. In Tan v. CA , the Court has held that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of witnesses subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the present case. (2) Credible. (3) Guilty.

QUINAO V. PEOPLE Facts: Both accused (Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases) and private complainant Francisco Del Monte are claiming ownership over the land in question. Accused-appellant presented a tax declaration and alleged that the land being claimed by the complainant is different from the land litigated in Civil Cases No. 3561. Trial Court finds accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this case. Issue: Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land in question could be held liable of usurpation of her own property Held: Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable law under Article 312 of Revised Penal Code. The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's real property or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property. In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.

SWINDLING (ESTAFA)

ONG V. PEOPLE


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Facts: Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is owned and operated by the family of private complainant Rosa Cabuso. While she normally bought jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks to cover the jewelry she bought in December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance that the checks would be funded on their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were returned with the stamp "Account Closed." Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10 counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code when she was, in the Information, charged of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the same Code Held: The appeal is impressed with merit. Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to enable the accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged is determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued the questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fund them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element – false pretenses or fraudulent acts – the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a). Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of dishonor being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder. In the case at bar, as priorly stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that petitioner received notice of dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of the questioned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This leaves it unnecessary to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that petitioner’s defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the amount covered by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of


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P338,250, which amount is almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank check. In fine, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.

VELOSO V. PEOPLE Facts: Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine, at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle, Quezon City, is a restaurant owned and operated by the Developers Group of Companies, Inc. Ramon Sy Hunliong (Ramon) was its president and general manager. Roland Veloso, petitioner, claiming to be a consultant of then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco, was an occasional guest at the restaurant. Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while at the said restaurant having dinner, had a conversation with Ramon. This led to a friendly bet between petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet. On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuencos secretary called Eva Anne Nanette Sto. Domingo (Eva), the restaurants assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for one table corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser, informed Eva that he would pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner. However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4) additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. Hence, Eva had four additional tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramons account. The Sales Invoice for the additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00. When the Sales Invoice was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay, explaining he was a guest of Ramon. Due to petitioners stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where she should send the bill. Petitioner instructed her to send it to Congressman Cuencos office as he was always present there. It turned out, however, that he was no longer reporting at that office. Hence, the bill was sent to his address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village, Quezon City, but still, he refused to pay. The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no avail. Consequently, petitioner was charged with estafa before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 31, Quezon City. Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of estafa Held: The court DENIED the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA finding petitioner Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Appellant insists that he is only civilly liable for an unpaid debt. We reviewed the records very closely and found that petitioner and his guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for only one


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table. We agree with the Solicitor General in his brief for the People that petitioner employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.

BONIFACIO V. PEOPLE Facts: Private complainant Ofelia Santos was a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell agent of jewelry. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner Crisanta Bonifacio was introduced to her. She expressed interest to see the pieces of jewelry Santos was selling. On March 21, 1996, petitioner received several pieces of jewelry from Santos. She signed a document acknowledging receipt of the jewelry and agreeing to sell these items on commission basis. She also promised to remit the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold items to Santos within 15 days. Petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale within the given period. She, however, returned some of the unsold items at a later date. The value of the pieces unaccounted for amounted to P154,000. On March 28, 1996, petitioner asked Santos for new sets of jewelry to sell under the same terms and conditions. Again, on due date, petitioner failed to account. This time, the value of the unpaid and unreturned items amounted to P91,500. On April 3, 1996, petitioner once more accepted several pieces of jewelry and signed an acknowledgment receipt under the same terms and conditions. On due date, petitioner again failed to pay. The pieces of jewelry left unpaid and unreturned amounted to P38,500. In a letter dated July 25, 1996, Santos demanded from petitioner the payment of the total amount of P244,500. Petitioner gave her two checks amounting to P30,000 as partial payment. The checks, however, bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds and being drawn against a closed account, respectively. Issue: Whether the CA’s decision of rendering judgement of petitioner being guilty of Estafa is correct Held: The petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The essence of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b), RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it is the agent's duty to return the jewelry on demand of the owner. The demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused-agent to account for it are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. Here, petitioner admitted that she received the pieces of jewelry on commission. She likewise admitted that she failed to return the items or their value on Santos' demand. On the other hand, the testimony of her lone witness, Lilia Pascual, failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence that she misappropriated the items or their corresponding value. She also never appeared in the trial court to refute the charge against her. Hence, the trial and appellate courts' conclusion of guilt by misappropriation was a logical consequence of the established facts.


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RECUERDO V. PEOPLE Facts: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional. Issue: Whether or not B.P. 22 is unconstitutional? Held: A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that “any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment. B.P. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made. It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee bank’s representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she deposited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation ‘drawn against insufficient funds’ stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.

GONZALUDO V. PEOPLE Facts: Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the Bacolod City Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita Manlangit in Bacolod

City. Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulysses’s mother at the latter’s house at Bacolod City. Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City. Meanwhile, his wife Anita secured a teaching job in Catubig, Samar prompting her to leave Bacolod City and live in Samar. After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned to Bacolod City. And, in December of 1978, he was able to buy for P1,500.00 a small house located near that of his


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mother at Purok 5, Mansungay, Bacolod City. Then, in 1985, Ulysses took one Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress and brought her into the house. In time, improvements were made on the house and the house was transformed into a 2-storey structure. After Ulysses’s demise in January of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey house for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben Gonzaludo, who lives just nearby. Since the house was being sold for a cheap price, petitioner convinced the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas, to whom he is related by affinity, to buy the same. Herein, petitioner introduced the Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo. In the Deed of Sale, Rosemarie Gelogo signed as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful owner of the 2-storey house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gregg Canlas acquired all of Rosemarie’s rights and interest on the subject house. Later, upon complaint of Ulysses’s widow Anita Manlangit, an Information dated May 31, 1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City charging Rosemarie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document. The trial court acquitted the Canlas spouses but convicted petitioner of the crime charged. The appellate affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction. Issue: Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime of Estafa is not present Held: The petition is partly impressed with merit. For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and private complainant Anita Manlangit’s right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases. It is petitioner’s thesis, however, that there is here an absence of the third element contending that private complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the offended party in this case, was never induced to part with any money or property by means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the false pretense or fraudulent representation by Rosemarie. The Court find merit in petitioner’s submission. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the present case. While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more reason must this be


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for herein petitioner. The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused of the other charge is legally feasible. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house in this case. Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Document.

DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE Facts: That on or about and during the period comprised from the month ofDecember 1994 to January 1995, inclusive, or thereabouts in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Great Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village, Inc., and Hock Wan Restaurant Corporation, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused being then the payroll clerk of said Corporations, existing domestic corporations primarily engaged in the restaurant business, with principal places of business at 798 Ongpin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and 489 Nueva St., Binondo, Manila, respectively, and by virtue of her position as such, received from said corporations in trust, during the said period a total sum of P471,166.11 representing the excess amount paid to the employees of said corporations as salaries under the obligation of accounting and turning over the said excess to said corporations, but she did not do so in violation of the trust relationship existing between her and said corporations, which amount, once in her possession, far from complying with her obligation aforesaid, went into hiding and failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to return the same whereby misappropriating, misapplying and converting the said amount to her personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said corporation represented by their common personnel manager Manuel M. Matammu in the total amount of P471,166.11 Philippine Currency. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented against petititoner is sufficient to convict her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence as charged in the information Whether or not formal demand is essential requisite in the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence to sustain a judgment of conviction Held:


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The court premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2001 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The questioned decision is hereby REVERSED. Accused-petitioner Amelita dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa defined under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code on the ground of reasonable doubt. The cash bond for the accused-petitioners provisional liberty is ordered returned to her, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Ominously, such bait, though hearsay evidence, was acknowledged hook, line and sinker by the court a quo, and worse, affirmed by the appellate court. Not even one iota of documentary or object evidence was presented that would give a semblance of correctness to the actions of the said courts. In sum, from the totality of evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with propriety and due respect for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent evidence on which to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the requisite degree of moral certainty. Only the checks and acknowledged payroll slips were presented to show the culpability of the accused-petitioner, and, sadly, said documentary evidence were the only basis for the theory that there was an over-computation of the payrolls. What the trial court used to convict the accused-petitioner are documents that had no direct relation to her. It would have been different had the accused-petitioners computations been used as the basis for comparing the acknowledged payroll slips. That way, it would be clearly shown that she had over-computed the salaries due the employees to enable her to misappropriate said excess. In other words, the trial court failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accusedpetitioner over-computed the payroll and pocketed the excess money. The Court finds the testimonies and documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there may be inherent weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on accusedpetitioner. The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. While the Court is not inclined to hold that the evidence is conclusive that she is not guilty, neither is it convinced that she is so, based on the circumstances of this case. The Court is, thus, under a long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner. Undeniably, the convergence of the circumstances vis--vis the evidence established by the prosecution, especially the tenuous testimonies of the witnesses, must ineluctably result in a favorable verdict for the defense.

PEOPLE V. JULIANO Facts: The accused purchased 190 sacks of milled rice from JCT Agro-Development Corporation and in payment she issued a check for a value of P89,000, knowing at the time of issue that she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said check. When presented for encashment, it was dishonored by the bank for reason of insufficiency of funds. On the following month the accused issued another check that was again dishonored by the drawee bank for the same reason, to the damage and prejudice of JCT AgroDevelopment Corporation. The trial court found her guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) and Estafa. Appellant appealed her conviction for estafa to the Court of Appeals, but still found her guilty, with intent to defraud and by means of false pretense, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, committed the offenses.


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Issue: Whether the prosecution able to prove beyond reasonable doubt to convict the appellant for estafa Held: The Court set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and acquitted Lea Sagan Juliano for the crime of estafa. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act. Nevertheless, appellant’s civil liability to JCT remains, in the amount of P89,000, which is the value of the sack of rice she purchased.

PEOPLE V. CUYUGAN Facts: That on or about the 18th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, Rica G. Cuyugan, defrauded and deceived private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following manner to wit: that said accused with intent to defraud and well knowing that her account with the bank was already closed, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, make out and issue to private Complainant the several checks. in the total amount of P396,000.00 simultaneous with the receipt by the accused of cash money from private Complainant also in the total amount of P396,000.00 but which checks when presented to the drawee bank on their maturity dates were promptly dishonored for reasons of Account Closed and notwithstanding demands made on her, accused failed and refused and still fails to redeem or make good the said checks face value thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the private Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of P396,000.00. That on or about the 12th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded and deceived private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following manner to wit: that the accused with intent to defraud and well-knowing that her account with the bank has no sufficient funds, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out and issue to the private Complainant Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 03A058532P postdated June 10, 1994 in the amount of P150,000.00 simultaneous with, for and in consideration of cash money from private Complainant in the total amount of P150,000.00 but which check when presented to the drawee bank on maturity date was promptly dishonored for reason of Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) and notwithstanding demands on her, accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem or make good the said check or its value, to the damage and prejudice of the private Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of P150,000.00. Issue: Whether or not the accused is liable for the crime of estafa Held: The judgment dated December 20, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, finding appellant RICA G. CUYUGAN, liable for three counts of estafa


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is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt.However, she is ordered to pay private complainants the balance of her obligation The transaction between appellant and the Abagat spouses, in our view, was one for a loan of money to be used by appellant in her business and she issued checks to guarantee the payment of the loan. As such, she has the obligation to make good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But such obligation is civil in character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment. We find appellants allegation, that the Abagat spouses entered into a joint venture agreement with her for the supply of materials with the AFP, is self-serving. But we also note that the trial court convicted appellant on a general allegation that all the elements of estafa under Article 315, 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code had been proved by the prosecution without making any reference to or giving any proof of the actual fraud that appellant allegedly committed to make her liable for estafa. It is elementary that where an allegation in the information is an essential element of the crime, the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. In this case, the prosecution did not establish specifically and conclusively the fraud alleged as an element of the offenses charged.

PEOPLE V. REMULLO Facts: That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, falsely representing herself to have the capacity and power to contract, enlist and recruit workers for job/placement abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise employment job placement abroad to the complainants, ROSARIO CADACIO, JENELYN QUINSAAT and HONORINA MEJIA, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, thus committing illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of [Article 38(2) in relation to Article 39 (b) of the Labor Code]. That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent representation made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, with intent to defraud the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT to the effect that she would send her abroad for the purpose of employment and would need certain amount for the expenses in the processing of papers thereof, which representations the accused well knew was (sic) false and fraudulent and was only made by her to induce said complainant to give and pay, as in fact the latter gave and paid to her the amount of P15,000.00 which the accused once in possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT in the aforementioned amount of P15,000.00. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty for large scale illegal recruitment Held:


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WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 132, is hereby AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 95-653, for illegal recruitment in large scale, appellant NIMFA REMULLO is found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000; and in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654, 95-655 and 95-656 for estafa, she is declared guilty sentenced in each case to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) one day of prision mayor, and to pay by way of restitution P15,000 to each of the private complainants, Jenelyn Quinsaat, Rosario Cadacio and Honorina Mejia, together with the costs. Anent appellants conviction for estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654 to 95-656, we find no error committed by the trial court. Their conviction and sentence are fully supported by the evidence on record. For charges of estafa to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. In this case, appellant clearly defrauded private complainants by deceiving them into believing that she had the power and authority to send them on jobs abroad. By virtue of appellants false representations, private complainants each parted with their hardearned money. Each complainant paid P15,000 as recruitment fee to appellant, who then appropriated the money for her own use and benefit, but failed utterly to provide overseas job placements to the complainants. In a classic rigmarole, complainants were provided defective visas, brought to the airport with their passports and tickets, only to be offloaded that day, but with promises to be booked in a plane flight on another day. The recruits wait in vain for weeks, months, even years, only to realize they were gypped, as no jobs await them abroad. No clearer cases of estafa could be imagined than those for which appellant should be held criminally responsible

GUINHAWA V. PEOPLE Facts: Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles, including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. His office and display room for cars were located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales manager. On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van and from the Union Motors Corporation (UMC) in Paco, Manila. Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van from Manila to Naga City. However, while the van was traveling along the highway in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack. The van went out of control, traversed the highway onto the opposite lane, and was ditched into the canal parallel to the highway. The van was damaged, and the left front tire had to be replaced. Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund of their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in Daet. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint from the DTI. On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga City. Issue:


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Whether or not under the Information, the petitioner was charged of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code Held: The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Considering the surrounding circumstances of the case, the petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. The petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. It bears stressing that Azotea and the petitioner had every opportunity to reveal to the private complainant that the van was defective. They resolved to maintain their silence, to the prejudice of the private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had no special knowledge of parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding circumstances, she relied on her belief that the van was brand new. In fine, she was the innocent victim of the petitioners fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment. The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent omission on his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their collective fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever the doing of a certain act or the transaction of a given affair, or the performance of certain business is confided to an agent, the authority to so act will, in accordance with a general rule often referred to, carry with it by implication the authority to do all of the collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized.

ARSON

PEOPLE V. BALUNTONG Facts: Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete destruction of the saidhouse and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on JoshuaSavarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The Trial Court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but in light of the passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not the courts correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder Held: The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE , and a NEW one is rendered findingappellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of


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reclusion p er p etua with no eligibility for parole and other civil damages modified. The assailed CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered as follows: Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. Appellant is ORDERED to pay the damages and other expenses. How Felicitas acquired such knowledge was not probed into, however, despite the fact that she was cross-examined thereon. Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house, Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons.While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act. As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

PEOPLE V. MURCIA Facts: That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon the latter stab wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason of causes independent of the will; that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered to said Alicia Q. Manlupig which prevented her death, all to the damage and prejudice of said offended party. Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He stated that while he was having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get a glass of water. He followed her and gave her water. He noticed Felicidad light a gas lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He got into a heated argument with Herminio. The latter struck him in the head. He immediately went inside the house to get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo, went back outside and hit Herminio. The latter ran away and appellant chased him. Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and lost consciousness because, apparently, he was struck by something in the back. Appellant denied setting the house on fire. On 30 May 2006, decision was rendered


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by the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated homicide. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Arson and frustrated homicide Held: The appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio. This Court does not discount the fact that there was a fight between appellant and Herminio which preceded the occurrence of the fire. However, it cannot be presumed that Herminio will automatically give a false testimony against appellant. His testimony, having withstood cross-examination, has passed the scrutiny of the lower courts and was held to be credible. The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments

PEOPLE V. MALINGAN Facts: From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accusedappellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare. Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting


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strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was later identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively identified the woman as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accusedappellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant EDNAs bag. Thereafter, accusedappellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained Issue: Whether or not there is a complex crime of arson and homicide Held: The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005, in CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated ± whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson , and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the m ain objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/ murder and arson.

PEOPLE V. OLIVA Facts: August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino Manguba (hereinafter referred to as "Avelino") and his family were sleeping in their house in San Jose, Claveria, Cagayan. Avelino went out of the house to urinate. He saw Ferigel set the roof of their house on fire with a lighted match. Awakened by the loud barking of dogs, Avelino's wife sensed danger and peeped through a hole in their wall. She also saw Ferigel burn the roof of their house. She shouted, "Perry is burning our house!" and called out to the neighbors


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for help. While the fire razed Avelino's house, Ferigel and three others, Dominador Oliva, Marcos Paderan and Arnel Domingo watched at a distance of about five (5) meters. One of the neighbors, Benjamin Estrellon (hereinafter referred to as "Benjamin") went to the nearby river and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was shot by Ferigel at close range. Benjamin tried to run, but he slumped and fell to the ground. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death. Avelino, his wife, and Benjamin's son, Noel, witnessed the shooting since they were only about five (5) to six (6) meters away from Ferigel when the incident occurred. The place was brightly lit by the burning roof and visibility was not a problem. On August 24, 1993, a post-mortem report was made on Benjamin's cadaver, revealing the following: "II POSTMORTEM FINDINGS: "Cadaver is in a state of rigor mortis and with postmortem lividity at back."Gunshot wound of entrance 0.9 cm. at left lateral mid-scapular area going medially and anterosuperiorily, 10 cms. deep without exit.""III. CAUSE OF DEATH "Internal Hemorrhage due to gunshot wound at back." Issue: Whether or not that the testimonies should be taken into consideration, same with alibi and defense Held: Whether or not Benjamin was shot while he was on the street or when he was in the act of pouring water on the burning roof is irrelevant to the crime. We agree with the Solicitor General that Benjamin could have been on the street while pouring water on the burning roof. The two testimonies were not inconsistent. Also whether or not Benjamin immediately fell or tried to run away after he was shot is not important. The fact is that he was shot; any act of his after he was shot would not change the shooting, which at that point was fait accompli. Equally insignificant is whether the gun used was a long firearm or a short firearm. Identification of the weapon only becomes critical when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant. In this case, the trial court did not doubt the identity, and neither would we. There are 2 elements of arson: (1) that there is intentional burning; (2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecution for felonies and offense. Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime. It refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimonies of the witnesses. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. The uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. Here, corpus delicti of the arson and murder was duly proven beyond reasonable doubt

PEOPLE V. ACOSTA Facts: Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief


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that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant. At about 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her house and approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino’s query, she returned immediately to her house. A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant. When she peeped through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainant’s house, which was unoccupied at that time. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by appellant’s wife who arrived at the place. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson. Held: In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record: First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses. Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother. Second, appellant’s intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainant’s) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife

BELTRAN V. PEOPLE Facts: Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.


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Issue: Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage. Held: The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.

VERA NERI V. PEOPLE Facts: : Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo in the City of Baguio. On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About forty-five minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium. Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later on traded marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto. Held: The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involve any illegal contract


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which either of the contracting parties is now seeking 171 | P a g e Background image of page 171 to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings.

ACTS OF LASCIVOUSNESS

AMPLOYO V. PEOPLE Facts: : Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and playing the breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her consent. Amployo contends that the element of lewd design was not established since: (1) the incident happened at 7am, in a street near the school with people around; (2) the breast of an 8 year old is still very much underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched her breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly whim. He also argues that the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 RPC and not child abuse under RA 7610 as the elements thereof had not been proved. Issue: Whether or not lewd design was established; Amployo violated RA 7610. Held: Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.The first element is lewd design. The term ‘lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;[12] it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention,i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition. Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would have been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very same act to the very same victim in the past. The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioner’s act of purposely touching Kristine Joy’s breasts (sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.


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The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years old at the time of the incident in question.

PEOPLE V. MONTERON Facts: On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann Martenez was walking home from Wangan National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was walking on a secluded portion of the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to see where the stone came from, she was hit again on the mouth. She fell down unconscious.[2] When Mary Ann came to, she found herself lying on the grass naked. Accused-appellant was lying on top of her, also naked. She struggled but accusedappellant, who was stronger, restrained her.[3] He placed his penis on top of her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She frantically grabbed his erect penis and pushed it away from her. This caused accused-appellant to stand up in pain. Mary Ann ran towards the road while putting on her clothes. Mary Anns cousin, Arnel Arat, witnessed the whole incident as he was then walking to Wangan Agricultural School. He met Mary Ann while the latter was running away and brought her home. When they got home, Mary Ann told her uncle what happened. Her uncle, in turn, told her mother. That afternoon, upon complaint of Mary Ann, the Calinan Police Precinct arrested accused-appellant. The following morning, Mary Ann was brought to the City Health Office of Davao City where she was examined by Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma. The latter found that Mary Anns hymen was intact and had no laceration, but her labia minora was coaptated and her labia majora was gaping.[4] On March 12, 1996, accused-appellant was formally charged with rape. At his arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[5] After trial, the lower court convicted him of the crime of rape Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape. Held: The decision is is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Marianito Monteron y Pantoras is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Further, accusedappellant is ordered to pay the victim, Mary Ann Martenez, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as moral damages. Accused-appellant also contends that it was unlikely for him to strip naked and commit rape in broad daylight. In this connection, suffice it to say that lust is no respecter of time and place. It is known to happen in the most unlikely places such as parks, along roadsides, within school premises or even occupied rooms. Rape has also been committed on a passageway and at noontime. While accused-appellant is guilty of rape, the same was committed only in its attempted stage. Mary Ann clearly testified that accused-appellant only placed his penis on top of her


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vagina. In fact, she was able to grab it and push it away from her, causing accusedappellant to stand up. The pain she felt may have been caused by accused-appellants attempts to insert his organ into hers. However, the fact remains, based on Mary Anns own narrative, that accused-appellants penis was merely on top of her vagina and has not actually entered the same.Accused-appellant has commenced the commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing himself and the victim and lying on top of her, but he did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the case at bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance which prevented the insertion of accusedappellants penis in her vagina.

PEOPLE V. PEREZ Facts: At about 6:00 A.M. on May 31, 1990, Manuel Perez woke up Jennifer who lying asleep on the cemented floor of the house. The door and the windows of the house were closed. Manuel Perez ordered Jennifer to remain lying down on the cemented floor and began undressing Jennifer. Manuel then kissed the cheeks of Jennifer. He proceeded to kiss and touch the breasts of Jennifer as well as the upper part of Jennifers body. Manuel, who was dressed in short pants, did not remove the same but he unzipped the zipper of his short pants. He pulled the legs of Jennifer apart and placed himself on top of the body of Jennifer. He then inserted his private part inside the private part of Jennifer. All this time Jennifer protested and complained of pain but was unable to resist because Manuel threatened to kill her. After satisfying his lust, Manuel again threatened Jennifer not to tell anybody about what happened to her. Jennifer left the house after the incident and proceeded to the nearby house of her aunt, Othelia Marco, who was then out of the house. Jennifer glanced at the clock in Othelias house and found out that it was 6:00 A.M. in the morning of May 31, 1990. Jennifer remained outside the house until Manuel called her later on to clean the bleedings. It was not until June 3, 1990 that Jennifer disclosed her harrowing experience to a certain Malou (Marilou Castellano), a kumadre of her mother, who was then staying with them. Malou promised to help her. She brought her to the Navotas Police Station in order to report the rape incident. The Navotas police, however, told them to report the matter to the Malabon Police Station. Malou and Jennifer then proceeded there, but they were advised that the matter fell under the jurisdiction of the Kalookan City police force. Malou and the victim, however, did not proceed to the Kalookan City police force as it was already late in the evening. The next day, Jennifer reported the incident to her aunts, Othelia Marco and Myrna Casapao. They then accompanied Jennifer and Malou to the Kalookan City police station, where Jennifer filed a complaint for rape against appellant. After the police investigation, Jennifer was advised to go to the then-Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a physical examination. However, it was only on June 13, 1990, that Jennifer submitted herself to a physical examination. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape


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Decision: The decision is finding appellant Manuel Perez y Magpantay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that appellant is also ordered to pay the victim, Jennifer Dimaano y Casapao. Having examined the entire record, we find that the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution proves beyond doubt all the elements of rape. Private complainant testified as to how appellant had carnal knowledge of her. The carnal knowledge took place under circumstances of violence and intimidation. Her testimony is supported by the results of the medico-legal examination conducted upon her at the police crime laboratory. Moreover, she positively pointed to appellant in open court as the person responsible for her defilement. Against said positive identification, appellants puerile defense of denial will not hold water, for he does not even deny that he was with the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. Moreover, his attempts to cast ill motive on private complainant or her family for fabricating the charge of rape against him have no evidentiary weight. It would be most unnatural for a young and immature girl to fabricate a story of rape by her mothers common-law spouse; allow a medical examination of her genitalia; and subject herself to a public trial and possible ridicule, all because her maternal relatives want her mother to separate from her common-law spouse. Perforce, appellants conviction must stand.

PEOPLE V. COLLADO Facts: TO TIE A CHILD of tender years spread-eagled to her bed to abuse her in the privacy of her home is despicable enough; to encroach on her innocence unashamedly in front of her younger brother is to descend to the deepest recesses of depravity. Thus the incorrigible lothario transgressed all norms of decency, morality and rectitude when he molested his nine (9)-year old victim in the presence of her six (6)-year old brother and severed all strands of gratefulness to her parents who gave him food, shelter and livelihood for four (4) years. Messeah is the daughter of Jose Noli Dumaoal, a seaman. His household was composed of his wife Julie, and their three (3) children, Reggie, Messeah and Metheor. The accused Jessie Ventura Collado, son of Jose Nolis cousin Benjamin, was living with them since 1989. While waiting for an opportunity to become a seaman himself like his uncle Jose, Jessie served as the family driver. Aside from driving Julie, Jessie would also drive the school service vehicle operated by the Dumaoal spouses. Since Jose was almost always at sea and having no househelp, their children were oftentimes left in the care of Jessie. But, instead of taking care of them as their surrogate father, he took advantage of Messeah by sexually molesting her at home, and worse, even in the presence of her younger brother. There were four unfortunate occasions that constituted the crime. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape Held: The court finding accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO guilty of Statutory Rape and three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in is MODIFIED. Messeahs failure to reveal the sexual abuses to her mother does not taint her credibility. Her silence was


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impelled by both fear for her life and shame for the degradation that had befallen her. It is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her life. Silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim. In fact, the burden of keeping such a secret took its toll on her health. Jose Noli testified that when he arrived for a vacation in August 1993, he noticed that his children looked blank and pale, especially Messeah who looked thin, complained of dizziness and headaches and sometimes threw up. He and his wife had brought Messeah to several doctors, before one finally diagnosed Messeah as suffering from nervous breakdown and psychological trauma. The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Jessie's alibi that he was driving the family car on the disputed occasions cannot stand up to his positive identification as the perpetrator of the crime by both Messeah and Metheor. Neither can we believe Jessie's allegation that Julie only wanted him out of their house because she favored her own relative over him. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for her child's defilement. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that a rape victim and her family would publicly disclose the incident and thus sully their honor and reputation in the community unless the charge is true. In fact, if Julie only wanted Jessie out of her house, then why would the Dumaoal family file the complaints against him only on 13 April 1994, when it is clear that he had already left the household as early as 22 October 1993. Neither does this explain why the Dumaoal spouses felt compelled to change residences in such a short period of time. As Jose Noli testified, they made the move even before All Saints Day, which shows that they left their familiar surroundings and uprooted their family all within ten (10) days just so they could ensure Messeahs safety. Moreover, we agree with the Solicitor General that the only reason why the Dumaoal spouses agreed to let Jessie go home to the province instead of filing charges against him was because they were "torn between seeking justice for their daughter and preserving her and the familys reputation. There was also the Christian desire to forgive and give a blood kin a new chance at life knowing the gravity of the penalty that would be meted out to him. To interpret their actuation any other way would be most unfair to parents who are equally suffering with what befell their only daughter.

DULLA V. CA Facts: On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with bruises on her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her uncle, herein petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, "Inaano ako ng uncle ko," while doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to demonstrate what had been done to her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis to her. The matter was reported to Barangay Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the child, the latter’s guardian, and three barangay tanods, went to the house of petitioner to confront him. As petitioner’s father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and his party, Lumaban sought assistance from the nearby Western Police District (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears; however, that petitioner took advantage of the situation and ran away. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape, whereupon trial ensued. In her


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testimony in court, Andrea said that petitioner fondled her organ and showed her his penis. She said that when petitioner did a pumping motion, she had no panties on and that she was lying down. Petitioner was also lying down, according to her. The medical report on Andrea prepared by Dr. Maximo Reyes, who examined the child on February 3, 1993, showed that hymen of the victim is still intact. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He said that Andrea was coached by her guardian. He likewise denied that he escaped from Lumaban and his men on February 2, 1993, and said that he only went away to avoid any trouble that time. The trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness hence this appeal. Issue: Whether Andrea is a competent witness. Held: The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Under Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, only children who, on account of immaturity, are incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses. In People v. Mendoza, the Court held: It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.The requirements then of a child’s competency as a witness are the following:(a) Capacity of observation,(b) Capacity of recollection(c) Capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination. In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months old at the time she testified. Despite her young age, however, she was able to respond to the questions put to her. She answered "yes" and "no" to questions and, when unable to articulate what was done to her by petitioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. During her interrogation, she showed an understanding of what was being asked. She was consistent in her answers to the questions asked by the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and even by the judge.

PEOPLE V. JAVIER Facts: Julia Ratunil Javier, a 16-year old girl, was raped three times by her father, Amado Sandrias Javier, one on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November, 1994 and December, 1994, which resulted to Julia’s pregnancy. Three complaints were filed. The trial court found Amado guilty of the crime of incestuous rape in the first complaint and sentenced to death. Upon failure of the prosecution to prove the use of force by Amado in the second and third complaints, he was just convicted of qualified seduction. Issue:


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Whether or not the conviction for qualified seduction is proper in the complaint for the crime of rape? Held: No. Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by accused, the latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of force by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information (People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144 [1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).

PEOPLE V. MANANSALA Facts: Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her father, a 44-year old “taho” vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991. On direct examination, Jennifer testified that she was raped eight times in the “taho” factory in Tondo, the workplace of her father. On cross examination, however, Jennifer changed her statement that the first rape incident was committed in the “taho” factory in Tondo but the rest of the seven rape incidents were committed in Tarlac. She also mentioned that her father gave her money every time they had sexual intercourse. The trial court found Rodante Manansala guilty of having raped his daughter in Manila but dismissed those committed in Tarlac on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly, the crime of qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the victim’s statement? Held: No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified seduction. The inconsistencies on victim’s testimony for evidence cannot be dismissed as trivial. Trial courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. As SC has said: Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the


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anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. The prosecution’s evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1, 1991, the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience at the hands of her father but the following day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed with him. It is true the medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991 showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of complainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is especially true because she said she had been given money by her father everytime they had an intercourse. The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What is clear from complainant’s testimony is that although accused-appellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accusedappellant’s moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accused-appellant was not living with them, having separated from complainant’s mother in 1986. Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was committed “by means of force, violence and intimidation,” accused-appellant cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. That charge does not include qualified seduction. Neither can qualified seduction include rape.

PEOPLE V. SUBINGSUBING Facts: Mary Jane S. Espilan, a highschool student that time, is sixteen years old and unmarried. While the accused Napoleon Subingsubing is the complainant's uncle, the brother of her mother and the son of her grandmother. Said accused was then living with his mother and his niece in the same house. Mary Jane alleged that when she was about to go out to attend her afternoon classes in school, Napoleon forcibly pulled her to the bedroom of the grandmother, pointed his Garand rifle at her, then punched her in the stomach as a result of which the former lost consciousness. When the complainant regained her senses, she noticed that she was en dishabille and her vagina was bloody. She felt pain in her private parts and is quite certain she was raped or abused. The accused who was then standing outside the room warned the complainant not to tell anybody what happened or else he will kill her. Hence Mary Jane did not report the incident to her grandmother or to anyone for that matter. The accused did sexually abused her niece in two more incidents. However, the accused at the trial, denied the charge of rape as narrated above and proferred a different story - interposing consent on the part of the complainant as a defense. He also professed that he had only one incident of sexual intercourse with the complainant. Issue:


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Whether or not the accused Subingsubing is guilty of rape. Held: No. The accused is guilty of the crime of Qualified Seduction under Article 337 of the RPC and not rape. A careful perusal of the records of the present case reveals, even if were to assume arguendo that the defense of consent on the part of the complainant was not sufficiently established, that the evidence for the prosecution cannot, on its own, stand and suffice to establish the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. A perusal of the records and the testimony of the complainant discloses contradictions and inconsistencies on vital details which lead one to seriously doubt the veracity of her story. The Court also cannot help but question the conduct of the complainant after the alleged incidents of rape. Her behavior after the alleged incidents directly contradicts the normal or expected behaviour of a rape victim. As things stand, for failing to meet the exacting test of moral certainty, it is incumbent to set aside the trial court's judgments of conviction for rape. However, the Court must state that it finds conclusive evidence (no less than the accused-appellant's admission) that on 25 November 1989, the accused Napoleon Subingsubing had sexual intercourse with Mary Jane Espilan when she was only 16 years of age. The complainant and the accused were living in the same house. The accused is the uncle of the complainant, brother of her own mother.

Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18 years of age and committed by any of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: any person in public authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education and custody of the woman seduced. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying circumstance in the offense. Notably, among the persons who can commit qualified seduction is a "domestic".

PEOPLE V. ALVAREZ Facts: A complaint for rape signed by the offended party herself that an information was filed against appellant Nicanor Alvarez. It is worded thus: "In the City of Naga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape and have sexual intercourse with the herein complaining witness, [Loreta T. dela Concepcion], a virgin 13 years of age and sister-in-law of the herein accused, while she was asleep by putting himself atop of her body, against her will and without her consent." The complainant lived in the house of the accused as she was taking care of the accused and her sister’s son. At the hearing, two witnesses testified for the prosecution, a certain Dr. Honesto Marco, who issued a medical certificate after examining the complainant, fully seven months and sixteen days after the alleged rape, to the effect that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy something rather obvious from her physical condition, 2 and the complainant. It


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was therefore solely on the basis of the testimony of the offended party herself that the lower court in the decision now on appeal, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Issue: Whether or not the accused is correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Held: No. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside. He is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Seduction. Hence, in his capacity as head of the family and master of the house, appellant was, for all intents and purposes, the custodian of the complainant. But even though he were not clearly or formally entrusted with the custody of the offended party, it is beyond doubt that, as the latter was serving in his house or was therein as a domestic — a term embracing 'persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in this sense, a part thereof' ... — the appellant upon taking advantage of his authority and abusing the confidence and trust reposed on him as master of the house, violated the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code." The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 'is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ... even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple seduction ... taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud.'"

SIMPLE SEDUCTION

PEOPLE V. PASCUA Facts: The RTC of Pangasinan finds the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape. Private complainants Liza and Anna, both surnamed Paragas, are twins aging 12 years old at the time of the crime. The appellant was their neighbor in Calvo, Mangatarem, Pangasinan. Liza and Anna considered appellant as their grandfather although he was not related to them. It was alleged that private complainants were playing near the house of the appellant when the latter called Liza and instructed her to buy juice at the store. Liza obeyed. After she returned from the store, the appellant ordered Liza to go inside his house and lie down on the floor. Appellant then removed Lizas pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. Liza tried to scream but


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appellant threatened to kill her. After the sexual intercourse, the appellant gave Liza P10 and warned her not to reveal the incident to her mother and she remained silent. The same thing happened again when Liza was called by the appellant as she was passing by his house. Liza’s twin sister, Anna, suffered the same fate at the hands of the appellant twice. The accused was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape on four counts as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. Insisting on his innocence, the appellant claims in his appeal that he is not guilty of rape because private complainants voluntarily submitted to his sexual desires. The appellant even postulates that, if there should at all be any liability on his part, it should only be for simple seduction. Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly held the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and not the crime of simple seduction. Held: Yes. The prosecution was able to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy his lust.Untenable is the argument of the Pascuat that, if he is at all liable for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338 of the RPC, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this promise or inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of sexual intercourse with the private complainants were in exchange for money. He declared that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would promise them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant presented no proof that private complainants consent was secured by means of such promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the appellant to private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him. Rather, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody discovered his dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than enough to show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private complainants was totally absent. Liza and Annas respective testimonies established that the appellant had sexual intercourse with them without their consent and against their will. Considering that the victims accounts of what the appellant did to them were absolutely credible and believable, the trial court correctly convicted the appellant of several crimes of rape against the 12-year-old twins, Liza and Anna Paragas.

PEOPLE V. TEODOSIO Facts: On that fateful day of December 19, 1985 Elaine and appellant were together from 7:00 o'clock in the morning when they met in front of the Fargo Department Store in Caloocan City when they attended the Christmas party at the Manila Central University, where Elaine was enrolled, up to 10:00 A.M. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Luneta where they


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took a stroll. Then they went to the Fiesta Carnival at Cubao, Quezon City and they ate at a nearby McDonald's restaurant. They later proceeded to Lyceum where appellant took his examinations at about 2:30 P.M. Then he fetched Elaine at the canteen where she was waiting. They rode the metropolitan light rail transit at the Central Station up to Doroteo Jose Street. Upon alighting therefrom, they walked to the Champion Lodging House. After drinking two glasses of pineapple juice, they had sexual intercourse. They stayed overnight in the said motel. It was alleged that the accused, being much older than Elaine, dragged her to the hotel and took advantage of, deceived and abused the latter sexually by raping her when she was unconscious on account of her having drunk the drugged softdrink or pineapple juice. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape Held: No. The accused was acquitted of the crime of rape neither can he be convicted for simple seduction. The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to prove that their coition was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the prosecution, served to demolish the same. Firstly, her medical examination did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of any force on her. Indeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped during the many hours they were together going from one place to another, but she did not. She was enjoying their tryst. Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all. She did not show any sign of having had a traumatic experience. Verily, the foregoing circumstances disproves the theory of force and involuntariness in the sexual interlude of the two. What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their mutual desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and thus consummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held liable for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair. Neither the crime committed by appellant is simple seduction in Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code. All the elements of the offense are present. Frankly —1. Elaine was over 12 and under 18 years of age; 2. She is single and of good reputation; 3. The offender had sexual intercourse with her; 4. It was committed by deceit. Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully persuaded her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that attended the commission of the offense.11 Unfortunately, the essential ingredients of simple seduction are not alleged nor necessarily included in the offense charged in the information. The only elements of the offense alleged in the sworn complaint of the offended party is that she is over 12 years of age when appellant had carnal knowledge of her.

FORCIBLE ABDUCTION


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PEOPLE V. LINING Facts: That on or about the 5th day of October, 1997, at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more or less, in sitio Buho, Barangay Mabuslot, municipality of Pinamalayan, province of Oriental Mindoro, the accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in common accord, with lewd and unchaste design, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with threat and intimidation with use of a deadly weapon, forcibly abduct one Emelina Ornos, a 15year-old girl, towards an unoccupied house and thereat and pursuant to their criminal conspiracy and motivated with lustful desire, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and had carnal knowledge one after the other of said victim against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, use of deadly weapon and abuse of superior strength are attendant. Accused Lining denied the accusations against him and disputed the findings of the trial court. He alleged that in the morning of October 4, 1997, his brother-in-law Artemio Salvacion invited him to attend a barangay dance in Nabuslot. Later that afternoon, he fetched Ildefonso Magararu and together, they went to the house of Artemio, arriving thereat at about eight oclock in the evening where they also met Russel Bolquerin, Allan Salvacion and Lian Salvacion, Lining was not able to attend the dance party because Artemio requested him to look after the palay in his house. Instead, he and Ildefonso had some beer and pulutan in the house of Artemio Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Lining guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of abduction with rape and another crime of rape Held: Yes. The accused-appellant could only be convicted for the crime of rape, instead of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Indeed, it would appear from the records that the main objective of the accused when the victim was taken to the house of Mila Salvacion was to rape her. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape. Accused-appellant has nothing to offer other than alibi. Further, the testimonies of accusedappellant and the other witnesses for the defense are not consistent on some material points. The inconsistencies of the testimonies only added doubt on the mind of the Court regarding the veracity of the statements of the defense witnesses. Even a woman of loose morals could still be a victim of rape, for the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will and without her consent ] Neither the absence of physical injuries negates the fact of rape since proof of physical injury is not an element of rape Finally, it should be stressed that one who clearly concurred with the criminal design of another and performed overt acts which led to the multiple rape committed is a coconspirator. Therefore, accused-appellant is deemed a co-conspirator for the act of rape committed by his co-accused Lian Salvacion and should accordingly be penalized therefor.


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PEOPLE V. EGAN Facts: Lito Egan alias Akiao, thirty-six (36) years old, was an avid admirer of a twelve (12)-year old girl named Lenie T. Camad. Both the accused and Lenie were members of the Manobo indigenous cultural community in Mindanao and residents of Sitio Salaysay, Marilog, Davao City. On 6 January 1997 Lenie and her cousin Jessica Silona were fetching water at a deep well several meters from Lenies house in Sitio Salaysay. In the afternoon, the accused appeared from nowhere and forcibly dragged and pushed Lenie towards Sitio Dalag, Arakan, Cotabato. He threatened to kill her if she resisted. Before leaving the site of the deep well, he likewise terrorized Jessica by brandishing his hunting knife which forced the girl to scamper for safety. About 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Jessica was able to report to Lenies father, Palmones Camad, the abduction of his daughter. For four (4) months, the datus attempted a customary settlement of the abduction in accordance with Manobo traditions. In exchange of the hand of Lenie in marriage, the accused agreed to give 2 horses to the family of Lenie. When the accused failed to fulfill his promise, the father demanded the unconditional return of his daughter to his custody. Since the amicable settlement was not realized, Akiao forcibly relocated Lenie to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where the latter was successfully rescued. Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed against the accused and after several warrants of arrest and attempts to arrest him, he was finally arrested at Arakan, Cotabato. The accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial, accused tried to prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together under Manobo rites in the house of her father after he has given the family, the dowry. The accused allegedly delivered the horse to the father, but was again refused when the latter increased the number of horses from one to two. The accused concluded that because he failed to deliver two wild horses, the instant case was filed against him. The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of forcible abduction with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not Egan is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Held: : No. The decision of the court in convicting accused-appellant LITO EGAN alias Akiao of forcible abduction with rape is modified and Egan is instead declared guilty of Forcible Abduction only under Art. 342 of the RPC. All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim, who is a young girl, was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knife-point she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her abode. At her tender age, Lenie could not be expected to physically resist considering the fact that even her companion, Jessica Silona, had to run home to escape accused-appellant's wrath as he brandished a hunting knife. Fear gripped and paralyzed


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Lenie into helplessness as she was manhandled by accused-appellant who was armed and twenty-four (24) years her senior. The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the victim after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that while Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirty-six (36) years old and although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she The logical conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part, and their respective testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy of full faith and credit. Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been engaged under Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship was willful and voluntary. Proof of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2) wild horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the horses which the old man Palmones had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize his matrimonial aspiration with Lenie. The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accused-appellant which in reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If they were, surely, Lenie would not have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having held her against her will and molesting her and, on top of it all, by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could have easily told her father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal reaction would have been to cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with whom she had a passionate affair. But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in denouncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the disgrace that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father would not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the couple for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from captivity and seeking the intervention of the datus in resolving the matter. The sexual abuse which accused-appellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible abduction and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot form the other half of a complex crime since the record does not show that the principal purpose of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity and that her abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the same. Surely it would not have been the case that accused-appellant would touch Lenie only once during her four (4)month captivity, as she herself admitted, if his chief or primordial intention had been to lay with her. Instead, what we discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and parcel of her forcible abduction and shares equal importance with the other element of the crime which was to remove the victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be and to take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but also to


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separate her from her family, especially from her father Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of forcible abduction.

PEOPLE V. GARCIA Facts: Cleopatra Changlapon, was nineteen years old and a sophomore student of B.S. Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central University. She left school at 6:30 p.m. to go home to Km. 3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she was crossing Bonifacio Street, Baguio City, Cleopatra was pulled by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door closed and the van sped away and fell unconscious. When Cleopatra came to, she was inside a room. She was totally undressed and was lying flat on her back on a bed. In the room with her were four men. The Bombay-looking man lay on top of her. She tried to push him away but he held her left arm. Another man with long hair, whom she later identified as accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia, burned her right chin with a lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but accused-appellant held her right arm. While accused-appellant was seated on her right side and holding her, the Bombaylooking man proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. After the Bombay-looking man finished having sexual intercourse with Cleopatra, accused-appellant took his turn and went on top of her. The third man, whom Cleopatra noted had pimples on his face, went on top of her. The fourth man was next in raping Cleopatra. By that time, she was feeling helpless and was too tired to struggle. As the fourth man was having sexual intercourse with her, she saw the Bombay-looking man burning her panties with a lighted cigarette. She closed her eyes and heard the men laughing. After the fourth man finished raping her, he got up. She felt dizzy and her private parts were aching. She opened her eyes and tried to move, but accused-appellant hit her on the abdomen. One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatras face which made her vision blurred. She heard somebody say that it was 1:30. After that, she blacked out. When she regained consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere between Tam-awan and Longlong. It was still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all over her body and was unable to move. A taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afraid to ride the taxi, she boarded it just to get home. The taxi brought her to her house. Cleopatra just kept crying and was unable to talk when asked. After some time, when she was able to regain her composure, she told them that she had been raped by four men. The Court finds Jeffrey Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and likewise of the three (3) crimes of rape in conspiracy with three (3) others whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown. Accused-appellant assails his conviction based on complainants identification. According to him, the identification was improperly suggested by the police. We are not persuaded. Based on our own review of the records of this case, we find that complainant was neither influenced nor induced by the police to point to accused-appellant as one of her molesters. On the contrary, the transcripts convincingly show that complainant was left to freely study the faces of the thirty or more inmates on the basketball court below to see whether she


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recognized any of them. There was no suggestion from the police to point to the new detainee, who had just been arrested on another rape charge.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting Garcia of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Held: No. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible abduction, i.e., the taking of complainant against her against her will and with lewd design. It was likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired, confederated and mutually aided one another in having carnal knowledge of complainant by means of force and intimidation and against her will. Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly established that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation. Moreover, the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant succeeded in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs, established by the actual rape. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. He should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three coaccused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused helped one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her, the other three held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted cigarettes to stop her from warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as well. However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape. The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when committed by more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus,


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accused-appellant should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for forcible abduction with rape.

PEOPLE V. NAPUD Facts: Esmaylita also filed two separate complaints, one for rape and another for forcible abduction with rape. In Criminal Case No. 44263 for rape, the complaint alleged: That on or about the 21st day of September, 1994, in the Municipality of Janiuay, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Alfredo Napud Jr. conspiring, confederating with Tomas Amburgo to better realize their purpose and armed with a butchers knife (pinute) with deliberate intent and lewd design by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned against her will and consent, after Tomas Amburgo had raped her. When arraigned in each of the three cases, both Napud and Amburgo pleaded not guilty to the charges. The third accused, Romel Brillo, has remained at large. Both Amburgo and Napud raised the defense of denial and alibi. The trial court summed up Napuds version as follows: Accused Alfredo Napud, Jr., alleged that in the afternoon of September 20, 1994, he butchered the ducks of Betty Barato, their neighbor at Brgy. Matag-ub, Janiuay, Iloilo, and then helped her husband in cooking it; that he and Betty Baratos son, husband, and father, had a drinking spree inside the latters house from 8:00 oclock that same evening until 2:00 oclock the following morning, September 21, 1994 and chose to sleep at the Baratos house the rest of the time until he was awakened at about 5:30 oclock in the morning by Betty Barato informing him that Brgy. Councilwoman Teresita Napud was summoning all male residents of the barangay to assemble at the basketball court for reasons that he did not know; That when he and about 20 other male residents were made to form a line-up he saw Ernesto Benedicto who looked at each of them in the line-up; that after a while all the others in the line-up were sent home while he was brought to the police headquarters where he was again presented to Esmaylita Benedicto and Greg Cantiller but both of them said that he was not the one; that it was only about 11:00 oclock that same morning inside the cell at the police headquarters, when Esmaylita Benedicto came back, that she identified him as the one who allegedly robbed their parents house and raped her, in the early morning of September 21, 1994. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting him of rape by means of force or intimidation Held: Yes. The trial court found that the forcible abduction with rape alleged in Criminal Case No. 44264 was absorbed by the rape charged in Criminal Case No. 44263. The evidence for the prosecution shows that Esmaylita was brought by Amburgo and appellant to a banana plantation some 1-1/2 kilometers away from her house for the purpose of raping


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her. Both men then successively had carnal knowledge of her at said place. Where complainant was forcibly taken away for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, then the rape so committed may absorb the forcible abduction. The trial court, thus, correctly held that the rape charged and proved in Criminal Case No. 44263 already absorbed the forcible abduction with rape complained of in Criminal Case No. 44264

BIGAMY

MANUEL V. PEOPLE Facts: Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaa. He met Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married before the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single. The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. Tina learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount of P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Issue: Whether or not Manuel is guilty of bigamy. Held:


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Yes. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage.

DIEGO V. CASTILLO Facts: This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law. The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single; b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a Decree of Divorce and purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce. c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.[if After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated:A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case. In his comment, respondent Judge stated: That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of


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fact. Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment Held: No. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law. As held in Alforte v. Santos, even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

PEOPLE V. ABONADO Facts: The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo. Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home. After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal. An annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the


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purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military. On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court appreciating the mitigating circumstance that the accuse seventy six years of age then. He argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989. Issue: Whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting Held: No. The statement in the information that the crime was committed in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995, was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the information was defective is untenable. The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised. It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity. All of these have been sufficiently established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.

MORIGO V. PEOPLE Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.


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Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy Held: No. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. MERCADO V. TAN Facts: Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused. It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that


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accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife. Issue: Whether or not Mercado is guilty of bigamy in spite of the filing the declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. Held: Yes. It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x. In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

GARCIA V. CA Facts: On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office an "Affidavit of Complaint" charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, for being previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without the said marriage having been dissolved, (or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989 and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy. The trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal case. The court believes that since the penalty prescribed under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of bigamy is prision mayor, which is classified as an afflictive penalty under Article 25 of the same Code, then said offense should prescribe in fifteen (15) years as provided in Article 92 of the Code. The complainant having discovered the first marriage


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of the accused to one Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one Eugenia Balingit, the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed in this case on November 15, 1991. The argument presented by the prosecution that it was difficult for the complainant to obtain evidence of the alleged first marriage, hence, the prescriptive period should be counted from the time the evidence was secured will not hold water. The petitioner then appealed to the CA. He contended therein that: (a) the trial court erred in quashing the information on the ground of prescription; and (b) the counsel for the accused was barred from filing the motion to quash the information against the accused. As to the first, the petitioner argued that bigamy was a public offense, hence "the offended party is not the first or second (innocent) spouse but the State whose law/policy was transgressed." The petitioner added that the "interchanging use" In Article 91 of the RPC of the terms "offended party," "authorities," and "their agents" supports his view that the State is the offended party in public offenses. The CA gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and concluded that the petitioner discovered the private respondent's first marriage in 1974. Since the information in this case was filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or eighteen years after the discovery of the offense, then the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. It further held that the quash of an information based on prescription of the offense could be invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal, for under Article 89(5) of the RPC, the criminal liability of a person is "'totally extinguish[ed]' by the prescription of the crime, which is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability." Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defense. Undaunted, the petitioner is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and to compel the respondent court to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription. Held: No. It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to state, as the petitioner does, that only the State is the offended party in such case, as well as in other public offenses, and, therefore, only the State's discovery of the crime could effectively commence the running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC provides that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . ." It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances. The petitioner even admits that he is the offended party in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272. The information therein, which he copied in full in the petition in this case, describes him as the "offended party" who suffered "damage and prejudice . . . in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code."


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The distinction he made between public crimes and private crimes relates not to the discovery of the crimes, but to their prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this matter. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.14324 is AFFIRMED.

LIBEL

FERMIN V. PEOPLE Facts: This is a case for Libel filed by a showbiz couple namely, Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C Tugas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Brach 218. The two (2) criminal informations uniformly read, as follows:

“That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused CRISTENELLI SALAZAR FERMIN, publisher, and BOGS C. TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid with offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas District, Quezon City, and circulated in Quezon City and other parts of Metro Manila and the whole country, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, publicly and acting with malice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously print and circulate in the headline and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14, 1995 the following material, to wit:

MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE

IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA DUN, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA

when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose said


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ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to be a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby causing dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and prejudice of the said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ. CONTRARY TO LAW” Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas both pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint Decisions dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. Petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article. The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for libel Held: Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was evident from his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit. In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article. In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or publishes it. Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was written. Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him from performing his work.


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However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by the appellate court in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of the Supreme Court, “But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy”. As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject article in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on her arguments by analyzing the libelous articles, to wit: The banner headlines of the offending article read: “KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA!

MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN SI ANNABELLE!” On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but bold letters, are: “HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E, PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA NOON SA AMERIKA, DUN SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA, MILYON-MILYON ANG INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI SA PILIPINAS NOON.”

A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether the statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.


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To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants. Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for libel should be upheld.

BUATIS V. PEOPLE Facts: Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was evident from his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit. In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article. In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or publishes it.


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Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was written. Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him from performing his work. However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by the appellate court in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of the Supreme Court, “But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy”. As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject article in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on her arguments by analyzing the libelous articles, to wit: The banner headlines of the offending article read: “KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA!

MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN SI ANNABELLE!” On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but bold letters, are: “HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E, PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA NOON SA AMERIKA, DUN SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA, MILYON-MILYON ANG INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI SA PILIPINAS NOON.”


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A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether the statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants. Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for libel should be upheld. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Buatis is guilty of libel Held: Yes. Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;and (d) the victim must be identifiable. The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication


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in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written. Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public. The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit: In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this point:In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable:(1)That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2)The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account.The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.ry Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as 'lousy', 'inutile', 'carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: 'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito. Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner's imputation is malicious (malice in law). A reading of petitioner's subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner's good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.


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Thus, the Supreme Court find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel

MAGNO V. PEOPLE Facts: This is a case for Libel committed by Dolores Magno on various occasions against Cerelito T. Alejandro, the former’s neighbor for almost 20 years at PucayVillage, Marcos Highway, Baguio City. In the afternoon of March 2, 1991, Cerelito, while at the upper portion of his house, saw Dolores write on the wall at the back of her garage the following words: 'Huag Burahin Bawal Dumaan Dito ang Maniac at Magnanakaw ng Aso katulad ni Cere Lito O. Cedring. Feeling that he was the 'Cere', 'Lito or 'Cedring being alluded to, Cerelito reported the matter to the local police and filed an affidavit-complaint with the Fiscal's Office. Subsequently, or on March 9, 1991, at around 4:00 p.m., Rodelito, Cerelito's 16-year old son, while on his way to buy bread at a nearby store, saw Dolores writing something on her garage's extension wall with the use of a paint brush and red paint. In full, the writing reads: "HUAG BURAHIN BAWAL DUMAAN ANG SUSPETSOSA BASTOS AT MAKAPAL NA MUKHA DITO LALO NA SA MANIAC AT MAGNANAKAW NG ASO KATULAD NI CERELITO." After reading what was thus written, Rodelito proceeded with his errand and, upon reaching home, related what he saw to his father. Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to, Cerelito lost no time in filing a complaint with the Baguio City Police (BCP). Pictures were then taken of the aforesaid writing on the wall. Eventually, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio, finding, following an investigation, probable cause for libel against Dolores, filed the corresponding information giving rise to Criminal Case No. 8804-R. Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito, Dolores, in the morning of March 15, 1991, went to the BCP sub-station to deliver her 3-page letteranswer written in yellow pad and addressed to the station sub-commander. At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to and instructed Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white, long, ordinary envelope to Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the house at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who immediately read the three (3) separate letters contained in the envelope. Evelyn followed suit afterwards. Fe read the contents of the envelope upon reaching home late in the afternoon of March 15, 1991. The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was addressed to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the information in Criminal Case No. 8806R, this unsigned letter reads: “If your husband can't show any proof of his makating dila then comply & if your husband can't understand this simple English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig isang tukang pamilya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya kaming idamay sa kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng grasa sa Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa


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siyang marumi at putang ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng tao.Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa pinangalingan namin.Siya ang magnanakaw at mandaraya.Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas kayo sa lote ninyo.Pinalakad ninyo ang mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo.Bago kayo magsalita mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo muna ang sarili ninyo. Mas mukha pang magnanakaw ang asawa mo para malinaw.” The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following addendum written in ink at the back page thereof which reads: “Ang tibay mo rin naman Mrs. Alejandro, makapal pa ang mukha mo at ikaw pa ang magpapablotter sa akin para pagtakpan mo ang maniac mong asawa. Kailan mo masasabi na pumasok sa bakuran mo para mamirhuesyo sa inyo. Tanga.” The third letter, a photocopy of Dolores’ signed letter dated March 15, 1991, to the SubStation 5 Commander of BCP purportedly in reply to the statement given by Fe Alejandro to the police station on March 3, 1991, reads, in part, as follows: The Sub Station Commander Sub-Station 5 Marcos Highway, B.C.

Dear sir: cralawxxxxxxxxx Allow me then to explain to you . . . why I call Mr. Alejandro a maniac.Pumasok siya sa lote ko sa garahe na naging shelter (temporary) namin ng pamilya ko pagkatapos ng lindol (3 weeks after) ng hatinggabi-lasing na lasing nakapaa, bukas ang zipper ng pantaloon nakayapak na walang sapin sa paa.Tulog na kami.We were awakened by the constant barking of my dogs.I have 3 native dogs but 1 was slaughtered by Mr. Cerelito Alejandro '.He is even a dog-napper. My Manang Louie can relate the incident since we were out of the country x x x.I don't trust him as my kapitbahay na bantay salakay.In simple tagalog magnanakaw ng aso para may malamon dahil takaw na takaw at walang maibili. It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Dolores was charged with libel under four (4) separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8803-R, 8804-R, 8805-R and 8806-R and raffled to Branch 6 of the court. Upon arraignment, Dolores, as accused, entered a plea of Not Guilty to each of the offenses charges in the four informations aforecited. Following a joint trial, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1993, finding her guilty of libel in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8804-R and 8806-R and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment and ordering her to indemnify the offended party a certain sum as moral damages. In Criminal Cases Nos. 8803-R and 8805-R, however, she was acquitted. On Appeal, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC. The appellate court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of Dolores Magno for lack of merit.


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Issue: Whether or not Magno could be held liable for libel Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held that to be liable for libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. If the statement is sent straight to a person for whom it is written there is no publication of it. The reason for this is that 'a communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him. Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute publication, for the person to whom the letter is addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the person defamed therein. Fe, the wife, is, in context, a third person to whom the publication was made. Finally, the Court cannot give credence to Dolores' allegation that she is not the author of the unsigned libelous letter. It cannot be overstressed that she herself handed the unsigned letter to Evelyn Arcartado with specific instructions to give the same to Fe Alejandro. Likewise, the contents of the letters are basically reiteration/elaborations of Dolores' previous writing on the wall and her letter to the BCP Sub-Station commander. What the Court of Appeals said on this point is basic common sense and deserving of acceptance. The Supreme Court finds all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently established. Accordingly, the ascription of reversible errors on the part of the CA and the trial court in adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of libel cannot be sustained

MACASAET V. PEOPLE Facts: Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alfie Lorenzo, et al. The factual antecedents are as follows: In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper Abante were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court, reads: The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL,


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committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and maliciously write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and circulated in the aforesaid newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense Issue: Whether or not the petitioners' contention that he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed is tenable. Held: Yes. The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It provides: Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . . The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published.


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The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. [49] When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him. [50] As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado . . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.[51] Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors before the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these two incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the government

VASQUEZ V. CA Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the following exerpts of the news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished were supposed allegations by Vasquez that (1) “nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa”; (2) ang mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. x x x” Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter’s statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation. On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of libel.


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Held: No. To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. There was nothing defamatory in the news item. This much was found by the trial court itself, noting that the published article was merely a factual report about the filing by the Ombudsman of the charge of corruption against the judge with the Sandiganbayan. Of course, it does not necessarily mean that if the news article complained of is not libelous because it is a privileged matter, he who repeats the publication is likewise free from accountability for the re-utterance. We recognize that a person's liability for libel does not necessarily proceed from the fact that he was the original publisher of the discreditable act. The maker of a libelous republication or repetition, although not liable for the results of the primary publication, is liable for the consequences of a subsequent publication which he makes or participates in making so long as the elements of libel are satisfied. But in every case malice must be present, something which has not been shown in the case at bar. The law presumes that malice is present in every defamatory imputation VICARINO V. CA Facts: ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor of Catarman, Northern Samar, with Judge Proceso Sidro of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mondragon-San Roque, Northern Samar, as complaining witness. According to the Information, the crime was committed when Vicario allegedly distributed and circulated in the vicinity of the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman photocopies of page 7 of the 20 March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer which contained the following article: SAMAR JUDGE WHO POCKETED BOND CHARGED WITH GRAFT OMBUDSMAN -- Conrado Vasquez yesterday filed with the Sandiganbayan graft charges against a Northern Samar judge who pocketed the P1,000.00 cash bond posted by a respondent in one of several cases pending in his sala. Charged was Judge Proceso Sidro of the Northern Samar municipal circuit trial court in Mondragon. Investigation showed that Sidro failed to deposit the cash bond with his clerk-of-court, and refused to return the money even after the accused who filed the bond was already acquitted in the case. Private complainant Sidro alleged that petitioner's act greatly prejudiced his reputation as a member of the bench and caused him great distress. Petitioner Vicario on the other hand disclaimed responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article, at the same time asserting that the libel suit against him was ill-motivated for he had filed a criminal charge for graft and corruption against Judge Sidro before the Ombudsman and an administrative complaint for dishonesty with the Supreme Court, both due to the latter's unjustified refusal and failure to return petitioner's cash bond of P1,000.00.


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After trial, the court a quo found petitioner Vicario guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The trial court justified its decision by declaring that while no evidence was presented to show that Vicario distributed copies of the news article to several persons, at least he gave one photocopy to prosecution witness Amador Montes which amounted to publication, and that this act was tainted with malice as it stemmed from Vicario's hatred, as evident from the manner his testimony was delivered, towards complaining witness Sidro. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the act of petitioner in giving a copy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer to Amador Montes where the news item was published, constitutes the crime of libel. Held: No. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. As found by the trial court, there was no evidence at all to show that petitioner was the source of the statements contained in the news item published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Indeed, for not only was the news item by itself bereft of this information, the records also confirmed its absence. This is why it was incorrect for the appellate court to find that "the news item was patently culled from the Affidavit-Complaint of the appellant imputing a criminal act on Judge Sidro filed with the Ombudsman (emphasis ours)" when no basis, factual or legal, exists for so ruling. To be sure, the Affidavit-Complaint was merely a narration of the facts constituting the cause of action of petitioner. Its contents never appeared in the news article which spoke only of the filing by the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan of graft charges against Judge Sidro after its investigation of a complaint that the judge refused to return the cash bond of an accused after the latter's acquittal in a criminal case. There is no specific reference therein to petitioner nor to his Affidavit-Complaint. Since it has not been established that he caused the publication of the subject article nor was the source thereof, it would be inappropriate to conclude that through the disputed news item he ascribed a criminal act to Judge Proceso Sidro. Parenthetically, it would have been more accurate for the appellate court to state that the news article was culled from the resolution of the Ombudsman directing the filing of a criminal charge based on the results of his investigation of a complaint leveled against the named judge. But then, if it did, it would have been left with no basis at all to hold, as in fact it did, that Vicario maliciously imputed a discreditable act to respondent judge, and there would be no more justification for the finding that the first element of libel was established

VILLANUEVA V. PEOPLE Facts:


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Petitioner Noel Villanueva was a member of the Municipal Council while private complainant Yolanda C. Castro was the Municipal Vice Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Sometime in September 1994, petitioner was filing an application for monetized leave for the approval of herein complainant. The application was not immediately attended to by complainant as she was then busy dictating some important matters to her secretary. A heated argument then ensued between the complainant and the enraged defendant Villanueva. In the presence of several persons, defendant Villanueva, in a loud voice and within hearing distance of everyone present, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously uttered in a serious and insulting manner the following words: "Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca man malinis, garapal ca" and "Balamu mansanas cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat" (You are pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt; you are like a red apple, but inside you are worm infested and extremely dirty). Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation Held: Yes. Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.

In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However, it should be noted that such scathing words were uttered by petitioner in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. The rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor. The slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.

CANA V. PEOPLE Facts:


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Petitioner is accused of bringing private complainant Daylinda Cañal, into discredit, disrepute and contempt when he unlawfully and publicly speak and utter against her the following insulting words and expressions, to wit: “AYAW MO KAHADLOK SA TESTIGOS NI DAYLINDA KAY WALAY BANCA-AGAN, NAHADLOK KAW KANG DAYLINDA, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT” which if translated in English language will mean (You afraid to the witness of Daylinda who had no how, why you afraid to Daylinda, she live from stealing, she is a long time thieves) and other words of similar imports. The petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred in sustaining his conviction. He insists that he was unjustly deprived of his right to adduce evidence in his behalf due to the failings of his counsel, Atty. Alvizo, who was always absent. He argues that at the MCTC, he was invariably present and ready to present his evidence; it was his counsel that did him in and he should not be made to suffer for that. He further alleges that the appellate court failed to appreciate the true facts of his case. Issue: Whether or not the statements of the petitioner constitute oral defamation. Held: Yes. To say that Daylinda is a thief is irrefragably grave oral defamation. This imputes to her a crime that is dishonorable or contemptuous. The Court affirms the trial courts award of moral damages in favor of the private complainant. Article 2219(7) of the New Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar. Indeed, calling Daylinda a thief is defamation against her character and reputation sufficient to cause her embarrassment and social humiliation. Daylinda testified to the feelings of shame and humiliation she suffered as a result of the incident complained of

PADER V. PEOPLE Facts: What is before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decisionof the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan affirming petitioners conviction of grave oral defamation by the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan. On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo! The latter was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.


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On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan a complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to which petitioner pleaded not guilty.[ After due trial, on October 30, 1997 the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan rendered decision convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation. On appeal, on March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in toto Issue: Whether or not Pader is guiltly of slight oral defamation Held: Yes. In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The trial court, in arriving at its decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty. Escolangos reputation since the parties were political opponents. We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioners father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature. In Reyes vs. People, we ruled that the expression putang ina mo is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slender but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates ones expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.

VICTORIA V. CA Facts: Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practising lawyer since 1926, one time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil cases from 1953 until 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz and his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Exequiel Victorio


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and his wife afterwards filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang which was assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, for investigation and disbarment proceedings against Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioner Daniel Victorio is the son of Exequiel Victoria. During the hearing of the administrative case on that particular afternoon of January 9, 1964 in the sala of Judge Avanceña, Atty. Castillo, counsel of the Victorios, presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avanceña to hear the administrative case, who apparently taken aback, called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for respondent Judge Guiang in the administrative case, moved that Atty. Castillo be cited for contempt of court. After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down the corridor leading to the stairs from the sala of Judge Avanceña, the incident that gave rise to the criminal prosecution for oral defamation took place. Petitioners were overheard by Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabanatuan City and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the following defamatory words: Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at estapador." Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.") The prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused, Exequiel Victoria is hereby found guilty of Grave Oral Defamation. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio of serious oral defamation and not slight oral defamation Held: No. There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given rise to the present case. Appellant-petitioner in this instant appeal, does not deny that the accused, on the occasion in question, uttered the defamatory words alleged in the information. Thus, the sole issue that the Court has to resolve is whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral defamation. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]). To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court


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adopted the following guidelines: . . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, '...upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: ... Balite v. People, Ibid., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494). Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that "where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are slanderous per se (Kraushaar v. LaVin, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943]; Mains v. Whiting 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d 638 [1968].

INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR

IVIER V. SAN PEDRO Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3 After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend


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proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion Issue: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband. Held: Yes. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." We find for petitioner. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads: Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount


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equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.


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These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling

LONEY V. PEOPLE Facts: Petitioners are officers of Marcopper, a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"), Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), Section 108 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the grounds that the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act. Issue: Whether or not the charge of the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 Held: No. The petition has no merit, The Court had continuously ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense.


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In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws. The claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them ABUEVA V. PEOPLE Facts: Teofilo Abueva y Cagasan was charged before the RTC of Davao City, in an information of Reckless Imprudence resulting in homicide for the death of Lourdes Mangruban qualified by petitioner’s failure to render or lend assistance on the spot to the victim such help as may be in the hands of the accused to give. It was alleged that petitioner drove and moved a passenger bus out of the terminal building even before Lourdes Mangruban, a passenger of said bus, could properly find and safely take her seat, and that as a direct result of said negligence, recklessness and carelessness, LOURDES MANGRUBAN fell down to the cemented pavement of the terminal road and sustained the injuries which caused her death. The facts showed that the victim, Lourdes Mangruban, fell rather than jumped off the bus. The claim of the defense that the deceased jumped off the bus is incredible and contrary to human experience. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide Held: Yes. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (3) his physical condition;


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and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Petitioner herein is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the bus company for 18 years and has undergone training courses and seminars to improve his skills as a driver. He is expected to be well aware of his responsibilities to his passengers. Not only must he make sure that they reach their destinations on time, he must also ensure their safety while they are boarding, during the entire trip, and upon disembarking from the vehicle. Having failed to exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident, petitioners liability for the death of passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by the lower courts, must be sustained.

PEOPLE V. CARMEN Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Cebu City, finding accused-appellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga @ Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuez @ Rey Nuez guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs. The information against accused-appellants alleged: That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 oclock p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy Luntayao which injuries caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants can be guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicice even the information filed charges them with murder Held: Yes. The accused are all declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa through falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held one of the accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contended that the appeals court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because the information charged him with having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this contention, the Court held: While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said


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that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . . The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence. In People v. Fernando, the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent

PEOPLE V. BEIBES Facts: "In the evening of February 16, 1990, appellant Pat. Domingo Belbes and Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned by the Bacacay Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay. Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca, appellant, Pat. Pabon and Elmo Bes were watching the dance, two students, Riselle Banares and Juliana Basaysay, approached Mrs. Ulanca and said "Mam, it seems that there is somebody making trouble." Appellant and Pat. Pabon, armed with an armalite rifle and a .38 caliber revolver, respectively, responded forthwith. Moments after the two police officers left, bursts of gunfire-- "Rat-tat-tat-tat-tat" filled the air. Fernando Bataller, a graduating student of Pili Barangay High School, was hit on different parts of his body and died. Moments before the gruesome incident, Fernando Bataller, then drunk, was in the company of Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. While Fernando was vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the schools temporary building, the bamboo splits broke. At this instance, appellant and Pat. Pabon appeared. Without warning, appellant fired his gun. Fernando slumped on the ground, bathed with his own blood. Appellant and Pat. Pabon fled from the crime scene. Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. As shown in the autopsy report, Fernando suffered the following gunshot wounds: (1) head, located at the right lower face, skin, muscles, blood vessels, nerves, bone torn away; (2) chest (front, located at left, antero lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, another gunshot wound on the same location with tattooing located at left lateral waistline; (3) chest (back) located at the middle back at the level of the lowest rib, skin and superficial muscles torn away,


CRIMINALLAW 2


Case Digest

another gunshot wound located at the left back, lateral level of the lowest rib, with tattooing. Issue: Whether or not Belbes can be convicted of the crime reckless imprudence resulting in homicide Held: No. The appellant is guilty of tbe crime of homicide. The RTC also erred in convicting him of murder. On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to rule out murder. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For the same to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means, method or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. There is no showing that the shooting was premeditated or that appellant, in shooting the victim, employed means, methods or forms to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended victim might make. Likewise, mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery. On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence resulting in homicide because the shooting was intentional. Illustrations of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who was killed by the accidental discharge brought about by negligent handling; or (2) discharging a firearm from the window of ones house and killing a neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the balcony front; or (3) where the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his .45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the bout continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon thereafter. In this case, appellant intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY the victim. We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken from prision mayor.


CRIMINALLAW 2

Criminal Law 2 Case Digest

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