“The Dead Man and Chicken Case” The United States v. Cecilio Tanedo US v Tanedo 15 Phil 196 Procedural Basis:
Appeal from a judgment judgment of the CFI of of Tarlac
Nature:
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Tarlac
On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some workers to work on the dam on his Facts: land, carrying with him his shotgun & a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, the accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the victim, Feliciano Sanchez, the latter’s Mother & Uncle. The accused went into the forest upon the recommendation of the deceased to continue his search for the elusive wild chickens. Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, simultaneousl y, he heard a human cry out in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one, Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst the tall cogon grass, & later burying in an old well. Only 1 shot was heard that morning & a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime. There was no enmity between the accused and the deceased. Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The lower court found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the deceased into the forest & intentionally shooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos & 1 day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused appealed. Issue:
WON the accused is guilty
Conviction is reversed, the accused accused acquitted, acquitted, and and discharged discharged from custody. Decision and Judgment of Conviction Rationale: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is negated by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired. Also, according to: • Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law • Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of causing it. • Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be in nocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal. In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, accused, nor is it disputed that the Analysis: accused was engaged in a legal act, nor is there evidence that the accused intended to kill the deceased. The only thing suspicious is his denial of the act and his concealment of the body. The court quoted State vs. Legg: “Where accidental killin g is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the state to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the state and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit.” Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
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“Ah Chong” US v Ah Chong 15 Phil 488 Procedural Basis:
The guilty decision rendered by a lower court is appealed to the Supreme Court
Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, Facts: he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, “Who is there,” but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called out again, “If you enter the room I will kill you.” But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door, & believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife & struck & fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Issue:
Is Ah Chong guilty of Murder?
Ruling:
Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.
Ratio Decidendi:
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intruder under A11, par. 1, of the RPC, which requires, to justify the act, that there be: -unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, -reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, & -lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been Analysis: unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no provocation at all. Under A11 of the RPC, there
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US v Laurel 22 Phil 252
On the night of December 26, 1909, while the girl Concepcion Lat was walking along the street, on her way Facts: from the house of Exequiel Castillo in Batangas, accompanied by several young people, she was approached by Jose Laurel who suddenly kissed her and immediately thereafter ran off in the direction of his house, pursued by the girl’s companions, among them was Exequiel Castillo, but they did not overtake him. Early in the evening of the 28th of December, Jose Laurel went to the parochial building, in company with several young people, for the purpose of attending an entertainment which was held there. While sitting in the front row of chairs, and while the director of the college was delivering a discourse, Jose Laurel was approached by Domingo Panganiban who told him that Exequiel Castillo wished to speak with him, to which Laurel replied that he should wait a while and thereupon Panganiban went away. A short time afterwards, he was also approached by Alfredo Yatco who gave him a similar message, and soon afterwards Felipe Almeda came up and told him that Exequiel Castillo was waiting for him on the ground floor of the house. This being the third summons addressed to him, he arose and went down to ascertain what the said Exequiel wanted. When they met, Exequiel asked Laurel why he kissed his sweetheart, and on Laurel’s replying that he had done so because she was very fickle and prodigal of her use of the word “yes” on all occasions, Exequiel said to him that he ought not to act that way and immediately struck him a blow on the head with a cane or club, which assault made Laurel dizzy and cause him to fall to the ground in a sitting posture and that, as Laurel feared that his aggressor would to continue to assault him, he took hold of the pocketknife which he was carrying in his pocket and therewith stabbed Exequiel. Among the wounds inflicted on Exequiel, the wound in the left side of his breast was the most serious on account of its having fully penetrated the lungs and caused him to spit blood. He would have died had it not been for the timely medical aid rendered him. Issue: WON the act of Laurel stabbing Exequiel which could have caused the latter’s death is a valid self defense? Held:
Yes. There was valid self defense.
Ratio: The defensive act executed by Jose Laurel was attended by the three requisites of illegal aggression on the part of Exequiel Castillo, there being lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Laurel, who did not provoke the occurrence complained of, nor did he direct that Exequiel Castillo be invited to come down from the parochial building and arrange the interview which Castillo alone was interested and finally, because Laurel, in defending himself with a pocketknife against the assault made upon him with a cane, which may also be a deadly weapon, employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the same.
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People v Taneo 58 Phil 255 Procedural An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by Basis: the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
The defendant lived with his wife in his parent’s home in Dolores, Ormoc. Sometime January 1932, the Facts: barrio had its fiesta and the family had many guest and visitors. Among them are Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. During the afternoon, Taneo went to sleep while the guest were being entertained by other family members. However, in the middle of his sleep, he got up and got hold of a bolo. His wife saw him and tried to stop him from going into the house with the bolo. However, she failed in stopping him and was wounded by a stab. Fred and Luis also got wounded for stopping the defendant from attacking his own father. His wife, who was also pregnant that time, died five days after the incident. On trial, the defendant stated that he was dreaming when he stabbed his wife. A day prior to the commission of the crime a certain Abadilla and certain Contollanes invited him to a fight. The fight, however, did not occur due to the intervention of the defendant’s wife and mother. When he slept during that afternoon, he d reamt of Abadilla and Contollanes attacking him. Thus, he claimed that when he wounded his wife, he taught it was his blood and that everyone around him was either Abadilla or Contollanes. Issue:
Whether or not the defendant shall be convicted of the crime.
No. The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore, weren’t voluntary in the sense of entailing Ruling: criminal liability. Expert witnesses during the trial attested that he was under hallucination and that he was not in the rig ht mind. The apparent lack of motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us. Although an extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. In the case at hand, the court found not only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained but also motives for not committing the acts. If the defense alleges lack of intelligence in the commission of a felony, it must be proven by them through Analysis: credible witnesses and hard evidence. Also, motive is not necessary to be identified by the courts. It is the outward action which the courts are to render judgment to.
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People v. Guillen GR No. L-1477, January 18, 1950, 85 Phil 307
The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple Facts: frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the President of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas on March 10, 1947.During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing candidate of Manuel Roxas. According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing to redeem and fulfill promises made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, the accused determined to assassinate the President and found the opportunity to do so on the night of March 10, 1947 when the President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen first intended to use a revolver to accomplish his goal but he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so he thought of using two hand grenades which were given to him by an American soldier in exchange for two bottles of whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been sitting on and hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on the platform saw the smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an open space where he thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of a group of persons standing close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela, who died the next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other persons. Guillen was arrested and he readily admitted his responsibility. WON the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Issue: Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to the other injured persons? The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing the hand grenade at Ruling: the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice and is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. As held by thie Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence.The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code.
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People v Boholst-Caballero 61 SCRA 180
Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the judgment of the CFI of Ormoc City finding her guilty of Facts: parricide — she allegedly killed her husband, Francisco Caballero, using a hunting knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had a daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's gambling and drinking and there were times when he maltreated and abused his wife. After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling with her friends and when she was on her way home she met her husband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused her of going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her, held her by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her towards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her and proceeded to choke her. Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt line while holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting knife and thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just above the thigh. He died2 days after the incident due to the stab wound. Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The next day, she surrendered herself to the police along with the torn dress that she wore the night before. Issue:
WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in legitimate self-defense?
Held:
Yes, she did. Acquitted
Ratio:
1. Burden if proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In this case, the location and nature of the stab wound confirms that the said victim, the husband, was the aggressor. With her husband kneeling over her and choking her, accused had no other choice but to pull the knife tucked in his belt line and thrust it into his side. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the knife was drawn from is a strong indication of the truth of the testimony of the accused. Based on the re-enactment of the incident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to lunge the knife into husband's left side. 2. Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present; Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing her to the ground then choking her just because she was out caroling at night constitutes unlawful aggression, There was imminent danger of injury. Reasonable necessity of means employed. While being choked, Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold of the knife and plunge it into husband's side in order to protect herself. Reasonable necessity does not depend upon the harm done but on the imminent danger of such injury. Lack of sufficient provocation. provocation is sufficient when proportionate to the aggression. In this case, there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused (Cunigunda) to warrant the attack of her husband. All that she did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband was to be out caroling at night.
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People v Genosa GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004 Facts: That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15 November 1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995. The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep. Issue: Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery? Ratio: No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense. No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor. HELD: The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. ADDENDUM: When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated? Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
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Intod v Court of Appeals 285 SCRA 52
Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandaya’s house to ask him to go with them to the house Facts: of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangan’s house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that “xxx. The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3) Palangpangan did not slee p at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, m not impossible. Issue:
Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?
[i]Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against Ruling: person or property because: 1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act i n order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
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People v Narvaez GR No. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983 Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with “No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead.” Defendant lost his “equilibrium,” and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep wher e the deceased’s gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer’s family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn’t pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages. Issues: 1. WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person? No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It’s accepted that victim was the original aggressor. 2.
WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights? Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites: • Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant’s property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez’s house and putting up fence. A536 of the CC also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession • Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In case, killing was disproportionate to attack. • Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault wasn’t deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered 3 degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
3.
WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party? No. He isn’t liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non-payment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of A39 applicable to fines only & not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages & costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its commission, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to RPC A22.
Ruling: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 mos. arresto mayor & to indemnify each group of heirs 4K w/o subsidiary imprisonment & w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 yrs so his immediate release is ordered. Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.
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People v Ramos 297 SCRA 618 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/118570.htm
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