CRIMINAL LAW I June 4, 2014, 2014, Wednesday Enlightenment – We can learn the law by ourselves— ourselves —we can study the law and advocate it. We can now access the law directly through technology. technology. ‚We do not need anybody to tell us anymore.‛ anymore.‛ Philippine Philippine Criminal Law Online Systems Grades: 50 item Midterms, 50 item Final Exams (Multiple Choice Questions) Questions) Objectives: REVISED PENAL CODE = GENERAL PENAL LAW Special Criminal Legislation RA 6232 – Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Anti-Trafficking Anti-Trafficking Act Tobacco Regulation Act Learn about Crimes Concepts of Felonies and Offenses The notion of crime is a consequence of the existence of legislation criminalizing criminalizing the activity.
Example: Joseph Estrada – convicted of plunder, pardoned by President, but prohibited him from running for public office. Challenged in the SC. HISTORY: Spanish Spanish Legal Code of 1870 (3 volumes) was extended to the Philippines in the 1880s – became our Penal Law until Revised Penal Code of 1932 (2 volumes, excluding crimes of little consequence/minor faults – designated to local governments/ordinances). governments/ordinances).
Lorenzo vs Posadas Dissent of Malcolm, J in People vs Moran
Criminal Law as a branch of Municipal Law (individuals and the state) Municipal Law separated from Int’l Law (dualist Law (dualist theory) Private Law: individuals and their relationships That’s why it’s People People of the Philippines vs X CRIMINOLOGY Criminal Biology Criminal Sociology Penology Criminal Policy Etiology Criminal statistics
Example: Joseph Estrada – convicted of plunder, pardoned by President, but prohibited him from running for public office. Challenged in the SC. HISTORY: Spanish Spanish Legal Code of 1870 (3 volumes) was extended to the Philippines in the 1880s – became our Penal Law until Revised Penal Code of 1932 (2 volumes, excluding crimes of little consequence/minor faults – designated to local governments/ordinances). governments/ordinances).
Lorenzo vs Posadas Dissent of Malcolm, J in People vs Moran
Criminal Law as a branch of Municipal Law (individuals and the state) Municipal Law separated from Int’l Law (dualist Law (dualist theory) Private Law: individuals and their relationships That’s why it’s People People of the Philippines vs X CRIMINOLOGY Criminal Biology Criminal Sociology Penology Criminal Policy Etiology Criminal statistics
TWO THEORIES IN CRIMINAL LAW 1887 Spanish Penal Law (applying 1870 Penal Law in Spain) – Revised by Rafael Belpan – Presented as Correctional Code – rejected by Phil Legislature – 1932 DOJ appoints Commission Commission to draft Revised Penal Code. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, this barely modified the Spanish Penal Code. There was an effort justifying and exempting some some circumstances. circumstances. 1. CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTERISTICS OF CLASSICAL THEORY a. Human Free Will as Basis of Criminal Liability; Retribution as Purpose of Penalty. Section 12 – enumerates circumstances granting exemption from criminal liability. liability. RA 9344. Age 9-15, with discernment – is possible to incur criminal liability – with free will and judgment. b. Man as Essentially Moral Creature, with absolutely free will to choose between good and evil: with stress on effect or result of felonious act, rather than upon man, criminal himself. The absence of criminal intent is a defense for exculpation. Article 365 is a remnant of the basis of result of focus on effect. Example: ‘Reckless Imprudence.’ Part of Quasi-Offenses. Murder and Homicide (Article 248). c. Endeavors to establish a mechanical and direct proportion between crime and penalty.
socially dangerous) dangerous) at the time of commission, and there can be no penalty without a law that imposes such penalties. c. < d. Advocates personal and individual investigation, conducted by a competent body of psychiatrists and social scientists. e. Revised Penal Code is based mainly on Classical Theory. June 11, 2014, 2014, Wednesday For today: Definition of Criminal Law Related disciplines in criminal science Its rationale Two prevailing theories in Criminal Law as we ll as to identify< Characteristics Characteristics of Criminal Law Generality Territoriality Irretrospectivity
Art. 1,2,3,21, 22, Revised Penal Code Art. 3, 14, New Civil Code Sec. 23, Ch 5, Bk 1, Admin Code of 1987 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations and Optional Protocols, Arts.
INTERNAL WATERS Breadth of the EEZ: Shall not extend beyond 200 NM from the baselines from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
High Seas are what lies beyond the territorial waters. Free for all states, whether coastal or landlocked.
*NOTE: Some crimes may be tried anywhere (usually these are against mankind): Slavery, Piracy. EXAMPLES OF SPECIAL PENAL LAWS Art. 2 Revised Penal Code – Philippine ship/airship (nationality of vessels) RA 9775 – Child Pornography RA 9372 – Human Security Act RA 10168 – Financing of Terrorism RA 9851 – Crimes against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and other crimes against humanity
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes, Crimes of Aggression) RA 10175 – Cybercrime (sec. 21 – Jurisdiction, 22- Int’l Cooperation)
Infraction of Ordinances
**When the penalty imposed is not an exercise of sovereign power to define crimes and provide punishment (de Guzman v Subido, 120 SCRA 443; Conde v Mamenta Jr., 142 SCRA 500). The Philippine Legal System is a mix of the Continental and Anglo-American Legal System. Spanish Civil Code+Penal Code+Corporation Code + American Constitution. There have been concepts that are lost in translation, such as: Delito el faltas = now construed as felony and misdemeanors. CRIMES: Felony (punishable by Revised Penal Code) vs. Offense vs. Infraction (of Ordinances) Only violations of statutes enacted by the National Legislature can give rise to ‘crimes’ or a ‘criminal record’--as these terms are used in our law on Local Gov’ts or the Law of Public Officers.
**NOTE: The Local Government Units are not delegated with authority to define what is a crime. June 14, 2014, Saturday
Note: The concept of the Civil Code is from the Romans. In our modern forms of government, the Legislature is considered an attribute of sovereignty, as part of the three great powers of the government. It’s among Government’s power to tax, eminent domain (taking private property for public use e.g. Land Reform) and police power (power to enact laws and regulations for the general welfare of the people). Criminalization is also subject to limitations by the constitution. (e.g. Substantive and Procedural due process) The Bill of Rights is one of the sources of such limitations. This Principle of Limitation became recognized in the Continental/European and Anglo-American Legal Systems:
Ex-post facto legislation – the passing of a law arising after the act was committed, and penalizing the act. Limitation of the Arbitrary Powers possessed by the judges in the time of Louis XIV—when judges can prescribe penalties not prescribed by law. Art. 21-22, embodiment in the Revised Penal Code (Criminal/Penalty Guarantee [no crime can be committed unless prescribed by law/no penalty can be imposed without being prescribed by law] – Universality of Principle as stated in the Rome Convention.
Example: US v Donoso – power to apply the law is vested in the courts. Executives cannot take unto themselves the impostion of penalties (extra judicial killings) unlike during the Inquisition: suspects were killed before they were given the chance to prove they were innocent. ‚Innocent until proven guilty.‛
Power cannot be done selectively or manner that can be done to promote the interest of certain groups.
Example: Sheriff of Manila vs Moya – all cases must be done for all. People of the Philippines vs X. Procedure is being undertaken on behalf of all. Example: Cooli vs Mamenta – very close to de Guzman v Subido (Cuchero Case). – Rental of a stall near a public market. What constitutes a crime? Lessee failed to pay his rent. Local Government in Zambales filed criminal charges under ordinance involving penalty and charges. Perception of prosecutor that it is a criminal act. Lorenzo v Posadas also enables us to interpret a legal provision as criminal. The criminal act would have a penalty involved. Not all acts with penalties would constitute a crime. Penalties/surcharges could constitute only a civil case/administrative process.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES A. Power to Punish Crimes (People v Pomar 46 Phil 440, US v Taylor (only the legislature can define crimes), 28 Phil 599, US v Pablo, 35 Phil 94, US v Gustilo [on unlicensed firearms – different kinds: one violation. One inclination, several acts], 19 Phil 208, People v Gregorio Santiago, 43 Phil 120, People v Chong Hong, 65 Phil 625). a. No Common Law Crimes (made through pronouncements of courts) in the PH (US v Taylor, 28 Phil 599) b. Defensor-Santiago v Garchitorena [32 acts motivated by just one criminal impulse and done on the same occasion. This is charged only once.] – one cannot be penalized twice for the same act. Unless there is a difference in elements. In that case there will be simultaneous trials. *Note: The Sangguniang Bayan/Sangguniang Panlalawigan acts are the same as the Legislature, on a local level. B. Power to Apply Laws in Criminal Cases (US v Donoso, 3 Phil 234, US v Montecillo 11 Phil 109) Executive cannot try or decide on cases. Only the judiciary exclusively has the power. Sentence is only carried out by the Executive. C. Characteristics of Criminal Law Generality (Art. 14, New Civil Code) Penal Laws and those of
1. Consuls and Vice-Consuls (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocols Arts 31, 40, 41, 42, 43,44,45,46,47,48,49 2. Honorary Consul not exempted (Schneckenburger v Moran, 63 Phil 250). iii. Treaty Provisions 1. Consuls and Vice Consuls 2. US-RP Military Bases Agreement 3. VFA iv. Laws of Preferential Application 1. 1987 Constitution a. Members of Congress not liable for libel or slander in connection with speeches or debates in congress or any committee thereof (Sec. 11, Article 6, Const.) b. RA 75 (Oct. 21, 1946) Sec. 4 i. Domestics or domestic servants of duly accredited ambassadors, if registered with the DFA are immune from criminal prosecution. c. Persons Subject to Military Law i. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over offenses committed by persons subject to Military Law.
Movement (Ruffy vs Chief of Staff, 76 Phil 875). b. Territoriality i. General Rule: Territorial Application of Criminality 1. Philippine Territory (Art. 1, 1987 Const.) 2. Sec. 3, Administrative Code of 1987 3. UNCLOS 46,47,48,49, 50 – submerged islands not included [those which are only visible during low tide] 4. RA 9522, RA 3046, RA 5446, PD 1596, RA 7942 (s3) 5. Exclusive Economic Zone, interior waters and maritime zone, atmosphere. 6. Exceptions a. Art. 2 of RPC: Extra-territoriality—Persons committing offenses while on Philippine ship or airship. b. Persons forging or counterfeiting coins or currency notes or obligations or securities of the Philippine Government. c. Persons liable for acts connected with introduction into the Philippines of said obligations or security. d. Persons who, while being public officers or employees, should commit offenses in the
2. Applicable when foreign vessel not in transit and Philippine port is destination [US v 3. Article 19, Article 60, UNCLOS h. Recent Legislations with Extraterritorial application: International crimes a. RA 9372 Section 58(Human Security Act of 2007) b. RA 10168 (Terrorism) s1920 c. RA 9851 Crimes against humanity, genocide, international humanitarian law s4-9, 17 d. Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court, art 5, 6,7,8,9,11 e. RA 10175 Cybercrime, s 21-22 i. Extradition, Definition, and Concept i. Philippine Extradition law (PD 1069), wright, v CA GR 113213, Aug 15, 1994 ii. Int’l Cooperation, regimes of Mutual
June 21, 2014, Saturday Article 22
Nullum crimen sine lege
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independently of this Statute. Article 23
Nulla poena sine lege
A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute. 1. Ex post facto Law (Sec. 22, Art. III, Const; In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429; Tolentino v Angeles 99 Phil 309; Nuñez v Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433)
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. -In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.
2. Bill of Attainder as ex-post facto law (Sec. 22, Art. III, Const.; People v Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382, Montenegro v Castañeda, 91 Phil. 82) vi. Judicial Rulings not applied retroactively (People v Jabinal, [possession of guns] 55 SCRA 607). *Note: Prescription is the concept where the state has a defined period of time to act on the crime. Afterwards, the state loses the right to prosecute. Imprescriptible Crimes: Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity Mala Prohibita: not wrong in itself, but because the law prohibits it. Example: Right to bear arms / right to revolution. Good faith is irrelevant/not a defense for mala prohibita. The only question to be asked is, ‚Was the act committed?‛ That would be enough for you to bear criminal responsibility. Versus Mala in se—the act is wrong in itself.
SCRA 545); For example: Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 has superseded dangerous drugs act of 1972. People v Simon—if court sees retroactive application as favorable to the accused, it may do so without being asked. ii. Prescribing grounds for mitigation or extinction of criminal liability (Laceste v Santos, 56 Phil 472). iii. Providing for prescription of offenses (People v Moran supra) b. Exceptions: i. Accused is a habitual criminal (Art 22, ibid.; People v Alcaraz, 56 Phil 520). Note: A principal can be coerced. Or be liable by mere execution. Or by conspiracy. Or can be liable as part of collective conspiracy. ii. Later Statute precludes application to existing actions or pending cases (Tavera v Valdez, 1 Phil. 468); People v Moran, supra) iii. Accused disregards later law and invokes prior statute under which he
a. All Crimes must be so defined and penalized by law (Art. 3, 21, 22, Revised Penal Code). i. No Common Law Crimes ii. No analogous crimes (Contra: in the defunct Soviet union, an act deemed socially dangerous although not specifically denounced by law, may be punished on grounds of its analogy to conduct prohibited by law.) 1. But see (People v Atento), 196 SCRA 357: has the Supreme Court established an offense by analogy when it held that sexual intercourse with a 17 y/o girl with mentality of a 7 y/o child is rape because sexual intercourse with 12 y/o victim is rape? OTHER FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS OF PENAL LAW. b. Free will, or freedom to choose between right and wrong. i. No Liability if felonious act is committed without free will. (Intelligence, Imbecility, Intent—For Mala in se, elements) c. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (Art. 3, New Civil Code; Sec. 23, Chapter 5, Book I, Admin Code of 1987; People v Navarro, CA, 51 OG 4062). CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS 1. Liberal Construction in favor of the offender (US v Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243).
a. English Text yields to Spanish Text (People v Manaba, 58 Phil 665; People v Mangulabnan et al., 99 Phil 992; Spanish Text is controlling, People v Mesias, 65 Phil 267; People v Balubar, 60 Phil 698; People v Abilong, 82 Phil 172). b. Brought about by errors in translation, as the Original Penal Code was in Spanish. 5. Amendment, Revision and Codification a. Amendment or Repeal i. How effected (David v Dancel, 17 SCRA 696; Estrada v Caseda, 84 Phil 791; People v Garcia, 85 Phil 651). b. Effect of Repeals. i. Distinguished from Expiration of Law (Ang Beng v Commissioner of Immigration, 100 Phil 810). ii. Express Repeals. 1. Crime is obliterated (People v Almuete 69 SCRA 410; People v Tamayo, 61 Phil 225; People v Pastor, 77 Phil 1000; Ramirez v CA, 71 SCRA 231; Buscayno (Commander Dante of CPP-NPA) v Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6, 25, 109 SCRA 273; People v Concepcion, 44 Phil 126; US v Cuña, 12 Phil 241; People v Monton, 158 SCRA 328). 2. Pending Action, if any, is dismissed (Ibid). 3. Release of Persons convicted under repealed law (Ibid).
4. Effect of Repeal on Jurisdiction to try Criminal Cases (People v Pegarum, 58 Phil 715; People v Almuete, supra; People v Pastor, 77 Phil 1000). iv. Effect of repeal or nullity of repealing law (US v Soliman, 36 Phil 5; Cruz v Youngberg, 56 Phil 234). Example: Piracy in the Revised Penal Code was only defined to be only in high waters. Marcos issued PD 532 on Piracy in PH waters. There was a difference in the definition. You can be prosecuted for both because there is no irreconcilable inconsistency. 6. Resolving Doubts in Favor of Accused a. When there are inculpatory facts susceptible of two interpretations, the one that will be used is the interpretation leading to acquittal favored (People v Alzaga, 177 SCRA 644 – accused may not provide evidence to prove innocence if evidence of the prosecution is weak.) It is better to have a guilty man go free than an innocent man go to jail. IV. ARTICLE 1: This Code shall take effect on the first day of January, 1932. It was a revision of an older law of the Spanish dated December 17, 1886, enforcing royal decree of September 4 1884 effective four months after.)
C. Where offense punishable under the Revised Penal Code is also Punished under Military Law a. Military and Civil Courts have concurrent Jurisdiction (Domiit Cabiling v Prison Officer, 75 Phil 1, Reyes v Crisologo, 75 Phil 225; Ruffy v Chief of Staff, 75 Phil 875; Concepcino v Jalandoni, 75 Phil 655; Untal v Chief of Staff, 84 Phil. 586). i. But War Crimes are not triable in Civil Courts (Cantos v Styer, 76 Phil 748; Yamashita v Styer, 75 Phil 563, 66 Sup Ct. 340; Kuroda v Jalandoni, 83 Phil 171; Raquiza v Bradford, 75 Phil 50). Criminal law and war crimes is sui generis (of its own kind)—criminal law is different from international law on war crimes. 1. But See: presently, RA 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes against Int’l Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and other crimes against humanity), Section: 4, War Crimes, 5 Genocide, 6 Other crimes against humanity, 9 irrelevance of official capacity), <33 Superior Orders and Prescription of Law). < 4. Piracy is triable anywhere (People v Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil 19). VI. ARTICLE III: Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
Murder, Art. 249 – Infanticide) Without regard to the mind of the offender. *Note: In terms of history, we have a lot of Special Penal Laws that deal with Mala In Se. There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. *Note: Criminal law only aspires to provide penal sanctions by acts manifested externally (positive/negative—omission or commission). Not thoughts. 1. Elements of Felonies (People v Lopez, CA 44, OG 584; US v Barnes, 12 Phil 93). (FELONY/FALTAS/PAGKUKULANG/DELITOS – Book 2: Felony vs crime – Violations of Ordinances: infractions; Violations of the Special Penal Laws/ Revised Penal Code: offense; violations of the Revised Penal Code are felonies/crimes. In general, they are all violations BUT the term felony/crime/offense is interchangeable anyway!) A. Act. 1. Only External Acts are Punished. B. Omission. Art. 275, par. 1; Art. 213, par. 2 *b+; Art. 116< Revised Penal Code. 1. Omission must be punishable by Law (People v. Silvestres
People involved in a crime: Principal Accomplice – not principal. What is the act being imputed upon her? Her silence. Her passive presence. – NOT GUILTY of complicity/cooperation/collaboration/being an accessory. Accessory
Criminal Law is not to make persons good but to prevent them from committing evil. Good Samaritan Law—only when in an isolated location, with an injured person are you liable to help the person. There can only arise a crime by omission where there is a legal duty that was omitted. Examples: Crime of Possessing an Unlicensed Firearms, Explosives, Dangerous Drugs. Filing of Income Tax Returns. Note: In the Revised Penal Code there are: 250 – crimes that have to be deliberate. – treason/rape 114 – crimes that may be committed by negligence/imprudence. Kusang-loob Kusang-loob pero hindi mo gusto ang kinahinatnan kusang-loob.
Hindi
Imbecility, Somnambulism (sleepwalking) in the case of Taneo – no freedom or intelligence. For as long as there is an absence of any of the elements of a felony, there is a ground for acquittal. Elements are for all crimes, even for mala prohibita. Not withstanding the fact that mala prohibita do not require intent. There must still be intelligence. Tragedy occurs while 3 people were hunting in the forest. They saw a deer, accidentally/involuntarily killing the person in front. Accident = acting in due care, without intent to cause damage, injures somebody. This is not punishable. US v Catangay. Punishable because of culpa. There was negligence resulting to homicide. US v Siy Cong Bieng = adulterated coffee. This is a crime of mala prohibita. Just intent is required to be punished. 30 Phil 577. Good faith negates criminal intent. But if crime is mala prohibita, good faith is not a defense. Mala prohibita does not require intent. (Art. 217) Guevarra v Almodovar. GR 75256, Jan 26, 1989. Intelligence is different from discernment. Two children played William Tell. They had bottlecaps on their heads. Tragedy struck. Legal Age of Discernment in the old Penal Code: 9 years
Nalunudasan case. Marcos says: no evidence. Nalundasan was shot by a sharpshooter. There may be motive on the part of Marcos, but there was no evidence. There wasn’t necessarily intent. Related: People v Taneo July 9, 2014, Wednesday Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. A. Criminal Liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (Delito) although the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended. A) Elements: 1) Felony is committed (People v Bindoy, 56 Phil 15; People v Galacgac, CA, 54 OG 1027). A) when act is lawful (People v Salinas, CA 62 OG 3186). 2) Wrong done is direct, natural, logical, consequence of felony committed (US v Sornito, 4 Phil 357; US v Zamora, 32 Phil 218; People v Cornel 78 Phil 458; US v Valdez, 41 Phil 497; People v Buhay, 79 Phil 372; People v Quianzon, 62 Phil 162; People v Moldes, 61 Phil 1; US v Marasigan, 27 Phil 604; Uni v Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 1). A) Blow was the efficient Cause of Death (People v
ii) Death attributable to fever prevalent in locality (People v Palalon, 49 Phil 177). iii) Cause of death not proved (US v Embate, 3 Phil 640). iv) Death attributable to tetanus (Urbano v IAC, 157 SCRA 1). D) Blow Accelerated Death (US v Rodriguez, 23 Phil 22). 3) When there is an intervening Cause (People v Palalon, 49 Phil 177). A) Instances not constituting efficient intervening cause: i) Weak or diseased physical condition of Victim (People v Illustre, supra; People v Reyes, supra). ii) Nervousness or Temperament of Victim (People v Almonte, 56 Phil 54; see also People v Quianzon, 62 Phil 162). iii) Causes inherent in victim: Addiction to tuba drinking (US v Bayutas, 31 Phil 584); Victim did not know how to swim US v Valdez, supra. iv) Neglect of victim or third person: (1) victim refused medical attendance or surgical operation (US v Marasigan, 27 Phil 504); (2) failure of doctor to give antitetanus injection (Peopl Red, CA, 43 OG 5072).
4) Infanticide (Article 255, RPC) 5) Abortion (Article 256-259, RPC) 6) Duel (Article 260-261, RPC) 7) Physical Injuries (Article 262-266, RPC) 8) Rape (Article 266A-B, RPC) b) Crimes against property Theft (308,310,313), usurpation (312-313), culpable insolvency (314), swindling and other deceits (315-317), chattel mortgage (319), arson and other crimes involving destruction (320-326, Amended by PD 1613, Art 320, amended by Sec. 10, RA 7659, PD 1613), malicious mischiefs (Article 327-331). 2) Evil Intent. 3) Not Accomplished. a) Inherent Impossibility b) Employment of inadequate or ineffectual means i) if crime is not produced despite adequate or effectual means: Frustrated felony. 4) Reason why impossible crimes are punished. 5) No frustrated or attempted stage. b) When accused cannot be convicted of impossible crime. (People v Ignacio) July 12, 2014, Saturday
Criminal: Praeter intertionem (fatal injury on account of the weakness of the victim—result going beyond intent), aberration iltus (mistake in the blow—hit someone/something else than the intended victim), error in personae (mistaken identity). Non-Criminal: Prove good faith (DAP). Else, this will be treated as criminal. Good Faith must be one of fact. For foreign laws, mistake of law is not a mistake of fact. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Mistake upon a difficult case of law, (Case of First Impression) good faith may be a defense. *Note: Every act is presumed to be voluntary. WHAT IS CULPABILITY?! In ENGLISH: Culpable: done with criminal intent. In Continental/SPANISH: (Delito doloso (dolo) vs delito culposo (culpanegligence or imprudence) An unlawful (illegal, unconstitutional, criminal) act is presumed to have been committed with a lawful intent. Good faith is a defense! If an act is determined to be unlawful, criminal intent has to be presumed and
US v Ah Chong, 15 Phil 488. Dagger underneath a pillow. (Fear of robber) People v Oanis- mistaken identity of Balagtas (Wanted: Dead or Alive criminal) People v de Fernando – escapees in zamboanga going up the stairs. People v Guillen – assassin of Roxas. US v Divino—good end is not always justified by wrong means. (Practice of Medicine without proper license)
Coverage of Midterms will be Program Modules 1-8 (mostly on the codal side up to 11-15). July 25, 2014 —Codal: Up to Article 26. July 19, 2014, Saturday Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
1. Reasons: Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege. 2. Acting with Lesser Degree of Malice (People v Orifon, 57 Phil 594; People v Castaneda, 60 Phil 604; People v Espino, et al, CA-GR No 14029-R, Feb 20, 1956). 3. Duty to apply law as interpreted by SC (People v Santos, et al., 104 Phil 1184). 4. Not applicable to Special Penal Laws: Possession of Firearms (People v Estoista, 93 Phil. 654; People v Lubo, 101 Phil. 179); Offenses punished by price control law (Ayuda v People, GR L-6149, Apr 12, 1954); Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act (People v Jandayan, GR No 74871, Feb 27, 1989) 5. Does not refer to Crimes Mala Prohibita (People v Quebral, CA, 58 OG 7399). Article 6. 1. Phases in Commission of Felonies A. Subjective (US v Eduave, 36 Phil. 209) B. Objective (People v Sy Pio (GR No. L-5848). 2. Development of Crimes – (Actus Reus—criminal act) Actions and Thoughts for Mala In Se (Mens Rea—from a criminal mind/malice/Criminal Intent—Good Faith negates Mens Rea) A. Internal Acts. Motive has nothing to do with criminal intent. Absence of criminal intent may be used to show good motives.
7. People v Borinaga, 55 Phil. 433; 8. US v Simeon (farmer with bolo). Indeterminate Offense-Asks woman for clothes with a gun to her head. (US v limbuangco) – checks and estafa. People v Toling, 91 SCRA 382 – A,B,C – intimidated D to join them. Present but did not participate. C and B – guns for hire. To rob a house. But to Kill X is the real purpose. Murder – AB. Robbery ABC. Acquitted D. People v Quinto, 93 SCRA 605.
Sir’s Awesome Pre-Midterm Lecture Below<
August 2, 2014, Saturday Orientation towards Individualizing Penalties and Humanizing Criminal Law Grave Felonies/Grave Penalties Mapagpasakit Less Grave Felonies/Correctional Penalties Mapagwasto Light Felonies/Light Penalty Capital = beheading DEGREES OF PENALTIES: Grave Penalties Death - indivisible Reclusion Perpetual (20 yesars+ 1 day - 40 Reclusion Temporal (12 y + 1 day – 20y) Prison Mayor (6 y + 1 day – 12y) Correctional Penalties: Prison Correctional (6m +1y – 6 y) Arresto Mayor (1m + 1d to 6y) Light Penalties: Arresto Menor (1-30 days ) (min, med, max) Modifying Circumstances/Aggravating Circumstances and Mitigating Circumstances Art. 49 Reclusion Temporal
If a crime is committed and penalty is divisible—without mitigating/aggravating circumstance, penalty is automatically medium. One ordinary mitigating circumstance = minimum. One ordinary aggravating circumstance = maximum. RA 9346 – suspension of Death Penalty Generic Mitigating Circumstance (just up to minimum of degree of penalty) v Privileged/Special Mitigating Circumstances (up to 1 to two degrees of penalty lower). Special Aggravating Circumstance (ex. quasi- recidivism not susceptible of being cancelled out by any ordinary mitigating circumstance. But only raises) v Generic Aggravating Circumstance. Inherent to the act – not aggravating. Obtain partial defense/acquit/absolve – duty of a defense counsel. People v Mesias – translation of ‘rice’ – robbery forced upon things. Palay is a mitigating circumstance v bigas. Absolutory Cases (article 6 –attempted stage) – when attempted only Image on Circumstances
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY I. In General. A. Justifying Circumstances. 1. Acts in Accordance With Law. 2. Neither Criminal Nor Civil Liability Arises. 1. Except under Art. 11 par. 4
B. Exempting Circumstances. 1. Acts not quite voluntary (imbecility/insanity also) 2. No criminal liability results, but civil liability rises. C. Mitigating or Extenuating Circumstances. 1. Diminution of Elements of Dolo or Culpa 2. Lesser Perversity of Offender. 3. Results in Lesser Penalty. D. Aggravating Circumstances. 1. Greater Perversity of Offender as shown by: 1. Motivating Power. 2. Time and Place. 3. Means Employed. 4. Personal Circumstances of Offender. 2. Results in greater penalty without exceeding maximum provided by law or changes nature of crime. E. Alternative Circumstances (QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES) 1. Aggravates or mitigates, according to: 1. Nature and effects of crime. 2. Other conditions attending commission of crime. F. Absolutory Causes. 1. Acts actually constituting crime. 2. No criminal liability by reason of public policy and sentiment. 3. Specific instances. 1. Spontaneous desistance at attempted stage (Art. 6, RPC, See people v Cadile, et al., CA 50 OG 5425) and acts performed so far do not constitute crime under other legal provision. 2. Light felony is only attempted or frustrated and is not against persons or property (Art 7, RPC)
3. Accessories are relatives of principal: Certain relatives NT (People v Galicia, CA 40 OG 4476; People v de la pena, GR 92534, July 9, 1991; People v Ramos, GR Ramos , GR 88301, Oct. 28, 1991) 4. Less Serious and Slight Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstances (Art. 247, RPC) 5. Legal Grounds for Trespass: Entry of another’s dwelling to prevent serious personal harm or to render service to humanity or justice or entry of cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses while same are open (Art. 280, RPC). 6. Legal Grounds for Detention: Commission of crime, violent insanity or other ailment requiring compulsory confinement of patient in hospital (Art. 124, RPC) 7. Theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed mutually by certain persons related to each other as specified by law (Art. 332, RPC) 8. Marriage by Offender with offended party in certain private crimes (Art. 266-C and 344, RPC) 9. Instigation (US v Phelps, 16 Phil. 440; People v Gatong-o, 168 SCRA 716). 1. Distinguished from Entrapment (People v Galicia, CA 40 OG 4476; People v de la Pena, GR No. 92534, July 9, 1991; People v Ramos, GR 88301, Oct. 28, 1991, Underlying Difference Lies in Origin of Criminal Intent). 1. Entrapment not Absolutory (People v Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 56 Phil. 44). 2. Why Instigation is Absolutory (State v Hayes, 105 Mo.76; Saunders v People, 38 Mich. 218). 3. Simple Discovery is neither instigation nor entrapment (People v Tan Tiong, CA 43 OG 1285). 4. Assurance of Immunity from Public Officer is not instigation and does not exempt from criminal liability (People v Alabas, CA 52 OG 3091). G. Performance of righteous Action is Neither Justifying , Exempting, nor Mitigating (People v Victoria, 78 Phil. 122), and neither is it an absolutory Cause.
H. Imputability, responsibility, guilt and imputation. 1. Imputability: Ascribability of Act to Author. 2. Responsibility: Obligation to suffer effects of crime. 1. Distinguished from imputability. 3. Guilt. 1. Sin, Vice and Crime distinguished. 4. Imputability Distinguished From Imputation. II. COMPLETE DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL CASES. 1. Absence of Proof as to essential element and elemnts proved do not constitute crime. 2. Act falls under any justifying circumstances (Art. 11, RPC). 3. Act falls under any exempting circumstnaces (Art. 12, RPC). 4. Case is covered by absolutory causes (see above). 5. Guilt not established beyond reasonable doubt (Rule 133, S ec. 2, New Rules on Evidence). 6. Crime has Prescribed (Art. 89, RPC) 7. Pardon by offended party before institution of criminal action in crimes against chastity (Art. 344, RPC). III. Article 11. 1. Justifying Circumstances. A. Definition B. Basis. 2. Old Penal Code did not distinguish between justifying and exempting circumstances. A. Freedom from both criminal and civil liability versus freedom from criminal liability alone. 3. Burden of Proof of Justification: Upon Accused (People v Bausing, GR No. 64965, July 18, 1991; People v Nabayra, GR No. 96368-69, Oct. 17, 1991). IV. Article 11, Par. 1. 1. Self-Defense (Propia Defensa). A. Scope
1. Defense of Person or life (Defensa de su vida). 2. Defense of Honor (Defensa de su honor). 1. When killing for honor held justified. 1. Picking up knife of rapist preparing to lie with accused and stabbing him (People v Luague, et al., 62 Phil 504). 2. Husband and wife cooperating to kill unarmed person trying to rape wife (People v Ruperto Pineda , 8 ACR 285). 3. Inflicting bolo wounds on assailant attempting rape, even if cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby (US v Sta. Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil. 249). 4. Stabbing with knife an attacker who grabbed accused from behind, refused to identify himself, touched her private parts and trying to throw her down (People v de la Cruz, 61 Phil 344). 5. Starring with knife for several times assailant who attacked accused in an uninhabited place, has pinned her down, face upward, raised her dress, touched her breast and endeavoring to effect penetration (People v Mengote, CA 49 OG 4874). 2. When killing held unjustified. 1. No actual danger of being raped, as deceased touched upper thighs o f accused inside well-lighted chapel where there were people around (People v Jaurigue, 76 Phil 174). 2. Mere touching or grasping of arm, without insistence or repetition which could be considered an attempt against honor, even if intruder did not reply when asked who he was (US v Apego, 23 Phil 391). 3. Using Barong (Bolo) of assailant to inflict mortal wound on back of latter’s neck in struggle of accused to protect her honor (People v Salip Milha, CA 35 OG 3496). 4. Killing of paramour not attributable to attempt to rape accused who maintained illicit relation with victim for some time (US v Potestas, 23 Phil. 466). 3. Defense of Property Rights (Defensa de sus derechos).
1. Basic Presupposition: coupled with attack or person entrusted with property (People v Apolinar, 38 OG 2870). 1. When Not Justified. 1. After firing in the air, shooting twice victim believed to be stealing palay for not stopping despite calls of accused (People v APolinar, 38 OG. 2870). 2. Shooting complainant who was going out with sack of palay from bodega under guard by accused (People v Goya, CA-GR No. 1673-R, Sept. 29, 1956). 3. Killing an intruder who entered bodega with apparent intent t o steal palay but came out without having carried away any palay (People v Talastas, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 127; see also US v Vallados, 4 Phil 339). 4. Killing an adversary within disputed property, even if attempting to gather crops therein (People v Co Arquiza, 62 Phil 611). 5. Killing suspected robber/thief trying to carry away stolen palay from granary (US v Bumanglag, 14 Phil 143). 2. When Justified. 1. Use by tenant of reasonable force to prevent dispossession from parcel of land he has already cultivated (People v Amado Reyes, CA 40 OG 1690; Art. 429, Civil Code). 2. Pointing a gun, whether real or toy, at person demolishing his wall, although same is constructed on land of another (People v Fuentebella, 23 CAR (2s) 946). 2. Self-Help: Use of ‚Reasonable Force‛ under Art. 429, Civil Code (People v Amado Reyes, CA 40 OG 1690; see Dissent in US v Brobst, 14 Phil 310; People v Depante, CA 58 OG 926; People v Tilos, CA 36 OG Sup. 5, 277). 3. <
B. Self-Defense Under Mistake of Facts (US v Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488; People v Boral, 11 CAR (2s) 914). C. Basis: Rationale. 1. Positivist and Classical Theories (People v Boholst -Caballero, 61 SCRA 180; Castanares v Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 567). D. Elements of Self-Defense (Art. 11, par. 1, RPC). E. Unlawful Aggression (Agresion Illegitima). 1. Defined (People v LAcson, 10 CAR (2s) 78; People v Sulabo, 15 CAR (2s) 962); People v Alconga, et al, 78 Phil. 466; People v Encomienda, 46 SCRA 522; People v Crisostomo, 108 SCRA 288; People v Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137). 2. Nature. 3. Significance. < 5. 6. Elements. 1. Actual, Real or imminent. 2. Unprovoked or unjustified. 3. Externally Initiated. 4. But no self-defense when author of aggression not known. 7. When required to exist. 8. When unlawful aggression held present. 1. Aiming a revolver with intent to shoot (People v Resurreccion, CA –GR No. 00048-R, Feb 9, 1962). 2. Opening a Knife and making a motion as if to attack 3. Attempting to Rape a woman 4. Unlawful Arrest 1. Unlawful aggression by agents of authority:Acting in extra-limitation of functions
5. Seizure of Fishing Net without judicial Authority 6. Taking personal property of judgment debtor with sentimental value although other personal property of sufficient value are made available (people v Hernandez, 59 Phil 343) 7. Strong retaliation for injury or threat (US v Carrero, 9 Phil 544) 8. Libel (People v Chua Hiong, CA 51 OG 1932). 1. Retaliation must also be in form of another libel (id) 9. Efforts by violence or surprise to commit felony in one’s home: Provided, coupled with attack on person (People v Salatan, CA 69 OG 10134; People v Mirabiles, CA 45 OG Supp. 5, 277). 1. Assault by thief inside house in the dark (People v Salatan, CA 69 OG 10134). 2. Violent Entry in one’s home (People v Mirabiles) 10. Raising a bolo as if to attack (People v Samonte, CA-GR no. 167-R, June 27, 1950). 11. Attack with Deadly Weapon where intent to Kill is manifest (People v de la cruz, 61 Phil 422) 12. Hurling a piece of wood (People v Alconga, et al., 78 Phil 332). Wife and Guests (People v Javier) 9. When unlawful aggression held absent. 1. Evasion of promise to marry (People v Guias, 8 CAR (2s) 446). 2. Thief caught in the act of stealing property but not manifesting intent to assault persons (People v Apolinar, People v Goya, CA-GR No. 16373-R, Sept. 29, 1965). 3. Forcibly pushing picketers to allow entry of trucks in company compound. (People v Calip, et al., 3 CAR (2s) 808). 4. Mere threatening attitude: 1. Aiming to throw a pot (People v Labinia, 115 SCRA 223). 2. Pressing right hand at revolver’s holster, even if accompa nied by angry countenance (People v Padin, CA-GR No. 11836-R, Feb. 12, 1960). 3. Approaching with bolo hanging from waist, with kris on hand but undrawn from sheath (People v de la cruz, 61 Phil. 422).
4. Placing hand in pocket as if going to draw something (People v Calantoc; US v Carrero) 5. Mere cracking (not firing) of gun, where accused does not even see gun or holder thereof 6. Holding hand of person with hunting knife while requesting t hat same be released so nothing untoward might happen. 7. Holding barrel of rifle even trying to grab it, after accused pointed it at deceased and accused was physically located as 8. Mere push or shove not followed by other acts: playful kick at foot by way of greeting among friends (People v Sabio) 9. May be mere slight provocation but not aggression 10. Kicks and blows which, although excessive, were k nown to be intended as mere disciplinary measures 11. Slight push on the head 12. Wounding another while struggling to free oneself from hold of gang (People v Obeda, 101 SCRA 675). 13. Retreating Aggressor. 1. Aggressor manifested refusal to continue fighting (People v Nicolas, People v Alviar) 2. Aggressor lying down and defenseless (People v del Rosario) 14. When there was agreement to fight 15. Acceptance of challenge to fight as negating unlawful aggression 16. Free-for-all fights (People v Kreuse, 12 CAR (2s) 399). August 9, 2014, Saturday V. Article 11, Paragraph 2.
1. Defense of Relative (Art. 11, Par. 2, RPC). 2. Relatives Mentioned by Law (Art. 11, Par. 2 RPC, People v Cabellon, 51 Phil 846). a. Spouse b. Ascendants c. Descendants d. Legitimate, Natural or Adopted Brothers nad sisters e. Relatives By Affinity i. Within same degree as those previously mentioned ii. Death of Spouse Terminates relationship by affinity (Kelly v Neely, 12 Ark. 667) 1. But Continuing if marriage results in issue who is still living (Dearmond v Dearmond, 10 Ind. 191; bigelow v Sprague, 140 Mass. 425). f. Relatives by Consanguinity within fourth civil degree. i. Blood Relatives 1. Nephews and nieces 2. Uncles and aunts. 3. First cousins 3. Basis 4. Requisites a. Unlawful Aggression (See discussions under Art. 11, Par. 1, RPC) i. When absence in defense of relative (People v Moro Munabe, CA 46 OG 4392; People v Panuril, CA 40 OG 1477). ii. May be based on honest belief: < Does not preclude defense of relative. (1) Reason: Defender may be purely prompted by noble, generous sentiment
VI. Article 11, Paragraph 3 A. Defense of Relatives (art. 11, par.3 RPC) 1. Who are deemed strangers (People v Ancehta, et al., 66 Phil 638; People v Valdez, 58 Phil 31; US v Subingsubing, 31 Phil 376). 2. Basis (US v Aviado, 38 Phil. 10). 3. Requisites. 1. Unlawful Aggression (See discussion under Art. 11, Par. 1, RPC) 2. Reasonable Necessity of Means Employed (See discussions under Ar t. 11, Par. 1, RPC) 3. Defender not induced by revenge, resentment, or or ot her evil motive 1. When third requirement not present (People v Cabellon and Gaviola, 51 Phil 851, Acting under impulse of resentment). VII. ARTICLE 11, Paragraph 4 A. State of Necessity: Avoidance of greater evil or injury (Art. 11, Par. 4, RPC) B. Damage ot another Embraces: 1. Injury to Persons (People v Norma Hernandez, CA 55 OG 8465). 2. Damage to Property (Tan v Standard Vacuum Oil Co. 91 Phil 672). 3. Requisites. 1. Actual Existence of Evil Sought to be Avoided. 1. When No avoidance of evil (People v Ricohermoso, etal., 56 SCRA 431). 2. Injury Feared Greater than that done to avoid it. 3. Absence of other practical, less harmful means. C. Civil liability obtains even if no criminal liability arises (Art. 101, RPC)
August 23, 2014, Saturday Article 12: Deprivation of Freedom of Action – Exempting Circumstances ‚Irresistible Force‛ or ‚Uncontrollable Fear‛ Degree of Irresistible Force or Uncontrollable Fear = For the person to act as a weapon of another. Crimes committed by Omission – insuperable cause vs refusal to do so Arbitrary Detention – Warrantless Arrest (Article 124, Book 2 RPC) Article 13: Other Circumstances or Analogous – Lack of Freedom or Intelligence US v Taneo – Not Insane! Just overate fiesta – siesta – sleepwalked and killed pregnant wife and injured father in law. Diminished Freedom or Intelligence + one or more requisites for exemption (Privileged Mitigating Circumstance, e.g. 1518 y/o with discernment) Total Absence of Freedom = Volition Test Total Absence of Intelligence = Cognition Test (Insanity) One for of Mistake (Praeter Intentionem) Act was wrong as to that which he intended (People v Cagoco) Sufficient Provocation preceding the act must be commensurate to act (Self-Defense) Unlawful Aggression (People v Quiamzon)..effect of provocation on the offender leading to diminution in the exercise of his intelligence. Vindication of Grave Offense = Diminished Intelligence – Immediately Preceded (Proximate, reasonable interval in Spanish) by sufficient Provocation or Threat to close relatives
Impulse (Pagdidilim ng Isip) US v Hicks – Shooting of common law wife is not lawful. People v Bello – Old man in the forest with woman from a well-lighted place. Man kills woman in movie theater. Man was provoked by the promiscuity of the woman. Woman pours water on herself. She gets raped. Lawful sentiment as provocation, not bestial instinct. Disposition of Offender to Reform and Saving the Gov’t the expense and effort in finding offender and prosecute him as Mitigating Circumstance: Voluntary Surrender to a person in authority without force. Admission of Guilt in Court when case is filed prior to presentation of evidence. Spontaneity is KEY. Diminished Freedom on Account of Restrictive Physical Defects/Disability (Deaf/Mute/Blind) – possibly unjustifiably provoked. Illness of Offender that would diminish willpower of offender without depriving him of his acts. August 27, 2014, Wednesday Aggravating Circumstances-Article 14 Greater Criminal Perversity of the Offender. Place, Time and other Circumstances. Generic Aggravating Circumstances Special Aggravating Circumstances Certain inapplicable Aggravating Circumstances Inherent Aggravating Circumstances
Personal to the Offenders. Qualifying Circumstances August 30, 2014, Saturday Article 14, Par. 13 1. Evident Premeditation A. Applies to an intended victim. B. Contemplated on a specific class of persons (US v Manalinde – running amok) Article 14, Par. 14 Aggravating Circumstance: 1. Employment of Craft, fraud, or disguise (Art. 14, Par. 14, RPC) 2. Basis: Means employed in the Commission of Crime Showing Greater Perversity. 3. Application (US v Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 155) A. Craft (US v Gampona, 36 Pihl 817) -- < pretending to be an innocent person to avoid suspicion or weaken ersistance 1. When Craft not Aggravating – Element of Qualified Theft, whereby offender gained possession of jeep from owner through a sham transaction of purchase and sale (People v Tiongson, CA 59 OG 4521) B. Fraud—intellectual deception.(inducing victims to give up their ar ms on promise that they will not be harmed then killing them after they did so) Where accused made victim believe she was to be taken to her godmother’s house but actually took her elsewhere to be raped. Victim induced to go down to lower story of dwelling where wine was stored on pretext of accused of wanting to buy wine, then assaulting him as soon as the door was opened. C. Disguise—Accused blacked his face to prevent recognition. Accused covered his face handkerchief before committing crime. Not aggravating when victim recognized the culprit. Wearing of constabulary uniform. Use of assumed name in publication of libel.
Article 14, Par. 15. Taking Advantage or superior strength or means employed to weaken defense. 1. Basis: Greater perversity shown by means employed. 2. Specific Instances. A. Abuse of Superior Strength (Marked difference of physical st rength between offended party and offender. Aggressors were armed police officers and dec eased was a smaller man, defenseless and intoxicated. B. Evidence of relative physical strength necessary. 1. Number of aggressors may point abuse of superiority (US v Tandoc, 40 Phil. 954; People v Caroz, et al. 68 Phil 521). 1. But no abuse of superior number when attack made alternately (People v Narciso, et al., GR No. L-24484, May 28, 1968). 2. No Abuse of superiority where one acted as principal and two acted only as accomplices (People v Cortes, 55 Phil. 143). C. Abuse of Superior Strength may be aggravating even in coercion and forcible abduction when force used is greatly in excess of what is required to commit offense (People v Fernando et al, CA 43 OG 1717). D. Other Instances when held aggravating. 1. Other Instances when held Aggravating. 1. Illegal Detention (US v Santiago, 4 Phil 168, 6 Persons took and carried away victim). 2. Robbery with Rape (People v Macaya, et al, 85 Phil 540, committed by 5 persons). 3. Multiple Rape (US v Camiloy, et al, 36 Phil 757, Committed by 4 Men). E. Cuadrilla does not absorb abuse of superiority (People v Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 800). F. Means employed to weaken the defense (US v Davela et al, 3 Phil 625, Accused suddenly throws cloak over victim and wounds and kills him in that situation, People v Ducusin, 53 Phil 280, Accused intoxicated the deceased; People v Slaotong et al, GR No L-9242, Mar. 29, 1957, Accused Cast sand or dirt on eyes of victim and then wounded and killed him).
Article 15, Paragraph 16. A. TREACHERY = DECEIT = KATRAYDURAN B. Basis: Means and ways employed in committing crime, showing greater perversity. C. Rules. 1. Applicable only to crimes against Persons (People v Ramos. CA 47 OG 1913). – NOT applicable to crimes with public interest (falsification), or against property (estafa) 2. Means, methods or forms of execution need not insure accomplishment of crime (People v Parana, 64 Phil. 331). 3. Mode of attack must be consciously adopted (People v Tumaob, 83 Phil 742, People v Saez, 1 SCRA 937, People v Dauz, CA 40 OG Supp. 11, 107, People v Abalos, 84 Phil 771, People v Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389, Not Appreciated because merely accidental, the slayer having acted instantaneously). 1. Treachery not presumed (People v Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245, Needs to be proven as fully as crime itself, People v Barba, GR No 50434, Nov. 13, 1991, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, US v Perdon, 4 Phil 141, Not established from mere suppositions; US v Panaligan, 34 Phil. 786, People v Lubreo, GR No 74146, Aug. 2, 1991, cannot be deduced from presumption). 1. Rule with exceptions (US v Santos, 1 Phil. 222, Victim tied elbow to elbow, his body bore numerous wounds and his head was cut off, People v Laggui, CA 34 OG 1708, victim is a child, US v Oro, 19 Phil. 554, Victim is child of tender age). D. Requisites. 1. At the time of attack, victim was not in a position to defend himself (People v Saquing, 30 SCRA 835, victims made to lie down, hands tied at back, before being killed). 1. Treachery may exist even in frontal attack (US v Cornejo, 28 Phil 457, Attack not preceded by dispute and offended party unable to prepare himself for defense; People v Noble 77 Phil. 93), attack so sudden and unexpected). 1. But mere suddenness of attack does not itself constitute treachery.
2. Offender consciously adopted particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him (People v Saez, 1 SCRA 937). 1. Method is to ensure offender’s safety: Purpose is to eliminate risk to himself. People Peo ple v Yadaon— Yadaon—victim on his back, drowsy and unarmed; People v Dequina, People v Miranda, Victims killed while asleep; People v Avila, Victim shot while just awkawening from sleep, People v Noble, Unsuspecting vitim hit on o n abdomen while wheeling around to face assailant, US v Valdez and Gamit – Victim wounded while held from behind by another, People v Mukung, Calling Victim down from house and subjecting him while doing so in volley of shots, People v Rendora, Sudden attack with firearms. 3. Treachery must precede commencement of attack which caused injury (US v Balagtas). 1. But not needed at beginning of assault where victim was first seized and bound and t hen killed (US v Elicanal, US v Candelaria) 1. But not needed at the beginning of assault where victim was first seiezed and bound the moment the fatalb low was inflicted, Victim was not killed at first shot but on return of accused wafter searching for others, when victim was utterly defenseless. 1. GR 42769 2. Wounding and killing was all so sudden that victims were left defenseless. (People v Pinto) 3. Suddenly stabbing victim at stomach after accused came from behind victim who was reading newspaper. (People v GAbatin) 4. Stabbing victim victim while engaged in otherwise peaceful activity of selling ‚Social boxes‛ in a dances party immediately after victim had fallen on dance floor (People v Gabatin) 5. Stabbing deceased without warning the moment he unsuspect ing released the hand of accused (People v Lacao GR 95320, Sep 4 1991) 6. Ambuscade (People v Arroyo, GR No 99258, Sep 13, 1991)
7. Shooting victim from a distance of six feet while citim has just started talking to an other person. 1. No showing that mode of commission was deliberately adopted, but circumstance proves abuse of superiority. 2. Meting between accused and victim was only accidental and attack followed heated dispute between them (People v Velaga, attack done on sudden impulse) E. Relationship to other aggravating circumstances. 1. Absorbed in treason by killings (People v Racaza) 2. Absorbed abuse of superior strength, aid of arm men, by a band and menas to weaken defense (People v Siaotong, US v Estopia, Estop ia, US v Oro, US v Vitug, V itug, People v Mori, People v Sespene, People v Sangalang, People v Sudoy). 1. But Defeneseless condition of victims held included in abuse o f superiority, not treachery (People v Lawas). 3. Nighttime inherent in treachery (People v Pardo, People v Corpuz, People v Balagtas). 1. When Treachery does not absorb nighttime: When they each rest on independent factual bases (People v John Doe, GR No. L-2463, Mar 31, 1950, People v VErdida et al, 17 SCRA 520, People v Guevarra, GR No. L-24371, April 13, 1968). 4. Treachery absorbs taking advantage of official position (People v Pascual, GR No. 42769, Dec, 5, 1991) 5. Treachery includes and absorbs craft (People v Malig et al, 83 Phil 804. People v Daos, where craft was considered separately from treachery, it having an independent factual basis, craft used to board taxi without arousing driver’s suspicioin , killing done from behind was treacherous) 6. Treachery includes disregard of age and sex. 7. But treachery does not include dwelling. 8. Treachery inherent in murder by poisoning.
9. Treachery incompatible with passion and obfuscation (since there is no impulse) –People v Wong, CA 70 OG 4844. 10. But treachery is not incompatible with lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (where lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was not appreciated because treachery characterized the offense ). 11. Treachery may be appreciated against co-conspirator. Mastermind held liable for employment of treachery even if he was not present when crime was committed because there was conspiracy. 12. But, treachery not appreciated against mastermind charged only as principal by inducement per se wirhout proof of conspiracy when employment of treachery was done without his knowledge and he was not present when crime was committed. Article 14, Paragraph 17. 1. Ignominy. 2. Basis: Means employed which shows greater perversity. 3. Ignominy defined (US v Abaigar, 2 Phil 417) 4. When applicable. A. Crimes against chastity (People v Jose, 37 SCRA 450, People v Torrefiel et al, CA 45 OG 803, Victim raped after accused wound cogon grass around his genital organ (But see discussion on cruelty); US v Iglesias et al, 21 Phil 55, Wife raped in front of husband, US v Casanas, 5 Phil 377, Woman Raped in presence of bethrothed , US v Camiloy, 36 Phil 757, Woman successively raped by four men, People v Detuya, 154 SCRA 410, Wife raped successively by five accu sed in front of husband , but see People v Mongado, 28 SCRA 642, Not appreciated because rape was done after husband was killed). B. Less serious physical injuries or maltreatment (People v Fernando, CA 43 OG 1717, Accused took off drawers of woman being forced to confess charge of theft). C. Light or grave coercion (People v Cantiong CA 50 OG 5899, Accused, acting under the impulse of anger, rather than desire to satisfy lust, embraced and kiss offended party who was a young woman, people v
Fernando, CA 43 OG 1717, Removal by accused of old woman drawers to force her to confess to charge of theft could have no other purpose but to put her to shame). D. Murder (US v de leon, 1 Phil 163, victim land owner forced to kneel before house servants before being killed, People v Nierra, 96 SCRA 1, victim shot in mouth while defacating). Article 14, Par. 18 1. Committing Crime after unlawful entry 2. Basis: Means and ways employed to commit crime, showing greater perversity. 3. Unlawful entry, defined (People v Sunga, 43 Phil 205R). 4. Application (People v Sunga, People v Barruga, 61 Phil 318, Dwelling and unlawful entry taken separately in murders committed in dwelling). A. When not aggravating (US v Barnedo, 17 Phil 509, Trespass to dwelling, unlawful entry bing integral to the crime). Article 14, Par. 19. 1. Breaking wall, etc. (Art. 14, Par. 19) 2. Basis: Means and ways employed to cimmit crime showing greater perversity. 3. Application A. Cutting of ropes of field tent embraced (US v Matanug, 11 Phil 192). B. When Breaking of door or window is lawful (Rule 113, Sec. 12, Rule 126, Sec. 6, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure). C. Break means actual Breaking, not merely removal of chips as a result of application of force (People v Fernandez, 59 Phil 674). Article 14, Par. 20 1. Aid of Minor, or by means of motor vehicle 2. Basis: Means and ways employed showing greater perversity
3. Two aggravating circumstances. A. Aid of minor. B. Use of motor vehicle (People v Espejo, 20 SCRA 400, Motor vehicle used in going to place of crime, carrying effects thereof, facilitating escape, people v Arabia, CA 53 OG 6569, motor vehicle used in carrying away stolen rails and iron and wooden ties from scene of theft, People v Valeriano et al, 90 Phil 31, Motor Vehicle used in transporting accused in robbery with homicide (People v de la Cruz, et al, 100 Phil 625, and People v Atitiw, et al, 14 CA Rep 457, Motor vehicle used to lure and take victims to place where they were killed (People v Maraigan, 70 Phil 583, Taxi hired and used by accused as place where he inflicted mortal wounds upon his girl friend, People v Soriano et al, 134 SCRA 542, victim mauled inside mini-bus, kicked off, and ran over by minibus. 1. When not aggravating (People v Batas et al, CA-GR No. 10823-R, Sep. 12 1955, Jeep used in carting away Vicks Vaporub in estafa case, People v Real, 10 CA Rep 668, Car and then hired jeep used in going to and coming from where theft was committed, People v Veloso, 112 SCRA 174, Motor vehicle used only to facilitate escape, but seePeople v Bartulay, 192 Scra 621, where motor vehicle appreciated as aggravating although used only to facilitate escape). C. Other similar means: Understood as referring to motorized vehicles and other efficient means of transportation similar to automobile or airplane per reyes, per kapunan and faylona, Spanish text refers to means of equal efficacy or utility and has no reference to motorized vehicles, hence include horse-drawn vehicle. Article 14, Par. 21. 1. Cruelty—purpose is to enjoy the suffering of the victim. 2. Basis: Ways employed in committing crime which shows greater perversity. 3. Cruelty defined (People v Dayug, et al, 49 Phil 423). A. Distinguished from ignominy. 4. Requisites:
A. Injury caused deliberately augmented by causing ot her wrong (US v Gasal, 3 Phil 354, Not Present in stoning victim twice to kill him, not to augment his suffering, Us v Corteso, 32 Phil 104, Assailants had decided purpose to kill, not to prolong agony). B. Other wrong committed is unnecessary for execution of purpose of offender (US v Oro, 19 Phil 548, Burning Mouth of Child, People v Mariquina, 84 Phil 39, Extracting victim’s eye and stuffing his mouth with mud, People v Torrifiel, CA-GR No 659-R, Nov. 29, 1947, Offender in committing rape tied cogon grass around his genital organ, People v Beleno, 92 Phil 872, Brutal Acts in rapid succession, but see People v Dayug, et al, 49 Phil 423, where mere infliction of various successive wound, with no appreciable l ength of time between infliction of one wound and that of another, considered not sufficient to constitute cruelty). 5. Cruelty not presumed (People v Jimenez, 54 OG 1361). 6. When Cruelty held not present (People v Bersabal, 48 Phil 439, Cutting of extremities after victim has died, People v Piring, 63 Phil 549, setting fire to house where inmates were already dead, People v Curiano, et al, 9 SCRA 332, No showing that wounds were unnecessarily inflicted while victims were still alive, People v Aquino, GR No. L49808, Feb 26, 1988, Victim’s Carabao, goat, and cow, were killed as well: Physical suffering of victim himself was not augmented). 7. In Treason, acts of rapes, robbery, and other forms of cruelties are considered as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and cruelty (People v Racaza, 82 Phil 623). A. Rape is also aggravating in robbery with homicide (People v Basca, 55 OG 797, People v Plaga, GR No. 73462, Sep. 30, 1991).—other wrongs not necessarily for the commission of the crime. Article 15 Alternative Circumstances. 1. Definition or Concept (Art. 15, RPC) 2. Basis: A. Nature and effects of crime. B. Other conditions attending the commission of crime.
3. Specific Circumstance. A. Relationship. 1. Defined. 2. Relatives Included. 1. Spouse. 2. Ascendant. 3. Descendant. 4. Legitimate,Natural or Adopted Brothers or Sisters 5. Relatives by Affinity within same degrees as the forego ing. 3. Other Relatives Included. 1. Stepparents and stepchildren (People v Bersabal, 48 Phil 439, People v Portento, CA 38 OG 467, Similar to Ascendants and Descendants). 2. Adopted Parents and Adopted Child. 4. Relatives Excluded. 1. Uncle and Niece (US v Incierto, 15 Phil 358, People v BAlondo, 30 SCRA 155). 5. When Exempting. 1. Theft (Art. 332 -- No criminal but only civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling ,ro malicious mischief committeed or caused mutualy by the following persons:. Parents and siblings up to parents and siblings in-law.) 2. Swindling or Estafa (Art.332) 3. Malicious Mischief (Art. 332) 6. When Mitigating 1. Crimes against Property 1. Robbery (Art. 294-302) 2. Usurpation (Art. 312) 3. Fraudulent Insolvency (Art. 314)
4. Arson (Art 321-322, Art 325-326) 2. Mitigation in Trespass to Dwelling (US v Ostrea, et al 2 Phil 93). 7. When Aggravating 1. Crimes against persons. 1. Offended party is of higher degree. 2. Offended party and offender are relatives of same level. 1. Brother (People v Alisub, 69 Phil 362) 2. Brother-in-law, People v Mercado, 51 Phil 99, People v Mendova et al, 100 Phil 811, However in People v Causi, GR No L-16498, June 19, 1963, Proof that deceased was brother-in-law of accused was held not aggravating because relationship by affinity only aggravates where offended party is of higher degree, on the other hand, see US v Ancheta, 1 Phil 30, where relationship was appreciated as mitigating because accused k illed his brother-in-law in view of conduct pursued by the latter in contracting adulterous relations with wife of accused; Also v Velarde, 39 Phil 991, where accused clubbed his brother-in-law who was suffering from an attack of insanity, and where such relationship was held mitigating: cause of maltreatment held to be the desire to render service to a relative 3. Half-brother 4. Adopted brother 5. Offended party is of lower degree 6. Serious physical injuries, except when inflicted by parent upon his child by excessive chastisement. 7. Less or slight physical injuries: ordinary rule applies. 8. In homicide or mrder: always aggravating. 9. Crimes against chastity: always aggravating.
1. Appreciated as aggravating in rape by stepfather of his stepdaughter, rape by father of his daughter. 8. When neither mitigating, aggravating nor exempting. 1. When an element of crime. 1. Parricide. 2. Adultery. 3. Concubinage. B. Intoxication. 1. Defined. 2. Reason why intoxication affect criminal liability (People v Amenamen, CA 37 OG 2324), when mitigating, because of impairment of will-power, when aggravating, because it is intentional, lessens individual resistance to eveil thoughts and undermines the will po wer making himself a potential evil-doer). 3. Reason why intoxication modifies criminal liability (People v Amenamen). 4. When Mitigating. 1. Not habitual. 1. Presumption in favor of non-habitual character of intoxication (US v Fitzgerald, 2 Phil 419, People v Dungka, 64 Phil 423, Intoxication once proved is presumed accidental; see also People v Dacanay, GR No L-11568, Mar 30, 1959). When Intoxication found habitual (People v Amenamen, defining habitual drunkard as one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks, US v McMann, 4 Phil 561, Accused seen drunk twelve times or more). 2. Not subsequent to plan to commit felony (People v Hernandez et al, 91 Phil 334). 3. Proven by satisfactory evidence (People v Noble 77 Phil 93; People v Apduhan, Jr. 24 SCRA 798). 1. Intoxication not proved in (People v Noble, 77 Phil 93, People v Pardo, 79 Phil 568).
4. But not appreciated separately when concurring with obfuscation and lack of instruction (People v Baterna, 49 Phil 997). 5. When Aggravating 1. Habitual (People v Ponciano, GR No. 86453, Dec. 5, 1991, accused admitted abit of drinking and taking prohibited drugs while drinking liquor). 2. Intentional (Subsequent to plan to commit felony). C. Degree of instruction and education. 1. When mitigating. 1. Low Degree of Education. 1. Exceptions. 1. In crimes against property (US v Pascual 9 Phil 491, People v de la Cruz, et al 77 Phil 444, People v Melendrez, 59 Phil 154; But see US v Maqui, 27 Phil 97, Mitigating in theft of large cattle, accused beign member of uncivilized tribe of igorots, People v Patricio, 79 Phil 227, People v Mantawar, 80 Phil 817, Robbery with homicide. Contra: People v Enot et al, GR L-17530, Oct. 30, 1962. 2. In crimes against chastity (Molesa v Director, 59 Phil 406, US v Borjal, 9 Phil 140). 3. In Treason (People v Lansanas) 4. In murder or homicide (People v Mutya) 5. Lacking education but highly and exceptionally intelligent and mentally alert as to realize the full significance of his acts not entitled to this mitigating circumstance (People v ORbista et al, 95 Phil 63, People v Geronimo 53 SCRA 246). 2. Who are illiterate. 1. Accused who only finished caton (basic alphabet and numbers up to grade 1, People v Marasigan, 85 Phil 427).
2. Accused who did not even finish first grade of elementary school (People v Limaco, 88 Phil 35). 3. Who are literate. 1. Accused who studied up to 6th grade (people v Pujilino 27 SCRA 1185). 2. Accused who finished grade two and usually answered in tagalog questions propounded in english. 3. City Resident hwo knows hhow to sign his na me. 4. But see people v Orbista where it was co nceded that a person able to sign his name may still be so densely ignorant and of such low intelligence that he does not fully realize the consequences of his act. 2. When aggravating. 1. High degree of education 1. Being a lawyer not aggravating in case of physical injuries, he not having taken advantage of his high degree of education. (People v Sulit CA-GR No. 21102-R, Sep. 29, 1959). DEGREES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES. Persons criminally liable for felonies – Principals, accomplices and accessories. 1. Subjects of Crimes. 2. Article 16. A. Division of Persons Criminally Liable B. For Grave and Less Grave Felonies (Art. 16) C. For Light Felonies
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Wednesday, September 3, 2014 PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES Article 15 1. Subjects of Crimes. A. Active Subjects. 1. Only Natural Persons 1. As to Corporations, officers are liable. 1. Must be participis criminis (People v Montilla, CA 52 OG 4327). 2. Exceptions (Under Special Laws, Corporation Code, Public S ervice Law, People v Lao Chio, CA 59 OG 4859, People v Cartesiano, 53 OG 3276). 2. Passive Subjects. 1. Holder of Injured Right. 1. On Unborn, Dead men and animals (Arts 40-42, Civil Code, 256-259, 353, RPC) Article 16
A. Division of Persons Criminally Liable. B. For Grave and less grave felonies (Art. 16, RPC) 1. Principals. 1. Distinguished from Co-conspirators (People v Peralta et al 25 SCRA 759, Art 8 and 17 RPC) 2. Accomplices. 1. Distinguished from principals. 2. Distinguished from accessories. 3. Accessories. 1. Distinguished from principals. 2. Distinguished from accomplices. 4. For light Felonies (Art. 16, RPC) 1. Principals 2. Accomplices. Article 17 1. Principals by direct participation (Art. 17 RPC) A. Participation in criminal resolution (People v Ibanez, 77 Phil 664; People v Izon et al, 104 Phil 690, People v Ortiz and Zausa, 55 Phil 995). 1. When There is conspiracy: collective Responsibility (People v Monroy, et al, 104 Phil 759, US v Bundal et al, 3 Phil 89). 1. When Conspiracy exists. 1. Formal agreement or previous acquaintance not necessary (People v Garduque et al, GR No L-10133, Jul 31, 1958). 1. Common Purpose. 1. Spontaneous Agreement. (People v Allado 43 OG 1717; People v Caballero, 53 Phil 585). 2. Active Cooperation (People v Manlao, et al 52 Phil 484).
3. Contributing by Positive Acts (People v Agbuya et al 57 Phil 238). 4. Presence in Crimes committed by a band an d lending moral support (US v Ancheta, et al, 1 Phil 30, US v Santos et al, 2Phil 454; Conspiracy presumed when crime committed by band, US v Asilo, 4 Phil 175; US v Perez, 13 Phil 287). 2. Unity in Execution. 2. But mere silence does not make a conspirator (People v Gensola et al, 29 SCRA 485, People v Silvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil 353, People v Assad, 55 Phil 697, People v Timbol et al, GR Nos L47471-73, Aug. 4, 1944). 2. How Proved (People v Bernardo et al, CA 57 OG 8675, People v San Luis, 85 Phil 485, People v Ancheta and del Rosario, 66 Phil 638). 2. When there is no conspiracy: Individual Liability (US v Magcomot, 13 Phil 386; US v Reyes and Javierm 14 Phil 27, Peeople v Quiosay, 103 Phil 1160). 1. No conspiracy to commit crimes by negligence 1. Co-principal by omission in criminal negligence (People v Santos and Teves CA 44 OG 1289, US v Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil 577). 3. Participation in criminal resolution must be previous or simultaneous (People v Tan Diong et al, 59 Phil 539). B. Carrying out Plan and personally taking part by acts directly tending to same end (People v Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil 788, Personal Presence Generally Required). 1. Presence at crime scene. 1. Exception: when pursuant to conspiracy, absent participant had already performed his part (People v Santos, 84 Phil 104). 2. Act directly tending to same end (People v Mandagay, et al 46 Phil 638). 3. Effect of absence of personal participation (People v Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil 788). 2. Principals by induction (Art. 17, 2nd Par, RPC)
A. Forcing another to commit crime. 1. Using irresistible force. 2. Causing uncontrollable fear. B. Inducing another to commit a crime (People v Gensola, et al, 29 SCRA 484). 1. Giving price or offering reward or promise. 1. Positive Resolution 2. Persistent Effort 3. Presentation of strongest temptation to commit crime. 1. Absence of personal reason to commit crime on part of direct participant. 4. Determining cause of commission of crime by material executor (People v Camaguran et al, GR No 108174, Oct 28 1999, When Absent). 1. Previous to act induced and so influential. 2. Using words of command (US v Gamao, 23 Phil 82). 1. Made directly with intention to procure commission of crime (US V Indanan, 24 Phil 203) 1. Distinguished from thoughtless expression without intention to produce result (US v INdannan) 2. Ascendancy of influence (US v Gamao, 23 Phil 82). 1. Words of command of father to son (People v Tamayo, et al. 44 Phil 38). 3. Direct, efficacious and powerful enough as to amount to physical or moral coercion (US v Gamao (23 Phil 82) 1. When not necessary: Conspiracy (People v Ulip, etal 89 Phil 629). 4. Uttered prior to commission of crime. 5. Absence of personal reason to commit crime on part of material executor (People v Kiichi Omine, 61 Phil 611). 3. Distinguished from proposal to commit felony.
4. Effect of acquittal of principal by direct participation on liability of principal by inducement (People v Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil 788, People v Po Giok To 96 Phil 913). C. Principals by indispensable cooperation (Art 17, RPC) 1. Participation in criminal resolution. 1. Anterior conspiracy 2. Previous unity or criminal purpose and intention. 2. Cooperation by performance of another act without which crime would not have been accomplished (People v Javier and Caguicia, 31 Phil 236; US v Lim Buanco, 14 Phil 484). 1. Embraces Cooperation by Acts of Negligence (Samson v Court of Appeals, 103 Phil 282, People v Rodis, 105 Phil 1294). 2. Act done is different from act of execution of crime committed. Article 18. 1. Accomplices. A. Quasi-collective criminal responsibility 2. Distinguished from Principals in General. (People v S ilvestre and Atienza 56 Phil 353) A. Distinguished from Principal by indispensable cooperation (People v Templonuevo, 106 Phil 1003, People v Geronimo, et al 53 SCRA 246). B. Distinguished from Principal by direct participation (People v Taayo, People v Manalac and via cruces, People v Diris, People v Aplegido et al). 3. Requisites A. Community of Design. 1. Knowledge of Criminal Design. 1. Principal informed accomplice of former’s criminal Purpose (US v Sotto and Datan, People v Tangbaoan, 93 Phil 687) 2. Accomplice saw criminal acts of principal (People v Tamayo, 44 Phil 38, People v MAnansala et al (31 SCRA 401)
September 6, 2014, Saturday a. Not accomplice in absence of knowledge of criminal design (People v Ibanez et al, 77 Phil 664, US v Flores, 25 Phil 596) iii. Concurrence in purpose of principal. 1. But not due to conspiracy (People v Francisco, et al, GR No. L-6270, Feb. 28, 1955; People v Tan, GR 132324, Sept. 28, 1999). b. Cooperation by previous or simultaneous acts with intention to supply material or moral aid (People v Ubina et al, 97 Phil 515, US v Guevara, et al 2 Phil 532) i. Not indispensable (People v Villegas, et al, 59 OG 7060). c. Relation between acts done by principal and those attributed to persons charged as accomplice (People v de la cruz, 61 Phil 162). 5. Liability of accomplices for crimes different from that committed by principals (People v Rabiera, 52 Phil 87, People v Valdellon, 46 Phil 252). ARTICLE 19. 1. Accessories Defined (Art. 19, RPC) 2. Distinguished from Principal and Accomplice. 3. Requisites. a. Knowledge of Crime. i. Mere possession of stolen property not enough: proof of knowledge of commission of crime required (People v Racimo, CA 40 OG 279). ii. Entertaining suspicion that crime was committed not equivalent to knowledge (People v Batuampo, et al, CA 62 OG 6269). 1. Crime committed by principal mustb e proved beyond reasonable doubt (People v Pardito, GRN o L_3234, Mar 1, 1951). iii. But knowledge may be acquired subsequent to acquisition of stolen property (US v Montano, 3 Phil 110).
iv. How knowledge is proved (People v Dalena, et al, CA-GR Nos 11387-R and 11388-R, Oct. 25, 1954). 1. Circumstantial evidence may suffice. v. < 4. Nature of Liability. a. Subordinate and subsequent (US v Mendoza) i. When accessory may be convicted even if principal is acquitted( US v Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil 377). b. But apprehension and conviction of principal unnecessary for holding accessory criminally liable (People v Billon, CA 48 OG 1391, But not if, after trial, court declares that no crime was committed, People v Custorio, GR No L-35578, Apr 8, 1932) i. When arraignment, trial and conviction of accessory during pendency of separate case against principal null and void (People v Gaw Lin, CA 63 OG 3821). c. Accessories after conviction of principal. 5. Classes of accessories. a. Those profiting themselves or assisting offender in profiting from effects of crime (People v Tanchoco, 76 Phil 463, US v Empelnado, 9 Phil 613, Distinguished from reward, People v Yatco, et al, CA 51 OG 260). i. Accessory should not take property without principal’s consent: Stealing stolen property. ii. But profiting by effects of crime may constitute act of principle under Art 307 RPC. b. Assisting offenders to benefit from the effects of the crime c. Concealing or destroying body of crime to prevent its discovery i. Body of crime: corpus delicti ii. Destruction of body of crime 1. Includes destruction or concealment of effects or instruments of crime (US v Villaluz and Palermo) d. Harboring, concealing, or assisting in escape of principal of crime i. Public officers as accessories: harboring, concealing or assisting escape of principal with abuse of public functions
1. Mayor who refused to prosecute offender ii. Private persons as accessories: harboring, concealing, or assisting escape of author of crime who is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, attempt against life of president, or known to be habitually guilty of other crime. 6. PD 1829 penalizes obstruction of apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders. (Even relatives) 7. PD 1612 Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 Article 20. 1. Accessories who are exempt from criminal Liability a. Spouse b. Ascendants c. Descendants PENALTIES IN GENERAL Constitutional Provisions Relating to Penalties (Art 3, Sec 18-22, Art. 8, Sec. 4(2), 5, 1987 Const). Provisions of the RPC of Constitutional Significance (Art 3,5,21,22, RPC) Art. 21 1. Penalties that may be imposed: Non-retroactivity of Penal Statutes (Art. 5 & 21, RPC; US v Parrone, 24 Phil 29, People v Carballo, 62 Phil 651) a. Penalty, Defined (Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal) b. Characteristics: Juridical Conditions. i. Judicial and legal. 1. Imposed by virtue of judgment a. What judgment of conviction must show 2. Prescribed by law ii. Certain or definite.
2. 3.
4. 5.
1. Inescapability of effects. 2. Not imposed in alternative iii. Commensurate or proportionate. 1. Extent measured by gravity of crime. iv. Perasonal 1. No one may assume the criminal punishment of another. 2. No one should be punished for the crime of another. v. Equal or uniform. 1. Applies indiscriminately to all transgressors of the law. Power to punish crime and jurisdiction to impose penalties (People v Purisima, 69 SCRA 341). Justification of punishment. a. Prevention (People v de la cruz, 76 Phil 169) b. Reformation (People v Ducosin, 59 Phil 108). c. Exemplary (People v de la cruz, 76 Phil 169, People v Ubaldo, 24 SCRA 735, Exemplarity in the imposition of death penalty) d. Self-Defense (People v Carillo and Raqueno, 85 Phil 611, People v Molo, 88 SCRA 22, In particular, by means of the death penalty) e. Justice (People v Sabenorio, 91 SCRA 47). System Penalties: Both rigid and elastic (People v Mape, 77 Phil 809) Classification a. Quantity. i. Single (Art. 249 Homicide: Reclusion Temporal) ii. Alternative (Imprisonment or fine). iii. Compound (art. 316 [2], Estafa: People v Crisostomo, 5 SCRA 1048, Arresto Mayor, and fine; (Art. 315[3], Estafa, Tadeo v Visperas, 23 SCRA 669, Arresto Mayor in its maximum perod to prision correccional in its minimum period).
b.
c.
d.
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iv. Complex (Art. 114, (3) , Treason by resident alien; Reclusion temporal to death). v. Multiple (People v Peralta, 25 SCRA 759, Multiple penalties for multiple felonies). Quality or relation (Art. 25 (RPC) i. Principal ii. Accessory Gravity (Art. 25 RPC) i. Capital ii. Afflictive iii. Correctional iv. Light or common Divisibility i. Divisible (Art. 64 RPC) ii. Indivisible (Art. 63, RPC) Effects i. Death ii. Deprivation of Liberty 1. Imprisonment a. Reclusion i. Perpetua ii. Temporal b. Prision i. Mayor ii. Correccional c. Arresto i. Mayor ii. Menor
d. Banishment (destierro) iii. Deprivation of rights. 1. Disqualification a. Perpetual b. Temporary c. Absolute d. SPECIAL 2. Suspension a. Public Office b. Right to vote and be voted for c. Profession or calling 3. Civil Interdiction 4. Fine 5. Confiscation or forfeiture a. Instruments b. Proceeds 6. Public Censure 7. Indemnification 8. Bond to keep the peace. 9. Payment of costs. A finding of guilt must precede punishment (de Peralta v Campos, Jr. 61 SCRA 206 If accused is not found guilty, no court can mete out punishment, see also, Abanto v Director of Prisons, 76 Phil 754, Reyes v Director of Prisons, 76 Phil 561, People v Jose (Santos), 75 Phil 612). 1. No Penalty in acquittal (Gomez v Concepcion, 47 Phil 717)
a. Censure not proper in acquittal (People v Abellera, 69 Phil 623, Censure being a penalty, but see People v Meneses, 74 Phil 119, recognize right of court acquitting accused of criminal charge to reprehend his acts). b. Penalty restricted to that provide by penal alw violated (Carroll and Ballesteros v Paredes, 17 Phil 754, Perlas v Concepcion, 34 Phil 559), and strictly in accordance with Law (US v Berry, 5 Phil 409, US v Cataquista, 1 Phil 537). Article 22. 1. Retroactive effect of penal laws (Art. 22 RPC, Escalante v Santos, 56 Phil 483, Rodriguez v Director of Prisons, 57 Phil 133). a. Exception to rule on non-retroactivity (Art 22, RPC) b. Exception to exception: Non-Retroactive even if favorable (People v Moran, 44 Phil 387, Tavera v Valdez, 1 Phil 468). Article 23. 1. Effect of Pardon by Offended Party (Art. 23&344, RPC, Generally, not extinguishing Criminal Action: Arts. 2034,1306,1352, and 1409, New Civil Code). a. Criminal Action Extinguished only by Pardon by offended party under Art. 344 (Art. 23 RPC, Balite v People, 18 SCRA 280, Otherwise, pardon does not extinguish the criminal act). i. Criminal Action distinguished from civil liability on interest of injured party (Art. 23, RPC, Rule 111[1] 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Expressly allowing waiver of Civil Liability. See US v Bertucio, GR No. L-299, Oct. 29, 1901, US v Heery, GR L-8634, Oct. 22, 1913, US v Guy-sayco, 13 Phil 292, Tan v Standard Vacuum Oil Co. 91 Phil 672, See also art. 112 RPC) ii. Waiver of right to prosecute is contrary to public policy (US v De Guzman, 1 Phil 138, Parties cannot change the nature of criminal causes, which are public in character, by converting them into civil actions; see also (US v Leano and Gonzales, 6 Phil 368, As to the effect of agreement or compromise, as to civil liability, on criminal liability (US v Mendezona, 2 Phil 375).
1. But provisional dismissal with the consent of the offended party, may now preclude the filing of another criminal action or revival of the case, after the lapse of the periods prescribed in sec. 8, Rule 117, 2000 revised rules of crim procedure (Thereby qualifying the rule laid down in People v Chang, 92 Phil 1084, to the contrary, see also, Acebedo v Sarmiento et al, GR No. L28025, Dec. 16, 1970). iii. Payment after commission of crime does not prevent prosecution (Javier v People, 70 Phil 550). iv. Extinction of civil action does not extinguish criminal liability (Art. 112 [extinction of civil action arising from crimes, governed by civil law] and Title Four Book One [Extinction of Criminal Liability: Art 89-99, RPC, People v Tierra, 12 SCRA 666, Prescription of Tax Liability does not extinguish Criminal Liability, but see People v MAgdaluyo, 1 SCRA 991, Extinguishment of criminal liability through payment of tax by compromise , made prior to criminal prosecution, a tax case being one expressly allowed by law to be compromised). v. Compromise or novation does not affect criminal liability (People v Benitez, 108 Phil 920). b. Pardon by Offended PAry under Art. 344 distinguished from pardon by president under art. 36 RPC (Art 344 RPC) Article 24. 1. Measures of prevention or safety not considered as penalties (Art. 24 RPC, Bayot v Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383). a. Detention fro commission of Crime (Art. 24 [1] and 124, [2], RPC, see Rule 113 [ARREST} and 114 [BAIL] Article 25. Article 26. When Fine is afflictive, correctional or light penalty (Art. 26, RPC, See also Art. 75 RPC for graduation of fines). 1. Afflictive a. Exceeding P6,000 2. Correctional
a. From P200 to P6000 (Samson v Court of Appeals, 103 Pihl 277). 3. Light a. Less than P200 (See Art. 9 RPC, where P200 fine is classified as light felony, albeit same is a correctional penalty under this article, People v Canson Jr (101 Phil 537). i. Art. 9, Not. Art 26 should prevail as to prescription of crime, as Art. 90 leaves it to Art. 9 to fix the meaning of light offenses, whereas Art. 26 merely classifies fines and does not relate to definition of offesnes (People v Yu Hai, 99 Phil 725, People v Canson, Jr et al 99 Phil 725). 4. When no minimum is fixed, determination of fine is discretionary upon the court, provided maximum is not exceeded (People v Quinto, 60 Phil 351). For purposes of prescription, fine should not be converted into subsidiary imprisonment (People v Basalo, 101 Phil 57, People v Crisostomo, 116 Phil 200). Fine is not an accessory penalty, but as much a principal penalty as imprisonment (See Art. 25, not listing fine among accessory penalties, People v Ignacio 13 SCRA 153, citing People v Crisostomo, 5 SCRA 1048). Duration and effect of Penalties. Article 27. 1. Duration of Reclusion Perpetua (Extended to 40 Years by RA 7659, Sec. 29) a. 20 years and one day to 40 Years (Art. 27 (1), RPC, as amended by Sec. 21 (RA 7659). b. Pardoned after 30 years unless unworthy of pardon on account of conduct or other serious cause (Art. 27 (1), RPC, See Art. 36 RPC, On effects of such Pardon, People v Gonzales, 58 SCRA 265). 2. Duration of Reclusion Temporal (Art. 27, RPC) a. 12 years and one day to 20 years (Art. 27 (2), RPC) 3. Duration of Prision Mayor and Temporary Disqualification (Art. 27 (3) RPC) a. Six Years and one day to 12 years (Art. 27 (3) RPC).
4.
5. 6. 7.
i. Exception: when disqualification is imposed as accessory penalty, coterminous with principal penalty (Art. 27 (3), RPC) 1. Temporary Special Disqualification is imposed as principal penalty in Arts. 205, 210, 214, 220, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 231, 235, 239, 245, 346, 347, RPC) 2. Perpetual Special Disqualification is imposed as principal penalty in Arts. 214, 217, 223, 229, 232, 233, 346, RPC, whereas it is an accessory penalty of prision mayor. a. Perpetual absolute disqualification is imposed as principal penalty in Art. 204, whereas it is an accessory penalty of reclusion perpetua and preclusion temporal. Duration of Prision Correctional, suspension and destierro (Art. 27 (4), RPC) a. Six Months and one Day to 6 Years (Art. 27 (4), RPC, See Arts. 206, 208, 236, RPC, where suspension is imposed as principal penalty). i. Exception: when suspension is imposed as accessory penalty, coterminous with principal penalty (Art. 27 (4), RPC) 1. Suspension is accessory to prision correccional, arresto mayor and arresto menor, whereas it is principal penalty in Art. 206, 208, 236 RPC) Duration of Arresto Mayor (Art. 27 (5) RPC) a. One month and one day to six months Duration of Arresto Menor (art. 27 (6) RPC) a. One day to thirty days Duration of bond to keep peace (art. 27 (7) Rand Ar.t 284 RPC) a. Covers such period of time as the court may determine (Art. 27 (7) RPC)
Art. 28. 1. Computation of Penalties (Art. 28, RPC) a. If offender in prison (Art. 28 RPC)
i. Term of duration of temporary penalties: Computed from day on which judgment of conviction shall have become final (Art. 28 RPC, (7), Rule 120, 2000 Revised Rules of criminal Procedure; Wagan v Tiangco, 72 SCRA 294, Judgment becomes final after accused starts serving sentence). 1. If the accused appealed, service of sentence commences from date of promulgation of appellate decision (GR No. L-30603, 1969, Alvarado v Director of Prisions, 87 Phil 157). b. If offender not in prision (Art. 28, RPC) i. Term of Duration of penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty: computed from day that offender is placed at disposal of authorities for enforcement of penalty ii. Term of duration of other penalties: computed only from day on which defendant commences to serve sentence (Art. 28 RPC) Art. 29 1. Deduction of period of preventive imprisonment from term of imprisonment (Art. 29 RPC) a. Requisites. i. Offender has undergone preventive imprisonment (Art. 29, RPC) ii. Sentence consists of deprivation of liberty (Art. 29, RPC, People v Magonawal, 63 SCRA 106, Destierro is a penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty , People v Bastasa, et al, 88 SCRA 184). 1. Even one sentenced to reclusion perpetua is, unless ot herwise disqualified, entitled to credit for preventive imprisonment (US v Ortencio, 38 Phil 341). iii. Offender agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners (Art. 29 RPC) 1. Refusal by dentention prisoner to abide by same disciplinary rules as are imposed on convicted prisoners: credit limited to 4/5 of time in preventive imprisonment. 2. Exception: those not entitled to deduction for period of preventive imprisonment. a. Recidivists (People v Gona GR No. L-47177, Nov. 4, 1940). b. Convicted previously twice or more times of any crime (Evangelista v Dir. Of Prisons)
Art. 30. 1. Effects of penalties of perpetual of temporary absolute disqualification for Public Office (Art. 30 RPC) a. Deprivation of public offices or employments, even if conferred by popular election b. Deprivation of right to vote and be elected in elections for populat elective office. c. Disqualification from office or public employment and for exercise of rights mentioned. d. Loss of rights to retirement pay or pension. 2. If absolute disqualification is temporary, disqualification comprised in Par. 2 and 3 of Art. 30 lasts only during term of sentence. (Lacuna v Abes) Art. 31 Art. 32 Art. 33 Art. 34 1. Rights Deprived under civil interdiction (Art. 34, 40, 4 1 RPC) a. Parental Authority of guardianship, either as to person or property of ward. b. Marital authority c. Right to manage property by any act or conveyance inter vivos (see also, Arts. 38, 1323, New Civ. Code, on effect of civil interdiction on civil law capacity to act and, therefore, to validly give consent to contracts; see however, Cruz v Court of Appeals, 93 Phil 619, Limitation on capacity to act does not exempt from obligation arising from one’s acts or property relations). i. Disposition by will (Art. 783, New Civ. Code) or donation mortis cause (Art. 728 New Civ. Code Not affected by Civil Interdiction. Art. 35 1. Effects of bond to keep peace: duty of person sentenced to give bond (Art. 35 RPC) a. Present two sufficient sureties to make undertaking: i. That such person will not commit offense sought to be prevented.
ii. That in case offense will be committed, sureties will pay amount determined by court in judgment. iii. Or, deposit amount determined by court in judgment to guarantee undertaking. b. Period of duration of bond: as determined by court, accdg. To its discretion. c. Effect of failure to give bond required (Art. 35 (3) RPC, detention not exceeding 6 months [grave or less grave felony] or 30 days [light felony]; but see Art. 284, RPC, which ddiffers from this aricle in terms of the effect of failure to give bond for good behavior (destierro). Art. 36 1. Effects of pardon (Art. 36 and 113, RPC, People v Albofera, 159 SCRA 523, Civil liability unaffected. See also Pelobello v Palatino, 72 Phil 441, Absolute pardon restores enjoyment of full civil and political rights; Cristobal v Labrador, 71 Phil 34, Absolute Pardon removes consequences of conviction, Pendon v Diasnes, 91 Phil 441; Lacuna v Abes, 24 SCRA 780, Plenary pardon removes disqualification under criminal and electoral codes). a. No restoration of right to hold public office or right of suffrage. i. Exception: when right to hold public office (Art. 30, 31, 36, RPC), or right of suffrage (Art. 32, 36RPC),expressly restored by terms of pardon. 1. Accused, whose monthly pension was stopped after he committed robbery, is entitled to resumption thereof by reason of pardon (Alimon, chief of Constabulary, 60 Phil 456, Padon resotres all his rights and relieves him of accessory penalties attaching to conviction). ii. No exemption from payment of civil indemnity. iii. May be absolute (Art. 89 [4] RPC) or Conditional (Art. 94[1] RPC) 1. Need for compliance with conditions of pardon (Art. 95 RPC), violation of which is penalized under Art. 159 RPC. Art. 37. 1. What costs include (Art. 37) a. Fees and indemnities in course of judicial proceedigns.
i. ii.
Fixed Unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force (Rule 142, Revised Ruels of Court. iii. Amounts not subject to schedule. 2. No subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay costs. Art. 38. i. Pecuniary liabilities and their order of payment when property of offender not sufficient for all (Art 38 RPC). a. Reparation of damage caused. b. Indemnification of consequential damages. c. Fine (Esler v Ledesma, 52 Phil 114, may be satisfied from cash deposit or bail). d. Costs of proceedigns. ii. Pecuniary Liabilities (Art. 38, RPC, fine and costs included but restitution excluded) distinguished from civil liability (Art. 104, RPC includes restitution but excludes fine and costs). Art. 39. i. Subsidiary personal liability in case of insolvency to pay fine: one day of each 8 pesos (Art. 39 RPC as amended by RA 5465, Ramos v Gonong, 72 SCRA 565, People v Fajardo, 65 Phil 539, See People v Moreno 60 Phil 712, Applying subsidiary liability under special laws, also Copiaco v Luzon Brokerage, 6 Phil 184, Art. 40 i. Accessory penalties of death penalty, when not executed because of commutation or pardon (Art. 40 and 73, RPC, Death penalty itself does not carry accessory penalties). a. Perpetual absolute disqualification (Art. 40 RPC) b. Civil Interdiction (Art. 40 RPC), 30 years from date of sentence, but see Art. 41, where civil interdiction is for life or during the period of the sentence)
ii.
Accessory penalties effective during 30 years following date of sentence (Art. 40 RPC). a. Exception: when pardon expressly remits accessory penalties (Art. 40 RPC).
Art. 41 i. Accessory penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion perpetual (Art. 41 and 73, RPC) a. Civil interdiction (Art. 41 RPC) i. For life or during period of sentence (Art. 41 RPC) b. Perpetual absolute disqualification (Art. 41 RPC) Art. 42 i. Pardon as to principal penalty does not extinguish accessory penalties (Art. 42) a. Exception: when pardon expressly remits accessory penalties Art. 43 i. Accessory penalties of prision correccional (Art. 43 and Art. 44 Pendon v Diasnes Art. 45 i. Confiscation and forfeiture of proceeds or instruments o f crime (Art. 45 General Forfeiture Provision), 25 (As accessory penalty, therefore, included in every penalty imposed for the commission of crime) and 186 Special Forefeiture Provision RPC, Arts. 1411 and 1770 New Civil Code, Confiscation of effects and instruments related to illegal contracts, RA 1379, Sec. 20 and 23, the Dangerous drugs act of 1972). a. Carried by imposition of penalty for commission of felony (Art. 45 +25 RPC) i. No forfeiture when no criminal case, proving guilt for commission of crime
ii.
ii. iii. iv.
Where no forfeiture has been ordered by the corut, gov’t cannot appeal and ask for forfeiture without placing accused in double jeopardy, same being an additional penalty (People v Paet, 100 Phil 357, People v Sanchez, 101 Phil 745, People v Revil, 104 Phil 1043). b. Art. 45 has been applied to special penal statutes i. When art. 45 not applicable to special laws: 1. When special law does not itself provide for confiscation or forfeiture. No confiscation where property not in possession of court or any parties to the action. No confiscation of property belonging to third persons not liable for the offense (People v Jose, 37 Phil 450, Car registered in the name of accused’s mother, who is not herself liable for the offense). Confiscation of proceeds or insturments of crime made in favor of gov’t, but stolen property must be restored to complainant (People v Vales 15 SCRA 26. Ramirez v Yatco) while articles not subject of lawful commerce are to be destroyed (Art. 45 RPC)
Art. 46 i. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general (Art. 46 RPC) a. Penalty prescribed by law for commission of felony i. When judgment fails to specify whether accused is convicted as principal, accomplice or accessory, it is understood that he is being penalized as principal. b. When law prescribed penalty in general terms i. Understood as applicable to consummated felony ii. Exceptions (Art 60) 1. Law provides that penalty is for principal at attempted Stage (Art .121) 2. Law provides that penalty is also intended for accomplice (Art. 346 RPC) Art. 47 i. Cases when death penalty shall not be imposed (Sec. 19 [1] Art. 3 1987 Const; Art. 47 RPC)
ii. iii.
a. Crime not classified as heinous for compelling reasons b. Guilty persons is more than 70 years of age. c. Lack of necessary votes on appeal or revision of case before SC. d. When guilty Person is below 18 y/o at time of commission of crime. Cases when death penalty is imposable (RA 7659, Sec. 19[1] Art 3 1987 Const. See People v Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682, upholding the constitutionality of RA 7659). Penalty imposable in cases where death penalty cannot be imposed: reclusion perpetua (Art. 47 RPC as amended by Sec. 22 RA 7659).
Art. 48 Complex Crimes i. Penalty for complex crimes: penalty for most serious crime, applied in maximum period (People v Gonzales, 73 Phil 549). a. Single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies (Art. 48 RPC, People v Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). i. Compound crime (Delito compuesto): Case of ideal Plurality People v Buyco, 80 Phil 58 (Murder with homicide); People v Balotol, 84 SCRA 289, People v Guillen, 85 SCRA 307 [Grenade-throwing], People v Tayo, 141 SCRA 393 [killing by explosion], People v Francisco 94 Phil 975[Dynamitethrowing]; People v Largo, 99 Phil 1061 [Bombing an airplane], People v Anquilano, 149 SCRA 442 [murder with less serious physical injuries], people v PAculba 124 SCRA 383 (Murder with frustrated urder, People v Lojo 52 Phil 390 (Homicide with direct assault), People v Gadiano, 115 SCRA 654 Homicide with direct assault, People v Renegado, 57 SCRA 275 (Murder with direct assault), People v Basbanio et al 7 SCRA 647 (Murder with direct assault, People v Jaranilla et al, 55 SCRA 563, (Direct assault with homicide, People v Oliva, 95 Phil 962 (Unreported, arbitrary detention ii. Complex crime in strict sense (Delito complejo)
iii.
a. Abduction with rape (People v Ablaza, 30 SCRA 173, People v Bulaong 106 SCRA 344, People v Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (six rapes), but See People v Jose 37 SCRA 450, People v Bernal, 131 SCRA 1 Illegal detention not a necessary means to commission of rape). i. Distinguished from kidnapping with serious illegal detention, with rape committed during illegal detention (People v Ablaza, 330 SCRA 173). ii. Distinguished from case where succeeding rapes cannot be considered as complexing one forcible abduction with rape (People v Bohos, 98 SCRA 353). b. Kidnapping with Murder (People v Ty Sui Wong, 83 SCRA 125, PArulan v Rodas, 78 Phil 855). i. Murder Absorbed Kidnapping (People v Ong, 62 SCRA 17 4, People v Camo and Manzanido 91 Phil 240). c. Malversation through falsification (People v Barbas, 60 Phil 241, People v Silvallana, 61 Phil 636, People v Pamati-an, 69 Phil 463). d. Estafa through falsification (US v Ferrer, 34 Phil 277). i. But no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document (People v Dizon, CA 48 OG 168 (Falisfication of Private Document only), People v Reyes, 56 Phil 286(Falsifcation of private document only). e. Seduction through usurpation of public functions (US v Hernandez et al 29 Phil 109). f. Incriminatory machination through unlawful arrest (People v Alagao, et al 16 SCRA 879). Separate liabilities for separate acts (People v Bakang, 26 SCRA 840, People v Macaso, 85 Phil 819). a. No complex crime where one offense found not to be a necessary means to commit another. i. Robbery not a means to commit attempted rape (People v Cariaga, CA 54 OG 4307). ii. Illegal detention not a necessary means to commit rape (People v Bernal, 131 SCRA 1). iii. Falsification not a necessary means to commit malversation (Regis v People, 67 Phil 43). b. No complex crime where an offense is used to conceal another. i. Falsification to conceal estafa (People v Benito, 57 Phil 587). ii. Falsification to conceal (US v Geta, 43 Phil 1009, People v Cid 66 Phil 354).
iv.
v.
c. Arson to conceal homicide (People v Bersabal, 48 Phil 439). Successive acts distinctly unrelated or independent. a. Frustrated coercion followed by murder (People v Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil 475). b. Attempted rape and theft (People v Buena CA 52 OG 4698). c. Four separate discharges of firearm (People v Buyco, 80 Phil 58). d. Distinct or separate acts of murder (People v Duco et al, 86 Phil 176, People v Mones, 86 Phil 331, People v Daligdig, 89 Phil 598, People v Pineda, 20 SCRA 748, People v Bakang, 26 Phil 840, People v Remollino, 109 Phil 607, People v Pantoj, 25 SCRA 468, People v Ordonio, 82 Phil 324, People v Noveloso, 96 SCRA 78, People v Layos, 60 Phil 224, People v Pardo et al, 79 Phil 568, People v Tamani, 55 SCRA 153). i. Killings resulting from single impulse, exceptionally co nsidered a single crime of multiple homicide (People v Lawas, 97 Phil 95, explained as exceptional in people v Remollino, 109 Phil 607, which found six separate acts of murder, in relation to victims killed one after another on same occasion, see also, People v Garcia, 96 SCRA 497). 1. Prison riot cases: People v de los santos, 14 SCRA 702; People v Abella, et al, 93 SCRA 25). 2. Defamation against three victims with common surname, uttered on single occasion constitutes only one offense (People v Aquino, 99 Phil 713, But see People v del Rosario et al, 86 Phil 163, inclusion of several persons in libel or slander cannot be the product of one act). e. Acts committed on different occasions, not within one continuousperiod nor with only one criminal intent (People v Dichupa, 3 SCRA 327). f. Daily abstractions and diversions of sums of money collected on different dates constitutes separate acts of estafa (Gamboa et al, v CA, 68 SCRA 308). g. Theft of firearm and illegal possession thereof constitute two distinct crimes (People v Remerata, 98 Phil 998, besides, one is present penalized under the RPC, while the other, under the Special Penal Statute; hence no complex crime under Art. 48, RPC). Light Offense cannot be complexed (Lontok v Gorgonio, 89 SCRA 632, People v Turla, 50 Phil 1001, People v Estipona, GR No. L-46978, Nov. 14, 1940, People v Benitez, 73 Phil 671, citing People v Acierto, 57 Phil 671).
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
Concept of complex crime applies to criminal negligence or quasi-offenses (People v Lara, 75 Phil 786, People v Agito, 103 Phil 526, Castillo v Donato, 137 SCRA 210, Lapuz v CA et al, 94 Phil 710, Angeles v Jose, 96 Phil 151, People v Narvas, 107 Phil 737). Rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes (People v Hernandez, 99 Phil 515, People v Santos et al, 104 Phil 551, People v Lava, 28 SCRA 72, People Romagosa, 103 Phil 20, People v Rodriguez, 107 Phil 659, People v Nana et al, 106 Phil 966, Ponce Enrile v Amin, 189 SCRA 573. a. When Rebellion does not absorb common crimes (US v Alfont, 1 Phil 114, No necessary or indispensable to object and purposes of rebellion, People v Buco, 21 SCRA 5, Murder committed after charge of rebellion was filed). b. Same rules applied in treason (People v Labra, 81 Phil 377, People v Adlawan, 83 Phil 194, Guinto v Veluz, 77 Phil 801, People v Suralta, 85 Phil 714, People v Navea, 87 Phil 1, People v Barrameda, 85 Phil 789), But not in sedition cases (People v Cabrera, 43 Phil 64). Continuous Crime (Gamboa v CA, 68 SCRA 308, People v Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77, Phil People v de Leon, 49 Phil 437, People v Tumlos, 67 Phil 320, People v Jaranilla, 55 SCRA 563). a. Distinguished from continuing crime or transitory offense (Gamboa v CA, 68 SCRA 308, Tuazon v Cruz, GR No. L- 27410, Aug. 28, 1875). b. Applied to prosecution under Special Penal Statutes. i. Several Violations of Sec. 3(e) of the anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, RA 3019, As Amended, as delito continuado (Santiago v Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214). c. Only one prosecution possible for continuous crime (Crisologo v People, 94 Phil 477). Singularity of Criminal Act and Singularity of Criminal Intent (People v Lawas,
Art. 50-57 Stage of Execution / Degree of Participation. Wednesday, September 17, 2014
