Public International Law CASE DIGEST
Secreta Secretary ry of Ju sti ce vs. vs. H on. Ralph C. L anti on, GR. 139465 139465 Janu ary 18, 2000 2000
FACTS:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is based on the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution. Subsequently, former Secretary of Justice of the Philippines, signed in Manila Man ila the Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. Subsequently, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez which was for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 and the established ―Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America‖, the department proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent requested for a copy of o f the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner on the other hand, denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not n ot yet available. The private respondent contends that he is entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings. ISSUE:
Whether or not there is conflict between international law and municipal law? RULING:
The provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential
decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditee‘s liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. on e. On the other
hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever wheneve r municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence
I n Re: Re: Ar tur o Garcia, Garcia, 2 SCRA SCRA 984
FACTS:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice pr actice of law in the Philippines without having taken the required bar examinations. His petition contained that among others, he is a Filipino citizen born, of Filipino parentage; and that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, app roved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He alleges that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Treaty entered into between the Spain and the Philippines is valid and takes primacy over subsisting municipal laws? RULING:
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny den y the petition for Garcia to practice law in the Philippines. Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides: diploma s to practice ―The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by compet ent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise ex ercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter.‖ The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2.9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar ex aminations.
Co Ki m Chan v. Valdez Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phi l 113 Nov. Nov. 16, 1945 1945
FACTS:
During the Japanese occupation, Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified n ullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. He contends that without an enabling law, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the former Republic of the Philippines which is the Philippine government under the Japanese occupation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation?
RULING:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and p roceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for ―the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary nec essary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating ab rogating them.
Lawyer’s League for Better P hi hi l ippi nes vs. vs. Pres. Pres. Cory Aqu in o, G.R. No. 73748, M ay 22, 22, 1986
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. Then subsequently issued, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE:
Whether or not the government established by Corazon Coraz on Aquino is legitimate? RULING: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court held that: The people have accepted the Aquino government gov ernment which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
Tan ada vs. vs. An gara, 272 SCRA SCRA 18, M ay 2, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in thei r capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. Their Th eir petition seeks the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The WT O opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits ben efits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the
signatory Senators, a ―free market‖ espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Con stitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement? RULING:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution ―adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of th e law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by b y generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. la ws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through Throu gh WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the ―concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.‖ What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine de termine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not n ot be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and th e veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not eco nomic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their d uly elected officers, make their free choice.
Th e H oly ol y See See vs. vs. Rosar Rosar i o, 238 SCRA SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994
FACTS:
Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was given by donation by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, Nu ncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence. Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who wh o assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the prop erty while Holy See
says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development D evelopment Corporation. Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against ag ainst Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporatio n. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunit y from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The Th e subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Holy See can invoke its sovereign immunity and thus cannot be sued?
RULING:
The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its nonsuability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles p rinciples of International Law are adopted by our ou r Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity immunit y from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and a nd sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit p rofit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suit because the th e act of selling the lot of concern conce rn is non propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The Th e transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietary) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict e vict the squatters living in said property.
People People vs vs. Per Per f ecto, 43 PH I L 887
FACTS:
Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine P hilippine Senate discovered that certain documents, which contained the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. The day following the convening of the Senate, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article regarding what happened. Perfecto was prosecuted for writing an editorial against the Philippine Senate. The editorial in question was alleged to have violated Art. 256 of the Penal Code, punishing insults to Ministers of the Crown.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal P enal Code is still in force?
RULING:
The Supreme Court acquitted him, holding that the particular article of the said Code had been automatically abrogated, being political in nature, upon the advent of American sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 256 of the Penal Code Co de is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from this spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy monarch y from a democratic republic like that of the Unite States. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon up on American principles. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.
Vil as vs. vs. City of of M anil a,229 a,229 PH PH I L 345
FACTS:
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under un der the Republic Act No. 183, 18 3, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts
has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of o f the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished. ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of o f the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to its creditor? RULING:
No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The Th e new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. cit y. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that onl y the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the oldc ity it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.
I chong vs. vs. Hern andez andez, 101 101 PHI L 155
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not no t citizens of the Philippine from having a stranglehold upon
the people‘s economic life. Lao Ichong, in his own behalf b ehalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the for the reason that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process; the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title; the Act violates international and treaty obligations; and the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession ISSUE:
Whether the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws? RULING:
The law does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws and is a valid exercise of police power. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
US vs. vs. L ook Chaw 18 18 PHI L 573 573
FACTS:
Several persons went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo. Note that steamship Erroll is of English nationality and it came from HongKong bound for Mexico via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. These persons found sacks of opium. The complaint was then filed against defendant and stated that defendant ―carried, kept, possessed, and had in his
possession and control 96 kg of opium‖ o pium‖ and that he ―he had been surprised surprise d in the act of selling P1,000 worth prepared opium.‖ However, since there was more than 1 crime charged, the fiscal just filed for ―unlawful possession of opium‖ Defense admitted that Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on board Erroll and that it was true that the defendant defend ant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that he had them in his possession. According to the th e testimony of the internal-revenue, the opium op ium seized in the vessel had been bought by the defendant in Hong Kong, at P3.00 for each round can and P5.00 for each of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that the vessel arrived at Cebu and on the same day he sold opium. ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime? RULING:
Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction. The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Philippines. However, in the case c ase at bar, a can of opium is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the Philippine laws.
People People vs vs. Wong-Chen, 18 PH I L 573
FACTS:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and inwhich the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, op ium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half h alf miles from the shores of the city.
ISSUE:
Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters? RULING:
There are two fundamental rules on this particular p articular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and s ecurity of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence p revailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
De Per Per i o-Santos vs. vs. M acarai g, G.R. No. 94070, Apri l 10, 1942
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed on July 24, 1986, 1986 , President Cory to the position of Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the Philippine Mission to the United Nations and other International Organizations with station in Geneva, Switzerland. On April 6, 1987, petitioner sought a leave of absence from the home office to spend the Easter Holidays in New York, U.S.A., with her mother, brothers and sisters at no expense to the Government. She S he bought two (2) non-transferable, non-refundable discounted tickets costing SFr. 1,597 for herself and her adopted daughter Pia. Before they could take the trip however, ho wever, petitioner was instructed to proceed to Havana, Cuba to attend a UNCTAD conference as Philippine delegate. Petitioner is entitled for official trip outside her station (Geneva) for the cost of airplane ticket costing to SFr . 2,996 for Geneva New York-Geneva portion of her Geneva-New York-Havana-New York-Geneva trip. Instead of buying an economy roundtrip ticket, petitioner used for the Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her trip the two (2) discounted tickets costing only o nly SFr. 1,597 for herself and her daughter Pia. They left Geneva for New York en route to Havana on April 15, 1987. On the same day, the DFA approved her application for a leave of absence with pay from April 27 to May 1, 1987. After the Havana Conference, she and her daughter spent her vacation leave in New York before returning to Geneva ( Ibid .). Instead of claiming reimbursement for SFr. 2,996, she requested, and Ibid .). received, reimbursement of only SFr. 1,597 which she spent for the Geneva to New York, and
New York to Geneva portion of her trip, thereby effecting savings of SFr.1,399 for the Government. On September 16, 1987, the DFA ask her to explain why the Mission paid for plane ticket of infant Pia de Perio-Santos (petitioner's daughter) Geneva-New York-Geneva when petitioner was not authorized to accompany her adopting mother at government expense. Petitioner replied that the air fare tickets were for her only and did not include her daughter d aughter whose trip was paid from her personal funds. The DFA required her to refund the amount representing her daughter's round-trip ticket since DFA received a copy of the "facture" from the travel agency showing that the amount of SFr.1,597 was in payment her trip and that the sum of SFr. 673 represented the cost of her daughter's portion of the ticket. Her co-workers led by Deputy Armando Maglaque, and some MISUNPHIL employees filed administrative charges against her for "incompetence; inefficient; corrupt and dishonest activities; rude and uncouth manners; abusive and high-handed behavior; irregular and highly illegal transactions involving funds of the mission. The Board of Foreign Service Administration (BFSA) constituted a new 5-man investigating committee to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties. The committee found her liable for misconduct only, and recommended dismissal of the other charges. They The y also recommended that she be reprimanded and recalled to Manila. In a letter-decision dated April 27, 1988, the Secretary of Foreign Fo reign Affairs affirmed the BFSA's recommendation declaring Petitioner guilty of the lesser offense of misconduct, instead of dishonesty, meted to her the penalty of reprimand, and recalled her to the home office. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that she was denied due process when she was declared guilty of misconduct although it was not one of the charges against her. On March 30, 1989, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty (instead of misconduct) and imposed upon upo n her the penalty of reprimand, with recall to the home office. Hence this petition for certiorari alleging that the President's "reprimand and recall orders are not supported by substantial evidence and were issued with gross abuse of discretion and serious error of law". ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was unjustly found guilty and whether he r recall to Manila was a valid exercise of power by the Secretary?
RULING:
The general rule is that the factual findings of administrative agencies are binding on this Court and controlling on the reviewing authorities autho rities if supported by substantial evidence. A review of the records fails to yield any evidence evidenc e of dishonesty on the part of o f the petitioner, or intent to cheat and defraud the government. Nevertheless, the Court is not disposed to disturb the order of the DFA and the Office of the President recalling the petitioner to the home office. There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that her tour of duty in Geneva was for four (4) years. The Court C ourt held that under a secret Executive Order No. 168, provides that a person who has completed a minimum of one year of service, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs can transfer that person to Manila for reassignment and did not have to be explained and justified. The Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, act with the implied imprimatur of the President herself, unless the act is rep robated by her. In consonance with the principle of separation of powers, and considering that the conduct of foreign relations is primarily an executive prerogative , courts may not inquire into the wisdom or unwisdom in the exercise thereof. The President is the 'sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative with foreign nations.' The assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate. The President is the 'sole organ of the nation n ation in its external relations and its sole representative with foreign nations.' The assignment to and recall from po sts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.
Reyes Reyes vs vs. Bagatsin B agatsin g, 125 SCRA 553
FACTS:
Petitioner, retired Justice Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. away. It was stated stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal Re moval of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and
assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally.‖ The request for permit was denied because of reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or distrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of
people are expected to attend. Respondent suggested that ―a permit may be issued iss ued for the rally if it is to be held at the th e Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured." The denial is also anchored on the provision of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations which was adopted adopt ed in our laws as accepted thru the Ordinance No. 7295 prohibiting the holdings or staging of rallies or demonstration within a radius of five hundred (500) (50 0) feet from any foreign mission or chancery. On October 25, 1983, a minute resolution was issued by the Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition may be granted as an exercise of the constitutional rights and hold rally despite the express provisions of the Vienna Convention Co nvention on Diplomatic relations? RULING:
The petition is granted. granted. The Philippines is a signatory signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which ratified and signed by the President on October 11, 1965 and was thereafter deposited with the Secretary general of the United Nations on November 15. As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph p aragraph of the Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take tak e appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission mission or impairment of its dignity. The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international international law as part of the law of the land. To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles p rinciples of international law, it should be a part part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Embassy. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet and that there exist a clear and present danger.
M i nu cher vs. vs. Cour t of Appeals, G.R. No. 97765, Sept. Sept. 24, 1992 1992
FACTS:
Minucher is an Iranian national who came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philipp Phi lippine iness in 197 1974. 4. Scalzo Sca lzo is as a s a specia speciall agen agentt of of the US Drugs Drugs Enforc Enforcemen ementt Agen Agency. cy. He conducts surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of proh prohib ibit ited ed drug drugss ship shippe ped d to the the US and and make makess the the actu actual al arre arrest st.. Minucher and one Abbas Torabian was charged for a violation of Act. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) befo before re the the Pasi PasigR gRTC TC,, such such crim crimin inal al char charge ge was was foll follow owed ed by a buy buy-bus -bustt oper operat atio ion n cond conduc ucte ted d by the the Philippine police narcotic agents to which Scalzowas a witness for the prosecution. They were acquitted. Minuch Min ucher er filed fil ed a comp c omplai laint nt for fo r damage dam agess agains ag ainstt Scalzo Sca lzo.. He said said that that some of his proper propertie tiess were were missing like Persian carpets, a painting together withhis TV and betamax sets. There was nothing left in his house. He averred that his arrest as a heroine trafficker was well publicized and that when we got arrested, he was not given any food or water for 3 days. In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that it wasrecognized by the US Government pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government itself thru its Executive Department and DFA. ISSUE:
Whether or not Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity? RULING:
Yes, Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity. immunity. The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and thetechnical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. The main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Scalzo was an Assistant Attaché of the US diplomatic mission. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed bytheir respective ministries or
departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation p articipation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the ―buy- bust bust operation‖ conducted at the residence residenc e of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur , if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.
Chau f vs. CA, CA , 191 SCRA SCRA 713
FACTS:
The Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by b y origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a qualified dependent locally available.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler, a civilian personnel officer and Anthony Persi, Education Director, for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex being female, color being brown and nationality as Filipino by birth. birth . Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180 -day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, o ccurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacanc y. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she‘s available. Shauf accepted the offer. Mrs. Mary Abalateo‘s was about to vacate her position during that time. But Mrs. Abalateo‘s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never
appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo‘s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with
the applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues venu es such as the Civil Service S ervice Commission, Appeals Review Board, and the Regional Trial Court. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf then claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government w/c would require consent. On the other hand, respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law. ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit? sui t? RULING:
No. While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed filed against state officials, it only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This d oes not cover acts contrary to law & injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit will not be a suit against ag ainst the state. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not app ly where the public official is being sued in his h is private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
Th e H oly See See vs vs. Rosar Rosarii o, 238 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Petitioner, Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented by the Papal Nuncio. Private Respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., us a domestic corporation engaged in the real Estate business. The petition arose over a parcel p arcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of the Petitioner Holy See-Papal Nuncio. The said lot Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by b y Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., Acting agent to the sellers. Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises. In view if the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to the private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may invoke non-suability? RULING:
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii. The operation of the restaurants and other facilities facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial land not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
Syqui Syqui a vs. vs. L opez opez, 84 PH I L 312
FACTS:
Plaintiffs, Pedro Syquia and Leopoldo Syquia are a re the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated in Manila. They executed exec uted three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments. The period for the three leases was w as to be for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the US. The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the US Armed Forces stationed in Manila. Six months after after
Japan surrendered, plaintiffs approached the defendants George Moore and Erland Tillman and requested the return of the apartment buildings. Moore and Tillman expressed to plaintiffs that the US Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. Plaintiffs requested to renegotiate said leases, to execute a lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. Respondents refused to execute new and not being in conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said leases and to release the apartments. apartments. Tillman refused to comply with the request. On February 17, 1947, plaintiffs served a formal notice to the occupants however thirty-day period lapsed without any of the respondents complying with their the ir demands. Plaintiffs commenced an action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for Unlawful Detainer against respondents. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over ov er the subject matter of the action because the real party in interest was the US Government and not the individual defendants. Furthermore, the respondent argued that the war between the US and her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other had not yet been terminated and consequently the period of the three leases has not yet expired. Also, a foreign government like the US cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent. That even though the US Government was not named as the defendant in the complaint, it is nevertheless ne vertheless the real defendant as the parties named name d are officers of the US Government. The Municipal Court dismissed the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower court. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and try the case. RULING:
It is clear that the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the present case for Unlawful Detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised an d interposed at the very beginning of the action. The US Government has not given its consent to the filing of the suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case c ase of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter‘s consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government‘s consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of this country.
Sander Sander s vs vs Ver Ver idan o, 162 SCRA 88
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Respondent Respond ent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed emplo yed as game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA. They were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US Department Department of Defense. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two. Due to the failure to to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default. ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties? RULING:
Yes. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly un doubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said said for Moreau. Moreau. Given the official official character of the abovedescribed letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as a s officers of the United States government. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.
WH O vs. vs. Aqui n, 48 SCRA SCRA 242
FACTS:
Respondents COSAC officers filed their answer joining issue against petitioners and seeking to justify their act of applying for and securing from respondent judge the warrant for the search and seizure of ten crates consigned to petitioner Verstuyft and stored at the Eternit Corporation warehouse on the ground that they "contain large quantities of highly highl y dutiable
goods" beyond the official needs of said petitioner "and the only lawful way wa y to reach these articles and effects for purposes of taxation is through a search warrant." It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Leo nce Verstuyft, who was assigned on December 6, 1971 by b y the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization. Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability inviolability of the official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation and customs duties. When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes. The crates were directly directl y stored at the Eternit Corporation's warehouse at Mandaluyong, Rizal, "pending his relocation into permanent quarters upon the offer of Mr. Berg, Vice President of Eternit who was once o nce a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the Congo." Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date of respondents COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of Republic Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code 3 directing the search and seizure of the dutiable dutiab le items in said crates. Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific with station in Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same date respondent Judge advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect of his personal baggage baggag e as accorded to members of diplomatic missions" pursuant to the Host Agreement and requesting suspension of the search warrant order "pending clarification of the matter from the ASAC." ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search and seizure? RULING:
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement as expressly recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine Government. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge o f the Philippine Government's official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine court summons without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of the search warrant, since his personal effects and baggages after having been allowed free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed to have been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by respondents COSAC C OSAC officers. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer
of the Government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or o r other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political p olitical branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. As already stated above, and brought to respondent court's attention, the Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 14 for consultations between the Host State and the United Nations agency concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of occurrence of the abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other recourses. This is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the force and effect of law.
Call ado vs vs. I ntern ational Rice Res Research I nstitut e, 244 SCRA SCRA 211
FACTS:
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 to December 14, 1990. On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager in a Memorandum dated March 5, 1990. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. On January 2, 1991, private respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed b y petitioner, not having waived the same. While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute on August 13, 1991 to the effect that "in all cases ca ses of termination, 8 respondent IRRI waives its immunity," immunit y," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. Hence, this petition where it is contended that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620 It is also petitioner's position that a dismissal of his complaint before the Labor Arbiter leaves him no other remedy through which he can seek redress. He further states that since the investigation of his case was not referred to the Council Co uncil of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right to due process. p rocess. It is also petitioner's position that a dismissal of his complaint before the Labor Arbiter leaves him n o other remedy through which he can seek redress. He further states that since the th e investigation of his case was not referred to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management Mana gement (CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship? RULING:
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it ma y relinquish or abandon this immunity. On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. In the second place, petitioner's reliance on the Memorandum with "Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to P.D. 1620" dated July 26, 1983, is misplaced.
L asco asco vs vs. UN Revolving Revolving F un d for Nati onal Resour Resour ces ces Ex plor ation , 241 SCRA 681
FACTS:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In support thereof, private respondent attached a letter from the Department Depa rtment of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that private respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an original signatory. Respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the ground that private respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in in its Resolution. ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent is entitled to immunity as a Specialized Agency of the United Nations? RULING:
Yes. As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. The diplomatic di plomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994; International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja.
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project p roject entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners.
I ntern ational Cathol ic M igr ation Commission Commission vs. vs. Pur Pur a Call Call eja, 190 SCRA 130
FACTS:
After the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted the international community. An Agreement A greement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereb y an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan. ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an international organization rend ering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines. Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal by TUPAS, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations Rel ations (BLR), reversed the Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct o f a certification election. At that time, ICMC's request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF). Subsequently, however, on 15 July 1988, the Philippine Government, through the DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly granted but the same was denied by respondent BLR Director who, again, ordered the immediate conduct cond uct of a pre-election conference. ICMC's two Motions for Reconsideration were denied despite an opinion op inion rendered by DEFORAF on 17 October 1988 that said BLR Order violated ICMC's diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic dip lomatic privileges and immunity to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws? RULING:
The foregoing issue constitutes a categorical recognition b y the Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or o r other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise ex ercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly n ecessitated by its international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality p artiality and interference by the host country co untry in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. ICMC's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, Article III, Section 8, and A rticle XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution. The immunity granted being "from every form of legal l egal process except in so far as in any a ny particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of o f that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process.
South east ast Asia F i sheri es Developm Developme ent Center vs. vs. Nati onal L abor Relati ons Commi ssion , 206 SCRA 283
FACTS:
The private respondent herein was an employee, who was later on terminated due to financial problem by SEAFDEC-AQD. The latter was a department of herein petitioner which is an international organization. The separation pay and other benefits was not given to the private respondent which gave birth to the case at bar. ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent NLRC has a jurisdiction in the case at bar? RULING:
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, petitioner enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. The subjection of such am organization to the authority of the local courts cou rts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there operations or even ev en influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
Commi ssi oner of Customs vs. vs. Easter Easter n Sea Sea Tr adin g, 3 SCRA SCRA 283
FACTS:
Eastern Sea Trading was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought sou ght to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement A greement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed. ISSUE:
Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate?
RULING:
No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Se nate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the th e more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes no tes and at other times that of more formal documents do cuments
denominated ‗agreements‘ or ‗protocols‘. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss d iscuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive ex ecutive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments.
Agu sti n vs. E du, 83 SCRA SCRA 195
FACTS:
This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Ferdinand Marcos aimed to prevent road accidents and in the interest of safety on all streets, highways including expressways. All motorist and motor vehicle owners shall have at all times one pair of early warning device. These hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Roads and Signs and the United Nations Organization (UN). Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207 ratified the said Vienna convention requiring the installation i nstallation of road signs and devices. ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process. RULING:
The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police po wer and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere interfere on personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety. It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines adopts the generally generall y accepted principles of international law as part p art of the law of the nation. Thus, Thu s, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country
to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country‘s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207.
Tan ada vs. vs. An gara, 272 SCRA SCRA 18
FACTS:
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by
the Philippine Senate of the President‘s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement Agreement violates the -reliant and independent national economy mandate of the 1987 Constitution to ―develop a self -reliant effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference p reference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.‖ Further, they contended that the ―national treatment‖ and ―parity provisions‖ of the WTO Agreement ―place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,‖ in contravention of the ―Filipino First‖ policy of our Constitution, Cons titution, and render meaningless the phrase ―effectively controlled by Filipinos.‖
ISSUES:
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution does not prohibit our ou r country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy econom y that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized. There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor favo r of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the th e rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did n ot shut out foreign investments, goofs, and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange excha nge on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy: Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding av oiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on ―most favored nation,‖ ―national treatment,‖ and ―trade without discrimination‖ cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy polic y based on
―equality and reciprocity,‖ the fundamental law encourages industries that are ―competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,‖ thereby thereb y demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity tenacit y to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong Hongkon g have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire .
Commi ssi oner of I nte nt er nal Reve Revenu e vs. vs. S.C. S.C. John son and an d Son, Son, I nc., 208 SCRA SCRA 87
Facts:
S.C. JOHNSON AND SON, INC., a domestic corporation organized organiz ed and operating under the Philippine laws, entered into a license agreement with SC Johnson and Son, United States of America (USA), a non-resident foreign corporation based in the U.S.A. pursuant to which the [respondent] was granted the right to use the trademark, patents and technology owned by the latter including the right to manufacture, package and distribute the products covered by b y the Agreement and secure assistance in management, marketing and production from SC Johnson and Son, U. S. A.
The said License Agreement was duly dul y registered with the Technology Transfer Board of the Bureau of Patents, Trade Marks and Technology Transfer under Certificate of Registration No. 8064.For the use of the trademark or technology, [respondent] was obliged to pay SC Johnson and Son, USA royalties based on a percentage of net sales and subjected the same to 25% withholding tax on royalty payments which [respondent] paid for the period covering July 1992 to May 1993 in the total amount of P1,603,443.00 On October 29, 1993, Respondent filed with the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD)
of the BIR a claim for refund of overpaid withholding tax on royalties arguing that, ―the antecedent facts attending case fall squarely within the same circumstances under which said MacGeorge and Gillete rulings were issued. Since the agreement was approved by the Technology Transfer Board, the preferential tax rate of 10% should apply. We therefore submit that royalties paid by the respondent to SC Johnson and Son, USA is only subject to 10% withholding tax pursuant to the most-favored nation clause of the RP-US Tax Treaty. The Commissioner did not act on said claim for refund. Private respondent S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. (S.C. Johnson) then filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax T ax Appeals (CTA).The Court of Tax Appeals rendered its decision de cision in favor of S.C. Johnson and ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to issue a tax credit certificate in the amount of P963,266.00 representing overpaid withholding tax on royalty payments, beginning July, 1992 to May, 1993. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thus filed a petition p etition for review with the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision finding no merit in the petition and affirming in toto the CTA ruling. ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that SC Johnson and Son, USA is entitled to the ―Most Favored Nation‖ Tax rate of 10% on Royalties as provide in the RP-US Tax Treaty in relation to the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty? RULING:
Under Article 24 of the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, the Philippine tax paid on income from sources within the Philippines is allowed as a credit against German income and corporation tax on the same income. In the case of royalties for which the tax is reduced to 10 or 15 percent according to paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, the credit shall be 20% of the gross amount of such royalty. To illustrate, the royalty income of a German resident from sources within the Philippines arising from the use of, or the right to use, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, is taxed at 10% of the gross amount of said royalty under certain conditions. The Th e rate of 10% is imposed if credit against the German income and corporation tax on said royalty is allowed in favor of the German resident. That means the rate of 10% is granted to the German taxpayer taxpa yer if he is similarly granted a credit against the income and corporation tax of West Germany. The clear intent of the
―matching credit‖ is to soften the impact of double taxation by different jurisdictions.
The RP-US Tax Treaty contains no similar ―matching credit‖ as that provided under the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty. Hence, the tax on royalties under the RP-US Tax Treaty is not paid under similar circumstances as those obtaining in the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty. Therefore, the ―most favored nation‖ clause in the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty cannot be availed of in interpreting the provisions of the RP-US RP -US Tax Treaty.5 The rationale for the most favored nation clause, the concessional tax rate of 10 percent provided for in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty should apply only if the taxes imposed upon royalties in the RP-US Tax Treaty and in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty are paid under similar circumstances. This would mean that private respondent must prove that the RP-US Tax Treaty grants similar tax reliefs to residents of the United States in respect of the tax es imposable upon royalties earned from sources within the Philippines as those allowed to their German counterparts under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty. The RP-US and the RP-West RP -West Germany Tax Treaties do not contain similar provisions on tax crediting. Article 24 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty expressly allows crediting against German income and corporation tax of 20% of the gross amount of royalties ro yalties paid under the law of the Philippines. On the other hand, hand , Article 23 of the RP-US RP -US Tax Treaty, which is the counterpart provision with respect to relief for double taxation, tax ation, does not provide for similar crediting of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid. Since the RP-US Tax Treaty does not give a matching tax credit of 20 percent for the taxes paid to the Philippines on royalties as allowed under the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, private respondent cannot be deemed dee med entitled to the 10 percent rate granted under the latter treaty for the reason that there is no payment of taxes tax es on royalties under similar circumstances.
F r ivaldo vs. vs. COME L EC, 174 SCRA SCRA 245
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time.
The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo‘s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator‘s agent abroad. ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of o f the Philippines at the time of his election? e lection? RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically aut omatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be p ossessed not only at the time of appointment or o r election or assumption of office but during the officer‘s entire tenure. Frivaldo is therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the P rovince of Sorsogon.
M oy Ya L im Yao vs. vs. Commiss Commission ion er of I mmigr ation , 41 SCRA SCRA 292
FACTS:
On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. S he was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or o r before the expiration of her authorized period p eriod of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Mo y Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration ex piration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Cou rt of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer p rayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. ISSUE:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen? RULING:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during d uring the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot can not be denied the same privilege. p rivilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence h ence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage m arriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Edilbe rto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
Bengzon Bengzon I I I vs. vs. H ouse ouse Re Represe presentati ves ves Electoral Electoral Tr ibu nal , 357 SCRA SCRA 545
FACTS :
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, his Filipino citizenship was lost. But he reacquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation under RA No. 2630. Subsequently, he was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for re-election. Petitioner filed a case claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as requiredunder Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?
RULING :
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumeratesthe enumeratesthe three three modes by which which Philippine citizenship citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization , (2) by repatriation , and (3) by direct act of Congress. Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4)marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be b e re st o re d to h is fo r me r st at us as a n at u ra l -b o rn Fi li pi no . In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Aznar vs. vs. COM EL EC, 185 SCRA SCRA 703
FACTS:
Private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. Petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issu issued ed by the the then then Immigr ation and Depo rtati on C ommis sion er M iriam Defe nsor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. respectively. (Annex "B-1"). During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has be b e en continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari. ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dualcitizenship?
RULING:
o r certiorari u pholding COMELEC‘s decision. SC dismissed petition f or The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subs subscr crib ibin ing g to an oath oath of alle allegi gian ance ce to sup por t t he Con sti tut ion or law s o f a for eig n country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the elec electo tora rall proc proces esss in this this coun try sinc e 19 63 u p to the prese nt, both as a v oter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly
L abo vs vs. COM EL EC, 176 SCRA SCRA 1
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines? RULING:
The petitioner‘s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does d oes the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.
Kookoori Kookoori tchkin vs. vs. Solicitor Solicitor Gene General ral , 81 PH PH I L 435 435
FACTS:
Eremes Kookooritchkin is a native-born Russia. He grew up as a citizen of the defunct d efunct Imperial Russian Government under the Czars. When the revolution broke out in Russia in 1917, 191 7, he joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until 1922 19 22 when the White Russian Army was overwhelmed by b y the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join the Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this Chinese Ch inese port he found his way to Manila, arriving at this port po rt as a member of a group of White Russians under Admiral Stark in March, 1923. He stayed sta yed in Manila for about seven months, then moved to Olongapo, Zambales, where he resided for about a year, and from this place he went to Iriga, Camarines Sur, where he established his permanent residence since May, 1925. He has h as remained a resident of this municipality, except for a brief period p eriod from 1942 to July, 1945, when by reason of his underground activities he roamed mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After liberation he returned to Iriga where again he resides up to the present time. Kookooritchkin is married to a Filipino by the name of Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has one son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is shop superintendent of A. L. Ammen Transportation Company, with about eighty Filipino employees working under him. He receives
an annual salary of P13,200 with free quarters and house allowance. He also owns stocks and bonds of this and other companies. Kookooritchkin speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. d ialect. Socially he intermingles with the Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other ot her social functions with his wife. He has a good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has never been accused of any crime. On the other hand, he has always conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire period of residence in Camarines Sur, in his relations with the constituted authorities as well as with the community. Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State, S tate, much less to the present Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed. He is not against organized government or affiliated with any association which upholds and teaches doctrine opposing all organized governments. He does not believe in the th e necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. ISSUE:
Whether or not Kookooritchkin is considered a stateless refugee? RULING:
Yes. Kookooritchkin‘s testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the wellknown fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country c ountry and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-sofortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of o f all bonds of attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless refugees. Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the wo rld ought to know, the history, nature and character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanit y and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further evidence o f petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian Communist Government and, is because he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines. After finding in this country economic security in a remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after showing his resolution to retain the happiness he found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim Russian citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese Jap anese and of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.
Tu quero vs. vs. M un oz, oz, G.R. No. 140520
FACTS:
The Hong Kong Magistrate‘s Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Munoz for accepting bribes in violation of a HK ordinance and for conspiring to defraud. Later, the Philippines DOJ was requested by the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit of the Hong Kong DOJ for the provisional arrest of Munoz pursuant to the RP-HK Extradition Agreement. The request was forwarded to the NBI. Subsequently, Subsequen tly, a warrant for the arrest of Munoz was issued by the RTC. Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest, which the CA granted on the ff. grounds: 1) that the request was unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for its issuance; 2) that the 20 day period p eriod under PD 1069 or o r the Philippine extradition law was not amended by the RP-HK extradition ex tradition agreement which provides for a 45 day period for provisional arrest; 3) the judge issued it without having personally determined the existence of probable cause; and 4) the requirement of dual criminality under the Philippine extradition law has not been satisfied as the crimes complained of are not punishable by Philippine laws. Munoz filed for release contending that since he has been detained beyond 20 days, the maximum for the provisional arrest, without a request for extradition being received by the DOJ, he should be released. ISSUE:
Whether the provisional warrant of arrest issued by the RTC was void? RULING:
Yes. Sec. 20 of PD 1069 provides that the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional prov isional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition. In urgent cases, the person sought ma y, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, be provisionally arrested on the application of the requesting Party. There was urgency in the th e present case as there was a concern of Munoz being a flight risk if he will be informed of the pending request for extradition extradition especially given the fact that if he will be found guilty of the charges against him, the penalties are of such gravity as to increase the probability of Munoz absconding if allowed provisional liberty. The request, as well as the accompanying documents, is valid despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extradition law does not provide for a requirement of authentication for the provisional arrest. Moreover, the authenticated copies of the decision or sentence imposed upon Munoz by HK and the warrant of arrest has already been received by the Phil. Furthermore, the extradition agreement only requires authentication for the request of extradition and not for the provisional arrest. Provisional arrest is a solution to the impending risk of flight as the process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents is time-
consuming and leakage-prone. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable or facsimile. The temporary hold on private respondent‘s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to HK. There is no denial d enial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
H arve ar vey y vs. vs. Santi ago, 162 SCRA SCRA 840
Facts:
Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey and Jonh Sherman, Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout. All of them reside at Pagsanjan, Laguna. Respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their
residences. The ―Operation Report‖ read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den
Elshout in the ―after Mission Report‖ read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in. During petitioner‘s apprehension there were rolls of photo negatives and photos p hotos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. sex . Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not no t for pedophile but working with NO VISA, V ISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest were issued against petitioners for violation of of Immigration Act and the Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed but was not no t granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause? 2. Whether or not there were unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents? age nts? 3. Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners? RULING:
While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined d etermined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation cha rges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not n ot be granted when con confinement finement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground gro und for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court Cou rt proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired. Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be b e injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.
Cuevas vs. vs. M un oz, oz, 348 SCRA 542
FACTS:
The Hong Kong Magistrate s Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz for seven counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven counts of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong. The Department of Justice received a request for the t he provisional arrest of the respondent from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong Kon g Department of Justice pursuant to Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement.
Upon application of the NBI, RTC of o f Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest. Arrest. Consequently, respondent was arrested pursuant to the said order, and is currently detained at the NBI detention cell. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order of Arrest null and void on o n the grounds, among others that the request for provisional arrest and the accompanying warrant of arrest and summary of facts were unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. ISSUE:
Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents must be authenticated? DECISION:
The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents is valid despite lack of authentication. There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. The enumeration in the provision of RPHong Kong Extradition Agreement does not specify that these documents must be authenticated copies. This may be gleaned from the fact that while Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for provisional arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 o f the same Extradition Agreement makes authentication a requisite for admission in e vidence of any document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. In other words, authentication is required for the request for surrender or extradition but not n ot for the request for provisional arrest. The RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, as they the y are worded, serves the purpose sought to be achieved by b y treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents, docum ents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of the pending request for their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable. Respondent‘s reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr. is misplaced. The proscription against the admission of a pleading that has been transmitted by facsimile machine has no application in the case at bar for obvious reasons. First, the instant case does not involve a pleading; and second, unlike the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading by means of a facsimile machine, P.D. No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong Extradition Agreement do not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional arrest by means of a fax machine.
Wr igh t vs. vs. CA, 235 SCRA SCRA 341
FACTS:
Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 198 7 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into fo rce of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI V I of the Constitution. ISSUE :
Whether or not the extradition treaty may be b e applied retroactively? RULING:
Under the Constitution, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This bein g so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition ag ainst ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty T reaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.
Sec. Sec. of Ju sti ce vs. vs. H on. Ralph C. L anti on, GR NO. 139465
FACTS:
The Department of Justice received from the Department Depa rtment of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition ex tradition were attached along with the request. The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further fu rther proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? RULING:
Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as ―the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the th e disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with an y criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.‖ Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation o f the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there‘s an
impending threat to a prospective extraditee‘s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure procedu re for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, th erefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
Qua Ch e Gan Gan vs. vs. Deport Deport ation Boar d, 9 SCRA SCRA 27
FACTS:
The petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board with having purchased US Dollars in the total sum of $130, 000 without the necessary license from the Central Bank o f the Philippines and further having remitted the money to Hong Kong and to to themselves.· Warrants were issued but upon filing for a surety and cash bond they were released.· Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation dele gation by the president to the Deportation Depo rtation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an al alien ien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State.· Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held to be essential to and complement the power to deport aliens under sec 69 of the rRvised Administrative Code ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to deport aliens and delegate those powers?
RULING:
The President has the power to carry out order of deportation but may not order arrest during investigation. Such power may not be delegated. It is provided under Sec. 69 of the Revised Administrative Code: Deportation of subject to foreign power ―A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, depo rted, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated.In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be hea hearrd by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.‖ While it did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens and merely lays down the procedure, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien maybe effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Commonwealth ActNo.613.SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation wherefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twentyseve se ven n hund hu ndred red and an d eleven eleven whic which h shall shall contin continue ue in in forc forcee and and effec eff ect. t.
F il ipi nas Compania Compania de Se Segur os vs. vs. Chr isten isten H uenfeld, 89 SCRA SCRA 54
FACTS:
Christern Huenefeld & Co, primarily controlled by German subjects, obtained a fire policy from Filipinas (a Philippine corp under American jurisdiction) jurisdiction) in the sum of P1000,000 covering merchandise in a building. During a Japanese Military occupation, the building and insured merchandise were burned. Christern submitted to Filipinas its claim claim under the policy but Filipinas refused to pay contending the policy ceased to be in force on the date the US declared war against Germany. Philippine Exec Commission, Filipinas paid Christern. Filipinas filed an action to recover the sum paid. The CFI dismissed the action and CA affirmed such decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Christern was a ―public enemy‖ and therefor e not entitled to the insurance? RULING:
The Philippine insurance Law in Sec. 8 provides that ―anyone except a public enemy may be insured.‖ It stands to reason that an insurance insuran ce policy ceases to be allowable as soon as an insured becomes public enemy. The purpose of the war is to cripple c ripple the power ad exhaust the resources of the enemy, and it is inconsistent that one country should destroy its enemy prope rty and repay in insurance the value of what has been so s o destroyed, or that it should in such manner increase the resources of the enemy or render it aid.
The respondent having become an enemy corporation on December 10 1941, the insurance policy issued in its favor on October 1 1941 by Filipinas had ceased to be valid and enforceable and since the insured goods were burned after Dec 10 1941, and during the war, Christern was not entitled to any indemnity under the said policy.
H aw Pia Pia vs. vs. China Banki ng Corporation,80 Corporation,80 PHI L 604 604
FACTS:
Haw Pia had a loan from China Banking Corporation. This was completely paid according to Haw Pia, on different occasions from 1942 to 1944 through Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., which was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of China Banking Corp. With this, Haw Pia instituted an action against China Banking Corp. to compel the bank to execute a deed of cancellation of mortgage on the property used as security for the loan and to deliver its title. However China Banking Corp. demanded from Haw Pia payment of the sum of the loan with interests. RTC decided in favor of China Banking Corp. Corp. on the basis that there was no evidence to show that Bank of Taiwan was authorized by China Banking Corp. to accept Haw Pia's payment and that Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate the business of China Banking Corp. As such, Haw Pia's payment to Bank of Taiwan has not extinguished the loan.
ISSUE:
Whether the Japanese Military Administration had the authority to order the liquidation of the business of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan authorized as such to accept payment? RULING:
YES, under international law, the Japanese Military authorities had pow er to order the liquidation of China Banking Corp. and to appoint and authorize Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to accept the payment in question, qu estion, because such liquidation is not confiscation co nfiscation of the properties of China Banking Corp., but a mere sequestration of its assets which required its liquidation. The sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in occupied territories is authorized expressly, not only by the US Army and Naval Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, but also similar manuals of other countries, without violating Art. 46 or other articles of the Hague Regulations. They do not amount to an outright confiscation of private property. The purpose of such sequestration, as expounded in the Annual Report of the Office of the Alien Custodian, is that enemy-owned property can be b e used to further the interest of the enemy and to impede their war efforts. All enemy controlled assets can be used to finance propaganda, espionage, and sabotage in these countries or in countries friendly to their cause. Since the Japanese Military Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the assets of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator, it follows that payments of Haw Pia to Bank of Taiwan extinguished his obligations to China Banking Corp. Br ownell ownell vs. vs. Bauti sta, 95 95 Phil 853
FACTS:
Antonina Bautista was married to Japanese National named Muneo Teraoka, also known as Charles M. Teraoka. Muneo Teraoka died and was survived by b y his wife and six children. Antonina Bautista and four of her children died d ied in different instances; the surviving children are Carlos Teraoka and Marie Dolores Teraoka, they were taken by the American army and were sent to Japan. The Enemy Property Custodian of the U.S. U.S . Army took into his custody the properties described in the complaint on suspicion that these properties were tainted with enemy interest. Macario Bautista, father of Antonina Bautista, believing that the entire Te raoka family had already died, and being the t he nearest surviving or relative of the Teraokas, claimed the said
properties from the Enemy Property Custodian. Macario Bautista, then, by an affidavit of adjudication, succeeded in securing the cancellation of the certificates of title in his own n ame. Once he had the certificates of title in his name, free of any lien or o r encumbrance, Macario Bautista sold one lot to defendant Antonio Baluga. The office of the Philippine Alien Property Administration was established in the Philippines; it assumed and took over the functions and duties of the defunct Enemy Enem y Property Custodian of the United States Army. This new office learned that the entire two of the Teraoka children, Carlos and Marie Dolores, are very much muc h alive and are living in Japan. J apan. Then the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, on the supposition that Carlos Teraoka and Marie Dolores Teraoka are Japanese nationals, vested and took title to the portion p ortion of the said properties belonging, by right of succession, to said Carlos and Marie Dolores Teraoka, by virtue of Vesting Order No. P-394, issued on February 2, 1949, which was later supplemented and amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vesting of the property by Philippine Alien Property Administrator is valid? RULING:
The complaint prays for partition of the properties and not no t merely for delivery of their possession. Apparently, this is an action contemplated in Rule 71 wherein the court, before proceeding with the partition, has to pass upon the rights or the ownership of the parties interested in the property (Section 2). In an action for partition the determination of ownership is indispensable to make proper adjudication. In this particular case, this acquires added force considering that the titles of the properties appear issued in the name of defendants, and the plaintiff contends that they belong to enemy aliens. By filing this action of partition partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his vesting order. He cannot therefore now dispute this power. It is true that the complaint does not specifically allege that the Administrator is invoking the authority of the court under section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and that the failure to make mention of that fact should no militate against the stand of o f the Administrator. The fact remains that the very averments of the complaint show that the real purpose of the action is not the recovery recover y of possession but the partition of the properties. This makes this case come, as already said, under un der Rule 71 of our Rules of Court. The lower court did not err in passing upon the nationality of Carlos and Marie Dolores Teraoka, or in determining the validity of the vesting order issued by the Philippine Ph ilippine Alien Property Administrator.
L aur el vs. vs. M isa, 77 Phil 856
FACTS.:
The petitioner, Anastacio Laurel, was arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the United States Army, and was interned, under und er a commitment order "for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons.He was charged with treason, by adhering adherin g to the enemy by b y giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time and that he cannot be tried since the Court has no jurisdiction. Furthermore, he claimed that he had renounced his Filipino citizenship after joining the Japanese paramilitary Makapili, and then swearing allegiance to Japan. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner‘s allegiance and sovereignty were suspended during the change of government? RULING:
The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; mad e; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, Moreov er, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty Sovereignt y per se wasn‘t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.
Co Ki m Cham vs. vs. Valdez Tan K eh and D izon, 75 PH I L 113
FACTS.
This case was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, was refused to be addressed by the respondent judge of the lower court. He argued that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the said governments. He also argued that the said governments during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments. The Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila on January 2, 1942 and on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts districts occupied by the Army." It
was also provided in the said proclamation that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the governments established in the Philippines under the names of Philippines Ph ilippines Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments? gove rnments? RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission which was organized by Order No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The source of its authority comes from the Japanese military, it is a government imposed by the laws of war. The same is true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently App arently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government gov ernment established by the Japanese forces of occupation.
Ku roda vs Jalan doni, 42 OG 4282
FACTS:
Kuroda argues that the military commission established by EO 68 h as no jurisdiction to try the petitioner for acts violated of the conduct of war, and crimes against the citizen of the
Philippines. The petitioner‘s basis is that the Philippines Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague convention. ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners may be tried by the Military commission or not? RULING:
The Hague Convention and the the Geneva Convention are rules and regulations which forms part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the land as promulgated by the constitution.
Yamshi ta vs. Styer Styer
FACTS:
Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during World War 2. He was charged before the th e American military commission for war crimes. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. ISSUE :
Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction? RULING:
The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.The laws of war imposes up on a commander the duty dut y to take any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others.
B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos L a Bugal- Bugal-
FACTS:
Petitioners assails the constitutionality of the RA 792 (Phil. Mining Act of 199 5) along with its Implementing Rules and Regulations, DENR Administrative order 96-40 and the Financial and technical assistance agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30,1995, by the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation Philippines, Inc.. On July 25, 1987, two days before the opening of congress, Pres. Cory Aquino issued EO 279, authorizing the DENR secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreignowned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale explorations, which upon recommendation of the Sec, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. Sec.8 of the EO states that the same shall take effect immediately. By such authority the subject WMCP FTAA was executed on March 30, 1995. On March 3, 1995, Fidel V. Ramos approved RA 7942, to govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila times, or on April 9, 1995, RA 7942 took effect. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on o n March 30, 1995 the President entered into an FTAA withWMCP.On August 15, 195, DENR Secretary, Se cretary, Victor Ramos issued DAO 95-23, later
repealed by DAO 96-406. Subsequently, WMCP sold all its shares to Sagittarius mines, Inc, a Filipino corporation. By virtue of such, DENR approved ap proved the transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to Saguittarius. ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 279 is valid and took effect in accordance with due process? RULING:
EO 279 took effect and is valid. Petitioners contentions that based on EO 200, Sec.1, EO 27 could have only onl y taken effect fifteen day after its publication at which time Congress had
already convened and the President‘s power to legislate has ceased have no merit. From a reading of Sec.8 of EO 279, Sec.1 of EO 200 and Tanada v Tuvera, the court holds that EO 279 became effective immediately upon its publication in the OG on August 3, 1987. There is nothing in EO 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date. What is mandatory under EO 200, and what due process requires as held in Tanada v Tuvera, is the publication of law. The convening of the first congress did not prevent the effectivity of the laws previously enacted by the president p resident in the exercise of her legislative le gislative powers. Art 18, Sec.6 states that ―The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the First Congress is convened.‖ Thus, the convening of Congress merely precluded the exercise of the legislative powers of the President. There can be no question that EO 279 is an effective and a validly enacted, statute.
Rep. Rep. of t he Phi l. vs. Sadigan Sadigan bayan
FACTS:
After the EDSA Revolution, there was a revolutionary revolutionar y government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the ―PCGG‖), through the AFP Anti-Graft Board, investigated reports of unexplained wealth involving Major General Josephus Ramas, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. Then, the Constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure warrant on the premises
of Ramas‘ alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment stated in the
warrant, items not included in the warrant, particularly, communications eq uipment, land titles, jewelry, and several thousands of cash in pesos and US dollars, were also seized
Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (the ―Republic‖ or ―Petitioner‖) filed a Complaint against Ramas and Dimaano.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate inv estigate the private respondents and (2) the search and seizure conducted was illegal. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas and Dimaano?
2. Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaano‘s house were illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence?
DECISION:
The PCGG, through the AFP Board can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the 2 categories mentioned in Section 2 of E.O No. 1, i.e.: i.e.: AFP personnel who accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latter‘s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence; or: AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. In the case at bar, Petitioner does not claim that
the President assigned Ramas‘ case to the PCGG. Therefore, the present controversy should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before P CGG could have jurisdiction. It was held that
Ramas was not a ―subordinate‖ of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a ―subordinate‖ as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it.
Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG‘s sole task is only to recover the illgotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
It has been said that ―the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state‖ and from there is derived ―the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.‖ Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure governme nt, assumed
responsibility for the State‘s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State ―to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.‖ Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, Co venant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that ―[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.‖ correspondence. ‖ The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that ―[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.‖ Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the right of individuals under the Declaration. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is is not the issue here. here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State‘s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. Thus, during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government governmen t officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the rev olutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with w ith respect to the items specifically described in the warrant. warrant. However, the Constabulary raiding team seized seized items not included in the warrant – the monies, communications equipment, and jewelry and land titles confiscated. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these
items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it it seized these items. The seizure of these items items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, the Court did not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor and ordered that these items should be b e returned immediately to Dimaano.
Oposa Oposa vs. vs. F actoran Jr
FACTS:
This class suit is brought by 44children, through their parents, p arents, claiming that they bring
the case in the name of ―their generation as well as those generations yet unborn.‖ Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as Parens Patriae The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-h umankind-- the natural law — and and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, co ntracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court Co urt on certiorari. ISSUE:
Whether or not the children have the legal standing to file the case? DECISION:
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal
standing to file the case based on the concept of ―intergenerational responsibility‖. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court Co urt recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the th e exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare
L aguna L ake Deve Development lopment A uth ori ty vs. vs. CA
FACTS:
The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady Lad y of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. The LLDA subsequently issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other en tities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or o r kind of garbage and other othe r waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. Also, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being bein g utilized as a dumpsite. The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. ISSUE:
Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint authorized by the City Government of Caloocan? RULING:
LLDA has authority. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, ch arter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order o rder may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction. To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly exp ressly conferred the power "to issue an ex-parte cease ce ase and desist order" in a language, as suggested su ggested by the City Government of Caloocan, Caloocan , similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Po llution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw there from the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health he alth of the people and instil health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines are party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.
B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos L a Bugal- Bugal-
FACTS:
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well w ell as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 19 87 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, [9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they the y allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our ou r natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor ex clusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic econo mic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment Env ironment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over our natural resources? RULING:
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to ―enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.‖ On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of ―every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.‖ In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress Con gress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard; the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty d uty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources. Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due d ue respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people p eople and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. ―The judiciary is loath
to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.‖ As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, ―Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations u surpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by b y the Organic Act.‖ Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of governme nt. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository repo sitory of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people. The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress Con gress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, ex pertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathizes with the plight p light
of La Bugal B‘laan and other tribal groups, and commends their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale large -scale mining operations, the complicated
technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State‘s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country‘s competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical technic al agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA). USA v. Guin to
FACTS:
These are several cases involving the doctrine do ctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607, 7660 7, the private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla an d Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and an d thereafter referred
the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal. Genove‘s reaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks bar racks boy in Cano O‘ Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a bu y-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers o fficers testified against him at his trial. Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the US), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the d efendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants den y this and claim that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In motion to dismiss the complaint, the US and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the US, which had not given its consent to be sued. ISSUE:
Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under un der the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties?
RULING:
The rule that a State may ma y not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Und er this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence conse quence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. an other. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against a gainst such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded.
PCGG vs. Sandi Sandi ganbayan
FACTS:
On 7 April 1986, in connection conn ection with criminal proceedings initiated in the Philippines to locate, sequester and seek restitution of alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses and other accused from the Philippine Government, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote the Federal Office for Police Matters in Berne, Switzerland, requesting assistance for the latter office to:(a) ascertain and provide the OSG with information as to where and in which cantons the ill-gotten fortune of the Marcoses and other accused ac cused are located, the names of the depositors and the banks and the amounts involved; and (b) take necessary precautionary measures, such as sequestration, to freeze the assets in order to preserve their ex isting value and prevent any an y further transfer thereof (herein referred to as the IMAC request). The Office of the District Attorney in
Zurich, pursuant to the OSG‘s request, issued an Order directing the Swiss Banks in Zurich to freeze the accounts of the accuse ISSUE:
Whether or not the Swiss officials can invoke state immunity from suit? RULING:
The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which States prevent p revent their national courts from deciding disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another State, the other two being immunity and non-justiciability. It is an avoidance technique that is directly related o a
State‘s obligation to respect the independence and equality of other States by not requiring them to submit to adjudication in a national court or to settlement of their disputes without their consent. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint in the adjudication of disputes relating to legislative
I ntern ntern ational Catholic M igr ation Commiss Commission vs. vs. Calleja
FACTS:
ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. That comes from an argument between the Philippine government and the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan. ICMC was duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and enjoys consultative status. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines, its activities are parallel to those of the international committee for migration migration and the international of the Red Cross. On July 14, 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied for certification with the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment a petition p etition for certification election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed oppo sed the petition on the ground groun d that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. The Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for each of jurisdiction. On appeal by TUPAS, Director Calleja, reversed the Med-arbiter‘s decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS petition for certification election involving the immunity expressly granted but the same was denied. With intervention of department of foreign affairs who was legal interest in the outcome of this case, the second division gave due to the ICMC petition and required the submittal of memoranda by the parties. ISSUES:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges p rivileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws? RULING:
The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws, because it is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes which is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. Employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled because each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of disputes out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. Moreover, pursuant to article IV of memorandum of abuse of privilege by ICMC, the government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.
Baer v. Ti zon
FACTS:
Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint co mplaint for injunction with the Court of First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer, Command er of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging in an area situated in Barrio Mabayo, Municipality of Morong, Bataan and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging operations.
A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge on November 23, 1964.Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent. Gener opposed petitioner's motion to dismiss relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing d oing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government." Petitioner, thereafter, on January 12, 1965, made a written offer of documentary evidence, including certified c ertified copies of telegrams of the Forestry Director to Forestry personnel in Balanga, Bataan dated January 8, and January 11, 1965, directing immediate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan and c alling attention to the fact that the records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or temporary extension permits. The respondent Judge, issued an order granting respondent Gener's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and denying den ying petitioner's motion to dismiss the opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is applicable? DECISION:
A foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly friendl y country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal criminal jurisdiction of the place. "It is a widely accepted accep ted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought b rought to suit before the courts of another state or its own courts co urts without its consent." The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important public function of any government - the defense of the state — is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act."
Bayan Bayan Mu na v. Romul Romul o
FACTS:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, no w deceased, was the Secretary of o f Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international interna tional concern conce rn X x x and shal shalll be comp complem lementa entary ry to to the nation national al criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, h umanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d·Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by b y its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval b y the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, on ly 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
ISSUE:
Whether Whethe r or not the RP-US RP-US Non Surrende Surrenderr Agree Agreemen mentt is void ab init initio io for contracting contr acting obligations obliga tions that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law?
RULING:
No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally u niversally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement , as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; huma nity; x x x it precludes our country coun try from delivering an American ‘s earlier criminal to the [ICC] x x x. The above argument is a kind k ind of recycling of petitioner ‘s position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined u ndermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles. Th e Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor-General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x . The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country‘s judiciary to
try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have h ave committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP o orr the US, before the ICC, assuming, a ssuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the
AKBAYAN v. Aquino FACTS:
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs cu stoms procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and an d final provisions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information? 2. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process? RULING:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons: To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern.In determining whether or not a
particular information is of public concern there is no rigid r igid test which can be applied. ‗Public concern‘ like ‗public interest‘ is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may ma y want to know, either because these th ese directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations ne gotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not no t dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine do ctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific ―showing of need‖ for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered b y the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.
Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. con tract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and ―sufficient showing of need‖. The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject docu ments fall short of this standard stated in the decided cases.
There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress Con gress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials – out of respect for their office – until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege.
Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary FACTS :
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which ―shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious serious crimes of international
concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.‖ Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression a ggression as defined in the Statute. On December 28, 2000, the Philippines signed the Rome Statue. The Rome Statute however requires that the signature of the representatives of o f the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of o f the signatory states. Thus, a petition for mandamus was filed by b y petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. ISSUE :
Whether the Executive Secretary and the th e Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President?
RULING:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of the state, is regarded regard ed as the
sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country‘s sole representative with foreign nations. As chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country‘s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact business of foreign relations. In the realm of treat ymaking, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, treaties, the Constitution provides for a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 votes of all the members of the Senate S enate for the validity of the treaty entered into by b y him. The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.
Petitioners equate signing of the treaty with ratification, which are two different and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. Signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of good faith of the parties. Ratification, the other hand, is a formal act, executive by nature, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence to the ratification. Such power of the President cannot be encroached by the courts via mandamus and the courts has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. Therefore, the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to Senate.
Lim vs. Exec. Secretary FACTS:
Personnels from the armed forces of the United States of America started a rriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in ―Balikatan 02-1.‖ They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treat y (MDT) a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the
tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001.The MDT has been described as the ―core‖ of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint
training with its American counterparts; the ―Balikatan‖ is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT‘s objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. Petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for ce rtiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002 ISSUE:
Whether the Balikatan is covered by the th e Visiting Forces Agreement?
RULING:
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains con tains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties‘ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context contex t of the treaty, as well as other elements ma y be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. The VFA permits United States S tates personnel to
engage, on an impermanent basis, in ―activities,‖ the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must ―abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.
It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word
‗activities‖ arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation‘s marine resources, sea search-andrescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that ‘Balikatan 02-1,‖ a ―mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and
training exercise,‖ falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of o f the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
Paul Joseph Wright vs. CA
FACTS:
This is a case of extradition request made in February 19, 1993, by b y the Australian government to the Philippine government seeking seek ing the arrest and deportation to Australia of petitioner Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian citizen, for indictable crimes crimes committed under that country‘s Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, specifically, numerous counts of Ob taining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the aforementioned law, and perjury. The Philippine authorities apprehended the petitioner, and extradition extraditio n proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner. p etitioner. The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, concluded that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. Petitioner challenged the validity of the extradition order issued b y the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the th e Treaty. Petitioner contending that the trial court order violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be valid, the Australian government should show that a formal charge had been initiated and pending before a competent court in Australia.
ISSUES:
1. Whether it is necessary necessary for a valid extradition request be based on a pending criminal charge against the extraditee in his home country; coun try;
post facto law abridging petitioner‘s right under Section 2.Whether the said treaty amount to a ex- post 21, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Ph ilippine Constitution;
RULING:
The court a quo committed no error in granting the extradition request. It was found foun d that the charges against the petitioner were offenses were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been committed. Under Article 6 of the said Treaty, it only required the warrant for the arrest of an individual be included in the request, reque st, enumerating the acts and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient su fficient to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is no t only wanted for prosecution
but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As our Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond ab scond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. Anent petitioner‘s contention that alleged offenses were committed prior to the effectivity of the Treaty. The Treaty provides that petitioner p etitioner is extraditable because the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under Article 2 of o f the Treaty. These were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were committed, and, and , irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the Extradition Ex tradition Treaty's provisions. Under the Treaty there is no finding proscribing its enforcement for crimes committed before its enactment.
Secretary of Justice vs. Hon Lantion and Mark Jimenez FACTS:
On June 18, 1999, the United States government sent a note verbale to the Philippine government requesting the extradition of Mark Jimenez, a Filipino citizen, for violation of US laws on conspiracy, fraud and tax evasion. Attached with request were the Grand Jury J ury Indictment and the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. Private respondent requested that he be furnished with the official extradition request and other supporting papers and that he be given time to answer the charges. The request of the respondent was denied. DOJ held that the move of respondent Jimenez was premature because it is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition. It also noted that the formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process are covered by b y strict secrecy rules under United States law. Private respondent filed with the RTC a case against the respective secretaries of DOJ, Foreign Affairs and the director of NBI for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999 ); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request), together with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The court a quo held in favor of Jimenez and ordered the DOJ to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of and from conducting cond ucting further proceedings in the extradition request. ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner official was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal d uties under the extradition treaty and the Philippine extradition law? RULING:
The Court in sustaining the two basic due process p rocess rights of private respondent, considered the evaluation process akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding the consequences of which, according ac cording to the court, are essentially criminal. As such jurisprudence dictates that the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Hence, private respondent is entitled to these indispensable basic rights during the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. However, upon motion for reconsideration the court cou rt reversed its previous decision.However, in a motion for reconsideration filed by the government, this Melo decision d ecision was reversed and instead the dissenting opinion of J. Puno was adopted. The Supreme Court held that extradition is a sui sui generis proceeding and as such, the the determination as to whether an individual should be extradited is not a criminal proceeding where a suspect is entitled to all the constitutional rights of an accused. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. The Court held the constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee, especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia Jr. FACTS:
The P h i l i p p i n e s a n d H o n g K o n g s i g n e d a n ― A g r e e m e n t f o r t h e S u r r e n d e r o f A c c u s e d a n d Convicted Persons.‖Private respondent Muñoz was char ged befo re t he Hon g Ko ng Court . D epart ment of J ustic e (DOJ (DOJ)) rece receiv ived ed from from the the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 1 9 an application for the provisional provision al arrest of private respondent. The NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed a petition for bail which was denied d enied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. holding h olding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high ―flight risk.‖ After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was wa s th en raff ra ffle le d of f to Bran Br an ch 8 presided presided by resp responde ondent nt judge. judge. Privat Privatee resp responde ondent nt filed filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application ap plication for bail and this was granted by by respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent respondent to bail?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the burden of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. This Th is is because the Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human hum an rights as well as value the the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty libert y of every individual is not impaired. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocen ce of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee‘s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive d eprive an extraditee of his right to apply appl y for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." The petition was dismissed and the case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.