[G.R. No. 182435. August 13, 2012.] LILIA B. ADA, et al., vs . FLORANTE BAYLON
FACTS: This case involves the estate of souses !lo"entino #a$lon an% &a'i(ina )lnas #a$lon *+ouses #a$lon-ho %ie% on Nove(e" /, 11 an% &a$ 5, 1/4, "esectivel$. At the ti(e of thei" %eath, +ouses#a$lon -e"e su"vive% $ thei" legiti(ate chil%"en, na(el$, Rita #a$lon *Rita, icto"ia #a$lon*icto"ia, olo"es #a$lon *olo"es, anla Go(e6 *anla, Ra(on #a$lon *Ra(on an% he"ein etitione" 7ilia #. A%a *7ilia.olo"es %ie% intestate an% -ithout issue on August 4, 1/. icto"ia %ie% on Nove(e" 11, 181 an% -assu"vive% $ he" %aughte", he"ein eti etiti tione one"" 7u 7u6 6 #. A% A%an6 an6a. a. Ra(o Ra(on n %ie% %ie% intes intestat tate e on ul$ ul$ 8, 1 18 8 an% -assu -assu"v "viv ive% e% $ he" he"ein "es son on% %ent !lo !lo"ant ante #a$l a$lon *!lo"ant ante, his chil hil% f"o( his "st (a"" a""iage, ge, as -ell as $ etitione" !lo"a #a$lon, his secon% -ife, an% thei" legiti(ate chil%"en, na(el$, Ra(on, ". ". an% he"ein etitione"s Re(o, Re(o, ose, )"ic, !lo"entino an% &a. Ru$, all su"na(e% #a$lon. Petitioners fled wit te RTC !o"#laint $or #artition, a!!o%ntin&, and da"a&es a&ain a&ainst st res#on res#onden dentFl tFlora orante nte,, Rita, Rita, and Panfla. anfla. Te' Te' alle&e alle&ed d tat tat S#o%se S#o%ses s Ba'lon owned () #ar!els o$ land. Te'!lai"ed tat Rita too* #ossession o$ te land and a##ro#riated te in!o"e deri+ed tere$ro".Florante, tere$ro".Florante, Rita and Panfla asserted, in teir answer, answer, tat te !oowned te #ro#erties in -%estion.On %l' /001 /001,, Rita Rita dona donate ted d a #ar! #ar!el el o$ land land to Flor Floran ante te.. In %l' %l' 2333 2333,, Rita Rita died died.. Petitioners learnedo$ te donation "ade 4' Rita in $a+or o$ Florante. Te' fled $or a S%##l %##le e"ent "ental al Plea Plead din&, n&, as*in s*in&t &te e !o%rt %rt to res! res!in ind d te Deed eed o$ DonationThe RTC rendered a decision, finding the existence of co-ownership but ordered the partition of theestate of the Spouses Baylon. RTC also rescinded the donation made.The case was appealed to the CA. The appellate court set aside the decision and remanded the caseto determine ownership of ot !os. "#$% and "#$&. The comp compla lain intt file filed d independentactions
by the the
peti petiti tion oner erss
with with the the RTC
in'o in'ol' l'es es two two
sepa separa rate te,,
dist distin inct ct and and
— partition and rescission.
First, the petitioners raised the refusal of their co-heirs,(lorante, Rita and )anfila, to partition the properties which they inherited from SpousesBaylon.
Second, in their supplemental pleading, the petitioners assailed the donation
inter vivos ofot !o. "#$& and half of ot !o. "#$% made by Rita in fa'or of (lorante
pendente lite. *SS+S /!R+*!0 By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or moredemands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separatesuit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances joinseveral distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 1& While parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes ofaction as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to thecondition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules. 23 Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of lorante. !est it beoverloo"ed, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by #ule $% of the #ules of &ourtwhi &ourtwhile le an action for resciss rescission ion is an ordinary ordinary civil action action governed governed by the ordinary ordinary rules of civil civil procedure.T procedure.The he vari va rian ance ce in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action ofrescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid conf onfusi usion in det determi rmining ning what hat rules shal hall
govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in thedetermination of the presence of re'uisite elements of each particular cause of action. 21 (evertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoinedcause of action to be proceeded with separately. 22 However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there e)ists no bar in the simultaneousadjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.It should be emphasi*ed that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdictionover all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying thecase has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court withrespect to the same would be a nullity.Here, lorante posed no objection, and neither did the #T& direct the severance of the petitioners+ actionfor rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission on the part of the #T&,this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The #T& validlyadjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by the petitioners. Asserting a !ew Cause of Action in a Supplemental )leading ection $, #ule - of the #ules of &ourt reads/ec. $. Supplemental Pleadings.
— 0pon motion of a party the court may, uponreasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened sincethe date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may pleadthereto within ten 1-2 days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.In Young v. Spouses Sy, 2% this &ourt had the opportunity to elucidate on the purpose of a supplemental pleading. Thus/As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or addsomething to the primary pleading. A supplement e)ists side by side with the original.It does not replace that which it supplements. 3oreover, a supplemental pleadingassumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of thecomplaint. *ts usual office is to set up new facts which 4ustify, enlarge or changethe 5ind of relief with respect to the same sub4ect matter as the contro'ersyreferred to in the original complaint. The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new factswhich will enlarge or change the 5ind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled6hence, any supplemental facts which further de'elop the original right of action,or extend to 'ary the relief, are a'ailable by way of supplemental complaint e'enthough they themsel'es constitute a right of action . 2# 1&itations omitted andemphasis ours2Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which hadtranspired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental factsconstitute another cause of action.Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter vivos of !ot (o. 45% and half of !ot (o. 45$made by #ita in favor of lorante is a new cause of action that occurred after the filing of the originalcomplaint. However, the petitioners+ prayer for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in theirsupplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partitioncase. !ot (o. 45% and half of !ot (o. 45$ are included among the properties that were sought to be partitioned he petitioners+ supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, on account of thegratuitous conveyance of !ot (o. 45% and half of !ot (o. 45$ after the filing of the original complaintand prayed for additional reliefs, i.e. , rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim that the said lots form partof the estate of pouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless the gratuitous conveyance of the same isrescinded. Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in their original complaint remained thesame.6etition is partly granted. The case is remanded to the #T&
