105 & 106: Philosophy of Science Dr Simon Saunders
This reading list is a component of three papers: Part A 105, Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Psychology and Neuroscience, Part A 106 Philosophy of Science a nd Social Science, and 102: Knowledge and Reality Introductory
D. Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the 20 th Century, 1993, Blackwells. H. Brown, Part 1, Observation and Commitment , 1977, Chicago University Press. A. F. Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science ?, 1976, University of Queensland Press. M. H. Salmon et al , Introduction to the Philosophy of Science , 1992, Prentice-Hall.
Classic Texts
K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery , 1959, Hutchinson Press T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 3rd Ed., 1998, University of Chicago Press. N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast , 4th Ed., 1983, Harvard University Press. B. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image , 1980, Clarendon Press. W.V. Quine, The Pursuit of Truth, 1990, Harvard University Press.
Collections
A. J. Ayer, Logical Positivism J. Leplin, Scientific Realism , 1984, University of California Press. D. Pappinau, The Philosphy of Science , OUP.
R. Boyd, P. Gasper, and J. D. Trout, The Philosophy of Science , 1991, MIT Press.
Readings by Topic in the Philosophy of Science
Observation
D. Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the 20 th Century, Part III., Blackwells 1993. K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery , Ch.1-5 N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Ch.1,2. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Ch. 10. B. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image , Ch.3.
Further reading:
O. Neurath, “Protocol Sentences”, reprinted in A.J. Ayer, M. Schlick, “The Foundation of Knowledge”, reprinted i n A. J. Ayer A.J. Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap , Ch. 18-19. H. Putnam, “What Theories are Not”, reprinted in H. Putnam, Mind, Mathematics, and Method, Collected Papers Vol. 1 , Cambridge, CUP, 1975. W. V. Quine, “In Praise of Observation Sentences”, Journal of Philosophy, XC, pp.107-16 (1993). I. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity , Ch. .5; W. Newton Smith, The Rationality of Science , Ch.2, Routledge, 1981. W.V. Quine, The Pursuit of Truth , Ch.1.
1.
Manuge, `The Scope of Observation’, Philosomphical Quarterly 45, 1995, pp.60-67
J. Fodor, ``Observation Reconsidered”, Philosophy of Science 51, pp.23-43, 1984. N. Cartwright, “Fables and Models”, reprinted in N. Cartwright, The Dappled World Ch.2. M. Wilson, “What Can Theory Tell Us About Observation?”, in P. Churchland and C. Hooker, eds., Images of Science, University of Chicago Press, 1985. C. Wright, “Scientific Realism and Observation Sentences”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1, pp.231-54 (1993).
Rationality and Scientific Change: Meaning and Reference
R. Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, reprinted in P. Benaceraf and H. Putnam, The Philosophy of Mathematics , W.V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in From a Logical Point of View , Cambridge: HUP,1980. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Ch.5, 10, University of Chicago Press 1.
Fine, “How to Compare Theories: Reference and Change”, Nous 9, pp.17-32 (1975).
Further reading
R. Carnap, “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”, in Feigl and Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science , University of Minnesota Press, pp.3876. R. Carnap, ‘Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages’, in Meaning and Necessity 2 nd Ed.. W. V. Quine, Ch. 1, 2, Word and Object , Cambridge: Harvard University Press. H. Putnam, “What Theories are Not”, reprinted in H. Putnam, Mind, Mathematics, and Method, Collected Papers Vol. 1 , Cambridge, CUP, 1975. W. V. Quine, “Ontological Relativity”, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays , Harvard.
D. Lewis, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, reprinted in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers , Vol.1, Oxford, 1987. T. Kuhn, “Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation”, in Wade Savage (ed), Minnesota Studies Vol. X1V Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp.298-318. T. Kuhn, “Afterwords”, in P. Horwich, ed., World Changes, MIT Press, 1993. W. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science , London: Routledge Ch.7 (1981) H. Putnam, “Reference and Theory Change” xxxxxx H. Putnam, “The Meaning of `Meaning’”, reprinted in H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol.2 , Cambridge: CUP (1979) M Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference , Ch.1, 2 Basingstoke: MacMillan. H. Field, “Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference”, Journal of Philosophy, 70, pp.462-81 (1973). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lecture III, Oxford: Blackwell (1972)
The Nature of Theories: Realism
W.V. Quine, “Posits and Reality”, reprinted in W. V. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays T. Kuhn, Ch.12, The Structure of Scientific Revolution , Chicago: Chicago University Press. A. Fine, “The Natural Ontological Attitude”, reprinted in D. Papineau, ed., The Philosphy of Science, OUP, 1996. B. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image , Ch.1-4. L. Laudan, “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, re printed in The Philosophy of Science , D. Papineau, Oxford, OUP, 1996, p.139-65. J. Worrall, 1989, “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds”, reprinted in The Philosophy of Science, D. Papineau, Oxford, OUP, 1996, p.139-65.
Further reading
R. Boyd, “The Current Status of Scientific Realism”, in J. Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism , Univ. Cal. Press. R. Boyd, “Realism, Underdetermination and a Causal Theory of Evidence”, Nous, 7, 1-12 (1973) J. Worrall, “Scientific Realism and Scientific Change”, Philosophy Quarterly , 32, (1982) W. Newton-Smith, “Modest Realism”, PSA 2 (1988) H. Stein, 1989, “Yes, but…Some skectpical Remarks on Rea lism and Anti-realism”, Dielectica, 43: 47-65. R. Boyd, “What realism implies and What it Does Not”, Dialectica, 43 (1989). N. Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie , Essay 4, Clarendon Press, 1983. Stathis Psillos , 1995, “Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds?”, Dialectica, 49: 1546. S. Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, Routledge, 1999. A.Fine, “Piecemeal Realism”, Philosophical Studies, 61 (1991). A. Fine, “Unnatural Attidues: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachment to Science”, Mind 95 (1986). A. Muisgrave, “NOA’s Ark: Fine for Realism”, (1989) in Papeneau ed., Philosophy of Science, Oxford , 1996. T. Kuhn, “Afterwords”, in P. Horwich, ed., World Changes, MIT Press, 1993. H. Putnam, “A Defense of Internal Realism”, in H. Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, Harvard University Press, 1990.
Scientific Explanation
C. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation , Ch..10, 1.
Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image , Ch.1, Ch.2, Ch.5
W. Salmon, Causality and Explanation . Ch.4.
Further reading
C. Hempel, “Explanation in Science and in History”, in Colodny, Frontiers in Science and Philosophy (1962). M. Friedman, "Explanation and Scientific Understanding", Journal of Philosophy, 1974, Vol.LXX1, p.5-1 P. Kitcher, "Explanatory Unification", Philosophy of Science 48, p.507-31. T. Grimes, “Explanation and the Poverty of Pragmatics”, Erkenntnis 27, 1987, 79-92. 1.
Richardson, “Explanation: Pragmatics and Asymmetry”, Philosophical Studies, 80, 1995, 109-29.
P. Kitcher and W. Salmon, “Van Fraassen on Explanation”, in Causality a nd Explanation, W. Salmon, Oxford, 1998, p.178-90. 2.
Glymore, “Explanation and Realism”, in P. Churchland a nd C. Hooker, eds., Images of Science, University of Chicago Press, 1985.
N. Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie , Essay 5, Claredon Press, 1983. R. Richardson, “Models and Scientific Explanation”, Philosophica 37, pp.59- (1986). D. Lewis, “Causal Explanation”, reprinted in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Vol II, Oxford.
The Interpretation of Laws
A.J. Ayer, “What is a Law of Nature?”, in A. J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person , London: Macmillan D. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? , Cambridge: CUP (1983), Part 1 F. Dretske, “Laws of Nature”, Philosophy of Science, 44, pp.248-68 (1977) N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast , Ch.1: Harvard University Press. (1983)
Further reading
E. Nagel, The Structure of Science , Ch.4, Routledge (1961). M. Tooley, “The Nature of Laws”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 7, pp.667-98 (1977) N. Cartwright, “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws”, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association_ (1993), reprinted in in N. Cartwright, The Dappled World Ch.2. D.Lewis, “Network for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 61 (1987) D.Lewis, “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind 103 (1994) 1.
Van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry , Oxford (1989)
J. Woodward, “Realism about Laws”, Erkenntnis, 36, pp.181-218 (1992) R. Harre, Laws of Nature , London: Duckworth. N. Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie , Clarendon Press (1983) P. Achinstein, Law and Explanation, Ch.1-3, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rationality and Scientific Change: Naturalism
W. V. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”, reprinted in W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. 1969. N. Goodman, “The New Problem of Induction”, reprinted in N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast , 1983. W. V. Quine, “Natural Kinds”, reprinted in W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. 1969. H. Putnam, Why Reason Can’t be Naturalized”, reprinted in H. Putnam, Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers vol.3, Cambridge: CUP, 1983.
Further reading
W.V. Quine, Word and Object , Ch.1,2, W. V. Quine, ‘Mind and Verbal Dispositions”, in S. Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language , Oxford, 1975. N. Chomsky, “Quine’s Empirical Assumptions”, in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, eds.,
Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V.Quine , ‘Rationality, Translation, and Epistemology Naturalized’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXIX, 1982, p.117-36.
20. Ricketts,
13. Friedman,
“Philosophical Naturalism”, photocopy on reserve in the Philosophy
Library H. Kornbluth, ed., Naturalizing Epistemology, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988. R. Giere, “Philosophy of Science Naturalized”, Philosophy of Science , 52, pp.331-56.
Scientific Method: Idealization and Thought Experiments
N. Cartwright, “False Idealization: A Philosophical Thrust to Scientific Method”, Philosophical Studies 77, pp.339 (1995). R. Giere, Explaining Science, Ch.3, Chicago: CUP (1988). J. Brown, “Thought Experiments Since the Scientific Revolution”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , 1, pp.1-15 (1986). T. Kuhn, “A Function for Thought Experiments”, reprinted in T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension
Further reading
N. Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie , Essay 6, 7, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. I. Hacking, “Do Thought Experiments Have a Life of Their Own?”, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association , Vol.2, pp.302-308 (1992).
A. Koyre, “Galileo’s Treatise De Motu : The Use and Abuse of Imaginary Experiment”, in Metaphysics and Measurement , London: Capman and Hall (1968). E. McMullin, “Galilean Idealization”, History and Studies in Philosophy of Science , 16, p.247- (1985). C. Mach, “On Thought Experiments”, in Knowledge and Error , Dordrecht: Reidel (1976). K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery , Appendix X1. W. Barr, “A Syntactic and Semantic Analysis of Idealizations in Science”, Philosophy of Science, 38, p.258 (1971). H. Putnam, “The Craving for Objectivity”, in H. Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, Cambridge: HUP.
Scientific Method: Virtues and Values
W. V. Quine, “On Simple Theories of a Complex World”, reprinted in W. V. Quine, The Ways of Paradox , Harvard. T. Kuhn, “Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice”, reprinted in T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension, Chicago, 1977. E Mc Mullin, “Values in Science”, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association , Vol.2, 1982. H. Putnam, “The Place of Facts in a World of Values”, reprinted in H. Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Further reading
Goodman, Problems and Projects, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, Ch.VII, 1972. 10. Sklar, “Methodological Conservativism”, Philosophical Review, 84, pp.398- (1975). 9.
W. V. Quine and Ullian, "Hypothesis", in Klemke, Hollinger and Kline eds, Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science , p.246-56 (1988). B. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image , pp.87-96.
T. Kuhn, “Afterwords”, in P. Horwich, ed., World Changes, MIT Press, 1993. H. Putnam, “Objectivity and the Science/Ethics Distinction”, in H. Putnam, Realism With a Human Face , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. H. Putnam, “Scientific Liberty and Scientific License”, in Realism With a Human Face, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. 2.
Van Fraassen, “Empiricism in the Philosophy of Scie nce”, in P. Churchland and C. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science, Chicago: UCP, 1984.
The Nature of Theories: Underdetermination
R. Boyd, “Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence”, Nous 7, pp.1-12, 1973. W. V. Quine, “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World”, Erkenntnis , 9, pp.313-28 (1975). 3.
Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image , Ch.3, Oxford: OUP.
L. Laudan, “Demystifying Underdetermination”, in Wade-Savage (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science , Vol.14, Minneapolis: UMP (1990) L. Bergstrom, “Underdetermination and Realism”, Erkenntnis, 21, pp.349-65 (1984)
Further reading
W. Newton-Smith, “The Underdetermination of Theory by Dat a”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 52, pp.71-91. W. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science , Ch.2, London: Routledge. W. V. Quine, “Comments on Newton-Smith”, Analysis, 39, pp.66-67. M. Wilson, “The Observational Uniqueness of Some Theories”, Journal of Philosophy , 77, pp.208-33 (1980). J. Worrall, “Scientific Realism and Theory Change”, Philosphical Quarterly, 32, (1982).
A. Kukla, “Non-Empirical Theoretical Virtues and the Argument for Underdetermination”, Erkenntnis, 41, pp.157-170. W. V. Quine, Word and Object , Ch.1,2. W. V. Quine, “Three Indeterminacies”, in R. Barrett and R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Quine , Oxford: Blackwell. L. Bergstrom, “Quine on Underdetermination”, in R. Barrett and R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Quine , Oxford: Blackwell. Y. Ben-Menahem, “Equivalent Descriptions”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 41, pp.261-79 (1990).
The Nature of Theories: Holism
P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory , Ch.6-7, New York: Atheneum. R. Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, reprinted in P. Benaceraf and H. Putnam, The Philosophy of Mathematics , W.V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in From a Logical Point of View , Cambridge: HUP,1980. A. Grunbaum, “The Falsifiability of a Component of a Theoretical System”, in P. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter and Method , Minneapolis: UMP, 1966.
Further reading
A. Grunbaum, “Can we Ascertain the Falsity of a Scientific Hypothesis?”, in E. Nagel, Bromberger, and A. Grunbaum (eds.), Observation and Theory in Science , Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1971. H. Krips, “Epistemological Holism: Duhem or Quine?”, History Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13, pp.251-64, 1982.
L. Laudan, “On the Impossibility of Crucial Falsifying Experiments: Grunbaum on `The Duhemian Argument’”, Philosophy of Science , 32, pp.295-99. S. Harding (ed), Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem/Quine Thesis , Dordrecht: Reidel. L. Laudan, Science and Relativism, Ch.3, Chicago: UCP, 1990.
Scientific Method: Induction and Confirmation
C. Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation”, reprinted in C. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation , New York: The Free Press (1965). M. H. Salmon et al , Introduction to the Philosophy of Science , Ch.2 Part III, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1992. D. Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the 20 th Century, Ch.2,3., Blackwells 1993. N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast , Ch.3, Cambridge: HUP.
Further reading
C. Glymore, Theory and Evidence , Ch.1-3, Princeton: PUP (1980). W. V. Quine, “Natural Kinds”, reprinted in W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. 1969. R. Carnap, “Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition”, reprinted in I. Lakatos (ed), The Problem of Inductive Logic , Amsterdam: North-Holland (1968). K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery , Ch.1-5. H. Putnam, “Probability and Confirmation”, reprinted in H. Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method: Collected Papers Vol.1 , Cambridge: CUP. P. Feyerabend, Against Method M. Redhead, “On the Impossibility of Inductive Logic”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 36, pp.185-191. R. Swinburne, An Introduction to Confirmation Theory , Ch.1-3, London: Metheun.
B. Van Fraassen, “The Problem of Old Evidence”, in D. Austin (ed), Philosophical Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer (1988). I. Lakatos, “Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic”, in I Lakatos (ed), The Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam: North Holland (1968). J. Mackie, “The Paradox of Confirmation”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 13, pp.265-77 (1963).
The Interpretation of Probability
M. H. Salmon et al , Introduction to the Philosophy of Science , Ch.2 Part III, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1992. K. Popper, “The Propensity Theory of Probability”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 10, pp.25-42 (1959). R. Torretti, Creative Understanding , Ch.4, Chicago: UCP, 1990.
Further reading
B. Skyrms, Choice and Chance , Ch.5-7, Belmar California: Wordsworth (1986). A.J. Ayer, “The Conception of Probability as a Logical Relation”, in S. Korner (ed), Observation and Interpretation: Proceedings of the Ninth Syposium of the Colston Research Society , London: Butterworth (1957). L. Sklar, “Is Probability a Dispositional Property?”, Journal of Philosophy, LXVII, 1970 I. Hacking, “Equipossibility Theories of Probability”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 22, pp. 339-55, 1971. I. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability , Cambridge: CUP, 1975. R. Jeffrey, Probability and the Art of Judgment , Ch.4, 1992. D. Lewis, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance”, reprinted in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers Vol.2. J. von Plato, Creating Modern Probability , Cambridge: CUP (1994).
J. Earman, Bayes or Bust , Cambridge: CUP (1992)
Major Schools in Philosophy of Science: Logical Positivism
R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap , La Salle: Open Court. A. J. Ayer, (ed) Logical Positivism, Introduction, New York: Freedom Press (1959). A. Richardson, “From Epistemology to the Logic of Sci ence: Carnap’s Philosophy of Empirical Knowledge in the 1930s”, in R. Giere and A. Richardson (eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.XV !, Minnesota: UMP, 1996. M. Friedman, “Geometry, Convention, and the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap”, in reprinted in M. Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge: CUP, 1999.
Further reading
W.V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View , Harvard, 1980. R. Carnap, ‘Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages’, in R. Carnap, Meaning and nd Necessity 2 Ed.. 13. Hanfling, Essential
Readings in Logical Positivism , Oxford: Blackwell
A. J. Ayer, (ed) Logical Positivism, Introduction, New York: Freedom Press (1959). M. Friedman, , Reconsidering Logical Positivism , Cambridge: CUP, 1999. R. Giere and A. Richardson (eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.XV !, Minnesota: UMP, 1996. ‘Rationality, Translation, and Epistemology Naturalized’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXIX, 1982, p.117-36.
20. Ricketts,
A. Richardson, Carnap’s Construction of the World , Cambridge: CUP, 1998.
Major Schools in Philosophy of Science: Thomas Kuhn
T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 2nd Ed., Chicago: UCP. T. Kuhn, “Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice”, reprinted in T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension, Chicago, 1977. M. Hesse, “In Defense of Objectivity”, Proceedings of the British Academy , 1972. E. McMullin, “Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science”, in P. Horwich (ed.), World Changes, MIT Press, 1993.
Further reading
T. Kuhn, “Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation”, in Wade Savage (ed), Minnesota Studies Vol. X1V Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp.298-318. T. Kuhn, “Afterwords”, in P. Horwich, ed., World Changes, MIT Press, 1993. T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension , Chicago, 1977. H. Putnam, “Explanation and Reference”, reprinted in H. Putnam, Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers vol.3, Cambridge: CUP, 1983. H. Post, “Correspondence, Invariance, and Heuristics: In Praise of Conservative Induction”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , 2, pp.213-55 (1971). J. Earman, “Carnap, Kuhn, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology”, in P. Horwich (ed.), World Changes, MIT Press, 1993. 13. Kitcher,
The Advancement of Science , Ch.6, Oxford: OUP (1993)
L. Laudan, “Relativism, Naturalism and Reticulation”, Synthese 71 pp.221-34 (1987). W. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science , Ch.5, 1981.
H. Sankey, “Kuhn’s Changing Concept of Incommensurability”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 44, pp.759- (1993). M. Malone, “Kuhn Reconstructed: Incommensurability Without Relativism”, History and Philosophy of Science , 24, pp.69- (1993).
Major Schools in Philosophy of Science: Karl Popper
9.
Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery , Ch.1-6, London: Hutchinson.
I.Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge , Cambridge: CUP (1970). D. Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the 20 th Century, Ch.1,2,8,9, Blackwells 1993.
Further reading
K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations , London: Routledge. A.J. Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap , Ch. 18-19, Cambridge: CUP, 1991. 1.
O’Hear (ed), Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems , Royal Institute of Philosophy Suppl. 39, Cambridge: CUP (1995).
W. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science , Ch.3, 1981. H. Putnam, in P. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of K. Popper , La Salle: Open Court (1974). Greg Bamford, “Popper’s Explications of Ad Hocness”: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Sci. Practise”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 44, 335-55. A. Grunbaum, “The Falsifiability of a Component of a Theoretical System”, in P. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter and Method , Minneapolis: UMP, 1966. A. Grunbaum, “Can we Ascertain the Falsity of a Scientific Hypothesis?”, in E. Nagel, Bromberger, and
1.
Grunbaum (eds.), Observation and Theory in Science , Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1971.
A. Grunbaum,, “ Ad Hoc Hypothes and Falsificationism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27, 329-62, (1976) J. Leplin, “”The Concept of an ad hoc Hypothesis.”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 5, p.309-46 (1975).
