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Table of contents Table of contents Picture Credits Glossary of abbreviations used in the text: German military ranks Introduction Western campaign Organizational structure chart of the 9 Panzer Division in May 1940 th
Operation “Fall Marita” Operation “Barbarossa” Operation “Blau” Organizational structure chart of the 9 Panzer Division on June 22 1942 th
Operation “Wirbelwind” Organizational structure chart of the 9 Panzer Division on October 23 1942 th
Organizational structure chart of the 9 Panzer Division on July 1943 th
Appendices Appendix No.1 Commanders of the 9 Panzer Division th
Appendix No.2 Operational Assignments of the 9 Panzer Division in the period of th
Bibliography
Picture Credits Photographs: from the authors’ collection. The authors would like to express their gratitude to Sylwester and Sławomir Grojca, as well as Artur Majewski, for their extensive help in obtaining some of the photographs used in this publication; and to Paweł Piotrowski for his most valuable consultation and assistance during the research conducted in his vast library; and last but not least, to Krzysztof for providing a valuable expertise in German translations.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT: Abt. / Abteilung - a military unit equivalent in strength to a battalion; a military detachment. AK / Armeekorps - army Corps. AOK / Armee Oberkommando - army command. Aufkl. Abt. / Aufklärungs Abteilung - reconnaissance battalion. Art.Rgt. / Artillerie-Regiment - artillery regiment. Aufkl.Rgt / Aufklärungs Regiment - reconnaissance regiment. Ausf. / Ausführung - model designation. BEF - British Expeditionary Force. Beob.Bttr. / Beobachtungs Batterie - observation (spotting) battery. Bttr. / Batterie - battery. Fahr-Schw. - horse drawn squadron. Fgst. / Fahrgestell - chassis or undercarriage. gep. / gepanzerte - armoured. gep. Pi.-Wagen - armoured pioneer (technical support) vehicle. H.Flakart.Abt. / Heeres-Flakartillerie-Abteilung - army anti-aircraft detachment. HG / Heeres Gruppe - army (commanding several armies) group. Inf. Div. / Infanterie Division - infantry division. Inf. Rgt. / Infanterie Regiment - infantry regiment. Koluft / Kommandeur der Luftwaffe Armme-Oberkommando - Commander of Luftwaffe units attached to an Army High Command (responsible for the air reconnaissance squadrons assigned to the Army, and for coordination of Luftwaffe-Army logistics arrangements; Koluft commanded Luftwaffe flak units attached to the army for air defence at the battlefront). Kp. / Kompanie - company. Kradsch.Btl. / Kradschützen-Bataillon - battalion of motorcycle rifles. KStN / Kriegsstärkenachwelsungen - wartime organization table (military organizational standard). KTB des OKW / Kriegstagesbuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - Combat Journal of the High Command of the Armed Forces. “LSSAH” - “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” - Adolf Hitler Guards (regiment). le. / leichte - light.
Le.Div. / Leichte-Division - light (motorized) division. leichte Flak-Abt. / leichte Flak-Abteilung - light anti-aircraft detachment. lePz.Aufk.Kp. / leichte Panzer Aufklärungs Kompanie - light armoured reconnaissance company. Oberstlt. / Oberstleutnant - lieutenant colonel. OKH / Oberkommando des Heeres - Army High Command. OKW / Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - High Command of the Armed Forces. mPak / mittlere Panzerabwehrkanone - medium anti-tank gun. Pi.Btl. / Pionier-Bataillon - pioneer (engineering) battalion. Pz AOK / Panzer Armee - tank (armoured) army. Pz.Art.Rgt. / Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment - armoured artillery regiment. Pz.Beob.Bttr. / Panzer-Beobachtungs-Batterie - armoured observation (spotting) battery. Pz.Div. / Panzer-Division – tank / armoured division. Pz.Div. Nachschubführer / Panzer-Division Nachschubführer – armoured division supply command. Pz.Gr. / Panzergruppe – armoured group command, higher than a corps but lower than an army. Pz.Gren.Rgt. / Panzergrenadier-Regiment – armoured grenadier (motorized infantry) regiment. Pz.Jg.Abt. / Panzerjäger-Abteilung - anti-tank battalion, self-propelled tank destroyer battalion. PzBfWg / Panzerbefehlswagen - armored command vehicle (command tank). PzK / Panzerkorps - tank (armoured) Corps. Pz.Kpfw. / Panzerkampfwagen - armoured fighting vehicle, usually in reference to a tank. Pz.Lehr.Abt. / Panzer Lehr Abteilung - training (instructional) tank battalion. Pz.Nachr.Abt. / Panzer-Nachrichten-Abteilung - armoured signal battalion. Pz.Pi.Btl. / Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon - armoured pioneer battalion. Pz.Rgt. - Panzer-Regiment - tank (armoured) regiment. Pz.Spah / Panzer-Spähwagen - armoured reconnaissance vehicle. Pz.Spah.Kp. / Panzer-Spähwagen-Kompanie - armoured reconnaissance vehicle company. RAD / Reichs Arbeits Dienst - National Labour Service. RTR – Royal Tank Regiment.
Schützen-Brig. / Schützen-Brigade - infantry (rifle) brigade. Schützen-Rgt. / Schützen-Regiment - infantry regiment. SPW / Schützenpanzerwagen - armoured half-track vehicle. Sd.Kfz./ Sonder Kraftfahrzeuge - special-purpose motor vehicle, ordinance inventory numbering. s.I.G.Kp. (mot S) / schwere Infanterie Geschütz Kompanie (mot S) - heavy field artillery company, motorized, self-propelled. STAVKA – Supreme High Command (Soviet Army). StuG.Abt. / Sturmgeschütz Abteilung - assault gun battalion. WK / Wehrkreis - military, mobilization district.
GERMAN MILITARY RANKS. Schütze - private. Oberfunkmeister - Senior Radio-communication Specialist. Feldwebel - Sergeant. Oberfeldwebel - Sergeant Major. Fahnenjunker - an officer cadet. Unteroffizier - non-commissioned officer Leutnant - Lieutenant. Oberleutnant - First Lieutenant. Hauptmann - Captain. Oberstleutnant - Lieutenant Colonel. Oberst - Colonel. Generalmajor - Brigadier or Major General. Generalleutnant - Lieutenant General. General von Infanterie - General of infantry. General der Panzertruppe - General of armoured troops. Generaloberst - Colonel General. Generalfeldmarschall - Field Marshal.
Introduction The purpose of this publication is to present a chronicle of the German Army’s 9 Armoured Division (9. Panzer-division) in the years between 1940 and 1943. This particular unit was never distinguished by a sobriquet or an alias. It did not have a coat of arms, so no sophisticated emblems were displayed on its vehicles. Yet noteworthy are the number of military decorations awarded to the personnel of this armoured division. During the Second World War 56 soldiers were honoured with one of the highest military decorations of the Third Reich, the Knight’s Cross rank of the Iron Cross (Ritterkreuz des Einsernen Kreuzes). This number is undoubtedly a testimonial to the high effectiveness of this unit. Among all the recipients of the Knight’s Iron Cross , four received an even higher recognition, the Oak Leaves (Eichenlaub zum Ritterkreuz des Eiserner Kreuzes), and one trooper was awarded Oak Leaves and Swords with his Iron Cross (Eichenlaub mit Schwertern zum des Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes) . The number of awarded decorations places the 9 Panzer Division in second place among the Wehrmacht’s armoured divisions, right behind the 4 Panzer Division with 84 Iron Crosses . Significantly, 56 also exceeds the number of equivalent medals received by the much glorified 1 Panzer Division of the SS “Adolf Hitler Guards” (SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”), which earned 54 Knight’s Iron Crosses. th
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The 9 Panzer Division emerged from the transformation of the 4 Light Division, but the history of the latter will not be covered in this publication. th
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The 9 Panzer Division (9 Panzer-division - 9. Pz.Div.) was an “Austrian” unit. It was created by means of reorganization and reinforcement of the 4 Light Division (4 Leichtedivision - 4. Le.Div.) formed in 1938, which in turn originated from the Fast Division (Schnelle Division) of the Austrian armoured forces (Bundesheer). The latter unit was established in 1935, but it was incorporated into the Wehrmacht, along with the rest of the Austrian Army, after the annexation of Austria (Anschluss) into Nazi Germany. The 9. Pz.Div. established on 3 of January 1940 become an heir to the XVII Mobilisation District (XVII WK - Wehrkreis) with Vienna (Wien) as garrison town. Despite that, the unit was initially formed in the town of Frankstadt unter dem Radhoscht (Frenštát pod Radhoštĕm) in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which was also a part of the same district. Generalleutnant Dr. Alfred Ritter von Hubicki, former commander of the Schnelle Division and subsequently the 4. Le.Div., remained at the head of the new unit. The constituents of the 9 Division were mostly the sub-units already in existence; however, their designations were changed. According to the order issued January 1 1940 the 50 Anti-tank Battalion (Panzerabwehr-Abteilung 50) and the 60 Infantry Division Supply Command (Infanterie Division Nachschubführer 60) became the 50 Tank Destroyer Battalion (Panzerjäger-Abteilung 50 -Pz.Jg.Abt. 50) and the 60 Panzer Division Supply Command (Panzer Division Nachschubführer 60 - Pz.Div. Nachschubführer 60). On the same day, the 9 Reconnaissance Regiment (Aufklärungs Regiment 9 - Aufkl.Rgt. 9) stationed in Krems, was ordered to join the 9 Division. This regiment, consisting of the I Battalion (I. Abteilung - I. Abt.) and the II Battalion (II. Abteilung -II. Abt.), was also a th
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part of the dissolved 4 Light Division. The same directive applied to the 102 Artillery Regiment (Artillerie-Regiment 102 - Art.Rgt. 102). th
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As the newly organized 9th Panzer Division underwent training, some accidents occurred. The photograph depicts a damaged truck, Ford G 917 T. A symbol used by the Division at the time -“xx”, may be noticed on the door of the vehicle.
A Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf. C tank during early divisional exercises. Wooden sticks, reminiscent of a fascine bundle, used under the tracks to assist the vehicle in negotiating muddy terrain, are visible in this picture.
On February 15, the 3 Company of the 38 Communications Battalion (3/Nachrichten-Abteilung 38) was expanded into the 85 Armoured Communications Battalion (Panzer-Nachrichten-Abteilung 85 - Pz.Nachr.Abt. 85). On 22 April, the 86 rd
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Pioneer Battalion (Pionier-Bataillon 86) was reclassified as the 86 Armoured Pioneer Battalion (Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 86 - Pz.Pi.Btl. 86). In accordance with the order dated February 2, the 33 Panzer Regiment (Panzer-Regiment 33 -Pz.Rgt. 33) was created to form the core of the 9 Panzer Division. The headquarters came from the Panzer Regiment “Conze” (Stab Panzer-Regiment Conze), the III Battalion of the 5 Panzer Regiment (III./Pz.Rgt. 5) became the I Battalion, and the 33 Panzer Battalion (Panzer-Abteilung 33) was renamed as the II Battalion of the newly-created regiment. Each battalion consisted of three companies, the I Battalion had numbers 1 – 3, the II Battalion had 4 – 6. As of January 1 1940, the 33 Battalion had a total of 75 armoured vehicles: 25 tanks Panzerkampfwagen I (Pz.Kpfw. I), 33 Pz.Kpfw. II, four Pz.Kpfw. III, four Pz.Kpfw. IV and nine command tanks Panzerbefehlwagen (Pz. Bf.Wg). The III Battalion of the 5 Panzer Regiment was formerly I Battalion of the Training Panzer Battalion (I./Pz.Lehr.Abt.); it had 71 tanks, 24 Pz.Kpfw. II, 36 Pz.Kpfw. III and 11 Pz.Kpfw. IV. In all, the 9 Panzer Division had 146 combat tanks available at that time. th
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Most likely the same Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf. C tank. Divisional symbol “xx” to the right of the driver’s visor, as well as the letter “G” are evident. It is not quite certain, but such a letter designation could have been used to warrant the right of way in traffic, on the roads leading to the front. In the back, there is an ammunition tractor Pz.Kpfw. I (A) Munitionsschlepper (SdKfz. 111).
On February 16, the 9 Rifle (Infantry) Brigade (9. Schützen-Brigade - 9. SchützenBrig.) was created to accommodate two infantry regiments joining the 9 Division. Both of the regiments were previously part of the 4 Light Division. The 10 Mounted Rifles Regiment (Kavallerie-Schützen-Regiment 10) and the 11 Mounted Rifle Regiment (Kavallerie-Schützen-Regiment 11) were on March 18 renamed the 10 Rifle Regiment (Schützen-Regiment 10 - Schützen-Rgt. 10) and the 11 Rifle Regiment (Schützen-Regiment 11 - Schützen-Rgt. 11) respectively. On May 6 1940 the 701 Company of self-propelled heavy infantry guns (schwere Infanterie Geschütz Kompanie (mot S) 701 - sIG Kp. (mot S) 701) was incorporated into the 9 Rifle Brigade. The company was equipped with selfpropelled guns 15 cm sIG 33 Sfl. auf Pz.Kpfw. I Ausf. B, referred to as “Bison”. The th
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vehicles, consisting of 150 mm heavy infantry gun sIG 33 on the chassis of a Pz.Kpfw. I Ausf. B tank were intended to increase the mobility and firepower of armoured divisions. Prior to April 22, before the anticipated attack on Western Europe, six such companies were created according to the KStN 179 (Kriegsstärkenachweisung) organizational standard issued on March 30. 7
A Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. E during exercises in Westphalia on April 2 1940. The “xx” symbol is painted at the unusual location, frontal lower hull armour.
Pz.Kpfw. IV tank column during cooperation exercises at the Westphalia proving grounds on April 2 1940. Location, frontal lower hull armour.
In the spring of 1940, the 9 Panzer Division consisted of: th
9.Schützen-Brig. including: Schützen-Rgt. 10 - garrison St.Pölten, including two battalions (I., II.); Schützen-Rgt. 11 - garrison Waidhofen an der Thaya, including two battalions (I., II.); Pz.Rgt. 33 including two battalions (I. Abt. - garrison Wünsdorf, II Abt. - garrison St. Pölten); Art.Rgt. 102 - garrison Wien, including two artillery detachments (I., II.); Panzer-Div. Nachschubführer 60 Aufkl.Rgt. 9 - garrison Krems, including two battalions (I. Abt., II. Abt.); Pz.Jg.Abt. 50 - garrison St.Pölten; Pz.Nachr.Abt. 85 Pz.Pi.Btl. 86 By the end of January 1940, the 9 Panzer Division, held as a reserve of the Army’s High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres - OKH) was transported to the region of Limburg an der Lahn, in Hesse, where the integration process continued. In February, the Division was relocated to Eifel district in Rhineland-Palatinate. As its organization progressed, the Division received additional equipment. For instance, in April of 1940 the 33 Panzer Regiment obtained the Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. F tank, chassis number Fgst.Nr. 61023, manufactured at MAN works in Nürnberg. From the beginning of April the Division was stationed in Westfalen, conducting exercises in cooperation with its units on the local proofing grounds. In the first days of May, the Division was relocated to the Dutch border near the township of Goch. th
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1 In the time period covered by this publication Jan.1.1940 - Aug.25.1943, 27 soldiers from the 9th Panzer Division were decorated in such a way.
2 Between Jan.3.1940 and Aug.25.1943, Walter Gorn was the 113th Wehrmacht soldier to receive the Eichenlaub zum Ritterkreuz des Eiserner Kreuzes, and on Jun.8.1943 r. became the 30th Wehrmacht recipient of the Eichenlaub mit Schwertern zum Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzess.
3 de Lannoy F., Charita J., Panzertruppen, Les troupes blindees allemandes 1935-1945, Baveux 2001, p. 154.
4 Tessin G., Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 19391945, III Band: Die Landstreitkräfte 6-14, Frankfurt/Main, p.136.
5 During peacetime, it was a I/Panzer-Lehr-Regiment.
6 Panzer Abteilung 33 was also a component unit of the 4th Light Division.
7 Skotnicki M., Ciężkie działo piechoty sIG 33, Nowa Technika Wojskowa 10/2002, s. 30-31.
8 Jentz T., Doyle H. L., Panzer Tracts No. 3-2 Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf. E, F, G und H, Boyds 2007, p. 18.
Western campaign The first military engagement of the new Panzer Division took place during the operation “Fall Gelb”, the attack on Belgium, Holland and northern France. Army Group “B” (Heeres Gruppe “B” - HG “B”), under the command of Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, was to launch an attack between the coast and the Maas River. The group consisted of the 6 Army (6. Armee - AOK 6) and the 18 Army (18. Armee - AOK 18) with a total of 29 divisions, including three armoured and one motorised. The operations of Group “B” were intended to divert Allied attention from the main assault, and to lure as many defending forces as possible. The 9 Panzer Division was among the units of Generaloberst von Bock, serving as part of the XXIV Army Corps (XXIV. Armeekorps – XXIV AK) assigned to the 18 Army. One of its tasks was to invade Dutch territory with the assistance of paratroops. th
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On May 10 1940, at the start of “Fall Gelb”, the 33 Panzer Regiment had 30 Pz.Kpfw. I, 54 Pz.Kpfw. II, 41 Pz.Kpfw. III, 16 Pz.Kpfw. IV and 12 Pz.Bf.Wg. tanks, while the 9 Reconnaissance Battalion had 62 armoured cars. The invasion of Holland began with the attack of German paratroopers from the 7 Airborne Division (7. Flieger-Division) on the river Mass bridges near Moerdijk. After the surprise attack, their objective was to hold the bridges until the arrival of the land forces. The 9 Panzer Division advanced from the border region of Goch – Kleve in order to join the airborne units as quickly as possible. In the morning of May 11, the 9 Division and the supporting SS Combat Division (SSVerfugungsdivision) were able to cross Mass River in Gennep over the railroad bridge, the only one captured intact. Both German units entered the region of North Brabant experiencing sporadic opposition from Dutch troops. A bigger challenge was the terrain configuration, numerous rivers and canals impeded movement of the armoured columns. In the meantime, the Allies reacted to the German offensive. On the same day, a French Motorised Division from the 7 Army under General Henri Giraud arrived at Breda. From there, two groups were dispatched, one of them with the objective to block the German advance in North Brabant. As a counter-measure to the French move, Generalleutnant von Hubicki also divided his forces. Half of the 9 Division joined by the SS Division was directed southwest to intercept the French. The rest of the Division continued an advance towards Moerdijk in order to relieve the paratroopers. In the afternoon, the French column reached Tilburg and engaged the enemy. German tanks and motorised infantry, supported by the Luftwaffe, were able to force the French into a retreat. The success allowed the German troops to rejoin the main force the following day, May 12. At around six in the afternoon of the same day, the 9 Reconnaissance Regiment dispatched from the 9 Panzer Division reached the airborne troops in Zevenbergschen Hoek near Moerdijk by the river Maas. From that point the German units, grouped together, pressed forward towards Rotterdam. On the morning of May 13, the 9 Panzer Division began an assault on Dordrecht, a town along the path to Rotterdam. The exchange of fire with the Dutch troops lasted until noon, when the defenders surrendered. On the same day, north of Breda, the 9 Division was reinforced by the “LSSAH” Motorised SS Regiment (SSRegiment (mot) “LSSAH” - Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler). On the next morning both rd
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units reached the region northwest of Dordrecht. Late in the evening of May 13, the commander of German paratroopers, General Kurt Student, established contact with the 9 Division in the vicinity of the Rotterdam bridgehead. In the afternoon of May 14, the 9 Division’s units were preparing for an attack on the city. The units of Group A concentrated in the Feijenoord District on the left bank of the river, at the southern bridgeheads. The Group consisted of the 33 Panzer Regiment tanks and III battalion of the 16 Infantry Regiment (III./Infanterie Regiment 16 - III./Inf. Rgt. 16) led by Oberstleutnant Dietrich von Cholitz. Support was provided by two artillery groups and two pioneer companies. The assault was to commence after a Luftwaffe air strike. th
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1 Solarz, Fall Gelb, Warszawa 1999, p. 10 and Jentz T. L, Die deutsche Panzertruppe1933-1942 Band I, Wölfersheim-Berstadt 1998, p. 121.
2 Stoves R, Die gepanzerten und motorisierten deutsche Grossverbände 1935-1945, Eggolsheim, p. 69.
3 Stein G. H., Hitler’s Elite Guard at War The Waffen SS 1939-1945, p. 64.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CHART OF THE 9 PANZER DIVISION IN MAY 1940 th
Meanwhile that afternoon, the surrender was being negotiated at Rotterdam’s port. The Dutch authorities were almost willing to capitulate. Therefore, an effort was made to call off the air strike planned for the afternoon. The attempt was not quite successful, as some of the bombers from the 54 Bomber Regiment dropped their load over the city around 3 o’clock in the afternoon. The bombardment caused a multitude of fires that had to be put out throughout the night. It also influenced the stance of the defenders, so around 5pm the Dutch units in the city surrendered. On May 15 1940, capitulation was offered by the Dutch government. On the same day, as the first in the 9 Division, Major Fritz Iwand from the I Battalion of the 10 Rifle Regiment received the Knight’s Cross. th
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Beginning May 15, despite the Dutch surrender, the 9 Division along with the “LSSAH” Regiment was involved in a “show of force” while marching through the remaining parts of the country. The intent was to demonstrate German superiority to the citizens of Holland. The route of the units led from Leiden to Haarlem and Amsterdam, where a victory parade was held, and then through Utrecht, Arnhem, Nijmegen, Venlo and Roermond across the Belgian border to Tongeren, where they arrived on May 18. From th
that point, the 9 Division was dispatched to join Army Group “A” (HG “A”) near the Somme River. On May 24 the Division reached Doullens, a township in which Marshal Ferdinand Foch, commander in chief of the Entente forces, established his headquarters during the First World War. In the following days, the 9 Division, deployed with the XIV Motorised Army Corps (XIV AK (mot)), remained in the area of Abbeville and Amiens by the lower Somme River as a rearguard. The infantry troops were to hold positions in that sector, while the 9 Panzer Division grouped north of the river, near Abbeville, was intended as an operational reserve/emergency manoeuvre unit. Before long, a decision was made to press the Division into front line action, in order to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the shores of the English Channel. th
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At the end of May, the Division was directed north, from Amiens towards Gravelines, where it arrived on June 1, to join other German units in besieging Dunkirk. Allied units, mostly remnants of the British Expeditionary Force, were evacuating from the port under heavy aerial assault by the Luftwaffe. Before the operation at Dunkirk ended, the Division was moved again to operate in the southern region of France. The concentration point was once more the German foothold at Amiens.
A group of Allied prisoner taken by the 9th Panzer Division in the region of Dunkirk.
Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. B medium tank destroyed by French anti-tank mine on June 5 1940 near Amiens. The “xx” divisional symbol is displayed to the left of the Balkenkreuz. Graves of the crew members are visible behind the tank.
The new German offensive, code name “Fall Rot”, was planned for June 5. The 9 Panzer Division was, as before, part of the XIV Army Corps, now assigned to “Kleist” Group (Gruppe Kleist) from Army Group “B” under Generaloberst von Bock. At the time, 9. Pz.Div. was the only German armoured division to still have just a single, two battalion armoured regiment. Generalleutnant Alfred Ritter von Hubicki, as early as the end of the Dutch campaign, voiced a strong complaint about the lack of operational equipment. Thus the Wehrmacht’s High Command was concerned that the Division might not be ready for action in time for the “Fall Rot” offensive. th
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in Kassel, and one tank of the same version with 3.7 cm Kwk cannon, from the MAN factory, with chassis number Fgst. Nr. 61057. The latter is the highest, so far, identified chassis number of the Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. F manufactured by that factory. 7
The German attack on France commenced on 5 June 1940. As a part of the “Kleist” Group, the 9 Panzer Division advanced from the west side of the Somme River bridgehead near Amiens. The defending French 16 Infantry Division was the opponent. The advance was preceded by a German artillery barrage which began at 4 o’clock in the morning. Ten minutes after it subsided, the infantry, supported by the tanks, pressed forward. The first waves of the 9 Division’s troops were brought to a halt by land mines and very well aimed machine gun and anti-tank gun fire coming mostly from French positions around the village of Dury. The attack failed. The field guns of the 9 Division, along with the artillery of the Army Corps, commenced bombardment of the village, progressively setting homes and farm buildings on fire. The shelling lasted most of the day with occasional 10 to 15 minute pauses. Ultimately, it destroyed the village. German artillery also targeted other French strongholds at Rumigny and Hébécourt. The second onslaught began at 13:00 hours, as the front line infantry attacked Dury and Cagny. Not much was achieved, nevertheless the Divisional tanks managed to penetrate the flank and destroy two French 155 mm howitzer batteries. Even so, the remaining French artillery continued to provide support to the defending units. The effective use of French artillery was one of the reasons why the German infantry were unable to infiltrate the breach made by the tanks. The entire area was covered by French artillery and machinegun fire. It was only on the next day that the Germans, after five attempts, broke through the French lines. th
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In the following days, the 9 Division, after penetrating the “Weygand defence line”, took part in intense battles near Sains-en-Amiénois. The anti-tank artillery proved particularly successful, while the light anti-aircraft guns from the 94 Regiment of Light Anti-aircraft Artillery (leichte Flak-Abteilung 94 (mot) - leichte Flak-Abt. 94(mot)) attached to the Division, were also engaged against ground targets near Bosquel . During the course of the action, Generalleutnant von Hubicki remained at the front line at all times. On the fourth day of the invasion, June 8, the Division crossed the Seine and Yonne Rivers and cleared the path to Paris, which in the meantime was declared an open city. German units entered the French capital on June 14 1940. While in Paris, the motorised SS Regiment “LSSAH” was attached to the 9 Panzer Division, still serving at the time as part of the “Kleist” Group. Both units moved south, crossing the Oise, Aisne and Marne Rivers. Many German military cemeteries, remnants of the First World War, marked the sites along the way. Once the town of Coulommiers was reached, a few detached combat groups were formed and dispatched south towards Sens and Auxerre to capture the Loire River crossings.On the afternoon of June 16, the 9 Panzer Division captured the town of La Charité -sur-Loire, where the French managed to detonate explosives under one of the bridges. The second one however, was secured intact by the 9 Reconnaissance Regiment. This action allowed them to establish a bridgehead on the other bank of the river. On the same day, the classified archives of the French General Staff fell into German hands. The events, as described by Janusz Piekałkiewicz, took the following turn: “On that same evening, during a routine patrol at the La Charité railway station Oberfunkmeister Balzereit from the regimental communication platoon, makes an amazing discovery in one the railcars of the military echelon; he finds classified documents of the th
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French high command. About the same time, in yet another railcar coupled to one of several freight trains forming a nearly 25 kilometre line up along the La Charite Masvessur-Loire track (trapped there due to Loire bridge destruction), Schütze Kenzer, a trooper of an adjoining division, discovers another batch of files.” The documentation belonged to Grand Quartier General (French General Headquarters) and Section Interallie du Gabinet du General Gamelin (Inter-allied section of general Gamelin staff), and contained classified protocols of the Allied command briefings. 11
An abandoned French light tank Renault FT 17 examined by a group of German officers. French Army insignia may be noted.
An overturned French armoured artillery tractor Renault UE encountered along the 9. Pz.Div. combat path.
It should also be mentioned that a number of prisoners were taken as the result of the Loire operation. On June 17, a detached combat group led by Oberleutnant Edwin-Oskar Dietz from the I battalion of the 11 Rifle Regiment (I./Schützen-Rgt 11) under Major Wilhelm Schmalz, seized the Loire bridge at Nevers in a surprise attack. Both officers were awarded Knight’s th
Crosses for this performance. Capture of the bridge allowed the 10 Rifle Regiment to continue its advance towards the south. Meanwhile, the 9 Panzer Division progressed towards Lyon. The 50 Tank Destroyer Battalion was spearheading the advance and on some occasions, particularly during battles at Moulins and Lapalisse, protected the flanks as the Division launched an attack. When Burgundy was taken on June 19, so was the town of Roanne. At that point, further advance of the Division was brought to an end. It was transferred to southwest France near Bordeaux. The relocation required a 600 kilometre road march through Montargis and Orleans, the latter was reached on June 22, then through Poitiers into the Perigord region. The last combat encounter with the dispersed French Army took place south of Orleans, in the vicinity of Angoulême. On 25 of June the 9 Panzer Division reached the town of Branne in Aquitaine. The troops were fatigued by combat and intensive marches. Any stops were used for recuperation, preferably sleep. As the French defence efforts were overwhelmed by the German onslaught, Marshal Petain proposed a cease fire. By that time, the 9 Division had forced its way across the Dordogne River in Aquitaine. th
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On June 26 1940, the military operations in the west came to an end. The Division received an order directing it back to Germany. Travelling through Tours, Melun and Reims, the unit reached the German border. From there, using an autobahn leading past Munich, it reached its garrison in Vienna. The combat route of the 9 Panzer Division between the initial engagement in Holland and its return to Vienna, extended some 7,000 kilometres. It is very probable that among all the Wehrmacht units participating it the Western Campaign, the 9 Division was the one to cover the longest distance. Upon arrival, the Division was enthusiastically greeted in the Third Reich, particularly in the town of Ried, located on the old Austro-German border. Stationed in the area of Vienna and St. Pölten, the unit restored its combat readiness, while the new equipment was being delivered. th
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In July, the 9 Panzer Division was co-opted into the XXXX Motorised Army Corps (XXXX AK (mot)) . On August 1 1940, the structure of the Division was altered. The 9 Reconnaissance Regiment was disbanded. In its place, independent new units were created: the 59 Battalion of Motorcycle Rifles (Kradschützen-Bataillon 59 - Kradsch.Btl. 59) was formed in place of the I Battalion of 9 Reconnaissance Regiment (I./Aufkl.Rgt. 9); and the 9 Reconnaissance Battalion (Aufklärungs Abteilung 9 - Aufkl.Abt. 9) replaced the II Battalion of the 9 Reconnaissance Regiment (II./Aufkl. Rgt 9). The 6 Company of the retired 9 Reconnaissance Regiment became the 1 Company of the 341 Reconnaissance Battalion (1./Aufkl.Abt. 341) assigned to the 16 Motorised Infantry Division (16. Infanterie Division (mot) - 16. Inf.Div. (mot)). th
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According to the same order, the 102 Artillery Regiment was reinforced with the mixed heavy III Detachment (III Abteilung), which until this point was the II Battalion of the 50 Artillery Regiment (II./Art.Rgt. 50) stationed in Lipsig. At the same time the 102 Artillery Regiment obtained the 321 Spotting/Observation Battery - Armoured (Beobachtungs Batterie 321 (Pz.) -Beob.Bttr. 321 (Pz.)). nd
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As for the minor changes, the 3 Company of the 86 Armoured Pioneer Battalion (3./Pz.Pi. Btl. 86) was once again given two light tank platoons of Pz.Kpfw. I and II tanks, as well as two armoured pioneer vehicle platoons, most likely equipped with half-tracked rd
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Sd.Kfz. 251 transporters including six vehicles carrying the “Do-Werfer” 150 mm rocket launchers (m. SPW mit Wurfrahmen). The support units of the 9 Division were also strengthened, a third repair company (Werkstatt-Kp.) was added, alongside four light supply columns (leichte Krafwagen Kolonne) and two motorised heavy supply columns (Kw. Kolonne (mot)) . The Division remained at its garrisons in Vienna and St. Pölten until the end of August of 1940. In September and October, the entire XXXX Army Corps along with the 9 Division was transferred to Poland, where it performed various occupational tasks, probably until the end of January 1941. 14
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A group of Wehrmacht tank crew and soldiers, probably photographed after the end of the French campaign next to a Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. F armed with 37 mm cannon. The tank’s tactical number “422”, as well as the divisional “xx” symbols, are evident.
4 Hermann C. H. Die 9. Panzer-Division 1939-1945, Eggolsheim, p. 172.
5 P. P. Battistelli claims that none of the operational units were referred to as a Panzergruppe at the time; this particular nomenclature was introduced in July of 1941. During the invasion on Western Europe, such operational units were called Gruppe, even if their combat potential was equal that of an army. (Battistelli P. P., Niemieckie dywizje pancerne Lata Blitzkriegu 1939-1940, Warszawa 2010, p.11)
6 Solarz J., Fall “Rot”, Warszawa 2000, p. 8.
7 Jentz T., Doyle H. L, Panzer Tracts No. 3-2 Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf. E, F, G und H, p. 18
8 English J. A., Gudmundsson B. I., On Infantry, Westport 1994.
9 http://www.ww2.dk/ground/flak/abt/le94.html
10 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 39.
11 Piekałkiewicz J., Cel Paryż Kampania 1939-1940, Janki k. Warszawy 2008, p. 213.
12 XXXX AK may be recorded as XXXX or XL. This publication will follow the manner used by G. Tessin XXXX.
13 Tessin G, op. cit. p. 140.
14 Stoves R, op. cit, p. 69.
15 Ibidem.
Operation “Fall Marita” In January 1941, the 9 Reconnaissance Battalion transferred its 1 Company of armoured cars (Pz.Spah) to the 231 Reconnaissance Battalion, where the unit became the 1 Company of the 231 Reconnaissance Battalion (1/Aufkl.Abt. (mot.) 231). At the end of the month, the troops of the 9 Panzer Division were progressively transferred to Romania via rail. Amongst other units, the 9 Reconnaissance Battalion began its journey on February 3 1941. For nearly a month, until February 27, the Division was guarding the oil fields near Ploesti. The Division was still a sub-unit of the XXXX Army Corps under General Georg Stumme. The corps was a part of Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List’s 12 Army (Armee-Ober-Kommando 12 - AOK 12). As a result of the political tensions in the Balkan region, and the anticipated execution of “Fall Marita”, the invasion on Yugoslavia and Greece, the 12 Army was ordered to take positions in Bulgaria. As the 9 Division, moving south through Romania, took a rest in the vicinity of Bucharest in the morning on February 28, the German engineering units begun construction of bridges spanning the Danube River near Giurgiu-Ruse, in accordance with the German - Bulgarian agreement. The work was finished on March 1. On the next day, the 9 Division, along with the other XXXX Army Corps units, crossed the Danube River and moved down the Shipka valley to reach the region south of Plovdiv. By March 17, the first and the second wave of the 12 Army, eleven and a half divisions strong, concentrated in Bulgaria. Until March 27, the 9 Division remained in central Bulgaria. On the 28, it was moved towards the Turkish-Greek border. From there, it marched towards its designated location to take up initial positions in readiness for the attack on Yugoslavia, soon to be launched from the western Bulgarian frontier. The XXXX Army Corps, including the SS “LSSAH” unit, by that time enlarged to a brigade, and the 73 Infantry Division (73. Infanterie Division -73. Inf.Div.) scattered itself in the region of Kyustendil and Upper Dzhumaya (later Blagoevgrad). It was a primary position for an attack in the direction of Kumanovo, towards Kriva Palanka -Skopje and Carevo Selo - Veles. The first aim was to cut the railroad connection between Yugoslavia and Greece. The subsequent objective was an assault headed for Prizren and Tetovo towards the Albanian border, conducted in order to connect with Italian forces and isolate Yugoslavian units. At the end of the operation, the Corps was to turn its main forces south and march towards Greek border through Monastyr. According to the German air force roster dated April 5 1941, the 1 (H)23 Reconnaissance Squadron equipped with Henschel Hs 126 airplanes was to cooperate with the 9 Division. th
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Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. G tank in Romania, early spring of 1941. The tank unit travels towards its assigned positions. Tarp covers are placed over the armament to protect it from the dust and dirt of the road march. Their presence indicates that the unit did not expect any threats during this particular part of the journey.
German vehicles entering a temporary wooden bridge over Danube River in the area of Giurgiu -Ruse at the Rumanian - Bulgarian border. The structure, constructed by German combat engineer troops, was laid over barges.
Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. F during the march through Romania. Additional fuel canisters are stored on the turret. Some spare track links are affixed in front of the turret only for the duration of the journey, in a combat situation they would prevent the turret from rotating. Next to the driver’s visor, a new 9th Panzer Division symbol “YII” may be seen. The letter “G” underneath probably indicates that this vehicle had priority passage rights in traffic en route to the front, but it is not quite certain, as indicated above. Below to the right, number “4” is painted. On the lower front panel the Fgst. Nr. “61414” serial number may be seen. It indicates that this vehicle was manufactured at the Henschel factory in Kassel.
An information sign specifying the capacity of the bridge. This structure, able to withstand the pressure exerted by up to a 24 ton vehicle, was built specifically for the armoured troops crossing. To the right, there is a wooden antiaircraft tower.
The 9th Panzer Division units photographed during the crossing of a nearly 1100 meters long Danube River bridge. An all terrain, crosscountry car, presumably Wanderer W 23 S, is seen in this image.
The crossing continues, as more units follow.
The 9th Panzer Division, Austrian in origin, retained some of the Bundesheer (Austrian Army) vehicles. A crosscountry Steyr 640 with a portable twin anti-aircraft emplacement - Zwillingssockel 36, utilizing the MG 34 machine guns is portrayed in this photograph.
One of the 9th Panzer Division’s Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. F medium tanks after the crossing of the provisional Danube River bridge.
The same tank on the Bulgarian side, driving over a ramp constructed of tree trunks. An unusual arrangement of the spare road wheels, and track sections attached to the lower front armour plate is noticeable.
A commemorative photograph taken along with the Bulgarian soldiers.
A roll call of one of the 9th Panzer Division’s units on Bulgarian territory.
A group of the 9th Division’s vehicles in a Bulgarian village. In a forefront there is a cross-country Adler Typ 3 Gd. The line up behind this vehicle consists of: an Opel Super 6 convertible, a cross-country Steyr Typ 250 and a mittlerer Einheist-Pkw. Kfz. 15, also known as Horch 901. Among the trucks seen in the rear, there are: Ford G 917 T, probably a MAN Typ ML 4500 S, two Opel Blitz 3 ton trucks and one Opel Blitz in the 1 ton version. On the left, in the background, a captured Czechoslovakian Praga RV and another Opel Blitz may be seen.
This photograph taken March 21 1941, shows the 9th Panzer Division’s column passing through the Roi mountain pass at 1707 m above the sea level. Austrian Steyr 640 vehicles may be noticed.
Troopers of the same column, during a break in the march through Bulgaria, having a meal at a roadside.
An amateur photograph of a 9th Division tanker riding a donkey, taken against a minaret in the far background. The snap shot was probably taken in Bulgaria. The Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. E, with spare road wheels and track links mounted to the lower hull front plate, is of some significance. So is the Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf. C visible on the right. This tank was modified by the addition of external armour at the front of the tank, as well as to the forward section of the turret. The commanders’ cupola with eight periscopes was also added. Two petrol cans were fastened to the turret. The divisional symbol “YII” is evident on both tanks.
A Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. F with additional armour during a road march in 1941.
9th Panzer Division vehicles before crossing the Yugoslav border. In the forefront from the left, two Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. Fs armed with 5 cm KwK (L/42) cannon. Next to them an Ausf. E. The latter is armed with a 37 mm cannon mounted in the interior gun mantlet.
A campsite established during the transfer. Two HWA 526 D Einhe-istdiesel are alongside a Praga RV truck of Czechoslovak origin. A symbol reminiscent of a letter “M” on the right side fender may indicate an ammunition supply truck of the 102nd Artillery Regiment.
German armoured scout car Sd.Kfz. 222 from the 9th Reconnaissance Battalion on a concrete bridge in Bulgaria.
The relocation of such a mass of people and equipment led to some problems. German military police from the 9th Division investigates an accident involving a Bulgarian horse team.
Some cross-country vehicles, trucks and tractors of the 9th Panzer Division before the attack on Yugoslavia. The III Reich flags used for aerial identification are evident in this photograph. From the left: Adler Typ 3 Gd, Mercedes-Benz Typ 170 VK and a Steyr Typ 250 with an Einheist-Diesel behind it. On the right: rear of a cross country Mercedes-Benz Typ 170 VK and a m. Zgkw. 8t (Sd. Kfz. 7) semi tracked prime mover.
Spring of 1941 in the Balkans. German tank company at rest. Pz. Kpfw. II and Pz.Kpfw. III tanks are visible in this photograph.
Operation “Marita” had begun. Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. F medium tank armed with 37 mm cannon crosses the Bulgarian – Yugoslav border near Kjustendil. At the front of the tank, near the drivers’ visor, the 9th Panzer Division symbol is displayed. Spare traction wheels and track links are mounted to the front armour plate. Gasoline canisters are mounted to the turret.
At the same time, the 86 Light Anti-aircraft Artillery Detachment (leichte Flak-Abt. 86) from the 12 Army (Kommandeur der Luftwaffe Armme-Oberkommando 12 - Koluft 12) was incorporated into the 9 Panzer Division. The Detachment consisted of three batteries. th
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On 6 April 1941, as “Fall Marita” commenced, the 9 Panzer Division had nine Pz.Kpfw. I tanks, 36 Pz.Kpfw. II, 22 Pz.Kpfw. III with 37 mm cannon, 29 Pz.Kpfw. III with th
50 mm guns, 20 Pz.Kpfw. IV tanks and ten Pz.Bf.Wg. command tanks.
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At daybreak, simultaneously from three directions, the attack on Macedonia began. In the Kumanovo sector, the 9 Panzer Division crossed the border and overwhelmed the solitary Yugoslav 22 Regiment form the 20 Bregalnic Infantry Division (20. Bregalnička Pešadijska Divizija) , taking Kriva Palanka as early as 8 o’clock in the morning. Soon the strategically important Stracin mountain pass (1,000 m above sea level) leading to Kumanovo was crossed. The gorge was defended by units of the 46 Morava Infantry Division (46. Moravska Pešadijska Divizija), among them, the 46 Artillery Regiment (46. artiljerijski puk) alongside the anti-tank artillery squadron (protivoklopni artiljerijski divizion) equipped with Czechoslovakian-made 47 mm anti-tank guns. Around 10 o’clock, the 9 Division’s spearhead reached the Yugoslav positions. During the initial exchange of fire, four German tanks were said to have been lost, and the advance came to a stop. Before long, Luftwaffe and German artillery were involved. Casualties and a shortage of ammunition forced the Yugoslav units to abandon their positions and withdraw. The gorge was secured by the evening and the Division sent off a reconnaissance unit towards Kumanovo. Chief of Staff (Generalstabschef OKH), Generaloberst Franz Halder noted in his journal: “At 14:00 hours the 9 Panzer Division engaged retreating enemy units in the region west of Vetunica.” . Later on the same evening, both German Army Corps reach the Strumica, Carevo Selo, Stracin perimeter, effectively securing the entire border region. On the morning on April 7, in the vicinity of Mlado Nagoričane, the 9 Division supported by aircraft overwhelmed the Yugoslavian 21 and 93 Infantry Regiments, which lacked anti-tank weapons, and at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon took the town of Skopje. While there, the Division dispatched at least two combat groups (Kampfgruppen). Units of the 9 Division captured the township of Veles on the same day. On April 7, commander of the 12 Army Generalfeldmarschall List declared the enemy forces in Macedonia to be defeated. The XXXX Corps was reported to have crushed three to four Yugoslavian divisions, capturing over 100 guns, and taking approximately 20,000 prisoners, including seven generals. th
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First in a series of photographs illustrating the types of tanks used by the 9th Panzer Division at the onset of operation “Marita”. Shown here, one of the nine Pz.Kpfw. I Ausf. B light tanks.
Light tank Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf. C. There were 36 such tanks in the Balkan campaign.
One of the 29 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. G, armed with a 50 mm cannon.
In view of the above, Generalfeldmarschall List ordered the XXXX Corps to switch its aim from the western to the southern region. The XXXX Corps, still expected to make connection with Italian units at the eastern border of Albania, was also supposed to secure the municipality of Bitola and conduct a reconnaissance at the Greek border. To fulfil this goal, on April 8, the main forces of the 9 Division concentrated around Skopje in order to continue their advance south. Meanwhile Combat Group “Gorn” (“Kampfgruppe Gorn”), named after its commander Oberst Walter Gorn, in charge of the I Battalion of the 10 Rifle Regiment, advanced west taking Tetovo and then, on the following day, Gostivar. In the north, the rear of the Division was guarded by combat groups which operated in the region between Presevo and Kačanik. As a result, Stari Kačanik was taken. This move not only separated Yugoslav units defending Kosovo from the ones in Macedonia, but also threatened the rear of the Yugoslav 3 Army conducting an offensive against Italian forces in Albania from the region of Prizren. By April 9, the Yugoslavian defences in Macedonia were broken. German XXXX Corps approached the Greek border. Combat Group “Gorn” detached from the 9 Panzer Division, marching from Tetovo, seized Gostivar and advanced towards Debar and Kicevo. At the same time, the main forces of the 9 Division concentrated in the vicinity of Prilep to prepare for further actions. One of the detached combat groups overwhelmed the defenders in the Kačanik region and captured Uroševac. From there, it moved to Štimlje and managed to break through to Prizren around 6 o’clock in the afternoon. Another group reached the vicinity of Lipljan. On April 10, the XXXX Army Corps was in the final stages of securing Macedonia, while the vanguard of the 9 Panzer Division neared Bitola. th
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Medium tank Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. D. The Division had 20 tanks of this type at the beginning of operation “Marita”.
Another Pz.Kpfw. IV in the newer version - Ausf. E.
The reconnaissance units of the 9 Division went through Kosovo marching north. On the way to Kosovska Mitrovica by way of Vucitrn, they reached Pristina on April 11. Regardless of the combat situation in Macedonia, the resistance of the 25 Vadar Infantry Division (25. Vardarska Pešadijska Divizija) was nearing an end. In order to block the retreat of Yugoslav forces, combat group “Gorn”, assaulting from Gostivar, negotiated some treacherous terrain to reach the Debar mountain pass situated 1,500 meters above sea level. Consequently, the remnants of the 25 Vadar Division, including two generals, 150 officers and 2,500 soldiers, alongside a few artillery batteries and 12 anti-tank guns, had fallen prisoner to “Gorn” group. For this achievement Major Walter Gorn was awarded the Ritterkreuz a few days later. His group, “Kampfgruppe Gorn”, after a successful blockage of the Debar pass, established contact with the Italian 14 Army Corps (XIV Corpo d’Armata) advancing from the west. At that point, the Yugoslav and Greek forces became separated. Meanwhile, the German 12 Army Group under Generalfeldmarschall List regrouped both Army Corps, General Stumme’s XXXX AK and General B. Böhme’s VIII Mountain Corps (VIII Gebirgs) in order to proceed south. The first corps was to concentrate in the Florina - Bitola region. At that moment the only units present in the area were parts of the SS-Brigade “LSSAH”, with the forefront of the 9 Panzer Division approaching. The main German forces were en route, passing through Veles. The 12 Army headquarters assumed that the Greek and British units had taken defensive positions along the Aliakmon-Vermion perimeter, facing north-east. The plan of attack, had the XXXX Army Corps assault the flank and the rear of the enemy, while exposing its own flank from the Albanian side. The purpose of the manoeuvre was to cut off and destroy the Greek-British formation, and to prevent the retreat of the remaining Greek units from Albania. To fulfil the objective, General Stumme intended to deploy armoured and motorised troops towards Bitola - Kozani. At the forefront was the SSBrigade “LSSAH” followed by the 9 Panzer Division, moving ahead of the 5 Panzer Division. On April 11, the German units made contact with the British and Greek armies at Florina. The SS-Brigade “LSSAH”’s scouts, through a series of skirmishes, surveyed th
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the defences in the area of Kerli - Derven mountain pass, and encountered a Greek cavalry division at the Pisoderi pass. The cavalry was preparing for a counterattack on Florina planned for the following day, to stop the 9 Division’s advance from Veles. Once the Klidi pass was secured by the SS-Brigade “LSSAH”, the first waves of 9 Division tanks were sent through. On April 12 German ground units, supported by the Luftwaffe, conducted a strong assault on the next mountain pass at Florina. The attack broke down under fire from the British 1 Armoured Brigade led by General Charrington. During the clash, the British lost only one A-10 tank. Even though the enemy advance was halted, the British left their stronghold at Florina under cover of the night of April 12 - 13, and retreated in fear of being outflanked. th
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Command tank Klein Panzerbefehlswagen (Sd Kfz. 265) constructed on the chassis of the Pz.Kpfw. I. The 9th Division had 10 command tanks prior to the Balkan campaign.)
Abandoned Yugoslavian bomber plane of German production Dornier Do –17 Ka-1, at Stubol airport near Pristina. It is probably plane number 3313 from the 64th Bomber Group of the Yugoslav Royal Air Force (JKRV Jugoslovensko Kraljevsko Ratno Vazduhoplovstvo).
A group of Yugoslav Army prisoners of war.
German Pz.Kpfw. III on the narrow street of a Macedonian township. The flags displaying swastika suggest that the Germans were warmly welcomed by the residents.
German fighter planes Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-7 probably belonging to II.(Sch)/LG 2 unit. The planes had yellow “friend – foe” identification markings painted on the engine cowling, rudder, wing tips, and fuselage.
Early in morning of April 13, the forward units of the 9 Panzer Division, moving towards the area of Bitola-Servia, approached British position at Amyntaio-Sotiras. The th
defences were held again by the 1 Armoured Brigade, therefore a tank battle ensued. The first move was made by the British, who launched their A-10 tanks from “A” squadron of the 3 Royal Tank Regiment (3. RTR) alongside two squadrons of light Mk VI tanks from 4 Hussars Regiment, against advancing German infantry. According to British historian and scholar Mr. Lidell Hart, the enemy infantry equipped with anti-tank guns could hit British tanks from 1,200 yards, while the “Besa” machine guns of the tankers had an effective range of only 600 yards. Some time later, German 33 Panzer Regiment tanks joined the encounter. The hussars withdrew their light tanks, so the burden of the fight fell on the A-10 tanks. In this brief, but intense encounter, the British, out-manoeuvred by their opponents, lost eight tanks. As the result, they withdrew to the next defensive position established at Ptolemaida, some 19 kilometres away. st
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German equipment and weapons abandoned at the roadside as a result of recent fighting. Helmets and Stielhandgranate 24 hand grenades may be recognized. The photograph was taken from the passing 9. Pz.Div. vehicle, almost certainly in the area of Florina mountain pass, where a particularly fierce combat took place involving the SS-Brigade “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” among other units.
Alikamon River crossing constructed by combat engineers of the Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 86.
After the battle, the 9 Panzer Division was divided into two groups. The first group, commanded by Oberst graf Teodor von Sponeck, was deployed as a first wave. According to Mr. W. G. McClymont the group consisted of the 11 Rifle Regiment without the 7 Company; two companies from the 59 Motorcycle Rifles Battalion; headquarters of the th
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102 Artillery Regiment (Stab Art.Rgt. 102) alongside some detachments of the spotting battery; III Squadron of the 102 Artillery Regiment (III./Art.Rgt. 102) without the 7 Battery; one light artillery battery from the III Squadron of the 102 Artillery Regiment; headquarters (Stab) and the 2 Company of the 86 Anti-aircraft Artillery Detachment (2/leichte Flak-Abt. 86) not including the 1 Battery; the 3 Company of the 50 Tank Destroyer Squadron (3/Pz.Jg.Abt. 50); one platoon of the 33 Panzer Regiment; headquarters (Stab) and the 1 Company of the 86 Armoured Pioneer Battalion (1/Pz.Pi.Btl. 86), one additional anti-aircraft battery and one transportation column. nd
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British equipment captured by the 9th Panzer Division in Greece. In the middle, three Bedford OYD trucks accompanied by an A-10.
9th Panzer Division troops at rest in Greece. Divisional symbol on a prime mover tractor m. Zgkw. 8t (Sd.Kfz. 7) is evident.
The 9 Panzer Division progressing towards Bitola and Servia, taking the town of Kozani on April 14. In effect, the retreat route of most units from the Greek 12 Infantry Division (XII M/K MII), led by General Karabatos, was blocked. One combat group from the 9 Division, advancing from Kozani, reached Alikamon River near Servia, where a small bridgehead was established. However, the German attempt to press forward utilizing th
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this advantage was successfully stopped by the New Zealand 4 Brigade. Another 9 Division detachment turned back from Kozani, marching west to Siatista. Consequently, only a part of the 9 Panzer Division with the 73 Infantry Division and the SS-Brigade “LSSAH” were deployed against the new Greek defence boundary forming along the Vourinos - Klisura mountain pass - Votochorion line. At 14:00 hours, the right wing of the 9 Division attacked the Metamorphis mountain pass. The Greek 12 Infantry Division units, supported by a squadron from the British 102 Anti-tank Regiment, defeated the attackers. th
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On April 15 Generaloberst Halder noted: “In Greece, the 9 Division established a bridgehead on the right bank of Aliakmon River, south of Kocani; south of the river lays a difficult terrain”. In the evening of the same day, the Allied forces withdrew to the province of Thessaly, and established a defensive line approximately 100 kilometres long, but the forces necessary to properly defend such extended positions were insufficient. Meanwhile in the vicinity of Servia, the New Zealand 4 Brigade was trying to restrain the advance of the 9 Panzer Division. Two Australian brigades were positioned to the south, the 16 Brigade defended the north bank of the Alikamon River, while the 19 Brigade shielded the Klidi - Kozani area. “General Charrington’s armoured brigade, weakened by the encounters with the 9 Panzer Division, could field only a small number of tanks. The ones that remained operational were defending west flank. (….) British tactics were simple, all the units of the British Expeditionary Corps were to conduct detaining skirmishes and slowly retreat towards Thermopile”. th
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9th Panzer Division’s vehicles at the Servia mountain pass. On the left Opel Blitz, in the forefront Einheist-Diesel truck. This photograph is dated April 16 or 17 1941.
German dive bomber Junkers Ju 87R-2 Stuka during fuelling at a provisional airfield located somewhere in the area of Prilep or Bitoli, near the Yugoslav - Greek border. The plane is most likely from the StG 77 unit. Additional fuel tanks mounted under the wing are worth noting.
This same day, April 15, the right wing of the 9 Panzer Division passing through Siatista, crossed the Aliakmon River and broke through the defences of the Greek 12 Infantry Division established on the hills surrounding the town of Kivotos in the east. Thus, the 12 Infantry Division had to pull back southwest, and regroup west of Grevena, allowing the town to be taken by the aggressors. Meanwhile, the rear guard units of the 9 Division, marching from Siatista, reached Neapoli, taking positions already behind an intended defence line of the Greek 20 Infantry Division. Another significant episode of this eventful day was the failed attack on Servia carried out by Oberst von Sponeck’s group. The town was defended by the New Zealand 4 Brigade. During the course of action, the 11 Rifle Regiment lost 21 dead, 37 wounded and 168 missing in action. In addition, three officers and 150 soldiers became Allied prisoners of war. By the evening of April 15, some of the 9 Panzer Division units were still engaged at Servia, while the rest, marching through Grevena and Deskati towards Elassona, attempted to encircle the Allied strongholds from the west. . During the night hours, General Stumme issued an order for the 9 Panzer Division to prepare a decisive attack for April 17, to which Generalleutnant von Hubicki replied that it would not be possible without very extensive artillery support. April 16 brought about a continuation of artillery exchanges at Servia, while the other German forces continued in their efforts to surround British entrenchments by marching towards Elassona. The 9 Panzer Division encountered strong opposition from the Greek 12 Infantry Division at Grevena, which allowed the British 1 Armoured Brigade to withdraw south. As of April 17, the German out-flanking manoeuvre continued, but it was hindered by the damage inflicted to roads by the retreating Allied troops, as well as recurring traffic jams unavoidable in this mountainous terrain, given the number of vehicles. The western group of the 9 Panzer Division took Grevena and approached Veneticos River; at that juncture, it had to combat the defending Greek 12 Infantry Division units again. As their resistance was overwhelmed, the 9 Division begun a slow advance to the south towards Karperon and Elassona, at which point it changed direction westwards, aiming for Deskati to provide a passage for the 5 Panzer Division headed for Kalabaka as soon as it was able to cross the Aliakmon River. The road south was almost impossible to drive on. It was not just deteriorated by the passage of the retreating British 1 Armoured Brigade. In addition, Allied engineering units did their best th
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to cause as much damage as possible. “In view of that, the efficient flow of vehicles was out of the question. Any forward movement was made possible only by the intense efforts of the pioneer troops. Nevertheless, their restoration attempts allowed only for a slow trickle of traffic.” 21
Damaged Dornier Do 17P-1 6M+GK from 2.(F.)/11 near Larissa in Greece, photographed in April 1941. According to the researchers, the location and the condition of the machine suggest a crash during landing or take off. It is probably W.Nr. 3586 that fell victim to a mechanical failure on April 17.
Another Junkers Ju 87, with a bomb about to be mounted in the rack.
On April 18, the advance of the 9 Panzer Division was additionally obstructed by the trailing vehicles of the 2 Panzer Division. On April 19 the German outposts reached Larissa, however any further enemy pursuit was made impossible by a shortage of fuel, among other reasons. The 9 Division, proceeding through Servia and repairing the road as it went along, was blocked by the German columns marching through Olympus. Later, the right of way had to be yielded again to ground units of the Luftwaffe. As the German units under Generalfeldmarschall List reached the plains of Thessaly, he changed the objective, the earlier goal of enemy pursuit suddenly became the march on Athens. The XXXX Army Corps was to advance first. The 5 and 9 Panzer Divisions with the 6 Mountain Division (6. Gebirg-Division) were to operate west of the Larisa – Lamia road. On April 20, two officers of the 9 Division were awarded the Ritterkreuz, the commanding officer th
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Generalleutnant Dr. Alfred Ritter von Hubicki and Major Walter Gorn, commander of the I battalion of the 10 Rifle Regiment, for his achievement at Debar . On the same day Oberst von Apell, commander of the 9 Rifles Brigade, was promoted to the rank of Generalmajor. th
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Soldiers of the 9. Pz.Div. at the recently captured town of Larrisa. Two Steyr 640 trucks are visible in this photograph taken on April 19. 1941.
Meanwhile, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List, without any consideration for the results, sent masses of his troops to the Fourka mountain pass and Lamia. He did not provide for the appropriate traffic regulation, nor took into consideration the destruction done by the withdrawing British troops. By the afternoon, the vehicles of the 5 Panzer Division were intermixed with the ones from the 9 Panzer Division approaching from the north. As a result, by the evening the 50 kilometre stretch of the road leading from Fourka pass contained: “a huge column of tanks, self-propelled guns, field guns, ammunition transporters, pontoon and engineering trucks, which all came to a complete stop. In such a simple way the Germans stopped their own advance for a few days to come.” th
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9th Division’s vehicle column in a ruined segment of Larrisa. One of the Einheist-Diesel trucks is visible.
Heavy armoured car Sd.Kfz. 232 from the 9th Reconnaissance Battalion with a characteristic frame antenna.
Divisional vehicles passing by a crash-landed Dornier Do 17 bomber. During Operation “Marita” 17 planes of this type were lost by the Luftwaffe.
A cross country mittlerer Einheits-Pkw Kfz. 15 (Horch 901) from the 9th Panzer Division, during intermission in combat against Greek forces.
On April 22, the German forces were still frozen in the traffic jam. The 9 Panzer Division grouped near Elasson to arrange its units. From Elasson it moved to Larissa, and on April 26 to Volos, a fishing town on the Aegean Sea. As the campaign ended, the armour equipment losses were reported. A total of 13 tanks were lost: three Pz.Kpfw. I, five Pz.Kpfw. II, three Pz.Kpfw. III and two Pz.Kpfw. IV. The Division also reported rather extensive mechanical wear of vehicles, as well as of their much deteriorated brake systems due to the travel on winding, narrow mountain roads. th
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On April 29, new orders were announced by General Adolf Heusinger, chief of the Operational Department (Operationsabteilung OKH), to Generaloberst Halder in charge of the AOK 12:
A motorcyclist from the Kradschützen-Bataillon 59 driving by an overturned anti-aircraft searchlight, abandoned at the side of the road.
9th Panzer Division soldiers photographed with a Mk. VI light tank left by the British at Valos township in Greece.
“As of May 5 commence the dispatch of the 9 Panzer Division units equipped with tracked vehicles via rail to Thessalonica, from loading point in Florina . The wheeled units are to conduct a road march via Belgrade. On May 27, arrival at the XVII Military District, where the 9 Division will be incorporated into “Kleist” Group, replacing the 5 Panzer Division.” th
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From May 2, the wheeled columns, in conformance with the order of Generalfeldmarschall List, began their route through Nis – Belgrade – Budapest to Vienna. As mentioned before, the tanks were transported by rail. On May 12, the columns passed through the streets of Vienna greeted by ovations from the residents. Generalmajor Wilhelm von Apell, commander of the 9 Rifles Brigade, was on May 14 presented the Ritterkreuz in recognition for his action against Yugoslav units at Stracin and British units at Klidi pass. th
During the month of June, the 9 Panzer Division was at the disposal of the commander of the Army Reserve at the VIII Military District (VIII WK) at Breslau. th
Prior to Operation “Barbarossa”, the 9 Panzer Division’s concentration point located in eastern Poland was reached via train between May 4 and 26 by some of the units, while the others arrived June 16 through 20. In the meantime, on June 12, the Operational Department reported to Generaloberst Halder: “Difficulties in preparation of the 9 Panzer Division. Temporary assistance extended by the 2 Panzer Division will cause delay in the readiness of the latter.” th
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Two Yugoslavian bomber planes Dornier Do Y captured by German forces at Kraljevo airfield. Yugoslav Royal Air Force had four of these German made planes; all of them fell in German hands in 1941. This photograph was taken by one of the troopers in Yugoslavia, as the 9th Division was returning home from the Balkans.
A mittlerer Einheits-Pkw Kfz. 15 (Horch 901) in front of a monastery, presumably in the vicinity of Belgrade.
9th Panzer Division’ s vehicles en route to Austria, photographed in the region of Belgrade or Zagreb. From the left: a cross-country Steyr Typ 250, behind it, a half tracked m. Zgkw. 8 (Sd. Kfz. 7) prime mover. In the middle there is a Praga RV truck, with a cross-country Adler Typ 3 GD to the right.
A snapshot of civilians offering wine to German soldiers. In the background, a half track m. Zgkw. 8 (Sd.Kfz. 8) prime mover artillery tractor may be seen.
At that time, the 9 Division was reinforced by the 3 Company of the 47 Anti-aircraft Artillery Detachment (3. Kompanie 47. Flak Abteilung) equipped with two platoons of the self-propelled Sd.Kfz. 10/4 guns and one platoon of Sd.Kfz. 7/1 guns. th
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The reports dating to June 1941 indicate that the 9 Division was provided with six half tracked medium armoured reconnaissance vehicles Saurer RR7 Sd.Kfz. 254. Most likely they were among the vehicles of the 102 Artillery Regiment. During preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the 33 Armoured Regiment of the 9 Division had two armoured battalions, each comprised of two light and one medium tank companies. th
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Main square of one of the Yugoslav towns, with the Divisional vehicles photographed against a baroque church. An array of vehicles including a Praga RV truck, Einheist-Diesel and a Mercedes-Benz Typ 170 VK are depicted in this photograph.
Motorcycle Rifle troops of the Kradschützen-Bataillon 59 during a return trip to Austria.
The “Grenz-dienststelle Kittsee” (Customs Office Kittsee) at the approach to the Kittsee town at the Austro – Hungarian border.
Divisional vehicles on a street of Vienna.
9th Panzer Division troops applauded by Viennese residents after another victorious campaign.
9th Division tanks left the Balkan region via rail. Depicted here, are Pz.Kpfw. III tanks on railroad cars.
A Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. E tank during preparations for Operation “Barbarossa”. The photograph was taken in occupied Poland.
1 Ibidem.
2 Messenger Ch., Gladiator Hitlera, Warszawa 2001, p. 123.
3 Janowicz K, Bałkany 1941, p. 18-19.
4 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche Panzertruppe 1933-1942 Band I, Wölfersheim-Berstadt 1998, p. 154.
5 Solarz J., Bałkany 1940-1941, Warszawa 2001, p. 48-49.
6 Halder F., Dziennik wojenny v. II , p. 422.
7 Rawski T., Wojna na Bałkanach 1941 Agresja hitlerowska na Jugosławię i Grecję, Warszawa 1981, p. 232.
8 Rawski, op. cit., p. 233.
9 Kurowski F., Infantry Aces. Mechanicsburg 2005, p. 309.
10 Besarabowicz T., Czołg Lekki Mk. VI, Militaria i Fakty Nr 1/2000 , p.10.
11 Solarz J., Bałkany, op. cit. p. 63
12 Solarz J., Bałkany, op. cit., s. 63-64. States that the encounter took place on April 14.
13 http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Gree-c12-6.html
14 Rawski T., op. cit., p. 309-310.
15 Halder F. op cit., v. II, p. 439.
16 Solarz J., Bałkany, op. cit., p. 66.
17 Rawski T, op. cit., p. 311 - 312.
18 Rawski T, op. cit., p. 313.
19 Rawski T, op. cit., p. 314.
20 Rawski T, op. cit, p. 317.
21 Rawski T., op. cit., p. 319.
22 Hermann C. H., op. cit., p. 172.
23 Rawski T., op. cit., p. 322-323.
24 Rawski T., op. cit, p. 378-379.
25 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche …. Band I, op. cit. p. 157.
26 Township near Bitola.
27 Halder F., op. cit., v. II, p. 461.
28 Halder F., op. cit., v. II, p. 463.
29 Halder F., op. cit., v. II, p. 540.
30 Ledwoch J., Sawicki R, Sd Kfz 10/4, Warszawa 2003, p. 25.
31 Jentz T. L, Doyle H. L, Panzer Tracts No. 11-1, Panzerbeobachtungswagen, Boyds 2003, p. 10.
32 Majewski A., Barwy i znaki Panzerwaffe Panzerregiment, Gdynia 2001, p. 36.
Operation “Barbarossa” As the operation commenced, the 9 Panzer Division alongside the 16 Panzer Division was included in the XIV Motorised Army Corps (XIV AK (mot)) of the 1 Armoured Group (Panzergruppe 1 - Pz.Gr. 1), which in turn was a part of the Army Group “South” (Heeresgruppe - HG “Süd”). As of June 22 1941, the following tanks comprised the 9 Division’s assault force: th
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eight Pz.Kpfw. I, 32 Pz.Kpfw. II, 11 Pz.Kpfw. III with 37 mm cannon, 60 Pz.Kpfw. III armed with 50 mm gun, 20 Pz.Kpfw. IV and 12 Pz.Bef. 2
On June 28, the Division departed from Tomaszow and marched through Sokal, trailing the German front moving eastwards. On the next day, the Germans deployed the XIV Motorised Army Corps against the Soviet 17 Army. The 9 Panzer Division was the first to see action, as it was ordered to advance towards Kamionka Strumilowa north of Lviv. The appearance of the German Corps in the rear of the Soviet 15 Mechanized Corps resulted in a Soviet retreat towards the positions held by the reserve units of the Soviet Southwest Front. The withdrawal was covered from the north by the 212 Mechanized Division, the outermost unit of the 15 Mechanized Corps’ east flank. The 15 Corps was already out-flanked by German infantry divisions from the north, while the south was threatened by the 9 Panzer Division, so outright retreat was the only manoeuvre that would prevent the Soviets from being surrounded. As it turned out, the Soviet 8 Tank Division saved the day by engaging the 9 Panzer Division. th
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On July 1, the 9 Division took Zolochiv and moved towards Ternopil. The 9 Reconnaissance Battalion was able to make a surprise break into Ternopil on July 2, but then proceeded further east, so the city as a whole was secured by German forces as late as July 8. th
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Halfway between Zolochiv and Ternopil, enemy tanks were observed on July 4. The 9 Division immediately turned towards the adversary, so the SS-Division “Viking” (SSDivision “Wiking”) gained an unobstructed path towards Ternopil.
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Arrival of a motorcycle liaison. The crosscountry personnel car Einheist-Pkw Kfz. 15 (Horch 901) with the general’s pennant most likely belongs to General von Hubicki, commander of the 9. Pz.Div. The Divisional mascot, a Doberman is also noticeable.
A cross-country Wanderer W 23 S at the onset of the Operation “Barbarossa”. The vehicle is missing its spare road wheels.
A group of soldiers next to a Wanderer W 23 S car.
An Austrian made, crosscountry Steyr Typ 250 from 9th Panzer Division vehicle park. A gasoline canister rack mounted to the front fender is of some interest.
From the beginning of the “Barbarossa” Operation until July 6, the losses sustained by the 9 Division amounted to 175 dead, 232 wounded, 36 missing and eight sick, a total of 451 troopers. th
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On July 7, the Division forced its way through to the river Buh. Generalstabschef Franz Halder wrote in his “Kriegstagebuch” (Combat Stage Journal): “(….) 9 Pz. Div. is now involved in large scale armour clash near Proskurov.” The 197 Assault Artillery Detachment (Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 197 - StuG.Abt. 197) operating in the vicinity of Lahodyntsi near Starokostyantyniv on July 8, received a warning of: “a large tank force attack, which turned out to be the 9 Panzer Division. Unfortunately one tank was destroyed by “friendly fire” from German anti-tank guns”, Leutnant Werner Preusser from the I Company of the 197 Assault Artillery Battalion (I./StuG.Abt. 197) recorded in his journal. A photograph presented in this book portrays a victim of this mistake, a Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. G tank. A hole made by the shell that pierced through the 30 millimetre thick frontal plate may be seen in the photograph. th
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In the days to follow, the Division moved eastward towards Zhitomir. Generaloberst Halder noted on July 11: “Around noon Generalfeldmarschall Keitel calls, voicing Fuhrer’s concerns (…) slow advance of the 9 Pz. Div. and the SS-Division “Wiking”.” Generalmajor Felix Steiner, the commandant of the SS-Division “Wiking” explains this in his recollections: “The movement is retarded because of constant scuffles with the retreating enemy rearguard, in which the 9 Pz. Div.is wasting precious time.” th
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Up until 11 July the 9 Panzer Division combat losses amounted to: two Pz.Kpfw. I, two Pz.Kpfw. II, ten Pz.Kpfw. III, three Pz.Kpfw. IV and three Pz.Bf.Wg., in all 20 tanks. th
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On July 14, Generaloberst Halder wrote: “Besides, the SS-Division “Wiking” is moving behind the 9 Pz. Div. which carries the burden of the onslaught from Zhitomir towards Belaya Tserkov.” By the evening of the same day, the 9 Division attacking from Zhitomir was able to capture the town of Skvyra. th
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A Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. J tank in a cloud of Ukrainian road dust. Spare track links mounted in the front provided additional protection. Unusual mounting of a spare road wheel is noteworthy.
A burned out Soviet BT-5 light tank equipped with two searchlights, right above its 45 mm cannon. These lights were intended to illuminate, as well as blind the enemy during night-time encounters. The rubber rims of the road wheels have been destroyed by fire. An interesting feature of this tank is a horizontal stripe painted on the turret, its white colour indicated a 2nd battalion vehicle. This marking system was introduced in 1932 according to the Mechanized and Motorized Red Army Unit standards. Some Soviet vehicles still had such markings in 1941, even though by the end of the 1930s the scheme was discontinued.
Another BT-5 destroyed while negotiating a ditch. A direct hit penetrated the turret. The engine cover was probably blown out by an internal explosion.
An abandoned Soviet 76,2 mm field gun M1936 F-22. The angle of barrel elevation is noteworthy. Captured guns of this type were modified by the Germans and used a anti-tank cannons Pak 36 (r).
Soviet 122 mm M-30 field howitzer abandoned by the Red Army.
Group of soldiers next to a cross country Wanderer W 23 S with Divisional symbol painted on the side.
An entry made in the “Kriegstagebuch” on July 15 states: “ The 6 Army (AOK 6) and the 1 Armoured Group rearranged their forces west of Berdychiv. From Berdychiv and Zhitomir the troops proceeded towards Belaya Tserkov and came a few kilometres away from their target – 9 Pz.Div. was followed by the two thirds of SS-Division “Wiking”.” On the same day, the city was taken. The day of July 15 brought an order from the commander of the XIV Motorised Corps General von Infanterie von Wietersheim moving the SS-Division “Wiking” to the front of the troops advancing east through Belaya Tserkov and Tarashcha towards Luka. The “Wiking” Division along with halted 9 Panzer Division was to change direction towards the southeast, in order to join the battle at Uman. At that time, the German high command noticed an opportunity to encircle and sack a number of Russian divisions, remainders of the 6 , 12 and 18 Armies fighting near Uman. Generaloberst Halder noted on July 17: “ The 11 and 16 Pz. Div.from the 1 Panzer Group aligned their units with the 9 Division, so the surrounding operation may commence.” . th
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By July 20, the German forces managed to cut off 25 Russian divisions, forcing them towards a front formed by infantry units from German 6 , 17 and 11 Armies (AOK 6., 17., 11.). The destruction of the Uman pocket begun. On July 22, the Russians initiated a th
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break-out attempt southeast of Belaya Tserkov near Tarashcha, in the area guarded by two combat groups from SS-Division “Wiking”. As the German positions came under heavy attack from Soviet infantry supported by artillery fire, the SS troops suffered heavy losses. “The difficult situation was resolved by arrival of the 9 Division’s 33 Panzer Regiment. The tanks proved invaluable in the fighting conducted over the course of the next two days. Their cannons and machine guns allowed repelling numerous attacks conducted by Russian infantry supported by armour.” A Knight’s Cross was awarded to Oberstleutnant Willibald Borowietz from the 10 Rifles Regiment on July 24. By July 26, the XIV Motorised Corps with its 9 Panzer Division and SS-Division “Wiking” reached the Ryzyne - Vynohrad - Bosivka perimeter. On July 28, Generaloberst Halder wrote: “Major Mueller-Hillebrand reports of his inspection at the 9 Pz.Div. - Combat conditions. - Operations. - Road conditions. - Traffic logistics / regulation” On August 6, the Division, still involved in rounding up Russian units sacked at Uman, took the township of Arbuzynka. A Knight’s Iron Cross was received by Oberfeldwebel Alfred Tykiel from the 6 Company of the 10 Rifles Regiment. Between August 4 and 6, the German 6 and 12 Army command announced that the Russians had lost 300 tanks and 130,000 soldiers, taken prisoner in the Uman area. The remainder were able to escape east. This victory opened the way toward Krivoy Rog, and consequently to the Black Sea ports of Nikolayev and Odessa. The 9 Panzer Division advanced in the direction of Kriovohrad on August 8, captured the town on the following day, and moved on to take Pervomaisk on August 11. The entry in Generalstabschef Halder’s journal, dated that day states: “Keitel from Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW) complains to the commander in chief of the land forces, that we did not advance towards Nikolayev, while Hitler considered this of uttermost importance. As to the situation and intentions on the outermost south flank, General von Sodenstern gave Generalmajor Heusinger the following explanation (…) the 25 Motorised Infantry Division (25. Inf.Div. (mot)), as well as the 9 and 14 Panzer Divisions need to march on Krivoy Rog.” th
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A Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. G tanks from 9th Panzer Division. Spare track links provide additional protection to the front of the hull. A horseshoe good luck charm is mounted on top of them.
9th Panzer Division troopers inspecting the battlefield in an Ukrainian village. Destroyed Soviet KV-1 tank number “304” with additional turret armour (appliqué armour) and a T-34 are visible.
Captured SchTZ-15/30 agricultural wheeled tractor. These vehicles were often used by Wehrmacht artillery units despite their low speed.
Deserted Soviet field howitzer 122 mm M-30 and its ammunition caisson.
Soviet equipment photographed after the liquidation of Uman pocket. In front of a ZiS-5 truck, three heavy machine guns Maxim M1910, a Mosin rifle with its bayonet stuck into the ground and RGD-33 hand grenades are among other weapons and military gear.
An abandoned Russian Maxim M1910 machine gun. The wire wrapped around the shield was used for securing small branches in order to conceal the weapon.
Group of Soviet prisoners taken in the Uman pocket.
In the middle of August, a war correspondent named Otto accompanied the 9 Division for some time. The photographs he took during a visit show a command tank Pz.Bf.Wg. numbered “R01”, assigned to the commander of the 33 Panzer Regiment, and another Pz.Bf.Wg. with wicker chairs set up on the engine cover panels. An aerial antenna frame mounted above and around the engine compartment prevented the chairs from sliding away during motion. The images imply that the officers of the 9 Division valued comfort while resting from their planning and command duties. th
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On August 16, the Division captured Krivoy Rog. Between August 17 and 25 it advanced along the Dnieper River en route to Nikopol, Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk, clearing the west bank of Red Army units. During August 16 to 18, the Division attacked in the region of Nikopol, taking Zaporozhye on the 18 day of the month. Next day, Generaloberst Halder wrote: “in the Dnieper bend strong air attacks against front line 9 Pz.Div. units, one kilometre west from Zaporozhye dam”. By August 21, the Division reached the Dnieper south of Zaporozhye at Nikopol. On August 25 the 9 Pz.Div. captured Dnepropetrovsk or, as may be presumed from archival photographs, just the southern part of the city. Afterwards, it participated in securing the Dnieper bend, then turned back southwest returning to Krivoy Rog on August 31. It stayed at that location for a few days to rest the troops and replenish ammunition, fuel and equipment. Subsequently, most likely on September 4, the units of the Division were directed to the concentration point of the 1 Armoured Group near Oleksandrya. The Ritterkreuz was received by Hauptmann Heinz Unger chief of the 1 Company from the 10 Rifles Regiment. As a result of fighting conducted between the start of Operation “Barbarossa” and September 5, the 9 Panzer Division lost six Pz.Kpfw. I, two Pz.Kpfw. II, 14 Pz.Kpfw. III, three Pz.Kpfw. IV tanks and three Pz.Bf.Wg. command tanks. 23
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In a meanwhile, between the months of August and September German forces managed
to establish bridgeheads on the Dnieper River at Kremenchug and Dereivka. The region of Kremenchug was defended by the 300 Rifle Division, three cavalry divisions from the 5 Cavalry Corps - equivalent in strength to one and a half rifle division - and the 47 Tank Division with 34 tanks. Against them, the Germans mustered parts of four infantry divisions, the 125 Infantry Division (125 Inf. Div.), the 101 , 100 , and 97 Jäger (German elite infantry troops) Divisions. On September 2, they were joined by 76 Infantry Division. By that time, as mentioned earlier, the concentration of the 1 Armoured Group including the 13 , 14 , 16 and 9 Panzer Divisions along with the 16 and 25 Motorised Infantry Divisions was well under way, some 40 kilometres southwest form Kremenchug. The German high command’s intention was to move their units across the Dnieper River, advance by the way of Khorol towards Lubny and secure bridges in this town. The next objective was to reach the region between Lubny and Lokhvitsa and link with the 2 Armoured Group (Pz.Gr. 2) advancing from the north. In this way, another pocket would be created trapping within it four Soviet armies. th
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September 9 was the starting point of the preparations. The commanding officer of the pioneer units from the XI Army Corps (XI AK) received a directive to construct a bridge of 16 ton capacity near Kremenchug. To achieve that efficiently, the command of the XVII Army Corps (XVII AK) decided that the old bridge near Voroskova could be dismantled. Thus, on September 10, the XI Army Corps ordered Oberstleutnant Hans von Ahlfen, leader of the 617 Pioneer Regiment (Pi.Rgt. 617) to begin work on the old bridge, starting at 15:30 hours. The pioneers were to take the bridge apart, reinforce its segments to carry a 16 ton load and transport them to Kremenchug. The work was performed in the pouring rain by, among others, the 73 and 74 Pioneer Battalion (Pi. Btl. 73 and 74) and the 107 Group of the National Labour Service (Reichs Arbeits Dienst - Gruppe RAD 107) and was completed on September 11 at 12:00 hours. At this point, the German forces had a new bridge spanning some 200 meters, with 16 ton capacity allowing for passage of all types of equipment. In addition, a provisional ferry crossing was put in place. During the preparations, the area was attacked by Russian aircraft, but without any success. In the meantime, the divisions of the 1 Armoured Group were successively transferred towards the new crossing. th
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A wreck of a Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. J. The tank received a direct hit in the front of the hull, between the driver and gunner / radio-operator stations. An armour piercing shell shattered the middle section of the plate.
Industrial factory in Krivi Rog destroyed during combat operations.
The “Dneproges” river dam in Zaporozhe district. The 60 meter high and 760 meter long dam was built between 1927 and 1932.
Retreating Soviet units tried to evacuate whatever was possible. An unusual assembly of a 76.2 mm field gun M1902/30 hooked up to a 122 mm field howitzer M1910/30 towed by a STZ-3 tractor, encountered by troops of the 9th Panzer Division.
Soviet 152 mm Schneider M1910 howitzer and limber towed by STZ-5 tractor deserted somewhere in the steppe. The howitzers of this type were obtained from France during the First World War.
A self propelled anti-aircraft cannon Sd.Kfz. 10/4 with a 20 mm Flak 38 gun from the 3rd Company of the 47th Flak Battalion assigned to the 9th Panzer Division.
A rest interval under combat conditions. On the right, a sniper’s ditch with a riflle. In the background there is camouflaged mittlerer Einheist-Pkw Kfz. 15 ( Horch 901).
Soldiers of the Schützen-Regiment 10 are scrutinizing an abandoned command version of a T-37 A amphibious tank. The tank was equipped with radio communication equipment including an frame aerial mounted in a handrail manner around the hull. Only the supports are what remains of the antenna assembly. At the front of each fender there are two angular deflectors meant to protect the antenna frame.
The 9th Panzer Division crossing Dnieper River over a pontoon bridge set up next to the destroyed permanent structure at Kremen-chug.
As of September 10, the 9 Panzer Division had 13 Pz.Kpfw. I, 30 Pz.Kpfw. II, 59 Pz.Kpfw III, 18 Pz.Kpfw IV and nine Pz.Bef.Wg., in all 129 tanks. The same night, under the cover of constant rain, the XXXXVII Motorised Corps (XXXXVII AK (mot)) moved its 9 , 13 , and 16 Panzer Divisions along with the 16 and 25 Motorised Infantry Divisions across the Dnieper. The 9 and the 16 Panzer Divisions, now concentrated at the bridgehead, were to press north in order to block the main road between Lubny - Poltava Kharkov, as it was predicted that the sacked Soviet forces would attempt a breakthrough along this line. th
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The German offensive began on September 12. On that day, the 9 Panzer Division, through a surprise attack, captured a bridge over the river Psel securing a bridgehead on the opposing bank. On the following days, the Division continued its assault towards the towns of Khorol and Lubny. On September 15, the 9 Division took Mirgorod. The very same day, Generaloberst Halder noted: “The forces of the 1 and 2 Armoured Groups met, sealing the sack, however the situation at the Sencha bridge, south of Lokhvitsa, is still unclear.” th
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This episode was described by Paul Carell in his book “Operation Barbarossa ”: “The very next day the 9th Panzer Division with units of 33rd Panzer Regiment, having moved north on the road east of the Sula river after the capture of Mirgorod, linked up with the most forward parts of 3 Panzer Division by the bridge of Sencha. Now the ring was properly closed and the trap shut behind fifty enemy divisions. ” rd
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The crossing photographed from the other side. Above, a Junkers Ju 52 transport plane. The planes were frequently employed to drop fuel, ammunition and food rations in order to rapidly supply the spearheading armoured columns with necessary provisions.
Some other destroyed Red Army vehicles. In the forefront a GAZ-AA cargo truck and a T-26 model 1939 light tank. To the left an artillery tractor STZ-5.
In the evening of September 15, Generaloberst Halder wrote: “The loop locking the enemy east of Kiev is now closed. From the outside of it, there is only a negligible counteraction. Now the pocket can be constricted towards the west.” 30
The initial contact between both German panzer groups was reinforced in the following days. Units of the 2 Armoured Group (Pz.Gr. 2), namely 3 , 4 Panzer Division and the SS-Division “Das Reich” were turning east. The 1 Armoured Group units, including the 9 and 16 Panzer Divisions, the 25 Motorised Infantry Division and the 3 Infantry Division (3. Inf.Div) from the XVII Army Corps, were redirected in the same manner. nd
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Until September 16, the 9 Panzer Division continued in its efforts to capture th
bridgeheads over the Sula River. The same day, Oberst graf Theo von Sponeck, the commanding officer of the 11 Rifle Regiment, was distinguished as a recipient of the Knight’s Cross. th
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On September 17, the Division begun an assault on Piryatin, followed by the clashes with Soviet units attempting to break out from the area of the Sula River and its eastern tributary the Uday. By September 18, the Germans managed to completely close the pocket trapping five Soviet armies, the 5 , 21 , 26 , 37 and 38 Armies of the Southwestern Front. In response, the Russian command ordered its forces to break out, but their attempts failed for the most part. It was only south of Piryatin, in the section secured by the German 25 Motorised Infantry Division, that solitary units of the 38 Army were able to accomplish the task. Some small groups were also able to penetrate through the German lines along other sections of the front, but most of the Southwestern Front forces remained sacked and were systematically eradicated. The Wehrmacht command had announced that 290,000 Soviet troops were taken prisoner by September 22. The same day, two more officers of the 9 Panzer Division became recipients of the Ritterkreuz, Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Künzel from the 3 Company of the 10 Rifle Regiment and Oberleutnant Kurt Speidel from the 2 Company of the 86 Pioneer Battalion. th
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The 9th Panzer Division also sustained combat losses. A damaged Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. E, hauled back to the repair facilities by a semi tracked Sd.Kfz. 8 prime mover.
A wreck of a STZ-5 with 122 mm field howitzer M-30 in tow.
On September 24, an attempt to penetrate the enemy lines, undertaken by the Soviet 5 Cavalry Division, was stopped by units of the 9 Panzer Division near Lokhvitsa. On the same day, the Division took the town of Romny. Most of the Soviet troops remaining in the pocket eventually surrendered by September 26, while some small groups continued with the fight, pressing east in anticipation of a breakthrough. th
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The outcome of the operation was a German success, the high command proclaimed that between August 21 and September 28 some 665,000 Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner. However, the above number also included other sectors of the front. According to Russian estimates, the losses sustained on the Southwestern Front from August 7 to September 26 of 1941 amounted to 585,598 soldiers. Beginning September 25, the Russian forces conducted strong counterattacks in the region of Novhorod-Siversky, Yampol and Glukhov in hope of allowing the escape of the remaining Southwestern Front troops. The 9 Panzer Division was deployed in the region east of Romny from September 26. The plans devised for the offensive towards Moscow, code named “Taifun” (“Typhoon”), changed the assignment of the 9 Panzer Division. It became a part of the XXXXVIII Armoured Corps (XXXXVIII PzK) in the 2 Panzer Army (Pz AOK 2) of the Army Group “Centre” (HG “Mitte”). th
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On September 27, the Division was visited by the Generaloberst Guderian, who wrote in his memoires: “(….) I visited the XXXXVIII Armoured Corps to verify its condition.
After a brief conversation with staff officers at Romny, I proceeded to the township of Krasna (10 kilometres east of Nedryhailiv), where the 9 Panzer Division under Generalleutnant von Hubicki was stationed (…) .” th
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The XXXXVIII Armoured Corps advanced on September 30 from the region of Hadyach and Shtepivka through Nedryhailiv towards Putivl. The 9 Division was among the units heading the attack. As recalled by Generaloberst Guderian: “General Kempf informs me that during the fight around Shtepivka the Russians unexpectedly attacked two battalions of the 119 Infantry Regiment (Inf.Rgt. 119) and captured their vehicles. The attack was conducted by heavy tanks. It was an unpleasant loss. Some units from the 9 Division had to turn back to resolve the situation.” th
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Hauptmann Heinz Unger, chief of staff of the 1 Company of the Schützen-Regiment 10 decorated with the Rit-terkreuz. st
Autumn rains changed the Russian roads into impassable quagmires. Somewhere in the steppes, a motorcyclist from the Kradschützen-Batail-lon 59 negotiates a road that has disappeared into mud.
A group of soldiers soldiers just managed to push a truck out of the mud.
The vehicles could not handle the sloughy conditions without assistance of human muscles. Soldiers pushing a captured French made Renault truck.
On October 1, Generaloberst Halder wrote: “The 2 Armoured Group is experiencing difficulties in aborting the defence of its flank (…). The 9 Panzer Division also had to engage the enemy one more time, thus its transfer north was delayed.” nd
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In October, the 9 Division had four Pz.Kpfw. I, 14 Pz.Kpfw. II, 31 Pz.Kpfw. III, six Pz.Kpfw. IV and seven Pz.Bf.Wg. tanks at its disposal. th
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On October 5, the Division advanced north of Rylsk. According to the Soviet account, at 1 o’clock at night, a Soviet tank regiment from 150 Tank Brigade broke through the lines and reached the headquarters of the 9 Panzer Division. A T-34 tank commanded by Lieutenant Korinienko supposedly destroyed 15 staff vehicles. In the later hours of the day, the Division took the town of Krupets. 40
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The night of 6 and 7 of October brought a first snowfall. The snow melted quickly but it turned the roads into impassable quagmires. Generaloberst Guderian wrote “The XXXXVIII Armoured Corps on its way to Dmitriyev marched on foot through the mud.” On October 7, the 9 Division captured Dmitrovsk while continuing the advance towards Orel. 41
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In the first half of October, the 9 Panzer Division was involved in the encircling operation against the Soviet 13 Army between Sevsk and Dmitrovsk. On October 9 the Russians attempted a breakout from the pocked, thus the XXXXVIII Armoured Corps already dispatched by the Army Group “Centre” towards Kursk and Livny at the time, was ordered to return with all its forces to the Sevsk region. th
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The snow kept on falling through October 12. The XXXXVIII Corps could barely move on its way to Fatezh due to muddy roads. Two day later, the Corps, aided by the 18 Panzer Division’s units, readied its troops for the assault on Fatezh. After that objective was achieved, the Corps was to attack Kursk from the northwest. On October 25, the units of the 9 Panzer Division captured Fatezh. On the same day the Division, along with most of the XXXXVIII Armoured Corps troops, was assigned to the 2 Army (AOK 2). th
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9th Panzer Division quartermaster vehicles passing by a destroyed Soviet column. An artillery tractor ChTZ-S65 “ Stalinec ” with damaged driver’s cabin is visible.
The assault towards Kursk commenced on October 26, as a result, the city itself was taken on November 3. After a few days of rest and troop rearrangement, beginning on November 8, the 9 Panzer Division begun an attack on Tim, Yelec and Efremov. th
On November 16, probably somewhere near Tim, one of the Pz.Kpfw. II light tanks led by Fahnenjunker Ludwig Bauer received a direct 152 millimetre hit from a Russian KV-2 heavy tank. The driver and the radio operator were killed. The commander survived, although he was wounded. November 20 1941 marked the 152 day of the Russian Campaign, at which time Generaloberst Halder wrote: “The 2 Army is successfully moving ahead The 9 Pz. Div. took Tim. Enemy defences are weak in some places, nonexistent in others.” nd
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From November 22, the Division established a defensive perimeter east of Shchigry town. A Soviet counterattack had to be repelled on November 23. Oberleutnant Georg Grüner, chief of the 1 Company of the 33 Panzer Regiment received the Ritterkreuz. The same medal was awarded to Hauptmann Franz Kohout, commander of the II Battalion of the 33 Panzer Regiment on December 4. The defence perimeter taken by the 9 Division at that time was facing the Soviet 2 Guards Rifle Division from the 40 Army. On December 5 the Soviet counter offensive at Moscow begun, and although the main thrust of the Soviet forces was directed towards the Moscow region, the supporting assaults of Red Army (RKKA) units were conducted in the area guarded by the 9 Panzer Division. st
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Divisional vehicles, amongst them a horse drawn “Panje-wagen”, passing by obliterated Soviet artillery column in autumn of 1941. In the centre, Soviet 152 mm howitzer M1939 type M-10. On the right, a partial view of German Steyr Typ 250.
The “Panje-wagen”, often just ordinary four wheel farm carts, were under certain weather conditions the only reliable form of transport. Even tracked vehicles were often helpless during the mud season.
Wounded soldiers from Schützen-Regiment 10 ready for evacuation in autumn of 1941.
Divisional vehicles in a village near Kursk during the winter of 1941. A cross country Mercedes - Benz Typ 170 VK may be seen.
On December 12, according to Generaloberst Halder’s commentary: “ The 2 Army was integrated into the 2 Panzer Army. The situation of the 2 Army is very tense. The 9 Pz. Div. will be facing an initial Soviet assault and its subsequent reinforcements.” nd
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The order issued on the same day reclassified the 102 Artillery Regiment as the 102 Panzer Artillery Regiment (Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 102 - Pz.Art.Rgt. 102). A day later, on December 13, Generalstabschef Halder wrote in his “Kriegstagebuch”: “ The attack against the 9 Pz. Div. along the railroad line so far repelled.” nd
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During the following two days, the 9 Division managed to fend off subsequent attacks. Nevertheless, the situation was serious. A continuous front line did not exist, thus the German defence clustered in villages and townships, while the Soviet units were able to permeate between, often enclosing the defenders in isolated pockets. In “Summary of events of December 12 1941” prepared by Generaloberst Guderian, it may be read: “For example, in the event of penetration of the 9 Pz. Div.’s defences, or infiltration through a serrated resistance perimeter of the 95 Infantry Division (95 Inf.Div.), the present contour of the front, which may not be even considered a continuous line, will be impossible to hold; furthermore, even considering the extreme valour of those units the encirclement will be unavoidable.” It seems that Generaloberst Guderian was suggesting to ignore Hitler’s direct order “not a step back”. th
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A group of soldiers, apparently freezing, by a field kitchen. The outer wardrobe, consisting of greatcoats and woven toques, derivative of balaclava headgear, were the only protection from bitter temperatures.
On January 1 1942, the 95 Infantry Division came under attack by Soviet ski troops. The attack was driven back by the 9 Division with the aid of tanks. Noteworthy is some of the tanks were used as a “stationary gun emplacements” due to lack of fuel. Following that period, the 9 Division cooperated with the 3 Panzer Division. Between December and January, the 9 Division was most likely divided into independent combat groups, due to the nature of operations, comprising of the defence of isolated strongholds established in inhabited areas. One of the groups was named “Kampfgruppe Schmalz” after the commanding officer of the 11 Rifle Regiment, Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Schmalz. th
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During the same month, the 701 Company of self-propelled heavy infantry guns received two s.I.G. 33 vehicles with steel wheels as reinforcements, as well as five Pz.Kpfw. I Ausf. B transporters as replacements. This weapon system proved itself to be quite versatile, as the Pz.Kpfw. I undercarriage failed or wore out, the s.I.G. 33 gun was dismantled and towed by the Sd.Kfz. 10 - 1t Zgkw. tractor until a new transporter chassis was obtained. st
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A MG-34 machine gun emplacement in the Kursk region village. Until more suitable attire could be supplied, the German soldiers utilized Soviet “ushanka” hats obtained as war booty in the occupied territories.
During the Russian winters, horse drawn sleds became an essential means of transport.
In the course of winter fighting, which began in December 1941, the 9 Division managed to hold its defence line. By March, the spring thaw hindered Soviet attacks. The ground turned into impassable flowing mud, walking through it was so difficult that in many German occupied townships wooden planks were laid down to ensure relatively unobstructed pedestrian passage. In March and April, the divisional headquarters was stationed in the village of Okhokchevka. th
The orders issued on March 14 dissolved the 9 Reconnaissance Battalion, and its remnants were assigned to the 59 Battalion of Motorcycle Rifles. The 1 Company of reconnaissance armoured cars became the 1 Company of the 59 Battalion of Motorcycle Rifles (1./Kradsch. Btl. 59). One of the other orders received on that day nominated Oberleutnant Hans-Henning Eichert from the 6 Company of the 11 Rifle Regiment as a recipient of the Knight’s Cross rank of the Iron Cross. th
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On April 15, Generalleutnant von Hubicki was recalled from his post of 9 Division commander and transferred to the Wehrmacht’s cadre reserve. His farewell celebration was held at the divisional headquarters. The anti-aircraft artillery of the 9 Division fired an honorary salvo. The salute alarmed the XXXXVIII Armoured Corps headquarters to such an extent that urgent telephone calls, inquiring about an ongoing Soviet attack, were made. Generalmajor Johannes Baessler took over command. During April and May 1942, the 9 Division, still stationed near the front, went through a refurbishment stage. The equipment lost or deteriorated during the earlier operations was also replaced. th
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The month of May brought spring to the Don River region. The intermission in combat activities, caused by thawing snow and the inevitable subsequent muddy road conditions, allowed for some rest of the troops. The recreational activities included concerts performed at the divisional encampments. Noteworthy, even jazz music, officially banned by the Nazi bureaucrats, was publically performed. Coincidentally, it turned out that Oberleutnant Schmalz and Oberstleutnant Gutmann, both from the 11 Rifle Regiment, were very talented percussion players. One of them excelled in playing bass drum, the other one a snare drum. th
An order received on May 4 brought further adjustments to the 9 Division structure, the 321 Observation Battery - Armoured was renumbered as 102 Armoured Observation Battery (Panzer-Beobachtungs-Batterie 102 - Pz.Beob.Bttr. 102). th
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As the troops enjoyed their recreation, a bowling tournament was conducted on May 11 at the 1 echelon (I Staffel) of the “Kampfgruppe Schmalz” stationed at the township of Schtschigortschik. Meanwhile, the defensive positions taken up by the 9 Panzer Division in December of 1941 were held until June 28 1942, until operation “Blau” commenced. st
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An artillery lieutenant in front of troop quarters. An Allge-meinesturmabzeichen (General Assault Badge) distinguishes the officer.
1 Tessin, op. cit., p. 290.
2 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche…Band I, op. cit., p. 191.
3 Domański J., Barbarossa 1941 vol. II, Bitwa pancerna na Zachodniej Ukrainie, Warszawa 2006 , p. 65.
4 Isaiev A., Dubno 1941, Moskva 2009, p. 172.
5 Proskurov became the town of Khmelnytskyij in modern times.
6 Halder F., Dziennik wojenny, v. III, p. 82.
7 Münch K, StuG Abt. 197, Katowice - Speyer 2007, p. 84.
8 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 98.
9 Steiner F, Ochotnicy Waffen SS Idea i poświęcenie, Gdańsk 2010, p.65.
10 Isaiev A., op. cit. p. 171.
11 Halder F, op. cit., v. III, p. 111.
12 Bieszanow W, Pogrom pancerny 1941, Warszawa 2009, p. 263.
13 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 115.
14 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 126.
15 Solarz J., Wiking 1941-1945, Militaria 186, Warszawa 2003, p. 22.
16 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 172
17 Bernage G, de Lannoy F., Operation Barbarossa, Bayeaux 1996. p. 241.
18 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 172.
19 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 172.
20 Bernage G, de Lannoy F., op. cit., p. 241.
21 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 222.
22 Bernage G, de Lannoy F., op. cit., p. 270.
23 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 241.
24 Hermann C. H., op. cit., p. 172.
25 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche…. Band I, op. cit. p. 206.
26 Bitva za Maskvu, Frontovaya Ilustracya nr 1, Moskva 2002, p. 4.
27 Lucas J., Ostheer Niemiecka Armia Wschodnia 1941-1945, Kraków 2008, p. 244.
28 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p.293.
29 Carell P., Operacja “Barbarossa”, p. 123.
30 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p.294.
31 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 172.
32 Hermann C. H., op. cit., p. 172.
33 The authors of the website: http://www.feldgrau.com/xxxxviii.html, state that the XXXXVIII AK (mot) was on Jun.22.1941 re-designated as the XXXXVIII PzK, but both designations were used interchangeably until 1942. Tessin states that the (mot.) XXXXVIII AK was re-designated according to the order issued on Jun.21.942 as the XXXXVIII PzK (Tessin G, Verbände und Truppen…. V Band, Frankfurt/Main 1971, p. 148). For the purpose of this publication, XXXXVIII PzK will be used
34 Guderian H, Wspomnienia żołnierza, Warszawa 1991, p. 182.
35 General de Panzertruppen Werner Kempf was the commander of the XXXXVIII PzK
36 Unit of the 25. Inf.Div.
37 Ibidem.
38 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 327.
39 Safronov A., Kurnosov W, Srasheniye za Tulu, Moskva 2008, p 6.
40 Bitva za Moskvu, op. cit., p. 29
41 Guderian H., op. cit., p. 187.
42 Halder F., op. cit., p. 371.
43 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 172.
44 Hermann C. H, op. cit, p. 172.
45 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 418.
46 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 419.
47 Piekałkiewicz J., Bitwa o Moskwę, Zamarznięta ofensywa, Janki k. Warszawy 2004, p. 249.
48 Kurowski F., Infantry …, p. 281.
49 Rosado J., Bishop Ch., Dywizje pancerne Wehrmachtu 1939-1945, Warszawa 2008, p. 91.
50 Jentz T. L, Doyle H. L, Panzer Tracts No. 10, Artillerie Selbstfahrlafette, Boyds 2002, p. 2.
51 Hermann C. H., op. cit., p. 172.
Operation “Blau” As the Germans regained control of the situation at the front after the winter of 1941/1942, Hitler planned a new offensive in the east. The objective was Stalingrad and the oil fields in the Caucasus region. According to the “Generalstab des Heeres / Organisation Abteilung” (Army General Staff / Organization Department) directive, issued on February 18 in preparation for the summer offensive, all two battalion tank regiments were strengthened by addition of a third tank battalion. From that moment, each of the three battalions was to consist of two light and one medium tank company. The specific order concerning the 9 Division came on May 10, the I battalion from the 3 Panzer Regiment (I./Pz.Rgt. 3) of the 2 Panzer Division was transferred, and became the third battalion of the 33 Panzer Regiment (III./Pz.Rgt. 33). 1
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On June 2 the 9 Division’s 102 Armoured Artillery Regiment was reinforced by an addition of the IV Detachment, which previously was the 287 Land Forces Anti-aircraft Detachment (Heeres-Flakartillerie-Abt. 287 - H.Flakart.Abt. 287). This new sub-unit had four batteries numbered 9 - 12. th
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On June 22, during the final stages of preparation for the summer offensive, the 9 Panzer Division was equipped with the following tanks: 22 Pz.Kpfw. II, 38 Pz.Kpfw. III armed with a short barrel 50 mm gun (Ausf. E-J), 61 Pz.Kpfw. III armed with a long barrel 50 mm gun (Ausf. J-L), nine Pz.Kpfw. IV armed with a short barrel 75 mm gun (Ausf. BF1), 12 Pz.Kpfw. IV armed with a long barrel 75 mm gun (Ausf. F2-G). In all it had 142 tanks, supplemented by two command tanks Pz.Bef.Wg. th
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Troops of the Hungarian 2nd Army during a march to their initial positions before operation “ Blau ”.
For the duration of the Operation “Blau” the Division was part of the XXIV Armoured Corps (XXIV PzK) incorporated into the 4 Panzer Army (PzAOK 4) assigned to the Army Group “South”. th
The German offensive begun on June 28, 1942. At 10 o’clock in the morning, the Wehrmacht units moved forward. The main thrust was undertaken by the units of the 4 Panzer Army under General Herman Hoth. The assault was directed towards the river Don, south of the Kursk-Voronezh railway line. The attack, conducted along a 45 kilometre stretch, was aimed at the junction of the Soviet 13 and 40 Army defensive boundaries. The first wave of the German assault consisted of the three Panzer Divisions 9 , 11 and 24 , three infantry divisions and a motorised division. Armoured grenadiers crossed the river Tim in pontoon boats and secured an area large enough to establish a bridgehead. It took only one hour for the 86 Armoured Pioneer Battalion to put together a provisional bridge allowing for the passage of tanks. During the crossing, a Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. N tank carrying Fahnenjunker Ludwig Bauer, mentioned before, was hit by an antitank shell. The commander’s position was destroyed, causing the death of Leutnant Sirse.
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By the end of the day, the Bryansk Front ramparts were penetrated. German tanks advanced 8 to 12 kilometres behind Soviet defensive lines towards Kastornoye, breaking the communications links and disrupting the command structures of the Red Army. The German advance continued for a few days. An entry made in the “Combat Journal of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” (“Kriegstagesbuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht“ - KTB des OKW) on July 2 states: “Panzer units of the Army Group “von Weichs” (HG “von Weichs”) made rapid advances east and southeast, allowing the 24 Panzer Division to reach the western outskirts of Gorshechnoye; the township was heavily defended by the enemy. The 16 Motorised Infantry Division turned south and is marching towards Staryy Oskol; north of Gorshechnoye units of the “Grossdeutschland” Division crossed the Olym River - the railroad bridge fell into our hands intact - and pushed the enemy out of Kulevka. The 9 Pz. Div. is conducting an attack on Kastornoye. South of Livny an eastward advance reached Kschen River. Strong enemy resistance noted southwest of Livny”. On the following day, July 3, the situation became even more complicated for the Soviet side. The Germans deployed their reserve units and were progressing towards Voronezh. The Soviet Army units concentrated on the determined defence of the crucial junction, at the town of Kastornoye. The town was defended by the 284 Rifle Division, which absorbed the retreating units of the 111 and 119 Independent Rifle Brigades. Soviet accounts state that the attempts to take the town from the initial direction of German advance failed. Thus the 11 Panzer Division and the 377 Infantry Division (377. Inf. Div.) bypassed Kastornoye from the north, while the 9 Panzer Division was to take the southern route. Meanwhile, an order dated July 3 transformed the 11 Rifle Regiment into the 11 Panzer Grenadiers Regiment (Panzergrenadier-Regiment 11 Pz.Gren.Rgt. 11). th
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1 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche…. Band I, op. cit., p. 215.
2 Jentz T. L, Die deutsche….,Band I, op. cit., p. 219.
3 Stoves R, op. cit., p. 70.
4 Ibidem.
5 Jentz T. L, Die deutsche…Band I, op. cit., p. 236.
6 http://www.stengerhistorica.com/History/WarArchive/Ritterkreuztraeger/Bauer.htm
7 Percy E. Schramm Kriegstagesbuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1942, Teilband 1, Eine Dokumentation, p. 468.
8 Kołomyjec M., Smirnow A., Fall „Blau” 1942, Warszawa 2004, p. 36.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CHART OF THE 9 PANZER DIVISION ON JUNE 22 1942 th
As stated in the “Kriegstagesbuch des OKW“, on July 4 “the 9 Pz. Div. crossed Olym River, turned north and begun an assault on Kastornoye, which is under attack of the 377 Infantry Division from the north.” Soviet sources claim that the German manoeuvre was foreseen, so in order to avoid encirclement, the 284 Rifle Division withdrew all its units and supporting artillery during the night of July 4, and took positions in the vicinity of Terbuny. th
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Following the pattern established two days prior, on July 5 the 9 Rifle Brigade was converted into the 9 Panzer Grenadiers Brigade (9. Panzergrenadier-Brigade). Subsequent orders of the same day renamed the 10 Rifle Regiment into the 10 Panzer Grenadiers Regiment (Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 - Pz.Gren.Rgt. 10). th
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As the railroad lines in the Kursk area were destroyed by partisans, Hungarian units had to disembark in Ukraine, and travel to the front by road, marching some 400 to 500 kilometres.
In the meantime, the Red Army attempted to hold off the German offensive. The Soviet 5 Tank Army launched a counterattack towards Zemlyansk on July 5, to cut the supply lines of the German armoured group, which managed to break through the Don River in the direction of Voronezh. In its next move, the 5 Tank Army was to positioned itself in the rear of the enemy forces, liquidate the Don River crossing and assist the 40 Army in a break out from the pocket around Kastornoye. General M.I. Kazakov, the Bryansk Front’s chief of staff recalls the events as: “Instead of arranging for a concentrated tank attack, carried out simultaneously with even just four or five tank brigades advancing on a 12 to 15 kilometres stretch, the tank corps’ commanders deployed their armour straight from the road columns, launching more or less two spearheading battalions per corps. This kind of tactics, usually applied in a situation where a breach through the enemy lines already existed, resulted in a combat introduction of just a few battalions, while the main forces stood still, taking unnecessary losses from ongoing German aerial assault. But, even this weak attack forced the enemy to redirect two armoured divisions from the XXIV Armoured Corps: the 11 Panzer Division was diverted north in the direction Terbuny, while the 9 Panzer Division was rerouted towards Ozerki via Zemlyansk.” th
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The morning of July 6 brought an attack of the armoured brigades from the 7 Tank Corps under Colonel Pavel Rotmistrov. In the vicinity of Krasnaya Polyana, an encounter with 11 Panzer Division took place. As a result, the German troops were halted, and then driven back to 15 kilometres beyond Kobylia Snova River. It is most likely, that on this day the 9 Panzer Division, in one battle, destroyed two Soviet tank brigades from the 5 Tank Army. The entry in the “Kriegstagesbuch des OKW” regarding the situation of the 4 Panzer Army between the rivers Don and Olym, made on July 7 seems to support this statement: “..just the 9 Pz. Div. alone, until 2 o’clock in the afternoon yesterday (July 6), destroyed 61 enemy tanks.” The 9 Panzer Division captured Zemlyansk on the same day of July 6. On that date, Generaloberst Halder noted a directive given during a briefing at the Führer’s headquarters: “Orders issued to stop the 9 and 11 Panzer Divisions, and make all the motorised units immediately available be led by Tich Sosna following behind the XXXX Army Corps.” There is another note regarding a conversation between Halder and Keitel in which a decision was made not to engage the armoured and motorised units in fighting at Voronezh: “All efforts must be made as quickly as possible to dispatch the “Grossdeutschland” and the 24 Panzer Division, right behind the XXXX Army Corps, to be followed by the 9 and 11 Panzer Division.” th
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Hungarian infantry were not motorized, thus the units, accompanied by horse drawn wagons, had to walk.
An artillery lieutenant inspecting the front before the “ Fall Blau ” operation. On the left, there is a mittlerer Einheits Pkw. Kfz. 17 communication vehicle.
The Soviet 11 Tank Corps under Major General A.F. Popov, supported by the 19 Independent Tank Brigade, arrived on July 7 and immediately engaged the enemy straight from the road march formation. On that day Fahnenjunker Bauer, mentioned before, managed to survive another direct hit from a Russian KV- 1 heavy tank on his Pz.Kpfw. III. th
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Generalstabschef Halder commented in his journal on the condition of the 6 Army on July 8: “Enemy tank attacks continue at the northern front. The 9 Pz. Div.was again able to destroy numerous tanks.” That same day the 9 Division took Kastornoye. A report dated July 9 states that the 33 Panzer Regiment had 106 tanks at its disposal. th
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July 10 Generaloberst Halder wrote: “Northern sector of “von Weichs” front is under heavy attack. The intended pull out of the 9 and 11 Panzer Division is complicated.” During the fierce four-day combat that erupted on July 7, the formations of two Soviet army corps pushed the Germans some 4 to 5 kilometres back, reaching the Sukhaya Vereyka River on July 10. The 2 Tank Corps under General Major I.G. Lazariev finally entered into combat on that same day. As Generaloberst Halder noted: “Northern combat perimeter of the “von Weichs” units is still under heavy attack of a large tank force. Despite some local break through accomplishments, the attack was stopped.” At that point, the Soviet forces were not able to attain any significant success. Lack of coordination during the introduction of the 5 Tank Army units into combat allowed their adversary to deploy reserves and set up reinforced positions along the river, which in itself formed a natural and convenient defence line. As a result, General Liziukov’s forces were halted. The German units, including the 9 Panzer Division, organized powerful resistance supported by anti-tank artillery and minefields in the vicinity of Zemlyansk. These defences could not be penetrated. Furthermore, Russian tank unit thrusts were not aligned with the path of the main offensive, their armour carried out classic wide frontal attacks reminiscent of ordinary infantry formations, with pre-assigned sectors and divisional zones. “Instead of a fist, a hand with outstretched fingers was shoved towards the enemy.” Nevertheless, in order to fend off the attack, the Germans had to recall the 9 , the 11 Panzer Division and three infantry divisions from the north, and provide them with sizeable airborne support. In all, the Soviet counter-attack not only delayed the German th
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offensive towards Voronezh, but it also allowed the Bryansk Front units a few days to prepare defences at the new positions. 22
An encampment at the operation “Blau” preliminary positions. Behind the tents made of combined Zeltbahn camouflage tarpaulin, there is a Pz.Kpfw. II light tank.
An artilleryman in Panzerwaffe (Armoured Force) uniform; an Allgemeines-turmabzeichen and a Eisernes Kreuz II klasse (Iron Cross 2nd class) ribbon may be noted
The same artillery officer in tanker’s uniform next to a Pz.Kpfw. II light tank. A fragment of a tactical identifier, “AR0” painted on the turret, most likely indicates the “ Artillerie Regiment”. If the above assumption is correct, the tank was used as an “artillery observation tank”, and was assigned to a fire coordination/observer specialist. Between July 23 and 28 1942, the Pz.Kpfw. II tanks obtained more powerful radio transmitters, which allowed them to communicate with artillery units.
A Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf.F light tank from 9th Panzer Division. The “A907” tactical number is displayed. Letter “A” probably indicates either a Headquarters Company or Command Platoon of a Panzer battalion.
Officers of the 33rd Panzer Regiment’s staff in a crosscountry staff car Horch Kfz. 15. First from the right, Oberstleutnant Gerhard Willing commander of the III Battalion of the 33rd Panzer Regiment of a Panzer battalion.
The last moments of peace before the attack. Captured in this photograph is an artilleryman wearing a shirt. His Erkennungsmarke (identity disc, also referred to as a dog tag), is worn on the suspenders. Many soldiers of this formation adhered to this particular custom.
9th Panzer Division tanks are seen here assuming positions in grasslands before an attack. In the background a rear view of Pz.Kpfw. II light tank. The photograph was taken from the turret of another Pz.Kpfw. II - the tip of the 20 mm gun barrel is visible in the foreground.
A meal consumed next to a concealed Pz.Kpfw. II light tank. An improvised sun or rain cover made of the Zeltbahn tarp is noteworthy.
The Panzerbefehlswagen III command tanks had a characteristic frame antenna mounted at the rear . As the enemy became more experienced, this feature allowed for quick identification and successful targeting of the commander’s tanks from long distances. In order to prevent that, the command tanks had to become indistinguishable. Thus, an order was issued to dismantle the antennae. The photograph shows one of the two Pz.Bf.Wg. III Ausf.H tanks in service with the 9th Panzer Division at the time, with the antenna removed. A mock up of the 50 mm (5 cm KwK (L/42)) cannon (dummy gun) may also be noted. This particular tank has the “R01”
tactical marking. The letter “R” stands for “Regiment”, and the number indicates the vehicle of Oberst Ewald Kraeber, leader of the Pz.Rgt. 33.
The 9th Panzer Division’s tanks unfold to assume an attack formation.
Divisional vehicles on the Russian steppe. In the foreground a semi tracked armoured Sd.Kfz. 250 transporter.
Three Pz.Kpfw., probably Ausf. J or Ausf. L, dispersed in the steppes during Divisional operations.
Combat in the steppe. Well aimed shots set the Soviet tanks on fire.
As the German armoured units were expected to advance, the Soviets tried to position their tanks behind natural obstacles or in manmade trenches, in such a way that only the turrets were exposed towards the approaching enemy. When the German tanks neared, they were subjected to a close range fire. The photograph portrays an entrenched Soviet T-34 tank overwhelmed by the German onslaught.
Another Soviet T-34 tank destroyed in its concealed position.
A group of Soviet prisoners of war. In the background, two German Pz.Kpfw. III tanks.
Capsized wreck of Soviet BA-20 armoured car. German tanks are visible in the background.
Staff briefing somewhere in the vast Russian grasslands. In front of the Pz.Bf.Wg.III Ausf.H, there is a motorcycle messenger. Pictured in the rear, a Pz.Kpfw. II light tank used by an artillery coordination officer.
Two 9th Panzer Division troopers. One on the left is distinguished by the Panzerkampfabzeichen (Panzer Assault Badge), one on the right has the same decoration as well as the Eisernes Kreuz I klasse (Iron Cross 1st class).
Three soldiers photographed in a conversation during a combat interval. Two of them were awarded the Eisernes Kreuz I klasse.
Two recipients of the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold (German Cross in Gold) - a tanker and a lieutenant from the Panzer Grenadier Regiment posed in front of a Pz.Kpfw. II artillery observation tank. The lettering painted on the turret - “AR05” - leads to a belief that this tank was assigned to an “Artillerie Regiment”.
Another trio of the 9th Panzer Division soldiers looking at a burning Russian truck with an 76 mm anti-tank ZIS-3 cannon.
A burned out shell of an American made Studebaker US-6 truck delivered to the Red Army under the Lend-Lease. Manufacturer’s mark is visible.
A destroyed Red Army Valentine MK III tank produced in Great Britain or Canada. The vehicle had tactical number “028”.
As Operation “ Fall Blau” was finished, the 9 Division prepared a report regarding the German and Soviet armoured units’ tactics. It stated that in the first phase of the campaign lasting from June 28 to July 13, the cooperation between armoured troops and artillery hardly existed due to the lack of radio communications. The report indicated: “Following installation of a suitable radio in the Pz.Kpfw. II, cooperation with the artillery significantly improved during the period from 23 to 28 July. Supplying the artillery with Pz.Kpfw. II for observation should still be viewed as a makeshift solution.” th
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Generalstabschef Halder wrote on July 14 : “Between Voronezh and our previous positions a weak enemy attacks were carried out, they were defeated by a 9 and 11 Pz. Div. strike between Don and Olym Rivers.” While the fighting on July 14 may have subsided, the overall intensity of the fighting may be illustrated by the fact that the same afternoon a report was sent alerting that the 33 Panzer Regiment had only 55 operational tanks left. th
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On July 15, Generaloberst Halder wrote: “The front northwest of Voronezh was attacked only by enemy units the size of a regiment or a battalion, but they were repelled.” 26
The 9 Division’s tanks declared as a total loss by that date were: two Pz.Kpfw. II, nine Pz.Kpfw. III (short barrel), 19 Pz.Kpfw. III (long barrel), five Pz.Kpfw. IV (short barrel) and four Pz.Kpfw. IV (long barrel) , a total of 39 combat vehicles. On July 18, it was reported that the number of tanks in the 33 Panzer Regiment rose to 94, which was most likely an accomplishment by service technicians who managed to repair some damaged vehicles. th
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Generaloberst Halder noted on July 21 : “Northwest of Voronezh stronger enemy action, with breakthroughs reported as wide as 10 kilometres, and as deep a 3 kilometres
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The next day Generalstabschef OKH continued: “Northwest of Voronezh at the place of yesterday’s breakthrough, renewed strong attacks continue.” Until July 23, the 9 Panzer Division continued defensive efforts on the flank of the Army Group “von Weichs” against Red Army troops attacking from the north, in the region of Bolshaya Vereyka. That day’s entry in Generaloberst Halder’s notebook states: “Northwest of Voronezh heavy fighting against massive enemy attack. Wide enemy breakthrough. The 9 Pz. Div. counterattacks.” 30
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An entry in the “Kriegstagesbuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht“dated July 24 informs of the Army Group “B” situation: “Counter attack eliminated the breakthrough. The units of the 9 Pz. Div. are engaging the enemy” Generaloberst Halder’s account of the day states: “Voronezh and the “dry front” : heavy fighting, with many enemy tanks destroyed and very successful defence.” The number of tanks at the disposal of the 9 Panzer Division on that day was 96. th
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Motorcyclists from the Kradschützen-Bataillon 59 riding through the grasslands.
In the journal of Generalstabschef Halder under July 25 it is noted: “Near Cymlansk ( should read Zemlyansk ) fierce attacks against a seemingly even more determined enemy”. The next day’s entry follows: “Near Cymlansk (should read Zemlyansk) successful counter attack of the 9 Panzer Division restores the previous positions. Heavy losses sustained! Further enemy attacks should be anticipated.” During the fighting Generalleutnant J. Baessler, commander of the 9 Panzer Division, was wounded on July 27, his post was temporarily taken over by Oberst Heinrich-Hermann von Hülsen. On July 30, Generalleutnant Walter Scheller reported for duty as the 9 Panzer Division’s commanding officer at the new headquarters of the Army High Command at Vinnytsia. A report dated July 31 stated that the 33 Panzer Regiment had 113 operational tanks. 36
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This was the day that the previously mentioned report on the German and Soviet armoured units’ tactics, based on the combat experiences of the 33 Panzer Regiment, was published. It indicated that: “In contrast to the tactics used in the previous campaign, in this campaign the regiment was usually employed as a single unit and thereby could achieve larger successes than when individual companies were employed, each having its own assignment. At least one battalion has to be sent on detached assignments. Detachment of a single company must remain an exception. Concentrated employment of all Panzers should always be strived for.” rd
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The safety of the command tanks also received some attention: “Removing the frame antenna from the Pz.Bef.Wg. was beneficial. From a distance the Pz.Bef.Wg. is hardly discernible from a gun-armed Panzer.” The Soviet defensive tank tactics were also analysed in the report. It was said that the Russians place their tanks in man-made ditches or behind natural obstacles, in such a way that only the turrets are exposed. “When they identified the main body of German Panzers attacking or advancing, they took up hulldown positions and let the German Panzers come on.” 42
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On August 3, the sixteenth 9 Panzer Division trooper was awarded the Knight’s Iron Cross. It was Feldwebel Alois Eckert from the 9 Company of the 33 Panzer Regiment. The 9 Division was guarding the flank of the Army Group “B” (von Weichs) up until August 4. th
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9 Percy E. Schramm, op. cit., Teilband 1, p. 474.
10 Kołomyjec M., Smirnow A., op. cit., p. 36.
11 Kołomyjec M., Smirnow A., op. cit., p. 41.
12 Glantz D. M., House J. M., When Titans clashed, Kansas 1995, p. 119.
13 Schramm P. E., op. cit., Teilband 1, p. 482.
14 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 574.
15 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 575.
16 http://www.stengerhistorica.com/History/WarArchive/Ritterkreuztraeger/Bauer.htm clash, http://www.ritterkreuztraeger-1939-45.de/Infanterie/B/Bauer-Ludwig.htm
17 Percy E. Schramm, op. cit., Teilband 1, p. 484-485.
18 Jentz T L, Die deutsche …Band I, op. cit., p. 241.
19 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 578.
20 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 579.
21 Bieszanow W, Poligon czerwonych generałów, Gdańsk-Warszawa 2009, p. 212-213.
22 Ibidem.
23 Jentz T. L, Die deutsche…Band I, op. cit, p. 243.
24 Halder F., op. cit, v. III, p. 582.
25 Jentz T. L, Die deutsche….Band I, op. cit., p. 241.
26 Halder F., op. cit, v. III, p. 583.
27 Jentz T. L, Die deutsche…Band I, op. cit., p. 241.
28 Ibidem.
29 Halder F., op. cit, v. III, p. 589.
30 Halder F., op. cit, v. III, p. 590.
31 Ibidem.
32 Schramm P. E., op. cit, Teilband 1, p. 523.
33 A stretch of front on the left flank of HG„B”, bowed away from Don River, without any water obstacles. Halder F, op. cit., v. III, p. 586.
34 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 592.
35 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche…Band I, op. cit., p. 241.
36 It is most likely that gen. Halder is mistaken as to the township’s name transliteration. Cymlansk lays few hundred kilometres southeast near Volgodonsk in the Rostov - on -Don region, but it is unlikely that the 9.Pz. Div. was transferred to that area.
37 Halder F, op. cit., v. III, p. 593.
38 Ibidem.
39 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 597.
40 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche….Band I, op. cit., p. 241.
41 Ibidem.
42 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche…Band I, op. cit., p. 243.
43 Ibidem.
44 Hermann C. H., op. cit., p. 172.
Operation “Wirbelwind” Unexpectedly, on August 4 1942 just as Generalleutnant Scheller took over the 9 Division command post, the unit was withdrawn from the front lines. Passing through Shchigry, Fatezh and Orel, it reached the operational region of the Army Group “Mitte” north of Orel. On August 11, the Division reached Bolkhov, where it was incorporated into the XXXXI Armoured Corps (XXXXI PzK) of the 2 Panzer Army under General Schmidt. In the middle of August, the Germans launched an attack on Kaluga from the region north of Bolkhov. Their advance towards Sukhinichi, was meant to counteract the Russian offensive headed for Rzhev. The intent of the operation, code named “Wirbelwind” (“Whirlwind”), was to break through the defences of the Soviet 16 and 61 Armies, and conduct an assault in the direction of Sukhinichi. The next stage of the operation was to position the forces in the region west of Yukhnov. Such a move would threaten an entire left flank of the Soviet Western Front. A total of eleven divisions, including the 9 and the 11 Panzer Divisions and the 25 Motorised Infantry Division participated in the operation. The units listed above had some 400 combat vehicles. The Luftwaffe was to provide an extensive air support throughout the operation. As mentioned before, Generalleutnant Walter Scheller was at the time the commanding officer of the 9 Panzer Division, the 33 Panzer Regiment was led by Oberst Wilhelm Hochbaum, while the 9 Armoured Grenadier Brigade was commanded by Oberst Heinrich-Herman von Hülsen. The 10 and the 11 Armoured Grenadier Regiments were under command of Oberst Willibald Borowietz and Oberstleutnant Joachim Gutmann respectively. Oberst Walter Gorn was in charge of the 59 Motorcycle Rifles Battalion at the time. th
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An August 11 the units of the 2 Panzer Army conducted a surprise attack at the junction of the sectors occupied by Soviet 16 and 61 Armies. The German units swiftly overcame the defences and drove a narrow wedge some 35 to 40 kilometres deep. The attackers reached the Zhizdra River near Usty and Belyy Kamen. nd
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Town of Bolkhov; the 9th Panzer Division passed through the area on August 11, on the way to join the 2nd Panzer Army.
On the same day Generaloberst Halder noted in his journal: “The Army Group “Mitte” is experiencing its first difficulties, the way for the 11 and 9 Panzer Divisions has to be fought for.” The 9 Panzer Division was proceeding on the right wing of the 2 Panzer Army right behind the 11 Division. As a result of the German advance, three rifle divisions of General Bielov were cut off from the main forces. At the same time, another grouping of German units attacked the 322 Rifle Division positioned on the left wing of General Ivan Bagramian’s 16 Army, defending the Rossieta River perimeter. With that series of moves, the Germans hoped to reach the Zhizdra River and join their main assault forces fighting against General Bielov’s units. Despite the fact that General Bagramian deployed his reserves, the Germans managed to reach Zhizdra between Gretnia and Usty. The 322 Rifle Division sustained very heavy losses, nonetheless it avoided being sacked and withdrew to the other side of the river. As the German objectives and the magnitude of the operation became evident to the Soviet command, General Bagramian issued two orders: th
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the 10 Tank Corps under General Burkov was to move out of Sukhinichi region and by morning of August 12 position its forces at the north bank of Zhizdra behind the left wing of the army. The Corps was to prepare for a southward counterattack against the German units, which broke through the defences of the 61 Army. th
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the defence perimeter of the 5 Guard Rifle Corps led by Major General G. P. Korotkov, was to be taken over by the neighbouring units and the 31 Guard Rifle Division deployed from the army reserves. Meanwhile General Korotkov’s Corps was to march through the night to be able to concentrate its forces near Aleshinka on the north bank of Zhizdra by the morning of August 12. th
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“Wirbelwind” attack is progressing, but a strong and determined defence, as well as fortified terrain allow for only a slow advance.” Usty township was eventually taken by the 10 Armoured Grenadier Regiment. The entry in the “Combat Journal of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” (KTB des OKW) dated August 16 states: “Operation “Wirbelwind” conducted by the Army Group “Mitte” achieved very little with exceptionally heavy losses. Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, reports via telephone that the attack cannot penetrate the enemy lines through the forests near Sukhinichi, because there is one stronghold after another, and the passages between the woodlands are protected by mine fields. ” 3
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Staff consultation with Generalmajor Walter Scheller, commander of the 9th Panzer Division, before operation “Wirbelwind”.
A frontal command post in the forest near Shizdra, during operation “ Wirbel-wind ”. Generalmajor Scheller is seen near the command version of the halftrack armoured transporters Sd.Kfz. 251/3.
On August 17, the 9 Panzer Division along with the 439 Infantry Regiment (Inf.Rgt. 439) from the 134 Infantry Division (134. Inf.Div.) fought in the area of Svetlyi Verch and Tscherebet. The units were able to make contact with the 446 Infantry Regiment (Inf.Rgt. 446) of the same 134 Infantry Division, so the encirclement of the Soviet units defending the area, so called “little pocket” could be completed. The same day of August 17, Oberstleutnant Gorn, commander of the 59 Motorcycle Rifles Battalion received the Knight’s Iron Cross with Oak Leaves as the 113 Wehrmacht trooper awarded this decoration. The little pocket was cleared of enemy troops by August 18 1942. th
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As a coincidence, that day, the 394 day of the Russian Campaign, marks the destruction of the 1000 Soviet tank by the 9 Panzer Division. By that time, the Division reached the intended bridgehead at Gretina. As the Germans arrived at Zhizdra River, for a few days they attempted the crossing in order to press towards Sukhinichi. With extensive support of the tanks, but suffering heavy losses, the river was finally crossed near Glinnaia, allowing a narrow entry point into the forests south of Aleshinka. At that juncture, the German motorised infantry came under a massive heavy artillery barrage from the Soviet artillery brigade. In the meantime, the counter-attacks conducted by 146 Tank Brigade and the units of the 11 Guard Rifle Division pushed the German forces back into the woods. Soviet accounts claim that the enemy units were obliterated by Major General A. W. Kurkin’s 9 Tank Corps, but this statement is over exaggerated. Nevertheless, the German advance came to a standstill. The 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was involved in a fierce fighting near the township of Bogdanovo - Kolodezi. The casualties were so intense that in some companies the number of soldiers was reduced from the full strength to only about 10 or 15. Meanwhile, other German units attempted to move northwest from the Gretnia region towards Sukhinichi, but concentrated artillery fire and the Soviet counterattack forced them back to their starting positions. The battle was at its culmination. The Soviet 16 Army managed to hold its ground, forcing the enemy into the defensive. The determined resistance and the counter-attacks conducted by the rifle units supported by the 3 , 9 and 10 Tank Corps’ brought the German attack to a halt. Thus, after the initial accomplishments of Wehrmacht between August 11 and 15, the units were stuck in the forests on the north bank of Zhizdra River. German sources state that the particularly bloody battles were fought between August 20 and 25. Some interesting information about the affairs on August 20 1942 may be found in a letter from Oberstleutnant Gustav-Adolf Bruns, commander of the 74 Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Pz.Gr.Rgt. 74) to the town mayor of Hamlen, “Brief des Kommandanten an den Oberbürgmeister der Stadt Hameln”. The letter contained a report on the breakthrough assault conducted by the 74 Panzer Grenadiers against the Soviet positions in the forest northeast of Gretnia, “Gefechtsbericht über den Durchbruch des verstärkten PanzerGrenadier-Regiment 74 durch den Wald nordöstlich Gretnja am 20.08.1942”. According to this account, the reinforced 74 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was temporarily assigned to the 17 Panzer Division on August 19. The assignment resulted in a transfer from Kolmkschtschi vicinity to the area east of Gretnia. The regiment was ordered to breach the Soviet defences and join forces with the 63 Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Pz.Gr.Rgt. 63) th
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under Oberstleutnant Hermann Seitz. At the time, this unit was operating as the “Seitz” Combat Group (“Gruppe Seitz”); it had reached the southern outskirts of Aleshinka village but was cut off from the rest of the forces. According to the plan, the 74 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was to aid the Group in capturing Aleshinka. The regimental command was also aware that south of “Seitz ” Group there is another German unit positioned in a nearby forest clearing. It was the III Battalion of the 15 Panzer Regiment (III/Pz.Rgt. 15) commanded by Oberst Hochbaum , which was not able reach the “Seitz” Group due to strong enemy resistance. During the night of August 19 and 20, the Battalion, referred to as “Hochbaum” Group (“Gruppe Hochbaum”), assumed an allround, deep defensive formation. On August 20 at 3:30 in the afternoon, the 74 Pz.Gr. Regiment entered the woods. At first, the march was uninterrupted, but before reaching the “Hochbaum” Group’s positions, the I Battalion of the 74 Regiment (I./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 74) was drawn into a series of forest skirmishes with Soviet units. After some fierce fighting, the Soviet troops were pushed away from the path of the Regiment. At about 4:55 in the afternoon a link with the “Hochbaum” Group was established. During the subsequent fighting, the 74 Regiment was able to clear the area northwest of the “Hochbaum” Group’s stronghold, pushing back the Soviet units. However, the advance aimed at joining the “Seitz” Group, which was conducted along the road, failed even though all the reserves were utilized. The frontal attack undertaken afterwards, was also ineffective in the heavily wooded area. On top of that, two German tanks moving down the road were destroyed by a Soviet anti-tank gun firing from a concealed position. The losses had an effect on morale, causing an understandable caution of Oberst Hochbaum’s armoured unit. The attack subsided “under a horrid infantry, mortar, anti-tank gun and artillery fire, while the casualties accumulated.” To reinforce the struggling units, Generalleutnant Scheller of the 9 Panzer Division dispatched the 17 Motorcycle Rifle Battalion (Kradsch.Btl. 17), the 59 Motorcycle Rifle Battalion, the II Battalion of the 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the remains of the III Battalion of the 446 Infantry Regiment (III./Inf.Rgt. 446). The above units became the Combat Group “Burns” (“Kampfgruppe Bruns”), and were assigned to the 74 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. The unit closest to the surrounded “Seitz” Group was the II Battalion of the 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. The battalion received an order via radio to move north towards the concentration point of the Combat Group “Burns”. However, the unit encountered such a strong enemy opposition that it could not proceed. The 17 Motorcycle Rifle Battalion and the 59 Motorcycle Rifle Battalion, led by Hauptmann Tescher and Oberstleutnant Gorn respectively, were deployed in accordance with the earlier reconnaissance conducted to the right of the 74 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Their objective was to slip by the unguarded flank of the enemy, while the I Battalion of the 74 Panzer Grenadier Regiment conducted a frontal attack, in order to secure a supply corridor leading to the “Seitz” Group. As the above aim was achieved, the motorcycle units joined by the II Battalion from the 74 Panzer Grenadier Regiment were to continue in the effort to encircle the enemy. In front of the attackers, there lay three sectors of enemy defences hidden in the forest. The letter mentioned above, contains a description of the fighting: “the determined enemy had to be challenged for each square meter of ground, the opponents used medium artillery barrages and constant mortar fire to repel our troops.” At around 15:00 hours the Germans managed to break the defences, and one hour later “… a surrounded “Seitz Group” could be greeted with a hand shake.” As it turned out, the forest was defended th
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A sign commemorating the 1000th tank destroyed by the 9thPanzer Division on August 18 1942. The photograph was taken by Kriegsberichter (war reporter) Kraayvänger from Pz.P.K. 693 ( Panzer Propagandakompanie ). It was later distributed in a form of a postcard for propaganda purposes.
“The enemy regiment was, according to its commander who was taken prisoner, completely wiped out. The prisoners were only sporadically taken. The battlefield showed the wrath of nearly 10 hour long intense fighting.” By the evening hours, most of the forest west of the road was secured, including the crucial sector where the enemy received reinforcements coming from the village of Bogdanovo - Kolodezi. The village was captured by the Germans around noon, but was recaptured by Red Army units soon after. 12
On August 20, the 33 Panzer Regiment had 94 operational tanks. rd
As the battle evolved, the German headquarters made new decisions. On August 22 during a conference between the Führer and Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge it was decided that: “The “Wirbelwind” operation will be aborted because the terrain difficulties and the presence of strong enemy forces does not allow for achievement of any notable success. However, the enemy units in the area should still be tied by spurious attacks so they could not be used at the other, weaker sectors of the front. To execute this order the 2 Panzer Army will not obtain any reinforcements; in fact, the 9 and the 11 Panzer Divisions should be withdrawn and transferred to the region north of Kirov. From that point, they should, in cooperation with the “Grossdeutschland” Motorised Infantry nd
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Division ( Infanterie-Division “Grossdeutschland” (mot)), operate in the general direction of southwest, trying to achieve a “little solution” to the “ Wirbelwind” Operation.” During the next few days, the departure of the 9 and the 11 Panzer Divisions was reconsidered. The dialogue between the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Army Group “Centre” continued, with the latter opting in favour of the withdrawal. Meanwhile, on August 22, the units of the Soviet Western Front launched an offensive towards Kozelsk. On August 24 Fahnenjunker Ludwig Bauer in a Pz.Kpfw. III tank armed with long barrel KwK 39 L/60 50 mm gun, survived another hit from a 152 mm artillery shell. Leutnant Rocholl, a crew member named Grosshammer, and the driver were seriously wounded in the incident. 13
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On August 25, the “Wirbelwind” Operation was completely abandoned. The entry in the “Kriegstagebuch” of OKW states: “The overall situation unchanged. At Sukhinichi, as previously decided, the withdrawal of the 9 and the 11 Panzer Divisions from the 2nd Panzer Army should be conducted. But the question if they should be deployed north of Kirov remains open.” By August 25, the German units pulled back behind the Zhizdra River where a new defence line was constructed. According to Soviet sources, the Germans lost some 10,000 soldiers and over 200 tanks during operation “Wirbelwind”. The 33 Panzer Regiment had 95 tanks on August 31. The total losses included four Pz.Kpfw. II, nine Pz.Kpfw. III (short barrel), 21 Pz.Kpfw. III (long barrel), five Pz.Kpfw. IV (short barrel) and five Pz.Kpfw. IV (long barrel) tanks, 44 vehicles in all. In the meantime, the 9 Division received four Pz.Kpfw. III (short barrel) and five Pz.Kpfw. IV (short barrel) replacement tanks. th
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Army Group “Mitte”: “During a conference held at noon it was decided, in accordance with the Führer’s wish often repeated during his briefings, that the 9 and the 11 Panzer Divisions, south of Sukhinichi, will be withdrawn, and the 95 Infantry Division stationed northwest of Voronezh will be incorporated into the 9 Army.” mentions an entry made on September 1 in the “Kriegstagebuch” of OKW. th
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The details of von Kluge’s discussion with Hitler are revealed by Generaloberst Halder: “In a few days withdraw the 9 Panzer Division; then the 11 Panzer Division, but only if the winter defensive perimeter will be pushed back 2 to 3 kilometres into the hills. The Führer agrees on the condition that the forest areas will be adequately prepared.” Furthermore Halder states: “The Führer wishes to resolve the Kirov situation with the aid of the 9 and the 11 Panzer Divisions.” th
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Indeed, on September 1 the 9 Division was pulled out of action at Sukhinichi. The fighting had weakened its units considerably. For example, on September 3 it was reported that the 59 Motorcycle Rifles Battalion had a strength of only 55 troopers. th
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As mentioned above, the Russians began another offensive in the area of Kozelsk. The fiercest fighting took place in the area of the main assault directed at Ozhigovo. As the rifle units of the 61 Army were not able to reinforce the 264 Rifle Division before the operation commenced, only a single regiment participated in the attack. Obviously, it could not break the enemy defences, cross the river, capture Ozhigovo and prepare the ground for the 15 Tank Corps breakthrough. Thus, the Russian Corps commander decided at midday to dispatch the 17 Motorised Rifle Brigade supported by two motorised fusilier battalions. After a brief artillery bombardment the river was crossed and Ozygovo taken st
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before the end of the day. On September 3, the 195 Tank Brigade advanced to the opposing bank of the Vytiebiet River and moved towards Perestryazh. The attempt to capture the township straight from the road march formation failed. The Soviet forces encountered a gorge protected by German anti-tank artillery. Soon thereafter, German tanks emerged from the left flank. Despite success in driving back the German tank attack, the Soviet units were temporarily stopped. The Soviet 3 Tank Army and the assault group of the 16 Army deployed from the north did not achieve any considerable success in their westward attack either. In the evening of that day, the 3 Tank Corps was almost depleted of its tanks, so it had to be put in reserve of the Stavka - Soviet Army High Command. Hence, on September 4 when the main forces of the 254 Rifle Division reached Ozhigovo, the 113 Tank Brigade under Colonel A. S. Swiridov and the 17 Motorised Rifle Brigade from the 15 Tank Corps had to regroup and transfer to Volosovo, where they joined the 342 Rifle Division in an assault at Trostianka. th
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An entry in the “Kriegstagebuch” of OKW dated September 4 cites: “The command of Army Group “Mitte” plans to use the withdrawn 9 and 11 Panzer Divisions not north of Kirov as previously intended, but due to better efficiency of railroad transport and the unloading options, transfer both divisions to the 4 Army region.” In the interim, the 9 Panzer Division was directed to assist in counteracting the Soviet offensive. From September 4, the Red Army forces continued with their attacks, but a resolute German defence as well as lack of fresh troops, supplies and ammunition prevented any Soviet breakthrough. It may be argued that during that time Soviet units, rather than advancing, fended off German counter-attacks conducted by the 9 and the 17 Panzer Divisions. th
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On September 9 amidst the fighting northwest of Belev, the 9 Division was pulled out of action and ordered to a new destination at Gzatsk, to be reached by a road march through Roslavl, Smolensk and Viazma. The Germans could afford such a move since the strength of the attacking Soviet units was so depleted that beginning on September 10 the Red Army found itself on the defensive, with the 3 Tank Army almost entirely withdrawn except for the 1 Motorised Rifle Division and some support units assigned to Generals Bielov and Bagramian. In all, after a loss of nearly 60,000 dead and wounded and nearly all the tanks, the Soviet troops gained only 8 to 10 kilometres of ground. The number of tanks available for action in the 33 Panzer Regiment amounted to 74 on this particular day. th
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In the Gzatsk region, the 9 Division had a chance to rest, recuperate and resupply after an eight week long combat action. On September 18, Oberstleutnant Gutmann, commander of the 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, received the Ritterkreuz as the seventeenth trooper of the Division awarded this decoration. By September 20, the number of operational tanks in the 9 Panzer Division rose to 93. th
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A Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. L. A fuel drum is carried on the rear armour panel.
1 Bieszanow W, Poligon… op. cit., p. 268-269.
2 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 608.
3 Halder F., op. cit., v. III, p. 609.
4 Greiner H., Za kulisami OKW, Warszawa 1959 , p. 359.
5 http://www.lexikon-der-Wehrmacht.de/Gliderungen/Infanterieregimenter/IR446-Rhtm
6 http://www.hamelner-geschichte.de/index.php?id=52.
7 Quoted as in original. However, the Pz.Rgt. 15 was a unit of the 11th Panzer Division Most likely it was the Pz.Rgt. 33, led by Oberst Wilhelm Hochbaum at that time.
8 http://www.hamelner-geschichte.de/index.php?id=52.
9 Ibidem.
10 Ibidem.
11 The 326 Rifle Division consisted of 1097, 1099 and 1101 Rifle Regiments.
12 http://www.hamelner-geschichte.de/index.php?id=52
13 Greiner H., op. cit, p. 361.
14 http://www.strengerhistocia.com/History/WarArchive/Ritterkreuztraeger/Bauer.htm, http://wwwritterkreuztraeger-1939-45.de/Infanterie/B/Bauer-Ludwig.htm - both sources contain inaccuracies as to the calibre of the guns. The KwK 39 L/60 used by Pz.Kpfw. III had a calibre of 50 mm, not 75 mm (“7, 5 cm”) as stated in the sources, while the Russian gun had a calibre of 152 mm, not 172 mm (“17,2 cm”).
15 Bieszanow W, Poligon… op. cit., p. 268-269.
16 Schramm P. E., op. cit., Teilband 1, p. 665.
17 Halder F., v III, op. cit., p. 622.
18 Halder F, v.III, op. cit., p. 623.
19 Schramm P. E., op. cit, Teilband 1, p. 677.
20 Hermann C. H., op. cit., p. 113.
21 Bieszanow W., Poligon… op. cit., p. 275.
22 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 114 and 172.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CHART OF THE 9 PANZER DIVISION ON OCTOBER 23 1942 th
On September 22 Generaloberst Halder wrote: “Ongoing urgent phone conversations with Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, who now does not believe again in the effectiveness of advance on Nielidovo, so he intends to use the 95 Infantry Division and the 9 Pz. Div. against Vasiuga.” th
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On September 29, the 9 Division, assigned as a reserve of the Army Group “Mitte” and the 9 Army (AOK 9), was directed by way of Smolensk to the region of Sychevka. After arrival, Generalleutnant Scheller ordered construction of roads, barracks and an allround fortified defensive zone. A lot of time and attention was devoted to training and local reconnaissance. During this pause in action, the combat potential of the unit was restored. th
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On September 30, the 33 Panzer Regiment could field 91 tanks. rd
The region of Sychevka. lies in the so-called Rzhev salient. The area was particularly convenient as a base for the next potential attack on Moscow. This factor, as well as prestige reasons, motivated the Germans to keep a stronghold there, despite the significant extension of the front lines. A note in the “Kriegstagebuch” of OKW dated October 5 reveals: “Army Group “ Mitte” has in the 9 Army operational area the “ Grossdeutschland” Motorised Infantry Division (Infanterie-Division “Grossdeutschland” (mot)), the 9 Panzer Division and other local reserves.” th
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On October 23, the 60 Panzer Division Supply Command was reorganized into 60 Command of the Panzer Divisions Supply Troops (Kommandeur der PanzerdivisionNachschubtruppen 60 - Kdr. der Panzer-Div.Nachschubtruppen 60). Between October and November, the German high command reassessed the exact location of the 9 Division units within the Rzhev salient. th
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On November 16, the entry in the “Kriegstagebuch” of OKW lists one possible location: “The 1 and the 9 Panzer Divisions should first be positioned in the area west of Zubtsov.” st
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According to a report from November 18, the 9 Panzer Division from the 9 Army of the Army Group “Mitte” was equipped with 26 Pz.Kpfw. II tanks, 30 Pz.Kpfw. III armed with 50 mm short barrel guns, 32 Pz.Kpfw. III armed with 50 mm long barrel guns, seven Pz.Kpfw. IV armed with 75 mm short barrel guns, five Pz.Kpfw. IV armed with 75 mm long barrel guns and two Pz.Bef.Wg. . th
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25 November 1942 marked the beginning of operation “Mars”, the offensive on the Soviet Western Front and the Kalinin Front on the Rzhev salient. Marshal Zhukov hoped that just like in the Stalingrad battle, the German defenders will become trapped and will eventually be destroyed. The most vulnerable sector located in the east of the Rzhev salient, along the rivers Vazuza and Osuga, was manned by three German infantry divisions, 102 , 337 and 78 (102., 337. and 78. Inf. Div.) supported by the 5 Panzer Division. At that time, the above units and the 9 Panzer Division were part of the XXXIX Armoured Corps (XXXIX PzK). The 9 Division was placed as an operational reserve west of Sychevka. The I Battalion of the 33 Panzer Regiment, was an exception, as it was stationed on the other side of the Rzhev salient near the town of Belyy. nd
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The region where the main divisional forces were stationed was attacked by two armies of the Western Front. The 20 and the 31 Army were deployed at the eastern end of the Rzhev salient, north of Zubtsov, at the 40 kilometres stretch along the rivers Vazuza and Osuga. The 20 Army consisted of the 247 Rifle Division, 80 and 140 Tank Brigades, and the 331 Rifle Division as a reserve. The 31 Army included the 88 , 336 and 239 Rifle Divisions, along with the 145 and 332 Tank Brigades. The Russians were able to penetrate through the German defences and gain ground, reaching the Viazma-Rzhev railroad line. On the evening of November 25, the 9 Panzer Division was dispatched toward Russian bridgehead on the Vazuza River. On November 26, German reinforcements, parts of the XXVII Corps (XXVII AK) from Rzhev and the 9 Panzer Division from Sychevka, reached the area of the Soviet breakthrough. The 9 Division was then divided into two combat groups identified as “Kampfgruppe Remont” and “Kampfgruppe von Zettwitz”, according to the names of their commanders. M. D. Glantz quotes imprecise spelling of the names. “Kampfgruppe Reumont”, most likely consisted of 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment led by Oberstleutnant Dr. Alfred von Reumont, while the core of the “Kampfgruppe Czettritz” was the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment under Hauptmann Gotthard von Czettritz und Neuhaus. According to M. D. Glantz, each combat group had 40 tanks, supply columns and panzer grenadier troops. The presence of tanks suggest that sub-units of the I and II Battalions of the 33 Panzer Regiment were incorporated into the groups. Both groups were to advance up the Rzhev-Sychevka road towards the attacking Soviet vanguards. Unfortunately, both newly created groups reported that, at the earliest, their combat readiness could only be attained on the morning of November 27. However, Soviet advances made throughout the day forced the Germans to hastily create, and immediately deploy, a new group referred to as “Kampfgruppe Hochbaum”. This combat group, named after Oberst Wilhelm Hochbaum, commander of the 33 Panzer Regiment, was ordered to attack the advancing Soviet Tank Corps under Colonel Arman. The first German counter-attacks hit the forefront as well as the flanks of th
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the progressing Soviet tank formation. At 17:30, in diminishing daylight, a chaotic encounter took place south-west of Aristovo and along the sides of the Rzhev- Sychevka road. During this clash, the “Kampfgruppe Hochbaum” overwhelmed Soviet infantry grouped in the village of Bolshoye Kropotovo. The German assault crushed the 147 Rifle Division, thus Wehrmacht troops were able to proceed to the open fields east of the village. After Bolshoye Kropotovo was secured, Oberst Hochbaum spent the night at that location awaiting reports from the units deployed in the south. The 78 Infantry Division under General Völker, operating in that area, attempted to restore the defences in their sector of the front. The situation was tense due to the constant Soviet Army onslaught. With help from the 9 Panzer Division, efforts were made to liquidate the breaches made by the enemy. In the afternoon, one of the battalions from the 9 Division, along with some sub-units of the 13 and 14 Panzer Grenadier Regiments (Pz.Gr.Rgt. 13 and 14) from the 5 Panzer Division, was able to re-establish a continuous defensive front between the villages of Zherebtsovo and Khlepen. It was made possible by countering the attacks conducted by the 8 Guards Rifle Corps. Meanwhile, “Kampfgruppe Reumont” was preparing for an attack north along the Rzhev- Sychyeka road against Soviet tank units active in the area. In the late afternoon, adjusting to the dramatically changing situation, General von Arnim, commander of the XXXIX Armoured Corps, made another change to the command structure. Generalleutnant Scheller, commander of the 9 Panzer Division, was made responsible for the counter-attacks carried out against the main Soviet armoured forces operating along, and east of, the Rzhev- Sychevka road. As it turned out, all the German counter actions undertaken that evening were unsuccessful, partially due to the snow fall. Generally, on November 26 the Germans only narrowly avoided a catastrophic defeat. It was the chaotic actions of the attacking Soviet Army units that allowed the Wehrmacht to block enemy breaches. th
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Early in the morning of November 27, General von Arnim directed the 102 Infantry Division located in the northern sector to abide by the orders from the 9 Panzer Division. The infantry was to protect the regions north of the Osuga River and between the Osuga and Vazuza rivers. The heaviest Soviet assaults of that day were directed against the German defensive positions in the vicinity of Nikonovo. At 9:15, “Kampfgruppe Hochbaum” reported that the Soviet offensive had forced the group to abandon the defence of Novaya Grinevka village, and withdraw to Nikonovo. Furthermore, Oberst Hochbaum warned that the testimony of Russian prisoners and deserters indicate preparations for a massive offensive to commence in the area that very morning. The attack was to be conducted by the 2 Guards Cavalry Corps. In an effort to thwart that threat and weaken Soviet pressure on Khlepen township, the newly created Combat Group “Scheller” (“Kampfgruppe Scheller”), named after Generalleutnant Scheller, was to launch an attack towards Aristovo. It was expected that the south flank of the Soviet offensive forces could be found in that general area. As the day went by, the German nd
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situation worsened. At 13:00 hours the Soviet forces began another attack, most likely the 20 Cavalry Division that sent its units in a two-pronged formation from Novaya Grinevka and Aristovo towards Nikonovo. As the telephone lines were not functioning, Oberst von Bodenhausen from the 31 Panzer Regiment of the 5 Panzer Division sent a radio message: “Heavy tank attacks from the east and south have made the situation very serious.” Soon after, the 9 Panzer Division reported via radio: “Group Hochbaum’s tank attacks on Aristovo are a failure. Eighteen enemy tanks are destroyed and eight of ours are lost. Many other of our tanks are damaged, but they can be brought home.” The reminder of “Gruppe Hochbaum” fought its way through Russian lines and joined Oberst von Bodenhausen’s forces. The German units, under heavy artillery fire, had to fend off successive Soviet attacks. The first one was carried out by the 247 Rifle Division, the subsequent one by the newly-arrived 1 Guards Motorised Rifle Division. Despite a very difficult situation, the combat groups dispatched from the 9 Panzer Division were able to stop the reserve units of the 20 Army deployed into action. The 22 and the 200 Tank Brigades, supported by units of the 6 Motorised Rifle Brigade, came to a standstill at the outskirts of Soustovo, Azarovo and Nikishyno, northeast of Sychevka. th
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On November 28, the Russians began operations as early as 4 o’clock in the morning. At Nikonovo, Combat Group “von Bodenhausen” (“Kampfgruppe von Bodenhausen”) came under heavy attack. At 5:50, the I Battalion of the 430 Grenadier Regiment (I/Gr.Rgt. 430) reached the village of Podosinovka. General von Arnim ordered the battalion to support the 9 Panzer Division tanks in a northward attack launched at dawn against the south flank of advancing Soviet troops. Before the attack commenced, units of the Red Army began their own assault on Podosinovka. Russian tanks, infantry and cavalry forced the Germans to assume defensive positions. The clash lasted throughout the day without resolution. “Combat Journal of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” reflects the events of the day: “The 9 Army’s front is under continuous enemy attacks (…) Northeast of Sychevka the 9 Panzer Division joins the encounter. A tank battle ensues, during which 56 enemy tanks are destroyed.” In the evening, General von Arnim ordered the 9 Panzer Division to muster men from the quartermaster and support units as well as convalescents, to create reserve troops. By November 30, these soldiers, as the 5 Panzer Division reserve units, were to be positioned at the defence lines. By the end of the day, the possibility of encircling Soviet troops, which managed to break through the German lines, became apparent. th
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During the night of November 29, the Germans attacked the flank and the rear of the Soviet group, which breached the defences. The units of the XXVII Corps attacked from the north, while the XXXXIV Armoured Corps with the 9 Panzer Division at the forefront moved in from the south. This manoeuvre allowed the Wehrmacht to close the gaps made by the Soviets in the German defence front at the vicinity of Lozkhi and Nikonovo. The combat groups dispatched from the 9 Panzer Division were involved in series of encounters, but did manage to advance through Bolshoe and Maloe Kropotovo, Nikonovo, Aristovo and Podosinovka. Additionally, in the same area, located east of the th
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Rzhev-Sychevka railway line, the German forces managed to sack a group of 20 Army units. Among these units were parts of the 2 Cavalry Corps, 22 and 200 Tank Brigades, some 6 Motorised Rifle Brigade’s battalions and the remnants of the 1 Bicycle Motorcycle Brigade. The 9 Panzer Division’s combat groups continued with their advance towards Nikonovo and Belokhvostovo south of Lozkhi, under constant counterattacks by Soviet troops from the inside as well as the outside of the sack. th
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On November 30 1942 the crisis at Nikonovo, Bolshoe and Maloe Kropotovo continued. The 1 Guards Motorised Rifle Division and the 29 Guards Rifle Division persisted with their tank and infantry attacks until the Soviet riflemen managed to break into Nikonovo. The German units were forced to abandon their positions. During the onslaught, Oberst Hochbaum was seriously wounded. In the late afternoon, the II Battalion of the 430 Grenadier Regiment (II/Gr.Rgt. 430) managed to recapture Nikonovo in a successful attack. The entry made in the “Kriegstagebuch” of OKW on that day states: “Army Group “ Mitte”: between Sychevka and Rzhev enemy breakthrough successful in the area of 9 Pz. Div. Counterattack in progress.” On the same day, the 9 Panzer Division was able to recapture and secure the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad line, by some German accounts referred to as a “lifeline” of the 9 Army. Indeed, this line, extending to Viazma, allowed for efficient transport of all supplies for Generaloberst Model’s army. The combat was very intense; the Red Army sustained heavy losses and lost many tanks. st
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During the night of November 30, a breakout attempt by surrounded 20 Army units took place. Near Maloe Kropotovo, the 6 Tank Corps launched an attack from the east to support this action. On December 1, as a result of a very fierce fighting, during which the commander of the 200 Tank Brigade Colonel Vinakurov and political commissar Rybalko (who took over the helm of the 6 Motorised Rifle Brigade after the demise of its commander), both died, parts of the Soviet units manage to burst out of the pocket. The 6 Tank Corps attacking from the outside, had to be afterwards transferred to the reserve due to heavy losses. th
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The “Kriegstagebuch” of OKW under the date of December 1 communicates: “Army Group “ Mitte”: as of yesterday no unusual combat activities in the Rzhev region. The railroad line between Rzhev and Sychevka is being cleared of enemy troops form the south by the 9. Pz.Div and from the north by the 129 Infantry Division (129. Inf.Div.).” th
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The 9th Panzer Division was transported by train to the Orel region. An NCO along with an Oberleutnant in a passenger compartment. Medal ribbons are noteworthy.
As the rail line was secured, the 9 Panzer Division continued to fight northeast of the divisional supply base located in Sychevka. The major combat activities in the area of Vazuza subsided by December 4. On December 10, General Robert Martinek, the newly appointed commander of the XXXIX Armoured Corps, assigned the task of defending Vazuza to the 9 Panzer Division and the 78 Infantry Division. He also ordered strengthening of the defence positions. The 9 Panzer Division created a strong and deep defensive zone between the south bank of the Osuga River and Maloe Kropotovo, anchored around the fortified villages of Bolshoe Kropotovo and Maloe Kropotovo. Local skirmishes in that area lasted until December 18. th
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As mentioned before, on November 25 the 22 and the 41 Armies of the Kalinin Front began an offensive on the western segment of the Rzhev salient. The 41 Army’s attack targeted the town of Belyy, while the 22 Army marched from the north along the Luchesa River. The Belyy area was defended by the “Kampfgruppe von Wietersheim” created on November 25. The group consisted of the II Battalion of the 113 Panzer Grenadiers Regiment (II./Pz.Gr.Rgt. 113) supported by the II Detachment of the 73 Armoured Artillery Regiment (II./Pz.Art.Rgt. 73) and the I Battalion of the 33 Panzer Regiment. nd
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On the opening day of the offensive, the counter attack carried out by the II Battalion of the 1 Panzer Grenadiers Regiment (II./Pz.Gr.Rgt. 1) from the 1 Panzer Division under Oberst von der Meden, managed to free a tank company of the 33 Panzer Regiment, which fought throughout the day surrounded by the enemy in the village of Shamilovo, west of Shtepanovo. The unit, with the aid of eight damaged tanks, managed to repel all Soviet attacks. On November 30, the area breached by the Kalinin Front forces was reached by all available forces of the 9 and the 12 Panzer Divisions. Thus, on December 1 the Soviet 1 Motorised Corps led by General Solomatin, was forced into the defensive. It was evident that during the defence of Rzhev salient the units of the 9 Panzer Division for most part operated independently of each other, just like the I Battalion of the 33 st
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Panzer Regiment mentioned above. On December 14, during a joint action of the 33 Panzer Regiment and the 12 Panzer Division units, a Pz.Kpfw. III tank armed with Kwk. 39 L/60 50 millimetre gun sustained a hit. An anti-tank shell burst at the front observation view ports of the driver and machine gunner. Trooper Enke was killed, Schmidt, Ewald and Betz were wounded, whereas Fahnenjunker Ludwig Bauer managed to survive unharmed. rd
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An order dated December 15 dissolved the 9 Panzer Grenadier Brigade. On December 18, 1942, Generaloberst Model transferred the 9 Panzer Division to the north of the Rzhev salient. It was assigned to the “Burdach” Group of the XXVI Corps (“Gruppe Burdach” XXVI AK) led by Generalmajor Karl Burdach, commander of the 251 Infantry Division (251. Inf.Div.). Besides the 9 Panzer Division, the group consisted of 87 Infantry Division (87. Inf.Div.), 251 Infantry Division and solitary units of the 6 and 206 Infantry Divisions (6. and 206. Inf.Div). th
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At the beginning of 1943 combat groups of the 9 Panzer Division held positions in the Zaitsevo and Panovo townships, where under different weather conditions, humid, cold wind or sunny skies, they resisted enemy attacks or conducted counter-attacks. At that time, the 33 Panzer Regiment was weakened by a withdrawal of the II Battalion, transferred to Grafenwöhr in Germany. Once there, the unit was equipped with new Pz.Kpfw. V Panther tanks and re-designated as the Panzerabteilung 51 (Pz.Abt. 51) Army Troop (Heerestruppe) in accordance to an order issued on January 13 1943. th
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Until February 7, the 9 Panzer Division participated in the defence of Rzhev. It remained within the “Burdach” group until February 12. In the meantime, the newly created Corps “Scheele” (Korps “Scheele”) led by General der Infanterie Hans-Karl von Scheele, deployed north of Zhizdra, was in need of immediate assistance due to concentrated Soviet attacks. The 9 Panzer Division was assigned that task, so it had to be withdrawn from the front lines and directed west of Belyy. After reaching the town on February 25, the Division had to perform a 650 kilometre road march through Viazma, Smolensk, Roslavl and Briansk. It was a challenging stretch even though some of the distance was travelled by rail. By the end of February, the Division managed to reach the area threatened by Soviet forces. Upon arrival north of Zhizdra, the 9 Panzer Division was immediately drawn into a four week long battle lasting throughout March 1943. th
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Wooden anti-aircraft tower near the railway crossing, probably at Poltava. The photograph taken during the transfer of the 9. Pz.Div. away from the front, so it could recuperate before the “ Citadel ” operation.
Due to a Soviet breakthrough, the entire Division, in a state of emergency equivalent to that of a fire-fighter squad, was deployed to the general vicinity of Volkovo, in the region between the townships of Jesenok-Dubishtche-Askovo, as early as March 1. In the following few days, the Division fought heavy defensive battles, launching frequent counter-attacks carried out mostly by the 33 Panzer Regiment and the I battalion of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. A large number of Soviet prisoners were taken during these encounters. rd
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On March 7, Major Gerard Willing, commander of the III Battalion of the 33 Panzer Regiment, was decorated with the Knight’s Cross. rd
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The remainder of the 9 Panzer Division units, including the 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the 59 Motorcycle Rifle Battalion, the 86 Armoured Pioneer Battalion and the 50 Tank Destroyer Battalion fought as regular infantry units. Whenever possible, the units attempted to stay in close proximity to the tanks of the 33 Panzer Regiment, particularly during the heavy fighting in the so called “Gorn forest” (“Gornwald”) on the northern bank of the Jasenok River. This wooded area, named after Oberst Gorn, commander of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, for half a month became a scene of extremely fierce battles with frequent occurrences of hand to hand combat - recalls C. H. Hermann in his book “Die 9. Panzer-Division 1939-1945”. th
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The photographs taken during that time indicate that the 9 Panzer Division was using an emblem, most likely a temporary one. On one of the photographs, it is displayed on a panel next to the “Schmahl” inscription, referring to Oberst Ludwig Schmahl, the leader of the 33 Panzer Regiment. It is possible that the use of the emblem was restricted to either the 33 Regiment, or one of the temporary combat groups. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that it was adopted for the entire division, to mislead the enemy into believing that a new unit had arrived to reinforce the front. On the panel mentioned above, a firefighter equipped with a fire hose may be noticed. It probably referred to the role of the 9 Panzer Division, used in the critical areas of the front as a fire brigade would be used in extinguishing fires. th
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An order to withdraw another battalion from the 33 Panzer Regiment was issued on March 15, this time it was the III Battalion. On April 3, the troops boarded a train in the town Orel and travelled to St. Pölten, Austria. The battalion was transformed into the 506 Heavy Tank Battalion (schwere Pz.Abt. 506) armed with Pz.Kpfw. VI Tiger tanks on May 8. . rd
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Meanwhile, an order dated March 16 initiated formation of a new armoured reconnaissance battalion for the 9 Panzer Division. The battalion, most likely stationed in Bruck an der Leitha, Austria, was to achieve combat readiness by April 20 1943. th
Beginning on March 18, the number of Red Army attacks north of Zhizdra diminished. On March 26, Unteroffizier Heinrich Hendricks from the 9 Company of the 33 Panzer Regiment became another recipient of the Ritterkreuz, a few day later, on 48
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March 31, Unteroffizier Leopold Liehl from the 7 Company of the 10 Panzer Grenadiers Regiment received the same honour. th
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The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht was quite willing to show due recognition to the 9 Panzer Division for its efforts in March 1943. On April 3 Generalleutnant Walter Scheller, the commander, became the 21st divisional recipient of the Ritterkreuz. On the same occasion, Oberleutnant Fritz Jacoby from the 7 Company of the 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was also decorated. Overall, for the actions at Zhizdra the soldiers of the 9 Panzer Division received five Knight’s Crosses, 13 German Crosses in Gold (Deutsche Kreuz in Gold), 213 Iron Crosses I class (Eisernen Kreuz I Klasse) and 1,545 Iron Crosses II class (Eisernen Kreuz II Klasse). Two more soldiers were listed in the Honour Roll of the German Army (Ehrenblattnennung). On the other side of the bloody battles were the hundreds of soldiers buried at Zhizdra cemetery. th
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An officer of the 102nd Panzer Artillery Regiment, most likely in a rank of Leutnant , decorated with Allgemeinesturmabzeichen .An Iron Cross as well as the Winterschlacht im Osten (Eastern Front Medal) ribbons are also visible.
On April 20, the entire 9 Division was withdrawn from active duties and, as a reserve of Army Group “Mitte”, was concentrated in the region of Briansk and Karatschev to allow for reorganization, training, replenishing of equipment and well-deserved rest. On that day, Feldwebel Wilhelm Steger from the 6 Company of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment received the Ritterkreuz. th
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In the meantime, the high command assigned the Division to the 2 Panzer Army for the purpose of the new offensive, code-named operation “Zitadelle” (“Citadel”), planned for the summer. Therefore, on April 25, the Division was ordered to relocate to the vicinity of Orel. The first rail transports to the new concentration point departed the very same day. Once the destination was reached, intensive training commenced. Generalleutnant Scheller’s goal was to increase the coordination level between sub-units fulfilling the same objective. As one of the exercises, with a practical purpose of improving the supply route, the 1 Company of the 86 Armoured Pioneer Battalion constructed a 24 ton capacity wooden bridge. The weeks of relatively warm spring weather were spent not just on exercises. Week long rest periods were allowed in a nd
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specially established divisional recreation centre, named “General-Scheller-Heim” (“House of General Scheller”) at the township of Dobromo. Amateur theatre spectacles with Russian folk music concerts were regularly given at Smiyevo.
The 9th Panzer Division transported by train to the Orel region.
Three officers from different 9th Division’s units. The Major , first from the left, was decorated with the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold, the Leutnant , most likely from the Panzer Grenadier Regiment has the Eisernes Kreuz I klasse and the Infanterie-Sturmabzeichen (Infantry Assault Badge) and the Oberleutnant , probably an artillery officer, E isernes Kreuz I klasse as well as Allgemeinesturmabzeichen .Two latter officers were also decorated with the Winterschlacht im Osten medals.
During that time, some new organizational changes took place. According to the order
issued on April 20, the IV Detachment of the 102 Armoured Artillery Regiment was restored to its original designation of the 287 Land Forces Anti-aircraft Artillery Detachment. On May 5, the 3 Anti-aircraft company of the 50 Armoured Tank Destroyer Battalion (3(Flak)/Pz.Jg.Abt. 50) was re-designated as the 4 Company of the 287 Land Forces Anti-aircraft Artillery Detachment (4/H.Flakart.Abt. 287). The order dated May 7 converted the II Detachment of the 102 Armoured Artillery Regiment into a self-propelled artillery detachment. Additional changes took place on June 13. The 9 Company of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the 9 Company of the 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment were transformed into self-propelled units. At the same time, the 701 Company of Heavy Infantry Guns, integrated into the 9 Division in the spring of 1940, was dissolved and absorbed by the self-propelled companies listed above. As the day of the summer offensive at the Kursk bend approached, the new 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion (Pz.Aufk.Abt. 9) joined the Division on May 27. As stated before, this unit was drafted on March 16, with the expected readiness for April 20. It comprised the headquarters, two light armoured reconnaissance companies (lePz.Aufk.Kp. (gep)) and one heavy, partially armoured, reconnaissance company (sPz.Aufk.Kp. (tgep)). It was planned that the remnants of the 59 Battalion of Motorcycle Rifles were to be incorporated into the 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion as well. However, as an interim measure, an order issued on April 19 added a company of Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicles “b” (Panzer-Spähwagen-Kompanie “b” (Pz.Spah.Kp. “b”)) to the 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion. The company was equipped with the reconnaissance tanks designated as Panzerspähwagen II Ausf. L (Sd.Kfz. 123) “Luchs“ (“Lynx”). 54
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An artillery Leutnant awarded the Eisernes Kreuz I klasse. In the background an artillery observation tank Artillerie Panzerbeobachtungswagen III Ausf. G (Sd.Kfz. 143) assigned to the II Squadron of the 102nd Armoured Artillery Regiment.
The same officer in front of an Artillerie Panzerbeobachtungswagen III. The vehicle has a modified gun mantlet. The dummy gun barrel is on the right hand side, while a MG 34 machine gun mount is visible in the centre. The tank was equipped with the FuG 4 and FuG 8 radio communication transmitters. A retractable TUF 2 periscope may be seen on the turret.
The same Artillerie Panzerbeobachtungswagen III Ausf. G in factory paint scheme, soon after the arrival to the Division. Only standard Wehrmacht markings, the Balkenkreuz, are painted on the tank. The vehicle does not have a machine gun in the turret. The frontal armour has a 30 mm reinforcing layer, and the machine gun ball mount in the hull was eliminated.
According to the original plan, the company was to become the 5 Company of the 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion, but later this designation was changed to the 2 th
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Company. The Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicles Company “b” was established according to the order issued on February 23 1943. It was the first Wehrmacht unit to be equipped with the “Luchs” tanks. The company had 18 tanks of this type. Formation of the unit took place in France; its combat readiness was attained on March 25 1943. At first, it was intended to join the 10 Panzer Division, or according to other sources the 9 SS Panzer Grenadiers Division (9. SS-Pz. Gren.Div.). At the beginning of April 1943, it was decided that the “Luchs” company would be assigned to the 9 Panzer Division. The official identifier of this sub-unit from April 30 was the 2 Panzer Reconnaissance Company of the 9 Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion (2. Panzer-SpähKompanie/Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 9). On April 26, the company was dispatched from France to Germany so it could join the rest of the recently formed reconnaissance battalion. An order dated May 4 requested the transfer of the 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion, including the newly formed Pz.Spah.Kp. “b”, from Bruck an der Leitha to Army Group “South” to commence on May 11. As the battalion reached Orel, it was most likely reinforced with the remainder of the 59 Motorcycle Rifle Battalion. 57
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Apart from the “Luchs” company, the 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion had two reconnaissance companies equipped with half-tracked armoured transporters Sd.Kfz. 250, a reconnaissance platoon with Schwimmwagen amphibious all-terrain cars, and some heavy self-propelled anti-tank guns, most likely of sPak. (Sfl) “Marder” type. As of June 1943, the 2 Company of the 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion had at its disposal 29 “Luchs” tanks and four armoured transporters Sd.Kfz. 251/1. Beginning in May 1943 the 9 Panzer Division, apart from the reconnaissance tanks mentioned above and typical equipment replacements, received some new types of combat ordnance. According to R. Stoves, the I Battalion of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the 3 Company of the 8 Armoured Pioneer Battalion received some half-tracked armoured transporters Sd.Kfz. 251, while the 287 Land Forces Anti-aircraft Artillery Detachment obtained three new batteries armed with a total of twelve 88 mm anti-aircraft guns. In the same month, the Division acquired four heavy armoured reconnaissance vehicles, most likely the eightwheel version, and six medium half-tracked armoured transporters Sd.Kfz. 251/16 armed with flamethrowers. As this equipment arrived, a flame thrower platoon (Flamm-Zug (gep)), was created on May 13. The platoon was assigned to the headquarters company of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. In June, the 9 Division acquired an additional 26 Pz.Kpfw. IV tanks and one half-tracked transporter. At the same time, the II Detachment of the 102 Armoured Artillery Regiment was equipped with the new self-propelled 15 cm heavy howitzers - schwere Panzerhaubitze sFH 18/1 auf Geschützwagen III/IV Sd.Kfz. 165 “Hummel” (“Bumble bee”), and self-propelled light howitzers - leichte Feldhaubitze 18/2 (sf) auf Geschützwagen II “Wespe” (“Wasp”). In July there were twelve “Wespe” howitzers on the divisional roster. th
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As for other new equipment, a few artillery observation vehicles - Artillerie Panzerbeobachtungswagen III Ausf. G, Sd.Kfz. 143 - were assigned to either the II Detachment of the 102 Armoured Artillery Regiment, or the 102 Armoured Observation Battery. nd
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The presentation of the new equipment took place on June 12, as the 9 Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion paraded in front of the XXXXVIII Armoured Corps’ commander, General der Panzertruppe Joachim Lemelsen. th
Photographs published in Mr. Hermann’s book indicate that the 9 Panzer Division obtained half-tracked armoured transporters Sd.Kfz. 250, and some eight wheeled armoured reconnaissance vehicles Sd.Kfz. 231 as well as their derivative, the Sd.Kfz. 233 armed with a short barrel 75 mm gun. In the meantime, on July 8, Oberst Gorn, commander of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, received the Oak Leaves and Swords with his Knight’s Iron Cross. This decoration was awarded for his stance during the March combat at Zhizdra, he was just the 30 Wehrmacht soldier recognized in such a way. As mentioned before, two tank battalions were withdrawn from the 33 Panzer Regiment, so by that time the 9 Panzer Division had only a single tank battalion. th
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As of July 1 1943, the divisional order of battle was as follows: Stab/9. Panzer-Division - 9 Panzer Division Headquarters, consisting of: th
Div.Kdo. [Divisionskommando] - Divisional Command Div.Kart.St. (mot) 60. [Divisionskartenstelle] - Divisional Mapping Detachment, motorised Pz.Rgt. 33 - 33 Panzer Regiment, consisting of: rd
Stab - Headquarters I. Abt. [Abteilung]- I Battalion Stab included: Pz.Na-Zug, [Panzer-Nachrichten-Zug] - Armoured Signal Platoon Pz.Aufk-Zug [Panzer Aufklärungs-Zug]- Armoured Reconnaissance Platoon Pz.Werk.Kp. (0./2. Zug) [Panzerwerkstatt-Kompanie (ohne 2. Zug)] - Repair (maintenance) Company without Second Platoon I. Abteilung had: Stab - Headquarters Stab.Kp. [Kompanie] - Headquarters / Staff Company three (1., 2., 3.) lePz.Kp. [leicht Panzer Kompanie] - Light Tank / Armoured Company one (4.) mPz.Kp. [mittlere Panzer Kompanie] - Medium Tank / Armoured Company Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 (gep) [gepanzerte] - 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment (armoured) included: th
Stab - Headquarters I. Bataillon (gep) - I Battalion (armoured) II. Bataillon (mot) - II Battalion (motorised) Stab had: Stab.Kp (tgep) [teil-gepanzerte] - Headquarters / Staff Company (partially armoured) (9.)sIG. Kp (Sf) [schwer Infanterie-Geschütz (selbstfahr)] - Heavy Infantry Gun Company (self-propelled) (10.) Flak Kp. (Sf) [Flugabwehrkanone] - Anti-Aircraft Company (self-propelled) Flamm-Zug (gep) - Flame Thrower Platoon (armoured) I. Bataillon consisted of:
Stab - Headquarters three (1., 2., 3.) Pz.Gren.Kp. [Panzergrenadier-Kompanie] - Panzer Grenadier Company one 4. sPz.Gren.Kp. (gep) - Heavy Panzer Grenadier Company (armoured) II. Bataillon consisted of: Stab - Headquarters three (5., 6., 7.) Pz.Gren.Kp.(mot) - Panzer Grenadier Company (motorised) one 8. sPz.Gren.Kp. - Heavy Panzer Grenadier Company Panzergrenadier-Regiment 11 - 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment consisted of: th
Stab - Headquarters I. Bataillon (mot) - I Battalion (motorised) II. Bataillon (mot) - II Battalion (motorised) Stab included: Stab.Kp.(mot) - Headquarters / Staff Company (motorised) (9.) sIG.Kp (Sf) - Heavy Infantry Gun Company (self-propelled) (10.) Flak Kp. (Sf). - Anti-Aircraft Company (self-propelled) I. Bataillon had: Stab - Headquarters three (1., 2., 3.) Pz.Gren.Kp. (mot) - Panzer Grenadier Company (motorised) one (4.) sPz.Gren.Kp. (gep) - Heavy Panzer Grenadier Company (armoured) II. Bataillon had: Stab - Headquarters three (5., 6., 7.) Pz.Gren.Kp .(mot) - Panzer Grenadier Company (motorised) one (8.) sPz.Gren.Kp. (mot) - Heavy Panzer Grenadier Company (motorised) 65
Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 102 consisted of: Stab - Headquarters I.Abt. [Abteilung] - I Artillery Detachment (battalion) II.Abt. (Sf) - II Artillery Detachment (battalion) (self-propelled) III Abt.(s) - III Artillery Detachment (battalion) (heavy) Stab had: Stab.Bttr. (mot) [Batterie] - Headquarters/Staff Battery (motorised) Pz.Beob.Bttr. (mot) 102 [Beobachtung Batterie] - Armoured Observation Battery (motorised) I. Abteilung included: Stab - Headquarters Stab.Bttr (mot) - Headquarters / Staff Battery (motorised) three (1., 2., 3.) Bttr. leFH. (mot Z) [leicht Feldhaubitze (motorisiert mit Zugmachine)] Light Field Howitzer Battery (motorised tow traction) II. Abteilung included: Stab - Headquarters Stab.Bttr. (gep) - Headquarters / Staff Battery (armoured) two (4., 5.) Bttr. leFH. (Sfl)[Selbstfahrlafette] - Light Field Howitzer Battery (self-
propelled tracked carriage) equipped with “Wespe” vehicles one (6.) Bttr. sFH (Sfl) - Heavy Field Howitzer Battery (self-propelled tracked carriage) equipped with “Hummel” vehicles III. Abteilung included: Stab - Headquarters Stab.Bttr. (mot) - Headquarters/Staff Battery (motorised) one (7.) Bttr. 10,5-cm sK (mot Z [schwer Kanone (motorisiert mit Zugmachine)] - Heavy Field Gun Battery (motorised tow traction) two (8., 9.) Bttr. sFH. (mot Z) - Heavy Field Howitzer Battery (motorised tow traction) Heeres-Flakartillerie-Abt. 287 - Battalion of Anti-aircraft Artillery of the Ground Forces consisted of: Stab - Headquarters Stab.Bttr. (mot) - Headquarters/Staff Battery (motorised) two (1., 2.) sFlak-Bttr. (mot Z) - Heavy Anti-aircraft Battery (motorised tow traction) one (3.) leFlak-Bttr. - 2 cm Flak (mot Z) - Light Anti-aircraft Battery (motorised tow traction) one (4.) leFlak-Bttr. - 2 cm Flak (Sfl) - Light Anti-aircraft Battery (self-propelled tracked carriage) one 2 cm Flak-Vierl (Sfl) [Flakvierling] - Quad anti-aircraft gun (self-propelled tracked carriage) leArt.Kol. (20 t) [Artillerie Kolonne] - Light Artillery Column (20 ton) one Scheinw. Stf (mot) [Scheinwerfer-Staffel] - Searchlight Section, motorised as part of the 3. Bttr. Panzerjäger-Abteilung 50 - Tank Destroyer (anti-tank) Battalion consisted of: Stab - Headquarters two (1., 2.) Pz.Jg.Kp. (Sf) - Tank Destroyer Company (self-propelled) one (3.) Pz.Jg.Kp. (mot Z) - Tank Destroyer Company (motorised tow traction) Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 - Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion included: Stab - Headquarters one (1.) Pz.Spah.Kp. [Panzerspäh-Kompanie] - Armoured Scout Vehicle Company including sPz.Spah-Zug [schwerer Panzerspäh-Zug] - Heavy Armoured Scout Vehicle Platoon equipped with Sd.Kfz. 233 one (2.) Pz.Spah.Kp. “b” - Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle Company “b” equipped with PzKpfw. II Ausf. L one (4.) lePz.Aufk.Kp. (gep) - Light Armoured Reconnaissance Company (armoured) one (5.) sPz.Aufk.Kp. (gep) - Heavy Armoured Reconnaissance Company (armoured) one lePz.Aufk.Kol. (mot) - Light Reconnaissance Column (motorised)
Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 86 - Armoured Pioneer Battalion included: Stab - Headquarters two 1., 2. Pi.Kp. (mot)[ Pionier] - Pioneer Company (motorised) one (3.) Pi.Kp. (gep) - Pioneer Company (armoured) Brücke-Kol. “K” 86 - Bridge Column one lePi.Kol. (mot) - Light Pioneer Column (motorised) Panzer-Nachrichten Abteilung 85 - Armoured Communications Battalion included: Stab - Headquarters one (1.) Pz.Fsp.Kp.[Panzer Fernsprechkompanie] - Armoured Telephonecommunications Company one (2.) Pz.Fu.Kp.[Panzer Funkkompanie]- Armoured Radio-communications Company one lePz.Na.Kol. (mot). [leichte Panzer-Nachrichten-Kolonne] - Light Armoured Signal Transportation Column Feldersatz-Bataillon 60 - Field replacement Battalion consisted of: Stab - Headquarters four 1., 2., 3., 4. FE.KP (fsbw) [Feldersatz-Kompanie] - Field Replacement Company one Div.K-Schule [Divisions-Kampfschule] - Divisional Combat School Komandeur-Divisions-Nachschub Truppen 60 - Command of the Panzer Divisions Supply Troops included: Stab - Headquarters three 1./60, 2./60, 3./60 Kf.Kp. (120 t) [Kraftfahr] - Motor Transport Company (120 tons) two 4./60, 5/60 Kf.Kp. (90 t) - Motor Transport Company (90 tons) one 60 Fahr-Schw. (60 t) [Fahr-Schwadron] - Horse-drawn squadron (60 tons) one 60. Nach.Kp. (mot) [Nachschub] - Supply Company (motorised) Kraftfahrpark Truppen 60 - Vehicle Park Troops had three companies: 1./60, 2./60, 3./60 Werk.Kp. (mot) [Werkstatt-Kompanie] - Workshop / Maintenance Company (motorised) one (60.) bew. Nach.Stf.ETle. (75 t) [Staffel fur Ersatzteile] - Spare Parts Supply Column Verwaltungs Truppen 60 - Administration Troops included three companies: Bä.Kp. (mot) 60 [Bäkerei-Kompanie] - Bakery Company (motorised) Schl.Kp. (mot) 60 [ Schlachterei-Kompanie] - Butcher Company (motorised) Va. (mot) 60 [Verpfegungsamt] - Ration’s Administration Detachment Sanitäts Truppen 60 - Medical Troops had:
1./60, 2./60 San.Kp. (mot)[ Sanitätskompanie] - Medical Company (motorised) three 1./60, 2./60, 3./60 Kr.Kw-Zug (mot)[Krankenkraftwagenzug] - Ambulance Platoon (motorised) one Tr Eg-Zug (mot) [Truppen-Entgiftungs-Zug] - Decontamination Platoon (motorised) Feldgendarmerie Trupp 60 - Field Military Police Troops Feldpostamt 60 - Field Post Office.
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The report dated July 1 lists the 9 Panzer Division troop shortfall as 238, and its losses as 501 soldiers. Out of the latter number, there were 16 dead, 9 wounded, 218 ill and 258 lost for other reasons. Troop replacements totalled 709, out of which there were 375 draftees and 334 convalescents. th
The number of divisional tanks available on that day amounted to: 25 Pz.Kpfw. III operational, and three under repair; 34 Pz.Kpfw. IV plus two under repair. In addition, the 9 Division had 275 half-tracked armoured transporters, armoured vehicles and armoured observation vehicles, plus 13 under repair. In all, there were 288 armoured combat vehicles. There were also 17, including one undergoing repairs, heavy self-propelled antitank guns, most likely “Marder”; 46 heavy motor traction anti-tank guns (sPak. (mot. Z)), plus four under repair, and 46 guns (Art-Gesch), out of which one was undergoing maintenance. . th
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According to T. Jentz, the ordinance of the 9 Panzer Division on July 1 1943 included: one Pz.Kpfw. II tank, eight Pz.Kpfw. III tanks armed with short barrel (L/42) 50 mm gun, 30 Pz.Kpfw. III armed with long barrel (L/60) 50 mm gun, eight Pz.Kpfw. IV armed with a short barrel 75 mm gun and 30 Pz.Kpfw IV tanks with a long barrel 75 mm gun, supplemented by six Pz.Bef. III. Thus, the main combat force included 38 Pz.Kpfw. III tanks and an equal number of the Pz.Kpfw. IV. Accordingly, it may be stated that a few days prior to operation “ Zitadelle” the 9 Panzer Division was fully prepared for action, being almost at 100% of troop and equipment potential. The report filed on July 1 indicated the percentage of equipment in existence, versus the required allowance: Pz.Kpfw. III- 53%, Pz.Kpfw. IV - 257%, SPW and Pz.Spah.Wg. - 89 %, sPak. (Sfl) - 89%, mPak. (mot. Z) and sPak. (mot. Z) - 100 %, artillery - 92 %. th
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Noteworthy is the surplus of Pz.Kpfw. IV tanks. According to the quota, the number should be 22, while in reality there were 38 tanks. At the onset of operation “Zitadelle”, a concentric attack on Kursk was to be launched both from the north and from the south. Army Group “Mitte” led by Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, was to advance from its line of departure established east of Maloarkhangelsk. The group consisted of 15 infantry divisions, six panzer divisions and one motorised division. The 9 Army, led by Generaloberst Model, was supposed to break through the Soviet defences on a 40 km stretch of land between Orel and Kursk, more precisely between the villages of Gnilets and Butryki, at the junction of the Soviet 13 and 70 Army defence sectors. The XXXXVII Armoured Corps under General der Panzertruppe Lemelsen, positioned in the centre of the 9 Army, was composed of the 6 Infantry Division and the 2 , 9 , and 20 Panzer Divisions. As the breakthrough was achieved, the attack was to unfold between the th
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road and the railroad tracks leading to the town of Kursk, aiming towards the hills north of the town in order to make contact with the Army Group “South”. According to the details of the plan, the XXXXVII Armoured Corps would dispatch the 6 Infantry Division and the 20 Panzer Division, keeping the stronger 2 and 9 Panzer Divisions in reserve until the Soviet defences were breached. . 71
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Operation “Zitadelle” was initiated on July 5 1943. On that day, one day prior to the deployment of the 9 Panzer Division, divisional chaplain Baumgärtner visited the encampments to perform religious services. One of the masses was held at Smiyevo, where the 86 Armoured Pioneer Battalion was stationed. Even though the fighting lasted throughout the night, the 6 Infantry Division and the 20 Panzer Division did not manage to penetrate the Soviet lines. Despite that, on the evening of July 5 Generaloberst Model: “Simply informed General Lemelsen of his decision (…), on the following day the 2 and 9 Panzer Divisions were to join the combat, regardless of the earlier plan to deploy them only after a breakthrough was achieved.” th
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23 Halder F., v. III, op. cit, p. 634.
24 Hermann C H, op. cit, p. 115.
25 Schramm P. E, op. cit, p. 793.
26 Schramm P. E, Kriegstagesbuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1942, Teilband 2, Eine Dokumentation, p. 967.
27 Jentz T. L, Die deutsche Panzertruppen 1943-1945, Band II, Wölfersheim-Berstadt, 1999, p. 24.
28 Glantz D. M., Zhukov’s greatest defeat. The Red Army’s epic disaster in Operation Mars, 1942, Lawrence, Kansas 1999
29 Glantz cites “General Hochbaum’s”. Hochbaum had a rank of Oberst at the time.
30 Glantz D. M., op. cit., p. 100.
31 Ibidem.
32 Schramm P. E., op. cit., Teilband 2, p. 1043.
33 Schramm P. E., op. cit., Teilband 2, p. 1057.
34 Hermann C. H., op. cit., p. 117-119.
35 Glantz D. M., op.cit., p. 185.
36 Schramm P. E, op. cit., Teilband 2, p. 1064.
37 Glantz D. M., op.cit., p. 259.
38 Battistelli P. P., Panzer Division: The Eastern Front 1941-43, Botley, Oxford, p. 51, and Galntz D. M., op. cit. p. 116.
39 http://www.stengerhistorica.com/History/WarArchive/Ritterkreuztraeger/Bauer.htm, http://www.ritterkreuztraeger-1939-45.de/Infanterie/B/Bauer-Ludwig.htm According to the information in the above sources, until the end of the war four more tanks in which Bauer fought were hit.
40 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 121.
41 Hermann C. H, op. cit, p. 120.
42 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 122.
43 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 111.
44 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 123.
45 Hermann C. H, op. cit, p. 172.
46 Hermann C. H, op. cit, p. 124.
47 Nevenkin K, Fire Brigades: The Panzer Divisions 1943-1945, Winnipeg 2008, p. 266.
48 Hermann C. H, op. cit, p. 125.
49 Hermann C. H, op. cit, p. 172.
50 Ibidem.
51 Ibidem.
52 Hermann C H, op. cit., p. 130.
53 Hermann C H, op. cit., p. 127.
54 Tessin states that the order was issued May 1 1943. Tessin G., Verbände und Truppen…VI Band, Osnabrück 1972, p. 181.
55 Michalski H., Zapomniane wersje Panzera II, cz. II, Militaria XX wieku, Nr 3/2009, p. 78.
56 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 266.
57 Michalski H., op. cit., p. 75.
58 Michalski H., op. cit, p. 75.
59 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 266.
60 Michalski H., op. cit, p. 75
61 Stoves R, op. cit., p. 70.
62 According to Stoves, Pz.Rgt. 33 (Stab and I. Abteilung) received about 85 medium Pz.Kpfw. IV with a long barrel gun during that period; in comparison with the data cited by Jentz and Nevenkin, it seems to be a rather incredible number. Stoves, op. cit, p. 70.
63 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 281.
64 Hermann C. H., op. cit, p. 171.
65 At the time, heavy infantry cannons towed by means of motor traction were unofficially included in the unit.
66 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 278-281.
67 Including 50 mm anti-tank guns Pak 38, described by Neverkin, probably just like in the official German documents as mPak - mittlerePak - medium anti-tank cannon.
68 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 283-285.
69 Jentz T. L, Die deutsche…, op. cit., Band II , p. 79.
70 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 267.
71 Piekałkiewicz J., Operacja Cytadela, Janki k. Warszawy 2004, p. 107.
72 Newton S. H., Ulubiony dowódca Hitlera, Warszawa 2007 , p. 155-156.
73 Hermann C. H., op. cit, p. 130.
74 Newton S. H., op. cit., p. 162.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CHART OF THE 9 PANZER DIVISION ON JULY 1943 th
Thus, the 9 Panzer Division was deployed on July 6. At 3:30, reinforced units of the XXXXVII Armoured Corps, over 600 combat vehicles strong, repeated the attack. On the left flank, the 6 Infantry Division led by General Grossmann, supported by the panzer grenadiers of the 18 Panzer Division and tanks from the 9 Panzer Division, was supposed to bypass Soborovka village, advancing toward hill 274 and Olkhovatka. At 5:40, Generaloberst Model placed a telephone call to Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, commander of Army Group “Mitte”, revealing his plan of action. Generaloberst Model was convinced that the hills surrounding the townships of Ponyri, Olkhovatka, Kashary and Teploye would be captured before the end of the day. This achievement would allow the 9 Army to destroy the main lines of General Rokossovsky’s defences and continue an attack on Kursk. The problem with the plan was that during the breakthrough, the 2 and 9 Panzer Division sustained such heavy losses that they would be unable to carry on the advance to surround the Soviet forces. Thus, the burden of the attack on Kursk would fall on the 4 Panzer Division. Generaloberst Model informed von Kluge that the assigned forces were too weak, so he asked if the 10 Panzer Grenadier Division (10. Pz.Gr.Div.) and the 12 Panzer Division could be deployed from the reserves of Army Group “Mitte”. th
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As the day progressed, the forces of the XXXXVII Armoured Corps, that is the 6 Infantry Division along with the 2 and 9 Panzer Divisions, did not achieve any considerable success in penetrating the deeply arranged Soviet defence positions. In addition, the tactics of the attack had changed. Instead of infantry attacks supported by armour, the tanks and armoured guns spearheaded the advance. While the German tanks were able to gain ground in such a way, without infantry they could not hold the captured positions. “ It explains the fact that the efforts aimed at breaking deeper into the Soviet lines made by the 2 , 9 and the 20 Panzer Divisions were futile.” At about 15:30 hours,
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the army command received information that the 20 Panzer Division had captured Bobrik and was advancing towards Podolian. If the 2 and the 9 Panzer Divisions were to immediately switch the aim of the attack from south to west, the manoeuvre would tie the forces of the 16 Tank Corps at a critical moment, so Generalleutnant von Kessel’s attack could accelerate. Unfortunately, the tactical objectives of the attack could not be altered at the level of 9 Army headquarters. By the time the information reached Generaloberst Model, at around 4 in the afternoon, it was too late to divert any armoured forces towards the west. At 16:30 hours, Model ordered a change in the 9 Army’s artillery support arrangement, to concentrate the barrage in the area of von Kessel’s attack. It turned out to be an unfortunate decision that led to a short lived chaos, as the 6 Infantry Division and the 9 Panzer Division lost their artillery support for some time. th
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A group of 9th Panzer Division officers. The third from the left, an Oberst, was decorated with the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold. The second from the right has a rank of Hauptmann.
Meanwhile, the 9 Panzer Division conducted an attack on Ponyri township defended by the 307 Rifle Division under General Major Jenshin. The 9 Division encountered determined resistance from General Lieutenant Pukhov’s 13 Army, reinforced with mortar and anti-tank units. At about 18:30 hours, Model, most likely present at the front lines at the time, decided that the 4 Panzer Division led by General von Saucken, would not reinforce the attack conducted by the 9 Division. Instead, on July 7 it was to follow the 2 Panzer Division. th
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An Oberst from the 9th Panzer Division. The Deutsches Kreuz in Gold and the Winterschlacht im Osten ribbon are partially visible.
By the end of the day, the 9 Panzer Division launched an attack on the left wing of the Soviet 81 Rifle Division, which resulted in pushing the Russians back towards railroad station in Ponyri. th
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As Model returned to his headquarters at about 21:30 hours, he received a detailed report of the combat actions performed throughout the day. He again rejected his staff proposal to dispatch the 4 Panzer Division behind the 9 in the direction of Olkhovatka. “He came up with the idea of consolidating the dispersed units of the 18 Panzer Division, so it could, along with the 9 Panzer Division, secure the key position at Snova, where the Soviet 16 Tank Corps concentrated its forces according to the aerial reconnaissance.” th
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As proposed in this plan, the 9 Panzer Division would assume defensive positions, while the attack on Teploye would be conducted by the 2 and the 4 Panzer Divisions. At the same time, the 86 and the 296 Infantry Divisions (86. and 296. Inf.Div.) were to capture Ponyri. “The last order of the day - July 6, was issued by General Model at 22:45, it reiterated the instructions for the 9 Army chief of staff von Elvefeldt to direct the 9 and the 18 Panzer Divisions to take defensive positions at Snova.” th
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An artillery Oberleut-nant decorated with the Eisernes Kreuz I klasse, the Verwundetena-bzeichen (Wound Badge) and Panzerkamp-fabzeichen (Tank Combat Badge). A self propelled Sd. Kfz. 165 Hummel gun is seen in the background
On July 7, the 9 along with the 2 and the 20 Panzer Divisions from the XXXXVII Armoured Corps of Army Group “Mitte”, were to attack from the Snova vicinity towards Ponyri II. At 8:30 that morning, a combat group consisting of 9 Panzer Division tanks and sub-units of the 6 Infantry Division, began the attack. They tried to force through the second defensive line of the 17 Guard Rifle Corps. At noon, two 6 Infantry Division’s regiments supported by 50 tanks faced the 6 Guards Rifle Division entrenched in Bitiug. As a result, the northern outskirts of Bitiug were taken. At 17:00 hours, 30 tanks and the grenadiers from the 9 Panzer Division achieved some success at Ponyri II. The region was defended by the 75 Guard Rifle Division supported by the 3 Tank Destroyer Brigade form the 70 Army. At some point during the day, the 9 Panzer Division came under assault by ground attack Il-2m3 planes from the 1 Aerial Ground Attack Corps commanded by General Riazanov. Robert Cross writes about these planes: “They were decimating the 9 and the 18 Panzer Divisions with their new 37 mm cannon. The planes would follow the tank columns, then circle and dive discharging their guns into the rear of the tanks, where the armour was at its thinnest. An aerial attack could last as long as 20 minutes with devastating results. Soviet sources claim the destruction of 70 9 Division tanks in one attack ( which, according to the author would mean that the 33 Panzer Regiment was completely obliterated,). Regardless of the interpretation of the accounts, they clearly show that the Soviet air force begun to achieve superiority over the north sector of the Kursk bend.” th
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The above data, although in a somewhat more cautious matter, is repeated in Mr. M. Healy’s book “Kursk 1943. Tide turns in the East” , citing 60 destroyed tanks. Mr. G. Swinney’s statement in an article “Kursk: The great Soviet-German armoured clash”, published in the Military History Journal vol. 9 no. 6, 1994, seems to be the most credible, citing the destruction of 70 vehicles, not just tanks but also armoured transporters, 91
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tractors and trucks. On the day of July 8 the fighting erupted again, all four divisions of the XXXXVII Armoured Corps supported by the 18 Panzer Division from the XXXXI Armoured Corps renewed their attacks. Taking advantage of air support, the Germans attempted to burst through the defensive positions of the 17 Guards Rifle Corps to reach the line some 8 km away, between Ossinovyy to the south and Leninsky village east of the Snova River. Despite the fact that the 6 Guards Rifle Division was forced out of its initial positions, the attack failed. The Germans were unable to cross the road leading from Ponyri II to Olkhovatka, so their advance came to a halt a few kilometres from the starting point. The Soviet anti-tank guns and counter-attacking tanks from the 16 and 19 Tank Corps could not be overwhelmed. The Russian defence between Ponyri II and Olkhovatka was particularly strong. “The 9 and the 18 Panzer Division did not succeed - their tanks were deterred at the outskirts of Olkhovatka.” th
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Generalleutnant Walter Scheller. In the foreground, an artillery observation post with typical scissor binoculars.
Some time later, the 9 and the 18 Panzer Divisions did manage to enter the township of Ponyri, where the heaviest fighting took place at the tractor base, railroad station, school building and the water tower. Mr. Robert Cross describes the events: “Panzer grenadiers were able to take the hillsides but failed to capture the top of hill 253.5, fiercely defended by the Soviet 1032 Rifle Regiment. The troops were fighting their way back and forth through Ponyri, where the Soviets secured the positions at the cross roads, while the Germans clinched to the school building.” th
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The extreme intensity of fighting caused Mr. Paul Carell to describe the township of Ponyri as the “Stalingrad of the Kursk Bend”, That very day the 2 , 4 and 9 Panzer Divisions lost nearly 50% of their infantry troops, and while the combined tank losses were still fairly low, a lot of tanks had to be withdrawn for repairs. 95
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On July 9, the 2 and 9 Panzer Divisions, along with the 6 Infantry Division, were nd
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still involved in a combat with the Red Army troops along the Ponyri-Olkhovatka road. The stubbornness of Soviet resistance hampered the German attacks. At 22:00 hours, the Soviet 6 Guard Rifle Division initiated a counter-attack against the 9 Panzer Division in the area east of Olkhovatka. As the ground combat continued, the Soviet air force slowly gained air superiority, so with every passing day the threat of an aerial assault increased. On July 9 Hauptmann Hans-Henning Eickert, adjutant of the 9 Panzer Division, recipient of the Ritterkreuz, fell victim to an air attack. th
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At that juncture, Generaloberst Model realized that operation “Zitadelle” was a fiasco, for lack of infantry troops among other reasons. At the same time he anticipated a Soviet counter-offensive at the north and east sector of the Orel region, which by that time had become a salient. In consideration of the above, Model begun a slow transfer of the troops to the potentially threatened area. The relocation was kept a secret from Hitler, as well as from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht). In order to keep up appearances, troops of the XXXXI and the XXXXVII Armoured Corps were ordered to conduct pointless, as well as fruitless, attacks on July 10 and 11. At midnight on July 11, the total loses of the 9 Army amounted to 22,273 soldiers, while the five panzer divisions of both Armoured Corps’, the 2 , 4 , 9 , 18 and 20 sustained losses in excess of 6,500 troops, mostly panzer grenadiers. th
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On July 12, the Red Army did indeed launch an offensive north and northwest of Orel, its code name was operation “Kutuzov”. General Rokossovsky’s Central Front, General Colonel Markian Popov’s Briansk Front, and the units of the 11 Guard Army under Lieutenant General Ivan Bagramin from the Western Front, joined in the attack. At this particular moment, the Soviet Army had a crushing supremacy over the German forces in the area. Soviet high command predicted that both flanks of the General Clössner’s LIII Army Corps (LIII AK) will fold, and Soviet units will break through the lines of the XXXV Army Corps (XXXV AK) under General der Infanterie Lothar Rendulic, reaching Orel in 48 hours, thus dividing German forces into three groups. The Soviet intent was to obliterate two German army groups. In such a way, the three week long battle for the Orel salient began. On July 13, the 9 Panzer Division’s advance at the Kursk bend was aborted because of heavy losses. Afterwards, the Division was immediately deployed by the XXXXI Armoured Corps to stop the Soviet advance at the rear of the 9 Army north of Orel. On the same day, the 9 Division was transferred to the area of a Soviet breakthrough at Bolkhov where it formed a defence line. At first, the Division was able to slow down the enemy advance. In the following days however, the Soviet pressure forced it to begin a deliberate retreat to the west. th
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On July 17, the 9 Panzer Division joined the “Esebeck” Group (“Gruppe Esebeck”) created within the 2 Panzer Army from the Army Group “Mitte”. On July 18, “Kahler” Group (“Gruppe Kahler”) was organized utilizing some of the 4 Panzer Division’s units. It included the 4 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion (Pz.Aufk.Abt. 4), 3 Company of the 35 Panzer Regiment (3/Pz.Rgt. 35), the 4 Battery of the 103 Armoured Artillery Regiment (4/Pz.Art.Rgt. 103) and the 1 Company of the 79 Armoured Pioneer Battalion (1/Pz.Pi.Btl. 79). In the late afternoon of July 18 the “Kahler” Group was relocated southwest of Bolkhov, where it was to join with the 9 Panzer Division. On July 19, the “Gruppe Kahler” was incorporated into the 9 Panzer Division. Together with the 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion, it formed Combat th
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Group “Schmall” (“Kampfgruppe Schmall”) and fought in this arrangement until July 25. 104
In the “HG “Mitte” headquarters’ intelligence report brief from July 20, the following entry may be found regarding the situation of “Harpe” Group (“Gruppe Harpe”): “The 9 Pz.Div. in its advance had reached the Karentyevo - Koptevo - Portachky - Shimovskyy line, 1 kilometre south from peak 227,1.” th
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“The night of June 20 become a moment of truth for Generalleutnant Scheller, the commander of the Austrian in origin, combat proven, 9 Panzer Division fighting in Orel region. Scheller, awarded the Ritterkreuz for his excellent leadership, shows extraordinary courage on that night, but this time in front of his superiors rather than the enemy. The General joined the army at the age of 19, he knows exactly under what circumstances his obedience should stop.” writes Janusz Piekałkiewicz in his book. On this crucial night, at 00:00 hours Generalleutnant Scheller received the order from General Harpe, senior officer of the XXXXI Armoured Corps, commanding him to deploy the 11 Panzer Grenadier Battalion and the I Battalion of the 33 Panzer Regiment against the Soviet troops entrenched in the hills west of Krasnikovo. At the same time, the I Battalion of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was to follow behind the tanks, and utilizing its weak infantry cover, trail behind the II Battalion of the same unit, advancing in the direction of Koptevo and hill number 213,0. It was quite clear to Generalleutnant Scheller and his chief of operations, Oberstleutnant von Rücker, that an attack conducted in such a manner would lead to enormous losses. Scheller was particularly concerned with the fate of the 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which just recently was taken over by a new officer. Up until 2:30, Scheller ordered all the preparations he deemed necessary to take place. Then he reported back to General Harpe that the orders are impossible to fulfil. Scheller’s stance was: “My duties as a commander of the troops entrusted to me have to take precedence over any other circumstances.” At 3:45 in the morning, the chief of operations forwarded a written response from Generalleutnant Scheller to the Corps’ commander, in which the Generalleutnant upheld his position. At 4:20, the 9 Panzer Division submitted its own plan of attack and asked for Corps acceptance. According to this alternative proposal, the I Battalion of the 33 Panzer Regiment supported by the I Battalion of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment were to form a spearhead of the attack acting as a ram. The 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment would join the attack covering both flaks of this wedge formation. At 4:35, the 9 Panzer Division received a radio communication from General Harpe, inquiring if Oberst Jollasse would be willing to commandeer the attack as originally ordered by Harpe. In response, Oberst Jollasse stated that he would lead an attack, but only if it was carried out according to Generalleutnant Scheller’s proposal. Ten minutes later Harpe dismissed Generalleutnant Scheller from his post as the 9 Panzer Division’s commanding officer. In the morning of July 21, Soviet troops launched a heavy attack north of Orel, in the sector guarded by the 10 Panzer Grenadier Division and the 9 Panzer Division. As the German defences were breached, Soviet infantry and tanks neared the headquarters of the 20 Panzer Grenadier Regiment (20. Pz.Gr.Rgt.). The breakthrough was eventually deflected by the action of the tank battalion from the 9 Division. th
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“As faith would have it, a few hours after the conflict with Generalleutnant Scheller, General Harpe had to call on the 9 Panzer Division units to provide tactical support.” th
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As the situation evolved, before noon Soviet planes bombed and shelled the I Battalion of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment grouped in its attack formation. At 10:30 on the same morning, the Russians breached the defences of the II Battalion of the 11 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. At the same time, the II Battalion of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which was supposed to launch an immediate counter-attack to regain hill 222,4 south of Krasnikovo, came under a surprise attack. Meanwhile, the I Battalion of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the I battalion of the 33 Panzer Regiment, which according to General Harpe’s personally enforced orders had to attack west of Krasnikovo, set out to perform this task at noon. As early as 14:25, Harpe was forced to abandon the attack and order his troops to assume defensive positions along the Karentievo - Koptevo line, reached as a result of their earlier advance. th
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An entry in the HG “Mitte” headquarters’ operational report brief dated July 22 regarding the situation of the XXXXI Armoured Corps said that: “Around lunch time ( in the original “dinner”, given to the troops in early afternoon) the enemy tanks breached the defences and reached the core positions of the 10 Panzer Grenadier Division and the 9 Panzer Division south of Krasnikovo. A violent engagement still continues.” th
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On July 23, at the peak of its strength, the “Harpe” Group consisted of three Corps, including the XXXXI Armoured Corps with its 9 Panzer Division. A note in the HG “Mitte” headquarters’ operational report brief dated the same day, concerning the situation of the XXXXI Armoured Corps, states: “The 253 Infantry Division (253. Inf.Div.) continues its attack, and after taking the peak 223,6 it established the tactical connection with the left flank of the 9 Pz.Div. The Division had reached the line Strykovo - point 223,6 - point 223,6 - Ilinskoye.” th
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An entry in the same source regarding that day’s situation at the Corps level states: “An attack by enemy divisions with massive tank support, conducted after strong artillery preparation against the left flank of the 9 Panzer Division forced it to move its main defence line back. The fighting with the enemy constantly receiving reinforcements continues.” th
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The July 5 to August 18 1943 Kursk bend combat report of the 2 Panzer Army and the 9 Army headquarters indicates that: “The units of the 9 Panzer Division were able to block the southeast advance of armoured enemy troops after their breakthrough at Ulyanovo.” On July 24, a note about the situation of “Harpe” Group was entered in the HG “Mitte” headquarters’ operational report brief: “Enemy attacks against the left wing of the 9 Panzer Division and the right wing of the 253 Infantry Division, carried out after heavy artillery barrage with strong tank support, were repelled with the exception of minor breaches of only local significance.” nd
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On July 25, the 9 Panzer Division was assigned to the XXIII Army Corps (XXIII AK) along with the 18 and 20 Panzer Divisions, 10 Panzer Grenadier Division and the 253 Infantry Division. As of July 26 the Combat Group “Schmall” was detached from the 9 Panzer Division and assigned to Panzer Grenadier Division “Grossdeutschland”, where it fought in the Karatschev region, northwest of Orel until August 1. th
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An alternative version is presented by the author of “Kursk. The German View”. It states that the group was named “Schaal” and it consisted of the 4 Armoured th
Reconnaissance Battalion (Pz.Aufk.Abt. 4) and the 9 Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion. On July 26, the group was part of the “Gruppe Harpe”, but from July 27 to August 5, it was included in the “Grossdeutschland” division. By the end of July, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht permitted Generaloberst Model to abandon the Orel salient and assume positions along the “Hagen line”. During the three-week long battle, the Germans, despite heavy losses totalling 62,305 soldiers, managed to prevent the Red Army from achieving its objective of annihilating both German armies. The fighting ended in a German defensive victory, one of the biggest strategic accomplishments of Generaloberst Model. Army Group “Mitte”, comprising two armies, was able to gradually slip out of the trap set by the Soviets, inflicting some heavy casualties to all three Red Army Fronts in the process. Part of the success could be attributed to the fact that Model ignored the order issued before Operation “Zitadelle” by the Oberkommando des Heeres, forbidding German forces from building fortified positions in the Orel salient area. By July 5 at least four defence lines were constructed, and became crucial in holding the enemy back long enough for reinforcements to arrive. On July 31 1943, the battle at the Orel salient came to an end. On the same day Hauptmann Jakob Zimmermann, commander of the I Battalion from the 10 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, received the Ritterkreuz. The 9 Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion dispatched from the 9 Panzer Division, rejoined its parent unit in the first days of August. According to a report dated August 1, the 9 Panzer Division had a shortfall of 2,008 men and losses of 3,642. The losses were subdivided as follows: 601 dead, 2,408 wounded, 253 ill and 137 missing for other reasons. 1,368 soldiers arrived as replacements, including 1,126 draftees and 242 convalescents. The available vehicles were: 22 Pz.Kpfw. III, 15 operational and seven under repair; 32 Pz.Kpfw. IV, 21 operational and 11 under repair; 241 half tracked armoured carriers, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and armoured artillery observation vehicles (SPW, Pz.Sp.Wg. and Art.Beob.Wg.), 218 combat ready and 23 under repair; 13 heavy self-propelled tank destroyers sPak. (Sfl); 32 heavy anti-tank guns with motor traction sPak. (mot Z) , 27 operational and five under repair; 47 guns Art-Gesch, 45 in readiness and two under repair. A comparison to the similar report issued July 1, reveals that the Division sustained the following equipment losses: six Pz.Kpfw. III; four Pz.Kpfw. IV; 47 half tracked armoured carriers, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and armoured artillery observation vehicles (SPW, Pz.Sp.Wg. and Art.Beob.Wg.); three heavy selfpropelled tank destroyers sPak. (Sfl); 18 heavy anti-tank guns with motor traction sPak. (mot Z). The divisional artillery did not have any losses, to the contrary, it obtained one additional gun. On August 7, Soviet forces launched a massive attack in the region of Spas - Demensk. As the situation became critical, the 9 Panzer Division was transferred to the area.From August 10 to 17, the Division operated north and west of Kirov, which lies south of Spas - Demensk, and became instrumental in repelling the enemy attack. An entry recorded on August 13 in the HG “Mitte” headquarters’ intelligence report brief: “The last sub-units of the 9. Pz.Div. and the first road march group of the 5. Pz.Div. had arrived in the sector of the XXXXVI Armoured Corps (XXXXVI PzK).” New types of weapons were tested in combat around that time. The Panzerspähwagen II Ausf. L “Luchs” earned a favourable rating. In a report from August 1943 Feldwebel Weber, one of the “Luchs” drivers, wrote about his experiences while serving with the 2 Reconnaissance Tank Company of the 9 Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion: “During my exposure to the Luchs, I did not notice any sign of technical difficulties, with the exception th
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of minor issues with the steering mechanism. The tank has superb manoeuvrability and mobility. High speed and small dimensions make this vehicle a very hard target for the enemy.” 127
By August 17, the company had only five operational “Luchs” tanks. As for other new ordnance, on July 31 the 9 Division had 12 light self-propelled guns Leichte Feldhaubitze 18/2 (sf) auf Geschützwagen II “Wespe”. During the second half of August 1943, the 9 Panzer Division was assigned to the 2 Panzer Army Some time later, it was incorporated into the LVI Armoured Corps (LVI PzK) north of Kirov. It participated in two significant fighting retreats to the “Hagen Line” east of Briansk. In the second half of August, the Division still had 12 “Wespe” guns, thus not a single one of them was lost during combat. On August 22, the 9 Division was relocated by rail to the defence region of the 6 Army, to join the XXIX Army Corps (XXIX AK) at the river Mius, where another Soviet offensive began on August 18 . By August 25, the entire 9 Division was grouped in the region of the so-called “Mius Front”, between Voroshilovgrad and Taganrog. The state of the Division report dated September 1 cites the following: a shortfall of 2,851 troops, losses 1,063. The losses included: 157 dead, 505 wounded, 90 missing, 86 ill and 225 missing for other reasons. 507 soldiers arrived as replacements, including 378 draftees and 192 convalescents. The number of vehicles was: 13 Pz.Kpfw. III, three operational and ten under repair; 23 Pz.Kpfw. IV, five operational and 18 under repair; 175 half tracked armoured carriers, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and armoured artillery observation vehicles (SPW, Pz.Sp.Wg. and Art.Beob.Wg.), 114 action ready and 61 under repair; seven heavy self-propelled tank destroyers sPak. (Sfl), three operational and four under repair; three heavy anti-tank guns with motor traction sPak. (mot Z); 47 guns Art-Gesch, 45 operational and two under repair. Comparing the reports from August and September, it is evident that during the month of August the 9 Division had lost nine Pz.Kpfw. III, nine Pz.Kpfw. IV, 66 half tracked armoured carriers, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and armoured artillery observation vehicles (SPW, Pz.Sp.Wg. and Art.Beob.Wg.), six heavy self-propelled tank destroyers sPak. (Sfl) and 29 heavy anti-tank guns with motor traction sPak. (mot Z). The 102 Armoured Artillery Regiment still did not sustain any losses. Noteworthy are the very heavy losses of the towed anti-tank guns. Most likely, the intensity of the encounters, as well as rapid Soviet advances, did not permit many antitank guns to be withdrawn in time. th
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An Artillerie Panzerbeo-bachtungswagen III Ausf . G, an armoured observation vehicle equipped with Schurzen. A frame for a telephone cable reel is welded to the hatch. “A04” marking is clearly visible. Letter “A” probably denotes “ Artillerie ”.
During the fourth year of war, outside of the eight day long offensive during Operation “Citadel”, the 9 Panzer Division was mostly utilized as an emergency rescue unit in the sectors threatened by overwhelming Soviet forces. The Division fulfilled its duties in an admirable manner and gained well deserved recognition. The resolution of the critical situation of the 9 Army and the 2 Panzer Army can be largely credited to the interventions of the 9 Division. The outcome of the bloody encounter at Zhizdra in March of 1943, as well as the later battle at Kursk bend against a so much more powerful enemy was, considering the circumstances, a considerable success for the 9 Panzer Division. th
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9 Panzer Division was sent to France to rebuild in 1944. On 1st May 1944 it absorbed men and tanks of the 155 Reserve Panzer Division to return to its full strength. Then the division was rushed to counter Operation “Overlord”, the D-Day offensive. It was destroyed several successive times by British and American forces as the German Army was pushed back across Europe. The division suffered massive casualties in armour and personnel until it finally collapsed in March 1945. The division’s few survivors were pushed into the Ruhr Pocket where they surrendered to the Allies on 26 April 1945. th
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75 Newton S. H., op. cit., p. 164-165.
76 Newton S. H., op. cit, p. 166.
77 Newton S. H., op. cit., p. 168.
78 Newton S. H., op. cit., p. 169.
79 Solarz J. in his book “Kursk 1943”, Warszawa 1996, on p. 16 writes, the speed of advance made by the 6. Inf.Div. and the 505. schwere Panzer Abteilung, surprised the commander of the AOK 9 to such an extent, that he could not dispatch the reserve units of the 2nd, 9th and 18th Panzer Division in the breakthrough zone right away.
80 Newton S. H., op. cit., p. 170.
81 Piekałkiewicz J., Operacja Cytadela op. cit., p. 149.
82 Newton S. H, op. cit., p. 170.
83 Glantz D. M., Soviet defensive tactics at Kursk, July 1943, CSI Report No. 11, 1986, p. 53.
84 Newton S. H, op. cit., p. 171.
85 Ibidem.
86 Jentz T. L., Die deutsche…, op. cit. Band II, p. 76.
87 Dunn W. S, Kursk Hitler’s Gamble 1943, Westport 1997, p. 176.
88 Ibidem.
89 The battle for Kursk. The Soviet General Staff Study, London, Portland 1999.
90 Cross R, Operacja „Cytadela”, Warszawa 2001, p. 143.
91 Healy M., Kursk 1943 Tide turns in the East, London 1992.
92 http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol096gs.html
93 Solarz J., Kursk 1943, op. cit., p. 27
94 Cross R, op. cit., p. 142.
95 Carell P., Spalona ziemia, Warszawa 2003, p. 39.
96 Newton S. H., op. cit, p. 174.
97 Barbier M. K, Kursk 1943: The Greates Tank Battle Ever Fought, Surrey 2002, p. 85.
98 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 133.
99 Newton S. H, op. cit., p.176.
100 Hermann C. H, op. cit. p. 111.
101 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 288.
102 Nevenkin K, op. cit. p. 267, does not mention the 3/Pz.Rgt. 35 as part of the Kampfgruppe.
103 Kiński A., Nowakowski T, Skotnicki M., Sawicki R, 4. Dywizja Pancerna Kursk 1943, Warszawa 1999 , p. 12.
104 Nevenkin K, op. cit, p. 267.
105 Kurskaya bitva, v. I, Moskva 2003, p. 343.
106 It was probably Max Sperling.
107 Piekłakiewicz J., Operacja… op. cit., p. 252-253.
108 Ibidem.
109 Ibidem.
110 Piekłakiewicz J., Operacja… op. cit., p. 256.
111 Kurskaya bitva, op. cit., v. I, p. 377.
112 Newton S. H., op. cit, p. 179.
113 Kurskaya bitva, op. cit., v. I, p. 394.
114 Kurskaya bitva, op. cit., v. I, p. 412.
115 Kurskaya bitva, v. II, Moskva 2003, p. 374-375.
116 Kurskaya bitva, op. cit., v. I, p. 409.
117 Kurskaya bitva, op. cit., v. I, p. 424.
118 Most likely a different transliteration of Schmahl.
119 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 267.
120 Newton S. H., Kursk. The German view, Cambridge 2002, p. 138.
121 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 172.
122 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 267.
123 Including the 50 mm Pak 38 cannons.
124 Nevenkin K, op. cit., p. 283-285.
125 Nevenkin K, op. cit, p. 267.
126 Kurskaya bitva, v. II, Moskva 2003, p. 201.
127 Michalski H, op. cit., p. 78.
128 Jentz T. L, Wespe leichte Feldhaubitze 18/2 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen II, Darlington 1996
129 Hermann C. H, op. cit., p. 111.
130 Nevenkin K., op. cit. p. 283-285.
Appendices APPENDIX NO.1 COMMANDERS OF THE 9 PANZER DIVISION th
Commanders of the 9 Panzer Division in the years 1940 -1943 th
Generalleutnant Dr. Alfred Ritter von Hubicki (January 3 1940 - April 15 1942) Generalmajor Johannes Baessler - (April 15 1942 - July 27 1942) Oberst Heinrich-Hermann von Hülsen - (July 27 1942 - August 4 1942) Generalmajor Walter Scheller - (August 4 1942 - July 22 1943) Oberst promoted Generalmajor Erwin Jolasse - (July 22 1943 - October 1 1943) (Based on: Rosado J., Bishop Ch., Dywizje pancerne Wehrmachtu 1939-1945, Warszawa 2008, p. 88 and de Lannoy F., Bernage G., Les divisions de l’Armee de Terre allemande Heer 1939-1945, Bayeux 1997, p. 322. Commanders of the 9 Panzer Division’s component units in the years 1940 -1943 9. Schützen-Brigade th
Oberst Wilhelm Apell - (February 16 1940 - August 27 or 28 1941) Oberst Walther Brehmer - (September 9 1941 - May 24 1942) Oberst Heinrich-Hermann von Hülsen - (May 25 1942 - July 27 1942 and August 4 1942 December 15 1942) Schützen-Regiment 10 - Pz.Gren.Rgt 10 Oberstleutnant Willibald Borowietz - (June 10 or 24 1941 - October 05 1942) Oberst Walter Gorn - (October 15 1942 - August 15 1943; with an intermission for officer’s training in 1943) Oberst Dr. Johannes Schulz - (March 12 1943 - October 21 1943) I./Sch.Rgt 10 - I/Pz.Gren.Rgt. 10 Oberstleutnant Fritz Iwand - May 1940 Oberst Walter Gorn - (October 12 1940 - January 26 1942) Hauptmann Otto Ernst Remer - (February 1 1942 - April 1 1942) Oberstleutnant Kurt Brassert - (July 05 1942 - October 30 1942) Hauptmann Gotthard von Czettritz und Neuhaus - (deceased December 25 1942) Oberst Walter Gorn - (June 1943 - July 1943) Hauptmann Jakob Zimmermann - July 1943 II./Sch.Rgt. 10
Major Kurt Brassert - (June 20 1941 - July 05 1942) Schützen-Regiment 11 - Pz.Gren.Rgt. 11 Oberst graf Theodor von Sponeck - (February 15 1940 - November 1 1941) Oberstleutnant Ernst Freiherr von Lüttwitz - (November 11 1941 - January 26 1942) Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Schmalz - (January 26 1942 - August 1942) Oberstleutnant Joachim Gutmann - (August 1942 - November 25 1942 ?) Oberstleutnant Dr. Alfred von Reumont - (November 26 1942 - May 1943) Oberst Max Sperling - (July 1943 - ?) I./Sch.Rgt. 11 Major Wilhelm Schmalz - (May 1940 - October 31 1940) Oberstleutnant Ernst Freiherr von Lüttwitz - (September 04 1940 - November 11 1941) Hauptmann Ernst Metelmann - August 1943 Panzer-Regiment 33 Oberstleutnant Hans-Joachim von Köppen - (August1940 - May 31 1941) Oberstleutnant Ewald Kraeber - (May 31 1941 - September 26 1941) Oberstleutnant Hans-Joachim von Köppen - (September 26 1941 - October 03 1941) Oberst Ewald Kraeber - (May 01 1942 - January 1943) Oberst Wilhelm Hochbaum - November 30 1942 Oberst Ludwig Schmahl - (March 1943 - March 19 1943 and April 04 1943 - April 10 1944) I/Pz.Rgt. 33 Major Horst Richter-Rethwisch - (? - September 1942) Hauptmann Friedrich Bauer - (October 1942 - July 06 1943) II/Pz.Rgt. 33 Hauptmann Franz-Josef Kohout - December 1941 III/Pz.Rgt 33 Oberstleutnant Gerhard Willing - October 1942 Art.Rgt. 102 - Pz.Art.Rgt. 102 Oberst Werner Kampfhenkel - (December 01 1938 - October 08 1941) Oberst Walther Bömerz I./Art.Rgt. 102 - Pz.Art.Rgt. 102 Hauptmann Schwickert - 1939 Hauptamnn der Reserve Franz Huber - (1941 - 1942) Hauptmann Dieter Schendel - (1942-1943)
Hauptmann der Reserve Karl Gassner - ? 1944 II/Art.Rgt. 102 - Pz.Art.Rgt. 102 Oberstleutnant Hubert Strohmaier - (April 01 1938 - September 11 1940) Hauptmann Horst Franke - (1942 - 1943) III./Pz.Art.Rgt. 102 Major Ewald Kraus Kradschützen-Bataillons 59 Manfred Freiherr von Lüttwitz - August 1940 Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Schmalz - (November 1 1940 - January 26 1942) Oberstleutnant Walter Gorn - (January 26 1942 - October 1 1942) Hauptmann Adolf Bulla - (October 1942 - January 1943) Major Friedrich Heraucourt - (January 1943 - ?) Aufklärungs-Regiment 9 Oberstleutnant Josef Vichytil - (October 15 1939 - July 31 1940) Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 Oberstleutnant Dr. Freiherr von Ohlen und Adlerscron - August 1940 Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 Hauptmann Rudolf von Bünau - (April 13 1943 - August 15 1943) Hauptmann Engelbert Bockhoff - (August 15 1943 - October 29 1944) Heeres-Flakartillerie-Abteilung 287 Hauptmann Rolf Schmidt - 1943 (Based on: www.ritterkreuztraeger-1939-45.de, wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/R/ReumontAv.htm.)
and
www.lexikon-der-
APPENDIX NO.2 OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS OF THE 9 PANZER DIVISION IN THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 1940 - AUGUST 1943 th
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