land titles

[G.R. No. 155450, August 06, 2008] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.:

The Case This is a petition for review [1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September 2002[3]Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The 21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines' (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Facts On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 381928 [4] in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), Carag ), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of [5] Cagayan is issu sued ed Or Orig igin inal al Ce Cert rtif ific icat atee of Ti Titl tlee No No.. 11 1158 585 5 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag . On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer Cagayan , covering certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277, [6] issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278, [7] issued in the the name of the private respondents,, respondents covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters. On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subjec sub jectt pro proper perty ty whi which ch was all allege egedly dly sti still ll cla classi ssifie fied d as ti timbe mberr lan land d at the ti time me of th thee iss issuan uance ce of Dec Decree ree No. 381 381928 928.. The Regional Executive Executive Director of the DENR DENR created an investigating investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property. The investigating team reported that: A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994. B) Petition Petitioner er Bienve Bienvenid nida a Taguia Taguiam m Vda. Vda. De Dayag Dayag and others others have have posses possessed sed and occupi occupied ed by thems themselv elves es and thru thru their their 8] predecessors-in-interest predecessors-in-interest the portion portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, Cad-151, covered by LC LC Project 3-L 3-L of LC Map Map 2999, since time time immemorial. immemorial.[ 8] Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982." In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation. On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for [9]] annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles [9 on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly allegedly still classified classified as timber land at the time time of issuance of Decree Decree No. 381928 and, a nd, therefore, was not alienable and dispo isposa sab ble unti ntil 22 Febr ebruary uary 198 1982 when hen the disp disput uteed por portion was clas classi siffied ied as alie lienabl nablee and dis disposa posabl blee. On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.[10] Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res

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judicata and law law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.[11] Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents.[12] On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. [13] The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared: The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. [14] (Citations omitted) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available; Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction; Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss; Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan; Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance Instance over the land; land; Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case. The Ruling of the Court While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit. Petitioner Complied Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court Court First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.[15] We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated: 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses











erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever.[16] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court's court's lack of jurisdic jurisdiction tion over the subject land, specifical specifically ly over the disputed disputed portion, which petitione petitionerr maintaine maintained d was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable. Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioner's failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." In Ancheta In Ancheta v. Ancheta, Ancheta,[17] we ruled: In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either either collaterally or in a direct direct action or by resisting such judgment judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[18] Since petitioner's complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner's complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. [19] Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. Procedure. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case. However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits. Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Gover vernmen nmentt, not not the tria triall cour courtts, had had the the pow power to dec declass lassif ify y or recla eclass ssiify land landss of the the publ publiic dom domain. ain. Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. [20] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.[21] Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government ,[22] we ruled: From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x [23] (Emphasis supplied) Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some [24] public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classificatio petitioner attached to











(a) (b)

Alienable

or Timber

disposable and

(c) Mineral lands and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition. Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874. It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides: SECTION SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, practicable, surveyed, surveyed, and which have not been reserved reserved for public or quasi-publ quasi-public ic uses, uses, not appropriated appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the GovernorGeneral may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act Act of the Legislature. Legislature. (Emphasis (Emphasis supplied) However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time. In Republic In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Appeals ,[27] the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 [28] and 2874. The Court ruled: We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive exclusive possession possession of the subject land for the prescribed prescribed number of years. years. It was the land registrat registration ion court which which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied) As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action its decision rendered in 1930 or 78 ears ago is no final and be ond re ie











Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were"subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Governme Government nt establish established ed under this Constitu Constitution. tion.""[29]When When the Common Commonwe wealt alth h Govern Governme ment nt was was establ establish ished ed under under the 1935 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court. WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE, we DENY the pet petiti ition. on. We DISMISS pet petitio itioner ner Republ Republic ic of the Philipp Philippine ines' s' complai complaint nt for rever reversio sion, n, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents respondents.. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J .: .: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari , under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, [1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, [2] granting the application for land registration of the respondents. Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. 1976.[3] Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents: (a) Advance Survey Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the the name of respondent Jeremias; Jeremias; and Advance Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the the name of respondent David; David;[4] (b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5] (c) Certifications Certifications by the Department of Environment Environment and Natural Resources Resources (DENR) (DENR) dispensing dispensing with the need for Surveyor’s Surveyor’s [6] Certificates Certificates for the Subject Lots; Lots ; (d) Certifications Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence absence of certificates certificates of title covering covering the Subject Subject Lots;[7] (e) Certifications Certifications by the Community Environment Environment and and Natural Resources Office Office (CENRO) (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding finding that the [8] Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963; 1963; (f) Certified True Copies Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) (ARP) No. No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot Lot No. [9] 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994; and (g) Deed of Definite Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Gregorio Herbieto and and Isabel Owatan Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David. David.[10] On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents’ application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents’ muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11] The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. [12] All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.[14] Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 [15] and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.[16] During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default, [17] with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentar documentary y evidence evidence to prove prove jurisdict jurisdictional ional facts. facts. The MTC commissione commissioned d the Clerk Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days. On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of











subdivisio subdivisions ns of patrimon patrimonial ial character character shall shall not be the object of prescrip prescription” tion” and that “Ownership “Ownership and other other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.” As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interes predecessors-in-interestt had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees’ possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water. As earlier stressed, the subject property, property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo. quo.[20] The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments: First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse adverse possession possession of the Subject Subject Lots in the concept concept of owners owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO’s CENRO’s certificat certification. ion. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive acquisitive [21] prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol , where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individual individually ly and separately separately owned by two applicants. applicants. Petitione Petitionerr Republic contends contends that it is implicit implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. co-owners. While an application may cover two two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated situated within the same province. province. Where the authority authority of the courts to proceed is conferred conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. void. Since Since the respondents respondents failed failed to comply with the procedure procedure for land registratio registration n under the Property Property Registrat Registration ion Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it. I Jurisdiction Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic. A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents’ application for registration. Respondent Respondents s filed filed a single single applicati application on for registration registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. co-owners. Respondent Respondents s Jeremias Jeremias and David David were actually actually seeking seeking the individual individual and separate registration registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Petitione Petitionerr Republic Republic believes that the procedural procedural irregularit irregularity y committed committed by the respondents respondents was fatal to their their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court’s pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, Appeals,[22] to wit: . . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. This This Court, Court, however, however, disagr disagrees ees with with petiti petitione onerr Republ Republic ic in this this regard regard.. This This proced procedura urall lapse lapse commit committed ted by the













Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Registration Decree itself itself provides that, “[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC consti constitut tutes es a misjoi misjoinde nderr of causes causes of actio action n and parties. parties. Instea Instead d of a single single or joint joint appli applicat cation ion for regist registrat ration ion,, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court’s jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties). The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion motion of the petitioner petitioner Republic. Republic. It is regrettabl regrettable, e, however, however, that the MTC failed to detect detect the misjoinde misjoinder r when the application for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court. B. Respondents, however, failed to to comply comply with the publication publication requirements requirements mandated mandated by the Property Property Registration Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court. Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents’ application for registration. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.[29] Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner: 1. By publication. – Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of init initia iall hear hearin ing g to be publ publis ishe hed d once once in the the Offi Offici cial al Gaze Gazett ttee and and once once in a news newspa pape perr of gene genera rall circ circul ulat atio ion n in the the Philippines: Provided Philippines: Provided , however , that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and “to all whom it may concern.” concern.” Said notice shall also require require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declarati declaration on in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication publication in a newspaper newspaper of general general circulati circulation on is











Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffecti ineffective. ve. Whoever Whoever read the Notice as it was published published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents’ application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents’ application for registration and even the registration decree that may be issued issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having having the same ultimat ultimate e result result.. Owing Owing to such such defect defect in the publica publicatio tion n of the Notice Notice,, the MTC failed failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents’ application for registration thereof. Therefore Therefore,, the MTC Judgment, Judgment, dated 21 December December 1999, ordering ordering the registrat registration ion and confirmat confirmation ion of the title of respondent respondents s Jeremias Jeremias and David David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respective respectively; ly; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction. II Period of Possession of Possession Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents’ application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land. Respondents’ application filed filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Isabel Owatan, Owatan, on 25 June June 1976. 1976. Respo Responde ndent nt Jeremi Jeremias, as, in his testimon testimony, y, claimed claimed that that his parents parents had been in [32] possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950. 1950. Yet, according to the DENR-CEN DENR-CENRO RO Certific Certificatio ation, n, submitted submitted by respondents respondents themselves, themselves, the Subject Subject Lots are “within “within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Forest [33] Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992.” The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963. As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;[34] and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35] The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately privately-owne -owned d lands which reverted reverted to the State. State.[36] It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows: (1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;











(c) Members Members of the national national cultural cultural minorities minorities who by themselves themselves or through through their their predecess predecessors-i ors-in-in n-intere terest st have been in open, continuou continuous, s, exclusive exclusive and notorious notorious possession possession and occupation occupation of lands of the public public domain domain suitable suitable to agricultu agriculture re whether whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect imperfect or incomplete title title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, amended, now requires adverse adverse possession possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. earlier. In the present Petition, Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when when the Subject Lots were classifie classified d as alienable and disposable disposable is inconseque inconsequential ntial and should be excluded excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. [41] It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized. The confirmation of respondents’ title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. law. It then ruled that the respondents, having having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.[42] The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. [43] As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act. However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads – SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44] Hence, respondents’ application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree. Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general general law. It is an established rule rule of statut statutory ory construc constructio tion n that that betwe between en a genera generall law and a specia speciall law, law, the special special law prevail prevails s – Generalia [46] specialibus non derogant .











On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title [4] with the RTC of Makati of Makati City against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation (APVC), and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-292. In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their names. [5] They further alleged that Ayala Corporation was claiming to have titles (specifically, (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporat Corp oration ion had made such prop property erty its equit equity y cont contribut ribution ion in APV APVC C to be devel developed oped into a resi residenti dential al subdivision. subdivision. Atta Attacched as annexes to the complaint were photocopies of: (a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the Carpos, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-56007) located in the Barrio of Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886) located in Bo. Tindig na Manga, Las Piñas with an area of 171,309 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 155,345 square meters. No copy of TCT TCT No. T-4366 was attached attached to the complaint. complaint. According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 and their derivatives “appear to have been issued in the name of Ayala and purport to cover and embrace the Carpo’s property or portion thereof duly covered registered under the already indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463 are inherently invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the duly issued derivatives of the Carpos’ title.” [6] The Carpos additionally applied for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Ayala Corporation Corporation and APVC APVC from doing construction construction and development development works on the properties in purported violation of the Carpos’ rights. The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment: (1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368 and all alleged derivatives thereof, issued in the name of Ayala Corporation and/or APVC over the properties or portion thereof embraced in the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and issuing a writ of possession in favor of the Carpos and/or ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to surrender to the Carpos the properties or portion thereof being occupied by the said corporations under inherently invalid or void titles; (2) declaring TCT No. 296463 issued in their names as valid and the Carpos as the owners of the property described therein “including the parcels of land being claimed and occupied by Ayala [Corporation] and APVC withou[t] valid and enforceable titles”; and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to pay jointly and severally severally the amount amount of P100,000 as as attorney’s fees fees plus costs of suit suit and litigation litigation expenses. expenses.[7] On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, impleading respondent Ayala











In the Order [13] dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the present case was an action in rem and directed the transfer of the case to the RTC of Las Piñas where the disputed property is located. The case was thereafter assigned to Branch 255 of the Las Piñas RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082. On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion a Motion for Summary Judgment on Judgment on the ground that there was allegedly no genuine issue as to any material fact and the only issue for the court to resolve was a purely legal one ― which of the two (2) titles should be accorded priority. According to ALI, ALI, the parties were were relying on their respective TCTs, TCTs, and since ALI admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242 which was issued more than twenty (20) years earlier than the Carpos’ predecessor’s title (OCT No. 8575), its title is, thus, superior. Expectedly, the Carpos filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were “genuine issues and controversies to be litigated.” In an Order Order dated dated April April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALI’s motion for summary summary judgment. judgment. This denial was challenged challenged in a petition petition for certiorari for certiorari with the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243. In a decision[14] dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALI’s ALI’s petition and ordered the RTC to render a summary judgment. Both parties moved for for reconsideration of the CA Decision. Decision. ALI filed a motion motion for partial partial reconsideration, reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to render render the summary judgment in the interest of judicial economy and on a claim that the sole issue was legal. The Carpos, in their motion, insisted that there were genuine issues in this case that must be threshed out in a trial. Both motions were denied in the CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998. 1998.[15] Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate petitions for review on certiorari . In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed assailed the CA’s refusal to render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the Carpos assailed the CA’s ruling that trial was unnecessary. In separate minute Resolutions,[16] the Court denied both petitions. Both parties’ motions for reconsideration reconsideration were likewise denied. Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998, finding the Carpos’ title superior to that of ALI and ruling, thus: Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant’s answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director Director of the Bureau Bureau of Lands, Lands, thereby justifyi justifying ng this court court to be skeptical skeptical of the validity validity of the issuance issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: held: “That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected.”













Evidently, Ayala’s Ayala’s claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs’ plaintiffs’ cannot therefore be sustained. sustained. Be that as it may, the fact that cannot be disputed on the basis of Ayala’s answer is its admission that SWO survey without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands was submitted in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering the decree and the title issued thereunder to be tainted with irregularity and therefore void. WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid and legal, and superior to that of defendant Ayala’s TCT No. T-5333; (b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives as null and void; (c)

Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney’s attorney’s fees; and

(d)

To pay the costs.[17]

On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed by the CA in a Resolution [18] dated May 14, 1999 for failure to pay the full amount of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, reconsideration, ALI pointed out that it paid the full amount assessed by the cash clerk on duty at the RTC Las Piñas. The motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALI’s petition meritorious, meritorious, the Court, in a Decision [19] dated November 22, 2000, reversed the CA’s dismissal of ALI’s appeal and remanded the same to the CA for further proceedings. On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision in favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the assailed Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas, Branch 255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered as follows:











After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and concur with the CA that the Summary Judgment rendered by the trial court should be reversed and set aside. Preliminary discussion discussion regarding subject matter matter of the controversy controversy

At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary Judgment declared null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT No. [125945] T-6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a land area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a land area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land area of 155,345 square meters, despite the lack of evidence of identity of the properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 with the property covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 or any portion of said property claimed by petitioners. This was grievous and palpable error on the part of the trial court considering that the property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT No. 296463 had an area of only 171,309 square meters and the total area of the properties in the titles invalidated by the trial court was 799,262 square meters. It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving the same parties, the CA ruled that: On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny the existence of a title in the name of the plaintiffs/private plaintiffs/private respondents. Instead, it alleged: alleged: “14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the property covered by ALI’s TCT No. T-5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970, long after OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALI’s TCT No. T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALI’s TCT No. T-5333 is superior to TCT No. 296463. xxx.” This is an admission that the private respondents have a title to the property in question, and that the property described in private respondents’ respondents’ TCT No. 296463 completely completely overlaps the title of petitioner petitioner ALI. This fact is further substantiated substantiated by an affidavit of Jose Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who, after attesting to his qualifications, competence and experience, declared under oath: “9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out, based on the technical descriptions in their respective titles, if the lots described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No.











Since the existence of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact of overlapping of the technical descriptions of the two titles are admitted in the pleadings, and substantiated by the supporting documents attached by the defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all, the sole issue is a legal one, to wit: whose title (as to the conflicting conflicting ones) is superior and must be upheld. This issue may be decided on the basis of the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the parties, as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, there need not be a protracted trial thereon, since all that the trial court should do is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents attached by the parties in their respective pleadings and/or submitted together with the motion or the opposition thereto. The same is true with the other defenses raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit: res judicata, judicata, prescription and and laches – which may may likewise be be resolved without without going to trial trial.[24](Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the separate petitions for review filed with this Court by the parties were denied with finality. The parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CA’s factual finding therein that the only lots whose technical descriptions overlap are those covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and ALI’s TCT No. T-5333 which later became TCT No. T-41262. There was simply no basis for the trial court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the complaint. The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the Summary Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Psu-47035). Petitioners’ claims claims with respect to these properties are already already barred barred by res judicata. judicata. In Realty In Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[25] petitioner Morris Carpo already asserted his purported ownership of these two properties based on a transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan number (Psu56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, in Realty, his claim was discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty), ALI’s predecessor in interest, [26] is the one with valid title to these properties. properties. The relevant portions portions of the Realty the Realty Decision are quoted here: Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Parañaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit: 1) TCT No. 20408 20408 issued issued on May 29, 1975 in the name name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was was derived derived from from OCT OCT No. No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N33721 and N-43516, respectively. respectively. 2) TCT No. 303961 303961 issued issued on October 13, 1970 1970 in the name name of Morris G. Carpo, Carpo, which was derived derived from from OCT OCT No. 8629, issued issued











deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x.” [27] (Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.)

We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition. First Assignment Assignment of Error Error Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of respondent is valid even without the requisite survey plan approved by the Director Director of the Bureau Bureau of Lands. Petitione Petitioners rs clearly misunderstood misunderstood or deliberat deliberately ely misread the CA’s ruling ruling on this point. point. It is the CA’s view that the trial trial court’s court’s pronouncement that OCT No. 242 was issued without an approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the presumption of regularity that said title enjoys. We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the following portion of the Summary Judgment: Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant’s answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director Director of the Bureau Bureau of Lands, Lands, thereby justifyi justifying ng this court court to be skeptical skeptical of the validity validity of the issuance issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval approval of the Director Director of the Bureau Bureau of Lands. Any title issued issued emanating emanating from a survey plan without the approval approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: held: “That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected.”











carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in favor of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest, predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively. effectively. This is as it should be, because once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree may be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant litigant could, by repeated actions, compel compel a court to review a decree previously issued by another court forty-five (45) years years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration, registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALI’s failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original land registration case. The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied with the requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest . Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the certificate of title issued for the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further. [30] (Underscoring ours; citations omitted.)

It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALI’s TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a presumption, it dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 3. Disputable 3. Disputable presumptions. presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxxx (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;













With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all the bases of their cause of action, particularly their allegation that ALI’s title is null and void and that such title should be cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that petitioners never alleged the purported lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of ALI’s title. All that the complaint alleged is that ALI’s titles should be declared void for not being derivatives of the Carpos’ title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners were relying relying solely solely on the supposed supposed priority priority of their their own title over ALI’s. ALI’s. It stands to reason reason then that ALI did not have to allege allege in its Answer that its mother title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved survey plan when petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in their complaint or in any other pleading filed with the trial court. Indubitably, in view of the CA’s Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, this controversy has been reduced to the sole substantive issue of which between the two titles, purporting to cover the same property, deserves priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As petitioners themselves are aware, in Realty in Realty,, it was held that: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x ."[33] (Emphasis supplied.)











whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrances for value.”[35] Third Assignment of Error The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial court, in rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily on the alleged admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos’ title, as declared by the CA. Specifically, Specifically, the CA stated as follows: In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence and validity of plaintiffs-appellees’ plaintiffs-appellees’ title. We have read the pertinent pleading pleading and We find ALI’s ALI’s statement to to be of no moment. moment. Nowhere in ALI’s ALI’s statement statement was there an an admission of the the validity of plaintiffs-appelle plaintiffs-appellees’ es’ title. x x x. The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a quo could have gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not only the existence, but also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees’ certificate certificate of title. x x x. x .[36]

An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would readily show that indeed the trial court relied on ALI’s supposed admission of the existence of Carpos’ title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was valid. Pertinently, the trial court merely declared:











have objections with respect to the fourth requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro and the instant case. [39]

We agree agree with with petit petition ioner erss that that it is not apparent apparent from from an exami examinat nation ion of Guico of Guico and the eviden evidence ce on recor record d that that indee indeed d the predecessors-in-interest predecessors-in-interest of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the subject property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially since the parties’ respective OCTs were not issued in these persons’ names but rather a certain Alberto Yaptinchay and Apolonio Apolonio Sabater. Sabater. It cannot be categoric categorically ally said that there was identity identity of parties parties between the Guico case and the instant case. Clearly, one of the elements of res of res judicata, judicata, i.e., i.e., that there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In any event, the CA’s questioned Decision had sufficient basis in fact and law even without relying relying on the Guico case. In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting aside the patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the petition petition is DENIED. DENIED. The Court Court of Appeals’ Appeals’ Decision Decision dated dated December December 22, 2003 and the Resolutio Resolution n dated dated December 16, 2004 are herebyAFFIRMED. herebyAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181502

February 2, 2010











However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation. On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended resolution)13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read: ACCORDINGLY, ACCORDI NGLY, the Court resolves to: (1) x x x x x x (2) x x x x x x (3) x x x x x x (4) x x x x x x (5) x x x x x x (6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;] (7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect; (8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently,SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff plai ntiff-appe -appellee llee Florencia Florencia Garci Garcia a Diaz over the portion of the subject property in conso consonance nance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999; (9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution











If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza. I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in which we all find ourselves. I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark forces that surround us everyday. I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system. Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original). The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified in the media and by the public. This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioner’s letter/third motion for reconsideration. APPLICABILITY APPLICAB ILITY OF REYES The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that Reyes is applicable to this case. To constitute res judicata, judicata, the following elements must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 24













By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus: Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32 Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable under CA 141. [E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of











Authority, and the Office of the President, was secured b y the OSG when it executed the agreement with her.40 The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the Philippines. 41 In this case, although the OSG was autho authorize rized d to appear as couns counsel el for respo respondent ndent,, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires "special authority" f or attorneys to bind their clients. Section 23. Authority 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But











appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play – for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic. Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors’ sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion – as her letter to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court. xxx Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It

land titles

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