Kitsch by t. Kulka

British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 28, No. 1, Winter lgSS

KITSCH Tomas Kulka consensus among scholars as to the etymology of the word 'kitsch'. Some believe that it derives from the English 'sketch', while others link it to the German: 'etwas verkitschen' (to knock off cheaply). The experts do, however, agree that ever since the word was coined in the second half of the nineteenth century, it has borne distinctly negative connotations. The epithet 'kitsch' has been used as a synonym for worthless art, artistic rubbish, or simply bad art. Yet, clearly, not every piece of bad art will be perceived as kitsch. If the author of these pages were to attempt to portray his dog, the reader would not think much of the result; yet it is doubtful whether he or she would classify it as kitsch. Kitsch isn't simply an artistic failure—a work which has somehow gone wrong. There is something special about kitsch which sets it apart from the rest of bad art. Kitsch has a definite appeal. People like it, at least many do. Commercially, kitsch successfully competes with serious art. The mass-appeal of kitsch is being exploited by advertising agencies.to promote commodities, as well as by political parties to promote their ideologies. (The official art in Hitler's Germany or Soviet Russia may illustrate this point.) But what is it about kitsch that creates this appeal? Can we deny that the appeal is of an aesthetic nature? It seems that we are in no position to do so: judging by all the obvious indications, people who like kitsch derive from it the same kind of pleasure we typically derive from works of art. But if we concede that kitsch has an aesthetic appeal and cling to a rather plausible assumption that art is appreciated for its aesthetic qualities, we will have to face the following problem: if the appeal of kitsch is of an aesthetic nature, and if aesthetic qualities serve as a measure of artistic excellence, why is kitsch considered worthless? The problem of reconciling the mass appeal of kitsch with the dismissive attitude of the art-educated elite can be easily resolved by a radical relativist: De gustibus non disputandum est. Just as some people prefer tea to coffee, some people prefer kitsch to so-called serious art. But what if we do not want to embrace radical subjectivism or relativism of this kind? Can we reconcile the mass-appeal of kitsch with the dismissive attitude of the art-educated elite without interpreting aesthetic judgements as autobiographical statements expressing purely subjective preferences? There seems to be another easy way out. One can simply say that the aesthetic appeal of kitsch is confined to a distinct, albeit extensive, class of people who can be characterized by their bad taste. This view differs from the relativist answer © Oxford University Press 1988

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THERE IS no

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We have already noted two basic facts about kitsch: (1) that it has an undeniable mass-appeal; and (2) that it is considered (by the art-educated elite) bad. These two features make kitsch into a special category of its own. Consequently, the analysis of kitsch has to provide answers to the following two questions: (Qi) What does its appeal consist in? and (Q2) What does its badness consist in? We have to explain why so many people are attracted to kitsch, as well as why kitsch, nevertheless, is not entitled to the status of respectable art. Let us ask what sort of instructions we would give to a painter to create a convincing kitsch? What sort of advice would you offer him as to (1) what to paint, and (2) how to paint it, in order that a commercially successful kitsch be produced? 2 Let us begin with the first question. It seems plain that some objects of depiction (e.g., a fluffy little kitten, a crying child, or a thinly veiled beautiful young lady playing a violin against the sunset on the sea shore) would be much better candidates for kitsch than others (e.g., a factory chimney, a chair, or a washing machine). Let us list some of the objects or themes that figure prominently in kitsch pictures: puppies or kittens


by building normative, elitist, implications into differences of taste. However, it only shifts the question. For we still want to know what is wrong with kitsch and what its aesthetic appeal consists in. The answer that its appeal consists in its being appreciated by many people and the explanation of its deficiencies by reference to their bad taste is hardly philosophically illuminating. For the question still remains as to what it is about kitsch that makes it so attractive to this group of people, and what, independently of this preference of theirs, attests to the 'badness' of their taste. After all, we have no evidence that consumers of kitsch consistently prefer bad art to good art outside the realm of kitsch. In an authoritative anthology edited by Gillo Dorfles1 the phenomenon of kitsch in various artistic genres is examined by a number of scholars. They all consider kitsch a bad form of art, yet none of them really explains what the aesthetic deficiencies of kitsch are. Interesting as much of what they say is, the discussions of kitsch presented in this anthology are couched in socio-economic terms, not in specifically aesthetic ones. They refer to rapid industrialization, the emergence of new social classes, diffusion of cultural traditions by modern means of communication and transportation, mass culture, etc. They deal informatively with those aspects of the human condition that have contributed ' to the emergence, the rapid diffusion and the prevalence of kitsch. They fail to explain, however, what kitsch actually is, from the aesthetic point of view. In this paper I propose to fill in this gap. I hope to show what it is that disqualifies kitsch as respectable art despite its apparent aesthetic appeal. I shall try to account for both the popular success of kitsch and its deficiencies by reference to its internal, aesthetic properties.

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of various sorts, children in tears, mothers with babies, long-legged girls with sensuous lips and alluring eyes, palm beaches with colourful sunsets, pastoral Swiss villages framed in mountain panoramas, pasturing families of deer in a forest clearing, couples embracing against the full moon, wild horses galloping along the waves of a stormy sea, cheerful beggars, sad clowns, sad faithful old dogs gazing towards infinity (often immortalized in porcelain), etc. The reader could easily extend the list. What is it that these themes have in common? They are all heavily emotionally charged. They are highly charged with stock emotions which spontaneously elicit a ready response. The subject-matter typically depicted by kitsch is generally considered to be beautiful (horses, long-legged girls), pretty (sunsets, Swiss villages), cute (puppies, kittens) and/or highly emotionally charged (mothers with babies, children in tears). It seems that these features do not just typically concur with kitsch, but actually constitute a condition sine qua non. Consider ordinary objects of everyday life which are not considered particularly pretty and which are devoid of any emotional charge: e.g., an ordinary chair, factory chimney, or a washing machine. It is, of course, easy enough to make bad pictures of chairs, chimneys or washing machines, but no matter how hard you try, it will not be kitsch. Take on the other hand an object which is generally considered cute and which triggers a ready emotional response: our fluffy little kitten, for example. Not only is it quite easy to produce such a kitten-depicting kitsch, it is actually quite difficult (given the appropriate technical skills) not to slide into one. From the above considerations it also follows that it would be much more difficult to produce an abstract kitsch painting than a figurative one. This, I think, agrees with our intuitions, for we seldom label an abstract work of art as kitsch, no matter how bad it appears to us. Our first advice to a painter who is after producing a convincing kitsch would thus be: as to what to paint, choose an object which is generally considered beautiful (pretty, cute) and/or which triggers a ready emotional response. Before turning to the question how to paint it, i.e., to the stylistic, or presentational constraints on kitsch, let us consider what further specifications should guide our choice of the represented subject-matter and what type of emotional response one should aim to elicit. Let us take, for example, the 'crying child' which figures so prominently in kitsch depictions. Our painter will be more likely to succeed if he chooses a nice and cute child rather than a wicked looking or an ugly one. The cry shouldn't be irritating or the hysterical cry which gets on your nerves but rather a sob of the soft and quiet variety. The crying child should elicit a sympathetic, patronizing response. We should feel secure and comfortable when we look at the picture. The kitsch painter should remove any unpleasant or disturbing features of reality, leaving us only with those which we can easily cope and identify ourselves with. There shouldn't be anything disturbing or threatening in kitsch. The success of kitsch also depends on the universality of the emotions it triggers. A typical kitsch is reassuring not

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II It seems that condition (1) already provides us with the answer to question (Qi). In view of condition (1) it seems natural to conclude that the reason why so many people are attracted to kitsch is that they like the depicted subject or that the theme of the picture elicits a ready emotional response. However, condition (1), by itself, does not really suffice to answer our question. We forgot something; or rather, we made an implicit assumption, which—despite its obviousness—should be spelled out. In order that the spectator should respond appropriately to the represented subject-matter, he has to be capable of recognizing it. People have to be able to identify the depicted subject in the picture as the beautiful or emotionally meaningful subject that they are familiar with. Kitsch, as a matter of fact, always satisfies this requirement. We never have a problem in telling what kitsch is about. If we did, the emotional charge and the relevant associations related to the depicted subject would not, so to speak, get across and the picture thus wouldn't elicit the response which kitsch typically does. The question is: What is it that accounts for this instant identifiability of depicted objects in kitsch pictures? What sort of advice would we offer to our painter as to how to paint a convincing kitsch? Let us, for illustration's sake, confine ourselves to a given subject-matter, say, our fluffy little kitten, or a crying child. Can one produce such a kitten-depicting or child-depicting kitsch in any artistic style? It seems that some artistic styles are better suited for kitsch-depictions than others. Our painter would be more likely to succeed were he to paint in compliance with the stylistic conventions of, say, socialist realism, or nineteenth-century romanticism, rather than if he were to adopt the canons of Cubism or Futurism. It seems very hard (if not impossible) to imagine a convincing kitsch of a crying child done in the manner that Picasso portrayed Ambroise Vollard in 1910. Or, try to imagine what would happen to our fluffy little kitten if it were rendered in the manner that Marcel Duchamp painted his Nude Descending a Staircase (1912). It simply would not work. Such pictures would fail to elicit the instant emotional response which kitsch typically does. Such problems, however, would not arise, if the above mentioned subjects of depiction were rendered in the romantic or socialist-realist style.


only because we respond spontaneously but also because we know that we respond 'rightly', that is, we know that we are moved in the right kind of way, which is to say, in the same way as everybody else. Kitsch does not work on individual idiosyncrasies but on universal images, the emotional charge of which is highly inter-subjective. Kitsch is to reassure us in our basic sentiments and beliefs, not to disturb or question them. Let us sum up the above considerations and state our first condition for the application of the concept of kitsch: (1): Kitsch depicts an object or theme which is generally considered to be beautiful or highly charged with stock emotions.

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The Rue La Peletier is really very unlucky. First there was the greatfireat the Opera, and now a second disaster has come to upset the district. An exhibition—supposed to be an exhibition of paintings—hasjust been opened at the Durand-Ruel Gallery . . . It really is frightful seeing such an aberration of human vanity and lunacy. Do tell Monsieur Pissarro that trees aren't really purple and the sky isn't really the colour of butter; tell him the things he paints don't really exist anywhere and no intelligent person can be expected to accept such rubbish. . . . Try and make Monsieur Degas see reason and tell him that there really are such things in art as drawing and colour


The above considerations may lead us to the conclusion that kitsch employs a very natural, or realistic, mode of representation. After all, Cubist and Futurist representations strike us (at least on the first sight) as somewhat odd and artificial. It would be, nevertheless, too hasty to identify the stylistic features of kitsch with realism. For kitsch is in many respects very unrealistic and unnatural. The eyes of the crying child in kitsch pictures are disproportionately large and the tears are roughly five times the size than any real tear can be. What can, nevertheless, be said about kitsch is that it invariably uses the most conventional, well tried and tested representational canons. The instant and effortless identifiability of the depicted object in kitsch pictures is not a matter of realism (kitsch typically displays a total disregard for detail), but rather a matter of compliance with the most common representational conventions of the time. Any departure from the accepted conventions is undesirable for kitsch, for it may make unnecessary demands on the spectator. The deciphering of the picture should be as effortless as possible. Kitsch should, so to speak, speak the most common language understandable to all.. It shouldn't venture into an esoteric jargon (such as Cubism) or idiosyncratic dialect (such as Jackson Pollock's biomorfic period). This is why we hardly ever find any stylistic innovations in kitsch. The 'realism' of kitsch thus consists of the compliance with the most well tried and tested representational conventions. We have noted that the adherence to the accepted representational conventions of the time is conducive to the instant identifiability of the depicted subjectmatter. We may note further, however, that this compliance need not enhance the artistic qualities of the depiction. Originality and artistic innovation, which are generally considered positive features of works of art, often challenge the accepted representational canons. Within the framework of accepted representational conventions there is often enough space for innovation. However, sometimes this space becomes so saturated that artists feel a need to expand, modify, or abandon altogether the accepted canons of representation. It'is on such occasions that we speak of emerging new styles. New styles often meet with hostile reactions. This is because the novel kind of presentation is not readily acknowledged by the conservative public as a 'correct' or 'realistic' representation. Let me illustrate this point by just one example. This is what the official art critic of Le Figaro wrote in his review of the second Impressionist exhibition:

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and technique and meaning . . . Try and explain to Monsieur Renoir that a woman's body is not just a bundle of decomposing flesh with green and purple patches that show what an advanced stage of putrefaction the corpse is in. 3

kitsch is instantly and effortlessly identifiable.


This passage shows that the critic considered the pictures incorrect and therefore inadmissible representations because certain salient features of those paintings (e.g., the presence of green and purple patches in the rendering of a nude) were not conducive to the instant identifiability of the depicted subjectmatter (human body in this case). All this is quite relevant to our problem. Since the appeal of kitsch derives its force from the depicted subject, which is generally considered pretty or strongly emotionally charged, it must be readily recognizable as such. This, as we have noted earlier, is best achieved by compliance with the accepted painting conventions of the time. However, it is the very violation of these conventions which eventually secured the Impressionists their esteemed place in the history of art. The requirement of instant and effortless identifiability thus militates against stylistic innovations. Kitsch never ventures into avant-garde. Kitsch doesn't venture into styles that haven't yet become universally digested. It can jump on the band-wagon only after the novelty becomes a commonplace. This, I think, accounts for the ultra-conservative, and stylistically reactionary, nature of kitsch. Our kitsch painter would thus be well advised to refrain from any stylistic innovations and keep well within the most comprehensible representational conventions. He should consider all features which do not directly contribute to the instant identifiability of the depicted subject as superfluous and—since they may also distract our attention from the associations evoked by the represented subject—potentially harmful to kitsch. This is why kitsch is likely to be unexciting or even boring from the artistic point of view. These considerations also point to the context-dependent nature of kitsch. In view of the above quoted passage we may assume that in the 1860s and 1870s it would have been virtually impossible to paint a picture in the Impressionist style which would be (then) considered kitsch. There is, however, no problem to produce an Impressionistically styled kitsch today. This is because the Impressionist canons of representation have become by now accepted as a quite natural and 'realistic' mode of representation. The Cubist mode of representation, however, is even today still seen as artificial, unnatural and 'unrealistic'. This is why, I guess, even our fluffy little kitten wouldn't quite come out as kitsch if rendered in truly Cubist manner. Let us summarize the above considerations by stating our second condition for the application of the concept of kitsch: (2): The object or theme depicted by

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III

The point of this picture is not that it tells you about a bar and a barmaid and how it was at the Folies-Bergere. . . . the picture distils an exhilarating experience that can be shared with the artist, in which the objects in the theatre bar, bottles, glasses, gas lights, anonymous barmaid, and reflections in a mirror lose their mundane character and ire transformed by a perceptive human intellect into a magical image. The picture does not simply represent a bar, it presents the end product of a transformation, we value it because it is like experiences we ourselves have had of suddenly seeing the ordinary world changed and exalted, but the picture is differentfrom and superior to our experience. . . . once having witnessed this transformation, we are prepared to be exhilarated more often and more intensely. Knowing the picture can actually make the real environment more worthwhile. The value of Manet's image, then, lies in the isolation of an experience of the environment—an experience most viewers share with the artist—and its intensification.4

The aesthetic appeal of the painting (unlike kitsch) is not simply parasitic on the projected beauty of the barmaid. The picture creates beauty of its own. The subject-matter is presented to us in a manner which, according to Ackerman, is superior to our experience. Ackerman draws our attention to the fact that the picture transforms and intensifies our experience. 'The picture can actually make the real environment more worth while.' The artist transforms the subject of his depiction in such a way that his painting evokes something that we might have not noticed or felt before. He elaborates its unique and often overlooked features to reveal new aspects of reality. It was John Dewey who emphasized this function of art when he wrote: 'art is not nature, but nature transformed by entering into a new relationship where it invokes a new emotional response'.5 Essentially the same idea has also been expressed by Nelson Goodman, who in his worldmaking terminology says: 'How representational painting makes worlds is strikingly clear to anyone who has stepped into a new world after seeing an exhibition of works that work'. 6


Our two conditions may well be necessary, but they are not sufficient. Nor do they answer question (Q2): Why is kitsch, despite its appeal, considered bad? For, clearly, not only kitsch but also the Venus of Milo, Goya's Maya, Manet's Bar at the Folies-Bergere, as well as countless other respected works of art, satisfy our two conditions. What we have to ask then is what distinguishes kitsch from respectable works of art in those cases where the depicted objects are generally considered beautiful or emotionally charged and the mode of rendering complies with the presently accepted representational conventions. Let us consider our last example: Eduard Manet's A Bar at the Folies-Bergere (1881). The subject-matter of this picture—a beautiful girl serving at a cabaret bar—is instantly identifiable, and could easily be exploited by kitsch. What is it, then, that places this painting at a safe distance from kitsch? Let me quote what James Ackerman says about this painting:

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It is a common psychological fact that when we perceive depicted objects in pictures we spontaneously draw upon our past experience of actual objects of the same general kind. The standard associations related to the depicted object which are stored in the memory are evoked by the identification of the familiar object in the picture. This is true of all representational pictures. Some pictures, however, transform the familiar ideas and associations related to the depicted object in various manners. The standard associations can be sharpened, amplified, intensified, or altogether transformed as a result of our visual experience of a painting. This can be achieved in a countless number of ways. Surrealist paintings, for example, typically exploit the tension between associations related to the depicted object whose surface details and style of depiction are reassuringly naturalistic and their assembly, which is disturbingly unnatural. Standard associations can also be enriched by simply presenting objects from unusual angles which emphasize its often overlooked features. By breaking objects into fragmented brush strokes of discontinuous patches of pure prismatic colours, and by their emphasis on the immediacy of the changing effects of light and reflections the Impressionists have not only enriched our associations, they have actually helped us to look at our environment in a new, more intense and refined way. Oscar Wilde once said that there was no fog in London before Whistler had painted it. In a similar vein Georg Schmidt and Robert Schenk remarked that 'although the color-saturated atmosphere of Paris is older than the city itself, its beauty was first revealed by impressionists'.7 Examples of representational pictures which enrich, or transform our standard associations could easily be multiplied. My claim is that kitsch does not belong to this category. Kitsch does not exploit the artistic possibilities of structural elaboration, extension of expressive potentialities, elaboration of unique individual features, interpretation and innovation. It works on stereotypes. Kitsch typically presents its subject-matter in the most standard and schematic manner. The crying child completely lacks any individual features; it is an idealized stereotype of a child. It functions as a sort of pictogram. If kitsch pictures were supplied with suitable verbal labels (such as: 'Crying Child', 'Fluffy Little Kitten', etc.,) we could say that the picture and the label are interchangeable in the following sense: the 'message' of kitsch is roughly the same as the 'message' of its label. The associations triggered by kitsch do not substantially exceed the associations triggered by its label. Apart from the obvious differences due to the different media, the label and the picture have roughly the same effect. The label sums up the picture and the picture sums up the label.8 Unlike real art, kitsch does not in any meaningful way enrich or transform the antecedently stored associations. It functions merely as a stimulus, or a triggering device, for their retrieval. The souvenir industry, which takes a lion's share of the kitsch market, exploits this very principle with utmost efficiency. A typical souvenir, say a plastic miniature replica of Santa Maria del Fiore is just about similar enough to

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IV Let us restate our three conditions and make a few concluding remarks about what these conditions amount to: (1) Kitsch depicts a subject which is generally considered beautiful or highly emotionally charged; (2) The subject depicted by kitsch is instantly and effortlessly identifiable; (3) Kitsch does not substantially enrich our associations related to the depicted subject. The first condition restricts the range of subjects that can be profitably exploited by kitsch, while the remaining two conditions pertain to the stylistic properties of the rendering and the manner of the presentation of the subject-matter. Each of the three conditions is considered to be necesary; jointly, they are considered to be sufficient. The first two conditions suggest an answer to the question: what does the mass-appeal of kitsch consist in? (Qi); while the third condition (in conjunction with the second) explains why kitsch is nevertheless considered bad (Q2). Jointly they point to the essentially parasitic nature of kitsch, and reveal the subtle trick that kitsch plays on its consumers. Kitsch does not create beauty of its own, its appeal is not really generated by the aesthetic merit of the work itself, but by the appeal of the depicted object. Good painters, even when they depict objects that are generally considered to be beautiful or emotionally charged, do not simply capitalize on the emotional charge of their subject-matter. The appeal of kitsch, on the other hand, is entirely parasitic on its referent. In semiotic terminology kitsch may be viewed as a transparent symbol the referential function of which is essential to its success. It is transparent in the sense that its effect is not secured by the qualities of the symbol (i.e., of the work of art itself) but rather by what the symbol refers to. Unlike the case in real art, the what is more important than the how. The consumer of kitsch looks through the symbol, so to speak, to what the symbol stands for. He believes he likes (and aesthetically appreciates) the depiction, i.e., the kitsch picture, while what he really likes is the depicted object. The referential function of kitsch carries its admirers from the picture itself (which they seldom scrutinize) to the associations related to the depicted object. Kitsch consumers may believe that what appeals to them are the aesthetic merits of the 'artistic' presentation. What is


Brunelleschi's masterpiece to remind you of the experience you had when you saw the Florentine Duomo, but it does not enrich or add anything to this experience. The success of kitsch depends entirely on the acquired associations related to the represented object but at the same time it does not enrich them: kitsch does not tell us anything new or interesting about its object. It merely plays on the stored emotions and associations by 'naming' the depicted subject, so to speak, in an appropriate visual language. Let us sum up what has been said in this section by stating our third condition for the application of the concept of kitsch: (3): Kitsch does not substantially enrich our associations related to the depicted subject.

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really at work are the standard associations triggered by the picture, associations to which they are positively predisposed. At the same time kitsch does not transform these associations, it does not elicit a new emotional response. To use Goodmanian terminology again, kitsch does not make new worlds—because it does not work. Tomas Kulka, Dept. of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.

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Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste (New York: Universe Books, 1969). For reasons of scope I shall discuss only kitsch in pictorial art. I believe, however, that the principles outlined below could, with certain modifications, be extended to characterize kitsch in other artistic disciplines. Albert Wolf, he Figaro (3 April 1876),. quoted from Maurice Serullaz, Phaidon Encyclopedia oj Impressionism (Oxford: Phaidon, 1978), p. 20. 'On Judging Art without Absolutes', Critical Inquiry, vol. 5 (Spring 1979), p. 462, my italics. Art as Experience (New York: 1934), p. 462. 'Aesthetics and Worldmaking: Reply to Jens Kulankampff, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 39 (Spring 1981), p. 275. Kunst und Naturform (Basel: Basileus Presse, 1958), quoted by E. M. Haffner, 'The New

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Reality in Art and Science', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 11 (Oct. 1969), p. 389. In an obvious sense a picture is bound to be richer than a label. The crying-child picture has to have some colours and some expression or other—features which labels lack. The point about kitsch is that many of its specific features usually do not matter much. As long as the tears are big and the child is cute, the rest can be altered in a great many ways without the picture losing its effect as kitsch. This, again, contrasts with serious art.

I want to thank Dr Yeal Cohen, Prof. Nelson Goodman and Prof. Avishai Margalit for their very helpful criticism of an earlier version of this paper.


REFERENCES

Kitsch by t. Kulka

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