Hans Blumenberg’s Beschreibung des Menschen.pdf

Cé Gál Có and séh Dhu on

Hans Ha ns Blumenberg’s Blumenberg’s Beschreibung des Menschen*

The Quest for a Phenomenological Anthropology Car Gonzez Cantn Ti book incde a nmber of te major teme wic Han Bmenberg freqenty dea wit in i oter work. Bmenberg trgged trogot i woe ife wit te poibiit y of deveoping deveoping a penomenoogica penomenoogica antropoogy ant ropoogy a a ret of  i anayi of man exitence, and Beschreibung des Menschen i once again a proof  of ti overarcing concern (p. 204). In point of fact, te tite Bmenberg wod imef im ef ave iked for te book – nay na y btitted by Beschreibung des Menschen – wa “Pänomenoogice Antropoogie.” Antropoogie.”1 Te probem Bmenberg Bmenberg want to addre a ddre in i book’ rt part i weter (or not) Her’ and Heidegger’ penomenoogica teorie can be fond ef for ti enterprie. 2 For im te obvio anwer i “no.” Bmenberg demontrate tat man being are actay abent from tee penomenoogica approace, intead tey preent a caricatre of man being ketced in term of a trancendenta verion of reaon. Te probem of te teoretica viibiity of man being , and wit it te poibiity of a penomenoogica penomenoogica antropoogy, t become te core of Bmenberg’ Bmenberg’ reection in te econd part. The Ontological Raise Ra ise of Anthropology

Bmenberg’ caenge to penomenoogica viion i jtied by te particar way in wic Bmenberg ndertand antropoogy. A trogot te book contingency i treed wen approacing approacing ma n being. Man beong to te word word of ting tat emerge and beqenty diappear. since every iving being mt foow ti detiny, ti od not be a primary concern. However, man concione poe a diaectica conict inide man being, wic w ic make tem dierent from te oter anima ani ma (ee p. 634). 634). Man i, on te

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H. Bmenberg, Beschreibung des Menschen, a dem acaß eragegeben von M. sommer, Frankfrt am Main: srkamp, 2006. 1 see M. sommer, “acwort, “ac wort,” ” in Bmenberg, Bme nberg, Beschreibung , p. 897. 2 De to pace contraint cont raint it eemed to me enibe to moty foc on Bmenberg’ B menberg’ accont of  Her’ Her’ penomenoogy and eave eave aide i parae critiqe cr itiqe on Heidegger. Iri, Iss 2036-3257, I, 2 October 2009, p. 545-556 © Firenze Univerity Pre

546 Car Gonzez Cantn and stpane Dircaer 

one and, aware of i nite being (p. 603). On te oter and, i reaon trive to compreend te entirety of te word (p. 147). In te atter cae, te ind ivida od trancend time’ given imit in order to f i reaon’ objective. Hman exitence i ten fndamentay awed: it cannot acieve te atifaction of it deire trog reaon (Vernunft ), becae te individa i born and die. Ti aw make man ot of armony wit te word and eventay wit te Being. Wy od c a being exit, woe concience can neiter conceive it (own) beginning nor it (own) end? Antropoogy addree ti contradiction by aming tat tere i no reaon for man to exit. More tecnicay, te core of  antropoogy’ notion i itoricity, ince te reaon for man contingency ie in it corpora natre; corporaity drown man in te word’ river of time. A Bmenberg arge, nataity and mortaity are antropoogica determination (p. 463). someting new appear in tee parad igmatic exampe, and, at te ame time, ometing i ot. In my view, te key point in te Bmenbergian notion of time i tat ometing changes. It i important to keep ti in mind to ndertand ater te penomenoogica compreenion of time. ot ony doe man’ corpora condition contribte to i particar vnerabiity, bt ao i ack of intinct. In te greater anima kingdom, man’ anatomica, perceptive, and motiona paticity make te “rationa anima” into eay prey. It migt be aid tat bioogica vnerabiity mirror man’ ontoogica dictie wit reaity. However, ti i ony part of te tory. Te vnerabiity caed by man’ paticity i a important a man’ reaoned eort to ecape treatening itation for an antropoogica teory. Lo of word de to o of intinct i compenated by ctre – in a broad ene of te word tat embrace too, magic, myt, cience, art, pioopy […] Hman being bid p a word in te cave of ctre to keep rea ity at a ditance (ee p. 145). Wit te ret tat, a  vnerabe a te man anima i, it dipay te greatet abiity to rvive in te woe anima ream. Lack of intinct and ctra compenation i te tarting point of 20 t centry German pioopica antropoogy. Te teme of body t frame Bmenberg’ ontoogica reection arond evotionary cience. Ie, c a te trgge for rviva, bipedim, reexive optic, deegation, memory, etc., are treated at engt in dicion wit Arnod Geen, Pa Aberg, Hemt Pener, and oter (pp. 217 ., 585 .). Reaon a a compenating device i not te end top of Bmenberg’ accont of  reaon. Tere i a frter twit: reaon can trow man back into awarene of i contingency. By foowing it inerent tendency to ed igt, to c arify (i.e., to ook for timate cae) reaon create awarene of contingency. onetee, ince – a mentioned above – tere i no reaon for man to exit, reaon actay come acro te very contingency it ad tried to ide from by oter mean. One form adopted by reaon in ti ene i natra cience. By decentring te Eart in te soar sytem, demontrating te tatitica wonder of reaon’ appearance in te Univere, pointing at te entropic na owdown of te Como, redctioniticay tracing back pycoogica penomena to nconcio force, or conidering man being a a certain combination of cemica, modern cience revea man conting ency (ee pp. 15-17). Anoter form of reaon i penomenoogy. A Bmenberg demontrate, te penomenoogica enterprie of teoretica carication eave no room for antropoogica conideration – jt a tere i no natra cience tat a to do, ony and

Han Bmenberg’ Beschreibung des Menschen 547

pecica y, wit man (p. 16). Antropoogy i not abot carit y; it impie te covering of track, not taring at te reaity bt iding. The Invisible Man of Phenomenology

Reaon’ careene abot m an contingency permitted Her’ penomenoogy to preent it teoretica enterprie a a never-ending one. Te trade-o wa to oe man aong te way. Every individa fnction indeed a a repaceabe ocia in te acievement of te penomenoogica goa (Funktionär des Ziels) (p. 13). since everyting i ppoed to remain preerved at te end of te teoretica tak beyond te individa concience – i.e., tere i neiter o nor novety – time i not reay ndertood in te penomenoogica framework. Time i ony te mean by wic te diacronic word wi yncronicay come to term wit te penomenoogica ecidation. By te ame token, “time concione” (Zeitbewusstsein) i not te mark of nite concience, bt i a featre necea ry for concience in order for te penomenoogica evidence to be poibe. 3 A privieged point of acce to ti qetion i Her’ concept of “retention” ( Retention) and “protention” (Protention) a contittive eement of inner-time experience: in te preent moment concione expand back and fort ony to ave it a gatered in te preence of te penomenoogica evidence a “owever imtaneo” (p. 43). Te mindertanding of time i te revere of Her’ treatment of te body qetion. A een, te body introdce contingency in te ma n ef. Te Herian anayi of “occaiona meaning” (okkasionale Bedeutungen) ow te dictie in bringing into agreement te trancendenta and contingent apect of te ef (p. 36). Ti qetion refer to te broader teme of interbjectivity. Her iked to pretend tat in te teory of perception of oter ( Fremderfahrung ) and  Appräsentation “te fondation of a penomenoogica antropoogy are aid down” (pp. 92-93), bt Bmenberg ow in i anayi tat tey are not. Reaon’ intentionaity remain nfed a ong a te woe of a word’ meaning a not been competey depoyed (p. 98). Tat i wy te exitence of oter apart from te individa penomenoogit i needed (p. 109, 122). Herian trancendenta interbjectivity, and it embodiment, i a condition for te contittion of te word a objectivity, by wic te oter are intrment of te penomenoogica “free variation” ( freie  Variation) (pp. 28, 57-58). Cod tat not be carried ot by te penomenoogit aone? Indeed, if e were not morta (p. 127). Tat i wy te oter’ (te penomenoogit) preence i reqired. Yet ti ony expain te contittion of te word’ meaning, bt not te exitence tereof. Tat i inked to te contingent bject’ poition now and here , wic impie tat a dierent one (then and there ) migt ave been te cae. Terefore, for bridging over te poibe and te rea word, oter poition in pace and time mt empiricay be occpied by oter (p. 126). Evidenty, it reqire embodied oter; witot bodie tere cannot be a word (p. 99). T, te oter bject’ exitence i for  Her demontrated previoy to teir being perceived a bodie (p. 103). In aion to te Kantian critiqe, interbjectivity work a a potate of te teoretica reaon.

3

Te Heideggerian “sorge” i for Bmenberg a verion of ti too (p. 42-43).

548 Car Gonzez Cantn and stpane Dircaer 

Terefore, in Her’ penomenoogy te oter are ony mean for rendering compreenive te naivety of or condence in te word’ exitence (p. 58), a ong a te penomenoogit i a morta being. For ti reaon, Bmenberg regard te God of panteim a te penomenoogit’ na verion (Grenzwert ): te God wo dwe in oipim.4 Te oter’ exitence trog teir body i ony factay reqired. Carrying ot a togt experiment – aready caica in te itory of tinking –  Bmenberg nd tat any oter rationa pecie from extraterretria origin wod fnction imiary to man being in te penomenoogica anayi (pp. 37 ., 246, 489). Te ominization proce i not reevant for te penomenoogica tak; ti i not rpriing if we conider tat te proce of body formation, a empirica reearc ow, revea man a a random prodct of natre (p. 106). Te Herian doing away of te man body goe and in and wit ignoring man’ contingency, and everyting amont to te inviibiity of man in penomenoogy. Tracking Down Man

Paradoxicay, by attempting to render man teoreticay viibe for imef, te penomenoogit ot man aong te way. Bmenberg’ antropoogica approac foow a dierent pat: by conidering man a not teoretica y approacabe, i.e., a inviibe (for teory), 5 it acieve at eat a gimpe of im. Te compenating roe aigned to reaon by antropoogy raie te qetion of  reaon’ facticity, i.e. “te fact of it itorica exitence” (p. 386, 495). A mentioned above, facticity i reated to te man body’ conideration in te context of evotionary inigt amed by pioopica antropoogy. Te qetion of body igigt te probem of man’ viibiity, and coneqenty of te poibiity of antropoogy a ong a it i reated to te probem of rviva. Man’ ef knowedge ( Selbsterkenntnis ) depend not pon making imef a teoretica object (ee p. 260), i.e. nding a “denition” of man’ eence (p. 511), bt rater oberving it in te action of etting p te condition for i rviva. Opacity ten correate wit viibiity (p. 789). Man t experience imef in te track e eave beind; rater tan being te bject of teorie, e can ony be tracked down. Provided wit ti anaytica ceme of  man’ radica vnerabiity and maxima  abiity for adaptation, Bmenberg nt after  a nmber of antropoogica penomena, among wic are: man’ radica fear of an indeterminate orce (pp. 566 .), man’ craving for conoation and te impoibiity of being conoed abot i exitentia tragedy (pp. 623 .), and toe reated to man’ deepet of deire, wic i to ave more time ( Zeitgewinn) (p. 608). Wit ti deire incde greed becae weat make one’ own word broader, te capacity for imation (Simulation) (p. 600), or, in te ame vein, for deegation (p. 625). Te faire of ef knowedge’ penomenoogica project i de to te inerenty awed way in wic man perceive imef, ince intentio obliqua i barey fnctiona for rviva cce (p. 891). It can even become a patoogy, and wit it te pe-

4

A Bmenberg tate, “[t]e qetion for a tinker’ God i te at poibe metodica approac to te impication of i tinking we can deveop” (p. 380). 5 Bmenberg empoy te Deus absconditus metapor to itrate i point.

Han Bmenberg’ Beschreibung des Menschen 549

nomenoogy a “an ndicipined form of reaon” (p. 39). Teoretica reection i a penomenon traceabe back to pecic antropoogica condition, i.e., to te “paive optic” ( passive Optik) ariing from bipedim (p. 143). standing on two eg a ow for  a broader optica ed and, beqenty, for more cance of rv iva, bt it ao f ree te back’ rface for oter’ eye, mak ing it neceary to expend extra eort to protect one’ own backide.  Jt a interbjectivity wa ndertood a an otcome of reection, o perception of oter (Fremderfahrung ) i an otcome of ef-regarding beavior (pp. 244 .) Yet Bmenberg trn arond te Herian anayi by potating tat oter-perception i not dedced from reection. Rater, reection i indced by te perceived vnerabi ity tat man’ nprotected back preent to potentia enemie.6 Te certainty of oter’ exitence i painfy acknowedged, previoy to any teoretica contittion of objectivity. Ti danger ndergird a te artifact (i.e., cotme, biding, re of poite beavior) devied by man to ide imef from oter’ eyeigt in te cave of ctre (p. 145). Once reviited by Bmenberg, te advice on te front of te Depi Tempe, “know tyef,” migt be interpreted a: “Reaie tat yo are een wen yo want to ee” (“Beachte, dass du gesehen wirst, wenn du sehen willst ”) (p. 140). Bmenberg come t to te foowing “antropoogica compex of viibiity” tat mmarize a of man interaction wit oter in te optica ed: “being v iibe” (Gesehenwerdenkönnen), “to et imef be een” (Sichsehenlassen), and “to ow imef” (Sichdarstellen) (p. 779). Man’ fndamenta dicomfort wit imef a manifod manifetation. Te rt i tat of one’ own body – te very orce of viibiity and inviibiity (pp. 659 .) Te body’ paradigmatic expreion i te patoogica penomenon of ypocondria (p. 696). Anoter one i te man need for eep wic i conidered by Bmenberg a one of te major treat to te bject’ identity, a ong a te bject i not i mef  for ome or (p. 172). Fear of o of imef in eep migt be acconted for te maaie of inomnia. Dream are eement of identity preervation dring eep time, bt teir typica trangene i ikey to be more trobing tan rearing; te exitence of dream interpreter, from aman to Fred, accont for ti. Te experience of time poe, for it part, it own et of appeaing qetion. Memory (Erinnerung ) can be een a te perception of myef aving been anoter  peron – i.e., omeone wo i no onger me – a a ret of reinterpreting one’ own experience in order to preerve perona identity over te paing of time. Memory bring togeter famiiarity and diaociation in te bject’ eart (p. 104). In ti recontrction, wic i dierent from penomenoogica Retention, many memorie get ot and new content i incded in identity congration. T, memory may be one of te actet cae of te awarene of contingency for te bject, wo know that  e i bt not what  e i (p. 104). A frter orce of contingency derive from memory’ reation to oter bject, a in t e penomenon of being een. Te dicrepancy between one’ own and oter’ memorie abot oneef i, according to Bmenberg, one of te mot inteney ditrbing experience tat take pace in man interaction (p. 188). At te ame time, precario a memory’ contrction of 

6

Again wit a teoogica metapor, ti a been beatify expreed in te fear of an aeeing God (pp. 808 .).

550 Car Gonzez Cantn and stpane Dircaer 

identity may be in comparion to retention and protention’ pretence (p. 179), it ao contitte by te ame token a mean of gti ng contingency (p. 250). It eem cear tat Bmenberg a tried i bet in deveoping an orig ina approac to a penomenoogica antropoogy. It i origina becae it repreent a oid propoa for te armoniation of ontoogica and antropoogica inigt. Fr termore, i decription of antropoogica penomena are, at eat, beatif y deveoped, and very freqenty compeing. Ti book deerve te iget praie a tinker can receive, and den itey one tat Bmenberg wod appreciate: tat it i togt-provoking.

Car Gonzez Cantn Univeritat Pompe Fabra cgcanton@gmai.com

Blumenberg on Phenomenology and Self-Knowledge  stpane Dircaer  Depite it impreive ize and cope, ti potmo addition to Bmenberg’ aready vomino body of work in’t exacty a treatie on te man condition, in te tradition of c earier tinker a A rnod Geen and Hemt Pener. Rater, foowing Bmenberg’ caref wording, Beschreibung des Menschen raie te qetion of te very “poibiity of a pioopica antropoogy” – to wic, a we a ee, it provide a provocative bt nanced anwer. Mankind’ dening trgge for efpreervation aready gred prominenty in Work on Myth and, in a trategic tog impicit way, in te Legitimacy of the Modern Age . One migt, owever, be rpried to ee Bmenberg trning to Her for inpiration in ti context. Inofar a a pioopica antropoogy i poibe, it wi be penomenoogica in natre. To be re, Zu den Sachen und zurück aready made cear Bmenberg’ facination for Her, wie inting at te poibiity of a ftre “penomenoogica antropoogy.” 7 In Bmenberg’ ifetime, Lebenszeit und Weltzeit  aready engaged Her’ togt in a ggetive bt pzzing way: a erie of tdie on te widening gf between an individa’ ifetime and te indenite marc of cientic progre wa andwiced between two ong capter on a fndamenta “mindertanding” aecting Her’ concept of ife-word. Beschreibung des Menschen cod perap bet be read a competing and iminating tee two previo work; it’ te crowning eement of a penomenoogica triogy in Bmenberg’ work. Of core, Her famoy raied te qetion of te “poibiity of a pioopica antropoogy” in a 1931 conference, ony to anwer it in te negative: it wod be a compete mireading of te penomenoogica redction to ee in te trancen7

H. Bmenberg, Zu den Sachen und zurück, a dem acaß eragegeben von M. sommer, Frankfrt am Main: srkamp, 2002, p. 300.

Han Bmenberg’ Beschreibung des Menschen 551

denta ef a member of  homo sapiens.8 o e famoy, in Heidegger’ exitentia anaytic, any interpretation of te man condition wa made entirey bordinate to Being and Time ’ ontoogica orientation. Wy, ten, doe Bmenberg ee ere a mere “ Anthropologie-Phobie ” rater tan an inrmontabe oppoition? Intentionality and Anthropology

To tart wit, penomenoogy i a “cience of triviaitie,” to e Her’ own word; it tak i to make expicit eemingy obvio trt. Indeed, te giding ambition of  te “teoretica attitde” i to do o exativey. In ti context, Bmenberg’ reference to Arnod Geen’ “antropo-bioogica” point of view a a certain provocative ogic to it. Geen ee man a a decient being woe very capacity for ef-preervation in a otie environment i far from obvio. In order to ecape te naïvet of te “natra attitde,” penomenoogy mt ca into qetion not ony te vaidity of te word’ exitence, a Her demanded, bt ao te baic viabiity of te man race. Te econd point of contact between penomenoogy and antropoogy, Bmenberg arge, can be fond in Her’ teory of intentionaity. Penomenoogy preent te tempora ef-contittion of concione a a yntetic activity. Concione, in Bmenberg’ reading of Her, i above a an attempt at ef-coerence, and t at ef-preervation: man concione mt come to tak wit ometime contradictory and often npredictabe data. Te nity of concione come abot at te ame time a te nity of te object perceived in it vario facet. Concione reentey pre it timate goa of nifying it experience of te word. Bmenberg minimize te decriptive fnction of te noetico-noematic correation in favor of a more Kantian interpretation of te intentionaity of concione a a yntetic activity. Interetingy, Bmenberg i te rt to recognize tat ti “concione in genera” wit it innite idea in’t pecicay man. A d ivine concione wod neceariy t te dening criteria of Her’ decription of te eidos of concione. Bt Her’ penomenoogy of time, for exampe, aready contain two ditinct eve of  anayi: according to Bmenberg, protention and retention may be eentia component of any form of intentionaity, bt memory and anticipation can be een a econdary penomena reting from a contingent and a too man imitation of  or tempora reac.9 In te ame way, te birt and deat of te ef may be many navoidabe fact, bt tey don’t obtain from an immanent reection on te being of  concione. I am a nite being wit innite teoretica aim; Bmenberg eem to ave ti antinomy in mind wen e peak of an “antropoogica paradox.”10 Her ad aready identied ti daity of man concione wen e poke of Eropean manity a “iving in nitde” bt ao “toward poe of innity.”11 He negected, owever, to take i interrogation frter. Intead of poiting a itorica 8

E. Her, “Penomenoogy and Antropoogy,” tran. R. G. scmitt, in Her, Shorter Works, otre Dame: Univerity of otre Dame Pre, 1981, pp. 315-323. 9 Ibid., p. 208. 10 Bmenberg, Beschreibung, p. 194. 11 E. Her, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology , tran. D. Carr, Evanton: ortwetern Univerity Pre, 1970, p. 277.

552 Car Gonzez Cantn and stpane Dircaer 

deciion to embrace te teoretica tandpoint – te Urstiftung of te Greek – Her cod ave earced for te antropoogica motivation beind intentionaity itef. For Bmenberg, te innite teoretica triving of concione can bet be ndertood in reference to te abence of a preetabied armony between man and i natra environment. Concione i te neceary adaptation of an organim bereft of any predetermined natra reaction. Bmenberg ee in Her’ togt a idden “antropoogica impication” tat give  te mean to dig deeper into ti “antropoogica paradox” tat dene man concione. It become epeciay apparent ere tat Beschreibung des Menschen mt be conidered aongide Lebenszeit  und Weltzeit , ince te two book provide compimentary view on intentionaity. In te terminoogy of Bmenberg’ potmo work, Lebenszeit und Weltzeit  decribe te antropoogica root of te intentio recta of concione a it open ot onto te word; in Beschreibung des Menschen , Bmenberg decribe te genei of te intentio obliqua of ef-reection. “Intentio Recta” and “Intentio Obliqua”

Bmenberg’ initence in Lebenszeit und Weltzeit  tat Her’ notion of a ife-word a noting to do wit te everyday word of precientic experience mig t eem pzzing for reader of te Krisis, were te Lebenswelt i expicity caracterized a c. Atog e never ca attention to te fact, Bmenberg’ reading of Her reie primariy on te “geneaogy of ogic” preented in Experience and Judgment , were te ife-word doe indeed repreent an even more baic eve of antepredicative evidence  – to be obtained, remarkaby for Her, by an “abtractive imitation.”12 Te root of negation reide in ti primitive ayer of experience and not at te iger eve of  apopantic jdgment. By ing a naïve beief in te immediacy of being a or ta rting point, we are abe to decribe te rt act of concione faced wit a contradiction in it experience. Ti object I perceive i not red, bt green; any dicordancy reqire a modaization of te act of concione. According to Bmenberg, Her negected to enqire into te antropoogica fondation of tee act of concione and preferred intead to concentrate on teir ater deveopment in te form of apopantic  jdgment. Bmenberg e te notion of ife-word in Her’ geneaogy of ogic a a mean to decribe te inevitabe diarmony between man and i environment. Te Lebenswelt i an abtract ction – a “garden word” (Gartenwelt ) or a “park of experience” (Erlebsnispark ) from wic any dicrepancy between man’ expectation and natre’ bonty i banied – “a word tat keep it promie.”13 Ti kind of narrative mode – an nveriabe tory, indeed a fabe – migt eem antipenomenoogica. Bt it cod be arged tat it doe erve to decribe, in an “intitive” way, “te eentia trait of wat a word in genera i.”14 Eqay remarkabe ere i tat concione – it modaization erving to re-etabi te treatened conitency of te word – i not

12

E. Her, Experience and Judgment , tran. J. s. Crci and K. Amerik, Evanton: ortwetern Univerity Pre, 1975, p. 66. 13 H. Bmenberg, Lebenszeit und Weltzeit , Frankfrt am Main: srkamp, 1986, p. 48. 14 Ibid., p. 60.

Han Bmenberg’ Beschreibung des Menschen 553

aociated wit int itive fment and te preence of te “ting temeve,” a in Her. Te act of concione are preented a a mean of coming to term  wit te abence of ting, wit cognitive diappointment of a kind. Lebenszeit und Weltzeit , prporting to foow Her’ ggetion in Experience  and Judgment , decribed te antropoogica root of intentionaity. Bt in reviiting Her’ geneaogy of ogic, it ti faied to expain wy concione wod ever trn it attention to itef in te form of te intentio obliqua of ef-reection. For  Bmenberg, a rpriing faiing of penomenoogy i it negect to accont for it very poibiity – ow can man concione take tock of itef? Beschreibung des Menschen tate: “te greatet weakne of te genetic penomenoogy introdced by Her arond 1920 wa to ppoe tat reection did not need, a ogic d id, a trancendentagenetic ‘expanation,’ did not need to be decribed in it originarity.”15 In repone to ti faire, Bmenberg depict an “originary cene of ominization […] wit no itorica pretenion.” 16 Work on Myth aready contained a imiar  preitorica tabea decribing man’ foray into te open orizon of te avanna. Bt Bmenberg’ foc ere i not on te “abotim of reait y,” te terrifying oterne of an inopitabe natre, bt rater on interbjectivity. A man being, or erect potre impie a potentiay acte concione of or viibiit y for oter. Witot peaking of an “abotim of oter,” Bmenberg dramatize te impication for man coexitence of or expore to te gaze of oter peope. To fy ndertand man perception, we mt reaize tat viion away impie potentia viibiity: “te res cogitans i a res extensa ”17 – a tatement tat a itte to do wit te pyioogica btratm of togt and everyting to do wit te fndamenta reciprocity of man viion. sef-concione in te pioopica ene a it root in everyday ef-concione: being ncomfortaby expoed to te potentia gaze of  oter peope. sef-concione in ti ene ead to ef-objectivation and cac ated attempt at ef-preentation: I ee myef from te point of view of oter and adjt my oter beavior according y. The Limits of Self-Knowledge 

Ti arcaic ction decribing man’ potentiay fata expore to te oter’ gaze in te open avanna migt eem anyting bt Herian. Bt it doe f te baic penomenoogica fnction of aowing Bmenberg to tematize “triviaitie” pertaining to or being-in-te-word: or erect potre and imited ed of viion (one can be een from beind witot reaizing it), a we a te eentiay embodied and protoocia natre of man perception. Wat kind of teoretica vaidity Bmenberg acribe to ti enigtening bt argey arbitrary “genei” of ef-concione i a qetion tat can be addreed ater in te context of i “contrctivim.” Te mot important impication for now concern te imit Bmenberg

15 16 17

Bmenberg, Beschreibung , p. 698. Ibid., p. 301. Ibid., p. 831.

554 Car Gonzez Cantn and stpane Dircaer 

impoe on ef-reection (or, a Beschreibung des Menschen impy ay, “reection”) a a coneqence of it antropoogica origin. Againt any form of radica kepticim regarding ef-knowedge, Bmenberg wod arge tat it i nprobematic for  concione to tdy and decribe it own cognitive activity in a broad ene. Bt if  reection doe indeed originate in a cacating tance of ef-objectivation and efpreentation impoed by te inerent danger of man coexitence, te notion of a trancendenta redction eading to knowedge of an abote ef eem dbio. sc a notion wa inevitabe, Bmenberg admit: penomenoogy wi eek to captre te eence of te ef a it doe wit a of it oter object. It od be aid a we tat Bmenberg voice no criticim of te penomenoogica redction in it origina ene, ince pending te tei of te natra attitde timatey aow  to compreend and recover te being of te word after  aving pt it between bracket. However, te idea of an apodicticay certain form of abote ef-givenne make  oe igt of te antropoogica dimenion of intentionaity.“We do not ndertand reection trog reection.”18 Conidered in te abtract, te innite teoretica triving of intentionaity may correpond to a “concione in genera,” bt tere i no c ting a a “pre concione,” ince concione in it man form re t from a confrontation wit te word. By exporing te “antropoogica impication” in Her’ togt, Bmenberg deveop i own genetic penomenoogy of man concione. Bt te very “poibiity of an antropoogica penomenoogy” i imited, given te abence of an immediate inner experience of te ef. ear te end of  Beschreibung des Menschen , Bmenberg make ti triking decaration: “Man doe not know wat e i; e doe not know wat e tink; e doe not know wat e know. Wy ten od it be rpriing tat e o often doe not know wat e i doing? And wy od e know of wat e i capabe?”19 Bt ti imitation on ef-knowedge need not take on a tragic cat. For Bmenberg, te injnction to “know tyef” doe not ret from te teeoogy of concione nor from man natre. If we retrn to or  initia Geenian potate of radica ef-preervation, ef-knowedge migt indeed eem e vitay important tan knowedge of oter peope. Even ef-deion can be more ef tan intropection. Tat reexivity od pay a imited roe in man togt i e rpriing wen we conider te penomena cce of modern cience  – obtained, a Her wa wont to decr y, wit itte attempt at ef-tematization. In keeping wit te eentia “otwardne” of intentionaity, ef-knowedge i bet obtained trog otide orce – be it te ocia feedback given to te individa  or  te tetimony of pat ive in regard to te man condition. In it very contingenc y, te vat domain of itory i “at eat coer tan te indigence of intropection and reection” 20 to embracing te gamt of man poibiitie. It i wort noting tat Bmenberg nowere impie tat te cognitive fnction of concione are entirey bordinate to it fnct ion for ef-preervation in a broad ene. A key paage of Zu den Sachen und zurück ditingie an intentiona (Her),

18 19 20

Ibid., p. 223. Ibid., p. 882. Ibid., p. 890.

Han Bmenberg’ Beschreibung des Menschen 555

an epiodic (ietzce and Dewey), and a fnctiona (Geen) conception of concione.21 For Bmenberg, te eentia openne of concione to te word  – te teoretica triving of intentionaity, in Her’ view – can coexit wit it rootedne in a vita fnction (ietzce and Dewey). Geen’ teory of  Entlastung  decribe ow man factie c a angage and perception cod originate in an attempt to compenate for a ack of baic rviva mecan im and yet evove into fy atonomo fnction tank  to a proce of progreive ef-enricment. Wat cod eem ike an noy marriage of two very dierent tinker – Her and Geen  – i made very expicit ere. Geen’ conception of man a a Mängelwesen provide te antropoogica nderpinning of Her’ teory of concione – werea, in Lebenszeit und Weltzeit , Her i amot made ot to be a proto-Geenian malgré lui. Converey, Bmenberg’ reference to Her ep avoid wat e termed te “abotim of intittion” in Geen’ Urmensch und Spätkultur , were te key notion of  ctra compenation to man’ bioogica inrmitie ed to a kind of robotization of  mankind trog econdary “intinct” of an intittiona natre. Te qetion remain of weter ti ypotetica antropogenei of intentionaity cod ti be termed Herian. Beschreibung des Menschen, Lebenszeit und Weltzeit  and Zu den Sachen und zurück bring deciive cange to te baic tenet of penomenoogy – cange Her wod ave conidered, by Bmenberg’ own admiion, “catatropic.” Bmenberg imef i of a dierent opinion: witot diminiing Her’ accompiment in te eat, e wod ay tat te mot famo “decription” in te penomenoogica canon are not decription in te common ene of  te word. Penomenoogy i a dedctive and expicative a it i decriptive. o one a ever “oberved” te cont ittion of time-concione: it’ a proce tat we mt recontrct ypoteticay. It’ more abot “wat concione must  ave accompied, in order for given ret […] to be poibe, witot te poibiity of dipaying it in concione or of eading to it by mean of indication.”22 Te fabe of a “garden-word” in Lebenszeit und Weltzeit  and te two “originary cene” of Work on Myth and Beschreibung des Menschen are exampe of c ypotetica recontrction. Teir narrative avor make f e of te Herian notion of “genei,” wic wa amot inevitabe in penomenoogy a a decriptive dicipine; abandoning a tatic object in favor of a dynamic proce impy give  more to decribe: “procee are ao ‘ting’ (Prozesse sind auch ‘Sachen’ ).” Bmenberg ca pon Her’ intitionim to dicover te merit of “contrctivim.”23 Constructivism and the Aphenomenal  Beschreibung des Menschen abandon te notion of ef-contitting bjectivity i n favor  of  homo sapiens, bt te rea “erey” in Bmenberg’ antropoogica reading of  Her ie eewere: a “contrctivit” penomenoogy give p on te idea of a tranparent inner experience. Te manifetation of concione a intentionaity

21 22 23

Bmenberg, Zu den Sachen, pp. 145-151. Bmenberg, Beschreibung , p. 331. Bmenberg, Lebenszeit , pp. 33, 348.

556 Car Gonzez Cantn and stpane Dircaer 

do not give  acce to it antropoogica dimenion, wic can ony be indirecty recontrcted tank to it idden “antropoogica impication.” Penomenoogy mt “rekantianize itef.” 24 A Her aid of Kant in te Krisis , we mt foow a “regreive” metod of recontrcting bjectivity. Depite teir dierence, bot Her and Heidegger poited a kind of ef-donation of bjectivity: te trancendenta ef cod imma nenty dicover it innite teoretica triving, jt a te Dasein ad acce to itef a  a nite concione. For Bmenberg, concione i at once nite and innite – innite a a “concione in genera,” nite a te compenatory intentionaity of homo sapiens. Or very natre i not given to  a a penomenon. It cod be aid in paing tat te primary dierence between Heidegger’ decription of angt in Being and Time and te primeva experience of te “abotim of reaity” in Work on Myth reide ere. For Bmenberg, angt i not a penomenon. Perap te very notion of a “recontrctivit” penomenoogy promie acce to “Sachen” wic, in a ene, cannot be  given; Bmenberg t peak of te “apenomena” natre of  te ife-word wic, in it abote immediacy, ef-detrct a oon a we attempt to approac it directy. Te antropoogica narrative of Bmenberg correpond to an eentiay “praitic” 25 view of pioopy qite removed from Her’: dierent teoretica ypotee can “make  ee more,”26 wic i penomenoogy’ baic caing. Bmenberg cite te exampe of scopenaer’ teory of te wi, woe metapyica potate actay ead to deep penomenoogica inigt. Wit it idea of a “contrctivit” penomenoogy of “das Aphänomenale ,” Bmenberg’ repectf  yet provocative attempt to tink wit Her againt Her migt prove to be one of i mot fritf contribtion to contemporary togt. stpane Dircaer  Univerity of Toronto tepane.dircaer@gmai.com

24 25 26

Bmenberg, Beschreibung , p. 161. Ibid. Bmenberg, Zu den Sachen, p. 344.