FM 3-20.15
TANK PLATOON
FEBRUARY 2007 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only. only. This publication contains techn ical or operational inormation that is or ofcial Gover nment use. This determination was made on 31 October 2006. Other requests or this document must be reerred to Director Director,, Directorate o Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZKTDDG, ATZKTDDG, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Rd Ste 207, US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY 401215123. Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent
disclosure o contents or reconstruction o the documen t.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil (www.us.army.mil)) and General Dennis J. Reimer Training Training and Doctrine Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil (www.train.army.mil). ).
*FM 3-20.15 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 22 February 2007
Field Manual No. 3-20.15
Tank Platoon Contents Page
PREFACE ...........................................................................................................xiii Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION ................................. ................ ................................. ................................. .................................. .............................. ............. 1-1 Section I - Organizations ................................................................................. Tank Platoon ...................................................................................................... Tank Company ................................................................................................... Armored Cavalry Troop ......................................................................................
1-1 1-1 1-5 1-5
Section II - Capabilities and Limitations ........................................................ 1-6 Capabilities ......................................................................................................... 1-6 Limitations .......................................................................................................... 1-6 Section III - Responsibilities............................................................................ Platoon Leader ................................................................................................... Platoon Sergeant................................................................................................ Tank Commander............................................................................................... Gunner................................................................................................................ Driver .................................................................................................................. Loader ................................................................................................................ Chapter 2
1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-8 1-8 1-8
COMMAND AND CONTROL....................... CONTROL...... .................................. .................................. ................................. .................... .... 2-1 Section I - Command........................................................................................ 2-1 Decision-Making ................... ............................ ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ............. ... 2-1 Leadership........................................................................................................ 2-11 Section II – Control......................................................................................... 2-12 Situational Understanding ................................................................................ 2-12 Fire Distribution and Control............................................................................. 2-26
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. This determination was made on 31 October 2006. Other requests for this document must be referred to Director, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, USAARMC, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road Ste 207, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5123. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. *This publication supersedes FM 3-20.15 dated 1 November 2001.
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Chapter 3
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS...............................................................................3-1 Section I - Fundamentals of the Offense ................... ............................ ................... ................... ..................3-1 .........3-1 Purposes of the Offense .................. ........................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ........... ..3-1 3-1 Characteristics of the Offense .................. ........................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ........... ..3-1 3-1 Forms of Offense ................................................................................................3-2 Role of the Tank Platoon ....................................................................................3-2 War-Fighting Functions......................... Functions.................................. .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................3-2 ......3-2 Section II - Planning..........................................................................................3-3 Movement and Maneuver ................... ............................ ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................3-3 ........3-3 Fire Support ........................................................................................................3-4 Intelligence .................. ........................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ..............3-4 ....3-4 Protection .................. ........................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ...............3-4 ......3-4 Sustainment .................. ........................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ...........3-5 ..3-5 Command and Control........................ Control................................. .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... .................3-5 ........3-5 The Human Aspect .................. ........................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ..................3-5 .........3-5 Section III - Preparation...................... Preparation............................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................3-5 ......3-5 Movement and Maneuver ................... ............................ ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................3-5 ........3-5 Fire Support ........................................................................................................3-6 Intelligence .................. ........................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ..............3-6 ....3-6 Protection .................. ........................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ...............3-6 ......3-6 Sustainment .................. ........................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ...........3-6 ..3-6 Command and Control........................ Control................................. .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... .................3-6 ........3-6 The Human Aspect .................. ........................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ..................3-7 .........3-7 Section IV - Execution—Tactical Execution—Tactical Movement ................... ............................. ................... ................... ............ ..3-7 3-7 Fire Distribution and Control in the Offense................. Offense.......................... ................... .................... ................... ........... 3-7 Use of Terrain for Cover and Concealment......... Concealment ................... ................... ................... .................... ..................3-9 ........3-9 Techniques of Movement.................. Movement............................ ................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ...................3-9 .........3-9 Formations ................... ............................ .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ...........3-11 .3-11 Overwatch ................... ............................ .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ...........3-16 ..3-16 Section V - Execution—Actions Execution—Actions on Contact .................... ............................. ................... ...................3-18 .........3-18 The Four Steps of Actions on Contact.......................... Contact.................................... ................... ................... .................3-18 .......3-18 Examples of Actions on Contact .................. ............................ ................... ................... ................... ................... ...............3-21 .....3-21 Battle Drills ........................................................................................................3-25 Section VI - Execution—Platoon Execution—Platoon Tactical Tasks ................... ............................ ................... .............3-36 ...3-36 Destroy an Inferior Force ................... ............................ ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................3-36 .......3-36 Attack by Fire ................... ............................ ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................3-38 ......3-38 Overwatch/Support by Fire ................... ............................ ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. .............3-39 ....3-39 Assault ..............................................................................................................3-40 Bypass ..............................................................................................................3-42 Reconnaissance by Fire .................. ............................ ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ..................3-44 ........3-44 Hasty Occupation of a Platoon Battle Position (Hasty Defense) .................... ...................... ..3-45 3-45 Breaching Operations ................... ............................. ................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ........... ..3-45 3-45 Section VII - Execution—Consolidation Execution—Consolidation and Reorganization.....................3-46 Reorganization.....................3-46 Consolidation ....................................................................................................3-46 Reorganization........................... Reorganization.................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ..............3-46 .....3-46
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Section VIII – Limited Visibility Operations ................................................. 3-46 Equipment ........................................................................................................ 3-47 Navigation......................................................................................................... 3-47 Vehicle Identification......................................................................................... 3-47 Tactical Movement and Attacks ................... ............................ ................... ................... .................. ................... ............... ..... 3-47 Chapter 4
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................................. 4-1 Section I - Fundamentals of the Defense .................. ........................... ................... ................... .................. ......... 4-1 Characteristics of the Defense ........................................................................... 4-1 Defensive Patterns, Missions, and Tasks ...................... ............................... ................... ................... ................. ........ 4-2 Role of the Tank Platoon......... Platoon .................. .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ......... 4-2 Warfighting Functions......................................................................................... 4-2 Section II - Planning ......................................................................................... 4-3 Reconnaissance and Time Management................... Management............................. ................... ................... ................... ........... .. 4-3 War-Fighting Function Considerations............... Considerations......................... ................... ................... ................... ................... .......... 4-3 Section III – Preparation................................................................................... 4-7 Phase of Preparation.......................................................................................... 4-7 Preparation Tasks .............................................................................................. 4-8 War-Fighting Function Considerations............... Considerations........................ ................... ................... ................... .................. ........ 4-21 Section IV - Execution.................................................................................... 4-23 Hide Position .................................................................................................... 4-23 Occupation of Firing Positions................ Positions......................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ........... .. 4-23 Indirect Fires..................................................................................................... 4-23 Direct Fires ....................................................................................................... 4-24 Displacement.................................................................................................... 4-25 Counterattacks ................................................................................................. 4-26 Limited Visibility Defense ................................................................................. 4-29
Chapter 5
OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS................................................................... 5-1 Section I - Tactical Road March ...................................................................... 5-1 Preparation and SOPs ....................................................................................... 5-1 Composition........................................................................................................ 5-1 March Columns .................................................................................................. 5-2 Control Measures ............................................................................................... 5-2 Actions During the March ................................................................................... 5-3
Section II - Assembly Areas ............................................................................ 5-5 Quartering Party Actions .................................................................................... 5-5 Occupation Procedures.......... Procedures ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ........... .. 5-6 Occupation by Force .......................................................................................... 5-7 Section III - Actions at a Contact Point .......................................................... 5-8 Section IV - Convoy Escort.............................................................................. 5-8 Command and Control ....................................................................................... 5-8 Tactical Disposition............................................................................................. 5-9 Actions on Contact ........................................................................................... 5-12 Actions During Halts......... Halts ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... .............. .... 5-17
Section V - Passage of Lines ........................................................................ 5-19 Operational Considerations.............. Considerations....................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... .................. ........ 5-19
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Conducting a Passage of Lines ................... ............................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ...............5-19 .....5-19 Assisting a Passage of Lines .................. ........................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ...........5-20 ..5-20 Section VI - Breaching Operations................. Operations........................... ................... ................... ................... ..................5-20 .........5-20 Types of Obstacles .................. ............................ ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... .................5-20 .......5-20 Breaching Procedures ................... ............................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ..........5 .5-26 -26 Section VII - Perimeter Defense...................... Defense................................ ................... ................... ................... ..................5-30 .........5-30 Section VIII – Screen..................... Screen.............................. ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ...................5-30 ..........5-30 Section IX – Delay .................. ............................ ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... .................5-31 .......5-31 Section X - Relief in Place .................. ............................ ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. .............5-31 ....5-31 Coordination and Reconnaissance................. Reconnaissance........................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ............5-31 ...5-31 Relief Procedures .............................................................................................5-32 Security and Communications .................. ............................ ................... ................... ................... .................. ..................5-32 .........5-32 Section XI - Withdrawal ................... ............................ ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................5-33 .......5-33 Chapter 6
COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS ................... ............................ .................. ................... ................... ................... ............6-1 ..6-1 Section I - Fire Support ....................................................................................6-1 Mortar Support ................... ............................. ................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ...............6-1 .....6-1 Field Artillery Support...................... Support............................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ............6-2 ...6-2 Fire Support Team ................... ............................ ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ...................6-3 .........6-3 Fire Request Channels .................. ............................ ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ............6-4 ...6-4 Fire Direction and Control Procedures ......................... ................................... ................... ................... ...................6-5 .........6-5 Tank Platoon Fire Support Planning.......................... Planning................................... ................... ................... ................... .............6-8 ...6-8 Section II - Army Aviation.................................................................................6-9 Air Cavalry...........................................................................................................6-9 Attack Helicopters .................. ............................ ................... ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ............ 6-9 Section III - Combat Engineers................. Engineers........................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ...............6-10 ......6-10 Capabilities........................................................................................................6-10 Engineer Support to the Tank Platoon................... Platoon............................ ................... ................... ................... ...............6-11 .....6-11 Section IV - Air and Missile Defense .................. ............................ .................... ................... ................... ..............6-11 ....6-11 Air and Missile Defense Warnings........................... Warnings.................................... .................. ................... ................... .............6-12 ....6-12 Passive Air and Missile Defense ................... ............................ ................... ................... ................... ................... .............6-12 ....6-12 Active Air and Missile Defense ................... ............................ ................... ................... ................... ................... ................6-12 .......6-12 Section V - Air Support...................................................................................6-13 Close Air Support.......................... Support.................................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ...........6-13 ..6-13 Marking Friendly Positions....................... Positions................................ ................... ................... ................... ................... ...................6-14 ..........6-14 Section VI - Military Police .............................................................................6-15 Maneuver and Mobility Support ................... ............................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ...............6-15 .....6-15 Area Security.....................................................................................................6-15 Detainee Operations .................. ............................ ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ..............6-15 .....6-15 Law and Order ..................................................................................................6-16
Chapter 7
SUSTAINMENT SUSTAINMENT ................... ............................ ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... .............7-1 ...7-1 Section I - Organization................... Organization............................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... .................7-1 ........7-1 Section II - Supply Operations..................... Operations.............................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ..............7-1 .....7-1 Basic and Combat Loads.......................... Loads.................................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ........... ..7-1 7-1 Classes of Supply .................. ........................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ........... ..7-2 7-2
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Methods of Resupply.......................................................................................... 7-3 Techniques of Resupply......... Resupply .................. .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ........... .. 7-6 Section III - Maintenance Operations ............................................................. 7-9 Leader Responsibilities .................................................................................... 7-10 Levels of Maintenance ..................................................................................... 7-11 Related Operational Considerations .................. ............................ ................... ................... ................... ................. ........ 7-12 Section IV - Personnel Operations ............................................................... 7-13 Personnel Services........................................................................................... 7-13 Personnel Management ................................................................................... 7-13 Section V - Medical Treatment and Evacuation .......................................... 7-13 Health and Hygiene .................. ........................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................ ....... 7-13 Soldiers Wounded in Action ............................................................................. 7-14 Soldiers Killed in Action......... Action ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ........ 7-15
Section VI - Detainees.......... Detainees ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................. ........ 7-16 Handling Detainees .......................................................................................... 7-16 Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment...................... Equipment................................ ................... .................. ......... 7-18 Civilians ............................................................................................................ 7-19 Civil Affairs Units and an d Psychological Operations .................. ............................ ................... ................. ........ 7-19 Chapter 8
URBAN OPERATIONS...................................................................................... 8-1 Section I - Urban Operations Planning Considerations ............................... 8-1 Categories of Urban Areas.......................... Areas.................................... ................... .................. ................... ................... ................. ........ 8-2 Vehicles, Weapons, and Munitions ...................... ............................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ........ 8-3 Command and Control ....................................................................................... 8-6 Maneuver............................................................................................................ 8-7 Armored Vehicle Positions ................................................................................. 8-8 Intelligence ....................................................................................................... 8-10 Fire Support...................................................................................................... 8-12 Sustainment...................................................................................................... 8-13 Section II - Offensive Urban Operations ...................................................... 8-13 Hasty and Deliberate Attacks in an Urban Environment................ Environment.......................... .................. ........ 8-13 Phases of Offensive Urban Operations.................... Operations.............................. ................... .................. ................... ............ .. 8-14 Task Organization ............................................................................................ 8-15 Offensive Techniques in Urban Operations .................. ........................... .................. ................... ................. ....... 8-15 Section III - Defensive Urban Operations.................. Operations............................ ................... ................... ................ ...... 8-17 Enemy Forces Outside the Urban Area ..................... .............................. ................... ................... .................. ........... 8-17 Enemy Forces Within the Urban Area...................... Area................................ ................... ................... ................... ........... .. 8-17 Defensive Techniques in Urban Operations ....................... ................................ ................... ................... ........... 8-17 Section IV – Employment Employment of Attack and Assault/Cargo Helicopters ........ ........ 8-18 Support for Ground Maneuver Units ........................ ................................. ................... ................... .................. ............ ... 8-18 Role during Urban Operations.......................................................................... 8-18 Command and Control ..................................................................................... 8-19 Maneuver Graphic Aids.......... Aids ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... ................. ........ 8-19 Identifying Friendly Positions, Marking Locations, and Acquiring Targets....... 8-19 Attack Helicopter Target Engagement .......................... .................................... .................... ................... ............... ...... 8-24 Air/Ground Integration in the Hasty Attack/Close Fight ........................ .................................. ............ 8-25
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Chapter 9
STABILITY OPERATIONS AND CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS..................9-1 Section I – General Considerations ................................................................9-1 Balanced Mindset ...............................................................................................9-1 Combat Skills Training ........................................................................................9-2 Section II – Stability Operations ......................................................................9-2 Types of Stability Operations ..............................................................................9-2 Purposes of Stability Operations ........................................................................9-3 Considerations for Stability Operations ..............................................................9-4 Role of the Tank Platoon ....................................................................................9-5 Planning and Operational Considerations ..........................................................9-6 Section III – Civil Support Operations...........................................................9-11 Types of Civil Support Operations ....................................................................9-11 Purposes of Civil Operations ............................................................................9-12 Considerations for Civil Support Operations ....................................................9-12 Section IV – Examples of Stability Operations ............................................9-12 Establish a Battle Position ................................................................................9-13 Conduct Reserve Operations ...........................................................................9-13 Overwatch a Traffic Control Point.....................................................................9-14 Defend a Choke Point.......................................................................................9-14 Overwatch a Blockade/Roadblock....................................................................9-14 Conduct Convoy Escort ....................................................................................9-15 Conduct Proofing/Breaching Operations ..........................................................9-15 Conduct Cordon and Search Operations .........................................................9-17
Appendix A
DIGITIZATION ................................................................................................... A-1
Appendix B
ORDERS AND REPORTS ................................................................................ B-1
Appendix C
INFANTRY/ARMOR OPERATIONS ................................................................. C-1
Appendix D
OPERATIONAL SECURITY.............................................................................. D-1
Appendix E
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR (CBRN), AND SMOKE OPERATIONS ................................................................................................... E-1
Appendix F
COMBAT IDENTIFICATION ..............................................................................F-1
Appendix G
RISK MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................... G-1
Appendix H
FRATRICIDE PREVENTION............................................................................. H-1
Appendix I
BATTLE DAMAGED TANK ................................................................................I-1 GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1 REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1 INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures Figure 1-1. Tank platoon.................................................................................................1-2 Figure 1-2. The wingman concept ..................................................................................1-2 Figure 1-3. Tank and Bradley main gun and coax dead space above street level ........1-3
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Figure 1-4. Tank company ............................................................................................. 1-5 Figure 1-5. Armored cavalry troop.................................................................................. 1-6 Figure 2-1. Traditional overlay ...................................................................................... 2-16 Figure 2-2. Sample FBCB2 with overlay ...................................................................... 2-16 Figure 2-3. Boundary (graphic control measure) ......................................................... 2-17 Figure 2-4. Phase line (graphic control measure) ........................................................ 2-17 Figure 2-5. Assembly area (graphic control measure)................................................. 2-18 Figure 2-6. Route (graphic control measure) ............................................................... 2-18 Figure 2-7. Checkpoint (graphic control measure)....................................................... 2-18 Figure 2-8. Attack position (graphic control measure) ................................................. 2-18 Figure 2-9. Contact point (graphic control measure) ................................................... 2-19 Figure 2-10. Passage lane (graphic control measure) ................................................. 2-19 Figure 2-11. Passage point (graphic con trol measure) ................................................ 2-19 Figure 2-12. Objective (graphic control measure) ........................................................ 2-19 Figure 2-13. Axis of advance (graphic control measure) ............................................. 2-20 Figure 2-14. Direction of attack (graphic co ntrol measure).......................................... 2-20 Figure 2-15. Assault position (graphic control measure) ............................................. 2-20 Figure 2-16. Attack-by-fire position (graphic control measure) .................................... 2-21 Figure 2-17. Support-by-fire position (graphic control measure) ................................. 2-21 Figure 2-18. Battle position (graphic control measure) ................................................ 2-21 Figure 2-19. Target reference point (graphic control measure) ................................... 2-21 Figure 2-20. Example of TIRS...................................................................................... 2-23 Figure 2-21. Platoon reports own position using TIRS (checkpoint)............................ 2-23 Figure 2-22. Frontal fire pattern .................................................................................... 2-29 Figure 2-23. Cross fire pattern ..................................................................................... 2-30 Figure 2-24. Depth fire pattern ..................................................................................... 2-31 Figure 2-25. Use of cross fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage enemy PCs (with platoon leader’s fire command) ..................................... 2-32 Figure 2-26. Use of frontal fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage multiple enemy tanks (with platoon leader’s fire command)...................... 2-33 Figure 2-27. Use of different fire patterns in each section (with simultaneous fire technique) to engage enemy targets (with platoon leader’s fire command) .................................................................................................. 2-34 Figure 2-28. Use of depth fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique (with section fire command) ............................................................................................ 2-35 Figure 2-29. Use of cross fire pattern and alternating fire technique (with section fire command) .................................................................................................. 2-36 Figure 2-30. Use of observed fire technique (with section fire command)................... 2-37 Figure 2-31. Example platoon fire command ............................................................... 2-40 Figure 2-33. Keyhole firing positions ............................................................................ 2-42 Figure 3-1. Example sectors of fire in a moving engagement (platoon moving in wedge formation) ......................................................................................... 3-8 Figure 3-2. Movement by alternate bounds ................................................................. 3-10
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Figure 3-3. Movement by successive bounds ..............................................................3-11 Figure 3-4. Column formation .......................................................................................3-12 Figure 3-5. Staggered column formation ......................................................................3-13 Figure 3-6. Wedge formation ........................................................................................3-13 Figure 3-7. Echelon formation.......................................................................................3-14 Figure 3-8. Vee formation .............................................................................................3-14 Figure 3-9. Line formation.............................................................................................3-15 Figure 3-10. Coil formation ...........................................................................................3-15 Figure 3-11. Herringbone formation..............................................................................3-16 Figure 3-12. Overwatch locations and techniques .......................................................3-17 Figure 3-13A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys using an action drill, and reports ........................................................................................................3-22 Figure 3-13B. Platoon develops the situation ...............................................................3-22 Figure 3-14A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys, and reports ..............................3-23 Figure 3-14B. Platoon executes a battle drill; platoon leader evaluates the situation as the drill is executed ................................................................................3-23 Figure 3-14C. Platoon develops the situation and identifies a superior enemy force ..3-24 Figure 3-14D. Platoon leader chooses and recommends an alternate COA; platoon executes the new COA...............................................................................3-24 Figure 3-15. Change of formation drill ..........................................................................3-26 Figure 3-16. Contact drill...............................................................................................3-26 Figure 3-17A. Action drill without enemy contact..........................................................3-27 Figure 3-17B. Action drill without enemy contact (continued) ......................................3-28 Figure 3-17C. Action drill without enemy contact (continued) ......................................3-28 Figure 3-18A. Action drill with enemy contact...............................................................3-29 Figure 3-18B. Action drill with enemy contact (continued) ...........................................3-30 Figure 3-18C. Action drill with enemy contact (continued) ...........................................3-31 Figure 3-18D. Action drill with enemy contact (continued) ...........................................3-32 Figure 3-19. React to indirect fire drill...........................................................................3-33 Figure 3-20. Machine gun aim points ...........................................................................3-34 Figure 3-21. Evading enemy aircraft.............................................................................3-35 Figure 3-22A. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force .............................3-37 Figure 3-22B. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force (cont.)..................3-37 Figure 3-23A. Platoon employs attack by fire against a convoy...................................3-38 Figure 3-23B. Platoon uses attack by fire against an enemy reconnaissance platoon as part of a hasty defense ..........................................................................3-39 Figure 3-24. Platoon supports by fire to suppress an enemy element during a company assault.........................................................................................3-40 Figure 3-25A. Tank section assaults an inferior force as another section supports by fire...............................................................................................................3-41
Figure 3-25B. Platoon executes an assault as two other platoons support by fire ......3-42 Figure 3-26A. Bypass ...................................................................................................3-43 Figure 3-26B. Bypass (continued) ................................................................................3-44
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Figure 4-1. Fighting positions ......................................................................................... 4-4 Figure 4-2. Battle positions............................................................................................. 4-4 Figure 4-3. Considerations for obstacle employment .................................................... 4-6 Figure 4-4. Dug-in firing positions .................................................................................. 4-7 Figure 4-5. Examples of constructed TRP markers ....................................................... 4-9 Figure 4-6A. Turret-down positions .............................................................................. 4-11 Figure 4-6B. Hull-down positions ................................................................................. 4-11 Figure 4-7. Traditional sector sketch card.................................................................... 4-14 Figure 4-8. Traditionally prepared fire plan (handwritten) ............................................ 4-16 Figure 4-9. Sample platoon time line............................................................................ 4-17 Figure 4-10. Using background to prevent skylining .................................................... 4-22 Figure 4-11. Displacement with cover from another element (entire platoon moves at once) .......................................................................................................... 4-25 Figure 4-12. Displacement without cover from another element (sections move using bounding overwatch).................................................................................. 4-26 Figure 4-13. Counterattack by fire................................................................................ 4-27 Figure 4-14. Counterattack by fire and movement ....................................................... 4-28 Figure 5-1. Example strip map ....................................................................................... 5-3 Figure 5-2. Sectors of fire ............................................................................................... 5-4 Figure 5-3A. Battalion assembly area; company team adjacent to other company teams ........................................................................................................... 5-7 Figure 5-3B. Company team assembly area independent of the battalion.................... 5-7 Figure 5-4. Tank platoon as part of a larger escort force ............................................. 5-10 Figure 5-5A. Platoon performing forward security for a convoy ................................... 5-11 Figure 5-5B. Platoon performing flank security for a convoy ....................................... 5-11 Figure 5-5C. Platoon performing rear security for a convoy ........................................ 5-11 Figure 5-6. Platoon performing convoy escort independently ...................................... 5-12 Figure 5-7. Platoon escort using modified traveling overwatch ................................... 5-12 Figure 5-8A. Convoy escort actions toward ambush ................................................... 5-13 Figure 5-8B. Convoy continues to move ...................................................................... 5-14 Figure 5-9A. Escort suppresses the ambush to facilitate attack by the reaction force 5-14 Figure 5-9B. Escort assaults the ambush force ........................................................... 5-15 Figure 5-9C. Escort breaks contact.............................................................................. 5-15 Figure 5-10. Convoy escort overwatches an obstacle ................................................. 5-17 Figure 5-11A. Convoy assumes herringbone formation .............................................. 5-18 Figure 5-11B. Convoy moves back into column formation .......................................... 5-18 Figure 5-11C. Convoy escort vehicles rejoin column ................................................... 5-18 Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations .................................................................... 5-22 Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations (continued) ................................................. 5-23 Figure 5-13. Antitank ditch ........................................................................................... 5-24 Figure 5-14. Road craters ............................................................................................ 5-24 Figure 5-15. Abatis ....................................................................................................... 5-24
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Figure 5-16. Log crib .....................................................................................................5-25 Figure 5-17. Wire obstacle in depth ..............................................................................5-25 Figure 5-18. Belly shot created by a tank berm ............................................................5-25 Figure 5-19. Plow tanks create multiple lanes while the section leaders’ tanks provide overwatch ......................................................................................5-28 Figure 5-20. Sample technique for obstacle lane marking ...........................................5-29 Figure 6-1. Fire support team vehicle .............................................................................6-4 Figure 6-2. FBCB2 SPOTREP (immediate suppression request)..................................6-4 Figure 6-3. Polar plot method of target location..............................................................6-6 Figure 6-4. Shift from a known point method using direction (in mils)............................6-6 Figure 6-5. Lateral and range shifts from a known point ................................................6-7 Figure 6-6. Target description.........................................................................................6-8 Figure 6-7. OH-58D armed helicopter ............................................................................6-9 Figure 6-8. Army attack helicopters ..............................................................................6-10 Figure 6-9. Combat engineer platoon organization ......................................................6-10 Figure 6-10. M9 armored combat earthmover..............................................................6-11 Figure 7-1. Example company or troop LOGPAC ..........................................................7-5 Figure 7-2. Tailgate resupply technique .........................................................................7-7 Figure 7-3. Service-station resupply technique ..............................................................7-8 Figure 7-4. Combination of resupply techniques ............................................................7-9 Figure 7-5A. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (front side)..................................7-15 Figure 7-5B. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (back side) .................................7-15 Figure 7-6. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag....................7-18 Figure 7-7. Sample tag for captured documents and equipment .................................7-19 Figure 8-1. Underground systems ..................................................................................8-2 Figure 8-2. Tank weapon dead space at street level......................................................8-4 Figure 8-3. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level.............................8-4 Figure 8-4A. Urban hull-down position ...........................................................................8-9 Figure 8-4B. Urban hull-down position ...........................................................................8-9 Figure 8-5. Hide position.................................................................................................8-9 Figure 8-6. Building hide position..................................................................................8-10 Figure 8-7. Favored threat weapons .............................................................................8-12 Figure 8-8. Example task force attack in an urban environment, with tank platoons in the support and assault forces ...................................................................8-16 Figure 8-9. Simplified area sketch ................................................................................8-20 Figure 8-10. Urban grid technique ................................................................................8-23 Figure 8-11. Checkpoint technique...............................................................................8-23 Figure 8-12. Objective area reference grid technique ..................................................8-24 Figure 8-13. TRP technique..........................................................................................8-24 Figure 8-14. Battalion close fight SITREP ....................................................................8-26 Figure 8-15. Example radio conversation .....................................................................8-26 Figure 8-16. Attack team/maneuver company communications check........................8-26
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Figure 8-17. Example request for immediate ACF....................................................... 8-28 Figure 9-1. Example rules of engagement ..................................................................... 9-8 Figure 9-2. Example graduated response card .............................................................. 9-9 Figure 9-3. Battle position and reserve/reaction force missions .................................. 9-13 Figure 9-4. Traffic control point, choke point, blockade, convoy escort, and route proofing missions ....................................................................................... 9-14 Figure 9-5. Tank section manning a light traffic checkpoint ......................................... 9-15 Figure 9-6. Tank platoon manning a heavy traffic checkpoint ..................................... 9-16 Figure 9-7A. Tank platoon roadblock ........................................................................... 9-16 Figure 9-7B. Equipment list for roadblocks and checkpoints ....................................... 9-17 Figure 9-8. Cordon and search operations .................................................................. 9-17 Figure A-1. FBCB2 computer system............................................................................. A-2 Figure A-2. FBCB2 tactical display.................................................................................A-2 Figure A-3. Tank platoon FBCB2 TI architecture diagram.............................................A-3 Figure A-4A. Tank sections maneuvering separately on actual terrain outside of their direct line of sight of each other................................................................... A-4 Figure A-4B. FBCB2 display of the tank sections maneuvering separately ..................A-4 Figure B-1. Sample platoon WARNO.............................................................................B-2 Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format .................................................................. B-7 Figure B-3. Sample platoon FRAGO.............................................................................. B-8 Figure B-4. Sample FM SALTT report............................................................................B-8 Figure B-5. Sample FM SITREP ....................................................................................B-9 Figure B-6. MEDEVAC request format.........................................................................B-10 Figure B-7. Sample FM contact report .........................................................................B-10 Figure C-1. Infantry leads while tank platoon remains stationary ..................................C-6 Figure C-2. Tanks move forward to link up with infantry ................................................C-7 Figure C-3. Infantry guides tanks to the firing position...................................................C-8 Figure C-4. Tanks destroy enemy targets ......................................................................C-9 Figure C-5. Sample positions for infantry riding on a tank ...........................................C-10 Figure E-1. MOPP levels ................................................................................................ E-4 Figure E-2. Hand-and-arm signal for CBRN hazard ......................................................E-8 Figure E-3. Nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) ......................................................... E-10 Figure E-4. Convulsive antidote nerve agent (CANA) injector.....................................E-10 Figure E-5. CBRN marking devices .............................................................................E-12 Figure E-6. Using smoke to confuse the enemy and silhouette his vehicles............... E-18 Figure E-7. Using screening smoke to conceal displacement .....................................E-19 Figure E-8. Using screening smoke to conceal a bypass............................................E-20 Figure E-9. Using screening smoke to conceal a breaching operation ....................... E-21 Figure E-10. Tank platoon occupying an alternate battle position that is not obscured by enemy smoke........................................................................................ E-24 Figure F-1. Combat identification system....................................................................... F-2 Figure F-2. Joint CID marking system (JCIMS) ............................................................. F-3
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Figure G-1. Risk levels and impact on mission execution .............................................G-3 Figure G-2A. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 1 of 2 pages ........................................................................................................... G-4 Figure G-2B. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 2 of 2 pages ........................................................................................................... G-5
Tables Table 6-1. Characteristics and capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft .................................6-14 Table 8-1. Penetration capabilities of a single 7.62-mm (ball) round .............................8-5 Table 8-2. Number of rounds needed to penetrate a reinforced concrete wall at a 25degree obliquity ............................................................................................8-5 Table 8-3. Structure penetrating capabilities of 7.62-mm round (NATO ball) against typical urban targets (range 25 meters) .......................................................8-6 Table 8-4. Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical urban targets (range 35 meters).............................................................................8-6 Table 8-5. Marking methods .........................................................................................8-21 Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon ............................. A-5 Table G-1. Risk assessment matrix............................................................................... G-3 Table G-2. Instructions for completing DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet ................................................................................................... G-6 Table I-1. Abandon tank procedures ...............................................................................I-1
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Preface This manual describes how the tank platoon fights. It focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to exploit its combat power and minimize its vulnerabilities while conducting combat operations. FM 3-20.15 is for leaders and crew members of all M1, M1A1, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP (system enhancement package) tank platoons. Because weapons and equipment vary among units, users should adapt information to fit their specific situations. Where capabilities of the various systems differ significantly, this manual examines alternative considerations and techniques for their use. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. In addition to FM 3-20.15, two publications are critical reference sources for the tank platoon. ARTEP 17-23710-MTP, the mission training plan for the tank platoon, contains collective platoon tasks and outlines training procedures and exercises. The other resource, ST 3-20.153, contains a detailed example of tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP). Each tank platoon can modify the TACSOP to meet its unique mission requirements. Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the preparing agency is the United States Army Armor Center. Users and readers of this manual are invited to submit recommendations that will improve its effectiveness. Send comments and recommendations to Director, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, U.S. Army Armor Center, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road Suite 207, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5123. For additional information, call (502) 624-3294/1779 or DSN 464-3294/1779.
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Chapter 1
Introduction The fundamental mission of the tank platoon is to close with and destroy the enemy. The platoon’s ability to move, shoot, and communicate—and do so with armored protection—is a decisive factor on the modern battlefield. It moves, attacks, defends, and performs other essential tasks to support the company or troop mission. In accomplishing its assigned missions, the tank platoon employs firepower, maneuver, and shock effect, synchronizing its capabilities with those of other maneuver elements and warfighting functions. When properly supported, the platoon is capable of conducting sustained operations against any sophisticated threat. The tank platoon can survive and win in battle only if it is well trained, effectively led, and highly motivated. Crews must be aggressive, and their tactics must reflect the tempo and intensity of maneuver warfare. Platoon training must prepare them to operate effectively in hostile territory with the enemy to their front, flanks, and rear.
SECTION I - ORGANIZATIONS
TANK PLATOON 1-1. By itself, any tank can be vulnerable in the face of diverse battlefield hazards (such as enemy forces or unfavorable terrain) and situations; these vulnerabilities are significantly reduced when tanks are employed as units. 1-2. A tank platoon consists of four main battle tanks organized into two sections, with two tanks in each section. Section leaders are the platoon leader, who is the tank commander (TC) of the vehicle designated as Tank 1 and the platoon sergeant (PSG), who is the TC of Tank 4. Tank 2 is the wingman in the platoon leader’s section, and Tank 3 is the wingman in the PSG’s section (see Figure 1-1).
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Figure 1-1. Tank platoon 1-3. The tank platoon is organic to tank companies, armored cavalry troops, and combined arms battalions. The platoon may be attached to a number of organizations, commonly a mechanized infantry company, to create company teams. It may also be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of light infantry organizations. Note. For information on light infantry organizations and their relationship with the tank platoon, refer to the discussion in Appendix C of this manual and to FM 7-20. Additional information concerning task organized company teams is found in Appendix C of this manual and in FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).
1-4. Under battlefield conditions, the wingman concept facilitates control of the platoon when it operates in sections. The concept requires that one tank orient on another tank on either its left or right side. In the absence of specific instructions, wingmen move, stop, and shoot when their leaders do. In the tank platoon, Tank 2 orients on the platoon leader’s tank, while Tank 3 orients on the PSG’s tank. The PSG orients on the platoon leader’s tank (see Figure 1-2).
Figure 1-2. The wingman concept
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SPLIT SECTION CONCEPT 1-5. The tank platoon is considered the smallest maneuver element in the company. It normally fights as a unified element, with its sections fighting in concert with one another. There may be times, however, when mission, enemy, terrain (weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) will cause the company commander to find it necessary to split the platoon and attach the sections to a dismounted infantry squad or mechanized infantry section. This concept most likely occurs when the unit encounters restricted terrain or during urban operations. 1-6. The attachment of sections presents a variety of command and control issues. Leaders must understand the principles of employing infantry and armored forces to maximize their capabilities and ensure mutual support. A clear communications plan between the dismounted infantry and the armor vehicles is essential to this success. Armored vehicles are presented with several disadvantages in an urban environment. If the crew is operating with closed hatches, the dead space immediately around the vehicle is increased, and a dismounted infantry squad can easily compensate for this deadspace. The infantry can also clear intervisibility lines and breach obstacles. The armor section provides the infantry with support by moving with it along an axis of advance and providing protection. The tank section suppresses and destroys bunkers, enemy weapons, and tanks by fire and maneuver. Tanks also provide transport when the situation allows acceptable risk to exposed Soldiers. When attached to a mechanized infantry section with Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV), the team gains the ability to conduct mounted and dismounted patrols; fix, suppress, or disrupt enemy vehicles and antiarmor systems out to 2,500 meters; and destroy enemy tanks with the use of tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile fires. The mechanized infantry and tank section’s weapons systems used together compliment one another by compensating for the other system’s limitations. The tank section’s 120-mm main gun can depress only to -10 degrees and elevate only to +20 degrees, which creates considerable dead space for the tank crews in an urban environment. The BFV, however, can depress to -10 degrees and elevate to +60 degrees, compensating for the tank’s dead space (see Figure 1-3).
Figure 1-3. Tank and Bradley main gun and coax dead space above street level 1-7. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant must understand the factors involved with operating in concert with light and mechanized infantry forces. Gaining dismounted infantry significantly changes the need to understand the differences in movement rates and communication challenges. The leaders must have a solid communication plan and conduct rehearsals, including the infantry squad. If the armor section is attached to the infantry or mechanized infantry section, then the infantry/mechanized infantry leaders must understand the supply and maintenance needs of heavy armor forces. This poses the biggest
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challenge for the dismounted infantry, because their need for fuel is far less than that of an armor section. Also, the armor section’s ammunition requirements will pose issues in acquisition and distribution. The following checklist is not limited to, but should include, the platoon leader’s responsibilities when gaining an infantry section or losing a tank section.
Section (Losing) z
z z z z z
Section leader receives coordination data: linkup time, location, gaining unit designation, frequencies, and point of contact from the platoon leader. Section is refueled and rearmed. Section moves to the linkup point. Section leader enters the gaining unit’s radio net. Section leader reports to the gaining unit’s point of contact and provides a status report. Section leader receives: Mission. Maps. Orders/overlays. TACSOP. Direct fire and control SOP. Digital SOP. Casualty evacuation plan. Section leader submits: Battle roster. CS report. Sensitive items report. Any general issues. Section conducts digital communications check. Section leader confirms linkup with parent unit.
z
z z
Section (Gaining) z z z z z
Receiving unit issues coordination data to losing unit: linkup time, location, frequencies. Receiving unit conducts linkup with attaching unit. Receiving unit conducts digital communications check with attaching unit. Receiving unit receives status report from attaching unit. Receiving unit issues: Mission. Maps. Orders/overlays. TACSOP and communications security (COMSEC) information. Unit SOP. Direct fire and control SOP. Digital SOP. Casualty evacuation SOP. Receiving unit receives: Battle roster. CS report. Sensitive items report. Any general issues. Receiving unit conducts battle drill rehearsals for all five forms of contact.
z
z
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TANK COMPANY 1-8. The tank company is organized, equipped, and trained to fight pure or as a task organized company team. The tank company consists of a headquarters and three tank platoons. The company headquarters consists of the commanding officer (CO), executive officer (XO), first sergeant (1SG), and supply section. The company headquarters is equipped with two tanks, one M113A2/A3 armored personnel carrier (APC), two M1025 or M998 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), and one cargo truck with a 400-gallon water trailer (see Figure 1-4). A maintenance section from the forward support company (FSC) is normally attached to the tank company. The maintenance section consists of one APC, one heavy recovery vehicle, one cargo truck with trailer carrying spare parts based on the prescribed load list (PLL), and one cargo truck with trailer as a tool truck. A medic team, normally attached from the battalion medical platoon, travels in a medic APC.
Figure 1-4. Tank company Note. As part of continued modernization of equipment, units are receiving the forward repair system (FRS) as a replacement for the maintenance M113.
ARMORED CAVALRY TROOP 1-9. The armored cavalry troop is organized, equipped, and trained to conduct reconnaissance and security operations. While its primary missions are reconnaissance and security, the cavalry troop may be called upon to execute attack, defend, and delay missions as part of squadron and regimental missions. 1-10. The armored cavalry troop consists of a headquarters, two tank platoons, two scout platoons, a mortar section, and a maintenance section. The headquarters section is equipped with one main battle tank, one M3 cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV), one command post (CP) carrier, one APC, one cargo truck with a 400-gallon water trailer, and two utility trucks. Each scout platoon consists of six M3 CFVs. Equipment in the mortar section includes two 120-mm mortars mounted in self-propelled carriers. The maintenance section includes one APC, one heavy recovery vehicle, and two cargo trucks with cargo trailers (see Figure 1-5). Note. As part of continued modernization of equipment, units are receiving the FRS as a replacement for the maintenance M113.
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Figure 1-5. Armored cavalry troop
SECTION II - CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 1-11. To win in battle, leaders must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of their equipment. This knowledge assists the tank platoon leader in evaluating transportability, sustainability, and mobility considerations for their own vehicles and for those with which the platoon may operate as part of a company team or troop.
CAPABILITIES 1-12. Tanks offer an impressive array of capabilities on the modern battlefield: excellent cross-country mobility, sophisticated communications, enhanced target acquisition, lethal firepower, and effective armor protection. In combination, these factors produce the shock effect that allows armor units to close with and destroy the enemy in most weather and light conditions. 1-13. Today’s tanks can move rapidly under a variety of terrain conditions, negotiating soft ground, trenches, small trees, and limited obstacles. In addition, global positioning systems (GPS) and inertial position navigation (POSNAV) systems allow tanks to move to virtually any designated location with greater speed and accuracy than ever before. Use of visual signals and the single channel ground/airborne radio system (SINCGARS) facilitates rapid and secure communication of orders and instructions. This capability allows tank crews to quickly mass the effects of their weapon systems while remaining dispersed to limit the effects of the enemy’s weapons. 1-14. On-board optics and sighting systems enable tank crews to acquire and destroy enemy tanks, armored vehicles, and fortifications using the main gun or to use machine guns to suppress enemy positions, personnel, and lightly armored targets. The tank’s armor protects crew members from smallarms fire, most artillery, and some antiarmor systems. 1-15. Perhaps the most important technological advance available to the tank platoon is the digital information capability of its vehicles. Some tank crews now employ the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system, to improve situational understanding, command, control, and navigation. The enhanced capabilities provided by these digitized systems represent a distinct advantage for the platoon leader. They enable him to gain and maintain the initiative on the battlefield by synchronizing his elements with other units through the use of faster, more accurate tactical information. Additional details on the capabilities and operational considerations of FBCB2 are provided in Appendix A and in discussions throughout this manual.
LIMITATIONS 1-16. Tanks require extensive maintenance, proficient operators, and skilled mechanics, as well as daily resupply of large quantities of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) products. They are vulnerable to the weapons effects of other tanks, attack helicopters, mines, antitank guided missiles (ATGM), antitank guns, and close attack aircraft. When tanks operate in built-up areas, dense woods, or other restricted terrain,
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reduced visibility leaves them vulnerable to dismounted infantry attacks. In such situations, they may be restricted to trails, roads, or streets; severely limiting maneuverability and observation. Existing or reinforcing obstacles can also restrict or stop tank movement.
SECTION III - RESPONSIBILITIES 1-17. The tank crew is a tightly integrated team. Though all members have primary duties, success depends on their effectiveness as a crew. They must work together to maintain and service their tank and equipment and function as one in combat. Crews must cross-train so each member can function at any of the other crew positions.
PLATOON LEADER 1-18. The platoon leader is responsible to the commander for the discipline and training of his platoon, the maintenance of its equipment, and its success in combat. He must be a subject matter expert in the tactical employment of his section and the platoon, both by itself and in concert with a company team or troop. He must have a solid understanding of troop-leading procedures and develop his ability to apply them quickly and efficiently on the battlefield. 1-19. The platoon leader must know the capabilities and limitations of the platoon’s personnel and equipment; at the same time, he must be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and equipment. He must serve as an effective TC. Most importantly, the platoon leader must be flexible and capable of using sound judgment to make correct decisions quickly and at the right times based on his commander’s intent and the tactical situation. During decentralized operations, the platoon leader cannot rely on the company commander for guidance and instructions. He must be capable of making decisions based on his unit’s task and purpose and the commander’s intent. 1-20. Platoon leaders must know and understand the task force mission and the task force commander’s intent. They must be prepared to assume the duties of the company commander in accordance with the succession of command.
PLATOON SERGEANT 1-21. The PSG is second in command of the platoon and is accountable to the platoon leader for the training, discipline, and welfare of the Soldiers in the platoon. He coordinates the platoon’s maintenance and CS requirements and handles the personal needs of individual Soldiers. The PSG is the most experienced TC in the platoon. His tactical and technical knowledge allow him to serve as mentor to crewmen, other noncommissioned officers (NCO), and the platoon leader. His actions on the battlefield must complement those of the platoon leader. He must be able to fight his section effectively, either in concert with the platoon leader’s section or by itself.
TANK COMMANDER 1-22. The TC is responsible to the platoon leader and PSG for the discipline and training of his crew, the maintenance of assigned equipment, the reporting of CS needs, and the tactical employment of his tank. He briefs his crew, directs the movement of the tank, submits all reports, and supervises initial first-aid treatment and evacuation of wounded crewmen. He is an expert in using the tank’s weapon systems, requesting indirect fires, and executing land navigation using both digital systems and more traditional methods such as terrain association. 1-23. The TC must know and understand the company mission and company commander’s intent. Again with decentralized operations, the TC may operate as a section and must be able to execute independently. He must be prepared to assume the duties and responsibilities of the platoon leader or PSG in accordance with the succession of command. These requirements demand that the TC maintain constant, thorough situational understanding. He does this by using all available optics for observation, eavesdropping on radio transmissions, and monitoring the FBCB2 display.
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GUNNER 1-24. The gunner searches for targets and aims and fires both the main gun and the coaxial machine gun. He is responsible to the TC for the maintenance of the tank’s armament and fire control equipment. The gunner serves as the assistant TC and assumes the responsibilities of the TC as required. He also assists other crew members as needed. Several of his duties involve the tank’s communications and internal control systems: logging onto and monitoring communications nets, maintaining digital links if the tank is equipped with FBCB2, inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays, and monitoring digital displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
DRIVER 1-25. The driver moves, positions, and stops the tank. While driving, he constantly searches for covered and concealed routes and for covered positions to which he can move if the tank is engaged. He maintains his tank’s position in formation and watches for visual signals. If the tank is equipped with a steer-to indicator, the driver monitors the device and selects the best tactical route. During engagements, he assists the gunner and TC by scanning for targets and sensing fired rounds. The driver is responsible to the TC for the automotive maintenance. He assists other crew members as needed.
LOADER 1-26. The loader stows and cares for ammunition, loads the main gun and the coaxial machine gun ready box, and aims and fires the loader’s machine gun. He is also responsible to the TC for the maintenance of communications equipment. Before engagement actions are initiated, the loader searches for targets, maintains rear security, and acts as air guard or ATGM guard. He also assists the TC as needed in directing the driver so the tank maintains its position in formation. He assists other crew members as necessary. Because the loader is ideally positioned both to observe around the tank and to monitor the tank’s digital displays, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong consideration to assigning their second most experienced crewman as the loader.
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Chapter 2
Command and Control Battle command is the process of assimilating information and then using the data to visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct military action required to achieve victory. Thinking and acting are simultaneous activities for leaders in battle. The process known as command and control (C2) is the biggest challenge faced by combat leaders on the modern battlefield. Command involves directing various combat, CS, and sustainment elements; control entails the measures taken to make sure these directions are carried out. Even the most knowledgeable tactician will be ineffective if he cannot properly use the techniques available to direct and control his combat elements. In exercising C2, the tank platoon leader, assisted by the PSG, employs a variety of techniques to prepare for operations, issue orders, employ the platoon, and communicate. The success of this process rests mainly on decisive leadership, realistic training, thoroughly understood SOPs, and the effective use of communications equipment. For maximum efficiency, the platoon leader must keep command and control as simple as possible while ensuring that he provides the platoon with all required information and instructions.
SECTION I - COMMAND 2-1. Command has two vital components: decision-making and leadership. This section examines in detail how the platoon leader and his subordinate leaders use these elements to develop the flexible, productive command structure that is the catalyst for success on the battlefield.
DECISION-MAKING 2-2. Decision-making is a conscious process for selecting a course of action (COA) from two or more alternatives. At platoon level, many decisions are based on SOPs and standard unit drills. SOPs and drills cover an array of routine and emergency actions, such as evacuation of wounded Soldiers, rearming and resupply procedures, and individual crew responsibilities; they allow the platoon to operate quickly and efficiently without constant guidance from the platoon leader. SOPs and checklists are especially critical in maintaining combat preparedness when leaders are tired or under stress as a result of continuous operations. Because of this, it is absolutely necessary that everyone in the platoon thoroughly understand all applicable SOPs. Refer to ST 3-20.153, Tank Platoon SOP , for a sample SOP that can be adapted for use in various tank platoon organizations. In the modern operational environment, the platoon leader may operate in a decentralized fashion requiring him to make rapid decisions with minimal guidance. Additionally, the platoon leader may conduct missions that will transition from combat operations to stability operations. The enemy will not conform or act in a manner that will fit into the doctrinal named operations. The platoon leader must understand that the enemy is always adapting his tactics to best defeat our forces.
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TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES 2-3. Troop-leading is a dynamic process that begins when the platoon receives a new mission or is notified by a warning order (WARNO) that a new mission is imminent. Most tactical decisions are made by the company or troop commander, who then announces them in the form of orders that include his intent and concept of the operation. Based on these orders, the platoon leader executes troop-leading procedures to organize his time during planning and preparation and to develop his platoon’s scheme of maneuver. Effective use of troop-leading procedures allows the platoon leader to lead his platoon more effectively in the execution of the mission. 2-4. Whenever possible, the eight steps of troop-leading procedures are integrated and accomplished concurrently rather than sequentially. Time management is the key. The platoon leader maximizes available planning time by starting as soon as he receives the first bit of information about the upcoming operation. He normally uses one-third of the available time to plan, prepare, and issue the order; his TCs then have the remaining two-thirds of the time available to prepare their tanks and crews for the operation. This time allocation, known as the “one-third/two-thirds” rule, is applicable in planning and preparation at all levels and for virtually all tactical situations and must be enforced. 2-5. The troop-leading process, although discussed here with the eight steps in traditional order, is not rigid, and the steps are not necessarily sequential. The tasks involved in some steps (such as initiate movement, issue the WARNO, and conduct reconnaissance) may recur several times during the process. Although listed as the last step, activities associated with supervising and refining the plan and other preparations occur throughout the troop-leading process. 2-6. The following discussion focuses on the eight steps of troop-leading procedures: z Receive and analyze the mission. z Issue the WARNO. z Make a tentative plan. z Initiate movement. z Conduct reconnaissance and coordination. z Complete the plan. z Issue the order. z Supervise and refine.
Step 1—Receive and Analyze the Mission 2-7. The platoon leader receives his orders as an oral operation order (OPORD) or as a fragmentary order (FRAGO) updating a previously issued OPORD. Graphics are copied from the commander’s overlay or sent by digital transmission (see the discussion). Initial coordination with other platoon leaders and the company or troop fire support team (FIST) are accomplished upon receipt of the mission. Note. Before the OPORD or FRAGO arrives, the platoon leader may receive a series of WARNOs from the company commander providing advance notice of an impending operation. The platoon leader should disseminate all pertinent information contained in the WARNOs as quickly as possible after they are received.
Initial Actions
2-8. Upon receipt of the WARNO, FRAGO, or OPORD, the platoon leader’s first task is to extract his mission from the commander’s overall plan. The key to understanding the platoon mission as part of the company team or troop mission lies in two elements of the plan: the commander’s intent and the concept of operations. One platoon will be designated as the company/troop main effort. This platoon’s task and purpose accomplishes the company’s stated mission. The other platoons are supporting efforts; their task and purpose ensures the success of the main effort platoon. The platoon leader’s understanding of the commander’s intent and his task and purpose allows him to use his initiative, exploit battlefield
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opportunities, and accomplish the commander’s plan. If he does not understand the intent or purpose, he must ask the commander for clarification. 2-9. Although mission analysis is continuously refined throughout the troop-leading process, the platoon leader’s actions are normally based only on the WARNO from higher. These include an analysis covering the terrain and enemy and friendly situations. The platoon leader may also conduct his time analysis, develop a security plan, and issue his own WARNO to provide guidance and planning focus for his subordinates. At a minimum, the platoon WARNO should cover the enemy and friendly situations, movement instructions, and coordinating instructions such as a time line and security plan. ( Note. The analysis is normally conducted as quickly as possible to allow the platoon leader to issue the WARNO in a timely manner. He then conducts a more detailed METT-TC analysis, as outlined in the following discussion, after the WARNO is issued.) Note. The technique of using multiple WARNOs is a valuable tool for the platoon leader during the troop-leading process. He can issue WARNOs for several purposes: to alert subordinates of the upcoming mission, to initiate the parallel planning process, and to put out tactical information incrementally as it is received (ultimately reducing the length of the OPORD). Refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) for a discussion of how WARNOs are employed at various stages of the troop-leading procedures.
METT-TC Analysis
2-10. The platoon leader analyzes the mission using the factors of METT-TC: mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations. Careful analysis of the company OPORD allows the platoon leader to identify the platoon’s purpose; the specified, implied, and essential tasks it must perform; and the time line by which the platoon will accomplish those tasks. The following outline of METT-TC factors will assist the platoon leader in analyzing the mission and creating a time line. 2-11. Mission. The platoon leader’s analysis includes the following points: z What is the battalion commander’s intent? z What are the company or troop commander’s intent and purpose? What tasks did the commander say must be accomplished (specified tasks)? In the OPORD, z specified tasks are contained in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. z What other tasks must be accomplished to ensure mission success (implied tasks)? Implied tasks are those that are not specified in the OPORD, but that must be done to complete the mission. They do not include tasks that are covered in the unit SOP. The platoon leader identifies implied tasks by analyzing the enemy, the terrain, friendly troops available, and the operational graphics. As an example, the commander may direct the platoon to occupy a support-by-fire position near a known enemy observation post (OP). The platoon leader will immediately recognize that he must occupy the designated position (the specified task). Through his analysis, he will probably determine that the platoon must also destroy or neutralize the enemy OP (the implied task) because it can affect the platoon and/or company mission. If time is available, the platoon leader should confirm implied tasks with the commander. 2-12. Enemy. The analysis of the enemy situation includes these considerations: z What have been the enemy’s recent activities? z What is the composition of the enemy’s forces? z What are the capabilities of his weapons? z What is the location of current and probable enemy positions? z What is the enemy’s most probable COA? The platoon leader must apply knowledge of the enemy’s doctrine and his most recent activities and locations to answer these questions:
Will the enemy attack or defend?
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What is the enemy’s task and purpose? What formations will the enemy use? How will the enemy defend? Where are the enemy’s kill zones? Where and when will the enemy execute his operations?
2-13. Enemy information is included in paragraph 1 of the OPORD. It is important that the platoon leader analyze this information in terms of the platoon’s role in the operation. For example, if the company commander only identifies platoon-size center-of-mass locations for a defending enemy, the platoon leader should identify probable enemy locations based on the terrain and the enemy’s doctrine. 2-14. Platoon leaders need to ensure that they use this evaluation of the enemy, whether it is on the high intensity battlefield (enemy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles [IFV]) or low intensity operations (guerillas, or destabilizing elements). These skills will allow the platoon to disrupt the enemy operations and force the enemy to react to the platoon’s actions, ensuring the platoon retains the initiative. With changing enemy tactics based on their success, an environment can easily evolve where leaders find themselves reacting to these ever-changing tactics and surrendering the initiative to the enemy. The platoon leader must ensure he sets the conditions for mission success, retaining the initiative at all times. 2-15. Terrain (and weather). The platoon leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment). Elements of the OAKOC and weather analysis include the following: z
Observation and fields of fire. These are influenced by key terrain that dominates avenues of approach. The following factors may apply: Where can the enemy observe and engage the platoon (danger areas)? Where are the natural firing positions the platoon can use to observe and engage the enemy, including locations for battle positions (BP), support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions, and overwatch positions?
z
Avenues of approach. Where are the most favorable avenues of approach (mounted, dismounted, and air) for enemy and friendly forces?
z
Key terrain. These factors may apply: Where is the key terrain? (Any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.) How can key terrain be used to support the mission?
z
Obstacles. These factors may apply:
z
Where are natural and existing obstacles located, and how can they affect maneuver? Where are likely areas for enemy-emplaced obstacles, and how can they affect maneuver? Are there bypasses, or must obstacles be breached?
Cover and concealment. These factors may apply: What routes within the area of operations offer cover and concealment for the platoon or for enemy elements? Do the natural firing positions in the area of operations offer cover and concealment for the platoon or enemy?
z
Weather. The platoon leader can use these questions as he analyzes the impact of weather and other environmental factors on the mission: What are the light conditions (including percentage of night illumination) and visibility? What are the times for beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), sunrise, sunset, end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), moonrise, and moonset? How will this effect friendly and enemy use of night vision equipment? What conditions will favor friendly forces, and what will favor the enemy forces.
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How has recent weather affected trafficability in the area of operations? Will weather become better or worse during the mission? How will fog, rain, dust, heat, snow, wind, or blowing sand affect the crew and equipment during the mission?
Note. This analysis should also cover the effects of weather on smoke and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.
2-16. Troops. The analysis of friendly forces and other personnel-related issues includes these considerations: z What is the supply status of ammunition, fuel, and other necessary items? z What is the current physical condition of the Soldiers, as well as of vehicles and equipment? z What is the training status of the platoon? z What is the state of morale? z How much sleep have the Soldiers had? z How much sleep will they be able to get before the operation begins? z Does the platoon need any additional assets to support or accomplish its mission? z What attachments are available to help the platoon accomplish its mission? 2-17. Time available. The platoon leader’s analysis includes the following factors: z What times were specified by the commander in the OPORD for such activities as movement, reconnaissance, rehearsals, and logistics package (LOGPAC) operations? z What priorities of work can the platoon accomplish (examples include security, maintenance, resupply, coordination, rehearsals, inspections, and sleep) in the time available? z How much time is available to the enemy for the activities listed in the previous items? z How does the potential enemy time line for planning and preparation compare with that developed for friendly forces? 2-18. As part of this analysis, the platoon leader conducts reverse planning to ensure that all specified, implied, and essential tasks can be accomplished in the time available. He develops a reverse planning schedule (time line) beginning with actions on the objective and working backward through each step of the operation and preparation to the present time. This process also helps the platoon in making efficient use of planning and preparation time. 2-19. Civilian considerations. The platoon leader uses this analysis to identify how the platoon will handle situations involving civilians and/or nonmilitary agencies or organizations. Considerations that may affect the platoon mission include the following: z What are the applicable rules of engagement (ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI)? Soldiers must understand when to fire as much as when not to. What procedures and guidelines will the platoon use in dealing with refugees, prisoners, and z other civilians? z Will the platoon be working with civilian organizations, such as governmental agencies, private groups, or the media? z Will the platoon be tasked to conduct stability operations (such as peace operations or noncombatant evacuation) or support operations (such as humanitarian or environmental assistance)? The platoon must be prepared for the operation to change based on the situation. A stability operation could very quickly escalate into a combat mission, as much as a combat mission can change to a stability operation. Leaders need to be prepared for this and make sure the platoon understands how the plan may change.
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Mission Statement
2-20. Once his METT-TC analysis is complete, the platoon leader can then write the platoon mission statement, including the task and purpose of the mission and answering the questions of WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. This is a clear, concise statement of the purpose of the operation and the essential task(s) that will be crucial to its success. The essential tasks (the WHAT) should be stated in terms that relate to enemy forces, friendly forces, and/or the terrain (for example, “SUPPRESS THE ENEMY,” “OVERWATCH 2D PLATOON,” or “SEIZE AN OBJECTIVE”). The purpose (the WHY) explains how the platoon mission supports the commander’s intent. The elements of WHO, WHERE, and WHEN add clarity to the mission statement (for example, “3D PLT, C CO ATTACKS TO SEIZE OBJ RAIDERS NLT 152200OCT2006, TO ALLOW THE COMPANY TO COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES.”). Note. Simultaneous planning and preparation are key factors in effective time management during the troop-leading procedures. The next five steps (issue a WARNO, make a tentative plan, initiate movement, conduct reconnaissance and coordination, and complete the plan) may occur simultaneously and/or in a different order. As noted, the final troop-leading step, supervise and refine, is on-going throughout the process.
Step 2—Issue the Warning Order 2-21. The platoon leader alerts his platoon to the upcoming operation by issuing a WARNO that follows the five-paragraph OPORD format (see Appendix B). Warning orders maximize subordinates’ planning and preparation time by providing essential details of the impending operation and detailing major time line events that will support mission execution. The amount of detail included in a WARNO depends on the available time, the platoon’s communications capability, and the information subordinates need to initiate proper planning and preparation. The WARNO may include the following information: z Changes to task organization. z Updated graphics (platoons equipped with FBCB2 send new overlays). z Enemy situation. z Company or troop mission. z Commander’s intent (if available). z Platoon mission. z A tentative time line, to include the following: Earliest time of movement. Readiness condition (REDCON) and vehicle preparation schedule. Reconnaissance. Training/rehearsal schedule. ( Note. The platoon leader may initiate some individual and collective training before he issues the OPORD; this technique maximizes preparation time and allows the platoon to focus on tasks that will support the anticipated operations. For example, a tank platoon equipped with a plow tank may practice the crew task of dropping the plow, as well as platoon-level actions at an obstacle.) Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued. Time of precombat check (PCC)/precombat inspection (PCI). z Service support instructions (if not included in the time line).
Step 3—Make a Tentative Plan 2-22. The platoon leader begins developing his maneuver plan as he listens to the commander issue the company OPORD. Based on the commander’s plan and the results of his mission analysis, the platoon leader develops a tentative plan that addresses all specified, implied, and essential tasks using the OPORD format (see Appendix B of this manual). The tentative plan also covers reconnaissance and coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent and supporting units. The PSG and TCs are excellent
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sources of ideas concerning the platoon plan and war-gaming COAs. Refer to Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual for more detailed discussions of planning considerations in offensive and defensive operations.
Step 4—Initiate Movement 2-23. Many company-level operations require movement to forward assembly areas and BPs during the planning phase of an operation. The platoon leader addresses movement in his time line; he orders the platoon to begin moving in accordance with the company plan. Activities may include sending platoon representatives to an assembly area with the company quartering party or beginning priorities of work.
Step 5—Conduct Reconnaissance and Coordination 2-24. Effective reconnaissance takes into account the factors of METT-TC and OAKOC from both friendly and enemy perspectives. If time and security considerations permit and authorization is obtained from higher headquarters, an on-site ground reconnaissance is the best way to survey the area of operations. As a minimum, the platoon leader conducts a detailed map reconnaissance. The platoon leader should take as many TCs as possible on his reconnaissance. 2-25. For offensive operations, the platoon leader should attempt to find a vantage point that will allow him to see as much of the objective as possible. Ground reconnaissance for offensive operations usually is limited to checking routes to the start point (SP), the line of departure (LD), and the axis just beyond the LD. For defensive operations, the platoon leader should conduct a reconnaissance of the engagement area, all platoon BPs, and the routes to be used. 2-26. During the reconnaissance (or during company-level rehearsals), the platoon leader or his representative should coordinate routes, movement speed, and sectors of observation and fires with other platoon leaders and with adjacent and supporting units.
Step 6—Complete the Plan 2-27. The platoon leader refines the plan based on the results of the reconnaissance and coordination. He then completes the plan using these results and any new information from his commander, other platoon leaders, and members of his platoon. He should keep the plan as simple as possible, at the same time ensuring that the platoon scheme of maneuver supports the commander’s intent.
Step 7—Issue the Order 2-28. If possible, the platoon leader issues the order from a vantage point overlooking the terrain on which the platoon will maneuver. If not, he uses a terrain model, sand table, sketches, or his map to orient the platoon. He can also build a model of the area of operations using a briefing kit that contains such items as engineer tape, colored yarn, 3-by-5-inch index cards, and “micro” armor vehicle models. 2-29. As time and security permit, the platoon leader issues the order to as many members of the platoon as possible. As a minimum, he assembles the TCs and his gunner. He briefs the platoon using the five paragraph OPORD format (see Appendix B). 2-30. To ensure complete understanding of the operation, the platoon leader and TCs conduct confirmation briefings immediately after the OPORD is issued. The TCs brief the platoon leader to confirm their understanding of his intent, the specific tasks their crews must perform, and the relationship between their tasks and those of other units in the operation. If time permits, the platoon leader should lead the TCs in a walk-through using a sand table.
Step 8—Supervise and Refine 2-31. Flexibility is the key to effective operations. The platoon leader must be able to refine his plan whenever new information becomes available. If he adjusts the plan, he must inform the platoon and supervise implementation of the changes. Once the operation has begun, the platoon leader must be able to direct his platoon in response to new situations and new orders. 2-32. Crew orders, rehearsals, and inspections are essential elements of the supervision process as the platoon prepares for the mission. The following discussion examines these procedures in detail.
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Crew Orders
2-33. The platoon leader and PSG make sure all crew members have been briefed by their TCs and understand the platoon mission and concept of the operation through the use of backbriefs. Rehearsals
2-34. A rehearsal is a practice session conducted to prepare units for an upcoming operation or event. The platoon leader should never underestimate the value of rehearsals. They are his most valuable tools in preparing the platoon for the upcoming operation. Effective rehearsals require crewmen to perform required tasks, ideally under conditions that are as close as possible to those expected for the actual operation. Participants maneuver their actual vehicles or use vehicle models or simulations while interactively verbalizing their elements’ actions. 2-35. In a platoon-level rehearsal, the platoon leader selects the tasks to be practiced and controls execution of the rehearsal. He will usually designate someone to role-play the enemy elements he expects to face during the operation. Refer to FM 5-0 for a detailed discussion of rehearsal types, techniques, and procedures. Note. A rehearsal is different from the process of talking through what is supposed to happen. For example, in a rehearsal, TCs should actually send spot reports (SPOTREP) when reporting enemy contact, rather than simply saying, “I would send a SPOTREP now.”
2-36. Rehearsal purposes. The platoon leader uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following purposes: z Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks. z Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan. z Synchronize the actions of subordinate elements. z Confirm coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent units. z Improve each Soldier’s understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct and indirect fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations that may arise during the operation. 2-37. Rehearsal types. The platoon leader can choose among several types of rehearsals, each designed to achieve a specific result and with a specific role in the planning and preparation time line. The primary types of rehearsals available to the tank platoon are the following: z Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is, in effect, a reverse briefing process routinely performed by subordinate leaders immediately after receiving any instructions, such as an OPORD or FRAGO. They confirm their understanding by repeating and explaining details of the operation for their leader. The platoon leader should conduct confirmation briefs after his TCs have received the OPORD, but before other phases of the platoon rehearsal begin. z Backbrief. The backbrief allows the platoon leader to identify problems in his own concept of the operation and his subordinates’ understanding of the concept; he also uses the backbrief to learn how subordinates intend to accomplish their missions. z Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. This rehearsal, conducted throughout the planning and preparation time line, is used to ensure that all participants understand a technique or a specific set of procedures. It does not necessarily cover a published drill or SOP, giving the commander or leader flexibility in designing the rehearsal. For example, the platoon leader could rehearse procedures for marking obstacle lanes or establishing local security. This rehearsal is critical when working with new units/forces (such as light units); it allows all elements to understand what each will be doing during a specific action and allows heavy and light forces to better mesh their drills together.
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2-38. Rehearsal techniques. The platoon leader can choose among several techniques in conducting rehearsals, which should follow the crawl-walk-run training methodology to prepare the platoon for increasingly difficult conditions. Considerations in selecting a rehearsal technique include the following: z Time. How much will be needed for planning, preparation, and execution? z
Multi-echelon. How many echelons will be involved?
z
Operations security (OPSEC). Will the rehearsal allow the enemy to gain intelligence about upcoming operations?
z
Terrain. What are the applicable terrain considerations?
z
Training. Is this a new skill or something they have never done before, either individually or as a platoon?
2-39. As noted in FM 5-0, techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the resourcefulness of the commander or leader; that manual outlines six basic techniques. Listed in descending order in terms of the preparation time and resources required to conduct them, these techniques are the following: z Full dress rehearsal. This rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the mission, but is the most difficult to conduct in terms of preparation and resources. It involves every Soldier and system participating in the operation. If possible, units should conduct the full dress rehearsal under the same conditions (such as weather, time of day, terrain, and use of live ammunition) that they will encounter during the actual operation. The platoon generally will take part in full dress rehearsals as part of a larger unit. z Reduced force rehearsal. This rehearsal normally involves only key leaders of the unit and is thus less extensive than the full dress rehearsal in terms of preparation time and resources. The commander decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan, if possible on the actual terrain to be used for the actual operation. The reduced force rehearsal is often conducted to prepare leaders for the full dress rehearsal. z Terrain model rehearsal. This is the most popular rehearsal technique, employing an accurately constructed model to help subordinates visualize the battle in accordance with the commander’s or leader’s intent. When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations or is within walking distance of such a vantage point. Size of the model can vary, but it should be large enough to depict graphic control measures and important terrain features for reference and orientation. Participants walk or move “micro” armor around the table or model to practice the actions of their own vehicles in relation to other members of the platoon. z Sketch map rehearsal. Units can use the sketch map technique almost anywhere, day or night. Procedures are similar to those for the terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large enough to allow all participants to see as each subordinate “walks” through an interactive oral presentation of his actions. Platoon elements can use symbols or “micro” armor to represent their locations and maneuver on the sketch. z Map rehearsal. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch map rehearsal except that the commander or leader uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and control the operation. This technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation brief or backbrief involving subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders. The platoon leader uses the map and overlay to guide participants as they brief their role in the operation. z Radio/digital rehearsal. The leader conducts this rehearsal by sending the OPORD and overlay digitally (if equipped). He then may review this information by FM radio. The radio rehearsal may be especially useful when the situation does not allow the platoon to gather at one location. Subordinate elements check their communications systems and rehearse events that are critical to the platoon plan. To be effective, the radio rehearsal requires all participants to have working communications equipment.
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Inspections
2-40. Precombat inspections allow the platoon leader to check the platoon’s operational readiness. The key goal is to ensure that Soldiers and vehicles are fully prepared to execute the upcoming mission. Inspections also contribute to improved morale. 2-41. It is essential that the entire platoon chain of command know how to conduct PCCs and PCIs in accordance with applicable SOPs (ST 3-20.153 or the platoon’s own SOP) or based on the procedures outlined in ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Examples of an inspection include the following: z Perform before-operation maintenance checks, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary. z Perform communications checks of voice and digital systems. z Inspect and verify maps and graphics. z Ensure that crews understand the plan and are in the correct uniform and mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level. z Review the supply status of rations, water, fuel, oil, all types of ammunition, pyrotechnics, firstaid kits, and batteries (for such items as flashlights, night-vision devices, and CBRN alarms). Direct resupply operations as necessary. 2-42. The platoon leader and/or PSG should observe each crew during preparation for combat. They should conduct the inspection once the TCs report that their crews and vehicles are prepared. It should be understood that the platoon leader will check items he deems critical for the upcoming operations, but the TCs need to check all items based on the platoon SOP. Failure at the TC level to check all systems, and not just the ones the platoon leader is going to check could lead to a critical element or piece of equipment to fail during operations. 2-43. PCCs differ from PCIs in that they are quick combat checks performed at crew level and designed to account for individuals and equipment. PCCs do not require formal notification or conduct. They are designed to be quick and concise in verification that the crew, section, and platoon have all necessary equipment to accomplish the mission. Examples for PCCs include the following: z Perform prepare-to-fire checks for all weapons, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary. Weapons are boresighted, and all sights are referred. Machine guns are test fired, if possible. Ammunition is checked and stored properly. z Upload vehicles in accordance with the platoon SOP. The standardization of load plans allows the platoon leader and PSG to quickly check accountability of equipment. It also ensures standard locations of equipment in each vehicle; this can be an important advantage if the platoon leader is forced to switch to a different vehicle during an operation. z Account for Soldiers’ uniforms and equipment necessary to accomplish the tasks.
CONTINGENCY PLANS 2-44. Leaders must use contingency planning to ensure that the platoon knows what actions to do in the absence of the leadership. Less experienced crews, or crews faced with unusual, unexpected circumstances will tend to carry out only their last orders. This tendency could place them in danger as the enemy is developing tactics of rapid hit and run operations which will capitalize on platoons that are not proactive and relay on the platoon leader or platoon sergeant to tell them what to do. The basic six-point contingency plan is used whenever the key leadership is going to be gone from the platoon. Some examples of when this is to be used: leader’s reconnaissance, dismounted patrols, or coordinating with other units or local government agencies.
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Six-Point Contingency Plan 1. Which personnel will be going with the platoon leader? 2. What route is the platoon leader taking? 3. How long will the platoon leader be gone? 4. What to do if the platoon leader fails to return. 5. What to do if the platoon leader makes contact. 6. What to do if the platoon makes contact or if other elements in the area make contact.
ABBREVIATED TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES 2-45. When there is not enough time to conduct all eight troop-leading steps in detail, such as when a change of mission occurs after an operation is in progress, the platoon leader must understand how to trim the procedures to save time. Most steps of these abbreviated troop-leading procedures are done mentally, but the platoon leader skips none of the steps. 2-46. Once the order is received, the platoon leader conducts a quick map reconnaissance, analyzes the mission using the factors of METT-TC, and sends for the TCs. He makes sure the TCs post the minimum required control measures on their maps and issues a FRAGO covering the key elements of the enemy and friendly situations, the platoon mission, and the concept of the operation. The service support and command and signal paragraphs can be deleted if they are unchanged or covered by SOP. FRAGOs are discussed in Appendix B. The platoon leader and TCs may also conduct a quick walk-through rehearsal of critical elements of the maneuver plan using a hastily prepared terrain model or sand table. 2-47. In some cases, there may not be enough time even for these shortened procedures. The platoon may have to move out and receive FRAGOs by radio or at the next scheduled halt. It then becomes critical for the platoon leader to send FRAGOs of his own to the TCs explaining the platoon’s purpose within the overall company maneuver plan. 2-48. Digital systems, such as FBCB2 and GPS devices, are valuable tools when the platoon is forced to use abbreviated troop-leading procedures and FRAGOs. They allow the platoon leader to designate waypoints to assist in navigation and target reference points (TRP) to assist in weapons orientation. 2-49. Other keys to success when abbreviated procedures are in effect include a well-trained platoon; clearly developed, thoroughly understood SOPs; and an understanding by all members of the platoon of the current tactical situation (situational understanding). The platoon leader and PSG must keep the platoon informed of the ever-changing enemy and friendly situations. They accomplish this by monitoring the company or troop net and issuing frequent updates to the other crews using the radio and digital information systems.
SPECIAL NOTE Whenever time is available, there is no substitute for effective, thorough rehearsals conducted prior to an operation, even if time is limited. Successful platoon leaders make the most of every available minute.
LEADERSHIP 2-50. Competent, confident leadership inspires Soldiers, instilling in them the will to win and providing them with purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leadership involves numerous important personal principles and traits: z Taking responsibility for decisions. z Exemplifying and demanding loyalty.
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z z z
Inspiring and directing the platoon toward mission accomplishment. Fostering a climate of teamwork that will engender success. Demonstrating moral and physical courage in the face of adversity and danger.
2-51. FM 6-22 and FM 3-0 further describe the qualities of effective leadership. The following are the five characteristics of successful combat leaders, as described in the 1984 study titled Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal conducted by the History Department at the United States Military Academy: z Terrain sense. Understand terrain; match tactics and weaponry with the terrain at hand. z Single-minded tenacity. This is the quality that compels the successful platoon leader to harness the combat power necessary to overwhelm the enemy. The platoon leader sees the mission through and never gives up. z Practical, practiced judgment. Common sense and constant practice allow the platoon leader to prioritize effectively, enabling him to separate critical tasks from the non-critical and preventing him from being overwhelmed by the demands of the information-rich battlefield. z Ferocious audacity. Calculated risk-taking is a must if the platoon is to exploit enemy weaknesses as they present themselves. z Physical confidence. Leaders can maintain their ability to meet the demanding requirements of leadership only if they are in top physical condition.
SECTION II – CONTROL
SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 2-52. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationship among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0). For the platoon leader, this is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental “picture” of the tactical situation. This picture includes an understanding of relevant terrain and the relationship between friendly and enemy forces, as well as an awareness of the culture with which you are interacting. It also includes the ability to correlate battlefield events as they develop. For platoon leaders and PSGs, situational understanding is the key to making sound, quick tactical decisions. It allows them to form logical conclusions and to make decisions that anticipate future events and information. A critical benefit of situational understanding on the part of TCs is a reduction in fratricide incidents (see Appendix F, this FM, for information about fratricide prevention). Situational understanding also gives leaders the ability to compress the time necessary to conduct troop-leading procedures; this is especially critical when there is limited time to plan and prepare for an operation. 2-53. The commander structures the battlefield based on his intent and the conditions of METT-TC. How he does this affects the tank platoon leader’s mission planning and his ability to maintain situational understanding. The framework of the battlefield can vary from a highly rigid extreme, with obvious front and rear boundaries and closely tied adjacent units, to a dispersed and decentralized structure with few secure areas and unit boundaries and no definable front and/or rear boundary. 2-54. Between these extremes are an unlimited number of possible variations. Maintaining situational understanding becomes more difficult as the battlefield becomes less structured. Modern, highly mobile operations involving small forces lend themselves to a less rigid framework that challenges the platoon leader’s ability to maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield.
TIME MANAGEMENT (R EADINESS CONDITIONS) 2-55. Time management is the key to success in continuous operations. During the planning and preparation phases of an operation, the commander dictates priorities of work, rest, and security. (Note. OPSEC is discussed in Appendix D.) In conjunction with REDCON levels, these priorities enable the platoon leader to develop his internal platoon timeline. He then uses troop-leading procedures (discussed in Chapter 2) to outline time requirements and disseminate them to the platoon.
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REDCON LEVELS 2-56. REDCON levels allow quick responses to changing situations and ensure completion of necessary work and rest plans. The commander uses the REDCON status as a standardized way to adjust the unit’s readiness to move and fight.
REDCON-1. Full alert; the unit is ready to move and fight. •
CBRN alarms and hot loop equipment are stowed; OPs are pulled in.
•
All personnel are alert and mounted on ve hicles; weapons are manned.
•
Engines are started.
•
The platoon is ready to move immediately.
Note. A variant of REDCON-1 is REDCON-1(-); the same cond itions apply except that the vehicles are not started in REDCON-1(-). REDCON-2. Full alert; the unit is ready to fight. •
Equipment is stowed (except hot loop and CBRN alarms).
•
Precombat checks are complete.
•
All personnel are alert and mounted in vehicles; weapons are manned.
Note. Depending on the tactical situation and orders from the commander, dismounted OPs may remain in place. •
All (100 percent) digital and FM communications links are operational.
•
Status reports are submitted in accordance with company SOP.
•
The platoon is ready to move within 15 minutes of notification.
REDCON-3. Reduced alert. • •
•
Fifty percent of the platoon executes work and rest plans. Remainder of the platoon executes security plan. Based on the commander’s guidance and the enemy situation, some personnel executing the security plan may execute portions of the work plan. The platoon is ready to move within 30 minutes of notification.
REDCON-4. Minimum alert. •
OPs are manned; one man per tank is designated to monitor the radio and man the turret weapons.
•
Digital and FM links with company and other platoons are maintained.
•
The platoon is ready to move within one hour of notification.
WORK PLAN 2-57. The work plan enables TCs and crewmen to focus their efforts in preparing vehicles, equipment, and themselves for operations. Activities designated in the timeline include, but are not limited to, the following: z Reconnaissance, as required and within capabilities. z Orders at crew and platoon level. z Crew- and platoon-level training and rehearsals. z Vehicle maintenance. z Vehicle preparation (camouflage, stowage, boresighting, communications checks).
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z z z z z
Individual soldier preparation (training, orders, rehearsals). Resupply (Classes I, III, and V). Preparation of fighting positions. Obstacle emplacement. Crew- and platoon-level PCCs and PCIs.
REST PLAN 2-58. The rest plan allows some soldiers to sleep while other crewmen conduct priorities of work and maintain security. To be effective in sustained combat, a soldier should get a minimum of 4 to 6 hours of uninterrupted sleep every 24 hours. Less than 4 hours of sleep can significantly degrade combat performance. 2-59. Planning and decision-making are among the skills that suffer most dramatically when soldiers cannot get enough sleep. The platoon SOP must provide for an adequate division of duties to allow leaders to get some sleep. This may require the platoon leader, PSG, and one or both of the other TCs to share duties. When soldiers are tired, confirmation briefings and backbriefs become critical whenever orders are issued, even for the simplest task. 2-60. Whenever possible, the tank platoon leader should coordinate with the commander to use infantrymen to assist with security. This coordination may enable the platoon leader to rest more soldiers for longer periods of time as the infantry mans OPs and conducts dismounted patrols to augment the security of the platoon.
BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION 2-61. To “see” the battlefield accurately, the platoon leader must have virtually perfect knowledge of the friendly situation one level higher than his own (the company team or troop situation). It is also important that he update the TCs periodically regarding the higher situation. The platoon leader must also have a relatively complete knowledge of the terrain and the enemy situation. He must be able to visualize enemy and friendly elements through time and to picture how the terrain will affect their actions. Note. The requirement to maintain a real-time awareness of the battlefield one level higher does not relieve the platoon leader of his responsibility to understand the situation and commander’s intent two levels higher than his own. The difference is that his understanding of the situation two levels higher does not have to be as specific or as timely.
2-62. Most of the information the platoon leader requires comes from what he can observe from his tank and from reports he receives through his communications systems. Although few voice and digital reports are specifically addressed to him, particularly on the company team or troop net, the platoon leader must monitor them by eavesdropping. He then can track enemy and friendly elements and plot all movement on his map and/or his digital display (FBCB2). This allows him to adjust his own movement so the platoon makes contact with the enemy from positions of advantage, which are identified during the map/ground reconnaissance step of the troop-leading procedures. Care must be taken in that inexperienced leaders do not become dependent on digitalization for their situational understanding. The enemy may employ tactics to jam digital systems or overload the leader and cause indecision. 2-63. How effectively the platoon leader can keep track of events on the battlefield depends, to some degree, on experience. No matter what his experience level, the platoon leader is responsible for learning techniques that allow him to relate the information he receives to his map or display and thereby track the tactical situation and increase situational understanding.
The Operational Environment 2-64. Joint doctrine describes the operational environment as the air, land, maritime, space, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (that is, political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, and others) that are relevant to a specific Joint operation (JP 1-02). Understanding
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this environment has always required a broad perspective. Leaders must consider more than the enemy’s military forces and other combat capabilities. 2-65. The better leaders understand their own forces and capabilities, threats, and the environment, the better they can employ and integrate the platoon’s actions to create conditions that lead to mission accomplishment. The key to understanding is determining what information is relevant to the mission and making informed decisions based on relevant information. 2-66. The structure for visualizing and analyzing the operational environment is METT-TC. The six factors of METT-TC make up the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for tactical operations. Cultural Awareness
2-67. Successful accomplishment of military missions requires that Soldiers and leaders possess an awareness of the cultures with which they interact. To develop this cultural awareness, and subsequently apply this knowledge, Soldiers and leaders must first understand the key elements of a culture. These key elements are the beliefs, values, behaviors, and norms that compose (or are important to) any culture, whether friendly or enemy, local or foreign. Soldiers and leaders must then take into account these considerations: z
US culture. They must understand the key elements of the US culture, and how these elements influence their own perceptions of other cultures. In addition, they must realize how US culture can affect other cultures, and that these effects influence other cultures’ perceptions of the US and its people.
z
COE culture. They must understand the key elements of the specific cultures within the COE with which they expect to interact during operations. This includes indigenous populations as well as multinational partners.
z
Impact of culture on military operations. Military personnel must not only know what cultural awareness is, but must also factor specific cultural information into the decisions and actions they take to accomplish their missions. Information that may have a direct impact on military operations includes—
The influences of religion(s) on how a population behaves. The impact of geography on a population. Actions or speech that might insult or offend the members of certain cultures. The dangers of stereotyping and other biases. Differences in what indigenous populations and multinational partners value. The influences of social structure and relationships. Historical events and how they impact behaviors, beliefs, and relationships. How to communicate effectively with multinational partners and indigenous persons. The impact of cultural awareness on battle command.
MAPS, OVERLAYS, GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES, AND NAVIGATION Maps and Overlays 2-68. Purposes. The most important role of maps and the accompanying overlays is to allow the platoon to understand and visualize the scheme of maneuver. They are the primary tools the platoon leader uses to organize information concerning the battlefield and to synchronize his assets once the battle begins. Maps also provide TCs with a visual reference they can consult as needed. The platoon leader must ensure that each TC has an updated map with the latest graphic control measures posted on the overlays and verify their accuracy. 2-69. The map and overlays also assist the platoon leader in performing a variety of other functions. He consults them constantly during reconnaissance operations, which can vary in complexity from a quick map reconnaissance to a fully mounted ground reconnaissance of the area of operations. The map and overlays help him to communicate the company or troop commander’s concept while he is issuing the
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OPORD or briefing the TCs on the plan. During mission execution, the map and overlays play an invaluable role in helping leaders to maintain situational understanding. 2-70. Types of overlays. Overlays can be prepared either in traditional fashion (written out by hand) or digitally. The platoon leader may receive one or more types of overlays from the commander covering such areas as maneuver, enemy forces, obstacles, fire support, and sustainment. All of the information is important; the key for the platoon leader is to combine, augment, and unclutter the overlays so the information needed for a specific situation is readily available to the platoon on one simple, combined overlay. 2-71. Traditional overlays. Copied on acetate, traditional overlays display graphic control measures as illustrated in Figure 2-1. They are prepared even if a platoon is equipped with FBCB2 digital systems in the event the platoon loses digital data or has its digital link broken. Overlays allow the TCs to use the graphic during rehearsals and dismounted operations when they will not have access to digital systems.
Figure 2-1. Traditional overlay 2-72. Digital overlays. FBCB2 allows the platoon leader to receive and transmit graphics virtually on a real-time basis within the platoon and to and from higher headquarters. When these systems are integrated with automatic position/location updates, the platoon leader has a nearly perfect situational understanding “link.” His display shows the positions of his platoon and adjacent units. These positions and locations are displayed on a menu of overlays using the most recent graphics. The platoon leader can combine, augment, and unclutter the overlays as needed; when appropriate, he can choose not to display any of them on his digital screen. Figure 2-2 illustrates a sample FBCB2-generated overlay.
Figure 2-2. Sample FBCB2 with overlay
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2-73. Although fairly accurate, digital systems suffer from minor flaws that detract from their effectiveness as a stand-alone battle command tool. They serve as an enhancement to, not a substitute for, the platoon leader’s map with traditional overlays.
Graphic Control Measures 2-74. The following paragraphs and the accompanying illustrations (Figures 2-3 through 2-19) explain and illustrate graphic control measures commonly used at the company and platoon level. They are entered on overlays to illustrate the commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver. In addition, they provide clarity when an order is issued and assist in the battle command process once the tank platoon begins executing the operation. Exact definitions are found in FM 1-02. 2-75. Graphic control measures are considered rigid and unchangeable; however, placement of platoon battle positions should be dictated by the terrain and commander’s intent as opposed to battle positions drawn on the map. The platoon leader fights the battle and terrain not the graphic. For example, if the map location of a support-by-fire position does not allow the platoon leader to mass direct fires on the enemy, he can, in most situations, inform the commander and adjust the position as needed to accomplish the platoon mission. Control measures assist the platoon leader in identifying the necessary coordination that must be accomplished with adjacent platoons. 2-76. Boundary. Boundaries delineate areas of tactical responsibility between units. Coordination with adjacent units along boundaries is the key to enhancing synchronization and decreasing the risk of fratricide. The platoon leader must be aware of adjacent platoons within his company, adjacent companies within the battalion, and adjacent units along the task force boundary. (See Figure 2-3.)
Figure 2-3. Boundary (graphic control measure) 2-77. Phase line. Phase lines are used to control and coordinate movement and synchronize tactical actions. Platoons report crossing phase lines, but normally do not halt unless directed to do so. The abbreviation on overlays is “PL.” (See Figure 2-4.)
Figure 2-4. Phase line (graphic control measure)
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2-78. Assembly area. Abbreviated “AA” on overlays, this is a location at which the platoon gathers (usually as part of the company or troop) to conduct maintenance and resupply activities and to make other preparations for future operations. The platoon must be able to defend from the assembly area. (See Figure 2-5.)
Figure 2-5. Assembly area (graphic control measure) 2-79. Route. This is the prescribed course of travel from a specific point of origin (the start point [SP]) to a specific destination, usually the release point (RP). The route should be named, and checkpoints should be designated at key locations. The abbreviation on overlays is “RTE.” (See Figure 2-6.)
Figure 2-6. Route (graphic control measure) 2-80. Checkpoint. Checkpoints are used to control and direct the maneuver of the tank platoon and tank section. They are usually placed on identifiable terrain features, such as hilltops, road intersections, or towers. (See Figure 2-7.)
Figure 2-7. Checkpoint (graphic control measure) 2-81. Attack position. This is the last position the platoon occupies or passes through before crossing the line of departure (LD). The platoon assumes the proper formation and performs last-minute checks of its weapons systems. The abbreviation on overlays is “ATK POS.” (See Figure 2-8.)
Figure 2-8. Attack position (graphic control measure) 2-82. Contact point. A contact point is a designated location, usually an easily identifiable terrain feature, where two or more units are required to physically meet. The headquarters assigning the contact point must specify what sort of activity is required when the units meet. The platoon leader may be tasked to man or move to a contact point for coordination. (See Figure 2-9.)
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Figure 2-9. Contact point (graphic control measure) 2-83. Passage lane. This is the area or route through which a passing unit moves to avoid stationary units and obstacles. Tank platoons may move on a lane or serve as the overwatch for a passing unit moving through a lane. (See Figure 2-10.)
Figure 2-10. Passage lane (graphic control measure) 2-84. Passage point. This is the place where a unit physically passes through another unit. Tank platoons may move through a passage point or overwatch other units moving through a passage point. The abbreviation for a passage point is “PP.” (See Figure 2-11.)
Figure 2-11. Passage point (graphic control measure) 2-85. Objective. An objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort (FM 1-02). The objective is the physical object or area (such as enemy personnel, a man-made object, or a terrain feature) to be seized or held. Tank platoons usually occupy some portion of the company objective. The abbreviation on overlays is “OBJ.” (See Figure 2-12.)
Figure 2-12. Objective (graphic control measure) 2-86. Axis of advance. This is the general route and direction of advance extending toward the enemy. It graphically portrays the commander’s intent, such as envelopment of the enemy. The unit may maneuver and shoot supporting fires to either side of the axis provided it remains oriented on the axis and the objective. For example, platoons may maneuver on or to the side of the axis assigned to their company as long as deviations do not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units. (See Figure 2-13.)
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Figure 2-13. Axis of advance (graphic control measure) 2-87. Direction of attack. This is the specific direction and route that the main attack or center of mass of the unit will follow. Tank platoons move along directions of attack specified by the commander to take advantage of terrain or to ensure maximum control of the moving unit. The overlay abbreviation is “DOA.” (See Figure 2-14.)
Figure 2-14. Direction of attack (graphic control measure) 2-88. Assault position. This is the location from which a unit assaults the objective. Ideally, it is the last covered and concealed position before the objective. Tank platoons may occupy an assault position or serve as overwatch for occupation of the position by the assault force. The abbreviation on overlays is “ASLT POS.” (See Figure 2-15.)
Figure 2-15. Assault position (graphic control measure) 2-89. Attack-by-fire position. This is the location from which a unit employs direct fire to destroy the enemy from a distance. Tank platoons occupy an attack-by-fire position alone or as part of the company or troop. From this position, the platoon can attack the enemy on the objective when occupation of the objective is not advisable; the position can also be used in an attack on a moving enemy force. In addition, this type of position can serve as a counterattack option for a reserve force. The overlay abbreviation is “ABF.” (See Figure 2-16.)
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Figure 2-16. Attack-by-fire position (graphic control measure) 2-90. Support-by-fire position. This is another type of position from which a maneuver element can engage the enemy by direct fire, with the fires providing support for operations by other units. The tank platoon usually occupies a support-by-fire position when providing supporting fires for an assault or breach force or when serving as the overwatch for a moving force. The overlay abbreviation is “SBF.” (See Figure 2-17.)
Figure 2-17. Support-by-fire position (graphic control measure) 2-91. Battle position. This is a defensive location, oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach, from which a unit defends. Tank platoon BPs and direct-fire orientations are designated in the OPORD. (See Figure 2-18.)
Figure 2-18. Battle position (graphic control measure) 2-92. Target reference point. This is an easily recognizable point on the ground (either natural or man made) used to locate enemy forces or control fires. TRPs can designate either the center of an area on which the platoon can mass its fires or the left or right limit of such an area. The tank platoon leader controls platoon fires by designating platoon TRPs as necessary to supplement company or troop TRPs issued by the commander. (See Figure 2-19.)
Figure 2-19. Target reference point (graphic control measure)
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Navigation 2-93. To protect his platoon, the platoon leader must learn to use terrain to his advantage. Land navigation of armored vehicles requires him to master the technique of terrain association. This entails the ability to identify terrain features on the ground by the contour intervals depicted on the map. The platoon leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of OAKOC and identifies major terrain features, contour changes, and man-made structures along his axis of advance. As the platoon advances, he uses these features to orient the platoon and to associate ground positions with map locations. 2-94. The intellectual concept of the area of operations (AO) is vital to the platoon’s survival during navigation and movement. The platoon leader must constantly be aware of key terrain and enemy fields of observation and fire that may create danger areas as the platoon advances. This allows him to modify movement techniques, formations, and routes and to maintain cross talk with overwatch elements to make sure the enemy does not surprise the platoon. 2-95. Navigation under limited visibility conditions is especially challenging. Vehicle thermal sights and night-vision devices provide assistance, but leaders nonetheless can easily confuse terrain features and become disoriented. See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for a discussion of limited visibility operations. 2-96. The platoon can employ a variety of techniques and equipment to assist in navigation. These are summarized in the following discussion. 2-97. Fires. Using field artillery (FA) or mortars to fire smoke (during the day) or ground-burst illumination (day or night) can provide a useful check on estimated locations or preplanned targets. 2-98. Global positioning systems. GPS devices receive signals from satellites or land-based transmitters. They calculate and display the position of the user in military grid coordinates as well as in degrees of latitude and longitude. Most GPS navigation readings are based on waypoints, the known positions entered into the system’s memory. The platoon leader identifies points along the route or at the destination and designates them as waypoints. Once waypoints are entered in the GPS, the device can display information such as distance and direction from point to point. Leaders must still know how to employ terrain association while navigating in case satellite or land signals are inoperative or unavailable. 2-99. Inertial navigation systems. Based on an initial calculation of the vehicle’s location from a known point, inertial navigation systems use the rotation of the track to determine the location of the vehicle. The M1A2’s POSNAV system is an example. POSNAV allows the TC to determine his exact location and gives him the ability to plot up to 99 waypoints. Tank drivers can then use the steer-to function on their driver’s integrated display (DID) as they move toward the designated waypoints. To compensate for track slippage that could affect the accuracy of the inertial system, TCs should reinitialize their systems often, using a GPS or a known point. Note. In using the GPS or POSNAV, the platoon leader must remember that waypoints are only one of several navigational tools he can use. He must still be prepared to use terrain association and map-reading skills in case of digital system failures. In addition, the platoon leader must not disregard the effects of terrain on the direction of movement. Terrain features that do not show up on the digital display (such as hills, valleys, and cliffs) may cause deviations in the route the platoon must take to reach the next waypoint.
2-100. Terrain/Grid Index Reference System (TIRS/GIRS). TIRS/GIRS are convenient tools for the platoon leader to use as he maneuvers the platoon and disseminates control measures. Known points are usually previously distributed graphic control measures. Referencing a location from a known point is done in kilometers. For example, 500 meters is given as “POINT FIVE,” 1,000 meters as “ONE,” and 3,500 meters as “THREE POINT FIVE.” Cardinal directions are used. Shifts to the east or west are given first, followed by shifts to the north or south. Consider the following transmission: “RED SET FROM CHECKPOINT SEVEN—EAST ONE POINT EIGHT—NORTH ONE POINT SEVEN.” This means, “We (the Red element) are set at a position 1,800 meters east and 1,700 meters north from checkpoint 7.” Figure 2-20 illustrates this example.
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Figure 2-20. Example of TIRS 2-101. TIRS/GIRS are used routinely to control combat operations; they make reporting of current platoon and enemy positions easier. The platoon leader could report his location by referencing a graphic control measure, such as a checkpoint as shown in Figure 2-21, or a grid location. The enemy, however, will quickly figure out the known points if they are continually used in the clear on a nonsecure net. The platoon leader should avoid using the same point more than twice. Instead, he should use a different known point to reference the same location.
Figure 2-21. Platoon reports own position using TIRS (checkpoint)
COMMUNICATIONS 2-102. During combat operations, dispersion forces the tank platoon to rely on effective communications by means of wire, visual signals, radio, and digital systems. The platoon must understand the proper procedures for using the available systems; the proper application of operational terms; and procedures for constructing and sending effective, concise messages using each type of system. The platoon leader is responsible for planning, training, and employment of the platoon’s communications systems. He is also responsible for maintaining communications within the company or troop communications system.
Means of Tactical Communications 2-103. The tank platoon has several available means of communications. Whether using messenger, wire, visual, sound, radio, or digital communications, the platoon must remain flexible enough to react quickly to new situations. The platoon leader must carefully plan the use of these resources, ensuring there is redundancy in the platoon’s communications systems while avoiding dependence on any single means. 2-104. SOPs play a critical role in ensuring that platoon communications enhance situational understanding and contribute to mission accomplishment. They prescribe hand-and-arm and flag signals that can aid in platoon movement and clear, concise radio transmissions that help to reduce transmission
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times. On digitally linked vehicles, crews can monitor the commander’s integrated display (CID), with its standardized graphics; this significantly reduces the need to send voice updates of friendly vehicle positions. 2-105. Messenger. Use of a messenger is the most secure means of communications available to the tank platoon. When security conditions and time permit, it is the preferred means. It is generally very flexible and reliable. A messenger can be used to deliver platoon fire plans, status reports, or lengthy messages. When possible, lengthy messages sent by messenger should be written to prevent mistakes and confusion. 2-106. Wire. This method of communications is especially effective in static positions. The platoon will frequently employ a hot loop in initial defensive positions, OPs, and assembly areas. Unit SOPs, tailored to counter the enemy’s electronic warfare capability, prescribe conditions and situations in which the platoon will employ wire. Tank crews can communicate directly with dismounted infantry by routing wire from the vehicle internal communications (VIC)-3 system through the loader’s hatch or vision block to a field phone attached to the outside of the tank. 2-107. Visual. Visual communications are used to identify friendly forces or to transmit prearranged messages quickly over short distances. Standard hand-and-arm or flag signals work well during periods of good visibility. Crews can use thermal paper, flashlights, chemical lights, or other devices during periods of limited visibility, but they must exercise extreme care to avoid alerting the enemy to friendly intentions. TCs must clearly understand visual signals as they operate across the battlefield; each TC must be ready to pass on visual signals from the platoon leader to other vehicles in the platoon. See STP 17-19K1-SM (the skill level 1 Soldier’s manual for MOS 19K) and FM 21-60 for a description of hand-and-arm signals. 2-108. Pyrotechnics. Pyrotechnic ammunition can be used for visual signaling. The meaning of these signals is identified in paragraph 5 of the OPORD and in the signal operation instructions (SOI). The main advantage of pyrotechnics is the speed with which signals can be transmitted. The main disadvantages are the enemy’s ability to detect and imitate them and to use them to identify friendly positions. 2-109. Radio. The radio is the platoon’s most flexible, most frequently used, and least secure means of communications. It can quickly transmit information over long distances with great accuracy. Secure equipment and the ability of the SINCGARS to frequency-hop provide the platoon with communications security against most enemy direction-finding, interception, and jamming capabilities. Sophisticated direction-finding equipment, however, can trace almost any radio signal, allowing the enemy to locate and destroy the transmitter and its operator. Survival of the tank platoon depends on good communications habits, especially when it is using the radio; the platoon leader must strictly enforce radio discipline. The most effective way to use the radio is to follow standard radiotelephone procedures (RTP), including brevity and proper use of approved operational terms; these techniques are covered later in this section. 2-110. Digital. FBCB2 enables the platoon leader to transmit digitally encoded information over the SINCGARS radio to other similarly equipped vehicles. Linkup refers to the ability of the tank’s radio to transmit and receive digital information. When properly linked, the platoon leader receives continuously updated position location information for the platoon’s vehicles, as well as for those of the company or troop commander and executive officer (XO) and of adjacent platoons. Using the digital link with other platoon vehicles and the company/troop commander, the platoon leader can also send and receive preformatted reports and overlays with graphic control measures. ST 3-20.153 provides an example SOP for use of digital systems.
Tank Platoon Radio Nets 2-111. The platoon leader, PSG, TCs, and crewmen employ and/or monitor the following radio nets. 2-112. Platoon. The tank platoon net is the key to command and control of the platoon and is the primary net in the conduct of all platoon operations. All tanks within the platoon must monitor and transmit on this net at all times. Some units do not use platoon radio nets; in such a situation, it is critical that all platoon vehicles adhere to communications SOPs and observe strict radio discipline. Every crewman in the platoon should understand net control guidelines, including proper RTP and techniques for effective communications, discussed later in this section. In addition, every Soldier must be trained to provide the platoon leader with essential information efficiently and without redundancy.
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2-113. Company/troop command. The commander uses this net to maneuver the company or troop as well as to process routine administrative/logistical (A/L) reports. Platoon leaders and PSGs monitor this net to keep abreast of the current tactical situation from the reports of the commander, XO, and other platoon leaders. They transmit on the company net to keep the commander informed and to cross talk with other platoon leaders coordinating the tactical actions of their platoons. Both the platoon leader and PSG must have the ability to monitor and transmit on this net. All TCs must be able to switch to this net to send reports and receive guidance if they are unable to contact their platoon leader or PSG.
Net Control 2-114. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and digital communications systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to place it into operation, and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly. The smooth functioning of the platoon net allows accurate information to be passed quickly to and from the platoon leader. This information flow is critical in maintaining the platoon leader’s situational understanding. It becomes especially important when contact is made and the volume of traffic on the p latoon and company/troop nets increases drastically. To ensure that information flowing over the net is organized and controlled in a manner that permits the platoon leader to understand it and to issue orders, use the following techniques. 2-115. Radiotelephone procedures. Proper RTP is the cornerstone of effective command and control in the tank platoon. Every platoon member must be an expert in communications procedures. This ensures efficient communications within the platoon and allows members of the platoon to communicate effectively with outside elements such as other platoons or the company or troop headquarters. 2-116. Depending on the enemy’s electronic warfare capability, the company commander may elect to use standardized call signs to simplify RTP. These call signs allow all users of a net to instantly recognize the calling station. Examples would be the use of RED, WHITE, and BLUE to designate 1st, 2d, and 3d platoons, respectively, and the use of bumper numbers to identity tanks within a platoon. 2-117. Techniques of effective communications. The platoon leader and PSG must ensure that every member of the platoon understands and adheres to the following techniques and guidelines, which can contribute to more effective, more secure tactical communications. 2-118. Minimize duration. All messages sent within or from the tank platoon must be short and informative. The longer the message, the greater the opportunity for enemy elements to use electronic detection to pinpoint the platoon’s location. Message length can be controlled in several ways: z Write down the message and then eliminate all unnecessary words from the written message before sending it. z Read the message as written when sending it. z Use brevity codes that reduce the need to explain the tactical picture in detail. z Break long messages into several parts and send each part separately. 2-119. Minimize signature. When sending a message, every tanker must be conscious of the size and nature of the electronic signature that he is emitting. To reduce the size of the signature, he can use terrain to mask his transmissions from known or suspected enemy positions. He should set the transmitter to the lowest possible power that will provide sufficient range. 2-120. Know the system. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and digital communications systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to place it into operation, and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly. 2-121. Use an effective format. A thorough knowledge of report formats is critical in ensuring timely reporting of enemy information, especially in fast-moving tactical situations. Every crewman should be familiar with the report formats that are outlined in Appendix B and know how to use them effectively. At the same time, however, they must never delay reports only to assure the correct format. ALWAYS REPORT ACCURATE INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!
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2-122. Reporting. In keeping the platoon leader informed, TCs must avoid redundant voice and digital reports. They monitor the platoon net so they can avoid reporting information the platoon leader has already received from other TCs. The PSG pays close attention to the company or troop net while the platoon net is active; he then relays critical information to the platoon. This technique allows the platoon leader to concentrate on fighting the platoon. Once the platoon leader begins to develop the situation, he is responsible for reporting the platoon’s tactical situation to the commander using SPOTREPs and situation reports (SITREP). Refer to Appendix B for information on report formats. 2-123. As a basic guideline, reports of enemy activity should follow the SALUTE format, which covers these factors: z Size. This includes the number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other equipment. z Activity. This covers what the enemy is doing. z
Location. This is usually reported as the grid coordinates of enemy elements.
z
Unit. This covers any indications useful in unit identification, such as patches, signs, and vehicle markings.
z
Time. This item details when enemy activity was observed.
z
Equipment. This includes description or identification of all equipment associated with the enemy activity.
2-124. Initial contact. Any vehicle can alert the platoon to an enemy. The section leader in contact (platoon leader or PSG) deploys and fights his section according to the platoon leader’s intent. The section leader not in contact forwards the report to higher headquarters. If the entire platoon is in contact, the platoon leader fights the platoon while the PSG reports the contact to the commander. 2-125. Routine traffic. The PSG normally receives and consolidates A/L reports and other routine communications from the TCs and passes the reports to the platoon leader or higher headquarters using the procedures prescribed in unit SOPs. 2-126. Digital traffic. Digital traffic may precede, replace, or follow voice transmissions; in many cases, it will reduce the need for and redundancy of voice traffic. Do not duplicate digital traffic with voice messages if digital transmissions precede or can replace voice traffic in a timely manner. Because digital systems are not totally reliable, it may be necessary to verify the receipt of critical digital traffic.
FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL 2-127. To maximize the effects of its fires, the platoon must know how to effectively focus, distribute, and control them. Depending on the situation, fire distribution and control may be accomplished by individual tanks, by section (each section leader’s tank and his wingman), or by the platoon as a whole. On many occasions, particularly in defensive operations, the platoon leader will be in a position to direct the fires of the entire platoon. At other times, especially during offensive operations, fire distribution and control may begin with the PSG or a wingman; as the situation develops, the platoon leader then takes control of the platoon fires and distributes them effectively. 2-128. This discussion provides standardized methods for directing and controlling fires applicable to the individual tank, the section, and the entire platoon. It covers the procedures used from the time targets are acquired, through the placement of fires on those targets, to the reporting of the effects of those fires to the company/troop commander. Also included are considerations for fire distribution and control during offensive and defensive operations. Although the discussion focuses on actions at the platoon and section level, these actions are always integrated into, and become part of, the company or troop plan. 2-129. Refer to FM 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams) for further information on controlling direct fires, including a complete explanation of target acquisition and destruction procedures during direct-fire engagements. Note. The following discussion focuses on platoon-level operations only. For more information on company-level operations, see FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).
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FUNDAMENTALS OF DIRECTING AND CONTROLLING DIRECT FIRES 2-130. The platoon’s ability to focus fires on the enemy is critical to combat survival. Proper scanning techniques and the immediate, violent execution of battle drills (refer to the discussion in Chapter 3) will initially orient the platoon toward the enemy. At that point, the platoon leader must supplement the drills using the techniques and considerations covered in the following discussion. These factors include the following: z Employment of TRPs to mass the platoon’s fires at one location. z Knowledge of the wingman concept in controlling platoon and section fires. z Use of platoon SOPs to aid in controlling fires.
Use of Target Reference Points 2-131. Once he has oriented the platoon, the platoon leader identifies and references each TRP using a terrain feature or by means of a digital overlay. When TRPs are used to delineate the left and right planning limits for platoon fires, he should designate a TRP near the center of the sector. The center TRP roughly divides the left and right sectors in which each section will scan and engage targets. Each section should have the ability to engage targets in the other section’s sector of fire from its primary, alternate, or supplementary position. This allows the platoon leader to distribute fires in response to changes in the enemy situation. 2-132. One section will then scan for and engage targets to the left of the center TRP while the other section does the same to the right of the TRP. ( Note. If he has M1A2 target designation capability, each TC can lase in the vicinity of the TRP and orient his main gun on the TRP using the commander’s digital display.) The outer limits of the sector of fire can be supplemented with TRPs identified by the section leader or can be left to the discretion of individual TCs based on the tactical situation.
Platoon/Section Fires and the Wingman Concept 2-133. As described in Chapter 1 of this manual, the tank platoon is the smallest maneuver element that conducts operations. Even though platoons may separate into sections as the situation requires (for example, during execution of traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch), the platoon leader is still responsible for controlling all four tanks in his platoon. Sections, which consist of a section leader (platoon leader or PSG) and a wingman, do not normally conduct missions or operations separate from those of the platoon. 2-134. During combat operations, the platoon leader/PSG must not become absorbed in firing his own tank; survival of the platoon depends on his ability to command and control the entire platoon. The platoon leader/PSG should have experienced gunners on his vehicle. The gunner must be able to understand the fire plan or operation so he can actively participate in the engagement process without the TC’s direct supervision. During an engagement, the platoon leader must first ensure that the platoon is firing in concert. He then must pass critical combat information (such as calls for fire, report criteria, and instructions) to his crews and higher headquarters using the appropriate communications techniques and nets.
Role of Platoon SOPs 2-135. When specific orders are too time-consuming or not possible, a well-rehearsed platoon SOP ensures fast, predictable actions by all tank crews. The SOP must be drilled repetitively so each tank within the platoon will react automatically to any tactical situation. It should precisely cover guidelines and procedures in such areas as target acquisition responsibilities, drills, reaction procedures, and use of engagement areas and TRPs. Crewmen must then learn these SOP items by memory to provide direction in the absence of orders. 2-136. ST 3-20.153 provides standardized methods for operations within the tank platoon. It includes guidance on the following: z Command and control.
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z z z z z
OPSEC. Organizing for combat. Tactical operations. Personnel. CS.
2-137. In addition to guidance in these general categories, ST 3-20.153 covers specific operational factors that the platoon leader must take into account in fire distribution and control. These additional SOP items include the following: z Vehicle positions (for example, Tank 2 will always be the left flank tank). z TRP marking procedures and materials. z Sectors of fire for each tank. z Engagement bands (based on ammunition capabilities and expected enemy forces). z Procedures for coordination with adjacent units. z Guidelines for identifying and covering dead space. 2-138. The platoon leader should supplement his SOP by developing standardized procedures for offensive and defensive fire planning. These procedures should be detailed enough to allow rapid fire planning after the terrain has been analyzed. This initial planning may be refined and improved as time permits. Note. Visual control measures (and the accompanying SOP actions) may be used to start and stop engagements, shift fires, and signal prearranged actions. On the other hand, an important consideration for the platoon leader in developing the unit SOP is that the dynamics of battle will normally require that fires be controlled using the radio. The radio instructions used to initiate SOPs (as well as issue fire commands) must be brief and precise.
Distribution 2-139. The platoon leader employs two primary methods to ensure effective distribution of direct fires: fire patterns and firing techniques. Fire Patterns
2-140. The entire platoon must thoroughly understand the three basic fire patterns: frontal, cross, and depth. In addition, each tank crew must understand its responsibilities, by SOP, in using the fire patterns for target engagement. The basic fire patterns cover most situations and promote rapid, effective platoon fire distribution. They are normally used in the defense, but may be modified for employment with techniques of movement. They may be used at both platoon and section level. 2-141. Regardless of the fire pattern used, the goal is to engage near targets first, and then shift fires to far targets. Tanks should engage targets near to far and most dangerous to least dangerous in their sector. A most dangerous enemy is any enemy antitank system preparing to engage the platoon. The platoon sector is defined by TRPs, which are used to mass platoon fires at specific locations and to mark the left and right planning limits for platoon fires. As directed or when he determines it is necessary, the section or platoon leader may make exceptions to the most dangerous to least dangerous guideline; an example would be engagement of designated priority targets (such as command and control vehicles). 2-142. Frontal fire pattern. The frontal pattern is used when all tanks within the platoon can fire to their front (see Figure 2-22). Flank tanks engage targets to their front (right tank shoots right target, left tank shoots left target) and shift fires toward the center as targets are destroyed. Leader tanks engage targets to their front and shift fire to the outside as targets are destroyed. The frontal fire engagement rule is near to far, flank to center, and center to flank.
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Figure 2-22. Frontal fire pattern 2-143. Cross fire pattern. The cross fire pattern is used when obstructions prevent some or all tanks within the platoon from firing to the front or when the enemy’s frontal armor protection requires use of flank shots to achieve penetration. In this pattern, each tank engages targets on the flank of its position. The right flank tank engages the left portion of the target area while the left flank tank engages the right portion. As targets are destroyed, tanks shift fires inward. The leader tanks engage the center targets and shift fire to the outside as targets are destroyed. The cross fire engagement rule is outside in, near to far. An example of the cross pattern is shown in Figure 2-23.
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Figure 2-23. Cross fire pattern 2-144. Depth fire pattern. The depth fire pattern is used when targets are exposed in depth. Employment of depth fire is dependent on the position and formation of both the engaging platoon and the target. For example, the entire platoon may be required to fire on a column formation in depth; in other cases, individual tanks engaging in their sector may have to fire in depth. If the whole platoon is firing, it may be possible for each tank to fire in depth on a portion of the enemy formation (see Figure 2-24). The far left tank engages the far target and shifts fire toward the center of the formation as targets are destroyed; the left center tank engages the center target and shifts fire toward the rear as targets are destroyed. The right center tank engages the closest (front) target and shifts fire to the rear as targets are destroyed; the far right tank engages the center target and shifts fire to the front as targets are destroyed.
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Figure 2-24. Depth fire pattern Firing Techniques
2-145. In addition to employing fire patterns, the platoon leader may choose one of three firing techniques to distribute and control the direct fires of the platoon: simultaneous, alternating, and observed. Figures 2-25 through 2-30 illustrate a variety of situations in which the firing techniques are employed; the illustrations include the applicable fire commands. ( Note. Refer to the discussion of fire commands later in this section.) 2-146. Simultaneous fire. This is the primary firing technique used by the platoon. It is employed during most offensive engagements when the unit encounters surprise targets. It is also used in most defensive engagements when the enemy array is numerous enough to require multiple engagements by each tank in the unit. In that case, all tanks engage simultaneously in their assigned sectors. Figures 2-25 through 2-28 illustrate various simultaneous fire situations. 2-147. Alternating fire. Alternating fire is normally used when the platoon is in a defensive position or is undetected. Each tank alternates firing and observing in conjunction with the other tank in the section until both are satisfied that they are hitting the target consistently. Subsequent fire, by command, is then simultaneous. During alternating fire, Tanks 2 and 3 (the wingmen in each section) are normally the first to fire at their outside targets. The section leaders (the platoon leader and PSG) provide observation before firing at their targets. The process continues until all targets are destroyed or the leader switches to simultaneous fire. Refer to Figure 2-29 for an illustration of how alternating fire is employed. 2-148. Observed fire. Observed fire is normally used when the platoon is in protected defensive positions and engagement ranges are in excess of 2,500 meters. The first tank to fire in each section engages designated targets while the second tank observes. The second tank prepares to engage targets in the event the first tank misses consistently, experiences a malfunction, or runs low on ammunition. This technique maximizes observation and assistance capabilities for the observing tank while protecting its location. See Figure 2-30 for an example of observed fire.
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Figure 2-25. Use of cross fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage enemy PCs (with platoon leader’s fire c ommand)
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Figure 2-26. Use of frontal fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage multiple enemy tanks (with platoon leader’s fire command)
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Figure 2-27. Use of different fire patterns in each section (with simultaneous fire technique) to engage enemy targets (with platoon leader’s fire command)
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Figure 2-28. Use of depth fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique (with section fire command)
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Figure 2-29. Use of cross fire pattern and alternating fire technique (with section fire command)
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Figure 2-30. Use of observed fire technique (with section fire command)
Control 2-149. The platoon leader uses two processes to control fires: fire planning and fire commands. He decides how to control fires based on the factors of METT-TC, especially the specific tactical situation and the time available to plan and prepare. Fire Planning
2-150. The more thoroughly the platoon leader can plan an operation, the more effective the platoon’s fires are likely to be. The amount of time available for fire planning, however, depends almost entirely on the collective factors of METT-TC. There are also important considerations based on whether the operation is offensive or defensive in nature. 2-151. For example, some defensive operations may allow the platoon leader hours or days to conduct fire planning. Intelligence assets may be able to acquire, track, and report enemy elements as they move toward the platoon. The platoon leader can then initiate fires with a platoon fire command or a predetermined event (such as the enemy crossing a trigger line). He can also rely on detailed planning and preparation to assist him in distributing fires effectively during the fight. Further fire commands may be required, but the object of the planning phase is to anticipate events and coordinate fires before the fight starts. A well-planned defense requires minimum radio traffic over the platoon net during execution; trigger points, priority of engagements, and targets are established in advance. 2-152. In other situations, especially during offensive operations (such as a meeting engagement or in a movement to contact), the platoon will have only limited time to plan and prepare. At best, the platoon leader may have time to issue a full platoon fire command; on the other hand, a member of the platoon may
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acquire and engage a “most dangerous” target before the platoon leader has an opportunity to initiate his fire command. In the absence of adequate planning time, the platoon leader must initially rely on preestablished, well-rehearsed SOPs to distribute and control fires and ensure fast, predictable engagement by all tanks. Note. Fire planning for offensive and defensive situations is covered in detail in a discussion later in this section and in Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual.
2-153. No matter what kind of situation it expects to face, the platoon must learn and rehearse target acquisition responsibilities; use of TRPs and fire patterns; and procedures for initiating, shifting, and stopping fires. Its survival depends on it. Fire Commands
2-154. The effective use of fire commands is a function of the leader’s knowledge of the enemy and the fire control process and of the time available to plan, prepare, and rehearse. Using a standard format for a platoon or section fire command ensures that all essential information and control measures are given in a minimum amount of time. It enables the unit to react instantly and effectively, even under the most adverse conditions. Standardized platoon and section fire command formats must be established by unit SOP and then practiced by platoon leaders and PSGs (the section leaders) for optimum proficiency. Brevity and clarity are essential. Abbreviated methods for identifying target locations are encouraged; however, these methods must be familiar and understandable. 2-155. The platoon leader may provide coordinating instructions or additional information to individual TCs; this information is not part of the platoon fire command. When one tank sends a contact or spot report and it is reasonable to believe all other tanks in the section or platoon have received it, the section or platoon leader issues only the elements needed to complete the fire command. In all cases, a TC has the freedom to engage a target without a section or platoon fire command if he is under immediate enemy contact. 2-156. The battlefield situation and/or platoon SOP dictate the number of elements used in a fire command. The standard platoon fire command includes up to six elements, transmitted in the following order: z Alert. z Weapon or ammunition (optional). z Target description. z Orientation. z Control (optional). z Execution. 2-157. Alert. The alert element addresses the tanks that are being directed to fire; it does not require the individual initiating the fire command to identify himself. ( Note. Wingman tanks or sections not designated to engage should sense the target effects and be prepared to engage targets as necessary.) 2-158. The platoon or company/troop SOP may specify code words to be used to standardize the alert element, as in the following example: z RED. Entire platoon prepare to fire. z ALPHA. Platoon leader and his wingman prepare to fire. z
BRAVO. PSG and his wingman prepare to fire.
2-159. Weapon or ammunition (optional). The weapon is not announced unless specific control measures are required. Ammunition is not announced unless a specific type is dictated by the situation. The TC selects ammunition based on the platoon SOP, the number and type of enemy targets, and the supply status of ammunition (how much of each type is on hand).
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2-160. Target description. This element briefly describes the target in terms of number, type, and activity (“THREE TANKS MOVING EAST TO WEST”). If the target is stationary, the activity may be omitted. 2-161. Orientation. Target location is described using one of two methods: z
Reference point or terrain feature. This method is used for most defensive engagements and can also be applied to offensive situations. If the platoon leader designates separate targets for each section, he assigns responsibility and clarifies target location in the orientation element. For example: “ALPHA—TWO TANKS—TRP 3126—BRAVO—BMPs AND TROOPS— ROAD JUNCTION.”
z
Direction of target. This method is used most often in the offense when no TRP or definitive terrain feature is near the target. Direction is indicated from the projected line of movement (LOM) of the platoon in the offense or from the center of sector (COS) in the defense (for example, “LEFT FRONT” or “RIGHT FLANK”). The clock option indicates direction starting with the LOM or COS at 12 o’clock (for example: “TWO O’CLOCK;” “NINE O’CLOCK”). The cardinal direction may also be used (for example: “NORTHWEST” or “SOUTHWEST”). When using the direction method, the platoon leader will announce a range to help his TCs locate the targets. Examples of this method: “RIGHT FRONT—ONE EIGHT HUNDRED” or “TEN O’CLOCK—TWO FOUR HUNDRED.”
2-162. Control (optional). The platoon leader can use the control element to provide the platoon with critical firing information in several areas, including the following: z Fire pattern. The platoon leader may specify which pattern (frontal, cross, or depth) he has selected based on his plan for fire distribution. As noted, if the control element is omitted, the platoon engages targets using frontal fire. Refer to the discussion of fire patterns earlier in this section. z
Firing technique. The platoon leader may designate which of the three firing techniques (simultaneous, alternating, or observed) he wants to employ. If no technique is specified, all tanks engage simultaneously. If the platoon leader wishes to designate a firing tank or section, he specifies which tanks will fire in the alert element of the fire command. Refer to the discussion of firing techniques earlier in this section.
z
Ammunition or weapon. The platoon leader may designate the amount or type of ammunition or weapons to be fired. For example, he might direct four bursts from the coax machine gun for every two main gun rounds fired. ( Note. This information may also be provided in the weapon or ammunition element of the fire command. Refer to the discussion of that element.)
2-163. Execution. The execution element indicates when firing will begin. Normally, this is simply the command “FIRE.” If simultaneous fire is desired or if the platoon’s fire is to be coordinated with other direct or indirect fires, the execution element “AT MY COMMAND” is given first. The resulting delay allows the coordination of all fires to be completed while the individual crews select their targets, issue their own fire commands, and prepare to engage. If for any reason a tank is not prepared to fire (for example, because it is conducting ammunition transfer or has experienced an equipment malfunction), the TC informs the platoon leader or PSG immediately. The TC estimates and reports the time required for the tank to become ready to fight. 2-164. As he prepares and issues the fire command, the platoon leader must remember that tanks have to occupy hull-down positions before firing. A pro-word (for example, “TOP HAT”) can be used in the execution element to signal this move.
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Note. Once engagement of the enemy begins, the platoon leader controls fires by issuing subsequent fire commands or individual elements of the fire command; this serves to focus and distribute the fires of individual tanks, a section, or the entire platoon. Figure 2-31 illustrates an example of a platoon fire command; note that the optional element specifying the weapon or ammunition has been omitted. Refer to Figures 2-25 through 2-30 on pages 2-29 through 2-34 for examples of how fire commands are used to control and distribute fires in a number of tactical situations. The engagement is terminated when all targets are destroyed or when the platoon leader announces “CEASE FIRE.”
Alert
“RED—
Target description
THREE TANKS—
Orientation
VICINITY TRP ZERO ZERO SIX—
Control (optional)
CROSS—
Execution
AT MY COMMAND—FIRE”
Figure 2-31. Example platoon fire command
FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL IN THE OFFENSE 2-165. While operating as part of a company team in the offense, a tank platoon conducts three types of missions: z Movement to contact. z Attack (hasty or deliberate). z Fire and movement. ( Note. This mission has been called “advance in contact” in some previous doctrinal and training publications, including FM 3-90.1 [FM 71-1].) 2-166. Although each of these missions is distinct and serves individual purposes, they all require coordination of platoon fires (both direct and indirect) and movement, which are the components of the tactical concept of maneuver. The major difference among the types of missions is the amount of information about the enemy and preparation time available. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion of offensive operations.
FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL IN THE DEFENSE 2-167. The tank platoon is the basic firing unit in defensive operations; therefore, effective control of the platoon’s fires is critical. Given the unknown number of enemy targets, each tank’s limited on-board ammunition, and the logistical burdens of resupply, the platoon must make every round count. It must be proficient in gunnery skills, have operational fire control systems that are ready for instant employment, and know how to effectively maintain control of its fires during the fight. Refer to Chapter 4 of this manual for a detailed discussion of defensive operations.
Defensive Fire Planning 2-168. When the platoon leader receives a defensive mission, he immediately analyzes it to determine how his platoon can best accomplish its assigned objectives. He begins a backward planning process based on the “defend not later than (NLT)” time specified in the company team OPORD. Establishing priorities of tasks and managing the available time are critical steps in the process; failure in either of these areas is likely to result in an uncoordinated effort that is doomed to failure. Reconnaissance of the Engagement Area
2-169. Based on his knowledge of enemy doctrine or suspected enemy’s goals and the terrain and weather, the platoon leader visualizes the enemy attacking through the engagement area. He then considers how the enemy is likely to be equipped and what capabilities his platoon has to defeat the enemy.
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2-170. If possible, the platoon leader, along with his TCs, physically inspects the ground where the company team commander has directed him to orient his platoon to engage the enemy. Looking back toward the BP, the platoon leader selects the platoon’s primary firing positions, alternate positions (50 to 100 meters from each tank’s primary position), and supplementary positions (to orient platoon fires into another engagement area or TRP). 2-171. As the platoon leader walks the engagement area, he identifies dead space based on how the enemy is expected to move through the area. He either adjusts the firing positions or plans indirect fires to cover the dead space. He verifies grids using the GPS. Firing Positions and Target Reference Points
2-172. The platoon leader then moves to the selected firing positions. He checks the positions for correct orientation toward the engagement area and determines whether suitable TRPs are available. TRPs must be visible through both daylight and thermal channels and should be visible to friendly elements only. If existing terrain or man-made objects are inadequate, a field-expedient TRP must be constructed. Note. Materials that can be used in constructing TRPs include target panels, heated with Class VIII heating pads, and caliber .50 or 7.62-mm ammunition cans filled with charcoal or a mixture of sand and diesel fuel.
2-173. The two main types of firing positions are defilade and keyhole. In defilade positions, tanks are vulnerable from the flanks and to enemy overwatch fire. Keyhole positions (also called window positions) provide greater protection by taking advantage of terrain features that create a “keyhole” around the position. Ideally, the platoon should employ a combination of defilade and keyhole positions whenever possible to take advantage of their respective advantages and negate their weaknesses. 2-174. Defilade positions. There are three types of defilade positions: z Turret-down. A turret-down position uses terrain to mask most of the tank, with only the highest parts of the vehicle (such as the GPS and CITV) exposed to the enemy. Targets cannot be engaged with the main gun from this position, but can use the turret top mounted machine guns. z Hull-down. A hull-down position exposes only as much of the tank as needed to engage targets with the main gun. z
Hide. The platoon leader may assign a hide position to the rear of the BP for each tank to occupy after the initial preparation of its firing positions. The hide position serves two purposes: A well-constructed, effectively camouflaged hide position may delay enemy acquisition of the platoon; a hide position located away from the prepared position may protect the platoon from the full effects of enemy artillery fires. (Locations of hide positions are terraindependent, but they should offer cover and concealment.)
2-175. Keyhole positions. Keyhole positions afford the firing tank a measure of protection from enemy overwatching fires (see Figure 2-33). They restrict observation, and thus limit vulnerability to only one segment of the platoon’s engagement; therefore, only those targets that can be seen (and engaged) by the tank can return fire on it. The platoon leader must select each keyhole position carefully so the ability to interlock fires with other tanks in the platoon is not degraded. Moving into or away from the opening to the position can vary the width of the field of fire. Weaknesses of keyhole positions are limited sectors of fire and excessive dead space. In built-up areas, dismounted infantry should be used to provide protection from infiltration.
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Figure 2-33. Keyhole firing positions Weapon Planning Range
2-176. The weapon planning range for a tank is the distance at which the platoon leader intends to begin engaging enemy targets. In determining this range, he must know the lethality of the kinetic energy rounds his crews will be firing versus the specific vulnerabilities of the enemy armor he expects to face. Lethality, and as a result the weapon planning range, is based on the two factors known as probability of hit (PH) and probability of kill (PK). While actual values of PH and PK are classified, it is obvious that PH decreases as range increases, as does PK for kinetic energy penetrators. This is because velocity decreases with range; penetration is largely dependent on velocity. 2-177. Evaluating and determining the planning range. With limited rounds available on board each vehicle, the platoon leader must weigh the tactical alternatives and try to make every round count. A key factor in determining the weapon planning range is METT-TC. The commander must consider the capabilities and limitations of friendly forces as well as those of enemy troops. In addition, the planning range for a tank cannot be separated from the number of rounds the platoon leader is prepared to expend. While it is possible to hit an enemy tank at 3,000 meters, the probability of doing so on the first round is low. Further, even when a hit is made, PK will be very low against turret frontal armor. 2-178. Taking into account these factors, the platoon leader will usually direct his TCs to engage targets from closer ranges, especially in frontal engagements. Considering only PK, frontal tank engagements should begin at less than 2,500 meters. Several factors combine to make frontal engagements of enemy tanks beyond 2,500 meters only marginally effective. If the tactical situation permits, the optimum weapon planning range against tanks in the frontal 60-degree arc is 1,500 meters. This can be extended with recognition of degraded PH, of degraded PK against turret frontal armor, and of reduced kills per on-tank load of ammunition. The planning range can also be reduced based on terrain, weather, and obscuration. As noted, engagement of enemy fighting vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer ranges based on
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the increased PK; however, due to their smaller size, the PH for these vehicles will normally be lower than that for tanks. Note. Frontal engagements of enemy fighting vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer ranges; the PK is higher due to the difference in protection levels.
2-179. Further consideration on engagement range will be based on enemy capabilities and type of equipment. Platoons may be faced with a full spectrum of equipment from converted civilian trucks, older equipment upgrade with new sensors and capabilities, to high level state of the art equipment. Now the platoon leader must not only understand how far his forces can see and shoot, but how far the enemy can see and shot. The tank platoon is no longer in an environment where it can see or fire farther than the enemy: it may even be faced with an enemy with superior equipment. 2-180. Long-range engagement considerations. When the decision is made to engage the enemy at longer ranges, several additional planning factors must be considered. In choosing long-range engagement, the platoon leader is almost certain to compromise his positions and loses the element of surprise. At the same time, however, the forward placement of a platoon may deceive the enemy as to the location of the main defensive position and cause the enemy to deploy sooner than he had planned. Longrange engagements require the use of sensing tanks and observed fire techniques; as a result, the platoon leader should always attempt to conduct them from an elevated firing position. He should task only his most proficient firing crews and most accurate tanks to execute the long-range gunnery mission. Note. Refer to FM 3-20.12 for an in-depth discussion of the training issues involved in preparing crews for long-range engagements.
Final Planning Considerations
2-181. As he conducts his troop-leading procedures, the platoon leader mentally rehearses the battle. After reconnaissance of the engagement area or sector, he gathers all the TCs (and gunners, if possible) where they can view the area. He ensures that everyone can identify the assigned TRPs, obstacles, avenues of approach, prominent terrain features, and dead space. 2-182. Using TRPs, terrain features, or man-made obstacles, the platoon leader ensures that each tank has a well-defined and well-understood sector of fire. An individual tank sector should be wide enough to allow some overlap with adjacent vehicles, but narrow enough to prevent overkill of targets. This reduces the scanning requirements for the gunner and the potential for overkill; it also ensures that the entire engagement area or platoon sector is covered by main gun fire. Based on the commander’s guidance, the platoon leader also establishes the trigger line for initiation of the direct-fire fight and takes other actions that are time- or space-dependent. 2-183. The platoon leader will decide whether to have all his tanks orient on the TRPs assigned by the company team commander or to have sections or individual tanks orient in slightly different areas (platoonlevel targets). For example, if the platoon leader is tasked to orient on TRP 006, he might decide on one of the following missions for his subordinates, based on the enemy and terrain: z All tanks orient on TRP 006. z Alpha section orients to the left of TRP 006 while Bravo section orients to the right. 2-184. When the platoon leader decides how to use his tanks to best execute the company team commander’s intent, he checks each firing position he has selected, identifying and confirming sectors of fire to ensure he has mutual support between tanks. The platoon leader must know where friendly infantry and combat support elements (such as air defense artillery [ADA]), if any, will be positioned. He must then plan machine gun fires for each tank to protect itself as well as other tanks in the platoon and adjacent friendly elements. He does this by assigning final protective fires (FPF), with the platoon using its coax machine guns to fire on dismounted enemy infantry, and by planning for additional indirect fire support.
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Preparing the Defense 2-185. When he completes his defensive fire planning, the platoon leader’s next step is to conduct preparation activities. As detailed earlier, he has already oriented his TCs on the engagement area, TRPs, and supplementary positions and has designated specific sectors of fire for each tank and each position. Initial Preparation Activities
2-186. The platoon leader directs and oversees a variety of activities designed to ensure the most effective positioning and preparation of his tanks on the ground. He must remember that if he fails to check an item, or fails to have another leader check it when necessary; the platoon may not be ready for combat. 2-187. Ammunition prestock. If Class V prestock is available, the platoon leader or PSG determines a location that is accessible to all platoon tanks. The platoon leader given the constraints of METT-TC will develop and modify the plan for how the platoon will conduct resupply. Some examples would be resupply by section (alpha then bravo), resupply one tank per section (odd number tanks then even number tanks), or resupply one tank at a time. The location should provide cover and concealment for the tanks while they are uploading the ammunition. The prestock site should be protected from indirect fires, either by completely digging in the position and preparing overhead cover or by improving existing terrain. A plan to recover or destroy the prestock is necessary to ensure it is not captured by the enemy. 2-188. Prepare-to-fire checks. When preparing for combat, the platoon leader ensures that crews have completed their prepare-to-fire checks. Boresighting is one of the most critical tasks in preparing the tank to kill the enemy. When the tactical situation permits, the platoon leader ensures that tanks are boresighted daily and after major temperature changes (typically, in the morning, at midday, and at dusk). If a building or some other man-made object is not available in the engagement area or the platoon is not carrying its own boresight panel, the platoon leader must prepare a field-expedient target for boresighting. ( Note. If preparation time is limited, the platoon leader may direct the PSG to check prepare-to-fire activities.) Sketch Cards
2-189. As each tank crew prepares its position, it completes a sketch card, a rough topographical sketch of the tank’s assigned sector showing its deliberate or hasty defensive fighting position. The sketch card aids the crew in target acquisition and enables the platoon leader to develop his platoon fire plan. The crew makes two copies, one to keep and one to send to the platoon leader. Sketch cards are prepared either traditionally (handwritten) or using the tank’s digital equipment (FBCB2). Refer to Chapter 4, pages 4-11 through 4-16 for additional information about sketch cards. Platoon Fire Plan Development
2-190. The platoon leader compiles the individual tank sketch cards (by either traditional or digital means), consolidates them, and develops the platoon fire plan. He then coordinates the fire plan with adjacent platoons and adjusts the individual tank positions as necessary. An effective platoon fire plan provides the entire platoon with the information necessary to distribute and control the fires of all available direct fire and indirect fire weapons, both organic and attached. An important point is that development of the platoon fire plan within the platoon, as at all levels of fire planning, is conducted from the top down. Refer to Chapter 4, pages 4-15 and 4 -16 for specific information about the platoon fire plan. Rehearsals
2-191. During rehearsals for defensive operations, the platoon leader ensures the platoon practices the platoon fire plan. It is absolutely critical that all crewmen understand the complete plan. Each TC must know what actions he is required to execute at each point in the mission. Each gunner must understand what his exact sector is and under what conditions engagement priorities will change. ( Note. The gunners on the platoon leader’s and PSG’s tanks should be the most experienced at their positions within the platoon, capable of executing the plan without further guidance from their TCs. This frees the platoon leader and PSG to fight the battle rather than spend too much time controlling their individual tanks.)
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Preparation Summary
2-192. The platoon leader must be resourceful and thorough in making sure all crews understand and can execute the plan under all conceivable conditions. This includes planning, preparing, and conducting rehearsals for supplementary and successive BPs that he has been directed to prepare. If time does not permit all of these steps, he must prioritize his preparation activities. 2-193. The end product of the platoon leader’s fire planning and preparation is not merely a thorough, accurate fire plan, although this is an indispensable component of the defense. To be successful in battle, he must complete these phases of the defensive operation with tank crews that understand in detail what they are supposed to do and a platoon that, as a package, is completely prepared to fight.
Executing the Defense 2-194. Once the platoon has completed fire planning and preparation activities, the platoon leader directs execution of the defense. The following discussion covers a number of key considerations in the distribution and control of fires during the execution phase. Observation
2-195. When occupying a prepared defensive position, an observer may be dismounted to acquire targets while the tanks are in turret-down or hide positions. When the platoon is alerted to targets in its sector, the tanks move to turret-down, optics-up positions before the observer remounts his tank. A platoon in a hasty defensive position will already be in a turret-down, optics-up position, and an observer will probably not be deployed. Initial Contact
2-196. When targets are identified, the platoon leader or PSG sends a contact or spot report (depending on the enemy situation and time available) to the company team commander. The platoon leader issues a fire command with “AT MY COMMAND” as a control element. At this time, TCs take the following actions: z Observe the target array and select the target(s) each tank must engage, as indicated by the fire pattern given in the platoon fire command. ( Note. If the fire command does not include a fire pattern, tanks use the pattern specified in the platoon SOP; if the SOP is not applicable, they use the frontal pattern). z Issue a fire command to the crew, using the ammunition element prescribed by SOP and target description indicated by the platoon fire command. z Ensure that the gunner acquires and ranges to his first target. Indirect Fire Support
2-197. While the individual crews select targets, determine ranges, and prepare to engage, the platoon leader calls for indirect fire (if this responsibility has been assigned to him) and asks for time of flight. He uses the time of flight to coordinate his fires so the indirect fire arrives at the same time, or just after, the direct fires of his platoon. If the indirect fire arrives too soon, the enemy will increase speed, change directions, or take other actions that may degrade the effects of the direct fires. The tank platoon leader has the responsibility to request indirect fire support using the FBCB2 system first. Engagement Procedures
2-198. On the command “FIRE,” each tank in the platoon moves to a hull-down firing position and begins to engage. (Note. The platoon leader may move the platoon to hull-down positions by announcing “TOP HAT, TOP HAT” before issuing the command to fire.) If a crew receives the command to fire before it has completed all of its preparations, it must complete the preparations and fire as soon as possible. 2-199. As the engagement proceeds, thorough planning and preparation helps the platoon to execute the defense with minimal instructions. Aggressive use of indirect fires slows and confuses the enemy. Each
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TC adjusts fire and switches targets in accordance with the platoon fire command or platoon SOP. The commander and/or platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the mission and other factors. As an example, defensive engagement priorities might be the following: z Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs). z Priority 2. Dangerous targets. z
Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas).
z
Priority 4. Air defense assets.
z
Priority 5. Engineer assets.
z
Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles).
2-200. How long each tank can safely remain in a hull-down position will depend on the enemy situation. Whenever possible, a tank should remain in position to kill enemy targets. Taking the time to move between a turret-down position and a hull-down position, however, increases the enemy’s probability of a hit because he will be closing on the tank’s position. If the enemy is within 2,000 meters, relatively numerous, closing rapidly, and the mission requires a defense (as opposed to delay), a defending tank will normally be more successful continuing to fire and not moving to his turret-down position. On the other hand, if the enemy is stationary and/or has tanks or ATGMs in overwatch, the crew should fire no more than two rounds before returning to a turret-down position. When the crew is not engaging enemy targets, the tank should return to a turret-down position and provide observation or assistance to other tank crews. Note. Similar considerations, problems, and criteria also apply to movement between primary and alternate positions.
Contingencies
2-201. After direct fire has been initiated, platoon fire commands will be used only to cover previously unanticipated contingencies. For example, the platoon leader might have one section engaging to the left side of the sector and the other to the right after anticipating an enemy company deployed on line across the platoon’s sector. If the entire enemy force arrives along the right side, use of a fire command gives the platoon leader the flexibility to adapt his distribution of fires rapidly and economically to the new situation. He issues the appropriate fire command to initiate the direct-fire fight. Ammunition Transfer
2-202. Important considerations as the engagement continues are each tank’s supply of ready ammunition and the related requirement for ammunition transfer. No tank should totally deplete its ready ammunition before initiating the transfer of rounds from its semi-ready storage area. The loader must maintain a running count of ready ammunition available and keep the TC informed of the tank’s ammunition status. In turn, the platoon leader and PSG must monitor the status of their wingmen. In addition, because all four tanks cannot transfer ammunition at the same time, the platoon leader must issue guidance on how and when each tank will conduct the transfer. 2-203. As ready ammunition is depleted, each crew must be ready to transfer rounds. Based on the platoon leader’s guidance, the tank backs into its hide position and completes ammunition transfer when the situation allows. The platoon leader needs to ensure that if prestock is available, he takes advantage of it during low points in the battle to keep his tanks as close as possible to full load of main gun ammunition. Movement Out of a Defensive Position
2-204. Changes in the mission or battlefield situation may require the platoon to move out of a BP, either to move to a successive position or to conduct another mission such as a delay. 2-205. Movement considerations. When the situation requires the platoon to move, the platoon leader and his TCs must make sure the movement does not expose the flank or rear of their tanks to enemy fire. If a concealed route out of the position is not available, the TC should mask the tank’s movement with terrain
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before turning around. To accomplish this, he turns over control of the main gun and coax machine gun to the gunner. He faces the rear and quickly guides the tank backward to a covered route by giving the driver short commands (for example, “LEFT FAST” or “HARD RIGHT”). The gunner acquires, engages, and adjusts fire on targets while the TC maintains command of the vehicle’s movement. Use of Covering Smoke
2-206. The tank smoke systems can be used to screen the move when the unit is in contact. The TC may use grenade launchers during initial movement, and then switch to the vehicle engine exhaust smoke system (VEESS) after the tank has built up speed and momentum. The gunner uses battlesight gunnery while the tank is obscured. He must use exhaust smoke judiciously; however, improper employment or careless movement techniques may cause the tank to become silhouetted against its own smoke. Note. If exhaust smoke prevents the crew from seeing where the tank is going and the tank is no longer screened by the first salvo of smoke grenades, the TC should use a second salvo of grenade-launched smoke.
CAUTION VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
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Chapter 3
Offensive Operations Offense is the decisive form of war. While tactical considerations may call for the platoon to execute defensive operations for a period of time, defeat of the enemy requires a shift to offensive operations. To ensure the success of the attack, the tank platoon leader must understand the fundamentals of offense and apply troop-leading procedures during the planning and preparation phases of the operation.
SECTION I - FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OFFENSE
PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSE 3-1. The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize an enemy force. Additionally, offensive operations are undertaken to secure key terrain, gain information, deprive the enemy of resources, deceive and divert the enemy, fix the enemy in position, disrupt his attack, and set the conditions for successful future operations.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE 3-2. FM 3-0 describes the common characteristics of all offensive operations: surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity. To maximize the value of these characteristics, tank platoons must apply the following considerations:
SURPRISE 3-3. Platoons achieve surprise by following OPSEC procedures and making the best possible use of vehicle speed, covered and concealed routes, vehicle optics, firepower, and stand-off capabilities during tactical movement.
CONCENTRATION 3-4. Platoons achieve concentration by massing the effects of their weapon systems without necessarily massing platoon vehicles at a single location. Modern navigation and position location/reporting systems allow the platoon leader to disperse his vehicles while retaining the ability to quickly mass the effects of the platoon’s weapon systems whenever necessary. In addition, these advanced systems allow him to maintain command, control, and OPSEC at all times. The platoon leader must remember that it is more important to move using covered and concealed routes to positions from which the platoon can mass fires and engage the enemy than it is to maintain precise formations and predetermined speeds.
TEMPO 3-5. Tempo, the rate of military action, can range from fast to slow. While a fast tempo is preferred, the platoon leader must remember that synchronization sets the stage for successful platoon operations. Leaders must understand the different rates of speed when comparing dismounted forces to mounted forces. To support the commander’s intent, he must ensure that his platoon’s movement is synchronized with the movement of other company or troop elements as well as with adjacent and supporting units. If the platoon is forced to slow down because of terrain or enemy resistance, the platoon leader reports this change so the commander can alter the tempo of company or troop movement to maintain synchronization.
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AUDACITY 3-6. At the platoon level, audacity is marked by violent execution of the mission and a willingness to seize the initiative. Knowledge of the commander’s intent two levels up allows the platoon leader to take advantage of battlefield opportunities whenever they present themselves, enhancing the effectiveness of the platoon’s support for the entire offensive operation.
FORMS OF OFFENSE 3-7. The four general forms of tactical offense described in FM 3-0 are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Characteristics include the following: z
Movement to contact is conducted to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact with the enemy force.
z
An attack is conducted to defeat, destroy, and neutralize the enemy, as well as seize and secure terrain. The attack can be deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning time available. An exploitation extends the destruction of the enemy by maintaining offensive pressure.
z z
A pursuit is conducted against a retreating enemy force and follows a successful attack to complete the destruction of the enemy force.
3-8. The company can execute movements to contact and either hasty or deliberate attacks on their own; the nature of these operations depends largely on the amount of time and enemy information available during the planning and preparation phases. Companies execute an exploitation or pursuit as part of a larger force.
ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON 3-9. The tank platoon is an integral part of company team or troop maneuver. The platoon conducts tactical movement, actions on contact, consolidation, and reorganization in support of higher operations. It can destroy, fix, or bypass an enemy as required by the commander’s intent, the tactical situation, and the rules of engagement.
WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTIONS 3-10. In conducting his planning and preparation for offensive operations, the platoon leader pays close attention to the considerations applicable for the war-fighting functions, which are outlined in the following discussion. The war-fighting functions, which help the platoon leader to logically organize his thoughts to cover the mission, are the following: z Movement and maneuver. z Fire support. z Intelligence. z Protection. z Sustainment. z Command and control. Note. Sections II and III of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation phases of the offense are organized using the war-fighting functions in the order listed above. Included in each section is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, focusing on intangible, Soldier-related factors.
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SECTION II - PLANNING 3-11. The planning phase begins when the platoon receives the higher WARNO or OPORD and ends when the platoon leader issues his own OPORD or FRAGO. During this phase, the platoon leader conducts troop-leading procedures as outlined in Chapter 2. In developing his OPORD or FRAGO, the platoon leader must take into account the considerations applicable for the operating systems, which are outlined in this section. 3-12. After he issues the WARNO, the platoon leader may initiate rehearsals of tactical movement, battle drills, or breaching actions. These generic rehearsals allow the platoon to begin preparing for the mission. Once the platoon leader completes his plan, the generic rehearsals are matched to the actual terrain and anticipated actions on enemy contact.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 3-13. The platoon leader develops the platoon maneuver plan so that it matches the commander’s intent and specific instructions and supports the company main effort. If working with light forces, the platoon leader must understand the abilities of the light forces, and be able to explain his capabilities to a light force commander. He determines the platoon’s route, movement technique, and formation based on his AO (including terrain factors), the company scheme of maneuver, and the likelihood of enemy contact. He pays particular attention to fields of observation and fire; these factors can help him to define potential enemy engagement areas. The platoon leader war-games anticipated actions on contact and execution of essential tasks. He also addresses actions on the objective and consolidation and reorganization.
DIRECT FIRES 3-14. The platoon leader identifies multiple attack-by-fire and support-by-fire positions along the direction of attack from which the platoon can engage known or suspected enemy positions. He designates TRPs and assigns sectors of fire, observation, and weapons orientation. He specifies platoon fire patterns (if different from those identified by SOP) and addresses restrictions on direct fire imposed by the ROE for the operation.
OBSTACLE TYPES 3-15. The platoon will encounter two types of obstacles, existing and reinforcing. The platoon leader can expect the enemy to employ both types in executing his defensive plan.
Existing Obstacles 3-16. Existing obstacles are those that are present on the battlefield but were not emplaced through military effort. They may be natural (such as streams, lakes, thick forests, and mountains) or cultural (towns or railroad embankments).
Reinforcing Obstacles 3-17. These are obstacles that are placed on the battlefield through military effort to slow, stop, turn, or canalize the enemy. Examples include minefields, wire, road craters, log cribs, and tank ditches.
BREACH PLANNING 3-18. The commander will designate each platoon to be part of the support force, the breach force, or the assault force. The support force usually leads the company during movement and identifies the obstacle. It then suppresses any enemy overwatching the obstacle. A tank platoon can conduct breach force operations only if it is equipped with the assets required to breach the type of obstacle encountered; such assets include demolitions, grappling hooks, rakes, mine plows, and mine rollers. The breach force is responsible for creating, proofing, and marking a lane through the obstacle and for securing the far side. It then
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suppresses remaining enemy forces as the assault force moves through the breach to continue the attack. (See Chapter 5 of this manual for more information on breaching operations.)
FIRE SUPPORT 3-19. Most fire support planning is conducted at company level and higher. The platoon leader reviews the plan to ensure that responsibilities for initiating, lifting, and shifting indirect fires are designated. As necessary, he identifies additional indirect fire targets on known or suspected enemy positions and submits recommendations to the company FIST. When working with light forces the platoon leader must ensure he has an understanding of the fire support capability inherent within the light force structure. The platoon leader evaluates and recommends the use of smoke to help conceal or obscure movement and suppress likely enemy positions while the platoon is moving through danger areas; in addition, he evaluates the need for illumination or smoke rounds for marking and/or to assist in navigation. See the discussion of navigation in Chapter 2 of this manual.
INTELLIGENCE ENEMY 3-20. Most analysis of the enemy situation and probable enemy COAs is done at the battalion and company level; however, it is the platoon leader’s responsibility to understand how the enemy’s disposition and possible COAs may affect the platoon’s area of operations and the accomplishment of its mission. The platoon leader uses what is developed from higher, but must be able to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) refining information received from higher. The platoon leader identifies and plots on his overlay all known and suspected enemy positions that affect his area of operations and identifies indirect and direct fire range fans of enemy weapon systems. The enemy overlay for FBCB2 should also be updated to include the latest enemy information. 3-21. The platoon leader then identifies terrain features or determines the standoff distance of friendly weapon systems that will negate the effects of enemy weapons if possible. Next, he determines the enemy’s most probable COAs. Using information from his own analysis and from higher headquarters, he identifies anticipated contact situations. This process includes estimating whether the enemy will defend in place, delay, or counterattack upon contact; when and where contact is most likely to be made; what type and size of enemy force the platoon will face; and what is then the enemy’s intent. Finally, the platoon leader must develop specific plans for the platoon’s actions against the enemy. Refer to the discussion of enemy analysis in the explanation of troop-leading procedures in Chapter 2 of this manual.
TERRAIN 3-22. The platoon leader conducts a map reconnaissance and uses the factors of OAKOC, as discussed in Chapter 2, to systematically analyze the terrain in his AO. He pays close attention to key terrain that could support positions offering unobstructed observation and fields of fire. These are danger areas that can be used by enemy or friendly forces when contact is made during the execution of the mission. This analysis is followed by a ground reconnaissance, conducted with the commander as far forward as possible and as extensively as time and security considerations permit. The ground reconnaissance covers the platoon’s movement routes to the LD, routes to the objective, and the objective itself. The platoon leader should check and record the time-distance factors to any SPs or to the LD.
PROTECTION 3-23. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power. Some of the tasks related to protection are: z Air and missile defense. (Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of planning considerations for air defense.) z Countermobility/survivability.
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z z
CBRN operations. Force protection/physical security.
Note. CBRN defensive operations are a critical consideration during offensive operations. These are discussed in detail in Section V of this chapter (as part of the execution of battle drills) and in Appendix E of this manual.
SUSTAINMENT 3-24. The platoon leader ensures that Soldiers are familiar with procedures for maintenance and medical treatment and evacuation; these as outlined in paragraph 4 of the platoon OPORD or in the unit SOP. See Chapter 7 of this manual for more details concerning sustainment operations.
COMMAND AND CONTROL 3-25. The platoon leader’s key function in this operating system is conducting troop-leading procedures. Immediately after the company order is issued or during the company rehearsal, he should coordinate unresolved issues with the other platoon leaders, the XO, and the company commander. The coordination should specify routes, intervals, movement speed, orientations, fire control measures, and signals between platoons. Coordination will be critical when working with light forces, or units that do not have a habitual working relationship.
THE HUMAN ASPECT 3-26. The “human aspect” is a crucial factor in the success of any mission. Soldiers are the key to combat power. They win battles; systems are only their tools. At the same time, Soldiers are human, with repetitive and predictable physical and emotional needs. A leader who is 100-percent “mission first,” with no considerations of this human dimension, will see his command degrade quickly. Success in combat often depends more on the human aspect than it does on numerical and technological superiority. 3-27. Leaders in the tank platoon must strive at all times to ensure that their Soldiers are disciplined, competent, and confident. They must also understand that Soldiers do not have an unlimited store of morale and endurance; the constant exposure to the dangers and hardships of combat can drain the fighting spirit. The guiding principle in handling the human aspect of operations is that leaders can tap their units’ full combat potential only when Soldiers are healthy physically, mentally, and spiritually. Every leader must take all necessary actions to enhance his troops’ health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness to fight.
SECTION III - PREPARATION 3-28. The preparation phase ends when the platoon crosses the LD and deploys for the attack. The platoon leader takes into account the following war-fighting functions.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 3-29. Following the last company rehearsal, the platoon should conduct a final rehearsal of its own to incorporate any adjustments to the company scheme of maneuver. The platoon rehearsal should follow the procedures outlined in Chapter 2 of this manual.
STANDARDIZED DRILLS 3-30. If possible the platoon should develop standardized drills for the following that will allow the platoon to operate in a near automatic mode. It should cover the following subjects: z Movement from current positions.
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z z z z z z z z z z
Routes. Platoon and company formations and movement techniques. Vehicle positions within the platoon formation. Weapons orientation and fire control. Triggers. Actions on contact. Actions on the objective (consolidation and reorganization.) Reporting procedures. Signals. Breaching drills.
3-31. Actions at obstacles should be rehearsed during the preparation phase. Breaching equipment should be checked durin PCCs and PCIs.
FIRE SUPPORT 3-32. During the rehearsal, the platoon leader should address responsibility for targets in the platoon AO. He should cover any scheduled indirect fires and the effects of smoke on the battlefield. In addition, he should discuss the direct-fire plan, with emphasis on platoon responsibilities, known and suspected enemy locations, friendly unit locations, and applicable ROE.
INTELLIGENCE 3-33. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader will receive updated SPOTREPs listing known and suspected enemy locations as well as the latest friendly actions. He should plot the updated enemy and friendly locations on his overlay and on the enemy overlay (digital systems); based on his terrain reconnaissance, he adjusts the maneuver plan accordingly. It is critical that the platoon has a standard method of either the PSG or platoon leader relaying this information to the wing tanks to maintain situational understanding for all crews.
PROTECTION 3-34. Air defense preparations during this phase should include a rehearsal of the react to air attack drill, which is outlined in Section V of this chapter.
SUSTAINMENT 3-35. During the preparation phase, tank crews conduct resupply operations to replenish their combat loads. They also perform preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on their vehicles and equipment. 3-36. Rehearsals should cover aspects of the logistical plan that will support the upcoming operation, including emergency resupply and personnel and vehicle evacuation procedures. For more information on sustainment, refer to Chapter 7 of this manual.
COMMAND AND CONTROL 3-37. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader continues with his troop-leading procedures and conducts rehearsals and inspections to ensure the platoon is ready for the upcoming operation. Near the end of the phase, the platoon leader conducts a PCI of his Soldiers and equipment. The Soldier inspection includes checking each crewman’s personal knowledge of the operation as well as the readiness of his equipment. All Soldiers must understand the company and platoon schemes of maneuver. The equipment inspection consists of checking each tank crew’s ability to move, shoot, and communicate. The inspection should be as thorough as time permits; for a detailed PCI checklist, refer to ST 3-20.153. Rehearsals and inspections are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this manual.
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THE HUMAN ASPECT 3-38. Activities aimed at enhancing each Soldier’s health, morale, welfare, and readiness to fight continue during the preparation phase. Additional discussion of the human dimension of operations is in Section II of this chapter.
SECTION IV - EXECUTION—TACTICAL MOVEMENT 3-39. The company OPORD may specify company and platoon formations and techniques of movement. This allows the commander to position his elements where they will optimize the company’s AO and facilitate execution of his scheme of maneuver. The platoon leader must recommend a different formation or technique of movement if a change will allow the platoon to more effectively contribute to the accomplishment of the company mission and protection of the force. If no formation or technique of movement is given in the order, the platoon leader selects the one that will make the most efficient use of his AO and that will best support the company scheme of maneuver.
FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL IN THE OFFENSE 3-40. While operating as part of a company team in the offense, a tank platoon conducts three types of missions: z Movement to contact. z Attack (hasty or deliberate). z Fire and movement. Note. The fire and movement mission has been called advance in contact in some previous doctrinal and training publications, including FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).
3-41. Although each of these missions is distinct and serves individual purposes, they all require coordination of platoon fires (both direct and indirect) and movement, which are the components of the tactical concept of maneuver. The major difference among the types of missions is the amount of information about the enemy and preparation time available.
OFFENSIVE FIRE PLANNING 3-42. It is critical to have a fire plan in the offense to reduce the chances of fratricide. It is not possible, however, to develop fire plans in the offense in the same detail as in a defensive operation. As a result, the platoon leader must take advantage of the available resources that make it easier for him to effectively distribute the platoon’s firepower, such as advance planning, reconnaissance (including leader’s and map reconnaissance), TRPs, platoon targets, and platoon SOPs. 3-43. Before beginning movement, the platoon leader plans how the platoon will engage known or suspected enemy locations. He identifies and assigns sufficient TRPs and platoon targets to allow him to adjust fields of fire quickly. In doing this, he considers tactical aspects of the operation, including— z The mission to be accomplished. z Enemy strengths and weaknesses. z Likely or known enemy locations. ( Note. The platoon leader will establish additional platoon targets as the platoon moves during the operation.) z Indirect fire support and smoke employment (preplanned targets). z Friendly forces. z Control measures, including phase lines, checkpoints, the LOA, and TRPs. z The route. z The movement technique. z Section and individual tank sectors of responsibility. z The operational status of platoon equipment.
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3-44. An important part of offensive fire planning is the assignment of overlapping sectors of fire for each element in the platoon (see Figure 3-1). These sectors, also called sectors of responsibility, are covered in the platoon SOP and are based on the formation and movement technique the platoon will use. During the operation, as the situation requires, the platoon leader then adjusts the sectors he assigned initially. Factors that may necessitate a change in sectors of fire include the following: z Changes in terrain or visibility. z Contact with previously unknown enemy positions. z Use of fires or smoke to conceal or cover the platoon’s movement. z The scheme of maneuver of adjacent units.
Figure 3-1. Example sectors of fire in a moving engagement (platoon moving in wedge formation)
ENGAGING TARGETS 3-45. Once movement begins but before contact is made, the platoon leader maneuvers the unit to take full advantage of his tanks, whose capabilities are maximized in the offense. Crews should stay aware of visible TRPs and control points as they come into view. The platoon leader uses these to adjust sectors of responsibility. He may also use the clock or cardinal direction method to designate sectors of responsibility. As noted, he modifies assigned sectors of fire as necessary while the platoon is moving. 3-46. Each TC identifies the tank’s sector of fire for his gunner and then monitors the gunner’s target search to make sure it covers the entire sector and does not stray beyond it. In addition, some offensive situations may require the platoon to operate in an area where the line of sight between tanks in the sections is interrupted by terrain or vegetation. The platoon leader and TCs must ensure that each crew conducts a 360-degree search for air and ground targets and maintains effective communications with the other tanks.
Moving Engagements 3-47. Most moving engagements begin with one tank in the platoon acquiring surprise targets. These targets should be engaged immediately. The TC who makes first contact gives a contact report after he has engaged a target. The other tanks may orient their gun tubes in the direction the tank in contact is firing, but continue to maintain 360-degree security. The tanks do not change direction unless the platoon leader orders an action drill; they scan and return fire on additional targets. 3-48. When targets are identified, the platoon leader or PSG sends a contact or spot report (depending on the enemy situation and the amount of time available) to the company team commander. The commander
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and/or platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the mission and other factors. As an example, offensive engagement priorities might be the following: z
Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs).
z
Priority 2. Dangerous targets.
z
Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas).
z
Priority 4. Air defense assets.
z
Priority 5. Engineer assets.
z
Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles).
3-49. After initial contact, the platoon leader controls the platoon fires by issuing fire commands and additional instructions as appropriate. He keeps the company team commander informed while developing the situation.
Developing the Situation 3-50. One platoon will normally attack while one or more platoons provide overwatch. The platoon leader should adjust his tanks’ sectors based on the current or last known enemy positions. Even while attacking, the platoon must maintain a 360-degree watch for attacking aircraft and targets that may appear between its position and that of the overwatching element. If overwatching elements are not available, the platoon may be directed to conduct bounding overwatch.
USE OF TERRAIN FOR COVER AND CONCEALMENT 3-51. While moving, the platoon uses terrain to provide cover and concealment, employing the following rules: z Do not move forward from an overwatch position or BP. Back away from your position and go around on the low ground. z Stay on low ground as much as possible. Moving on top of ridgelines and over hilltops will silhouette (skyline) platoon vehicles. z Scan the ground for disturbed earth, out-of-place features, and surface-laid mines. These are indicators of an obstacle or minefield. z Select the formation and movement technique that will maximize the platoon’s AO while minimizing gaps and dead space. z If your move is being covered by an overwatch element, remember that the overwatch element cannot cover all of the platoon’s gaps and dead space. z If the move is being overwatched, also keep in mind that the distance of each move (or bound) must not exceed the direct-fire range of the overwatch element. z Always plan actions at danger areas. If necessary, direct the TC or loader to dismount and either observe around blind spots or check the trafficability of a route or defile before the tank moves over or through these locations.
TECHNIQUES OF MOVEMENT 3-52. The commander or platoon leader selects a technique of movement based on several battlefield factors: z The likelihood of enemy contact. z The availability of another element to provide overwatch for the moving element. z The terrain over which the moving element will pass. 3-53. In open terrain, such as deserts, one company will normally overwatch the movement of another company. In close terrain, such as rolling hills or countryside, platoons will normally overwatch other platoons. In restricted terrain, such as mountains, forests, or urban areas, a tank section will rely on another tank section or dismounted infantry to overwatch movement.
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3-54. The tank platoon must be able to employ any of the following techniques of movement: z
Traveling. Characterized by continuous movement of all elements, traveling is best suited to situations in which enemy contact is unlikely and speed is important.
z
Traveling overwatch. Traveling overwatch is an extended form of traveling that provides additional security when contact is possible but speed is desirable. The lead element moves continuously. The trail element moves at various speeds and may halt periodically to overwatch the movement of the lead element. The trail element maintains dispersion based on its ability to provide immediate suppressive fires in support of the lead element. The intent is to maintain depth, provide flexibility, and sustain movement in case the lead element is engaged.
z
Bounding overwatch. Bounding overwatch is used when contact is expected. It is the most secure, but slowest, movement technique. Bounding may be no greater than one-half the weapon’s planning range. This allows the overwatch section to have effective fires forward of the bounding section. There are two methods of bounding: Alternate bounds. Covered by the rear element, the lead element moves forward, halts, and assumes overwatch positions. The rear element advances past the lead element and takes up overwatch positions. The initial lead element then advances past the initial rear element and takes up overwatch positions. Only one element moves at a time. This method is usually more rapid than successive bounds. (Refer to Figure 3-2.)
Figure 3-2. Movement by alternate bounds Successive bounds. In this method, the lead element, covered by the rear element, advances and takes up an overwatch position. The rear element advances to an overwatch position abreast of the lead element and halts. The lead element then moves to the next position, and so on. Only one element moves at a time, and the rear element avoids advancing beyond the lead element. This method is easier to control and more secure than the alternate bounding method, but it is slower. (Refer to Figure 3-3.)
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Figure 3-3. Movement by successive bounds
FORMATIONS 3-55. Formations are used to establish tank positions and sectors of responsibility during tactical operations. They facilitate control; alleviate confusion, and increase protection, speed, and the effectiveness of fires. 3-56. Formations are not intended to be rigid, with vehicles remaining a specific distance apart at every moment. The position of each tank in the formation depends on the terrain and the ability of the wingman driver to maintain situational understanding in relation to the lead tank. At the same time, individual tanks should always occupy the same relative position within a formation. This will ensure that the members of each crew know who is beside them, understand when and where to move, and are aware of when and where they will be expected to observe and direct fires. Weapons orientation for all tanks should be adjusted to ensure optimum security based on the position of the platoon in the company formation. 3-57. The following paragraphs and illustrations describe the six basic movement formations the platoon will use. Note. In these examples, vehicle numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the field, the location and sequence of vehicles in the formation will be prescribed in the platoon SOP and/or the OPORD. The tactical situation will also influence vehicle location.
COLUMN 3-58. The column formation provides excellent control and fire to the flanks, but permits less fire to the front (see Figure 3-4). It is used when speed is critical, when the platoon is moving through restricted terrain on a specific route, and/or when enemy contact is not likely.
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Figure 3-4. Column formation
STAGGERED COLUMN 3-59. The staggered column formation is a modified column formation with one section leading and one section trailing to provide overwatch (see Figure 3-5). The staggered column permits good fire to the front and flanks. It is used when speed is critical, when there is a limited area for lateral dispersion, and/or when enemy contact is possible.
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Figure 3-5. Staggered column formation
WEDGE 3-60. The wedge formation permits excellent firepower to the front and good firepower to the flanks (see Figure 3-6). It is employed when the platoon is provided with overwatch by another element and is moving in open or rolling terrain. Depending on the platoon location within the company formation, the platoon leader and PSG (with wingmen) can switch sides of the formation. When the platoon leader’s tank is slightly forward, one flank has more firepower.
Figure 3-6. Wedge formation
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ECHELON 3-61. The echelon formation permits excellent firepower to the front and to one flank (see Figure 3-7). It is used to screen an exposed flank of the platoon or of a larger moving force.
Figure 3-7. Echelon formation
VEE 3-62. The vee formation provides excellent protection and control, but limits fires to the front (see Figure 3-8). This formation is used when terrain restricts movement or when overwatch within the platoon is required.
Figure 3-8. Vee formation
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LINE 3-63. The line formation provides maximum firepower forward (see Figure 3-9). It is used when the platoon crosses danger areas and is provided with overwatch by another element or when the platoon assaults enemy positions.
Figure 3-9. Line formation
COIL AND HERRINGBONE 3-64. These formations are employed when the platoon is stationary and 360-degree security is essential.
Coil 3-65. When it is operating independently, the platoon uses the coil formation to establish a perimeter defense during extended halts or lulls in combat (see Figure 3-10). The lead vehicle will halt his vehicle in the direction of travel (12 o’clock) while the other vehicles position themselves to form a circular formation covering all suspected enemy avenues of approach.
Figure 3-10. Coil formation
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Herringbone 3-66. The herringbone formation is used when the platoon must assume a hasty defense with 360-degree security while remaining postured to resume movement in the direction of travel (see Figure 3-11). It is normally employed during scheduled or unscheduled halts in a road march. If terrain permits, vehicles should move off the route and stop at a 45-degree angle, allowing passage of vehicles through the center of the formation.
Figure 3-11. Herringbone formation
OVERWATCH 3-67. Overwatch is the tactical mission in which an element observes and provides direct fire support for a friendly moving element. Situational understanding is a crucial factor in all overwatch missions, whose objective is to prevent the enemy from surprising and engaging the moving unit. 3-68. The overwatch force must maintain communications with the moving force and provide early warning of enemy elements that could affect the moving force. It also scans gaps and dead space within the moving element’s formations. If the overwatch is unable to scan dead space and engage the enemy, it must alert the moving element of the lapse in coverage. The overwatch must also be able to support the moving force with immediate direct and indirect fires. 3-69. The overwatch element can be either stationary or on the move. Figure 3-12 suggests what to look for and where to look during an overwatch mission. Note. While the main function of overwatch is to provide early warning and/or timely supporting fires for a moving element, overwatch crews must also maintain 360-degree observation and security for themselves.
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Figure 3-12. Overwatch locations and techniques
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STATIONARY OVERWATCH 3-70. The section or platoon occupies hull-down firing positions that provide effective cover and concealment, unobstructed observation, and clear fields of fire. ( Note. Firing positions are discussed in Chapter 4 of this manual.) 3-71. The section or platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. Individual crews aggressively scan their sectors using applicable search techniques to identify enemy positions. They employ all available sights, including the thermal channel (using various polarities) and daylight channel of the gunner’s primary sight, binoculars, PVS-7s, and CITV. ( Note. See FM 3-20.12 for a discussion of search techniques.) 3-72. The overwatch element scans the area of operations of the moving element, paying close attention to gaps and dead space. If contact is made, the overwatch element initiates a high volume of direct and indirect suppressive fires; it moves as necessary between primary and alternate positions to avoid being decisively engaged.
OVERWATCH ON THE MOVE 3-73. The trail section or platoon maintains a designated location in the formation. It continuously scans the lead element’s area of operations, closely monitoring gaps and dead space. The trail element maintains an interval dictated by the capabilities of its weapon systems and the effects of terrain. As needed, it can execute a short halt on key terrain to provide more effective overwatch.
SECTION V - EXECUTION—ACTIONS ON CONTACT 3-74. In both offensive and defensive operations, contact occurs when any member of the platoon observes enemy personnel or vehicles, observes or receives direct or indirect fire, or encounters any situation that requires an active or passive response to the enemy. This includes reports of enemy contact through the chain of command or from an adjacent friendly element. The platoon initiates actions on contact when it recognizes one of the defined contact situations or on order from higher headquarters. 3-75. As discussed in Section II of this chapter, the platoon leader should use the planning process to anticipate the actions on contact that the platoon may be required to execute based on the enemy situation. The platoon can then rehearse these potential actions during the preparation phase of the operation. 3-76. The commander’s OPORD will assist the platoon leader in two ways. The most important thing the platoon leader must understand is the commander’s intent. Understanding the commander’s intent allows the platoon leader to execute without constant supervision and also in the event that the enemy situation changes during the mission. The commander’s scheme of maneuver will direct the platoon leader in planning how to kill the templated or anticipated enemy force. The scheme of maneuver will define the platoon’s role in maneuver and direct fire as part of the company or task force plan. The commander’s coordinating instructions should specify for the platoon leader the actions on contact that, based on the size and activity of the anticipated enemy force, are related to the maneuver plan. These specific instructions may include engagement criteria, bypass criteria, displacement criteria, and the COAs the commander expects to employ. By learning and planning for these details in advance, the platoon leader will be able to develop contact situations rapidly and determine the most effective COA.
THE FOUR STEPS OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT 3-77. The following four steps allow the platoon leader to execute actions on contact using a logical, wellorganized decision-making process: z Deploy and report. z Evaluate and develop the situation. z Choose a COA. z Execute the selected COA.
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3-78. The four-step process is not a rigid, lockstep response to the enemy contact. Rather, the goal is to provide an orderly framework that enables the platoon to survive the initial contact, and then apply sound decision-making and timely actions to complete the operation. In simplest terms, the platoon must react instinctively and instantly to the contact, and the platoon leader must decide, with equal dispatch, whether to execute a preplanned battle drill or COA or to recommend and execute an alternate drill or action. 3-79. At times, the platoon leader, and the platoon, will have to execute several of the steps simultaneously. This makes thorough preparation an absolute requirement in contact situations. To ensure the platoon functions as a team, reacting correctly and yet instinctively, the platoon leader must establish SOPs and conduct comprehensive training and rehearsals covering each step.
DEPLOY AND R EPORT 3-80. The platoon leader deploys the platoon when he recognizes one of the general categories of initial contact or receives a report of enemy contact. No matter how thoroughly the platoon leader prepares for an operation, direct contact with the enemy is still a possibility, usually as a result of chance contact. In all types of operations, contact occurs when an individual soldier, squad, or section of the platoon encounters any situation that requires an active or passive response to the threat. These situations may entail one or more of the following eight forms of contact : z Visual contact (friendly elements may or may not be observed by the enemy). z Physical contact (direct fire) with an enemy force. z Indirect fire contact. z Contact with obstacles of enemy or unknown origin. z Contact with enemy or unknown aircraft. z Situations involving CBRN conditions. z Situations involving electronic warfare tactics (such as jamming, interference, and imitative deception). z Situations involving nonhostile elements (such as civilians). 3-81. When the platoon makes contact with the enemy, it responds according to the circumstances of the situation. This covers a range of actions that correspond to the nature of the contact. Most critically, if the contact entails enemy antitank fire, the platoon in contact returns fire immediately. Tanks returning fire alert the rest of the platoon with a contact report (see ST 3-20.153 for report formats). 3-82. The platoon leader has several choices in deploying the platoon. In many cases, he will initiate one of the seven battle drills. This is usually a contact or action drill, with the platoon attempting to acquire and engage the enemy. ( Note. Refer to the discussion and illustrations of the battle drills in this section of this chapter.) The platoon leader can also order his tanks to immediately seek the best available covered and concealed position. The position should afford unobstructed observation and fields of fire and allow the platoon to maintain flank security. Tank crews also seek cover and concealment in the absence of a deployment order from the platoon leader. 3-83. This step concludes with the platoon leader or PSG sending a contact report to the commander, followed as soon as possible by a SPOTREP.
EVALUATE AND DEVELOP THE SITUATION 3-84. While the platoon deploys by executing a battle drill or occupying a covered and concealed position, the platoon leader must begin to evaluate and develop the situation. His primary focus is on determining and/or confirming the size (inferior or superior), composition (available weapon systems), activity, and orientation of the enemy force. He analyzes how obstacles and terrain in the area of operations will affect enemy and friendly capabilities and possible COAs. The platoon leader uses SPOTREPs from the TCs, other platoon leaders, the company commander, and the XO to make his evaluation. ( Note. Because the tank platoon usually operates as part of a company team or cavalry troop, additional infantry, scout, or tank platoons will usually be available to assist the commander and platoon leader in developing and confirming the enemy situation.)
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3-85. There are no hard and fast rules for determining the superiority or inferiority of an enemy; the result is dependent on the situation. An inferior force is defined as an enemy element that the platoon can destroy while remaining postured to conduct further operations. A superior force is one that can be destroyed only through a combined effort of company- or combined arms battalion-level combat and CS assets. 3-86. The platoon leader bases his evaluation on the enemy’s capabilities, especially the number of lethal weapon systems the enemy force is known to have, and on the enemy’s current activity. Lethality varies; the enemy may employ rapid-fire antitank weaponry, slow-firing wire-guided systems, or dismounted Soldiers with automatic weapons. Likewise, enemy activity can range from an entrenched force using prepared fighting positions to a unit conducting refueling operations with little security. 3-87. After making contact and evaluating the situation, the platoon leader may discover that he does not have enough information to determine the superiority or inferiority of the enemy force. To make this determination, he can further develop the situation using a combination of techniques, including maneuver (fire and movement), reconnaissance by direct and/or indirect fire, and dismounted surveillance. In such a situation, however, the platoon leader must exercise caution, ensuring that his actions support the commander’s intent. Mission accomplishment and the survivability of the platoon are crucial considerations. Once he develops the situation sufficiently, the platoon leader sends an updated SPOTREP to the commander.
CHOOSE A COURSE OF ACTION 3-88. Once the platoon leader develops the situation and determines that he has enough information to make a decision, he selects a COA that both meets the requirements of the commander’s intent and is within the platoon’s capabilities. He has several options in determining the COA: z Direct the platoon to execute the original plan. The platoon leader selects the COA specified by the company commander in the OPORD. z Based on the situation, issue FRAGOs to refine the plan, ensuring it supports the commander’s intent. z Report the situation and recommend an alternative COA based on known information in response to an unforeseen enemy or battlefield situation. z Direct the platoon to execute tactical movement (employing bounding overwatch and support by fire within the platoon) and reconnaissance by fire to further develop the situation and gain the information the platoon leader needs to clarify a vague battlefield picture.
Considerations in Choosing a COA 3-89. Because he will have little time for analysis, the platoon leader develops a clear understanding of the available COAs during the planning phase. The platoon leader can then evaluate various responses to possible enemy actions during the planning phase, in the company rehearsal, and in information war gaming and rehearsals with the platoon. 3-90. If a predetermined COA is not the best option, the platoon leader analyzes the commander’s intent. In most cases, the commander identifies the criteria for anticipated actions on contact in terms of the enemy’s capabilities (that is, whether the enemy is a superior or inferior force). The commander specifies criteria for destroying, fixing, and bypassing the enemy, as well as the applicable disengagement criteria. Based on the commander’s intent and these criteria, the platoon may develop a new COA. 3-91. Refinements to the original plan or development of a new COA may change the scheme of maneuver. In most situations, the intent of maneuver is to gain positions of advantage over the enemy, forcing him to fight in two directions. One element moves to the position of advantage while another element overwatches and supports. 3-92. If necessary, the platoon leader should issue a revised set of graphic control measures as part of the FRAGO. Examples include waypoints to assist in navigation along desired routes to a position of advantage and TRPs to help the platoon orient weapons and fires.
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Use of Platoon Tasks as COAs 3-93. During execution of actions on contact, the platoon collective tasks described in Section VI of this chapter are available as COAs. These include— z Destroy an inferior force. z Attack by fire. z Overwatch/support by fire. z Assault. z Bypass. z Reconnaissance by fire. z Hasty defense. z Breach. 3-94. If the commander’s plan has already addressed the situation adequately, the platoon leader directs the platoon to execute the specified task or COA. If the situation dictates adjustments to the plan, he can recommend an alternative COA to the commander.
EXECUTE THE SELECTED COURSE OF ACTION 3-95. If contact is anticipated and falls within the commander’s original scheme of maneuver, the platoon executes as directed in the OPORD. If the situation dictates a change to the scheme of maneuver specified in the original plan, however, the platoon leader must recommend a new COA to the commander. If the commander concurs, he directs the platoon to execute the new COA. The platoon leader cross-talks with other platoon leaders, as necessary, to obtain support in accordance with the commander’s intent. 3-96. More information will become available as the platoon executes the COA. The platoon leader and/or PSG keep the company commander abreast of the situation with SPOTREPs and SITREPs; accuracy of these reports is critical because the task force commander and S2 use them to confirm or deny the situational template. 3-97. Key information the commander needs includes the number, type, and location of enemy elements the platoon has observed, engaged, destroyed, or bypassed. Additionally, the platoon leader must inform the commander of the platoon’s current location (or that he is moving to or set at a particular location). Finally, he must inform the commander of any changes in the platoon’s combat power or logistical status. 3-98. Based on details of the enemy situation, the platoon leader may have to alter his COA during execution. For example, as the platoon maneuvers to destroy what appears to be a lone enemy tank, it discovers six more tanks in prepared fighting positions; in this situation, the platoon leader would inform the commander and recommend an alternate COA, such as an attack by fire against the enemy tank company. (Figures 3-14A through 3-14D on pages 3-23 and 3-24 illustrate a similar situation in which changes to the COA become necessary.) 3-99. The platoon continues to execute the selected or refined COA until it accomplishes the original mission, receives a FRAGO from the commander changing the mission or COA, or is ordered to execute consolidation and reorganization on the objective.
EXAMPLES OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT 3-100. The following examples illustrate actions on contact for two potential situations. The illustrations are organized to show the four-step process for executing actions on contact.
ACTIONS ON CONTACT WITH AN ANTICIPATED INFERIOR FORCE 3-101. Figures 3-13A and 3-13B illustrate actions on contact when the platoon encounters an inferior enemy force. In this case, the commander and platoon leader anticipated contact with such a force and planned for actions on contact by including possible COAs in their OPORDs and/or rehearsals.
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Figure 3-13A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys using an action drill, and reports
Figure 3-13B. Platoon develops the situation
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ACTIONS ON CONTACT WITH AN UNANTICIPATED SUPERIOR FORCE 3-102. Figures 3-14A through 3-14D illustrate actions on contact when the platoon unexpectedly encounters a superior enemy force.
Figure 3-14A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys, and reports
Figure 3-14B. Platoon executes a battle drill; platoon leader evaluates the situation as the drill is executed
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Figure 3-14C. Platoon develops the situation and identifies a superior enemy force
Figure 3-14D. Platoon leader chooses and recommends an alternate COA; platoon executes the new COA
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BATTLE DRILLS 3-103. When the tank platoon makes contact with the enemy, the platoon leader usually initiates a battle drill. Drills can be initiated following reports or observation of enemy activity or ordered upon receipt of enemy fires. 3-104. Battle drills provide virtually automatic responses to situations in which the immediate, violent execution of an action is vital to the platoon’s safety or its success in combat. Drills allow the platoon leader to protect the platoon from the effects of enemy fires, quickly mass the platoon’s combat power and fires, or move the platoon to a position of advantage over the enemy. 3-105. Drills are standardized collective actions, executed by each tank crew with minimal instruction and without application of a deliberate thought process. They can be carried out under almost any type of battlefield conditions and from any formation or technique of movement, although execution can be affected by the factors of METT-TC. 3-106. The platoon can expect to execute any of the following standard battle drills: z Change of formation drill. z Contact drill. z Action drill. React to indirect fire drill. z z React to air attack drill. z React to a nuclear attack drill. z React to a chemical/biological attack drill. 3-107. Commanders and leaders at all levels must be ready to augment or adjust these seven basic drills based on the enemy, terrain, and ROE. In addition, they must ensure their platoons rehearse battle drills until they are able to execute the drills perfectly no matter what command and control problems arise. Note. In the figures that accompany the following discussion of the seven battle drills, vehicle numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the field, the location and sequence of vehicles during the drill will be prescribed in the platoon SOP, OPORD, or tactical situation.
CHANGE OF FORMATION DRILL 3-108. This drill is executed to accomplish a rapid change of formation in response to a change in terrain or enemy situation. The platoon leader must ensure that each TC knows the new formation and the relative position of each tank in the new formation. He uses visual signals and/or the radio to initiate the drill. Figure 3-15 illustrates the movement of individual tanks during a change of formation from column to wedge to line.
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Figure 3-15. Change of formation drill
CONTACT DRILL 3-109. The contact drill enables the platoon to orient weapon systems and engage an enemy without changing its direction or speed of movement along the axis of advance. This drill is used when contact is made with small arms fire, non-armor-defeating weapons, or when the platoon sights the enemy without being engaged and does not want to stop or slow its movement. The platoon leader initiates the contact drill using visual signals and/or the radio. Over the radio, he uses the contact report format and adds the execution element “FIRE” as a platoon fire command. 3-110. Figure 3-16 illustrates a contact drill from a wedge formation. Note the main gun orientation for wingman Tank 2. If a tank’s weapon systems are masked by another tank, the masked tank maintains weapons orientation and flank security as prescribed in the OPORD; this helps to prevent fratricide.
Figure 3-16. Contact drill
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ACTION DRILL 3-111. The action drill permits the entire platoon to change direction rapidly in response to terrain conditions, obstacles, FRAGOs from the commander, or enemy contact. The platoon leader uses visual signals or the radio to order the action drill, which can be initiated with or without enemy contact.
Action Drill Without Enemy Contact 3-112. The platoon leader can execute an action drill to avoid a danger area or obstacle or to respond to FRAGOs from the commander. When the platoon leader initiates the action drill, tanks come on line and continue to move in the prescribed direction unless the platoon leader directs a change of formation. Figures 3-17A through 3-17C illustrate tanks’ relative positions during various action drills without contact.
Figure 3-17A. Action drill without enemy contact
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Figure 3-17B. Action drill without enemy contact (continued)
Figure 3-17C. Action drill without enemy contact (continued)
Action Drill With Enemy Contact 3-113. Following a contact report alerting the platoon that enemy contact involves antitank weapon systems, the platoon leader can direct an action drill to orient his platoon’s frontal armor toward the antitank fire while moving to cover and concealment. If the platoon cannot reach a covered and concealed position or achieve weapon standoff, the platoon leader directs the platoon to assault the enemy. Figures 318A through 3-18D illustrate examples of action drills in reaction to enemy contact.
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Figure 3-18A. Action drill with enemy contact
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Figure 3-18B. Action drill with enemy contact (continued)
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Figure 3-18C. Action drill with enemy contact (continued)
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Figure 3-18D. Action drill with enemy contact (continued)
R EACT TO INDIRECT FIRE DRILL 3-114. When the platoon receives unexpected indirect fire, it moves out of the impact area, unless it is also engaged in direct fire contact or is directed to remain stationary. TCs place their hatches in the open protected position; other crewmen close their hatches. Crews also close ballistic doors. Gunners will begin scanning with the gunner’s auxiliary sight (GAS). M1A2 and M1A2 SEP crews move the commander’s independent thermal viewer (CITV) to the shielded position (do not stow it as it will require time to cool down and function again when turned back on). Crew members mask based on the automatic masking criteria established in the OPORD or if they suspect the use of chemical agents. The platoon leader sends a SPOTREP to the commander. 3-115. If the platoon is moving when it receives suppressive artillery fire, it executes an action drill to avoid the impact area or increases speed to move to clear the impact area and continue the mission (see Figure 3-19). If it is stationary, the platoon should attempt to clear the impact area. ( Note. Several factors, such as the commander’s orders or the enemy situation, may prevent the platoon from moving during direct-fire engagements or defensive operations. For example, the commander may require the platoon to occupy hide or turret-down positions while continuing the mission. In such a case, the platoon leader must request permission from the commander before clearing the impact area.) Once the platoon clears the
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artillery impact area, individual crews place their hatches in the appropriate position, open ballistic doors (M1A2 and M1A2 SEP crews scan with CITV), check antennas, and return to positions or continue the mission.
Figure 3-19. React to indirect fire drill 3-116. The commander should address the platoon’s reaction to anticipated indirect fires in the actions on contact subparagraph of the OPORD. When the platoon receives anticipated indirect fires, it reacts according to the commander’s guidance. It is important to note the different drills conducted by mounted forces and light forces, and address the differences. If the platoon needs to execute a COA different from that directed by the commander, the platoon leader should request permission from the commander before executing the alternate action.
R EACT TO AIR ATTACK DRILL 3-117. When the platoon observes high-performance aircraft, helicopters, or unmanned aircraft system (UAS) that could influence its mission, it initially takes passive air defense measures unless the situation requires immediate active measures. In a passive air defense, the platoon disperses or stops, to avoid detection altogether and/or to minimize the aircraft’s target acquisition capability. The platoon also prepares for active air defense measures. ( Note. When the platoon is operating as part of a company team or troop, tank crews must be familiar with required actions in the company-level battle drill.) Passive air defense involves three steps: z Step 1. Alert the platoon with a contact report. z Step 2. Deploy or take the appropriate actions. If the platoon is not in the direct path of an attacking aircraft, the platoon leader orders tanks to seek cover and concealment and halt with at least a 100-meter interval between vehicles; the platoon also may be ordered to continue moving as part of the company.
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z
Step 3. Prepare to engage. TCs and loaders get ready to engage the aircraft with machine-gun and/or main-gun fire on order of the platoon leader.
3-118. If the platoon leader determines that the platoon is in the direct path of an attacking aircraft, he initiates the active react to air attack drill, which entails these actions: z
Step 1. The platoon initiates fire. The primary intent is to force aircraft to take self-defense measures that alter their attack profile and reduce their effectiveness. The platoon leader may use a burst of tracers to designate an aim point for platoon machine gun antiaircraft fires (see Figure 3-20). Volume is the key to effectiveness of these fires; tanks throw up a “wall of steel” through which aircraft must fly. The main gun is effective against hovering attack helicopters. The platoon leader may also direct some vehicles to engage high-performance aircraft with multipurpose antitank (MPAT) main gun rounds.
z
Step 2. Tanks create a nonlinear target by moving as fast as possible at a 45-degree angle away from the path of flight and toward attacking aircraft (see Figure 3-21). The platoon maintains an interval of at least 100 meters between tanks, forcing aircraft to make several passes to engage the entire platoon.
z
Step 3. Tanks move quickly to covered and concealed positions and freeze their movement for at least 60 seconds after the last flight of aircraft has passed.
z
Step 4. The platoon leader sends a SPOTREP to update the commander.
Figure 3-20. Machine gun aim points
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Figure 3-21. Evading enemy aircraft
R EACT TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK DRILL 3-119. When the platoon observes a brilliant flash of light and a mushroom-shaped cloud, crew members must act quickly to minimize the effects of a nuclear detonation. This drill involves the following four steps: z Step 1. Take immediate protective actions, including the following: If mounted, close hatches and close the breech and ballistic doors (M1A2 and M1A2 SEP crews stow the CITV). If time permits, position the vehicle behind a protective terrain feature, and turn off the master power until the effects of the blast have passed. Dismounted crewmen drop to the ground and cover exposed skin until blast effects have passed.
z
Step 2. Implement SOPs and accomplish related actions in the following areas:
z
Reestablish communications. Prepare and forward a (nuclear, biological, and chemical) NBC-1 report. Implement continuous monitoring. Submit a SITREP to the commander.
Step 3. Reorganize the platoon, taking the following actions:
Evacuate casualties and fatalities. Redistribute personnel as needed. Conduct essential maintenance. Step 4. Continue the mission.
z
R EACT TO A CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL ATTACK DRILL 3-120. The platoon initiates this drill during an operation whenever an automatic masking event occurs, the chemical agent alarm sounds, M8 detection paper indicates the presence of chemical agents, or a Soldier suspects the presence of chemical or biological agents. ( Note. Refer to Appendix E of this manual for more information on CBRN operations.) This drill involves the following four steps: z Step 1. Crewmen recognize and react to the hazard, taking these actions: Put on protective mask (and hood) within 15 seconds. Alert the remainder of the platoon and company. Button up and/or activate the tank overpressurization system. Conduct decontamination, as necessary.
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z
Within 8 minutes, assume MOPP 4 (refer to the discussion in Appendix E).
Step 2. Implement SOPs in these areas:
Administer self-aid and buddy-aid to crewmen with symptoms of chemical/biological agent poisoning (see Appendix E). Ensure individual crewmen decontaminate their skin. Conduct operator’s spraydown and decontamination of equipment as necessary. Initiate continuous monitoring with M256/M256A1 detection kits, and submit NBC-1 and follow-up reports as needed. Step 3. Continue the mission. Step 4. Monitor for chemical/biological agents; as the situation warrants, initiate actions to reduce MOPP levels and discontinue agent monitoring. ( Note. See Appendix E for additional information.)
z z
Note. If the M256/M256A1 detection kit records a negative reading inside an overpressurized M1A1, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP tank, the crew can initiate unmasking procedures.
SECTION VI - EXECUTION—PLATOON TACTICAL TASKS 3-121. The commander may direct the platoon to execute the collective tactical tasks described in this section as part of the company’s planned scheme of maneuver. He will cover employment of the tasks in the company OPORD. In addition, the platoon can use the tactical tasks as COA when it executes actions on contact (refer to the discussion in Section V of this chapter).
DESTROY AN INFERIOR FORCE 3-122. To maintain the tempo of an attack, the commander may order the platoon to destroy an inferior force, based either on his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader. The platoon leader usually employs maneuver techniques (fire and tactical movement) in executing this task or COA. When the platoon is in contact with the enemy, he designates one section to overwatch or support by fire to suppress and/or destroy the enemy while the other section moves. 3-123. The moving element uses appropriate movement techniques as well as covered and concealed routes to move to a position of advantage over the enemy. This position may offer dominating terrain that allows the platoon to attack enemy positions by direct fire, or it may provide covered routes that enable the section to close with and assault the enemy. 3-124. After the platoon leader designates the route to the next possible overwatch position, the overwatch leader identifies graphic control measures and assigns responsibility for suppression of identified enemy positions. Cross-talk among sections and vehicles is important in ensuring mutual support while the overwatch is providing supporting fires during the other section’s movement to the position of advantage. 3-125. After successfully destroying the inferior enemy force, the platoon positions itself where it can most effectively prepare for subsequent actions. Figures 3-22A and 3-22B illustrate two potential situations in which a platoon is ordered to destroy an inferior force.
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Figure 3-22A. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force
Figure 3-22B. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force (cont.)
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ATTACK BY FIRE 3-126. The commander may order the platoon to execute this task, either as specified in his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader. The task is to destroy the enemy using long-range fires from dominating terrain or using standoff of the main gun. The platoon can use an attack by fire to destroy inferior forces when the platoon leader does not desire to close with the enemy or when the platoon is part of a company-level effort. In addition, the platoon may occupy an attack-by-fire position as part of a company-level hasty defense with the goal of destroying a superior force. 3-127. In executing this task, the platoon uses tactical movement to move to a position that allows it to employ weapon standoff or that offers cover for hull-down firing positions. It also must be ready to move to alternate firing positions for protection from the effects of enemy direct and indirect fires. 3-128. As time permits, the platoon leader designates TRPs and assigns sectors of fire and tentative firing positions for individual tanks. He issues a platoon fire command specifying the method of fire, firing pattern, and rate of fire the platoon must sustain to accomplish the task in support of the company. 3-129. A successful attack by fire destroys the enemy force. Figures 3-232A and 3-23B illustrate attack by-fire situations.
Figure 3-23A. Platoon employs attack by fire against a convoy
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Figure 3-23B. Platoon uses attack by fire against an enemy reconnaissance platoon as part of a hasty defense
OVERWATCH/SUPPORT BY FIRE 3-130. Either as specified in his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the commander may order the platoon to provide overwatch or support by fire during the movement of a friendly force. The purpose is to suppress the enemy using long-range direct and indirect fires from a dominating piece of terrain or using the standoff of the main gun. This support sets the conditions that allow moving (supported) friendly elements to engage and destroy the enemy. 3-131. The techniques involved in occupying an overwatch or support-by-fire position and in focusing and controlling fires are similar to those for an attack by fire. Some specific considerations exist, however. As noted, the overwatch/support-by-fire task is always tied directly to the movement and/or tactical execution of other friendly forces. In executing overwatch or support by fire, the platoon must maintain a high level of situational understanding relative to the supported force so it can lift and shift direct and indirect fires as required to prevent fratricide. Throughout this type of operation, the supporting platoon maintains cross talk with the moving force on the company net. In addition to reducing fratricide risk, cross talk allows the platoon to provide early warning of enemy positions it has identified and to report battle damage inflicted on the enemy force. 3-132. A successful overwatch/support-by-fire operation suppresses the enemy, permitting the moving (supported) force to conduct tactical movement, breaching operations, or an assault. Figure 3-24 illustrates a support-by-fire situation in support of an assault.
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Figure 3-24. Platoon supports by fire to suppress an enemy element during a company assault
ASSAULT 3-133. The commander may direct the platoon to execute an assault, either on its own or as part of a larger assault force. The purpose of the assault is to seize key terrain or to close with and destroy the enemy while seizing an enemy-held position. Designation of the platoon as the assault force may be made as part of the commander’s original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader. 3-134. The platoon usually assaults the enemy while receiving supporting fires from an overwatch element. If supporting fire is not available, the platoon conducts tactical movement to a position of advantage over the enemy, and then conducts the assault. A successful assault destroys the enemy elements or forces them to withdraw from the objective. 3-135. To prepare for the assault, the assault force occupies or moves through an assault position. This should be a predetermined covered and concealed position that provides weapon standoff from the enemy. The platoon leader receives updated enemy information from support-by-fire elements. He assigns targets or weapons orientations and confirms the axis of advance and the LOA for the assault. On order, the platoon assaults on line, moving and firing as quickly as possible to destroy the enemy and seize the objective. 3-136. The assault must be extremely violent. If the platoon assaults buttoned up, machine gun fire from the support force or wingman tanks can provide close-in protection against dismounted enemy elements on the objective. If tanks are unbuttoned, the TCs and loaders use personal weapons, hand grenades, and machine guns to provide close-in protection. 3-137. Following a successful assault, the assault force occupies a defensible position, either on the objective or on the far side of it, and begins consolidation and reorganization procedures. Figures 3-25A and 3-25B illustrate two assault situations.
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Figure 3-25A. Tank section assaults an inferior force as another section supports by fire
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Figure 3-25B. Platoon executes an assault as two other platoons support by fire
BYPASS 3-138. As part of his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the commander may order the platoon to bypass the enemy to maintain the tempo of the attack. This COA can be taken against either an inferior or superior force. The commander may designate one platoon to suppress the enemy, allowing the other platoons to use covered and concealed routes, weapon standoff, and obscuration to bypass known enemy locations. ( Note. Units may have to execute contact drills while conducting the bypass.) 3-139. Once clear of the enemy, the supporting platoon hands the enemy over to another force, breaks contact, and rejoins the company. If necessary, the platoon leader can employ tactical movement to break contact with the enemy and continue the mission; he can also request supporting direct and indirect fires and smoke to suppress and obscure the enemy as the platoon safely breaks contact. See Figures 3-26A and 3-26B for an example of a bypass.
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Figure 3-26A. Bypass
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Figure 3-26B. Bypass (continued)
RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE 3-140. Based on his original plan or a recommendation from the platoon leader, the commander may direct the platoon to execute reconnaissance by fire when enemy contact is expected or when contact has occurred but the enemy situation is vague. The platoon then conducts tactical movement, occupying successive overwatch positions until it makes contact with the enemy or reaches the objective. 3-141. At each overwatch position, the platoon leader may designate TRPs. He then either requests indirect fires or employs direct fires on likely enemy locations to cause the enemy force to return direct fire or to move, thus compromising its positions. He directs individual tanks or sections to fire their caliber .50 and/or coax machine guns into targeted areas. ( Note. In some situations, main-gun fire can also be used.) 3-142. Individual tanks and sections not designated to reconnoiter by fire observe the effects of the firing tanks and engage enemy forces as they are identified. Focus of the reconnaissance by fire is on the key terrain that dominates danger areas, on built-up areas that dominate the surrounding terrain, and on wooded areas not yet cleared. Note. A disciplined enemy force may not return fire or move if it determines that the pattern or type of fires employed will be nonlethal. The platoon leader must analyze the situation and direct the use of appropriate fires on suspected positions. For example, he would use small-arms fire against suspected dismounted elements but employ main guns to engage bunkers or other fortified positions.
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HASTY OCCUPATION OF A PLATOON BATTLE POSITION (HASTY DEFENSE) 3-143. The platoon may use this task if it is fixed or suppressed by enemy fire and no longer has the ability to move forward or bypass. It may also set up a hasty defense when the enemy executes a hasty attack. The platoon maintains contact or fixes the enemy in place until additional combat elements arrive or until it is ordered to move. When the platoon must conduct a hasty defense, the commander has responsibility for continuing to develop the situation.
BREACHING OPERATIONS 3-144. When they expect to make contact with enemy obstacles, the commander and platoon leader must plan and rehearse actions at an obstacle, tailoring their preparations to templated locations for the expected obstacles. They must ensure the platoon knows how to accomplish early detection of both anticipated and unexpected obstacles and how to react instinctively when contact is made. 3-145. A critical consideration is that the tank platoon has only limited ability to deal independently with an obstacle or restriction. If it is equipped with mine plows or other breaching assets, the platoon can create track-width lanes through most wire, mine, and other reinforcing obstacles. The commander and platoon leader must keep in mind, however, that the platoon cannot internally accomplish all of the SOSRA elements of the breach (suppress the enemy; obscure the breach; secure the far side; reduce the obstacle; and assault through the obstacle). Refer to the discussion of breaching operations, including SOSRA procedures, in Chapter 5 of this manual. 3-146. When tanks encounter an unexpected obstacle, crew members must assume that the enemy is covering the obstacle with observation and fire. They must immediately seek cover and establish an overwatch to evaluate the situation. The overwatch tanks scan for evidence of enemy forces in and around the obstacle and on dominant terrain on the far side of the obstacle. They attempt to locate a bypass so the operation can continue without delay. If no bypass is found, the overwatch determines the dimensions of the obstacle and sends a report to the commander so he can designate a COA. Note. It is critical that the tank platoon initially remain under cover while evaluating the situation. The platoon must NEVER attempt to approach the obstacle area or breach the obstacle without first killing or obscuring enemy elements overwatching the obstacle.
3-147. If he needs to develop the situation further, the commander ideally will use scouts or infantry to reconnoiter the obstacle, with the tanks continuing to provide overwatch. This usually requires him to move mounted or dismounted elements to the far side. If this reconnaissance locates a bypass route, the commander often will order the unit to execute a bypass as the preferred COA. If a bypass is not possible, he may order a breaching operation, with the tanks either executing an in-stride breach within their capabilities or supporting a deliberate breach. 3-148. Deliberate breaching operations are conducted at the company or higher level and require engineer augmentation. The HBCT has one engineer company for mobility support that is capable of establishing, proofing, and marking two lanes through a complex wire and mine obstacle. Tank platoons generally operate in support of deliberate breaching operations by overwatching engineer forces, providing suppressive fires, and/or assaulting to the far side of the obstacle to establish a foothold. Tank platoons may also be called upon to serve as a breaching or proofing force if BCT assets are unavailable or disabled.
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SECTION VII - EXECUTION—CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION 3-149. The platoon executes consolidation and reorganization on the objective to ensure that it is prepared to destroy an enemy counterattack or is prepared to resume the attack as soon as possible.
CONSOLIDATION 3-150. Consolidation consists of actions taken to secure an objective and to defend against an enemy counterattack. The company commander designates platoon positions and weapons orientations. The platoon takes these steps: z Eliminate remaining enemy resistance and secure detainees. z Establish security and coordinate mutual support with adjacent platoons. z Occupy positions on defensible terrain as designated in the OPORD or FRAGO. Tanks move to hull-down positions, and the platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. If the location designated in the OPORD/FRAGO is not defensible, the platoon leader notifies the commander and searches for terrain that is defensible and supports the commander’s intent. The platoon leader informs the commander of the new location. z Execute procedures for a hasty defense to prepare for possible counterattacks (see Chapter 4 of this manual for details on hasty defense).
REORGANIZATION 3-151. Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is normally accomplished by SOP. Responsibilities during reorganization include the following: z TCs take these actions: Reload machine guns and redistribute main gun ammunition to ready areas. Move crewmen who are wounded in action (WIA) to a covered position and provide first aid. Send a SITREP to the PSG reporting casualties and supply status of equipment, ammunition, and fuel. Conduct essential maintenance. z The PSG takes these actions: Compile SITREPs from TCs and, as required by unit SOP, submit a consolidated report to the platoon leader or 1SG. Direct cross-leveling of supplies within the platoon. Oversee evacuation of casualties. Coordinate the movement of detainees to the detainee collection point. z The platoon leader takes these actions: Forward a consolidated SITREP to the commander. Redistribute personnel as necessary to maintain combat readiness. Oversee consolidation of Soldiers who have been killed in action (KIA). Reestablish communications with elements that are out of contact.
Note. SITREPs are sent using voice or digital format (or a combination). Refer to ST 3-20.153 and unit SOPs for additional information.
SECTION VIII – LIMITED VISIBILITY OPERATIONS 3-152. Units conduct limited visibility operations for various reasons, such as to achieve surprise against the enemy or gain a position of advantage by means of stealth. Darkness obviously has the most dramatic
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effect on the ability of Soldiers to see the battlefield. There are, however, other conditions that restrict visibility; the most common are the following: z Dust, smoke, and other obscuration factors caused by weapon firing and movement of Soldiers and equipment. z Weather conditions, including rain, snow, fog, and blowing sand and dust. 3-153. If it is to use its superior technology and basic combat skills to sustain continuous operations and destroy the enemy, the tank platoon must train to fight effectively in all types of visibility conditions. The platoon must first master the execution of tasks under optimum visibility conditions and then continue its training in progressively more difficult situations.
EQUIPMENT 3-154. The tank platoon is equipped with the following types of equipment for use in limited visibility conditions: z Driver’s night-vision viewer. This sight is either passive (the vehicle visualization system (VVS)-2/driver’s vision enhancer [DVE]) or thermal (the driver’s thermal viewer [DTV]). It enhances the driver’s ability to move the tank and enables him to assist in target acquisition and to observe rounds in darkness or other limited visibility conditions. z PVS-7. This passive-vision device enables the TC to observe from his opened hatch to control movement and provide close-in security. There are normally two PVS-7s per tank. z Gunner’s primary sight and commander’s extension. This integrated thermal sight gives the gunner and TC the capability to see and engage targets under almost any visibility condition. z CITV. This is a fully integrated, full-target engagement sight on the M1A2. It provides the TC with a redundant target acquisition and surveillance capability equivalent to that of the gunner’s primary sight and the TIS. The CITV extends the TC’s field of view, giving him 360-degree observation capability independent of the gunner’s primary sight.
NAVIGATION 3-155. The platoon leader uses the GPS and/or POSNAV (if available), terrain association, and the compass and odometer method to navigate in limited visibility conditions. When they are fired to create a ground-burst effect, artillery or mortar illumination rounds can be helpful in confirming locations. Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for a detailed discussion of navigation techniques.
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION 3-156. The problem of vehicle identification is compounded in limited visibility conditions. TCs must be able to distinguish vehicles of their platoon and company/troop and of other friendly elements from those of the enemy. Most unit SOPs cover vehicle marking and identification procedures. In addition, the platoon can use the following techniques to enhance command and control and to help prevent fratricide (see also Appendix F, this FM, for information about fratricide prevention): z Attach color-coded lights or chemical lights to the rear of the turret or the hull. z Replace the brake light cover with color-coded plastic. z Use luminous or thermal tape to “outline” vehicles or to make battle boards. z Use radio and digital systems (if available) to provide the platoon with frequent updates of friendly unit locations.
TACTICAL MOVEMENT AND ATTACKS 3-157. The fundamentals for executing tactical movement and attacks discussed elsewhere in this manual are applicable during periods of limited visibility. The following paragraphs cover additional considerations for the planning, preparation, and execution of these operations when visibility is restricted.
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PLANNING 3-158. During the planning phase, the platoon leader must pay particular attention to routes, formations, and navigational aids. He must conduct a thorough reconnaissance to identify locations where the platoon could become disoriented. The reconnaissance must also focus on finding rough or restricted terrain that will be even more difficult to negotiate with limited visibility. Such terrain may require a change in formation or movement technique or employment of dismounted ground guides.
PREPARATION 3-159. In the preparation phase, the platoon leader conducts rehearsals in as many types of adverse conditions as possible to prepare the platoon for potential command and control problems. He must stress light discipline. During PCCs and PCIs, the platoon leader or PSG views each tank using a passive sight to ensure that sources of light have been dimmed or covered so they are not visible to the enemy. During confirmation briefs and rehearsals, the platoon leader must ensure that all personnel understand the platoon’s projected actions during each phase of the operation. One technique is to designate waypoints or phase lines as trigger points for platoon actions.
EXECUTION 3-160. During the execution phase, TCs use the PVS-7 and the CITV (if available) to assist their drivers with navigation and to enhance situational understanding. The platoon leader must assume that the enemy possesses the same limited visibility observation capabilities as friendly units. Use of terrain to mask movement and deployment remains critical since limited visibility may create a false sense of protection from observation. During movement, the distance between platoon vehicles is reduced to allow vehicles to observe each other and to decrease the time necessary to react to enemy contact. 3-161. When the platoon encounters enemy elements, an effective technique is to have the vehicle that makes contact fire a steady burst of machine gun fire in the direction of the enemy to orient the rest of the platoon. The platoon must adhere strictly to applicable control measures, especially those covering the employment of direct fires and maintain strict situational understanding of friendly force locations.
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Defensive Operations The immediate purpose of any defensive operation is to defeat an enemy attack. Military forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Additionally, defensive operations are undertaken for purposes that include the following: z To gain time. z To hold key terrain. z To fix the enemy so friendly forces can attack elsewhere. z To erode enemy resources at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly operations.
SECTION I - FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE 4-1. FM 3-0 describes several characteristics of an effective defense: preparation; security; disruption, mass, and concentration; and flexibility. To optimize these characteristics in the defense, the tank platoon leader must consider the factors examined in the following discussion.
PREPARATION 4-2. The critical element affecting preparation is time management, beginning with receipt of the WARNO, OPORD, or FRAGO. Effective use of the available time allows the platoon leader to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of engagement areas, BPs, displacement routes, and the axis for possible counterattacks. Section III of this chapter describes preparation at the platoon level in detail.
SECURITY 4-3. The OPSEC measures discussed in Appendix D of this manual will assist the platoon leader in maintaining security during the planning, preparation, and execution of the defense. The platoon leader must integrate his security plan with that of the company or troop. He enhances the platoon’s early warning capability by identifying potential mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and then positioning early warning devices and OPs to cover these avenues.
DISRUPTION, MASS, AND CONCENTRATION 4-4. Augmenting the platoon’s direct fires with reinforcing obstacles and indirect fires is a key step in disrupting enemy operations. Platoons achieve mass and concentration by maximizing the number of tanks that can fire into an engagement area or that can move from primary positions to alternate and supplementary positions to concentrate fires on the enemy.
FLEXIBILITY 4-5. The platoon leader contributes to the flexibility of company or troop operations by developing a thorough understanding of the company/troop plan, including on-order and be-prepared missions. He must be alert to any possible contingencies that have not been addressed by the commander. During the preparation phase of the defense, the platoon increases flexibility by conducting thorough reconnaissance and mounted rehearsals of all possible plans. A crucial indicator of platoon flexibility is the ability to
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move quickly under all battlefield conditions, between primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions as well as subsequent BPs.
DEFENSIVE PATTERNS, MISSIONS, AND TASKS 4-6. The two patterns described in FM 3-0 are mobile and area defenses. A mobile defense is executed to destroy the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack by a mobile reserve. The focus of area defenses is on retention of terrain; defending units engage the enemy from an interlocking series of positions and destroy him, largely by direct fires. In support of mobile and area defenses, a company team may be tasked to execute one or more of these missions and tasks: z Defend BPs. z Defend in sector. z Defend a strongpoint. z Counterattack. z Screen. z Delay. z Execute a reserve mission. z Withdraw.
ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON 4-7. Tank platoons participate in the company team or troop defense by performing one or more of the following operations: z Defend a BP. z Displace. z Counterattack. z Perform reserve missions. 4-8. When defending a BP, the platoon may be tasked to destroy, block, or canalize enemy forces; to retain terrain; or to displace to occupy subsequent BPs based on the commander’s intent. In a counterattack or reserve mission, the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to occupy BPs or attack-byfire positions; it executes hasty attacks, assaults, or other actions on contact based on the commander’s intent for the counterattack.
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS 4-9. In conducting planning, preparation, and execution of defensive operations, the platoon leader must pay close attention to the considerations applicable for the war-fighting function (WFF), which help him to logically organize his thoughts to cover the mission. The WFFs are the following: z Movement and maneuver. z Fire support. z Intelligence. z Protection. z Sustainment. z Command and control. Note. Sections II and III of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation phases of the defense, are organized using the WFFs in the order listed above. Included in each section is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, focusing on intangible, Soldier-related factors.
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SECTION II - PLANNING 4-10. The planning phase of a defensive operation is a continuous process that begins when the platoon leader receives the higher order (WARNO, FRAGO, or OPORD). It ends when the platoon leader issues his own OPORD or FRAGO. Planning may continue into the preparation phase as the platoon gains more information through the plan of the higher headquarters and from further reconnaissance and rehearsals.
RECONNAISSANCE AND TIME MANAGEMENT 4-11. The keys to a successful, coordinated platoon defense that is effectively integrated into the company or troop scheme of maneuver are reconnaissance and efficient time management during the planning phase. Whether time permits a thorough ground reconnaissance or only a quick map reconnaissance, it is critical that the platoon leader understand where the commander wants to kill the enemy. It is also essential that he identify platoon sectors of fire and tentative platoon BPs, as well as TRPs that define the company/troop engagement area . 4-12. Ideally, the platoon leader takes part in two reconnaissance operations during the planning phase. He is normally part of the commander’s reconnaissance, along with the XO, other platoon leaders, the FIST, and the 1SG. The platoon leader’s own reconnaissance includes his TCs and PSG. 4-13. During the commander’s reconnaissance, the platoon leader must identify, record, and mark the tentative TRPs, fighting positions, and routes he thinks the platoon will use in executing the defense. It is important for him to have sufficient day and night marking materials such as engineer stakes and tape, chemical lights, or thermal paper. He records the eight-digit grid coordinates of each position; this will allow him to provide precise locations that the platoon can use in navigation or orientation. Ideally, the platoon leader can record positions electronically, using a hand-held GPS or the POSNAV system; if neither is available, he must rely on his map-reading skills to manually identify and record accurate position locations.
WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTION CONSIDERATIONS 4-14. As planning progresses, it is important that the platoon leader make a careful evaluation of the considerations outlined in the following discussion, which is organized using the WFF.
MANEUVER AND COMMAND AND CONTROL 4-15. The platoon leader must understand the company or troop plan and triggers; he develops his plan based on these factors as well as the commander’s intent. The commander normally determines operational considerations such as OPSEC, occupation of firing positions, initiation of direct fires, primary and supplementary platoon sectors of fire, and disengagement criteria; however, he may allow the platoon leader to make decisions covering some or all of these areas. 4-16. The primary concern in selecting fighting positions is the platoon’s ability to concentrate and mass lethal fires into its sectors of fire. Whenever possible, primary and alternate fighting positions should allow engagement of the enemy in the flank and from two directions. Supplementary fighting positions are planned to allow the platoon to defend against enemy forces that penetrate adjacent platoon positions or that move along additional avenues of approach for which the commander has assumed risk. Dispersion among fighting positions reduces vulnerability of platoon vehicles to enemy fires; however, dispersion increases the demands for local security in the area between vehicles. 4-17. Ideally, the platoon will occupy hull-down firing positions as the enemy crosses the direct-fire trigger line. The trigger line should optimize weapon standoff, while the firing positions and the designated firing pattern should be selected to create the opportunity for flank engagements.
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Note. Primary and alternate fighting positions are oriented on the same sectors of fire. Supplementary fighting positions orient on different sectors of fire (see Figure 4-1). Subsequent BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along the same avenue of approach as the primary/alternate positions. Supplementary BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along different avenues of approach (see Figure 4-2).
Figure 4-1. Fighting positions
Figure 4-2. Battle positions
FIRE SUPPORT 4-18. The platoon leader posts targets on his overlays (in both traditional and digital format). Although most fire support planning is done by the company or troop FIST, the platoon leader can, if necessary,
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provide the FIST with nominations for additional targets for inclusion in the company fire support plan. As these targets are approved, the platoon leader plots them on his overlays. If a target is disapproved, he notes its grid coordinates so he can, if needed, submit a speedy call for fire using the grid method. See Chapter 6 of this manual for methods of transmitting calls for fire. 4-19. The platoon leader should plan and request artillery targets on potential avenues of approach, at choke points along the avenues of approach, at possible enemy support by fire positions, at obstacles, and in dead space within the platoon’s AO. He should also be prepared to request a mix of smoke and dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) rounds in front of his BP to disrupt an enemy assault or behind his BP to help the platoon disengage from the enemy. 4-20. Each artillery target should have a trigger line overwatched by at least a crew or section. The trigger line triggers the call for fire on a target to ensure that the impact of the rounds coincides with the enemy’s arrival. The platoon’s laser range finders or target designation capabilities (on digitally equipped tanks) enhance its effectiveness in requesting artillery fires using trigger lines. The location of the trigger line is based on the enemy’s expected rate of advance over the terrain, the time of flight of the rounds, and the priority of fires. The company or troop FIST should assist in determining all trigger points. 4-21. The platoon leader should plan and coordinate mortar targets on dismounted avenues of approach. In addition, because mortar smoke is generally more responsive than smoke delivered by FA, he may be able to gain a tactical advantage by employing mortar support in certain situations. Mortars should be the platoon leader’s first choice as indirect fire due to the probability of the company’s or troop’s low priority of FA fires. (See Appendix E of this manual for information on smoke operations.)
INTELLIGENCE 4-22. Security decisions are based on enemy capabilities. Platoons use OPs to provide early warning of the enemy’s actions; their REDCON status and other OPSEC preparations then enable them to respond in a timely manner. See Appendix D of this manual for more information on OPSEC measures. 4-23. OPSEC is especially critical during the platoon leader’s ground reconnaissance. The platoon leader ensures that he provides security for the reconnaissance based on the commander’s guidance. Because it is probable that enemy elements are already in the area, he must ensure that platoon reconnaissance elements have the capability to p rotect themselves effectively. 4-24. As he conducts the reconnaissance, the platoon leader orients his map and references graphic control measures to the terrain. He conducts a terrain analysis, using the results in conjunction with his knowledge of possible enemy COAs to identify key terrain that may define potential enemy objectives. He identifies mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and determines the probable formations the enemy will use when occupying support-by-fire positions or when assaulting the platoon’s position. Based on his analysis and available fields of observation and fire, the platoon leader confirms vehicle positions that will allow the platoon to mass fires into the company or troop engagement area. 4-25. The platoon leader should complete his reconnaissance by conducting initial coordination with adjacent platoons to establish mutual support and to cover dead space between the platoons. At the conclusion of the reconnaissance, he may leave an OP to report enemy activity in the area of operations.
PROTECTION Survivability 4-26. The platoon leader may be responsible for supervising engineer efforts. He should incorporate plans for linkup, supervision, and handoff of engineer assets into his time line.
Countermobility Considerations (Obstacles) 4-27. Key factors for the platoon leader to consider in countermobility planning are a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent for each planned obstacle and knowledge of the time and personnel he must allocate to supervise or assist emplacement of the obstacle. He must keep in mind that
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both the platoon and the company or troop have only limited ability to transport and emplace obstacles. This means that in most situations the platoon will have to depend on the task force or squadron for obstacle planning and transport and on engineers for emplacement. 4-28. The commander’s intent will guide the emplacement of obstacles based on the following principles and characteristics: z Obstacles are integrated with and reinforce the scheme of maneuver and the direct fire plan. z They are integrated with existing obstacles. z They are employed in depth and positioned where they will surprise enemy forces. z They should be covered by direct and indirect fires at all times. 4-29. In general, obstacles are used to disrupt, turn, fix, and block the enemy based on the factors of METT-TC. Figure 4-3 illustrates considerations for obstacle employment in relation to platoon BPs. If the commander does not specify the intent for obstacles, the platoon leader should analyze the situation and plan hasty or engineer-emplaced obstacles to meet these purposes: To block the final assault of an enemy force to the front of the platoon. z z To block the seams between vehicles or between adjacent platoons. z To disrupt enemy forces that are assaulting on the flanks of the platoon. z To shape the engagement area by forcing enemy elements to turn, slow down, stop, or flank themselves at known ranges in the engagement area.
Figure 4-3. Considerations for obstacle employment
Survivability Considerations 4-30. The platoon leader must plan the priority of survivability efforts. His plan should specify the sequence (first through fourth) in which his tanks will receive digging assets. When designating priorities, he considers the survivability of unimproved positions and the relative importance of each firing position within the BP. The engineer platoon leader, section leader, or dozer operator can estimate how much time it will take to improve firing positions. These estimates will range from 45 minutes to 2 hours depending
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on soil and light conditions and the type and amount of engineer equipment available. illustrates dug-in positions and lists considerations for their construction and use.
Figure 4-4
Figure 4-4. Dug-in firing positions
Air Defense 4-31. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of air defense planning and employment.
SUSTAINMENT 4-32. The platoon leader conducts resupply operations to replenish basic loads in accordance with the company or troop plan. Ammunition may be pre-positioned on the battlefield to facilitate resupply once the battle begins. The platoon leader determines prestock requirements based on the commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver. He discusses prestock requests with the commander, identifying resupply locations, the types (usually ammunition) and amounts of supplies involved, the time required to conduct resupply, and any necessary security considerations.
THE HUMAN ASPECT 4-33. As noted previously, the “human aspect” is not considered a formal WFF, but it is a crucial factor in the success of the defensive mission. The platoon leader must plan for and conduct activities aimed at enhancing each Soldier’s health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness. For a more complete discussion of the human dimension of operations, refer to Section II in Chapter 3 of this manual.
SECTION III – PREPARATION 4-34. Preparation of a BP begins after the platoon leader has issued his order and ends at the “defend not later than” time specified in the OPORD. ( Note. Some preparation activities may occur while the platoon leader is preparing his order.) The platoon leader designates these preparations as priorities of work and identifies them in the platoon WARNO or OPORD. He must weigh competing demands of security, firing position and obstacle preparation, rehearsals, and coordination against the amount of time available for the preparation; this requirement places a premium on effective troop-leading procedures and time management during the preparation process.
PHASE OF PREPARATION 4-35. The commander may designate the phase of preparation for each BP. There are three phases, listed here in descending order of thoroughness and time required: ( Note. The platoon leader may raise but not lower the phase of preparation directed by the commander.)
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z
Reconnoiter. This phase of preparation consists of the steps conducted during the ground reconnaissance of the planning phase.
z
Prepare. This phase includes the steps conducted during the planning and preparation phases for the deliberate occupation of a BP.
z
Occupy. This is complete preparation of the position from which the platoon will initially defend. The position is fully reconnoitered, prepared, and occupied prior to the “defend NLT” time specified in the OPORD.
PREPARATION TASKS HASTY OCCUPATION 4-36. Tank platoons conduct a hasty occupation under a variety of circumstances. During a movement to contact, the platoon may prepare to destroy a moving enemy force by conducting a hasty occupation of BPs or attack-by-fire positions in defensible terrain. During defensive operations, hasty occupation may take place during counterattack missions, after disengagement and movement to subsequent BPs, or in response to FRAGOs reflecting a change of mission.
Initial Occupation Activities and Information 4-37. Hasty occupation of a BP usually occurs in response to a prearranged signal or a FRAGO. Often, only a minimum of planning time and information is available prior to execution, although in some situations, such as after disengagement, the platoon may occupy prepared positions it has previously reconnoitered. As a minimum, the platoon leader must have the following information when he orders a hasty occupation : z Where the commander wants to kill the enemy. The commander designates company or troop TRPs either to define the company/troop engagement area and platoon sectors of fire or to identify locations where the platoon will mass its fires. z The tentative location of the BP. 4-38. The platoon leader must pass this information to the platoon. He may supplement it with tentative section or vehicle fighting positions within the BP and platoon TRPs defining section sectors of fire. As an alternative, he can elect to use the company or troop TRP alone to mass platoon fires to the left and to the right of the TRP. Depending on the situation, the platoon leader issues the information in person, over the radio, or by digital overlay (if available). 4-39. A TRP is a recognizable point on the ground that leaders use to orient friendly forces and to focus and control direct fires. In addition, when TRPs are designated as indirect fire targets, they can be used in calling for and adjusting indirect fires. Leaders designate TRPs at probable enemy locations and along likely avenues of approach. These points can be natural or man-made. A TRP can be an established site, such as a hill or building, or an impromptu feature designated as a TRP on the spot, like a burning enemy vehicle or smoke generated by an artillery or mortar round. Friendly units can also construct markers to serve as TRPs (see Figure 4-5). TRPs should be visible in three observation modes (unaided, passiveinfrared (IR), and thermal) so all forces can see them. Examples of TRPs include the following features and objects: z Prominent terrain feature (for example, a large hill mass). z Distinctive man-made structure (for example, a grain silo). z Observable enemy position. z Destroyed vehicle. z Ground-burst illumination. z Smoke round. z Laser point.
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Figure 4-5. Examples of constructed TRP markers
Approaching the Position 4-40. The platoon leader then directs the platoon to approach the position from the flank or rear. Based on terrain factors, the platoon assumes a modified line formation facing the center of the engagement area. Vehicle dispersion is generally 100 to 250 meters between tanks, again based on engagement area and terrain considerations. TCs automatically move to turret-down positions; they execute a short halt and overwatch the engagement area.
Developing the Situation 4-41. The platoon leader continues to develop the situation. He identifies additional TRPs defining the company or troop engagement area and/or platoon or section sectors of fire; he also designates tentative vehicle positions (as necessary), routes into and out of the BP, and the location of subsequent BPs. As time permits, the platoon leader establishes the following fire control measures: z The trigger line and engagement criteria. z The fire pattern to be used. z Disengagement criteria and the disengagement plan. 4-42. The platoon is now ready to move to hull-down firing positions to engage the enemy. The platoon leader reports “ESTABLISHED” to the company/troop commander. If the enemy has not reached the trigger line and time is available, the platoon leader initiates the steps necessary for a deliberate occupation of the BP.
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DELIBERATE OCCUPATION 4-43. The tank platoon can conduct deliberate occupation of a BP when all of the following conditions exist: z Time is available. z The enemy is not expected or has not been located within direct fire range. z A friendly element is forward of the BP with the mission of providing security for the occupying force. 4-44. The platoon begins by occupying a hide position behind the BP. It assumes a formation that will provide 360-degree security based on considerations of METT-TC and OAKOC. TCs move to the platoon leader’s vehicle and prepare to reconnoiter the position. The platoon leader briefs his gunner on actions to take if the reconnaissance group does not return by a specified time or if contact occurs.
Reconnaissance of the Battle Position 4-45. The platoon leader, TCs, and a security element (usually the loaders from the wingman tanks) dismount and move to the BP. If possible, platoon vehicles provide overwatch for the reconnaissance group; otherwise, the platoon leader positions dismounted OPs, as necessary. The reconnaissance group can then move mounted or dismounted around the BP and engagement area. 4-46. If the platoon leader has already conducted a leader’s reconnaissance with the commander, he uses information from his own reconnaissance to acquaint his TCs with the BP, briefing his OPORD from an advantageous location within the BP. If there has been no prior leader’s reconnaissance, the platoon leader should, if possible, conduct a complete ground reconnaissance with the TCs. This allows him to confirm his map reconnaissance and tentative plan before he issues the OPORD. ( Note. If he is unable to issue the full OPORD during the reconnaissance, the platoon leader should, as a minimum, issue a detailed WARNO.) 4-47. Members of the reconnaissance party should use marking materials (for daylight and limited visibility recognition) to indicate key locations. They should record the eight-digit grid coordinates for these locations, either manually on their maps or by using electronic means such as the GPS or POSNAV system (if available). 4-48. To be most effective, the reconnaissance begins from the enemy’s perspective in the engagement area, with the party looking toward the BP. ( Note. The platoon leader must receive permission from the commander to move in front of the BP.) The platoon leader should explain the enemy situation, outlining probable COAs and the effects of terrain on enemy movement. He also identifies the enemy’s potential support by fire positions as well as assault avenues through the platoon’s BP. 4-49. The platoon leader and TCs then mark the company/troop engagement area with platoon and section sectors of fire. They may also mark TRPs and tentative obstacle locations. As necessary, fire control measures may be designated and/or marked using easily identifiable terrain features. 4-50. When reconnaissance of the engagement area is complete and all TCs are sure of where the platoon leader wants to kill the enemy, the platoon leader and TCs move back to the BP. They discuss details of the platoon fire plan, including the trigger line, engagement criteria, fire pattern, disengagement criteria and disengagement plan, and routes to supplementary or subsequent BPs. They also make plans to identify and mark primary and alternate fighting positions. 4-51. Prior to departing the BP, the platoon leader briefs the OPs on actions to take if the platoon does not return on time or if contact is made with the enemy. He also must coordinate with adjacent platoons to establish overlapping fields of fire and to eliminate gaps and dead space between the platoons. More information on coordination is found later in this section.
Occupation Procedures 4-52. After completing the reconnaissance and coordination, the platoon leader and TCs move back to their vehicles. The TCs remount, start vehicles simultaneously, and move to hide positions behind their
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primary fighting positions. On order, the platoon moves simultaneously into turret-down firing positions (see Figure 4-6A). These positions allow the tanks to fire only their caliber .50 or loader’s M240 machine gun. Observation can be executed using the CITV (if available); the gunner’s primary sight also provides observation capability.
Figure 4-6A. Turret-down positions 4-53. The platoon leader checks with the OPs to ensure that the enemy situation has not changed, then orders platoon vehicles to occupy their primary hull-down firing positions (see Figure 4-6B). Tank crews orient on the engagement area and complete their sketch cards. Each crew sends its completed sector sketch to the platoon leader, either by messenger or by digital transmission (FBCB2, if available); the crew retains a copy of the sketch card for its own reference. Tanks then move individually to their hide positions and assume the appropriate REDCON status. Note. ( See Chapter 2 of this manual for a discussion of REDCON levels.)
Figure 4-6B. Hull-down positions Sector Sketches and Platoon Fire Plan
4-54. As each tank crew prepares their vehicle for deliberate or hasty defensive operations, they will be required to develop a sector sketch card (see Figure 4-7 on page 4-15). This is a rough topographical sketch of the tank’s assigned sector, which may be prepared traditionally (handwritten) or using the tank’s digital equipment (FBCB2). The sketch card aids the crews in target acquisition and paints a better picture of the battlefield for the platoon leader to be able to develop his platoon fire plan (see Figure 4-8 on page
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4-17). The fire plan should provide information necessary to distribute and control the fires of all available direct and indirect fire weapons, both organic and attached. It is prepared using the same two methods (handwritten or FBCB2). 4-55. Traditional sketch card development. The ability to create traditional, handwritten sketch cards, while important for all tank crewmen, is especially critical for crews of the M1 and M1A1. These tanks lack the digital capabilities that provide valuable assistance to crews of later-model vehicles in preparing their sketch cards. The process begins with the platoon leader designating the primary and supplementary positions for his tanks and each TC selecting his alternate fighting position. After the positions have been designated and reconnoitered (time permitting), the platoon leader will designate the sector limits of fire for each tank and the TRPs within the sector. The platoon leader must give the TC the number designators for the TRPs. 4-56. As the positions are prepared, the TC and gunner will prepare the sketch cards for each position. When the cards are completed (normally within 20 minutes), one copy will be sent to the platoon leader and the other copy will be kept with the tank. 4-57. When the tank is moved into position, and before engineer assets are released from the position, the crew will make sure the target areas and obstacles within the sector can be fired upon, and determine if assigned TRPs can be engaged. A TRP that could be engaged before the position was prepared may be masked when the tank is dug in. The platoon leader must be informed of any inability to engage assigned TRPs and may direct a change in position. If time permits, the TC will make physical contact with his wing or flanking elements to determine overlapping fire within the sectors and the position of friendly OPs. 4-58. As a minimum, the traditionally drawn sketch card, which is illustrated in Figure 4-7 on page 4-14, will depict the following: z All key terrain features. z TRPs. TRPs should be marked with a cross and their assigned number in the upper right quadrant of the cross. Mark all TRPs that are visible, whether they are in your sector or not. z High-speed avenues of approach. z Symbol indicating north. z Preplanned fires (direct and indirect). These may be added after the platoon leader receives this information from the FIST officer and constructs a platoon fire plan. These should be marked with a cross, with the letter designation in the top left block and numeric designation in the top right. z Range bands. These will help when the LRF fails. The number of bands will be determined by the terrain or mission. (If terrain permits, range bands of 1,200, 1,800, and 2,400 meters will be used.) A minimum of three range bands should be used. z Right and left limits of assigned sector. These limits are marked by double lines beginning at the tank’s position and extending through the terrain feature that designates the boundary limit. z Reference point. This is located near the center of the sector and, ideally, at or beyond the tank’s maximum engagement range. The reference point should be a prominent, immovable, and readily identifiable feature; it should not be a target and should not be easily destroyed. The reference point should be depicted using a military map symbol, sketch of feature, or brief word description, and marked with the letters Ref Pt inside a circle. z Obstacles and dead space. Obstacles should be marked on the sketch card using approved military symbols. Dead space should be marked using diagonal lines with the words “DEAD SPACE.” z The positions of elements to the left and right and of friendly OPs/listening posts (LPs). These positions should be marked with standard symbols. (This information will be omitted if the tactical situation does not allow enough time to make contact with wing and flank elements, or otherwise determine their exact location). z Identification data. This consists of the vehicle bumper number, placed directly below the tank symbol, and the firing position (primary, alternate, or supplementary), marked with a capital P, A, or S and placed below the vehicle bumper number.
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z
Marginal information. Placed in the bottom left third of the sketch card, this information includes the following: List of TRPs. Range to TRPs. Reference points. Description of TRPs. Description of obstacles and other likely target areas visible to your position. Range to obstacles and other likely targets. Legend. The legend, placed in the bottom right third of the sketch card, includes an explanation of symbols used on the card and other control measures and pertinent information, as required.
z
4-59. Creating sketch cards using FBCB2 (M1A1D and M1A2 SEP). While FBCB2 currently does not have the capability to produce a tank sketch card, crews can use the range card tool to produce a rough, nondoctrinal sketch card. Upon receipt of these tank sketch cards, the platoon leader must redraw them onto the platoon fire plan before forwarding it to the commander. Future software upgrades of the FBCB2 will include the sketch card function. 4-60. Sketch card verification. As he receives the platoon’s sketch cards, the platoon leader must verify them. Either he or the PSG mounts each tank and views its sector through the gunner’s primary sight, gunner’s primary sight extension (GPSE), or CITV. The sketch card check should ensure that the TCs have covered each of the following considerations: z Tank sectors are mutually supporting and overlapping. z Each tank crew understands and has recorded the designated TRPs and FPF. z All TRPs assigned to the platoon are covered by fire. z Each crew has marked ranges to all TRPs or identifiable targets within the tank’s sector. These ranges are especially critical in limited visibility or degraded (LRF) operations. z The risk of fratricide between platoon tanks and adjacent elements has been evaluated and appropriate adjustments or restrictions implemented. ( Note. Each crew member needs to know the location of adjacent vehicles and OPs and what they look like through the tank’s sights. Using pickets to indicate left and right limits for individual tank main gun fire can help TCs to observe their limits of fire. Rehearsals are the best method of achieving fratricide reduction.) z The sketches show friendly obstacles, with each obstacle covered by machine gun or main gun fire from at least one tank. z Dead space is covered by indirect fire or alternate positions. z Each tank and the platoon as a whole has identified alternate positions that cover the same area as the primary positions and supplementary positions that cover additional areas of responsibility assigned to the tank or platoon.
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Figure 4-7. Traditional sector sketch card 4-61. Backbriefs. The sketch card verification process provides an optimum opportunity for the platoon leader to conduct backbriefs to confirm that each TC understands his mission. If time permits, the backbrief includes a field-expedient sand table or chalkboard exercise (using a chalked side-skirt, “micro” armor, or a rough terrain model scratched in the dirt). The platoon leader can use the exercise to reinforce operational considerations for the mission, including the following:
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z z
z
Individual tank responsibilities (which tank will engage where within the platoon sector). Tactical contingencies, such as which tank will pick up a sector if another tank is knocked out or what happens if a particular tank’s sector is overloaded with targets. Adjustments to positions, such as when a tank is unable to cover its entire assigned sector. ( Note. This should be verified immediately after the position has been prepared, while engineer assets are still on site.)
4-62. Graphics, maps, and overlays. These are critical elements of fire plan development. As discussed earlier in this chapter, they are the platoon leader’s primary tool for organizing information and synchronizing his assets on the battlefield. They assist him in depicting the fire plan accurately. 4-63. The platoon leader must have both maneuver and fire support graphics posted on his map and make sure that all the TCs have done the same. He then prepares the overlay, which, like the fire plan, can be developed by either traditional (handwritten) or digital means. The overlay technique eliminates the tedious process of recopying operational graphics onto a sketch. As an example, if the platoon leader believes a TRP should be added to the company graphics, he marks it on his overlay. He also places at least two reference marks on the overlay to ensure proper alignment with his map. 4-64. The platoon leader prepares two copies of the overlay. He gives one copy to the company commander during the OPORD confirmation brief. The commander can then apply the platoon overlays to ensure his assigned engagement area is covered. After evaluating the platoon overlays, he may wish to adjust platoon positions or assign supplementary positions if the entire engagement area is not covered by either observation or direct fire. If a portion of the engagement area appears as dead space on all platoon overlays, the commander may wish to plan indirect fires to cover the area. 4-65. Depiction of the fire plan. With the information from the individual tank sector sketches, the platoon leader uses the available tools to prepare the platoon fire plan. As with other tactical products, the fire plan product can be handwritten or displayed on the tank’s digital display. Figure 4-8 shows a handwritten fire plan. 4-66. To enhance the platoon’s understanding of the fire plan and the operation itself, the platoon leader must know how to make effective use of marginal data. These notations cover numerous types of tactical information. They may vary according to mission, means of fire plan development (handwritten or digital), and higher unit guidance. As an example, marginal data required on the fire plan for an M1 or M1A1 platoon might include the following types of entries: z Unit designation. z Date. z Type of position (primary, alternate, or supplementary). z Information on TRPs (description, range, list of tanks that can engage each TRP). z Additional notes as necessary, covering such areas as specific coordination with adjacent units and engagement criteria and priority. Note. On digitally equipped vehicles, much of the information normally included in marginal data can be developed and transmitted using FBCB2.
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Figure 4-8. Traditionally prepared fire plan (handwritten) Priorities of Work
4-67. At this point, the platoon executes its defensive priorities of work. ( Note. Some tasks will be performed simultaneously. Figure 4-9 is an example of a platoon time line to assist the platoon leader in managing the defensive preparation and division of labor based on the “defend NLT” time.) Priorities of work include, but are not limited to, the following tasks:
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z
z z z
z z z
Maintain platoon OPSEC and surveillance of the engagement area. ( Note. See Appendix D for more information.) Verify each vehicle’s location, orientation, and sector of fire. Supervise any allocated engineer assets. Conduct reconnaissance and mark supplementary engagement areas and subsequent BPs as time permits. Conduct rehearsals. Oversee vehicle maintenance and prepare-to-fire checks. Improve the position by emplacing M8/M22 alarms and hot loops and by upgrading camouflage protection.
Figure 4-9. Sample platoon time line
BUILDING THE ENGAGEMENT AREA 4-68. The engagement area is where the commander intends to trap and destroy an enemy force using the massed fires of all available weapons. The success of any engagement depends on how effectively the commander can integrate the obstacle plan, the indirect fire plan, and the direct-fire plan within the engagement area to achieve the company tactical purpose. 4-69. At the company level, engagement area development is a complex function, demanding parallel planning and preparation if the company is to accomplish the myriad tasks for which it is responsible.
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Despite this complexity, however, engagement area development resembles a drill in that the commander and his subordinate leaders use an orderly, fairly standard set of procedures. Beginning with evaluation of METT-TC factors, the development process covers these steps: Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach. z z Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver. z Determine where to kill the enemy. z Plan and integrate obstacles. z Emplace weapon systems. z Plan and integrate indirect fires. z Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area. 4-70. Tank leaders need to be experts in building their sectors of the company engagement area using the same seven steps outlined above. By doing this, they will be able to destroy the enemy force where the command wants. A detailed discussion of each of the seven steps can be found in FM 3-90.1.
FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL 4-71. Effective fire distribution and control requires a unit to rapidly acquire the enemy and mass the effects of fires to achieve decisive results in the close fight. When planning and executing direct fires, the commander and subordinate leaders must know how to apply several actions of subordinates. Applied correctly, they help the company/troop to accomplish its primary goal in any direct-fire engagement: to both acquire first and shoot first; they give subordinates the freedom to act quickly upon acquisition of the enemy. This discussion focuses on the following principles: Mass the effects of fire. z z Destroy the greatest threat first. z Avoid target overkill (double tapping targets). z Employ the best weapon for the target. z Minimize friendly exposure. z Employ combat identification (CID) process. z Prevent fratricide. z Plan for extreme limited visibility conditions. z Develop contingencies for diminished capabilities.
Mass the Effects of Fire 4-72. The platoon must mass its fires to achieve decisive results. Massing entails focusing fires at critical points and distributing the effects. Random application of fires is unlikely to have a decisive effect. For example, concentrating the platoon’s fires at a single target may ensure its destruction or suppression; however, that fire control COA will probably not achieve a decisive effect on the enemy formation or position.
Destroy the Greatest Threat First 4-73. The order in which the platoon engages enemy forces is in direct relation to the danger it presents. The threat posed by the enemy depends on his weapons, range, and position. Presented with multiple targets, a unit will, in almost all situations, initially concentrate fires to destroy the greatest threat, and then distribute fires over the remainder of the enemy force.
Avoid Target Overkill 4-74. Use only the amount of fire required to achieve necessary effects. Target overkill wastes ammunition and ties up weapons that are better employed acquiring and engaging other targets. The idea of having every weapon engage a different target, however, must be tempered by the requirement to destroy the greatest threats first. In most situations, however, it is necessary for the platoon to overwhelm the enemy with a tremendous volume of fire to compensate for its lack of direct-fire assets.
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Employ the Best Weapon for the Target 4-75. Using the appropriate weapon for the target increases the probability of rapid enemy destruction or suppression; at the same time, it saves ammunition. The platoon has many weapons with which to engage the enemy. Target type, range, and exposure are key factors in determining the weapon and ammunition that should be employed, as are weapons and ammunition availability and desired target effects. Additionally, leaders should consider individual crew capabilities when deciding on the employment of weapons. The platoon leader arrays his forces based on the terrain, enemy, and desired effects of fires.
Minimize Friendly Exposure 4-76. Units increase their survivability by exposing themselves to the enemy only to the extent necessary to engage him effectively. Natural or man-made defilade provides the best cover from kinetic-energy direct-fire munitions. Crews minimize their exposure by constantly seeking effective available cover, attempting to engage the enemy from the flank, remaining dispersed, firing from multiple positions, and limiting engagement times.
Employ Combat Identification Process 4-77. Combat identification is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. The CID process has three key purposes: z Identify and classify targets in the operational environment. z Allow for the timely processing of engagement decisions on targets classified as enemy. z Mitigation of fratricide and collateral damage to noncombatants. 4-78. The CID process is a series of progressive and interdependent steps (or actions) that lead to the decision process to engage or not engage: z Target search. z Detection. z Location. z Identification. 4-79. Effective CID for a crew requires a constant combined effort from each crew member.
Prevent Fratricide 4-80. The platoon leader must be proactive in reducing the risk of fratricide and noncombatant casualties. He has numerous tools to assist him in this effort: identification training for combat vehicles and aircraft; the unit’s weapons safety posture; the weapons control status; recognition markings; FBCB2 and situational understanding (see also Appendix F, this FM, for additional information about fratricide prevention). Situational awareness and employment of applicable ROE are the primary means of preventing noncombatant casualties. Note. ( Because it is difficult to distinguish between friendly and enemy dismounted Soldiers, the commander must constantly monitor the position of friendly dismounted squads.)
Plan for Extreme Limited Visibility Conditions 4-81. At night, limited visibility fire control equipment enables the platoon to engage enemy forces at nearly the same ranges that are applicable during the day. Obscurants such as dense fog, heavy smoke, and blowing sand, however, can reduce the capabilities of thermal and infrared equipment. The platoon leader should, therefore, develop contingency plans for such extreme limited visibility conditions. Although decreased acquisition capabilities have minimal effect on area fire, point target engagements will likely occur at decreased ranges. Typically, firing positions (whether offensive or defensive) must be adjusted closer to the area or point where the platoon leader intends to focus fires. Another alternative is the use of visual or infrared illumination when there is insufficient ambient light for passive light intensification devices. ( Note. Vehicles equipped with thermal sights can assist dismounted scout and infantry squads in detecting and engaging enemy infantry forces in conditions such as heavy smoke and low illumination.)
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Develop Contingencies for Diminished Capabilities 4-82. Leaders initially develop plans based on their units’ maximum capabilities; they make backup plans for implementation in the event of casualties or weapon damage or failure. While leaders cannot anticipate or plan for every situation, they should develop plans for what they view as the most probable occurrences. Building redundancy into these plans, such as having two systems observe the same sector, is an invaluable asset when the situation (and the number of available systems) permits. Designating alternate sectors of fire provides a means of shifting fires if adjacent elements are knocked out of action.
COORDINATION 4-83. Throughout the preparation phase, the platoon leader coordinates with adjacent platoons and other elements to ensure that platoon sectors of fire overlap and that CS and sustainment requirements are met. Coordination is initiated from left to right and from higher to lower. The platoon leader, however, should initiate coordination through the chain of command if he desires support not specified in the company or troop OPORD. He must also ensure that the platoon conducts necessary internal coordination.
Adjacent Unit Coordination 4-84. The information that the platoon exchanges with adjacent elements includes the following: z Locations of primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions and locations of flanks. z Overlapping fields of observation and direct fire. z Locations and types of obstacles. z Locations of any dead space between units and procedures for how dead space is to be covered. z Indirect fire targets and SOI information. z Locations of OPs and patrol routes. z Routes into and out of BPs and routes to subsequent BPs.
Platoon Coordination 4-85. Effective internal coordination within the platoon enhances the situational understanding of tank crews and alerts them to the actions needed to prepare the defense. One method of ensuring this coordination is dissemination of enemy and friendly information in the form of intelligence updates, which were discussed earlier in this chapter. In addition, sector sketches and the platoon fire plan facilitate coordination of fires before the fight begins. 4-86. Rehearsals are especially effective in helping the platoon to practice and coordinate necessary tactical skills, including these: z Occupation procedures. z Calls for fire. z Initiation, distribution, and control of direct and indirect fires. z Movement to alternate and supplementary fighting positions. z Displacement to subsequent BPs. 4-87. Rehearsals can begin as soon as the platoon receives the company or troop WARNO, with individual crews practicing berm drills, snake board exercises, and ammunition transfer drills. Initial walk-through rehearsals on a sand table can focus on deliberate or hasty occupation procedures, fire distribution, and the disengagement plan. The platoon can then conduct mounted movement rehearsals and force-on-force rehearsals, continually raising the level of difficulty by conducting the rehearsals at night and at various MOPP levels. The platoon leader should integrate voice and digital radio traffic as well as calls for fire during all rehearsals.
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WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTION CONSIDERATIONS FIRE SUPPORT 4-88. The platoon leader should confirm locations of artillery and mortar targets, adjust them as necessary, and mark them for daylight and limited visibility recognition. He should also mark triggers that will be used to request artillery on moving targets; these locations are based on the enemy’s doctrinal rates of movement, the terrain, the time of flight of artillery rounds (the company FIST has this information), and the priority of the target. Marking of triggers also may be necessary when readily identifiable terrain features are not available. 4-89. The platoon leader can use either of two methods to accurately mark triggers and target locations. In one method, a member of the platoon moves to the locations using the map, GPS, or POSNAV and marks the sites. In the second, a member of the platoon notes the impact location of rounds during artillery registration and moves to and marks these target locations. In both methods, markings must be visible under daylight and limited visibility conditions.
INTELLIGENCE 4-90. OPSEC is critical during defensive preparations. The platoon should adhere to the procedures outlined in Appendix D of this manual to limit the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance efforts. 4-91. Intelligence is constantly updated by higher headquarters as the battlefield situation develops, such as when the enemy fights through a screening or covering force. The platoon leader keeps the platoon informed with periodic intelligence updates. The updated information may force him to reevaluate and adjust his time line to ensure preparations are as complete as possible. For example, the platoon leader may determine that engineer assets only have time to dig hull-down firing positions rather than turret-down and hide positions; in another situation, he may direct the engineers to prepare fighting positions for only one section because the other section has access to terrain that provides excellent natural hull-down firing positions. 4-92. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader may conduct reconnaissance of subsequent or supplementary BPs. Simultaneous planning for these positions during the preparation of initial positions is a critical component in effective time management.
PROTECTION 4-93. Because engineer assets are at a premium during defensive preparations, they should never be allowed to remain idle for any reason other than maintenance checks and services. A member of the platoon, either the platoon leader or a designated TC, must physically link up with the engineers as directed in the platoon OPORD and escort them to each firing position. The escort provides local security and instructions to the engineers.
Survivability Considerations 4-94. Engineers improve the platoon’s survivability by digging or improving hide, turret-down, or hulldown positions (see Figure 4-4 on page 4-7). Each TC should be responsible for the improvement of his firing position. He must make sure that the location, orientation, and depth of the hole are correct before the engineer departs for the next fighting position. He should also be aware of the importance of selecting a site with a background that will break up the silhouette of his vehicle (see Figure 4-10); this helps to prevent skylining.
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Figure 4-10. Using background to prevent skylining 4-95. Several factors can help the platoon to significantly increase the number of kills it achieves while executing the defense. Firing positions should maximize weapon standoff and/or the platoon’s ability to mass fires from survivable positions. As discussed previously, firing positions and obstacles should be complementary. The platoon leader must coordinate with engineers to ensure that the platoon’s direct fires can cover the entire area of any obstacle that the commander intends to emplace in the platoon’s sector of fire. Additionally, the platoon should know the exact location of the start point, end point, and turns of the obstacle. This knowledge contributes to the accuracy of calls for fire. The platoon leader can also locate a TRP on the obstacle to ensure more accurate calls for fire.
Engineer Considerations 4-96. Engineer mobility operations in the defense normally are of lower priority than those involving survivability and countermobility. Engineers can improve routes from the platoon’s hide position to its primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions as well as to subsequent BPs. Such efforts are labor-intensive, however, and should be evaluated carefully based on the commander’s priority of work for the engineers.
SUSTAINMENT 4-97. Resupply methods and procedures are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of this manual. If the commander authorizes pre-positioning, the platoon leader determines the amount and type of prestock (normally ammunition) that will be required for the operation. For example, to calculate ammunition requirements, he evaluates the number and type of enemy vehicles the platoon expects to engage and the amount of time available to conduct resupply between engagements. He then directs the PSG to select and prepare the prestock location and coordinate the delivery of the prestock supplies. 4-98. Prestock resupply can be accomplished successfully in virtually any location where supplies can be hidden and protected, such as in or behind the primary fighting position, along the displacement route, or in the firing positions of a subsequent BP. Preparation of the site includes providing cover, concealment, and protection for platoon and delivery personnel and vehicles during the transfer process. The site must also protect the supply materials from enemy observation and the effects of artillery and weather.
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4-99. Once the supplies are delivered, the prestock site should be concealed. The platoon should conduct periodic security checks or keep the site under constant surveillance to ensure safekeeping of the prestock.
THE HUMAN ASPECT 4-100. Activities aimed at enhancing each Soldier’s health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness to fight continue during the preparation phase. Refer to the discussion of the human aspect of operations included in Section II of Chapter 3.
SECTION IV - EXECUTION 4-101. This section contains a “best case,” chronological discussion of the procedures and considerations that apply during the execution of a typical tank platoon defensive mission.
HIDE POSITION 4-102. The platoon’s hide positions are located behind its primary battle and/or fighting positions. The platoon occupies hide positions in one of two ways: either as a unit, using perimeter defense techniques discussed in Chapter 5 (this method is used when hide positions are behind the BP), or with individual vehicles occupying hide positions behind their primary fighting positions. 4-103. While in the hide position, the platoon employs all applicable OPSEC measures to limit aerial, thermal, electronic, and visual detection. It deploys OPs as discussed in Appendix D of this manual to provide surveillance of its sectors of fire and early warning for vehicles in the hide position. It also maintains the REDCON status prescribed in the OPORD. The hide position should not be located on or near obvious artillery targets. Note. The platoon leader may decide to occupy turret-down positions rather than hide positions based on terrain considerations, such as availability of cover and concealment, or if the enemy situation is vague and observation of the engagement area is necessary.
OCCUPATION OF FIRING POSITIONS 4-104. The platoon leader monitors intelligence reports provided on the company or troop net and upgrades the platoon’s REDCON status as the enemy approaches or as directed. When previously identified occupation criteria are met, he orders the platoon to occupy its primary fighting positions. Based on reconnaissance, rehearsals, and known time-distance factors, each TC moves to his position along a previously reconnoitered route. If the GPS or POSNAV is available, TCs use waypoints to assist in controlling movement. Ideally, the platoon occupies turret-down positions with enough time to orient weapon systems and acquire and track targets before the enemy crosses the direct fire trigger line. 4-105. Because the observation range of OPs is usually limited to the engagement area, OP reports should not be the sole criterion triggering the platoon’s occupation of fighting positions. If the enemy situation becomes unclear, the platoon leader may request permission to occupy turret-down positions for the purpose of scanning the engagement area.
INDIRECT FIRES 4-106. As the enemy approaches the direct-fire trigger line, the platoon leader updates his crews on the situation reported on the company or troop net. He monitors the SPOTREPs and calls for fire being sent on the company/troop net and compares these reports with the SPOTREPs from his platoon net. He reports any new enemy information higher using the SPOTREP format (see ST 3-20.153). The platoon leader employs available artillery to engage targets that are not being requested by other platoon leaders or the company/troop commander. He initiates calls for fire on moving enemy elements using previously
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identified triggers and the “AT MY COMMAND” method of control (calls for fire are discussed in Chapter 6 of this manual). 4-107. Crews of M1A2 SEP tanks can track enemy vehicle movement toward a target location by employing the vehicle’s far target designate capability; they can use this information to initiate artillery fires. Additionally, they can use the far target locator capability to determine the location of stationary targets and to quickly process a tactical fire (TACFIRE) direction system or FBCB2 call-for-fire message to attack unplanned targets.
DIRECT FIRES FIRE COMMANDS 4-108. The platoon leader initiates tank direct fires using a fire command as discussed in Chapter 2 of this manual. The fire command enables him to engage single targets (for example, a reconnaissance vehicle) using a single section or an individual vehicle without exposing the entire platoon. It also allows the platoon to maintain the element of surprise by simultaneously engaging multiple targets with a lethal initial volley of tank fires. Sectors of fire and the preplanned fire pattern should be selected to help prevent target overkill and the resulting waste o f ammunition.
TRIGGER LINE 4-109. The trigger line is a backup to the fire command. In the absence of communications from the platoon leader, a preestablished direct-fire trigger line allows each TC to engage enemy vehicles in his sector of fire. The criteria for the direct-fire trigger line should specify the number of enemy vehicles that must pass a designated location before the TC can engage without any instructions from the platoon leader. Selection of the trigger line is dependent on METT-TC factors. Considerations might include the following: z A maximum range or a point, such as an obstacle, at which the platoon will initiate fires to support the company or troop scheme of maneuver. z The survivability of enemy armor. z The fields of fire that the terrain allows. z The planning ranges for the platoon’s weapon systems. The planning range for the 105-mm main gun is 2,000 meters; for the 120-mm main gun, it is 2,500 meters.
MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 4-110. Individual TCs move from hull-down to turret-down firing positions within their primary and alternate positions based on two considerations: the necessity to maintain direct fire on the enemy and the effectiveness of enemy fires. Influencing each TC’s decision to move between firing positions are such factors as enemy movement rates, the number of advancing enemy vehicles, the accuracy with which the enemy is acquiring and engaging friendly fighting positions, and the lethality of enemy weapon systems.
R EPORTING 4-111. During the direct-fire fight, TCs describe the situation for the platoon leader, who in turn describes what is happening for the commander. Contact reports, SPOTREPs, and SITREPs are used as appropriate. In the defense, contact reports are used to alert the platoon to previously unidentified enemy targets. SPOTREPs and SITREPs are sent to list the number, types, and locations of enemy vehicles observed, engaged, and/or destroyed and to provide the strength and status of friendly forces. Everyone involved in the reporting process must avoid sending redundant or inflated descriptions of the situation. Such reports not only are confusing, but also may trigger unnecessary, and possibly dangerous, actions by higher headquarters.
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R ESUPPLY 4-112. The platoon may expend main gun ammunition quickly in a direct-fire fight. Based on the terrain and expected enemy situation, the platoon leader must develop and execute resupply procedures to maintain a constant supply of main gun rounds. He must balance the necessity of maintaining direct fires on the enemy against the demands imposed on the platoon’s crews by the ammunition transfer process and the retrieval of prestock supplies.
DISPLACEMENT 4-113. Displacement may become necessary in several types of situations. For example, a numerically superior enemy may force the platoon to displace to a subsequent BP. In another situation, a penetration or enemy advance on a secondary avenue of approach may require the platoon or section to occupy supplementary BPs or fighting positions.
DISENGAGEMENT CRITERIA AND DISENGAGEMENT PLAN 4-114. The company commander establishes disengagement criteria and develops the disengagement plan to support the company or troop scheme of maneuver. Disengagement criteria are primarily based on a specified number and type of enemy vehicles reaching a specified location (normally called the break point) to trigger displacement. Other considerations, such as ammunition supplies and friendly combat power, also influence the decision to displace.
METHODS OF DISPLACEMENT 4-115. The platoon leader chooses between two methods of displacement depending on whether or not the move is conducted with overwatch (and cover) by an adjacent platoon.
Displacement With Cover 4-116. If the displacement is covered, the entire platoon usually displaces as a whole (see Figure 4-11). It employs smoke grenades and on-board smoke generators to screen the displacement.
CAUTION On-board smoke (VEESS) will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
Figure 4-11. Displacement with cover from another element (entire platoon moves at once)
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4-117. The platoon leader issues instructions or uses a prearranged signal to initiate movement. The platoon simultaneously backs down to hide positions, keeping front hulls toward the enemy until adequate cover protects each tank. Individual tanks orient weapon systems toward the enemy as they move to the subsequent or supplementary positions along previously identified and reconnoitered routes.
Displacement Without Cover 4-118. If the displacement is not covered by another element, the platoon leader designates one section to overwatch the displacement of the other section. The overwatch section is responsible for providing suppressive fires covering the entire platoon sector of fire. It also initiates artillery calls for fire, mixing smoke with tank-killing munitions, to help cover the displacement. When overwatch is no longer necessary to cover the displacing section’s movement, the overwatch section may request one last artillery call for fire in front of its own position, then displace to the subsequent BP. Note. In some instances, the platoon may have to use bounding overwatch to the rear during tactical movement to the subsequent or supplementary position (see Figure 4-12). This may become necessary when such factors as the distance to the new position, the enemy’s rate of advance, and terrain considerations (fields of fire) do not allow the original overwatch section to displace without the benefit of an overwatch of its own.
Figure 4-12. Displacement without cover from another element (sections move using bounding overwatch)
COMPLETION OF DISPLACEMENT 4-119. The displacement is complete when the platoon has occupied the subsequent BP and all vehicles are prepared to continue the defense. If the platoon leader and TCs were able to reconnoiter and rehearse the disengagement and occupation, the occupation should go quickly. If reconnaissance and rehearsals were not possible, the platoon leader must conduct the steps of a hasty occupation outlined earlier in this chapter.
COUNTERATTACKS 4-120. The platoon is capable of conducting limited counterattacks, either alone or as part of a larger force (usually the company team). It can employ one of two methods: counterattack by fire and counterattack by fire and movement.
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PURPOSES 4-121. The platoon may conduct (or take part in) a counterattack to accomplish the following purposes: z Complete the destruction of the enemy. z Regain key terrain. z Relieve pressure on an engaged unit. z Initiate offensive operations.
COORDINATION AND CONTROL 4-122. Coordination and control are critical to the success of the counterattack. Locations of routes and positions must be planned and disseminated to all units; this assists the counterattack force and other elements in controlling indirect and direct fires. If adjustments to any route or position become necessary, the counterattack force must take immediate action to ensure that other forces lift and shift fires; otherwise, fratricide becomes a distinct danger.
COUNTERATTACK METHODS Counterattack By Fire 4-123. When the company team executes a counterattack by fire, one platoon conducts tactical movement on a concealed route to a predetermined BP or attack-by-fire position from which it can engage the enemy in the flank and/or rear. The remaining platoons hold their positions and continue to engage the enemy (see Figure 4-13). The intent of this method is to use weapon standoff and/or cover to full advantage and destroy the enemy by direct fires.
Figure 4-13. Counterattack by fire
Counterattack By Fire and Movement 4-124. The intent of this method is to close with and destroy the enemy. The counterattack force uses tactical maneuver to gain a position of advantage from which it attacks the enemy (from the flank, whenever possible) (see Figure 4-14). It conducts hasty attacks and assaults based on the particular situation and the factors of METT-TC.
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Figure 4-14. Counterattack by fire and movement
CONSOLIDATION AND R EORGANIZATION 4-125. Once an enemy assault is defeated, leaders must ensure their Soldiers are ready to continue with defensive operations, to shift to the offense, or to displace. If the platoon is directed to hold its current positions, it must consolidate and reorganize quickly so it will be ready to destroy follow-on enemy forces and to execute any other required tasks.
Consolidation 4-126. To consolidate a defensive position, the platoon takes these steps: z Eliminate remaining enemy resistance by conducting a counterattack as directed by the commander. z Reestablish communications. z Ensure positions are mutually supporting; check all sectors of fire to eliminate gaps and dead space that result when tanks are disabled. z Secure detainees. z Reestablish OPSEC by emplacing OPs and early warning devices (such as M8 alarms) and enhancing camouflage for platoon positions. z Replace, repair, or fortify obstacles. z Improve positions in accordance with procedures for a deliberate defense and established priorities of work.
R EORGANIZATION 4-127. Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is usually conducted by unit SOP. Reorganization in the defense is accomplished in the same manner as in the offense. Refer to Section VII in Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion.
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LIMITED VISIBILITY DEFENSE 4-128. The defensive fundamentals covered previously are applicable in limited visibility situations; additional considerations for planning, preparation, and execution of the defense in limited visibility are covered in the following paragraphs.
PLANNING 4-129. In the planning phase, the commander, the platoon leader, and the TCs conduct a thorough reconnaissance, usually during daylight hours, to mark positions and routes. They must keep in mind that obscurants that limit visibility may also degrade the effectiveness of their thermal sights and laser range finders. This may force them to designate engagement areas that are closer than anticipated to the unit’s BPs. In marking their positions, they use materials that will facilitate occupation either in daylight or under limited visibility conditions.
PREPARATION 4-130. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader ensures that TRPs and artillery targets are “thermalized” to allow for positive identification during limited visibility. Used with a sector sketch during direct fire engagements, thermalized TRPs also help TCs to more accurately estimate the range to their targets when smoke or other factors inhibit the use of the LRF. Ideally, rehearsals of occupation and displacement are conducted in limited visibility conditions; the same applies to preparation and occupation of fighting positions and to any necessary repositioning. 4-131. OPSEC is strictly enforced during all phases of defensive preparation. OPs are critical in providing security and early warning of enemy activities. The platoon leader emplaces mounted OPs to take advantage of the capabilities of his vehicles’ thermal sights in scanning the engagement area and the platoon’s assigned sector. Dismounted OPs provide local security and augment mounted OPs with shorterrange observation and the ability to listen for approaching enemy elements.
EXECUTION 4-132. As the platoon enters the execution phase, the platoon leader must ensure that all crewmen thoroughly understand the occupation and displacement criteria and TCs strictly enforce all fire control measures. TCs use sketch cards and the CITV (if available) to estimate target range when visibility factors prevent use of the LRF.
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Chapter 5
Other Tactical Operations This chapter describes additional tasks the tank platoon may conduct to complement or support its primary operations of move, attack, and defend. The platoon executes these additional tasks separately or as part of a larger force.
SECTION I - TACTICAL ROAD MARCH 5-1. Tank platoons conduct tactical road marches to move long distances and position themselves for future operations. The main purpose of the road march is to relocate rapidly, not to gain contact. Tactical road marches are conducted using fixed speeds and timed intervals. Road marches are planned at the battalion and company levels and executed by platoons.
PREPARATION AND SOPs 5-2. The success of a road march depends on thorough preparation and sound SOPs. 5-3. Platoon preparations should address the following considerations: z Movement to the SP. z Speed control. z Formations. z Intervals. z Weapons orientation. z Actions at scheduled halts. z Actions at the RP. 5-4. SOPs should cover the following factors: z Actions at unscheduled halts. z Actions in case a vehicle becomes lost. z Actions if a vehicle becomes disabled. z Actions on contact.
COMPOSITION 5-5. A road march is composed of three elements: z The quartering party (or advance party). z The main body. z The trail party. 5-6. The tank platoon normally travels as a unit in the main body. Before the march begins, the platoon may provide individual Soldiers or a vehicle and crew to assist with quartering party activities (see Section II of this chapter).
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MARCH COLUMNS 5-7. The following discussion focuses on the three primary road march techniques. ( Note. The commander bases his decision on the formation used during the march on which technique is employed. The road march is usually executed in column or staggered column formation.)
OPEN COLUMN 5-8. The open column technique is normally used for daylight marches. It can be used at night with blackout lights or night-vision equipment. The distance between vehicles varies, normally from 50 meters to 200 meters depending on light and weather conditions.
CLOSE COLUMN 5-9. The close column technique is normally used for marches conducted during periods of limited visibility. The distance between vehicles is based on the ability to see the vehicle ahead; it is normally less than 50 meters.
INFILTRATION 5-10. Infiltration involves the movement of small groups of personnel or vehicles at irregular intervals. It is used when sufficient time and suitable routes are available and when maximum security, deception, and dispersion are desired. It provides the best possible passive defense against enemy observation and detection. ( Note. Infiltration is most commonly used by dismounted elements.)
CONTROL MEASURES 5-11. The following discussion covers control measures the platoon leader can use in effectively controlling his platoon during the conduct of a road march.
MAP WITH OVERLAY 5-12. As a minimum, the overlay must show the SP, the RP, and the route. The SP location represents the beginning of the road march route. It should be located on easily recognizable terrain, far enough away from the unit’s initial position to allow the platoon to organize into the march formation at the appropriate speed and interval. If time is available, the platoon leader should determine the time to reach the SP. This ensures the platoon arrives at the SP at the time designated in the commander’s OPORD. The RP location is at the end of the route of march. It also is located on easily recognizable terrain. Elements do not halt at the RP, but continue to their respective positions with assistance from guides, waypoints, and/or graphic control measures. The route is the path of travel connecting the start and release points.
DIGITAL OVERLAYS 5-13. When available, digital overlays serve as the platoon’s primary source of graphic control measures, although the traditional hard-copy map and overlay must be maintained as a backup. Digital overlays display waypoints and information concerning unit locations along the route of march that can assist TCs in navigation and help them in maintaining situational understanding.
CHECKPOINTS 5-14. Locations along the route of march where interference with movement may occur or where timing is critical are represented using checkpoints. The SP, RP, and all checkpoints are considered critical points.
STRIP MAPS 5-15. A strip map can be used to assist in navigation. It must include the SP, RP, and checkpoints and must list the distances between these points. Detailed blow-up sketches should be used for scheduled halt
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locations and other places where confusion is likely to occur. Strip maps are included as an annex to the movement order; if possible, a copy should be provided to all TCs. See Figure 5-1 for an example of a strip map.
Figure 5-1. Example strip map
VISUAL SIGNALS 5-16. Hand-and-arm signals provide an alternate means of passing messages between vehicles. This becomes important because the enemy may have the ability to interfere with FM communication. Leaders must understand that this is a perishable skill.
TRAFFIC CONTROL 5-17. Road guides and traffic signs may be posted at designated traffic control points by the headquarters controlling the march. At critical points, guides assist in creating a smooth flow of traffic along the march route. Military police, members of the battalion scout platoon, or designated elements from the quartering party may serve as guides. They should have equipment that will allow march elements to identify them during periods of limited visibility.
ACTIONS DURING THE MARCH MOVING TO THE START POINT 5-18. The platoon must arrive at the SP at the time designated in the company or troop OPORD. Some commanders will designate a staging or marshaling area that enables platoons to organize their march
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columns and conduct final inspections and briefings before movement. Other units require platoons to move directly to the column from their current positions. To avoid confusion during the initial move, the platoon leader and TCs conduct a reconnaissance of the route to the SP, issue clear movement instructions, and conduct thorough rehearsals, paying particular attention to signals and timing.
MARCH SPEED 5-19. An element’s speed in a march column will change as it encounters variable routes and road conditions. This can produce an undesirable accordion effect. The movement order establishes the speed of march and maximum catch-up speed. During the march, the platoon’s lead vehicle must not exceed either the fixed march speed or the top catch-up speed. In addition, it should accelerate slowly out of turns or choke points; this allows the platoon to gradually resume the speed of march after moving past the restriction.
ORIENTATION 5-20. Each tank in the platoon has an assigned sector of fire (see Figure 5-2). TCs assign sectors of observation to crewmen both to cover their portion of the platoon sector and to achieve 360-degree observation.
Figure 5-2. Sectors of fire
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HALTS 5-21. While taking part in a road march, the platoon must be prepared to conduct both scheduled and unscheduled halts.
Scheduled Halts 5-22. These are executed to conduct maintenance, refueling, and personal relief activities and to allow other traffic to pass. The time and duration of halts are established in the movement order; unit SOP specifies actions taken during halts. The first priority at a halt is to establish and maintain local security (see Appendix D of this manual). A maintenance halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the first hour of the march, with a 10-minute break every two hours thereafter. 5-23. During long marches, the unit may conduct a refuel-on-the-move (ROM) operation. Depending on the tactical situation and the company or troop OPORD, the platoon may conduct ROM for all vehicles simultaneously or by section. The OPORD will specify the amount of fuel or the amount of time at the pump for each vehicle. It will also give instructions for security at the ROM site and at the post-fueling staging area.
Unscheduled Halts 5-24. Unscheduled halts are conducted under a variety of circumstances, such as when the unit encounters obstacles or contaminated areas or if a disabled vehicle blocks the route. The platoon conducts actions on contact and establishes 360-degree security. 5-25. A disabled vehicle must not be allowed to obstruct traffic. The crew moves the vehicle off the road immediately (if possible), reports its status, establishes security, and posts guides to direct traffic. If possible, the crew repairs the vehicle and rejoins the rear of the column. Vehicles that drop out of the column should return to their original positions only when the column has halted. Until then, they move at the rear just ahead of the trail element, usually comprised of the maintenance team with the M88 recovery vehicle and some type of security. If the crew cannot repair the vehicle, the vehicle is recovered by the maintenance element.
ACTIONS AT THE R ELEASE POINT 5-26. The platoon moves through the RP without stopping. The platoon leader picks up the assigned guide or follows the guide’s signals to the assembly area. Depending on terrain and the equipment available (GPS or POSNAV), guides and marking materials may be posted at or near exact vehicle locations. ( Note. Refer to the discussion of assembly area procedures in Section II of this chapter.)
SECTION II - ASSEMBLY AREAS 5-27. An assembly area is a site at which maneuver units prepare for future operations. A well-planned assembly area will have the following characteristics: z A location on defensible terrain. z Concealment from enemy ground and air observation. z Good drainage and a surface that will support tracked and wheeled vehicles. z Suitable exits, entrances, and internal roads or trails. z Sufficient space for dispersion of vehicles and equipment.
QUARTERING PARTY ACTIONS 5-28. Normally, a quartering party assists the platoon in the occupation of an assembly area. Established in accordance with company or troop SOP, the quartering party may consist of one or two Soldiers from each platoon or even one tank per platoon with the prescribed equipment and uniform. It is led by the
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company/troop XO or 1SG or by a senior NCO. The quartering party takes these actions in preparing the assembly area: z Reconnoiter for enemy forces, CBRN contamination, condition of the route to the assembly area, and suitability of the area (covering such factors as drainage, space, and internal routes). If the area is unsatisfactory, the party contacts the commander and requests permission to find a new location for the site. z Organize the area based on the commander’s guidance. This includes designating and marking tentative locations for the platoon, trains, and CP vehicles. z Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes. z Mark and/or remove obstacles (within the party’s capabilities). z Mark tentative vehicle locations.
OCCUPATION PROCEDURES 5-29. Once the assembly area has been prepared, the quartering party awaits the arrival of the company or troop, maintaining surveillance and providing security of the area within its capabilities. Quartering party members guide their elements (including the platoon) from the RP to their locations in the assembly area. SOPs and prearranged signals and markers (for day and night occupation) should assist the TCs in finding their positions. The key consideration is to move quickly into position to clear the route for follow-on units. 5-30. Once in position, the platoon conducts hasty occupation of a BP as described in Chapter 4 of this manual. It establishes and maintains security (see the OPSEC discussion in Appendix D) and coordinates with adjacent units. These actions enable the platoon to defend from the assembly area as necessary. The platoon can then prepare for future operations by conducting troop-leading procedures and the priorities of work in accordance the company or troop OPORD. Priorities of work are: z Establish and maintain security (REDCON status). z Position vehicles. Emplace OPs. z z Emplace CBRN alarms. z Establish lateral communications/flank coordination. z Prepare range cards and fire plans. z Establish wire communication (if directed by unit SOP). z Camouflage vehicles. z Select alternate, supplementary positions, and rally points. z Develop an obstacle plan. z Conduct troop-leading procedures. z Perform maintenance activities on vehicles, communications equipment, and weapon systems. z Verify weapon system status; conduct boresighting, muzzle reference system (MRS) updates, test-firing, and other necessary preparations. z Conduct resupply, refueling, and rearming operations. z Conduct rehearsals and training for upcoming operations. z Conduct PCCs and PCIs. z Eat, rest, and conduct personal hygiene. z Establish field sanitation. 5-31. Normally, the platoon occupies an assembly area as part of a company team or troop. The team or troop may be adjacent to or independent of the task force or squadron (see Figures 5-3A and 5-3B). The company or troop commander assigns a sector of responsibility and weapons orientations for each platoon. If the platoon occupies an assembly area alone, it establishes a perimeter defense (explained later in this chapter).
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Figure 5-3A. Battalion assembly area; company team adjacent to other company teams
Figure 5-3B. Company team assembly area independent of the battalion
OCCUPATION BY FORCE 5-32. In some cases, a company or troop will occupy an assembly area without first sending out a quartering party. During this “occupation by force,” the platoon leader orders a hasty occupation of a BP at the platoon’s designated location. He establishes local security, directs adjacent unit coordination, begins troop-leading procedures, and establishes priorities of work.
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SECTION III - ACTIONS AT A CONTACT POINT 5-33. Actions at a contact point entail the meeting of friendly ground forces. It may occur in, but is not limited to, the following situations: z Advancing forces reaching an objective area previously secured by air assault or airborne forces. Units conducting coordination for a relief in place. z z Cross-attached units moving to join their new organization. z A tank platoon moving forward during a follow and support mission with dismounted infantry or scouts. z A unit moving to assist an encircled force. 5-34. Platoons conduct actions at a contact point independently or as part of a larger force. Within a larger unit, the tank platoon may lead the linkup force. The linkup consists of three phases; the following actions are critical to the execution of a speedy, safe operation: z Phase 1—Far recognition signal. During this phase, the two units should establish communications before they reach direct-fire range. The lead element of the linkup force should monitor the radio frequency of the other friendly force. z
Phase 2—Coordination and movement to the linkup point. following information:
z
The forces coordinate the
Known enemy situation. Type and number of friendly vehicles. Disposition of stationary forces (if either unit is stationary). Routes to the linkup point. Fire control measures. Near recognition signal. Finalized location for the linkup point. Any special coordination, such as maneuver instructions or requests for medical support.
Phase 3—Linkup. The units enforce strict fire control measures to help prevent fratricide. If both units are moving, the controlling headquarters designates a location in the formation for the subordinate unit. If one unit is stationary, the moving unit moves through the linkup point to a predetermined location.
SECTION IV - CONVOY ESCORT 5-35. This mission requires the tank platoon to provide the convoy with security and close-in protection from direct fire while on the move. The platoon is well suited for this role because of its vehicles’ mobility, firepower, and armor protection against mines and direct and indirect fires. Depending on a variety of factors (size of the convoy, escort assets available, METT-TC factors), the platoon may perform convoy escort either independently or as part of a larger unit’s convoy security mission.
COMMAND AND CONTROL 5-36. Battle command is especially critical because of the task organization of the convoy escort mission. The relationship between the platoon and the convoy commander must provide for unity of command and effort if combat operations are required during the course of the mission. In most cases, the tank platoon will execute the escort mission under control of the security force commander, who is usually OPCON or attached to the convoy commander. At times, however, the platoon will be OPCON or attached directly to the convoy commander. This occurs when the platoon is providing security for tactical operations centers (TOC) or when it is operating independently with a small convoy. 5-37. The convoy commander should issue a complete OPORD to all vehicle commanders in the convoy prior to execution of the mission. This is vital because the convoy may itself be task organized from a
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variety of units and because some vehicles may not have tactical radios. The order should follow the standard five-paragraph OPORD format, but special emphasis should be placed on the following subjects: z Route of march (with a strip map provided for each vehicle commander). z Order of march. z Actions at halts. z Actions if a vehicle becomes disabled. z Actions on contact. z Chain of command. z Communications and signal information.
TACTICAL DISPOSITION 5-38. During all escort missions, the convoy security commander and tank platoon leader must establish and maintain security in all directions and throughout the length of the convoy. They can adjust the disposition of the platoon, either as a unit or dispersed, to fit the security requirements of each particular situation. As noted, several factors, including convoy size and METT-TC, affect this disposition. Perhaps the key consideration is whether the platoon is operating as part of larger escort force or is executing the escort mission independently.
LARGE-SCALE ESCORT MISSIONS 5-39. When sufficient escort assets are available, the convoy commander will usually organize the convoy into three distinct elements: advance guard, close-in protective group, and rear guard. Figure 5-4 shows a convoy in which the tank platoon is part of a company team-size escort force. 5-40. The tank platoon will normally be task organized to operate within the close-in protective group. This element provides immediate, close-in protection for the vehicle column, with escort vehicles positioned either within the column or on the flanks. The convoy commander’s vehicle is located within this group. 5-41. The advance guard reconnoiters and proofs the convoy route. It searches for signs of enemy activity, such as ambushes and obstacles. Within its capabilities, it attempts to clear the route and provides the convoy commander with early warning before the arrival of the vehicle column. In some cases, an individual tank platoon vehicle, a section, or the entire platoon may be designated as part of the advance guard. The platoon leader may also be required to attach a tank with a mine plow or mine roller to this element. 5-42. The rear guard follows the convoy. It provides security in the area behind the main body of the vehicle column, often moving with medical and recovery assets. Again, an individual vehicle, a section, or the entire tank platoon may be part of this element. Note. The convoy commander may also designate the tank platoon as part of a reaction force for additional firepower in the event of enemy contact. The reaction force will either move with the convoy or be located at a staging area close enough to provide immediate interdiction against the enemy.
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Figure 5-4. Tank platoon as part of a larger escort force
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5-43. When the platoon is deployed as a unit during a large-scale escort operation, it can provide forward, flank, or rear close-in security. In such situations, it executes tactical movement based on the factors of METT-TC. Figures 5-5A through 5-5C illustrate the platoon using various formations while performing escort duties as a unit.
Figure 5-5A. Platoon performing forward security for a convoy
Figure 5-5B. Platoon performing flank security for a convoy
Figure 5-5C. Platoon performing rear security for a convoy
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INDEPENDENT ESCORT OPERATIONS 5-44. When the tank platoon executes a convoy escort mission independently, the convoy commander and platoon leader will disperse the tanks throughout the convoy formation to provide forward, flank, and rear security. Whenever possible, wingman tanks should maintain visual contact with their leaders. Tanks equipped with mine plows or mine rollers (and engineer assets, if available) should be located near the front to react to obstacles. At times, these assets may be required to move ahead of the convoy, acting as the reconnaissance element or moving with scouts to proof the convoy route. Figure 5-6 illustrates this kind of escort operation.
Figure 5-6. Platoon performing convoy escort independently 5-45. In some independent escort missions, variations in terrain along the route may require the platoon to operate using a modified traveling overwatch technique. Figure 5-7 illustrates such a situation. It shows one section leading the convoy while the other trails the convoy. Dispersion between vehicles in each section is sufficient to provide flank security. Depending on the terrain, the trail section may not be able to overwatch the movement of the lead section.
Figure 5-7. Platoon escort using modified traveling overwatch
ACTIONS ON CONTACT 5-46. As the convoy moves toward its new location, the enemy may attempt to interdict it. This contact will usually occur in the form of an ambush, often with the use of a hastily prepared obstacle or improvised explosive device (IED). The safety of the convoy then rests on the speed and effectiveness with which escort elements can execute appropriate actions on contact. 5-47. Based on the factors of METT-TC, portions of the convoy security force, such as the tank platoon or a tank section, may be designated as a reaction force. The reaction force performs its escort duties, conducts tactical movement, or occupies an assembly area as required until enemy contact occurs; it then is given a reaction mission by the convoy commander.
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ACTIONS AT AN AMBUSH 5-48. An ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy. Conversely, reaction to an ambush must be immediate, overwhelming, and decisive. Actions on contact must be planned for and rehearsed so they can be executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with care taken to avoid fratricide. 5-49. In almost all situations, the platoon will take several specific, instantaneous actions when it must react to an ambush. These steps, illustrated in Figures 5-8A and 5-8B, include the following: z As soon as they acquire an enemy force, the escort vehicles conduct action toward the enemy (see Figure 5-8A). They seek covered positions between the convoy and the enemy and suppress the enemy with the highest possible volume of fire permitted by the ROE. Contact reports are sent to higher headquarters as quickly as possible. z The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles and continues to move them along the route at the highest possible speed (see Figure 5-8A). z Convoy vehicles, if they are armed, may return fire only if the escort has not positioned itself between the convoy and the enemy force. z Security forces must plan to secure all damaged or disabled vehicles and equipment. The platoon leader or the convoy commander may request, as a last resort, that any damaged or disabled vehicles be abandoned and pushed o ff the route (see Figure 5-8B). z The escort leader (in the example included here, this is the tank platoon leader) uses SPOTREPs to keep the convoy security commander informed. If necessary, the escort leader or the convoy security commander can then request support from the reaction force; he can also call for and adjust indirect fires.
Figure 5-8A. Convoy escort actions toward ambush
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Figure 5-8B. Convoy continues to move 5-50. Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the escort element executes one of the following COAs based on the composition of the escort and reaction forces, the commander’s intent, and the strength of the enemy force: z Continues to suppress the enemy as combat reaction forces move to support (see Figure 5-9A). z Assaults the enemy (see Figure 5-9B). z Breaks contact and moves out of the kill zone (see Figure 5-9C). 5-51. In most situations, tanks continue to suppress the enemy or execute an assault to destroy enemy forces. Contact should be broken only when the tactical situation requires.
Figure 5-9A. Escort suppresses the ambush to facilitate attack by the reaction force
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Figure 5-9B. Escort assaults the ambush force
Figure 5-9C. Escort breaks contact
ACTIONS AT AN OBSTACLE 5-52. Obstacles are a major threat to convoys. Obstacles can be used to harass the convoy by delaying it or stopping it altogether. In addition, obstacles may canalize or stop the convoy to set up an enemy ambush. 5-53. The purpose of the route reconnaissance ahead of a convoy is to identify obstacles and either breach or bypass them. In some cases, however, the enemy or its obstacles may avoid detection by the reconnaissance element. If this happens, the convoy must take actions to reduce or bypass the obstacle.
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5-54. When an obstacle is identified, the convoy escort faces two problems: reducing or bypassing the obstacle and maintaining protection for the convoy. Security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle must be accomplished very quickly. The convoy commander must assume that the obstacle is overwatched and covered by the enemy. To reduce the time the convoy is halted and thus to reduce its vulnerability, the following actions should occur when the convoy escort encounters a point-type obstacle: z The lead element identifies the obstacle and directs the convoy to make a short halt and establish security. The convoy escort overwatches the obstacle (see Figure 5-10) and requests that the breach force move forward. z The convoy escort maintains 360-degree security of the convoy and provides overwatch as the breach force reconnoiters the obstacle in search of a bypass. z Once all reconnaissance is complete, the convoy commander determines which of the following COAs he will take: Bypass the obstacle. Breach the obstacle with the assets on hand. Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets. z The convoy security commander relays a SPOTREP higher and requests support by combat reaction forces, engineer assets (if they are not part of the convoy), and/or aerial reconnaissance elements. z Artillery units are alerted to be prepared to provide fire support.
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Figure 5-10. Convoy escort overwatches an obstacle 5-55. Tanks equipped with mine plows are ideal for breaching most obstacles encountered during convoy escort missions. If the convoy escort is required to breach limited obstacles using plow tanks, the platoon leader must maintain the security of the convoy, ensuring that adequate support forces are in place to overwatch the breach operation.
ACTIONS DURING HALTS 5-56. During a short halt, the convoy escort remains at REDCON-1 regardless of what actions the convoy vehicles are taking. ( Note. Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for more information on REDCON levels.) If the halt is for any reason other than an obstacle, the following actions should be taken: z The convoy commander signals the short halt and transmits the order via tactical radio. All vehicles in the convoy assume a herringbone formation. z If possible, escort vehicles are positioned up to 100 meters beyond the convoy vehicles, which are just clear of the route (see Figure 5-11A). Escort vehicles remain at REDCON-1, but establish local security based on the factors of METT-TC. z When the order is given to move out, convoy vehicles reestablish the movement formation, leaving space for escort vehicles (see Figure 5-11B).
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z
z
Once the convoy is in column, local security elements (if used) return to their vehicles, and the escort vehicles rejoin the column (see Figure 5-11C). When all elements are in column, the convoy resumes movement.
Figure 5-11A. Convoy assumes herringbone formation
Figure 5-11B. Convoy moves back into column formation
Figure 5-11C. Convoy escort vehicles rejoin column
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SECTION V - PASSAGE OF LINES 5-57. The tank platoon participates in a passage of lines, in which one unit moves through the stationary positions of another, as part of a larger force. If it is part of the stationary force, the platoon occupies defensive positions and assists the passing unit. If it is part of a passing unit, the platoon executes tactical movement through the stationary unit. A passage may be forward or rearward, depending on whether the passing unit is moving toward (forward) or away from (rearward) an enemy unit or area of operations.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 5-58. Units are highly vulnerable during a passage of lines. Vehicles may be concentrated, and fires may be masked. The passing unit may not be able to maneuver and react to enemy contact. 5-59. Detailed reconnaissance and coordination are critical in overcoming these potential problems and ensuring the passage of lines is conducted quickly and smoothly. The commander normally conducts all necessary reconnaissance and coordination for the passage. At times, he may designate the XO, 1SG, or a platoon leader to conduct liaison duties for reconnaissance and coordination. The following items of information are coordinated ( Note. An asterisk indicates items that should be confirmed by reconnaissance): z Unit designation and composition, including type and number of passing vehicles. z Passing unit arrival time(s). z Location of attack positions or assembly areas. * z Current enemy situation. z Stationary unit’s mission and plan (to include OP, patrol, and obstacle locations). * z
z z z z z z z
z z
Location of contact points, passage points, and passage lanes. ( Note. The use of GPS/POSNAV waypoints will simplify this process and, as a result, speed the passage.) * Guide requirements. Order of march. Anticipated and possible actions on enemy contact. Supporting direct and indirect fires, including location of the restrictive fire line (RFL). * CBRN conditions. Available CS and sustainment assets and their locations. * Communications information (to include frequencies, digital data, and near and far recognition signals). Chain of command, including location of the battle handover line (BHL). Additional procedures for the passage.
CONDUCTING A PASSAGE OF LINES FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES 5-60. For a forward passage, the passing unit first moves to an assembly area or an attack position behind the stationary unit. Designated liaison personnel move forward to link up with guides and confirm coordination information with the stationary unit. Guides then lead the passing elements through the passage lane. 5-61. As the passing unit, the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to maximize its AO within the limitations of the passage lane. Radio traffic is kept to a minimum. Disabled vehicles are bypassed. The platoon holds its fire until it passes the BHL. Once clear of passage lane restrictions, the platoon conducts tactical movement in accordance with its orders.
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R EARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES 5-62. Because of the increased chance of fratricide during a rearward passage, coordination of recognition signals and direct-fire restrictions is critical. The passing unit contacts the stationary unit while it is still beyond direct-fire range and conducts coordination as discussed previously. RFLs and near recognition signals are emphasized. 5-63. As the passing unit, the tank platoon then continues tactical movement toward the passage lane. Gun tubes are oriented on the enemy, and the platoon is responsible for their own security until it passes the BHL. If guides are provided by the stationary unit, the passing unit may conduct a short halt to link up and coordinate with them. The platoon moves quickly through the passage lane to a designated location behind the stationary unit.
ASSISTING A PASSAGE OF LINES 5-64. As noted, the tank platoon provides this assistance while it is in stationary defensive positions. This can occur after the platoon has consolidated on an objective or has occupied a BP. Coordinating instructions may be in the form of a company or troop OPORD or a FRAGO issued over the radio. The platoon leader may or may not have coordinated directly with the passing unit. 5-65. The platoon leader ensures that the platoon understands the points of coordination listed previously in this section. If the platoon is to provide guides to assist the passing unit, he selects the personnel and briefs them on the points of coordination. The guides are responsible for linking up with and guiding the passing unit through the passage lane and for closing obstacles as necessary. 5-66. Control of direct fires is a critical role for the element that is assisting the passage of lines. In a forward passage, the stationary unit engages known enemy targets until the passing unit moves past the BHL. During a rearward passage, the passing unit contacts the stationary unit by radio at a point beyond the direct-fire range of weapon systems. The stationary unit then holds all fires until the passing unit reaches the BHL.
SECTION VI - BREACHING OPERATIONS 5-67. Obstacle breaching entails the employment of a combination of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and equipment to project combat power to the far side of an obstacle. The platoon leader must understand the challenges presented by various types of obstacles and the capabilities and limitations of the assets the platoon and its parent unit can employ to defeat them. He must further understand the basic tenets of breaching operations and roles the platoon may be tasked to play in a breach. FM 3-34.2 (FM 90-13-1) contains a more detailed discussion of breaching operations and enemy obstacle employment.
TYPES OF OBSTACLES 5-68. Obstacles are any obstructions that stop, delay, divert, or restrict movement. They are usually covered by observation and enhanced by direct or indirect fires and as such the platoon leader needs to plan for this possibility. This discussion examines the two categories of obstacles.
EXISTING OBSTACLES 5-69. Existing obstacles are already present on the battlefield and are not emplaced through military effort. They fall into two major classifications: z Natural obstacles, which include these types: Ravines, gullies, gaps, or ditches over 3 meters wide. Streams, rivers, or canals over 1 meter deep. Mountains or hills with a slope in excess of 60 percent (30 degrees). Lakes, swamps and marshes over 1 meter deep. Tree stumps and large rocks over 18 inches high.
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Forests or jungles with trees 8 inches or more in diameter and with less than 4 meters of space between trees on a slope. Man-made obstacles, which include built-up areas such as towns, cities, or railroad embankments.
z
R EINFORCING OBSTACLES 5-70. Reinforcing obstacles are placed on the battlefield through military effort and are designed to slow, stop, or canalize the enemy. Whenever possible, both friendly and enemy forces will enhance the effectiveness of their reinforcing obstacles by tying them in with existing obstacles. The following discussion focuses on several types of reinforcing obstacles.
Minefields 5-71. The minefield is the most common reinforcing obstacle the platoon will encounter on the battlefield. It is easier and quicker to emplace than other obstacles and can be very effective in destroying vehicles. The minefield may be emplaced in several ways: by hand, by air or artillery delivery using scatterable mines, or by mechanical means (the Volcano system). It can be used separately or in conjunction with other obstacles; refer to Figure 5-12 for possible minefield locations.
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Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations
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Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations (continued)
Antitank Ditch 5-72. The antitank ditch, illustrated in Figure 5-13, may be reinforced with wire and/or mines to make it more complex and more difficult for the attacker to overcome. In addition, soil from the ditch can be built up into a berm on the emplacing unit side.
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Figure 5-13. Antitank ditch
Road Craters 5-73. Road craters can be rapidly emplaced and are especially effective where restricted terrain on the sides of a road or trail prevents a bypass (refer to Figure 5-14). Craters are at least 1.5 meters in depth and 6 meters in diameter and are usually supplemented with mines and/or wire.
Figure 5-14. Road craters
Abatis 5-74. An abatis provides an effective barrier against vehicle movement. Trees are felled either by sawing or by use of explosives; the cut is made at least 1.5 meters above the ground, with the main trunks crisscrossed and pointed toward the enemy at approximately a 45-degree angle. The abatis is usually about 75 meters in depth and ideally is located on trails where there is no bypass; the trunk of each tree should remain attached to the stump to form an obstacle on the flanks of the abatis (see Figure 5-15). Abatis are usually mined or booby-trapped.
Figure 5-15. Abatis
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Log Crib 5-75. A log crib is a framework of tree trunks or beams filled with dirt and rock (see Figure 5-16). It is used to block roads or paths in wooded and mountainous terrain.
Figure 5-16. Log crib
Wire Obstacles 5-76. Wire obstacles provide an effective and flexible antipersonnel barrier; they are frequently employed on dismounted avenues of approach in the form of tanglefoot, double- or triple-strand concertina, and fourstrand fences. Employed in depth or in conjunction with mines, wire obstacles are also very effective against tanks and similar vehicles (see Figure 5-17). A single wire obstacle, however, will have little effect on armored vehicles; the sprocket of M1-series tanks is designed to cut wire.
Figure 5-17. Wire obstacle in depth
Tank Wall and Tank Berm 5-77. Tank walls and berms are constructed of dirt and rock to slow or canalize enemy tanks. They can also create “belly” shots for the defender while the attacker is unable to engage (see Figure 5-18).
Figure 5-18. Belly shot created by a tank berm
Road Blocks in Urban Terrain 5-78. Road blocks can be constructed of any local material, to include overturned vehicles. These obstacles would also create “belly” shots when the platoon tries to climb over the obstacle. In addition, the use of burning tires or trash will cause this to be a more complex obstacle hindering thermal and optical scanning.
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BREACHING PROCEDURES 5-79. Breaching operations entail the coordinated efforts of three task-organized elements: the support force, the breach force, and the assault force. The discussion in this section covers the actions and responsibilities of these elements, as well as the tank platoon’s role in the operation.
SOSRA STEPS 5-80. The following actions, known by the abbreviation SOSRA, occur during a breaching operation: z
Sufficient support elements are employed to suppress enemy elements that are overwatching the obstacle. The support force uses direct and indirect fires to accomplish its mission.
z
The support force requests immediate or preplanned smoke to obscure the enemy and prevent observation of the breach operation. The breach force must organize in such a manner as to secure the reduction area to prevent the enemy from interfering with the obstacle reduction.
z
z
The breach force takes actions to reduce the obstacle and allow follow-on forces to assault enemy forces beyond the obstacle after the lane is proofed and marked.
BREACHING ORGANIZATION 5-81. The commander in charge of the breaching operation will designate support, breach, and assault forces. He may task the tank platoon to serve in any of these elements, as detailed in the following discussion. During operations with light forces the platoon leader may need to be prepared to cover any one or several of the above missions. The light forces will not have the capability to create a breach large enough for a tank force.
Support Force 5-82. This element usually leads movement of the breach elements. After identifying the obstacle, it moves to covered and concealed areas and establishes support-by-fire positions. The support force leader sends a voice or digital SPOTREP to the commander. This report must describe the location and complexity of the obstacle, the composition of enemy forces that are overwatching the obstacle, and the location of possible bypasses. The commander decides whether to maneuver to a bypass or to breach the obstacle. ( Note. He must keep in mind that a bypass may lead to an enemy kill zone.) 5-83. In either case, the support force suppresses any enemy elements that are overwatching the obstacle to allow the breach force to breach or bypass the obstacle. The support force should be in position to request suppressive artillery fires and smoke for obscuration. As the breach and assault forces execute their missions, the support force lifts or shifts supporting fires. Because the enemy is likely to engage the support force with artillery, the support force must be prepared to move to alternate positions while maintaining suppressive fires.
Breach Force 5-84. The breach force receives a voice or digital SPOTREP identifying the location of the obstacle or bypass. It then must organize internally to fulfill these responsibilities: z Provide local security for the breach site as necessary. z Conduct the actual breach. The breach force creates, proofs, and marks a lane through the obstacle or secures the bypass. z Move through the lane to provide local security for the assault force on the far side of the obstacle. In some instances, the breach force may move to hull-down firing positions that allow it to suppress enemy elements overwatching the obstacle. At other times, it may assault the enemy, with suppressive fires provided by the support force.
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Breaching Methods
5-85. The tank platoon can create a lane by itself if it is equipped with the assets required to breach the type of obstacle encountered. If the platoon does not have this capability, it may be required to provide close-in protection for attached engineers with breaching assets. Three breaching methods are available to the platoon: z Mechanical breaching, usually with mine plows or mine rakes. z Explosive breaching, employing such means as the mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), M173 line charge, or 1/4-pound blocks of TNT. z Manual breaching, with Soldiers probing by hand or using such items as grappling hooks, shovels, picks, axes, and chain saws. Manual breaching is the least preferred method for the tank platoon. Note. In extreme cases, the commander may order the platoon to force through an obstacle. This technique requires the breach force to move in column formation through the obstacle location. If available, a disabled vehicle can be pushed ahead of the lead breach vehicle in an attempt to detonate mines. Creating and Proofing the Lane
5-86. The mine plow is the breaching device most commonly employed by the tank platoon. The battalion or company commander may allocate one to three plows per platoon. When properly equipped and supported, the platoon can create up to two lanes through an obstacle. 5-87. Plow tanks lead the breach force. Immediately following them are vehicles that proof the lane; these are usually tanks equipped with mine rollers. This process ensures that the lane is clear. Note. If the location and/or dimensions of the obstacle are unknown, the platoon leader may choose to lead with tanks equipped with mine rollers to identify the beginning of the obstacle.)
5-88. If the platoon is allocated one plow, the PSG’s wingman normally serves as the breach tank. The PSG follows immediately behind to proof the lane and provide overwatch. The platoon leader’s section follows the PSG. 5-89. If the platoon has two or more plows, it can create multiple lanes, usually 75 to 100 meters apart. The wingman tanks are normally equipped with the plows, with the section leader’ tanks following to proof the lanes and provide overwatch (see Figure 5-19).
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Figure 5-19. Plow tanks create multiple lanes while the section leaders’ tanks provide overwatch Marking the Lane
5-90. After the lane is created and proofed, it can then be marked to ensure safe movement by vehicles and personnel; this is critical for follow-on forces that may not know the exact location of the cleared lane. Distinctive markers must show where the lane begins and ends. A visible line down the center is effective. Another technique is to mark both sides of the breached lane. Figure 5-20 shows a sample marking method. To minimize the necessary breaching time, the proofing vehicle may simultaneously mark the lane. Unit SOPs will dictate marking methods and materials, which commonly include the following: z Cleared lane mechanical marking system (CLAMMS). z Pathfinder system. z Engineer stakes with tape. z Guides. z Chem lights. z Expended shell casings.
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Figure 5-20. Sample technique for obstacle lane marking Completing the Breach
5-91. Throughout the operation, the platoon leader provides continuous updates of the breach force’s progress to higher headquarters and other elements involved in the breach. He also coordinates with the support force for suppressive fires. 5-92. After marking is complete, the platoon leader uses voice and digital systems to report the location of the lane and the method of marking to expedite the movement of the assault force. Digital overlays enable units to move quickly to the breach lanes using the POSNAV or GPS. Note. The assault force will often move behind the breach force and closely follow the breach vehicles through the new lane.)
Assault Force 5-93. While the breach is in progress, the assault force assists the support force or follows the breach force while maintaining cover and dispersion. Once a lane is cleared through the obstacle, the assault force then moves through the breach. It secures the far side of the obstacle by physical occupation and/or continues the attack in accordance with the commander’s intent. 5-94. Tank units, including the tank platoon, are ideally suited for assault force operations against mobile enemy defenses in open terrain. Consideration should have mechanized infantry as an assault force attacking dug-in enemy positions in close terrain.
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SECTION VII - PERIMETER DEFENSE 5-95. The purpose of the perimeter defense is to protect the force or hold key terrain when the force is not tied in with adjacent units. It is generally conducted in the same manner as a defense from a BP (hasty or deliberate) except that it orients on a full 360-degree sector, normally through use of the coil formation. ( Note. For information on the coil formation, refer to the discussion of tactical movement in Chapter 3 of this manual.) Common situations for the use of the perimeter defense include the following: z Defense of assembly areas. z Defense of specific installations, sites, or equipment (such as a TOC, downed aircraft, tactical bridge, or roadblock). z Defense of key terrain (such as a bridge, hilltop, pickup zone, or landing zone). z When a unit has been isolated or bypassed by the enemy. z As part of a larger force’s perimeter defense; examples include the defense of lodgment areas (forward operating base), airfields, or assembly areas. 5-96. The tank platoon will normally execute a perimeter defense while attached to company- or battalionsize dismounted infantry units. The platoon may also establish a perimeter defense when it is operating alone and requires 360-degree security, such as during screen missions or while occupying platoon hide positions. Considerations for the execution of a perimeter defense include the following: z One section or the entire platoon orients on the most likely mounted avenues of approach. z A section or the entire platoon may occupy an assembly area within the perimeter as a reserve or reaction force. Missions of this force include the following: Moving to BPs that block potential areas of enemy penetration. Conducting counterattacks to repel or destroy an enemy penetration. Moving to BPs that add firepower to a portion of the defense. z To avoid disrupting other fighting positions, the platoon must carefully coordinate, reconnoiter, and conduct rehearsals on mounted movement routes to positions within the perimeter. z Tanks must never fire over the heads of unprotected personnel. The concussion of the main gun as well as discarded sabot petals can endanger these troops. z Close coordination with dismounted infantry is critical. The tank platoon must know the location and routes of dismounted OPs and patrols to help prevent fratricide. Additionally, the platoon must rely on dismounted infantry to provide security against enemy infiltration of the perimeter as well as close-in protection from dismounted enemy attacks.
SECTION VIII – SCREEN 5-97. The screen is a common security mission for cavalry troops and company teams. Cavalry troops conduct stationary or moving flank screens. Company teams usually establish screen lines (for counter reconnaissance purposes) in front of a task force as part of a defense. Purposes of the screen include the following: z Provide early warning of enemy approach. z Provide real-time information, reaction time, and maneuver space to the protected force. z Impede and harass the enemy. z Facilitate counter reconnaissance operations, allowing the screening force, within its capability, to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements. 5-98. During stationary screens, the tank platoon will normally occupy a hide position or a hasty defensive position in depth behind OPs. The OPs are provided by scout or mechanized infantry platoons. When the OPs identify the enemy, the commander issues FRAGOs for the tank platoon to conduct tactical movement and occupy a hasty defensive position or an attack-by-fire position; the platoon also may conduct a hasty attack to destroy the enemy. At times, the tank platoon may occupy a hasty BP as part of the screen line, acquiring and killing the enemy forward of the position. During the conduct of a stationary screen, the
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tank platoon may be required to break contact or conduct a withdrawal and then execute a passage of lines. These tasks are discussed in other sections of this chapter. 5-99. In a moving flank screen (platoons normally execute this as a follow and support operation, discussed earlier in this chapter), the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to the rear of scout platoons. It may periodically occupy hasty BPs. When the scouts identify enemy elements, the commander issues a FRAGO for the tank platoon to occupy a hasty defensive position or attack-by-fire position or to conduct a hasty attack to destroy the enemy. 5-100. It is critical that the tank platoon leader keep these considerations in mind during all screen operations: z
OPSEC requirements. During screen missions, the platoon may be required to operate apart from other units.
z
Location and identification of friendly forces. The platoon leader should know all patrol routes and OP locations within the platoon’s AO. The platoon should maintain voice and digital (if available) communications with the OPs.
z
Engagement criteria. To reduce the potential for fratricide, engagement criteria should be as specific as possible when friendly units operate to the front and flanks of the tank platoon as it executes a screen mission.
SECTION IX – DELAY 5-101. A delay operation is a continuous series of defensive actions over successive positions in depth. The purpose is to trade the enemy space for time while retaining freedom of action. Units involved in a delay maximize the use of terrain and obstacles, maintaining contact with the enemy but avoiding decisive engagement. In some instances, local counterattacks are used to assist units during disengagement or to take advantage of battlefield opportunities. 5-102. The tank platoon conducts the delay as part of a company team. In some cases, it will occupy either a hasty or deliberate BP; it will then disengage and occupy successive BPs in depth as part of the delaying force. The platoon may also be required to conduct local counterattacks or to support the movement of other platoons during the delay. The considerations involved in planning and executing a delay at platoon level are the same as for offensive operations (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual) and defensive operations (refer to Chapter 4).
SECTION X - RELIEF IN PLACE 5-103. A relief in place occurs when one unit assumes the mission and positions of another unit. It may be accomplished during either offensive or defensive operations, preferably during periods of limited visibility. There are two methods by which to conduct a relief in place: z Simultaneous. All elements are relieved simultaneously. z Sequential. The relief takes place one element at a time (by individual vehicle or by section). 5-104. A relief in place requires detailed planning, coordination, and reconnaissance before the operation is executed and precise movement and effective communications once execution begins. OPSEC is critical throughout the operation.
COORDINATION AND RECONNAISSANCE 5-105. When time is available and the situation permits, the incoming platoon leader coordinates with the in-place platoon leader and conducts a reconnaissance to confirm details of the relief. The two leaders should coordinate and exchange the following information: z The enemy situation and other pertinent intelligence. z The platoons’ maneuver and fire support plans. Who will provide fire support and for how long?
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z z z z z
z
z
Unit level obstacle plans. Routes to be used during the operation The location of weapons and fighting positions. Sketch cards and fire plans (including grid locations for input into digital systems). Details of the relief, to include the sequence, the use of recognition signals and guides, and the time of change of responsibility for the area. Procedures for transferring excess ammunition, POL, wire lines (hot loops), and other materiel to the incoming unit. Command and signal information.
5-106. Reconnaissance of relief positions is the same as for any BP. The incoming platoon leader should obtain information on the following: z The engagement area, to include triggers, and trigger lines, TRPs, obstacles, and the break point. z Primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions. z Routes to and within the BP. z Hide positions. z Location of guides.
RELIEF PROCEDURES 5-107. After reconnaissance and coordination are complete, the platoon leaders continue with their troopleading procedures and prepare to execute the relief. Initially, the relieving unit moves to an assembly area behind the unit to be relieved. Final coordination is conducted, and information is exchanged between the two units. 5-108. The relieving unit links up with guides or finalizes linkup procedures. Individual vehicles then relieve forward positions using one of three techniques: z The relieving vehicles occupy primary positions after the relieved unit has moved to alternate positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit can withdraw. z The relieving vehicles occupy alternate positions while the relieved unit remains in primary positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws. The platoon leader then orders the relieving unit to o ccupy primary positions as necessary. z The relieving unit occupies a hide position while the relieved unit occupies hide, primary, or alternate positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws.
SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS 5-109. As noted, OPSEC is critical in preventing enemy reconnaissance and intelligence assets from identifying the weaknesses and vulnerabilities that occur during the relief. Net discipline is the key to an effective, and secure, relief operation. Before beginning the relief, the relieving unit changes to the outgoing unit’s frequency and the two units operate on the same net throughout the relief. The incoming unit observes radio listening silence while the outgoing unit maintains normal radio traffic. 5-110. By monitoring the same frequency and maintaining digital links, leaders at all levels have the ability to contact other units involved in the relief to warn of emergency situations, such as enemy contact. Because of the proximity of the relieved and relieving elements, however, leaders must remember that the net will be crowded with many stations and digital links competing for limited availability of “air time.” 5-111. Once the relief is complete, there are two methods for returning to separate unit frequencies. One technique is to have the incoming unit switch back to its original frequency. The other is to have the outgoing unit switch to an alternate frequency. The latter technique offers several advantages: z The relieving unit establishes voice and digital communications and is prepared to defend immediately upon the exit of the relieved unit.
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z
z
The relieving unit never loses the digital link (if applicable) as it assumes the new mission. Once the relief is complete, the relieved unit simply logs off the digital net and switches to an alternate FM frequency; it can then reestablish a digital link after leaving the relief site. Maintaining radio traffic on the same frequency before, during, and after the operation will help deceive the enemy as to whether a relief has occurred.
SECTION XI - WITHDRAWAL 5-112. The purpose of this retrograde operation is is to free a force in contact with the the enemy so it can execute a new mission. Conducting a withdrawal at platoon level is is identical to disengagement (see the discussion in Chapter 4 of this manual). The withdrawal may be conducted under pressure (with direct or indirect fire enemy contact) or with no pressure.
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Chapter 6
Combined Arms Operations The tank platoon must take full advantage of available combined arms assets to accomplish its mission mission and to reduce its its vulnerability on the battlefield. Combined arms integration may include mortars, FA, combat engineers, ADA, and aviation units. These assets are not organic organic to the tank platoon, platoon, but they may be available available to through its parent battalion, company, company, or troop. The platoon leader must understand understand the capabilities and limitations of each combined arms asset in order to effectively employ them in combat.
SECTION I - FIRE SUPPORT 6-1. Mortars and FA FA are the primary means of indirect fire fire support available available to tank platoons. In addition to understanding the capabilities and limitations of these assets, platoon leaders and their TCs must know what fire request channels to use to request fires. fires. They must also understand how to to work with the FIST at company team/troop level level to plan and coordinate indirect fires. fires. FM 6-30 explains how to call for and adjust fires.
MORTAR SUPPORT 6-2. Mortars afford afford immediate immediate and responsive indirect indirect fire support to maneuver forces. forces. Each combined combined arms battalion (CAB) has four 120-mm mortar systems systems organized into two sections. Each reconnaissance squadron has six 120-mm mortar systems organized with two systems organic to each troop.
CAPABILITIES 6-3. With a maximum maximum effective effective range of 7,200 meters, 120-mm 120-mm mortars can provide a heavy volume of accurate, sustained fires. They are ideal weapons for attacking attacking a variety of targets, including the following: following: z Infantry in the open. z Targets on reverse slopes. z Targets in narrow ravines or trenches. z Targets in forests, towns, and other areas that are d ifficult to strike with low-angle fires. 6-4. In addition to these highly flexible targeting options, options, mortars have the the following capabilities capabilities and advantages: z Rapid response time. z Effective against low-density targets. z Highly destructive target effects.
LIMITATIONS 6-5. Mortars are limited limited in the the following following ways: ways: z Maximum range is limited in comparison to the indirect fire support capability of FA elements. z They cannot be used against targets inside their minimum indirect fire effective range (200 meters from the mortar tube position). z Only limited types of ammunition are available.
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z z
Mortar elements carry limited amounts of ammunition. Their fire direction center (FDC) and tubes are not linked to the TACFIRE system.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 6-6. Mortars can be extremely effective when used for the purposes outlined in the following discussion.
Destruction 6-7. High-explosive (HE) rounds, mounted mounted with variable-time variable-time (VT) fuses, can be used to destroy or disperse dismounted infantry infantry and vehicles that are in the open. HE mortar rounds have the the capability to destroy or disable some armored vehicles.
Suppression 6-8. HE rounds can be used to force the enemy enemy to button up or move to less advantageous positions.
Smoke 6-9. Mortar smoke smoke builds up more rapidly than than artillery smoke. White phosphorus (WP) rounds are used for obscuration and screening. See Appendix E of this manual for detailed detailed information information on the use of smoke.
Illumination 6-10. Illumination rounds are used to light an area or enemy position during periods of limited visibility. Illumination can increase the effectiveness of the tank platoon’s image intensification devices (passive sights). This helps the platoon in gathering information, information, adjusting adjusting artillery fire, and engaging engaging enemy targets. Ground-burst illumination can also be used to mark enemy positions and to provide a thermal TRP for control of fires. 6-11. Units must be careful, careful, however, not to illuminate illuminate friendly positions. positions. Also, because U.S. night-vision devices may or may not be superior to those of most potential adversaries, illuminating the battlefield may be unnecessary or even counterproductive.
FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT 6-12. Tank platoon leaders must fully understand how to use artillery support support to their best advantage. It is often their primary means of delaying and disrupting enemy formations and suppressing enemy positions. FA can provide immediate, responsive, accurate fires with a wide variety of munitions. 6-13. FA support is provided by an artillery artillery (fires) battalion battalion of the brigade (BCT). Each ground squadron in the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) has its own organic howitzer battery to provide dedicated indirect fire support. The platoon generally receives FA support support through its attached company or troop FIST. FIST.
CAPABILITIES 6-14. In support of the tank platoon, FA elements can accomplish accomplish the following tasks: z Provide immediate suppression on unplanned targets. z Provide continuous fire support on planned targets in all weather conditions and types of terrain. z Allow commanders and platoon leaders to shift and mass fires rapidly. z Offer a variety of conventional shell and fuse combinations. z Provide obscuration and screening smoke to conceal movement. z Fire battlefield illumination rounds as necessary.
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LIMITATIONS 6-15. FA support has the following limitations: limitations: z Limited capability against moving targets. z Limited capability to destroy point targets without considerable ammunition expenditure or use of specialized munitions. z Highly vulnerable to detection by enemy target acquisition systems.
FIRE SUPPORT TEAM 6-16. The FIST is attached to companies or troops for combat operations or assigned as part of the company in the CAB. It may be positioned positioned forward with a security force force in support of operations when on-target designation is required for special munitions munitions engagements. The FIST, however, is is a valuable resource because of its command and control link with the artillery; it should not be exposed to direct fire except when absolutely necessary.
SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS 6-17. FISTs are organized, equipped, and trained to provide the following personnel and support to the company or troop: z A fire support advisor and coordinator. z A communications link to all available indirect fire support assets. z On-the-spot support for infantry companies (ten-man team) or for armor companies and cavalry troops (four-man team).
COMMUNICATIONS 6-18. The armor or mechanized infantry FIST normally monitors monitors the following radio nets: z Attached unit command net (battalion, company team, or troop). z Battalion mortar fire direction net. z Direct support (DS) battalion fire direction net (digital). z Battalion fire support net (voice). 6-19. The armored cavalry troop FIST normally monitors monitors these radio nets: z Troop command net. z Troop fire support net. z Supporting artillery fire direction net (digital and voice). z Squadron fire support net. 6-20. The FIST serves as the net control station (NCS) on the unit fire support net, while the fire support element (FSE) serves as the NCS on the maneuver battalion battalion fire support net. The FIST relays calls for fire fire to supporting artillery on a digital net (TACFIRE) or sends the fire mission to the mortar platoon or section. The command net allows the FIST to to monitor operations and links the FIST to the commander commander and platoon leaders for planning and coordination.
FIRE SUPPORT TEAM VEHICLE 6-21. The FIST will operate from one of two vehicles; the M981, known as the fire support team vehicle (FISTV) or the M7 Bradley fire support team (BFIST) vehicle. Refer to Figure 6-1 for an illustration.
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Figure 6-1. Fire support support team vehicle
FIRE REQUEST CHANNELS 6-22. In a tank company, all requests for indirect fire support are normally sent through the FIST on the company or troop command net. The commander approves the request using a prearranged method method (oral approval or silence). The FIST selects selects the best available available fire support asset to engage the target. target. Adjustments of the fire mission normally are also sent to the FIST, which then relays the message to the artillery unit on a digital fire direction direction net or to the battalion mortars on the fire support net. net. In cavalry troops, the FIST may pass the fire mission to the troop mortars; all adjustments are sent directly to the mortars. 6-23. Besides specific requests sent to the FIST, the platoon can request fire support in several other ways: z Calls for fire can result from SPOTREPs sent on the company or troop command net; the company FIST eavesdrops on the net and requests fires on targets of opportunity and on targets approved by the commander. z Requests for fire can be “tagged” onto preformatted SPOTREPs and contact reports sent via FBCB2. The TC presses the button for “request fire,” “immediate “immediate suppression,” or “immediate “immediate smoke” when sending a FBCB2 report (see Figures 6-2). z Requests for fire support can be entered directly into the TACFIRE system using FBCB2. Using the digital system, the platoon leader can exit a communications net and link into the TACFIRE system. system. Once the request is complete, the platoon platoon leader exits the TACFIRE TACFIRE system and reenters the unit’s net. Unit SOP will dictate dictate the use of this TACFIRE capability; capability; see ST 320.153 for details.
Figure 6-2. FBCB2 SPOTREP SPOTREP (immediate suppression suppression request)
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FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL PROCEDURES INITIAL CALL-FOR -F -FIRE 6-24. The standard call for fire consists of three basic transmissions, which in turn comprise six elements: z Observer identification and WARNO (first transmission). z Target location (second transmission). z Target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control (third transmission).
Observer Identification and Warning Order (First Transmission) 6-25. Observer identification identification tells the FDC who is calling. calling. It also clears the net for the duration of the call. The WARNO tells the FDC FDC the type of mission and the method method of locating the target. The types of indirect fire missions are the following: z Adjust fire. This is used when the observer is uncertain of the exact target location. location. The observer says, “ADJUST FIRE.” z Fire for effect. The observer should always attempt first-round fire for effect if he is sure his target location is correct. correct. He should also be sure the rounds of the first volley volley will have the desired effect on the target so little little or no adjustment will be required. The observer announces, “FIRE FOR EFFECT.” ( Note. On FBCB2-equipped vehicles, properly updated POSNAV data and an accurate lase to to the target provide extremely extremely accurate accurate target location. location. This enables observers to call “FIRE FOR EFFECT” on the first transmission.) z Suppression. The word “SUPPRESS” is used to quickly bring fire on a preplanned target when unable to observe. This is a simplified call for fire fire and is sent in one transmission. Example: “G24—THIS IS G59—SUPPRESS G59—SUPPRESS AF2401—OVER.” AF2401—OVER.” Target description is not announced. z Immediate suppression. This is used to bring fire quickly on a planned target or a target of opportunity that is firing at a friendly unit or aircraft. As an example, the observer says, “G24— THIS IS G57—IMMEDIATE G57—IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION SUPPRESSION AF2402—OVER.” AF2402—OVER.” Target description is not announced. z Immediate smoke. This is used to place smoke quickly on a planned target or a target of opportunity that is is firing at a friendly unit. Sample transmission: transmission: “G24—THIS “G24—THIS IS G54— IMMEDIATE SMOKE AF2405—OVER.” 6-26. The polar and shift methods are announced to the FDC as part of the first transmission. transmission. They will be covered more in the following paragraph.
Target Location (Second Transmission) 6-27. Following the type of mission, the method of target location is announced; this prepares the FDC to receive the data sent by the observer and apply it to locate locate the target. The three methods for locating locating targets are grid, polar plot, and shift from a known point. The polar and shift methods are announced to the FDC. If the observer does not specify either polar polar or shift, the FDC knows the grid grid method is being used; the word “grid” is not announced. announced. Example: “H24—THIS IS H67—FIRE H67—FIRE FOR EFFECT—POLAR— EFFECT—POLAR— OVER.” Grid Method
6-28. In the grid method, the target location normally consists consists of a two-letter grid zone identifier with with eight digits (example: “AB180739”). The direction from the observer to the target (in mils, if possible) possible) must be given to the FDC after the call for fire, but before the first adjusting rounds are shot. Note. With the likelihood of operating in built-up areas, crew members should call for fire using eight- or ten-digit grids to reduce collateral damage.
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Polar Plot Method
6-29. This method requires that the observer and the FDC know the observer’s exact location. The observer determines the direction (to the nearest 10 mils) of the observer-target (OT) line and the distance (to the nearest 100 meters) from his position to the target (see Figure 6-3).
Figure 6-3. Polar plot method of target location Shift From a Known Point Method
6-30. This method can be used if the observer and the FDC have a common known point (see Figure 6-4). Normally, this point is an artillery target. To locate the target, the observer must first determine the direction to the known point to the nearest 10 mils. If the observer has no compass, he can determine the direction by using a map and protractor or by using his binocular reticle pattern and a known direction to the known point. He then determines direction to the target using the RALS rule (right add, left subtract).
Figure 6-4. Shift from a known point method using direction (in mils) 6-31. The observer then determines the lateral and range shifts (see Figure 6-5). Lateral shifts are left or right from the known point to the OT line and are given to the nearest 10 meters. Range shifts are given as “ADD” (when the target is beyond the known point) or “DROP” (when the target is closer than the known
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point). Range shifts are given to the nearest 100 meters. FM 6-30 explains in detail how to determine lateral and range shifts.
Figure 6-5. Lateral and range shifts from a known point
Target Description, Method of Engagement, and Method of Fire and Control (Third Transmission) 6-32. The observer includes the target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control in his call for fire using the guidelines discussed in the following paragraphs. Target Description
6-33. The observer describes the target to the FDC; see Figure 6-6 for examples. The FDC then determines the type and amount of ammunition needed. The target description should be brief but accurate. This is the last required element in the call for fire.
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Figure 6-6. Target description Method of Engagement
6-34. The observer tells how he wants to attack the target (including type of ammunition, fuse, and distance from friendly troops). The FDC may change the ammunition type and fuse based on availability or other constraints. If the target is within 600 meters of friendly troops, the observer announces “DANGER CLOSE” to supporting mortars and artillery. Method of Fire and Control
6-35. The observer will state who will give the command for fire to begin firing. If the observer wants to control the time of firing, he will say, “AT MY COMMAND.” The FDC will tell the observer when the unit is ready to fire. At the proper time, the observer will say, “FIRE.” If the observer does not say, “AT MY COMMAND,” the FDC will fire as soon as the platoon or battery is ready.
ADJUSTING INDIRECT FIRE 6-36. Once the call for fire has been made, the observer’s next concern is to get the fire on the target. If he can locate the target accurately, he will request fire for effect in his initial call for fire. When the observer cannot accurately locate the target, for any reason such as deceptive terrain, lack of identifiable terrain features, or poor visibility, he must execute an adjustment to bring fires on the target. Normally, one artillery piece or mortar is used in adjustment. 6-37. The observer must first pick an adjusting point. For a destruction mission (precision fire), the target is the adjusting point. For an area target (area fire), the observer must pick a well-defined adjusting point at the center of the area or close to it. The observer must spot the first adjusting round and each successive round and send range and deviation corrections, as required, back to the FDC until fire hits the target. The observer spots by relating the burst or group of bursts to the adjusting point. For a further discussion of adjusting mortar and artillery fire, see FM 6-30.
TANK PLATOON FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING 6-38. The fire support plan is developed along with the scheme of maneuver supports. It discusses the use of all available indirect and direct fires. The goal is to destroy as many enemy elements as possible and to suppress any others to keep them from firing on friendly forces. The company commander and FIST plan indirect fires; however, the platoon leader may plan and request more targets if needed.
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6-39. After receiving the company offensive fire plan, the platoon leader checks it to ensure that targets are planned on all known or suspected enemy positions in front of, on, behind, and to the flanks of the objective. The company defensive fire plan should list planned targets in front of, on, behind, and to the flanks of BPs; likely areas for these targets include observed choke points, avenues of approach, obstacles, and likely support-by-fire positions. If more targets are necessary for either the offensive or defensive plan, the platoon leader coordinates them with the commander and the FIST.
SECTION II - ARMY AVIATION 6-40. Army aviation forces may be employed organic to a division or higher level of command to conduct maneuver or provide support. Aviation forces may also be attached or OPCON to another command. Army aviation units normally will not be OPCON to echelons below battalion level; however, attack helicopters may conduct direct air-to-ground coordination with companies and platoons during combat operations.
AIR CAVALRY 6-41. Armed reconnaissance, found in combat aviation brigades, is organized, equipped, and trained to conduct reconnaissance and security missions.
ATTACK HELICOPTERS 6-42. Attack helicopter units operate either as a separate element within a division or as part of the air cavalry. Attack helicopter companies are maneuver units and are normally integrated into the ground scheme of maneuver. When working with ground maneuver units, the attack helicopter unit may be placed OPCON to the ground force. Normally, it is OPCON to a maneuver brigade or regiment; on rare occasions, it can be OPCON to a battalion or squadron. 6-43. The primary aircraft in air cavalry units is the OH-58D. This helicopter provides substantial limitedvisibility and all-weather acquisition capability. The aircraft features a stabilized mast-mounted sight (MMS) with a low-light TV camera, TIS, and laser range finder/designator. It can acquire armored vehicle targets at night at ranges up to 10 kilometers. It can be armed with a wide assortment of weapons and thus can be configured for a variety of threat situations (see Figure 6-7).
Figure 6-7. OH-58D armed helicopter 6-44. Aeroscouts usually arrive before attack aircraft, establish communications with ground forces, and coordinate the situation and mission with the commander. Aeroscouts identify targets, choose general BPs, and control attack helicopter fires. 6-45. The attack helicopter is primarily employed as an anti-armor weapon system. Figure 6-8 shows the type of attack aircraft in the Army’s inventory, the AH-64 Apache.
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Figure 6-8. Army attack helicopters
SECTION III - COMBAT ENGINEERS 6-46. Brigade/regiment and battalion/squadron commanders decide how best to employ their engineer assets: as a distinct unit, attached to their subordinate elements, or in direct support of the subordinate elements. In the heavy BCT, the maneuver battalions have an engineer company assigned to the battalion. In fast-moving offensive operations, one technique is to place engineers OPCON to the lead company team or troop to support breaching operations. In the defense, commanders generally keep engineer units intact to construct major obstacles and execute survivability operations, designating the priority of work to be accomplished. Engineers are trained to fight as infantry as a secondary mission; however, they are employed as infantry only if absolutely necessary.
CAPABILITIES 6-47. The combat engineer platoon is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct mobility, countermobility, and survivability missions in support of ground operations. The higher unit commander determines the engineers’ specific tasks and responsibilities in these three roles.
ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT Organization 6-48. The combat engineer platoon consists of three squads mounted in M113s or M2 IFV (see Figure 6-9). Every squad has a demolition set, chain saw, and two mine detectors. The platoon headquarters is authorized one M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE), which is highly mobile, armored, and amphibious (see Figure 6-10).
Figure 6-9. Combat engineer platoon organization
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Figure 6-10. M9 armored combat earthmover
Equipment 6-49. The platoon may also be supplemented with equipment from the engineer company.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 6-50. In mobility operations, the engineer platoon can provide the following support: z
Obstacle reduction. The engineers can reduce or negate the effects of obstacles, thereby improving their supported unit’s maneuver capability.
z
Route construction. The engineers can construct, improve, and maintain roads, bridges, and fords.
6-51. In a countermobility role, engineers can assist with obstacle construction to obstruct the enemy’s scheme of maneuver. They can reinforce terrain and existing obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the enemy force. 6-52. Engineers can improve survivability by constructing dug-in positions and overhead protection to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapons.
ENGINEER SUPPORT TO THE TANK PLATOON 6-53. Combat engineers normally support the company team as a platoon under the direction of the company team commander. During planning for mobility, countermobility, and survivability work, the engineers can advise the commander on construction time and materials needed; the company normally must order much of the material through battalion supply channels. 6-54. The tank platoon leader frequently will be tasked to provide security while the engineer platoon conducts its missions. To speed up the construction process, the engineers may need the help of armor crewmen. Additional details on engineer support and employment are in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this manual.
SECTION IV - AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 6-55. Air and missile defense assets are scarce; maneuver units can expect not to receive any air and missile defense protection. As a result, the tank platoon must be able to protect itself from enemy air attacks during all combat operations. Air and missile defense measures include actions to avoid enemy air attack, actions to limit the damage if an attack occurs, and (as necessary) actions required to engage enemy aircraft.
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AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE WARNINGS 6-56. Local air and missile defense warnings are used to indicate the air threat. They are used in conjunction with the weapon control status (discussed in the active air and missile defense portion of this section) to provide early warning of and planned responses to enemy aircraft. There are three local air and missile defense warning levels: z z
z
DYNAMITE. Aircraft are inbound or attacking locally now. LOOKOUT. Aircraft are in the area of interest but are not threatening. They may be inbound, but there is time to react. SNOWMAN. There are no aircraft posing a threat at this time.
Note. Air and missile defense warnings of RED, YELLOW, and WHITE are established at levels higher than division. These roughly parallel the local warning levels, but they cover a larger area of operations, such as a theater.
PASSIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 6-57. Passive air and missile defense is the tank platoon’s first line of defense against enemy air attack. It includes all measures, other than active defense, taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action. There are two types of passive air and missile defense: attack avoidance and damage-limiting measures.
ATTACK AVOIDANCE 6-58. If an enemy pilot cannot find friendly elements, he cannot attack them. The platoon should use concealment, camouflage, deception, communications security, and any other necessary action to prevent enemy detection. Refer to the discussion of OPSEC in Appendix D of this manual. 6-59. Whenever possible, static positions must provide effective overhead concealment. When concealment is not available, vehicles must be camouflaged to blend into the natural surroundings. Track marks leading into the position must be obliterated. All shiny objects that could reflect light and attract attention must be covered.
DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES Dispersion 6-60. Dispersion is one of the most effective ways to reduce the effects of enemy air attack. It is essential when a unit is occupying static positions such as assembly areas or is preparing to cross a water obstacle or pass through a breached obstacle. When the platoon is on the move and air guards identify an enemy air attack, vehicles disperse quickly, move to covered and concealed positions if possible, and stop (a stationary vehicle is more difficult to see than a moving vehicle). Refer to the discussion of the react to air attack battle drill in Chapter 3 of this manual. An early warning system that includes both visual and audible signals can help to limit damage by enabling the platoon to begin dispersion at the earliest possible moment.
Cover 6-61. Another damage-limiting measure is the use of natural or man-made cover to reduce the effects of enemy munitions. Folds in the earth, depressions, buildings, and sandbagged positions can provide this protection.
ACTIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 6-62. Although passive measures are the first line of defense against air attack, the tank platoon must be prepared to engage enemy aircraft. The decision to fight back against an air threat is based on the situation
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and the capabilities of organic weapon systems. All platoon members must understand that they can defend against a direct attack but cannot engage aircraft that are not attacking them unless the weapon control status allows it.
WEAPON CONTROL STATUS 6-63. The weapon control status describes the relative degree of control in effect for air and missile defense fires. It applies to all weapon systems. The platoon leader receives the status from the company or troop commander. The three control statuses are the following: z
WEAPONS FREE. Crews can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. This is the least restrictive weapon control status.
z
WEAPONS TIGHT. Crews can fire only at air targets positively identified as hostile according to the prevailing hostile criteria.
z
WEAPONS HOLD. Crews are prohibited from firing except in self-defense or in response to a formal order from the unit commander. This is the most restrictive control status.
PLATOON AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE FIRES 6-64. When it must fight back, the platoon can use the tank’s main gun and machine guns against attacking aircraft.
Machine Gun Fires 6-65. Engaging aircraft with volume fire is the key to effective use of the machine guns. These fires must be coordinated to be effective. Delivered on the platoon leader’s command, they are directed at an aim point; gunners do not attempt to track the target with machine guns. Refer to Chapter 3, Figure 3-20 of this manual for guidelines and procedures for selecting machine gun aim points. These rules are simple and logical; everyone in the platoon must learn and retain them.
Main Gun Fires 6-66. Several types of main gun ammunition are effective against helicopters, including MPAT, highexplosive antitank (HEAT), and armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) rounds. The main gun aim point is always center of mass. Note. Refer to the battle drill for reaction to air attack in Chapter 3 of this manual. For further information on MPAT ammunition, refer to FM 3-20.12.
SECTION V - AIR SUPPORT
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 6-67. Close air support (CAS), provided by the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps, can be employed to destroy large enemy armor formations or when using smart weapons can be effective against point targets. CAS strikes can be either preplanned (at brigade, battalion, or squadron level) or requested on an immediate-need basis through the battalion enlisted terminal air controller (ETAC). The ETAC on the ground or the forward air controller (FAC) in the air acts as a link between the ground element and the CAS aircraft. 6-68. Army air cavalry is best equipped to coordinate with U.S. Air Force assets in joint air attack team (JAAT) and attack helicopter operations. The air cavalry can see the battlefield and the target better than ground forces can, and it has the radio equipment needed to talk to U.S. Air Force aircraft. The attack aircraft organic to air cavalry units can assist CAS aircraft in suppressing the enemy ADA threat.
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Table 6-1. Characteristics and capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft
AIRCRAFT
SERVICE
CHARACTERISTICS (Typical Munitions)
AV-8B
USMC
Vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 4,000 lbs. Maximum load 9,200 lbs; 25mm Gatling gun.
A-10 or O/A-10
USAF, USAF Reserve, USAF NG
Specialized CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum load 16,000 lbs; 30-mm gun.
F-15E
USAF
Multi-role aircraft; priority is air-to-ground; supersonic; maximum load 24,500 lbs; 20-mm cannon with 512 rounds.
F-16
USAF, USAF Reserve, USAF NG
Multi-role aircraft; complements the F-15 in an air-to-air role; most accurate air-to-ground delivery system in the inventory; supersonic; typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum load 10,500 lbs.
F/A-18
USN, USMC
Multi-role fighter; wide variety of air-to-surface weapons; typical load 7,000 lbs. Maximum load 17,000 lbs; 20-mm gun mounted in the nose and air-to-air missiles.
AC-130
USAF, USAF Reserve
Specialized CAS/rear area combat operations (RACO) aircraft, propeller driven, two models. The A-model is equipped with two 40-mm guns, two 20-mm guns, and two 7.62-mm mini guns. The H-model is similar, except it has no 7.62 mini guns and one of the 40-mm guns is replaced with a 105-mm howitzer. Both models have advanced sensors and a target acquisition system including forward-looking infrared and low-light TV. Weapons employment accuracy is outstanding. This aircraft is vulnerable to threat air defense systems and must operate in a low ADA threat environment.
Note. Typical load is average load for typical support mission; maximum load is the amount the aircraft can carry in an ideal situation. Ammunition load is for information purposes only, as the platoon has no control of aircraft configurations. This will help platoon leaders understand which aircraft would best be able to support the platoon for a certain type of mission.
MARKING FRIENDLY POSITIONS 6-69. Whenever possible, friendly positions should be marked during close air strikes, especially when friendly troops are within 300 meters of the target. Resources for marking positions include the following: z
z
6-14
Smoke. The smoke grenade is the most commonly used marker, but it has limitations. Wind may cause smoke to drift above trees, and some colors can blend with the background. Violet or white smoke shows up well against most background colors. Flares. Rocket or 40-mm flares are useful for attracting attention at night; they can sometimes be employed effectively during the day.
z
Mirrors and signal panels. Signal mirrors are probably the best ground-to-air devices for attracting attention. If the sun is shining and the operator is skillful, pilots can see a mirror’s flash miles away. VS-17 signal panels are also good visual references for pilots.
z
Lights. Pocket-size, battery-powered strobe lights produce brilliant white or blue flashes at about 1-1/2-second intervals. The flash is visible at night for 1 to 3 miles. Vehicle lights, such as an unshielded red taillight, are visible to a pilot for several miles at night. Chemical glow lights can also be used to mark friendly positions. One technique that can be used at night is to tie an infrared or green chemical light on a 10-foot string. When aircraft are in the area, a crewman can swing the light in a circular motion to mark the location.
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SECTION VI - MILITARY POLICE 6-70. Military police (MP) operations play a significant role by assisting the commanders in meeting the challenges associated with conducting combat operations. MPs provide a wide range of diverse support in urban terrain, to include area damage control, area security, detainee operations, and noncombatant operations. MP operations require continuous coordination with host-nation civilian police to maintain control of the civilian population and to enforce law and order. These MP assets may be attached or OPCON to combat units for the duration of a specific mission and then will be released to the control of their parent unit. Their training in urban operations can be of great assistance for help in crowd control, roadblocks/checkpoints, marking and controlling routes, and detainee control.
MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT 6-71. The maneuver and mobility support (MMS) function involves numerous measures and actions necessary to support the commander’s freedom of movement in his area of responsibility (AOR). The MPs expedite the forward and lateral movement of combat resources and ensure that commanders get forces, supplies, and equipment when and where they are needed. This is particularly important in the modern battlefield where there is a greater geographical dispersal of forces and lengthened lines of communication. 6-72. The MPs maintain the security and viability of the strategic and tactical lines of communication to ensure that the commander can deploy and employ his forces. The MPs support the commander and help expedite military traffic by operating traffic-control points (TCPs), defilades, or mobile patrols; erecting route signs on main supply routes (MSR) or alternate supply routes (ASR); or conducting a reconnaissance for bypassed or additional routes. The MPs move all units quickly and smoothly with the least amount of interference possible. 6-73. As part of the MMS function, the MPs support river-crossing operations, breaching operations, and a passage of lines. They also provide straggler control, dislocated-civilian control, route reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), and MSR regulation enforcement.
AREA SECURITY 6-74. The MPs perform the area security (AS) function to protect the force and enhance the freedom of units to conduct their assigned missions. The MPs, who provide AS, play a key role in supporting forces in operations outside main battle area. The MPs act as a response force that delays and defeats enemy attempts to disrupt or demoralize military operations in the AO. The MPs’ mobility makes it possible for them to detect the threat as they aggressively patrol the AO, MSRs, key terrain, and critical assets. The MPs’ organic communications enable them to advise the appropriate headquarters, bases, base clusters, and moving units of impending enemy activities. With organic firepower, the MPs are capable of engaging in decisive operations against a Level II threat and delaying (shaping) a Level III threat until commitment of the tactical combat force (TCF).
DETAINEE OPERATIONS 6-75. The Army is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) executive agent for all detainee operations. Additionally, the Army is DOD’s executive agent for long-term confinement of U.S. military prisoners. Within the Army and through the combatant commander, the MPs are tasked with coordinating shelter, protection, accountability, and sustainment for all types of detainees. A detained person in the custody of US armed forces who has not been classified as an RP (retained person) or a CI (civilian internee) is treated as an EPW until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority. 6-76. The I/R function is of humane as well as tactical importance. In any conflict involving U.S. forces, safe and humane treatment of detainees is required by international law. Military actions on the modern battlefield will result in many detainees. Entire units of enemy forces, separated and disorganized by the shock of intensive combat, may be captured. This can place a tremendous challenge on tactical forces and can significantly reduce the capturing unit’s combat effectiveness. The MPs support the battlefield
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commander by relieving him of the problem of handling detainees with combat forces. The MPs perform their I/R function of collecting, evacuating, and securing detainees throughout the AO. In this process, the MPs coordinate with military intelligence (MI) to collect information that may be used in current or future operations.
LAW AND ORDER 6-77. The law and order (L&O) function consists of those measures necessary to enforce laws, directives, and punitive regulations. The MPs’ L&O function extends the battlefield commander’s C2. The MPs, in close coordination with the Criminal Investigative Division (CID), work to suppress the chance for criminal behavior throughout the AO.
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Sustainment Sustainment elements arm, fuel, fix, feed, clothe, and provide transportation and personnel for the platoon. The platoon leader is responsible for supervising sustainment within the platoon. The PSG is the sustainment operator for the platoon, as the 1SG is for the company and troop. The PSG advises the platoon leader of logistical requirements during preparation for combat operations. He also keeps the platoon leader informed of the platoon’s status. During combat operations, the PSG coordinates directly with the 1SG, informing him of the platoon’s supply, maintenance, and personnel requirements. The PSG is assisted by the other TCs and the gunners on the platoon leader ’s and PSG’s vehicles.
SECTION I - ORGANIZATION 7-1. The platoon has no organic sustainment assets. The PSG coordinates directly with his 1SG for all sustainment assets. The PSG is also the primary recipient of all maintenance, supply, and personnel reports within the platoon. He is assisted by the TCs, but it is his responsibility to keep the platoon leader informed of the current status of the platoon. 7-2. Most routine sustainment functions are accomplished by SOP. These procedures and services include the following: z Accountability, maintenance, and safeguarding of the unit’s assigned equipment. z Reporting of the status of personnel, equipment, and classes of supply. z Requests for resupply. z Turn-in of equipment for repair. z Evacuation of personnel (WIA, KIA, detainees). z Evacuation of equipment and vehicles for replacement and/or repair.
SECTION II - SUPPLY OPERATIONS 7-3. Each platoon has a large amount of equipment and requires frequent resupply to accomplish its mission. All leaders must make periodic checks to ensure that the platoon’s equipment, especially high-use items, is accounted for and ready to use. They must anticipate supply expenditures and request resupply before an operation begins. 7-4. The company or troop delivers supplies to the platoon. Priorities for delivery are established by the company/troop commander. The PSG distributes supplies within the platoon.
BASIC AND COMBAT LOADS BASIC LOAD
7-5. For supply classes other than ammunition, the basic load covers supplies kept by units for use when combat is initiated. The quantity of each item of supply in a basic load is based on the number of days the unit may have to sustain itself in combat without resupply.
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7-6. For ammunition (Class V), the basic load is the quantity of ammunition required to be on hand to meet combat needs until resupply can be accomplished. The basic ammunition load is specified by the theater army and is expressed in rounds, units, or units of weight, as appropriate.
COMBAT LOAD 7-7. The combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the platoon must have on hand to sustain operations in combat for a prescribed number of days. The platoon’s parent unit must be capable of moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets, into combat in a single delivery. Like the basic load, the platoon’s combat load is specified by higher headquarters.
CLASSES OF SUPPLY CLASS I 7-8. Class I includes subsistence items (rations, water, and ice) as well as gratuitous issue of items related to health, morale, and welfare. 7-9. Each vehicle maintains a supply of rations, usually a three- to five-day stock, in the form of meals, ready-to-eat (MRE). Hot meals are brought forward whenever possible. All meals should be eaten in shifts, and they should never be served at one centralized location. The platoon leader and PSG must make sure not only that the platoon is fed, but also that their Soldiers eat nutritious meals to maintain the energy levels required in combat. During continuous or cold-weather operations, Soldiers will eat more than three meals per day. This extra allowance must be planned and requested. 7-10. Potable water should be replenished daily, either by refilling from the water trailer or by rotating 5gallon cans with the 1SG or supply sergeant. Each combat vehicle should maintain a minimum of 10 gallons of potable water, more during operations in arid climates or in MOPP gear. The platoon should also maintain a minimum amount of nonpotable water for vehicle and equipment maintenance; one technique is to recycle water previously used for personal hygiene.
CLASS II 7-11. Class II includes items of equipment, other than principal items, that are prescribed in authorization and allowance tables. Among these items, which are requested through the supply sergeant, are individual tools and tool sets, individual equipment and clothing items, chemical lights, batteries, engineer tape, tentage, and housekeeping supplies. Supply sergeant should also keep 10-percent overage of central issue facility (CIF) items in order to replace Soldier’s equipment that is lost or damaged during operations.
CLASS III 7-12. Class III comprises all types of POL products. Rearming and refueling usually occur daily or at the conclusion of major operations; for optimum security, they should be executed simultaneously under the cover of limited visibility. The two techniques of refueling and rearming and tailgate and service-station resupply are covered later in this section. 7-13. The platoon leader must control redistribution of fuel and ammunition when these supplies cannot be delivered or when only limited quantities are available. The PSG continually monitors the platoon’s supply status through CS reports and, on digitally equipped vehicles, automated SITREPs. Refer to ST 3-20.153 for report formats. The PSG notifies the platoon leader before a specific vehicle or the platoon as a whole is critically short of these major classes of supply. 7-14. In planning for refueling operations, the platoon leader should balance the range and fuel capacity of his vehicles against the requirements of future operations. The platoon must top off vehicles whenever the tactical situation permits. When time is limited, however, the platoon leader must choose between topping off vehicles that need the most fuel first and giving limited amounts to each vehicle. Vehicle crews must maintain a stock of oil, grease, and hydraulic fluid, replenishing these POL products every time they refuel.
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CLASS IV 7-15. Class IV includes construction and barrier materials used by the platoon to construct OPs and obstacles and to improve fighting positions. Barrier materials include lumber, sandbags, concertina or barbed wire, and pickets. Based on unit SOP, some Class IV materials may be part of the tank load plan; other materials are requested through the company or troop headquarters. Prior planning for resupply is required due to long delivery and large amounts of haul assets required.
CLASS V 7-16. Class V is ammunition, to include small arms, artillery and tank rounds, mines and demolitions, fuses, missiles, and bombs. 7-17. He should take steps to ensure ammunition is equally distributed throughout the platoon before the start of any tactical operation, after direct-fire contact with the enemy, and during consolidation on an objective.
CLASS VI 7-18. Class VI covers personal-demand items. Tobacco products, candy, and toiletry articles are normally sold through the exchange system during peacetime or for units not in a combat environment. In a combat environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and comfort packs.
CLASS VII 7-19. Class VII includes major-end items. These are major pieces of equipment, assembled and ready for intended use, such as combat vehicles, missile launchers, artillery pieces, and major weapon systems. Major-end items that are destroyed are reported immediately by means of CS reports (see ST 3-20.153 for report formats). The items will be replaced by the parent unit as they are reported and as available.
CLASS VIII 7-20. Class VIII includes medical supplies, which are provided through the battalion or squadron medical platoon and ordered through the medical team supporting the platoon, company, or troop. Included are individual medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits and combat lifesaver bags, water purification tablets, and foot powder.
CLASS IX 7-21. Class IX comprises repair parts carried by the maintenance team. These basic-load supplies are part of the PLL. PLL items carried by the platoon usually include spare track, road wheels, assorted bolts, machine gun parts, and light bulbs. Class IX supplies are requisitioned through the company or troop maintenance section by using the DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet .
METHODS OF RESUPPLY 7-22. The tank platoon uses three methods in conducting supply operations: pre-positioning, routine resupply, and emergency resupply. The method to be used is determined after an analysis of the factors of METT-TC.
PRE-POSITIONING 7-23. Pre-positioning of supplies, also known as prestock resupply, may be required in some defensive operations. Normally, only Class V items will be prestocked, but Class I and Class III supplies may be included in some situations. Prestock operations are fairly rare in the offense and generally are limited to refueling.
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Operational Considerations 7-24. The location and amount of a prestock must be carefully planned and then verified through reconnaissance and rehearsals. Each TC must be informed of prestock locations. The following considerations influence selection of prestock sites and execution of the resupply operation: z Availability of overhead cover for the prestock location. z Cover and concealment for the location and routes that vehicles will take to reach it. z Security procedures required to safeguard the resupply operation. z Procedures for protecting friendly personnel and vehicles in the event prestock ammunition is ignited.
Prestock in the Defense 7-25. There are several techniques for accomplishing prestock resupply in the defense. Normally, Class V (ammunition) is positioned next to or within a vehicle’s fighting position. This enables the tank crew to resupply during an engagement without displacing. Another technique is to locate Class V supplies en route to or within a successive BP. Use of this method requires consideration of security procedures to safeguard the prestock. Resupply of Class III (specifically fuel) is usually accomplished behind a unit’s current BP or en route to a successive BP. When the platoon must conduct this type of resupply in the defense, the platoon leader directs the PSG to rotate vehicles or sections through prestock positions based on the enemy situation and shortages within the platoon. Security will require planning to prevent enemy dismounted/guerilla forces from destroying or sabotaging prestocked supplies.
Prestock in the Offense 7-26. As noted, pre-positioning of supplies in the offense is normally limited to refueling. The ROM technique is planned and organized at battalion or higher level to sustain vehicles during long movements. The goal of the ROM is to ensure that vehicles are topped off prior to possible contact with the enemy. Security for ROM sites is normally maintained using battalion assets. If enough fuel-hauling vehicles are available, individual vehicles, sections, platoons, or companies/troops proceed directly to their specified fuel vehicle and either top off or receive an amount of fuel specified in the OPORD. If the number of fuel vehicles is limited, vehicles either assume a herringbone formation or occupy hasty defensive positions until they can top off.
Destruction or Removal of Supplies 7-27. In all prestock operations, the unit must have a plan for the destruction or removal of supplies to prevent their capture by the enemy. The plan should include information about the location of and routes to prestock sites.
R OUTINE R ESUPPLY 7-28. These operations include regular resupply of items in Classes I, III, V, and IX and of any other items requested by the company or troop. Routine resupply is planned at battalion level and normally takes place at every opportunity. The LOGPAC comprises company/troop and battalion/squadron assets that transport supplies to the company or troop (see Figure 7-1).
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Figure 7-1. Example company or troop LOGPAC 7-29. The company or troop supply sergeant assembles his LOGPAC in the battalion/squadron field trains area under the supervision of the support platoon leader from the FSC and the company 1SG. Replacements and hospital returnees travel to company/troop locations on LOGPAC vehicles as required. 7-30. Once the LOGPAC is prepared for movement, the supply sergeant moves the vehicles forward from the field trains as part of the battalion/squadron resupply convoy to the logistics resupply point (LRP). The 1SG or his representative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to the company or troop resupply point. The company or troop then executes tailgate or service-station resupply; refer to the discussion of these resupply techniques later in this section.
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EMERGENCY R ESUPPLY 7-31. Emergency resupply, normally involving Class III and Class V, is executed when the platoon has such an urgent need for resupply that it cannot wait for the routine LOGPAC. Emergency resupply procedures start with immediate redistribution of ammunition in individual vehicles, followed by crossleveling of ammunition within the platoon. It is better to have four tanks with 20 rounds of ammunition each than two tanks with 40 rounds and two others with none. 7-32. Once requested through the commander or 1SG, emergency supplies are brought forward by the battalion/squadron support platoon. Based on the enemy situation, the tank platoon may have to conduct resupply while in contact with the enemy. Two techniques are used to resupply units in contact: Limited supplies are brought forward to the closest concealed position, where the tailgate z technique of resupply is used. z Individual vehicles or sections disengage and move to a resupply point, obtain their supplies, and then return to the fight. This is a version of the service-station technique. Note.
Refer to the following discussion of the tailgate and service-station resupply techniques.
TECHNIQUES OF RESUPPLY 7-33. The tactical situation will dictate which technique of resupply the platoon will use: tailgate, service station, a variation of one type, or a combination of both types. The situation will also dictate when to resupply. Generally, the platoon should attempt to avoid resupply during the execution of offensive operations; resupply should be done during mission transition. Resupply is unavoidable during defensive missions of long duration.
TAILGATE R ESUPPLY 7-34. In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition are brought to individual tanks by the 1SG or another responsible individual who is assisting him (see Figure 7-2). This method is used when routes leading to vehicle positions are available and the unit is not under direct enemy observation and fire. It is timeconsuming, but it is useful in maintaining stealth during defensive missions because tanks do not have to move. If necessary, supplies can be hand carried to vehicle positions to further minimize signatures.
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Figure 7-2. Tailgate resupply technique
SERVICE-STATION R ESUPPLY 7-35. In the service-station technique, vehicles move to a centrally located point for rearming and refueling, either by section or as an entire platoon (see Figure 7-3). Service-station resupply is inherently faster than the tailgate method; because vehicles must move and concentrate, however, it can create security problems. During defensive missions, the platoon must be careful not to compromise the location of fighting positions.
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Figure 7-3. Service-station resupply technique
VARIATIONS AND COMBINATIONS 7-36. The platoon leader can vary the specifics of the two basic techniques, or he can use them in combination. During a defensive mission, for example, he may use the tailgate technique for a mounted forward OP and the service-station method for the remainder of the platoon located in hide positions (see Figure 7-4).
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Figure 7-4. Combination of resupply techniques
SECTION III - MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS 7-37. Proper maintenance keeps equipment and materiel in serviceable condition. It includes PMCS, as well as inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, recovering, and evacuating equipment and materiel when necessary. 7-38. There are two maintenance echelons in the tank platoon: z Field maintenance, which consists of crew tasks, organizational tasks, and direct-support (DS) tasks. z Sustainment maintenance, which consists of general support (GS) tasks and some DS tasks. 7-39. The tank platoon maintenance structure is designed to support the “replace forward, repair rear” concept. This concept focuses on the combat repair team (CRT) replacing nonserviceable line replaceable units (LRU), and evacuating systems to higher levels for repair. Field maintenance primarily involves system tasks that are performed on or nearby a system to return it to mission-capable status. These tasks do not require disassembly of components after removal from the system. 7-40. Sustainment maintenance involves off-system tasks that support the supply system. These tasks generally require disassembly of components away from the combat system and, when repaired, are returned to the supply system rather than the user. 7-41. Repair and recovery take place as far forward as possible. When personnel cannot repair the equipment on site within two hours, they move the equipment to the nearest rear unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).
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7-42. The platoon leader is concerned primarily with supervising operator maintenance. He also must ensure that personnel perform scheduled services as part of organizational maintenance. In addition, he must ensure that personnel provide support for DS maintenance elements when equipment must be evacuated.
LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES PLATOON LEADER 7-43. The platoon leader has ultimate responsibility for the condition and performance of the platoon’s equipment and materiel. In that role, his duties include the following: z Ensuring, within the platoon’s maintenance capabilities, that all platoon vehicles, weapon systems, and equipment such as night-vision devices, mine detectors, and communications equipment are combat ready at all times. The platoon leader also ensures that equipment that cannot be repaired at platoon level is reported to organizational maintenance as soon as possible using DA Form 2404. z Knowing the status of current platoon maintenance activities, including corrective actions for equipment faults, job orders to DS maintenance elements, and requisition of repair parts. The platoon leader keeps his commander informed of the platoon’s maintenance status. z Coordinating with the maintenance officer in planning, directing, and supervising unit maintenance for the platoon. z Developing and supervising an ongoing maintenance training program. z Ensuring that tank crews have appropriate technical manuals on hand and are trained and supervised to complete operator maintenance properly. z Ensuring that unit-level PMCS are performed on all assigned equipment in accordance with appropriate operator’s manuals. z Ensuring that drivers are trained and licensed to operate platoon vehicles and equipment. z Planning and rehearsing a maintenance evacuation plan for every mission.
PLATOON SERGEANT 7-44. The PSG has primary responsibility for most of the platoon’s maintenance activities. His duties include the following: z Directing and supervising unit maintenance of platoon equipment, vehicles, and weapon systems. Because time constraints will not allow all equipment to be PMCS’d every day, the PSG will need to develop a schedule to ensure all equipment is checked in a reasonable time. At a minimum, weapons and vehicles must be checked daily. z Helping the platoon leader to comply with his responsibilities and assuming these responsibilities in his absence. z Coordinating with the 1SG to arrange organizational or DS maintenance. z Supervising and accounting for platoon personnel during maintenance periods. z Ensuring that repair parts are used or stored as they are received. z Collecting reports of the platoon’s maintenance status in the field and sending the appropriate consolidated reports to maintenance personnel. z Ensuring that vehicles are always topped off with fuel in garrison and that they receive adequate fuel in the field. z Keeping the platoon leader informed of the platoon’s maintenance and logistics status.
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TANK COMMANDERS AND PLATOON LEADER ’S GUNNER 7-45. The TCs and the gunner from the platoon leader’s tank are the platoon’s first-line maintenance supervisors. In large part, the platoon’s maintenance status, and thus its combat readiness, depends on their commitment to proper maintenance procedures. Their duties in this area include the following: z Ensuring that the equipment inspection and maintenance worksheet is filled out accurately and updated in accordance with DA Pam 750-8. z Ensuring that dispatch records are completed accurately and turned in on schedule. z Ensuring that the crew is properly trained in PMCS procedures and that PMCS are performed on the vehicle in accordance with the appropriate technical manuals. Soldiers must be made to use the book, to ensure correct checks are being completed. (See special note after paragraph 7-45, below.) Ensuring that, as a minimum, the assigned driver for each vehicle is properly trained and z licensed. In preparing for continuous operations, the TC must ensure that all crew members are trained and licensed as drivers. z Ensuring that repair parts are installed upon receipt or are stored in authorized locations. z Ensuring that all tools and basic issue items (BII) are properly marked, stored, maintained, and accounted for. z Ensuring that each vehicle is always topped off in garrison and that it receives as much fuel as possible at every opportunity in the field. z Constantly updating the PSG on the maintenance and logistics status of the vehicle.
LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE FIELD MAINTENANCE — OPERATOR 7-46. Operator maintenance includes proper care, use, and maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew equipment such as weapons, CBRN equipment, and night-vision devices. Checks and services prescribed for the automotive system, weapon systems, and turret are divided into three groups: z Before-operation. z During-operation. z After-operation. 7-47. The driver and other crew members perform daily checks and services on their vehicle and equipment, to include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication, cleaning, preserving, and adjusting. The driver and gunner are required to record the results of checks and services, as well as all equipment faults and deficiencies that they cannot immediately correct, on the equipment inspection and maintenance worksheet (DA Form 2404). The worksheet is the primary means of reporting equipment problems through the TC to the PSG and platoon leader and ultimately to organizational maintenance personnel. 7-48. The M1A2 is equipped with embedded nonintrusive and intrusive diagnostic test capabilities; these include the built-in test (BIT) and fault isolation test (FIT). These tests enable crews to identify and isolate many system and component failures prior to the arrival of organizational mechanics. Unit SOP should specify how to report the results of these tests as well as identify the duties of organizational mechanics.
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Special Note Detailed vehicle and equipment checks and services are outlined in every operator’s manual and should always be conducted as stated in the manual. Although operators must learn to operate equipment without referring to the manual, maintenance must be performed using the appropriate technical manual—not from memory!
FIELD MAINTENANCE — FIELD MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS 7-49. Organizational maintenance is the responsibility of the unit assigned the equipment. It is performed by the operators and mechanics provided by the FSC of the brigade support battalion. Because the tank’s design allows rapid modular replacement of parts, many faults can be corrected, and the vehicle returned to the platoon, with minimum delay. 7-50. When the operator identifies a problem that is beyond his level of maintenance capability, he notifies his chain of command so the problem can be isolated and corrected. The company or troop maintenance team provided by the FSC has trained mechanics who are authorized to perform field maintenance tasks as prescribed in the technical manuals for the vehicle. 7-51. The built-in diagnostic tests on the M1A2 SEP (BIT/FIT) facilitate rapid replacement of defective components and systems. When the crew isolates a problem using these tests, the organizational mechanic can verify the fault as soon as he arrives on site and replace the component without further diagnostic testing. 7-52. Other functions performed by field maintenance technicians either at the FSC or BSB consist of repair and/or replacement of parts, assemblies, components, and limited fabrication. Maintenance support teams from DS units are usually located forward with the battalion or squadron field trains. These support teams may go forward to fix disabled equipment on site, but they are limited in what they can fix and where they can go.
SUSTAINMENT MAINTENANCE 7-53. Sustainment maintenance entails operations employing job shops or bays or production lines; it gives units the capability to task-organize to meet special mission requirements. Sustainment maintenance assets operate at echelons above corps (EAC). Based on METT-TC factors and the tactical situation, platoon- or team-size elements may be moved as far forward as necessary to fulfill support requirements.
RELATED OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS EVACUATION 7-54. Evacuation is necessary when a damaged vehicle cannot be repaired on site within two hours or when evacuation is the only means (besides friendly destruction) available to prevent capture or destruction by the enemy. When a vehicle needs to be evacuated, the platoon leader or PSG reports its exact location, the vehicle type, and the extent of damage, if known, on the company or troop net to personnel designated in the unit SOP. The crew should remain with the vehicle to assist in evacuation and repair, to provide security, and to return the repaired vehicle to the platoon as soon as possible. 7-55. A recovery vehicle from the company/troop or battalion/squadron maintenance team will evacuate the damaged vehicle. It is vital that the crew move the damaged vehicle to a covered position that allows the recovery vehicle to reach it without exposing the recovery crew to enemy fire. The vehicle is evacuated to an LRP, to the MSR, or to the UMCP as necessary. 7-56. The recovery team normally employs an M88A1/A2 recovery vehicle. This vehicle travels with the company or troop maintenance team under the direction of the 1SG. The location of the maintenance team during operations is designated in the company/troop OPORD.
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7-57. If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time is critical, other platoon vehicles can evacuate the damaged vehicle for short distances. The decision to do this rests with the platoon leader. Towing procedures are outlined in the operator’s manual. Self-evacuation by the platoon is a last resort that should be considered only to prevent losing the damaged vehicle to the enemy. 7-58. If the damaged vehicle will be lost for an extended period, the platoon can replace other vehicles’ damaged equipment (such as weapons and radios) with properly functioning items from the damaged vehicle within the commander’s controlled substitution policy. Damaged equipment can then be repaired or replaced while the vehicle is being repaired.
SECTION IV - PERSONNEL OPERATIONS
PERSONNEL SERVICES 7-59. Many of the personnel services required by the platoon are provided automatically by higher-level support elements; nonetheless, the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for coordinating personnel services and providing them to his platoon. These services are nearly always executed and supervised by the PSG and TCs and include the following: z Personal needs and comfort items, such as clothing exchange and showers. z Awards and decorations. z Leaves and passes. z Command information. z Mail. z Religious services. z Financial services. z Legal assistance. z Rest and relaxation. z Any other service designed to maintain the health, welfare, and morale of the Soldier.
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 7-60. Personnel management includes classification, assignment, promotions, and reenlistments. Although the platoon leader requests these actions through the company or troop, they are normally performed by the battalion or squadron staff or by a division-level organization. The platoon leader must submit accurate strength reports to ensure that crew positions, in which critical shortages exist, such as TCs and gunners, are filled with qualified personnel.
SECTION V - MEDICAL TREATMENT AND EVACUATION
HEALTH AND HYGIENE 7-61. Leaders must emphasize high standards of health and hygiene. Soldiers must shave daily so their protective masks will seal; bathing and changing clothes regularly are essential in preventing disease. Each crewman should carry shaving equipment, soap, a towel, and a change of clothing in a waterproof bag inside his pack. 7-62. During cold weather, Soldiers must check their hands and feet regularly to prevent such conditions as frostbite, trench foot, and immersion foot. They must also learn that the effects of windchill on exposed skin are equal to those of temperatures much lower than the thermometer shows. A moving vehicle will cause a windchill effect even if the air is calm. 7-63. Field sanitation teams are trained in preventive medicine measures (PMM) and in treatment of disease and nonbattle injuries (DNBI). They may advise the company/troop commander and platoon leader on the implementation of unit-level procedures for PMM and DNBI. For additional information,
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refer to FM 21-10. Each platoon should have an NCO designated a field sanitation representative to ensure the platoon follows proper procedure when operating in a decentralized environment.
SOLDIERS WOUNDED IN ACTION CREW R ESPONSIBILITIES 7-64. It is the TC’s responsibility to make sure that WIA crewmen receive immediate first aid and that the platoon leader or PSG is notified of all casualties. The platoon has to have a plan to ensure sections keep eyes on each other so that if one is damaged or destroyed, the platoon leadership will know about it without having to relay on radio traffic. The use of crewmen who are trained as combat lifesavers is absolutely critical. As a minimum, one member of each tank crew must be a trained combat lifesaver. Ideally, however, each crewman should be a combat lifesaver. As per unit SOP, TCs will need to mark their vehicles so that the unit medics can identify where casualties are located and who has priority.
EVACUATION PROCEDURES 7-65. If wounded crewmen require evacuation, the platoon leader or PSG takes one of the following steps: z Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop aidman for ground evacuation. z Coordinate with the company or troop commander for self-evacuation using organic platoon assets. z Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop commander for aerial evacuation. 7-66. Regardless of the method of evacuation, all TCs must have the necessary sustainment graphics available, including casualty collection points for the company/troop and/or combined arms battalion/squadron. Evacuation procedures must be included in the platoon plan and should be rehearsed as part of mission preparation. 7-67. Aerial evacuation, if it is available, is preferred because of its speed. The platoon leader or PSG coordinates with higher headquarters and then switches to the designated frequency to coordinate directly with aerial assets for either MEDEVAC or casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) services. He must pick a relatively flat, open, and covered and concealed position for the aircraft’s landing zone. The location should be given to the aircraft by radio and marked with colored smoke as the aircraft approaches the area. The tank platoon provides local security of the landing zone until the evacuation is complete.
ACTIONS FOLLOWING EVACUATION 7-68. After evacuation is complete, the PSG compiles and submits witness statements and casualty feeder reports in accordance with unit SOP. See Figure 7-5A, DA Form 1156 (Casulaty Feeder Card [front side]) and Figure 7-5B, DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Card [back side]) for a sample casualty feeder report. The platoon leader redistributes crewmen and, as necessary, directs TCs to take the actions necessary to prepare for operations at reduced manpower levels. ( Note. It is extremely difficult, but not impossible, for the platoon to sustain continuous operations with three-man crews.)
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Figure 7-5A. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (front side)
Figure 7-5B. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (back side) 7-69. A wounded crewman’s individual weapon becomes the responsibility of the TC, or senior remaining crewmen. Personal effects, weapons, and equipment are turned in to the company or troop supply sergeant at the earliest opportunity. The crewman’s protective mask stays with him at all times. All sensitive items remain with the vehicle; these include maps, overlays, and SOPs.
SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION 7-70. The company/troop commander will designate a location for collection of KIA personnel. The remains of each KIA Soldier are placed in a body bag or sleeping bag or rolled in a poncho and are evacuated by the PSG or 1SG. The lower dog tag is removed and retained by the PSG or 1SG. The
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personal effects of the KIA Soldier remain with the body. The Soldier’s weapon, equipment, and issue items become the responsibility of the TC until they can be turned over to the supply sergeant or 1SG. 7-71. As a rule, the bodies of KIA Soldiers should not be placed on the same vehicle as wounded Soldiers. If the PSG or 1SG cannot expedite evacuation, however, a vehicle may have to carry dead and wounded personnel together to its next stop. In the attack, this may be the objective. In the defense, it may be the next BP.
SECTION VI - DETAINEES 7-72. If enemy soldiers want to surrender, it is the tank crew’s responsibility to take them into custody and control them until they can be evacuated. Detainees are excellent sources of combat intelligence; however, this information will be of tactical value only if the prisoners are processed and evacuated to the rear quickly. 7-73. The unit SOP or company/troop OPORD should designate specific detainee handling procedures, such as collection points, responsibilities for safeguarding prisoners, and procedures for moving prisoners. The following discussion focuses on considerations that may apply when the platoon must deal with detainees, captured equipment and materiel, and civilians. (See FM 3-19.40 for additional information on the handling of detainees.)
HANDLING DETAINEES BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 7-74. The basic principles for handling detainees are covered by the “five-S’s and T” procedures (search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag) outlined below.
“Five-S’s and T” Procedures for Handling Detainees SEARCH
Remove and tag all weapons and documents. Return to the detainee all personal items with no military value. Detainees are allowed to keep their helmet, protective mask, and other gear that will protect them from the immediate dangers of the battle area.
SEGREGATE
Break the chain of command; separate detainees by rank, sex, and other suitable categories (keep the staunch fighter away from those who willingly surrender).
SILENCE
Prevent detainees from giving orders, planning escapes, or developing false “cover stories.”
SPEED
Speed detainees to the rear to remove them from the battle area and to quickly obtain and use their information.
SAFEGUARD
Prevent detainees from escaping. Protect them from violence, insults, curiosity, and reprisals of any kind.
TAG
Tag detainees with a DD Form 2745, (Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag) or a field-expedient capture tag that includes the following information: Date of capture. Location of capture (grid coordinates). Capturing unit.
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Special circumstances of capture (how the person was captured, if he resisted, if he gave up, and so forth). Note.
The capturing unit must complete a capture tag because failure to do so hinders further processing and disposition.
7-75. The first rule that platoon members must keep in mind is that they must never approach an enemy soldier, even when it appears certain that he wants to surrender. He may have a weapon hidden nearby, or he may be booby-trapped. The following procedures apply for taking the prisoner into custody: z Gesture for him to come forward, and then wait until it is clear that he is honestly surrendering and not trying to lure friendly troops into an ambush. z Use a thermal sight to locate possible ambushes. z When searching the prisoner, always have another friendly Soldier cover him with a weapon. z Do not move between the enemy and the Soldier covering him. 7-76. As directed by the platoon leader, crewmen take the detainees to an area designated by the commander. The prisoners are then evacuated to the rear for interrogation. If a detainee is wounded and cannot be evacuated through medical channels, the platoon leader notifies the XO or 1SG. The detainee will be escorted to the company or troop trains, or the 1SG will come forward with guards to evacuate him.
DETAINEE R IGHTS AND R ESPONSIBILITIES 7-77. The rights of detainees have been established by international law, and the United States has agreed to obey these laws. Once an enemy soldier shows he wants to surrender, he must be treated humanely. It is a court-martial offense to physically or mentally harm or mistreat a detainee or to needlessly expose him to fire. In addition, mistreated detainees or those who receive special favors are not good interrogation subjects. 7-78. The senior officer or NCO on the scene is legally responsible for the care of detainees. If the unit cannot evacuate a prisoner within a reasonable time, he must be provided with food, water, and medical treatment.
TAGGING OF DETAINEES 7-79. Before evacuating the detainee, attach a DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag to him listing all pertinent information and procedures. DD Form 2745 tags are not available by electronic media, but may be obtained through supply channels or made from materials available on the battlefield. An example is illustrated in Figure 7-6.
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Figure 7-6. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT 7-80. Captured enemy documents (such as maps, orders, records, and photographs) and equipment are excellent sources of intelligence information. If captured items are not handled properly, however, the information in them may be lost or delayed until it is useless. These items must be evacuated to the next level of command as rapidly as possible.
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7-81. The platoon should tag each captured item (see Figure 7-7 for an example). If the item is found in the detainee’s possession, include the prisoner’s name on the tag and give the item to the guard. The guard delivers the item with the detainee to the next higher headquarters. Platoons may find themselves in a fast paced operation where equipment that is not of significant intelligence value may not be transported or recovered. In such cases, the platoon needs to have a plan on destroying the equipment so it will not fall back into the enemy’s hands. ( Note. Enemy medical equipment will never be destroyed.)
Figure 7-7. Sample tag for captured documents and equipment
CIVILIANS 7-82. Civilians who are captured as the result of curfew violations or suspicious activities are treated the same other detainees. The platoon evacuates them quickly to higher headquarters using the “five-S’s and T” principles discussed earlier in this section.
CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 7-83. Civil affairs (CA) units and psychological operations (PSYOP) have essential roles during urban operations (UO). They are critical force multipliers that can save lives. The battle in urban terrain is won through effective application of necessary combat power, but CA and PSYOP can help facilitate mission accomplishment. CA and PSYOP offer the possibility of mission accomplishment in urban terrain without the destruction, suffering, and horror of battle. These units may become key factors in shaping the urban battlefield and facilitating movement from shaping directly to transition, thus minimizing the amount of close combat conducted by companies, platoons, and squads (see Chapter 4, Sections IV and V).
EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS 7-84. If the brigade or battalion task force is tasked to facilitate the evacuation of civilians from the AO, the unit is normally augmented by CA personnel. Infantry units may provide security and command and control for the execution of this operation, which is accomplished in two separate but supporting actions. z CA personnel coordinate with the military police and local police officials for evacuation planning. They plan for establishing evacuation routes and thoroughfare crossing control, and for removing civilians from the MSRs. z CA personnel coordinate with U.S. Army PSYOP assets, local government officials, radio and television stations, newspapers, and so on, to publicize the evacuation plan.
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HEALTH AND WELFARE OF CIVILIANS 7-85. CA assets will also conduct coordination for the health and well-being of civilians. They can include the reestablishment of water systems; distribution of available food stocks and clothing; and establishment of displaced persons, refugee, and evacuee (DPRE) camps. Again, brigades and battalion task forces may be tasked to provide security and command and control for some of these missions.
TACTICAL PSYOP 7-86. Tactical PSYOP in support of urban operations are planned and conducted to achieve immediate and short-term objectives. PSYOP are an integral and coordinated part of the overall tactical plan. They provide the tactical commander with a system that can weaken the enemy soldier’s will to fight, thereby reducing his combat effectiveness. They can also help prevent civilian interference with military operations. PSYOP are designed to exploit individual and group weaknesses. For example, infantry units may be given the mission to clear a specific urban objective where it has been determined that a graduated response will be used. The PSYOP unit would be in support of the unit conducting this mission, and they use loudspeakers to broadcast warnings and or incentives not to resist.
OTHER PSYOP 7-87. PSYOP units also provide support during urban operations using television, radio, posters, leaflets, and loudspeakers to disseminate propaganda and information. Television, including videotapes, is one of the most effective media for persuasion. It offers many advantages for PSYOP and is appropriate for use during urban operations. In areas where television is not common, receivers may be distributed to public facilities and selected individuals. Note.
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See FM 3-05.40 for further discussion on civil affairs.
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Urban Operations The platoon may take part in large-scale urban operations as part of a larger force. This chapter examines the basic characteristics of urban operations as well as special planning considerations and techniques of offensive and defensive operations as well as employment of attack and assault/cargo helicopters. For more detailed information, refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) or FM 3-06.11 (FM 90-10-1).
SECTION I - URBAN OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 8-1. Built-up areas consist mainly of man-made features such as buildings, streets, and subterranean systems. These features of urban terrain create a variety of tactical problems and possibilities. To ensure that the platoon can operate effectively in an urban environment, the platoon observation and direct-fire plans must address the ground-level fight (in streets and on the ground floor of buildings), the aboveground fight (in multistoried buildings), and the subterranean fight. The following considerations apply: z An important aspect of the urban environment is that built-up areas complicate, confuse, and degrade command and control. z Streets are usually avenues of approach. Forces moving along a street, however, are often canalized by buildings and have little space for off-road maneuver. Obstacles on urban streets thus are usually more effective than those on roads in open terrain since they are more difficult to bypass. z Buildings offer cover and concealment and severely restrict movement of military elements, especially armored vehicles. They also severely restrict fire distribution and control, especially fields of fire. Every street corner and successive block becomes an intervisibility line, requiring careful overwatch. Thick-walled buildings provide ready-made, fortified positions. z Subterranean systems found in some built-up areas can be easily overlooked, but they may prove critical to the outcome of urban operations. Figure 8-1 illustrates examples of underground systems, which include subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems.
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Figure 8-1. Underground systems
CATEGORIES OF URBAN AREAS 8-2. There are six types of urban terrain (see also FM 34-130 for more information): z Dense, random construction . Dense, random construction is typical of the old inner-city pattern with narrow, winding streets radiating from a central area in an irregular manner. Buildings are located close together and frequently close to the edge of a roadway. z Closed-orderly block . This type of city block typically has wider streets that form rectangular patterns. The buildings frequently form a continuous front along the blocks. Inner-block courtyards are common.
8-2
z
Dispersed residential area. Dispersed residential areas are normally adjacent to closed-orderly block areas in Europe. The pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens, trees, and fences. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving.
z
High-rise area. High-rise areas are typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns. It consists of multistoried apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings. Wide streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. These areas are often adjacent to industrial or transportation areas or interspersed with closed-orderly block areas.
z
Industrial-transportation . These areas are generally located on or along major rail and highway routes in urban complexes. Older complexes may be located within dense, random construction or closed-orderly block areas. New construction normally consists of low, flatroofed factory and warehouse buildings. High-rise areas providing worker housing is normally located adjacent to these areas throughout the orient. Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is critical. These facilities, especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles to military movement.
z
Permanent or fixed fortifications and other military installations . Permanent-type fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any combination of the above. Some of the latest variants have been built underground and employ heavy tank or warship armor, major caliber and other weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and CBRN overpressure systems. This category also includes other military
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installations (examples, Camp Lejeune, Fort Huachuca, Travis Air Force Base, and Norfolk Navy Base).
VEHICLES, WEAPONS, AND MUNITIONS 8-3. Numerous factors related to vehicles and their organic weapons and munitions affect the tank platoon’s urban operation planning and execution, including the following: z The preferred main gun rounds in the urban environment are HEAT, MPAT (ground mode), MPAT-OR (obstacle-reducing) (M908), and canister (M1028). These all perform much better than sabot rounds against bunkers and buildings. z HEAT ammunition will open a larger hole in reinforced concrete or masonry structures than MPAT or MPAT-OR (M908). Both MPAT and MPAT-OR, however, offer greater incapacitation capability inside the structure. z HEAT ammunition arms approximately 60 feet from the gun muzzle. It loses most of its effectiveness against urban targets at ranges of less than 60 feet. z MPAT and MPAT-OR rounds arm approximately 100 feet from the muzzle of the gun. Because of the shape and metal components of the projectiles, however, this ammunition remains effective at ranges of less than 100 feet. z Canister (M1028) ammunition is used primarily against troop formations from 100 to 500 meters, but can be used effectively against light-skinned vehicles (technical) and to reduce simple obstacles at ranges of less than 200 meters. z Sabot petals, including those on MPAT and MPAT-OR, endanger accompanying infantry elements. They create a hazard area extending 70 meters on either side of the gun-target line, out to a range of 1 kilometer. z Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristics of urban terrain. The effect of the rounds is reduced by their tendency to strike at an oblique angle and increase the threat of ricochets. z Engagement ranges will tend to be less then 200 meters, and could be as little as 35 meters when engaging enemy troops. z There will tend to be large amounts of flammable material in the urban area, and leaders should understand that engagements have the chance of causing large fires. z The tank’s main gun can depress to -10 degrees and can elevate to +20 degrees. This creates considerable dead space for the crew at the close ranges that are typical in the urban environment. z The external M2 HB (heavy barrel) machine gun can elevate to +36 degrees; however, the TC must be exposed to fire the M2 on the M1A2 or M1A2 SEP. z The M240 coax machine gun can effectively deliver suppressive fires against enemy personnel and against enemy positions that are behind light cover. z The loader’s M240 machine gun can effectively deliver suppressive fire against enemy personnel and against enemy positions that are behind light cover; however, the loader must be exposed to operate it. This weapon may be dismounted and used in a ground role if units are equipped with the M240 dismount kit. z When operating with hatches closed, the tank crew has limited visibility to the sides and rear and no visibility to the top. Figures 8-2 and 8-3 illustrate the dead space associated with tank operations in an urban environment. z FM 3-20.12 explains special uses for tank-mounted machine guns in the urban environment.
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Figure 8-2. Tank weapon dead space at street level
Figure 8-3. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level
MEDIUM AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS (7.62-MM AND CALIBER .50) 8-4. In the urban environment, the caliber .50 machine gun and the 7.62-mm M240 machine gun provides high-volume, long-range, automatic fires for the suppression or destruction of targets. They provide final protective fire along fixed lines and can be used to penetrate light structures; the caliber .50 machine gun is most effective in this role. Tracers from both machine guns are likely to start fires.
Employment 8-5. The primary consideration that impacts the employment of machine guns within urban areas is the limited availability of long-range fields of fire. 8-6. The caliber .50 machine gun is often employed on its vehicular mount during both offensive and defensive operations. The caliber .50 machine gun can be used as an accurate, long-range weapon and can supplement sniper fires. 8-7. The M240 machine gun is useful to suppress and isolate enemy defenders.
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8-8. The M240 is less effective against masonry targets than the caliber .50 machine gun because of its reduced penetration power.
Weapon Penetration 8-9. The ability of the 7.62-mm and caliber .50 rounds to penetrate is also affected by the range to the target and type of material fired against. The 7.62-mm round is affected less by close ranges than the 5.56mm; the caliber .50 round’s penetration is reduced least of all. 8-10. At 50 meters, the 7.62-mm ball round cannot reliably penetrate a single layer of well-packed sandbags. It can penetrate a single layer of sandbags at 200 meters, but not a double layer. The armor piercing round does only slightly better against sandbags. It cannot penetrate a double layer but can penetrate up to 10 inches at 600 meters. 8-11. The penetration of the 7.62-mm round is best at 600 meters. Most urban targets are closer. The longest effective range is usually 200 meters or less. Table 8-1 explains the penetration capabilities of a single 7.62-mm (ball) round at closer ranges.
Table 8-1. Penetration capabilities of a single 7.62-mm (ball) round Penetration (inches)
Range (meters)
Pine Board
Dry, Loose Sand
Cinder Block
Concrete
25
13
5
8
2
100
18
4.5
10
2
200
41
7
8
2
8-12. The caliber .50 round is also optimized for penetration at long ranges (about 800 meters). For hard targets, obliquity and range affect caliber .50 penetration. Both armor-piercing and ball ammunition penetrate 14 inches of sand or 28 inches of packed earth at 200 meters, if the rounds impact perpendicular to the flat face of the target. Table 8-2 explains the effect of a 25-degree obliquity on a caliber .50 penetration.
Table 8-2. Number of rounds needed to penetrate a reinforced concrete wall at a 25-degree obliquity Thickness (feet)
100 Meters (rounds)
200 Meters (rounds)
2
300
1,200
3
450
1,800
4
600
2,400
Protection 8-13. Barriers that offer protection against 5.56-mm rounds are also effective against 7.62-mm rounds with some exceptions. The 7.62-mm round can penetrate a windowpane at a 45-degree obliquity, a hollow cinder block, or both sides of a car body. It can also penetrate wooden frame buildings easily. The caliber .50 round can penetrate all the commonly found urban barriers except a sand-filled 55-gallon drum.
Wall Penetration 8-14. Continued and concentrated machine gun fire can breach most typical urban walls. Such fire cannot breach thick, reinforced-concrete structures or dense, natural-stone walls. Internal walls, partitions, plaster, floors, ceilings, common office furniture, home appliances, and bedding can be penetrated easily by both 7.62-mm and caliber .50 rounds (Tables 8-3 and 8 -4).
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Table 8-3. Structure penetrating capabilities of 7.62-mm round (NATO ball) against typical urban targets (range 25 meters) Type
Thickness (inches)
Hole Diameter (inches)
Rounds Required
8
7
100
Triple brick wall
14
7
170
Concrete block with single brick veneer
12
6 and 24
30 and 200
Cinder block (filled)
12
*
18
Double brick wall
9
*
45
Double sandbag wall
24
*
110
Log wall
16
*
1
Mild steel door
3/8
*
1
Reinforced concrete
* Penetration only, no loop hole. (A small hole or slit in a wall, especially one through which small arms may be fired.)
Table 8-4. Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical urban targets (range 35 meters) Type
Thickness (inches)
Hole Diameter (inches)
Rounds Required
Reinforced concrete
10 18
12 24 7
50 100 140
Triple brick wall
12
8 26
15 50
Concrete block with single brick veneer
12
10 33
25 45
Armor plate
1
*
1
Double sandbag wall
24
*
5
Log wall
16
*
1
* Penetration only, no loop hole. (A small hole or slit in a wall, especially one through which small arms may be fired.)
COMMAND AND CONTROL 8-15. The following command and control considerations will affect the platoon’s urban operations planning and execution:
8-6
z
Communications problems. The low-level task organization that may take place during urban operations will require elements to establish additional communications links, which can be disrupted by buildings and other urban terrain features.
z
Fire control. Extensive direct-fire planning and restrictive fire control measures are an absolute requirement in urban operations.
z
Proximity and visibility. Friendly elements often must operate in confined and restrictive areas during urban operations, and they may not be able to see other nearby friendly forces. These factors significantly increase the danger of fratricide.
z
Personnel factors. Urban operations impose significant, and often extreme, physical and psychological demands on Soldiers and leaders.
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z
ROE/ROI and civilians. The ROE and/or ROI may restrict the use of certain weapon systems and TTPs. As an integral part of urban operations, noncombatants create special operational problems. To deal with these concerns, units operating in urban terrain must know how to effectively employ linguists and counterintelligence and civil affairs teams.
z
The slow pace of urban operations . This will usually prevent the platoon from taking full advantage of the speed and mobility of its tanks. When buttoned up, the tank platoon’s command and control and freedom of maneuver will be reduced due to limited visibility.
MANEUVER PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 8-16. The following factors related to maneuver will affect the platoon’s urban operations planning and execution: z
The need for detailed centralized planning and decentralized execution . Urban operations are usually executed as a deliberate attack, demanding extensive intelligence activities and rehearsals.
z
Requirements for cooperation . Urban operations are most successful when close cooperation is established between dismounted forces, armored vehicles, and aviation elements at the lowest level.
z
Formation of combined arms teams at the lowest levels . Whereas task organization normally is done no lower than platoon level, urban operations may require task organization of squads and sections. The tank platoon may face a variety of organizational options, such as a tank section or an individual tank working with an infantry platoon or squad. Leaders must strive to employ armored vehicles in sections at a minimum. Whether conducting operations as a twotank section or a tank/Bradley section, armored vehicles must work together to overwatch movements and defeat threats outside the capabilities of dismounted forces. Integration of aviation assets and their ability to communicate and act in coordination with small-unit ground forces greatly increases the chances of mission success. For a detailed discussion of employment of Army aviation in an urban environment, see Section IV of this chapter.
z
Vulnerability of friendly forces. Tanks can provide firepower to effectively support accompanying infantry squads, but they are, in turn, vulnerable to attack from enemy infantry. The attacking force in urban operations must also guard against local counterattacks.
z
Absolute necessity to maintain all-around security and situational awareness. When conducting urban operations, it is absolutely imperative that leaders and units at all levels maintain all-around situational awareness and security. The ability of the enemy to move rapidly within an urban environment to gain positions above, behind, or below friendly forces necessitates an active and vigilant reconnaissance and IPB of the tank platoon’s area of operations and area of interest. In addition, individual tanks, sections, and platoons must be extremely vigilant in conducting local security of their vehicles and formation as well as providing overwatch for attached mechanized or dismounted elements.
z
The role of infantry . Infantry squads are employed extensively during urban operations as part of the combined arms team. They can be employed against both enemy vehicles and enemy dismounted elements.
8-17. Additionally, the infantry can help the tank platoon by— z Locating targets for tanks to engage. z Destroying antitank weapons. Assaulting enemy positions and clearing buildings with tank support. z z Protecting tanks from antitank fires.
Light Infantry Limitations 8-18. Light infantry limitations include the following:
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z z z
Light infantry forces lack heavy supporting firepower, protection, and long-range mobility. Exposed light infantry forces are subject to a high number of casualties between buildings. Light infantry forces are more vulnerable to fratricide-related casualties from friendly direct and indirect fire.
Light Infantry Strengths 8-19. Light infantry strengths include: z Infantry small-arms fire within a building can eliminate resistance without seriously damaging the structure. z Infantrymen can use stealth to move into position without alerting the enemy. Infantrymen can move over or around most urban terrain, regardless of the amount of damage to buildings. z Infantrymen have excellent all-around vision and can engage targets with small-arms fire under almost all conditions. 8-20. How does armor support the infantry? z Use main-gun fire to reduce obstacles or entrenched positions for the infantry. z Take directions from the infantry ground commander (platoon leader/PSG/squad leader) to support their fire and maneuver. z Provide reconnaissance by fire for the infantry. z Know and understand how the infantry clears and marks the cleared buildings, as well as the casualty evacuation plan, signal methods, engagement criteria for tank main gun, front line trace reporting, and ground communication from the tank with the dismounted personnel. 8-21. How does the infantry support the tank? z Provide local flank and rear security for each vehicle. z Increase crew member’s situational understanding by reporting sights and sounds masked by track noise and movement. z Provide reconnaissance and fire direction of enemy positions for main gun engagement. 8-22. Considerations for dismounted tank security include the following: z Each tank will require a four-man team of dismounted infantry to provide local security to the flanks and rear for the vehicle. z The security element can ride on the tank, but when the tank stops for more than 5 minutes, the tank commander should direct the troops to dismount along likely avenues of ATGM/rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attack. z Tank crewmen should rehearse the mounting and dismounting of the security element from their vehicle, briefing the infantrymen on safety procedures for the vehicle and weapon systems. z If possible, the security element should have two members attempt to observe from a second floor window to provide greater situational understanding. z Tank commanders need to rehearse communicating with dismounted Soldiers via the infantry phone or TA-1 and DR-8 in the bustle rack.
ARMORED VEHICLE POSITIONS 8-23. Fighting positions for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are essential to a complete and effective defensive plan in urban areas. Armored vehicle positions are selected and developed to obtain the best cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire while retaining the vehicle’s ability to move.
HULL DOWN 8-24. If fields of fire are restricted to streets, hull-down positions should be used to gain cover and fire directly down streets (Figures 8-4A and 8-4B). From those positions, tanks and BFVs are protected and
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can move to alternate positions rapidly. Buildings collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazard to the armored vehicle and crew if operating in a closed hatch configuration.
Figure 8-4A. Urban hull-down position
Figure 8-4B. Urban hull-down position
HIDE 8-25. The hide position (Figure 8-5) covers and conceals the vehicle until time to move into position for target engagement. Since the crew will not be able to see advancing enemy forces, an observer from the vehicle or a nearby infantry unit must be concealed in an adjacent building to alert the crew. The observer acquires the target and signals the armored vehicle to move to the firing position and to fire. After firing, the tank or BFV moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising one location.
Figure 8-5. Hide position
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BUILDING HIDE 8-26. The building hide position (Figure 8-6) conceals the vehicle inside a building. If basement hide positions are inaccessible, engineers must evaluate the building’s floor strength and prepare for the vehicle. Once the position is detected, it should be evacuated to avoid enemy fires.
Figure 8-6. Building hide position
INTELLIGENCE 8-27. Threats to the U.S. have one common goal: to coerce the U.S. military or a U.S.-led multinational multinational force to redeploy out of the theater of operations. The primary means of accomplishing accomplishing this goal is for the threat to cause a politically politically unacceptable level of casualties casualties to friendly forces. forces. Urban areas provide a casualty-producing and stress-inducing environment environment ideally suited for threat operations. operations. Moreover, urban areas provide the threat with an unmatched degree of cover and concealment from friendly forces.
TYPES OF THREATS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 8-28. Active threats to U.S. Army forces operating in an urban environment include terrorists, paramilitary forces, mercenaries, disgruntled civilians, and conventional conventional military military units. Further, urban environments environments may also expose Army forces to many passive dangers such as psychological illnesses, hazardous materials, and disease from unsanitary conditions.
URBAN THREAT TACTICS 8-29. While active threats vary widely, many techniques will be common common to all. This discussion examines several operational and tactical tenets that can be used against U.S. forces in the urban environment.
Use the Population to Advantage 8-30. The populace of a given urban area represents represents key terrain: the side that manages it best has a distinct distinct advantage. Future urban battles may see large segments of the populace remain remain in place as they did in Budapest and Grozny. Army forces involved in stability operations operations will certainly conduct missions in and among the residents of the area. 8-31. Threat forces may use the population to provide camouflage, concealment, and deception for their operations. Guerilla and terrorist terrorist elements elements may look no different from any other member member of the
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community. Even conventional conventional and paramilitary troops may often have a “civilian” “civilian” look. Western military forces adopted the clean-shaven, close-cut hair standard at the end of the nineteenth century to combat disease and infection, but twenty-first-century opponents might very well sport beards as well as civilian-looking clothing and other other “non-military” “non-military” characteristics. The civil population may may also provide cover for threat forces, enhancing their mobility in proximity to friendly positions. Allowing the enemy to shoot and then disappear into the crowd. 8-32. Threat forces may take advantage of U.S. moral responsibilities and attempt to make the civil population a burden on the Army’s logistical and force-protection force-protection resources. They may herd refugees into friendly controlled sectors, steal from U.S.-paid local nationals, and hide among civilians during offensive operations. 8-33. The civil population may also serve as an important intelligence intelligence source for the threat. threat. Local hires serving among U.S. Soldiers, civilians with access to base camp perimeters, and refugees moving through friendly controlled sectors may be manipulated by threat forces to provide information on friendly dispositions, readiness, and intent. In addition, threat SPF and hostile hostile intelligence service (HOIS) (HOIS) assets may move among well-placed civilian groups.
Use All Dimensions 8-34. Upper floors and roofs provide the urban threat with excellent observation points and BPs above the the maximum elevation elevation of many weapons. Shots from upper floors floors strike armored armored vehicles in vulnerable vulnerable points. Basements also provide firing firing points below many weapons’ weapons’ minimum depressions and strike at weaker armor. Sewers and subways provide covered and concealed concealed access throughout the area of operations. 8-35. The threat will think think and operate throughout all dimensions dimensions of the urban environment. Conventional lateral boundaries will often not apply as threat forces control some stories of the same building while friendly forces control others.
Employ Urban-Oriented Weapons 8-36. Whether they are purpose-built or adapted, many weapons may have greater than normal utility utility in an urban environment while others may may have significant disadvantages. disadvantages. Urban threat weapons are much like the nature of urbanization and the urban environment: inventive inventive and varied. Small, man-portable man-portable weapons, along with improvised munitions, will will dominate the urban environment. Figure 8-7 lists examples of threat weapons favored in urban operations.
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Figure 8-7. 8-7. Favored threat weapons
Engage the Entire Enemy Force 8-37. Threat forces may “hug” high-tech conventional forces operating in an urban area to avoid the effects of high-firepower standoff standoff weapon systems. Additionally, they they may attempt attempt to keep all or or significant portions of Army forces engaged in continuous operations to increase their susceptibility to stress-induced illnesses. Urban operations, by their nature, nature, produce an inordinate amount of combat combat stresscasualties and continuous operations exacerbate this problem. problem. Threat forces that employ this this tactic often maintain a large reserve to minimize the psychological impacts impacts on their own forces.
Focus Attacks on Service Support and Unprotected Soldiers 8-38. Threat forces may prey on Soldiers Soldiers poorly trained in basic infantry skills. skills. Ambushes may focus on these type Soldiers Soldiers conducting resupply resupply operations or moving in poorly guarded convoys. convoys. Urban operations are characterized by the isolation of small groups and navigational challenges, and the threat may use the separation this creates to inflict maximum casualties even when there is no other direct military benefit from the action.
FIRE SUPPORT 8-39. The urban operations environment affects affects how and when indirect fires are employed. employed. The following factors may have an impact on planning and execution of indirect fire support: z When taking part in urban operations, the platoon must always keep in the mind that the urban operations environment creates unique requirements for centrally controlled fires and more restrictive fire control measures. z An urban operation requires the careful use of VT ammunition to prevent premature arming. z Indirect fire may cause unwanted rubble. z The close proximity of friendly troops to enemy forces and other indirect fire targets requires careful coordination. z WP ammunition may create unwanted fires or smoke. z Artillery may be used in direct fire mode against point targets. z Fuse delay should be used to ensure rounds penetrate fortifications as required.
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z
z
z
VT and ICM rounds are effective for clearing enemy positions, observers, and antennas on rooftops. Illumination rounds can be effective in the urban setting; however, employment must be carefully planned to ensure friendly positions remain in the shadows while enemy positions are highlighted. Tall buildings may mask mask the effects of illumination illumination rounds. Mortars are the most responsive indirect fires available to the platoon in the urban environment. They are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle of fall, and short minimum range. range. In employing mortars, however, however, the platoon faces difficulties in target acquisition and the effects of the rounds (rubble).
SUSTAINMENT 8-40. Guidelines for providing effective sustainment to units fighting in built-up areas include the following: z Plan for a higher consumption rate of supplies when operating in an urban environment due to the slow pace. z Plan the locations of casualty collection points and evacuation sites. z Plan for the use of carrying parties and litter bearers. z Plan for and use host-country support and civil resources when authorized and practical. z Develop plans for requesting and obtaining special equipment such as ladders and toggle ropes with grappling hooks.
SECTION II - OFFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS 8-41. Offensive operations in a built-up area are planned and executed based on the factors of METT-TC and established doctrine. This section focuses on the unique problems and challenges that offensive offensive urban operations pose for the tank platoon.
HASTY AND DELIBERATE ATTACKS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT 8-42. The platoon may be employed in an urban offensive mission as part of a larger force, usually a company team and task force. force. Offensive urban operations take the the form of either a hasty or deliberate attack. Both types of attacks require require the friendly force to to conduct as much planning, reconnaissance, reconnaissance, and coordination as time and the situation permit.
HASTY ATTACK 8-43. Task forces and company teams conduct hasty attacks in a variety of tactical situations: z As a result of meeting engagements. z When unexpected contact occurs and bypass has not been authorized. z When the enemy is in a vulnerable position and can be quickly defeated through immediate offensive action. 8-44. The following special considerations considerations apply for hasty attacks in the urban environment: environment: z In built-up areas, incomplete intelligence and concealment may require the maneuver unit to move through, rather than around, the unit fixing the enemy in place (the base of fire element). Control and coordination become important factors in reducing congestion at the edges of the built-up area. z Once its objective is secured, an urban hasty attack force may have to react to contingency requirements, either by executing on-order or be-prepared missions or by responding to FRAGOs.
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DELIBERATE ATTACK 8-45. A deliberate attack is a fully integrated operation that employs all available assets against the enemy’s defense. It is employed when enemy positions are well prepared, when the built-up area area is large or severely congested, or when the element element of surprise has been lost. Deliberate attacks are characterized characterized by precise planning based on detailed information and reconnaissance and thorough preparations and rehearsals. 8-46. Given the nature of urban terrain, the techniques employed in the deliberate attack of a built-up area are similar to those used in assaulting a strongpoint. The attack avoids the enemy’s main strength, instead instead focusing combat power on the weakest point in in the defense. A deliberate attack in in a built-up area is usually conducted in four phases: reconnoiter the objective, isolate isolate the objective, secure a foothold, and and clear the built-up area. The following discussion examines examines these phases in detail.
PHASES OF OFFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS ECONNOITER THE OBJECTIVE R ECONNOITER
8-47. The reconnaissance phase of urban operations must provide the platoon and other friendly elements with adequate intelligence to stage a deliberate deliberate attack. Communications with with friendly elements elements in or near the urban area is essential to gain up-to-date information on the objective.
WARNING Friendly elements may still be operating in the area; therefore, extra caution must be taken to prevent fratricide.
MOVE TO THE OBJECTIVE 8-48. Once the objective has been reconnoitered, forces move to the objective by the most expedient, covered, and concealed route to prevent detection of the force by the enemy.
ISOLATE THE OBJECTIVE 8-49. Isolating the objective involves seizing terrain that dominates the area so that the enemy cannot supply or reinforce his defensive defensive forces. This step may be taken at the same same time as securing securing a foothold. If isolating the objective is the first step, the subsequent steps should be carried out quickly so that the defender has no time to react.
GAIN A FOOTHOLD 8-50. Gaining a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides attacking forces with cover from enemy fire as well as a place at which which they can enter the built-up area. When the tank platoon is operating with the company, the foothold is normally normally one to two city blocks. As the platoon attacks to gain the foothold, it should be supported by direct and indirect suppressive fires and by obscuring or screening smoke.
CLEAR THE URBAN AREA 8-51. In determining the extent to which the urban area must be cleared, the commander of the attacking force must consider the factors factors of METT-TC. He may decide to clear only only those parts of the area area necessary to the success of his mission if any of the following factors apply. z An objective must be seized quickly.
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z z
Enemy resistance is light or fragmented. Buildings in the area are of light construction construction with large open areas between between them. In this situation, the commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his objective or those necessary to ensure the unit’s security.
8-52. On the other hand, the attacking unit may have a mission to systematically clear clear an area of all enemy forces. Through detailed analysis, the the commander may anticipate anticipate that the unit will will be opposed by a strong, organized resistance or will be operating in areas where buildings buildings are close together. The platoons move slowly through the area, clearing clearing systematically systematically from room to room and building to building. building. Other maneuver elements support the clearing elements and are prepared to assume their mission as necessary. EORGANIZE CONSOLIDATE AND R EORGANIZE
8-53. Once the objective is secure, the unit must consolidate and reorganize equipment, supplies, and personnel quickly to prepare for counterattack or continue the mission.
TASK ORGANIZATION 8-54. The task organization of a platoon taking part in an attack during an urban operation may vary according to the specific nature of the built-up area area and the objective. In general, the parent task force force and/or company team will employ an assault force, a support force, and a reserve; in some cases, a security force is also used. Normally, there is no separate breach breach force; however, breaching elements may may be part of the assault or support force, depending on the type and location of anticipated obstacles.
SUPPORT FORCE 8-55. Most mounted elements of the urban unit, such as the tank platoon, are generally task organized in the support force. This allows the task force/company force/company team commander commander to employ the firepower of the fighting vehicles without compromising their survivability, a distinct danger when heavy forces move into an urban area. The support force isolates the area of operations operations and the actual entry point into the urban area, allowing assault forces to secure a foothold.
ASSAULT FORCE 8-56. The assault force is the element that gains a foothold in the urban area and conducts the clearance of actual objectives in the area. This force is normally a dismounted dismounted element task organized with engineers, engineers, with specific augmentation by armored vehicles. ESERVE FORCE R ESERVE
8-57. The reserve force normally normally includes both mounted and dismounted forces. It should be prepared to conduct any of the following tasks: z Attack from another direction. z Exploit friendly success or enemy weakness. z Secure the rear or flank of friendly forces. z Clear bypassed enemy positions. z Maintain contact with adjacent units. z Conduct support by fire or attack by fire as necessary.
OFFENSIVE TECHNIQUES IN URBAN OPERATIONS OLE OF THE TANK PLATOON R OLE
8-58. During the attack of a built-up area, the commander must employ his tanks to take advantage of their long-range lethality. The tank platoon may may provide support by fire fire while lead elements elements are seizing a foothold. The platoon then can provide overwatch or serve as a base of fire fire for the infantry until the area has been secured.
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8-59. The commander may position the platoon outside the built-up area, where it will remain for the duration of the attack to cover high-speed avenues of approach. This is especially true during the isolation isolation phase. Note. ( Before providing support for the attack, tanks must be able to maneuver into overwatch or base-of-fire positions; this will normally require support from organic infantry weapons to suppress enemy strongpoints and ATGM assets.) Additionally, the tank tank platoon can conduct the following urban offensive operations: z Neutralize enemy positions with machine gun fire. z Destroy enemy strongpoints with main gun fire. z Destroy obstacles across streets. z Force entry of infantry into buildings. z Emplace supporting fires as directed by the infantry. z Establish roadblocks and barricades.
MUTUAL SUPPORT 8-60. In house-to-house and street fighting, tanks move down the streets protected by the infantry, which clears the area of enemy ATGM weapons. The armored vehicles in turn support the infantry by firing their main guns and machine guns from a safe standoff range to destroy enemy positions. Particular attention attention must be paid to the layout layout of the urban area. Streets and alleys alleys provide ready-made firing firing sectors and killing zones for tanks to use. Note. Figure 8-8 illustrates a situation situation in which two tank platoons are participating participating in a task force attack in an urban operations environment.
Figure 8-8. Example task force attack in an urban environment, environment, with tank platoons in the support and assault forces
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SECTION III - DEFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS 8-61. Like offensive urban operations, defensive urban operations require thorough planning and precise execution based on METT-TC and established doctrine. This section examines urban operations considerations that affect the platoon in the defense.
ENEMY FORCES OUTSIDE THE URBAN AREA 8-62. While positioned in an urban area as part of a larger force, the platoon may be tasked to defend against an enemy approaching from outside the area. In general, procedures and considerations are the same as those for defensive operations in open terrain. For example, the commander designates BPs that take advantage of all available weapon systems. Objectives are similar as well; these may include preventing the enemy from isolating the defensive position, conducting reconnaissance of the defensive position, and/or gaining a foothold in the urban area. This type of urban operation may transition into an in-depth defense of the urban area, as described in the following paragraph, if the attacker continues to commit forces to the battle and the defending force fails to divert or destroy them.
ENEMY FORCES WITHIN THE URBAN AREA 8-63. When it faces enemy forces within the urban area, the platoon may be called upon to take part in any of several types of defensive operations, including defend in sector, defend a strongpoint, and defend a BP. Procedures and considerations for these defensive operations are generally similar to those used in more conventional open terrain situations. ( Note. Refer to FM 3-90.1 [FM 71-1] for detailed information on these operations. The commander should designate engagement areas that take advantage of integrated obstacles and urban terrain features and that can be covered by direct and indirect fires.
DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES IN URBAN OPERATIONS R OLE OF THE TANK PLATOON 8-64. In the defense, tanks provide the urban operations commander with a mobile force that can respond quickly to enemy threats. They should be located on likely enemy avenues of approach in positions that allow them to take advantage of their long-range fires. Effective positioning allows the commander to employ the armored vehicles in a number of ways, such as the following: z On the edge of the city in mutually supporting positions. z On key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages. z In positions from which they can cover barricades and obstacles by fire. As part of the reserve. z 8-65. Tanks are normally employed as a platoon. The commander also has the alternative of employing sections or individual vehicles with infantry platoons and squads; this allows the tanks to take advantage of the close security provided by the infantry and to provide immediate direct-fire support to the infantry.
FIGHTING POSITIONS AND FIRING POSITIONS 8-66. Careful selection of fighting positions and firing positions for tanks is an essential component of a complete and effective defensive plan in built-up areas. Vehicle positions must be selected and developed to afford the best possible cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire; at the same time, they must not restrict the vehicles’ ability to move when necessary. These considerations apply: z If fields of fire are restricted to the street area, hull-down positions should be used to provide cover and to enable tanks to fire directly down the streets. From these positions, the tanks are protected while retaining their ability to rapidly move to alternate positions. Buildings collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazard to tanks and their crews. z Before moving into position to engage the enemy, a tank can occupy a hide position for cover and concealment. Hide positions may be located inside buildings or underground garages,
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z
z
adjacent to buildings (using the buildings to mask enemy observation), or in culverts. Refer to Figure 8-5 on page 8-9 for an example of a tank using an urban hide position. Since the crew will not be able to see the advancing enemy from the hide position, an observer from the tank or a nearby infantry unit must be concealed in an adjacent building to alert the crew (see Figure 8-5 on page 8-9). When the observer acquires a target, he signals the tank to move to the firing position and, at the proper time, to fire. After firing, the tank moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising its location.
EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY SQUADS 8-67. Infantry squads are usually employed abreast so that they all can fire toward the expected direction of attack. In a company team defense, however, the limited number of available infantrymen may require squad positions to be interspersed with tank positions for mutual support.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE R ESERVE FORCE 8-68. The commander’s defensive scheme of maneuver in an urban operation must always include the employment of a reserve force. This force should be prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to block enemy penetrations, to protect the flanks of the friendly force, or to provide a base of fire for disengaging elements. For combat in built-up areas, the reserve force has these characteristics: z It normally consists of infantry elements. z It must be as mobile as possible. z It may be supported by tanks. z In platoon-level urban operations, the reserve force may be a section or squad.
SECTION IV – EMPLOYMENT OF ATTACK AND ASSAULT/CARGO HELICOPTERS 8-69. Ground maneuver commanders must understand that aviation forces can provide a significant advantage during urban operations. In addition, ground maneuver planners must understand that the unique capabilities of Army aviation also require unique planning and coordination. Army aviation forces must be fully integrated in the military decision-making process to ensure effective combined arms employment. Effective combined arms employment also requires that aviation and ground maneuver forces synchronize their operations by operating from a common perspective. This section highlights some possible procedures that will aid in creating a common air-ground perspective.
SUPPORT FOR GROUND MANEUVER UNITS 8-70. Ground units may receive support from a variety of attack helicopters including (but not limited to) the AH-64, OH-58D, and AH-6. Attack helicopters can provide area fire to suppress targets, and precision fire to destroy specific targets or breach structures. Attack helicopters can also assist with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and communications using their advanced suite of sensors and radios. Other supporting (lift) helicopters, such as the UH-60 and CH-47, may have weapon systems (7.62-mm machine gun, caliber .50 machine gun, 7.62-mm minigun) that aid in the suppression of enemy forces when operating in urban terrain; however, their primary role is to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies to those critical urban areas. Lift helicopters can provide a distinct advantage by placing personnel and weapon systems at critical locations at critical times to surprise and overwhelm the enemy. Lift helicopters can also transport needed supplies to urban areas that may be inaccessible to ground transportation or serve as CASEVAC platforms if ground evacuation is not feasible or timely.
ROLE DURING URBAN OPERATIONS 8-71. Army aviation’s primary role during urban operations is to support the ground maneuver force’s operations. Army aviation is normally most effective conducting shaping operations. Aviation forces operating on the urban periphery effectively enhance isolation, reconnaissance, resupply, troop movement,
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evacuation, and support by fire for ground forces. Army aviation also enhances the combined arms team’s ability to quickly and efficiently transition to new missions.
COMMAND AND CONTROL 8-72. Army aviation forces may be employed organic to a division or higher level of command to conduct maneuver or provide support. Aviation forces may also be attached or OPCON to another command. Army aviation units normally will not be OPCON to echelons below battalion level; however, attack helicopters may conduct direct air-to-ground coordination with companies and platoons during combat operations.
MANEUVER GRAPHIC AIDS 8-73. The greatest strength of aviation is the ability to maneuver in the third dimension. In an urban environment, this strength can be a detriment due to associated challenges. One associated challenge is that air crews have different visual cues and perspectives than do ground forces. Common graphics and sketches can help alleviate these differences. z A network route structure of air control points (ACP) and routes (preferably surveyed) may be used to facilitate route planning, navigation, and command, control, and communications. z Sketches help correlate air and ground control measures with predominate urban features. The area sketch offers the ground commander and the aircrew a means of identifying friendly and enemy locations for planning and coordination. It is best used for smaller towns and villages but can be applied to a certain engagement area or specific area of operations in a larger city. The area sketch captures the natural terrain features, man-made features, and key terrain in an area and designates a letter or numeral code to each. Buildings are coded and each corner of the building is coded. This gives the air crews an accurate way to identify specific buildings as requested by the ground unit commander or to identify friendly locations. z Inclusion of maneuver graphic, fire support control measures (FSCM), and airspace control measures (ACM) further allow air crews and maneuver elements to better visualize the urban portion of the area of operations. It is the responsibility of both the aviation unit and the ground maneuver unit to ensure they use the same area sketch for accurate coordination (see Figure 89).
IDENTIFYING FRIENDLY POSITIONS, MARKING LOCATIONS, AND ACQUIRING TARGETS 8-74. In the urban environment, friendly and enemy forces, along with noncombatants, may operate in close vicinity to one another. Furthermore, structures and debris can cause problems with the identification of precise locations. Reliable communication is essential to ensure air crews know the locations of all participants in urban operations. To further enhance air-ground coordination, methods must be established to allow air crews to visually identify key locations.
MARKING METHODS 8-75. Table 8-5, page 8-21 describes different marking methods.
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Figure 8-9. Simplified area sketch
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Table 8-5. Marking methods Method
Day/ Night
Smoke
D
Smoke (IR)
D/N
Assets
Friendly Target Marks Marks
Remarks
All
Good
Good
Easily identifiable, but may compromise friendly position, obscure target, or warn of fire support employment. Placement may be difficult due to structures.
All
Good
Good
Easily identifiable, but may compromise friendly position, obscure target, or warn of fire support employment. Placement may be difficult due to structures. Night marking is greatly enhanced by the use of IR reflective smoke.
NVD AT
Illumination, Ground Burst
D/N
All
NA
Good
Easily identified, but may wash out NVDs.
Signal Mirror
D
All
Good
NA
Avoids compromise of friendly location. Dependent on weather and available light and may be lost in reflections from other reflective surfaces (windshields, windows, water, etc.).
Spotlight
N
All
Good
Marginal
Highly visible to all. Compromises friendly position and warns of fire support employment. Effectiveness is dependent on degree of urban lighting.
IR Spotlight
N
All NVD
Good
Marginal
Visible to all with NVGs. Less likely to compromise than overt light. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting.
IR Laser Pointer (below .4 watts)
N
All NVG
Good
Marginal
Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting.
IR Laser Pointer (above .4 watts)
N
All NVD
Good
Good
Less affected by ambient light and weather conditions. Highly effective under all but the most highly lit or worst weather conditions. The infrared zoom laser illuminator designtor (IZLID)-2 is the current example.
Visual Laser
N
All
Good
Marginal
Highly visible to all. Risk of compromise is high. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting.
Laser Designator
D/N
PGM or LST equipped
NA
Good
Highly effective with PGM. Very restrictive laser acquisition cone, and requires line of sight to target. May require precoordination of laser codes.
Tracers
D/N
All
NA
Marginal
May compromise position. May be difficult to distinguish mark from other gunfire. During daytime use, may be more effective to kick up dust surrounding target.
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Table 8-5. Marking methods Method
Day/ Night
Electronic Beacon
D/N
Strobe (Overt)
Assets
Friendly Target Marks Marks
Remarks
See remarks
Excellent
Good
Ideal friendly marking device for AC130 and some USAF fixed wing (not compatible with Navy or Marine aircraft). Least impeded by urban terrain. Can be used as a TRP for target identification. Coordination with air crews essential to ensure equipment and training compatibility.
N
All
Marginal
NA
Visible by all. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting.
Strobe (IR)
N
All NVD
Good
NA
Visible to all NVDs. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting. Coded strobes aid in acquisition.
Flare (Overt)
D/N
All
Good
NA
Visible by all. Easily identified by air crew.
Flare (IR)
N
All NVD
Good
NA
Visible to all NVDs. Easily identified by air crew.
GLINT/IR Panel
N
All NVD
Good
NA
Not readily detectable by enemy. Very effective, except in highly lit areas.
Combat ID Panel
D/N
All FLIR
Good
NA
Provides temperature contrast on vehicles or building. May be obscured by urban terrain.
VS-17 Panel
D
All
Marginal
NA
Only visible during daylight. Easily obscured by structures.
Chemical Heat Sources
D/N
All FLIR
Poor
NA
Easily masked by urban structures and lost in thermal clutter. Difficult to acquire, can be effective when used to contrast cold background or when aircraft knows general location.
Spinning Chem Light (Overt)
N
All
Marginal
NA
Provides unique signature. May be obscured by structures. Provides a distinct signature that is easily recognized. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting.
Spinning Chem Light (IR)
N
All NVD
Marginal
NA
Provides unique signature. May be obscured by structures. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting.
TARGETING GRIDS AND R EFERENCE TECHNIQUES 8-76. Ground maneuver elements generally use a terrain-based reference system during urban operations. Military grid reference system (MGRS) coordinates have little meaning at street level. To facilitate combined arms operations, aviation and ground maneuver forces must use common control methods. Possible techniques include urban grid, checkpoint targeting, objective area reference grid, and TRPs. These techniques are based on the street and structure pattern present, without regard to the MGRS pattern. Using common techniques allows air crews to transition to the system in use by the ground element upon arrival in the objective area. For example, references to the objective or target may include local landmarks
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such as, “The third floor of the Hotel Caviar, south-east corner.” This transition should be facilitated by using a “big to small” acquisition technique.
Figure 8-10. Urban grid technique
Figure 8-11. Checkpoint technique
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Figure 8-12. Objective area reference grid technique
Figure 8-13. TRP technique
ATTACK HELICOPTER TARGET ENGAGEMENT 8-77. Attack helicopters will conduct a variety of TTPs to engage targets in the urban area. Techniques range from support-by-fire/attack-by-fire at maximum standoff ranges to running/diving fire and closecombat attack at minimum engagement ranges. Coordination is imperative to ensure positive identification of the target as well as friendly locations.
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Note. Ground forces should make every attempt to pass along accurate 8-digit grid coordinates. The AH-64D can easily and accurately engage targets using this method.
WEAPONS MIX 8-78. Armed helicopters can carry a mix of weapons. Commanders must choose the weapons to use on a specific mission based on the effects on the target, employment techniques, and the target’s proximity to ground forces. Leaders must consider proportionality, collateral damage, and noncombatant casualties. Leaders and air crew must consider the following when choosing weapons: z Hard, smooth, flat surfaces with 90-degree angles are characteristic of man-made targets. Due to aviation delivery parameters, munitions will normally strike a target at an angle less than 90 degrees. This may reduce the effect of munitions and increase the chance of ricochets. The tendency of rounds to strike glancing blows against hard surfaces means that up to 25 percent of impact-fused rounds may not detonate when fired onto rubbled areas. z Identification and engagement times are short. z Depression and elevation limits create dead space. Target engagement from oblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, must be considered. z Smoke, dust, and shadows mask targets. Additionally, rubble and man-made structures can mask fires. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct. z Urban fighting often involves units attacking on converging routes. The risks from friendly fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered during the planning of operations. z The effect of the weapon and the position of friendly and enemy personnel with relation to structures must be considered. Chose weapons for employment based on their effects against the building’s material composition rather than against enemy personnel. z Munitions can produce secondary effects, such as fires.
AIR/GROUND INTEGRATION IN THE HASTY ATTACK/CLOSE FIGHT 8-79. Attack helicopter employment in urban operations will typically involve the close fight and often, the hasty attack. The hasty attack in the close fight, historically, lacks proper coordination between air and ground elements to ensure mission success. The key to success for enhancing air-ground coordination, and the subsequent execution of the tasks involved, begins with standardizing techniques and procedures. The end-state is a detailed SOP between air and ground maneuver units that addresses the attack in a close combat situation. 8-80. Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with the ground maneuver force. When the aviation brigade or task force receives a mission to provide assistance to a ground unit engaged in close combat and planning time is minimal, the initial information provided by the unit in contact should be sufficient to get the aviation attack team out of the aviation tactical assembly area to a holding area to conduct direct coordination with the engaged maneuver unit. The attack teams utilized in this procedure are under aviation brigade control. This procedure contains five major steps: z Battalion close-fight SITREP. z Attack team check-in. z Coordination for aviation close fires (ACF). z Battle damage assessment/reattack.
BATTALION CLOSE FIGHT SITREP 8-81. En route to the holding area, the attack team leader contacts the ground maneuver battalion on its FM command net to receive a close-fight SITREP (Figure 8-14). This SITREP verifies the location of the holding area and a means to conduct additional coordination. The attack team leader receives an update
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from the ground maneuver battalion on the enemy and friendly situations. The battalion also verifies frequencies and call signs of the unit in contact. By this time, the ground maneuver battalion has contacted the ground maneuver unit leader in contact to inform him that attack aviation is en route to conduct a hasty attack. Figure 8-15 shows an example of radio traffic and what may occur.
Battalion Close Fight SITREP 1. Enemy situation. Focusing on ADA in the AO, type of enemy vehicles/equipment position (center mass) and direction of movement if dispersed provide front-line trace. 2. Friendly situation. Location of company in contact, mission assigned to them, method of marking their position. 3. Call sign/frequency verification. 4. Holding area verification. If intended to be used for face-to-face coordination, a sign counter-sign must be agreed upon; i.e., using a light/heat source to provide a recognizable signature, answered by either aircraft IR lights or visible light flashes to signify which aircraft to approach. Figure 8-14. Battalion close fight SITREP
Attack Team
Ground Maneuver Battalion
“BULLDOG 06, THIS IS BLACKJACK 26, OVER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, THIS IS BULLDOG 06, L/C, OVER.”
“BULLDOG 06, BLACKJACK 26 EN ROUTE TO HOLDING AREA AT GRID VQ 98454287, REQUEST SITREP, OVER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, THIS IS BULLDOG 06, ENEMY SITUATION FOLLOWS, HARDROCK 06 IS TAKING DIRECT FIRE FROM A PLATOON-SIZE ARMOR ELEMENT AT GRID VQ 96000050, HOLDING AREA VQ 94004000. EXPECT RADIO COORDINATION ONLY. CONTACT HARDROCK 06 ON FH 478, OVER.”
Figure 8-15. Example radio conversation 8-82. Upon receiving the required information from the ground maneuver battalion, the attack team leader changes frequency to the ground company’s FM command net to conduct final coordination before progressing on attack routes to BPs or ABF/SBF positions. Coordination begins with the ground maneuver company commander and ends with the leader of the lowest-level unit in contact. 8-83. Regardless of which key leader the attack team leader conducts coordination with, the ground command net is the most suitable net on which both air and ground elements can conduct the operation. It allows all key leaders on the ground, including the FIST chief and the attack team leader and his attack crews, to communicate on one common net throughout the operation. Operating on the command net also allows the attack team to request responsive mortar fire for either suppression or immediate suppression of the enemy. The AH-64 Apache and the AH-1 Cobra are limited to only one FM radio due to aircraft configuration; however, the OH-58 is d ual-FM capable, which gives the attack team leader the capability to maintain communications with the ground maneuver company, as well as its higher headquarters or a fire support element (see Figure 8-16).
Attack Team “HARDROCK 06, THIS IS BLACKJACK 26 ON FH 478, OVER.”
Ground Maneuver Battalion “BLACKJACK 26, THIS IS HARDROCK 06, L/C, OVER.”
Figure 8-16. Attack team/maneuver company communications check
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ATTACK TEAM CHECK -IN 8-84. Upon making initial radio contact with the ground maneuver unit in contact, the attack team leader executes a succinct check-in. This check-in includes a SITREP with the following check-in information— z The attack team’s present location, which is normally the ground or aerial holding area. z The composition of the attack team. z The armament load and weapons configuration. z Total station time. z The night-vision device capability of the attack team. 8-85. In the event a ground holding area is not used because of METT-TC considerations, the attack team will select and occupy an aerial holding area within FM communications range until all required coordination is complete. 8-86. The attack team leader and ground unit’s key leaders must consider the effects on friendly forces of the various weapons carried by the attack aircraft prior to target selection and engagement. Weapon systems and munition selection for a given engagement is METT-TC dependent. Point target weapon systems, such as Hellfire or TOW, are the preferred system for armor or hardened targets when engaging targets in the close fight. The gun systems and the 2.75-inch rockets are the preferred system/munition for engaging troops in the open and for soft targets such as trucks and trenchworks. These area fire weapon systems pose a danger to friendly soldiers who may be in the lethality zone of the rounds or rockets. In this case, the leader on the ground must be very precise in describing the target he wants the aircraft to engage.
COORDINATION FOR AVIATION CLOSE FIRES 8-87. Time is the primary constraining factor for coordinating ACF in the hasty attack. When possible, ACF should be coordinated face-to-face using the following ACF coordination checklist: z Enemy situation-specific target ID. z Friendly situation location and method of marking friendly positions. z Ground maneuver mission/scheme of maneuver. z Attack aircraft scheme of maneuver. z Planned engagement area and BP/SBF. z Method of target marking. z Fire coordination and restrictions. z Map graphics update. z Request for immediate ACF should be used for targets of opportunity or for ground-to-air target handoff. 8-88. If time is not available to accomplish face-to-face coordination, then radio-only communications will be the means for coordination using the request for immediate ACF (see Figure 8-17 for a sample request for immediate ACF).
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Attack Team
Ground Maneuver Battalion
“HARDROCK 06, BLACKJACK 26, GOOD COPY. STANDING BY AT HOLDING AREA FOR ACF REQUEST, OVER.” “HARDROCK 16, BLACKJACK. ELEMENTS WILL ATTACK FROM THE SOUTHEAST. TURN ON IR STROBES AT THIS TIME. WE WILL ESTABLISH A BP 100 METERS TO THE WEST OF YOUR POSITION, OVER.” “ROGER HARDROCK, BLACKJACK HAS YOUR POSITION, EN ROUTE FOR ATTACK, 30 SECONDS, OVER.” “HARDROCK 16, BLACKJACK 26, ENGAGEMENT COMPLETE, TWO T-80s DESTROYED, OVER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 06. STAND BY FOR UPDATE. FRIENDLY PLATOON IN CONTACT LOCATED AT VQ 96000050, MARKED BY IR STROBES. ENEMY PLATOON-SIZE ARMOR ELEMENT IS 800 METERS DUE NORTH. THERE HAS BEEN SPORADIC HEAVY MACHINE GUN FIRE AND MAIN TANK GUN FIRE INTO OUR POSITION. FIRE APPEARS TO BE COMING FROM ROAD INTERSECTION VICINITY VQ 96204362. NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE ON DISPOSITION OF ENEMY ADA. I’LL BE HANDING YOU DOWN TO HARDROCK 16 FOR THE ACF REQUEST, OVER.” “ROGER BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16. REQUEST FOLLOWS. FRIENDLY LOCATION VQ 96000050, 360-DEGREES TO TARGET, 800 METERS, TWO T-80S AT THE ROAD INTERSECTION, TARGET LOCATION VQ 96000850, AN/PAQ-4 SPOT ON, NO FRIENDLIES NORTH OF THE 00 GRID LINE, LOW WIRES DIRECTLY OVER OUR POSITION, OVER.” “BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16, STROBES ON AT THIS TIME, OVER.” “HARDROCK 16, ROGER.” “BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16, ROGER TWO T80s DESTROYED, END OF MISSION, OUT.”
Figure 8-17. Example request for immediate ACF 8-89. After receipt of a request for immediate ACF, the attack team leader informs the ground unit leader of the BP, SBF, or the series of positions his team will occupy that provide the best observation and fields of fire into the engagement or target area. z The BP or SBF is a position from which the attack aircraft will engage the enemy with direct fire. It includes a number of individual aircraft firing positions and may be preplanned or established as the situation dictates. Size will vary depending on the number of aircraft using the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of terrain. z The BP or SBF is normally offset from the flank of the friendly ground position, but close to the position of the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handoffs. This also ensures that rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure and the general signature of the aircraft does not interfere with operations on the ground. The offset position also allows the aircraft to engage the enemy on its flanks rather than its front, and lessens the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun target line. 8-90. The attack team leader then provides the ground maneuver unit leader with his concept for the team’s attack on the objective. This may be as simple as relaying the direction the aircraft will be coming from or attack route, time required to move forward from their current position, and the location of the BP. Only on completion of coordination with the lowest unit in contact does the flight depart the holding area for the battle position. As the attack team moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth (NOE) flight along attack routes to mask itself from ground enemy observation and enemy direct fire systems. The attack team leader maintains FM communications with the ground unit leader while he maintains internal communications on either his very high frequency (VHF) or ultra high frequency (UHF) net. Note. Grid locations may be difficult for the ground maneuver, depending on the intensity of the on-going engagement, and actual FM communications between the ground and air may not work this well.
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BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND R EATTACK 8-91. After completing the requested ACF, the attack team leader provides a battle damage assessment (BDA) to the ground maneuver commander. Based on his intent, the ground maneuver commander will determine if a reattack is required to achieve his desired endstate. Requests for ACF can be continued until all munitions or fuel is expended. Upon request for a reattack, the attack team leader must consider the effects on duration and strength of coverage he can provide the ground maneuver commander. The attack team may be required to devise a rearming and refueling plan, maintaining some of his aircraft on station with the unit in contact, while the remainder returns to the forward arming and refueling point (FARP). In addition to coordinating with the ground maneuver unit in contact, the attack team leader is required to coordinate this effort with his higher headquarters.
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Chapter 9
Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests during stable peace by influencing the operational environment in ways that reduce the likelihood of conflict. They do this through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activitied and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances government and economic prosperity. Civil support operations are operations conducted to address the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, and incidents within the United States and its territories. There are many similarities between civil support and stability operations. The purposes, considerations, and characteristics are related; however, U.S. laws carefully circumscribe the actions that military forces, particularly the regular Army, can conduct within the United States and its territories. The local population is composed of U.S. citizens, whose security and protection is the reason the Armed Forces exist. Local and national agencies normally are the lead, and Army forces cooperate and synchronize their efforts closely with them.
SECTION I – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 9-1. The tank platoon has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to Army units executing missions as part of stability operations and civil support operations. The platoon may be called upon to perform a variety of missions in a wide range of political, military, and geographical environments and in both combat and noncombat situations. These operations will almost always be decentralized and can require the tank platoon leader to make immediate decisions that may have strategic or operational consequences. The distinction between these roles and situations will not always be clear, presenting unique challenges for the platoon, its leaders, and its crewmen. Note. U.S. Army policy normally does not allow a unit to modify its warfighting missionessential task list (METL) unless and until the unit is selected for stability operations or civil support operations. Only then should a unit train for specific mission-related tasks. Chief among these are operations with very restrictive ROE/ROI and orientation on the area, its culture, and the nature of the conflict.
BALANCED MINDSET 9-2. A balance must be achieved between the mindset of peacetime military engagement in areas of stable peace through major combat operations during general war. Soldiers cannot become too complacent in their warrior spirit, but also must not be too eager to rely on the use of force to resolve conflict. This balance is the essence of full-spectrum operations and the fundamental aspect that will enable the company team to perform its mission successfully and avoid an escalation to combat. Proactive leaders that are communicating and enforcing the ROE are instrumental to achieving this mindset.
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COMBAT SKILLS TRAINING 9-3. If the stability or civil support operation extends over prolonged periods of time, training should be planned that focuses on the individual and collective tasks that would be performed during transition to offensive and or defensive missions.
PEACETIME 9-4. In peacetime, a variety of measures are employed to achieve national objectives; these include political, economic, and informational measures, as well as military actions short of combat operations or active support of warring parties. Within this environment, U.S. forces may conduct training exercises to demonstrate national resolve; conduct peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities; conduct disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance to friends and allies; or execute shows of force. Confrontations and tensions may escalate during peacetime to reach a point of transition into a state of conflict.
CONFLICT 9-5. Conflict can encompass numerous types of situations, including the following: z Clashes or crises over boundary disputes and land and water territorial claims. z Situations in which opposing political factions engage in military actions to gain control of political leadership within a nation. z Armed clashes between nations or between organized parties within a nation to achieve limited political or military objectives. 9-6. While regular military forces are sometimes involved, the use of irregular forces frequently predominates in conflict actions. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and limited in weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military response to a threat is exercised indirectly, usually in support of other elements of national power. Limited objectives, however, may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of military force. Conflict approaches the threshold of a state of war as the number of nations and/or troops, the frequency of battles, and the level of violence increase over an extended time. 9-7. Stability operations and civil support operations involving tank platoons often occur in the state of peacetime. Refer to Section IV of this appendix for examples of stability and support situations in which the tank platoon may participate.
SECTION II – STABILITY OPERATIONS 9-8. Stability operations are operations that occur in conjunction with offensive and defensive operations to restore, establish, preserve, or exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. Stability operations are executed outside the United States. Stability operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions by the military force. They are operations designed to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local government. Army forces engaged in stability operations establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until the host nation is capable of providing these services. They act in support of other governmental and host-nation agencies. When the host nation or other agency is unable to accomplish their role, Army forces may provide basic civil functions directly. Stability operations contribute to an environment in which the other instruments of national power can predominate. Most stability operations are multiagency and multinational.
TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS 9-9. Stability operations include— z
9-2
Civil security. Protecting the populace from serious external and internal threats.
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z
Civil control. Regulating the behavior and activity of individuals and groups to reduce risk to individuals or groups and to promote security. Control channels the population’s activity to allow for the provision of security and essential services while coexisting with a military force conducting operations. A curfew is an example of civil control.
z
Essential services include emergency life-saving medical care, the Essential services. prevention of epidemic disease, provision of food and water, provision of emergency shelter from the elements, and the provision of basic sanitation (sewage and garbage disposal).
z
Governance. The provision of societal control functions that include regulation of public activity, taxation, maintenance of security, control and essential services, and normalizing means of succession of power.
9-10. The degree to which Army forces engage in these types of stability operations is circumstantial. In some operations, the host nation is capable of carrying out these types of operations and Army forces are engaged in civil-military operations to minimize the impact of military presence on the populace. Army forces located in Kuwait but supporting operations in Iraq is an example of this. On the other hand, Army forces within Iraq may be responsible for the well-being of the local population, while working with other agencies to restore basic capabilities to the area or region. ( Note. See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for detail on stability operations.)
PURPOSES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS 9-11. Stability operations complement offensive and defensive operations. They may be the decisive operation within a phase of a campaign or major combat operation. Although military forces set the conditions for success, the other instruments of national power are decisive. The purposes of stability operations are— z Isolate adversaries from the local population. z Gain support for the indigenous government. z Shape for interagency and host-nation success by providing the necessary security and control for the host nation and interagency elements to function. z Develop an indigenous capacity for a viable market economy, rule of law, and democratic institutions. This requires security, control, essential services, and governance provided by the military, host nation, or both. 9-12. Stability operations seek to reduce the level of violence and establish order by working with the local population and their government. They employ military capabilities to restore or establish essential services and support civilian agencies. Stability operations conducted in the absence of a local civil government provide the necessary security and control for the local population. By providing security and control to stabilize the AO, these operations provide a foundation for transitioning control to other governmental agencies and eventually to the host nation. Once this transition is complete, the operation focuses on transferring regional control to a legitimate civil authority according to the desired end state. The goal of these combined military and civil efforts is to strengthen legitimately recognized governance, rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to establish sustainable peace and security fostering a sense of confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for economic reconstruction. Stability operations seek to manage the level of violence and establish order by working with the local population. The goal is to enable local institutions to assume their civic responsibilities. They occur simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations. Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host government, an interim government, or a part of an occupation when no government exists. By providing security and control to stabilize the AO, these operations provide a foundation for transitioning control to other governmental agencies. Once this transition is complete, the operation focuses on transferring regional control to a legitimate civil authority according to the desired end state. 9-13. During hostilities, stability operations help prevent armed conflict from spreading. The first aim is to limit the influence on disaffected populations. Isolation in stability operations is usually indirect; that is, it aims to redirect, compel, and influence the attitudes and civil activity away from supporting adversaries and toward supporting the legitimate government. Concurrently, they secure the support of local
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populations in unstable areas. They support this by isolating irregular forces from the population. Forces engaged in an operation where stability predominates may have to defend themselves. Conversely, they may conduct defensive and offensive operations to physically isolate, defeat, or destroy forces seeking to undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the stability mission. Following conventional hostilities, forces conduct stability operations to provide a secure environment for civil authorities. Security is vital to achieving reconciliation, providing governance, rebuilding lost infrastructure, and resuming vital services.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS 9-14. Commanders and staffs consider several factors when conducting stability operations. These include: z Understand the operational environment, particularly civil considerations. z Establish HUMINT networks early. z Use IO, to engage and influence the local population and isolate adversaries. z Use PA to inform local and regional populations. z Display the capability to use overwhelming force, but use minimum lethality consistent with rules of engagement and proportional to the mission requirements. z Be impartial. z Be transparent when dealing with the local population. z Be consistent and credible with the local population. 9-15. To establish a stable and lasting peace, stability operations capitalize on the coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization with nonmilitary organizations. This allows all participants to exploit their capabilities and conduct operations simultaneously, with increased endurance and in depth across the AO. 9-16. Coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization between host-nation elements and Army forces are enhanced by impartiality, transparency, and credibility. Impartiality is not neutrality. Impartiality does not imply that force will affect all sides equally. Force will be used against threats not because of who they are but because they are violating the law. Fair and even-handed treatment of all sides in the conflict, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim, can improve the prospects for lasting peace, stability, and security even within ongoing combat operations. The commander uses transparency to make the populace aware of mandates, intentions, and techniques used to ensure security and control. Transparency serves to reinforce impartiality and credibility. Credibility reflects the local populations and host nation’s assessment of the capability of the force to accomplish its mission. The force must have the proper structure and resources with appropriate ROE to accomplish the mission and discharge its duties swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt as to its will and intensions. 9-17. Stability operations take a different form during contingencies. As offensive operations clear populated areas of hostile forces, part of the force secures critical infrastructure and population areas. As civil security is established, the force returns territory to civil authorities’ control. Facilitating the transition to the civil authority promotes the coordination, integration, and synchronization of civil and military efforts to build the peace. Effective stability operations focus on the population’s essential needs. This produces a secondary effect of preventing the populace from becoming disillusioned and offering support and sanctuary to irregular forces. Properly focused and effective stability operations prevent population centers from degenerating into recruiting areas for insurgencies, opposition movements, and civil unrest.
APPLY FORCE SELECTIVELY AND DISCRIMINATELY 9-18. Commanders must make sure their units apply force consistent with and adequate to assigned objectives and employ combat power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed legal and policy limitations. Commanders use the rules of engagement to guide the tactical application of combat power. The commander on the ground is best qualified to estimate the correct degree of force that must be used, consistent with the ROE.
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ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION 9-19. Army forces must always be prepared to act with speed and determination when carrying out assigned tasks. Opponents of stability may perceive hesitation to act decisively as weakness. Units and individuals must pursue military objectives energetically and apply military power forcefully. By doing so, Army forces assure friend and foe alike that they not only can protect themselves and the people and facilities under their charge but also achieve stability objectives.
UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS 9-20. Individual and small-unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic impact. Recognizing and avoiding these potential problems requires trained, disciplined, and knowledgeable leaders and Soldiers at every level. Every Soldier must be aware of the operational and strategic context of the mission. Additionally, each Soldier must understand the potential military, political, and legal consequences of the actions they take or fail to take. Dissemination of this information throughout the force minimizes any possible confusion regarding desired objectives.
ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON 9-21. The tank platoon has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to U.S. and combined forces executing missions in stability operations and civil support operations. Whether it is operating organic to the company or task organized to a light or heavy force, the platoon may be called upon to support a wide range of operations in various political and geographical environments. Examples of these operations are included in Section IV of this appendix.
USING THE PLATOON’S CAPABILITIES 9-22. Because of the resources necessary to deploy, operate, and sustain armored forces, tank platoons are usually used to execute stability and support activities that take maximum advantage of their inherent capabilities of firepower, maneuver, shock effect, and survivability. They execute move, attack, and defend missions using procedures similar to those described throughout this manual. 9-23. On the other hand, the factors of METT-TC and the operational considerations prevalent in stability operations and civil support operations may modify the conditions for successful mission accomplishment. This means the tank platoon occasionally may be assigned operations that are normally handled by specially trained and equipped elements. For example, the platoon could be tasked for crowd and riot control if a shortage of military police exists. 9-24. Several problems arise when armored forces are used in this type of role. To perform with complete effectiveness and efficiency, crewmen should receive special equipment and training before executing such operations. In addition, dismounted missions effectively negate the tank platoon’s inherent advantages (lethality, mobility, and survivability).
TRAINING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AND CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS 9-25. Disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready leaders and crewmen can adapt to the specialized demands of stability operations and civil support operations. To achieve this degree of readiness, however, the platoon must be thoroughly trained before deployment on such factors as the operational environment, the ROE and ROI, force protection, and individual Soldier responsibilities. A discussion of these operational considerations is included later in this section. The training must be updated continuously after deployment.
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LEADER R EQUIREMENTS 9-26. Flexibility and situational understanding are paramount requirements, especially for the tank platoon leader. The platoon’s role and/or objectives in stability operations and civil support operations will not always be clear. The platoon leader will sometimes be called upon to make on-the-spot decisions that could have an immediate, dramatic effect on the strategic or operational situation. In this uniquely tense setting, leaders who disregard the will of belligerent parties and the lethality of these groups’ weapons compromise the success of their mission and risk the lives of their Soldiers.
PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 9-27. Although stability operations can take place in any part of the world, they are most likely to occur in third world countries, where social, political, economic, and psychological factors contribute to political instability. Each country or region is unique, with its own history, culture, goals, and problems. U.S. forces deployed to these areas can be subject to rapid and dramatic changes in situations and missions. The tank platoon leader must understand this environment; he must plan for rapid changes in the situation or mission and constantly be prepared to adapt to them. In addition, the platoon must be prepared to operate in any type of terrain and climate. 9-28. To deal effectively with the diverse situations they may face, U.S. forces must undergo orientation training on the complex conditions and factors at work in a specific region. Each Soldier must understand the political and economic situation, as well as the cultures, climates, and terrain of the region. He should understand the military situation, especially the doctrine, tactics, and equipment that are employed by hostile forces or civil unrest. Orientation training should also clarify the following environmental factors as well as the planning and operational considerations discussed in the remainder of this section.
Tempo 9-29. The speed of military action can vary widely, from fast, violent tactical movement by a reaction force for the purpose of relieving encircled friendly forces to the deliberate occupation of stationary defensive positions to provide overwatch at traffic control points. Although extreme tension may underlie stability operations and civil support operations, the tempo of these operations is generally slow. 9-30. Throughout stability operations and civil support operations, belligerents can be expected to execute both overt and covert operations to test friendly reaction times and security procedures. Units that are predictable or that lack sound OPSEC leave themselves susceptible to attack. For the tank platoon, the key to a secure environment is not only to maintain the highest possible level of OPSEC, but also to vary the techniques by which security procedures are executed.
Role of U.S. Forces 9-31. All crewmen should be aware of the role U.S. forces will play in the overall mission. This is especially vital when Americans are part of a combined force that requires constant interaction and coordination with the Soldiers of foreign nations. In all cases, the commander’s intent and projected end state should be simplified and presented in a way that gives Soldiers the guidance they need to accomplish the mission.
INTELLIGENCE 9-32. Intelligence is crucial during the planning, preparation, and execution of stability operations and civil support operations. The threats faced by military forces in these operations are more ambiguous than those in other situations because combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily blend with the civilian population. Before forces are committed, intelligence must be collected, processed, and focused to support all planning, training, and operational requirements. ( Note. See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for additional information.)
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DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS 9-33. Although stability operations are normally centrally planned, execution takes the form of smallscale, decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. Responsibility for making decisions on the ground will fall to junior leaders. Effective command guidance and a thorough understanding of the applicable ROE and/or ROI (refer to the following discussions) are critical at each operational level.
R ULES OF ENGAGEMENT 9-34. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations. The ROE are directed by higher military authorities based on the political and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these restrictions may require that the forces involved limit their use of firepower to a certain geographical area or that they limit the duration of their operations. Refer to Figure 9-1 for an example of ROE for one possible situation. 9-35. While ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all operations, understanding, adjusting for, and properly executing ROE are especially important to success in stability operations and civil support operations. The unit’s SOP will require adjustment based on each particular situation’s ROE. The restrictions change whenever the political and military situations change; this means ROE must be explained to friendly Soldiers continuously. 9-36. ROE provide the authority for the Soldier’s right to self-defense. Each Soldier must understand the ROE and be prepared to execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition, ROE violations can have operational, strategic, and political consequences that may affect national security; the enemy can be expected to exploit such violations.
All enemy military personnel and vehicles transporting enemy personnel or their equipment may be engaged subject to the following restrictions: A.
Armed civilians will be engaged only in self-defense.
B.
Civilian aircraft will not be engaged, except in self-defense, without approval from division level.
C.
All civilians should be treated with respect and dignity. Civilians and their property should not be harmed unless necessary to save U.S. lives. If possible, civilians should be evacuated before any U.S. attack. Privately owned property may be used only if publicly owned proper ty is unavailable or its use is inappropriate.
D.
If civilians are in the area, artillery, mortars, AC-130s, attack helicopters, tubelaunched or rocket-launched weapons, and main tank guns should not be used against known or suspected targets without the p ermission of a ground maneuver commander (LTC or higher).
E.
If civilians are in the area, all air attacks must be controlled by FAC or FO, and CAS, WP weapons, and incendiary weapons are prohibited without approval from division.
F.
If civilians are in the area, infantry will shoot only at known enemy locations.
G.
Public works such as power stations, water treatment plants, dams, and other public utilities may not be engaged without approval from division level.
H.
Hospitals, churches, shrines, schools, museums, and other historical or cultural sites will be engaged only in self-defense against fire from these locations.
I.
All indirect fire and air attacks must be observed.
J.
Pilots must be briefed for each mission as to the location of civilians and friendly forces.
K.
Booby traps are not authorized. Authority to emplace mines is reserved for the division commander. Riot control agents can be used only with approval from division level.
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L.
Prisoners should be treated humanely, with respect and dignity.
M.
Annex R to the the operational operational plan (OPLAN) provides more more detail. detail. In the event this card conflicts with the OPLAN, the OPLAN should be followed.
Distribution: One for each Soldier deployed (all ranks). Figure 9-1. Example rules of of engagement ULES OF INTERACTION /GRADUATED R ESPONSE ESPONSE R ULES
9-37. ROI and graduated response embody the human dimension of stability operations and support operations; they lay the foundation for successful relationships with the myriad of factions and individuals that play critical roles in in these operations. ROI encompass an array of interpersonal interpersonal communication communication skills, such as persuasion and negotiation. Graduated response deals with the process of applying applying greater levels of force to a situation in response to the changes in that situation. These are tools the individual Soldier Soldier will need to deal with the nontraditional threats that are prevalent in stability operations, including political friction, unfamiliar cultures, cultures, and conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI enhance the Soldier’s survivability survivability in such situations. Refer to Figure 9-2 for an example of a graduated response card.
Figure 9-2. Example graduated graduated response card
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9-38. ROI are based on the applicable ROE for a particular operation; they must be tailored to the specific regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by the operation. operation. Like ROE, the ROI can be effective effective only if they are thoroughly rehearsed and understood by every Soldier in the unit.
FORCE PROTECTION 9-39. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in stability operations and civil support operations, precautions and operations required to minimize casualties and collateral damage become a particularly important important operational consideration during these operations. At the same time, however, force protection must be a constant priority. priority. Armored forces are commonly deployed in a force protection role. 9-40. In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in stability operations and civil support operations, leaders must avoid making tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary risks. On the other hand, an overpowering use of force correctly employed employed and surgically applied, can reduce subsequent violence or prevent a response from the opposing opposing force. These considerations must must be covered in the ROE and the OPORD from the battalion or brigade. 9-41. OPSEC, tempered by restrictions restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an important tool for the platoon leader in accomplishing his force protection goals. Security procedures should encompass encompass the full range of antiterrorist activities activities for every Soldier and leader. Examples include proper RTP; strict strict noise, light, and litter discipline; proper wear of the uniform; display of the proper demeanor for the situation; as well as effective use of cover and concealment, obstacles, OPs and early warning devices, the protection afforded by armor vehicles, and safe locations for eating and resting. 9-42. A final consideration in force force protection is hygiene. hygiene. Proper field sanitation sanitation and personal hygiene are mandatory if Soldiers are to stay healthy.
TASK ORGANIZATION 9-43. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and civil support operations, the tank platoon may be task organized to operate operate with a variety of units. units. As noted, this may may include armor or mechanized company team or a light infantry company company or battalion. In addition, the platoon may operate with other elements with linguists, counterintelligence teams, and civil affairs teams.
SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS 9-44. The operational environment that the platoon faces during stability operations and civil support operations may be very austere, creating special sustainment sustainment considerations. These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: z Reliance on local procurement of certain items. z Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supplies (barrier materials), and lubricants. z Special Class V supply requirements, such as pepper spray. z Reliance on bottled water.
OPERATIONS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES 9-45. U.S. Army units may conduct certain stability operations and civil support operations in coordination with a variety of outside organizations. These include other U.S. armed armed services or government agencies as well as international organizations, including private volunteer organizations (PVO) (such as Doctors Without Borders), nongovernmental organizations (NGO) (such as the Red Cross), and United Nation (UN) agencies. ESPONSIBILITIES SOLDIERS’ R ESPONSIBILITIES
9-46. U.S. Soldiers may have extensive contact with civilians during stability operations and civil support operations. As a result, their personal conduct has a significant significant impact on the opinions, and thus the the
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support, of the local population. As noted, Soldiers must understand that misconduct misconduct by U.S. forces (even those deployed for only a short time) can damage rapport that took years to develop. U.S. Soldiers must treat local civilians and military personnel as personal and professional equals, affording them the appropriate customs and courtesies. 9-47. Every Soldier must be updated continuously on changes to operational considerations (such as environment, ROE/ROI, ROE/ROI, media, and force protection). Such changes can have an immediate impact impact on his freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the Soldier informed informed of changes enhances his situational situational understanding and his ability to adapt to changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate disseminate this information quickly and accurately. 9-48. Every individual is an an intelligence-collecting intelligence-collecting instrument. The collection of information is a continuous process, and all information information must be reported. reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources, including friendly forces, enemy enemy elements, and the the local populace. From the friendly friendly standpoint, each Soldier must be familiar with the local PIR and other applicable intelligence intelligence requirements. At the same time, enemy Soldiers or other outside countries’ intelligence agencies will be continuously seeking intelligence on U.S. actions, often often blending easily into the civilian population. population. U.S. Soldiers must be aware aware of this and use OPSEC procedures at all times. 9-49. To emphasize Soldier responsibilities, leaders conduct PCCs and PCIs that focus on each Soldier’s knowledge of the environment and application of the ROE. ROE. These checks and inspections should should also identify possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the Soldier and his equipment at risk. Leaders should stress that terrorists and thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either to steal equipment and supplies or to cause harm to U.S. forces or facilities. 9-50. To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the tank platoon leader is responsible for obtaining a key word and phrase card from the S2 to assist in translation of key english phrases into the language of the host nation. These phrases should apply specifically specifically to the area of operations.
SECTION III – CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS 9-51. Civil support operations are operations conducted to address the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents, and incidents within the United States and its territories. territories. Army forces engage in civil support operations when the size and scope of events exceed the capabilities of domestic civilian agencies. The Army National Guard Guard often acts as a first responder on behalf of state authorities authorities when functioning under Title 32 U.S. Code authority or while serving on State active duty. The National Guard is uniquely suited to perform these missions; however, the scope and level of destruction may require the use of additional active military military forces to respond to the disaster, disaster, accident, or incident. incident. There are many similarities similarities between civil support support and stability operations. The purposes, considerations, and characteristics are related; however, U.S. laws carefully circumscribe the actions that military forces, particularly the regular Army, Army, can conduct within the United States and its territories. territories. The local population is composed of U.S. citizens, whose security and protection is the reason the Army Army forces exist. Local and national agencies normally are the lead and Army forces cooperate and synchronize their efforts closely with them.
TYPES OF CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS 9-52. Civil support encompasses three types: support civil law enforcement, enforcement, support civil authority, authority, and restore essential services. These types are are similar to the the stability types types of operations. They differ because because they are conducted within the U.S. and its its territories and are executed executed under U.S. law. Within the U.S., National Guard forces under state control have law enforcement authorities not granted to regular Army units. In addition to legal differences, operations conducted conducted within the U.S. are conducted in support of other government agencies. These agencies are trained, resourced, and equipped far more extensively than counterpart agencies involved in many stability stability operations overseas. In stability operations, multinational multinational operations are typical; in civil support operations, they are the exception.
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SUPPORT CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT 9-53. When authorized and directed, Army forces provide support to local, state, and federal law enforcement officers. In extreme cases, when directed by the President President of the United States, regular Army Army forces maintain law and order under martial law.
SUPPORT CIVIL AUTHORITY 9-54. The civil authorities within the U.S. and its territories are dedicated and experienced civil servants. They are manned, funded, and equipped to provide governance and essential serivces serivces to the citizens. As a result of disaster or attack, the capacity of government may be reduced or overextended. overextended. Army forces provide C2, protection, and sustainment to government officials at all levels to support governance until these agencies are able to function without Army support. ESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES R ESTORE
9-55. In response to natural or man-made disaster, Army forces provide essential services to an affected area. Essential services include rescue, rescue, emergency medical care, care, prevention of epidemic disease, provision provision of food and water, provision of emergency shelter from the elements, and the provision of basic sanitation (sewage and garbage disposal). Army forces work directly directly with local and federal federal officials to restore and return control of services to civilian control as rapidly as possible.
PURPOSES OF CIVIL OPERATIONS 9-56. Army forces conduct civil support operations as part of Homeland Security. Security. Homeland Security provides the nation its strategic flexibility by protecting its citizens, critical assets, and infrastructure from conventional and unconventional threats. threats. It has two related related elements. elements. The first first is homeland defense. If the United States comes under direct attack or is threatened by hostile armed forces, Army forces under Joint Command conduct offensive and defensive operations against enemy elements while simultaneously providing civil support. The other is civil support. The purposes of civil civil support operations operations are: z Save lives. z Maintain or restore law and order. z Protect infrastructure and property. z Maintain or restore local government. z Shapte for interagency success.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS 9-57. Commanders and staffs consider consider and incorporate several factors into into civil support operations. operations. These include the following: z Provide essential services and support to the largest number of people. z Respond quickly to save lives and alleviate suffering. z Use C2 capabilities and forces to complement civilian jurisdictions. z Use defensive capabilities to secure critical assets and key infrastructure. z Hand over responsibility to civilian agencies as soon as possible. z Display the capability to use overwhelming force, but use deadly force only as a last resort and in self-defense. z Treat all civilians as U.S. citizens. 9-58. Most operations conducted within the U.S. have only minor offensive and defensive components; however, Homeland Security Security employs complementary complementary offensive offensive and defensive capabilities. capabilities. Defensive capabilities employed in Homeland Security missions include the protection of critical assets and key infrastructure during crises. The ability to conduct offensive offensive operations, though maintained maintained only as a potential for homeland defense, is also present. Discipline, endurance, and unit cohesion developed during during
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training prepare Soldiers and units to address the ambiguities and complexities inherent in civil support operations.
SECTION IV – EXAMPLES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS 9-59. The following discussion and accompanying figures examine several situations the tank platoon may face during stability operations and and civil support operations. The list is not all-inclusive; all-inclusive; assessment of METT-TC factors and the operational considerations applicable in the area of operations may identify additional mission requirements. 9-60. The platoon leader must keep in mind that the relatively simple situations illustrated here cannot adequately portray the ever-changing, often confusing conditions of the stability operations and civil support operations. As noted, flexibility flexibility is a key to success (and survival) under such such conditions. To the extent possible, the platoon leader should attempt to shape the role or mission to match the platoon’s unique characteristics and capabilities. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for for a discussion of urban operations. operations. As noted, these operations often provide the operational framework for stability operations and civil support operations.
Note.
ESTABLISH A BATTLE POSITION 9-61. The platoon establishes a BP or conducts a relief in place at a platoon BP as part of a company perimeter or strongpoint defense (the circled “A” in Figure 9-3) (see Chapter 4 for detailed information on defensive operations). Dismounted infantry infantry should be integrated with the tank platoon. Coordination with with dismounted patrols and OPs OPs outside the perimeter is critical for situational situational understanding. Signs, in the local language, should be posted as necessary within the engagement area to identify movement restrictions on the local populace.
Figure 9-3. Battle position and reserve/reaction force force missions
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CONDUCT RESERVE OPERATIONS 9-62. As part of the battalion or company reserve, the tank platoon occupies an assembly area or sets up a perimeter defense (the circled circled “B” in Figure 9-3). Potential missions missions include linkup with and relief relief of encircled friendly forces (the circled “B1”); linkup and movement to secure an objective in an operation to rescue a downed helicopter or stranded vehicle (the circled “B2”); and tactical movement to destroy enemy forces attacking a convoy (the circled “B3”). In all three scenarios, scenarios, the platoon conducts tactical movement and operations in contact. contact. Tasks such as linkup, support by fire, fire, attack by fire, assault, assault, hasty attack, and consolidation and reorganization are also critical critical to the reserve mission. For more information information on these operations, refer to Chapters 3 and 5.
OVERWATCH A TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT 9-63. The tank platoon (or section) overwatches an infantry or MP traffic control point (the circled “C” in Figure 9-4). In turn, the overwatch element must ensure ensure its own local security; it usually does this by coordinating with dismounted infantry infantry for OPs and dismounted patrols patrols from the company. Overwatch is covered in Chapter 3, occupation occupation of a defensive position in Chapter Chapter 4. Also see Figures 9-5 and 9-6 for manning of light and heavy traffic checkpoints.
Figure 9-4. Traffic control point, choke point, point, blockade, convoy escort, and route proofing missions
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DEFEND A CHOKE POINT 9-64. The tank platoon (supported by infantry) occupies a perimeter defense to protect traffic and facilitate movement through a choke point along the MSR (the circled “D” in Figure 9-4). 9-4). Infantry is integrated integrated into the perimeter defense to augment the platoon’s firepower and to provide early warning and OPSEC for the defense by means of dismounted dismounted patrols and OPs. For detailed information information on defensive operations, operations, see Chapter 4.
OVERWATCH A BLOCKADE/ROADBLOCK 9-65. The tank platoon (or section) overwatches a blockade or roadblock, either a manned position or a reinforcing obstacle covered by fires only (the circled “E” in Figure 9-4). It coordinates with dismounted dismounted infantry from the company for local security (OPs and dismounted dismounted patrols). Positions are improved using procedures for deliberate occupation occupation of a BP (see Chapter Chapter 4). Also see Figures 9-7A 9-7A and 9-7B for examples of tank platoon roadblocks set up and a list of equipment needed to conduct the operation.
CONDUCT CONVOY ESCORT 9-66. The tank platoon conducts convoy escort duties (the circled “F” in Figure 9-4) using procedures covered in Chapter 5.
CONDUCT PROOFING/BREACHING OPERATIONS 9-67. The tank platoon (or section) overwatches breaching operations along the MSR or provides overwatch to engineer elements elements as they clear the route (the circled “G” in Figure Figure 9-4). In doing so, the platoon conducts tactical movement as outlined in Chapter 3 of this manual. 9-68. Based on METT-TC factors, the tank platoon may use tactical movement techniques to provide overwatch for the proofing vehicle, which can be a tank (equipped with a mine roller, if available) or an engineer vehicle. If mines are detected, the platoon platoon continues to overwatch the breaching breaching unit until all mines have been detected and neutralized. If the obstacle is not within the the breaching unit’s capability, capability, engineers are called forward. At all times, overwatch overwatch vehicles should take notice of anything anything that is out of the ordinary, such as new construction, repairs to damaged buildings, plants or trees that seem new or out of place, and freshly freshly dug earth. These conditions may may indicate the presence of newly newly emplaced or command-detonated command-detonated mines. At no time will tanks conduct breaching or proofing operations.
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Figure 9-5. Tank section manning manning a light traffic traffic checkpoint
Figure 9-6. Tank platoon manning manning a heavy traffic traffic checkpoint
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Figure 9-7A. Tank platoon roadblock
Figure 9-7B. Equipment Equipment list for roadblocks roadblocks and checkpoints
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Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations
CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS 9-69. During cordon and search operations, the tank platoon occupies overwatch and/or hasty defensive positions to isolate a search area (see Figure 9-8). Close coordination and communication communication with the search team are critical, as is employment of OPs and patrols to maintain surveillance of dead space and gaps in the cordoned area.
Figure 9-8. Cordon and and search operations operations 9-70. The tank platoon (or section) must be prepared to take immediate action if the search team or OPs identify enemy elements. elements. Enemy contact may require require the platoon to execute tactical movement and linkup; it would then coordinate with other units to destroy the enemy using techniques discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual. 9-71. Additionally, the tank platoon may support the infantry by conducting vehicle and personnel searches as part of the the search operation or traffic control points. Refer to FM 3-20.98 (FM 17-98), Appendix E, for a detailed discussion on vehicle and personnel search procedures.
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Appendix A
Digitization Army digitization is the result of the desire to employ existing and emerging technology to enhance Army operations from the strategic to the tactical level by providing its Soldiers an automated, near real-time capability for planning, coordinating, monitoring, monitoring, controlling, and executing operations. operations. At the tactical level, the Army is capitalizing on this technology by digitizing its vehicles, weapons, and equipment. Digitized systems systems enhance operational effectiveness in many ways. Providing the user the ability to take the initiative on the battlefield and achieve combat superiority over an enemy through increased situational understanding especially enhances it. Situational understanding understanding is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of relevant information information and the tactical situation. This picture includes the knowledge of both the friendly and threat situation and of relevant Note. Even with the addition of these digital enablers, the basic combat terrain. ( Note. skills of tankers must be mastered and reinforced in the event digital technology is compromised or fails. fails. Once the basic skills skills are mastered, the digital digital enablers can be exploited to their fullest capabilities.) As outlined throughout this manual, the tank platoon’s primary tools on the digitized battlefield is the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system. This appendix focuses on the impact of these systems on various phases of platoon operations and on the duties and responsibilities of platoon leaders and crewmen employing these systems while conducting conducting tactical operations. This appendix also provides a brief overview of the structure of the tactical Internet (TI) and its major subcomponents.
SECTION I – THE TACTICAL INTERNET AND FBCB2
THE TACTICAL INTERNET A-1. The TI is is designed to provide users with with near real-time, real-time, shared situational understanding. understanding. It consists of tactical radios linked with routers that use commercial protocols to allow digital systems to interoperate in a dynamic battlefield environment. The TI provides reliable, seamless seamless communications connectivity connectivity to deliver situational understanding and command, control, and intelligence (C2I) data to digital systems. A-2. The TI is comprised comprised of two echelons: echelons: the upper TI TI and the lower lower TI. Company level and below operate on the lower TI. The upper TI passes situational situational understanding and C2I between the the command posts at the task force level and higher.
FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW A-3. The FBCB2 is a battle command command information system system designed for units performing performing missions at the tactical level. FBCB2 is a system of computers, global-positioning global-positioning equipment, and communication communication systems that work together to provide unprecedented amounts of real-time information to combat leaders. FBCB2 integrates with the Army tactical command and control system (ATCCS) to provide complete, seamless battle battle command capability capability with increased increased battlefield awareness. awareness. It provides command command and control capabilities relevant to each of the BFAs, increasing the effectiveness of their capabilities in
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relation to the mission. Both the lower and upper TIs support FBCB2 communications. (Figure A-1 shows the FBCB2 system.)
Figure A-1. FBCB2 computer system A-4. FBCB2 displays the relevant information regarding the situational understanding environment. This information shows the user his location, the location of other friendly forces, reported enemy locations, and known enemy and plotted friendly battlefield obstacles. The warfighter receives data “pushed” from all the battlefield systems to maintain real-time battle information. (Figure A-2 shows the FBCB2 tactical display.)
Figure A-2. FBCB2 tactical display A-5. FBCB2 receives data across the TI via the Internet controller (INC). The INC is a tactical router built into the SINCGARS. The enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) data radio, blue force tracker (BFT), and SINCGARS data/voice radio transmit and receive digital information between vehicles. Each FBCB2 derives its own location via the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR). Utilizing these interfaces, the FBCB2 automatically updates and broadcasts its current location to all other FBCB2 and embedded battle command (EBC) platforms. EBC platforms, such as selected M1A2s and M2A3s, are not installed with FBCB2 hardware, but are equipped with software capabilities that allow them to share situational understanding and command and control information with the FBCB2 platforms. (Figure A-3 shows the tank platoon FBCB2 TI architectural diagram.)
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Figure A-3. Tank platoon FBCB2 TI architecture diagram A-6. Digital systems on the battlefield pass messages using the joint variable message format (JVMF). The JVMF is a Department of Defense standardized message format. It prescribes uniform message formats for all branches of the armed services.
SECTION II – OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS A-7. This section focuses on several areas in which FBCB2 affect tank platoon operations.
WINGMAN CONCEPT A-8. The FBCB2 system allows tank sections and platoons to maneuver outside their direct line of sight of each other and still maintain situational understanding and mutual support (see Figures A-4A and A4B). Even as they improve command and control within the platoon, however, these digital systems increase the command and control demands on the individual TC. They require the platoon to make more effective use of the wingman concept.
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Figure A-4A. Tank sections maneuvering separately on actual terrain outside of their direct line of sight of each other
Figure A-4B. FBCB2 display of the tank sections maneuvering separately A-9. The M1A1D, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP platoon must be able to operate as two independent sections. This capability provides the platoon leader and company/troop commander with the flexibility to maneuver using sections. ( Note. Although FBCB2 allows the ability to spread forces over a large area, the platoon leader must still consider mutual support between sections.)
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NAVIGATION A-10. The POSNAV system (a built-in navigational system on digitally-equipped tanks that operates through FBCB2) significantly improves navigation for the company team and platoon. This inertial navigation system allows the unit to maintain greater depth and dispersion. It also enhances the ability of the company team commander or platoon leader to maneuver his unit on the battlefield. A-11. On the M1A2, the navigation system must be periodically updated to increase accuracy; however, the POSNAV system on the M1A2 SEP automatically updates itself with a GPS built into the system. This allows the platoon leader and TCs to use waypoints to orient vehicles during movement. The tank driver can then steer to these waypoints to maintain orientation and dispersion within the company team or platoon. A-12. One method of controlling platoon movement is for the platoon leader to preselect checkpoints and add them to the FBCB2 overlay. He then sends the overlay to the remainder of the platoon. Each TC uses the CID or commander’s display unit (CDU) to designate these checkpoints as waypoints for the driver in accordance with the platoon leader’s guidance, movement orders, and designated movement technique. Once the TC selects a waypoint to which he wants the driver to steer, the DID will display direction and distance information to that waypoint. ( Note. The DID does not display terrain relief. The driver must not become ‘fixed’ on driving the tank via the DID only, but should maneuver the tank visually and periodically check the DID to apply course corrections as needed. Also, the platoon leader’s driver, using his DID steer-to capability, can lead the platoon via the waypoint designated by the platoon leader. The remainder of the tanks will orient on the lead tank and maintain their position in the formation.) A-13. Unless the tank is in contact, the loader should be up in the hatch to assist the driver and provide security. The TC must ensure that the loader is knowledgeable of tank platoon formations and active in acquiring targets. This loader’s assistance will give the TC more freedom to send and receive digital traffic and monitor the CID or CDU. As a result, the TC can focus more effectively on the tactical situation and maintain better overall command of the tank.
SECTION III – CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS A-14. Digitized equipment has the potential to improve the platoon’s effectiveness in several areas, including situational understanding, command and control, intelligence, and navigation. These enhanced capabilities allow the platoon leader to more effectively synchronize his elements with other units through the employment of timelier and more accurate information. In turn, digital enhancements assist the platoon leader and other friendly leaders and commanders in gaining and maintaining the initiative against enemy forces. At the same time, however, the platoon leader must keep in mind several areas in which digitized equipment imposes limitations on the platoon and other friendly units. Table A-1 summarizes the limitations and capabilities of the digitized tank platoon.
Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon Capabilities
Limitations
Digitized equipment provides these tactical advantages:
Digitized equipment has or causes these tactical limitations:
•
•
•
Provides accurate locations of friendly units with respect to known enemy locations. This information reduces the chance of fratricide and enhances situational understanding. Allows platoon leaders to increase dispersion among the platoon.
•
•
Enhances survivability through enhanced awareness of known enemy locations. •
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Units not equipped with the SINCGARS SIP INC radio (SINCGARS with system improvement program and Internet controller) cannot send digital and voice traffic simultaneously. Users must physically manipulate digital controls or visually read digital information causing a loss of focus on enemy acquisition and destruction and situational understanding. Users must be aware that the size of
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Appendix A
Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon Capabilities •
•
Limitations graphics (if too large) could cause the system to run at a slower speed or c rash.
Enables leaders to receive, process, and distribute information (including WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs) in near real time.
•
Greatly improves maneuver capability on the battlefield through the use of the POSNAV system.
If the net server is lost, the platoon will lose situational understanding until they conduct net join procedures (EPLRS).
A-15. Battle command of the tank platoon is significantly enhanced through the use of FBCB2. It allows the platoon to— z Maintain friendly situational understanding (Blue SU). z Track actual and templated enemy positions and obstacles (Red SU). z Submit preformatted, standardized reports (SALUTE, SITREP, MEDEVAC, NBC, call-for-fire, and so forth). z Rapidly disseminate graphic overlays and written FRAGOs. z Maneuver in dispersed formations. z Enhance situational understanding and decrease dependency on graphic control measures.
SECTION IV – DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES A-16. As with all tactical organizations, the effectiveness of the digital unit depends on the synergy of its subordinate elements (individual tanks and tank sections) as well as its relationship with higher headquarters and support elements. Together, these components create a broad array of capabilities. Individually, however, the platoon has a number of vulnerabilities. Effective application of the platoon within the combined arms force can capitalize on its strengths and enhance the capabilities of its parent unit. This section discusses factors that affect the platoon’s organization and its relationship with other elements.
ROLE OF TRAINING A-17. The skills required to operate and maintain the highly technical systems on the M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP are extremely perishable. To ensure combat effectiveness of their units, leaders in both the company team and platoon must place special emphasis on the training of individual tank crews. Constant sustainment training is a must in order to remain proficient on the digital systems particular to their vehicle. A-18. A comprehensive training program must include cross training. Even though each crewman has specific duties and responsibilities, success in battle often depends on his ability to function at any position on the tank. Every crewman must be proficient in the operation of all tank systems, including the FBCB2, CITV, and SINCGARS. In addition, tank crew members must have a thorough understanding of how to maintain and service the tank and its component parts to keep the vehicle fully mission capable. ( Note. Training programs for digitized units must be coordinated with the training programs of nondigitized units. Digital units must understand that they need to push situational understanding information to nondigitized units and attachments.)
LEADER AND CREW RESPONSIBILITIES A-19. In general, members of the M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP company team and platoon hold the same functional responsibilities as their counterparts in other tank units. This discussion focuses on responsibilities specific to the unique capabilities and employment considerations of digitized tanks.
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COMPANY TEAM R ESPONSIBILITIES Company Team Commander A-20. The company team commander plans and coordinates tactical operations for the team. He uses FBCB2 to quickly disseminate information and begin parallel planning. He can streamline the planning process by preparing and sending FBCB2 overlays. The digital systems offer him a variety of overlays (operations, fire support, obstacle, and other areas) that can reduce the clutter of a combined overlay. A-21. During offensive operations, the commander receives FBCB2 reports from his platoon leaders. Looking at his display screen, he develops the situation and evaluates COAs. When executing a particular COA, he monitors the movement of the company team, both visually (limited) and on the display, and makes sure that combat power is massed at the proper point on the battlefield. The commander can use FBCB2 to quickly establish platoon sectors of fire in overwatch positions or during consolidation. A-22. In the defense, the company team commander exercises command and control of the company team using his FBCB2 fire plan. He lases to known or suspected enemy positions to create enemy icons on the FBCB2 display. He then uses the grid coordinates generated by this process to initiate calls for fire and mass indirect fires when the enemy is outside direct-fire range. He uses FBCB2-generated TRPs and trigger lines to shift and mass the team’s fires to destroy the enemy. At the conclusion of tactical operations, the commander uses FBCB2 to gather and consolidate updated CS status reports from his platoons.
Executive Officer A-23. Before the battle, the XO conducts tactical coordination with higher, adjacent, and supporting units as required or directed. Acting as the company team NCS, he assists in the command and control of the team’s maneuver. He receives tactical FBCB2 reports from the platoons, and then submits consolidated reports via digital means (FBCB2) and FM voice to the task force S3 and/or commander as required. A-24. The XO performs most of his sustainment responsibilities before and after the battle. In coordination with the 1SG, he plans and supervises the team’s sustainment preparations. A-25. The FBCB2 system also enables the XO to receive, verify, and consolidate other required reports from the platoons. He can forward the company team’s consolidated reports digitally (with FM voice confirmation) to the task force XO, S3, S4, and/or commander. ( Note. In the event that the task force TOC does not possess FBCB2 capability, these reports will have to be sent by FM voice.) A-26. If units that are cross attached to the company team lack digital capabilities, the XO must coordinate with that unit to ensure it remains informed throughout the attachment.
First Sergeant A-27. The 1SG’s sustainment role in the digital company team is to consolidate all of the A/L reports and send them digitally (with FM confirmation) to the battalion S4/combat trains command post (CTCP). After the battle, the 1SG consolidates the FBCB2 situation rollup reports (covering ammunition, fuel, personnel, and vehicle status) from the platoon leaders and directs cross leveling, as necessary. He forwards the company team’s consolidated FBCB2 situation rollup report to the company team commander, XO, and battalion S4/CTCP.
Fire Support Team A-28. The intervehicular information system (IVIS) and FBCB2 allow units to send fast, accurate call-forfire requests with a ten-digit grid location. It also gives the position of friendly elements, which can decrease the possibility of fratricide from indirect fires. If the FIST lacks FBCB2 compatibility, the XO can provide periodic position updates to the FIST on the forward trace of the company team.
Master Gunner A-29. The master gunner’s specific responsibilities include assisting the crews of the M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP platoons in establishing or coordinating boresight lines, plumb and synchronization berms, and
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using live-fire screening ranges and zero ranges. During the planning and preparation phases of an operation, the master gunner may be called upon to help coordinate and execute the sustainment operations, to serve as NCOIC of the command post, and to help the company team commander with his troop-leading procedures. In combat operations, the master gunner may serve as the gunner on one of the command tanks, as a sustainment operator riding on the APC, or as a section NCOIC in the company team’s wheeled vehicles with responsibility for handling communications with the task force.
PLATOON R ESPONSIBILITIES Platoon Leader A-30. Platoon leaders in M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP units inform the company team commander and XO on the tactical situation by forwarding FBCB2 contact reports and SITREPs. Prior to contact, they keep FM voice communications to a minimum to facilitate the timely transmission and receipt of FBCB2 reports. The platoon leaders act as forward observers (FO) for the commander and FIST, using the interface between the POSNAV system and LRF to identify targets and initiate calls for fire. They transmit digital reports, overlays, and the ammunition and fuel status of their platoons to the commander and XO as required by unit SOP. A-31. As applicable (either as directed by unit SOP or at the conclusion of the battle), each platoon leader receives a situation rollup report from his PSG containing consolidated individual tank CS reports for the platoon. The platoon leader reviews the situation rollup report and forwards the platoon report to the 1SG and XO.
Platoon Sergeant A-32. All TCs, including the platoon leader, use the FBCB2 to forward SITREPs to the PSG. The PSG consolidates these reports and forwards an FBCB2 situation rollup report to the platoon leader. He then sends the same report and any other A/L reports to the 1SG, either digitally or via FM voice. A-33. In general, although the PSG’s duties will lean more heavily toward sustainment activities, he must be prepared to handle the tactical aspects of digitized operations as well. If the platoon leader’s vehicle is destroyed or disabled and standard FBCB2 routing is affected, the PSG must log on as the platoon leader to receive operations overlays from the company team commander or XO. ( Note. With custom routing, the commander or XO can send FBCB2 operations overlays to the PSG at any time.)
Tank Commander A-34. The TC monitors the FBCB2 screen for friendly vehicle position updates, digital overlay updates, and digital reports. He uses FBCB2 to transmit reports as requested by the platoon leader or PSG. He employs the CITV (along with such nondigitized equipment as binoculars and/or the PVS-7) to scan his assigned sector and to assist the driver as necessary during limited visibility. The TC also lases to possible indirect-fire targets and forwards FBCB2 call-for-fire requests to the platoon leader as necessary. A-35. The TC can use waypoints from his digital system to mark his map with key positions that will be critical to mission accomplishment. Examples include checkpoints, the battalion aid station, and rally points.
Gunner A-36. The gunner’s duties include many communications tasks that are applicable to digitized operations, including the following: z Monitoring both digital and radio traffic. z Logging onto nets. z Inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays. z Monitoring digital displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
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A-37. The gunner also assists the TC in performing other digitized functions. In turn, this allows the TC to participate directly (on the ground) in such activities as orders drills, leader’s reconnaissance, and rehearsals. These digital-related duties include the following: Entering graphics into FBCB2 overlays. z z Sending FBCB2 reports. z Building FBCB2 sketch and range cards. z Monitoring the CID or CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
Driver A-38. In the M1A2 and M1A2 SEP tanks, the driver can monitor the DID steer-to indicator and select the best tactical route using preselected waypoints as designated by the TC. It is the driver’s responsibility to maneuver the tank to the next waypoint, with the loader’s assistance, but with minimal guidance from the TC. He uses terrain to conceal the tank’s movement at all times.
Loader A-39. The loader’s duties include logging into unit radio nets and being an expert in operating and manipulating the SINCGARS radio and VIC-3 intercom system. Because the loader is ideally positioned to assist the TC in maintaining battlefield awareness, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong consideration to assigning their second-most experienced crewman as the loader. ( Note. The loader may assist the TC in entering graphics on FBCB2 overlays, sending FBCB2 reports, and monitoring the CID or CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.) A-40. Once an operation is under way, the loader performs a variety of functions when the TC is occupied with digital traffic on the FBCB2 screen or CITV. These duties include the following: z Assisting the driver in keeping the tank in its position in formation. z Assisting in acquiring targets for the gunner. z Acting as the air guard or ATGM guard. z Dismounting for local reconnaissance and security as required.
SECTION V – DIGITAL VERSUS FM OPERATIONS A-41. Commanders should not rely on digital communications alone. Presently, digitization does not eliminate the requirement for maps and FM communications. The decision of when to use digital and/or FM depends on the situation, unit SOP, and level of unit training. Some message traffic should be sent digitally followed by an FM alert directing recipients to check their message queues.
DIGITAL TRANSMISSIONS USES OF DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS A-42. Digital messaging at the individual, platoon, and company level is recommended as the primary means of communication for the following purposes: z Transmitting graphics and orders, when the situation allows. z Sending routine reports, such as personnel and CS status or requests. z Sending contact reports (vehicles not in contact). z Requesting MEDEVAC support. z Sending enemy SPOTREPs when not in contact (FBCB2 creates an enemy icon). z Transmitting planned call-for-fire missions (follow up via FM). z Sending digital NBC-1 reports. (This creates a contaminated area icon across the network. Follow up with an FM report on the company team or battalion task force command net.)
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A-43. Some other types of orders and reports that can be sent via FBCB2 include the following: z
Fragmentary orders. A digital FRAGO can be used to provide changes to existing OPORDs. It should include all five paragraphs of the OPORD. Each paragraph should state either “No Change” or give the new information to ensure that recipients know they have received the entire FRAGO.
z
Free-text messages. A free-text message can be used to send an unstructured digital message to other FBCB2 or Army battle command systems (ABCS) (like an e-mail message).
THREADED MESSAGES A-44. Certain messages require specific routing for them to be effective. These are called “threaded messages.” The exception to this is the personnel status report and the task management message. The routing for these is SOP driven. Note. Users may add to the threaded message addressee list but should not delete from it. These defaults are dictated by Army doctrine and communication architecture; for example, the size, activity, location, type of resource, and time frame (SALTT) report feeds into the all-source analysis system (ASAS) intelligence database for correlation into the joint common database for higher situational understanding and analysis.
A-45. Most threaded messages must follow specific paths for information to reach intended personnel or communication systems or to feed into the correct databases. For example, the call-for-fire (CFF) message must be threaded properly to interface with the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS). The CFF message originator may add as many recipients as desired to the addressee list; however, if he alters any of the default recipients, the message may not reach AFATDS, and the fire mission will not be processed. If all addressees are not kept on the thread, “orphan” fire missions will occur. An orphan mission is where a mission task order and target number was not received from AFATDS. A-46. The following are threaded messages: z SALTT reports. z NBC-1 reports. z Obstacle reports. z Fire support messages.
FM TRANSMISSIONS A-47. FM radio remains the primary means of communication after crossing the LD because it is more responsive. Multiple stations can monitor the net, and parties can convey emotion during the transmission—a critical tool in assessing and understanding the battlefield situation. Light discipline in night operations may dictate the use of FM communications; for example, brigade cavalry troop Soldiers may go to blackout light FBCB2 operations and send SPOTREPs via FM to a vehicle (usually the troop CP, which is stationary and postured to use the FBCB2 display while maintaining light discipline). The CP can generate and manage FBCB2 SPOTREPs based on FM SPOTREPs and updates. A-48. FM radio is recommended as the primary means of communication for — Making initial contact report. z z Coordinating operations when in contact or moving. z Calling for fire on targets of opportunity. z Making subsequent adjustment of fires on planned and unplanned targets. z Requesting urgent MEDEVAC support. z Transmitting enemy air reports.
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Appendix B
Orders and Reports Orders and reports are the means by which the tank platoon receives and transmits information, from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the final phases of execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success. In a tactical situation, the platoon leader and PSG work with these vital tools on a daily basis; obviously, they must have precise knowledge of orders formats and reporting procedures. At the same time, they must ensure that every member of the platoon understands how to receive and respond to the various types of orders and how to compile and submit accurate, timely reports.
SECTION I – ORDERS B-1. The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the formats of WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs. He must be able to convert these into concise, yet thorough, orders for the platoon.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS B-2. Before the commander issues the OPORD, the platoon leader may receive one or more WARNOs. He analyzes all information in these orders and transmits important details to the platoon as soon as possible. B-3. When the higher headquarters issues a complete five-paragraph OPORD, analysis of the order is a fairly simple, straightforward process for the platoon leader. Commanders, however, do not always have the time to issue a full OPORD; instead, they may have to issue a FRAGO. B-4. The tank platoon leader normally issues instructions to his platoon in the OPORD format. He derives much of the content from the higher order he received during execution of his troop-leading procedures. He should always plan to issue his own five-paragraph order when time permits. When time is short, he still issues as complete an order as possible, but he does so using a FRAGO. B-5. Once an operation begins, FRAGOs become the normal method of issuing orders. Digital systems allow commanders and leaders to supplement oral orders with overlays and a limited text capability; these items can enhance their subordinates’ u nderstanding of the FRAGOs. B-6. Units may find themselves conducting the same type of operations on a repeat basis, such as route clearance. There will tend to be a point where units will want to stop using the combat orders process. This must be avoided; all operations are combat missions and must be planned as such, to do otherwise leads to the Soldiers not having the combat focus.
WARNING ORDERS B-7. During the planning phase of an operation, commanders and leaders use WARNOs as a shorthand method of alerting their units and individual Soldiers (see Figure B-1 for a sample of a platoon WARNO). The company or troop commander usually sends a series of WARNOs to his platoon leaders. These orders help subordinates to prepare for new missions by providing directions and guidelines for platoon-level planning and preparation. Each platoon leader immediately analyzes the information, and then issues a WARNO of his own to alert the platoon to the upcoming operation. This allows the platoon to conduct parallel planning and perpetrations.
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B-8. Warning orders generally follow the five-paragraph OPORD format (illustrated in Figure B-2). The key consideration is that they should be as brief as possible while giving units and Soldiers the information they need to begin preparing for the operation. A company-level WARNO normally includes these elements: z Enemy situation. z Higher headquarters’ mission. z Commander’s intent (if available). z Earliest time of movement. z Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals, training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements). z Time and place at which the company or troop OPORD will be issued. B-9. Before he issues his own WARNO, the platoon leader should send graphics to the TCs, either by traditional overlay or by using their digital systems (if available). The order is almost always given orally and in person, but it may be issued by radio or, on digitally equipped tanks using the free-text message capability of FBCB2. As a minimum, the platoon WARNO includes the following information: z Updated enemy situation. z Company and platoon mission statement. z Company or troop commander’s intent (if available). z A tentative time line, including the following: Earliest time of movement. Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals, training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements). Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued.
B-10. If he knows other times, events, or details related to the operation, the platoon leader may include the information in the WARNO. (Figure B-1 shows an example of a platoon WARNO.)
“RED, THIS IS RED ONE, WARNING ORDER FOLLOWS, PREPARE TO COPY.” “SUSPECTED SQUAD-SIZE ELEMENT OF INSURGENTS IS REPORTED IN SAFE HOUSE VICINITY NK77368900. WHITE IS MOVING TO PHASE LINE BULLDOG TO PROVIDE OVERWATCH AND SECURE INNER CORDON. BLUE IS MOVING TO CHECKPOINT 32 TO STAGE AND, ON ORDER, ATTACK TO CLEAR COMPOUND.” “OUR MISSION IS TO BLOCK ROAD JUNCTIONS ALONG AXIS THUNDER VICINITY CHECKPOINTS 24 AND 26 TO ESTABLISH OUTER CORDON.” “WE WILL MOVE IN A STAGGERED COLUMN FORMATION THROUGH WAYPOINTS TWO AND FIVE. ALPHA SECTION DEFENDS NORTHWEST FROM CHECKPOINT 24; BRAVO SECTION DEFENDS TO THE SOUTH FROM CHECKPOINT 26.” “SP IN FIVE MINUTES. REPORT RECON 1. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER.” Figure B-1. Sample platoon WARNO
OPERATION ORDERS B-11. When time and information are available, the company or troop commander will normally issue a complete OPORD as part of his troop-leading procedures. The OPORD provides platoon leaders with the
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essential information required to conduct the operation and to carry out the commander’s intent. The commander should distribute graphics (traditional and digital) before issuing the OPORD.
FIVE-PARAGRAPH OPORD FORMAT B-12. Whenever possible, the OPORD is issued orally and in writing in the five-paragraph format. This helps to ensure that required information is presented in a logical manner. Although the five-paragraph format is straightforward, every commander and leader will develop techniques that allow him to make a clearer, more concise OPORD presentation. The platoon leader should request a copy of his commander’s OPORD format to facilitate note-taking. See FM 5-0 for more information concerning company OPORDs. Refer to Figure B-2 for a sample platoon OPORD in the five-paragraph format.
ISSUING THE PLATOON OPORD B-13. Issuing the OPORD is, in effect, a type of drill, with contents and delivery procedures covered by SOPs and other guidelines. The platoon leader must understand, however, that simply reading off the five paragraphs word for word is usually ineffective. His foremost consideration is effective communication. He must fully understand all aspects of the operation and know how to describe and discuss them. He must integrate the friendly and enemy situations and the effects of terrain and weather into the platoon maneuver plan. B-14. To make the order even more understandable, the platoon leader should use visual aids to illustrate key points. He can take advantage of a number of pre-made and field-expedient materials, including the following: z The operation map and accompanying overlays. z Terrain models or impromptu sand tables. z Sketches on dry-erase boards, MRE boxes, butcher paper, or the back of a map. B-15. As far as possible, the platoon leader must establish optimum physical conditions that will allow effective presentation of the OPORD. For example, the site at which the platoon order will be issued should afford adequate security and minimum distractions. At night, this may require gathering the TCs in one tank or under a tarp supported by gun tubes. The platoon leader must ensure that the TCs post accurate graphics on their overlays and/or digital displays. TCs should arrive at the OPORD site early to study maps and post graphics. Units with digital capability should post the graphics on their vehicle displays before the platoon leader issues the order.
TASK ORGANIZATION (company or troop and allocation of forces to support the concept of operations). 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy forces. (1) Use SALTT report format (see Figure B-4, page B-10) for reporting likely and known location of enemy forces and their composition. (2) Other enemy information critical to the upcoming operation, to include the following: (a) Chemical and nuclear capabilities. (b) ADA. (c) Aviation, including helicopters. (d) Electronic warfare. (e) Type and condition of enemy vehicles. (f) Most probable enemy COA. (g) Most dangerous enemy COA.
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Appendix B
b. Friendly forces (include the following items as applicable). (1) Mission and intent of higher headquarters two levels above (company team/troop and battalion/squadron), including concept of the operation. (2) Identification (ID)/mission of adjacent units (left, right, front, rear). (3) ID/mission of reserves in higher headquarters. (4) ID/mission of supporting units with a direct support/reinforcing (DS/R) role to higher headquarters (field artillery, engineer, ADA). (5) Which higher headquarters element has priority of fires. (6) CAS allocated to higher headquarters, including number of sorties available. c. Terrain. (1) Obstacles, hills, valleys, road types and conditions, streams, rivers, bridges, and built-up area. (2) Avenues of approach. (a) Size unit that can be supported. (b) Start and end point. (c) Objective. (3) Key terrain (discuss how friendly and/or enemy forces may attempt to use it to their advantage). (4) Observation and fields of fire. (5) Cover and concealment. (6) Engagement areas. (7) Overall effect of terrain on the operation. d. Weather and light data. (1) Light conditions: (for all the days of the operation). BMNT: _____; Sunrise: _____; Sunset: _____; EENT: _____; Moonrise: _____; Moonset: _____; Percent Illumination: _____. (2) Weather forecast for the operation. (3) Effects of weather and light conditions on the operation. (a) Trafficability. (b) Visibility. (c) Effect on lasers/thermals. (d) Effects on air operations. e. Attachments and detachments to the platoon and higher. 2. MISSION. This is the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. State the essential task(s) to be accomplished by the entire unit, to include on-order missions. Clearly define the platoon’s objective. Task and purpose? 3. EXECUTION. a. Commander’s intent. Using the commander’s intent as a guideline, the platoon leader may issue his own intent to define the purpose, method, and end state of the operation. The purpose is the WHY of the operation. The method tells how the platoon leader visualizes achieving success with respect to the company/troop mission as a whole and outlines, in general terms, use of combat multipliers. The end state specifies final disposition of forces and explains how the end state will facilitate future operations.
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b. Concept of the operation. This paragraph further explains and expands on the platoon leader’s (and/or commander’s) intent, particularly his vision of HOW he will conduct the operation and WHO he will assign to execute it. The platoon leader uses a concept statement when he feels more detail is necessary to ensure subordinates will take the appropriate actions in the absence of additional communications or further orders. The sequence of subparagraphs is as follows: (1) Scheme of maneuver. This is how the platoon will maneuver to kill the enemy or to accomplish its mission. It conforms to the commander’s intent. In offensive operations, it specifies the platoon’s formation, movement technique, routes or avenues of advance, and plans for direct fire and overwatch. In defensive operations, it specifies the platoon engagement plan, BPs, orientation of weapons, and the plan for movement to supplementary or successive positions. (2) Fires. (a) Purpose for FA and mortar fires (how fires will be used to support the maneuver). (b) Priority of fires within the platoon and company/troop. (c) Allocation of FPF. (d) Preparation starting time and duration of fires. (e) Triggers (trigger line/point or event). (f) Description of enemy fires in the area of operations. (g) Special fire allocation/use (smoke, illumination, CAS). (h) Restrictions. (i) Target overlay annex. (3) Engineer support (obstacles, mines, and fortifications). (a) Priority of engineer effort (mobility, countermobility, survivability). (b) Priority of engineer support. (c) Obstacle overlay. (d) Obstacle list. (e) Logistical constraints. (f) On-order missions. c. Specific instructions. List the specific missions, in “battle sequence,” for each tank, including the attached elements. Include movement techniques, flank coordination requirements, other details, and be-prepared missions. Dismount team, detainee team, CBRN team, obstacle team, and bridge team. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Time schedule for critical events. (a) Rehearsals. (b) Confirmation briefs and backbriefs. (c) PCCs and PCIs. (d) First movement. (e) Arrival of any attachments/detachments. (f) Boresighting. (2) Movement instructions. (a) SP/RP times. (b) Formation and movement technique. (c) Order of march. (d) Route of march.
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Appendix B
(3) Passage of lines. (a) Contact points. (b) Passage points. (c) Lanes (to include identification/markings). (4) Actions at danger areas. (5) Actions on expected contact. (6) Rally points. (7) ROE/ROI. (8) Intelligence requirements (IR), to include priority intelligence requirements (PIR). (9) Air defense warning and weapons control status. (10) MOPP level and operational exposure guidance (OEG). (11) Any changes regarding battlesight and battlecarry ranges. (12) Be-prepared tasks or other general information not provided in concept of the operation or specific instructions. (13) Actions on the objective. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. a. Trains. Location and movement plan of the company/troop trains (initial and subsequent grids). b. Material and services. (1) Supply. (a) Priorities of supply. (b) Resupply points and prestock sites. (c) Ration cycle. (d) Location of task force trains. (e) LOGPAC instructions. (2) Transportation. (a) Supply routes. (b) LRPs. (c) Priorities established on MSRs. (3) Services. Handling of KIA personnel. (a) Location of water points. (b) Location of deliberate decontamination sites. (4) Maintenance. (a) Maintenance procedures. (b) Vehicle evacuation. (c) Task force UMCP location. c. Medical evacuation and treatment. (1) Location of company/troop medics. (2) Location of battalion/squadron aid station. (3) Procedures for treatment and evacuation of WIA personnel. (4) Aero medical evacuation information. (5) Location of ambulance exchange points (AXP). (6) Handling of contaminated WIA personnel.
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d. Personnel. (1) Handling and disposition instructions for detainees. (2) Detainee guard instructions. (3) Location of detainee collection point. (4) Instructions for interaction with local civil populace (ROI). (5) Number of expected replacements. (6) Cross-leveling procedures. e. Miscellaneous. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. a. Command. (1) Location of commander, XO, TOC, and/or tactical command post (TAC CP). (2) Succession of command. b. Signal. (1) SOI/ANCD index and edition in effect. (a) Key frequencies. (b) Key call signs. (c) Current item number identifier. (2) KY-57/ANCD fill and changeover data. (3) Listening silence instructions. (4) Challenge and password. (5) Special signals, to include use of pyrotechnics. (6) Code words. (7) Digital traffic instructions (digital systems only). (8) Actions to counteract jamming or “hot mike” situations. 6. TIME CHECK (for synchronization). Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format
FRAGMENTARY ORDERS B-16. The FRAGO is a brief oral or written order that can serve any of the following purposes: z Implement timely changes to existing orders. z Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders. z Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed. z Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not require a complete order. B-17. There is no specific format for a FRAGO. For simplicity and complete clarity, it normally follows the five-paragraph OPORD structure; however, it includes only the information required for subordinates to accomplish their mission. To enhance understanding of voice FRAGOs, digitally equipped units can quickly develop hasty graphics and transmit digital overlays. B-18. Platoon FRAGOs normally include the following information: z Updated enemy or friendly situation. z
z z
Mission. (Note. The platoon leader must ensure that platoon tasks and purpose are clearly stated.) Scheme of maneuver. Specific instructions as necessary.
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Appendix B
B-19. Figure B-3 illustrates a platoon FRAGO transmitted by voice over a secure net.
“RED, THIS IS RED ONE—FRAGO FOLLOWS. WHITE IS IN CONTACT AND ENGAGING TWO T80s VICINITY NK77368900. BLUE IS MOVING TO CHECKPOINT 26 TO FIX THE T80s. OUR MISSION IS TO ASSAULT AND DESTROY THE T80s AND ALLOW BRAVO COMPANY TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK NORTH. WE WILL MOVE IN A PLATOON WEDGE THROUGH WAYPOINTS 2 AND 5, MANEUVER TO FLANK THE T80s, AND ASSAULT FROM EAST TO WEST. RED 4, ENSURE THAT BLUE AND WHITE SHIFT FIRES WEST AS WE BEGIN OUR ASSAULT, OVER.” Figure B-3. Sample platoon FRAGO
SECTION II – REPORTS B-20. Reports are the unit’s primary means of providing information for plans and decisions. They must be accurate, timely, and complete. B-21. Procedures for preparing, transmitting, and safeguarding reports will vary from unit to unit and from situation to situation. Among the factors influencing tank platoon report procedures are the preferences and requirements of the chain of command, the tactical environment in which the platoon is operating, available equipment, terrain, and the electronic warfare situation. Digital systems, for example, enable the transmission of accurate preformatted reports. B-22. For leaders at all levels, two guidelines remain constant throughout the reporting process: the importance of compiling timely, accurate information and the need to relay that information by the clearest, quickest, and most secure method possible. The tank platoon leader, along with the PSG and TCs, can save time, ensure completeness, and reduce confusion by developing and implementing thorough SOPs covering report procedures. Refer to ST 3-20.153 for an extensive sample SOP that includes line-by-line descriptions of voice and digital report formats used by the platoon. (See Figures B-4 through B-7 for sample reports/sample formats.)
“BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONE—SALTT REPORT—OVER.” “BLUE ONE, THIS IS BLACK SIX—SEND IT—OVER.” “BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONE—REPORT FOLLOWS: SIZE: ONE BMP. ACTIVITY: MOVING SOUTH. LOCATION: GRID CG100456. TIME: 180640MAY99 ZULU. TROOPS: TEN DISMOUNTED TROOPS. CONTINUING TO OBSERVE—OVER.“ “BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIX —ROGER—CONTINUE OBSERVATION—OUT.“ Figure B-4. Sample FM SALTT report
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“BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONE—SITREP—OVER.” “BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIX—SEND IT—OVER.” “BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONE—REPORT FOLLOWS: LINE 1 (As of DTG): 181217MAY99 ZULU. LINE 2 (Enemy Activity in Brief) : OBSERVING FOUR ENEMY SOLDIERS. LINE 3 (Friendly Locations): CP 28. LINE 4 (FMC Vehicles): FOUR. LINE 5 (Defense Obstacles): NONE. LINE 6 (Personnel Status): GREEN. LINE 7: CLASS THREE AMBER—CLASS FIVE GREEN. LINE 8: CONTINUING MISSION. OVER.“ “BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIX—ROGER—OUT.” Figure B-5. Sample FM SITREP Medical Evacuation/Aero-Medical MEDEVAC
MEDEVAC FREQ: Line 1
Grid
Line 2
Unit frequency, Call Sign, Suffix
Line 3
Number of Patients by Precedence: Urgent Urgent/Surgical Priority
Line 4
Special Equipment: Aircraft Rescue Hoist Jungle/Forest Penetrator Semirigid Litter Strokes Basic Litter Kendrick Extraction Device Jaws of Life
Line 5
Number of Patients by Type: L = Litter A = Ambulatory
Note. Once complete with Lines 1 through 5, the MEDEVAC can fly. Continue with remainder of report when you can.
Line 6
If in Wartime: N = No Enemy in Area P = Possible Enemy in Area E = Enemy in Area X = Enemy in Area, Escort Required If in Peacetime: (Type of injury) Gunshot Broken Bones Illness, etc.
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Appendix B
Medical Evacuation/Aero-Medical MEDEVAC
Line 7
Method of Marking Site: A = VS-17 B = Pyro C = Smoke D = None E = Other
Line 8
Patient Nationality and Status (Military/Nonmilitary)
Line 9
CBRN Contamination: Y = Yes N = No Description of Terrain at Pick-Up Site Figure B-6. MEDEVAC request format
“BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONE—CONTACT—TROOPS, EAST—OUT.” Figure B-7. Sample FM contact report
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Appendix C
Infantry/Armor Operations Tank units, including the platoon, almost never fight alone. Open terrain such as desert, plains, and flat countryside is conducive to the employment of massed armor formations. In such terrain, mechanized infantry supports the forward movement of the armor units by providing local security, retaining key terrain, clearing dug-in enemy positions, and enhancing direct fires with organic small arms and antitank fires. On the other hand, restricted terrain (such as built-up areas, forests, and jungles) increases the vulnerability of armor units. In close terrain, it is more advantageous for tanks to take a supporting role in the forward movement of the infantry. Armor provides close-in direct fire support against hard and soft targets that could slow the infantry’s advance. This appendix examines, in detail, how both elements are employed to support each other. Regardless of terrain, infantry and armor units fight as part of a combined arms team to maximize their respective capabilities and minimize their limitations. Leaders of both tank (heavy) and infantry (light) forces must understand the TTP employed by their operational counterparts. The principles of offense, defense, and movement discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are applicable. Covered here will be the employment of the tank platoon as part of an infantry organization. To cover the employment of an infantry platoon in use in an armor unit would be out of the scope of this manual and is covered as part of the company team manual FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1). Tanks support the infantry by— z Leading movement. z Using firepower, mobility, and the ability to protect the infantry by quickly developing the situation on contact. z Leading the assault to provide protection for following infantry when enemy antitank capability is limited. z Destroying enemy armored vehicles, especially tanks. Infantry supports tanks by— z Clearing or breaching obstacles and marking lanes, especially in minefields, to allow tanks to exploit their speed and mobility. z Destroying, suppressing, or neutralizing antitank weapons or by destroying bunkers. z Following the tank assault closely to protect the rear and flanks of the tanks from handheld HEAT weapons, to clear the objective, or to reduce bypassed enemy forces. z Securing or clearing choke points such as towns, forests, stream crossings, or narrow defiles. z Providing close security at night or in restricted terrain. z Conducting reconnaissance to support the tank unit’s maneuver.
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Appendix C
SECTION I – TASK ORGANIZATION C-1. When an armor unit is task organized to support infantry, the mix of units is referred to as light/heavy. For example, light battalion/heavy platoon refers to a light infantry battalion supported by a tank platoon; this is the most common type of light/heavy task organization. ( Note. Conversely, a heavy/light operation is one in which the controlling headquarters is a heavy unit, either armor or mechanized infantry, with light infantry in support.) Light company/heavy section refers to a light infantry company supported by a tank or MGS platoon.
ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON C-2. When the tank platoon is task organized to support a light infantry battalion task force, the controlling commander will determine the role of the platoon based on METT-TC factors. The platoon may perform one of several functions, including the following: z As the primary maneuver element (main effort). z In a DS role when infantry is the primary maneuver element. z As part of the task force reserve, often with a reactive role in an antiarmor defense (AAD) mission. Note. In some situations, the armor platoon also may be used as a separate special platoon, or it may be attached to one of the infantry companies in a DS role.
C-3. The platoon is the lowest level at which the armor leader must be trained to interact with a controlling headquarters. The platoon leader must act as the armor force advisor to the battalion commander. He must rely on the infantry staff for immediate support. Note. If the platoon’s parent company or troop is in the vicinity, he may be able to coordinate some assistance through the company/troop commander or XO; however, this support may not be available.
C-4. It is important that the tank platoon leader understand the infantry unit he supports; this generally will be a light infantry, air assault, or airborne battalion. Characteristics of these battalions vary by the composition and mission of the forces involved, as outlined in the following discussion.
INFANTRY ORGANIZATIONS LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION C-5. This is the most austere conventional combat battalion. The light infantry battalion has only three rifle companies and a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). Of the three types of infantry units described in this section, the organization of the light infantry battalion differs most from that of the armor battalion. C-6. There are also differences among this battalion and the air assault and airborne battalions, the greatest being the organization of support and logistics. The light infantry battalion has no trucks larger than its 27 cargo HMMWVs. The battalion has only 18 long-range radios. It has limited antiarmor capability: four HMMWV-mounted TOW systems in one platoon at battalion level and six Dragon (Javelin) launchers at company level. C-7. Infantry leaders must understand the tactical doctrine for employing a heavy company team (as prescribed in FM 3-90.1), a tank platoon (refer to this FM), and a mechanized infantry platoon (refer to FM 7-7 and FM 3-21.71). To effectively employ any armored vehicle, leaders must know the specific capabilities and limitations of the vehicle and its weapon systems. The platoon leader must be able to brief the battalion leadership on how to best use the tank platoon. He is the subject matter expert, and must
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ensure the battalion understands the capabilities and limitations of the tank platoon. For example, M1series tanks provide rapid mobility as well as excellent protection and lethal, accurate direct fires. These tanks are most effective in open terrain with extended fields of fire.
AIR ASSAULT BATTALION AND AIRBORNE BATTALION C-8. The air assault battalion and airborne battalion are similarly organized, with three rifle companies, an antiarmor company (with five AT platoons of four vehicles each), and a headquarters company. Tactical movement for both is usually accomplished by a combination of air insertion and foot marches. A major difference is in the number and types of wheeled vehicles available in each type of battalion. C-9. The air assault battalion has 6 5-ton cargo trucks and 45 HMMWVs. There is a mess section and a 17-person maintenance platoon. Communications are served by 29 long-range radios. In the line companies, a Javelin- or Dragon-equipped section within the company headquarters provides AT capability. C-10. Once inserted, the airborne battalion performs tactically much like a light infantry battalion; walking is the principal means of transportation. The battalion does have 10 2-1/2-ton trucks and 36 cargo HMMWVs, allowing it to execute nontactical movement by truck. It has a mess section and a 16-member maintenance platoon. The airborne battalion has 30 long-range radios. Its rifle squads also have antiarmor capability.
SECTION II – LIAISON ACTIVITIES C-11. Light/heavy operations demand effective coordination between the tank platoon and the infantry unit it is supporting. The following discussion covers several important areas on which light/heavy liaison activities should focus.
TANK PLATOON CONSIDERATIONS C-12. The tank platoon leader’s first responsibility is to have a thorough tactical and technical knowledge of his tank’s systems and its logistical needs; he must understand precisely the vehicle’s capabilities as well as its limitations (see Chapter 1 of this manual). Based on these factors, he then works with the infantry commander and S3 to formulate plans to support the infantry. They maximize use of the tank’s capabilities for lethal firepower, enhanced target acquisition (including night sights), and effective armor protection. The most common limitations they must overcome are the tank’s relative lack of mobility and the need for close-in security in restricted terrain situations and urban operations and stability and support environments.
INFANTRY CONSIDERATIONS C-13. Besides understanding the capabilities and limitations of his tanks, the armor platoon leader must appreciate the tactical assets and liabilities of the infantry. He must realize that infantry elements move much more slowly than tanks over certain types of terrain. At the same time, he will learn that infantry can use terrain very effectively to gain a positional advantage over the enemy and that terrain has a direct impact on survivability for the infantryman. C-14. The tank platoon leader must ensure that the controlling infantry headquarters understands that considerations for positioning and control of the tank’s crew-served direct-fire weapon systems are the same as those for the infantry’s crew-served and AT weapons. In addition, he must be able to anticipate the effects of his weapon systems on both friendly and enemy forces. As an example, he must remember that sabot ammunition cannot be fired over the heads or flanks of unprotected infantry because of the danger created by the concussion of the main gun and the discarding sabot petals of tank rounds.
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Appendix C
ROLE OF TRAINING C-15. Finally, light/heavy liaison activities must emphasize the importance of combined arms training. Armor and infantry elements must train together, or they will not be able to execute combined arms operations smoothly in combat. Ideally, this training is conducted prior to deployment. To enhance coordination and execution, however, light/heavy forces must take advantage of every training opportunity that arises. C-16. An important aspect of training is teaching leaders of light and heavy elements how to work together and how their forces can support each other. For example, leaders must know how to communicate by digital, radio, phone, and visual means. Other areas of the training include the following: z Infantrymen help heavy forces by finding and breaching or marking antitank obstacles. They detect and destroy or suppress enemy antitank weapons. The infantry may also designate targets for armored vehicles and protect them in close terrain. z Heavy forces lead infantrymen in open terrain and provide them with a protected, fast-moving assault weapon system. Tanks can suppress and destroy enemy weapons, bunkers, and tanks by fire and maneuver. They can also transport infantrymen when the enemy situation permits.
SECTION III – OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS C-17. The following considerations apply when the tank platoon operates in support of dismounted infantry.
COMMAND AND CONTROL C-18. As previously discussed, the tank platoon leader becomes the principal advisor to the infantry battalion commander regarding the employment of his tanks. They may consolidate the platoon to provide a larger antiarmor force; in some instances, the platoon or a section may be placed OPCON to support a company. Note. A section should normally be OPCON to a company for only a limited time to accomplish a specific direct-fire support mission. In longer-duration operations, the logistical demands of the armor section would overwhelm the separate infantry company’s sustainment capabilities.
C-19. The tank platoon leader and PSG maintain communications with the controlling infantry battalion headquarters. When attached at lower levels, the platoon leader or PSG gains and maintains contact with the company commander and talks to other platoon leaders on the company net. Individual tanks and dismounted infantry communicate with each other using one of these techniques: z FBCB2 (digital). The TI provides situational understanding at company/troop level and above. Leaders are responsible for ensuring proper connectivity of digital assets, which enhance their ability to send and receive OPORDs and FRAGOs, friendly graphics, locations of adjacent units, and known and templated threat locations. z FM radio. The infantry platoon leader uses his SOI information and contacts supporting tanks on the tank platoon frequency. This is a fast, reliable method of communications that does not require any additional assets. z Wire. Tank crewmen can route WD-1 wire from the VIC-1 through the loader’s hatch or vision block and attach it to a field phone on the back of the tank. (Note. The field phone must be rigged inside a protective container, such as an ammunition can, which is then welded, bolted, or otherwise affixed to the tank.) The platoon leader needs to understand this is only a stop gap method and should only be used when all other methods fail. z Hand-held radios. Infantry squad radios or other short-range hand-held radios can be distributed during the linkup to provide a reliable means of communications between infantry and supporting TCs. These radios allow the infantry to use terrain more effectively in providing
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z
close-in protection for the tank; infantrymen can watch for enemy elements while limiting exposure to enemy fires directed against the tank. The use of nonsecure radios is not recommended. Visual signals. Visual signals, as prescribed by SOP or coordinated during linkup, can facilitate simple communications. Platoon leader needs to remember that tanks and infantry use different visual signals, so without prior coordination and training, this method will cause confusion and lead to either infantry or tank leader exposing them selves to enemy fire in an attempt to understand what the other element requires.
INTELLIGENCE C-20. The tank platoon leader must obtain information from the battalion S2 on enemy capabilities, especially those of antiarmor assets. He should focus not only on direct fire capabilities, but also on the capacity of the enemy’s mines, artillery, and mortar fires to disable his vehicles. C-21. Terrain analysis is another area of supreme importance in which the platoon leader must work closely with the S2. Platoon leaders must understand and account for the fact that infantry do not view the terrain in the same manner as a mounted element. They determine trafficability of the terrain, examining the effects of weather, obstacles, and limited visibility on the speed and mobility of armored vehicles. Following this detailed analysis, TCs and section leaders conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area of operations. The reconnaissance confirms the trafficability of routes and aids in the effective positioning of weapon systems. The terrain analysis and subsequent reconnaissance also confirm whether the platoon needs to employ ground guides who are knowledgeable of the terrain and the limitations it will impose on tracked vehicle movement.
MANEUVER C-22. When the light/heavy operation begins, either the tanks or the infantry can lead. The following discussion of moving with infantry covers a situation in which terrain and other factors of METT-TC clearly favor the use of infantry in the lead, supported by armor.
TANK PLATOON EMPLOYMENT C-23. When operating with infantry, the tank platoon may execute missions “pure,” either on its own or as part of a tank company or cavalry troop. In such a situation, the platoon can perform one of several roles, including the following: z Execute reserve/reaction force missions. z Attack separate objectives. z Support the advance of infantry with close-in direct fires. C-24. When infantry leads, the platoon can be employed in one of three ways: z It can remain stationary at the battalion or company command post until called forward. z It can follow and support the infantry, staying close enough to provide direct-fire support when requested. z During company-level tactical movement, it can overwatch forward movement of the infantry from stationary positions.
MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS C-25. Infantrymen conduct tactical movement until they identify an enemy force that halts their progress (see Figure C-1). They deploy into position, suppress enemy AT weapons with direct and indirect fires, and request tank support to destroy the enemy. The tanks move forward and link up with the infantry (see Figure C-2). At the linkup point, the tank platoon or section leader (depending on the size of the supporting armor element) dismounts and coordinates the following information with the infantry leader: z Enemy disposition. z Friendly disposition.
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Appendix C
z z
The tentative maneuver plan. Any additional tactical information not already covered in the OPORD or maneuver plan, including the use of guides, control of direct and indirect fires, close-in protection for the tank, and communications and signal information.
Figure C-1. Infantry leads while tank platoon remains stationary
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Figure C-2. Tanks move forward to link up with infantry C-26. The armor leader (either the platoon or section leader) conducts a ground reconnaissance of the route to the final firing position and finalizes the plan with the infantry leader. He then returns to the platoon or section and briefs the plan to his platoon or section. C-27. Depending on task organization and terrain factors, the tank platoon or section moves forward to the firing position, using guides provided by the infantry (see Figure C-3). If the entire platoon is involved, one section overwatches the movement of the lead section to the firing position. If a single section is used, the trail vehicle must overwatch the movement of the lead vehicle to the firing position.
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Appendix C
Figure C-3. Infantry guides tanks to the firing position C-28. Depending on the amount of suppressive fires received, the firing tank may move to the position buttoned up, with the ballistic doors closed (M1A2 crews may stow the CITV). This provides better protection for the crew and helps to prevent damage to the gunner’s sights. At the same time, however, it degrades the tank’s target acquisition capability and makes it easier for dismounted enemy forces to attack the tank with small arms or machine gun fires.
ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS C-29. If tank crews cannot immediately identify targets when they reach the firing position, the infantry designates each target using tracers, mortars, smoke, or grenades fired from the M203 grenade launcher. TCs open the ballistic doors as necessary to acquire and lase to their targets; tanks then suppress or destroy targets using main gun or machine gun fire. When targets are destroyed, the infantry signals the tanks to cease fire (see Figure C-4).
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Figure C-4. Tanks destroy enemy targets
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS C-30. Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in light/heavy operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of these considerations to prevent u nnecessary casualties. C-31. Tank crewmen are often unable to see infantry Soldiers operating close to their vehicle. This limitation is worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed; in these conditions, the crew is focused on the enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. It is the infantry’s responsibility to stay alert and to maintain a safe position in relation to the vehicle. C-32. Infantry Soldiers operating near tanks are exposed to the effects of any fires the enemy directs against the vehicles. This is true whether the infantry and vehicles are moving or stationary. Proximity also severely degrades the infantry’s to avoid detection by the enemy. It therefore becomes the responsibility of infantry leaders to maintain sufficient distance to avoid the effects of fires directed against the tanks, even when they are required to provide security or close support. C-33. Tanks fire high-velocity, armor-piercing, discarding sabot rounds that pose hazards to infantry. Dismounted Soldiers should be at 70 meters to the left or right of the line of fire and/or at least 1,000 meters to the front of a firing tank. Any infantry within this danger area must have overhead cover and protection (a berm or tree) from the rear.
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Appendix C
C-34. The exhaust from an M1-series tank may reach more than 1,700 F. Dismounted Soldiers following behind the tank must position themselves either to the side of the exhaust grill or, if they are directly behind the vehicle, at a safe distance away. The use of exhaust shield will overcome this problem. The shield is a critical element in tanks recovering other tanks, so they should be readily available in the tank platoons. Consideration should be given to fabricating enough for all tanks as a leader will not know when he will be working with the infantry. ˚
C-35. Infantrymen may ride on tanks if conditions allow, but they must be aware of the serious safety concerns involved.
TRANSPORTING INFANTRY C-36. At times, the tank platoon may be required to transport infantrymen on its tanks (as illustrated in Figure C-5). This is done only when contact is not expected. This is the least preferred method of transporting infantry and should only be used when both the mounted and dismounted element have had time to train and have a firm understanding of how each element will work. If the platoon is moving as part of a larger force and is tasked to provide security for the move, the lead section or element should not carry infantry.
Figure C-5. Sample positions for infantry riding on a tank C-37. Infantry and armor leaders must observe the following procedures, precautions, and considerations when infantrymen ride on tanks: z Infantry teams should thoroughly practice mounting and dismounting procedures and actions on contact. z Passengers must always alert the TC before mounting or dismounting. They must follow the commands of the TC. z Infantry platoons should be broken down into squad-size groups, similar to air assault chalks, with the infantry platoon leader on the armor platoon leader’s vehicle and the infantry PSG on the armor PSG’s vehicle. z Platoon leaders, PSGs, and team leaders should position themselves near the TC’s hatch, using the external phone (if available) to talk to the TC and relay signals to the unit. z If possible, the lead vehicle should not carry infantrymen. Riders restrict turret movement and are more likely to be injured or killed on initial contact. z Tank crewmen must remember that the vehicle cannot return fire effectively with infantry on board. z Whenever possible, passengers mount and dismount over the left front slope of the vehicle. This ensures that the driver can see the infantrymen and that the infantrymen do not pass in front of the coax machine gun. Passengers must ensure that they remain behind the vehicle’s smoke grenade launchers. This will automatically keep them clear of all weapon systems.
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z
z z
z
z
Passengers must always have three points of contact with the vehicle; they must watch for lowhanging objects like tree branches. All passengers should wear hearing protection. Infantrymen should not ride with anything more than their battle gear. Rucksacks and B-bags should be transported by other means. Infantrymen should scan in all directions. They may be able to spot a target the vehicle crew does not see. Passengers should be prepared to take the following actions on contact: Wait for the vehicle to stop. At the TC’s command, dismount immediately (one fire team on each side). Do not move forward of the turret. Move at least 5 meters to the sides of the vehicle. Do not move behind or forward of the vehicle. Do not move in front of vehicles unless ordered to do so. Do not dismount a vehicle unless ordered or given permission to do so.
z z z
Do not dangle arms or legs, equipment, or anything else off the side of a vehicle; they could get caught in the tracks, causing death, injury, or damage to the equipment or vehicle.
z
Do not carry too many riders on the vehicle.
z
Do not fall asleep when riding. The warm engine may induce drowsiness; a fall could be fatal.
z
Do not smoke when mounted on a vehicle.
z
Do not stand near a moving or turning vehicle at any time. Tanks have a deceptively short turning radius.
CONSIDERATIONS WHEN TANKS LEAD C-38. Certain situations may require that tanks lead the infantry; this is, however, the least preferred method of light/heavy employment. Tanks must move very slowly when they lead infantrymen (approximately 2-1/2 miles per hour). This hinders their ability to use speed as a survivability tool. C-39. In addition, restricted terrain severely limits the mobility of the tank platoon. It further increases the platoon’s vulnerability by limiting visibility for tank crews. Without the aid of infantrymen serving as guides and providing security, tanks have a much greater chance of becoming stuck in close terrain or of being the target of enemy fires. In these situations, the infantry must provide close-in protection and early warning against dismounted and mounted threats. The infantry’s antitank assets should stay close enough to overwatch the tanks during tactical movement. Tank crews maintain constant communications with the infantry so they do not outrun the ground force. C-40. When tanks lead, the infantry maintains a standoff distance to prevent injury from the “splash” and ricochet of enemy AT weapons and small-arms fire aimed at the tanks. Additionally, the light/heavy force can expect tanks to attract the attention of mortar and artillery gunners. The enemy will use indirect fires to strip away supporting infantry and to force tank crews to button up, further reducing their ability to acquire targets. All armor and infantry leaders must plan actions to counter the effects of these fires.
FIRE SUPPORT C-41. The use and control of indirect and direct fires are critical to the effective employment of armor with infantry.
INDIRECT FIRES C-42. Indirect fires are used to suppress enemy AT weapons and dismounted infantry in the area of operations. The tank platoon uses its optics to detect targets and its communications systems to initiate
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Appendix C
calls for fire in support of infantry. In addition, the noise of mortar and artillery fires, combined with the use of smoke, helps to conceal the movement of tanks moving forward, adding the element of surprise to the operation. The platoon leader needs to have an understanding of the light force’s indirect capabilities and limitations. He must understand they do not have the same capabilities and limitations as a self propelled artillery unit.
DIRECT FIRES C-43. One of the primary assets that tanks offer in working with infantry is their ability to provide accurate, lethal direct fires from a mobile, survivable platform. The weapon systems on each tank offer unique capabilities and limitations that must be considered in relation to infantry support; these characteristics are covered later in this discussion.
Target Acquisition C-44. The target acquisition capabilities of the tank exceed the capabilities of all systems in the infantry battalion. The thermal sight provides a significant capability for observation and reconnaissance. It can also be used during the day to identify heat sources (personnel and vehicles), even through light vegetation. Infantry units can take advantage of the tank’s laser range finder to enhance their capabilities in establishing fire control measures (such as trigger lines and TRPs) and in determining exact locations on the battlefield.
Machine Guns C-45. The TC’s caliber.50 machine gun is effective against both personnel and materiel. The 7.62-mm coax machine gun is an effective AP weapon. These machine guns provide a high volume of supporting fires for the infantry.
Main Gun C-46. The main gun remains the best antitank weapon on the battlefield. The main gun is extremely accurate and lethal at ranges up to 2,500 meters. Tanks with stabilized main guns can fire effectively even when moving at high speeds across country. C-47. All current tanks fire sabot, MPAT, and HEAT rounds. These have great penetrating power against armored vehicles, but may not have the destructive capability necessary to destroy prepared fighting positions or penetrate walls in built-up areas. High explosive, obstacle-reducing with tracer (HE-OR-T) rounds (the M908) have enough destructive power to destroy most prepared positions and to create large holes in walls. The canister is an AP round that is extremely effective for area suppression.
Tank Capabilities C-48. The Army’s tanks have the following firepower capabilities and limitations: z M1A1 and M1A2. Both vehicles are limited in ammunition storage capacity (40 rounds in the M1A1, 42 in the M1A2). They can fire sabot, HEAT, and MPAT ammunition, as well as the HE-OR-T and canister rounds. On the M1A1, the TC can fire the M2 caliber .50 without exposing himself. The M1A2 TC must expose himself to fire the M2, unless equipped with common remotely operated weapons station (CROWS). Both vehicles consume fuel at a high rate, and their mobility is limited in terrain that does not support heavy tracked vehicles.
MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY C-49. Although the mobility and survivability of the tank are well known, these capabilities suffer significantly when tanks are employed by themselves in close terrain. This discussion lists techniques the tank platoon can use to operate more safely and effectively under these conditions. C-50. The following factors can help to enhance the tank platoon’s mobility in restricted terrain: z Information from the S2. As previously discussed, the S2 must provide mobility information to the platoon leader.
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z
Ground reconnaissance. The platoon leader should use ground reconnaissance by a knowledgeable member of the platoon (preferably a section leader or TC) to confirm or deny the S2’s estimate.
z
Ground guides. In restricted terrain, the use of ground guides is critical in leading tanks to their firing positions, especially during periods of limited visibility. The ground guide can be either an infantryman or the section leader who conducted the reconnaissance.
z
Knowledge of vehicle capabilities. The tank has an awesome ability to bull or force through walls, small trees (up to 12 inches in diameter), wire obstacles, and other hasty barricades such as cars or trucks blocking a road or trail. The addition of a mine plow or mine roller enhances the tank’s breaching capability, but also hinders movement in rough terrain.
z
Engineer support. Engineers can enhance tank mobility by spanning unfordable rivers or gaps, reducing obstacles, and cutting down larger trees to construct hasty tank trails.
C-51. The survivability of the Army’s tanks differs by system. They offer varying degrees of protection against small arms fire, time-fused artillery, and AT weapons. The tank platoon can enhance the survivability of the various systems using these techniques: z Terrain driving. The old maxim still holds true: “What can be seen can be hit; what can be hit can be killed.” Every potential enemy has the ability to employ weapons that can disable or destroy any tank. Terrain driving techniques, discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual, are still extremely important for the tank platoon. z Overwatch. Wingman tanks or sections scannot only their sector of fire, but also the area around moving vehicles. This enables overwatch vehicles to fire their coax machine guns to protect the moving vehicles if they are attacked by dismounted forces. z Moving into the attack-by-fire position buttoned up. When tanks move into an attack-by-fire position to engage a prepared enemy position, they will face intense small arms, artillery, mortar, sniper, or AT fires. In addition to the factors listed previously, the survivability of the crew depends on its ability to take full advantage of the armor protection of the vehicle. z Suppression. Suppression of enemy AT assets and dismounted infantry forces by artillery and close infantry support is critical. z Having individual weapons ready. Crew members must be ready to use their M4 carbine, M16A2, and/or 9-mm personal weapons, as well as grenades, to repulse close-in dismounted attacks.
AIR DEFENSE C-52. The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the air defense considerations applicable to light/heavy operations, including ADA capabilities and employment considerations. Refer to the discussion in Chapter 6 of this manual.
SUSTAINMENT C-53. When attached to infantry, the tank platoon must prepare to operate under austere conditions. The key to effective combat support in this situation is to maintain a constant flow of reports updating the platoon’s supply status and requirements. C-54. In an infantry task force, the tank platoon leader and PSG will do much of their logistical coordination directly through the battalion staff. They coordinate reporting procedures within the platoon and notify the staff when classes of supply fall below the levels of 80 percent (identified by the code word AMBER), 70 percent (RED), and 60 percent (BLACK). When a class of supply falls below 70 percent, the platoon leader or PSG requests resupply.
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Appendix C
C-55. Fuel, ammunition, recovery, and maintenance are the primary concerns of the attached platoon. Other logistical needs are usually handled through the normal sustainment functions of the battalion. These considerations apply: z Fuel. Fuel conservation must be a priority at all times. Engines should be shut down whenever possible. REDCON status should be used to help regulate engine start-up requirements and to assist in operational preparations. The tank platoon can normally support infantry operations for 24 hours before refueling. Infantry units normally do not understand the amount of fuel that tanks will consume. If fuel support is coming through the infantry battalion only, it will be critical that fuel requests are forecasted in advance so that the battalion will have the required amounts on hand or request support from their parent brigade. z Ammunition. The tank platoon’s ammunition requirements present a unique challenge for the infantry battalion. The type of rounds requested should be based on the S2’s analysis to fit the needs for direct fire support of the light/heavy mission. A basic load of ammunition should be on hand to provide for emergency resupply during periods of heavy contact. Infantry battalions will not be able to support the requirements of main gun ammunition, but can support the platoon for small arms and grenade requirements. Platoon sergeants must constantly think about CS constraints, and not limit themselves to only one area (the parent company) for support. z Recovery and maintenance. When a tank is disabled, the platoon should first attempt selfrecovery. If this is not possible, the crew makes the necessary coordination to secure the vehicle until recovery and maintenance personnel reach it. Infantry personnel can be employed to provide local security during recovery operations or to protect the vehicle as the attack progresses. Recovery and maintenance assets may be part of the infantry battalion’s attached slice within the brigade forward support battalion, or they may be on call from the tank platoon’s parent company or troop headquarters.
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Appendix D
Operational Security Throughout the area of operations, the enemy will, at any given moment, be attempting to acquire intelligence information and gain a tactical advantage. Tank platoon leaders must understand the demands of continuous operations under all possible conditions. They then must provide their Soldiers with the training and leadership they will need to meet the challenges of the battlefield.
SECTION I – OPERATIONS SECURITY D-1. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities, including: z z
z
Identifying those actions that can be observed by enemy intelligence systems. Determining which indicators enemy intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical intelligence in time to be useful to the enemy. Selecting and executing measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to enemy exploitation.
D-2. OPSEC measures consist of countersurveillance, information security (INFOSEC), signal security, and physical security.
COUNTERSURVEILLANCE D-3. Maneuver units use countersurveillance measures to protect against surprise, observation, and infiltration. In future operations, tank platoons may find themselves to be high-value targets for the enemy. One destroyed M1-series tank would not be a large military victory, but would be a large victory from a propaganda standpoint. The enemy will continue to further his use of precision weapons in place of massed artillery fire. As was true in the past is even more so now, what can be seen, can be hit, and what can be hit will be destroyed. The following considerations and procedures will assist the tank platoon in executing countersurveillance operations: z
Enforce noise and light discipline. Follow these procedures: Turn off the circuit breaker for the brake lights. Dim or cover all sources of light in the turret. Use a passive night observation device (NOD) to check vehicles for light leaks before operations begin. Move only when necessary. Use headsets or the combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet to monitor the radio; do not use the radio’s external speakers. Do not slam hatches. Use short-count procedures to start engines simultaneously. Use terrain to mask resupply and maintenance areas. Use hand-and-arm signals and digital communications whenever possible. Do not allow smoking outdoors at night. Collect and turn in all garbage during LOGPAC. As a last resort, garbage will be burned and buried.
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Appendix D
z
Use camouflage to best advantage. Follow these procedures: Place vegetation on vehicles to break up their “profile.” Drape camouflage nets over gun tubes and turrets. Park vehicles in natural concealment, such as shadows. Cover all headlights and optics whenever possible. Consider the effects of dust and exhaust smoke when moving. Minimize track, tire, and foot trails that could be detected from the air or from enemy positions. Drive vehicles in previously made tracks when possible. In heavily used areas such as CPs and trains, ensure that vehicles travel on existing tracks or roadways. Maintain effective concealment. Follow these procedures: Disperse vehicles and personnel under foliage or inside structures whenever possible. Conceal vehicles and personnel behind objects that block the thermal “line of sight” of enemy devices. Ensure vehicles in hide positions protect against aerial observation by minimizing or eliminating their thermal signatures. Tie antennas down. Use challenges and passwords.
z
z
INFORMATION SECURITY D-4. INFOSEC entails the protection of all materials, both classified and unclassified, that may be of intelligence value to the enemy. Refer to the discussion in Appendix A of this manual. The following procedures will assist the platoon in maintaining INFOSEC: z Ensure that Soldiers do not put critical information in the mail. This includes unit identification, location, and capabilities; the commander’s name; and information on combat losses or morale. z Before leaving an area, police it to make sure items of intelligence value are not left behind. z Garbage will be turned in with LOGPAC or burned to prevent the enemy from gathering any type of information. z As operations are conducted near and around foreign nationals, care must be taken in exchanging information between Soldiers. Soldiers tend to assume that local people do not speak English and could inadvertently give up details of operations to enemy agents who appear as local population.
SIGNAL SECURITY D-5. The discussion of communications in Chapter 2 of this manual outlines considerations and procedures for establishing and maintaining signal security. Refer to the discussion of INFOSEC in Appendix A.
PHYSICAL SECURITY AND LOCAL SECURITY D-6. Physical security is the protection of materiel and equipment. (Note. Physical security is also an important component of INFOSEC, as discussed in Appendix A of this manual.) Local security is the active measures used by the platoon to protect itself from enemy attack. The following considerations and procedures can help the platoon maintain physical security: z When stationary, employ anti-intrusion devices, trip flares, and concertina wire. z Maintain the prescribed REDCON status. The platoon should assume REDCON-2 each morning and evening to ensure that all crewmen are ready for action and to allow them to adjust to the changing light conditions. As a minimum, the platoon goes to REDCON-2 from 30 minutes before BMNT until 30 minutes after BMNT and again for a similar period at EENT.
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z
z
z
z
z
z
z
Conducting area sweeps right before or right after BMNT/EENT will allow the platoon to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and or dismounted elements. This when used in a varied method will keep the enemy off guard and will force him to react to the platoon and not the other way around. Do not allow foreign nationals and unauthorized observers in or near the unit’s area or positions during operations. In accordance with ROE/ROI and the company or troop commander’s intent, establish procedures for handling civilian intruders. In urban areas, the platoon will not be able to stop every person walking in the area. Attention must be paid to ensure the civilians stay out of a stand off zone to prevent them from placing explosives on the vehicles. Also, platoons need to be observant of civilians taking too much interest in unit actions or missions. During all operations and especially during areas of close-in terrain, it is critical that the platoon’s tanks have an M4 rifle positioned on the turret, ready to be used rapidly. Close-in terrain, or more restrictive ROE, will allow the enemy to get closer to the tank prior to the crew being able to engage him. Due to dead space of the turret machine guns and limited stopping power of the pistol, the M4 will allow the crew to engage and destroy dismounted threats as they approach the tank. Crews must ensure that the caliber .50 machine gun and tank radios are manned at all times, and the Soldier is looking around to prevent the enemy or unknown personnel from getting too close to the tank. The enemy will constantly be watching vehicles to detect a period of low security in which to conduct attacks. Local vehicles will not be allowed to park near or place objects close to the platoon. An IED or a VBIED could, but may not, cause catastrophic damage to the tank itself, but would be deadly to exposed crewmen or supporting infantry. Crews faced with multi-echelon threats will need to ensure they wear their protective equipment. The wearing of interceptor body armor (IBA) with the small arms protective inserts (SAPI) by the loader and TC will reduce their vulnerability to small-arms fire when they are exposed out of the turret hatches. In addition, crews may be required to conduct dismounted operations or OPs and will be required to wear IBA as a force protection measure. Employ OPs to maintain surveillance on avenues of approach into the platoon’s AO.
OBSERVATION POSTS D-7. OPs are especially important in maintaining the platoon’s OPSEC and enhancing its AO. They help to protect the platoon when long-range observation from current positions is not possible; this can occur when the platoon is in a hide position or when close terrain offers concealed avenues of approach to the platoon’s position. OPs can be employed either mounted or dismounted.
SELECTION OF THE OBSERVATION POST SITE D-8. Before deploying an OP, the platoon leader analyzes the terrain in his sector; he also coordinates with adjacent platoons to discover ways to enhance his own AO and eliminate gaps in the AO between units. Next, he decides on the type of OP necessary to observe the avenue of approach based on requirements for early warning and platoon security. The platoon leader must consider the platoon’s reaction time based on the REDCON status. An OP should have the following characteristics: z Clear observation of the assigned area or sector. Ideally, the fields of observation of adjacent OPs and/or units will overlap to ensure full coverage of the sector. z Effective cover and concealment. Positions with natural cover and concealment help to reduce the OP’s vulnerability to enemy observation and attack. z Covered and concealed routes to and from the OP. Soldiers must be able to enter and leave their OPs without being seen by the enemy. z A location that will not attract enemy attention. An OP should not be in a site that would logically be the target of enemy observation or that would serve as artillery TRPs. z A location that does not skyline observers. Avoid hilltops. Position the OP farther down the slope of the hill.
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Appendix D
z
A location that is within range of platoon small-arms fire. This enables the platoon to cover the OP if withdrawal becomes necessary.
MOUNTED OBSERVATION POSTS D-9. Mounted OPs are used when the platoon has access to hull-down or turret-down positions that afford unobstructed surveillance of mounted avenues of approach in the platoon sector. They allow the platoon leader to take advantage of his vehicles’ capabilities: magnified thermal and daylight optics, sophisticated communications, lethal weapon systems, and enhanced survivability. D-10. The CITV on the M1A2 is especially valuable in the mounted OP. The M1A2 can occupy a turretdown position and use the CITV to scan the designated sector without moving its turret. All other types of vehicles must occupy turret-down or hull-down positions that allow them to move their turrets when scanning the sector. D-11. A common mounted OP technique is to position one vehicle to observe an engagement area or obstacle while the remainder of the platoon occupies hide positions. Even when the mounted OP has clear fields of observation, it is advisable to dismount one or two members of the crew to provide close-in local security for the vehicle. The dismounted crewmen occupy positions far enough away that sounds from the vehicle do not prevent them from hearing an approaching enemy. Another method of enhancing local security is to coordinate with infantry elements. The infantry can conduct patrols and occupy dismounted OPs in accordance with the company or troop commander’s OPSEC plan.
DISMOUNTED OBSERVATION POSTS D-12. Dismounted OPs provide local security along dismounted avenues of approach whenever the platoon must halt and occupy vehicle positions from which the terrain impedes observation or early warning of enemy activities. During urban operations, TCs will need to place OPs to protect blind spots. Use of supporting infantry is the best answer, but loaders may be required to fill this mission if infantry is not available. They also augment or replace mounted OPs based on the commander’s OPSEC plan. The tank platoon uses the following steps to occupy, staff, and improve a dismounted OP: z The platoon leader or PSG determines the need for the OP and identifies the location based on the physical characteristics outlined previously in this section. z The platoon leader or PSG assembles OP personnel at his vehicle. Note. OP personnel are designated in the unit SOP, but are normally the loaders from wingman tanks. In two-man OPs, one crewman observes the sector while the other provides local security. Some short-duration OPs may consist of one crewman providing local security for individual vehicles in close terrain. z
The platoon leader or PSG briefs the OP personnel to ensure that they are trained in reporting procedures and individual camouflage techniques and that they have the proper equipment as designated in the unit SOP. Equipment will normally include the following: Individual weapons, M4 rifle, and grenades. Communications equipment (such as wire, flag set, flashlight, and/or radio). (Note. The use of nonsecure radios, to include hand-held types, is not recommended. If used; however, platoons must exercise extreme caution.)
Note. Flag use will be based on local SOP, but a general rule of thumb is green flag for friendly elements, yellow flag for unknown elements, and red flag for enemy elements.
D-4
Seasonal uniform with load-bearing equipment (LBE) and appropriate MOPP gear. Binoculars and NODs. Paper and pen/pencil for making a sector sketch.
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Map with overlay, protractor and compass. Local security measures such as trip flares and claymore mines. The platoon leader or PSG leads OP personnel to the OP site and briefs them on the following information: Ensure OP personnel understand that their mission is to see and report and not become engaged with the enemy dismounts. When and how to report. When and how to withdraw. The withdrawal criteria should be specific; examples include withdrawal when a CBRN attack is detected, when an enemy tank section crosses a phase line, or when enemy dismounted infantrymen approach to within 300 meters of the OP. Challenge and password. When they will be replaced. As a general rule, OP personnel should be replaced every 2 hours. During cold weather, this rotation may be done more frequently. OP personnel must execute a plan for night-vision operations. Rotating between Soldiers with one Soldier not scanning for longer than 20 minutes, will allow them to keep their night vision and maintain good scanning techniques. Once in place, OP personnel take these steps to improve the position: Establish communications. Camouflage the position and routes into and out of it. Prepare a sector sketch based on the platoon fire plan (see Chapter 4 of this manual). Dig in to provide protection from indirect and direct fires. A good rule of thumb is to dig when dismounted infantry dig. If possible, emplace hasty obstacles for additional protection.
z
z
MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS D-13. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts everyone conducting military operations. All leaders and Soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the growth of news coverage via international television and radio broadcasts and the Internet. They must realize that operations that run counter to official U.S. policy may damage the nation’s interests and international standing. D-14. Tank platoon crewmen must learn how to deal effectively with broadcast and print reporters and photographers. Training should cover any information restrictions imposed on the media. Soldiers must also gain an understanding of which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to higher authorities, such as their chain of command or the public affairs office (PAO). PAOs usually issue daily guidance dealing with these subjects.
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Appendix D
Actions when Approached by the Media during Operations 1. Soldiers must stop and check the reporter’s identifications and authorization to be working in the sector. 2. Escort the media to the platoon leader; avoid taking them past any sensitive areas if possible. 3. If not authorized to be in the area, detain the media in accordance with the ROE until given further guidance. 4. Platoon leader informs unit commander. 5. If given permission from the commander to conduct filming and interviews, the platoon leader will designate someone to escort and observe the media. 6. Unless given clearance, do not allow the media to take pictures of the unit, equipment, or near-by land marks. 7. When filming is authorized, pay attention to what is being filmed and the background.
Soldier Tips when Dealing with the Media 1. Should stay within the boundaries of their job, mission, or personal feelings. 2. Tell the truth; if they don’t know, say that. 3. Do not degrade the unit, the Army, or the government, to include allies or host nations. 4. Don’t speculate about policy or future events. 5. Do not cover any secure information. 6. Everything is “on the record” and will be used by the media. This is especially important when dealing with the embedded media. After a short period of time, Soldiers will come to see the reporter as a member of the unit, and will be more likely to release information. 7. Do not answer questions about the unit’s mission, equipment capabilities, or any upcoming operations. 8. Answer questions in broad, open terms; do not become bogged down in a series of details. 9. Always maintain military bearing.
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Appendix E
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), and Smoke Operations Because many potential adversaries have the capability to employ nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, the tank platoon must prepare to fight in a CBRN environment. Faced with the contemporary operating environment it is as likely now as at any point for enemy forces to use CBRN weapons, both at the small unit level as well as strategic level. Collecting, processing, and disseminating needed CBRN hazard information are also vital functions. To survive and remain effective on the integrated battlefield, the tank platoon must be proficient in the three fundamentals of CBRN defense: contamination avoidance, CBRN protection, and decontamination. A thorough understanding of CBRN capabilities and unit detection equipment will allow the platoon to function and operate. It’s has been proven that a units fear of CBRN weapons is as disabling as the weapons themselves. Additional-duty CBRN personnel should be designated by the platoon SOP for operations in a CBRN environment. Selected crews should be designated and trained as chemical agent detection teams and radiological survey and monitoring teams. Smoke has a variety of uses on the battlefield; it is employed extensively by enemy and friendly elements in both offensive and defensive operations. The effectiveness of smoke depends on the type that is used and the weather at the time it is employed. The tank platoon’s success on the battlefield may depend on how well crewmen understand the effects of smoke on enemy and friendly acquisition systems in various weather conditions.
SECTION I – CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE E-1. Avoidance is the most important fundamental element of CBRN defense because the best way to survive is to avoid being the object of a chemical or nuclear attack. Avoiding contaminated areas minimizes the risk of additional casualties; it also prevents the degradation of combat power that results when a unit must operate in MOPP level 3 or 4 for extended periods of time. In addition, the unit is not required to spend the time and resources needed for decontamination.
GENERAL AVOIDANCE MEASURES E-2. Contamination avoidance measures include the following: z Using passive avoidance techniques. z Locating contaminated areas. z Identifying CBRN agents. z Warning other members of the platoon as well as other units. z Reporting CBRN threats to higher headquarters. E-3. Passive avoidance measures can decrease the possibility of CBRN attack or reduce the effects of an attack already under way. Effective use of concealment, dispersion, prepared positions, OPSEC, and
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Appendix E
signal security reduces the chances of being acquired as a target. The tank platoon should continually analyze its vulnerability to chemical or nuclear attack and take appropriate protective measures. E-4. Attacks and contamination must be detected quickly and reported to adjacent units and headquarters elements. The tank platoon must have an effective method of quickly giving the alarm in the event of a CBRN attack. Alarms can be passed by radio, audible signals, or hand-and-arm signals. The unit SOP should specify criteria and automatic procedures for employing detection teams and submitting the required CBRN reports following a CBRN attack or when contamination is encountered. E-5. Whenever possible, all movement routes and future positions should be reconnoitered for CBRN contamination. Quartering party personnel should be prepared to conduct monitoring operations; if they detect contaminated areas, they identify, report, and mark them. The quartering party can then evaluate the location and type of hazard (nuclear radiation or chemical/biological agent) to determine the best plan for bypassing, crossing, or operating in the contaminated area. Based on the situation, the platoon leader and company commander must be able to implement protective measures specified in the SOP to minimize personnel losses and limit the spread of contamination.
DEFENSIVE ACTIONS BEFORE AN ATTACK BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE E-6. The key protective measure against a biological attack is maintaining a high order of health, personal hygiene, and sanitation discipline. Biological attacks are difficult to detect. If an attack occurs, the chances of survival are better if crew members are healthy and physically fit and maintain good personal hygiene. Keeping the body clean helps to prevent ingestion of biological agents. Small cuts or scratches should be covered and kept germ-free by means of soap, water, and first-aid measures. Since insects may carry biological agents, Soldiers should prevent insect bites by keeping clothes buttoned and skin covered. The platoon will only consume water and food that has come through approved sources. Leadership must ensure all Soldiers understand the risk from getting food or water from local sources.
NUCLEAR DEFENSE E-7. The best defense against a nuclear attack is to dig in. Unit defensive positions, which range from individual foxholes to full-scale improved fighting positions, should be prepared whenever the tactical situation permits. Personnel should keep their individual weapons, equipment, clothing, and other issue items in their vehicles. Inside the vehicle, equipment and any loose items must be secured because the blast wave can turn unsecured objects into lethal missiles. Supplies, explosives, and flammable materials should be dispersed and protected. E-8. Reverse slopes of hills and mountains give some nuclear protection. The initial radiation and the heat and light from the fireball of a nuclear blast tend to be absorbed by hills and mountains. The use of gullies, ravines, ditches, natural depressions, fallen trees, and caves can also reduce nuclear casualties. E-9. Equipment that would be damaged in the explosion must be safe guarded. One technique is not using all night-vision goggles at the same time, if not required by the mission, to prevent damage to the image enhancing mechanism by the flash.
CHEMICAL DEFENSE General Guidelines E-10. Make sure all personnel have their protective masks available, and make sure each mask fits and functions properly. All personnel should wear the proper protective clothing in accordance with the MOPP level designated by the commander. Inform everyone to remain alert and to be constantly aware of the chemical threat. Protect all equipment and supplies from liquid chemical contamination by keeping them organized and covered with a tarp. Exposed gear will not be decontaminated and will be destroyed and
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deprive the platoon of its equipment. The platoon must have a standardized plan for placing M9 tape on the vehicles as part of the early warning process.
Automatic Alarm System E-11. The automatic alarm system is the primary means of detecting an upwind chemical attack. The system provides two essential elements of survival: detection of a toxic agent cloud and early warning to troops in the monitored position. E-12. The platoon leader decides where to place the chemical alarm. In stationary operations, he first determines the wind direction, and then places available detector units upwind of the nearest position to be protected. The detector unit should be no more than 400 meters upwind from the alarm unit. The optimum distance is 150 meters. Operation of the alarm can be affected by blowing sand or dust, rain, sleet, snow, tropical conditions, and temperatures below 40 degrees Fahrenheit (4.5 degrees Celsius). E-13. Space the available detector units approximately 300 meters apart, and make sure each detector unit is connected to each alarm unit by telephone cable (WD-1). Position the alarm units near radiotelephone communications; this makes it easy to alert the unit to an attack. Platoons must remember that although the M8A1 could be installed in the platoon hot loop the new M22 cannot. Attempt to do so will cause the M43 alarm not to sound in the event of an attack. E-14. During movement operations the platoon should place the alarm on the exterior of the CBRN vehicle to give the platoon as much early warning as possible. E-15. The platoon sergeant and CBRN tank commander must ensure the platoon has sufficient batteries to support continuous operation of the chemical agent alarm. The PSG also needs to ensure that normal PMCS is being conducted on the platoons CBRN equipment and corrective action is taken when deficiencies are identified.
SECTION II – CBRN PROTECTION E-16. Soldiers on the integrated battlefield face a combination of nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional attacks. If the tank platoon cannot avoid a CBRN hazard, it must be prepared to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of exposure. The type and degree of protection required will be based on the unit’s mission and the hazard. Note that the line between contamination avoidance and protection is not distinct. Many actions contribute to both areas of CBRN defense.
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES AND MOPP LEVELS E-17. The key to effective protection in a CBRN environment is the tank platoon’s proficiency in automatically and correctly implementing CBRN defense SOPs. Individual and unit protection against chemical attack or contamination hinges on effective use of the MOPP and on individual proficiency in basic CBRN skills. The six levels of MOPP, illustrated in Figure E-1, should be listed in the SOP.
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Figure E-1. MOPP levels
DEFENSIVE ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER AN ATTACK BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE E-18. After a biological attack, crewmen must assume that all surfaces have been exposed to germs. Do not eat food or drink water that may be contaminated. Eat or drink only food or water that has been stored
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in sealed containers; consume it only after washing and cleaning the outside of the container. All water must be boiled for at least 15 minutes. Leaders continue to monitor for signs of delayed acting agents. Note. Refer to the battle drill for reaction to a chemical/biological attack in Chapter 3 of this manual.
NUCLEAR DEFENSE Defense During a Nuclear Attack E-19. This discussion focuses on defensive measures the platoon must be prepared to take to protect tank crewmen, whether they are in their vehicle or have dismounted. Mounted Defensive Actions
E-20. If time permits, the platoon should take the following actions: z Position each vehicle behind the best available cover with the front of the vehicle toward the blast. z Point the gun away from the blast. Lock the brakes. z z Secure loose equipment inside the vehicle to prevent injuries and equipment damage. z Secure all exterior components that could be damaged by the blast (such as water cans, duffel bags, and antennas) inside the vehicle. z Turn off all radios as well as turret and master power. z Close and lock all hatches, including ballistic shields. z Take actions to protect the head and eyes. As necessary, wear helmets and eye protection whenever possible. Note. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a nuclear attack.
Dismounted Defensive Actions
E-21. Never run for cover! Immediately drop flat on the ground (face down) or to the bottom of a foxhole, facing away from the fireball. Cover as much exposed skin as possible. Keep eyes tightly closed. Remain down until the blast wave has passed and debris has stopped falling. Stay calm, check for injury, check weapons and equipment for damage, and prepare to continue the mission.
Defense After a Nuclear Attack E-22. Once the attack has ended, forward a NBC-1 nuclear report, organize survivors, secure and organize equipment, repair and reinforce the BP, assist casualties, improve protection against possible fallout, and begin continuous monitoring. If the radiation dose rate reaches a hazardous level after fallout has ended, be prepared to move, on order, to a less hazardous area. General Guidelines
E-23. When operating in or crossing radiologically contaminated areas, vehicles should be closed tightly. Crewmen cover their faces with a handkerchief or cloth; cargoes should be covered by tarps or tenting. Mission permitting, vehicles should keep their speed down to prevent dust and should maintain adequate following distance to stay out of the dust raised by preceding vehicles. After the unit exits a contaminated area, personnel, equipment, and cargo should be checked for contamination and decontaminated, if necessary. Dose rates will be monitored closely to ensure compliance with the applicable OEG. Radiation exposure status (RES) will be updated, if appropriate.
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Appendix E
Fallout Warning
E-24. The first person to detect the arrival of fallout is usually a member of the radiological survey and monitoring team. As soon as the recorded dose rate reaches 1 centigray per hour (cGy/hr) or higher, issue a fallout warning. All personnel hearing the warning relay it to others. If the mission allows, Soldiers should get into a shelter with overhead cover and stay there until given an “ALL CLEAR” signal or until otherwise directed to move. If the mission does not allow the unit to take cover, decontamination becomes more important and, in many cases, more difficult. Supervision of Radiological Monitoring
E-25. Designate a point in the platoon area where readings will be taken, and note the grid coordinates of that point. Check the monitor operator to make sure that he takes readings at least once each hour from this point, that he zeroes the radiacmeter (AN/VDR-2) before taking each reading, and that he uses the device properly. Have the operator monitor continuously if any of the following conditions occur: z A reading of 1 cGy/hr or more is obtained. z A fallout warning is received. z A nuclear burst is seen, heard, or reported. z An order to monitor is received. The unit begins to move. z E-26. Ensure that the operator immediately reports all readings showing the presence of radiation, as well as the time of these readings. Use this information and the location of the readings to prepare a NBC-4 report. Continue these operations until monitoring shows a dose rate of less than 1 cGy/hr or until directed to stop. Supervision of Tactical Dosimetry
E-27. The tank platoon is normally issued two dosimeters. Select two Soldiers, one from each section, to wear them ideally the TC but at a minimum a loader that is outside the armor to get an accurate reading. Before the operation begins, check all dosimeters; any that do not read zero should be turned in for recharging if applicable. If a charger is not available, note the original reading on the dosimeter and adjust subsequent readings accordingly. Make sure dosimeter readings are reported accurately. Collect readings at least once daily. Average these readings, round to the nearest 10, and report this average to higher headquarters.
CHEMICAL DEFENSE Defense During a Chemical Attack E-28. Give the alarm. Have all unmasked Soldiers put on their protective masks and other MOPP gear. All personnel should move inside their tanks; in most cases, they should place their hatches in the closed position to protect against gross contamination. Direct the crews of vehicles that are equipped with CBRN overpressurization to turn the system on. Use M256 chemical agent detector kits to determine the type of agent, and forward a NBC-1 chemical report. Continue the mission. Notes. Tactical and safety considerations (such as observation of the terrain, enemy disposition, and the amount of gross contamination that may be spread inside the vehicle) may outweigh the need to keep the tank’s hatches closed. Depending on the tactical situation and unit SOP, platoon members may be required to keep their hatches in the open or open-protected position.
Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a chemical/biological attack.
Defense After a Chemical Attack E-29. As directed by unit SOPs, forward follow-up NBC-1 chemical reports, treat casualties, perform immediate decontamination as required, and mark the contaminated area.
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ALARMS AND SIGNALS E-30. When a CBRN attack is recognized, everyone must receive the warning and assume the appropriate MOPP level (see Figure E-1). Soldiers in immediate danger need warnings they can see or hear. The alarm or signal must be simple and unmistakable if it is to produce a quick and correct reaction. Units that are not immediately affected need the information as well, either to prepare for the hazard or to change plans. If a CBRN hazard is located, the contaminated area should be marked. The CBRN warning and reporting system (CBRNWRS) and standardized contamination markers contribute to orderly warning procedures.
VOCAL ALARMS E-31. To give a vocal alarm for any chemical or biological hazard or attack, the person detecting the hazard stops breathing, masks, and shouts “GAS, GAS!” as loudly as possible. Everyone hearing this alarm must immediately mask, repeat the alarm, and take cover from agent contamination and fragmentation of munitions. It may also be necessary to pass the alarm over the radio or telephone. Visual signals must supplement vocal alarms.
AUTOMATIC ALARMS E-32. If an M8/M22 automatic chemical agent alarm sounds or flashes, the first person to hear or see it stops breathing, masks, and yells “GAS, GAS!” This alarm is relayed throughout the unit by vocal and visual signals and radio.
NONVOCAL ALARMS E-33. One person yelling “GAS, GAS!” to warn unit personnel may be drowned out by the sounds of the battlefield; therefore, sound signals by means other than voice may be required. These signals must produce noise that is louder than, and not easily confused with, other sounds of combat. The unit SOP should specify nonvocal alarms for CBRN hazards. Following are some suggestions: z Rapid and continuous beating together of any two metal objects to produce a loud noise. Sample SOP entry: “The audible warning of a chemical attack is rapid and continuous beating of metal on metal.” z A succession of short blasts on a vehicle horn or other suitable device. Sample SOP entry: “While in convoy, five short blasts on a vehicle horn is the audible signal for a chemical attack.” z An intermittent warbling siren sound. Sample SOP entry: “The audible alarm for impending chemical attack is the sounding of the installation siren as follows: 10 seconds on, 5 seconds off; sequence repeated for 2 minutes.”
VISUAL SIGNALS E-34. Visual signals may replace sound alarms when the sound may be lost amid battlefield noises or when the situation does not permit the use of sound signals. The standard hand-and-arm signal for a CBRN hazard is illustrated in Figure E-2. Signaling is done by extending both arms horizontally to the sides with the fists closed and facing up, then rapidly moving the fists to the head and back to the horizontal position. This is repeated until other elements react. Colored smoke or flares may also be designated as visual signals for a CBRN hazard, but these must be specified in unit SOPs.
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Appendix E
Figure E-2. Hand-and-arm signal for CBRN hazard
SYMPTOMS AND TREATMENT OF CBRN CASUALTIES E-35. Soldiers must be able to recognize CBRN-related symptoms and conduct self-aid and buddy-aid. The basic steps of first aid apply in any combat environment.
BIOLOGICAL AGENT CASUALTIES E-36. Casualties resulting from live biological agents or toxins require medical treatment as quickly as possible. One indication of a live biological agent attack is large numbers of Soldiers developing an unexplained illness over a short period of time. Soldiers showing symptoms of disease must be isolated to prevent infection from spreading to others. E-37. A wide variety of toxins is available to potential adversaries for use on the modern battlefield. These can be dispensed alone or with other carriers or agents. Symptoms associated with some toxins mimic those of other types of illness or of exposure to chemical agents. Toxin symptoms may include any of the following: z Dizziness, mental confusion, or double or blurred vision. z Formation of rashes or blisters. z Coughing. z Fever, aching muscles, and fatigue. z Difficulty in swallowing. z Nausea, vomiting, and/or diarrhea. z Bleeding from body openings or blood in urine, stool, or sputum (spit). z Shock. E-38. These symptoms may appear within minutes after the toxin attack, or they may be delayed several hours. Appropriate self-aid and buddy-aid measures vary, depending on the agent. Soldiers should first mask to prevent inhaling or ingesting additional agents; then they should remove agents from exposed skin, either by washing with soap and water or by using the M291 kit. Soldiers use buddy-aid procedures to help each other clean exposed skin, to observe each other for early symptoms of toxic exposure, and to request medical assistance.
NUCLEAR CASUALTIES E-39. Blast injuries. These can range from minor cuts and broken bones to severe lacerations and critical damage to vital organs. The first-aid treatment will be the same as that used for conventional combat casualties suffering similar injuries. E-40. Thermal radiation injuries. The intense heat generated by a nuclear detonation can cause burn injuries. As with other types of burns, there are three degrees of injury: z First-degree burns should heal without special treatment, and there will be no scar formation. z Second-degree burns resemble severe sunburn with blistering; they should be treated as a burn to prevent infection. z In third-degree burns, the full thickness of the skin is destroyed; the victim should be treated as a burn casualty and evacuated.
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CHEMICAL AGENT CASUALTIES E-41. Chemical agents fall into four major categories: nerve, blister, blood, and choking. Their primary routes of attack upon the body are through the respiratory system and the skin. These agents create an especially dangerous situation because they can kill or incapacitate quickly. The first, and most important, step in dealing with them effectively is to recognize symptoms so proper treatment can be administered.
Nerve Agents E-42. Nerve agent poisoning can lead to a quick death; for this reason, quick recognition of its symptoms is crucial. Immediate self-aid or buddy-aid is needed if most or all symptoms appear. Poisoning Symptoms
E-43. Early symptoms usually appear in the following progression: z Runny nose. z Redness and tearing of the eyes. z Sudden headache. z Excessive flow of saliva (drooling). z Tightness in the chest, leading to breathing difficulty. z Impaired vision. z Muscular twitching in the area of exposed or contaminated skin. z Stomach cramps. z Nausea. E-44. Severe nerve agent poisoning is likely when any of the early symptoms are accompanied by all or most of the following symptoms: z Strange or confused behavior. z Gurgling sounds when breathing. z Severely pinpointed pupils. z Loss of bladder and/or bowel control. z Vomiting. z Convulsions. z Breathing that becomes extremely labored or stops. Self-Aid Procedures
E-45. No effective drug exists to remedy the effects of nerve agents on vision. If Soldiers experience any of the other mild symptoms of nerve agent poisoning, they must perform the following self-aid measures, which are covered in more detail in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11): z Step 1. Immediately put on the protective mask. z
Step 2. Remove a Mark I nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) from the protective mask carrier (see Figure E-3).
z
Step 3. Inject one thigh with the first injector from the kit (atropine in the small autoinjector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds. Remove the injector.
z
Step 4. Immediately inject the thigh with the second injector (pralidoxime chloride in the large injector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds.
z
Step 5. Remove the injector and place each injector needle through the jacket pocket flap of the overgarment, bending each needle to form a hook.
z
Step 6. Massage the injection area, if time permits and the overgarment suit is not contaminated.
z
Step 7. If symptoms persist or recur, wait 10 to 15 minutes and repeat both injections. Repeat a third time if needed. Allow 10 to 15 minutes between each set of injections. Do not
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Appendix E
administer more than three NAAK sets. administration of more than three sets.
Medical support personnel must authorize the
Figure E-3. Nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) Buddy-Aid Procedures
E-46. If a Soldier experiences severe symptoms from nerve agent poisoning and is unable to administer self-aid, another Soldier must perform the following buddy-aid measures, which are covered in more detail in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11): z z
z
z z
Mask the casualty. Step 2. Using the victim’s NAAK, administer three sets immediately and in rapid succession in the thigh muscle of either leg. Do not wait between injections. Step 3. Administer the back-pressure armlift method of artificial respiration if the casualty’s breathing is labored or has stopped. Hook the expended autoinjectors to the casualty’s overgarment jacket pocket flap. Step 4. Step 1.
Step 5. If necessary to stabilize the casualty’s heart rate, administer the convulsive antidote nerve agent (CANA) injection Diazepam (see Figure E-4). Use the following procedure:
Tear open the protective plastic packet and remove the injector. Grasp the injector with the needle (black) end extending beyond the thumb and two fingers (index plus next finger). With the other hand, pull the safety cap off the injector base to arm the injector. (CAUTION: Do not touch the black portion, which is the injector needle. You could accidentally inject yourself.) Place the black end of the injector against the casualty’s injection site. Push the injector into the muscle with firm, even pressure until it functions. Hold the injector in place for at least 10 seconds. Push the needle of each used injector (one at a time) through one of the pocket flaps of the casualty’s protective overgarment and, being careful not to tear protective gloves or clothing; bend each needle to form a hook. Step 6. Obtain immediate medical attention for the victim.
z
Note. This information is covered in task 031-503-1013, Decontaminate Yourself and Individual Equipment Using Chemical Decontamination Kits.
Figure E-4. Convulsive antidote nerve agent (CANA) injector
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Blister Agents
E-47. Casualties resulting from blister agents may not be noticeable immediately. Symptoms may take several hours or days to appear. They include the following: z Redness or inflammation of the eyes. z Temporary blindness or, with severe poisoning, permanent blindness. z Itching, burning, or reddening of the skin. z Welts or, in an advanced state, blisters on the skin. z Hoarseness. z Coughing. z Difficult or labored breathing. z Stomach pain. z Nausea. z Vomiting. z Diarrhea. E-48. If a blister agent comes in contact with skin or eyes, remove it immediately. To remove an agent from the eyes, flush repeatedly with plain water. Decontaminate the skin using the M258A1/M291 kit. If severe blisters form, seek medical attention as soon as possible. Blood Agents
E-49. A seemingly mild case of blood agent poisoning can progress to death within 10 minutes. Symptoms include the following: z Rapid or shallow respiration (panting). z Headache. z Dizziness or giddiness. z Red or pink color change in light-colored skin. z Convulsions. z Coma. E-50. There is no self-aid or buddy-aid treatment for blood agent poisoning. When hit with blood agent the platoon must mask as soon as possible. Victims must receive immediate medical attention. Blood agent leads to a break down of protective mask filters and leaders must plan actions accordingly. Choking Agents
E-51. These agents produce casualties by means of inhaled vapors. They damage blood vessels in the lung walls, causing body fluid to slowly fill the lung cavity. Ordinary field concentrations do not cause death, but prolonged exposure to high concentrations of the vapor, coupled with neglect or delay in masking, can be fatal. Maximum damage will occur between 12 and 24 hours after exposure. In most cases, the excess fluid in the lungs will absorb back into the body. Slow recovery will begin approximately 48 hours after exposure. E-52. During and immediately after exposure, choking agent symptoms may include the following: z Coughing. z Choking. z Tightness in the chest. z Nausea. z Headache. Tearing of the eyes. z E-53. Following the early symptoms, a symptom-free period of 2 to 24 hours is likely. This will be followed by these signs of fluid collecting in the lungs: z Rapid, shallow breathing.
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z z z
Painful coughing. Blue lips and fingernails. In severe cases, clammy skin and rapid heartbeat.
E-54. No self-aid or buddy-aid treatment exists for choking agent symptoms. If only minimum amounts were inhaled, the Soldier may continue with normal duties. If definite symptoms occur, the Soldier should keep warm and seek immediate medical attention and rapid evacuation to an aid station.
MARKING CONTAMINATED AREAS E-55. Contamination must be marked so unsuspecting personnel will not be exposed to it. When platoon monitoring teams detect or suspect a CBRN hazard, they mark all likely entry points into the area and report the contamination to higher headquarters. The only exception to this policy is if marking the area would help the enemy. If this exception is made by the commander, the hazard must still be reported to protect friendly units.
TYPES OF MARKERS E-56. U.S. forces use NATO standard markers (illustrated in Figure E-5) to make it easier for allies to recognize the hazards. These markers are in the standard CBRN marking set. The colors and inscriptions on a marker indicate the type of hazard. Additional information is written on the front of the sign.
Figure E-5. CBRN marking devices
MARKING PROCEDURES E-57. Markers face away from the contamination. For example, if markers are placed on the edge of a contaminated area to mark a radiological hot spot, they face away from the point of the highest contamination reading. Markers are placed along roads and trails and at other likely points of entry. When time and mission permit, additional markers should be emplaced. The distance between signs varies. In open terrain, they can be placed 25 to 100 meters apart; in hilly or wooded areas, they should be placed more frequently. An observer should be able to stand in front of a marker and see the markers to the left and right of it.
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E-58. Units discovering a marked contaminated area do not have to conduct elaborate, time-consuming surveys. They simply check the extent of contamination and use the information to adjust their plans, if necessary. If the size of the hazard has changed, they relocate the signs. If the hazard is gone, they remove the signs. Changes are reported to higher headquarters.
UNMASKING PROCEDURES E-59. Soldiers should unmask as soon as possible except when a live biological or toxin attack is expected. Use the following procedures to determine if unmasking is safe.
UNMASKING WITH M256/M256A1 K IT E-60. If an M256/M256A1 detector kit is available, use it to supplement the unmasking procedures. The kit does not detect all agents; therefore, proper unmasking procedures, which take approximately 15 minutes, must still be used. If all tests with the kit (including a check for liquid contamination using M8 detector paper) have been performed and the results are negative, use the following procedures: z The senior person should select one or two Soldiers to start the unmasking procedures. If possible, they move to a shady place; bright, direct sunlight can cause pupils in the eyes to constrict, giving a false symptom. z The selected Soldiers unmask for 5 minutes, then clear and reseal their masks. z Observe the Soldiers for 10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, request permission from higher headquarters to signal “ALL CLEAR.” z Watch all Soldiers for possible delayed symptoms. Always have first-aid treatment immediately available in case it is needed. Note. Time to complete the M256/M256A1 detector kit, including using M8 detector paper for liquid, takes approximately 20 minutes. Two kits completed simultaneously along with unmasking procedures with the M256/M256A1 detector kit will take approximately 35 minutes to complete.
UNMASKING WITHOUT M256/M256A1 K IT E-61. If an M256/M256A1 kit is not available, the unmasking procedures take approximately 35 minutes. When a reasonable amount of time has passed after the attack, find a shady area. Use M8 paper to check the area for possible liquid contamination. Conduct unmasking using these procedures: z The senior person selects one or two Soldiers. They take a deep breath and break their mask seals, keeping their eyes wide open. z After 15 seconds, the Soldiers clear and reseal their masks. Observe them for 10 minutes. z If no symptoms appear, the same Soldiers break the seals, take two or three breaths, and clear and reseal their masks. Observe them for 10 minutes. z If no symptoms appear, the same Soldiers unmask for 5 minutes, and then remask. z If no symptoms appear in 10 minutes, request permission from higher headquarters to signal “ALL CLEAR.” Continue to observe all Soldiers in case delayed symptoms develop.
ALL-CLEAR SIGNAL E-62. Units pass the all-clear signal by word of mouth through their chain of command. Leaders initiate the signal after testing for contamination proves negative. The commander designates the specific all-clear signal and includes it in the unit SOP or the OPORD. If required, standard sound signals may be used, such as a continuous, sustained blast on a siren, vehicle horn, or similar device. When “ALL CLEAR” is announced on the radio, the receiving unit must authenticate the transmission before complying.
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WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEMS E-63. The CBRNWRS is a rapid means of sending reports of a CBRN attack. These reports inform other affected units of clean areas and possible contamination. They are also used to provide this information up and down the chain of command and to adjacent units. E-64. Each report has a specific purpose and uses standard codes to shorten and simplify the reporting process. For a detailed outlined of the formats and letter codes for the standard CBRN (NBC) reports, refer to ST 3-20.153.
SECTION III – DECONTAMINATION E-65. During continuous operations in areas of nuclear or chemical contamination, decontamination is essential in preventing casualties and severe combat degradation. The tank platoon gains maximum benefit from the available time and decontamination resources by observing these considerations: z The platoon should execute decontamination as soon as possible and as far forward as possible. z Decontamination should be conducted only to the extent that is necessary to ensure the platoon’s safety and operational readiness. z Decontamination priorities with regard to unit safety and mission accomplishment should be strictly observed. E-66. These principles are consistent with doctrine that places the burden of decontamination at battalion or company level. For this reason, the tank platoon must develop a thorough SOP covering decontamination methods and priorities, using all available assets to the maximum extent possible. E-67. Refer to FM 3-11.5 (FM 3-5) for a more detailed examination of CBRN decontamination procedures.
IMMEDIATE DECONTAMINATION E-68. Immediate decontamination is a basic Soldier survival skill. Any contact between chemical or toxic agents and bare skin should be treated as an emergency. Some agents can kill if they remain on the skin for longer than a minute.
SKIN DECONTAMINATION K IT E-69. The best technique for removing or neutralizing these agents is to use the M258A1/M291 skin decontamination kit. Leaders must ensure that their Soldiers are trained to execute this technique automatically, without waiting for orders.
PERSONAL WIPE DOWN E-70. Personal wipe down should begin within 15 minutes of contamination. The wipe down removes or neutralizes contamination on the hood, mask, gloves, and personal weapon. For chemical and biological contamination, Soldiers use packets from the M280 decontamination kit. For radiological contamination, Soldiers wipe the contamination off with a cloth or simply flush or shake it away.
OPERATOR ’S SPRAY DOWN E-71. Operator’s spray down of equipment should begin immediately after completion of personal wipe down. The spray down removes or neutralizes contamination on the surfaces operators must touch frequently to perform their mission. For chemical and biological contamination, operators can use on board decontamination apparatuses like the M100 Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS) or the M11/M13. For radiological contamination, they brush or scrape the contamination away with whatever is at hand or flush it with water and wipe it away.
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OPERATIONAL DECONTAMINATION E-72. Operational decontamination allows a force to continue fighting and sustain momentum after being contaminated. It limits the hazard of transferring contamination by removing most of the gross contamination on equipment and nearly all the contamination on individual Soldiers. E-73. Operational decontamination speeds the weathering process and allows clean areas (people, equipment, and terrain) to stay clean. When they complete the decontamination process, Soldiers who have removed sources of vapor contamination from their clothing and equipment can use hazard-free areas to unmask temporarily and eat, drink, and rest. E-74. Operational decontamination is accomplished using assets of the parent unit. It makes use of two decontamination techniques: Vehicle wash down. z z MOPP gear exchange. E-75. These procedures can be performed separately from each other; both are best performed at crew level. Uncontaminated vehicles and personnel should not go through either technique.
VEHICLE WASH DOWN E-76. Vehicle wash down is conducted as far forward as possible and is performed by the battalion decontamination specialist with assistance from the company or troop decontamination team. It is most effective if started within one hour after contamination. There are two steps in vehicle wash down: z Step 1. Button up the vehicle and secure equipment. z Step 2. Wash down the vehicle and equipment with hot, soapy water for two to three minutes. E-77. Because speed is important, do not check vehicles for contamination after the vehicle has been washed down. Remove only gross contamination.
MOPP GEAR EXCHANGE E-78. There are eight steps in a MOPP gear exchange: z Step 1. Decontaminate gear and set it aside. z Step 2. Decontaminate hood and gloves, and roll up hood. z Step 3. Remove overgarment. z Step 4. Remove overboots and gloves. z Step 5. Put on new overgarment. z Step 6. Put on new overboots and gloves. z Step 7. Secure hood. z Step 8. Secure gear. E-79. MOPP gear exchange is best performed using the buddy system. Both Soldiers perform Step 1. Steps 2 through 7 are performed first by one Soldier, then by the other. Both Soldiers perform Step 8. The company or troop assists the platoon by bringing replacement overgarments and decontaminants to the exchange site.
THOROUGH DECONTAMINATION E-80. Thorough decontamination operations restore the combat power of maneuver units by removing nearly all contamination from Soldiers and individual equipment. Executed promptly and correctly, these detailed procedures reduce the danger of contamination exposure to negligible risk levels. Just as important, they allow Soldiers to operate equipment safely for extended periods at reduced MOPP levels.
PROCEDURES E-81. Contaminated units conduct detailed troop decontamination (DTD) for their crewmen under the supervision of the chemical unit. When detailed equipment decontamination (DED) operations are
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required, the chemical unit usually selects a site, sets it up, and performs detailed procedures with assistance from the contaminated unit. E-82. After completing thorough decontamination, the unit moves into an adjacent assembly area for reconstitution. Support elements from the brigade, division, or corps support area replenish combat stocks, refit equipment, and replace personnel and equipment. The newly reconstituted unit leaves the assembly area fully operational and fit to return to battle. A small risk from residual contamination remains, so periodic contamination checks must be made following this operation.
LIMITATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES E-83. Thorough decontamination is usually conducted as part of an extensive reconstitution effort in brigade, division, and corps support areas; support sites at lower levels cannot provide the quantities of decontamination resources (such as water, decontaminants, and time) required for such an extensive process. In some cases, a contaminated unit can conduct a thorough decontamination operation with organic assets, but armor units usually must depend on support from a chemical unit. E-84. Thorough decontamination does the most complete job of getting rid of contamination and related hazards, but as noted, it requires large quantities of valuable resources that may not be immediately available. In addition, under a variety of tactical or operational conditions, it will be impossible to execute such a major effort. The next best solution is to decontaminate only to the extent necessary to sustain the force and allow it to continue the mission. This entails using a combination of immediate and operational decontamination procedures.
SECTION IV – MOVEMENT IN A CBRN ENVIRONMENT E-85. As with other combat elements, one of the basic tactical requirements for the tank platoon is to be able to move through and operate in a contaminated area. To do so safely, the platoon should follow the procedures outlined in this section.
CROSSING A CHEMICALLY OR BIOLOGICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA E-86. Upon identifying a contaminated area, each tank crew makes preparations to cross. While one section provides security, the other section, positioned in a covered and concealed location, removes all externally stowed equipment. Crews mount and test M8A1/M22 alarms and M9 paper. They adopt MOPP level 4 and prepare the vehicle’s overpressure system (if it is available and METT-TC factors permit). Once the section’s preparations are complete, it moves into an overwatch position; the other section moves to a covered and concealed position and follows the same procedures. E-87. When both sections have been prepared, they use standard tactical movement techniques (such as bounding overwatch) to cross the contaminated area. During this movement, the crews continuously monitor the M8A1/M22 and the M9 paper. E-88. Drivers and TCs take precautions to avoid low ground, overhanging branches, and brushy areas as much as possible. While the platoon is in the contaminated area, all personnel observe each other for signs of chemical poisoning. E-89. Once the platoon has successfully crossed the contaminated area, it makes a temporary halt. During the halt, detection teams monitor for the presence of chemical agents. Each crew in turn executes operational decontamination of its vehicle and, with higher headquarters’ approval, initiates unmasking procedures. Once these procedures are complete, the platoon continues its mission.
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CROSSING A RADIOLOGICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA E-90. The procedures involved in crossing a radiologically contaminated area are similar to those for a chemically or biologically contaminated area, with the following additional considerations: z Vehicle preparation. Crews may store external equipment in the turret or cover it with a tarp. This prevents contaminated dust particles from accumulating on the equipment. Place wet sandbags or other materials on the turret floor to increase the amount of radiation shielding. When available, turn on the turret overpressurization system to protect the crew compartment from contaminated dust. z Movement. Vehicles should limit their speed to minimize dust. In addition, they must maintain the correct dust interval. z Monitoring. Ensure IM-93/UDR-13 and VDR-2 dosimeters are zeroed (if not zeroed, follow instructions that are included with the equipment to zero). Conduct continuous monitoring and report the results of dosimeter and radiacmeter surveys to higher headquarters and adjacent units. z Decontamination. During decontamination, each crewman should cover his nose and mouth with a handkerchief or cloth to avoid breathing contaminated dust particles.
SECTION V – SMOKE OPERATIONS E-91. One of the key features of the modern battlefield is the extensive use of smoke. Effectively employed, smoke is a combat multiplier. It can be used for identification, signaling, obscuration, deception, or screening. At the same time, employment of smoke must be carefully planned and coordinated to prevent interference with friendly units. E-92. As it prepares for an operation, the tank platoon should plan to take advantage of smoke from all available sources. Mission accomplishment, however, should never depend on smoke for success; the platoon must develop alternative plans in case smoke delivery systems are not available.
USES OF SMOKE E-93. Smoke has four general uses on the battlefield, as described in the following discussion.
IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNALING E-94. Smoke is used to identify (mark) targets, supply and evacuation points, and friendly positions during CAS operations. As a means of prearranged battlefield communications, it can be employed to initiate such operations as displacement.
OBSCURATION E-95. Smoke can be fired on enemy positions to degrade the vision of gunners and known or suspected OPs, preventing them from seeing or tracking targets and thereby reducing their effectiveness. Employed against an attacking force, nonthermal smoke (white phospherous) can cause confusion and disorientation by degrading the enemy’s command and control capabilities; at the same time, friendly units retain the ability to engage the enemy using thermal sights and from your sketch card. In addition, enemy vehicles become silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. If smoke employment is planned and executed correctly, this will occur as the enemy reaches the trigger line. (Figure E-6 illustrates this use of smoke.)
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Appendix E
Figure E-6. Using smoke to confuse the enemy and silhouette his vehicles
DECEPTION E-96. Smoke can mislead the enemy regarding friendly intentions. For example, it can be employed on several avenues of approach at once to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the main attack. In the defense, smoke may be fired at a remote location for the sole purpose of attracting attention and confusing the enemy.
SCREENING E-97. Smoke is used in friendly areas of operation or in areas between friendly and enemy forces to degrade enemy ground and aerial observation and to defeat or degrade enemy acquisition systems. Screening smoke helps to conceal the platoon as it displaces from a BP or as it conducts tactical movement approaching enemy positions. Smoke can also be employed to conceal a platoon as it conducts a bypass, breach, or assault mission. Figures E-7 through E-9 illustrate uses of screening smoke.
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Figure E-7. Using screening smoke to conceal displacement
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Appendix E
Figure E-8. Using screening smoke to conceal a bypass
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Figure E-9. Using screening smoke to conceal a breaching operation
SOURCES OF SMOKE E-98. There are a number of sources of smoke on the battlefield, including the residual effects of burning vehicles, equipment, and storage facilities. Depending on availability, the tank platoon can employ the following smoke delivery systems during tactical operations.
MORTARS E-99. Mortar support, provided by the CAB mortar platoon or cavalry troop mortar section, is the most rapid and responsive means of indirect smoke delivery. The tank platoon leader coordinates the planning and execution of mortar smoke missions with the commander and the company or troop FIST. Mortars use WP rounds, which can degrade the effectiveness of thermal sights and can also produce casualties to friendly troops. Refer to FM 3-11.11 (FM 3-11).
FIELD ARTILLERY E-100. FA can place smoke on distant targets. Artillery-delivered smoke is not as responsive as mortar smoke support and may not be available if it is not planned and coordinated well in advance. Artillery smoke is made up of hexachloroethane (HC) and has less effect on thermal sights than does WP smoke.
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Appendix E
SMOKE POTS E-101. These produce a large volume of white or grayish-white smoke that lasts for extended periods. The smoke has minimal effect on thermal sights. This is the only system that floats on water and that can be delivered by hand or vehicle. The tank platoon will normally employ smoke pots to screen displacement or breaching operations.
HAND-HELD SMOKE GRENADES E-102. These can produce white or colored smoke. White smoke grenades are most often used to screen individual vehicles. Colored smoke grenades are primarily used to signal displacement and other critical events or to identify (mark) friendly unit positions and breach and evacuation locations. Smoke from hand-held grenades has minimal effect on thermal sights.
VEHICLE SMOKE GRENADE LAUNCHERS E-103. Grenade launchers, which can produce a limited amount of smoke, are used as a self-defense measure to screen or conceal the vehicle from enemy antitank gunners. They can also be used to screen individual vehicle displacement. Smoke from vehicle-launched grenades can degrade thermal sights.
VEHICLE ENGINE EXHAUST SMOKE SYSTEM E-104. The VEESS injects diesel fuel into the engine exhaust to produce smoke. It serves primarily as a self-defense measure for individual vehicles, but a tank crew can also employ it to screen other friendly vehicles if wind conditions and the direction of vehicle movement allow. This system consumes fuel at the rate of 1 gallon per minute of operation.
CAUTION VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
TACTICAL SMOKE GENERATORS E-105. These wheel- or track-mounted devices are available through the division chemical company. Their use is prescribed at brigade or battalion level. This type of smoke normally does not affect thermal sights.
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SMOKE OPERATIONS WEATHER E-106. The effectiveness of smoke in tactical situations (including the time required to build the cloud and cloud duration) depends in large measure on the weather. Wind direction, wind speed, humidity, and cloud cover are important considerations. If the wind is strong or blowing in the wrong direction, it may be impossible to establish an effective smoke screen. Smoke clouds build up faster and last longer the higher the humidity and the greater the cloud cover (refer to FM 3-50). The best time to use smoke is when the ground is cooler than the air.
FACTORS IN SELECTING THE TYPE OF SMOKE EMPLOYED E-107. Certain types of smoke will degrade visual, infrared, and thermal sights. Enemy capabilities and the desired effect of the smoke (such as screening or obscuration) will dictate what type is requested.
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Note. Even types of smoke that do not affect thermal sights may prevent the tank’s laser range finder from computing an accurate ballistic solution. Under such conditions, crewmen must rely on such techniques as range bands, range estimation, and battlesighting.
NAVIGATION E-108. Navigational aids such as POSNAV, GPS, and thermal sights assist individual vehicles during movement through smoke, while FBCB2 and other digital systems help the platoon leader to maintain situational understanding and control of the platoon. The platoon leader also decreases the interval between vehicles to further enhance control of the platoon.
MANEUVER Offense E-109. A defending enemy may employ smoke to confuse and disorient the attacker. Whenever the platoon is traveling through smoke, whether it is of friendly or enemy origin, the platoon leader must remember that his tanks will be silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. The critical consideration is for all vehicles to emerge at the same time. The navigational tools discussed previously enable the platoon leader to maintain command and control during movement and to ensure that the platoon is postured, as it exits the smoke, to mass fires against previously unidentified enemy vehicles. E-110. During an assault, friendly smoke should be shifted in advance of the arrival of the assault element. The use of multispectral smoke for obscuration must be carefully planned. The duration of the effects of the smoke should be controlled based on the capability of enemy and friendly units to acquire and engage targets through the smoke and on the ability of friendly units to maintain situational understanding during movement.
Defense E-111. An attacking enemy may employ smoke on the tank platoon’s positions or in the platoon’s engagement area. As noted, this may not only “blind” thermal sights but also prevent laser range finders from accurately computing ballistic data. One solution is to occupy alternate BPs that conform to the commander’s intent but that are not obscured by smoke (see Figure E-10).
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Appendix E
Figure E-10. Tank platoon occupying an alternate battle position that is not obscured by enemy smoke E-112. If multispectral smoke does not disable thermal sights, the TC can use sector sketches with grid lines, range bands, and TRPs to estimate the target range in the absence of a laser-computed range. On the M1A2, the choke sight of the CITV enables the TC to estimate and input ranges for a ballistic solution.
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Appendix F
Combat Identification Fratricide and collateral damage adversely affect combat operations. In addition to the loss of life and materiel, fratricide can have a devastating effect on operational effectiveness and morale. The advent of continuous operations of highly mobile forces, extended range of operations, and weapon systems of greatly increased range, lethality, and autonomy exacerbates the challenge of combat identification. Based on empirical data from Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Combat Readiness Center, as well as Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, fratricide remains a significant issue. Identification of unknown entities, such as friendly, enemy, or neutral/noncombatant, is increasingly important as weapon system ranges extend beyond visual recognition in the fog of war and the prospect of commonality of friendly and enemy systems increases. It is highly unlikely that US Army forces will operate independent of other US ground, air or naval forces in future combat operations. Combat operations within Joint Task Force structures will invariably place with US Army units in close proximity to other US and multinational units with potentially dissimilar equipment and uniforms. Effective combat identification measures and TTPs will be even more important within this context.
CID MEASURES F-1. Combat identification measures must be established early in all operational orders and planning cycles to ensure subordinates fully understand and have opportunity to implement all established measures prior to combat operations. F-2. Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere unduly with unit and individual rights and responsibilities to engage adversary forces. F-3. There is no perfect combat identification system, but by analyzing combat identification requirements from planning to execution, friendly forces can be more effective in combat and reduce the potential for fratricide and undesired collateral damage. Soldiers make the engage/don’t engage decision at the point of engagement and must be fully proficient in all aspects of CID. This includes situational awareness and TI systems and understanding of doctrine, TTPs, and ROE. Figure F-1 depicts the complete combat identification system. Noncooperative TI does not always work at optimum ranges due to climatic conditions and equipment status. Noncoperative TI systems require no response, equally support friendly, enemy, and neutral ID, and include optics. Cooperative TI (CTI) only identifies friendly entities that have an operational CTI device; it does not identify enemy or neutral entities. Cooperative systems also directly address fratricide avoidance and expedite force sorting for improved combat effectiveness. Other limitations pertain to how many entities are equipped with a blue force tracker (BFT) or similar device. BFT does not automatically report enemy or neutral entities. Accuracy of SA systems and latency is another limitation.
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Appendix F
DEFINITIONS F-4. Combat identification is “the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the joint battlefield to the extent that high confidence, timely application of military options, and weapons resources can occur.” F-5. Target identification is “the accurate and timely characterization of a detected object on the battlefield as friend, neutral, or enemy. This aspect of combat identification is time sensitive and directly supports a combatant’s shoot or don’t-shoot decision for detected objects on the battlefield.” TI is shooterfocused for “shoot/don’t shoot” decisions with friendly identification systems like the joint combat identification marking system (JCIMS) that requires no response from either platform observed.
Figure F-1. Combat identification system F-6. Situational awareness is a “...general knowledge of the dynamic, operational, and tactical situation and the events occurring on the battlefield...” within their area of operations.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS F-7. Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in light/heavy operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of these considerations to prevent unnecessary casualties. F-8. Tank crewmen are often unable to see dismounted infantry soldiers operating close to their vehicle. This limitation is worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed. In these conditions, the crew is focused on the enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. The use of JCIMS CID marking systems like the dismounted soldier combat identification marking system (DCIMS) and Phoenix IR lights can help identify and illuminate other friendly vehicles and dismounted infantrymen at night. Employment of JCIMS will assist TCs/gunners and allow the driver to assist in positive identification. F-9. JCIMS is used to reduce the risk of fratricide. JCIMS devices include combat identification panels (CIP), thermal identification panels (TIP), DCIMS, Phoenix IR lights, and IR tape. JCIMS marking devices are used in conjunction with forward looking infrared (FLIR) optics and image intensification
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devices (such as night-vision goggles [NVG]) to assist in identifying friendly vehicles and soldiers at the point of engagement. The markings must be installed, turned on, and visible on friendly vehicles and dismounted soldiers to be effective and operational status in accordance with the unit TACSOP and specifics contained in the OPORD must be included in precombat inspection procedures.
Figure F-2. Joint CID marking system (JCIMS)
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Appendix G
Risk Management Risk is the chance of injury or death for individuals and damage to or loss of vehicles and equipment. Risks, and/or the potential for risks, are always present in every combat and training situation the tank platoon faces. Risk management must take place at all levels of the chain of command during each phase of every operation; it is an integral part of all tactical planning. The tank platoon leader, his NCOs, and all other platoon soldiers must know how to use risk management, coupled with fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the mission is executed in the safest possible environment within mission constraints. The primary objective of risk management is to help units protect their combat power through accident prevention, enabling them to win the battle quickly and decisively, with minimum losses. This appendix outlines the process that leaders can use to identify hazards and implement a plan to address each identified hazard. It also includes a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the platoon’s leaders and individual soldiers in implementing a sound risk management program. For additional information on risk management, refer to FM 3-100.14 (FM 100-14).
SECTION I – RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES G-1. This section outlines the five steps of risk management. Leaders of the tank platoon must always remember that the effectiveness of the process depends on situational understanding. They should never approach risk management with “one size fits all” solutions to the hazards the platoon will face. Rather, in performing the steps, they must keep in mind the essential tactical and operational factors that make each situation unique. G-2. There are two types of hazards: tactical and accident. Tactical hazards deal with hazards imposed upon us by the enemy (such as ATGM positions or untemplated enemy positions on our flanks). Accident hazards are those hazards imposed upon us due to terrain, weather, or mission requirements (such as traveling an unimproved road at night in a snow storm).
STEP 1 – IDENTIFY HAZARDS G-3. A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential condition that could entail injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and property; or some other sort of mission degradation. Tactical and training operations pose many types of hazards. G-4. The tank platoon leader must identify the hazards associated with all aspects and phases of the platoon’s mission, paying particular attention to the factors of METT-TC. Risk management must never be an afterthought; leaders must begin the process during their troop-leading procedures and continue it throughout the operation. G-5. The following lists possible sources of risk that the tank platoon might face during a typical tactical operation. The list is organized according to the factors of METT-TC.
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Appendix G
SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK MISSION • •
•
Duration of the operation. Complexity/clarity of the plan. understood?)
(Is the plan well developed and easily
Proximity and number of maneuvering units.
ENEMY •
Knowledge of the enemy situation.
•
Enemy capabilities.
•
Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER •
Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, and smoke.
•
Precipitation and its effect on mobility.
•
Extreme heat or cold.
•
Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, and water obstacles).
TROOPS •
Equipment status.
•
Experience the units conducting the operation have working together.
•
Danger areas associated with the platoon’s weapon systems.
•
Soldier/leader proficiency.
•
Soldier/leader rest situation.
•
Degree of acclimatization to environment.
•
Impact of new leaders and/or crew members.
TIME AVAILABLE •
Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by subordinates.
•
Time available for PCCs/PCIs.
CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS • •
•
Applicable ROE and/or ROI. Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with civilians (such as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism). Potential for media contact/inquiries.
STEP 2 – ASSESS HAZARD TO DETERMINE RISKS G-6. Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct impact of each hazard on an operation (in the form of hazardous incidents). Use the following steps: z Determine which hazards can be eliminated or avoided. z Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated or avoided to determine the probability that the hazard can occur. z Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated or avoided. Severity, defined as the result or outcome of a hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree of injury or illness (including death), loss of or damage to equipment or property, environmental damage, or other mission-impairing factors (such as unfavorable publicity or loss of combat power).
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Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, determine the associated risk level (extremely high, high, moderate, and low). Figure G-1 summarizes the four risk levels. Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, and risk level, as well as the operational factors unique to the situation), complete the composite risk management worksheet. Refer to Table G-1 for an outline of the risk assessment matrix used to determine the level of risk. Figure G-2A and B show an example of a composite risk management worksheet (pages 1 and 2). Refer to Table G-2 for instructions on completing the worksheet. ( Note. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet , can be found on the AKO website, Self-Help, DA Pubs and Forms.)
z
z
LEVELS OF RISK EXTREMELY HIGH •
Someone will die or suffer permanent disability.
HIGH •
More often than not, someone will suffer an injury that requires less than 3 months to heal.
MODERATE •
More often than not, someone will require first aid or minor medical treatment.
LOW (WORST CASE) •
Someone is likely to need first aid or minor medical treatment. Figure G-1. Risk levels and impact on mission execution
Table G-1. Risk assessment matrix Probability Severity
Frequent
Likely
Occasional
Seldom
Unlikely
Catastrophic
E
E
H
H
M
Critical
E
H
H
M
L
Marginal
H
M
M
L
L
Negligible
M
L
L
L
L
E – Extremely High Risk H – High Risk M – Moderate Risk L – Low Risk
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Figure G-2A. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 1 of 2 pages
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Figure G-2B. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 2 of 2 pages
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Table G-2. Instructions for completing DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet Item
Instruction
1 through 4
Self explanatory.
5
Subtask relating to the mission or task in block 1.
6
Hazards — Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or task. Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.
7
Initial Risk Level — Includes historical lessons learned; intuitive analyses, experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings; and environmental considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment matrix (Table G-1). Enter the risk level for each hazard.
8
Controls — Develop one or more controls for each hazard that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. Specify who, what, where, why, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.
9
Residual Risk Level — Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment matrix (Table G-1). Enter the residual risk level for each hazard.
10
How to Implement — Decide how each control will be put into effect or communicated to the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal instruction; tactical, safety, garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.
11
How to Supervise (Who) — Plan how each control will be monitored for implementation (continuous supervision, spot-checks) and reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if they can be improved. Pass on lessons learned.
12
Was Control Effective — Indicate “Yes” or “No.” Review during AAR.
13
Overall Risk Level — Select the highest residual risk level and circle it. This becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides whether the controls are sufficient to accept the level of residual risk. If the risk is too great to continue the mission or task, the co mmander directs development of additional control or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.
14
Risk Decision Authority — Signed by the appropriate level of command.
STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS DEVELOPING CONTROLS
G-7. After assessing each hazard, develop one or more controls that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of potential hazardous incidents. When developing controls, consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard by itself. MAKING R ISK DECISIONS
G-8. A key element in the process of making a risk decision is determining whether accepting the risk is justified or, conversely, is unnecessary. The decision-maker (the tank platoon leader, if applicable) must compare and balance the risk against mission expectations. He alone decides if the controls are sufficient and acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he determines the risk is unnecessary, he directs the development of additional controls or alternative controls; as another option, he can modify, change, or reject the selected COA for the operation.
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STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS G-9. Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to eliminate hazards or reduce their risk. Implementing controls is the most important part of the risk management process; this is the chain of command’s contribution to the safety of the unit. Implementing controls includes coordination and communication with appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and with individuals executing the mission. The tank platoon leader must ensure that specific controls are integrated into operational plans (OPLAN), OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to ensure that controls are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood by all levels. G-10. If the leaders have conducted a thoughtful risk assessment, the controls will be easy to implement, enforce, and follow. Examples of risk management controls include the following: z Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including related hazards and controls. z Conduct thorough PCCs and PCIs. z Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels. z Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as possible (at least 4 hours in any 24hour period). z Use buddy teams. z Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety. z Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to distinguish maneuvering units. z Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on dangerous terrain. z Establish marked and protected sleeping areas in assembly areas. z Limit single-vehicle movement. z Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel.
STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE G-11. During mission execution, it is imperative for leaders to ensure that risk management controls are properly understood and executed. Leaders must continuously evaluate the unit’s effectiveness in managing risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement. SUPERVISION
G-12. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that effective risk management controls are implemented. All leaders are responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce established safety policies as well as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections, SITREPs, confirmation briefs, buddy checks, and close supervision. G-13. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk management controls, both to determine whether they are effective and to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, identify, and assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning and execution reflect changes in hazard conditions. EVALUATION
G-14. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also include an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit performance in identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should then incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions.
SECTION II – IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES G-15. Leaders and individuals at all levels are responsible and accountable for managing risk. They must ensure that hazards and associated risks are identified and controlled during planning, preparation, and execution of operations. The tank platoon leader and his senior NCOs must look at both tactical risks and
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Appendix G
accident risks. The same risk management process is used to manage both types. The platoon leader alone determines how and where he is willing to take tactical risks. With the assistance of his PSG, NCOs, and individual soldiers, the platoon leader manages accident risks. G-16. Sometimes, despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a risk taken or about to be assumed, the risk management process may break down. Such a failure can be the result of several factors; most often, it can be attributed to the following: z The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to kno w about the risk. z A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job and does not want to bother his platoon leader or section leader. z Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk involved. z Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in the capability to avoid or recover from a hazardous incident. z Subordinates not fully understanding the higher commander’s guidance regarding risk decisions. G-17. The tank platoon leader gives the platoon direction, sets priorities, and establishes the command climate (values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires him to embed risk management into individual behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the platoon leader must exercise creative leadership, innovative planning, and careful management. Most important, he must demonstrate support for the risk management process. The tank platoon leader and others in the platoon chain of command can establish a command climate favorable to risk management integration by taking the following actions: z Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management behavior through leading by example and by stressing active participation throughout the risk management process. z Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is responsible for obtaining the assets necessary to mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate leaders. z Understand their own and their soldier’s limitations, as well as their unit’s capabilities. z Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them. z Prevent a “zero defects” mindset from creeping into the platoon’s culture. z Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their trade and their ability to execute a chosen COA. z Keep subordinates informed. z Listen to subordinates. G-18. For the platoon leader, his subordinate leaders, and individual soldiers alike, responsibilities in managing risk include the following: z Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly communicate risk decision criteria and guidance. z Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals. z Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates understand the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” and “why” of managing risk and how these factors apply to their situation and assigned responsibilities. z Accurately evaluate the platoon’s effectiveness, as well as subordinates’ execution of risk controls during the mission. z Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed established limits.
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Appendix H
Fratricide Prevention Fratricide is defined as the employment of friendly weapons that results in the unforeseen and unintentional death or injury of friendly personnel or damage to friendly equipment. Fratricide prevention is the commander’s responsibility. He is assisted by all leaders across all operating systems in accomplishing this mission. This appendix focuses on actions the tank platoon leader and his subordinate leaders can take with current resources to reduce the risk of fratricide. Special Note. Prior to all missions, commanders must ensure that their units conduct detailed planning and rehearsals emphasizing fratricide prevention.
In any tactical situation, situational understanding on the part of all crewmen, particularly the platoon leader, is critical not only to mission success but also to survival. It is critical that leaders know where other friendly elements are operating. With this knowledge, they must anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps to either avoid or mitigate them. With the new technology becoming more common at all levels the ability to maintain situational understanding is better enhanced, but the platoon leader cannot solely depend on this and must have an understanding of how the different units are moving. The platoon leader must always be vigilant of changes and developments in the situation that may place his elements in danger. When he perceives a potential fratricide situation, he must personally use the higher net to coordinate directly with the friendly element involved.
SECTION I – THE ROLE OF TRAINING H-1. The underlying principle of fratricide prevention is simple: Leaders who know where their soldiers are and where they want them to fire, can keep those soldiers alive to kill the enemy. At the same time, leaders must avoid, at all costs, any reluctance to employ, integrate, and synchronize all required operating systems at the critical time and place. They must avoid becoming tentative out of fear of fratricide; rather, they must strive to eliminate fratricide risk through tough, realistic, combined arms training in which each soldier and unit achieves the established standard. H-2. Training allows units and soldiers to make mistakes, with the goal of reducing or eliminating the risk of errors occurring in combat. A key role of the tank platoon training program is to teach crews which targets to engage and when to engage them. Just as important, crews must learn and practice restraint in what and when to engage; for example, every TC must know that he must confirm the target as hostile before issuing and executing any fire command. H-3. Eliminating the risk of fratricide is no less critical as a training standard than are other mission requirements. All leaders must know all aspects of the applicable training standard, including fratricide prevention, and then make sure their soldiers train to that standard.
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H-1
Appendix H
SECTION II – EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE H-4. Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always affects the unit’s ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences: z Loss of confidence in the unit’s leadership. Increasing self-doubt among leaders. z z Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems. z Over-supervision of units. z Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations. z Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver (fire and movement). z Loss of initiative. z Disrupted operations. z General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.
SECTION III – CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE H-5. The following paragraphs discuss the primary causes of fratricide. Leaders must identify any of the factors that may affect their units and then strive to eliminate or correct them.
FAILURES IN THE DIRECT-FIRE CONTROL PLAN H-6. These occur when units do not develop effective fire control plans, particularly in the offense. Units may fail to designate target engagement areas or adhere to target priorities, or they may position their weapons incorrectly. Under such conditions, fire discipline often breaks down upon contact. H-7. The tank platoon can use a number of techniques and procedures to help prevent such incidents. An example is “staking in” vehicle and individual positions in the defense, using pickets to indicate the left and right limits of each position. An area of particular concern is the additional planning that must go into operations, requiring close coordination between the platoon and infantry squads. For example, because of the danger posed by discarding petals, sabot rounds should be fired over friendly infantry elements only in extreme emergencies or when the friendly infantry elements are under adequate cover.
LAND NAVIGATION FAILURES H-8. Units often stray out of assigned sectors, report wrong locations, and become disoriented. Much less frequently, they employ fire support weapons from the wrong locations. In either type of situation, units that unexpectedly encounter an errant unit may fire their weapons at the friendly force.
FAILURES IN COMBAT IDENTIFICATION H-9. TCs and gunners cannot accurately identify thermal or optical signatures near the maximum range of their systems. In limited visibility, units within that range may mistake one another for the enemy.
INADEQUATE CONTROL MEASURES H-10. Units may fail to disseminate the minimum necessary maneuver fire control measures and fire support coordination measures; they may also fail to tie control measures to recognizable terrain or events. As the battle develops, the plan then cannot address obvious branches and sequels as they occur. When this happens, synchronization fails.
FAILURES IN REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS H-11. Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical situations change. This distorts the tactical “picture” available at each level and can lead to erroneous clearance of supporting fires.
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WEAPONS ERRORS H-12. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.
BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS H-13. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on the battlefield: unexploded ordnance; unmarked or unrecorded minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark, record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to casualties.
SECTION IV – FRATRICIDE PREVENTION PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
Special Note. In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive target identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must ensure positive target identification before they issue commands to fire. In addition, all units must accurately report their locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must carefully track the location of all subordinate elements in relation to all friendly forces.
H-14. The measures outlined in this section, including those listed in the special note above, provide the platoon with a guide to actions it can take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative by the tank platoon’s leaders and crewmen. Rather, commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC factors.
PRINCIPLES OF FRATRICIDE PREVENTION H-15. At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are the five key principles covered in the following discussion.
IDENTIFY AND ASSESS POTENTIAL FRATRICIDE R ISKS H-16. Identify risks and conduct a risk assessment while developing the estimate of the situation. Explain these risks thoroughly in the OPORD and/or applicable FRAGOs.
MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING H-17. Focus on such areas as current intelligence; unit locations/dispositions; denial areas (minefields/ scatterable mines); contaminated areas, such as ICM and CBRN; SITREPs; and METT-TC factors.
ENSURE POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION H-18. Review vehicle and weapons ID cards. Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and enemy vehicles, including their silhouettes and thermal signatures. Know at what ranges and under what conditions positive identification of various vehicles and weapons is possible. ( Note. Refer to the special note at the start of this section.)
MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE FIRE CONTROL H-19. Ensure that fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated. Make it mandatory for crewmen to ask for clarification of any portion of the fire command that they do not completely understand. Stress the importance of the chain of command in the fire control process; ensure that crewmen get in the habit of obtaining target confirmation and permission to fire from their leaders before engaging targets they assume are enemy elements.
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Appendix H
ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND CLIMATE H-20. Enforce fratricide prevention measures at all times, placing special emphasis on the use of doctrine. Ensure that leaders maintain constant supervision in the execution of orders and in the performance of all tasks and missions to standard.
FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES H-21. Commanders, leaders, and crewmen should adhere to the following guidelines, considerations, and procedures in ensuring fratricide reduction and prevention: z Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit cohesion by taking quick, effective action to alleviate stress. z Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training covering fratricide awareness, target identification and recognition, and fire discipline. z Develop a simple, decisive plan. z Give complete and concise mission orders. z To simplify mission orders, use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine. Periodically review and update SOPs as needed. z Strive to provide maximum planning time for leaders and subordinates. z Use common language/vocabulary and doctrinally correct standard terminology and control measures, such as fire support coordination line (FSCL), zone of engagement, and RFL. z Ensure that thorough coordination is conducted at all levels. z Plan for and establish effective communications. z Plan for collocation of CPs whenever it is appropriate to the mission, such as during a passage of lines. z Designate and employ liaison officers (LO) as appropriate. z Make sure ROE and ROI are clear. z Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows the platoon adequate time to do so. z Be in the right place at the right time. Use position location/navigation devices (GPS and POSNAV); know your location and the locations of adjacent units (left, right, leading, and follow-on); and synchronize tactical movement. If the platoon or any element becomes lost or disoriented, leaders must know how to contact higher headquarters immediately for instructions and assistance. z Include a discussion of fratricide incidents in all AARs.
SECTION V – STOPPING A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT H-22. This section covers actions that leaders and crewmen must be prepared to take when they encounter a friendly fire incident. The tank platoon may become involved in such a situation in one of several ways: z As the victim of the fire. z As the firing element. z As an observer intervening in an attack of one friendly element on another.
ACTIONS AS THE VICTIM OF FRIENDLY FIRE H-23. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the platoon, section, or individual tank falls victim to friendly fires: z React to contact until you recognize friendly fire. z Cease fire. z Take immediate actions to protect soldiers and vehicles. z Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to cease fire.
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Fratricide Prevention
z
Report the following on the next higher unit net: Announce that the unit or vehicle is receiving friendly fire. Request medical assistance as needed. Give the location and direction of the firing vehicles. Warn the higher unit not to return fire if the firing unit is positively identified as friendly.
ACTIONS AS THE FIRING ELEMENT H-24. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level when the platoon, section, or individual vehicle has engaged friendly forces: z Cease fire. z Report the following on the next higher net: Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report the number and types of vehicles). The location of the incident. Direction and distance to the engaged force. The type of fire. The target effects.
ACTIONS AS AN OBSERVER OF FRIENDLY FIRE H-25. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the platoon, section, or individual vehicle observes a friendly fire incident: z Seek cover and protect all crewmen and vehicles. z Use a visual recognition signal to direct the firing unit to cease fire. z Report the following on the next higher net: Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report number and types of vehicles). The location of the incident. Direction and distance to the victim and the firing unit. The type of fire. The target effects. z Provide assistance as needed (when safe to do so).
LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES H-26. In all situations involving the risk of fratricide and friendly fire, leaders must be prepared to take immediate actions to prevent casualties as well as equipment damage or destruction. Recommended actions in fratricide situations include the following: z Identify the incident and order the parties involved to cease fire. z Conduct an in-stride risk assessment. z Identify and implement controls to prevent the incident from recurring.
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Appendix I
Battle Damaged Tank If the tank sustains a hit making it impossible to move and remaining in the tank will jeopardize the safety of the crew, the TC should consider abandoning the tank. The procedures in Table I-1 are used to abandon and disable a crippled tank. Note. The crew cannot totally destroy all parts of a tank; therefore, the chain of command must make every effort to recover the disabled tank. The following procedures are just a guideline to ensure all sensitive items are properly accounted for and or destroyed. Crews may deviate from these procedures if the tactical situation allows. For example, the crew may want to keep the loader’s machine gun and ammunition. METT-TC will dictate the actions of the crew in the event of abandon tank. Also the wingman or platoon should assist in security of the crew as they perform these tasks.
Table I-1. Abandon tank procedures TC
Gunner
Loader
Driver
Commands “ABANDON TANK ASSEMBLE RIGHT (LEFT) REAR.”
Zeros out the radio to remove fill.
Announces “CLEAR” so the TC knows he is clear and can traverse the turret.
Traverses turret to 3 o’clock position.
Sets radio to unused frequency.
Ensures main gun is level.
Opens breech and removes main gun round. Stows round (leaves ammunition door open).
Reports crew status. ⎯
Removes caliber .50 machine gun back plate and places it in breech.
Removes coax machine gun back plate and places it in breech.
Secures protective mask, individual weapon, rations, and automated network control device (ANCD).
Secures protective mask, individual weapon, rations, and all grenades, to include four thermite grenades.
Secures protective mask, individual weapon, M4 rifle, ammunition, rations, and loader’s mittens.
Secures protective mask, individual weapon, ammunition, and rations.
Places ANCD in breech and receives two thermite grenades from gunner.
Passes two thermite grenades to TC and two thermite grenades to loader. Before exiting station, removes and gives EPLRS to TC (if equipped).
Places one thermite grenade in breech and stands by.
Ruptures heater fuel line, turns on heater, and dismounts tank.
Exits through TC’s hatch, and moves to back deck.
Exits through TC’s hatch, secures loader’s machine gun and two boxes of ammunition, and dismounts tank.
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Appendix I
Table I-1. Abandon tank procedures TC
Gunner
Loader
Opens right top grille doors to expose fuel cell. If equipped, places EPLRS on top of fuel cell.
Moves to area announced by TC and establishes security watch.
Driver Moves to area announced by TC and establishes security watch.
Commands “PULL PIN.”
On command, pulls pin on remaining thermite grenade, places it in the breech, and closes breech.
Pulls pin on one thermite grenade (as loader exits tank) and places both grenades on top of fuel cell.
Exits through loader’s hatch and dismounts tank.
Dismounts tank and conducts personnel accountability.
Moves to location announced by TC and provides security watch.
WARNING Crews should take additional safety measures because of the use of depleted uranium (DU) if they are― •
In, on, or near (within 50 meters) a vehicle at the time of impact by DU ammunitions or a DU armored vehicle at the time of impact by munitions.
•
Near (within 50 meters) actively burning fires involving DU.
•
Routinely entering vehicles with penetrated DU armor or that have been struck by DU munitions.
Good safety procedures to take in the event of the occurrences listed above are: •
Wear a protective mask as long as it does not degrade your ability to fight or protect yourself.
•
Cover exposed skin; an increase in MOPP is not required.
•
Dust off your uniform after you leave the vehicle or area. Observe standard field hygiene, including washing your hands before eating.
Crews should follow the three basic principles of hazard avoidance, which are: •
Minimize the time near the radioactive source.
•
Maximize the distance between crew members and the radioactive source.
•
Improve the shielding (use cardboard, tape, and so forth).
TB 9-1300-278, Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions or Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium , currently provides operational guidance for incidents involving DU munitions, armor, and battlefield damage.
DISABLING TANK PROCEDURES I-1.
If time permits, discharge fixed and portable fire extinguishers prior to disabling the vehicle.
I-2. If thermite grenades are not available to disable the tank, a sledge hammer and other heavy instruments should be used to destroy sensitive equipment (computer, optical instruments, communication equipment, and gauges). The main gun firing pin and machine gun back plates should be taken from the
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Battle Damaged Tank
tank and destroyed. Pour fuel, engine oil, and other combustible liquid over the TA-50 inside the turret and ignite it by lighting it or using hand grenades. The crew must download all main gun ammunition to another vehicle if the situation permits; otherwise, the ammunition must be destroyed. I-3.
If enemy contact or capture is imminent, the TC will destroy the ANCD. Note. For training purposes, use practice grenades and simulate rupturing heater fuel lines.
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Glossary ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Term 1SG A A/L AAD ABCS
Definition
first sergeant alternate (position) administrative/logistical antiarmor defense Army battle command system
ABF
attack by fire
ACE
armored combat engineer; armored combat earthmover (M9)
ACF
aviation close fires
ACM
airspace control measure
ACP
air control point
ACR
armored cavalry regiment
ADA
air defense artillery
ADC
area damage control
AFATDS
advanced field artillery tactical data system
ammo
ammunition
ANCD
automated network control device
AOR AP APC APDS ARTEP AS ASAS ASIP aslt pos ASR ATCCS
area of responsibility antipersonnel armored personnel carrier armor-piercing discarding sabot (ammunition) Army Training and Evaluation Program area security all-source analysis system advanced system improvement program (also known as SIP, system improvement program) assault position alternate supply route Army tactical command and control system
ATGM
antitank guided missile
atk pos
attack position
AVLB AVLM
armored vehicle launched bridge armored vehicle launched MICLIC
AXP
ambulance exchange point
BCT
brigade combat team
BDA
battle damage assessment
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Glossary-1
Glossary
BFIST BFT
blue force tracker
BFV
Bradley fighting vehicle
BHL
battle handover line
BII BIT BMNT
basic issue item built-in test beginning of morning nautical twilight
BP
battle position
C2
command and control
C2I
command, control, and intelligence
CA
civil affairs
CAB CANA CAS CASEVAC CBRN CBRNWRS cdr
combined arms battalion convulsive antidote nerve agent close air support casualty evacuation chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CBRN warning and reporting system commander
CDU
commander’s display unit
CFF
call-for-fire
CFV
cavalry fighting vehicle
cGy/hr
centigray per hour
CI
counterinsurgency
CID
commander’s integrated display; Criminal Investigative Division (U.S.)
CIF
central issue facility
CINC
commander in chief
CIP CITV CLAMMS
combat identification panel commander’s independent thermal viewer cleared lane mechanical marking system
cm
centimeter(s)
CO
commanding officer
COA COMSEC COS CP CROWS CRT CS CTCP
Glossary-2
Bradley fire support team
course of action communications security center of sector command post common remotely operated weapon station combat repair team combat support combat trains command post
CVC
combat vehicle crewman
DA
Department of the Army
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Glossary
DCIMS DD DED DID DNBI
dismounted soldier combat identification marking system Department of Defense detailed equipment decontamination dirver’s integrated display disease and nonbattle injuries
DOA
direction of attack
DOD
Department of Defense
DPICM DPRE DS
dual-purpose improved conventional munitions displaced persons, refugee, and evacuee direct support
DS/R
direct support/reinforcing
DSO
domestic support operations
DTD
detailed troop decontamination
DTV
driver’s thermal viewer
DU DVE EA
depleted uranium driver’s vision enhancer engagement area
EAC
echelons above corps
EBC
embedded battle command
EENT EN EPLRS EPW FA FAC FARP FBCB2
end of evening nautical twilight enemy (graphic overlay abbreviation) enhanced position location reporting system enemy prisoner of war field artillery forward air controller forward arming and refueling point Force XXI battle command brigade and below
FDC
fire direction center
FHA
foreign humanitarian assistance
FIST
fire support team
FISTV FIT FLIR
fire support team vehicle fault isolation test forward-looking infrared
FM
field manual
FO
forward observer
FPF FRAGO
final protective fires fragmentary order
FRS
forward repair system
FSC
forward support company
FSCM FSE
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fire support control measure fire support element
FM 3-20.15
Glossary-3
Glossary
GAS GIRS GPS GPSE
gunner’s auxiliary sight grid index reference system global positioning system gunner’s primary sight extension
GS
general support
HB
heavy barrel
HC
hexachloroethane
HE
high explosive
HEAT HE-OR-T HHC HMMWV HOIS HQ HRP IBA ICM ID
high-explosive antitank (ammunition) high explosive obstacle-reducing with tracer (ammunition) headquarters and headquarters company high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle hostile intelligence service headquarters high-risk personnel interceptor body armor improved conventional munitions identification
IED
improvised explosive device
IFV
infantry fighting vehicle
INC
Internet controller
INFOSEC IPB I/R IR ISR IVIS
information security intelligence preparation of the battlefield internment/resettlement (U.S. DOD) infrared; intelligence requirement intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance intervehicular information system
IZLID
infrared zoom laser illuminator designator
JAAT
joint air attack team
JP JVMF KIA
joint publication joint variable message format killed in action
km
kilometer(s)
KY
Kentucky
L&O LBE
law and order load-bearing equipment
lbs
pound(s)
LD
line of departure
LOA
limit of advance
LOGPAC
logistics package
LOM
line of movement
Glossary-4
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Glossary
LP
listening post
LRF
laser range finder
LRP
logistics resupply point
LRU
line replaceable unit
LST
laser spot tracker
LT LTC METL METT-TC
MGRS MI MICLIC MLC mm
Lieutenant (U.S. Army rank) Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army rank) mission-essential task list mission, enemy, terrain (weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations (factors taken into account in situational awareness and in the mission analysis process) military grid reference system military intelligence mine-clearing line charge military load class millimeter(s)
MMS
mast-mounted sight, maneuver and mobility support
MOS
military occupational specialty (U.S. Army)
MP MPAT
Military Police multipurpose antitank (ammunition)
MRE
meals, ready-to-eat
MRS
muzzle reference system
MSR
main supply route
MTP
mission training plan
MTT
military training teams
MTW
major theatres of war
MWD
military working dog
NAAK
nerve agent auto-injector kit
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAV
navigation (FBCB2 display push button)
NCO
noncommissioned officer
NCS
net control station
NEO
noncombatant evacuation operations
NG
National Guard
NGO
nongovernmental organizations
NLT
not later than
NOD
night observation device
NOE
nap of the earth
NVG
night-vision goggle
OAKOC
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observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment
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Glossary-5
Glossary
obj OEG OP
operational exposure guidance observation post
OPCON
operational control
OPORD
operation order
OPSEC
operations security
OR
obstacle-reducing (MPAT-OR)
OT
observer-target
P
primary (position)
Pam
pamphlet
PAO
public affairs office
PCC
precombat inspection
PGM
precision guided missile/munition
PH
probability of hit
PK
probability of kill
PLGR plt PMCS
precision lightweight GPS receiver platoon preventive maintenance checks and services
PME
peacetime military engagement
PMM
preventive medicine measures
PO POL POSNAV PP PSG PSYOP
peace operations petroleum, oils, and lubricants position navigation passage point platoon sergeant psychological operations
PVO
private volunteer organization
PVS
passive-vision system
R&S
reconnaissance and surveillance
RACO RALS RDL REDCON ref pt
Glossary-6
objective
rear area combat operations right add, left subtract Reimer Digital Library readiness condition reference point
RES
radiation exposure status
RFL
restrictive fire line
ROE
rules of engagement
ROI
rules of interaction
ROM
refuel on the move
RPG
rocket-propelled grenade
RTP
radiotelephone procedures
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Glossary
S
supplementary (position)
S2
security/intelligence officer (U.S. Army)
S3
operations officer (U.S. Army)
S4
supply officer (U.S. Army)
SALTT SALUTE
size, activity, location, type of resource, and time frame size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment
SAPI
small arms protective inserts
SAW
semiautomatic assault weapon
SBF
support by fire
SDS
(M100) sorbent decontamination system
SDZ
surface danger zone
SEP
system enhancement package
SFC
Sergeant First Class (U.S. Army rank)
SGT
Sergeant (U.S. Army rank)
SINCGARS SINCGARS SIP INC SITREP
single-channel ground/airborne radio system SINCGARS with system improvement program and Internet controller situation report
SM
Soldier’s manual
SOI
signal operation instructions
SOP
standing operating procedures
SOSRA SP
suppress the enemy; obscure the breach; secure the far side; reduce the obstacle; and assault through the obstacle start point
SSC
smaller-scale contingency
SSG
Staff Sergeant (U.S. Army rank)
ST STP SU TAC CP TACFIRE TACSOP
special text Soldier’s training publication situational understanding tactical command post tactical fire tactical standing operating procedures
TB
technical bulletin
TC
tank commander
TCF
tactical combat force
TEP
theater engagement plan
TI TIP TIRS TIS TNT
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tactical Internet thermal identification panel terrain index reference system thermal imaging system trinitrotoluene (explosive)
FM 3-20.15
Glossary-7
Glossary
TOC
tactical operations center
TOT
time on target
TOW TTP
tactics, techniques, and procedures
TTT
time to target
TV
television
U.S.
United States (of America)
UAS
unmanned aircraft system
UHF
ultra high frequency
UMCP
unit maintenance collection point
UN
United Nations
UO
urban operations
USAF USMC USN
United States Air Force United States Marine Corps United States Navy
VBIED
vehicle-borne improvised explosve device
VEESS
vehicle engine exhaust smoke system
VHF
very high frequency
VIC
vehicle internal communications
VSTOL
vertical/short takeoff and landing
VT VVS WARNO WIA WMD WP
Glossary-8
tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (missile)
variable time (proximity fuse) vehicle visualization system warning order wounded in action weapons of mass destruction white phosphorus
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References These sources were quoted or paraphrased in this publication, are needed in conjunction with this manual, and/or contain relevant supplemental information. For the latest dates and versions of these references, refer to DA Pam 25-30 or the Reimer Digital Library (RDL).
SOURCES USED These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (ARTEP) ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Tank Platoon , 15 October 2002
DA PAMPHLET (DA PAM) DA Pam 750-8, The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS) User Manual , 22 August 2005
FIELD MANUAL (FM) FM 1-02 (FM 101-5-1), Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004 FM 3-0 (FM 100-5), Operations, 14 June 2001 FM 3-05.40 (FM 41-10), Civil Affairs Operations, 29 September 2006. FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, 28 February 2002 FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, 20 February 2003 FM 3-11.5, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination, 4 April 2006 FM 3-11.11, Flame, Riot Control, and Herbicide Operations , 19 August 1996 w/Change 1, 10 March 2003 FM 3-19.40 (FM 19-40), Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001 FM 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams), 15 August 2005 FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, 2 December 2002 FM 3-21.71 (FM 7-7J), Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley), 20 August 2002 FM 3-34.2 (FM 90-13-1), Combined-Arms Breaching Operations, 31 August 2000 w/Change 3, 11 October 2002 FM 3-50, Smoke Operations, 4 December 1990 w/Change 1, 11 September 1996 FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1), Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team , 9 December 2002 FM 4-25.11, First Aid , 23 December 2002 w/Change 1, 15 July 2004 FM 5-0 (FM 101-5), Army Planning and Orders Production , 20 January 2005 FM 6-22 (FM 22-100), Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile , 12 October 2006 FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, 16 July 1991 FM 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (APC), 15 March 1985 FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, 6 April 1992 FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, 21 June 2000 FM 21-60, Visual Signals, 30 September 1987 FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield , 8 July 1994
JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism , 17 March 1998
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
References-1
References
SOLDIER ’S TRAINING PLAN (STP) STP 17-19K1-SM, Soldier’s Manual, M1/M1A1/M1A2/M1A2 SEP, Abrams Armor Crewman, MOS 19K, Skill Level 1, 30 July 2004
SPECIAL TEXT (ST) ST 3-20.153, Tank Platoon SOP , January 2002
TECHNICAL BULLETIN (TB) TB 9-1300-278, Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions or Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium, 21 July 1996
DOCUMENTS NEEDED These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card . DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms . DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet . DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet . DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag .
READINGS RECOMMENDED These sources contain relevant supplemental information. The source listed in parenthesis is the superceded manual under the old numbering system.
ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (ARTEP) ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company, 1 June 2003
FIELD MANUAL (FM) FM 1-05 (FM 16-1), Religious Support , 18 April 2003 FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations , 2 April 1997 FM 1-114, Air Cavalry Squadron and Troop Operations, 1 February 2000 FM 3-06 (FM 90-10), Urban Operations, 1 June 2003 FM 3-11.3 (FM 3-3), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance , 2 February 2006 FM 3-11.4 (FM 3-4), Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, 2 June 2003 FM 3-11.19 (FM 3-19), Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance, 30 June 2004 FM 3-19.40 (FM 19-40), Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations , 1 August 2001 FM 3-21.91 (FM 7-91), Tactical Employment of Antiarmor Platoons and Companies , 26 November 2002 FM 3-34 (FM 5-100 and FM 5-114), Engineer Operations, 2 January 2004 FM 3-50, Smoke Operations, 4 December 1990 w/Change 1, 11 September l996 FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001 FM 3-90.2 (FM 71-2), The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, 11 June 2003 FM 3-100.12, Risk Management for Multiservices Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures , 15 February 2001
References-2
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
References
FM 4-0 (FM 100-10), Combat Service Support , 29 August 2003 FM 4-25.12 (FM 21-10-1), Unit Field Sanitation Team, 25 January 2002 FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis, 11 July 1990 w/Change 1, 11 September 1992 FM 5-102, Countermobility, 14 March 1985 FM 5-103, Survivability, 10 June 1985 FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions, 30 July 1998 FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Airland Battle , 17 May 1998 FM 6-20-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Light), 5 January 1990 FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, 16 July 1991 FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, 14 December 1990 w/Change 1, 31 October 2000 FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, 6 April l992 w/Change 1, 29 December 2000 FM 7-90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, 9 October 1992 FM 7-92, The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry), 23 December 1992 w/Change 1, 13 December 2001 FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, 19 October 1992 FM 8-42, Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations , 27 October 1997 FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, 29 May 1998 w/Change 5, 1 April 2005 FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, 21 June 2000 FM 21-60, Visual Signals, 30 September 1987 FM 22-100, Army Leadership, 31 August 1999 FM 31-70, Basic Cold Weather Manual , 12 April 1968 w/Change 1, 17 December 1968 FM 34-2-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance , 19 June 1991 FM 44-8, Combined Arms for Air Defense, 1 June 1999 FM 71-100, Division Operations , 28 August 1976 FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team, 30 September 1992 FM 90-3, Desert Operations, 24 August 1993 FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations , 16 March 1987 FM 90-13, River Crossing Operations, 26 January 1998 FM 90-26, Airborne Operations, 18 December 1990 FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces , 1 August 1999 Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal , U.S. Military Academy, History Department, 1984
JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations , 12 February 1999
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References-3
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Index A Abrams tank capabilities, 1-6 limitations, 1-7 actions on contact battle drills, 3-25 eight forms of contact, 3-19 examples of, 3-21 four steps of, 3-18 offense, 3-18 air and missile defense assets, 6-11 armored cavalry troop organization, 1-5 Army aviation forces, 6-9
B battle drills, 3-25 action drill, 3-27 actions on contact, 3-25 change of formation drill, 325 contact drill, 3-26 react to air attack drill, 3-33 react to chemical/biological attack drill, 3-35 react to indirect fire drill, 332 react to nuclear attack drill, 3-35
C CBRN operations, E-1 alarms and signals, E-7 avoidance, E-1 chemical defense, E-6 decontamination, E-14 marking contaminated areas, E-12 MOPP levels, E-3 movement in CBRN environment, E-16 nuclear defense, E-5 protection, E-3 smoke operations, E-17 symptoms and treatment of casualties, E-8 unmasking procedures, E13 civil support operations, 9-1, 911 considerations for, 9-12 role of tank platoon, 9-5 close air support, 6-13
22 February 2007
marking friendly positions, 6-14 collective tactical tasks (see platoon tactical tasks), 3-36 combat engineer assets, 6-10 combat identification measures, F-1 situational awareness, F-2 target identification, F-2 combat service support (see sustainment ), 7-1 combat support (see combined arms operations), 6-1 combined arms operations, 6-1 air and missile defense, 611 Army aviation, 6-9 close air support, 6-13 combat engineers, 6-10 fire support, 6-1 infantry/armor (see infantry/armor operations), C-1 military police assets, 6-15 command, 2-1 contingency plans, 2-10 decision-making, 2-1 leadership, 2-11 troop-leading procedures (see also troop-leading procedures), 2-2 command and control command, 2-1 control, 2-12 communications, 2-24 company/troop command net, 2-26 digital, 2-25 platoon radio net, 2-26 techniques and guidelines for effectiveness, 2-26 use of messengers, 2-25 use of pyrotechnics, 2-25 use of radio, 2-25 use of wire, 2-25 visual, 2-25 consolidation and reorganization, 3-46 control fire distribution and control (see also fire distribution and control ), 2-27 readiness conditions, 2-12
FM 3-20.15
situational understanding, 212 time management, 2-12 counterattack, 4-28 crew responsibilities, 1-7 communications, 2-26 driver, 1-8 gunner, 1-8 loader, 1-8 platoon leader, 1-7 platoon sergeant, 1-7 reporting initial contact, 2-27 tank commander, 1-7 using fire patterns, 2-29 cultural awareness, 2-15
D defensive operations, 4-1 actions on contact, 3-18 building the EA, 4-18 combat identification process, 4-20 coordination for fires, 4-21 deliberate occupation of BP, 4-11 execution, 4-24 fire distribution and control, 2-41, 4-19 fundamentals of, 4-1 hasty occupation of a BP, 48 planning, 4-3 preparation of BP, 4-8 preparing the defense (fire distribution and control), 2-45 priorities of work, 4-17 deliberate occupation of BP, 411 platoon fire plan, 4-13 platoon time line, 4-18 priorities of work, 4-17 procedures for, 4-12 sector sketch card, 4-13 detainees handling principles and procedures, 7-16 digital communications, 2-25 digitization, A-1 capabilities and limitations, A-5 digital vs FM operations, A9 duties and responsibilities, A-6
Index-1
Index tactical Internet and FBCB2, A-1 displacement, 4-26 methods, 4-26 driver responsibilities, 1-8 digitization, A-9
E EPWs (see detainees), 7-16
F FBCB2, A-1 operational considerations, A-3 fire commands, 2-39 alert element for fire control, 2-39 control element for fire control, 2-40 execution element for fire control, 2-40 orientation element for fire control, 2-40 target description element for fire control, 2-40 weapon or ammunition element for fire control, 239 fire distribution and control, 228 control, 2-38 distribution, 2-29 during defensive operations, 4-19 in defense, 2-41 in offense, 2-41, 3-7 fire patterns cross, 2-30 depth, 2-31 effective distribution of direct fires, 2-29 frontal, 2-30 fire support, 6-1 channels for fire request, 64 FA, 6-2 fire direction and control, 65 FIST, 6-3 mortar, 6-1 planning, 6-8 firing techniques, 2-32 formations during tactical operations, 311 forms of contact, 3-19 fragmentary orders, B-7 sample, B-8
Index-2
fratricide prevention, 2-12, 217, 3-7, 3-26, 3-39, 3-47, 414, 4-20, 4-28, 5-8, 5-13, 520, 5-30, 5-31, 8-6, 8-8, 814, A-5, A-7, H-1 causes of, H-2 combat identification measures, F-1 effects of, H-2 leader responsibilities, H-5 prevention measures, H-4 principles of, H-3 safety considerations, F-2 situational awareness, F-2 stopping friendly fire incident, H-4 target identification, F-2
G graphic control measures, 2-17 assault position, 2-21 assembly area, 2-18 attack position, 2-19 attack-by-fire position, 2-21 axis of advance, 2-20 battle position, 2-22 boundries, 2-17 checkpoint, 2-19 contact point, 2-19 direction of attack, 2-20 objective, 2-20 passage lane, 2-19 passage point, 2-20 phase line, 2-18 route, 2-18 support-by-fire position, 221 target reference point, 2-22 gunner responsibilities, 1-8 (gunner on plt ldr tank) maintenance operations, 7-11 digitization, A-8
H hasty occupation of BP, 4-8 initial occupation activities, 4-9 must-have information, 4-9
I infantry/armor operations, C-1 considerations when tanks lead, C-11 infantry organizations, C-2 liaison activities, C-3 operational considerations, C-4 role of tank platoon, C-2 safety considerations, C-9 transporting infantry, C-10
FM 3-20.15
L light/heavy operations (see infantry/armor operations), C-1 limited visibility operations, 347 additional considerations for tactical movement and attacks during, 3-48 considerations, 4-30 defensive planning for extreme conditions, 4-20 equipment for use during, 347 navigation methods during, 3-47 vehicle ID techniques during, 3-47 loader responsibilities, 1-8 digitization, A-9
M maintenance operations, 7-9 evacuation of damaged vehicle, 7-12 levels of, 7-11 maps and overlays digital overlays, 2-16 types of overlays, 2-16 use of, 2-15 maps, overlays, graphic control measures, navigation, 2-15 graphic control measures, 2-17 navigation, 2-22 medical treatment and evacuation operations, 7-13 detainees, 7-16 KIA actions, 7-15 METT-TC analysis civilian considerations, 2-5 enemy, 2-3 mission, 2-3 terrain and weather, 2-4 time available, 2-5 troops, 2-5 missions overwatch, 3-16 MOPP levels, E-3
N navigation, 2-22 use of fires, 2-23 use of GPS devices, 2-23 use of inertial navigation systems, 2-23 use of TIRS/GIRS, 2-23
22 February 2007
Index
O observation posts, D-3 offensive operations characteristics, 3-1 execution (actions on contact), 3-18 execution (consolidation and reorganization), 3-46 execution (platoon tactical tasks), 3-36 execution (tactical movement), 3-7 fire distribution and control, 2-41 fundamentals, 3-1 general forms of tactical offense, 3-2 limited visibility, 3-47 planning using war-fighting functions, 3-3 preparation using warfighting functions, 3-5 war-fighting functions, 3-2 operation orders, B-2 five-paragraph format, B-3 sample, B-3 operational environment cultural awareness, 2-15 operational security, D-1 orders and reports, B-1 fragmentary orders, B-7 operation orders, B-2 orders, B-1 reports, B-8 warning orders, B-1 organizations armored cavalry troop, 1-5 light infantry, 1-2 tank company, 1-5 tank platoon, 1-1, 1-2 overwatch, 3-16
P personnel operations, 7-13 planning six-point contingency plan, 2-10 platoon fire plan, 4-13 critical elements for development, 4-16 sample, 4-17 platoon leader responsibilities, 1-7 actions on contact, 3-18 battle drills, 3-25 battlefield visualization, 2-14 characteristics of effective defense, 4-1
22 February 2007
characteristics of successful combat leader, 2-12 combined arms operations, 6-1 communications, 2-24 communications guidance, 2-26 conducting backbrief, 4-15 contingency plans, 2-10 controlling fires, 2-38 defensive fire planning (fire distribution and control in the defense), 2-41 defensive planning, 4-3 defensive preparation of BP, 4-8 digitization, A-8 executing the defense (defensive fire planning), 2-46 execution of defensive mission, 4-24 fire coordination, 4-21 fire distribution and control, 2-27 firing techniques, 2-32 graphics, maps, overlays, 416 infantry/armor operations, C-4 knowledge of equipment, 16 leadership principles, 2-11 maintenance operations, 710 offensive fire planning, 3-7 offensive operations (technique of movement), 3-7 operating with infantry and armored forces, 1-3 operating with light and mechanized infantry forces, 1-3 planning offensive operations, 3-3 precombat inspections, 2-10 preparing the defense (defensive fire planning), 2-45 rehearsals, 2-8 reporting, 2-27 troop-leading procedures (see also troop-leading procedures), 2-2 understanding operational environment, 2-15 use of fire commands in fire control, 2-39 use of terrain (see also navigation), 2-22
FM 3-20.15
using maps and overlays, 216 verifying sketch card, 4-14 when gaining an infantry section or losing a tank section, 1-4 WIA evacuation, 7-14 platoon sergeant responsibilities, 1-7 coordinating sustainment assets, 7-1 digitization, A-8 infantry/armor operations, C-4 maintenance operations, 710 operating with light and mechanized infantry forces, 1-3 precombat inspections, 2-10 reporting, 2-27 WIA evacuation, 7-14 platoon tactical tasks, 3-36 assault, 3-40 attack by fire, 3-38 breaching operations, 3-45 bypass, 3-42 destroy an inferior force, 336 hassty occupation of a platoon battle position (hasty defense), 3-45 overwatch/support by fire, 3-39 reconnaissance by fire, 3-44 preparation of a BP, 4-8 phases, 4-8 prisoners of war captured civilians, 7-19 captured documents and equipment, 7-18 prisoners of war (see detainees), 7-16
R REDCON levels, 2-13 reports, 2-27, B-8 digital traffic, 2-27 initial contact, 2-27 routine, 2-27 SALUTE format, 2-27 rules of engagement, 9-7
S sector sketch card, 4-13 sample, 4-15 using FBCB2, 4-14 verification of, 4-14 situational understanding, 2-12
Index-3
Index battlefield visualization, 2-14 communicaitons, 2-24 cultural awareness, 2-15 maps, overlays, graphic control measures, navigation, 2-15 operational environment, 215 smoke operations, E-17 sources of, E-21 tactical considerations, E-22 uses of, E-17 split section concept principles of employing infantry and armored forces, 1-3 tank sections attached to dismounted infantry squad or mechanized infantry section, 1-3 stability operations, 9-1, 9-2 considerations for, 9-4 examples of, 9-12 role of tank platoon, 9-5 supply operations, 7-1 classes of supply, 7-2 methods of resupply, 7-4 techniques of resupply, 7-6 sustainment, 7-1 maintenance operations, 79 medical treatment and evacuation, 7-13 personnel operations, 7-13 supply operations, 7-1
T tactical Internet, A-1 tactical movement engaging targets, 3-8 execution in offensive, 3-7 formations, 3-11 overwatch, 3-16 techniques of, 3-9 use of terrain for cover and concealment, 3-9 tactical road march, 5-1 control measures, 5-2 strip map sample, 5-3 tank commander responsibilities, 1-7 digitization, A-8 maintenance operations, 711 reporting, 2-27 treatment of WIA, 7-14 tank company organization, 1-5
attached to, 1-2 OPCON to, 1-2 organization, 1-1 split section concept, 1-3 wingman concept, 1-2 tank platoon (see also split section concept ), 1-3 tank platoon tasks actions at a contact point, 58 breaching operations, 5-20 convoy escort, 5-8 delay, 5-31 other tactical operations, 51 passage of lines, 5-19 perimeter defense, 5-30 planning and occupying assembly area, 5-5 relief in place, 5-31 screen, 5-30 tactical road march, 5-1 withdrawal, 5-33 tank sections attached to dismounted infantry squad, 1-3 attached to mechanized infantry section, 1-3
W war-fighting functions defensive preparation considerations, 4-22 war-fighting functions defensive planning considerations, 4-3 offense, 3-2 war-fighting functions urban operations, 8-6 war-fighting functions urban operations, 8-7 war-fighting functions urban operations, 8-10 war-fighting functions urban operations, 8-12 war-fighting functions urban operations, 8-13 war-fighting functions infantry/armor operations, C-4 warning orders, B-1 sample, B-2 wingman concept, 1-2
target identification, F-2 target reference points use of for directing and controlling direct fires, 228 terrain reference points, 4-9 troop-leading procedures abbreviated procedures, 211 eight steps of, 2-2 METT-TC factors to analyze mission (see also METTTC analysis), 2-3 precombat inspections, 2-10 rehearsals, 2-8
U urban operations, 8-1 armored vehicle fighting positions, 8-8 categories of, 8-2 command and control, 8-6 defensive operations, 8-17 fire support, 8-12 intelligence, 8-10 maneuver, 8-7 offensive operations, 8-13 sustainment, 8-13 vehicles, weapons, munitions, 8-3
tank platoon
Index-4
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
*FM 3-20.15 22 February 2007
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER General, United States Army Chief of Staff
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0703202
DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 111029, requirements for FM 3-20.15.
