fm3-20

* FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98] Field Manual No 3-20.98

Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 2 December 2002

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON Contents Page

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

PREFACE .............................................................................................

v

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................

1-1

Section I

Types of Reconnaissance Platoons .......................

1-2

Section II

Operational Environment .........................................

1-3

Section III

Tactical Organization ...............................................

1-5

Section IV

Responsibilities ........................................................

1-16

Section V

Missions, Capabilities and Limitations, and Vehicle Capabilities ....................................

1-18

Section VI

Battle Command .......................................................

1-21

Section VII

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield .............

1-26

Section VIII

Situational Awareness .............................................

1-32

Section IX

Navigation .................................................................

1-37

LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES .........................................................

2-1

Section I

Troop-Leading Procedures ......................................

2-1

Section II

Deployment ...............................................................

2-17

Section III

Tactical Movement ...................................................

2-18

Section IV

Actions on Contact ...................................................

2-32

Section V

Employment of Fires ................................................

2-43

Section VI

Communications ......................................................

2-44

Section VII

Reporting ...................................................................

2-51

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors. This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official Government use. This determination was made on 12 July 2002. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. _________________ * This publication supersedes FM 17-98, 10 April 1999.

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Chapter 3

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ...................................................

3-1

Section I Section II

3-1

Purpose and Fundamentals .................................... Reconnaissance Planning, Methods, and Tactical Employment .................................. Multidimensional Aspects of Reconnaissance and Surveillance ................................................. Route Reconnaissance ............................................ Area Reconnaissance .............................................. Zone Reconnaissance .............................................. Obstacle/Restriction Reconnaissance ...................

3-29 3-43 3-51 3-57 3-64

SECURITY OPERATIONS ...................................................................

4-1

Section I Section II Section III Section IV

Purpose and Fundamentals .................................... Planning Considerations ......................................... Screening Missions .................................................. Convoy and Area Security Operations ...................

4-1 4-3 4-4 4-22

DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS .............................................................

5-1

Section I Section II Section III Section IV Section V Section VI

Troop-Leading Procedures ...................................... Patrolling Tasks ........................................................ Actions on Contact ................................................... Types of Patrols ........................................................ Patrol Bases .............................................................. Observation Posts ....................................................

5-1 5-14 5-24 5-32 5-54 5-58

OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS .....................................................

6-1


Assembly Areas ........................................................ Road Marches ........................................................... Battle Handover During Passage of Lines ............. Relief in Place ...........................................................

6-1 6-4 6-9 6-16

URBAN OPERATIONS ........................................................................

7-1


Phases of Urban Operations ................................... Understanding the Urban Environment ................. Planning .................................................................... Execution ..................................................................

7-1 7-2 7-7 7-20

COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ................

8-1

Section III Section IV Section V Section VI Section VII Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Section I Section II Section III Section IV Section V Section VI Section VII

ii

Employ Fire Support ................................................ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ....................................... Combat Engineers .................................................... Air Defense ................................................................ Aviation Support ....................................................... Multicapable Sensor Teams .................................... Combat Service Support ..........................................

3-3

8-1 8-26 8-32 8-34 8-38 8-62 8-66

_______________________________________________________ Reconnaissance Platoon Page

Chapter 9

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C

ESSENTIAL FIELD DATA ...................................................................

9-1

Section I Section II Section III Section IV Section V Section VI Section VII Section VIII Section IX Section X Section XI

Route Reconnaissance Symbols ............................ Route Classification ................................................. Curve Calculations ................................................... Slope Estimation ...................................................... Constrictions ............................................................ Stream Reconnaissance .......................................... Ford Reconnaissance .............................................. Ferry Reconnaissance ............................................. Bridge Classification and Reconnaissance ........... Bypasses ................................................................... Measurement Conversions .....................................

9-1 9-7 9-12 9-15 9-19 9-23 9-26 9-28 9-30 9-53 9-54

COMBAT ORDERS ..............................................................................

A-1


Warning Orders ........................................................ Operation Orders ...................................................... Fragmentary Orders ................................................. Patrol Orders .............................................................

A-1 A-2 A-6 A-7

REPORT FORMATS ............................................................................

B-1

Section I Section II Section III Section IV Section V Section VI

Contact and Blue Reports (Operations) .................. Green Reports (Intelligence) ................................... Yellow Reports (Logistics) ...................................... Red Reports (Personnel) ......................................... NBC Reports ............................................................. Digital Reporting and C2 Messages .......................

B-2 B-7 B-10 B-16 B-17 B-21

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS .............

C-1

Section I Section II Section III Section IV Section V

C-1 C-5 C-11 C-26

Section VI Appendix D

Principles of NBC Defense ...................................... Contamination Avoidance ....................................... NBC Equipment ........................................................ Reconnoitering an NBC Environment .................... Shielding the Force (Reducing Platoon Vulnerability) ...................................................... Decontamination and First Aid ...............................

C-40 C-52

STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ..............

D-1


D-2 D-9 D-15

Section V

General Considerations ........................................... Stability Operations .................................................. Support Operations .................................................. Role of the Reconnaissance Platoon in Stability Operations and Support Operations ................ Light/Medium Operations in Stability and Support Environments ......................................

D-20 D-36

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Appendix E

Appendix F

Appendix G

Appendix H

ANTENNAS ..........................................................................................

E-1

Section I

Siting Considerations ..............................................

E-1

Section II

Field-Expedient Repair .............................................

E-2

Section III

Field-Expedient Antennas .......................................

E-5

DEMOLITIONS AND OBSTACLES .....................................................

F-1

Section I

Demolitions ...............................................................

F-1

Section II

Mines .........................................................................

F-26

Section III

Obstacle Characteristics and Report Formats ......

F-36

Section IV

Obstacle Turnover ....................................................

F-39

Section V

Obstacle Breaching Capabilities .............................

F-39

Section VI

Field-Expedient Mines and Demolitions ................

F-43

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ......................................................

G-1

Section I

Environmental Risk Management Process ............

G-1

Section II

Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet ........

G-3

RISK MANAGEMENT ..........................................................................

H-1

Section I

Risk Management Procedures .............................................

H-1

Section II

Implementation Responsibilities .........................................

H-6

FRATRICIDE PREVENTION .................................................................

I-1

Section I

The Role of Training in Fratricide Prevention .......

I-1

Section II

Effects of Fratricide ..................................................

I-2

Section III

Causes of Fratricide .................................................

I-2

Section IV

Fratricide Risk Assessment .....................................

I-4

Section V

Fratricide Prevention Measures ..............................

I-6

Section VI

Stopping a Friendly Fire Incident ............................

I-7

DEBRIEFING FORMAT ........................................................................

J-1

Appendix I

Appendix J

GLOSSARY .................................................................................. BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................

Glossary-1 Bibliography-1

INDEX ...................................................................................................

iv

Index-1

_______________________________________________________ Reconnaissance Platoon

Preface On the ever-changing landscape of the modern battlefield, the reconnaissance platoon remains one of the tactical commander’s most valued assets. This is especially true in the traditional role of the cavalry: as the commander’s “eyes and ears” on the forward edge of the battle. Today’s reconnaissance platoon complements its strengths in mobility, speed, and stealth with the latest technology to provide an accurate, timely picture of developments in the area of operations. This field manual describes how the reconnaissance platoon conducts its primary missions, reconnaissance and security. The manual focuses on the principles of platoon operations and on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to acquire information and provide security and protection for other units on the battlefield. It also covers a variety of supporting tasks and operations the platoon must perform or coordinate, either as part of its reconnaissance and security missions or as assigned by the commander. FM 3-20.98 (FM 17-98) is for leaders of reconnaissance platoons employing M3-series cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV), high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), or Stryker reconnaissance vehicles (RV). This covers platoons of the armor battalion, the mechanized infantry battalion, the heavy division, the heavy cavalry regiment, the light cavalry regiment, and the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron. The principles and TTP are also adaptable for scout platoons of the light division reconnaissance squadron. The US Army Armor Center is the proponent for this publication. Users and readers are invited to submit comments and recommended changes. Prepare comments using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) or in a memorandum using a similar format. Send recommendations to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZKTDD-C, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000, or e-mail the DA Form 2028 to Chief, Cavalry Branch, from the Doctrine Division web site at http://147.238.100.101/center/dtdd/doctrine/armordoc.htm. (After accessing the web site, select “Organization” from the menu on the left side of the screen to reach the Cavalry Branch site.) The procedures described in this manual are intended as a guide only and are not to be considered inflexible. Each situation in war and military operations other than war must be resolved by intelligent interpretation and application of the doctrine described here.

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Chapter 1

Introduction This manual is a doctrinal guide for reconnaissance platoons. This field manual, with ARTEP 17-97F-10 MTP and ST 3-20.983, focuses on principles of reconnaissance platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to operate in a theater of operations and to acquire information for its higher commander. The term “reconnaissance platoon” refers to all forms of the scout platoon, whether it is part of an armor or infantry battalion, a cavalry squadron, a brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), or a cavalry squadron (reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition [RSTA]). References to the “recce platoon” in this manual apply specifically to reconnaissance platoons that are organic to the cavalry squadron (RSTA) . Refer to Section II of this chapter for a discussion of the various types of reconnaissance platoons.

CONTENTS Role of the Reconnaisssance Platoon ....... Types of Reconnaisssance Platoons ......... Operational Environment ............................ Scope of Operations ............................. Operational Concept ............................. Tactical Organization ................................... Reconnaissance Platoon Organizations .................................... Dismounted Organization .................... Task Organization ................................. Responsibilities ........................................... Platoon Leader ...................................... Platoon Sergeant .................................. Section and Squad Leaders ................. HUMINT Collectors ............................... Missions, Capabilities and Limitations, and Vehicle Characteristics .......... Missions ................................................ Capabilities and Limitations ................ Vehicle Characteristics ........................ Battle Command .......................................... Command and Control in the Platoon .................................... Command Relationships ...................... FBCB2 in the Battle Command Structure ............................................ Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ....................................... What IPB Accomplishes ....................... The IPB Process ................................... Friendly COA Development and War-gaming ................................ Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan ............................... Platoon IPB Execution .......................... Situational Awareness ................................. Battlefield Visualization ....................... Battlespace ............................................ Fratricide ............................................... Navigation ................................................. Maps and Overlays ............................... Land Navigation ....................................

1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-6 1-15 1-17 1-17 1-17 1-18 1-18 1-19 1-19 1-19 1-20 1-21 1-23 1-24 1-24 1-25 1-29 1-29 1-30 1-31 1-33 1-34 1-35 1-35 1-36 1-39 1-40 1-40 1-40

SECTION I – ROLE OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON 5-1. In simplest terms, the reconnaissance platoon serves as the commander’s eyes and ears on the battlefield. The platoon is organized, equipped, and trained to gather battlefield information, its primary

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function. It employs the TTP of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), as well as proper techniques of movement (both mounted and dismounted) and stealth. Scouts provide current battlefield data to help the commander plan and conduct tactical operations in stability operations, support operations, smaller-scale contingencies (SSC), and major theater of war (MTW) environments. The recce platoon is specifically tailored to conduct the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance in complex terrain (refer to the discussion on the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance in Chapter 3 of this manual). 5-2. Reconnaissance platoons also conduct limited security missions, but they are not organized and equipped to fight for extended periods or to act as armor killers. Although they can employ a variety of antitank (AT) weapons (TOWs, AT-4s, or Javelins), if so equipped, they normally use these assets for defensive purposes (self-protection and breaking contact), not for offensive reasons.

SECTION II – TYPES OF RECONNAISSANCE PLATOONS 5-3. There are two types of reconnaissance organizations. One type relies solely on passive surveillance, human interaction (HUMINT), and technical means to perform reconnaissance. The other type uses these techniques and assets, but has the additional capability of fighting for information. 5-4. In the first category, which focuses purely on information gathering, are reconnaissance organizations such as task force scouts found in armor or mechanized infantry battalions, BRTs, and light cavalry units and recce units in the cavalry squadron (RSTA) of the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). Because these organizations conduct reconnaissance dismounted, or from lightly armored vehicles, they are not capable of surviving protracted engagement with threat forces. For this reason, they rely on stealth and the integration of other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets for survivability and success. These types of organizations avoid direct fire contact and engage threat forces with direct fire weapons only in selfdefense. They lack the capability to fight for information. 5-5. Reconnaissance organizations such as armored cavalry regiments (ACR) and division cavalry squadrons not only use the common techniques and assets (HUMINT, passive surveillance, and technical means) but also are capable of employing combat power to fight for information. Because these units are usually the forward-most elements in MTW environments, they must have the capability to survive meeting engagements and to destroy or impede threat forces as necessary to sustain operations in high-threat areas. These unique, combined arms organizations employ tanks, attack helicopters and, usually, Bradley cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV) to enhance survivability and to sustain the aggressive tempo required for operations in this environment. The capabilities of the integrated weapons platforms, working together, allow these organizations to fight for information using a higher level of engagement criteria and tempo than those reconnaissance organizations

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

not organized in this manner. These units are capable of fighting through threat reconnaissance (destroying the threat’s “eyes and ears”) to gain combat information needed by higher unit commanders. In shaping operations, the ability to fight for information is important in determining the intent of a threat (for example, whether the threat is willing to defend, withdraw, or fight when confronted) without committing main body infantry or armor units. 5-6. These two types of reconnaissance organizations are mutually supporting. Organizations working forward in an area of operations provide the initial information that may allow the refinement of focus for follow-on reconnaissance elements. This information can also enhance survivability and mission success by enabling the follow-on organization to maneuver out of contact (using stealthy movement) and then make initial contact on the most favorable terms. 5-7. Unlike most other combat arms platoons, which maneuver together in formation, the reconnaissance platoon normally maneuvers as individual sections or squads (mounted, dismounted, or a combination) under the direction and control of the platoon leader. A section may consist of two vehicles plus any combat elements under the platoon’s operational control (OPCON). Determining which organization best meets his mission requirements is one of the key decisions the platoon leader must make during his troop-leading procedures.

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 5-8. Reconnaissance platoons provide accurate and timely information over large operating environments. This is especially true for the recce platoon operating as part of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) within the SBCT. The current operational environment in which reconnaissance platoons will operate is characterized by a new threat, armed with advanced equipment as a result of global arms proliferation and using unconventional terrorist/guerrilla operating tactics. Employing asymmetrical tactics are regular and irregular forces, special forces, terrorists, political factions, supporting government factions, nongovernment agencies, transnational organizations, organized criminal groups, and even refugee populations. The geographical area in which these threats choose to operate is characterized by highly varied terrain, from complex urban sprawl to regions of weak infrastructure supported by inferior roads, bridges, and transportation networks. 5-9. These adaptive strategies are designed to counter or mitigate the strengths of US forces. Being aware of their vulnerabilities to US precision strikes and control of the air (as seen in US operations in Afghanistan), adversaries may attempt to avoid massing their forces in linear offensive and defensive echelons. Instead, they may employ selective precision strikes, along with rapid tactical and operational maneuver from areas of sanctuary and other asymmetric actions aimed at continuous, nondecisive engagements. Today’s reconnaissance platoons will most likely face a threat that knows more about the US than the US knows about them.

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SCOPE OF OPERATIONS CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS 5-10. Stability operations and support operations may precede and/or follow war or occur simultaneously in the same theater. These operations may be conducted in conjunction with wartime operations to complement the achievement of strategic objectives, or they may support a commander’s forward-presence operations or a US ambassador’s nation plan. It is possible that they may even occur within the United States itself. The Army conducts stability operations or support operations as part of a joint team, often in conjunction with other US and foreign government agencies. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of stability operations and support operations in Appendix E of this manual.) Regardless of the location and context in which these operations are conducted, they are designed to fulfill a number of important objectives, including the following:

· · · · ·

Promote regional stability. Maintain or achieve democratic end states. Retain US influence and access abroad. Provide humanitarian assistance. Protect US interests, and to assist US civil authorities.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES 5-11. Historically, SSCs like those in Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo have occurred in regions with weak infrastructure (especially roads, rail facilities, and bridges), complex terrain with large urban areas, and diverse weather patterns. A variety of humanitarian issues complicate operations in these areas: overpopulation, resource shortages, natural disasters, and inadequate local, regional, and global response capabilities. 5-12. Threats in these environments usually consist of mid- to low-end industrial-age forces characterized by limited armor/mechanized elements, mainly equipped with small numbers of early generation tanks and some mechanized, but mostly motorized, infantry. There is a pervasive presence of guerrilla, terrorist, paramilitary, special purpose, special police, and militia organizations. These forces are equipped with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), antitank guided missiles (ATGM), mortars, mines, explosives, and machine guns. They have limited fixed- and rotary-wing aviation assets. These forces can be expected to have robust communications, employing conventional military devices augmented by commercial equipment such as cell phones. 5-13. Most threats within an SSC environment are not capable of longterm, sustained, high-tempo combat operations. They are capable of brigade- and division-level operations of limited duration and with limited objectives. Examples of these operations include destruction of a weaker force, seizure of an area or region, or the seizure of an urban center, often emphasizing the use of decentralized and distributed operations. On the other hand, these threat forces are capable of conducting highly effective defensive operations in complex and urban terrain. They are also adept at conducting long-term, sustained,

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unconventional terrorist and guerrilla operations. Present and future trends indicate that friendly forces employed in SSCs can expect to face the following threat capabilities and conditions:

· ·

Employment of more sophisticated and advanced technology.

·

Increased use of urban areas as a sanctuary and operating base for conventional capabilities.

·

Use of sophisticated tactics, with the ambush as a key operating focus.

Employment of more capable and secure command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I).

CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR THEATER OF WAR 5-14. MTW operations have the greatest potential of occurring in regions containing moderate to well-developed infrastructure (especially roads, rail, and bridges), complex and urban terrain with large urban areas, and diverse weather patterns. Humanitarian issues would probably complicate these operations in much the same fashion as they would SSCs; examples include overpopulation; resource shortages; natural disasters; and inadequate local, regional, and global response capabilities. 5-15. Military threats in MTW operations usually include advanced industrial-age forces, with some high-technology niches, characterized by both armor and mechanized forces as well as motorized/light infantry. These threats are capable of long-term, sustained, high-tempo operations at brigade and/or division level. They can also conduct sustained, unconventional combat operations and limited duration/objective attacks. These forces are mostly equipped with newer generation tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and have significant numbers of MANPADs, ATGMs, missiles, rockets, artillery, mortars, and mines. They possess an integrated air defense system and a robust military and civilian communications capability. In addition, they have advanced fixed- and rotary-wing aviation assets as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Most threats capable of initiating an MTW operation also possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 5-16. Reconnaissance assets are the commander’s primary source for information. The fundamental role of reconnaissance platoons is to perform reconnaissance and security, as well as surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment (BDA). These organizations enhance the higher commander’s ability to retain freedom of maneuver, which in turn allows him to concentrate combat power and apply assets deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing. Stealth is the reconnaissance platoon’s primary means of force protection; in most cases, organic weapons are used only in self-defense. 5-17. It is important to note that the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance (as discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this manual) is integrated into all reconnaissance operations. All reconnaissance assets must go beyond merely investigating terrain characteristics of an area. They must also be prepared to assess infrastructure, demographics,

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centers of influence, flash points, and personalities as part of their traditional missions of zone, area, and route reconnaissance. To accomplish his primary mission of providing continuous, accurate, and timely information in complex environments, the commander enhances his multidimensional reconnaissance capability by “nesting” collection assets—either air/ground collectors or ISR assets from other units—with ground reconnaissance platoons.

SECtion Iv – TACTICAL ORGANIZATION

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON ORGANIZATIONS 5-18. There are several types of reconnaissance platoon organizations in the force, including platoons in light and heavy divisions and those in separate cavalry troops. The three most prominent types, however, are the CFV platoon, the HMMWV platoon, and the reconnaissance vehicle (RV) recce platoon. The platoons are organized by tables of organization and equipment (TOE) into a headquarters element and scout sections. When executing missions, the reconnaissance platoon is organized according to the factors of mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METTTC) into an appropriate tactical organization consisting of a variable number of scout sections or squads. RECCE PLATOON 5-19. The recce platoon consists of one officer and 20 enlisted soldiers manning four vehicles (see Figure 1-1). The recce platoon is equipped with the Stryker RV. Refer to Figure 1-22 for an illustration of the vehicle’s capabilities and specifications.

Figure 1-1. Recce Platoon Platoon Headquaters

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5-20. The recce platoon headquarters element provides command and control (C2) for the platoon. It consists of the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant (PSG), and their respective vehicle crews. The recce platoon rarely uses a headquarters element during tactical operations, relying instead on the leaders of its sections or squads as described in the following discussion. Recce Sections and Squads 5-21. The recce section is normally employed as the platoon’s basic tactical maneuver organization. Each section is made up of a section leader, squad leaders, and their crews manning two vehicles. The platoon may also be task organized for maneuver purposes into elements known as recce squads; the squad is normally a single vehicle and its crew. Recce Platoon Dismounted Organization 5-22. Dismounted operations are the recce platoon’s primary means for gathering information. The basic dismounted elements within the recce platoon are the team, squad, section, and platoon. Each recce vehicle has a designated dismounted team. (NOTE: Refer to discussions of dismounted organization later in this chapter and in Chapter 5 for detailed information on dismounted operations.) Recce Platoon Vehicle Organization 5-23. Regardless of the mission it is executing or the formation or movement technique it is using, the recce platoon normally operates in one of three organizations during mounted operations: as three sections with one vehicle in each section and the platoon leader’s vehicle providing C2, as two sections with two vehicles in each section, or as a four-vehicle platoon. 5-24. Three-Section Organization. The three-section organization is used when the anticipated threat is low to medium. The key to this organization rests in the use of dismounted elements and in ensuring that adjacent vehicles mutually support each other. If mutual support is not possible because of terrain or other mission constraints, vehicles must have the ability to maneuver and support adjacent elements. This organization allows the platoon leader to provide C2 for the platoon; he can also provide additional support for any of the other three vehicles in the platoon. On the other hand, this organization does not provide the recce platoon with section overwatch capability, leaving elements vulnerable to threat contact. (See Figure 1-2.)

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Figure 1-2. Recce Platoon Three-Section Vehicle Organization 5-25. Two-Section Organization. The two-section organization is used when increased security is required, when the area of operations can be covered efficiently with only two elements, or when the threat situation is unknown. This type of organization limits the amount of terrain the platoon can cover and decreases the speed with which the platoon can perform its tasks. On the other hand, it increases internal section security by providing mutually supporting fires. It also gives the platoon leader and PSG greater flexibility in performing C2 and combat service support (CSS) requirements. (See Figure 1-3.)

Figure 1-3. Recce Platoon Two-Section Vehicle Organization 5-26. Four-Vehicle Organization. The four-vehicle organization is the most difficult to control (refer to Figure 1-4 for an illustration). The platoon leader employs this organization when he must have four separate information sources at the same time or when the platoon is executing certain surveillance missions. This organization should be used when the threat situation is known and/or the threat is low or nonexistent. This formation may also be implemented during shortduration security missions, allowing for depth in the platoon’s sector.

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Figure 1-4. Recce Platoon Four-Vehicle Organization CFV PLATOON 5-27. The CFV platoon, also known as the cavalry scout platoon, is equipped with six M3 CFVs (as shown in Figure 1-5). The platoon is found in the cavalry squadrons of an armored or mechanized division or in an armored cavalry regiment (ACR); it may also be found in certain mechanized battalions. Regardless of the mission it is executing or the formation or movement technique it is using, the CFV platoon normally operates in one of three organizations: as three sections with two vehicles in each section, as two sections with three vehicles in each section, or as a six-vehicle platoon.

Figure 1-5. CFV Scout Platoon Three-Section Organization 5-28. This is the basic organization for the CFV scout platoon (see Figure 1-6). This organization allows the platoon to achieve a good compromise between the requirement of employing a maximum number of elements during the reconnaissance or security mission and the need for security. It is the ideal organization for the conduct of a route reconnaissance mission. In a screen mission, this organization allows employment of three long-duration OPs, which are occupied for 12 or more hours; it also facilitates the simultaneous conduct of dismounted patrols.

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Figure 1-6. CFV Scout Platoon Three-Section Organization Two-Section Organization 5-29. The two-section organization is used when increased security is required, when the area of operations can be covered efficiently with only two elements, or when operational strength (less than six vehicles operational) makes the three-section organization impossible. Refer to the illustration in Figure 1-7.

Figure 1-7. CFV Scout Platoon Two-Section Organization Six-Vehicle Organization 5-30. The six-vehicle organization is the most difficult to control (see Figure 1-8). The platoon leader employs this organization when he must have six separate information sources at the same time.

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Figure 1-8. CFV Scout Platoon Six-Vehicle Organization HMMWV RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON 5-31. With 6 or 10 vehicles (see Figures 1-9 and 1-10), the HMMWV reconnaissance platoon has a wide variety of organizational options, including the basic options covered in the following discussion. The platoon leader may develop other combinations to meet unique METT-TC requirements and to accommodate attachments. No matter how he organizes his platoon, however, the HMMWV platoon leader has only a limited number of soldiers to conduct dismounted operations.

Figure 1-9. Ten-HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon

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Figure 1-10. Six-HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon Two-Section Organization 5-32. This is an effective organization when only two maneuver corridors have to be observed or when two distinct reconnaissance missions are required. This organization maximizes security at the section level and gives the sections sufficient maneuver and C2 capability to conduct limited separate missions. This organization allows the platoon to put out two long-duration observation posts (OP); it is the best organization for dismounted operations. (See Figures 1-11 and 1-12.)

Figure 1-11. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon Two-Section Organization (10-HMMWV Platoon)

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Figure 1-12. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon Two-Section Organization (Six-HMMWV Platoon) Three-Section Organization 5-33. This organization is ideal for reconnaissance along a single route. It allows employment of three long-duration OPs in a 10-HMMWV platoon and three short-duration OPs in a six-HMMWV platoon. The ability to concurrently conduct dismounted patrols is very limited for sixHMMWV platoons. (Refer to Figures 1-13 and 1-14.) (NOTE: A consolidated headquarters section, with the platoon leader and PSG as shown in Figure 1-14, increases C2 capability and is an optional configuration.)

Figure 1-13. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon Three-Section Organization (10-HMMWV Platoon)

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Figure 1-14. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon Three-Section Organization (Six-HMMWV Platoon) Five-Section Organization 5-34. This organization is used only by 10-HMMWV platoons in reconnoitering large areas or multiple avenues of approach. Five shortduration OPs can be established, allowing OPs to be structured in depth. In this organization, sections have dismounted capability to conduct local security only. (See Figure 1-15.)

Figure 1-15. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon Four-Section Organization (10-HMMWV Platoon) Six-Vehicle Organization 5-35. The six-vehicle organization is used only by six-HMMWV platoons and is the most difficult to control (refer to Figure 1-16). The platoon leader employs this organization when he must have six separate information sources at the same time.

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Figure 1-16. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon Six-Vehicle Organization (Six-HMMWV Platoon) Ten-Vehicle Organization 5-36. The 10-vehicle organization is used only by the 10-HMMWV platoon. It gives the platoon an enhanced ability to conduct screening missions in depth, although only for short durations. It also provides the platoon with the ability to conduct numerous reconnaissance tasks simultaneously. (See Figure 1-17.) 5-37. At the same time, however, the 10-vehicle organization is rarely employed because it creates very difficult C2 challenges. It severely limits the platoon’s overwatch capability; if the platoon is not echeloned in its sector with an overwatch plan for follow-on squads, platoon elements are left extremely vulnerable to threat contact. In addition, this organization affords the platoon no ability to organize patrols of any type.

Figure 1-17. HMMWV Reconnaissance Platoon 10-Vehicle Organization (10-HMMWV Platoon)

DISMOUNTED ORGANIZATION 5-38. Every dismounted team consists of a reconnaissance element and a security element. The purpose of the reconnaissance element is to obtain data on information requirements. The security element’s primary responsibility is to protect the reconnaissance element. The security element may also serve as a reconnaissance element or have alternate responsibilities. Whichever role the security element plays, its primary objective is protecting the dismounted element. A two-man team is the smallest dismounted element within the platoon (see Figure 1-18).

Figure 1-18. Dismounted Two-Man Reconnaissance Organization

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DISMOUNTED THREE-MAN SQUAD ORGANIZATION 5-39. The three-man dismounted squad is the basic dismounted element within a recce squad (single RV) and a three-vehicle HMMWV section. It can perform reconnaissance tasks, security tasks, OP and surveillance tasks, liaison, or a combination of these tasks. It is headed by a 19D scout of grade E5 or higher. In this organization (as well as the other dismounted organizations), the vehicle may provide security for the entire element. (See Figure 1-19.)

Figure 1-19. Dismounted Three-Man Squad DISMOUNTED FOUR-MAN SQUAD ORGANIZATION 5-40. The four-man organization is the basic dismounted section configuration for the platoon leader’s RV in a recce platoon or a twovehicle CFV section. The four-man squad can perform reconnaissance tasks, security tasks, OP/surveillance tasks, liaison, or a combination of these tasks. It is headed by a 19D scout of grade E6 or higher. (Refer to Figure 1-20.)

Figure1-20. Dismounted Four-Man Reconnaissance Organization DISMOUNTED SECTION ORGANIZATION 5-41. The dismounted section combines the strength of two dismounted squads. It can also perform reconnaissance tasks, security tasks, OP/surveillance tasks, liaison, or a combination of these tasks. The

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platoon leader, PSG, or an E6 section sergeant heads this section. The recce platoon’s dismounted section is large enough to have a reaction team as part of its security element. DISMOUNTED PLATOON ORGANIZATION 5-42. The dismounted platoon can perform reconnaissance tasks, security tasks, OP/surveillance tasks, liaison, or a combination of these tasks. The platoon leader/PSG heads the dismounted platoon element, which always includes an element designated for security (reaction force) and control. The dismounted platoon organization may be used if the threat is high (security of the element requires mutual support) or vehicular movement is impossible. Infiltration, for example, may require the platoon to conduct dismounted tactical movement. The platoon’s vehicles may provide security for the entire element; this organization normally leaves two scouts mounted on each vehicle.

NOTE: For a detailed discussion of dismounted operations, refer to Chapter 5 of this manual.

TASK ORGANIZATION 5-43. METT-TC circumstances will often require the reconnaissance platoon leader to employ variations of the basic platoon organizations discussed previously. In addition, attachments such as tanks, mobile gun systems (MGS), infantry, or engineers may change the composition and number of reconnaissance squads or sections. Later chapters provide further information regarding mission task organization.

SECTION V – RESPONSIBILITIES 5-44. The reconnaissance platoon leader and the platoon’s noncommissioned officers (NCO) must be experts in the use of organic weapons, indirect fires, land navigation, supporting fires, demolitions, obstacles, communications, reconnaissance, HUMINT collection, liaison, and security techniques. They must be familiar with infantry, mortar, and combined arms tactics and be able to react to rapidly changing situations; they must also know how to employ combat support (CS) assets that are supporting or are attached to the platoon. Because of the many missions the platoon must be capable of performing, the platoon leader and PSG must be proficient in tasks at all skill levels of MOS 19D and familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and deployment of ISR assets, such as ground sensors and UAV sections.

PLATOON LEADER 5-45. The platoon leader is responsible to his higher commander for the discipline, combat readiness, and training of the platoon as well as the maintenance of its equipment. The platoon leader must have a thorough knowledge of reconnaissance and security tactics. He works closely with his higher commander during the mission analysis portion of the planning process.

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5-46. The platoon leader must be proficient in the tactical employment of the platoon. A solid understanding of troop-leading procedures and the ability to apply them quickly and efficiently in the field are essential. The platoon leader must also know the capabilities and limitations of the platoon’s personnel and equipment. He must be an expert in threat organizations, doctrine, and equipment. 5-47. Most of all, the platoon leader must be versatile. He must be able to exercise sound judgment and make correct decisions quickly based on his commander’s intent and the tactical situation. He must ensure that he, and every member of the platoon, understands and can successfully accomplish the following leadership competencies:

· · · · · · · · · ·

Troop-leading procedures. Deployment. Tactical movement. OP establishment and operation. Patrolling and local security. Establishment and maintenance of effective communications. Employment of fires. Actions on contact. The multidimensional aspect of R&S. Reporting procedures.

NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for additional information on the leadership competencies.

PLATOON SERGEANT 5-48. The PSG leads elements of the platoon as directed by the platoon leader and assumes command of the platoon in the absence of the platoon leader. During tactical operations, he may assist in the control of the platoon, requiring him to be proficient in each of the platoon’s leadership competencies (refer to Chapter 2 for additional discussion of these competencies). The PSG assists the platoon leader in maintaining discipline, as well as in coordinating training and controlling the platoon. He supervises equipment maintenance, supply operations, and other CSS activities.

SECTION AND SQUAD LEADERS 5-49. Section and squad leaders must be experts in mounted operations, dismounted patrolling, and employment of HUMINT assets (whether or not these are organic to the platoon). These leaders also must be experts in conducting surveillance and establishing OPs. Section leaders are responsible to the platoon leader for the training and discipline of their sections. They are also responsible for the tactical employment and control of the section, requiring proficiency in the platoon’s leadership competencies (refer to the discussion in Chapter 2 of this manual). Section leaders are responsible for the maintenance and operation of all vehicles and equipment organic to their sections. Squad

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leaders have the same responsibilities for their squads as section leaders have for sections.

HUMINT COLLECTORS 5-50. HUMINT collectors within the recce platoon are tasked with collecting information for intelligence use from people or related documents. Their responsibilities are covered in detail in Chapter 3 of this manual (in the discussion of the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance) as well as in Chapter 7 (urban operations). The HUMINT collectors must be proficient in the following related procedures and operations:

·

Tactical questioning. This is an abbreviated form of interrogation or debriefing used to collect information related to the commander’s priority information requirements (PIR) from human sources.

·

Interrogation and debriefing. These involve the systematic questioning of individuals to procure information to answer specific collection requirements. Sources, such as enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and civilian detainees who are in the custody of US forces, are interrogated. All others are debriefed, to include friendly forces, civilian refugees, and local inhabitants. (NOTE: The role of interrogation in the reconnaissance platoon is limited to the initial questioning and evaluation of detainees. Debriefing is limited to gathering information from internal patrols.)

·

Source operations. These intelligence collection operations use recruited and registered HUMINT sources. The registration of sources is a legal requirement in any sustained use of a specific individual as a source. (NOTE: The role of recce platoon HUMINT collectors in source operations is normally limited to identifying potential intelligence sources for exploitation by HUMINT assets at higher levels.)

5-51. In reconnaissance platoons that do not have organic HUMINT collectors, scouts should have an understanding of these functions of information-gathering. A supportive civilian populous will likely pass valuable information to the first soldiers with whom they come into contact. In addition, all scouts should have an understanding of the roles and duties of HUMINT collectors because these assets may be attached once the platoon is deployed, even if they are not organic to the platoon.

SECTION VI – MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS, AND VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS MISSIONS 5-52. The reconnaissance platoon’s primary missions are reconnaissance, surveillance, and security in support of its parent unit. As part of R&S tasks, the platoon will conduct target acquisition,

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which will require it to detect, identify, and locate key targets for lethal and nonlethal fire. The platoon is also trained and equipped to conduct tactical BDA. It can perform these missions mounted or dismounted, day or night, in various terrain conditions, and under all weather and visibility conditions. In addition to the primary missions, the reconnaissance platoon can perform the following tactical and support missions:

· · · ·

Liaison.

·

Limited obstacle construction and reduction.

Quartering party duties. Traffic control. Chemical detection and radiological survey and monitoring operations as part of a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 5-53. The reconnaissance platoon is a reconnaissance force that conducts operations as part of a larger combined arms force. Scouts in general have capabilities and limitations that must be considered when they are employed. Each type of reconnaissance platoon has characteristics specific to its TOE. Characteristics of reconnaissance platoons include the following:

·

Employment considerations. Distance and mission duration are critical considerations affecting employment of the reconnaissance platoon away from the main body of its parent unit. Fire support, CSS, and communications requirements are also important factors when the platoon is tasked to conduct sustained operations beyond the immediate supporting range of the main body.

·

Support. The reconnaissance platoon is dependent on its parent unit for CS and CSS.

·

Route reconnaissance. During route reconnaissance, the platoon can reconnoiter only one route unless it is properly augmented or is operating in a permissive environment.

·

Zone reconnaissance. The following considerations apply when the reconnaissance platoon is tasked to conduct zone reconnaissance:

·

1-20

n

Depending on METT-TC, the recce platoon can reconnoiter a zone up to 2 to 3 kilometers wide. METT-TC factors may increase or decrease the size of the zone.

n

Depending on METT-TC, HMMWV and CFV platoons can reconnoiter a zone up to 3 to 5 kilometers wide. METT-TC may increase or decrease the size of the zone.

Screening. During screening operations, recce and HMMWV reconnaissance platoons are extremely limited in their ability to destroy or repel threat reconnaissance units.

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·


OPs. The following considerations apply when the reconnaissance platoon employs OPs during its operations: n

A recce platoon can man up to four OPs for short durations (less than 12 hours) or two OPs for long durations (over 12 hours).

n

The CFV scout platoon can man up to six OPs for short durations or three OPs for long durations.

n

The 10-HMMWV reconnaissance platoon can man up to 10 short-duration OPs or up to three OPs for long durations.

n

The six-HMMWV reconnaissance platoon can man up to six short-duration OPs or up to two OPs for long durations.

·

Patrolling. When properly organized, scouts can conduct effective reconnaissance and security patrols. The CFV scout platoon has 12 dedicated dismounted scouts, while the recce platoon has 13 dismounts, including HUMINT collectors (MOS 97B) organic to the platoon. The HMMWV scout platoon has very limited dismounted capability; it must be carefully task organized to conduct dismounted operations.

·

Communications. While operating on the platoon net, the reconnaissance platoon leader can monitor only two nets at one time. This means he cannot operate continuously on all necessary squadron or battalion nets, including the squadron/battalion command, operations and intelligence (OI), administrative/logistics (A/L), and mortar nets. Refer to the discussion of platoon radio nets in Chapter 2 of this manual.

·

Obstacles. The reconnaissance platoon has the following capabilities related to the employment and reduction of obstacles during its operations. n

The reconnaissance platoon has limited obstacle construction ability and carries only a basic load of demolitions.

n

The reconnaissance platoon has very limited obstacle reduction capability; under most conditions, it can breach only point obstacles.

VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS 5-54. In many respects, the scout’s capability is dependent on his equipment. The three types of reconnaissance platforms—the RV, the M3 CFV, and the M1025/1026 HMMWV—have distinctly different characteristics. When employed with the appropriate TTP, all three vehicles are highly effective reconnaissance and security platforms. 5-55. Every scout must understand his mount thoroughly so he can maximize its capabilities and minimize its limitations. See Figures 1-21, 1-22, and 1-23 for illustrations of the three scout vehicles and summaries of their capabilities and specifications.

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To be published upon selection of vehicle. Figure 1-21. RV Characteristics

Figure 1-22. M3 CFV Characteristics

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Figure 1-23. HMMWV Characteristics

SECTION VII – BATTLE COMMAND 5-56. Battle command is the process that leaders use to assimilate information from many sources, to visualize the battlefield and assess the situation, and then to direct military action as required to achieve victory. Thinking and acting are simultaneous activities for leaders in battle. 5-57. The actions inherent in the C2 of combat elements on the modern battlefield are the biggest challenges faced by combat leaders. Command involves directing elements; control entails the steps taken to ensure that the directions are carried out. The greatest tactician in the world would be ineffective if he did not properly use the methods available to direct and control his combat elements. C2 must be kept extremely simple to be effective.

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5-58. Battle command is an important consideration for all types of reconnaissance platoons in providing their higher commands with critical battlefield information. The accuracy and timeliness of this information will often have a direct impact on the success or failure of the troop, squadron/battalion, and higher commands.

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE PLATOON 5-59. The reconnaissance platoon leader leads his platoon and is assisted by the PSG. He uses a variety of techniques to plan operations, issue orders, employ the platoon, and communicate. At platoon level, effective use of C2 is a function of several critical factors:

· · · ·

The commander’s intent.

·

The tactically sound employment of control measures and communications equipment and techniques.

Leadership. Training. Sound and thoroughly procedures (SOP).

understood

standing

operating

5-60. As noted, the reconnaissance platoon’s primary functions are to gather information (reconnaissance), conduct surveillance, and perform limited security missions. Except when they are operating as a part of a larger force, the HMMWV and recce platoons are not organized and equipped to undertake operations that entail a significant offensive component, such as counterreconnaissance, armed reconnaissance, reconnaissance by fire, or reconnaissance in force. The unique information-gathering capabilities of these platoons should be preserved by limiting direct contact with the threat force to that necessary for selfdefense.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 5-61. As part of a recce, reconnaissance, or cavalry troop, the reconnaissance platoon is subject to command relationships similar to those of other platoons in a company-size organization. In an armor or infantry battalion, the reconnaissance platoon performs several critical tasks in support of the battalion commander’s concept of the operation. The reconnaissance platoon responds to its platoon leader, who receives guidance from the troop or battalion commander, depending on their command relationship. 5-62. As the commander’s eyes and ears, the reconnaissance platoon leader must stay in contact with either the troop/battalion commander or the troop command post (CP) or battalion tactical operations center (TOC). This is necessary if the platoon leader is to keep the platoon informed of the next higher commander’s current situation as well as the current threat situation. He must also ensure that information gained by the platoon is transmitted higher. 5-63. The commander must ensure that his initial operation order (OPORD) and any following fragmentary orders (FRAGO) focus the reconnaissance platoon on its mission by telling the platoon leader what is expected of the reconnaissance or security effort in each phase of the

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operation. The intent includes the commander’s criteria for recovering the reconnaissance platoon as tactical operations progress. He must make it clear whether he intends for the platoon to conduct stay-behind operations if the threat main body has passed its locations or to pass through friendly lines before the arrival of the threat main body. 5-64. The commander also specifies PIR for which the reconnaissance platoon is responsible. PIR cover the information for which the commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his planning and decision-making. Often stated in question form, these tactical and operational considerations are the foundation for development of R&S plans and for execution of operations involved in the overall ISR effort. 5-65. In recce/reconnaissance/cavalry troop operations, the troop XO is a battlefield manager for the troop commander. He operates from a vehicle CP; this vehicle gives him the communications capability and facilities to receive, collate, and pass to higher headquarters the routine reconnaissance information processed by the troop’s reconnaissance platoons. In this system, most of the routine reports are sent to the troop XO rather than to the troop commander. The troop commander’s role is to monitor the routine actions, receive high-priority information to transmit on command nets, and control the troop once contact is gained. In armor or infantry battalions, reconnaissance platoons generally report to their TOCs, although they may report high-priority information directly to the battalion commander or S3.

FBCB2 IN THE BATTLE COMMAND STRUCTURE 5-66. Employment of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system significantly enhances the reconnaissance platoon’s battle command capability. FBCB2 is a network of computers, global positioning system (GPS) equipment, and communication systems that work together to provide combat leaders with real-time information of unprecedented quantity and quality. FBCB2 affords the reconnaissance platoon with a variety of capabilities, including the following:

· ·

Maintain friendly situational awareness (BLUE SA).

·

Submit preformatted standardized reports. These include SALT reports (covering size, activity, location, and time of enemy/threat forces), situation reports (SITREP), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) reports/requests, NBC reports, and call for fire (CFF) reports.

·

Rapidly disseminate graphic overlays and written FRAGOs.

Track actual and templated threat positions and obstacles (RED SA).

FBCB2 ARCHITECTURE 5-67. Each of the vehicles in the reconnaissance platoon is equipped with the three basic components of the FBCB2 system. First, the GPS provides precise location and date/time information that is the basis for reporting real-time friendly locations and for generating laser-designated map spots for reporting purposes. Second, the single channel ground/airborne radio system (SINCGARS) provides a secure means of

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transmitting both voice and digital traffic between vehicles in the platoon. In addition to the SINCGARS, platoon vehicles are also equipped with the enhanced position location and reporting system (EPLRS). The EPLRS provides a secure digital connection and serves as a router, efficiently sending message traffic internally within the platoon and also out to the higher command and fire support nets. This routing capability ensures that information is passed even if the chain of command is disrupted by physical separation on the battlefield, casualties, or mechanical failures. Finally, the FBCB2 terminal includes a monitor, keyboard, mouse, and a variety of computing functions; these features provide the crew with direct access to the system. Together, these FBCB2 components form the lower tactical internet (TI). Figure 1-24 illustrates FBCB2 architecture in a recce platoon. 5-68. The upper TI consists of a variety of tactical computer systems and communications equipment located primarily at the squadron/battalion level and higher. The most important of these are the maneuver control system (MCS), the all source analysis system (ASAS), the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS), and the combat service support control system (CSSCS). These systems draw upon the reports and positional data passed on the lower TI to provide situational awareness at higher command levels. In turn, these systems can push information such as location of adjacent units, known and templated threat positions, graphics, and OPORDs down to FBCB2 users.

Figure 1-24. FBCB2 Architecture for a Recce Platoon

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FBCB2 CAPABILITIES 5-69. This discussion focuses on several areas in which FBCB2 enhances the reconnaissance platoon’s battle command capabilities. Friendly Situational Awareness 5-70. To enhance friendly situational awareness (also referred to as BLUE SA), the FBCB2 screen displays an icon for each individual vehicle in the platoon. This provides the vehicle commander with a clear picture of where he is located in relation to the platoon and the platoon leader with a picture of where he is operating in relation to the rest of the higher unit. While the system functions automatically for vehicles equipped to operate on the TI, it does not provide locations for every friendly element on the battlefield. For example, the system does not automatically track dismounted scout teams operating at extended distances from their vehicles. In addition, it does not cover infantry squads from the brigade, nondigitally equipped units, or allied troops that may be operating in or adjacent to the platoon’s battlespace. Icons representing these elements may be imported into FBCB2 based on FM radio reports, but these are not updated in real time. As a result, FBCB2 cannot be the sole instrument used for clearing fires; it does not substitute for the leader’s or commander’s judgment in preventing fratricide. Threat Situational Awareness 5-71. FBCB2 creates threat situational awareness (RED SA) from both top-down and bottom-up feeds. The higher unit S2 inputs threat icons into the system based on spot reports (SPOTREP) generated by assets outside the unit; these include the joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) and sensor assets organic to recce troops, such as tactical UAV (TUAV) flights, radio intercepts, and ground surveillance radar (GSR). Based on his IPB, the S2 augments these actual locations with templated positions in the form of a situation template (SITEMP). 5-72. As the reconnaissance platoon conducts operations, it adds to the RED SA by sending SPOTREPs of threat activity and obstacles via the FBCB2. When a vehicle commander sends a SPOTREP, he automatically creates an icon representing the threat on FBCB2 systems in his platoon. The platoon leader or PSG evaluates the validity of the report and forwards it to the TOC. At the troop level, the report is evaluated to make sure it is accurate and is subsequently forwarded to the other platoons in the troop and higher to the squadron. (NOTE: This process is the same for the reconnaissance platoon in a battalion.) 5-73. To keep the RED SA current, units must update SPOTREPs concerning threat locations that are represented by icons on the FBCB2. Updates must be sent whenever the threat situation changes, such as when a threat element moves or is destroyed. Icons will “fade” and eventually disappear from the FBCB2 screen as their information ages. The unit SOP governs the rate at which icons fade. 5-74. Member of the reconnaissance platoon must remember that the RED SA provided by FBCB2 is only as good as the reports that the system receives. It will never give a 100-percent complete or accurate threat picture. The platoon leader and his vehicle commanders must ensure that vehicle scanning plans and the platoon R&S plan are adequate to detect threat forces not yet reported by digital means.

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Standardized Reporting 5-75. FBCB2 streamlines the reporting process by providing the reconnaissance platoon with the capability to send and receive standardized reports. These include SALT reports, MEDEVAC requests, NBC-1 reports, calls for fire, check fire reports, and SITREPs. (NOTE: For more information on FBCB2 reporting capabilities, refer to Chapter 2 of this manual.) Figure 1-25 shows the FBCB2 screen for a SALT report. Standardized reports afford several tactical advantages:

·

They help to ensure that all required information is included in a particular report or request.

· ·

They reduce the chance of errors in transmission. They allow for the storage of messages for retrieval and reference.

NOTE: There is still a requirement for FM voice message traffic. For example, leaders must still transmit contact reports to initiate battle drills and cue leaders to check their FBCB2 screens for updated information. Additionally, vehicle commanders may need to send oral descriptions of threat locations, routes, or obstacles to help clarify the situation. This is especially true in close or urban terrain where the FBCB2 cannot display the terrain in sufficient detail to assist leaders in making effective decisions.

Figure 1-25. FBCB2 Display for Standardized Reports Combat Orders and Graphics 5-76. FBCB2 greatly enhances the speed and precision of the orders process. The system allows leaders to add or modify operational graphics during the planning process or execution. This ensures that every element has the most current information to control movement and fires. In addition, commanders can use free text messages to transmit OPORDs, FRAGOs, and battle update briefings over extended distances without the loss of time and information inherent in FM voice communications. Like standardized reports, graphics and orders can be stored for retrieval and reference.

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SECtion VIIi – INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD 5-77. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the effects of the threat and the environment on the unit. It is a dynamic staff process, driven by the commander, that continually integrates new information into the unit’s operational framework. Reconnaissance platoon leaders should have a clear understanding of the IPB process, which in turn drives ISR focus and synchronization. For a detailed discussion of IPB concepts and procedures, refer to FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130).

WHAT IPB ACCOMPLISHES 5-78. IPB identifies facts and clarifies assumptions about the threat and the battlefield environment. The commander and his staff use the IPB process to analyze the threat, weather, and terrain to determine and evaluate the threat’s capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action (COA). The resulting information serves the following purposes:

·

It facilitates staff planning and development of potential friendly COAs for the operation.

·

It provides the basis for directing and synchronizing the ISR effort that supports the commander’s chosen COA.

·

It contributes to thorough staff synchronization successful completion of several staff processes.

·

In turn, it helps the commander to selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield.

and

SPECIAL NOTE The most critical mission of the reconnaissance platoon is to gather information on threat forces that the S2 then uses to assess threat disposition and intentions. IPB is a disciplined staff procedure that provides the reconnaissance platoon leader with formal ISR guidance in the form of reconnaissance objectives and PIR, as contained in the R&S plan. The platoon leader then applies this information in accomplishing the platoon’s assigned reconnaissance tasks. 5-79. Figure 1-26 illustrates the various phases and components of the information-gathering process, including IPB.

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Figure 1-26. The Information-Gathering Process

THE IPB PROCESS STEP 1 – DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT 5-80. The first step of the IPB process focuses the staff on the requirements of the initial ISR effort. During this step, the staff takes the following actions:

·

Identify battlefield characteristics, such as terrain and weather, that will influence friendly and threat operations and that require evaluation through the IPB process.

·

Establish the area of interest (AI) to focus the IPB analysis and the ISR effort.

·

Identify gaps in current intelligence holdings that become the initial information requirements.

STEP 2 – DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS 5-81. This step identifies general limitations that the environment imposes on friendly and threat forces, as well as the tactical opportunities it offers. IPB products developed during this step focus on these effects; they include, but are not limited to, the following:

· ·

1-30

Population status overlay. Overlays that depict the military aspects and effects of terrain, including the factors of observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA).

_______________________________________________________________

· ·


Weather analysis matrix. Integrated staff products such as the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).

STEP 3 – EVALUATE THE THREAT 5-82. Step 3 includes analysis of current intelligence holdings to determine how the threat normally organizes for and conducts combat operations. The results are portrayed using threat models that depict how the threat fights; these are the only products associated with this step. Although they usually emphasize graphic representation of the threat situation, such as doctrinal templates with high-value targets (HVT), threat models sometimes entail use of matrices, simple narrative descriptions, and depictions of threat obstacle systems. STEP 4 – DETERMINE THREAT COAS 5-83. This step integrates the results of the first three steps of IPB into a meaningful summary of likely objectives and COAs available to the threat. IPB products, which are valid only if the staff establishes a solid foundation during the first three steps, include the following:

·

Models that depict the threat’s available COAs. These are normally produced in the form of situation developments; they may include associated matrices and/or text descriptions.

·

Event templates and related matrices to focus the ISR effort.

FRIENDLY COA DEVELOPMENT AND WAR-GAMING 5-84. During threat COA development, the staff concurrently develops friendly COAs based on the facts and assumptions identified during IPB and mission analysis. Incorporating the results of IPB into COA development ensures that each friendly COA takes into account the opportunities and limitations related to the environment and the threat situation. 5-85. During the war-gaming session, the staff fights the set of threat COAs, developed in step 4 of the IPB process, against each potential friendly COA. Targeting conferences often accompany or follow the wargaming session to refine selected HVTs from the threat COA models into high-priority targets (HPT) that support the friendly COAs. 5-86. Based on the results of war-gaming, the staff takes the following actions to finalize the COA development process:

·

Construct a decision support template (DST) and its associated matrix.

· ·

Identify information requirements for each COA.

·

For each threat COA, determine the probability that the threat will adopt it.

·

Identify the most dangerous threat COA.

Refine threat COA models and event templates (and their related matrices), focusing on the intelligence required to execute the friendly COAs.

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5-87. After deciding on a COA and issuing orders, the commander approves a list of information requirements; he identifies the most important of these as the final PIR. During execution of the operation, emerging intelligence will confirm or deny the assumptions and information identified during the initial IPB. 5-88. The staff continues to evaluate the situation and update the commander and staff. As necessary, he performs parts of the IPB process to support new iterations of the decision-making process. Figures 1-27 through 1-29 provide examples of the templates developed during IPB and the war-gaming of friendly COAs.

Figure 1-27. Example Situational Template

Figure 1-28. Example Event Template

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Figure 1-29. Example Decision Support Template

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLAN 5-89. The key purpose of the R&S plan is to organize collection of information the commander needs to fight and win the battle. Like other brigade- and battalion-size elements, the SBCT and cavalry squadron (RSTA) will both produce R&S plans. The brigade plan will task the squadron or battalion, and these tasks will be incorporated into the squadron/battalion plan. Figure 1-26 shows how the R&S plan is developed within the overall information-gathering process. NOTE: The R&S plan is developed very early in the ISR planning process because it is important to integrate the reconnaissance platoon with other information-gathering assets, such as GSR and engineer reconnaissance teams. Because reconnaissance is a continuous and dynamic process, the reconnaissance platoon is committed as soon as possible in accordance with the commander’s intent and reconnaissance objectives. Deployment of the platoon should not be delayed until the R&S plan has been formulated.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE R&S PLAN 5-90. From the decision support template, the S3, in coordination with the staff, prepares the detailed squadron/battalion R&S plan, which graphically depicts where and when reconnaissance elements should look for threat forces. The S3 should brief the R&S plan. In a squadron, the S3 should brief the plan to the recce troop commander, ensuring that the troop commander understands all ISR objectives.

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5-91. The staff uses an R&S tasking matrix to coordinate all available assets for ISR operations. The R&S plan must direct specific tasks and priorities to all ISR elements, including reconnaissance platoons, GSR, and patrols. 5-92. R&S tasking, which is handled by the S3, can take the form of a warning order, OPORD, R&S tasking matrix, or R&S overlay. The S3 translates the R&S plan into operational terms and graphics. For example, in preparation for reconnaissance operations, the S3 designates named areas of interest (NAI) in terms of reconnaissance objectives. COORDINATION WITH SUPPORT ELEMENTS Fire Support 5-93. To ensure the unit can provide responsive fire support to the reconnaissance platoon, the fire support officer (FSO) stays abreast of what the platoon will be doing throughout the conduct of the mission. The platoon will receive indirect field artillery (FA) or mortar support and joint fire support from 3 to 4 kilometers forward of the lead elements. The reconnaissance platoon leader should coordinate with the FSO to discuss his mission and the platoon’s unique fire support requirements. The platoon leader finds out what support is available, where supporting units are located, and what fire support restrictions exist. He will then recommend preplanned targets and target priorities to be incorporated by the FSO into the platoon fire support plan. The platoon leader should receive an approved target list and/or overlay from the FSO. Signal 5-94. The squadron/battalion signal officer (S6) must conduct additional coordination with the troop commander and/or platoon leader if the mission requires communications support. The reconnaissance platoon leader must request retransmission (retrans) or relay support from the squadron/battalion signal section if the mission dictates. Scouts should not perform relay duties as their primary platoon mission. Other Elements 5-95. The reconnaissance platoon leader also coordinates support with any attached or assigned elements; examples include engineer reconnaissance teams, fire support team (FIST), air defense artillery (ADA) elements, Striker teams, GSR and/or remotely monitored battlefield sensor system (REMBASS) teams, and aerial reconnaissance elements (TUAVs). The platoon leader should be aware of how changes to the organization affect his platoon. Ideally, linkup with support elements should occur at the TOC in daylight and with sufficient time to conduct thorough briefings and rehearsals.

PLATOON IPB EXECUTION 5-96. When the platoon leader leaves the TOC area to prepare for his mission, he should, as a minimum, have the following materials:

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· ·

Operational and ISR/R&S graphics.

·

Fire support overlay.

The situational template, event template, and notes on the current threat situation.

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5-97. Once in the vicinity of their mission objectives, the scouts confirm or deny the templated information. Additionally, if they find the threat, the scouts look for possible weaknesses, gaps, and flanks of the threat force. During screening operations, the commander directs the reconnaissance platoon leader to report threat activity at designated NAIs. The reconnaissance platoon leader uses OPs to observe and report on these areas of command interest. The scouts must rapidly and accurately report all information related to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) that they find during either reconnaissance or screening operations.

SECTION IX – SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 5-98. Situational awareness is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of the tactical situation. This picture includes an awareness of both the friendly and threat situations and of relevant terrain. It also entails the ability to relate battlefield information and events through space and time to form logical conclusions and make decisions that anticipate events. Since the platoon normally operates dispersed as individual sections or squads, it is essential that all reconnaissance leaders maintain situational awareness so they can make sound, quick tactical decisions. Critical outcomes of situational awareness on the part of all scouts are reduction in fratricide incidents and the ability to stay one step ahead of the threat they are facing. NOTE: The reconnaissance platoon and its higher element assess all information within their area of operations. Their primary responsibility is to provide their squadron or battalion with complete awareness of the situation based on their reported raw data and assessments of information in their area of operations. In a cavalry squadron (RSTA), the analysis section at the squadron headquarters gathers all the information from its recce troops and surveillance troop assets. The squadron/battalion analyzes this information and provides the SBCT/brigade with situational understanding of the area of operations.

BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION 5-99. The commander will structure the battlefield based on the conditions of METT-TC and his commander’s intent. How he does this affects the reconnaissance platoon leader’s mission planning and his ability to maintain situational awareness. The framework of the battlefield can vary from a very rigid extreme with obvious front and rear boundaries and closely tied adjacent units to a dispersed and decentralized structure with few secure areas and unit boundaries and no definable front or rear. 5-100. Between these extremes is an unlimited number of possible variations. Maintaining situational awareness becomes more difficult as the battlefield becomes less structured. Modern, highly mobile operations with small forces lend themselves to a less rigid framework that challenges the scout’s ability to maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield.

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5-101. To have a clear picture of the battlefield, the reconnaissance platoon leader must have virtually perfect knowledge of the friendly situation one level higher than his own. The platoon leader must have a relatively complete knowledge of the terrain, and he must know as much as possible about the threat. It is important that the platoon leader use this knowledge to update his section and squad leaders periodically regarding the higher situation. NOTE: The requirement to maintain a real-time picture of the battlefield one level higher does not relieve the scout of the requirement to understand the situation and commander’s intent two levels higher than his own. The difference is that his understanding of the situation two levels higher does not have to be as specific or in real time. FBCB2 will assist all vehicles in the platoon in maintaining a real-time situational awareness. 5-102. Almost all of the information the platoon leader needs comes in the form of reports over his FM communication system or FBCB2. He receives many reports based on his platoon’s understanding of shared, common graphics. Effective graphics require that the subordinate elements report periodically as they accomplish requirements. The platoon leader must be aware of when his scouts report so he can maintain a current visualization of the situation. If an element does not report in a timely manner, the platoon leader must quickly determine the situation of the overdue element. 5-103. Although many reports are not addressed specifically to him, particularly on the higher net, the reconnaissance platoon leader must monitor them by eavesdropping on the nets as traffic is sent. How effectively he can accomplish this is, to some degree, experiencedependent. The platoon leader must learn how to relate the information he is receiving to his map, which is perhaps his most important tool in maintaining situational awareness. He should plot all friendly position reports up to one level higher than his own. Information from SPOTREPs should also be plotted. 5-104. The platoon leader can employ a variety of techniques in using his map to track the tactical situation. For example, he should use different colors for friendly and threat elements to allow quick recognition. To avoid cluttering the map, he should place a dot or symbol on his map where the element is located and label the point with a number. The same number should then be written in the map margin (or beyond the area of operations) with the complete SPOTREP or unit ID next to it. This notation should also include the time of the report. As positions or reports are updated, the platoon leader crosses off the old symbol and adds a new one with a corresponding notation; it is critical that updates to previous reports be clearly identified as such during transmission. 5-105. Even though it is relatively simple, this type of map notation system can help all scouts in the platoon to easily track and monitor the tactical situation. Maps can be augmented by a formal platoon log, kept on the platoon leader’s or PSG’s vehicle or on both.

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BATTLESPACE 5-106. As discussed previously, an accurate picture of the battlefield provides the reconnaissance platoon leader with important tactical information, including friendly and threat positions and relevant terrain. In turn, complete understanding of the military significance of this picture requires knowledge of the concept of battlespace, the key element in the intellectual process of visualizing the battlefield. 5-107. At the most fundamental level, battlespace is the threedimensional “bubble” or area in which the platoon can acquire threat forces and influence them with effective fires. This space is defined by numerous battlefield factors: the locations of friendly forces, including the platoon’s individual sections, squads, OPs, and patrols; the effects of terrain, weather, and movement; and the ranges of all available platoon weapons and sensing systems. Each section or squad has its own battlespace; the platoon battlespace is the sum of individual section/squad battlespaces (see Figure 1-30). Platoon battlespace is not restricted by boundaries; it can overlap with the battlespace of adjacent units.

Figure 1-30. Recce Platoon’s Battlespace 5-108. Battlespace has applications in all phases of mission planning and execution. During the planning process, it is a critical factor in selection of routes and tentative positions. Once mission execution begins, the platoon leader’s knowledge of his battlespace is critical when he must issue timely and effective orders as the situation changes. 5-109. The importance of battlespace demands that the platoon leader direct most of his battle command effort toward managing, and enhancing, his space. He must be aware at every moment how battlespace is changing as friendly and threat forces move and as terrain and visibility conditions change (as illustrated in Figures 1-31A and 131B). He must evaluate how these changes affect his sections and squads.

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Figure 1-31A. Effects of Movement on Battlespace

Figure 1-31B. Effects of Movement on Battlespace (Continued) 5-110. As the operation progresses, the platoon leader must take active measures to shape the platoon’s battlespace to his best advantage. In many situations, he should attempt to eliminate any gaps, or dead space, that exist within the “bubble.” The platoon leader can accomplish this in several ways, such as maneuvering sections or squads, repositioning OPs, and deploying patrols or remote sensors. He must also ensure that organic and attached assets are positioned to achieve overlapping coverage of critical points within the platoon’s battlespace. 5-111. The purpose of overlapping coverage is to prevent the threat from overcoming the friendly reconnaissance effort by degrading or destroying a single platform or sensor. It also prevents the threat from gaining an advantage during periods when environmental or weather conditions, including limited visibility, degrade the platoon’s observation capability or sensor performance. Refer to Figures 1-32A and 1-32B for an illustration of how the platoon leader can optimize his battlespace.

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Figure 1-32A. Optimizing Battlespace

Figure 1-32B. Optimizing Battlespace (Continued)

FRATRICIDE 5-112. Recent experience has shown that fratricide is a significant danger to all forces operating on a mobile battlefield where weapon system lethality is significantly greater than identification friend or foe (IFF) capability. Fratricide is the result of many factors, including inadequate direct fire control plans, navigation errors, combat identification failures, and incorrect or inadequate operational graphics. For an in-depth discussion of fratricide and its prevention, refer to Appendix I of this manual.

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SPECIAL NOTE In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive target identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must ensure positive target identification before they issue commands to fire. In addition, all units must accurately report their locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must carefully track the locations of all subordinate elements in relation to those of all friendly forces.

SECTION X – NAVIGATION MAPS AND OVERLAYS 5-113. The most important role of maps and their accompanying overlays is in helping the reconnaissance platoon to understand and visualize the scheme of maneuver. They are the platoon leader’s primary tools in organizing information concerning the battlefield and in synchronizing his assets once the battle begins. They also provide vehicle commanders with a visual reference they can consult as needed. The platoon leader must ensure that each vehicle commander has an updated map with the latest graphic control measures posted on the overlay. 5-114. Overlays can be prepared either in traditional fashion or digitally. The platoon leader may receive one or more types of overlays from the squadron, covering such areas as maneuver, threat forces, obstacles, fire support, and CSS. All of the information is important; the key for the platoon leader is to combine, augment, and declutter the overlays so the information needed for a specific situation is readily available to the platoon on one simple, combined overlay.

LAND NAVIGATION 5-115. To protect the reconnaissance platoon, the platoon leader must learn to use terrain to his advantage. Land navigation of reconnaissance vehicles requires him to master the technique of terrain association. This entails the ability to identify terrain features on the ground by the contour intervals depicted on the map. The platoon leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of OCOKA and identifies major terrain features, contour changes, and man-made structures along his axis of advance. As the platoon advances, he uses these features to orient the platoon and to associate ground positions with map locations. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for a detailed description of the use of OCOKA factors in the terrain analysis.) 5-116. The intellectual concept of battlespace is vital to the platoon’s survival during navigation and movement. The platoon leader must constantly be aware of key terrain and threat fields of observation and fire that may create danger areas as the platoon advances. This allows him to modify movement techniques, formations, and routes and to maintain cross-talk with overwatch elements to ensure that the platoon is

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not surprised by the threat. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of danger areas in Chapter 2 of this manual.) 5-117. Navigation under limited visibility conditions is especially challenging. Vehicle thermal sights and night vision goggles provide assistance, but leaders nonetheless can easily confuse terrain features and become disoriented. The platoon can employ a variety of techniques and equipment to assist in navigation. For a detailed discussion of these methods and assets, refer to ST 3-20.983.

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Chapter 2

Leadership Competencies As a tactical organization, the reconnaissance platoon must be proficient in certain tasks and skills. While each platoon leader will establish his own collective task list based on his commander’s mission essential task list (METL), this chapter covers a roster of established leadership competencies in which every platoon and its leaders must train and maintain proficiency.

CONTENTS Troop-Leading Procedures .......................... Operational Considerations ................. Military Decision-Making Process ........ Conduct of Troop-Leading Procedures ......................................... Deployment ................................................... Critical Tasks ......................................... Platoon Guidelines ................................ Tactical Movement ....................................... Planning and Operational Considerations ................................... Fundamentals of Movement ................. Danger Areas ......................................... Platoon Formations ............................... Movement Techniques .......................... Actions on Contact ....................................... Contact Considerations ........................ The Four Steps of Actions on Contact ............................ Examples of Actions on Contact ......... Employment of Fires .................................... Employment Considerations ................ Critical Tasks ......................................... Communications .......................................... Means of Tactical Communications .... Radio Net Organization and Responsibilities .......................... Net Control ............................................. Techniques of Effective Communications ................................ Reporting ....................................................... Operational Considerations ................. Report Guidelines .................................. Types of Reports ................................... Digital Reporting and C2 Messages ....

2-1 2-2 2-3 2-3 2-19 2-19 2-19 2-20 2-20 2-21 2-23 2-27 2-30 2-34 2-35 2-37 2-45 2-48 2-48 2-48 2-48 2-49 2-51 2-54 2-55 2-56 2-57 2-57 2-58 2-59

SECTION I – TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES 2-1. Many platoons are not prepared to perform their mission effectively because of inadequate planning. To prevent this from happening, the reconnaissance platoon must be proficient in troopleading procedures. These are the basis of the dynamic process by which units develop plans and orders at every level of leadership. The troopleading process consists of eight steps, which are discussed in this chapter in the traditional order. The process, however, is not rigid, and the steps are not necessarily sequential. The tasks involved in some steps (such as initiate movement, issue the warning order, and conduct reconnaissance)

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may recur several times during the process. Although listed as the last step, activities associated with supervising and refining the plan and other preparations occur throughout the troop-leading process.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 2-2. The following points summarize important factors involved in troop-leading procedures:

NOTE:

·

Time management. The platoon leader makes the most efficient use of the time available for planning, preparation, and issuing the order. He ensures that his subordinate leaders then have sufficient time to conduct their own troopleading procedures. (Refer to the discussion of reverse planning and timeline development later in this chapter.)

·

IPB. The platoon leader must understand the IPB process. He develops knowledge of how his platoon’s actions feed the IPB for higher command elements. Likewise, it is critical for the platoon leader to understand that IPB in not just a process performed during the planning phase; rather, he is prepared to continually update his IPB throughout the mission.

·

Understanding the mission. The platoon leader must understand his mission; he develops this knowledge by conducting an effective mission analysis to identify all specified and implied tasks. At a minimum, he understands the focus of the reconnaissance (terrain-, threat-, or civilian-oriented, or a combination), the tempo of the operation, and his engagement criteria. He also develops the facts and assumptions related to his mission with regard to the factors of METT-TC.

·

Effective orders. The platoon leader must be able to issue an OPORD or FRAGO (oral, digital, or both as applicable) to convey the nature of the mission so his subordinates understand the operations they will be conducting.

·

Rehearsals. The platoon leader must be proficient in conducting rehearsals. At a minimum, he conducts rehearsals of major events in his mission (actions on expected contact and actions on the objective), actions on contact/battle drills (if different), and casualty evacuation.

·

Precombat checks and inspections. Before execution begins, soldiers must be prepared for their mission and have confidence in their equipment. To accomplish this, the platoon conducts precombat checks (PCC), as a minimum, and precombat inspections (PCI) before the mission begins.

For additional information on crew orders, rehearsals, PCCs, and PCIs, refer to the discussion of the “supervise and refine” step of troop-leading procedures later in this chapter.

2-3. The key to success is that the platoon is prepared to move by the time specified in the order with operational weapons and equipment and the basic load of supplies as specified by the order and/or the platoon

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Chapter 2 – Leadership Competencies

leader. All personnel must be able to explain the higher unit’s mission, the higher commander’s intent, the platoon mission, and their specified tasks and duties to support the mission. All attachments must be received, briefed, and inspected. The elements of SERE (survival, escape, resistance, evasion) should also be considered and addressed. For further information on SERE, refer to ST 3-20.983.

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 2-4. Decisions are the means by which a commander or leader translates the information available to him and his vision of the desired end state of an operation into the actions necessary to achieve that end state. Decision-making is a conscious process for selecting a COA from two or more alternatives. As outlined in FM 5-0 (FM 101-5), it is a learned skill of knowing if to decide, then when and what to decide. The process includes an understanding of the consequences of each decision. 2-5. The military decision-making process (MDMP) is the Army’s adaptation of this analytical approach to decision-making and problemsolving. It provides the commander or leader with a valuable tool in developing his estimate of the situation and his plan. Although the process begins with the receipt of the mission, the analytical aspects of the MDMP continue at all levels throughout the operation. Refer to FM 50 for a detailed examination of the MDMP. 2-6. At platoon level, many actions associated with the MDMP are based on SOPs and standard unit drills; these include evacuation of wounded soldiers, rearming and resupply procedures, and individual crew responsibilities. This allows the platoon to operate quickly and efficiently without constant guidance from the platoon leader. SOPs are especially critical in helping to maintain combat preparedness when leaders are tired as a result of the stress of continuous operations. Because SOPs are so critical, it is absolutely necessary that everyone in the platoon know and understand them.

CONDUCT OF TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES 2-7. Regardless of the time available, leaders must always remember this principle: “see the terrain, see the enemy, see yourself.” Only after they view and evaluate the terrain and the enemy, can they determine what their own actions should be in that given situation. They update this visualization continuously throughout the troop-leading process, basing this new “picture” of the battlefield on their own refinements to the plan, additional information from various sources, and/or developments in the reconnaissance or security operation. 2-8. Troop-leading procedures begin when the platoon leader receives the first indication of an upcoming operation (often by warning order from higher) and continue throughout the planning, preparation, and execution phases of the mission. The platoon leader maximizes the available planning time by starting as soon as the first bit of information becomes available. He normally uses one-third of the available time to plan, prepare, and issue the order; his vehicle commanders then have the remaining two-thirds of the time available to conduct their own troopleading procedures. This system of time allocation is known as the “onethird/two-thirds” rule of planning and preparation.

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2-9. Figure 2-1 lists the eight troop-leading steps and illustrates their role in relation to the MDMP, which plays an important role in the troopleading process. The following discussion provides a step-by-step overview of troop-leading procedures. NOTE:

Refer to the appropriate platoon-level MTP for the training and evaluation outline (T&EO) covering the task of conducting troop-leading procedures. The task, included in Chapter 5 of the MTP, includes procedures involved in each of the troop-leading steps.

Figure 2-1. Relationship of Troop-Leading Procedures and the Military Decision-Making Process RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE MISSION

2-10. The reconnaissance platoon leader normally receives his orders as an oral, written, and/or digital OPORD, as a FRAGO, or as a warning order. Upon receipt of the order, he begins analyzing the mission using the factors of METT-TC: mission, enemy (threat), terrain (and weather), troops, time available, and civil considerations. Mission analysis is a continuous process. The platoon leader constantly receives information during the planning phase and must decide if it affects his mission. If it does, he then decides how to adjust his plan to meet this new situation. Initial Actions

2-11. Although mission analysis is continuously refined throughout the troop-leading process, the platoon leader’s initial actions are normally based only on the initial warning order from higher. These include an initial METT-TC analysis covering the terrain and the threat and friendly situations.

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2-12. The platoon leader may also conduct his initial time analysis, develop an initial security plan, and issue his own initial warning order to provide guidance and planning focus for his subordinates. At a minimum, the initial platoon warning order should cover the threat and friendly situations, movement instructions, and coordinating instructions such as an initial timeline and security plan. (NOTE: The initial analysis is normally conducted as quickly as possible to allow the platoon leader to issue the initial warning order in a timely manner. He conducts a more detailed METT-TC analysis after the initial warning order is put out.) NOTE:

The technique of using multiple warning orders is a valuable tool for the platoon leader during the troop-leading process. He can issue warning orders for several purposes: to alert subordinates of the upcoming mission, to initiate the parallel planning process, and to put out tactical information incrementally as it is received (ultimately reducing the length of the OPORD). Refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) for a discussion of how multiple warning orders are employed at various stages of the troop-leading process.

METT-TC Analysis

2-13. The following discussion provides detailed information on the six METT-TC factors. (NOTE: METT-TC factors are not necessarily analyzed sequentially. How and when the platoon leader analyzes each factor depends on when the information is made available to him.) 2-14. Mission. After receiving an essential task and purpose, either in a warning order or the OPORD, the platoon leader can then begin the analysis of his own mission. He may use a refined product to better visualize the interrelationships of the terrain, the threat, and friendly forces. These may include a MCOO and/or the SITEMP, if available. The platoon leader’s goal in this analysis is to clarify what the platoon is to accomplish and why the platoon must accomplish it. Key considerations in the analysis include the following:

· · ·

What is my task and purpose for this operation?

·

What are the implied tasks for the operation? These are other tasks, not specifically noted by the commander, that must be accomplished to achieve the purpose or specified tasks.

·

What are the essential tasks for the operation? These are all tasks, both specified and implied, that are absolutely required to ensure mission success.

· · ·

What is the focus of the operation?

What is the commander’s intent? What are the specified tasks for the operation (those that the commander stated must be accomplished)? (NOTE: In the OPORD, these tasks are outlined in paragraph 3, which comprises the commander’s intent, concept of the operation, tasks to subordinate units, and coordinating instructions.)

What is the tempo of the operation? What are the engagement criteria for the platoon? For the troop? For the squadron/battalion?

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2-15. Enemy (Threat Forces). The platoon leader’s analysis of the threat situation should focus on the areas outlined in FM 3-90.1 (FM 711)—including doctrinal analysis and objectives, composition and disposition, capabilities, weaknesses, anticipated COAs, and factors that can influence these COAs—as well as those in FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130), which covers IPB. The analysis can focus on the following considerations:

· ·

What types of threat units is the platoon up against? Where are these units? (NOTE: If possible, these locations should be templated to vehicle level.)

· · ·

What is the threat doing?

· · · ·

What are his capabilities and weaknesses?

·

How will he react to the eight forms of contact? These are the following:

·

How strong is he? What kind of equipment does he have? What are his weapons types and effective ranges? Where is he vulnerable? Where are his engagement areas? What are the threat’s intentions, doctrinal objectives, and most probable COA(s)?

n

Visual contact.

n

Physical contact (direct fire).

n

Indirect fire contact.

n

Contact with obstacles of threat or unknown origin.

n

Contact with threat or unknown aircraft.

n

Contact involving NBC conditions.

n

Situations involving electronic warfare tactics (such as jamming, interference, and imitative deception).

n

Situations civilians).

involving

nonhostile

elements

(such

as

What can the threat do in response to friendly actions?

2-16. Terrain (and Weather). The platoon leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of OCOKA: observation and fields of fire; cover and concealment; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach. The following discussion focuses on questions the platoon leader can use in his analysis. 2-17. Observation and fields of fire. The platoon leader should cover the following considerations in his analysis:

2-6

·

Where can the threat observe and engage my platoon, and how do I counter this capability?

·

Where can I establish OPs to maximize my ability to see the battlefield?

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2-18. Cover and concealment. The platoon leader should include the following considerations in his analysis of cover and concealment:

·

What routes within the area of operations offer cover and concealment for my platoon or for threat elements?

·

What dismounted and/or mounted routes offer my platoon the best available cover and concealment?

2-19. Obstacles. In terrain analysis, the platoon leader first identifies existing and reinforcing obstacles that may limit mobility (affecting such features as objectives, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors).

2-20. Existing obstacles include, but are not limited to, the following:

· · · · · ·

Gullies, ravines, gaps, and ditches over 3 meters wide.

·

Man-made existing obstacles, including built-up areas such as towns, cities, or railroad embankments.

Streams, rivers, and canals over 1 meter deep. Mountains or hills with a slope in excess of 60 percent. Lakes, swamps, and marshes over 1 meter deep. Tree stumps and large rocks over 18 inches high. Forest or jungles with trees 8 inches or more in diameter and with less than 4 meters of space between trees.

2-21. Reinforcing obstacles include, but are not limited to, the following:

· · · · ·

Minefields. Antitank ditches. Road craters. Abatises. Wire obstacles.

2-22. Based on the degree of obstruction posed by obstacles, terrain is further classified in one of the following categories:

·

Unrestricted. This is terrain that is free of any restriction to movement; no actions are required to enhance mobility. For wheeled vehicles, this terrain is typically flat or moderately sloped, with scattered or widely spaced obstacles such as trees or rocks. This type of terrain generally allows wide maneuver and offers unlimited travel over well-developed road networks.

·

Restricted. Restricted terrain hinders movement to some degree. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units may have to zigzag or make frequent detours. They may have difficulty maintaining optimum speed, moving in some types of combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to another. For wheeled vehicles, restricted terrain typically encompasses moderate to steep slopes and/or moderate to dense spacing of obstacles such as trees, rocks, or buildings.

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Swamps and rugged ground are examples of restricted terrain for dismounted infantry forces. Logistical or rear area movement in this type of terrain may be hampered by poorly developed road systems.

·

Severely restricted. This terrain severely hinders or slows movement in combat formation unless some effort is made to enhance mobility. This could require commitment of engineer forces to improve mobility or deviation from doctrinal tactics, such as using a column rather than a line formation or moving at speeds much lower than otherwise preferred. Severely restricted terrain for wheeled vehicles is typically characterized by steep slopes, densely spaced obstacles, and/or the virtual absence of a developed road system.

2-23. Key terrain. Key terrain is any location or area whose seizure,

retention, or control affords a marked advantage either to friendly forces or to the threat. The platoon leader’s analysis should cover these factors:

· · ·

Where and what is the key terrain? How can the platoon use key terrain to support the mission? How will the threat use key terrain to support his mission?

2-24. Avenues of approach. These are areas through which a unit can maneuver. The definition of an avenue of approach is an area that provides sufficient ease of movement and enough width to allow passage of a force large enough to significantly affect the outcome of the battle. The platoon leader’s analysis should include these considerations:

·

Where are the most favorable mounted and dismounted avenues of approach for threat and friendly forces?

·

Where are the best air avenues of approach for threat forces?

2-25. Weather. The platoon leader analyzes weather conditions as part of his evaluation of the terrain. The following considerations should be included in this evaluation:

·

What are the light conditions (including percentage of night illumination) and visibility?

· ·

How has recent weather affected the area of operations?

· ·

Will weather become better or worse during the mission?

·

How will weather conditions affect the employment of chemical weapons and/or smoke?

What are the times for beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), sunrise, sunset, end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), moonrise, and moonset? How will fog, rain, dust, heat, snow, wind, or blowing sand affect the troops and equipment of both friendly and threat forces during the mission?

2-26. Troops and Support Available. The platoon leader’s analysis of troops and support available for an operation includes an assessment of

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the platoon’s vehicles and equipment. His analysis should include the following considerations:

·

What is the present condition of the platoon’s soldiers, vehicles, and equipment?

·

What is the supply status of ammunition, fuel, and other necessary items?

·

What is the turnaround time for resupply operations (time between transmission of the request and delivery of supplies)?

· · · · ·

What is the state of training of the platoon?

·

What attachments does the platoon have (or require) to accomplish its mission?

·

How many OPs (mounted/dismounted and long-/shortduration) can be manned with the available assets?

·

How big a frontage can be covered with the available assets?

What is the state of morale? How much sleep have the soldiers had? How much sleep can they get before and during the operation? Does the platoon need any additional equipment to support or accomplish its mission?

2-27. Time Available. The platoon leader’s analysis of the time

available for an operation begins with the “one-third/two-thirds” rule of planning and preparation discussed earlier in this section. This principle allows the platoon leader to use one-third of planning and preparation time himself, then to allocate the remaining two-third to subordinates. Additional considerations in the analysis should include the following:

·

How much time reconnaissance?

·

How much time is available for rearming, refueling, and resupply?

·

How long will it take the platoon to move to planned OPs, to the line of departure (LD), and/or to the objective?

· ·

Is there enough time for rehearsals?

·

How does the potential threat timeline for planning and preparation compare with that developed for friendly forces?

is

available

to

plan

and

conduct

How much time is available to the threat for the activities listed in the previous items?

2-28. Civil Considerations. In his analysis of how the platoon will handle situations involving civilians and other aspects of the civil environment (including stability operations and support operations), the platoon leader should assess the following considerations:

·

How will existing civil considerations affect the mission? What are the potential negative effects of civilian contact?

·

What are the applicable rules of engagement (ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI)?

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·

What procedures and guidelines will the platoon use in dealing with refugees, prisoners, and other civilians?

·

Will the platoon be working with civilian organizations, such as governmental agencies, private groups, or the media?

·

Will the platoon conduct stability operations (such as peace operations or noncombatant evacuation) or support operations (such as humanitarian or environmental assistance)? See the discussion of the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance in Chapter 3 of this manual and the discussion of stability operations and support operations in Appendix D.

Information Sources

2-29. In planning and preparing for the mission, the platoon leader may find that he requires additional sources of information to help answer some of the questions raised in the analysis of METT-TC. The platoon can receive and/or request information from a variety of sources to assist in planning and understanding the operational area, including the following:

·

Paragraph 1 of the OPORD (especially those portions covering the threat and the applicable terrain and weather).

·

UAV imagery and video (such as photos/video of a route or danger area to assist with the METT-TC assessment).

·

Satellite imagery (for example, showing locations of increased military traffic).

·

Engineer database information on terrain, such as from the TERRABASE program.

·

HUMINT reports from brigade and higher, such as a human density overlay.

· ·

Assessments on the operational area. Signal intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signal intelligence (MASINT) reports from the surveillance troop.

Risk Management

2-30. Leaders must make a thorough risk assessment, identifying and evaluating hazards the platoon will face during the operation. They then develop risk management controls and ensures that all subordinate leaders and individual scouts implement them to eliminate or reduce the risks. Refer to Appendix H of this manual for a detailed discussion of the risk management process. Reverse Planning and Timeline Development

2-31. After completing his METT-TC analysis, the platoon leader conducts reverse planning to ensure that all specified, implied, and essential tasks can be accomplished in the time available. He develops a reverse planning schedule (timeline), as illustrated in Figure 2-2. Beginning with actions on the objective, he works backward through each step of the operation and then through preparation and planning activities to the present time. This process also helps the platoon in making efficient use of planning and preparation time.

2-10

___________________________________________________

NOTE:


Simultaneous planning and preparation are key factors in effective time management during the troop-leading process. The next five steps (issue a warning order; make a tentative plan; initiate movement; conduct reconnaissance; complete the plan) may occur simultaneously and/or in a different order. As noted, the final troop-leading step, supervise and refine, is on-going throughout the process.

Figure 2-2. Example Reverse Planning Timeline ISSUE THE WARNING ORDER

2-32. After the platoon leader has analyzed his orders and worked out his mission and related tasks, he must quickly pass this information to his subordinate leaders. This is accomplished through the warning order. As a minimum, the following information must be included:

· ·

Elements and individuals to whom the warning order applies. Threat situation as stated in the higher unit’s order.

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· · · ·

The time and nature of the operation. The earliest time of movement. Coordinating instructions, including an initial timeline. The time and place the OPORD will be issued.

2-33. If possible, the platoon leader should issue a conventional (analog) and/or digital overlay of the area of operations. In the absence of further orders, this gives the platoon an idea of the scope of the operation. Also, the platoon leader should inform his subordinates of the results of his reverse planning process and delegate appropriate preparation tasks to the PSG and to the section and squad leaders. If possible, the platoon leader should also include the task organization of the platoon. In addition to accounting for all required preparatory tasks, the reverse planning schedule should include a sleep plan. All elements should acknowledge receipt of the warning order. NOTE:

The sleep plan should be a 24-hour plan with the goal of maximizing available time in the planning, preparation, and execution phases of the operation. It covers all platoon members.

MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN

2-34. Based on results of his mission analysis, the platoon leader develops a tentative plan that addresses all specified, implied, and essential tasks using the OPORD format (see Appendix A of this manual). INITIATE MOVEMENT

2-35. After issuing a warning order and making a tentative plan, the platoon leader may choose to initiate movement. The platoon leader should at least be able to determine when the platoon will move. He announces this in terms of a readiness condition (REDCON) level. Each REDCON level indicates critical tasks and time available to prepare for future operations. The following considerations apply:

·

NOTE:

n

All personnel alert and ready for action.

n

Vehicles loaded and secured, and weapons manned.

n Vehicle engines running and OPs not manned. A variant of REDCON-1 is REDCON-1(-); the same conditions apply except that the vehicles are not started in REDCON-1(-). · REDCON-2 (be prepared to move in 15 minutes).

·

2-12

REDCON-1 (be prepared to move immediately). These conditions are in effect:

n

All personnel alert.

n

OPs and wire pulled in.

REDCON-3 (be prepared to move in half an hour). n

Fifty percent of each crew/squad stand down for rest, feeding, and maintenance.

n

Remaining 50 percent man vehicles, OPs, and weapons and monitor radios/phones.

___________________________________________________

·


REDCON-4 (be prepared to move in one hour). n

Two men per platoon make dismounted checks of platoon area.

n

One man per vehicle monitors radios/phones and mans turret weapon.

2-36. All personnel remain at 100 percent alert until prioritized mission preparations are complete. The platoon leader initiates the appropriate REDCON when the work is finished. As the time for mission execution nears, he increases the REDCON in accordance with guidance from higher, achieving REDCON-1 before the platoon must move. CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE

2-37. This step of the troop-leading procedures allows the platoon leader to confirm the validity of his tentative plan and to refine the plan. The platoon leader should conduct the reconnaissance with his subordinate leaders. This will allow them to see the terrain and develop a better visualization of the projected plan. At a minimum, the platoon leader conducts this step as a detailed map reconnaissance. He should at least confirm his initial march route to the LD or start point (SP) and check initial positions. If possible, he should also check some of the area beyond the LD; this may require permission from the commander. 2-38. If the platoon leader cannot personally conduct on-site reconnaissance, he should make the most efficient use of available time by tasking his subordinates to accomplish specific reconnaissance requirements. An example of this is tasking a squad leader to reconnoiter and time routes to the SP. The platoon leader must conduct the reconnaissance with an open mind; not everything he sees will match his tentative plan. He must be flexible enough to change and competent enough to work out new plans rapidly. NOTE:

For detailed discussions of reconnaissance procedures, refer to Chapter 3 of this manual.

COMPLETE THE PLAN

2-39. The platoon leader refines his plan based on the results of the reconnaissance. He then completes the plan using these results and any new information from his commander and members of his platoon. He should keep the plan as simple as possible, at the same time ensuring that it effectively supports the commander’s intent. 2-40. As he completes and refines his plan, the platoon leader should consider delegating planning responsibilities to other members of the platoon. He can then use the information developed by these soldiers in developing his order and in establishing an effective platoon SOP. Examples of delegated planning responsibilities include the following:

·

The HUMINT NCO researches and briefs the threat/civilian situation.

· ·

A section sergeant researches and briefs terrain and weather. An NCO sets up rehearsals.

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·

The PSG researches, plans, and briefs CSS considerations (such as MEDEVAC and vehicle recovery operations).

· ·

An NCO translates graphics to FBCB2 and overlays.

·

An NCO plans and briefs occupation procedures for such areas as objective rally points (ORP), OPs, and surveillance sites.

·

An NCO plans and briefs specific communication issues (paragraph 5 of the OPORD).

·

An NCO plans and briefs specific coordinating instructions (such as the collection plan, actions on contact, special equipment, linkup tasks, and methods of handling EPWs).

·

A leader finalizes the risk management process, as outlined in Appendix J of this manual.

Section sergeants plan specific reconnaissance patrols in support of the overall mission.

2-41. Using this type of planning delegation will help the platoon leader to ensure that his subordinate leaders are in synch with the plan. It also facilitates a more rapid planning process. The platoon leader must remain fully aware of all facets of the plan and of the activities of his subordinates. He must also give clear guidance for this technique to be successful. ISSUE THE ORDER

2-42. The platoon leader issues his finalized order in the five-paragraph OPORD format, as discussed in Appendix A of this manual. He refers to notes to make sure he does not forget anything. He ensures that all subordinate leaders understand the entire plan as well as their particular portion of it. To ensure complete understanding of the operation, the platoon leader should end the order with a brief-back of key points by his leaders. 2-43. Whenever possible, the platoon leader should issue his order to the entire platoon. At a minimum, he should issue the order to his subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders. Once everyone has arrived at the place and time specified in the warning order, the platoon leader or PSG should ensure that everyone has recorded the applicable graphic control measures. The platoon leader should issue the revised operations overlay before he starts; he should have a copy of the graphics for each of his leaders. The PSG ensures that each subordinate leader’s overlay matches the platoon leader’s overlay. To use his time most efficiently, the platoon leader should use a walk-through rehearsal as part of his briefing of paragraph 3 of the order. 2-44. If he can issue the order from a favorable vantage point, the platoon leader can physically indicate the ground over which his scouts will maneuver. If a vantage point is not available, he can use a terrain cloth, sand table, or map as a reference. He leader should have a briefing kit available to build a model of the area of operations; items in the kit might include the following:

· ·

2-14

Nylon rope and nails or spikes. “Micro” armor vehicles or other models.

___________________________________________________


·

Preconstructed plexiglas squares for units and equipment (blue for friendly elements, red for threat forces).

· · · · ·

Pens and markers. Stakes. Engineer tape. Operational symbol cutouts. Dry eraser board.

2-45. In extreme situations, FBCB2 allows the platoon leader to issue the OPORD to his sections or squads when they are widely dispersed and cannot gather at a central point. The platoon leader must alert his elements (via FM voice) that a new order is available on the FBCB2 and direct each element to acknowledge receipt of the order. SUPERVISE AND REFINE

2-46. Flexibility is the key to effective operations. The reconnaissance platoon leader must be able to refine his plan whenever new information becomes available. If he adjusts the plan, he must inform the platoon and supervise implementation of the changes. Once the operation has begun, the platoon leader must be able to direct his platoon in response to new information and new situations. 2-47. Crew orders, rehearsals, and inspections are essential elements of the supervision process as the platoon prepares for the mission. The following discussion covers these procedures in detail. Crew Orders

2-48. The platoon leader and PSG make sure all crewmembers have been briefed by their leaders or vehicle commanders and understand the platoon mission and concept of the operation. Combat orders are the means by which the platoon leader receives and transmits information, from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the final phases of execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success. All members of the platoon must be familiar with the formats of warning orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs. For a detailed discussion of combat orders, refer to Appendix A of this manual. Rehearsals

2-49. The platoon leader should never underestimate the value of rehearsals. They are his most valuable tools in preparing the platoon for the upcoming operation. Refer to FM 101-5 for a detailed discussion of rehearsal types, techniques, and procedures. The platoon leader uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following purposes:

· · · ·

Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks. Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan. Synchronize the actions of subordinate elements. Improve each soldier’s understanding of the concept of the operation.

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2-50. Rehearsal Types. The platoon leader can choose among several types of rehearsals, each designed to achieve a specific result and with a specific role in the planning and preparation timeline. The following discussion focuses on the five rehearsal types. 2-51. Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is, in effect, a

reverse briefing process routinely performed by subordinate leaders immediately after receiving any instructions, such as an OPORD or FRAGO. They confirm their understanding by repeating and explaining details of the operation for their leader. In the reconnaissance platoon, the platoon leader should conduct confirmation briefs after his subordinate leaders have received the OPORD, but before other phases of the platoon rehearsal begin.

2-52. Backbrief. Leaders perform this type of rehearsal throughout the planning and preparation timeline to help clarify their intent for their subordinates. The backbrief allows the platoon leader to identify problems in his own concept of the operation and his subordinates’ understanding of the concept; he also uses the backbrief to learn how subordinates intend to accomplish their missions.

2-53. Support rehearsal. Support rehearsals are normally conducted

within the framework of a single operating system, such as fire support or CSS, or a limited number of operating systems. The goals are to ensure that support elements can achieve their missions within the higher commander’s plan and that their support plans are synchronized with the overall maneuver plan. The rehearsals are conducted throughout the planning and preparation timeline.

2-54. Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. This type of rehearsal is used to

ensure that all participants understand a technique or a specific set of procedures. The platoon initiates battle drill and/or SOP rehearsals as soon as possible after receipt of the mission; he then can continue to conduct them as needed throughout the planning and preparation timeline. This rehearsal does not necessarily cover a published drill or SOP, giving the commander or leader flexibility in designing the rehearsal. For example, the platoon leader could rehearse procedures for marking obstacle lanes or establishing local security. (NOTE: It is recommended that drills for actions on contact be rehearsed frequently during planning and preparation.)

2-55. Rehearsal Techniques. The platoon leader can choose among several techniques in conducting rehearsals, which should follow the crawl-walk-run training methodology to prepare the platoon for increasingly difficult conditions. As noted in FM 5-0 (FM 101-5), techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the resourcefulness of the commander or leader; that manual outlines six basic techniques (full dress, reduced force, terrain model, sketch map, map, and radio). The following discussion covers these techniques, which are listed in descending order in terms of the preparation time and resources required to conduct them. Considerations in selecting a rehearsal technique include the following:

2-16

·

Time. How much time will be needed for planning, preparation, and execution?

·

Terrain. What are the applicable terrain considerations?

___________________________________________________


·

Multiechelon involved?

·

Operations security (OPSEC). Will the rehearsal allow the threat to gain intelligence about upcoming operations?

employment.

How

many

echelons

are

2-56. Full force rehearsal. This rehearsal produces the most detailed

understanding of the mission, but is the most difficult to conduct in terms of preparation and resources. It involves every soldier and system participating in the operation. If possible, units should conduct the full force rehearsal under the same conditions (such as weather, time of day, terrain, and use of live ammunition) that they will encounter during the actual operation.

2-57. Reduced force rehearsal. This rehearsal normally involves

only key leaders of the unit and is thus less extensive than the full dress rehearsal in terms of preparation time and resources. The commander decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan, if possible on the terrain to be used for the actual operation. The reduced force rehearsal is often conducted to prepare leaders for the full dress rehearsal.

2-58. Terrain model rehearsal. This is the most popular rehearsal technique, employing an accurately constructed model to help subordinates visualize the battle in accordance with the commander’s or leader’s intent. When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations or is within walking distance of such a vantage point. Size of the model can vary, but it should be large enough to depict graphic control measures and important terrain features for reference and orientation. Participants walk or move “micro” armor around the table or model to practice the actions of their own vehicles in relation to other members of the platoon.

2-59. Sketch map rehearsal. Units can use the sketch map technique

almost anywhere, day or night. Procedures are similar to those for the terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large enough to allow all participants to see as each subordinate “walks” through an interactive oral presentation of his actions. Platoon elements can use symbols or “micro” armor to represent their locations and maneuver on the sketch.

2-60. Map rehearsal. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch

map rehearsal except that the commander or leader uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and control the operation. This technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation brief or backbrief involving subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders. The platoon leader uses the map and overlay to guide participants as they brief their role in the operation.

2-61. Radio rehearsal. The commander or leader conducts this

rehearsal by having his unit simulate critical portions of the operation orally and interactively over established communications networks. The radio rehearsal may be especially useful when the situation does not allow the platoon to gather at one location. Subordinate elements check their communications systems and rehearse events that are critical to the platoon plan. To be effective, the radio rehearsal requires all participants

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to have working communications equipment and a copy of the OPORD and applicable overlays. Inspections

2-62. PCCs and PCIs allow leaders to check the platoon’s operational readiness. The key goal is to ensure that soldiers and vehicles are fully prepared to execute the upcoming mission. The platoon leader makes sure the entire chain of command conducts PCCs and PCIs in accordance with ST 3-20.983 or his own SOP. 2-63. Precombat Checks. Equipment operators, vehicle crewmen, and individual soldiers conduct PCCs before executing operations. These checks are designed to ensure that equipment is in working order, required supplies are on hand, and soldiers are ready to execute the mission. PCCs are conducted in accordance with appropriate technical manuals, supply catalogs, and unit SOPs. Areas covered by PCCs include the following:

·

Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) of essential equipment.

· · ·

Vehicle load plans.

·

Resupply of rations, water, fuel, oil, all weapons, ammunition, pyrotechnics, first-aid kits, and equipment batteries (for such items as flashlights, night-vision devices, mine detectors, and NBC alarms).

·

Individual readiness. This includes ensuring that crewmembers understand the mission and tactical situation and are in the correct uniform and mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level.

· ·

Vehicle readiness, including camouflage and light leaks.

·

Communications checks, including radio, FBCB2, and tactical satellite (TACSAT) systems. This includes verifying proper uploading of data for digital equipment, proper filter settings, and integration of attached assets in digital systems.

Inspections of TA-50 equipment. NBC protective equipment (known as the ICE pack) and combat lifesaver bag inventories.

Prepare-to-fire checks for all weapons. This includes reporting or repairing deficiencies and making sure that weapons are boresighted and all sights are referred. Machine guns should be test-fired, if possible.

2-64. Precombat Inspections. Leaders in the reconnaissance platoon conduct PCIs to ensure that subordinate leaders and soldiers have executed the necessary PCCs. Obviously, leaders cannot possibly check everything. They should focus on key pieces of equipment and details of the plan that are critical to mission accomplishment. The platoon leader and PSG should coordinate their inspections to make optimum use of available time and to avoid redundant inspections. PCIs must be completed in time to fix deficiencies before mission execution begins.

2-18

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NOTE:


Refer to ST 3-20.983 for a comprehensive precombat checklist that can be employed for both PCCs and PCIs.

SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT 2-65. Global commitments place requirements on the US Army to conduct short-notice deployments. The American military is transforming itself from a forward-deployed force to a power projection force. The characteristics of this type of organization have generated new interest in the TTP involved in deployment and in the process known as reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). In planning and preparing for future operations, the US military is focusing on the strategy, tactics, and resources necessary to conduct two major, simultaneous regional contingency force projection scenarios. Such a situation will require forces to be at a high state of deployability. 2-66. The reconnaissance platoon will never deploy by itself; it will always be part of a larger organization. To ensure that the platoon is ready to fulfill its role in the power projection force, however, the platoon leader must understand the fundamentals of deployment and RSOI.

CRITICAL TASKS 2-67. Execution of deployment and RSOI entails the following critical tasks and purposes:

NOTE:

·

Prepare for deployment. Purpose: To ensure necessary personnel and equipment are on hand and fully mission capable.

·

Execute deployment. Purpose: To carry out orders from higher headquarters and protect US national interest.

·

Conduct reception operations. Purpose: To receive all unit resources, personnel, and equipment at the entry point to the theater of operations.

·

Conduct staging operations. Purpose: To incrementally build forces capable of meeting the commander’s operational and tactical mission requirements by organizing personnel and material at designated areas and preparing them for movement.

·

Execute onward movement. Purpose: To relocate forces that are capable of meeting the commander’s operational and tactical requirements to the initial point of their mission execution by rail, road, boat, or air.

·

Execute integration. Purpose: To provide the commander with a synchronized force ready to conduct operations.

For more detailed discussions of deployment tasks and procedures, refer to FM 3-35 (FM 100-17) and to the RSOI appendix in FM 3-20.96.

PLATOON GUIDELINES 2-68. The reconnaissance platoon leader should use the following guidelines to help ensure successful completion of deployment and RSOI:

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· ·

Adhere strictly to established timelines.

·

Conduct effective deployment preparations include the following:

· ·

Maintain communications with higher throughout the deployment/RSOI process.

headquarters

preparations.

Platoon

n

The platoon is prepared to deploy 24 to 36 hours after notification.

n

Vehicles are loaded, inspected (using PCI procedures), and prepared for shipment by the appropriate means (rail, road, boat, or air).

n

Soldiers are deployable, established in the unit SOP.

meeting

the

standards

Track the platoon’s combat power throughout the process. Ensure that the platoon arrives at the area of operations ready to execute the assigned missions.

SECTION III – TACTICAL MOVEMENT 2-69. To be successful, the reconnaissance platoon must be able to conduct effective tactical movement. The platoon’s ability to conduct stealthy movement, undetected by the threat, is critical to mission accomplishment.

PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 2-70. This section focuses on several critical aspects of tactical movement, including the following:

2-20

·

Movement fundamentals and formations. The reconnaissance platoon needs a thorough understanding of the fundamentals of movement and proper employment of movement formations. Use of formations must take into account such factors as METT-TC, applicable troop-leading procedures, and additional assets that influence the platoon’s movement (such as FBCB2, ground sensors, TUAVs, and GSR).

·

Movement techniques. The platoon must be proficient at using the appropriate movement technique for the specific situation. Effectively employed, movement techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, bounding overwatch, moveset techniques) allow the platoon to conduct reconnaissance without becoming compromised. They also assist the platoon leader in achieving a number of tactical purposes: n

Minimize the platoon’s exposure to threat observation and/or fire.

n

Help the platoon maintain freedom of movement.

___________________________________________________

n


Maximize the number of tactical options available to the platoon.

·

Mission considerations. The platoon applies movement fundamentals, formations, and techniques in support of its primary missions, such as reconnaissance and surveillance. It can use an array of digital tools in the planning, preparation, and execution of these operations. Such resources as TUAVs, GSR, and FBCB2 assist the platoon in conducting stealthy movement and in gaining visual contact with threat forces before they can see the scouts.

·

Chance contact. The reconnaissance platoon must take steps to minimize chance contact with threat forces. (NOTE: The use of national-level intelligence sources, coupled with the available internal information from such assets as TUAVs and ground sensors, can greatly increase the platoon’s situational awareness and therefore decrease chance contact.)

·

Timelines. The platoon conducts and completes tactical movement in accordance with the timelines directed by the higher commander.

FUNDAMENTALS OF MOVEMENT 2-71. Sound tactical movement is the essence of all reconnaissance platoon operations. Effectively employed, the guidelines in this section can help scouts to see the threat first and observe him undetected. The scouts are then able to achieve a number of tactical goals, including retaining the initiative and retaining freedom of movement to gain information. USE TERRAIN FOR COVER AND CONCEALMENT

2-72. Terrain offers concealment from threat observation and cover

from threat fire. Scouts must make maximum use of this natural protection to survive and accomplish their mission; avoiding threat detection is the key. Cover should be used whenever possible. When no cover is available, however, scouts should use the concealment offered by trees, shadows, brush, and man-made structures (see Figure 2-3). The crest drills illustrated in Figures 2-4 and 2-5 are examples of using the terrain to protect the vehicle from threat observation during movement.

2-73. During mounted or dismounted movement, individual vehicles and personnel should avoid becoming silhouetted against a skyline. In addition, they should never move directly forward from a defilade position. Direct forward movement may enable the threat to pinpoint the vehicle and engage it as it moves. Instead, vehicles should back up and move left or right around the previous position to get to the next position. 2-74. Despite its obvious advantage, movement along covered and concealed routes can present disadvantages that should be considered. Speed is often reduced, and control problems increase. The possibility of being ambushed by threat forces increases. In most situations, these limitations must be accepted because the accuracy and lethality of longrange weapons make exposed movement too dangerous. The vehicle commander or dismounted leader must be careful to balance the need for

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security with his reconnaissance.

ability

to

conduct

required

observation

and

Figure 2-3. Use of Natural Concealment

Figure 2-4. Dismounted Crest Drill

Figure 2-5. Mounted Crest Drill USE CAUTION AT DANGER AREAS

2-75. Scouts must be prepared to take necessary precautions when they encounter danger areas. Based on terrain analysis and IPB, the reconnaissance platoon leader considers where threat reconnaissance assets will be focused and determines their fields of observation. The platoon can then avoid movement through these areas. In addition, scouts

2-22

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should combine proper terrain driving techniques with carefully selected routes to maximize security.

2-76. The reconnaissance platoon should stop short of danger areas and use dismounted scouts to reconnoiter them. For example, when it encounters an open area, the platoon should send dismounts to a concealed position where they can observe the area. From that position, scouts should carefully check the other side of the open area for threat positions. The scouts must then cross the open area quickly, using overwatch and following the folds in the terrain. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of danger areas later in this chapter.) DISMOUNT VEHICLES

2-77. As a general rule, scouts dismount. This enhances mission accomplishment and survivability. Vehicles are easily identified because of their visual, sound, and exhaust signatures; vehicles that can be seen (or otherwise detected) can be killed. Conversely, dismounted patrols and OPs are very difficult to detect. Scouts should dismount their vehicles and use optical devices to gain information on objectives or areas of interest. 2-78. As an example, during reconnaissance operations, the scouts should dismount beyond the direct fire range of suspected threat positions and weapon systems. Dismounted scouts can then move in front of their vehicles using the cover and concealment of a dismounted avenue adjacent to the mounted route. Additionally, dismounts can occupy OPs while leaving the vehicles in a hide or overwatch position. These basic actions enable the dismounted scouts to provide critical information while enhancing the unit’s survivability and its ability to perform later missions. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual for further discussion of dismounted operations.) REDUCE VEHICLE-RELATED SIGNATURES

2-79. The reconnaissance platform’s major signatures (audible, thermal, visual) can be reduced. Audible signature can be reduced simply by shutting off the vehicle and related systems, such as heaters or thermal sights, whenever the vehicle is not moving or the system is not needed. Reduce visual and thermal signatures using these steps:

·

Erect camouflage nets. This will help hide a stationary vehicle both visually and thermally; nets tied to the vehicle can reduce dust and exhaust signatures, as well as reduce the thermal signature while moving.

· ·

Keep hatches closed to reduce noise and light signatures.

·

Reduce vehicle glass reflection from periscopes and windows by removing, covering, or camouflaging them (placing a net over the windshield, for example).

Prevent white light displays at night. Conduct careful PCIs of flashlights and dome lights to check for leaks.

DANGER AREAS 2-80. During the execution of reconnaissance and security missions, scouts will encounter specific types of terrain or features that expose them to threat fire. Known as danger areas, these are likely points of

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threat contact due both to the reconnaissance platoon’s vulnerability and to the cover, concealment, and observation these sites afford to the threat. Danger areas should be identified and highlighted when the platoon leader performs his map reconnaissance during troop-leading procedures. Once these areas are identified, the platoon leader can employ specific reconnaissance methods and movement techniques to move through them quickly and with maximum security. OPEN AREAS

2-81. Open areas frequently afford the reconnaissance platoon the opportunity to observe the threat or objectives from long ranges. Conversely, these areas often expose the platoon to possible threat observation and fire for long periods of movement. The platoon, therefore, must make maximum use of the terrain and employ effective observation techniques to avoid exposing itself to a well-concealed and camouflaged threat. 2-82. Before moving across a large open area, the platoon must make a thorough visual scan of the area. This should be done both dismounted and mounted. The platoon leader must use all available optics and other assets, including TUAVs and GSR, to reconnoiter the open area and find a bypass, if applicable. If a bypass cannot be found, he focuses not only on finding potential threat positions, but also on locating covered and concealed routes for bounding and covered and concealed positions to which the unit can move. If time and terrain permit, dismounted scouts may be used to move to the far side of the open area and secure it. In very large open areas, use of dismounts may not be feasible because of the distances between covered and concealed positions. 2-83. Once the area has been reconnoitered using visual, digital, and sensor enablers, the scouts move across it. They use bounding overwatch because of the possibility of threat contact. If the open area is very large, the overwatch element should only remain stationary until the bounding element has moved a distance equal to half the effective range of the overwatching element’s weapon system. When that point is reached, the overwatch element must move out, even if the bounding element has not yet reached a position of cover and concealment. 2-84. When the platoon must move across large open areas with limited cover and concealment and threat contact is likely, scouts should consider the use of reconnaissance by indirect fire to provide additional security as they move. The platoon must make the conscious decision to use this method with the understanding that stealth is being sacrificed. Additionally, indirect fire can provide concealment, with smoke either used alone or mixed with suppressive fires. Use of smoke is feasible, however, only for limited periods because of Class V supply restrictions on supporting mortar or artillery units. WOODED AREAS

2-85. Wooded areas provide a high degree of concealment to forces that occupy them, particularly infantry. They must be approached and moved through with extreme caution. Visibility within wooded areas is very limited; therefore, reconnaissance is confined primarily to trafficable routes and trails through the forest. In densely wooded areas, mounted

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scouts are extremely vulnerable to dismounted threat forces that can close on them undetected.

2-86. Scouts should use available terrain to scan the wooded area before entering. They should search for movement, reflections, smoke, and any irregular shapes or colors indicating camouflage. Whenever possible, the entire wood line should be reconnoitered with dismounts prior to mounted movement to the wooded area. 2-87. The scouts should move mounted to the wooded area using bounding overwatch. Once the vehicles are set inside the wood line (approximately 100 to 200 meters), engines are shut off, dismounted security maintained, and a listening/security halt conducted. Crewmen wearing CVC helmets remove them. Radio speakers are turned off. The halt should last approximately one to two minutes, with 360-degree security maintained throughout. Similar halts must be conducted at regular intervals during movement through the wooded area (approximately every kilometer). At the same time, because reconnaissance vehicles are most vulnerable in wooded areas when they are stopped, halts should be kept to a minimum 2-88. During movement through a wooded area, scouts should move using traveling overwatch. This technique is appropriate because of the extremely short fields of view and the danger of dismounted ambush. Exposed scouts should maintain a minimum silhouette in their vehicles because of the danger from close-in snipers and ambush. 2-89. Scouts may encounter small clearings, buildings, or hills while moving through a wooded area. Each must be treated as a separate task. Small clearings may require crossing in the same manner as a large open area. Isolated buildings must be checked by dismounted scouts. Hills and curves must be approached cautiously; dismounted scouts must clear any dead space. 2-90. Before leaving a wooded area, scouts must clear the open area to the front. They stop inside the wood line (ensuring they are still within the shadow line of the woods). Engines are turned off, and dismounted scouts move to the edge of the wooded area to observe. If the area is determined to be clear, vehicles are brought forward to observation positions. As the dismounts remount, the vehicles use their optics to again visually clear the open area. Once this is completed, the scouts resume movement using their chosen movement technique. URBAN AREAS

2-91. Urban areas, including towns and villages, pose many potential dangers for the reconnaissance platoon. Troops can be garrisoned in villages, snipers can dominate approaches, and buildings and roads can be mined and booby-trapped. Cover and concealment are abundant, and it is easy for the threat to remain undetected until he is at very close range. Urban areas are ideal for effective ambush by small numbers of infantry. Whenever possible, scouts should initially observe urban areas from a distance. Detailed reconnaissance of urban areas during MTW operations is extremely difficult and is usually beyond the capability of a reconnaissance platoon. 2-92. During reconnaissance with a multidimensional focus, scouts may be required to execute a reconnaissance of a town or village. They must 2-25

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always remember that this is a very dangerous task, especially if the threat is occupying the urban area in strength. They must take steps to counter these dangers and ensure local security. The scouts should collect tactical information and HUMINT before they enter the urban area, observing it from a distance. They look for movement and evidence of threat occupation, including track marks on pavement; lack of civilian activity; and sandbags, stakes, timber, intentional building damage, or any other sign of prepared fighting positions and obstacles.

2-93. The scouts should attempt to observe the area from multiple vantage points. Scouts move through it using traveling overwatch, ensuring that vehicles remain in mutual support and maintain 360degree security. Once in the town, all scouts must be alert to additional signs of threat activity, including tactical markings or signaling devices, antennas, spent shell casings and pyrotechnics, and damage to buildings and streets. Dismounts can be used to reconnoiter major intersections and provide security during halts. The scouts do not have the manpower or time to clear buildings. They can, however, be employed dismounted for limited search and secure tasks as needed to support the movement of the mounted element or a particular reconnaissance mission. Vehiclemounted crews must reduce their silhouette to a minimum when moving through a town. 2-94. As the platoon approaches the far side of the urban area, scouts are employed to reconnoiter the area for threat movement. The platoon should stop short and move dismounts to the edge of town. The dismounts will secure the local area and observe the open area beyond the town; the platoon should also use such assets as TUAVs to observe this area. When this reconnaissance has been completed, the vehicles will move forward and continue to observe from covered and concealed positions while the dismounted elements remount. The platoon is then prepared to continue its mission. NOTE:

Refer to Chapter 7 of this manual for specific information on urban operations.

LATERAL OR BOUNDARY ROUTES

2-95. As the platoon executes reconnaissance and security missions, it will encounter routes or mobility corridors that provide access into the area between the platoon and friendly elements to its rear. These lateral corridors pose a security threat to both the platoon and the other friendly elements. 2-96. It is critical that the scouts maintain continuous surveillance of these mobility corridors to provide security against threat forces that move into the sector after the reconnaissance platoon has moved on. This is especially important when the scouts are moving through a threat security area where threat forces are likely to respond to friendly activity or when the platoon expects to encounter a moving threat force. If necessary, the platoon can use a series of contact points and/or coordination points to enhance security during movement through the area. 2-97. To maintain surveillance, the platoon can use outposting to maximize the reconnaissance effort forward. This security technique involves the use of short-duration OPs consisting of two soldiers with 2-26

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equipment. A reconnaissance section or squad should deploy an outpost when it is at risk of losing observation on a possible threat approach route that no other element can cover. Once deployed, the outpost maintains surveillance of the avenue of approach until the rest of the reconnaissance element returns. In doing so, the outpost can provide security through early warning of threat activity that the mounted element would not have detected.

PLATOON FORMATIONS 2-98. During either mounted or dismounted movement, the reconnaissance platoon employs combat formations when terrain supports their use or when the mission or reconnaissance objective is very focused, such as in a route reconnaissance. In many situations, however, platoon formations are not appropriate to the execution of a reconnaissance or security mission. 2-99. There are six mounted reconnaissance platoon formations:

line, vee, column, staggered column, coil, and herringbone. Formations are intended to be flexible. They can be modified to fit the situation, terrain, and combat losses; they do not have exact geometric dimensions and design. Movement into and out of the various formations must be second nature to each squad. (NOTE: The following formation examples are based on the four-vehicle recce platoon.)

LINE FORMATION

2-100. This formation (see Figure 2-6) can be used regardless of the

platoon organization and is applicable to most reconnaissance platoon missions. It allows maximum reconnaissance forward.

Figure 2-6. Platoon Line Formation VEE FORMATION

2-101. The vee formation, illustrated in Figure 2-7, uses the two-section organization. The platoon maintains relative positioning based on terrain and combat losses. The vee lends itself to immediate mutual support and provides depth; it is very flexible. Using any of the techniques of movement, the two forward vehicles perform all of the information gathering and reporting. The rear vehicles provide overwatch and command and control.

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Figure 2-7. Platoon Vee Formation COLUMN FORMATION AND STAGGERED COLUMN FORMATION

2-102. The platoon uses the column formation when speed is essential as it moves on a designated route (see Figure 2-8). The column offers good protection to the flanks, but little to the front and rear. Normally, the platoon leader briefs the section leaders on the route and speed and then allows the lead section to control the column movement. This frees the platoon leader to concentrate on the subsequent mission, enhancing command and control. It does not, however, relieve him of the responsibility of tracking the move on his map. 2-103. The order of march in the column may depend on which organization the platoon will use at the end of the movement; in addition, the lead section may vary based on METT-TC considerations. When conducting movement in a secure area, it is appropriate to specify the order of march by SOP.

Figure 2-8. Platoon Column Formation

2-104. The staggered column is used for rapid movement across open terrain. It affords all-around observation and fields of fire. Figure 2-9 shows the platoon in the staggered column in a two-section organization with Alpha section leading.

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Figure 2-9. Platoon Staggered Column Formation COIL FORMATION

2-105. The platoon coil is used to provide all-around security during halts. Each vehicle has a particular position to occupy in the coil. The platoon leader designates the orientation of the coil using a cardinal direction; in the absence of orders, the direction of travel becomes 12 o’clock. The reconnaissance platoon must develop a coil SOP based on its METL, war plans, and most frequently used organizations. The SOP should be practiced as a drill so that correct execution of the coil becomes automatic. 2-106. The coil is always executed from the column or staggered column, with the lead vehicle occupying the 12 o’clock position. The other vehicles occupy the 3, 9 and 6 o’clock positions in accordance with the order of march. Vehicles are positioned 100 to 150 meters apart. An example is illustrated in Figure 2-10.

Figure 2-10. Example Platoon Coil Formation

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HERRINGBONE FORMATION

2-107. The herringbone is used to provide 360-degree security during a temporary halt from a march column (see Figure 2-11). Scouts should dismount to provide greater security. The formation may be widened to permit passage of vehicles down the center of the column. All vehicles should move completely off the road if terrain allows.

Figure 2-11. Platoon Herringbone Formation

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES 2-108. As noted earlier in this section, the reconnaissance platoon employs movement techniques for a number of reasons (minimize exposure, maintain freedom of movement, maximize available tactical options, and react effectively to contact). Effectively employed, movement techniques allow the platoon to find and observe threats without being compromised. 2-109. At the same time, however, movement techniques alone are not enough to guarantee accomplishment of these tactical goals. The platoon must use them in conjunction with other movement- and security-related measures. For example, scouts must make maximum use of all available natural cover and concealment when moving. In addition, they must avoid becoming vehicle-bound; they must dismount to improve observation, prevent threat detection, and provide security. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

2-110. In conducting either mounted and dismounted movement on the battlefield, the reconnaissance platoon uses three movement techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. These techniques provide a standard method of movement, but the platoon leader must use common sense in employing them as he performs his missions and encounters different situations. The decision of which technique to use is based in large part on the likelihood of threat contact; in general, this can be summarized as whether contact is not likely (traveling), possible (traveling overwatch), or expected (bounding overwatch). Terrain considerations may also affect the choice of movement technique. 2-111. In the conduct of most tactical missions, the reconnaissance platoon will move as separate sections or squads under the command and control of the platoon leader. Traveling overwatch and bounding overwatch, therefore, are most often executed at the section or squad

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level. Traveling, which is usually employed in secured areas, is used equally at the section and platoon levels.

2-112. Regardless of which technique is used, the section leader gives the section an order explaining what each squad will do. This becomes more critical as the likelihood of threat contact increases. If possible, the section leader should provide his squads with the following information:

· ·

The threat situation as he knows or suspects it to be.

· ·

The route of the bounding element to that position.

The next overwatch position (the objective for the bounding element). What he wants the section to do after the bounding element gets to the next position.

EXECUTION OF MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES Traveling

2-113. In this technique, the lead and trail elements move together as a unit. It is the fastest but least secure movement technique. It is used when speed is important and threat contact is not likely. Movement is continuous, and interval and dispersion are maintained between squads as terrain and weather permit. The platoon does not intend to engage in combat, but it is dispersed to prevent destruction in case of unexpected air or ground attack. When using this technique, the platoon could be in a column formation or dispersed in its other formations (see Figure 2-12).

Figure 2-12. Recce Platoon Using Traveling Technique and Staggered Column Formation Traveling Overwatch

2-114. Traveling overwatch is used when contact is possible but speed is desirable (see Figures 2-13 and 2-14). The lead element moves continuously along covered and concealed routes that afford the best available protection from possible threat observation and direct fire. The trail element moves at variable speeds, providing continuous overwatch.

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It normally maintains visual contact with the lead element and may stop periodically for better observation. The trail element remains close enough to provide immediate suppressive fire and to maneuver for support. It must, however, be far enough to the rear to avoid contact in case the lead element is engaged by a threat force.

Figure 2-13. Section Using Traveling Overwatch Technique and Wedge Formation

Figure 2-14. Dismounted Traveling Overwatch Bounding Overwatch

2-115. Employed when threat contact is expected, bounding overwatch is the most deliberate and secure movement technique. It provides for immediate direct fire suppression on a threat force that engages the bounding element with direct fire. (NOTE: When sufficient time is

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available, bounding overwatch should always be used regardless of the likelihood of threat contact.)

2-116. In bounding overwatch, one element is always stationary to provide overwatch. The trail element first occupies a covered and concealed position from which it can overwatch the lead element. Upon completing its movement (bound), the lead element then occupies a similar position and provides overwatch as the trail element bounds forward to its next overwatch position. Bounding overwatch can be executed using one of the following bounding methods:

·

Alternate bounds. In this method, the trail element advances past the lead element to the next overwatch position. This is usually more rapid than successive bounds.

·

Successive bounds. In successive bounding, the trail element moves to an overwatch position that is approximately abreast of the lead element. This method is easier to control and more secure than alternate bounding, but it is slower.

2-117. As an example, a two-vehicle section may use bounding overwatch with successive bounds (see Figure 2-15). The lead vehicle advances to a point (first move) where it can support the advance of the overwatch vehicle. On signal, the overwatch vehicle moves forward to a position abreast of the lead vehicle (second move) and halts. During its move, it is overwatched by the lead vehicle. The lead vehicle then moves forward again, with the overwatch vehicle providing security. Maximum use is made of folds of the earth and concealment to mask movement from likely threat positions. (NOTE: See Figure 2-16 for an illustration of dismounted bounding overwatch. This can also be conducted at squad level with the vehicle providing overwatch and the dismounted team moving as the lead bounding element.)

Figure 2-15. Section Movement Using Bounding Overwatch Technique

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Figure 2-16. Dismounted Bounding Overwatch Move-Set Technique

2-118. This method of movement is simply an organized way of

controlling the section when it moves in bounding overwatch. “Set” means that the element has arrived at its destination and has occupied a position from which it can observe to its front. This technique allows for an absolute minimum of radio transmissions, positive control by the section leader, and maximum security within the section. Preferably, the section leader uses hand-and-arm signals within the section for C2. If the section leader must use the radio, squad leaders should keep their radios on the lowest possible power setting to minimize their signature and reduce possible interference on the platoon net. The move-set method can be used to control bounding overwatch within the section regardless of the platoon organization.

2-119. When terrain permits sections to be mutually supporting (such as in desert terrain) and other METT-TC factors are favorable, the platoon leader can use this technique to control platoon bounding (by sections). In such a situation, the sections would not be operating independently, but rather would be directly controlled, and their movement coordinated, by the platoon leader.

SECTION IV – ACTIONS ON CONTACT 2-120. Prior to any mission, the leadership of the reconnaissance platoon must conduct a detailed IPB (covered in Chapter 1 of this manual) of the area of operations as part of analyzing the mission during troop-leading procedures (discussed in earlier in this chapter). The leaders must determine the probability of contact and identify locations where contact is most likely to occur. To do this, they use information from all available

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assets, to include TUAVs, GSR reports on the FBCB2, information collected by dismounted patrols, and intelligence from the S2. The leaders are then able to plan for contact and determine how to employ TTP, such as the proper movement techniques, to avoid chance contact.

CONTACT CONSIDERATIONS 2-121. The ideal way for the platoon to make contact is by means of reports from other ISR assets (such as TUAVs or GSR). FBCB2 will allow immediate dissemination of this information. The platoon leader can then evaluate and develop the situation out of contact. Based on this evaluation and further guidance from higher, he can maneuver the platoon out of contact and make contact either on his own terms or as directed by the commander. THE EIGHT FORMS OF CONTACT

2-122. No matter how thoroughly the platoon leader prepares for an operation, direct contact with the threat is still a possibility, usually as a result of chance contact. In all types of operations, contact occurs when an individual soldier, squad, or section of the platoon encounters any situation that requires an active or passive response to the threat. These situations may entail one or more of the following forms of contact:

·

Visual contact (friendly elements may or may not be observed by the threat).

· · · · · · ·

Physical contact (direct fire) with a threat force. Indirect fire contact. Contact with obstacles of threat or unknown origin. Contact with threat or unknown aircraft. Situations involving NBC conditions. Situations involving electronic warfare tactics. Situations involving nonhostile elements, such as civilians.

INITIAL CONTACT AND REACTION

2-123. The platoon must be prepared to execute actions on contact under any of the following conditions:

· · ·

Visual contact (the platoon is undetected by the threat force). Contact with an unknown or superior force. Contact with an inferior force.

2-124. Whether the platoon remains undetected or is identified by threat forces, it must first take actions to protect itself, find out what it is up against, and decide on a COA. To properly execute actions on contact, the platoon must take action consistent with the fundamentals of reconnaissance (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion):

· ·

Develop the situation rapidly. Report quickly and accurately.

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·

Maintain contact with the threat in accordance with the mission.

· ·

Retain the freedom to maneuver. Remain focused on the reconnaissance objective.

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT

2-125. When contact is made, the reconnaissance platoon executes battle drills, designated by SOP, to maintain freedom of maneuver and avoid becoming decisively engaged. It uses the four steps of actions on contact (covered in detail later in this section) as the foundation for these drills:

· · · ·

Deploy and report. Evaluate and develop the situation. Choose/recommend a COA and maneuver the force. Execute the COA.

2-126. The platoon leader will direct the platoon’s actions based on the commander’s intent and guidance he receives from the OPORD/FRAGO. These specific instructions must include focus of the reconnaissance, tempo of the operation, engagement criteria, and the desired COA based on the size and activity of the threat force encountered. By knowing these details ahead of time, the platoon leader can develop the situation more rapidly and arrive at and execute the desired COA. He strives to make contact with combat multipliers (such as GSR assets or TUAVs) or with its smallest possible internal element: the dismounted scout. The goal is digital or visual contact in which the threat is observed but the platoon remains undetected. This gives the platoon the greatest possible flexibility to maneuver and develop the situation. 2-127. When the platoon deploys and reports, it employs the fundamental techniques of tactical movement (dismounted/mounted) and action drills, using the terrain to ensure effective cover and concealment. As information becomes available, the element in contact sends a contact report, followed by a SPOTREP (digital/analog). The platoon executes fire and maneuver only when specifically directed by the platoon leader. 2-128. Developing the situation is a critical step in choosing the correct COA and providing an accurate, timely report to the commander. Once the platoon leader has enough information to make a decision, he selects a COA that is within the capabilities of the platoon, that allows the platoon to continue the reconnaissance as quickly as possible, and that supports the commander’s concept of the operation. He considers various possible COAs, based on well-developed TTP (including battle drills), to meet the types of contact. At a minimum, the platoon must rehearse and be ready to execute these potential COAs:

· · · · ·

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Disengage from threat contact. Break contact and bypass. Maintain contact and bypass. Maintain contact to support an attack on an inferior force. Conduct an attack against an inferior force.

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· · ·


Conduct a hasty defense. Conduct reconnaissance handover. Conduct battle handover, if applicable.

THE FOUR STEPS OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT 2-129. The steps that make up actions on contact must be thoroughly trained and rehearsed so that the platoon can react instinctively as a team whenever it encounters threat forces. As noted, the four steps, which are executed to allow the platoon to accomplish its mission in accordance with reconnaissance fundamentals, are the following:

· · · ·

Deploy and report. Evaluate and develop the situation. Choose and recommend a COA and maneuver the force. Execute the COA.

STEP 1 – DEPLOY AND REPORT

2-130. When a scout makes contact with the threat, he reacts according to the circumstances of the contact. (NOTE: Refer to the eight general categories of contact discussed earlier in this section.) The section or squad that makes initial visual contact with the threat deploys to covered terrain that affords good observation and fields of fire. If the scouts receive fire from the threat, they return fire, but only with the intent of breaking direct fire contact. 2-131. The scout or element in contact sends a contact report to the platoon leader and follows as soon as possible with a SPOTREP using the SALUTE format (size, activity, location, unit identification, time, and equipment). If the scout or element in contact is unable to report or cannot report quickly, another squad in the section must report. 2-132. Scouts that are not in contact temporarily halt in covered terrain, monitor the incoming reports, and plot the situation on their maps. Once they determine that they cannot be influenced by the threat or are not needed to support the element in contact, they continue their mission with the platoon leader’s approval. The platoon leader or PSG relays the contact report to the commander, followed as soon as possible by a spot report and updates. STEP 2 – EVALUATE AND DEVELOP THE SITUATION

2-133. The scouts next concentrate on defining what they are up against. If they have not sent a spot report to this point, they initially focus on getting enough information to send one. If they have not been detected by the threat and time is available, the scouts reconnoiter the threat position, emphasizing stealth, dismounted reconnaissance, and use of such assets as GSR and TUAVs. 2-134. If the threat is aware of their presence, the scouts use a combination of mounted and dismounted reconnaissance. They conduct dismounted reconnaissance to get detailed information on threat dispositions. Mounted reconnaissance will be used to move additional assets into the area to support the element in contact.

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2-135. When physical contact occurs, the reconnaissance platoon employs indirect and direct fires to suppress the threat while maneuvering to get information. The scouts attempt to confirm or determine in detail threat size, composition, activity, orientation, and weapon system locations. They search for AT ditches, minefields, wire, or other obstacles that could force friendly elements into a fire sack. The scouts find the flanks of the threat position and look for other threat elements that could provide mutual support to the position. Once the scouts determine what they are up against, the platoon leader updates the spot report. STEP 3 – CHOOSE AND RECOMMEND A COA AND MANEUVER THE FORCE

2-136. Once the element in contact has developed the situation and the platoon leader has enough information to make a decision, he selects a COA. He ensures the COA is within the capabilities of the platoon, that it allows the scouts to continue the reconnaissance as quickly as possible, and that it supports the commander’s concept of the operation. The platoon leader should consider all available COAs, including those outlined in the following discussion. Once he decides on a COA, he recommends it to his commander, providing information on how the platoon COA will affect the next higher echelon’s situation. Disengage from Threat Contact

2-137. The reconnaissance platoon cannot conduct its mission if it becomes decisively engaged. If it is engaged, the platoon must have a plan to break contact with the threat. As a general rule, the platoon, section, or squad should disengage from the threat as early in the contact as possible. This will allow for continuation of the mission and reduce the chance of any loss of combat power. 2-138. At platoon level, OPs or patrols gain contact with the threat, then report and prepare to displace to successive positions. These platoon members should report the threat contact to the overwatching vehicles and to the platoon leader. 2-139. When the threat force reaches the OPs’ break point (the point at which the OPs must displace or risk detection and/or engagement by the threat), the OPs pass off responsibility for tracking the threat to other OPs in depth. The platoon then displaces its OPs to successive positions in depth while maintaining contact with the threat. Patrols request permission to return to the platoon vehicles. When permission has been granted, they use covered and concealed routes back to the vehicle positions and remount the vehicles. 2-140. Once the initial contact has been reported to higher headquarters and the order to break contact has been given, disengagement should be executed with one section or squad acting as overwatch for the displacing section/squad as it moves. The section or squad that moves first will keep its weapon systems oriented on the threat as it uses covered and concealed routes to move to a designated rally point that precludes threat observation and provides cover and concealment. This element may also use on-board smoke generators or smoke grenades to cover its movement. The overwatching section/squad provides suppressive fires, both indirect and if necessary direct, to cover the movement of the displacing section/squad. Mortars can also provide effective and responsive support

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when elements must break contact. The overwatching section must also employ its dismounts with the Javelin missile system.

2-141. Once the displacing section/squad has arrived at the rally point, it

takes up defensive positions and reports its arrival to the overwatch section/squad. The overwatching element then calls for protective fires and uses an alternate covered and concealed route to move to the rally point. When the entire platoon or section has moved back to the rally point, it consolidates and reorganizes, reports its status to the higher headquarters, and continues the mission. Figure 2-17 illustrates a situation in which a recce platoon breaks contact by sections.

Figure 2-17. Platoon Disengages by Section

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Break Contact and Bypass

2-142. This COA may be selected when the platoon does not have the resources to leave an element in contact and still continue to accomplish its priority reconnaissance tasks. It may also be selected when the platoon has made contact with a threat force that cannot adversely affect the mission of the platoon’s higher headquarters. Because breaking contact is a violation of reconnaissance fundamentals, the platoon leader must be sure that his higher headquarters is informed of and approves this COA. (Refer to Figure 2-18.)

Figure 2-18. Break Contact and Bypass. Maintain Contact and Bypass

2-143. This COA is appropriate when a threat force, based on its current disposition, is not in a position to influence the platoon’s higher commander. An element (normally a section or squad) will be left to maintain contact while the rest of the platoon continues the reconnaissance mission. The element that remains in contact will maintain visual contact with the threat and report if the threat situation changes. The platoon must keep scouts in contact with the threat unless specifically authorized to do otherwise. Depending on the applicable task organization, the platoon leader must carefully assess METT-TC before selecting this COA. Mission constraints may force the platoon leader to leave one vehicle in contact. If this is the case, he must ensure that the vehicle is AT-heavy (Javelin/TOW). To regain the use of all his assets, the platoon leader continues coordination to execute reconnaissance or battle handover of the contact to a follow-on element. (Refer to Figure 2-19.)

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Figure 2-19. Maintain Contact and Bypass Maintain Contact to Support a Hasty Attack

2-144. This COA is appropriate when the platoon discovers threat elements the higher commander wants to destroy, but which the scouts cannot destroy, either because they lack sufficient combat power or because they have other tasks to perform. In this situation, the platoon maintains contact by leaving a section or squad in contact. The rest of the platoon continues on to establish far-side security, monitor any changes in the threat situation, and support the hasty attack by a friendly unit. 2-145. The platoon focuses on requirements for supporting a successful friendly attack, including the following:

·

Locating covered and concealed movement routes for friendly attacking units.

· · ·

Locating attack positions.

·

Designating an LD to use as a handover line to the attacking unit.

·

Preparing and coordinating fire support for the friendly attack.

·

Locating and preparing to occupy base of fire positions, if required.

Locating enemy positions (within capability). Establishing a contact point to link up with, brief, and guide the friendly unit as necessary.

2-146. It is essential that the section or squad left in contact understand what needs to be accomplished, who will be executing the attack, and when the friendly unit anticipates being in position to receive handover of the threat. As the unit responsible for the attack moves into position, the scouts in contact may rejoin the platoon or be placed OPCON to the attacking unit to ease command, control, and coordination. (Refer to Figure 2-20.)

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Figure 2-20. Maintain Contact to Support a Hasty Attack Attack an Inferior Force

2-147. In most cases, the reconnaissance platoon cannot, or should not, mass its combat power to defeat a threat force. If the scouts mass, they risk losing the capability to complete their mission as well as jeopardizing their ability to conduct subsequent missions. If the scouts are permitted to attack a threat, they should only attack lightly armored or unarmored reconnaissance vehicles, such as motorcycles or Soviet-style BRDMs and BTRs. They should not engage more heavily armored vehicles except in self-defense. (Refer to Figure 2-21.)

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Figure 2-21. Attack an Inferior Force Establish a Hasty Defense

2-148. The platoon will establish a hasty defense if it cannot bypass the threat, all the sections and/or squads are fixed or suppressed, and the platoon no longer has the ability to move forward. A hasty defense will also be used when the threat executes a hasty attack. The platoon maintains contact or fixes the threat in place until additional combat power arrives or the platoon is ordered to move. (Refer to Figure 2-22.) If the platoon is required to conduct a hasty defense, the commander then becomes responsible for continuing to develop the situation. (NOTE: Without the use of indirect fires in this situation, the platoon will fail.)

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Figure 2-22. Establish a Hasty Defense Conduct Reconnaissance Handover

2-149. The platoon leader will attempt to hand over responsibility for the threat element. He does this for several tactical reasons: to continue operations as directed, to regain use of all his elements, or to pass reconnaissance responsibility to another friendly element. An example of this is a BRT platoon handing over a threat element to a task force reconnaissance platoon to maintain contact. Refer to the discussion of reconnaissance handover in Chapter 3 of this manual. Conduct Battle Handover

2-150. This COA is applicable when a reconnaissance platoon hands over responsibility for a threat force to a friendly combat element. The platoon does this for reasons similar to those for reconnaissance handover: to continue operations, to regain use of all elements, or to hand over contact to an element that usually will then engage and destroy the threat force. An example of battle handover is a task force reconnaissance platoon handing over a threat element to a tank company team for destruction. STEP 4 – EXECUTE THE COA

2-151. The platoon leader updates his spot report to the commander with any new information and then recommends a COA to the commander. The commander approves or disapproves the recommended COA based on how it will affect the parent unit’s mission. 2-152. If the commander and the S2 have anticipated the threat situation the platoon is reporting, they will already have addressed the contingency in the OPORD and given guidance to their subordinates on what COA the platoon should execute. In such a case, the platoon leader can evaluate the situation, choose a COA consistent with his higher commander’s intent or concept, and execute it without further guidance.

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He keeps the commander informed of what he is doing as he executes the COA.

EXAMPLES OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT 2-153. The following examples illustrate actions on contact in a variety of tactical situations. They are organized using the four-step process. VISUAL CONTACT (UNDETECTED BY THE THREAT) Deploy and Report

2-154. A reconnaissance section or squad makes contact when its dismounted element identifies a threat force. It immediately sends a contact report informing the platoon leader that it has made visual contact with the threat but is not being engaged. This report is quickly followed by an initial spot report. Evaluate and Develop the Situation

2-155. Based on the initial spot report of the section or squad in contact, the platoon leader determines that he has located his primary reconnaissance objective; he orders additional sections or squads to maneuver into the area. These reconnaissance elements move to dismount points, set their vehicles in hide positions, and send dismounted patrols from different directions into the area of contact. 2-156. The patrols move to multiple vantage points using dismounted reconnaissance techniques, with the emphasis on avoiding detection. As they develop new information, they send spot reports to the platoon leader. The platoon leader moves his element to a covered and concealed hide position where he can maintain effective communications with both subordinate elements and higher headquarters. From this position, he establishes local security (a hasty OP) and monitors and controls the efforts of his sections or squads. Choose/Recommend a COA and Maneuver the Force

2-157. When the platoon leader receives sufficient reports to have a clear picture of the situation, he chooses to prepare to support a hasty attack. This choice is made because the platoon leader determines that the force he has located is the objective of his commander; therefore, this COA is in accordance with his commander’s intent. After determining that the commander’s intent has not changed, the platoon leader recommends the COA to the commander and requests that the platoon execute it. He ensures that he receives clear guidance from the commander before moving on to the execution step. Execute the COA

2-158. The platoon leader issues appropriate orders directing his subordinates to prepare to support the hasty attack. He continues to inform his commander of the threat situation and the platoon’s actions. CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN OR SUPERIOR FORCE Deploy and Report

2-159. The scouts make contact as the lead platoon vehicle is engaged. The lead scout and the overwatch see the signature of the threat weapon system; since they do not have a clear idea of the size of the threat, they

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react as if it were a superior force. Simultaneously, the lead element returns fire, sends a contact report, employs smoke grenades, and moves to the nearest hide position. The overwatch vehicle engages the source of threat fire by calling for mortar support and monitors to ensure the contact report is sent. As soon as the lead vehicle is in a covered and concealed position, the overwatch vehicle moves to an alternate firing position and occupies a hide position while trying to maintain contact with the smallest element, if possible.

2-160. The section or squad leader follows up on the contact report with an initial spot report. This initial report may not be very detailed, but it includes a description of what happened and the threat’s approximate location. Evaluate and Develop the Situation

2-161. Once the section or squad is set in cover and concealment and has submitted its initial reports, it must develop the situation. The objective is to determine exactly what the threat situation is by dismounted reconnaissance or use of GSR/TUAVs. This can best be done by moving to the threat’s flank or rear. The section/squad leader organizes a hasty reconnaissance patrol that will attempt to move to the flank or rear of the threat and observe the threat position. Simultaneously, the section or squad maintains at least one hasty OP in contact with the threat. As the dismounted element maneuvers, it is supported by direct fire from the vehicles, by indirect fire called for by the OP, or by both. These fires serve to suppress the threat, reducing his ability to observe the scouts; they also fix the threat’s attention on the last known location of the mounted element. 2-162. In the course of attempting to develop the situation, the section or squad may determine that it is unable to determine the exact threat situation for a number of possible reasons: suppressive fires by the threat; obstacles; combat losses; or the size and extent of the threat position. This information is sent to the platoon leader as soon as possible in the form of updates to the original spot report. 2-163. If this occurs, the platoon leader must decide whether to commit additional platoon assets to the contact to develop it further or to adopt a COA based on the information he has discovered to that point. If the platoon leader determines he needs more information, he may commit additional assets to develop the situation further. He must also use available combat multipliers such as GSR or TUAVs. The earlier in the contact that the platoon leader can make this decision the better; however, he must not commit unneeded resources to an action that will detract from other reconnaissance tasks. 2-164. If he decides additional assets are required, the platoon leader then orders other sections or squads not in contact to move to specific locations and assist in developing the situation. As more than one section or squad becomes involved in the situation, the platoon leader or PSG (whoever is in the best location to do so) takes control of coordinating their efforts. The elements conduct mounted movement to designated dismount points, where they organize dismounted patrols to develop the situation from a new direction. As these patrols discover the threat and add additional information to the platoon leader’s picture, the platoon leader may determine he has sufficient information to choose and execute 2-46

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a COA based on the commander’s engagement criteria or to recommend a COA to the commander. Choose/Recommend a COA and Maneuver the Force

2-165. Based on the available information and his commander’s intent and guidance, the platoon leader determines to leave one section in contact to support a hasty attack by a supporting element. His other sections continue their reconnaissance mission. Execute the COA

2-166. In this example, because the commander had specifically addressed the contingency the platoon has developed, the platoon leader neither makes a recommendation to his commander nor asks his permission to execute the COA. Instead, the platoon leader immediately issues orders to his sections and contacts the supporting element’s leader to initiate coordination for handover of the threat and support of the element’s hasty attack. He keeps the commander informed of his actions. CONTACT WITH AN INFERIOR FORCE Deploy and Report

2-167. A TUAV supporting the lead element (section or squad) identifies a threat element, which consists of one reconnaissance vehicle. In the commander’s order, the engagement criteria tasked the section or squad to engage when the threat force consists of one wheeled vehicle or less (dismounted troops), giving the section/squad the initiative to execute immediate actions on contact. The section/squad leader sends a contact report and quickly engages and destroys the threat vehicle. After the engagement is complete, he sends an initial spot report. Evaluate and Develop the Situation

2-168. The lead vehicle and the overwatch element occupy positions that allow them to observe the destroyed vehicle while the TUAV provides area security overhead. They look for any other signs of threat activity or any threat response to the destruction of the vehicle. The lead vehicle then bounds past the destroyed vehicle and establishes far-side security. Once far-side security is established, a dismounted element moves to the destroyed vehicle and conducts a thorough search for prisoners, items of intelligence value, and any other information that can be gained from a close examination of the threat. When this reconnaissance is complete, the section or squad sends an updated report to higher headquarters. Choose/Recommend a COA and Maneuver the Force

2-169. When engagement is complete and the threat is destroyed, the COA is obvious: the section or squad will continue its mission. Execute the COA

2-170. Since the destruction of the threat is in accordance with the commander’s order, the section/squad leader simply informs higher headquarters that he is continuing the mission.

SECTION V – EMPLOYMENT OF FIRES 2-47

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2-171. Future battles will be mobile and violent, with emphasis on rapid fire capability, increased speed, and maneuverability. Under these conditions, the reconnaissance platoon’s ability to direct indirect fires is its primary asset in helping the higher commander to shape the battlefield. To help defeat the threat while surviving on the battlefield, the reconnaissance platoon must be fully prepared to take maximum advantage of the indirect fire capabilities of the friendly forces at its disposal.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 2-172. The reconnaissance platoon employs FA and mortars as its primary means of fire support across a broad spectrum of operations. Using effects in accordance with the fires paragraph of the OPORD, the platoon uses Army and/or joint precision fires to support reconnaissance and security missions, as well as to impede, harass, or destroy threat forces without compromising its current position. The platoon also employs other types of fires. These include helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, which provide close air support (CAS) and aviation close fires (ACF), and naval gunfire (NGF) assets. Refer to Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion of fire support assets. 2-173. Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. With advances in precision munitions and the systems to rapidly deliver them from relatively safe locations, the likelihood of the reconnaissance platoon’s mission being focused on target acquisition has increased. The process itself is embedded in reconnaissance operations, and target acquisition may be the focus of a reconnaissance mission. The platoon works with other ISR assets to gather targeting information and identify targets using all available means. These assets include, but are not limited to, individual scouts, strikers, aviation elements (including TUAVs), and radar. In the BRT, for example, scouts and strikers may together to execute the brigade’s essential fire support tasks (EFST).

CRITICAL TASKS 2-174. The platoon’s critical tasks in employing fires on the battlefield include the following:

· · ·

Conduct target acquisition. Conduct indirect fire planning. Call for and adjust indirect fires and joint fires.

SECTION VI – COMMUNICATIONS 2-175. The reconnaissance platoon’s primary mission is to provide information to the commander about the threat and the battlefield environment. Because of the extended frontages and distances over which the platoon operates, it must rely heavily on effective communications techniques. These techniques include not only the means of communications (such as wire, visual signals, or radio and digital systems) and the proper way of using them, but also the effective 2-48

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application of operational terms, radiotelephone procedures (RTP), and digital TTP.

2-176. The platoon leader must ensure that all of his soldiers understand communications procedures. For radio systems, including TACSAT, this includes the different nets on which the platoon operates, as well as siting considerations, field-expedient communications techniques, and visual signals. In employing the platoon’s digital systems, including FBCB2, the platoon’s scouts must understand how to prepare and send reports, orders, and overlays and how to use hot keys.

MEANS OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS 2-177. The reconnaissance platoon always has several available means of communications. Whether it is using messenger, wire, visual, sound, radio signals, or digital systems, the platoon must remain flexible enough to react quickly to new situations. Use of each of these means of communication must be carefully planned to avoid dependence on a single method. 2-178. SOPs can afford the platoon a tremendous advantage in mission accomplishment. Hand-and-arm and flag signals aid in platoon movement. Clear and concise radio transmissions can reduce transmission times. MESSENGER

2-179. This is the most secure means of communications available to the

platoon. Messenger service is generally very flexible and reliable. In an assembly area, it is the preferred means. On an infrequent basis, members of the platoon may be called on to act as messengers to the parent unit’s higher headquarters.

WIRE

2-180. This method of communications is especially effective in static positions or during the conduct of a screening mission. It is very versatile and can be used in many different situations. Using one of the many wire devices available, the platoon establishes hot loops to communicate within the platoon, with OPs, and with the parent unit CP in assembly areas. VISUAL

2-181. Visual communications are used to transmit prearranged messages quickly over short distances. Reconnaissance sections or squads may rely heavily on this type of communications. Since the platoon rarely operates as a unit over short distances, however, visual signals are seldom used at the platoon level. In those cases when the entire platoon is together, such as in a coil, in an assembly area, or on a road march, all vehicle commanders must stay alert so they can receive visual signals from the platoon leader and pass them on to other vehicle commanders in the platoon. 2-182. Whenever visual signals are used, they must be clear enough to be understood by vehicle commanders as they operate in tactical situations. Standard hand-and-arm or flag signals work well during periods of good visibility. Flashlights, chemical lights, or other types of lights are required during limited visibility. The platoon must exercise

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extreme care when using lights to avoid alerting the threat to friendly intentions.

2-183. Pyrotechnic ammunition can also be used for visual signaling. The meanings of these signals are identified in paragraph 5 of the OPORD and in the unit signal operation instructions (SOI). The main advantage of pyrotechnics is the speed with which signals can be transmitted. Key disadvantages are the threat’s ability to see them and, potentially, to imitate them. SOUND

2-184. This form of communications is used mainly to attract attention, transmit prearranged messages, and spread alarms. Sound signals carry only short distances; in addition, range and clarity are greatly reduced by battle noise. Since they are open to threat interception, use of sound signals may be restricted for security reasons. Prearranged meanings for sound signals are outlined in the unit SOP and CEOI; they must be kept simple to prevent misunderstandings. RADIO

2-185. The radio is the platoon’s most flexible and most frequently used form of communications. Types of radio communications include electromagnetic transmissions over FM, AM, UHF, and VHF spectrums and use of TACSAT systems. 2-186. The most effective way to use the radio is to follow standard guidelines for effective RTP; these include brevity, proper use of authentication tables, and the use of approved operational terms. Threat direction-finding units can trace radio signals. Once found, the transmitter can easily be destroyed. For this reason, the platoon leader and PSG must strictly enforce radio discipline regardless of encryption devices; survival of the platoon depends on good radio habits. FM Communications

2-187. Operations normally depend on radio as the primary means of communication for both voice and digital traffic. Net discipline and SOP minimize needless traffic. To avoid detection by threat direction finding equipment, the platoon uses other means of communication whenever possible to supplement the radio and minimize emissions. Once in contact, the primary means of communication will be FM voice. TACSAT Communications

2-188. Because the platoon often conducts reconnaissance operations over great distances, the unlimited range of TACSAT radios can prove extremely valuable. DIGITAL

2-189. FBCB2 is the digital system that enhances the reconnaissance platoon’s battle command capability by linking the platoon internally and to its higher headquarters. As noted in the discussion in Chapter 1 of this manual, FBCB2 is part of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), a network of computers, GPS equipment, and communication systems that work together to provide combat leaders with real-time information of unprecedented quantity and quality. FBCB2 and the ABCS allow for

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advanced reporting, orders and management.


graphics sharing, and

database

COMMERCIAL LINES

2-190. The platoon may communicate via commercial lines when approved by higher headquarters. Careful consideration must be given to securing commercial lines and limiting the amount and type of classified material sent over nonsecured lines. If the platoon is forced to withdraw, existing wire lines, including commercial lines, are cut and sections removed so the threat cannot use them.

RADIO NET ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES RECCE, BRT, AND CAVALRY PLATOON NETS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-191. The following radio nets are employed and/or monitored by leaders in recce, BRT, and cavalry reconnaissance platoons. (See Figure 2-23.) NOTE:

The platoon leader may assign section or squad leaders to monitor the nets of units operating to the front and/or rear of the platoon. These would become the alternate nets monitored by the leaders. This technique supports situational awareness and facilitates reconnaissance or battle handover.

Figure 2-23. Reconnaissance Platoon Nets Platoon

2-192. This net is used to conduct all platoon operations. All elements within the reconnaissance platoon must have the ability to monitor and transmit on this net at all times. Making sure this happens is one of the 2-51

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keys to effective command and control during the conduct of tactical operations. All scouts must also have the ability to rapidly change to any other platoon net as required to coordinate contact points or handover of threat targets. Troop Command

2-193. This net is used to maneuver the reconnaissance or recce troop as well as to process most routine reports not sent on FBCB2. The troop TOC is the net control station (NCS), and the platoon leader or PSG sends routine reports to the troop XO. This net can be used by reconnaissance platoon leaders to talk to each other and coordinate key tactical actions of their platoons; however, platoon leaders will use each other’s platoon nets to pass routine messages not of interest to the commander. 2-194. Both the platoon leader and PSG must always have the ability to monitor and transmit on this net. All scouts must be able to move to this net to send reports and receive guidance if they are unable to contact their platoon leader or PSG. Troop Fires

2-195. Many troops operate a troop fires net to send calls for fire to the troop FSO or directly to the troop mortars. The reconnaissance platoon leader should direct all radios not actively operating on another net to enter this net. All scouts must have the ability to change to this net and coordinate indirect fire. (NOTE: Scouts must also be prepared to change to the nets of supporting elements such as tank, MGS, and AT platoons to coordinate supporting fires.) Administrative/Logistics

2-196. The PSG will usually monitor the A/L net for the platoon, but the platoon leader must be familiar with it as well. The PSG uses it as required to send routine A/L reports. This net is also used to coordinate resupply operations and evacuation of casualties. BATTALION RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON NETS

2-197. The following are the radio nets employed and/or monitored by leaders in the battalion reconnaissance platoon. (See Figure 2-24.) NOTE:

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The platoon leader may assign section or squad leaders to monitor the nets of units operating to the front and/or rear of the platoon. These would become the alternate nets monitored by the leaders. This technique supports situational awareness and facilitates reconnaissance or battle handover.

___________________________________________________


Figure 2-24. Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon Nets Platoon

2-198. This net is used to conduct all platoon operations. All elements within the reconnaissance platoon must have the ability to monitor and transmit on this net at all times. Making sure this happens is one of the keys to effective command and control during the conduct of tactical operations. Battalion Command

2-199. The battalion command net is the primary net used to direct the tactical operations of the battalion. It is monitored continuously by all subordinate commanders in the battalion, as well as by key staff members and the TOC. As a key maneuver element of the battalion, the reconnaissance platoon must monitor this net continuously. The platoon leader and the PSG should both have the capability to monitor and transmit on this net when the battalion is conducting tactical operations. Operations and Intelligence

2-200. Many battalions operate an OI net to handle R&S reports and thus make the command net more efficient. This net can also be used to control the R&S effort before the battalion main body begins tactical operations. If the battalion has not begun tactical operations but the scouts are engaged in reconnaissance or surveillance operations, the platoon may use this as its primary net. In such a case, both the platoon leader and PSG would monitor, receive, and transmit on this net. 2-201. The reconnaissance platoon should continue to maximize the use of the OI net to pass information while conducting reconnaissance in support of the main body, even after the main body has begun its operations. The platoon leader can monitor the command net at this time

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or choose to remain on the OI net. If he continues to use the OI net, he should designate a member of the platoon to eavesdrop on the command net to alert him when the battalion commander needs to communicate directly with the scouts or when critical traffic is being passed over the command net. Battalion Fires

2-202. Because rapidly coordinating for and adjusting indirect fires is vital in all R&S operations, the fires net is extremely critical to the success of scout platoon operations. The platoon should have all radios that are not on the higher command net or the platoon net preset to this net. All scouts, whether operating mounted or dismounted and regardless of how many radios they have, must have the ability to quickly change to this net and coordinate indirect fire. The scout platoon leader must coordinate with the battalion FSO regarding the use of the fires net to ensure that the platoon can use it to send voice call for fire messages. Company Team

2-203. All scouts must have the ability to rapidly change to any of the battalion company team nets. These nets are used to conduct coordination for handing off enemy targets once the scouts make contact. Administrative/Logistics

2-204. The scout PSG will usually monitor the A/L net for the platoon, but the platoon leader must be familiar with it as well. The PSG uses it as required to send routine A/L reports. This net is also used to coordinate resupply operations and evacuation of casualties. Retrans

2-205. When the scout platoon operates at extended distances from the battalion TOC, it may use the battalion retrans net to facilitate effective communications between the scout platoon leader and the TOC. The platoon leader should request use of the retrans net during all missions requiring FM communications at extended ranges.

NET CONTROL 2-206. The reconnaissance platoon net is the key to command and control of the platoon. The smooth functioning of this net allows accurate information to be passed quickly both to and from the platoon leader. This information flow is critical in maintaining the platoon leader’s situational awareness and in enhancing command and control. When contact is made, the volume of traffic on the recce platoon net will increase drastically. The platoon must be organized to control, understand, and process this vast amount of information while engaging the threat and possibly being engaged in turn. The following guidelines will help to ensure that the information flowing over the net is organized and controlled in a way that permits the platoon leader to both understand it and issue orders in response to it. FLASH TRAFFIC

2-207. The platoon leader should, in either the platoon order or the unit SOP, establish criteria for flash traffic. For example, the flash traffic criteria could dictate special handling of the platoon’s prescribed PIR.

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When a scout gains information relevant to a critical PIR item, he interrupts any net traffic with a proword such as “FLASH—FLASH— FLASH.” The use of such a proword immediately advises all other scouts to get off the net, thus clearing it for the critical traffic to be passed. NET DISCIPLINE

2-208. The PSG is responsible for net discipline. In this capacity, he will challenge any violation of procedure as it occurs. Improper or inefficient radio procedures, even in routine administrative reports, inhibit effective command and control. EFFECTIVE MESSAGES

2-209. The best way to ensure effectiveness of a radio message is to write it out before it is sent. This procedure yields a more accurate and, ultimately, more timely tranmission. It also ensures that the message is sent correctly, completely, and clearly in the shortest possible amount of time. The message is easier to understand, and the duration of the electronic signature of the sending station is minimized. RADIOTELEPHONE PROCEDURES

2-210. Proper RTPs are the cornerstone of effective command and control in the reconnaissance platoon. All scouts must be expert in communications procedures. This not only ensures efficient communications within the platoon, but also allows all members of the platoon to communicate effectively with outside elements such as the squadron, troop, other platoons, and subordinate and/or supporting elements.

TECHNIQUES OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS 2-211. The platoon leader and PSG are responsible for ensuring that their scouts understand and adhere to the following guidelines, which can contribute to more effective, more secure tactical communications. KNOW THE SYSTEM

2-212. Each scout must be an expert at using and maintaining his FM communications system. In particular, he must understand its capabilities and limitations. He must also understand how to maintain the system and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly. MINIMIZE DURATION

2-213. All messages sent within or from the platoon must be short and informative. The longer the message, the greater the opportunity for threat elements to electronically determine the platoon’s location. Message length can be controlled in several ways:

·

Write the message down and then eliminate all unnecessary words from the written message before sending it.

· ·

Read the message as written when sending it.

·

Break long messages into several parts and send each separately.

Use a brevity code that reduces the need to explain the tactical picture in detail.

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MINIMIZE SIGNATURE

2-214. When sending a message, every scout must be conscious of the size and nature of the electronic signature that he is emitting. He must consider the following methods for reducing the size of the signature:

·

Use terrain to mask the signature from the direction of the threat.

·

Set the transmitter power to low if that setting will provide sufficient range (as it often does within the reconnaissance platoon, section, or squad).

·

Whenever possible (particularly in stationary operations), use an expedient directional antenna to restrict the threat’s ability to monitor the signal. See Appendix E of this manual for instructions on how to construct and use such an antenna.

USE AN EFFECTIVE FORMAT

2-215. A thorough knowledge of report formats is critical in ensuring

timely reporting of threat information, especially in fast-moving tactical situations. Every scout should be familiar with the report formats that are outlined later in this chapter and know how to use them effectively. At the same time, however, they must never delay reports only to assure the correct format; ALWAYS REPORT ACCURATE INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!

2-216. As a basic guideline, reports of threat activity follow the SALUTE format, covering these factors:

·

Size. This includes the number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other equipment.

· ·

Activity. This covers what the threat is doing.

·

Unit. This covers any indications useful in unit identification, such as patches, signs, and vehicle markings.

· ·

Time. This item details when threat activity was observed.

Location. This is usually reported as the grid coordinates of threat elements.

Equipment. This includes description or identification of all equipment associated with the threat activity.

SECTION VII – REPORTING 2-217. The reconnaissance platoon’s primary function is to gather and report information (reconnaissance). The platoon reports information, using either analog equipment or digital means (FBCB2), in a timely and accurate manner that enhances the decision-making process of its higher headquarters and/or that enables the higher headquarters to employ effective fires to defeat the threat. The use of FBCB2 enhances the scouts’ capability to send timely and detailed reports to all elements of the combined arms force, providing the winning edge on the battlefield. Initial contact reports should still be analog, providing immediate

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notification to all, yet allowing the element in contact to focus on his actions in contact procedures. Once disengaged, or there is no further threat to the element, he can follow up the initial contact report with a detailed, digital report.

2-218. The reconnaissance platoon’s unique information-gathering capabilities provide the commander with information that has tactical value concerning the threat, terrain, and effects of weather within an area of operations. Scouts reconnoiter terrain to determine movement and maneuver conditions. When they find the threat, they determine his disposition, strengths, and weaknesses in detail. The reconnaissance platoon provides the information necessary to allow combined arms forces to maneuver against the threat, strike him where he is most vulnerable, and apply overwhelming power to defeat him. The platoon’s accurate and timely reporting of threat locations and strength can make the difference between victory and defeat.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 2-219. Important considerations and guidelines for the reconnaissance platoon in its reporting of tactical information include the following:

·

Conduct effective communications. This entails understanding the means of tactical communications (such as wire, visual signals, analog radio, or digital communications), the correct application of operational terms, and the use of effective RTPs. Refer to the discussion of communications earlier in this chapter.

· ·

Verify all information before reporting it higher.

·

Report the following types of information as quickly as possible: n

Information of potential intelligence value.

n

Threat information.

n

Requests for medical assistance and evacuation.

As needed, use report formats and procedures to supplement and enhance combat orders, including warning orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs.

REPORT GUIDELINES 2-220. The reconnaissance platoon should follow these guidelines in reporting tactical information:

· · ·

Do not overload radio nets by repeating information.

·

Though each report has a prescribed format to ensure the completeness of the information reported, users must remember that timely reporting, especially of threat activity, is critical in fast-moving tactical situations.

Use local time zones for all reports unless otherwise specified. Send only the parts or lines of a report that contain new information or changes.

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·

Do not delay reports only to assure correct format; REPORT ACCURATE INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!

TYPES OF REPORTS 2-221. The following list covers the various reports available to the reconnaissance platoon. Refer to Appendix B of this manual for a discussion of these reports, including line-by-line formats and examples:

· ·

·

·

·

·

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Contact Report. Blue Reports (Operations). n

Blue 1 – Spot Report (SPOTREP).

n

Blue 2 – Situation Report (SITREP).

n

Blue 4 – Report for Bridge, Overpass, Culvert, Underpass, or Tunnel (BRIDGEREP).

n

Blue 5 – Report for Ford, Ferry, or Other Crossing Site (CROSSREP).

n

Blue 7 – (ROUTEREP).

n

Blue 9 – Obstacle Report.

n

Blue 10 – Bypass Report.

n

Blue 11 – Stand-to Report (STANREP).

Route

Reconnaissance

Report

Green Reports (Intelligence). n

Green 2 – Sensitive Items Report (SENSEREP).

n

Green 3 – Splash Report.

n

Green 4 – Patrol Report.

n

Green 5 – Meaconing, Interference (MIJI) Report.

n

Green 6 – EPW/Captured Material Report.

Intrusion,

Jamming,

and

Yellow Reports (Logistics). n

Yellow 1 – Equipment Status Report (ESTAT).

n

Yellow 1A – Battle Loss Spot Report.

n

Yellow 2 – Ammunition Status Report.

n

Yellow 2A – Ammunition Request.

n

Yellow 3 – POL Status Report.

n

Yellow 3A – POL Request.

Red Reports (Personnel). n

Red 2 – Personnel Battle Loss Report.

n

Red 3 – Medical Evacuation Request.

NBC Reports. n

NBC-1 – Observer’s Initial Report.

n

NBC-3 – Immediate Warning of Expected Contamination.

n

NBC-4 – Report of Radiation Dose-Rate Measurement.

___________________________________________________

n


NBC-5 – Report of Areas of Contamination.

DIGITAL REPORTING AND C2 MESSAGES 2-222. In addition to its capabilities related to providing situational awareness data, FBCB2 offers a variety of functions that can enhance C2 in the reconnaissance platoon. The system has four categories of C2 messages:

NOTE:

·

Alerts and warnings (examples include NBC reports and warnings of danger zones such as NBC contaminated areas, obstacles, or enemy locations).

·

Joint support information (interfaces with other branches of service). (NOTE: This type of digital information is not covered in this discussion.)

· ·

Combat reporting (such as the commander’s SITREP). Mission planning FRAGOs).

information

(including

OPORDs

and

This discussion also includes an explanation of geo-referenced messages, which create icons linked to a location on the FBCB2 map. These messages can be used in each of the C2 categories listed.

ALERTS AND WARNINGS

2-223. Alerts and warnings are sent via reports, free text messages, or geo-referenced messages. They are posted on the flash immediate priority routine (FIPR) message queue and are displayed on the function bar of the main FBCB2 screen and as a symbol on the map screen. 2-224. When the platform penetrates the safety radius of a danger zone, the FBCB2 alarm is triggered, an alert message is displayed on the warnings/alerts marquee, and an entry is made in the warnings tab group. The danger zone tab group will display the type, distance, direction, location and originator of all danger zone information received. Danger zone information is transmitted in specific joint variable message format (JVMF) messages as situational awareness data. FBCB2 receives the message and displays the situational awareness/danger zone information in the danger zone tab group. Table 2-1 lists types of danger zone messages as well as the safety radius within which FBCB2 will trigger a danger zone alert. COMBAT REPORTING REPORTING MESSAGESMESSAGES

2-225. These are JVMF messages that have been modified and grouped together to provide single-button access to the message template, requiring fewer keystrokes to complete and send the message. Combat messages are the following:

· · · ·

SALT. MEDEVAC. Fire mission (call for fire). Check fire.

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FM 3-20.98

__________________________________________________________________________

·

SITREP.

Table 2-1. FBCB2 Danger Zone Messages Message Type

2-60

Type of Danger Zone

Safety Radius (Meters)

NBC-1

Chemical

500

Obstacle Report / NBC-1

Biological

500

Obstacle Report / NBC-1 / Strike Warning

Nuclear

1000

Spot Report

Aircraft

5000

Spot Report

Formation

4000 1500

Spot Report

Field Fortifications

Spot Report

Multiple Rocket Launcher

4000

Spot Report

Air Defense Artillery

4000

Spot Report

Assembly Area

4000

Spot Report

Buildings

1500

Spot Report

Equipment

4000

Spot Report

Command Center

1500

Spot Report

Supply Dump

1500

Spot Report

Rocket Missiles

4000

Spot Report

Vehicles

4000

Spot Report

Armor Combat

4000

Spot Report

Artillery

4000

Spot Report

Mortar

8000

Spot Report

Weapons

1500

Spot Report

Personnel

1500

Spot Report

Unknown

4000

Spot Report

Fire Mission

600

Obstacle Report

Minefield, Antipersonnel

500

Obstacle Report

Minefield, Antitank

500

Obstacle Report

Minefield, Mixed

500

Obstacle Report

Minefield, Unknown

500

Obstacle Report

Chemical, Nerve

500

Obstacle Report

Chemical, Blood

500

Obstacle Report

Chemical, Blister

500

Obstacle Report

Chemical, Choking

500

Obstacle Report

Booby Traps

500

Obstacle Report

Abatis

500

Obstacle Report

Craters

500

Obstacle Report

Antitank Ditch

500

Obstacle Report

Scatterable Mines

500

Obstacle Report

Bunker Strongpoint

1500

Strike Warning

Conventional

1000

Threat Warning

NBC

500

Threat Warning

Antiaircraft Artillery

4000

Threat Warning

Aircraft

10000

Threat Warning

Air-to-Air Missile

10000

Threat Warning

Surface-to-Air Missile

1500

Threat Warning

Surface-to-Surface Missile

10000

___________________________________________________


Threat Warning

Air-to-Surface Missile

15000

Threat Warning

Unknown

4000

MISSION PLANNING INFORMATION

2-226. Mission planning information includes orders and request-type messages that contain JVMF message templates. They include the following:

· · · · ·

Warning orders. Operational plans (OPLAN) and OPORDs. FRAGOs. Logistics orders and requests. Free text massages.

GEO-REFERENCED MESSAGES

2-227. These messages, which can be used in the C2 categories discussed earlier, create icons linked to a location on the FBCB2 map. They are also disseminated across the TI as situational awareness data. Geo-referenced messages can be used for the following:

· · · · · ·

Obstacle reports. NBC-1 reports. Bridge reports. Supply point status reports. Contact reports. Engagement reports.

2-228. FBCB2 users can choose to hide or display all geo-referenced data

from the filter dialog box. Geo-referenced messages contain “hook” information—detailed information on the status of any icon. To access “hook” information on a geo-referenced icon, however, the user must have been a recipient of the message.

2-61

Chapter 3

Reconnaissance Operations Reconnaissance platoons conduct reconnaissance to provide their commander with information that has tactical value concerning the terrain, threat, social/human demographics, infrastructure, and effects of weather within an area of operations. Scouts reconnoiter terrain to determine movement and maneuver conditions. When they find the threat, they determine his disposition, strengths, and weaknesses in detail. The reconnaissance platoon provides information necessary to allow combined arms forces to maneuver against the threat, strike him where he is most vulnerable, and apply overwhelming power to defeat him. In addition, scouts must be able to perform the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance to gather the information needed for execution of such activities as stability operations and support operations.

CONTENTS Purpose and Fundamentals ........................ Purpose .................................................. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance ...... Reconnaissance Planning, Methods, and Tactical Employment .............. Reconnaissance Tempo ....................... Reconnaissance Pull/Push ................... Planning Considerations ...................... Reconnaissance Operational Environment ....................................... Reconnaissance Handover .................. Reconnaissance Methods .................... Tactical Employment ............................ Multidimensional Aspects of Reconnaissance and Surveillance .................................... Operational Considerations ................. Intelligence Collection .......................... Civil-Military Operations ....................... Route Reconnaissance ................................ Critical Tasks ......................................... Techniques ............................................ Example of a Recce Platoon Route Reconnaissance ................................ Example of a CFV Platoon Route Reconnaissance ................................ Area Reconnaissance .................................. Critical Tasks ......................................... Techniques ............................................ Example of an Area Reconnaissance .. Zone Reconnaissance ................................. Critical Tasks ......................................... Techniques ............................................ Example of a Zone Reconnaissance ... Obstacle/Restriction Reconnaissance ....... The Steps of Obstacle/Restriction Reconnaissance ................................ Examples of Obstacle/Restriction Reconnaissance ................................

3-1 3-2 3-2 3-4 3-4 3-6 3-6 3-8 3-13 3-17 3-21 3-32 3-33 3-33 3-42 3-48 3-48 3-49 3-50 3-54 3-57 3-57 3-58 3-59 3-62 3-62 3-63 3-64 3-69 3-70 3-74

SECTION I – PURPOSE AND FUNDAMENTALS 3-1. Reconnaissance is conducted as part of all scout missions, both mounted and dismounted, and always maximizes all available assets. Scouts conduct dismounted reconnaissance to gather detailed information, to enhance security, and to move with stealth or in rugged terrain. They conduct mounted reconnaissance when time is critical and they need to cover a large area quickly. Mounted reconnaissance allows scouts to maintain a fast tempo in combat operations and to make 3-1

FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

maximum use of optics, firepower, communications, and protection provided by scout vehicles.

3-2. Scouts must thoroughly understand how the threat deploys his reconnaissance and security forces, as well as the sequence and timing of their entry into battle. The scouts’ accurate and timely reporting of threat locations and strength can make the difference between winning or losing the main battle. At the same time, it is critical that scouts never lose sight of their reconnaissance priorities and become involved in battles that invariably wear down reconnaissance forces.

PURPOSE 3-3. Based on their commander’s intent and guidance, scouts conduct reconnaissance forward of other friendly forces to provide current, accurate information about the threat, terrain, weather, society, infrastructure, and physical resources within a specified area of operations. In simplest terms, the reconnaissance platoon and its higher headquarters take steps to link the purpose of the reconnaissance to one or more of the following requirements:

· ·

Obtain information to answer the CCIR.

·

Support targeting acquisition.

Obtain information to fill voids in the unit IPB by answering IR and SIR. requirements

by

conducting

target

3-4. These actions provide follow-on forces with an opportunity to maneuver freely and rapidly to their objective. Scouts keep the follow-on forces from being surprised or interrupted, and they prevent these forces from losing men and equipment along the way to the objective. Reconnaissance platoons perform three types of reconnaissance: route, zone, and area.

FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE 3-5. Seven fundamentals are common to all successful reconnaissance operations. Scout leaders must ensure that their plans adhere to these fundamentals, which are covered in the following discussion, during the execution of reconnaissance missions. MAXIMIZE RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

3-6. Previous doctrine focused on maximum reconnaissance forward, which may still be appropriate in many situations. With the increasing likelihood of noncontiguous operations, however, reconnaissance and security operations may be oriented in multiple directions. Planning must also cover considerations for reconnaissance platoon operations in depth. The platoon must be able to integrate a wide range of sensors, to include TUAVs and ground sensors, to ensure maximum effectiveness and survivability of ground scouts. In the recce platoon, the platoon leadership must know how to focus platoon HUMINT collectors as well as traditional scouts. ORIENT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE

3-7. The reconnaissance platoon’s scheme of maneuver is focused toward a reconnaissance objective or set of objectives. The objective may 3-2

__________________________________________________ Chapter 3 – Reconnaissance Operations

be a terrain feature, a specific area, an enemy formation, or other type of threat force (such as a paramilitary element). It may be designated by an NAI, target area of interest (TAI), checkpoint, or objective symbol. A multidimensional reconnaissance objective, especially in stability operations or support operations, may reflect some aspect of the society or infrastructure within the area of operations. In Bosnia, for example, reconnaissance objectives were based on considerations from the Dayton Peace Accord; these included compliance with inspectors at weapons storage site facilities, the disbanding of illegal factional checkpoints, or the absence of police activity in the zone of separation.

3-8. The platoon must maintain its orientation toward the objective, regardless of what it encounters, until the mission is complete or it is directed otherwise. The platoon’s objective is covered in paragraph 3 of the higher commander’s OPORD. It is critical that the reconnaissance platoon leader and his subordinate leaders completely understand the mission focus before they begin the planning process. As noted earlier, the focus of the reconnaissance must be clearly linked to answering the CCIR, to filling voids in the unit IPB (especially related to the IR and SIR), and/or to supporting target acquisition. REPORT ALL INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY

3-9. Commanders base their decisions and plans on the battlefield information that scouts find and report during reconnaissance. Information loses value over time. Scouts must report all information exactly as they see it and as fast as possible. They must never assume, distort, or exaggerate; inaccurate information is dangerous. Information that the threat is not in a certain location is just as vital as where the threat is. RETAIN FREEDOM TO MANEUVER

3-10. Scouts must be able to maneuver on the battlefield. If the threat fixes them, the scouts must free themselves; otherwise, they can no longer accomplish their mission. Scouts must continually maintain awareness of tactical developments. They must employ effective techniques of tactical movement and react appropriately to unexpected situations. When contact is made, the platoon leader must seek to develop the situation at the lowest possible level, retaining the initiative, the ability to continue the mission, and the ability to maneuver his other elements. GAIN AND MAINTAIN THREAT CONTACT

3-11. Scouts seek visual contact with the threat. Ideally, the reconnaissance platoon leader will gain a thorough understanding of the threat situation before the operation starts by integrating ISR assets (such as TUAVs and ground sensors) during the planning process. This will enable him to maneuver the platoon out of contact so he can make contact either on the most favorable terms or as directed by the commander. He employs sound tactical movement, effective target acquisition methods, and appropriate actions on contact to see the threat first and thereby retain the initiative and control of the situation. Once the scouts find the threat, they maintain contact using all available means (sensors, radar, sound, and visual) until their commander orders them to do otherwise or until a change of mission is specified by their

3-3

FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

specific instructions and/or engagement criteria. The platoon then conducts reconnaissance handover (RHO) to pass responsibility for the threat to other elements. RAPIDLY DEVELOP THE SITUATION

3-12. Whether scouts run into a threat force or an obstacle, they must quickly determine what they are up against. If it is the threat, the scouts determine his size, composition, and activity. They find the flanks of the threat force. They find any barriers or obstacles surrounding the threat position and determine whether any other threat forces can support the position. If the scouts encounter an obstacle, they find and mark a bypass or, if appropriate, execute or assist in a breach. These actions all must be done quickly, with a minimum of guidance from higher. Time is the scout’s most precious resource; he cannot waste it if he is to achieve mission success. ENSURE CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

3-13. Units at battalion level and above conduct ISR before, during, and after all types of operations. The reconnaissance platoon is integral to the ISR effort; however, it is limited in its ability to conduct and sustain continuous reconnaissance. When the platoon is involved in reconnaissance conducted over extended time and distance, the higher commander will have to pace his assets and rotate units to maintain continuous reconnaissance coverage.

SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING, METHODS, AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT 3-14. To reduce vulnerability on the battlefield, scouts employ reconnaissance methods that achieve a balance between an acceptable level of risk and the security necessary to ensure mission accomplishment. Often this is expressed as a tradeoff between speed and security. The faster the reconnaissance, the more risk the scout takes and the less detailed the reconnaissance he conducts. 3-15. In conducting their missions, scouts must use all available resources, including reconnaissance methods that have been trained and rehearsed in detail. They must take every opportunity, both during peacetime and on the battlefield, to hone their reconnaissance skills. By the nature of their missions, scouts can never achieve perfect security; however, thorough knowledge of the various reconnaissance methods and their employment, combined with an understanding of a mission’s particular METT-TC requirements, allows the scout leader to choose, and mix, reconnaissance methods that both maximize security and ensure mission accomplishment.

RECONNAISSANCE TEMPO 3-16. This discussion focuses on several reconnaissance methods that scouts can employ. These methods have proven effective in a variety of situations and form a foundation for how to conduct reconnaissance. Scouts must use their experience, professional judgment, and common 3-4


sense to analyze a given situation and employ the appropriate method. Usually, a mission will require that these methods be applied using a variety of techniques, combinations, and variations.

3-17. In executing a reconnaissance mission, the reconnaissance platoon employs methods that reflect METT-TC considerations and that are geared to the particular task or the platoon’s unique capabilities. The types of methods and actions that the platoon may employ during the course of a mission can be generally characterized as stealthy or forceful, discreet or aggressive, and deliberate or rapid. The majority of platoon missions will actually fall along a continuum with varying levels of these three sets of extremes. 3-18. To help the platoon leader determine the appropriate reconnaissance method, the commander should provide him with pertinent information on the reconnaissance focus, tempo, and engagement criteria. The focus and engagement criteria will dictate whether the platoon reconnaissance will be stealthy or forceful and/or aggressive or discreet. The tempo of the mission will determine whether reconnaissance is deliberate or rapid. (NOTE: Reconnaissance focus, tempo, and engagement criteria are covered in the discussion of planning considerations later in this chapter.) 3-19. Stealthy and forceful describe the level of covertness required by

the commander. Stealthy reconnaissance is a time-consuming process that emphasizes avoiding detection by the threat. To be effective, a stealthy approach must rely on dismounted reconnaissance assets and maximum use of covered and concealed terrain. Forceful operations, which are conducted without regard for whether the reconnaissance force will be detected, often involve mounted elements, including combat units that do not ordinarily take part in reconnaissance.

3-20. Discreet and aggressive are terms describing the potential for engagement by the threat. Discreet reconnaissance is conducted under restrictive conditions, especially in relation to engagement criteria and the ability of the reconnaissance force to fight for information. Aggressive reconnaissance emphasizes identification of the threat’s combat power by techniques that may include fighting for information. This method is characterized by the employment of armored vehicles and the use of supporting fires. The platoon leader must always remain aware that aggressive information-gathering can provide the threat with an indication of friendly capabilities and future intentions. 3-21. The terms deliberate and rapid relate directly to the tempo of a particular reconnaissance and to the degree of completeness required by the commander. A deliberate operation yields a thorough, detailed reconnaissance of a particular area or zone. Rapid reconnaissance is focused on one or two critical tasks, thus minimizing the time necessary to cover a particular area or zone. 3-22. Because of the nature of their organizations, recce and HMMWV mounted reconnaissance platoons will tend to conduct stealthy and/or discreet reconnaissance. CFV mounted platoons, on the other hand, are more likely to conduct forceful and/or aggressive reconnaissance. 3-23. At the same time, the reconnaissance platoon leader must realize that the opposing approaches to reconnaissance (stealthy/forceful;

3-5

FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

discreet/aggressive; deliberate/rapid) are not mutually exclusive. For example, there may be times when HMMWV mounted platoons, such as battalion reconnaissance platoons, may choose to conduct aggressive reconnaissance based on the efforts of division cavalry and the BRT, which may already have operated in the area into which the HMMWV platoon is moving. Any of the possible combinations can be useful based on templated and actual threat dispositions, changing tactical situations, varying weather and light conditions, and available resources.

RECONNAISSANCE PULL/PUSH 3-24. There are two general forms of reconnaissance: push and pull. 3-25. Reconnaissance pull is used when the enemy situation is not well known and/or the situation is rapidly changing. Reconnaissance pull fosters planning and decision-making processes that are focused on changing assumptions into confirmed information. Initial assumptions and PIR are used to deploy reconnaissance assets early to collect information for use in the development of COAs. The commander uses R&S assets to confirm or deny initial PIR prior to the decision on a COA or maneuver option, thus pulling the supported unit (battalion or brigade) to the decisive point on the battlefield. Success of the reconnaissance pull requires an integrated reconnaissance plan that can be executed prior to the commander having to make a COA decision. 3-26. Reconnaissance push is used once the commander is committed to a COA or maneuver option. The commander pushes his R&S assets forward as necessary to gain greater visibility on specific NAIs and to gain information that will confirm or deny the assumptions on which the COA is based.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 3-27. The purpose of this section is to outline the planning, methods, and tactical employment involved in executing reconnaissance missions. Critical to the platoon leader’s ability to execute his mission is to clearly understand the focus, tempo, and engagement criteria of the reconnaissance mission. This information can be labeled as essential commander’s guidance. It is an extension of the commander’s intent and is meant to fully clarify the intent for the reconnaissance effort. It should be received from higher as well as issued to subordinates. The essential commander’s guidance answers the three basic questions the platoon leader needs to know to plan his mission:

·

3-6

What is the focus of the reconnaissance? Considerations related to the focus include the following (the first four items are characteristics of the reconnaissance operational environment, which are discussed later in this section): n

Threat/enemy (conventional and/or nonconventional forces, terrorist organizations, criminal elements).

n

Society/human considerations).

n

Terrain (bridges, routes, defensible terrain).

n

Infrastructure distribution).

demographics

(political

(HUMINT,

situation,

civilian

facilities,

food


n

What reconnaissance critical tasks are to be conducted or deleted?

NOTE: As noted throughout this chapter, the focus should be linked to the purpose of the reconnaissance operation to accomplish any or all of the following tasks: answer the CCIR, fill voids in the unit IPB (as related to the IR and specific information requirements [SIR]), and/or support targeting operations through target acquisition.

·

·

What is the tempo of the reconnaissance? Considerations related to the tempo include the following: n

Will the reconnaissance be conducted dismounted or mounted (stealthy or forceful)?

primarily

n

Will the reconnaissance be discreet or aggressive (or a combination)?

n

Will the reconnaissance be deliberate or rapid?

What are the engagement criteria (if any)? Considerations related to the engagement criteria include the following: n

What are the applicable ROE?

n

What situations will lead to a fight for the supported unit?

n

What situations will lead to a reconnaissance platoon fight?

n

What weapon systems will be used to engage what types of targets?

3-28. The focus of the reconnaissance allows the platoon leader to determine which critical tasks he wants the platoon to accomplish first. It helps him narrow the platoon’s scope of operations to get the information that is most important to squadron and brigade operations. In SSC operations the platoon focus might be terrain-oriented, or threat securityforce oriented. In an environment involving stability operations and support operations, the platoon might be focused on determining local populace sentiment or on identifying local paramilitary leaders. While all critical tasks have some degree of applicability in any given operation, certain ones are more important for specific missions; this must be clearly articulated at each level. Given a specified amount of time, the reconnaissance platoon accomplishes its specified critical tasks and then accomplishes other tasks as instructed by the commander. 3-29. The tempo of the reconnaissance allows the platoon leader to

establish associated time requirements and correlate them with planning time, movement formations, engagement criteria, and methods, such as dismounted or mounted reconnaissance (see Figure 3-1). The platoon leader establishes the tempo by answering two questions and articulating the results to the platoon:

·

Is the platoon conducting stealthy or forceful reconnaissance? As noted, the term stealthy implies time-consuming, primarily dismounted operations that minimize chance

3-7

FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

contact and observation of the platoon by threat forces. The platoon conducts forceful reconnaissance when there is no concern about being observed; it is usually mounted during these operations.

·

Does the reconnaissance require discreet or aggressive methods? Discreet reconnaissance is characterized by very restrictive engagement criteria, with reconnaissance forces restrained from initiating combat to gain information. Aggressive reconnaissance entails primarily mounted, fastpaced operations with permissive engagement criteria that allow the reconnaissance force to fight for information.

·

Is the reconnaissance deliberate or rapid? Deliberate reconnaissance entails slow, detailed, broad-based operations that require accomplishment of numerous tasks and that usually have no specific focus for the platoon. Rapid reconnaissance operations focus the platoon on a few key pieces of information required by the commander. They usually take place in a time-constrained environment and require completion of a small number of tasks.

Figure 3-1. Tempo of Reconnaissance

3-30. The engagement criteria establish which targets the platoon is

expected to destroy and which ones it is expected to hand off to higher elements. Conversely, by coupling his understanding of what the commander wants the platoon to destroy with his understanding of the threat’s most likely COA, the platoon leader is able to break down what he wants his sections to destroy. This enables him to focus the platoon’s weapon systems, develop engagement areas, and plan for the destruction of specified threat vehicles if the platoon encounters them.

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 3-31. The reconnaissance platoon must be prepared to operate beyond a narrow focus on the adversary and his capabilities. The platoon, of course, must excel in the traditional roles of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition of threat forces. In addition, it must fulfill the broader mission of providing situational awareness of the operational

3-8


environment in all its dimensions, covering political, cultural, economic, and demographic factors in addition to the military aspects of the area. This multidimensional requirement means that the platoon must develop an understanding not just of what is happening, but also of why. In the asymmetric environment, identifying threat centers of gravity, decisive points, and the means to influence the threat’s will and behavior is one of the most important contributions that the platoon can make to the higher unit’s success. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-32. The Army has always focused its efforts on traditional combat operations, based on open terrain, force-on-force battles, and symmetrical enemy formations. The standard reconnaissance approach in this environment has been simply to focus on gaining information on the enemy and terrain. The Army’s thinking, however, must expand to include nontraditional environmental variables that could influence its operations. In the future, Army forces will not habitually face conventional forces in open areas. Asymmetric Warfare

3-33. The new millennium, coupled with the technological developments of the information age, raises the specter of asymmetric warfare, a concept in which a weak opponent successfully engages a stronger opponent by using a variety of “offset” TTP for gaining advantage in hopes of achieving its objectives and goals. As noted, the reconnaissance platoon must be ready to concentrate both on the traditional approach to reconnaissance (focused on gathering information on enemy forces and terrain) and on the asymmetric aspects of the operational environment that affect military operations. Asymmetric threats include regional military forces, paramilitary forces, guerrillas and insurgents, terrorists, criminal groups, and certain civilian groups and individuals. Threat asymmetric approaches involve information operations, weapons of mass destruction, operations in complex (mainly urban) terrain, civilian involvement, and evasive attacks against US forces and soldiers. Urban Considerations

3-34. The urban environment confronts commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found in other settings in which the Army is called upon to conduct operations. The distinct characteristics of the urban environment are primarily a function of the following factors:

· ·

The increasing size and global prevalence of urban areas.

·

The density of civilians in close proximity to combat forces.

The combinations of manmade features and supporting infrastructure superimposed on the existing natural terrain.

3-35. Of those factors, the third one, and the human dimension it represents, is potentially the most important—and the most perplexing for commanders to understand and evaluate. Although urban terrain is complex, understanding it is a relatively straightforward process in comparison to comprehending the multifaceted nature of urban society. The urban environment is, first of all, a human environment. That makes

3-9

FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

it different from all other types. An urban environment is not defined by its structures or systems but by the people who compose it. It reacts and interacts with an army in ways that no natural environment can.

3-36. Military operations often require Army forces to operate in close proximity to a high density of civilians, whose presence, attitudes, actions, and needs in turn affect the conduct of operations. The behavior of civilian populations within an urban area is dynamic and poses a special challenge to commanders conducting military operations. Civilian populations continually influence, to varying degrees, military operations within an area of operations. As urban areas increase in size, they become less and less homogenous; therefore, commanders must understand and account for the characteristics of a diverse population whose beliefs and actions may vary based on many factors. 3-37. The center of gravity during a military operation, particularly in stability operations and support operations, may be the civilian inhabitants themselves. The side that enjoys the support of the population retains many advantages. To gain and/or retain this support, commanders must first understand (through reconnaissance) the complex nature and character of the urban society and its infrastructure, which are covered later in this discussion. Second, they must understand and accept that every military action (or inaction) may influence, positively or negatively, the relationship between the urban population and Army forces and, by extension, have a significant impact on mission success. With this awareness, commanders visualize decisions they must make, plan operations, implement programs, and/or take immediate action to maintain support of a friendly populace, gain the support of neutral factions, or neutralize hostile elements. 3-38. As noted, understanding how operations affect the urban society (and vice versa) normally begins with reconnaissance of the society and its infrastructure. As noted, these two characteristics of the reconnaissance operational environment (covered later in this discussion) allow the commander to determine the locations and numbers of civilians as well as the infrastructure in relation to decisive points within the area of operations. The commander can then decide whether civilian presence and/or density represent a significant risk to the accomplishment of the mission. He uses this knowledge to visualize what actions he must take to influence and/or exploit the society and its infrastructure. It should be emphasized that the society may assist friendly military operations by providing information on threat forces or by supporting friendly forces with its infrastructure resources. If civilians are the primary focus of the operation, as in many stability and support operations, this analysis may help to determine the decisive points. 3-39. In the broader mission of providing information for situational understanding of the operational environment, the platoon must direct its reconnaissance based on a number of dimensions—political, social, cultural, and economic demographics; infrastructure; open and complex terrain—as well as military factors. This multidimensional reconnaissance is not a mission; rather, it expands on the traditional focus of reconnaissance by concentrating on additional asymmetric threats, urban factors (such as society and infrastructure), and other considerations that can influence military operations. For the platoon to make an effective contribution to the multidimensional reconnaissance 3-10


effort, leaders must clearly understand this expanded focus for reconnaissance in the operational environment. They must also understand how to work with a variety of ISR assets (refer to Chapter 8 of this manual) that are fused at the lowest level to assist the platoon. See the discussion later in this chapter for more information on multidimensional reconnaissance. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-40. To successfully accomplish the reconnaissance mission, the

platoon leadership must clearly understand the four characteristics of the reconnaissance operational environment: threat/enemy, society/human demographics, terrain, and infrastructure. These characteristics, when applied to the fundamentals of reconnaissance, will enhance the platoon’s ability to fully understand its environment and conduct a more detailed, comprehensive reconnaissance and surveillance mission.

Threat/Enemy

3-41. The platoon no longer faces a single, monolithic, well-defined threat. During the Cold War, planning centered on confronting numerically superior armored forces in Europe, the Far East, or Southwest Asia. Today’s reconnaissance units must be able to conduct operations across the range of military operations (MTW, SSC, stability operations, and support operations) against threats ranging in size from major regional powers to asymmetric threats. These may include conventional threat forces, insurgents, paramilitary forces, guerrillas, criminal groups, and certain civilian groups and individuals. 3-42. Because of the diversity of the threat, the IPB process becomes even more important at the brigade, squadron, troop, and platoon levels. No longer will the threat always fit into a neat time-distance scenario. Potential adversaries may use a variety of doctrine, tactics, and equipment. It is extremely important to quickly identify the threat/enemy in a specific operational area. This will almost always be the major focus of reconnaissance for the platoon. At times, however, the reconnaissance focus may be the identification of the unknown threat as well. That is why the understanding of the society and infrastructure of an area are also important factors in the reconnaissance operational environment. Society/Human Demographics

3-43. Because the focus of reconnaissance may be the society and people of a given area, the reconnaissance platoon must be aware of the full dimension of demographics in its area of operations. The demographic framework is the basis of the characteristics of a specific environment and determines many, if not most, of the platoon’s reconnaissance objectives. Gaining an awareness of how the local society affects military operations and of the impact of military operations on the society is likely to be critical to the platoon leader and his subordinate leaders as they make operational decisions. The following are examples of the social/human dimensions of reconnaissance focus in the area of operations:

·

Population demographics. Categories of interest in this area include race, sex, age, religion, language, national origin,

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tribe, clan, class, political party affiliation, education, or any significant social grouping.

· · ·

· · ·

History. Government. Government or factional leaders, including the following: n

Mayors.

n

Local police chiefs.

n

Local political leaders.

n

Local military commanders.

n

Local religious leaders.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Economy. Media personnel and outlets, including the following: n

Organizations.

n

Reporters.

n

Publications.

n

Broadcast outlets (TV and radio).

n

Internet users and World Wide Web sites.

3-44. As noted, the center of gravity during operations may be the civilian inhabitants themselves. Failure to understand the needs of the society or to gain the support of the population may cause elements of the society to become a threat to the unit during military operations. To gain and/or retain this support, the platoon leader and his soldiers must understand the complex nature and character of the society as well as the relationship between the population and Army forces. In addition, an understanding of the society (gained by effective reconnaissance) provides the platoon leader with vital information he needs to shape the operational environment. 3-45. An understanding of how operations affect the society (and vice versa) normally begins with gaining information on the size, location, and composition of the society. While traditional reconnaissance is focused mainly on conventional threat forces and their personnel, the multidimensional environment requires the platoon to clearly understand all types of potential threat elements—conventional, paramilitary, terrorist, or even organized crime groups that could undermine the stability of the local economy. Even elements of a society that are not normally considered hostile may pose a threat and consequently become a specific focus for reconnaissance. Examples include a mob whose demonstrations against US military presence disrupt military operations or refugees clogging a route that higher headquarters plans to use for combat operations. The platoon’s reconnaissance focus may then be to identify and evaluate these groups; it will attempt to gain information that will allow the higher unit to use nonlethal effects to deal with the problem. 3-46. In addition, the platoon must understand the different cultural and economic backgrounds of the people it encounters on a day-to-day

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basis. The platoon leadership must become familiar with civic and factional leaders such as mayors, police chiefs, local military commanders, and political leaders. This knowledge, while important in SSC and MTW operations, is critical in stability operations and support operations where the platoon might have a permanent lodgment area surrounded by diverse local communities. Terrain

3-47. The reconnaissance platoon must never become complacent in terrain analysis and the identification of key terrain. The platoon must understand terrain factors as they pertain to friendly forces and threat forces alike. It must also be able to evaluate the role of terrain not just in traditional operations, but in stability, support, and SSC environments as well. For example, in stability operations or support operations, key terrain could be a religious or cultural monument or a historic geographical boundary or town. Infrastructure

3-48. For a platoon to operate successfully in an area, it must understand the local infrastructure. The platoon must develop a general understanding of facilities, institutions, and organizations; how each of these entities fit into the community at large; and how they relate to one another. Infrastructure considerations include the following:

·

Physical facilities like utilities, factories, transportation, and food distribution points as well as the many services and products that make a community function.

·

Financial services and factors. What is the monetary base of the different communities, the income demographics, and the black market trade situation? Who can provide for the CSS needs of friendly forces?

·

The local community, political, and governmental structure. This includes religious, military, and paramilitary organizations, such as local security and police forces that work independently of one another.

RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER 3-49. RHO is the action that occurs between two elements in order to coordinate the transfer of information and/or responsibility for observation (reconnaissance and/or surveillance) of potential threat contact, or the transfer of an assigned area from one element to another. The term “element” is all-inclusive of those involved in the handover, whether it is OP to OP within the same platoon, sensors (such as GSR) to a recce platoon, recce troop to infantry battalion, and so on. 3-50. RHO draws its origins from a World War II term “connecting file,” which facilitated the linking of units to prevent seams between them. RHO shares many critical tasks with battle handover: relief in place, linkup, and passage of lines. Unlike battle handover, however, it does not imply the assumption of a fight or being within direct fire range. Instead, it focuses on planning for, preparing, and executing the passing of information, threat contact, or an assigned area and the related responsibility for it from one element to another.

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3-51. This task provides the information connection, overlapping communications, and commander’s focus (which may differ for each echelon) required when planning and executing layered reconnaissance and surveillance with multiple assets. RHO is normally associated with a designated coordination point (RHOCP) or reconnaissance handover line (RHOL), which is in effect a phase line; it may entail handover of a sector/zone, NAI, TAI, and/or threat contact. RHO can involve visual, electronic, digital, or analog information sources or any combination of these. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER

3-52. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations must be nested with higher, lower, and adjacent units in order to provide a coordinated and integrated effort. Planning for these operations includes coordinating RHO from higher echelons to the lowest element, as well as coordination with adjacent units/elements. Planning

3-53. Responsibility for the coordination of RHO normally occurs from higher to lower units. Planning for RHO may take place before an operation or may be conducted during operations as part of a change of mission. When planning is conducted before an operation, the completed plan is reviewed, ensuring layered, redundant reconnaissance and surveillance using all available ISR assets. This layered reconnaissance/surveillance is then analyzed to determine where and who may be required to conduct RHO. Once this is determined, the locations and/or criteria for RHO are coordinated with higher headquarters as applicable. Pertinent control measures related to RHO, such as the RHOL (phase line) between units or the potential RHOCP to facilitate ground linkup, are then added with other graphic control measures to aid in command and control. Preparation

3-54. Coordination begins as RHO requirements between units are identified. The communications plan between the units is then identified. The communications plan includes radio frequencies, net IDs, EPLRS needlines, host files required to conduct the linkup (if units are from different maneuver control systems), and COMSEC variables for communications and establishment of the TI between the two forces. Recognition signals must be implemented to prevent friendly troops from exchanging fires. These signals may be pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle markings, panels, colored smoke, distinctive light patterns, and passwords. The situational awareness provided by FBCB2 can significantly enhance friendly recognition. 3-55. Indirect fires are coordinated, and fire support information is exchanged between units, to include assets available, fire control measures, critical friendly zones (CFZ), preplanned targets, final protective fires (FPF), and smoke missions. 3-56. ISR (R&S) plans are exchanged allowing an understanding of how higher information requirements (IR) may fulfill the lower unit’s or passing unit’s IR needs. For example, this will allow the brigade reconnaissance assets to understand the follow-on battalion IR needs while still remaining focused on the brigade’s requirements. This understanding may lead to the transfer of vital information collected by 3-14


the brigade assets to the battalion during critical moments, such as the RHO of an enemy target for destruction (this is further emphasized in the example). The remarks block of the ISR (R&S) matrix may also be used to identify established RHO coordination.

3-57. The criteria for target handover (engagement criteria) are identified and coordinated, including who will interdict if the target exceeds the unit’s engagement criteria. If follow-on forces are designated to destroy the target (as a result of meeting their engagement criteria), a forward passage of lines may need to be coordinated to support that unit’s attack. The contact report of threat forces exceeding the engagement criteria of the element/unit in contact may act as a trigger for follow-on forces to initiate movement to conduct the forward passage of lines. 3-58. Coordination is conducted to identify the transfer and/or acceptance of C2 of elements between units as necessary. On-order missions may be identified for elements/units to support RHO. An example of this would be a TUAV task to establish and maintain contact with a moving contact while RHO of the contact is being conducted from one unit to another. The initial contact report may act as a trigger to prepare the TUAV for launch, allowing the supporting element/unit (TUAV crew) time to prepare. As RHO becomes imminent and final coordination begins, the TUAV is launched to support the handover. This level of coordination will allow the TUAV maximum time on station, ensuring redundant observation during handover. 3-59. Rehearsals are of paramount importance before executing any plan. During rehearsals, RHO coordination is confirmed and practiced to ensure clarity and understanding. NOTE: Throughout RHO planning and preparation, all elements/units must be prepared to transition to battle handover in the event they are engaged by threat forces. Execution

3-60. Elements/units may conduct RHO with follow-on or security (stationary) forces, accept RHO from a forward force, or provide C2 for the handover. 3-61. During execution of RHO, liaison with a unit may consist of collocating both units’ C2 nodes as well as attaching scouts to the forward maneuver units to facilitate implementation of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Every effort should be made to establish a faceto-face liaison. If this is not possible, establish a reliable digital and/or voice linkup to exchange critical information. As the distance closes between the forces, the requirement to maintain close liaison and exchange information increases. 3-62. If face-to-face linkup is made at the RHOCP, final coordination is completed and relevant information is exchanged. Confirmation is made to ensure RHO is complete based on the specified criteria. If a target is being handed over, the criteria should require the accepting unit to acquire the target before handover is complete. The unit conducting RHO may then be required to support the unit accepting the handover by executing the responsibilities of the stationary unit while conducting a

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forward passage of lines or relief in place. If follow-on forces are conducting an attack, the unit conducting the RHO may facilitate the follow-on force’s attack by conducting reconnaissance pull and support by executing targeting, to include previously coordinated indirect fires. EXAMPLES OF RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER Handover in Urban Terrain

3-63. The platoon may conduct RHO during an area reconnaissance mission in urban terrain. One of its squads makes contact with a potential source that may be able to provide information relevant to the brigade as it moves through the area. The squad reports this contact and begins to exploit the source through tactical questioning. The platoon leader forwards the reports higher. The brigade tasks a supporting HUMINT asset (such as MP, MI, or civil affairs elements) to further develop the contact. The squad then conducts RHO, passing responsibility for the source and all information collected to that point to the follow-on HUMINT asset. NOTE: The following example illustrates an RHO operation at a higher level, in this case between a BRT and both division cavalry scouts (forward of the BRT) and task force scouts (to the rear of the BRT). This type of higher-level handover would directly affect the reconnaissance platoons within all of these elements. Higher-Level Handover

3-64. A more detailed example entails a division cavalry squadron conducting a zone reconnaissance forward of the brigade. The brigade’s BRT has been given a mission to conduct area reconnaissance missions behind the division cavalry to reconnoiter potential assault positions and then conduct surveillance of TAIs in support of the brigade’s attack. This technique will allow the BRT to conduct a thorough reconnaissance while taking advantage of the security the ground cavalry troop (GCT) provides. The BRT has been assigned a zone through which it will move to its assigned areas. It conducts physical and FM/digital linkup with the division cavalry troop directly to its front and with the lead task force’s scout platoon following the BRT. 3-65. En route to their OPs, the BRT scouts maneuver into the divisional scouts’ area of operations. They report real time information to the brigade and its lead maneuver battalion. Once the conditions are set, the BRT conducts RHO with the division cavalry troop to its front. The divisional cavalry (DIV CAV) troop reports that it has bypassed a threat OP consisting of two BRDM-type vehicles; it provides additional information concerning the terrain and enemy on the brigade’s objective. The DIV CAV troop and the BRT also coordinate passage of lines for the BRT to move into OPs that observe the assigned TAIs. The BRT accepts the handover from the DIV CAV. It reports the contact to the brigade and the follow-on task force and updates both the FBCB2 overlay (adding the OP contact) and the threat template on the objective. The brigade accepts responsibility for the threat OP contact and directs the BRT bypass the OP and continue the mission. 3-66. The BRT establishes OPs to observe the assigned TAIs and support the brigade’s attack. The troop XO begins RHO with the lead

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task force scout platoon. The task force (TF) scout platoon leader collocates with the troop CP and gathers the relevant information for his task force. The BRT directs a section to establish a linkup point for the lead TF scouts. The BRT identifies the best axis of advance for the task force from its own observations and from information provided by DIV CAV. The BRT also provides locations of passage lanes through the DIV CAV and the threat’s security zone as well as the latest update on the threat’s posture on the objective.

3-67. The BRT scouts provide an “eyes-on” SITREP and then lead the task force scouts to the position of advantage using a covered and concealed route identified en route to the linkup point. The scout platoon leader now has enough information to point out the RHOL on the ground, to identify enemy/friendly locations and routes to the flank and rear of the enemy, and then to physically lead the formation to the RHOL. The BRT is positioned to support the BCT fight, with scouts and Strikers conducting target acquisition.

RECONNAISSANCE METHODS RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS

3-68. Reconnaissance patrols provide timely and accurate information about the threat and terrain. The reconnaissance platoon may be tasked to conduct any of the three types of reconnaissance patrols (area, zone, or route). The patrol leader must have specific intelligence collection requirements for each mission. For a detailed discussion of reconnaissance patrols, refer to Chapter 5 of this manual. MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE

3-69. Scouts frequently conduct mounted operations, which give reconnaissance platoons the ability to conduct fairly detailed reconnaissance while maintaining the speed and momentum required for the operation. Mounted reconnaissance also allows the scouts to take advantage of the protection afforded by their vehicles, although they must still dismount when they cross danger areas. Employment Considerations

3-70. Mounted reconnaissance is normally used under these conditions:

· · · ·

Time is limited.

·

Ground sensors (such as GSR elements) are conducting reconnaissance activities in support of ground forces.

·

Terrain is open.

Detailed reconnaissance is not required. IPB provides accurate information on the threat. The UAV platoon is performing coordinated reconnaissance tasks in support of ground forces.

Advantages

3-71. Speed and momentum are rarely necessary in a reconnaissance operation, but they are often critical to the successful execution of offensive operations that the reconnaissance mission may support. In 3-17

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addition to speed, mounted reconnaissance offers scouts the advantages of their reconnaissance vehicle. These advantages depend on the specific vehicle employed, but they can include firepower, armor protection, enhanced navigation and communications capability, and thermal optics. Disadvantages

3-72. The disadvantages of mounted reconnaissance include the loss of stealth due to the visual, noise, and thermal signatures of the vehicle and the loss of some detail because of restricted vision and impairment of the senses of smell and hearing. These disadvantages increase the risk to scouts as they conduct reconnaissance. DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE

3-73. The primary purpose of dismounted reconnaissance is to obtain detailed information about terrain features, obstacles, or threat forces. In addition, scouts dismount and reconnoiter forward of their vehicle to provide security before moving through danger areas such as open spaces, hilltops, curves, or other blind spots on the battlefield. They also dismount to set up short- or long-duration OPs. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual for additional information on dismounted operations.) Employment Considerations

3-74. In general, scouts conduct dismounted reconnaissance when the following conditions apply:

· · ·

Detailed reconnaissance is required.

· · · · ·

Restricted terrain is encountered.

Stealth is required. Threat contact is expected or visual contact has been achieved. Time is available. Danger areas are encountered. Security is the primary concern. IPB indicates close proximity to threat positions.

3-75. Dismounted scouts provide security for each other as they move. Ideally, at least two scouts work together when operating dismounted. When only a single scout dismounts, he should never move out of supporting distance of the vehicle. Advantages

3-76. Dismounted reconnaissance is the preferred method when stealthy movement is desired. Scouts on foot benefit from the concealment offered by folds in the terrain; in addition, they do not emit a significant visual or audio signature. Dismounted reconnaissance techniques allow the reconnaissance platoon to observe threat vehicles and soldiers at close range without being detected. Scouts conducting dismounted reconnaissance can also quickly transition to a stationary OP for a short period of time without suffering any loss of effectiveness. Disadvantages

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3-77. Disadvantages of dismounted reconnaissance include a relatively slow rate of movement for personnel on foot, extensive requirements for detailed preliminary planning and coordination, and considerable risk to scouts who are conducting dismounted operations. Unless they establish a radio relay, scouts cannot conduct dismounted reconnaissance in depth because of the relatively short range of man-portable FM communications systems. When dismounted reconnaissance takes place during hours of darkness, target acquisition depends largely on hand-held night vision devices, whose capabilities can be degraded. Tools for Dismounted Reconnaissance

3-78. Dismounted scouts employ a variety of equipment and other tactical tools to enhance their capability to report information accurately and to call for and adjust indirect fires. At a minimum, they carry the following items:

· · · · · · ·

SOPs. Personal weapons. Communications equipment. SOI extracts. Maps. A compass. Binoculars (and night vision devices, if necessary).

RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE

3-79. In reconnaissance by fire, indirect fire is used on positions where there is a reasonable suspicion of threat occupation; the goal is to cause the threat to disclose his presence by moving or by returning fire. In rare circumstances, the reconnaissance platoon or section may use this reconnaissance method when threat contact is expected and time is limited or when the platoon cannot maneuver to develop the situation. In such a situation, it is critical for the platoon leader to conduct thorough war-gaming and rehearsals to prepare for the probable threat reaction. Employment Considerations

3-80. Examples of threat locations and/or contact situations in which reconnaissance by fire may be employed include the following:

· · · · ·

Contact with a natural or man-made obstacle. Detection of an obvious kill zone. A suspected threat position that fits the situational template. Signs of recent activity (such as track marks or trash). Bunker complexes that may or may not be occupied.

3-81. Reconnaissance by fire eliminates any element of surprise the scouts may have had, and it is likely to give the threat detailed knowledge of their location. It may, however, reduce the chance of scouts being ambushed within established kill zones. 3-82. Reconnaissance by fire does not work in all cases. For example,

disciplined troops in prepared positions will not react to the scouts’ fires.

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As a result, reconnaissance by fire must not entail the indiscriminate use of direct and indirect fires at all wood lines and hilltops in the hopes of causing the threat to react. The threat will recognize this for what it is; he will not react to it. This also wastes valuable ammunition. Use of Indirect Fire

3-83. Scouts can conduct reconnaissance by fire by calling for and adjusting indirect fire. Reconnaissance by indirect fire provides security for the scouts because it does not disclose their exact position; in addition, all scouts are available to observe the effects of the fire. 3-84. Reconnaissance by indirect fire has disadvantages as well.

Indirect fire requires more coordination and communication than direct fire; it is also less responsive and may be less accurate. Indirect fire can be subject to factors beyond the control of the platoon, such as the supporting unit’s Class V supply status, counterbattery threats, and command approval. Additionally, the effects of indirect fire may obscure the scout’s vision.

FIGHTING FOR INFORMATION

3-85. As discussed earlier in this manual, reconnaissance organizations such as ACRs and division cavalry squadrons not only use the common techniques and assets (HUMINT, passive surveillance, and technical means) to conduct reconnaissance operations, but also are capable of employing combat power to fight for information. Because these units are usually the forward-most elements in MTW environments, they must have the capability to survive meeting engagements and to destroy or impede threat forces as necessary to sustain operations in high-threat areas. They can do this because of the platforms they operate and the unique, combined arms organizations they employ. These units are capable of fighting through threat reconnaissance (destroying the threat’s “eyes and ears”) to gain combat information needed by higher unit commanders. In shaping operations, the ability to fight for information is important in determining the intent of a threat (for example, whether the threat is willing to defend, withdraw, or fight when confronted) without committing main body infantry or armor units. 3-86. The ability to fight for information is linked directly to the unit’s engagement criteria and capabilities; therefore, the ability to fight for information is not limited only to ACRs and division cavalry squadrons. When an organization faces an inferior force that is within its engagement criteria, it may have to fight for information even if it is not traditionally equipped to fulfill this role. Because the ability to fight for information is threat-based, a clear understanding of the threat and its capabilities is required for units not normally conducting this form of aggressive reconnaissance. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

3-87. When available, aerial reconnaissance can be employed to complement ground reconnaissance. Aerial assets are an integral part of reconnaissance operations; ground scouts must synchronize their reconnaissance efforts with that of available UAV assets if they are operating in the same area.

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3-88. The ground scout must understand the capabilities and limitations of aerial reconnaissance. Air-ground coordination is vital to mission success and fratricide reduction. If possible, the platoon leader should arrange to conduct face-to-face coordination with the UAV platoon or section leader as well as with the leaders of any other aviation assets in the area of operations. If this is not practical, analog or digital coordination becomes essential. 3-89. When operating together, aerial and ground reconnaissance assets can compensate for each other’s limitations and significantly increase the effectiveness of their combined reconnaissance effort. Aerial reconnaissance is the fastest form of reconnaissance. It is also terrainindependent; air assets can reconnoiter areas that may be difficult or impossible for ground scouts to reach. 3-90. On the other hand, aerial reconnaissance is limited by weather conditions, the night-vision capability of the particular aircraft’s sensors, fuel requirements, ADA threats, and the detail with which terrain can be observed. Generally, aerial reconnaissance will not be able to identify stationary threat elements smaller than platoon size or moving elements of squad size or smaller, although this can vary widely depending on the terrain and available equipment. NOTE: Refer to Chapter 8 of this manual for further details on air/ground reconnaissance integration.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT INFILTRATION

3-91. Infiltration is a form of maneuver that the reconnaissance platoon can use to penetrate the threat security zone or main battle area to accomplish its mission. Entailing use of stealthy forms of movement, infiltration is primarily conducted by, but not limited to, recce and HMMWV mounted platoons due to their increased vulnerability, in high threat environments, to direct and indirect fires. Although it is most commonly used by ground reconnaissance assets, aerial and waterborne platforms may also employ tactics based on infiltration techniques. Purposes of infiltration include the following:

· · ·

Reconnoiter a specified area and establish OPs.

· · · ·

Determine threat strengths and weaknesses.

Emplace remote sensors. Establish communications relay capability for a specific period in support of other reconnaissance operations. Locate unobserved routes through threat positions. Determine the location of high-payoff threat assets. Provide surveillance for follow-on echelons moving into sector.

3-92. The primary focus of infiltration is to move to a designated point without being detected or engaged by the threat. During infiltration, the platoon’s elements use predesignated lanes to reach their objective. The

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infiltrating elements employ cover, concealment, and stealth to move through identified or templated gaps in the threat array.

3-93. The platoon can infiltrate by dismounted teams; mounted by vehicles, by sections, or as a complete platoon; or using a combination of mounted and dismounted teams. It can infiltrate as an entire element at one time or move into sector by echelon, at different times. Two examples of infiltration operations follow the discussion of operational considerations. Operational Considerations

3-94. Infiltration imposes a number of distinct, and often difficult, operational considerations on the reconnaissance platoon. 3-95. Planning and Coordination. The amount of intelligence information available to the reconnaissance platoon leader during the planning process will determine the risk involved in conducting the infiltration. The platoon leader must maximize the use of known intelligence, including aerial photographs, for the area of operations. As he plans the operation, the platoon leader must select appropriate routes and movement techniques based on the mission, the terrain and weather, the likelihood of threat contact, the expected and/or necessary speed of movement, and the depth to which the platoon’s elements must penetrate. Once these factors have been considered, the platoon leader must make the decision to infiltrate either mounted or dismounted or a combination of both. Even if he decides the platoon can conduct a mounted infiltration, his plan must take into account that the situation may require scouts to dismount and reconnoiter an area before the vehicles move forward. The platoon leader’s infiltration plan must provide platoon elements with enough time for preparation and initial movement. The initial plan should also cover an evasion and extraction plan, as well as any special equipment requirements. 3-96. The platoon leader must conduct detailed coordination with any friendly elements through which the platoon will pass when executing infiltration tactics; this includes integration of communications, fires, and CSS activities. In addition, the platoon’s higher headquarters must coordinate the activities of adjacent friendly units to ensure that they do not compromise the platoon and its elements as they conduct the infiltration. 3-97. Size of Infiltrating Elements. The size of the elements depends on several factors: the assigned mission, time available, cover and concealment, the target acquisition capabilities of both friendly and threat forces, available communications assets, and navigation capabilities and limitations. If the platoon is tasked to gather information over a wide area, it may employ several small teams to cover the complete sector. In most situations, smaller elements are better able to take advantage of available cover and concealment. Another consideration is that some elements of the platoon may not use infiltration. If the platoon is moving into sector in echelon, the initial echelons may infiltrate to a specific location and provide surveillance for follow-on echelons that are moving into sector using a more conventional movement technique.

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3-98. Infiltration Lanes or Routes. The reconnaissance platoon’s higher headquarters will assign the platoon an infiltration lane or zone, requiring the platoon leader to gather the necessary information and intelligence to prepare for the mission. The platoon leader must decide whether to move the entire platoon along a single lane or assign separate lanes for each section or vehicle. 3-99. Each alternative presents distinct advantages and disadvantages. Moving the entire platoon on a single lane makes navigation and movement easier to control, but it can increase the chance of the platoon being detected by threat forces. Moving on multiple lanes may require development of additional control measures, make command and control more difficult, and create navigation problems. On the other hand, it can reduce the chances of detection by the threat. 3-100. In choosing infiltration lanes, the platoon leader must ensure that lanes afford sufficient width to allow each element to change its planned route to avoid unexpected threat contact. He must also consider civilian activity along each lane and within the infiltration zone as a whole. The infiltration route should avoid obstacles, populated areas, and areas occupied or covered by threat elements. The route should provide cover and concealment by placing ridgelines, rivers, and other restrictive terrain between the platoon and threat forces. The plan should also make use of limited visibility and adverse weather. 3-101. As noted, the focus for the scout during infiltration is to remain undetected and avoid contact with any threat elements. In conjunction with intervisibility lines, the TERRABASE program can be used on templated enemy positions and dominant terrain to help refine route selection. Using TERRABASE at various points of the infiltration route, the platoon leader can determine where the route can be observed by the threat and identify potential danger areas prior to moving into the area of operations. If time permits and assets are available, UAVs may be used to proof the route and to survey danger areas and influencing terrain. The use of UAVs, however, must be weighed carefully against the potential for compromising the infiltration route. 3-102. Communications. In general, infiltrating elements should

maintain radio listening silence except to send critical information that the commander has directed to be reported immediately or to report contact with threat forces. When operating out of range of normal radio communications, an infiltrating element that must transmit required information should move to high ground or set up a long-range expedient antenna. (NOTE: See Appendix F of this manual for information on repair of communications equipment and construction of field expedient antennas.)

3-103. Fire Support. Infiltration plans always cover employment of indirect fires, although these are used only in limited circumstances. The most common use is when the infiltrating unit makes threat contact. The commander or platoon leader may employ indirect fires in another sector to divert attention from the infiltration lane. Indirect fires can also be useful in degrading the threat’s acquisition and observation capabilities by forcing him to seek cover. 3-104. Actions on Contact. Each infiltrating element must develop and

rehearse a plan that clearly defines its actions when faced with one or more of the eight forms of contact discussed in Chapter 2 of this manual.

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If detected, an infiltrating element will return fire, break contact, and report; these actions are also discussed in Chapter 2. Fighting through the threat force, however, is the least preferred COA. Direct fire engagements are normally limited to whatever actions are required to break contact. To prevent compromise of their established locations, elements already established in sector may choose not to provide direct fire support for follow-on echelons in contact.

3-105. During infiltration using multiple lanes, the detection of one platoon’s elements may alert the threat and compromise other units in the infiltration zone. The OPORD must clearly state the criteria under which elements will either continue the mission or return to friendly lines if they are detected by the threat. If an element makes visual contact but is not detected, it should continue the mission. Examples of Infiltration Operations

3-106. The following examples focus on the reconnaissance platoon as it conducts infiltration either as a unit or by echelon. 3-107. Mounted Infiltration of a Platoon Moving as a Unit. This

example has a reconnaissance platoon moving as a whole along a predesignated infiltration route. Maximizing intervisibility lines and using masking terrain are key considerations in selecting infiltration routes. Units must maximize all available tools and assets that support thorough IPB, with emphasis placed on OCOKA. (NOTE: Refer to the discussions of IPB and OCOKA factors in Chapter 1 of this manual). The TERRABASE program is a tremendous tool that can assist leaders in terrain analysis. For example, TERRABASE can aid in analysis of potential OP locations. In addition, it can be used on a potential infiltration route to determine positions from which the route can be observed; this will help identify danger areas and help focus the platoon’s maneuver, observation, and indirect fire plans.

3-108. Prior to the infiltration, UAVs may be deployed to check these danger areas and reconnoiter the infiltration route and influencing terrain. This assists in refinement of the route. Coordination is made to receive either video or photos from the UAV reconnaissance flights. GSR and PROPHET are also deployed prior to infiltration to provide early detection and location of possible threat forces operating in the area. The platoon also requests intelligence updates through the S2 prior to infiltration. The intelligence may come from numerous ISR assets that have worked in the area in the past, to include prior HUMINT operations that may have collected intelligence from the local inhabitants. Checkpoints or TIRS/GIRS may be used to control and report movement along the route. An initial rally point may be designated beyond the passage lane; this point may also act as a casualty or maintenance collection point. SOPs may dictate the use of checkpoints as rally points as well. The quick reaction force (QRF) is also briefed and is provided with an overlay of the infiltration route. 3-109. When the infiltration begins, the platoon, moving as a whole, conducts a passage of lines and continues along the infiltration route (see Figure 3-2A). Temporary halts are conducted throughout the movement to allow dismounts to move forward of the vehicles to reconnoiter danger areas. These danger areas may have been identified during the planning phase through the use of TERRABASE or UAVs. Each section maneuvers 3-24


to its proposed OP location and establishes the OP to observe its designated NAIs. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual for details on occupying an OP.) As the initial section establishes its OP, it also provides surveillance for those sections continuing on the infiltration route. The next section follows the same procedures as the first section until all sections have established their OPs. In the event COLTs/Strikers are moving into sector to cover TAIs, which are tied to the scout NAIs, they may use the same infiltration route and follow the same procedures as the scout sections in establishing their positions. NOTE: Although doctrine prescribes the use of infiltration lanes, a specific route may be identified, as described in this example, to increase survivability and the chance for success.

Figure 3-2A. Mounted Platoon Moving on an Infiltration Route

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3-110. Once established, OP1 observes NAIs 1 and 2, OP2 observes NAIs 3 and 1, and OP3 observes NAIs 2 and 3 (see Figure 3-2B). This observation plan allows redundancy of observation of the NAIs and enhances the platoon’s ability to conduct handover of contact from one OP to another. OP1 must also be prepared to conduct handover of contact with the elements to its rear. These potential actions are coordinated prior to execution of the infiltration.

Figure 3-2B. NAI Observation Plan with Built-In Redundancy

3-111. Platoon Infiltration by Echelon. This example never has more

than one section moving at any time. Planning and coordination for the infiltration is virtually the same as for the first example; the main difference is that the platoon does not move as a whole. GSR, PROPHET, and UAVs may be used throughout the infiltration process, but caution

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must be taken not to compromise the infiltration route by frequent UAV flyovers.

3-112. At 1730 hours, a dismounted squad conducts a passage of lines and moves along an infiltration route to establish OP1 (see Figure 3-2C). Once established, this OP conducts surveillance along the mounted infiltration route and reports its observations to assist the platoon leader in refining the mounted infiltration plan. Elements of the platoon may act as the QRF for this dismounted team.

Figure 3-2C. Initial Infiltration of Dismounted Team

3-113. At 2017, the first mounted section begins its infiltration along the designated route, moving to OP2 (see Figure 3-2D) with the dismounts at OP1 providing surveillance. OP1 is also prepared to support the first mounted section’s actions on contact with preplotted indirect fires if

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needed. Once the first mounted section is established at OP2, OP1 may also handle communications retrans duty as required.

Figure 3-2D. Infiltration of Mounted Section

3-114. The second mounted section begins infiltration at 0115 along the previously employed route. OP1 and OP2 provide surveillance for its movement to OP3 (see Figure 3-2E).

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Figure 3-2E. Infiltration by Second Mounted Section

3-115. At 0325, the third section infiltrates along the same, successful route with OP1, OP2, and OP3 providing surveillance. If OP1 is not needed to conduct retrans, the third section picks the dismounted team up and proceeds to OP4. Establishment of all OPs is completed no later than 0500 with redundant observation on NAIs 1, 2, and 3 (refer to Figure 3-2F).

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Figure 3-2F. Completed Infiltration with Redundant Observation of NAIs EXFILTRATION

3-116. The reconnaissance platoon and its elements may have to conduct exfiltration in several types of tactical situations. For example, reconnaissance forces that infiltrate the threat main battle area or rear area must exfiltrate once they gather the required information. In another instance, the platoon may be deliberately employed in a staybehind mode during defensive operations, forcing it to use exfiltration to return to friendly lines. Planning Considerations

3-117. In all situations, exfiltration must be planned as carefully as infiltration. An effective exfiltration plan is essential in terms of mission accomplishment and morale. In most cases, planning for an exfiltration operation begins at the same time as planning for the infiltration (or

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other tactical operation) that precedes it. For example, the platoon leader must anticipate contingency measures that may be required if his elements must conduct an unplanned exfiltration during a reconnaissance operation. His exfiltration plan should factor in additional time that the platoon may need to react to unforeseen circumstances, such as inadvertent contact with threat forces or unexpected restricted terrain. Whether the platoon plans to exfiltrate on foot or by another transport method (ground vehicles, aircraft, or watercraft), detailed planning is required to establish criteria for a passage of lines to minimize the chances of fratricide. The exfiltrating force must also be prepared to conduct additional planning once the operation is under way, particularly if threat contact occurs.

3-118. The exfiltration plan should also cover other types of contingencies that will not require the platoon to exfiltrate. For example, when a section or squad repeatedly misses mandatory radio contact, it must be assumed that the element has a communications problem, is in trouble, or both. The exfiltration plan might address this situation by calling for a resupply drop of new batteries and another means of communication at a predetermined location. The plan would mandate that the resupply location be specially marked to ensure that the equipment does not fall into threat hands. Movement Considerations

3-119. The principles of route selection, movement formations, and movement security are critical to the success of the exfiltration operation. Plans for extraction by applicable means (ground, air, or water) must be developed before the operation, covering procedural contingencies such as the loss of vehicles, evacuation of sick and wounded personnel, and disruption of communications. These plans should address various contingencies for movement, such as the possibility that the platoon may be able to exfiltrate intact or the option of breaking into smaller groups to avoid detection. Elements may use successful infiltration routes as their exfiltration routes as well. Planning should also include identifying casualty collection points and emergency resupply points along exfiltration routes, providing supporting elements with a more secure, stealthy route into the sector to conduct these support operations. Routes and Pickup Points

3-120. The methods that the platoon uses for exfiltration route selection are the same as those discussed for infiltration earlier in this section. The platoon leader ensures that primary and alternate linkup points are not on a single azimuth leading away from the OP or exfiltration route. 3-121. Exfiltration pickup points for dismounted personnel should be far enough away from the OP to ensure that the threat does not hear vehicle or helicopter noises. The exfiltrating force should use mountains, dense foliage, and other terrain features to screen these noises. Under normal conditions in flat, open terrain on a clear night, rotary-wing aircraft lose most of their audio signature at a distance of approximately five kilometers. Methods of Exfiltration

3-122. Exfiltration can be conducted by air, water, or land. Each alternative presents the platoon with specific operational considerations 3-31

FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

as well as tactical advantages and disadvantages. The exfiltration plan and the OPORD must address these factors as well as operational contingencies such as actions the reconnaissance unit will take if an unplanned exfiltration becomes necessary.

3-123. Extraction by air or water means is favored when the resources are available and their use will not compromise the mission. These methods are used when long distances must be covered, when time of return is essential, when the exfiltration zone lacks adequate cover and concealment, when the threat does not have air or naval superiority, or when complex terrain or heavily populated hostile areas obstruct ground exfiltration. 3-124. Reconnaissance forces normally conduct exfiltration via land routes when friendly lines are close or no other extraction method is feasible. Ground exfiltration is preferred when areas along the route are largely uninhabited, when threat forces are widely dispersed or under such pressure that they cannot conduct counterreconnaissance and security operations, or when terrain is sufficiently restricted to degrade threat efforts to use mobile forces against the exfiltrating reconnaissance unit. Emergency Exfiltration

3-125. The platoon may have to conduct emergency exfiltration if it is detected or engaged by a threat force. This type of operation requires activation of an escape and evasion plan or deployment of a reaction or support force to assist with the extraction of friendly elements. Employment of the reaction force and supporting fires must be carefully coordinated and rehearsed before the infiltration (or other tactical mission, if applicable) is initiated.

SECTION III – MULTIDIMENSIONAL ASPECTS OF RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE 3-126. The multidimensional aspect of operations is part of all reconnaissance platoon missions. The term “multidimensional” refers to the directed effort, during the conduct of reconnaissance or surveillance operations, to obtain detailed information on an area. This effort covers all types of threat forces (military, paramilitary, criminal, and other types), civilian (social/human) demographics, infrastructure (including utilities, transportation, and the political, economic, and agricultural situation), routes, obstacles, and terrain. Planning and execution of any reconnaissance or surveillance mission must always take into account the multidimensional aspect of the operation. In turn, the multidimensional aspect must include the effective integration and employment of the full range of ISR assets, including TUAVs and sensors. 3-127. This discussion is primarily for recce platoons, even though all reconnaissance platoons must understand the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance operations and be prepared to execute it to benefit their operations. Because of its unique organization, which includes organic HUMINT collectors, the recce platoon is ideally suited to focus on the 3-32


multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Recce platoons primarily operate in areas with reduced threat levels. They enhance situational awareness by working closely with their HUMINT soldiers to collect and assess information through contact with community leaders and the local populace. Reconnaissance platoons that do not have organic HUMINT collectors must be prepared to have these assets attached and then be able to employ them properly to execute conduct liaison operations, conduct tactical questioning, or identify HUMINT information requirements. In addition, it is extremely important that all types of reconnaissance platoons fully understand the commander’s focus for the reconnaissance two levels up and that they understand the operational considerations of civil-military operations.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 3-128. The multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance is deliberate and detailed. It requires the platoon leader and other leaders within the platoon, specifically the HUMINT collectors, to develop relationships with local military/civilian leaders to determine information that may be pertinent to troop, squadron, and brigade operations. The HUMINT collectors are the subject matter experts in dealing with the local populace; they provide training so the platoon’s scouts can operate effectively in large populated areas where multidimensional information is key to operational success. In these areas, soldier-based, humanintensive intelligence compensates for the limitations of equipment-based sensors, which are better suited for providing situational awareness in open and rolling terrain for conventional force-on-force operations. 3-129. The multidimensional facet of reconnaissance expands on the traditional forms of reconnaissance by acquainting the platoon’s soldiers with the local populace throughout the area of operations; the threat level will greatly influence the level of interaction between reconnaissance elements and the populace of the area. Understanding this human dimension of the environment (political, religious, ethnic, criminal, and transnational) will be a key factor in the analysis of threat centers of gravity and the execution of decisive operations. The ability to conduct the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance can assist the commander in defeating or countering asymmetrical threats. In addition, the multidimensional aspect of any reconnaissance or surveillance mission can greatly enhance situational awareness at all levels by gaining operational information from previously untapped sources. On the other hand, multidimensional reconnaissance can become an inordinately timeconsuming process without specific, precisely focused guidance from the platoon’s higher command; refer to the discussion of essential commander’s guidance earlier in this chapter.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES Human Intelligence

3-130. HUMINT is the intelligence, to include adversary intentions, derived from information collected from people and related documents. It is the oldest collection discipline and is a key contributor to the intelligence picture of the battlefield. HUMINT uses passively and actively acquired human sources to gather information to answer

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intelligence requirements and to cross-cue other intelligence disciplines. HUMINT tasks include, but are not limited to, the following:

· · ·

Source operations using tactical and other developed sources.

· · ·

Debriefing of US and allied forces and civilian personnel.

Liaison with host-nation (HN) officials and allied counterparts. Elicitation of information including transients.

from

the

civilian

populace,

Interrogation of EPWs and detainees. Exploitation of adversary and open-source documents, media, and material.

Counterintelligence (Within the SBCT’s MI Company)

3-131. Counterintelligence (CI) is a multidiscipline function whose purpose is to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, or exploit the intelligence collection efforts of competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies. It is the key intelligence community asset to protect the force against espionage and other intelligence activities, as well as against sabotage or assassination. CI helps to guard against these dangers when they are conducted by or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist groups. CI agents use HUMINT collection in some aspects of their collection and investigative mission. CI tasks include the following:

·

Intelligence support to assessments of vulnerability and OPSEC requirements.

·

Investigations of security suitability of local nationals.

· ·

Multidiscipline counterintelligence analysis.

·

Limited counter-HUMINT operations.

violations

and

employment

Liaison with other service and HN counterintelligence organizations.

Intelligence Activities

3-132. HUMINT and CI operations may entail some or all of these activities:

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·

Interrogation and debriefing. These activities involve the systematic questioning of individuals to obtain information related to specific collection requirements. Sources who are in the custody of US forces, such as EPWs and civilian detainees, are interrogated. All other sources are debriefed; these include friendly forces, civilian refugees, and local inhabitants.

·

Tactical questioning. This is an abbreviated form of interrogation or debriefing used to collect PIR-related information from human sources.

·

Source operations. These are collection operations using recruited and registered HUMINT sources. The registration


of sources is a legal requirement in any sustained use of a specific individual as a source. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL

3-133. The recce platoon’s organic HUMINT collectors, who are specifically trained in military intelligence (MI) operations, maximize its effectiveness in multidimensional aspects of reconnaissance missions. It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of properly using these personnel. While the platoon leader is not likely to have the time to be an expert on every aspect of MI operations, he must be proficient in HUMINT and CI training, operations, and implementation. NOTE: Unless noted as otherwise, the term “HUMINT collector” refers to personnel in MOSs 351E and 97E/B. The term “counterintelligence collector” or “CI agent” refers strictly to those in MOSs 35E, 351B, and 97B. HUMINT Personnel and Missions

3-134. HUMINT collectors, either through training or by occupying specific positions such as an S2, are tasked with collecting information for intelligence use from people or related documents. (NOTE: A HUMINT source is anyone who can provide information to answer collection requirements.) As noted, HUMINT collectors also assist CI personnel at the MI company in detecting and countering the intelligence collection efforts of outside elements, especially threat forces. 3-135. The four HUMINT collectors in the recce platoon provide the squadron with an organic, trained HUMINT/CI collection capability. The intelligence collectors will normally be distributed as one per recce squad, but they can be task organized based on METT-TC to concentrate collection capability as needed to meet specific mission parameters. The senior HUMINT/CI collection NCO advises the platoon leader on intelligence collection operations, provides initial assessment and quality control of HUMINT/CI collection and source spotting, and acts as the platoon HUMINT/CI trainer. 3-136. The HUMINT collector’s mission within the platoon includes the following general tasks:

·

Collect information of immediate tactical value from EPWs, civilian detainees, refugees, and civilians on the battlefield.

·

Collect information of immediate tactical value from foreign documents.

· ·

Assist in the debriefing of friendly forces, such as patrols. Identify individuals for potential detailed exploitation by the CI teams in the brigade’s MI company.

3-137. Specific missions for HUMINT collectors (MOS 351E/97E) in an MTW include, but are not limited to, the following:

· · ·

Conducting tactical questioning. Conducting interrogation of EPWs and civilian detainees. Debriefing or interviewing civilians on the battlefield.

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· · ·

Debriefing friendly forces. Conducting HUMINT analysis. Conducting document exploitation.

CI Personnel and Missions

3-138. As noted, CI collectors/agents (MOS 351B/97B/35E) are organic to the SBCT’s MI company. Specific missions for CI teams in the MTW include, but are not limited to, these:

·

Identifying and recommending countermeasures to threat intelligence collection efforts.

· · ·

Conducting CI investigations. Conducting CI analysis. Providing CI support to threat and vulnerability analysis.

HUMINT OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-139. The recce platoon leader conducts HUMINT collection activities to gather the information he needs to make decisions in support of the overall mission. HUMINT activities help the platoon leader shape the battlefield by providing information that enables him to respond to previously unforeseen threats. He focuses the HUMINT effort by carefully assigning missions and clearly defining the desired results. In orienting the unit’s HUMINT capabilities, he must decide who or what will be advantageous targets for collection activities. Role of HUMINT Collectors

3-140. The platoon’s HUMINT soldiers, who can be augmented by interrogators (from the MI company) when available, conduct collection operations in support of the overall mission. These operations rely on the use of both casual and recruited sources of information. The collection effort includes liaison activities; the debriefing of refugees, civilian detainees, and EPWs; review of open source literature; and document exploitation. These operations use the techniques identified in FM 2-22.2 (FM 34-5) (S). Other resources include AR 381-172 (S), which covers policy concerning counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO), and AR 381-10, which outlines policies and procedures governing the conduct of intelligence activities by DA. 3-141. In addition, during the planning process, the platoon leader must be aware of the combat multiplier capability that his HUMINT assets provide. In this role, the platoon’s HUMINT personnel conduct the following tasks:

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· · ·

Support to combating terrorism.

· · ·

Support to operations security (OPSEC).

Support to rear operations. Support to civil-military operations (discussed later in this section). Support to information operations. Support to domestic civil disturbances.


· · · · ·

Liaison. Local operational data collection. Debriefing and interrogation. Threat assessment. Assessment of the HUMINT threat in the area of operations.

HUMINT Sources

3-142. To satisfy command PIR, HUMINT personnel should be prepared to use all sources of information consistent with mission, policy, and resources. These sources include the following:

·

Casual source. A casual source is one who, by social or professional position, has access to information of CI interest, usually on a continuing basis. Casual sources usually can be relied on to provide information that is routinely available to them. They are under no obligation to provide information. Casual sources include private citizens, such as retired officials or other prominent residents of an area. Members of private organizations also may furnish information of value.

·

Official sources. These are liaison contacts. CI personnel conduct liaison with foreign and domestic CI intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies to exchange information and obtain assistance. CI personnel are interested in investigative, operational, and threat information.

·

Recruited sources. These include sources who support CFSO, as identified in FM 34-5 (S). By design, CFSOs entail the use of human source networks, dispersed throughout the area, that can provide timely and pertinent force protection information.

·

Refugees, civilian detainees, and EPWs. Interrogators normally conduct collection operations with these sources, often with technical assistance from a CI agent. The key to identifying the source of valuable CI force protection information is in analyzing the information being sought and predicting which potential sources, by virtue of their regular duties, would have regular, frequent, and unquestioned access to such information.

·

Open source publications. These printed materials, as well as radio and television broadcasts, are valuable sources of information of CI interest and operational information. When information is presented in a foreign language, linguist support is required for timely translation. Depending on the resources, this support can be provided by interrogation personnel, allied personnel, indigenous employees, or reserve component (RC) translators (MOS 97L).

·

Documents not openly available. Such sources as adversary plans and reports are exploited in much the same way as open source publications.

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Reconnaissance Support Activities

3-143. In military urban operations, people (EPWs and civilians) are the preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection provides information not otherwise available through SIGINT and image intelligence (IMINT). When a lodgment is made in a building, the HUMINT collectors move in and are readily available to interrogate EPWs, persuade holdouts to surrender, and help with the questioning and evacuation of noncombatants that are encountered in the building. They collect information on floor plans, defensive plans, and locations of combatants and noncombatants in the building and surrounding neighborhood. 3-144. Another focus of the HUMINT teams is intelligence support to force protection. The teams establish a network of force protection sources, debrief casual sources, and interview/debrief local national employees. The information they collect helps to enhance the security posture of US forces, to provide information in response to command collection requirements, and to provide early warning of threats to US forces. 3-145. As noted, the HUMINT collectors organic to the recce platoon will normally be allocated to individual reconnaissance squads as necessary. They provide the platoon with language and tactical questioning ability. They also debrief friendly forces and translate and exploit foreign documents. Another important function is to identify individuals as potential force protection sources to be more fully exploited by the HUMINT platoon in the brigade’s MI company. HUMINT Assessment Forms

3-146. Higher headquarters may provide assessment forms to further focus HUMINT collection efforts. These products help the platoon to gather information on enemy, terrain, society, and/or infrastructure in an urban environment. They also address the requirement to identify the basic human needs of the society (such as food, water, and shelter). This information gives the higher command the ability to influence the society based on these identified needs. Figure 3-3 shows an example of a HUMINT collection and assessment form. For further discussion of these forms, refer to FM 3-20.971.

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Figure 3-3. HUMINT Urban Assessment Form

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Figure 3-3. HUMINT Urban Assessment Form (Continued)

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CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-147. When they take part in civil-military operations, military elements, including the reconnaissance platoon, will encounter a number

3-42


of factors that they seldom face in any other setting. This discussion covers some of these crucial, but often subtle, considerations. Local Cultural Factors

3-148. One problem encountered by the reconnaissance platoon is adapting to the local culture. Each culture has its own peculiar customs and courtesies. While they may seem insignificant to US personnel, these customs and courtesies are very important to local nationals. Understanding a country’s culture and adhering to its etiquette are very important. What is socially acceptable behavior in the US could very well be offensive in other cultures. Knowing the local culture helps the platoon understand the behavior and mentality of a liaison source. It also helps in gaining rapport and avoiding embarrassment for both the liaison source and the platoon. In many cultures, embarrassing a guest causes “loss of face.” This inevitably undermines rapport and may cause irreparable harm to the liaison effort. 3-149. The platoon may have to adapt to unfamiliar food, drink, etiquette, social customs, and protocol. While some societies make adjustments for an “ignorant foreigner,” many expect an official visitor to be aware of local customs. Platoon personnel must make an effort to avoid cultural shock when confronted by situations completely alien to their background. They also must be able to adjust to a wide variety of personalities. Local Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals

3-150. The platoon also must understand the capabilities of outside agencies involved in civil-military operations. Knowledge of the liaison source’s capabilities in terms of mission, human resources, equipment, and training is essential in the process of requesting information or services. Information exchanged during the conduct of liaison activities is frequently sanitized. Information concerning sources, job specialties, and other sensitive material relating to the originator’s operations may be deleted. This practice is common to every intelligence organization worldwide and should be taken into account when analyzing information provided by another agency. 3-151. The platoon may also have to deal with individuals who have had no previous contact with US agencies and who are unsure of how to deal with a US intelligence soldier. In their work with liaison sources, platoon soldiers must remember that they represent the people, culture, and government of the entire nation. The liaison source assumes the behavior of the platoon to be typical of all Americans. Once the American identity becomes tarnished, it will be difficult to regain rapport, not only for the platoon and its soldiers but for other American individuals and organizations as well. 3-152. The platoon leader and his HUMINT soldiers must be aware of any known or hidden agendas of the individuals or organizations with which they conduct liaison. Furthermore, jealousy between agencies is often a problem. Platoon personnel must never play favorites and never play one agency against another.

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Corruption, Bribery, and Gifts

3-153. Corruption is the impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle or the inducement to wrong by bribery or other unlawful or improper means. In some countries, government corruption is a way of life. The reconnaissance platoon must be familiar with these customs if indications of bribery, extortion, petty theft of government goods and funds, or similar incidents are discovered in the course of liaison. When corruption is discovered, the platoon leader must request command guidance before continuing liaison with the particular individual or organization. Regardless of the circumstances, all platoon soldiers must exercise caution and professionalism when they encounter corruption. 3-154. Occasionally, because of the close professional relationships developed during civil-military operations, a source may wish to present a personal gift. If possible, platoon personnel should diplomatically refuse the gift. If that is not possible, such as when rapport might be compromised, the soldier can accept the gift. Any gifts received must be reported in accordance with AR 1-100; they can be kept only if higher authorities approve a request to do so. Records and Reporting

3-155. Complete and accurate records and reports are essential in

maintaining the continuity of civil-military operations, including intelligence collection and liaison. All records must contain information on agencies contacted. It is preferable to have a file on each organization or individual contacted to provide a quick reference concerning location, organization, mission, and similar intelligence-related information. Limit information to name, position, organization, and contact procedures when the liaison is a US representative. For contacts with foreign sources, use the formal administrative, operational, and information reporting procedures outlined in FM 2-22.2 (FM 34-5).

LIAISON OPERATIONS

3-156. Liaison with appropriate US, host-nation, and allied military and civilian agencies is fundamental to the success of civil-military operations, including the multidimensional effort. Without the support of the local government and authorities, attempts to win the cooperation of the populace are almost certainly doomed to failure. In many cases, fulltime liaison officers (LO) or sections are necessary to maintain regular contact with appropriate organizations and individuals. In addition to national agencies, numerous local agencies and organizations also provide assistance and information. 3-157. A basic tenet of liaison is the quid pro quo (meaning “something for something”) exchange. While the LO sometimes encounters individuals who cooperate out of a sense of duty or for unknown reasons of their own, an exchange of information, services, material, or other assistance normally is part of the interaction. The nature of this exchange varies widely, depending on the locations, cultures, and personalities involved. Critical Tasks

3-158. The recce platoon and its HUMINT assets may be tasked to conduct liaison activities, either for the platoon’s own operations or in

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support of higher missions. The IR and PIR must be identified and defined by the platoon. Critical tasks in liaison operations include the following:

·

Identify key authority figures. Purpose: To assist in developing a list of priority contacts within the area of operations to facilitate mission success.

·

Match liaison personnel with each contact. Purpose: To facilitate the communication between local factions and the US forces operating in the area of operations.

·

Evaluate contacts. Purpose: To determine the capabilities of each contact within the area of operations and to ascertain the influence the contact has within the community.

·

Establish each liaison/contact agenda. Purpose: To determine the end state for each contact. Once this is established, the liaison officer knows how to conduct himself at meetings.

·

Identify information requirements. Purpose: To assist in defining the scope of liaison activities. These can be developed through liaison with the civilian/military agency based on guidance from the higher and platoon OPORDs.

·

Use available HUMINT collection assets. Purpose: To assist with liaison, develop IR, or debrief reconnaissance patrols.

Role of the Recce Platoon and its Intelligence Assets

3-159. The recce platoon’s HUMINT soldiers conduct liaison to obtain

information, gain assistance, coordinate or procure material, and exchange views necessary to understand the liaison counterparts with whom friendly forces must work. All of these activities are essential for successful reconnaissance missions. Operational benefits derived from using the platoon’s HUMINT assets in liaison activities include the following:

·

Establishing working relationships with various commands, agencies, or governments.

·

Exchanging operational information and intelligence within policy guidelines.

·

Facilitating access to records and personnel of other agencies not otherwise available. Access includes gaining information via other agencies when cultural or ethnic constraints preclude effective use of US personnel.

·

Acquiring information to satisfy intelligence collection requirements.

troop

and

squadron

3-160. Recce platoon leaders who task HUMINT assets with liaison should provide the following guidance:

·

Liaison objectives. Liaison objectives are the types of information to be collected, the methods of operations unique to the area, and the command objectives to be accomplished.

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·

Limitations on liaison include the following:

activities.

These

limitations

n

Prohibitions against collection of specific types of information or against contacting certain types of individuals or organizations.

n

Delineation of areas of responsibility of other elements.

·

Authority. The platoon leader must define the authority under which the specific liaison program is conducted as well as guidelines for joint and combined operations.

· ·

Applicable ROE/ROI. Additional factors. The platoon leader should outline SOPs for related aspects, such as intelligence information reporting procedures and areas of responsibility and jurisdiction.

3-161. The nature of intelligence-collection activities and the many legal restrictions imposed, including SOFAs or other agreements, make success of these activities largely dependent on effective liaison. During transition from increased tension to open hostilities, the liaison emphasis shifts to support the platoon leader. HUMINT soldiers must establish liaison with appropriate agencies before the outbreak of hostilities. Information and cooperation gained during this period can have a major impact on the effectiveness of both intelligence and combat operations. 3-162. Liaison with foreign organizations and individuals normally requires foreign language proficiency, a highly desirable capability for HUMINT soldiers. It is easier to deal with a liaison source if the LO or intelligence collector can speak directly to the source rather than rely on an interpreter. Even if the LO is not fluent, the liaison source usually appreciates the LO’s effort to learn and speak the language. This often enhances rapport. Example Liaison Techniques and Procedures

3-163. The following example illustrates the techniques and steps involved in liaison operations. It is meant to be a guide and should be modified to fit individual METT-TC conditions. The majority of the steps are geared toward a stability operation because, under these conditions, there are more things to consider. This example liaison operation, however, can and should be modified to meet the operational requirements of the specific tactical situation. Steps in the liaison operation may include the following:

·

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Higher headquarters determines liaison requirements, which are then refined by the platoon leadership (platoon leader, HUMINT NCO, PSG). n

Identifies military forces, civil authorities, religious leaders, ethnic groups, local factions, and NGOs operating in the area of responsibility (AOR).

n

Develops liaison requirements and contact frequency for elements in the AOR.

n

Establishes times and locations for initial liaison contacts with elements.


·

Unit conducts liaison activities. n

n

n

n

Maintains a positive, cooperative image of the unit and other friendly forces with the population in the AOR. -

Ensures uniforms and personal appearance are professionally maintained.

-

Provides communication liaison elements.

-

Ensures LOs and all soldiers know current political and military situation.

-

Enforces the mandate, ROI, ROE, terms of reference (TOR), and status of forces agreement (SOFA) in all dealings with liaison counterparts.

and

transportation

for

Complies with requests for liaison assistance from the civil population if consistent with unit constraints. (NOTE: This may not be possible in SSC or similar tactical environments.) -

Establishes an on-call liaison to respond to crises that develop in the unit AOR.

-

Updates the platoon/troop situation map for current locations of liaison contacts.

-

Ensures that LOs do not deploy beyond range of the platoon/troop quick reaction force response.

-

Ensures that LOs are prepared to cope with hijacking or kidnapping.

Coordinates with observer teams operating in the unit AOR, as required. -

Identifies UN military observer (UNMO) teams operating in the unit AOR.

-

Establishes contact with UNMOs at checkpoints or as specified in the regional force SOP.

-

Exchanges information on military, paramilitary, and mass civilian movements; minefields and obstacles; intentions and missions of belligerents; and locations of key faction force leaders.

Stabilizes areas identified as having escalating tension. -

Identifies potential “hot spots” of increased tension.

-

Determines which factions may be involved and the regions affected.

-

Designates forces to stabilize the area, within capability, or requests additional support.

-

Coordinates with belligerents to resolve real or perceived problems.

-

Reports developments of any destabilizing situation to higher headquarters, as required.

-

Contacts forces or civilians involved.

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·

·

-

Establishes an upgraded alert status and security awareness of units in the affected area and in adjacent areas, as needed.

-

Dispatches LOs to all elements involved.

Unit employs LOs to initiate coordination for negotiations or dispute resolution using neutral facilities. n

Identifies all units, agencies, and individuals within the sector with whom liaison or coordination must be conducted.

n

Specifies linkup times and locations.

n

Develops an agenda for liaison meetings.

n

Complies with local protocols and established limits of support in accordance with TORs, SOFAs, or other directives.

n

Maintains continuous contact until disputes are resolved and/or tensions are reduced.

Unit coordinates a meeting with local officials. n

Directs that only major problems be brought to the attention of LOs and local liaison counterparts and then only after subordinates have been unable to resolve the issues.

n

Demonstrates resolve, confidence, commitment, and concern for local customs and people living in the AOR by attending major local events.

n

Implements immediate response to any serious breach of trust, confidence, or deception that has occurred.

SECTION IV – ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE 3-164. The reconnaissance platoon conducts a route reconnaissance to gain detailed information about a specific route or axis as well as the terrain on both sides of the route that the enemy could use to influence movement on the route. The platoon is usually tasked with this type of reconnaissance when the commander wants to use a certain route, but first wants to make sure that the route is free of obstacles and threat forces and that it will support the movement of his vehicles. Because of the large number of critical tasks associated with route reconnaissance, the platoon normally can conduct detailed reconnaissance of only one route. 3-165. An exception is the recce platoon, which can conduct reconnaissance of a single route by itself only in a permissive environment. When contact is likely, the recce platoon requires augmentation, either a section from another recce platoon or an engineer attachment, to conduct the route reconnaissance. In the nonpermissive environment, the platoon can assist in the troop mission of route reconnaissance by conducting reconnaissance of the route or providing security; this allows the troop to reconnoiter one or two routes depending

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on the likelihood of contact. As an alternative when augmentation is not available, the recce platoon can conduct a route classification in which lateral routes are not cleared.

CRITICAL TASKS 3-166. During a route reconnaissance, the reconnaissance platoon must be prepared to accomplish a wide range of tasks. Based on the time available and the commander’s intent, however, the platoon may be directed to conduct the reconnaissance to acquire specific information only. To be ready for either type of situation, the platoon leader must clearly understand the following critical tasks that may have to be accomplished in a route reconnaissance:

· · ·

Determine the trafficability of the route.

· · · · · · ·

Reconnoiter, to the limit of direct fire range, all lateral routes.

· ·

Report route information.

Reconnoiter all built-up areas along the route. Reconnoiter, to the limit of direct fire range, terrain that dominates the route. Inspect and classify all bridges on the route. Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges on the route. Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts. Reconnoiter all defiles along the route. Locate minefields, and other obstacles, along the route. Locate a bypass around built-up areas, obstacles, restrictions, and contaminated areas. Find and report all threat forces that can influence movement along the route.

NOTE: Refer to Chapter 9 of this manual for a detailed discussion of route overlays and related information.

TECHNIQUES 3-167. Because of the number of critical tasks that must be accomplished, the reconnaissance platoon, such as a recce platoon(+), can conduct a detailed reconnaissance of only one route. The following discussion outlines techniques of getting all the tasks accomplished as rapidly and securely as possible. 3-168. The order the platoon leader receives specifies the route the platoon must reconnoiter and defines the route from the SP to the release point (RP). Additionally, the order may specify platoon boundaries, phase lines, an LD, and a limit of advance (LOA) or reconnaissance objective. These control measures specify how much terrain on both sides of the route the platoon must reconnoiter and where the operation must begin and end. 3-169. The boundaries are drawn on both sides and include the terrain that dominates the route. They usually extend out to include terrain from which a threat force, based on the maximum effective range of its direct

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fire weapons, may influence the route. This ensures that the scouts reconnoiter all terrain that the threat could use to influence movement along the route. The LD is drawn from one boundary to the other behind the SP. This allows the platoon to cross the LD and be fully deployed before reaching the route. The LOA or objective is placed beyond the RP on the last terrain feature that dominates the route or at a location out to about 3 kilometers.

3-170. The platoon leader may add additional phase lines, contact points, and checkpoints to the graphics he receives from his commander. Phase lines are used to help control the maneuver of the platoon. The contact points ensure that the sections or squads maintain contact at particular critical points. Checkpoints are used along the route or on specific terrain to control movement or to designate areas that must be reconnoitered. 3-171. In coordination with the FSO, the platoon leader plans artillery targets on known or suspected threat positions and on dominant terrain throughout the area of operations. The platoon leader evaluates the factors of METT-TC to select a platoon organization. He must ensure that at least one section has responsibility for reconnoitering the route. 3-172. A three-section organization is usually the type best suited for reconnaissance of one route. One section reconnoiters the terrain on the left side of the route, another covers the terrain on the right side, and the third section reconnoiters the route and controls the movement of the other two. In this organization, the platoon leader’s section has specific responsibility to reconnoiter the route. NOTE: The first example of route reconnaissance in the following discussion is for a recce platoon in a permissive environment. As noted, an unaugmented recce platoon cannot reconnoiter a route by itself in a nonpermissive environment; it takes part in a route reconnaissance as part of a larger force, such as a recce troop. This second example is for a CFV platoon in a higher threat environment.

EXAMPLE OF A RECCE PLATOON ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE 3-173. In this low threat scenario, a recce platoon has been ordered to conduct classification of a route in the troop sector. The situation is permissive, and the troop’s area of operations is considered friendly. The troop has one platoon conducting checkpoint operations and one acting as squadron quick reaction force, leaving the route reconnaissance platoon operating independently. The troop commander has provided the tempo and engagement criteria and has focused the platoon leader on confirming trafficability of the route to vehicles within the SBCT, identifying key terrain along the route, and surveying the citizens of communities along the route to determine their feelings concerning upcoming elections. The troop commander is clear in his guidance that the platoon leader is to stay on hard surface roads. 3-174. The platoon leader organizes the platoon into two sections, which move using the traveling overwatch technique. Bravo section, consisting of the PSG and his wingman, take the lead while Alpha section, consisting of the platoon leader and his wingman, provide overwatch. The

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platoon leader reports when the platoon arrives at and crosses the SP. (See Figure 3-4A.)

Figure 3-4A. Recce Route Reconnaissance (Part One)

3-175. The platoon leader is responsible for the recce platoon’s movement through the sector. He uses checkpoints to control and report the platoon’s movement and to focus on key terrain or features that may influence movement along the route. 3-176. Bravo section moves along the route at a speed dictated by the platoon leader in his OPORD. The platoon makes steady progress until checkpoint 3, which is a small village. There the platoon halts, consolidates, and conducts HUMINT operations. The platoon leader, two scouts from his vehicle, his HUMINT collector, and his interpreter walk to the police chief’s office to let him know their intentions and to find out if he knows of any obstructions along the route. (See Figure 3-4B.)

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Figure 3-4B. Recce route reconnaissance (part two)

3-177. The police chief identifies an obstacle north of checkpoint 4 and shows the platoon leader the route the locals use to bypass the obstacle. Additionally, two dismounted patrols move through opposite sides of the village conducting HUMINT operations and area assessment. One squad is left to provide vehicle security and maintain communications with the troop CP. The platoon leader contacts the troop commander and relays the information he learned from the police chief. The troop commander tells him to verify the obstacle and continue his mission on the new route. The patrols return, and the platoon continues its mission. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of urban operations in Chapter 7 of this manual.) North of checkpoint 4, the platoon identifies the complex wire and mine obstacle. The platoon sketches the obstacle from the road, but based on

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the troop commander’s guidance, it does not search for an immediate bypass. (See Figure 3-4C.)

Figure 3-4C. Recce Route Reconnaissance (Part Three)

3-178. When the sketch is complete, the platoon moves back along the route to the bypass indicated by the police chief. The platoon continues its mission, stopping one more time to conduct HUMINT operations at the village west of checkpoint 6 before returning to the base camp. Once the platoon has closed on the base camp, the platoon leader submits a reconnaissance overlay (refer to the discussion and illustrations in Chapter 9 of this manual) and reports to the troop CP to be debriefed by the troop HUMINT NCO.

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EXAMPLE OF A CFV PLATOON ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE 3-179. The following example of route reconnaissance is for a cavalry scout platoon. Refer to Figures 3-5A through 3-5H for an illustration of this situation. 3-180. When the platoon conducts a route reconnaissance, it often deploys in a vee formation because of the very focused nature of this mission. Section A is positioned to the left of the route, Section B to the right, and Section C in the center of the zone along Route SABER. The platoon should deploy into formation before reaching LD PATTON so that it crosses the LD at the specified time. The platoon leader reports crossing the LD when the first element crosses it (see Figure 3-5A). The platoon leader is responsible for the platoon’s movement through the sector. He uses checkpoints to control the movement and to focus on key terrain or features that may influence movement along the route. 3-181. Section C should be positioned along the route so it can observe the route, and one element of the section must physically drive the entire route. Unless the sector is very small or very open, the platoon will move as individual sections. As the sections move to the checkpoints, they maneuver in a zigzag pattern to reconnoiter the sector and accomplish all critical tasks of a route reconnaissance. The lead sections, on the flanks, must observe the route and report any restrictions or obstacles that may restrict movement along the route. Visually clearing the route before Section C travels it provides for better security and allows Section C to concentrate on the critical reconnaissance tasks. As the lead sections maneuver toward the checkpoints, they maintain visual contact with the route (see Figure 3-5B). 3-182. After both lead sections report “SET” and are in overwatch positions, Section C begins the route reconnaissance (see Figure 3-5C). As the section leader moves along Route SABER, his wingman maneuvers to provide overwatch for the section leader. During the reconnaissance, the platoon leader normally must send a route classification of the trafficability at intervals designated by the commander. A route report may be required only if there is a significant or unexpected change in the route’s makeup. 3-183. As Section C reconnoiters the route, the other sections move ahead, reconnoitering critical and dominant terrain. The platoon leader controls and coordinates the movement of all three sections. He must ensure that the flank sections remain far enough forward of Section C to provide security. The flank sections have also been assigned responsibility for covering lateral routes. Section A is executing a lateral route and will use contact point B to tie in with Section C on Route SABER (see Figure 3-5D).

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Figure 3-5. CFV Route Reconnaissance (Part One)

3-184. The platoon order must address actions on the approach to the stream. In this case, the two flank sections have been given the task of locating bypasses in the form of fords or unmapped bridges. Section B is successful in locating a ford; Section A is not. Section B conducts a ford reconnaissance, following the steps used for obstacle and restriction reconnaissance. It crosses the stream at the ford and then continues its mission on the far side of the stream (see Figure 3-5E). 3-185. Section C continues its route reconnaissance along the route until it approaches the bridge site. It then executes a bridge reconnaissance to establish trafficability of the bridge. Section A occupies an overwatch position while Section C reconnoiters the bridge. Section B continues its reconnaissance one terrain feature beyond the stream and then occupies a short-duration OP (see Figure 3-5F).

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3-186. Section C completes its bridge reconnaissance and establishes local security on the approaches to the far side of the bridge. Once this is complete, Section A passes across the bridge and through Section C, continuing its reconnaissance of the dominant terrain on the left flank of the route (see Figure 3-5G). Once Section A is set in sector, the platoon resumes its route reconnaissance to the LOA (see Figure 3-5H).

Figure 3-5. CFV Route Reconnaissance (Part Two)

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SECTION V – AREA RECONNAISSANCE 3-187. Before moving forces into or near a specified area, the commander may call on the reconnaissance platoon to conduct an area reconnaissance to avoid being surprised by unsuitable terrain conditions or unexpected threat forces. The area could be a town, ridgeline, woods, or another feature that friendly forces intend to occupy, pass through, or avoid. Area reconnaissance is the primary mission of the recce platoon, the BRT, the task force scouts, and scouts in light cavalry organizations. 3-188. Area reconnaissance is frequently employed to gain information on objective areas as well as to confirm IPB templates and provide detailed information regarding threat dispositions. Within a zone of operations, area reconnaissance can be used to focus the platoon on the specific area that is critical to the commander. Examples include platoons from the BRT directed to focus on areas that could hold brigade-size threat targets or a battalion reconnaissance platoon directed to focus on areas of dominant terrain that influence the battalion’s axis of advance because division cavalry and BRT troops have already moved through the area. This technique of focusing the reconnaissance also permits the mission to be accomplished more quickly. Area reconnaissance can thus be a stand-alone mission or a task to a section or platoon within the larger context of a platoon or higher reconnaissance mission. 3-189. Area reconnaissance can be terrain-oriented, force-oriented

(threat), society-oriented, infrastructure-oriented, or a combination of any of these factors. The commander analyzes the mission using METT-TC to determine whether to conduct one of these types of reconnaissance separately or to conduct them in conjunction with each other.

3-190. A recce platoon, or a reconnaissance platoon augmented with the appropriate assets, conducts the multidimensional aspect of area reconnaissance, if directed, to gain detailed information about the civilian populace and infrastructure in a particular area.

CRITICAL TASKS 3-191. The reconnaissance platoon must accomplish numerous critical

tasks during the area reconnaissance. The platoon’s primary critical tasks include the following (unless the commander directs otherwise):

· · · ·

Reconnoiter all terrain within the area.

·

Within capability, locate all minefields and other obstacles in the area, reduce or breach them, and clear and mark lanes.

·

Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas.

· ·

Find and report all threat forces within the area.

Inspect and classify all bridges within the area. Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges in the area. Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts in the area.

Report reconnaissance information.

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3-192. In addition to these tasks, the platoon must be prepared to conduct other tasks that may be deemed as critical by the higher commander. Additional tasks for the area reconnaissance may include the following:

·

Identify threat activities, countermeasures, and probable COAs.

·

Determine the size, location, and composition of society/human demographics. Examples include race, sex, age, religion, language, tribe, clan, class, education, history, government, and/or factions.

·

Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and military leadership.

·

Conduct reconnaissance of the society to determine the regional, local, and neighborhood situations.

·

Determine the needs of the society to assist friendly forces in determining operations/actions needed to maintain support of the friendly populace, gain support of neutral factions, and/or neutralize hostile elements.

·

Identify key infrastructure that operations, including the following:

could

affect

military

n

Political, government, and religious organizations and agencies.

n

Financial and economic systems.

n

Physical facilities and utilities (such as power generation, transportation, and communications networks).

· ·

Determine media activities (local, US, international).

·

Identify the allegiances of the local populace to factions, religious groups, or other organizations.

Identify organizations and methods of operation for terrorists, transnational groups, and ethnic centers of power.

TECHNIQUES 3-193. To conduct an area reconnaissance mission, the reconnaissance platoon leader first identifies the area to be reconnoitered within a continuous boundary. The platoon leader analyzes the mission, threat, and terrain and completes his troop-leading procedures. He also plans the movement to and, if necessary, from the area, following the basic rule of using different routes to and from the area. The routes may be specified for the platoon in the OPORD it receives from its higher command. 3-194. The platoon’s primary concern during movement to the area to be reconnoitered is security rather than reconnaissance. If the platoon leader feels there may be threat forces along the route to the area, the platoon should employ the principles of tactical movement based on METT-TC factors. The platoon leader must also incorporate information from UAVs and ground sensor assets (such as GSR) into the operation. During movement to the area, it may be appropriate (depending on the commander’s intent) for the platoon to avoid contact. The platoon leader

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may also choose to orient and focus sections or squads on checkpoints as the platoon moves to the area.

3-195. The platoon leader encloses the given area within a platoon zone; he uses boundaries, an LD, and an LOA. He can divide the area into section zones by placing boundaries on identifiable terrain; this ensures that each section has responsibility for specific pieces of terrain. 3-196. The platoon leader places contact points at the intersections of phase lines and boundaries and at any other locations where he wants physical contact and coordination between his sections. He uses GIRS/TIRS as necessary. He works with the FSO to plan indirect fires to support the platoon’s scheme of maneuver. 3-197. The platoon can conduct area reconnaissance using any of the platoon organizations. The platoon leader deploys his sections abreast across the LD to accomplish their reconnaissance tasks. Formations are often not appropriate to the area reconnaissance mission because the area may be irregular in shape and because of the wide variety of METTTC considerations the platoon may encounter.

EXAMPLE OF AN AREA RECONNAISSANCE 3-198. The following example illustrates area reconnaissance by a recce platoon; however, the mission may be conducted in similar fashion by any type of reconnaissance platoon. 3-199. The platoon is operating within a troop conducting an area reconnaissance in an SSC scenario. Each of the troop’s platoons has a different reconnaissance objective. The focus and tempo of the operation allow the troop to move to a dismount point close to its reconnaissance objective. The engagement criteria allow the recce platoon to use indirect fire on threat dismounts and vehicles only to break direct fire contact. 3-200. In this example, the recce platoon has been given the mission of performing an area reconnaissance of OBJ IRON. A UAV overflew the area several hours ago and confirmed threat soldiers in OBJ IRON, but it could not remain on station to determine the direction in which threat vehicles were being focused. The platoon will conduct stealthy reconnaissance in establishing its OPs. 3-201. The platoon has been assigned a specific infiltration route. It is believed that the threat has established a traffic control point at an intersection, checkpoint 7, in OBJ IRON. From this intersection the threat is deploying forces east or west into BPs. The platoon leader decides, after analyzing METT-TC factors, to deploy his platoon to maximize security. Based on his analysis of the terrain and his mission requirements. he decides to use the two-section organization. He decides to move with Alpha section on Lane SABER and assigns Bravo section, with the PSG, to Lane SPUR. The platoon leader decides to move the platoon using phase lines, allowing the sections more latitude in choosing covered and concealed terrain rather than checkpoints. 3-202. Using the two-section organization, the platoon crosses PL RAY at the time specified in the commander’s OPORD. It infiltrates in two sections, with each section using internal bounding overwatch. (See Figure 3-6A.)

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Figure 3-6A. Area Reconnaissance (Part One)

3-203. The recce sections continue their move to the designated dismount points. Alpha section occupies its dismount point, checkpoint 12. Bravo section occupies its dismount point, checkpoint 15. Each section sets its vehicles in hide positions, organizes a patrol, and deploys local security. 3-204. The platoon leader notifies the UAV section assigned to his area of operations that his elements are set in their dismount points. Based on prior coordination, the UAV section sends a TUAV to reconnoiter OBJ IRON before the recce platoon continues its move to establish its OPs. The UAV section leader reports to the recce platoon leader that his aircraft confirmed soldiers at the intersection, but detected no vehicle movement or activity. 3-205. After evaluating the UAV update, each patrol moves on covered and concealed dismounted routes to OBJ IRON, conducting dismounted reconnaissance. Based on their commander’s guidance, each patrol carries equipment to establish a 48-hour OP. Each four-man team conducts stealthy movement, using traveling overwatch. Two of the men focus on moving forward, conducting reconnaissance; the other two provide security. (See Figure 3-6B.)

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Figure 3-6B. Area Reconnaissance (Part Two)

3-206. Each section places its OP where it can observe the objective area. Alpha section establishes its OP at checkpoint 13; Bravo section establishes its OP at checkpoint 14. Each OP establishes communications back to its vehicles in the hide position. 3-207. The OPs send reports, in terms of content and frequency, as outlined by the troop commander or unit SOP. The soldiers in the hide position maintain communications with the troop CP and are prepared to act as a quick reaction force for the dismounted OPs. The platoon continues to observe the objective until relieved or assigned subsequent tasks by the troop commander. NOTE: For a detailed discussion of area reconnaissance in an urban environment, refer to Chapter 7 of this manual.

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SECTION VI – ZONE RECONNAISSANCE 3-208. The commander normally assigns a zone reconnaissance to the reconnaissance platoon when he needs detailed information before maneuvering his forces through the zone. This reconnaissance provides the commander with a detailed picture of how the threat plans to defend the zone, enabling him to choose the appropriate COA. (NOTE: The recce platoon will normally conduct zone reconnaissance as part of a larger force; it will conduct the mission on its own only with sufficient augmentation support.) Zone reconnaissance is a primary mission of regimental and division cavalry reconnaissance elements. 3-209. As in area reconnaissance, the main types of zone reconnaissance are terrain-oriented, force-oriented (threat), society-oriented, and infrastructure-oriented. The specific zone reconnaissance mission may be focused on one of these types or be a combination of any of them. The techniques and objectives of terrain-oriented and force-oriented zone reconnaissance missions are not mutually exclusive. The commander’s intent, his guidance on the focus of the reconnaissance, and METT-TC factors will dictate the priorities and critical tasks for the mission. 3-210. The platoon conducts terrain-oriented zone reconnaissance to

gain detailed information about routes, terrain, and resources within the assigned zone. This is the most thorough and complete reconnaissance mission and therefore is very time-intensive. It is common for scouts executing a zone reconnaissance in terrain with heavy vegetation to advance at only about 1 kilometer per hour.

3-211. The platoon conducts force-oriented zone reconnaissance to gain detailed information about threat forces within the zone. As the platoon conducts this type of zone reconnaissance, its emphasis is on determining the threat’s locations, strengths, and weaknesses. 3-212. A recce platoon, or a reconnaissance platoon augmented with the appropriate assets, conducts the multidimensional aspect of zone reconnaissance, if directed, to gain detailed information about the civilian populace and infrastructure in a particular zone.

CRITICAL TASKS 3-213. The reconnaissance platoon must accomplish numerous critical

tasks during the zone reconnaissance. Unless the commander directs otherwise, the platoon’s primary critical tasks include the following:

3-62

· · · ·

Reconnoiter all terrain within the zone.

·

Within capability, locate all minefields and other obstacles in the zone, reduce or breach them, and clear and mark lanes through the obstacles.

Inspect and classify all bridges within the zone. Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges in the zone. Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts in the zone.


·

Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas.

· ·

Find and report all threat forces within the zone. Report reconnaissance information.

3-214. In addition to these tasks, the platoon must be prepared to conduct other tasks that may be deemed as critical by the higher commander. Additional tasks for the zone reconnaissance may include the following:

·

Identify threat activities, countermeasures, and probable COAs.

·

Determine the size, location, and composition of society/human demographics. Examples include race, sex, age, religion, language, tribe, clan, class, education, history, government, and/or factions.

·

Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and military leadership.

·

Conduct reconnaissance of the society to determine the regional, local, and neighborhood situations.

·

Determine the needs of the society to assist friendly forces in determining operations/actions needed to maintain support of the friendly populace, gain support of neutral factions, and/or neutralize hostile elements.

·

Identify key infrastructure that operations, including the following:

could

affect

military

n

Political, government, and religious organizations and agencies.

n

Financial and economic systems.

n

Physical facilities and utilities (such as power generation, transportation, and communications networks).

· ·

Determine media activities (local, US, international).

·

Identify the allegiances of the local populace to factions, religious groups, or other organizations.

Identify organizations and methods of operation for terrorists, transnational groups, and ethnic centers of power.

TECHNIQUES 3-215. Zone reconnaissance is very time-consuming. Unless the orders

specify otherwise, all critical tasks listed in the previous discussion are implied in the zone reconnaissance mission statement. When speed is the primary concern, commanders must modify the focus, tempo, and engagement criteria to prioritize the critical tasks for the platoon leader. The width of the zone is determined by the road network, terrain features, anticipated threat activity, and time available to accomplish the mission. In general, reconnaissance platoons can reconnoiter a zone that is 3 to 5 kilometers wide; however, a recce platoon can effectively reconnoiter a zone only 2 to 3 kilometers wide. If the platoon is stretched

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any farther than this, it quickly loses the capability to accomplish critical tasks and move securely.

3-216. When the platoon leader receives a zone reconnaissance mission, the order will define the zone by lateral boundaries, an LD, and an LOA or objective. The parent unit may include additional phase lines or other graphic control measures within the zone to help control the maneuver of the units. 3-217. The platoon leader analyzes the mission to determine what must be accomplished. He analyzes the commander’s guidance on focus (the reconnaissance objective: threat, terrain, social/human demographics, infrastructure, or a combination), tempo (time allowed for mission accomplishment: stealthy or forceful, aggressive or discrete, deliberate or rapid), and the engagement criteria (What situations constitute a platoon fight? In what situation will the platoon defer the fight to a higher element?). He evaluates any information he has received about the threat in the IPB to determine what threat activity he should expect to encounter. He then analyzes the terrain by conducting a map reconnaissance and by examining any IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, or information from other units to determine what types of terrain the platoon must operate over. This reconnaissance is important in identifying areas the threat could occupy based on observation capability, fields of fire, and natural obstacles. From these factors, the platoon leader determines the manner in which the platoon will accomplish its mission. 3-218. The platoon leader completes troop-leading procedures and comes up with a COA to accomplish his assigned mission. He may add phase lines on easily identifiable terrain through the zone to help control the maneuver. He places checkpoints in specific areas that must be reconnoitered or where they will aid in controlling the operation. If the terrain is mixed, with both extensive dead space and easily identifiable features, he may use boundaries to designate areas of responsibility for each section. He will place contact points at critical areas where he wants to ensure that sections maintain contact. 3-219. The platoon leader works with the FSO to plan and refine indirect fire targets to support the platoon’s scheme of maneuver. As a minimum, they should plan targets on known or suspected threat positions. 3-220. Depending on applicable METT-TC considerations, the platoon can conduct the zone reconnaissance using a two-section, three-section or single-vehicle organization. It must deploy to cover the entire zone. It usually operates in a zone it knows very little about, so the COA must allow for flexibility, responsiveness, and security as it moves. 3-221. The platoon leader deploys his sections before reaching the LD to prevent detection. He then moves the sections across the LD and assigns each section a zone within the platoon zone for which it is responsible. He uses phase lines, checkpoints, contact points, or GIRS/TIRS to ensure that the platoon reconnoiters the entire zone. He ensures that the sections remain generally on line; this prevents development of significant gaps that a moving threat could exploit. Scouts dismount to gather detailed information, reconnoiter danger areas, or move through areas that are not accessible to the vehicles. The platoon continues to reconnoiter the zone until it reaches the LOA or the final reconnaissance objective. 3-64


EXAMPLE OF A ZONE RECONNAISSANCE 3-222. The following example illustrates zone reconnaissance by a recce platoon; however, the mission may be conducted in similar manner by any type of reconnaissance platoons. 3-223. The recce platoon is operating within a troop, conducting a zone reconnaissance in an SSC scenario. The focus and tempo of the operation require the platoon to operate mounted, dismounting only to clear danger areas and intervisibility lines. The engagement criteria allow the platoon to use indirect fire on threat dismounts and vehicles. The troop commander will mass platoons to destroy individual vehicles. A UAV overflew the area several hours ago, but did not identify the threat security zone. 3-224. Although recce platoons generally do not use strict formations

forward of the LD, the platoon leader in this example starts out with his platoon on line. He will attempt to maintain this relationship even though the sections will not always be mutually supporting. The platoon deploys into formation prior to crossing the LD. It is operating in two sections, with Alpha section consisting of the platoon leader and his wingman and the PSG and his wingman in Bravo section. In this mission, the platoon leader has chosen to position his section (Alpha) in the left portion of the zone because of the importance of confirming the location of a bridge in that area.

3-225. The platoon (3d Platoon in this example) crosses the LD at the time prescribed in the commander’s OPORD, using the bounding overwatch technique of movement within sections. The sections maneuver through the zone in a zigzag pattern to ensure that the zone is properly reconnoitered and to accomplish all critical tasks of a zone reconnaissance. Security is maintained within sections because the width and terrain of the zone prevent the sections from providing continuous mutual support. 3-226. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, the platoon leader chooses the movement technique best suited for command and control. He may choose to have the sections secure the area and set at all checkpoints. As an alternative, he may have the sections bound through the checkpoints, report when they have been secured, and then set at the next phase line. If the platoon leader has not assigned sections a particular checkpoint on which to orient, the section leaders must plan their own graphic control measures to control the movement. The sections make contact at contact points to ensure that they remain abreast and to receive updates on the current situation. 3-227. The recce platoon continues reconnaissance up to the river (PL

OHIO). As the platoon approaches the river, scouts move into covered and concealed positions, dismount, and visually search the dominant terrain on the north side of the river. Alpha section identifies the remains of the bridge in its zone. Bravo section identifies a fording site with a rock bottom just east of the blown bridge at checkpoint 32; the ford will support heavy armored traffic (see Figure 3-7A). The platoon leader does not allow any element to cross PL OHIO without permission from the troop commander.

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Figure 3-7A. Zone Reconnaissance (Part One)

3-228. When the troop is set on PL OHIO, the platoon is given permission to execute OHIO and move to PL BAMA. The sections immediately begin reconnaissance of natural and man-made obstacles, including the stream to their front. As the platoon continues reconnaissance towards PL BAMA, the platoon leader learns that contact has been made within the troop. He informs his platoon that they are entering the threat security zone. Alpha section uses dismounts to determine if the dominant terrain near checkpoint 33 is clear of threat forces. The platoon continues its reconnaissance and sets at PL BAMA.

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3-229. When the troop is set on PL BAMA, the platoon is given permission to execute BAMA and move to PL IDAHO. As the platoon crosses the ridge at PL BAMA, Alpha section receives sporadic machine gun fire from concealed positions south of checkpoint 34. The platoon immediately deploys, reports the contact to the troop commander, and calls for indirect fire to suppress the threat and enable the platoon to break direct fire contact. 3-230. Under this protection, the platoon, primarily dismounted, reconnoiters to the flanks and rear to develop the situation. The troop commander acknowledges the contact report and moves immediately to link up with the platoon leader. The troop commander orders the platoon to continue its reconnaissance to locate the threat’s flank. The platoon leader sends Bravo section forward on the threat’s left and his Alpha section on the right flank to determine if the threat is mutually supported by other forces from the flanks or rear. The Bravo section sergeant and a three-man dismount team (two scouts as a security element and two for reconnaissance) move in closer and determine that the threat consists of one BRDM-2 and six dismounted soldiers. The scouts from the adjacent 2d Platoon identify the right flank of the threat and discover the flank is unprotected by obstacles and exposed to direct fires. 3-231. The troop commander directs 2d Platoon to move to a designated position and dismount two two-man Javelin teams to destroy the threat OP. These teams move to checkpoint 24 and link up with the 3d Platoon scouts, who guide them into position to attack the threat OP. (Refer to Figure 3-7B.) 3-232. The 3d Platoon reports it is set with 2d Platoon dismounts in the attack position. The platoon leader of 3d Platoon confirms that his dismount teams are out of the target area and set and that his Bravo section is providing overwatch. The platoon leader shifts mortar fire to the rear of the threat position. Javelin teams from the 2d and 3d platoons engage the threat from the flank to complete destruction of the OP. (See Figure 3-7C.) 3-233. Scout dismount teams from 3d Platoon move in quickly, capture two wounded prisoners, and search the vehicle and personnel. The platoon HUMINT collectors conduct tactical interrogation to determine the proximity and mission of other threat forces’ zones. The 3d Platoon leader orders one scout dismount team to stay and secure the prisoners and then completes his reconnaissance up to the LOA. Upon completion of the zone reconnaissance, the platoon leader collects reports and forwards them to the troop CP.

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Figure 3-7B. Zone Reconnaissance (Part Two)

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Figure 3-7C. Zone Reconnaissance (Part Three)

SECTION VII – OBSTACLE/RESTRICTION RECONNAISSANCE 3-234. One of the common tasks associated with reconnaissance missions is the location and reconnaissance of obstacles and restrictions that may affect the trafficability of a particular route or axis. The

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reconnaissance platoon may perform obstacle and restriction reconnaissance as a stand-alone task or as part of a route, zone, or area reconnaissance mission.

3-235. Obstacles and restrictions can be either natural or man-made. Current threat doctrine emphasizes the use of man-made obstacles to reinforce natural obstacles and of restrictions to slow, impede, and canalize friendly forces. These obstacles and restrictions include the following:

· · · · · · · ·

Minefields. Bridges. Log obstacles such as abatises, log cribs, stumps, and posts. AT ditches. Wire entanglements. Defiles. Persistent agent contamination. Fills, such as a raised railroad track.

3-236. The reconnaissance platoon’s ability to deal with an obstacle or restriction is extensive in certain areas and, at the same time, somewhat limited in others. The platoon’s most important function is reconnaissance of deliberate obstacles, including supporting threat positions and possible breach sites. Another important platoon reconnaissance task is to locate bypasses around obstacles and restrictions. 3-237. The reconnaissance platoon has the capability to reduce or breach small obstacles; however, this is generally limited to point obstacles that are not integrated into the threat defense and are not covered by threat fire and observation. When the scouts encounter obstacles that support a threat defense, they have the capability to assist in breaching. NOTE: An engineer reconnaissance team or squad may be task organized or attached to the platoon to assist in obstacle/restriction reconnaissance. The engineer element provides expertise in collecting pertinent intelligence, known as OBSTINTEL, about the obstacle/restriction. The engineers also provide extremely limited breaching capability.

THE STEPS OF OBSTACLE/RESTRICTION RECONNAISSANCE 3-238. How the platoon approaches obstacle and restriction reconnaissance is highly dependent on METT-TC. In general, however, the process of conducting this type of reconnaissance can be covered in five steps that under most METT-TC conditions will ensure an organized and efficient operation:

· · · ·

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Detection. Area security and reconnaissance. Obstacle reconnaissance. Selection of a COA.


·

Recommendation/execution of a COA.

DETECTION

3-239. During reconnaissance operations, the reconnaissance platoon must locate and evaluate man-made and natural obstacles and restrictions to support the movement of their parent unit. Detection of obstacles and restrictions begins in the planning phase of an operation when the S2 conducts IPB. The platoon combines the S2’s work with the reconnaissance conducted during the troop-leading process (normally a map reconnaissance only) to identify all possible obstacles and restrictions within the area of operations. The platoon leader then plans the obstacle/restriction reconnaissance based on the orders he receives and on the IPB and map reconnaissance (both his own and from the S2). 3-240. Scouts use visual and physical means to detect mines and obstacles while conducting their mission. They visually inspect terrain for signs of mine emplacement and other reinforcing obstacles. They also must be alert to dangerous battlefield debris such as bomblets from cluster bomb units (CBU) or dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM). 3-241. Mines and other types of obstacles can be difficult for mounted elements to detect; therefore, scouts must also conduct obstacle detection while dismounted. They may need to dismount their vehicles several hundred meters short of a suspected obstacle and approach the obstacle on foot to conduct reconnaissance. They look for disturbed earth, unusual or out-of-place features, surface-laid mines, tilt rods, and tripwires. They can incorporate vehicle-mounted thermal sights into the search to help detect surface-laid mines. 3-242. Physical detection methods include detonating, probing, and using a mine detector. Detection occurs when a vehicle, soldier, or countermine system physically encounters a mine. This method does not indicate the boundaries of the obstacle. The scouts must probe or conduct additional visual inspection to define the extent of the minefield. AREA SECURITY AND RECONNAISSANCE

3-243. Threat forces often cover their obstacles with observation and

fire. Whenever scouts encounter an obstacle, they must proceed with their reconnaissance assuming the threat can observe and engage them. The element that detects the obstacle establishes overwatch before it proceeds with the reconnaissance. The scouts in overwatch look for signs of threat forces in and around the obstacle or in positions that allow observation of the obstacle. They visually search the dominant terrain on the far side of the obstacle for evidence of threat positions or ambushes.

3-244. Once they confirm the threat situation from the near side, the scouts not in overwatch move mounted and/or dismounted to find bypasses around the obstacle. If they find a bypass, they move around the obstacle and establish OPs on the far side to provide 360-degree security of the obstacle. If the scouts are unable to find a bypass, they must conduct their reconnaissance from the near side under the security of the overwatch elements. OBSTACLE RECONNAISSANCE

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3-245. Once security is established, scouts then move dismounted to the obstacle. They must be cautious when reconnoitering the obstacle. Tripwires or other signs may indicate the threat is using booby traps or command-detonated mines to prevent friendly forces from determining and collecting OBSTINTEL. The reconnaissance platoon must collect all information that may be critical to the commander in such functions as planning a breach and verifying the threat template. Examples of OBSTINTEL include the following:

· · · · · · · · ·

Obstacle location. Obstacle orientation. Soil conditions. Presence of wire, gaps, and bypasses. Composition of complex obstacles. Minefield composition, including types of mines. Breaching requirements. Gaps between successive obstacle belts. Location of threat direct fire weapons.

3-246. The element reconnoitering the obstacle prepares an obstacle report (Blue 9) with this information and forwards the report through the platoon leader or PSG to the commander. (NOTE: For information on obstacle report formats, refer to Appendix B of this manual.) SELECTION OF A COA

3-247. The platoon leader analyzes the situation and METT-TC to determine which COA to select. He has a choice of four COAs:

· · · ·

Bypass the obstacle/restriction. Conduct obstacle reduction. Support a breaching operation. Continue the mission.

Bypass

3-248. A bypass is the preferred COA when it offers a quick, easy, and tactically sound means of avoiding the obstacle. To be effective, a bypass must allow the entire force to avoid the primary obstacle without risking further exposure to threat ambush and without diverting the force from its objective. Bypassing conserves reduction assets and maintains the momentum of the moving unit. If the platoon leader decides to bypass and his commander approves, scouts must mark the bypass and report it to the commander. They may be required to provide guides for the main body if the bypass is difficult to locate or visibility conditions are poor. (NOTE: For bypass report formats, refer to Appendix B of this manual.) NOTE: In some cases, bypassing is not possible, with breaching/reduction the best, or only, tactical solution. Such situations may include the following:

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·

The obstacle is integrated into a prepared defensive position and the only available bypass canalizes friendly forces into a fire sack or ambush.

·

The platoon’s mission specifically tasks it to reconnoiter and reduce any obstacle or to eliminate any threat forces located on the original route, allowing follow-on forces to maintain freedom of movement.

·

The best available bypass route will not allow follow-on forces to maintain their desired rate of movement.

·

Improving the bypass may require more time and assets than breaching the primary obstacle(s).

Conduct Obstacle Reduction

3-249. Obstacle reduction significantly degrades the platoon’s ability to maintain momentum, either for its own reconnaissance effort or for follow-on forces. Obstacles within the platoon’s breaching capability include small minefields, simple wire obstacles, small roadblocks, craters, and similar point-type obstacles. (NOTE: Refer to Appendix F of this manual for information on obstacle reduction operations.) For other types of obstacles, the scouts can support the breaching effort, as covered in the following discussion. Support a Breaching Operation

3-250. When the platoon locates a large obstacle that cannot be easily bypassed, its primary option is to support a breaching operation. The scouts perform additional reconnaissance and security tasks as necessary; these may include determining the amount of time and resources required to reduce the obstacle and locating the best available reduction site. (NOTE: If he expects to encounter large obstacles during an operation, the commander may direct engineer reconnaissance teams to move with the scouts to determine much of this information.) The platoon’s reconnaissance effort focuses on the following features:

·

Fighting positions for support force weapons on the near side of the obstacle.

·

Trafficable routes to the reduction site and routes from the far side leading to the objective.

· ·

Dispersed covered and concealed areas near the reduction site.

·

Fighting positions on the far side once a foothold is established.

·

Positions on both sides of the obstacle that could facilitate threat observation of the reduction site.

·

Trafficability and soil conditions near the reduction site. This is especially important for minefield reduction because mineclearing blades will not work properly in all soil conditions.

· ·

Soil stability of wet and dry gaps.

Work areas on the near side for reduction assets of the breach force.

Width, depth, and bottom condition of wet and dry gaps.

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· · ·

Bank height and slope. Water velocity of wet gaps. Wind direction for obscuration of the obstacle.

3-251. Engineer assistance can make the process of gathering the OBSTINTEL necessary for a breaching operation much easier and more effective for the reconnaissance platoon. If he expects to encounter large obstacles during a mission, the platoon leader should request an attached engineer reconnaissance team or, as a minimum, an engineer NCO to serve as a technical advisor. Scouts who have received sapper training may also enhance the platoon’s capabilities. 3-252. After the platoon reports the necessary information to the

commander, the scouts maintain security of the obstacle and serve as guides, if necessary, for the breach force. The information they provide is used by the commander and his engineers to prepare the suppression, obscuration, security, reduction, and assault (SOSRA) plans for the breach. The platoon maintains security during the breaching operation and calls for and adjusts indirect fires, as necessary, in support of the breaching operation. The platoon must be in position to move rapidly through the obstacle once a lane is created so it can continue its mission.

Continue the Mission

3-253. When the platoon encounters a restriction, such as a bridge or defile, it may find that the restriction is not an obstacle to movement and is not covered by threat fire or observation. Scouts may also discover dummy minefields or obstacles that are incomplete and easily passed through. Under these conditions, the platoon’s COA may be to report, then continue its reconnaissance mission. RECOMMENDATION/EXECUTION OF A COA

3-254. Once the platoon leader has determined the COA best suited to the situation, he either executes it or recommends it to his higher headquarters for approval. Generally, the platoon will execute a particular COA without specific approval if it was addressed in the OPORD received from higher or is covered in the unit SOP. In such a case, the platoon leader will execute the COA and then inform the commander of his actions. If the situation the platoon has discovered is not covered by previous guidance, the platoon leader determines the best COA and recommends it to his commander. He then executes the COA specified by the commander.

EXAMPLES OF OBSTACLE/RESTRICTION RECONNAISSANCE 3-255. These examples illustrate reconnaissance of obstacles and restrictions in two tactical situations. They are organized using the fivestep process. RECONNAISSANCE OF A RESTRICTION (NOT COVERED BY FIRE OR OBSERVATION)

3-256. Figures 3-8A through 3-8D illustrate this situation. Detection

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3-257. A reconnaissance section detects a bridge when a dismounted element observes it from an overwatch position (see Figure 3-8A). The bridge was expected because it was also identified during the scout’s IPB and map reconnaissance. A TUAV in the area of operations confirms the bridge’s location and reports that it appears to be intact. Area Security and Reconnaissance

3-258. The dismounted scouts bring the section’s vehicles into covered and concealed overwatch positions; the section establishes near side security of the bridge. A dismounted patrol is organized to conduct reconnaissance up to the bridge, overwatched by the vehicles and by a TUAV attached to augment the platoon’s security and reconnaissance capability (see Figure 3-8B). The dismounted element reconnoiters for both mounted and dismounted bypasses. The dismounts must determine quickly if it is possible to bypass the bridge through the use of a ford in the local area. The platoon leader monitors the situation and, if necessary, may direct other sections to assume the mission of locating other bridges or fords to serve as bypasses. The TUAV focuses on the far side of the obstacle to identify threat positions and/or reinforcements. 3-259. If the water obstacle can be forded, the dismounts use the ford to move to the far side. On the far side, they reconnoiter the terrain that dominates the bridge. They establish far side security on terrain where they can observe threat approach routes to the bridge. Once the far side is secure, the section is ready to reconnoiter the bridge itself. 3-260. If the water obstacle cannot be easily forded in the local area, the scouts may have to cross on the bridge itself. Before attempting to cross, the dismounted scouts visually examine the bridge for structural damage and rigged explosives. Because the bridge appears intact, the dismounted element then crosses the bridge one scout at a time. The scouts move quickly to the far side and take up covered and concealed positions that provide local security on the opposite approach to the bridge. Once the entire dismounted element is secure on the opposite side, it continues beyond the immediate bank area to secure the far side. Obstacle Reconnaissance

3-261. Once the area has been reconnoitered and secured, a dismounted element moves to the bridge under the supervision of the senior scout and conducts a detailed examination of the bridge (see Figure 3-8C). The scouts examine the bridge for the following purposes:

·

Ensure that the bridge is free of demolitions. This requires examination of underwater pilings and the underside of the bridge for hidden explosives. In addition, the scouts should take a detailed look at the far side to find any electrical cables or wires connecting the bridge to the shore.

·

Find any structural damage. Scouts look for obvious signs of threat destruction efforts and for less obvious signs of structural damage, including cracks or fractures in stringers or supports and twisted or untrue alignment of stringers or supports.

·

Conduct a hasty classification of the bridge. The scouts determine if it will support the largest vehicle in the unit. For

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additional information on bridge classification, refer to Chapter 9 of this manual and to FM 3-34.343 (FM 5-446).

3-262. The section leader consolidates all appropriate and relevant reports (for example, the bridge, ford, and bypass reports) and sends them higher. Selection of a COA

3-263. Based on results of the bridge reconnaissance, the section leader determines that the restriction is secure, that he can safely move the section across it, and that he can continue his mission. Recommendation/Execution of a COA

3-264. In accordance with platoon SOP, the section leader now moves the rest of his element across the bridge. The lead reconnaissance vehicle moves across the bridge, overwatched by the other vehicles (refer to Figure 3-8D). The vehicle crosses with only the driver on board. As he observes the crossing, the section leader watches for any signs of damage or stress on the bridge.

3-265. Once the lead vehicle is across, it moves to link up with the dismounted element and assists in providing far side security. At this point, the overwatch vehicles can cross the bridge, and the section can continue its mission. The section leader also advises his platoon leader that he is continuing his mission. 3-266. Once the lead vehicle is across, it moves to link up with the dismounted element and assists in providing far side security. At this point, the overwatch vehicles can cross the bridge, and the section can continue its mission. The section leader also advises his platoon leader that he is continuing his mission.

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Figure 3-8. Reconnaissance of a Restriction RECONNAISSANCE OF A DELIBERATE OBSTACLE (COVERED BY FIRE)

3-267. Figures 3-9A through 3-9F illustrate this situation. Detection

3-268. Dismounted scouts detect an extensive wire obstacle from a covered and concealed position. From its vantage point, the reconnaissance section cannot determine any additional details. Area Security and Reconnaissance

3-269. The section brings vehicles up to covered and concealed positions to overwatch the obstacle. It organizes a dismounted element to attempt to locate a bypass and secure the far side. Because of the obstacle’s size, the section also informs the platoon leader that it will take considerable time for the section to reconnoiter the obstacle by itself. In the process of

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executing the patrol, the section discovers that the left flank of the obstacle is tied into an impassable swamp (refer to Figure 3-9A).

3-270. Based on this initial evaluation, the platoon leader attempts to increase the speed of the reconnaissance by sending the other section to find a bypass around the right flank of the obstacle. That section moves to a dismount point and sends a patrol around the right flank. The patrol is engaged by threat machine guns. The overwatch vehicles suppress the machine guns and then are engaged by threat vehicles in defensive positions. The section reports that it can maintain contact with the threat but can no longer maneuver (see Figure 3-9B). It can also observe the threat from the rear and reports a company-size unit in defensive positions overwatching the obstacle. It also reports that there are no trafficable routes around the threat’s right flank (see Figure 3-9C). 3-271. At this point, the platoon leader determines that he does not have the combat power to secure the far side of the objective. He also determines that the only trafficable bypass is covered by threat direct fires. He now must conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the obstacle before he can recommend a COA to his commander. Obstacle Reconnaissance

3-272. The reconnaissance section that originally detected the obstacle is in the best position to reconnoiter it. It organizes a dismounted element to move to the obstacle. Because there is enough light for the threat to visually cover the obstacle, the platoon leader coordinates indirect fire to support the patrol. As the patrol moves out, artillery lays suppressive fires on the known threat positions, and mortars fire smoke into the area between the threat positions and the obstacle (see Figure 3-9D). 3-273. The scouts move by covered and concealed dismounted routes to the obstacle. Through probing and visual observation, they determine that the wire obstacle is reinforced with buried mines. They are able to determine that there is a mix of AT and AP mines with antihandling devices, emplaced in 30-meter belts on both the near side and the far side of the wire. Once they acquire this information, the scouts move laterally along the obstacle to determine its length and to find out if its composition is uniform. They look for the most favorable breaching location (see Figure 3-9E). Selection of a COA

3-274. The platoon leader evaluates the situation and determines that he cannot bypass the obstacle and does not have the capability to breach it. He decides to recommend a breach. Recommendation/Execution of a COA

3-275. The platoon leader recommends to his commander that the platoon prepare to support a breach. With higher approval, he orders the platoon to continue the reconnaissance and security tasks necessary to support a breach operation. He also begins coordinating with, and passing information to, the element responsible for conducting the breach (see Figure 3-9F).

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Figure 3-9. Reconnaissance of an Obstacle (Part One)

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Figure 3-9. Reconnaissance of an Obstacle (Part Two)

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Chapter 4

Security Operations In security operations, security forces protect the main body from threat observation and surprise attack. They provide the main body commander with early warning, allowing him to concentrate his combat power at the right place and time to defeat the threat. There are four types of security missions:

· · · ·

CONTENTS Purpose and Fundamentals ........................ Purpose ................................................. Fundamentals of Security ..................... Planning Considerations ............................. Screening Missions ..................................... Critical Tasks ........................................ Counterreconnaissance Techniques .. Example of a Screen Operation ........... Convoy and Area Security Operations ...... Convoy Security .................................... Area and High-Value Asset Security ...

4-1 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-4 4-14 4-17 4-23 4-23 4-32

Screen. Guard. Cover. Area security.

SECTION I – PURPOSE AND FUNDAMENTALS PURPOSE 4-1. All security missions serve the same general purpose: They prevent the main body from being observed or attacked unexpectedly by the threat. These operations are conducted forward, to the flanks, or to the rear of the main body. The reconnaissance platoon may operate at considerable distances from the main body it is screening (limited only by communications capabilities and the range of indirect fire support). This provides the main body with time and space to react and to position forces to fight the threat. 4-2. The reconnaissance platoon can conduct screening and area security operations independently or as part of a larger force such as a reconnaissance troop or company team. In conducting guard missions, the platoon works as part of a larger unit such as a battalion or squadron; in addition, the platoon may be tasked to conduct screening or reconnaissance missions in support of the larger unit’s guard or cover mission. SCREEN

4-3. A screening force provides early warning to the main body and impedes and harasses the threat with direct and indirect fires. Within its capabilities and based on the higher commander’s guidance, it destroys or repels threat reconnaissance units in coordination with other combat elements.

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4-4. Screening missions, which are defensive in nature, provide the protected force with the lowest level of protection of any security mission. They are conducted to the front, flanks, and rear of a stationary force and to the flanks and rear of a moving force. The screening force normally operates within the range of the supporting artillery. The reconnaissance platoon generally accomplishes a screening mission by establishing a series of OPs and conducting patrols to ensure adequate reconnaissance and surveillance of the assigned sector. GUARD

4-5. A guard force is deployed over a narrower front than is a screening force. It accomplishes all the tasks of a screening force, with the additional task of preventing threat ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. A guard force reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. It normally operates within the range of the supporting artillery. Guard operations are not conducted below task force or squadron level. COVER

4-6. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces to deceive, disrupt, and destroy threat forces. The key distinction of the cover mission is that the force operates apart from the main body to allow early development of the situation. Unlike screening or guard forces, a covering force is tactically self-contained; it is normally a reinforced separate brigade or cavalry regiment. It is organized with sufficient CS and CSS assets to operate independent of the main body. Because the covering force (or a portion of it) can be decisively engaged by a threat force, it must have sufficient combat power to effectively engage the threat. AREA SECURITY

4-7. Area security missions are conducted to provide reconnaissance and security in support of designated personnel, facilities (including airfields), unit convoys, main supply routes, lines of communications, equipment, and critical points.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY 4-8. Five fundamentals, described in the following paragraphs, are common to all security missions. The platoon leader’s plans must adhere to these fundamentals as the platoon executes its mission. ORIENT ON THE MAIN BODY

4-9.

If the main body moves, scouts must be aware of its move and must reposition their forces accordingly. They must understand the main body commander’s scheme of maneuver and where he wants his security force in relation to his movement. The element must be positioned where it can provide the needed security.

PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

4-10. The reconnaissance platoon conducts continuous reconnaissance during security operations to gain as much information as possible about the area of operations and the threat. 4-2

_________________________________________________________ Chapter 4 – Security Operations

PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNINGS

4-11. Early and accurate warning of threat approach is essential to

successful operations. The main body commander needs this information to shift and concentrate his forces to meet and defeat the threat. Scouts occupy OPs and conduct patrols to provide long-range observation, to observe threat movement, and to report the threat’s size, location, and activity to the main body commander.

PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE

4-12. The reconnaissance platoon works at a distance from the main body that is sufficient to enable the platoon to identify the threat force and then report threat activities so the main body commander can react accordingly. The platoon provides additional reaction time and/or maneuver space by employing indirect fires to slow the threat’s rate of advance. MAINTAIN THREAT CONTACT

4-13. Scouts gain and maintain contact with the threat to provide the commander with continuous information. If they lose contact, they take steps to regain it. They then maintain contact until ordered to do otherwise or until they conduct handover of the contact to another unit. Ideally, the reconnaissance platoon leader gains a thorough understanding of the threat situation before the operation starts by integrating ISR assets (such as TUAVs and ground sensors) during the planning process. This enables him to maneuver the platoon out of contact so he can make contact either on the most favorable terms or as directed by the commander.

SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 4-14. Critical to the reconnaissance platoon leader’s ability to execute his mission is to clearly understand the focus, tempo, and engagement/displacement criteria of the security mission. These factors, labeled as the commander’s reconnaissance guidance, provide the basic information the platoon leader needs to know for planning and executing his mission. They are an extension of the commander’s overall guidance clarifying the security mission. The platoon leader receives the commander’s guidance from higher and then issues it to subordinates within the platoon as part of his scheme of maneuver. 4-15. The focus of the security mission allows the commander to determine which critical tasks he wants the platoons to accomplish. It helps him narrow each platoon’s scope of operations to get the information that is most important to battalion, squadron, and/or brigade operations. In SSC operations, for example, the platoon focus might be oriented on the threat, terrain, social/human demographics, or infrastructure or on a combination of these factors. In stability operations and support operations, the platoon might be focused on determining local populace sentiment, identifying local paramilitary leaders, or conducting checkpoint operations to determine the direction of movement

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of displaced persons in the area of operations. While all critical tasks have some degree of applicability in any given operation, certain tasks are more important for specific missions; this must be clearly articulated at each level. Given its focus and a specific amount of time, the reconnaissance platoon accomplishes its specified critical tasks as instructed by the commander, then moves on to any other tasks within its capabilities.

4-16. The tempo of the security mission allows the commander to establish associated time requirements, such as the available planning time, and applicable operational methods, such as dismounted or mounted OPs, reconnaissance patrols, engagement criteria, and triggers for displacement. 4-17. The engagement and displacement criteria establish what the next higher unit is expected to destroy and what it is expected to hand over. This is particularly important when the unit is conducting counterreconaissance. At his level, the reconnaissance platoon leader uses the engagement criteria, coupled with his understanding of the threat’s most likely COA, to develop his understanding of what the commander wants the platoon to destroy. He can then determine what he wants the sections or squads to destroy. This enables the platoon leader to focus certain weapon systems, develop engagement areas, and plan for the destruction of specified threat vehicles. Displacement criteria inform the platoon leader of the events that will trigger the collapse of the screen. He uses them in planning how to occupy the area and in determining when the platoon will execute displacement security drills.

SECTION III – SCREENING MISSIONS 4-18. The reconnaissance platoon conducts screen missions for its parent unit or other combined arms forces to provide early warning of threat approach and to provide real-time information, reaction time, and maneuver space for the main body. The commander calls on the platoon to screen for him when he needs advance warning of when and where the threat is attacking. Operating over an extended area, the platoon fights only for self-protection within its capabilities and to deny threat elements close-in observation of the main body.

CRITICAL TASKS 4-19. During a screening mission, the platoon must accomplish the following critical tasks:

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·

Maintain continuous surveillance of the area of operations, including all assigned NAIs or avenues of approach into the sector.

· ·

Provide early warning of any threat approach. Within capability and based on the commander’s guidance, identify threat reconnaissance units and, in coordination with other combat elements, destroy them.


·

Gain and maintain contact with the threat main body, report the threat activity, and conduct proper handover with other elements.

·

Impede and harass the threat main body by controlled use of indirect fires.

4-20. The platoon maintains surveillance from a series of OPs. OPs are positioned where they can best observe designated NAIs and/or avenues of approach. The screen, normally identified by a phase line on a map, designates the most forward location of the OPs. Commanders must carefully weigh time and distance factors when choosing where to place this line. The platoon covers the space between the screen line and the supported/subsequent unit to the rear by establishing positions in depth. This also supports reconnaissance handover, both within the platoon and with the supported/subsequent unit to the rear of the screen line. 4-21. In executing a screen mission, scouts conduct active patrolling to extend their observation range and/or to cover dead space and the area between OPs. The platoon leader can request to place OPs forward of the LOA if they can more effectively observe the NAI/avenue of approach. Unless they have to, the scouts do not fight with their direct fire weapons. Indirect fire is their primary means of engaging the threat. They use direct fire for self-defense. 4-22. When planning a screen mission, the platoon leader uses the critical task requirements covered in the following discussion as a guide to prioritizing and sequencing the mission. He must address each requirement. CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF ASSIGNED AREAS

4-23. The first task for the reconnaissance platoon in the screening mission is to provide surveillance of the assigned area of operations. Surveillance Requirements

4-24. Generally, scouts are assigned to screen along a lateral line (the screen line). This can be misleading, however. The screen is actually set to observe specific avenues of approach or, more specifically, NAIs. The screen line merely indicates the limit of the forward positioning of the scouts. Along with the screen line graphic, the platoon leader must have an event template/matrix; he may also have a decision support template. 4-25. The areas the platoon is tasked to observe should be identified in either the reconnaissance and security plan the platoon leader receives or in the OPORD from higher headquarters. If the platoon does not receive an IPB product, the higher OPORD must specifically state where it must focus the screening operation. If the platoon is assigned multiple requirements, the higher headquarters must prioritize them. 4-26. The scout’s understanding of his commander’s intent and guidance is the most critical aspect of planning the screen mission. More important than the specifics of where to orient is the focus on what to look for. There are three choices for this focus: the threat main body, the threat reconnaissance effort, or both. The intent should specify on which of these alternatives the platoon will focus or, if both are required (as is often the case), which has priority.

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4-27. This guidance will then determine where the platoon will orient and how it will allocate resources. If the commander’s priority is locating the main body, the scout will focus most of his assets on the main avenues of approach and accept risk on the reconnaissance avenues of approach (RAA). If the commander’s priority is on counterreconnaissance, the scout will put priority on the RAAs and accept some risk on the main avenue. If the commander wants both choices, with equal priority, the scout must plan to transition from the RAA to the main avenue at a designated point in the battle. The commander will usually order this transition based on the threat situation. NOTE: A threat RAA may mirror or parallel the intended route of a threat maneuver force, or it may follow a route that facilitates observation of key terrain or friendly forces but is unrelated to the threat scheme of maneuver. Surveillance Assets

4-28. Once the platoon leader has a thorough understanding of what his surveillance requirements are, he must next determine what assets he has available to execute these requirements. Availability of assets is dependent on how long the screen must remain in place and how the platoon is task organized. Among the assets that can enhance the platoon’s surveillance capability are GSR, infantry squads, engineer reconnaissance teams, artillery forward observers (FO), and TUAV assets. If the screen will be of short duration (less than 12 hours), individual squads can emplace and man separate OPs. If the duration of the screen is unknown or longer than 12 hours, the platoon leader must assign a two-vehicle section (CFV/RV platoons) or three-vehicle section (HMMWV platoons) for each OP to facilitate continuous operations. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 8 of this manual for further details on air/ground reconnaissance integration.) Surveillance Techniques

4-29. To ensure that the critical task of surveillance of assigned reconnaissance objectives is accomplished, the platoon leader and his higher headquarters apply a combination of techniques to make the most efficient use of their assets. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 5 of this manual for a discussion of surveillance methods, OPs, patrols, and use of electronic and mechanical assets.) 4-30. Task Organization. The platoon leader will task organize the

platoon and any other assigned assets to achieve the most effective surveillance of an NAI or avenue of approach. He may also employ assets not under his direct control, but rather under the command of the next higher unit. As noted, these assets could be engineer or infantry squads, GSR, artillery observers, and TUAV assets. (NOTE: When the platoon leader does not control the assets directly, he must ensure that his dispositions complement those of the other forces in the screen and do not duplicate them unnecessarily. In addition, he must ensure that all scouts understand where these forces are and what role they are playing.)

4-31. The platoon leader may use these surveillance assets in a number of ways. These may include adjusting the number of sections or squads in a particular surveillance team; mixing scouts and other assets such as

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engineers, artillery, GSR, or infantry into the same team; or maintaining elements in pure teams under the platoon leader’s control. The platoon leader must consider the characteristics of the NAI or avenue when task organizing for surveillance. These considerations will determine whether the platoon will need to call for fire or conduct dismounted patrols; they will also affect the field of view and applicability of GSR and TUAVs.

4-32. Figures 4-1A and 4-1B illustrate how the recce and HMMWV platoons might be task organized for surveillance operations.

Figure 4-1A. Sample Recce Platoon Task Organization

Figure 4-1B. Sample HMMWV Platoon Task Organization

4-33. Redundancy. The platoon leader may task more than one element to observe a particular assigned NAI or avenue. He does this based on the nature of the NAI or avenue in terms of size, terrain, or importance. For example, a very large avenue may require multiple observation assets to ensure all aspects of the avenue are covered. Terrain that is very broken or mixed with areas of thick vegetation may require more than one asset to ensure that adequate continuous coverage is achieved. Finally, if a particular NAI is assigned significant priority by 4-7

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the commander, the platoon leader may assign multiple elements to cover it. Redundancy not only ensures that an NAI or avenue is adequately observed, but also enables the unit to accomplish the mission even if some assets are compromised by threat forces. Figure 4-2 illustrates redundancy of observation assets.

Figure 4-2. Redundant Coverage of an Avenue of Approach

4-34. Cueing. Cueing is a technique the platoon leader can use to cover an NAI or avenue when assets are limited and he lacks the capability for redundancy. He plans contingency tasks that will increase surveillance on a particular NAI; his surveillance teams execute the tasks when “cued” by activity at that NAI.

4-35. The NAI or avenue is covered initially either by a single surveillance team or by a remote or electronic signaling device such as GSR, REMBASS, trip flares, or the platoon early warning system (PEWS). When activity is detected, other teams move into preselected positions to add their capabilities to the surveillance of the NAI or avenue. Refer to Figure 4-3.

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Figure 4-3. Use of Trip Flare to Cue a Patrol PROVIDE EARLY WARNING

4-36. The platoon’s second critical task is to provide early warning of a threat approach. Effective early warning requires planning for communications in detail. The platoon leader looks at communications distances and significant terrain features to identify potential FM communications problems. If he anticipates problems, he can address them by requesting support from higher (in the form of battalion or squadron retrans) or by planning for radio relays and directional antennas. See Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-4. Platoon Communications Setup PERFORM COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE (IF ORDERED)

4-37. Once the platoon leader has planned surveillance of assigned reconnaissance objectives and has ensured that he can provide early warning, he must next evaluate the threat’s reconnaissance effort and the platoon’s assigned role in the conduct of counterreconnaissance. These operations consist of two elements: acquiring and killing. The most appropriate role for the platoon in the counterreconnaissance operation is acquiring threat reconnaissance assets rather than killing them, although it does have limited killing capability. 4-38. The commander’s guidance must specifically define the role of the scouts in counterreconnaissance operations. Once he has a thorough understanding of his commander’s intent, the platoon leader must consider four factors when planning to acquire threat reconnaissance elements:

· ·

Threat RAAs (both mounted and dismounted). When and under what conditions the platoon is likely to encounter threat reconnaissance forces.

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Likely composition of threat reconnaissance forces in terms of size, organization, and equipment.

·

Identity and location of friendly reconnaissance-killing forces.

4-39. Threat reconnaissance forces are not likely to use primary avenues of approach to execute their mission. To acquire their assigned reconnaissance objectives, the scouts must be oriented on RAAs, which may include trails, rough terrain, and dead space that allows mounted movement, but only for small teams of vehicles. They must also realize that threat reconnaissance is most likely to move during darkness and periods of limited visibility. A thorough understanding of the composition of threat reconnaissance elements will allow the scouts to more accurately determine what the threat’s likely RAAs are and how best to acquire them. 4-40. Other assets in the battalion, squadron or, more likely, the brigade will be given the specific mission of killing threat reconnaissance behind the screen line where initial acquisition occurs. Once the scouts locate threat reconnaissance elements, they must use their thorough knowledge of the terrain and of the location and capabilities of the friendly killing force to coordinate handover of the threat forces. 4-41. The counterreconnaissance task is extremely resource-intensive. It is generally most effective when conducted by an element larger than a single reconnaissance platoon. Most often, the platoon by itself does not have sufficient assets to both acquire and kill the threat. In addition, it may not be able to cover all RAAs and still maintain surveillance on the threat’s main avenues of approach. The commander’s intent is critical to resolving this dilemma. 4-42. When the platoon must acquire both threat reconnaissance elements and the main body, the priority in the early stages of the mission will be on the reconnaissance forces, focusing on the RAAs. The platoon will then track the echeloned arrival of threat elements on the battlefield and shift priority to the main avenues of approach at the appropriate time. This technique permits the platoon to time-phase its priorities based on battlefield conditions. The platoon leader, however, must recognize when to change priority to the main avenue and then execute the change successfully. See Figures 4-5A and 4-5B.

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Figure 4-5A. Changing the Screen Priority (Initial Priority to Counterreconnaissance)

Figure 4-5B. Changing the Screen Priority (Priority Changed to Main Avenue of Approach) (Continued) MAINTAIN CONTACT

4-43. After locating the main body of the threat, the platoon must maintain contact with it until authorized to hand over contact to another friendly element. This is one of the most difficult tasks for the individual section or squad to accomplish and therefore is best accomplished through a platoon effort. 4-44. The preferred method of maintaining contact with a moving threat main body is to position echeloned OPs in depth along the avenue of approach. This allows contact to be handed over from one OP to another without the requirement for the OPs to physically displace. This technique requires that the platoon have enough assets to pre-position the OPs in depth. See Figure 4-6.

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Figure 4-6. Positioning OPs in Depth

4-45. Another technique used to maintain contact is to displace in front of a moving threat. This technique is very difficult because the scouts must move to the rear faster than the threat is moving forward. This often exposes the scouts to threat fire. Additionally, if they attempt to use covered and concealed routes only, they risk moving too slowly, being outrun and/or overrun by the threat, and losing contact. Figure 4-7 illustrates how scouts can conduct displacement while maintaining contact.

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Figure 4-7. Displacement while in Contact

4-46. A third technique is a combination of the two discussed earlier. Leaving the original dismounted OP in position (with a vehicle in support, if possible), the scouts detach a vehicle or vehicle section and reposition it in depth as either a mounted or dismounted OP. This OP can be established or reoriented to maintain contact until the threat force can be handed over to a maneuver element. The platoon must maintain observation of NAIs/avenues of approach or request that other assets maintain the screen. The platoon leader can also request or coordinate handover to maintain the screen. This technique reduces both the time associated with moving OPs and the likelihood that any reconnaissance element will be compromised. Refer to Figure 4-8A and 4-8B. 4-47. No matter how the platoon plans to maintain contact, the platoon leader should attempt to rehearse the method, especially if it involves displacement of reconnaissance elements. This will help him to validate the method he has chosen or to choose another one if it becomes necessary.

Figure 4-8A. Repositioning OPs in Depth

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Figure 4-8B. Repositioning OPs in Depth (Continued) HARASS AND IMPEDE

4-48. Reconnaissance platoons should attempt to harass and impede the threat using indirect fire. The platoon leader must plan carefully to overcome the difficulties involved in effectively engaging a moving mechanized element with indirect fire. He should focus on expected avenues of approach, choke points, the threat rate of march, and artillery time of flight to determine trigger lines (or points) that allow accurate engagement of the threat. A technique for planning the use of triggers is to have a dismounted OP, sited forward of its supporting vehicle, observe the triggers and initiate fires, with the vehicle OP observing the impact zone and adjusting the fires. Every scout in the reconnaissance platoon must be proficient in planning, coordinating, and calling for indirect fires, such as linear sheaths on main avenues of approach. 4-49. Accurate artillery fire will have an immediate effect on the threat force. Formations will be disrupted as individual vehicles change speed, button up, or are destroyed or disabled. Command and control will deteriorate as vision is restricted and antennas are lost; this loss of vision and command and control will restrict the threat’s ability to spot displacing friendly forces. The threat may also compromise his momentum and combat power if he attempts to locate the element directing the fire.

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES 4-50. Counterreconnaissance is a directed effort to prevent visual observation or infiltration of friendly forces by threat reconnaissance elements. It is a critical task in all reconnaissance platoon security missions. Countering the threat’s mounted and dismounted reconnaissance elements is the first and possibly most important step in ensuring the friendly main body can successfully execute its mission. At the same time, it can be extremely difficult to identify threat reconnaissance forces, especially when they are dismounted. The platoon may lack this capability. As a result, this task is most successfully

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executed when it is approached as a combined arms effort at troop and battalion task force level. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-51. The troop or task force concept of executing counterreconnaissance must address how the unit will accomplish the two aspects of counterreconnaissance: acquiring the threat and then killing it. At battalion/squadron level, the S2 provides key input in this determination. He identifies where RAAs are located in the unit sector, what type of threat reconnaissance elements might be used in the sector, and when they are most likely to move into the sector. It is especially important for the S2 to note the locations and activities of dismounted threat elements, which present the greatest danger to the platoon and the supported unit. Information from the S2 is integrated into the OPORD and is part of the unit’s IPB. 4-52. The commander should discuss conduct of counterreconnaissance in the OPORD or FRAGO, indicating in tactical terms how elements will organize and conduct the operations throughout the depth of the area of operations. This information should include planning considerations for the operation, including the following:

· · · ·

Direct fire planning and coordination. Observation planning and coordination. Command and control. Battle handover.

4-53. In all counterreconnaissance operations, the goal is to destroy the threat reconnaissance forces after they have penetrated the initial screen line. The reconnaissance platoon’s role in these operations will usually be to conduct a screen mission to acquire and identify threat reconnaissance forces. This requires that the acquiring elements of the platoon be well hidden to prevent the threat from detecting the screen. In most cases, the platoon cannot be expected to have the capability to acquire, identify, and defeat the threat reconnaissance by itself. Other combat elements must be tasked to fight and destroy the threat reconnaissance elements. ORGANIZATION

4-54. Several organizational options, which are described in the following paragraphs, are available to the commander to counter the threat reconnaissance effort. Reconnaissance Platoon

4-55. This technique puts the entire burden for counterreconnaissance on the reconnaissance platoon and attached CS assets. It requires maximum use of the CS assets to acquire the threat, freeing the scouts to perform the killing function of counterreconnaissance. The platoon leader places acquiring assets along the screen line and positions his designated killing teams in depth. The killing assets of the platoon occupy positions on likely threat reconnaissance routes; however, they must be flexible to respond to threat elements moving on other routes. (NOTE: When the platoon operates with units that commonly have strikers or COLTs attached, such as BRTs, the platoon leader may have to integrate NAIs to

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support the TAIs that are positioned in depth. This will place the scouts in the role of acquiring the threat, with the strikers/COLTs as the killers in depth.)

4-56. This technique requires that the platoon’s sections or squads reconnoiter alternate positions and routes that permit quick repositioning once contact is made by the acquiring elements. When it is used, counterreconnaissance tasks must be prioritized in the early stages of the screen mission. Reconnaissance Platoon and MGS/Tank Platoon

4-57. The team technique requires the close integration of a reconnaissance platoon and an MGS/tank platoon to execute counterreconnaissance tasks. The reconnaissance platoon is the acquiring element, and the MGS/tank platoon is the killing element. The reconnaissance platoon leader, whose element makes first contact, commands the counterreconnaissance effort; the MGS/tank platoon is placed OPCON to the reconnaissance platoon. In a cavalry troop, BRT, or recce troop, the troop commander may control and coordinate the effort. 4-58. The scouts acquire the threat through the use of surveillance techniques. The MGSs or tanks occupy a BP along likely reconnaissance avenues, but they are prepared to move to previously reconnoitered alternate positions based on reports coming from the reconnaissance platoon. This organization will be most effective when the two platoons establish a habitual relationship. Refer to Figure 4-9 for an illustration of this technique using a counterreconnaissance team made up of recce and MGS platoons.

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Figure 4-9. Recce/MGS Team Counterreconnaissance Array Reconnaissance Platoon and Company Team

4-59. In this technique, a combined arms task force uses a company team with an attached or OPCON reconnaissance platoon to execute counterreconnaissance and security operations. This technique is primarily executed by battalion reconnaissance platoons. The company team commander controls the security effort. The reconnaissance platoon is the primary acquiring element, but it can be supplemented with infantry assets from the company team and CS assets from the battalion. The commander uses all other assets as the killing element. 4-60. This is the most robust counterreconnaissance technique and has the combat power to be very effective. It also has organic CSS assets, making service support operations quicker and more responsive. Major disadvantages of this technique are the combat power it diverts from the main battle area (MBA) and the execution problems that may result if the scouts and the killing elements have not trained together. Refer to Figure 4-10.

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Figure 4-10. Reconaissance Platoon and Company Team Counterreconnaissance Array

EXAMPLE OF A SCREEN OPERATION 4-61. The following example illustrates a screen operation by a recce platoon; however, the mission can be conducted in similar fashion by all types of reconnaissance platoons. 4-62. The recce platoon normally screens as part of a troop operation. This example focuses on 1st Platoon, Troop B, operating as part of a RSTA squadron (see Figure 4-11). The troop commander has been assigned the mission to screen in his sector along PL BOB and between PL BOB and PL SAM. The troop will hand over threat contact as the threat crosses PL SAM. The troop commander decides to screen with his three recce platoons on line and an attached MGS platoon in depth behind the recce platoons.

Figure 4-11. Troop Screen Concept

4-63. The primary focus of the 1st Platoon is on acquiring threat main body elements moving along avenue of approach 2 or 2A (AA2 and AA2A

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in the accompanying illustrations). The platoon will also locate as many threat reconnaissance elements as possible. Because of the width of the sector, the recce platoons have permission to engage threat reconnaissance patrols smaller than section size, but only under favorable conditions. (NOTE: CFV-equipped scouts may be tasked to engage enemy elements up to platoon size.) The MGS platoon’s primary task is to destroy threat reconnaissance elements of section or platoon size. In 1st Platoon’s area of operations, the attached MGS platoon has been positioned in BP A6 and is prepared to occupy any other BP on order.

4-64. With his troop commander’s guidance, the 1st Platoon leader evaluates the resources available to accomplish his tasks. Because there is no assigned time limit to the mission, he plans for long-duration OPs. This consideration leads him to select a two-section organization. He places one section to observe AA2A from OP A and positions the other section at OP E (see Figure 4-12). Positioning of these OPs is critical. A map reconnaissance indicates that RAAs are probably located along the platoon’s boundaries and through the wooded area in the center of the platoon screen (in the vicinity of checkpoints 7, 2, and 3). 4-65. Careful positioning of the OPs will allow continuous coverage of AA2 and AA2A and some coverage of the RAAs. The platoon leader plans to conduct patrols for further surveillance of the RAAs. In addition to his primary positions, the platoon leader plans alternate and subsequent OPs throughout the depth of his sector. He selects these positions based on his requirements to reposition if an OP is compromised and to maintain contact with the main body throughout the depth of his sector (as illustrated in Figure 4-12). 4-66. If time permits, the platoon leader will report all his planned positions to the troop TOC. As a minimum, he will send the exact locations of the initial positions.

Figure 4-12. Recce Dispositions

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4-67. As the recce sections arrive at their assigned positions (OPs A and E), they adjust the sites to best meet the intent of the platoon leader. Upon arriving, the sections report “SET”; after the OP is completely installed, they report “ESTABLISHED.” Once established, the recce sections begin executing patrols in accordance with the platoon patrol plan. 4-68. After a period of time, OP A reports contact with a threat

reconnaissance patrol consisting of two BRDMs (see Figure 4-13). Based on the platoon leader’s guidance, the recce section takes no action, remains hidden, and continues to report. The platoon leader forwards the report to the troop commander and receives instructions to coordinate target handover with the MGS platoon in BP A6. Based on his commander’s guidance, the recce platoon leader has the MGS platoon move to BP A5 to engage and destroy the threat.

Figure 4-13. Initial Contact and Engagement

4-69. A short time later, the scouts in OP E report artillery impact in the vicinity of OP C and then contact with two BMPs, moving south just west of AA2. Having monitored the developing threat situation, the troop commander orders the MGS platoon to move to BP A6 and engage the threat. The MGS platoon coordinates with the recce platoon leader, then engages and destroys the second threat. See Figure 4-14.

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Figure 4-14. Scouts Acquire Combat Reconnaissance Patrols (CRP); MGSs Destroy CRPs

4-70. Having engaged a significant number of threat elements from BP A6 and/or BP A5, the MGS platoon is ordered by the troop commander to reposition to BP A8. As that occurs, the recce section at OP E identifies the first element of the threat main body, a company-size element. The platoon leader decides to take a risk along AA2A. He requests to displace from OP A to OP H or displaces in accordance with the established displacement criteria. This gives him additional depth along AA2 and will make it easier for the platoon to maintain contact with the threat main body (see Figure 4-15). The platoon leader reports the displacement.

Figure 4-15. Scouts Acquire Threat Main Body

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4-71. The recce section formerly at OP A reports set at OP H. The section at OP E maintains contact with the threat main body until it can be observed by the section at OP H (as shown in Figure 4-16). Once that occurs, the two OPs conduct target handover, with the section at OP E beginning displacement in depth to OP J. The section at OP H begins to harass the threat main body by calling for indirect fire. This fire not only breaks up the momentum of the main body, but also helps cover the displacement of OP E. OP H also reports threat artillery impact in the vicinity of BP A6. Eavesdropping on the troop net, the recce platoon learns that the MGS platoon is set at BP A8.

Figure 4-16. Scouts Harass Threat Main Body

4-72. OP H maintains contact with the threat and continues to harass him with indirect fire (as illustrated in Figure 4-17). As the threat main body continues to move, it is engaged with direct fire by the MGS platoon in BP A8. These combined fires disrupt and significantly slow the threat main body. The recce section reports set at OP J and begins coordinating battle handover to the friendly unit south of PL SAM.

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Figure 4-17. MGSs and Scouts Engage Threat Main Body

4-73. After the initial engagement of the threat main body, the MGS platoon displaces laterally toward Troop A to conduct a rearward passage of lines (see Figure 4-18). OP H conducts target handover with OP J and also moves toward Troop A. OP J maintains contact with the moving threat main body until battle handover with the friendly unit to the south is complete. The recce section at OP J then moves east to pass to the rear.

Figure 4-18. Scouts Execute Battle Handover to Incoming Unit

SECTION IV – CONVOY AND AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS 4-23

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4-74. Area security operations are designed to protect specific critical and vulnerable assets or terrain from threat observation and direct fire. They can involve escorting friendly convoys; protecting critical points such as bridges, command and control installations, or other key and vulnerable sites; or participating in protection of large areas such as airfields. They are normally performed when conventional security or combat operations are not appropriate to the situation. The reconnaissance platoon may perform area security operations as part of a larger force or as an independent platoon mission.

CONVOY SECURITY 4-75. Convoy security missions are performed by recce troops, company

teams, cavalry troops, and larger organizations to provide protection for a specific convoy. These missions include numerous tasks for elements such as escort, reconnaissance, and combat reaction forces. The tasks in turn become missions for the subordinate units. The recce platoon is particularly well suited for outposting missions, whereas other types of reconnaissance platoons are effective for both route reconnaissance and outposting missions. All reconnaissance platoons can perform convoy escort as well. The size of the unit performing the convoy security operation is dependent on a number of factors, including the size of the convoy, the terrain, and the length of the route. Refer to Figures 4-19A and 4-19B for illustrations of recce troop and cavalry troop convoy security missions.

Figure 4-19A. Recce Troop Convoy Security Mission

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Figure 4-19B. Cavalry Troop Convoy Security Mission ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

4-76. When route reconnaissance is conducted as part of a convoy security operation, it is done in the same manner as discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual. In this mission, scouts focus on the trafficability of the route and on threat forces that might influence the route. The platoon must plan to call for engineer assets to assist in breaching point-type obstacles. Command-detonated devices are a major threat during route reconnaissance. OUTPOSTING

4-77. Outposting is a technique used during convoy security to screen the route after it has been reconnoitered. Its use is similar to the technique for covering lateral and boundary routes in reconnaissance operations. Outposting as part of convoy security, however, is generally done by all elements of the platoon for the specific purpose of helping to secure the convoy. It involves employing OPs on critical portions of the route or on key avenues of approach to the route to provide early warning of threat elements attempting to interdict the convoy. 4-78. Outposting differs from a conventional screen in that the outposts are oriented on the route rather than on the friendly main body. Normally, the outposting element follows the element that is executing the route reconnaissance (see Figure 4-20). Outposts have a limited ability to destroy small threat forces attempting to influence the route. Their primary purpose is to acquire the threat and then to direct the employment of reaction forces or indirect fire to destroy him.

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Figure 4-20. Recce Platoon Conducts Outposting CONVOY ESCORT

4-79. The platoon may perform a convoy escort mission either independently or as part of a larger unit’s convoy security mission. The convoy escort mission requires that the platoon provide a convoy with close-in protection from direct fire. The platoon can protect 5 to 10 convoy vehicles per escort vehicle. These vehicles can include military vehicles (CSS, command and control), civilian trucks, or buses. Among reconnaissance platoons, those equipped with CFVs are best suited for this mission because of their vehicles’ firepower and the armor protection they provide against direct and indirect fires and mines. Leaders must carefully evaluate the threat before assigning a convoy escort mission to HMMWV- or RV-equipped platoons. The following considerations apply during convoy escort operations. Command and Control

4-80. Command and control is especially critical during convoy escort because of the task organization inherent to the mission. When the reconnaissance platoon is executing the escort mission, it operates under the control of the convoy commander. The relationship between the platoon and the convoy commander must provide for unity of command and effort if combat operations are required during the course of the mission. (NOTE: The convoy commander must understand the employment of combat assets while in contact. If the senior leader in the convoy chain of command lacks such experience, the next most senior leader with the appropriate qualifications should assume the duties of convoy commander.) 4-81. The platoon leader must ensure that a complete OPORD is issued to all vehicle commanders in the convoy prior to execution of the mission. This is vital because the convoy may itself be task organized from a variety of units and because many of the vehicles may not have tactical

4-26


radios. The order should follow the standard five-paragraph OPORD format, with special emphasis on the following subjects:

· · · · · · ·

Order of march. Actions on contact. Chain of command. Communications and signals. Actions on vehicle breakdown. Actions at a halt. Route of march (this should include a sketch for each vehicle commander).

Tactical Disposition

4-82. Security during convoy escort missions must be in all directions and throughout the length of the convoy. This requires that the elements of the platoon and any combat or CS attachments be dispersed throughout the convoy formation. Engineer assets should be located toward the front to respond to obstacles; the fire support team (FIST) or COLT should be located near the platoon leader. The platoon will normally use the column formation because of its inherent speed and ease of movement. If a HMMWV unit is used as the escort, a tracked, armored vehicle should be attached to lead the convoy whenever possible because of its superior protection against mines. Figures 4-20A, 4-20B, and 4-20C illustrate convoy escort missions by various types of reconnaissance platoon.

Figure 4-20A. Recce Platoon Escorts a Convoy

Figure 4-20B. CFV Platoon Escorts a Convoy

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Figure 4-20C. HMMWV Platoon Escorts a Convoy Actions at an Ambush

4-83. Ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy and is therefore a threat the convoy escort must be prepared to counter. Reaction to an ambush must be quick, overwhelming, and decisive. It must be executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with care taken to avoid fratricide. The following actions should be included in the convoy escort drill:

·

Upon detection of a threat force, escort vehicles action toward the threat. They seek covered positions between the convoy and the threat and suppress the threat with the highest possible volume of fire. They send appropriate contact reports to higher headquarters (as shown in Figure 4-21A). NOTE: In some situations, elements of the escort force will be required to remain with the convoy main body. This is especially true when the convoy comprises mainly nonmilitary elements, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or local civilian agencies. In addition to being unarmed in most cases, these elements will usually lack communications capabilities, making it difficult for escort elements to link back up with the main body. · The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles and maintains radio contact with the security force while moving the convoy on the route at the highest possible speed.

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·

Convoy vehicles, if armed, may return fire only until the escort has imposed itself between the convoy and the threat.

·

Any damaged or disabled vehicles are abandoned and pushed off the route (as illustrated in Figure 4-21B).

·

The escort leader (reconnaissance platoon leader) submits spot reports. If necessary, he requests reinforcement and calls for and directs indirect fires and air support if they are available.

·

Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the escort leader chooses one of the following COAs based on the composition of the escort and the strength of the threat force: n

Continue to suppress the threat force while combat reaction forces move to support (see Figure 4-22A).

n

Assault the threat (see Figure 4-22B).

n

Break contact and move out of the kill zone (as illustrated in Figure 4-22C).


4-84. Generally, CFV-equipped platoons will continue to suppress the threat or execute an assault because of their vehicles’ capabilities. HMMWV- and RV-equipped platoons are more likely to move out of the kill zone as soon as the convoy is clear. Contact should be broken only with the approval of the platoon’s higher commander.

Figure 4-21A. Convoy Escort Actions toward Ambush

Figure 4-21B. Convoy Continues to Move out of Kill Zone

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Figure 4-22A. Escort Suppresses Ambush for Reaction Force

Figure 4-22B. Escort Vehicles Assault Ambush Position

Figure 4-22C. Escort Vehicles Break Contact Actions at a Short Halt

4-85. The convoy may be required to make a short halt for a number of reasons. During the short halt, the escorting unit is at REDCON-1 regardless of what actions convoy vehicles are taking. If the halt is for any reason other than an obstacle, these actions should be taken:

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·

The convoy commander signals the short halt and transmits the order via tactical radio.

· ·

The convoy assumes a herringbone formation. Escort vehicles take up protective positions forward, to the rear, and to the flanks (up to 100 meters beyond the convoy


vehicles, as applicable) and orient their weapon systems outward. They remain at REDCON-1, although they establish dismounted local security (as illustrated in Figure 4-23A). The vehicles being escorted pull into the protected area in the center of the herringbone, between the escort vehicles. (NOTE: Escort vehicles should not leave the roadway if there is a possibility of threat mines.)

·

When the order is given to move out, convoy vehicles first reestablish the column formation, leaving space for the escort vehicles (see Figure 4-23B). Once the convoy is in column, the escort vehicles join the column, leaving local security dismounted (shown in Figure 4-23C).

·

Once all elements are in column, local security personnel mount, and the convoy continues to move.

Figure 4-23A. Convoy Assumes Herringbone Formation

Figure 4-23B. Convoy Moves Back into Column Formation

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Figure 4-23C. Escort Vehicles Rejoin Column Actions at an Obstacle

4-86. Obstacles are a major threat to convoys. They can be used to

delay the convoy; if the terrain is favorable, they may be able to stop the convoy altogether. In addition, an obstacle or series of obstacles can be used to channel or stop the convoy to set up an ambush. Generally, the convoy should treat every obstacle as though the threat is overwatching it with direct and/or indirect fires.

4-87. The purpose of the route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy is to identify obstacles and either breach them or find bypasses. In some cases, it is not possible to mount a route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy; in other cases, the reconnaissance element may fail to detect the threat or its obstacles. In either situation, the convoy must take actions to reduce or bypass the obstacle. 4-88. When a convoy is dealing with an obstacle, it faces a two-sided problem: it is more vulnerable because it is stopped, and its escort force is occupied with tasks required to overcome or bypass the obstacle. For these reasons, security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle must be accomplished very quickly. The convoy escort takes the following actions when it encounters a point-type obstacle:

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·

When the lead security element identifies the obstacle, the convoy commander directs a short halt. He establishes dismounted local security and overwatch of the obstacle. Convoy vehicles remain on the road, with the escort elements moving to the flanks to provide security. (NOTE: All convoy vehicles must be aware that the threat may have buried mines in the area, especially on the flanks of the road.)

·

The convoy commander relays a spot report to higher headquarters and requests support from combat reaction forces, engineer assets (if they are not already part of the convoy), and aerial reconnaissance elements. In addition, he alerts artillery units to be prepared to provide fire support.


Employment of these assets is designed to reduce the time the convoy is halted and thus to reduce its vulnerability. The convoy commander must always assume that the obstacle is overwatched and covered by the threat.

·

The escort forces form a reconnaissance team and begin reconnaissance for a bypass while maintaining 360-degree security of the convoy (see Figure 4-24).

·

Simultaneously, an additional reconnaissance team made up of escort elements and/or engineers moves forward to conduct an obstacle reconnaissance. Because of limited time and assets, the convoy does not need to establish far-side security prior to reconnaissance of the obstacle (see Figure 4-24).

·

Once all reconnaissance is completed, the convoy commander determines which of the following COAs he will take:

·

n

Bypass the obstacle.

n

Breach the obstacle with the assets on hand.

n

Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets.

The convoy commander executes the best COA and continues the mission.

Figure 4-24. Escort Teams Conduct Obstacle Reconnaissance and Reconnoiter for a Bypass

AREA AND HIGH-VALUE ASSET SECURITY 4-89. Units conduct area security missions in MTWs and SSCs to deny the threat the ability to influence friendly actions in a specific area or to deny the threat use of an area for its own purposes. This may entail occupying and securing an area without the presence of the threat or taking actions to destroy threat forces already present in the area. The area security mission may provide protection of designated personnel,

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airfields, unit convoys, facilities, main supply communications, equipment, and critical points.

routes,

lines

of

AREA SECURITY TASKS

4-90. Area security involves a variety of techniques and may include reconnaissance, security, defensive, offensive, stability, and support tasks. Reconnaissance organizations, including the platoon, may conduct the following in support of area security:

· · ·

Area, route, and/or zone reconnaissance.

· ·

Convoy security.

Screening operations. Offensive and defensive tasks (within the platoon’s capability based on METT-TC). High-value asset security.

NOTE: Reconnaissance units without organic combat assets (such as the BRT, recce troop, and task force reconnaissance platoon) rely on the brigade to provide the combat assets needed to perform offensive and defensive actions if the enemy situation dictates.

4-91. The platoon may conduct or support the following additional tasks in stability operations and support operations:

· · · · ·

Liaison. Compliance inspections. Presence patrols. Checkpoints. Roadblocks.

NOTE: See Appendix D of this manual for a more detailed discussion of platoon operations in stability operations or support operations. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-92. An area security force neutralizes or defeats enemy operations in a specified area. It operates in an area delineated by the headquarters assigning the area security mission. It screens, reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and delays (within capability) as necessary to accomplish its mission. Area security operations may be offensive or defensive in nature and focus on the threat/enemy, on the force/element being protected, or on a combination of the two. Commanders may balance the level of security measures taken with the type and level of threat posed in the specific area; however, all-around security is an essential consideration at all times. 4-93. As noted, area security operations are conducted to deny the threat/enemy the ability to influence friendly actions in a specific area or to deny him use of an area for his own purposes. This may entail occupying and establishing a 360-degree perimeter around the area being secured or taking actions to destroy or neutralize enemy forces already present. The area to be secured may range from specific points (bridges,

4-34


defiles) to defined areas (terrain features such as ridgelines or hills) to large population centers and adjacent areas.

4-94. Proper IPB is vital in providing adequate security for the assigned area. Along with unit capability and the factors of METT-TC, the following considerations, which are determined during the IPB, will determine specific unit missions during area security operations:

· ·

The natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.

·

Control of land and water areas and avenues of approach surrounding the area to be secured extending to a range beyond that of threat artillery, rockets, and mortars.

· ·

Control of airspace.

Existing roads and waterways for communication and civilian commerce.

military

lines

of

Proximity to critical sites such as airfields, power generation plants, and civic buildings.

4-95. Because of the possibility of commanders tying their forces to fixed installations or sites, area security missions may become defensive in nature. This must be carefully balanced with the need for offensive action. Early warning of enemy activity to provide the commander with time to react to any potential threat is a paramount consideration in effective area security missions. It requires thorough reconnaissance and surveillance planning, coupled with employment of dismounted and mounted patrols and aerial reconnaissance. 4-96. A perimeter is established when a unit must secure an area where the defense is not tied into an adjacent unit. Perimeters vary in shape depending on METT-TC. If the commander determines the most probable direction of threat attack, he may weight that part of the perimeter to cover the approach of threat forces. The perimeter shape conforms to the terrain features that afford the most effective observation and fields of fire. 4-97. Perimeters are divided into troop/platoon sectors with boundaries and contact points. Mutual support and coordination between defensive elements (usually combat elements within the brigade) require careful planning, positioning, and coordination because of the circular aspects of the perimeter. A screen line is established, integrating OPs, GSR, and patrols. Tanks, MGSs, and/or antiarmor weapons systems are placed on armor-restrictive terrain and high-speed avenues of approach. Likely threat/enemy drop zones (DZ), landing zones (LZ), or bases are identified and kept under observation. Air assets, if available, are integrated into the R&S plan. (NOTE: Refer to FM 3-20.971 and FM 3-20.97 [FM 17-97] for further discussion on area security at the troop level.) PLATOON AREA SECURITY TECHNIQUES

4-98. The reconnaissance platoon may deploy to conduct area security operations on its own or as part of a larger force. When the platoon deploys to conduct area security on its own, it generally moves into a coil formation around the point, area, or asset to be secured. Vehicle positions are adjusted to orient on likely threat avenues of approach. If engineer

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support is available, the vehicle positions are dug in; if not, vehicles occupy hasty fighting positions.

4-99. To further improve the position, the platoon employs hasty protective minefields, wire, and other obstacles as appropriate and available. Wire obstacles should be emplaced outside grenade range of friendly positions. Once vehicle positions and obstacles are established, the platoon develops a fire plan, including integrated indirect fires, and submits it to its higher headquarters. 4-100. In addition to setting up the platoon position around the asset to be secured, the platoon also employs patrols and OPs to enhance security (see Figure 4-25). It employs reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols as needed to become familiar with the area of operations, to gain information on threat forces, and to destroy small threat dismounted reconnaissance elements. OPs are deployed to observe likely avenues of approach, to provide early warning of threat activity, and to assist in controlling indirect fires.

Figure 4-25. Platoon Area Security Dispositions

4-36

Chapter 5

Dismounted Operations Dismounted operations, in some form, are a critical element in virtually every reconnaissance platoon mission. The best scouting is done dismounted. It is critical that all reconnaissance leaders understand when and how to employ dismounted scouts to enhance the platoon’s effectiveness in reconnaissance and security tasks. This chapter focuses on the two major types of dismounted operations: patrols and observation posts.

CONTENTS Troop-Leading Procedures .......................... Tenets .................................................... Troop-Leading Steps in Dismounted Operations .......................................... Patrolling Tasks ........................................... Movement Techniques .......................... Security Halts ........................................ Departure from Friendly Lines ............. Use of Rally Points ................................ Contingency Plans ................................ Leader’s Reconnaissance .................... Reentry to Friendly Lines ..................... Debriefing .............................................. Actions at Danger Areas ....................... Actions on Contact ...................................... Battle Drills ............................................ Methods of Handling Casualties and Prisoners ............................................ Types of Patrols ........................................... Reconnaissance Patrol ......................... Security Patrol ....................................... Combat Patrol ........................................ Presence Patrol ..................................... Tracking Patrol ...................................... Patrol Bases .................................................. Site Selection ......................................... Planning Considerations ...................... Patrol Base Occupation ........................ Patrol Base Activities ........................... Passive (Clandestine) Patrol Base ...... Observation Posts ........................................ Critical Tasks ......................................... Types of Observation Posts ................. Positioning the OP ................................ Selecting an OP Site ............................. Occupying the OP ................................. Manning the OP ..................................... Improving the Position ......................... OP Communications ............................. OP Security ............................................ Extended OP Operations ...................... Remote Electronic/Mechanical Surveillance .......................................

5-1 5-2 5-2 5-15 5-15 5-18 5-19 5-20 5-21 5-21 5-22 5-23 5-23 5-26 5-26 5-32 5-33 5-33 5-39 5-40 5-51 5-51 5-57 5-57 5-58 5-58 5-60 5-61 5-61 5-62 5-63 5-63 5-64 5-65 5-66 5-67 5-68 5-68 5-69 5-80

SECTION I – TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES 5-1. Patrols are missions to gather information or to conduct combat operations. The platoon must be proficient at conducting the five types of patrols: reconnaissance, security, combat, presence, and tracking. The leaders understanding of how and when to employ dismounted scouts will

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facilitate the successful accomplishment of any assigned reconnaissance and security task. A mission to conduct a patrol may be given to a team, section, squad, or the entire platoon. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 7 of this manual for a discussion of urban operations.)

TENETS 5-2. The following considerations are basic to the platoon’s understanding, planning, and execution for every patrol mission:

·

The platoon must plan and conduct the reconnaissance patrol in accordance with the fundamentals of reconnaissance outlined in Chapter 3 of this manual.

·

Based on the higher commander’s guidance and intent, the platoon leader must specify the following aspects of the patrol: n

The focus of the patrol. In most cases, this is the reconnaissance objective.

n

The tempo. This includes the level of planning and preparation (deliberate or hasty) and the methods and actions to be employed (stealthy or aggressive).

n

Engagement criteria, including applicable ROE and ROI.

·

The platoon must execute the patrol using the correct movement technique to prevent compromise of any patrol element. It must always maintain local security by using separate reconnaissance and security elements.

·

The platoon must take advantage of available resources (including TUAVs, GSR, FBCB2, and other enablers) to develop the situation prior to threat contact.

·

Threat contact is avoided unless specifically directed by the platoon leader. In such a situation, the platoon gains contact with its smallest element. Unexpected contact by reconnaissance elements is absolutely minimized.

·

Based on the higher commander’s intent and the platoon order, the platoon reports all critical and information requirements rapidly and accurately (by FM voice and/or FBCB2, as applicable).

·

The platoon can execute reconnaissance patrols to ensure the security of OPs and integrity of the platoon area of operations. For example, a section can send out a reconnaissance patrol after establishing an OP to check all locations from which the threat can observe the OP; this will ensure the OP position was not detected as it was occupied. When executed as part of a screen or other security mission, this type of patrol is referred to a security patrol.

·

The platoon accomplishes the assigned patrol mission within the timeline specified by the higher commander.

TROOP-LEADING STEPS IN DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS 5-3. When ordered to lead a patrol, the patrol leader follows the troopleading procedures discussed in Chapter 2 of this manual. The following

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______________________________________________________ Chapter 5 – Dismounted Operations

discussion focuses on how he can use the troop-leading process as a tool to make and carry out tactical decisions quickly and effectively. RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE MISSION 5-4. Orders come in two forms: written OPORDs and FRAGOs. Once an order is received, the first thing the patrol leader must do is clearly understand what is required to accomplish the mission. First, he looks at the order and jots down the tasks the commander told him to perform, such as conduct reconnaissance of a bridge; these are called specified tasks. Next, he identifies the tasks that must be done even though the commander did not tell him to do them, such as cross a stream and an open area en route to the patrol objective; these are called implied tasks. The patrol leader does not list tasks that are part of the SOP. He takes a hard look at the list of specified and implied tasks and puts a check mark by those tasks that must be done for the unit to accomplish its mission. These are called essential tasks. To identify these tasks accurately, the patrol leader must thoroughly understand the commander’s intent. He then restates the patrol mission in terms of WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, and WHY. ISSUE A WARNING ORDER 5-5. The patrol leader issues the warning order to all patrol members whenever possible or, at a minimum, to key members of the patrol. It should include the following:

·

Elements/personnel to whom the warning order is issued. This identifies the soldiers involved in the patrol and allows them to prepare for the operation.

·

The time and nature of the operation. This is a brief and clear statement of' what the patrol must accomplish. It may tell who, what, when, where, and why.

·

The earliest time of movement. This helps the patrol members prepare, inspect, and organize for movement by a specified time.

·

The time and place the OPORD will be issued.

5-6. The patrol leader also gives instructions to special purpose teams and key men so they can get ready for the patrol by taking such actions as preparing explosives, checking radios, and making a map study (point and compass men). MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN 5-7. Once the warning order is issued, the patrol leader selects a COA that will accomplish the assigned mission(s). To develop a COA, he must consider all the things that will influence his patrol’s ability to accomplish the mission. The primary influences on his decisions are the factors of METT-TC: the mission; the known or expected enemy (threat); terrain and weather; troops or combat power available; time available to plan, prepare, and execute the mission; and civilian considerations. 5-8. The plan should take into account how each aspect of METT-TC will influence the others regarding mission accomplishment. The patrol leader should give special consideration to the terrain the patrol must

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traverse, the threat forces it will pass near or through en route to its objective, the effects of extensive dismounted work on the scouts, and the amount of time available to conduct the mission. Patrol Time Schedule 5-9. A method the patrol leader uses to organize his time is to backplan from mission completion to the present time. This aids in mission planning and provides a schedule of events for all patrol members. An example of back-planning a time schedule is illustrated in Figure 5-1.

PATROL TIME SCHEDULE 0200 - Return Friendly Area 2330 - 0200 - Movement En Route 2300 - 2330 - Accomplish Mission, Reorganize 2230 - 2300 - Reconnaissance of Objective Area 2000 - 2230 - Movement En Route 2000 - Depart Friendly Area 1945 - 2000 - Movement to Departure Area 1930 - 1945 - Final Inspection 1845 - 1930 - Night Rehearsals 1800 - 1845 - Day Rehearsals 1745 - 1800 - Inspection 1700 - 1745 - Supper Meal 1515 - 1700 - Subunit Planning and Preparation 1445 - 1515 - Issue Operation Order 1400 - 1445 - Complete Detailed Plans 1315 - 1400 - Conduct Reconnaissance 1300 - 1315 - Issue Warning Order

Figure 5-1. Example Patrol Time Schedule (Back-Planning) Coordination 5-10. Patrols may act independently, may move beyond the direct fire support of the parent unit, and may operate forward of friendly units. As a consequence, their coordination effort must be thorough, detailed, and continuous throughout the planning and preparation phases. The patrol leader may perform coordination personally, or his superior may do it for him. Keeping in mind that the entire platoon may be tasked to patrol, the necessary coordination may be extensive. A checklist is a common tool used to ensure that all items of vital importance are covered. Times of Departure and Return 5-11. Times of departure and return are based on the amount of time needed to accomplish the following:

5-4


·

Reach the objective. This is determined by considering the distance, terrain, anticipated speed of movement, friendly and threat situation, and (if applicable) the time at or by which the mission must be accomplished.

·

Accomplish essential tasks in the objective area. This includes the leader’s reconnaissance and movement of elements and teams into position, as well as the accomplishment of the patrol’s mission.

·

Return to a friendly area. This may be difficult to determine because casualties, EPWs, or captured equipment may slow the patrol. The use of a different return route may change the time needed.

Primary and Alternate Routes 5-12. The patrol leader selects a primary route to and from the objective. The return route should be different from the route to the objective. The patrol leader also selects an alternate route that may be used either to or from the objective. The alternate route is used when the patrol has made contact with the threat on the primary route. It may also be used when the patrol leader knows or suspects that the patrol has been detected (see Figure 5-2).

Figure 5-2. Primary and Alternate Routes Routes Divided into Legs 5-13. Routes are divided into legs with each leg starting, if possible, at a point that can be recognized on the ground (see Figure 5-3). A pace count and azimuth are used between points. This makes it easier to stay oriented. When it is not possible to start and stop legs at recognizable points, a continuous pace count and azimuth may be used.

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Figure 5-3. Route Divided into Legs

Rally Points 5-14.

A rally point is a place where a patrol can conduct these actions:

· · ·

Temporarily halt to prepare to depart from friendly lines.

·

Temporarily halt to prepare to reenter friendly lines.

Reassemble and reorganize if dispersed during movement. Temporarily halt to reorganize and prepare for actions at an objective.

5-15. Types of Rally Points. The most common types of rally points are initial, en route, objective, reentry, and near side and far side rally points. Soldiers must know the rally point to which they are moving at each phase of the patrol mission. They should know what actions are required there and how long they are to wait at each rally point before moving to another. Rally point considerations include the following:

5-6

·

Initial rally point. An initial rally point is where a patrol may assemble and reorganize if it is dispersed or makes enemy contact before departing friendly lines or before reaching the first en route rally point. Located within friendly lines, the initial rally point is normally selected by the commander of the friendly unit.

·

En route rally point. An en route rally point is where a patrol rallies if dispersed en route to or from its objective. There may be several en route rally points along the patrol’s route between friendly lines and the objective. They are either planned or designated by the patrol leader en route every 100 to 400 meters (based on the terrain, vegetation, and visibility). When the leader designates a new en route rally point, the previously designated one goes into effect. This


precludes uncertainty over which one soldiers should move to if contact is made immediately after the leader designates a new rally point. There are three ways to designate an en route rally point:

·

n

Physically occupy the rally point for a short period. This is the preferred method.

n

Pass by the rally point at a distance and designate it using arm-and-hand signals.

n

Walk through the rally point and designate it using armand-hand signals.

Objective rally point. An ORP is where the patrol halts to prepare for actions on its objective. It is normally located in the direction that the platoon plans to move after completing its actions on the objective. The ORP must be located near the objective. At the same time, it must be out of sight and sound range of the objective area so that the patrol’s activities at the ORP will not be detected by the threat. It must also be out of small arms range of threat forces and far enough from the objective that it will not be overrun if the patrol is forced off the objective. The ORP is tentative until the objective is pinpointed. The patrol uses the ORP as a base for conducting the following actions: n

Reconnoiter the objective.

n

Issue a FRAGO.

n

Disseminate information from reconnaissance if contact was not made.

n

Make final preparations before continuing operations. These may include applying or replenishing camouflage; preparing demolitions; lining up rucksacks for quick recovery; preparing EPW bindings, first aid kits, and litters; and inspecting weapons.

n

Account for soldiers and equipment after actions on the objective are complete.

n

Reestablish the chain of command after actions on the objective are complete.

·

Reentry rally point. A reentry rally point is where a patrol halts to prepare to reenter friendly lines. It is located just short of friendly lines and out of sight, sound, and small arms range of friendly OPs. This also means that the reentry rally point should be outside the limit of FPF of the friendly unit. The patrol occupies the rally point as a security perimeter while it awaits reentry.

·

Near side and far side rally points. These rally points are established on the near and far side of danger areas. If the patrol makes contact while crossing the danger area and control is lost, soldiers on either side move to the rally point nearest them. They establish security, reestablish the chain of command, and determine their personnel and equipment status. They can then continue the patrol mission, link up at the ORP, or complete their last instructions.

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5-16. Rally Point Selection. The patrol leader should pick rally points either during the patrol or by a map study before the patrol. Those selected before the patrol begins are tentative and will remain so until confirmed on the ground. In selecting rally points, the patrol leader should look for locations with the following characteristics:

· · · · ·

Large enough for the patrol to assemble. Easily recognizable. Affording adequate cover and concealment. Defensible for a short time. Away from normal routes of troop movement and natural lines of drift (streams, ridges).

INITIATE MOVEMENT 5-17. The patrol leader may be required to direct the patrol to move once he issues his warning order and is making his plan. This movement may involve securing a passage point (PP) or moving to the SP. CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE 5-18. The patrol leader must make a map, ground, or aerial reconnaissance before completing his plan. This allows him to proof his tentative plan and get an idea of the ground he will initially traverse. He must keep an open mind during the reconnaissance; not everything he sees will match his tentative plan. COMPLETE THE PLAN 5-19. After the warning order has been issued, reconnaissance has been made, and patrol members are preparing themselves and their equipment, the patrol leader completes his plan. He first assigns essential tasks to be performed by elements and men in the objective area. After this, he plans and assigns tasks that will help the patrol reach the objective and return, such as navigation, security during movement and halts, actions at danger areas, actions on threat contact, and stream crossing. The following discussion focuses on additional planning considerations. Rations 5-20. The patrol leader must determine whether the men should carry rations. If so, he specifies the type and amount and where to get them. Weapons and Ammunition 5-21. This applies if there is something out of the ordinary that the patrol needs to bring, such as significant amounts of demolitions. Signals 5-22. The signals to be used on the patrol must be planned and rehearsed. Signals may be needed to lift or shift supporting fires, order withdrawal from the objective, signal “all clear,” stop and start movement of the patrol, and direct linkup of elements. Visual and audible signals

5-8


such as hand-and-arm signals, flares, voice, whistles, radios, and infrared equipment may be used. All patrol members must know the signals. Communications with Higher Headquarters 5-23. The plan must include retrans sites, the correct FBCB2 programming, radio call signs, primary and alternate frequencies, times to report, and codes. Challenge and Password 5-24. The challenge and password from the SOI should not be used by a patrol beyond the FEBA. The patrol leader may devise his own challenge and password system. 5-25. The platoon can use the odd-number system. If the patrol leader specifies 11 as the odd number, the challenge could be any number between 1 and 10. The password would be the number which, when added to the challenge, equals 11 (such as challenge 8, password 3). 5-26. The platoon leader can also designate a running password. This code alerts a unit that friendly soldiers are approaching in a less than organized manner and may be under pressure. This technique may be used to get soldiers quickly through a compromised passage of lines. The running password is followed by the number of soldiers approaching (Dogwood, 6); this prevents threat soldiers from joining the group in an attempt to penetrate friendly lines. Chain of Command 5-27. Everyone on the patrol must understand where he fits into the patrol or his element of the patrol. Location of Leaders 5-28. The locations of the patrol leader and assistant patrol leader are planned for all phases of the patrol during movement, at danger areas, and at the objective. These considerations apply:

·

The patrol leader plans to be where he can best control the patrol during each event.

·

The assistant patrol leader may have a specific job for each phase of the patrol. He may help the patrol leader control the patrol by being where he can best take command, if required.

·

Duties and responsibilities for the assistant patrol leader during actions on the objective area include these: n

Area reconnaissance in the ORP.

n

Zone reconnaissance with a reconnaissance element that has been directed to move to and establish the point at which all elements are to link up after completing the operation.

n

Combat patrol (raid or ambush). The assistant patrol leader normally controls the support element.

Patrol Organization 5-29. To accomplish the patrolling mission, a platoon or squad must perform specific tasks. Examples include providing security for itself or at danger area crossings or rally points; reconnoitering the patrol objective;

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and conducting breach, support, or assault operations. As with other missions, the leader tasks elements of his platoon in accordance with his estimate of the situation. He identifies those tasks the platoon must perform and decides which elements will perform them. If possible, the patrol leader should maintain squad and fire team integrity in assigning tasks. The chain of command continues to lead its elements during a patrol. 5-30. The basic patrol configuration includes a reconnaissance element and a security element. In turn, these elements are made of individual soldiers with specific roles, as well as subordinate and supporting groups known by the terms “element” and “team.” These refer to the squads, fire teams, or buddy teams that perform the common and specific elements for each type of patrol. Squads and fire teams may perform more than one task in an assigned sequence; others may perform only one task. The leader must plan carefully to ensure that he has identified and assigned all required tasks in the most efficient way. The following elements are common to all patrols:

5-10

·

Headquarters element. The headquarters consists of the platoon leader, PSG, and RTO. It may consist of any attachments that the platoon leader decides that he or the PSG must control directly, such as an FO.

·

Aid and litter team. Aid and litter teams treat and evacuate casualties.

·

EPW team. EPW teams are responsible for controlling prisoners in accordance with the “five-S” principles and the leader’s guidance. This team may also be the search team. If contact results in wounded and/or killed threat soldiers, this team searches those individuals for information and material they may have been carrying while the rest of the patrol provides security.

·

Surveillance team. The surveillance team keeps watch on the objective from the time that the leader’s reconnaissance ends until the unit deploys for actions on the objective. The members of the team then join their elements.

·

Point man. The point man selects the actual route through the terrain, guided by the compass man or patrol leader. In addition, he provides security to the front of the patrol.

·

En route recorder. The en route recorder records all information collected by the patrol.

·

Compass man. The compass man assists in navigation by ensuring that the lead fire team leader remains on course at all times. Instructions to the compass man must include an initial azimuth, with subsequent azimuths provided as necessary. The compass man should preset his compass on the initial azimuth before moving out, especially if the move will be during limited visibility conditions. The platoon or squad leader should also designate an alternate compass man.

·

Pace man. The pace man maintains an accurate pace at all times. The platoon or squad leader should designate how


often the pace man is to report the pace to him. The pace man should also report the pace at the end of each leg. The leader should designate an alternate pace man.

ISSUE THE ORDER 5-31. The order is issued in standard OPORD sequence. Terrain models or sketches are used to illustrate the plan. Sketches to show planned actions can be drawn in the sand, dirt, or snow. Figure 5-4 includes a sample format for a patrol order. It is organized in the standard fiveparagraph outline and includes examples of information that can be included. For detailed information on the annexes listed at the end of the patrol order, refer to Appendix A of this manual.

PATROL OPERATION ORDER Task Organization: Explain how the patrol is organized for the operation and confirm the composition of each element. Identify time(s) of attachment and detachment. If there is no change to the previous task organization, the patrol leader indicates that there is no change. 1. SITUATION. A.

Enemy Forces. (1) Weather and light data.

· · · ·

Precipitation. Temperature. Other weather conditions (such as wind, dust, or fog). Light data: BMNT:

_______.

Sunrise:

_______.

Sunset:

_______.

EENT:

_______.

Moonrise:

_______.

Percent Illumination:

·

Moonset:

_______.

_______.

How it will affect the patrol and threat forces.

(2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA).

· · · · · ·

Observation and fields of fire. Cover and concealment. Obstacles. Key terrain. Avenues of approach. How it will affect the patrol and threat forces.

(3) Enemy forces.

· · · ·

Identification, composition, disposition, and strength/weaknesses. Capabilities. Recent activities. Most probable course of action.

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·

Current/last known location (only those forces that pertain to the specific mission of the patrol).

Figure 5-4. Patrol Order B.

Friendly Forces (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

C.

Concept of the operation for the next higher unit. Location and mission of the units on the left, right, front, rear and supporting. Missions and routes of adjacent patrols. Unit(s) providing fire support. Mission and commander’s intent for the rest of the platoon (in the event the platoon has multiple missions).

Attachments and Detachments. Include any special personnel or elements (such as engineers, medics, linguists, FOs) who will accompany the patrol.

D.

Civilian Population.

· · · · ·

Culture. Political/government/religious. Factional allegiances. Factions/groups/organizations/terrorists. Restrictions and curfews.

2. MISSION. Include a clear and concise statement of the task and purpose, including the aspects of who, what (including type of patrol), when, where, and why. 3. EXECUTION. Commander’s Intent. A.

Concept of the Operation. (1) Commander’s focus, tempo, and engagement criteria. (2) In general terms, how the patrol will accomplish the mission.

B.

· · ·

Mission essential tasks and other critical tasks.

· ·

Maneuver.

· · ·

Intelligence.

Duration of the patrol. Scheme of maneuver and graphics, sequentially, as they will occur during the patrol (with simultaneous reference to a terrain board, dirt sketch, or map). Fires. Include team target overlay, with target numbers; who has priority of fires; use and/or availability of special purpose fires (such as smoke, illumination, or CAS); triggers; how and when fires will be used. Electronic warfare.

Engineering. Tasks to Maneuver Units. (1) Task and purpose of teams and sections. (2) Task and purpose of special teams and key individuals. (3) Task and purpose to support/attached personnel.

C.

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Coordinating Instructions.


(1) Actions at the objective. (2) Time line, covering the time sequence from issuance of the OPORD to actions at the objective. (3) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

Figure 5-4. Patrol Order (Continued)

(4) Movement techniques. (5) Primary route. (6) Alternate route. (7) Departure and reentry of friendly lines.

· · ·

Linkup time and location. Departure point.

Reentry point. (8) Rally points and actions at rally points. (9) Actions on contact (covering the eight forms of contact). (10) Actions at danger areas. (11) Actions at halts. (12) Debriefing time and place. (13) MOPP level, initiation time, and exposure guidance (in cGy). (14) Rehearsals (prioritized). (15) Inspections. (16) Equipment (including special equipment) needed to accomplish the mission. (17) Soldier safety. (18) Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response. (19) Annexes (air assault, airborne, stream crossing, vehicle movement, linkup, evasion and escape, hide site, cache). 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. A.

Supply. Include requirements for Classes I, III, V, and IX.

B.

Transportation.

C.

Personnel.

Include location and route of mounted elements of the platoon. (1) Procedures for handling EPWs and captured documents and equipment. (2) MEDEVAC/CASEVAC procedures. (3) Personnel replacement (alternate team members or assignment changes based on the loss of personnel). D.

Civil/military restrictions. (1) Curfews. (2) Collateral damage restrictions. (3) Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. A.

Command. (1) Curfews.

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(2) Locations of patrol leader and assistant patrol leader. (3) Location of next higher commander. (4) Succession of command.

Figure 5-4. Patrol Order (Continued)

B.

Signal. (1) Time zone used and time synchronization criteria. (2) SOI and matrix used. (3) Key hand-and-arm signals. (4) Code words and reports. (5) Times when radio listening silence is in affect. (6) Alternate frequencies and time or condition for changing frequency. (7) Challenge and password (regular, forward of friendly lines, running). (8) Electronic protection. (9) Visual and pyrotechnic signals (alternate means of control, emergency signaling).

ANNEXES A.

Air Assault and Airborne.

B.

Stream Crossing.

C.

Vehicle Movement.

D.

Evasion and Escape.

E.

Linkup.

F.

Rest Overnight, Hide Site, Surveillance Site.

G. Cache Site.

Figure 5-4. Patrol Order (Continued) SUPERVISE AND REFINE 5-32. Rehearsals and inspections are vital to proper preparation. They must be well planned and conducted even though the men are experienced in patrolling. Coordination is made with the commander or S3 for use of a rehearsal area resembling the objective area. Inspections determine the patrol’s physical and mental state of readiness. Inspections before rehearsals ensure uniforms and equipment are complete and correct. Each soldier is questioned to ensure that he knows the following:

· · · ·

The plan. What he is to do and when he is to do it. What others are to do. Challenges and passwords, signals, codes, radio call signs, frequencies, and reporting times.

5-33. Rehearsals help to ensure the proficiency of the patrol. They let the patrol leader check plans and make any needed changes. The

5-14


suitability of equipment is verified. It is through well-directed rehearsals that soldiers become familiar with their actions and responsibilities during the patrol. 5-34. If the patrol is to be at night, it is advisable to have both day and night rehearsals. Terrain similar to that over which the patrol will operate should be used. All actions are rehearsed when time permits. When time is short, only the most critical actions are rehearsed. Actions on the objective area are the most critical and should always be rehearsed. 5-35. A good way to rehearse is to have the patrol leader walk and talk the whole patrol through each action. He describes the actions of elements, teams, and men and has them perform these actions. In this “dry run,” patrol members take their positions in formations at reduced distances. This can all be done with little or no distance separation so the soldiers get the “feel” of the patrol. When the different actions are clear to the patrol members, a complete rehearsal, at full speed, is conducted with the whole patrol. This is a “wet run.” As many “dry runs” and “wet runs” are conducted as are necessary to gain proficiency. When possible, element and team leaders rehearse their units separately before the final rehearsal of the entire patrol. Supervision is continuous by all leaders. 5-36. An inspection after the final rehearsal and just before departure ensures that all equipment is still working, that nothing is being left behind, and that each member of the patrol is ready.

SECTION II – PATROLLING TASKS 5-37. Scouts who work dismounted must know a variety of tasks that are slightly different from the tasks they perform during mounted operations. Although not every patrol requires the same tasks, those discussed here are common to most patrols.

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES 5-38. The selection of a movement technique is based on METT-TC. Factors to consider for each technique are control, dispersion, speed, and security. Movement techniques are not fixed formations. They refer to the distances between soldiers, teams, and squads that vary based on mission, enemy, terrain, visibility, and any other factor that affects control. Soldiers must be able to see their patrol leaders, and the patrol leader should be able to see his leaders. Leaders should control movement with arm-and-hand signals and use radios only when needed. FUNDAMENTALS OF MOVEMENT Ensure that Patrol Members Can Navigate 5-39. Preparations are worthless if the patrol cannot find the objective in time or if the patrol is compromised by enemy contact during movement. Always plan to use a compass and pace man on a patrol. (NOTE: The element point man must not be tasked to perform compass

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or pace duties. The point man’s sole responsibility is forward security for the element.) Avoid Detection 5-40. Patrols must use stealth and the cover and concealment of the terrain to its maximum advantage. Whenever possible, move during limited visibility to maximize technological advantages gained by night vision devices and to hinder the enemy’s ability to detect the patrol. Exploit the enemy’s weaknesses, and attempt to time movements to coincide with other operations that will distract the enemy. Maintain Constant Security 5-41. Always maintain 360-degree security. The patrol must constantly use both active and passive security measures. Give elements or individual soldiers responsibility for security en route, at danger areas, at patrol bases, and most importantly, in the objective area. Plan for Use of Support Fires 5-42. Patrol leaders must plan for fire support (artillery, tactical air, attack helicopter, NGF) even if they think it may not be needed during movement. Use Appropriate Movement Techniques 5-43. The enemy situation determines which of the three movement techniques will be used: traveling (when contact is not likely), traveling overwatch (when contact is possible), or bounding overwatch (when contact is expected). When manpower allows more than one team, the patrol will usually move in traveling overwatch. Vary movement techniques to meet changing situations. Maintain Dispersion in Open Terrain 5-44. When enemy contact is possible and manpower permits, have one team well forward and overwatch it with a security team. Assign duties for the movement. Security teams maintain visual contact, but the distance between them is such that the entire patrol does not become engaged if contact is made. Patrols can spread their formations as necessary to gain better observation to the flanks. Although widely spaced, men must retain their relative position when in a wedge formation. Only in extreme situations should the file formation be used in the open Assign Responsibilities and Positions 5-45. The lead elements must secure the front along with assuming responsibility for navigation. For a long movement, the platoon leader may rotate the lead squad’s responsibilities. The elements in the rear are charged with rear security. Leaders should move inside the formation where they can best maintain control of the patrol. Use Control Measures 5-46. During movement, leaders use control measures (such as head counts, rally points, or phase lines) to maintain the patrol’s effectiveness and security. Plan for Effective Contact

5-16


5-47. Leaders maneuver the patrol to ensure that enemy contact is made with the smallest element possible. MOVEMENT FORMATIONS 5-48.

Figures 5-5 through 5-8 illustrate patrol movement formations.

Figure 5-5. File Formation

Figure 5-6. Diamond Formation

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Figure 5-7. Alternate Diamond Formation

Figure 5-8. Four-Man Diamond Formation

SECURITY HALTS 5-49. During short halts, team members drop on one knee, face out, and freeze in place. The security halt should not exceed five minutes. If the halt exceeds five minutes, the team should move to the prone position. For extended halts, team members may sit with their feet facing outward and shoulders touching (see Figures 5-9 and 5-10). This aids quick and quiet communication, and guarantees all-round security at all times. This technique offers the smallest signature, and it is the most difficult to detect and is best used in dense vegetation.

5-18


Figure 5-9. Security/Extended Halt

Figure 5-10. Security/Extended Halt (Four-Man)

DEPARTURE FROM FRIENDLY LINES 5-50. The departure from friendly lines must be thoroughly planned and coordinated using considerations outlined in the following discussion. PLANNING 5-51. In his plan for the departure of friendly lines, the leader should consider the following sequence of actions:

· · · · ·

Make contact with friendly guides at the contact point. Move to the coordinated initial rally point. Complete final coordination. Move to and through the passage point. Establish a location for a security-listening halt beyond the friendly unit’s limit of FPF.

COORDINATION 5-52. The platoon leader must coordinate with the commander of the forward unit and the leaders of other units that will be patrolling in the same or adjacent areas. The coordination includes SOI information, signal plan, fire plan, running password, procedures for departure from and reentry to friendly lines, departure and reentry points, dismount points, initial rally points, and information about the threat. The following actions take place:

·

The platoon leader provides the forward unit leader with unit identification, size of the patrol, departure and return times, and information on the area of operations.

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·

The forward unit leader provides the platoon leader with the following: n

Additional information on terrain.

n

Known or suspected threat positions.

n

Likely threat ambush sites.

n

Latest threat activity.

n

Detailed information on friendly positions and obstacle locations. This includes the location of OPs.

n

Friendly unit fire plan.

n

Support that the unit can provide, such as fire support, litter teams, guides, communications, and reaction force.

EXECUTION 5-53. The platoon should remain in single file. The PSG, or the patrol equivalent (such as assistant patrol leader), follows directly behind the guide so he can count each soldier who passes through the PP. He gives the count to the guide, tells him how long to wait at the PP (or when to return), and confirms the running password. If the platoon makes contact after it is past the departure point, it fights through. Soldiers return to the departure point only if they become disorganized. They then reoccupy the initial rally point, and the leader reports to higher headquarters.

USE OF RALLY POINTS 5-54. The patrol leader plans for the use and locations of rally points. As noted, a rally point is a place designated by the leader where the platoon moves to reassemble and reorganize if it becomes dispersed. Refer to the discussion of the types and characteristics of rally points earlier in this section. OCCUPATION OF AN ORP BY A SQUAD 5-55. In planning the occupation of an ORP (see Figure 5-11), the squad leader considers the following sequence:

·

Halt beyond sight, sound, and small-arms weapons range of the tentative ORP (200 to 400 meters in good visibility; 100 to 200 meters in limited visibility).

· ·

Position security elements.

·

Position the Team A soldier at 12 o’clock and the Team B soldier at 6 o’clock in the ORP. Issue them a contingency plan and return with the compass man.

·

Lead the squad into the ORP. Position Team A from 9 to 3 o’clock and Team B from 3 to 9 o’clock.

Move forward with a compass man and one member of each fire team to confirm the location of the ORP and determine its suitability. Issue a five-point contingency plan before departure.

NOTE: The squad may also occupy the ORP by force. This requires more precise navigation, but eliminates separating the squad.

5-20


OCCUPATION OF AN ORP BY A PLATOON 5-56. In planning the occupation of an ORP, the platoon leader should consider a sequence similar to that outlined for a squad (see Figure 5-11). He brings a soldier from each squad on his reconnaissance of the ORP and positions them at the 10, 2, and 6 o’clock positions. The first squad in the order of march establishes the base leg (10 to 2 o’clock). The trailing squads occupy from 2 to 6 o’clock and 6 to 10 o’clock.

Figure 5-11. Occupation of an Objective Rally Point

CONTINGENCY PLANS 5-57. The patrol leader leaves the main patrol body for many reasons throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of the mission. One of these departures, conducted after the ORP is occupied and secure, is the leader’s reconnaissance by the patrol leader, compass man, and element leaders. The assistant patrol leader remains in the ORP. Before the patrol leader departs, he issues a five-point contingency plan. 5-58. The contingency plan covers the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY by covering the following points:

· ·

Who the leader will be taking with him.

· · ·

When the leader is leaving and how long he will be gone.

What actions are taken if the leader fails to return and the actions of the unit and the leader on chance contact while the leader is gone. Where the leader is going (to include routes there and back). Why the leader is leaving (his mission).

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5-59. Consideration must always be given to the possibility of an element becoming separated from the rest of the patrol. Refer to ST 320.983 for a discussion of SERE situations and techniques.

LEADER’S RECONNAISSANCE 5-60. The plan must include a leader’s reconnaissance of the objective once the platoon or squad establishes the ORP. During his reconnaissance, the leader pinpoints the objective; selects positions for his squads and teams; and adjusts his plan based on his observation of the objective. Each type of patrol requires different tasks during the leader’s reconnaissance, and the leader will take different elements with him depending on the patrol’s mission. The leader must plan for adequate time to return to the ORP, complete his plan, disseminate information, issue orders and instructions, and allow his squads to make any additional preparations.

REENTRY TO FRIENDLY LINES 5-61. The patrol leader’s initial planning and coordination must include the reentry of friendly lines. He should consider a sequence for this process similar to the one covered in the following discussion. (NOTE: This example is for a patrol conducted by a platoon.)

WARNING Reentry of friendly lines at night is dangerous and should only be attempted when it is essential to the success of the patrol. 5-62. The platoon halts in the reentry rally point (RRP) and establishes security. The platoon leader communicates the code word advising the friendly unit of patrol’s location and that it is ready to return. The friendly unit must acknowledge the message and confirm that guides are waiting before the platoon moves from the RRP. 5-63. If digital/radio communications are not possible, the platoon leader, radiotelephone operator (RTO), and a two-man security element (buddy team) move forward and attempt to contact an OP using the challenge and password. The OP notifies the friendly unit that the platoon is ready to return and requests a guide. 5-64. If the platoon leader cannot find an OP, he moves with the RTO and security element to locate the coordinated reentry point. He must move straight toward (and away from) friendly lines, never parallel to them. All lateral movement should be outside small-arms weapons range. NOTE: The platoon leader should only attempt this procedure during daylight. At night he should use other backup signals to make contact with friendly units. The preferred method is to wait until daylight if contact with the friendly unit cannot be made as planned.

5-22


5-65. Once the friendly unit acknowledges the return of the platoon, the platoon leader issues a five-point contingency plan and moves with his RTO and security element on a determined azimuth and pace to the reentry point. The platoon leader uses far and near recognition signals to establish contact with the guide. 5-66. The platoon leader signals the platoon forward (radio) or returns and leads it to the reentry point. He may post the security element with the guide at the threat side of the reentry point. The PSG counts and identifies each soldier as he passes through the reentry point. The guide leads the platoon to the assembly area. 5-67. The platoon leader reports to the CP of the friendly unit. He tells the commander everything of tactical value concerning the friendly unit’s area of responsibility. The platoon leader rejoins the platoon in the assembly area and leads it to a secure area for debriefing.

DEBRIEFING 5-68. Immediately after the patrol element (platoon or squad) returns, personnel from higher headquarters conduct a thorough debriefing. This may include all members of the patrol or the leaders, RTOs, and any attached personnel. Normally the debriefing is oral. Sometimes a written report is required. Refer to Appendix J of this manual for a sample debriefing format for the reconnaissance platoon. NATO forces use the patrol report form specified by STANAG 2003.

ACTIONS AT DANGER AREAS 5-69. A danger area is an area that increases the chance of detection or a direct fire engagement. When moving, the patrol tries to avoid danger areas. Typical danger areas are the following:

· · · · ·

Known threat positions. Roads and trails. Streams. Open areas. Urban environments.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 5-70. Specific plans are made before crossing danger areas. These plans are very similar to actions taken during mounted operations; however, they require more practice and rehearsal because a dismounted patrol does not have the same mobility, protection, and firepower to extract itself should it encounter a threat. In addition, general plans are made for crossing unexpected danger areas; these can be modified quickly to fit the situation. 5-71. The patrol uses bounding overwatch or variations of it to cross a danger area. The leader designates procedures the patrol will use based on the time available, the size of the patrol, the size of the danger area, the fields of fire into the area, and the amount of security he can post. A small patrol may cross all at once, in pairs, or one man at a time. A large patrol normally crosses its subordinate elements one at a time. As each

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element crosses, it moves to an overwatch position or to the far side rally point until told to continue movement. 5-72.

To cross a danger area, a patrol must take these actions:

· · · ·

Designate near side and far side rally points. Secure the near side. Secure the far side. Cross the danger area.

5-73. Securing the near side may involve nothing more than observing it. In some places, however, it may involve posting security teams far enough out on both flanks and to the rear of the crossing point to give warning of an approaching threat and to overwatch the crossing of the rest of the patrol (see Figure 5-12).

Figure 5-12. Securing the Near Side of a Danger Area 5-74. Once flank and rear security elements are positioned, the danger area is quickly crossed by a team that then reconnoiters and secures the far side (see Figure 5-13). The area secured on the far side must be large enough for the entire patrol to deploy. When the team leader is sure the far side is safe, he sends two men back to signal the rest of the patrol to cross. When the patrol has crossed the danger area, the security teams cross and rejoin the patrol (see Figure 5-14).

5-24


Figure 5-13. Securing the Far Side of a Danger Area

Figure 5-14. Crossing the Danger Area SCROLL TO THE ROAD TECHNIQUE 5-75. The lead team member identifies the danger area and moves across, placing his left or right shoulder toward the danger area (see Figure 5-15). The second team member faces in the opposite direction from the lead team member. This gives security in both directions. Each member crosses in the same manner.

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Figure 5-15. Scroll to the Road Technique

SMALL OPEN AREA TECHNIQUE 5-76. When crossing a small open area, the team uses the contour or detour bypass method (see Figure 5-16). They avoid crossing directly through the open area, if possible.

Figure 5-16. Crossing a Small Open Area

5-26


SECTION III – ACTIONS ON CONTACT 5-77. Unless required by the mission, the patrol avoids threat contact. If it makes unexpected contact with a threat, it must quickly break contact so it can continue its mission. The leader’s plan must address actions on chance contact during each event of the mission. The patrol’s ability to continue the mission will depend on how early contact is made, whether the patrol is able to break contact successfully (so that its subsequent direction of movement is undetected), and whether the patrol suffers any casualties as a result of the contact. The plan must address the handling of soldiers who are seriously wounded in action (WIA) and killed in action (KIA) and the handling of prisoners who are captured as a result of chance contact and are not part of the planned mission.

BATTLE DRILLS 5-78. Well-rehearsed battle drills are critical to the success of a dismounted team. The team is lightly armed with a limited supply of ammunition and can expect little or no fire support. If indirect fires are precoordinated, they should be maximized while breaking contact. An immediate suppression fire mission on a near target from the target overlay may support the team breaking contact; then, once in a covered and concealed position, adjusted fire missions may be executed against the enemy. Indirect fires should be considered whenever breaking contact, emphasizing the need for thorough fire support planning. BREAK CONTACT 5-79. The team breaks contact as soon as possible because it lacks the assets to stay and fight. METT-TC determines which drill is executed. Break Contact (Front) 5-80. The team executes fire and movement by two- or three-man teams until contact with the enemy is broken. When contacted from the front, the senior observer and another observer return fire with one full magazine each. An observer and the team leader move to a position to provide support for the withdrawal of the senior observer and observer. Once the senior observer and observer have fired a complete magazine, team leader and observer begin firing, covering the withdrawal of the senior observer and observer to the next firing position. The process of fire and movement continues until contact is broken (see Figures 5-17 and 5-18). The RTO and assistant team leader may place a Claymore with a time-delay fuze to slow the enemy. It is placed in the position where the RTO was when the team began the break contact drill. When using a Claymore mine in a battle drill, the mine is dual-primed (electrically and time-delay fuze).

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Figure 5-17. Break Contact (Front)

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Figure 5-18. Break Contact (Front; Four-Man) Break Contact Using Australian Peel (Front or Rear) 5-81. The Australian peel is a method to break contact from the front or rear. This technique, which should be executed as a battle drill, is most effective while the team is in a file formation, where the vegetation is dense, or during limited visibility. The second through the sixth team members take one or two steps to the left or right, depending on the terrain. One member at a time passes back through the formation (see Figure 5-19). 5-82. Front Contact. When contact occurs from the front, the first member fires a full magazine (automatic or burst). Every other member does the same, one at a time. Each member waits until the member in front of him is even with him or on his left or right before firing a weapon. Individuals move straight back through the inside of the formation, avoiding masking the fires of the members providing covering fire. The assistant team leader or the last member throws a hand grenade (fragmentary). During limited visibility, the battle drill may be executed without firing weapons. In this event, the battle drill is still executed in the same sequence. Upon completion of the first iteration, the team can emplace a Claymore mine with a time-delay fuze to slow the enemy. The team initiates fires only if it has been compromised. If the enemy element breaks contact and ceases fire, the team should cease fire immediately to prevent revealing their new position.

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5-83. Rear Contact. If contact occurs from the rear, the Australian peel technique is executed in the reverse sequence. The first member is the last to throw a hand grenade (fragmentary). Once the drill is completed, the team moves to the designated rally point.

Figure 5-19. Break Contact (Front; Using Australian Peel) Break Contact (Left or Right) 5-84. If a patrol finds itself in a threat ambush, it must get out of the kill zone or face destruction. Team members in the kill zone, without order or signal, immediately return fire, throw smoke, and move quickly out of the kill zone by the safest route (refer to Figures 5-20 and 5-21). There is no set procedure for this; each man must decide the best way for his situation. For inferior-sized enemy force, a team may assault through a near ambush. Soldiers not in the kill zone fire to support the withdrawal or hasty assault of the men in the kill zone.

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Figure 5-20. Break Contact (Left or Right)

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Figure 5-21. Break Contact (Left or Right; Four-Man) REACT TO AIR ATTACK 5-85. The first soldier who hears or sees an aircraft signals, “FREEZE.” The first soldier who sees an attacking aircraft alerts the patrol: “AIRCRAFT, FRONT (LEFT, RIGHT, OR REAR).” Each soldier hits the ground, using available cover, and returns fire. Between attacks, the team should seek better cover and concealment. If the team leader wants the team to move out of the area, he gives the clock direction and distance. See Figure 5-22.

Figure 5-22. React to Air Attack REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE 5-86. Upon receiving indirect fire, the team deploys and takes cover. If more rounds impact, the team leader gives the clock position and the direction and distance to move. The team consolidates while moving or at a distance given by team leader. The team may elect to move to the last rally point or as otherwise directed by the team leader (see Figure 5-23).

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Figure 5-23. React to Indirect Fire or Air Attack REACT TO FLARES 5-87. If the team encounters flares, it should execute the following actions:

·

Ground flares. The team moves out of the illuminated area and takes cover. Each soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night vision.

·

Overhead flare with warning. The team assumes a prone position (behind concealment, when available) before the flare bursts. Each soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night vision.

·

Overhead flare without warning. The team gets into a prone position, making the most use of nearby cover, concealment, and shadows until the flare burns out. Each soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night vision.

REACT TO SNIPER FIRE 5-88. If the patrol comes under sniper fire, it immediately returns fire in the direction of the sniper. The patrol then conducts fire and maneuver to break contact with the sniper. FREEZE 5-89. This immediate action drill is used when a patrol, not yet seen by the threat, observes the threat and does not have time to take any other action. All patrol members remain still until signaled to continue or take another action as directed.

METHODS OF HANDLING CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS 5-90. Major tactical challenges may arise if members of the patrol are WIA or KIA or the patrol encounters EPWs. Specific methods for

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handling such situations must be established prior to the patrol’s departure. All patrol members must know what to do in each case. HANDLING OF WIAs 5-91. The methods used for handling WIAs must not jeopardize the mission. If patrol members become wounded during an engagement, they are removed from the immediate area and given buddy-aid. 5-92.

5-93.

Walking wounded may be handled in the following ways:

·

They can be evacuated by air. This is generally practical only when the patrol is returning to friendly areas.

· ·

They can accompany the patrol.

·

They can return to friendly areas. Another soldier should accompany the casualty.

They can conceal themselves for later pickup. Another soldier should remain with the wounded soldier.

Seriously wounded may be handled in the following ways:

· ·

They can be evacuated by air, when available. They can be concealed for later pickup. Another soldier should be left with the wounded soldier.

HANDLING OF KIAs 5-94. KIAs may be handled in the same way as the seriously wounded, except that no one is left with the concealed remains. The grid location of the remains is confirmed and is marked for later pickup. HANDLING OF EPWs 5-95. EPWs are processed and handled in accordance with the “five-S” procedures (search, segregate, silence, speed, and safeguard). They may be taken under guard to a friendly area, or they may be evacuated by air, taken with the patrol, or concealed for later pickup. (NOTE: See Chapter 8 of this manual for a discussion of EPW handling, including the “five-S” procedures.)

SECTION IV – TYPES OF PATROLS 5-96. This discussion focuses on the two primary types of patrols employed by the reconnaissance platoon: reconnaissance and security. It also includes details of procedures for combat patrols (including raids), presence patrols, and tracking patrols, although these are relatively rare assignments for the reconnaissance platoon.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROL 5-97. Reconnaissance patrols provide timely and accurate information about the threat and terrain. The patrol leader must have specific intelligence collection requirements for each mission. For example, a

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reconnaissance patrol objective might be a small mounted avenue of approach that the platoon does not have assets to cover continuously. For a more detailed discussion of reconnaissance, refer to Chapter 3 of this manual. TYPES OF RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS 5-98. The following discussion covers the three main types of reconnaissance patrols. Area Reconnaissance Patrol 5-99. In conducting an area reconnaissance, the patrol uses a series of surveillance and vantage points around the objective. This type of patrol is conducted to obtain information about a specific location (such as a road junction, hill, bridge, or threat position) and the area immediately around it. The location of the objective is designated either by grid coordinates or by a map overlay with a boundary line encircling the area. The reconnaissance platoon normally sends a squad or section on an area patrol. In rare cases, the entire platoon may be required to conduct reconnaissance of a large area. Zone Reconnaissance Patrol 5-100. This patrol is conducted to obtain information on all threat forces, terrain, and routes within a specific zone. The zone is defined by boundaries. Route Reconnaissance Patrol 5-101. This patrol focuses on obtaining information on one route and adjacent terrain or on locating sites for friendly obstacles. Reconnaissance is oriented on a road; on a narrow axis, such as an infiltration lane; or on a general direction of attack. The route reconnaissance patrol provides detailed information on trafficability, threat activity, NBC contamination, and the adjacent terrain from the viewpoint of both threat and friendly forces. The preferred method for conducting a route reconnaissance is the fan method, described later in this section. The patrol leader must ensure that the fans are extensive enough to cover intersecting routes beyond direct fire range of the main route. If all or part of the proposed route is a road, the patrol leader must treat the road as a danger area. If possible, the platoon should move parallel to the road using a covered and concealed route. As necessary, reconnaissance and security teams move close to the road to reconnoiter key areas and provide local security for reconnaissance teams and the patrol main body. RECONNAISSANCE PATROL PROCEDURES 5-102. Before occupying the ORP, the patrol conducts the leader’s reconnaissance to ensure that no threat forces are in the area. Once this reconnaissance is completed, the patrol is signaled to move forward; it halts at the ORP and establishes security. The patrol leader and element leaders conduct a leader’s reconnaissance of the objective to confirm the plan and then return to the ORP. The security element departs the ORP before the reconnaissance element. The security element leader positions security teams at the ORP and on likely threat avenues of approach leading into the objective area (as shown in Figure 5-24).

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Figure 5-24. Area Reconnaissance Using Separate Reconnaissance and Security Elements 5-103. Once the security teams are in position, the reconnaissance element departs the ORP, moving to several surveillance/vantage points around the objective. The reconnaissance element leader may decide to have a small reconnaissance team move to each surveillance/vantage point instead of having the entire element move as a unit from point to point. Once the objective has been reconnoitered, the elements return to the ORP. The patrol leader collects information from the reconnaissance element, report pertinent information higher, and disseminates any required information within the patrol itself. The patrol then returns to friendly lines. 5-104. The terrain may not allow the patrol to secure the objective area. In this case, the patrol leader leaves a security team in the ORP and combines his reconnaissance and security elements into several reconnaissance and security teams (known as R&S teams) to reconnoiter the objective. These teams move to different surveillance/vantage points, from which they reconnoiter the objective. Once the objective has been reconnoitered, the teams return to the ORP and report the information. The patrol then returns to friendly lines (see Figure 5-25).

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Figure 5-25. Using Combined Reconnaissance and Security Teams to Reconnoiter the Objective DISTANCE FACTORS 5-105. A reconnaissance patrol can execute either long-range or shortrange observation or surveillance of the objective. The following paragraphs examine factors that influence the distance at which the reconnaissance is conducted. Long-Range Observation/Surveillance 5-106. Whenever METT-TC permits the required information to be gathered from a distance, the patrol executes long-range observation or surveillance of the objective from an OP. The OP must be far enough from the objective to be outside threat small arms range and local security measures. 5-107. Since the patrol does not move in close enough to be detected, long-range observation is the more desirable method for executing reconnaissance. If the threat forces discover the patrol, friendly direct and indirect fires can be employed on the objective without endangering the patrol. 5-108. When information cannot be gathered from only one OP, multiple OPs may be used. This is accomplished by squad-size reconnaissance patrols. The OPs must use available cover and concealment and have an unrestricted view of the objective. Short-Range Observation/Surveillance 5-109. If it cannot obtain the required information by observing from a distance, the patrol moves closer to the objective. Short-range observation or surveillance is the technique of watching an objective from a position that is within the range of threat local security measures and small arms fire. 5-110. This method can be executed by the platoon as a whole or by an individual section or squad. When the entire platoon is taking part in a

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short-range observation operation, the reconnoitered must be clearly defined.

routes

and

area

to

be

RECONNAISSANCE METHODS 5-111. Depending on the situation and patrol requirements, the patrol leader has a choice of several reconnaissance methods, which are described in the following discussion. Fan Method 5-112. In this method, the patrol leader first selects a series of ORPs throughout the zone from which to operate. When the patrol arrives at the first ORP, it halts and establishes security. The patrol leader then selects reconnaissance routes out from and back to the ORP, forming a fan-shaped pattern around the ORP. The routes must overlap to ensure that the entire area is reconnoitered. 5-113. The patrol leader then sends out reconnaissance elements along the routes. He does not send out all of his elements at once, keeping a small reserve in the ORP. (For example, if the patrol has three reconnaissance elements, only two are sent out. The other is kept as a reserve or quick reaction force). The patrol leader sends the elements out on adjacent routes. This keeps the patrol from making contact in two different directions. After the entire area (fan) has been reconnoitered, the patrol leader reports the information. The patrol then moves to the next ORP, and the fan process is repeated (see Figure 5-26).

Figure 5-26. Fan Reconnaissance Method Box Method 5-114. The leader sends his reconnaissance and security teams from the ORP along routes that form a boxed-in area. He sends other teams along routes through the area within the box. All teams meet at a linkup point at the far side of the box from the ORP (as shown in Figure 5-27).

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Figure 5-27. Box Reconnaissance Method Converging Routes Method 5-115. The patrol leader first selects an ORP and then reconnaissance routes out from the ORP to a rendezvous point, at which patrol members will link up after completing the reconnaissance. Once the patrol arrives at the ORP, it halts and establishes security. The patrol leader designates the following:

· ·

The element that will handle each reconnaissance route. A linkup time at the rendezvous point.

5-116. Each reconnaissance element reconnoiters its designated route, normally using the fan method. The patrol leader usually moves with the center element. The entire patrol links up at the rendezvous point at the designated time. The rendezvous point is secured in the same way as the ORP. The patrol reports its information at the rendezvous point, then returns to friendly lines (see Figure 5-28).

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Figure 5-28. Converging Routes Reconnaissance Method Successive Sector Method 5-117. This method is basically a continuation of the converging routes method. The patrol leader selects an initial ORP and a series of reconnaissance routes and rendezvous points. The actions of the patrol from each ORP to each rendezvous point are the same as in the converging routes method. Each rendezvous point becomes the ORP for the next phase. When the patrol links up at a rendezvous point, the patrol leader confirms the designated reconnaissance routes and the next rendezvous point and designates a linkup time. This sequence continues until the reconnaissance is complete. The patrol then returns to friendly lines (see Figure 5-29).

Figure 5-29. Successive Sector Reconnaissance Method

SECURITY PATROL 5-118. The reconnaissance platoon conducts security patrols to prevent threat infiltration of a screen or an assembly area (see Figure 5-30). These patrols reconnoiter areas through which threat units may pass and the routes they would use. The patrols prevent infiltration and surprise attacks on stationary units by screening their front or flanks and by reconnoitering gaps between OPs and around their positions. A reconnaissance squad normally conducts a security patrol. The platoon may be tasked to provide several squads to patrol and secure an area for a battalion task force. The patrol leader picks a series of objectives in the area in which the patrol must reconnoiter. The patrol moves from objective to objective until the area has been reconnoitered. The intention of the security patrol is to destroy or capture threat dismounted troops. If the patrol makes contact, it reports to the commander and attacks or withdraws according to the commander’s instructions.

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Figure 5-30. Integration of Patrols into a Screen

COMBAT PATROL 5-119. Combat patrols are a rare assignment for the reconnaissance platoon, but they may be employed during a counterreconnaissance mission. Combat patrols are generally categorized into two types of missions: an ambush or a raid. They are generally conducted for the following reasons:

· · · ·

Capture threat soldiers. Capture threat equipment. Harass threat forces. Destroy threat soldiers, installations, or facilities.

5-120. Even though the primary mission of the reconnaissance platoon is to conduct stealthy reconnaissance and surveillance, a thorough understanding of the TTP involved in a combat patrol is essential. Certain situations may require the platoon, or elements of the platoon, to conduct a combat patrol. For example, one section might conduct a hasty ambush to assist another section in breaking contact. Another case may involve the platoon conducting a raid to capture specific threat personnel. Some specific considerations for both ambushes and raids are included in this discussion. ORGANIZATION 5-121. Besides the common elements (discussed in the discussion of patrol organization earlier in this section), combat patrols also have the elements and teams covered in the following paragraphs. Assault Element 5-122. The assault element seizes and secures the objective and protects special teams as they complete their assigned actions on the objective. Security Element 5-123. The security element provides security at danger areas, secures the ORP, isolates the objective, and supports the withdrawal of the rest of

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the platoon once it completes its assigned actions on the objective. The security element may have separate security teams, each with an assigned task or sequence of tasks. Support Element 5-124. The support element provides direct fire support and may control indirect fires for the platoon. Breach Element 5-125. The breach element breaches the threat’s obstacles when required. Demolition Team 5-126. Demolition teams are responsible for preparing and exploding the charges to destroy equipment, vehicles, or facilities on the objective. Search Team 5-127. The assault element may comprise two-man (buddy teams) or four-man (fire team) search teams to search bunkers, buildings, or tunnels on the objective. These teams may also search the objective or kill zone for casualties, documents, or equipment. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS 5-128. Normally the platoon headquarters element controls the platoon on a combat patrol mission. The platoon leader must make every attempt to maintain squad and fire team integrity as he assigns tasks to subordinate units. 5-129. The platoon leader must consider the requirements for assaulting the objective, supporting the assault by fire, and securing the platoon throughout the mission. These factors include the following:

·

For the assault on the objective, the leader must consider the required actions on the objective, the size of the objective, and the known or presumed strength and disposition of the threat on and near the objective.

·

The leader must consider the weapons available and the type and volume of fires required to provide fire support for the assault on the objective.

·

The leader must consider the requirement to secure the platoon at points along the route, at danger areas, at the ORP, along threat avenues of approach into the objective, and elsewhere during the mission.

5-130. The platoon leader must assign additional tasks to his squads for demolition, search of threat KIAs, search and guarding of EPWs, treatment and evacuation (litter teams) of friendly casualties, and other tasks required for successful completion of the patrol mission. He must also determine who will control any attachments of skilled personnel or special equipment. LEADER’S RECONNAISSANCE OF THE OBJECTIVE 5-131. In a combat patrol, the platoon leader must take into account several additional considerations in the conduct of the leader’s

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reconnaissance of the objective from the ORP. He is normally the assault element leader. He should also take the support element leader, the security element leader, and a surveillance team (a two-man team from the assault element). 5-132. The leader should designate an RP halfway between the ORP and the objective. Squads and fire teams separate at the RP and move to their assigned positions. The RP should have wire communications with the ORP and be set up so that other elements can tie into a hot loop there. 5-133. During the leader’s reconnaissance, the platoon leader should confirm the location the objective and determine whether it is suitable for the assault or ambush. He notes the terrain and identifies where he can place mines or Claymores to cover dead space. He notes any other features of the objective that may cause him to alter his plan. The platoon leader should confirm the suitability of the assault and support positions and routes from them back to the ORP. 5-134. If the objective is the kill zone for an ambush, the leader’s reconnaissance party should not cross the objective; to do so will leave tracks that may compromise the mission. The platoon leader should post the surveillance team and issue a five-point contingency plan before returning to the ORP. AMBUSH OPERATIONS 5-135. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target. Antiarmor ambushes are established when the mission is to destroy threat armored or mechanized forces. Ambushes are classified by formation (linear or L-shaped), category (hasty or deliberate), or type (point, area, or antiarmor). The platoon leader uses a combination of formation, category, and type in developing his ambush plan. Planning 5-136. The key planning considerations for an ambush, conducted as thoroughly as time permits, include the following:

· ·

Covering the entire kill zone by fire.

·

Protecting the assault and support elements with mines, Claymores, or explosives.

· ·

Using security elements or teams to isolate the kill zone.

·

Timing the actions of all elements of the platoon to preclude loss of surprise.

·

Using only one squad to conduct the entire ambush and rotating squads over time from the ORP. This technique is useful when the ambush position must be manned for a long time.

Using existing or reinforcing obstacles (Claymores and other mines) to keep the threat in the kill zone.

Assaulting into the kill zone to search dead and wounded, assemble prisoners, and collect equipment. (The assault element must be able to move quickly through its own protective obstacles.)

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NOTE: For a more detailed explanation of planning considerations and procedures, refer to the discussion of deliberate ambushes later in this section. Ambush Formations 5-137. The leader considers the linear or L-shaped formations in planning an ambush. 5-138. Linear. In an ambush using a linear formation, the assault and support elements deploy parallel to the threat’s route (see Figure 5-31). This positions both elements on the long axis of the kill zone and subjects the threat to flanking fire. This formation can be used in close terrain that restricts the threat’s ability to maneuver against the platoon or in open terrain when there is a means of keeping the threat in the kill zone.

FLANKS RESTRICTED BY TERRAIN, MINES MANTRAPS, OR COMBINATION KILL ZONE

MAN TRAPS SECURITY TEAM

MAN TRAPS

MAN TRAPS

ACCESS LANES ASSAULT ELEMENT

SECURITY TEAM

RALLY POINT

SECURITY TEAM

Figure 5-31. Linear Ambush Formation 5-139. L-shaped. In an L-shaped ambush, the assault element forms the long leg parallel to the threat’s direction of movement along the kill zone. The support element forms the short leg at one end of and at right angles to the assault element. This provides both flanking (long leg) and enfilading fires (short leg) against the threat. The L-shaped ambush can be used at a sharp bend in a trail, road, or stream. It should not be used where the short leg would have to cross a straight road or trail (see Figure 5-32).

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!R ! GRN

LIMIT OF ADVANCE

TEAM B SECURITY TEAM

! MG ! TEAM

KILL ZONE

! AR

! AR

! TL

LEFT FLANK SECURITY TEAM

! TL

EPW/SEARCH DEMO TM AID/LITTER

! GRN

! SL RP

!R TEAM A ASSUALT ELEMENT ORP

Figure 5-32. L-shaped Ambush Formation Ambush Categories 5-140. In planning the ambush, the leader evaluates the considerations and requirements for the hasty or deliberate ambush. 5-141. Hasty Ambush. A platoon or squad conducts a hasty ambush when it makes visual contact with a threat force and has time to establish an ambush without being detected. The actions for a hasty ambush must be well rehearsed so that soldiers know what to do on the leader’s signal. They must also know what actions to take if detected before they are ready to initiate the ambush. In planning and rehearsing the conduct of a hasty ambush, the platoon leader should consider the following sequence of actions:

·

Using visual signals, a soldier alerts the platoon that a threat force is in sight. The soldier continues to monitor the location and activities of the threat force until he is relieved by his team or squad leader.

· ·

The platoon or squad halts and remains motionless.

·

Security elements move out to cover each flank and the rear. The leader directs the security elements to move a given distance, set up, and rejoin the platoon on order or after the ambush is completed (when the sound of firing stops). At section level, the two outside buddy teams normally provide flank security as well as fires into the kill zone (as shown in Figure 5-33). At platoon level, fire teams make up the security elements (see Figure 5-34).

·

Soldiers move quickly to covered and concealed positions, normally 5 to 10 meters apart. Soldiers ensure that they have good observation and fields of fire into the kill zone.

·

The leader initiates the ambush when the majority of the threat force has entered the kill zone. (If time and terrain permit, the squad or platoon may emplace Claymores and use them to initiate the ambush.)

The leader determines the best nearby location for a hasty ambush. He uses arm-and-hand signals to direct soldiers to covered and concealed positions. The leader designates the location and extent of the kill zone.

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NOTE: If the threat detects a soldier, the soldier initiates the ambush by firing his weapon and alerting the rest of the platoon, saying THREAT RIGHT (LEFT or FRONT).

·

The leader controls the rate and distribution of fires. He orders cease fire when the threat force is destroyed or ceases to resist, then directs the assault element to move into the kill zone and conduct a hasty search of the threat soldiers. All other soldiers remain in place to provide security.

·

The security elements rejoin the platoon after the assault element has cleared the kill zone. The platoon withdraws from the ambush site using a covered and concealed route. The platoon returns to the applicable ORP, collects and disseminates all information, reorganizes as necessary, and continues the mission.

Figure 5-33. Section Hasty Ambush

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Figure 5-34. Platoon Hasty Ambush 5-142. Deliberate Ambush. A deliberate ambush is conducted against a specific target at a predetermined location. In planning a deliberate ambush, the leader requires detailed information on the following:

· · · ·

Size and composition of the targeted threat unit. Weapons and equipment available to the threat. The threat’s route and direction of movement. Times that the targeted unit will reach or pass specified points along the route.

5-143. In addition to key planning considerations listed earlier in this discussion, the following planning factors and procedures also may apply, especially when time is available to permit a deliberate ambush:

·

The security or surveillance team(s) should be positioned first. The support element should be in position before the assault element moves forward of the RP. The support element must overwatch the movement of the assault element into position.

·

Instructions to security teams must include how to notify the platoon leader of the threat’s approach into the kill zone (SALUTE report). The security element must also keep the platoon leader informed if any threat forces are following the lead force.

·

The platoon leader is the leader of the assault element. He must check each soldier once they establish the assault position. He signals the surveillance team to rejoin the

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assault element. Tasks for the assault and support elements include the following:

·

·

5-48

Actions of the assault element include the following: n

Identify individual sectors of fire as assigned by the platoon leader. Emplace aiming stakes.

n

Emplace Claymores and other protective devices.

n

Emplace Claymores, mines, or other explosives in dead space within the kill zone.

n

Camouflage positions.

n

Move the selection lever on each weapon off SAFE. Because this will cause a metallic click that could compromise the ambush if soldiers wait until the threat is in the kill zone, it must be the last action performed by all soldiers before waiting to initiate the ambush.

Actions of the support element include the following: n

Identify sectors of fire for all weapons, especially machine guns. Emplace limiting stakes to prevent friendly fires from hitting the assault element in an L-shaped ambush.

n

Emplace Claymores and other protective devices.

·

The platoon leader must determine how large a threat element his ambush can engage successfully. He must be prepared to let units pass that are too large. He must report to higher headquarters any units that pass his ambush unengaged.

·

The platoon leader initiates the ambush. He may use a command-detonated Claymore. He must also plan a backup method for initiating the ambush should the primary means fail; this should also be a casualty-producing device, such as a machine gun. Information on how the ambush will be initiated must be passed out to all soldiers; rehearsals must cover initiation of the ambush.

·

Soldiers must have a means of engaging the threat in the kill zone during periods of limited visibility if it becomes necessary to initiate the ambush then. Use of tracers must be weighed against how it might help the threat to identify friendly positions. The platoon leader may use handheld or indirect illumination flares.

·

The platoon leader should include indirect fire support as a part of his plan. Indirect fires can cover the flanks of the kill zone to help isolate it. They can also help the platoon to disengage if the ambush is compromised or the platoon must depart the ambush site under pressure.

·

The platoon leader must have an effective plan to signal the advance of the assault element into the kill zone to begin its search and collection activities. For example, he must realize that smoke may not be visible to the support element. All soldiers must know and practice relaying the signal during rehearsals.


Ambush Types 5-144. This discussion focuses on considerations and procedures for the three types of ambush operations (point, area, and antiarmor) conducted by the combat patrol. 5-145. Point Ambush. In a point ambush, soldiers deploy to attack a threat in a single kill zone. The platoon leader should consider the following considerations and sequence of actions when planning a deliberate point ambush:

·

·

Once it begins its search, the assault element must be prepared to move across the kill zone. Soldiers may have to use individual movement techniques if there is any return fire. Otherwise, the assault element moves across by bounding fire teams. It uses the two-man search technique, taking the following actions: n

Search from one side to the other and mark bodies that have been searched to ensure the area is thoroughly covered.

n

As the search team approaches a dead threat soldier, one man guards while the other man searches. First, he kicks the threat weapon away. Second, he rolls the body over (if on the stomach) by laying on top and, when given the goahead by the guard (who is positioned at the threat’s head), rolling the body over on him. This done for protection in case the threat soldier has a grenade with the pin pulled underneath him.

n

The searchers then conduct a systematic search of the dead soldier from head to toe, removing all papers and anything new, such as different type or rank, shoulder boards, different unit patch, pistol, weapon, or night vision device (NVD). They note if the threat soldier has a fresh or shabby haircut and the condition of his uniform and boots. They take note of the radio frequency, SOI, and maps. The search team will continue in this manner until all threat personnel in and near the kill zone have been searched. As noted, threat bodies should be marked (for example, with arms folded over the chest) to avoid duplication.

Other assault element actions in the kill zone include the following: n

Collect and secure all EPWs and move them out of the kill zone before searching bodies. Establish a location for EPWs. If there are threat WIAs who will not be taken with the prisoners, find a location that provides them with cover, yet allows them to be found easily by their units.

n

Identify and collect equipment to be carried back. Prepare it for transport. (Clear all weapons and place them on SAFE.)

n

Identify and collect remaining equipment for destruction. The demolition team prepares dual-primed explosives (C4

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with two M60 fuse lighters and time fuse) and awaits the signal to initiate. This is normally the last action performed before departing the objective and may signal the security elements to return to the ORP. n

Treat friendly wounded first, then threat wounded, time permitting.

·

The flank security teams may emplace antiarmor mines after the ambush has been initiated if the threat is known to have armor capability. If a flank security team makes contact, it fights as long as possible without becoming decisively engaged. It uses a prearranged signal to let the platoon leader know it is breaking contact. The platoon leader may direct a portion of the support element to assist the security team in breaking contact.

·

The platoon leader must plan the withdrawal from the ambush site, using these actions:

·

n

Elements normally withdraw in the reverse order that they established their positions.

n

The elements may return first to the RP, then to the ORP, depending on the distance between elements.

n

The security element at the ORP must be alert to assist the platoon’s return to the ORP. It maintains security for the ORP while the rest of the platoon prepares to leave.

Actions after return to the ORP include accountability of personnel and equipment and recovery of rucksacks and other equipment left at the ORP during the ambush.

5-146. Area Ambush. In an area ambush, soldiers deploy in two or more related point ambushes. A platoon is the smallest unit to conduct an area ambush. The platoon leader should consider the following considerations and sequence of actions when planning a deliberate area ambush. 5-147. Platoons conduct area ambushes where threat movement is largely restricted to trails or streams (see Figure 5-35). The platoon leader should select one principal ambush site around which he organizes outlying ambushes. These secondary sites are located along the threat’s most likely approach to and escape from the principal ambush site. Squad-size elements are normally responsible for each ambush site. They establish a point ambush as described earlier in this discussion.

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Figure 5-35. Area Ambush 5-148. The platoon leader must determine the best method for employing his machine guns. He normally positions them both with the support element of the principal site. 5-149. Squads responsible for outlying ambushes do not initiate their ambushes until after the principal one is initiated. They then engage to prevent threat forces from escaping the area or from reinforcing elements in the kill zone. 5-150. Antiarmor Ambush. Platoons and squads conduct antiarmor ambushes to destroy one or two armored vehicles. If a squad is given the mission to conduct an antiarmor ambush, it should have an antiarmor weapons team attached to it (refer to Figure 5-36). The leader considers the following sequence and considerations when planning an antiarmor ambush.

Figure 5-36. Antiarmor Ambush

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5-151. While the antiarmor ambush is built around the antiarmor weapons team, the leader must consider additional weapons available to supplement its fires. These are normally LAWs or AT4s. The leader must carefully position all antiarmor weapons to ensure the best shot (rear, flank, or top). The remainder of the platoon must function as support and security elements as in other combat patrols. 5-152. In a squad antiarmor ambush, the platoon leader selects the general site for the ambush. The squad leader must find a site that restricts the movement of armored vehicles out of the kill zone. The leader should attempt to place his elements so that an obstacle is between them and the kill zone. Security elements must consider dismounted avenues of approach into the ambush site. 5-153. The leader should consider the method for initiating the antiarmor ambush. The preferred method is to use a command-detonated antiarmor mine placed in the kill zone. An antiarmor weapon can be used to initiate the ambush, but its signature and slow rate of fire make it less desirable. 5-154. The antiarmor team attempts to kill the first and last vehicles in the column, if possible. All other weapons open fire once the ambush has begun. If the kill zone is within range of LAWs, each soldier fires one during the ambush. 5-155. The leader must also consider how the presence of dismounted threat elements with the tanks will affect the success of his ambush. If the threat has a significant dismounted capability, the leader’s choices include the following:

· · ·

Initiate the ambush as planned. Withdraw without initiating the ambush.

Initiate the ambush using only automatic weapons, without firing antiarmor weapons. 5-156. Because of the speed with which other armored forces can reinforce the threat in the ambush site, the leader should plan to keep the engagement short and the withdrawal quick. The platoon will not clear through the kill zone as in other ambushes. RAID 5-157. A raid is a combat operation to attack a position or installation, followed by a planned withdrawal. Squads do not execute raids. The sequence of platoon actions for a raid is similar to that for an ambush. The platoon’s assault element may have to conduct a breach of an obstacle; it may also have other tasks to perform on the objective, such as demolition of freed facilities.

PRESENCE PATROL 5-158. The presence patrol is almost always used in urban environments, particularly during stability operations and support operations. Among the various types of patrol the reconnaissance patrol may conduct, the presence patrol is unique in that its primary purpose is to be seen by military forces and civilians in the area of operations. Although this patrol does perform limited reconnaissance and security functions, it usually is conducted to serve as evidence of the presence of

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US and allied forces. This patrol’s focus may be the society or its infrastructure, with the purpose of conducting tactical questioning to fulfill information requirements.

TRACKING PATROL 5-159. A platoon or squad may receive the mission to follow the trail of a specific threat unit. Soldiers look for signs left by the threat. They gather information about the threat unit, the route, and the surrounding terrain as they track. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 5-160. Key considerations in conducting a tracking patrol include the following:

·

The soldiers move stealthily. The soldiers must be well disciplined and well trained in tracking techniques.

·

When the platoon receives the mission to conduct a tracking patrol, it assigns the task of tracking to only one squad/section. The remaining squads and attachments provide security.

·

The configuration of the platoon must provide security for the tracking team to the front and flanks as it follows the trail. The formation of a squad conducting a tracking patrol is illustrated in Figure 5-37. Separate elements of the squad must move as dispersed from each other as terrain and vegetation allow while still maintaining visual contact. Normally, the lead fire team is responsible for point security, tracking, and navigation.

Figure 5-37. Tracking Organization and Formation ORGANIZATION 5-161. Besides the common elements, tracking patrols include the following elements:

·

Security team. These teams provide security for the squad leader, RATELO, and pace man and also provide rear and flank security.

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·

Tracking team. The tracking team reads signs and follows the track of a specific threat unit.

TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS 5-162. The most important consideration in assigning duties for the tracking patrol is the requirement to make the best-trained soldier the primary tracker. The squad leader attempts to maintain the integrity of the fire teams and, if possible, buddy teams. He assigns the following duties:

·

Patrol leader. The squad leader is the patrol leader and the main navigator. He has overall responsibility for mission accomplishment.

·

Primary tracker. This soldier’s only task is to follow the main trail of the main body of the unit being tracked.

·

Security man. This soldier provides security for the primary tracker. When possible, he is the primary tracker’s buddy team member.

·

Security team. One buddy team provides security for the squad leader, the pace man, and RTO.

·

Rear security team. One buddy team provides rear security for the squad.

TRAINING 5-163. Training is essential in developing and maintaining the necessary tracking skills. Once deployed into an area of operations, the platoon must continue its training activities to learn about local soil, climate, vegetation, animals, vehicles, footwear, and other factors. The primary tracker can prepare a tracking book showing specific signs and how they weather or change over time. INTELLIGENCE 5-164. Specific intelligence about threat habits, equipment, garment, footwear, diet, or tactics is important. For example, reports might show that the threat wears sandals like the natives in the area, while the units being tracked show signs of one soldier wearing boots with an unfamiliar tread. This could mean that the unit has a trained cadre, a foreign advisor, or a prisoner with it. Any specific information about the threat is also helpful. If possible, soldiers should interview someone who has seen them. TRAIL SIGNS 5-165. Humans, machines, and animals leave signs of their presence as they move through an area. These signs can be as subtle as an odor or as obvious as a well-worn path. All soldiers can read obvious signs such as roads, worn trails, or tracks in sand or snow. To obtain better information from signs they find in the battle area, however, soldiers must develop and practice more refined attributes during tracking, including attention to detail, common sense, staying alert, logic, and knowledge of the environment and threat habits. Finding the Trail

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5-166. This is the first task of the tracking team. When the trail cannot be found in the immediate area, the tracking team can reconnoiter around a known location of threat activity. There are two ways the team can hunt for the trail:

·

From a known location. Often there is a specific area or location where the threat has been seen. Using that as a starting point, the tracking team can locate and follow the threat’s trail.

·

Cutting trails. This occurs when the route of a friendly unit crosses a trail left by another group (see Figure 5-38). This can happen by chance, or the team can deliberately choose a route that it believes will cut across one or more probable threat routes.

Figure 5-38. Cutting Threat Trails Trail and Sign Analysis 5-167. Once the first sign is discovered, it must not be disturbed or covered. The tracking team analyzes it carefully before following the threat. If the sign is found at the site of threat activity, the exact occurrence can often be reconstructed. If a trail is the first sign found, the tracker can still determine such facts as the size and composition of groups being tracked, their directions, their general condition, and other facts. The tracker determines as much as possible about the threat before following them. As the patrol proceeds, analysis continues, increasing the tracker’s knowledge of the threat. 5-168. At some point, it is likely that patrol will encounter any of several potential problems in tracking, finding, and/or learning more about the threat. These may include losing the trail of the threat force, often because of actions the threat takes to evade tracking or detection, or facing a threat attack. The patrol and the tracking team can use one or more of the following techniques when the threat attacks or tries to evade being tracked:

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·

Regaining a lost trail. As soon as the tracker loses the trail, he stops. The tracking team then retraces its path to the last threat sign. It marks this point. The team studies the sign and the area around it for any clue as to where the threat went. It looks for signs of the threat scattering, backtracking, doglegging, or using any other countertracking method. If the trail is still lost, the team establishes security in a spot that precludes destruction of any sign. The tracker and an assistant look for the trail. They do this by “boxing” the area around the last clear sign (see Figure 5-39) The tracking team always returns to the same path, away from the last sign, to avoid creating more trails than needed.

·

Overcoming common countertracking techniques. Once the threat realizes he is being followed, he will try to evade or attack the tracking team. Figure 5-40 illustrates a number of countertracking techniques that the patrol and/or the tracking team must be prepared to handle.

·

Multiple patrols. Two or more tracking teams can be used to track the same threat unit. (NOTE: The use of multiple patrols is illustrated in Figure 5-41, which accompanies the example of tracking patrol operations that follows this discussion.)

Figure 5-39. Boxing Technique

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Figure 5-40. Countertracking Techniques

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Figure 5-40. Countertracking Techniques (Continued) EXAMPLE OF A TRACKING PATROL 5-169. The 1st Squad/Section is tracking a threat force (see Figure 5-41). The squad/section leader contacts platoon headquarters (at the ORP) by radio and tells them the estimated size, composition, rate of march, and direction of travel of the threat. The platoon leader directs 2d Squad/Section on a route that will cut the threat’s trail. 5-170. The 2d Squad/Section marks where they cut the trail (Point A) and begins tracking. The mark is by prearranged signal. It can be a stake driven into the ground, several stacked rocks, or a twist of grass tied up and bent at an angle. 5-171. The 1st Squad/Section continues to follow the trail until it reaches the mark left by 2d Squad/Section. This ensures that the threat unit is still together and that 2d Squad/Section has found the correct trail. The 1st Squad/Section leader then requests further orders from the ORP. 5-172. When 2d Squad/Section confirms the threat unit’s direction, speed, and estimated distance, 2d Squad/Section gives this information to

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the ORP. The platoon leader directs 3d Squad/Section, which is patrolling in sector, to set up an ambush along the probable threat avenue of approach.

Figure 5-41. Multiple Tracking Teams

SECTION V – PATROL BASES 5-173. A patrol base is a position with a security perimeter that is set up when a dismounted team conducting a patrol halts for an extended period. Except in an emergency, patrol bases should be occupied no longer than 24 hours. The platoon or squad never uses the same patrol base twice. Platoons and squads use patrol bases to accomplish the following purposes:

· ·

Stop all movement to avoid detection.

· · · ·

Eat, clean weapons and equipment, and rest.

Hide during a long, detailed reconnaissance of an objective area. Plan and issue orders. Reorganize after infiltrating a threat area. Establish a base from which to conduct several consecutive or concurrent operations, such as ambush, raid, reconnaissance, or security.

SITE SELECTION 5-174. The leader selects the tentative site from a map or by aerial reconnaissance. The site’s suitability must be confirmed; it must be secured before occupation. Plans to establish a patrol base must include

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selecting an alternate patrol base site. The alternate site is used if the first site is unsuitable or if the patrol must unexpectedly evacuate the first patrol base.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 5-175. Leaders planning for a patrol base must consider the mission and passive and active security measures. MISSION 5-176. A patrol base must be located so it allows the unit to accomplish its mission. SECURITY MEASURES 5-177. Security measures involve the following:

·

·

·

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The leader attempts to locate the patrol base on terrain that will enhance its security. Whenever possible, the terrain should meet the following criteria: n

Terrain that the threat would probably consider of little tactical value.

n

Terrain that is off main lines of drift and that affords adequate drainage.

n

Difficult terrain that would impede foot movement. An example would be an area of dense vegetation, preferably with bushes and trees that spread close to the ground.

n

Terrain near a source of water.

n

Terrain that can be defended for a short period and that offers good cover and concealment.

The leader avoids the following locations: n

Known or suspected threat positions.

n

Built-up areas.

n

Ridges and hilltops, except as needed for maintaining communication.

n

Roads and trails.

n

Small valleys.

The leader plans for the following security considerations: n

OPs.

n

Communications with OPs.

n

Defense of the patrol base.

n

Withdrawal from the patrol base, to include withdrawal routes and a rally point, a rendezvous point, or an alternate patrol base.

n

A security system to ensure that specific soldiers are awake at all times.

n

Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

n

The conduct of required movement and noise.

activities

with

minimum


PATROL BASE OCCUPATION 5-178. A patrol base is established using the steps covered in the following discussion (see Figure 5-42). The patrol base is reconnoitered and established using the same procedures and considerations as an ORP or RRP. The exception is that the platoon will, when necessary, enter the patrol base at a 90-degree turn. NOTE: This action is METT-TC dependent; if there is nothing to be gained by doing this step, then the unit does not do it (for example, in flat desert terrain).

Figure 5-42. Occupation of the Patrol Base 5-179. The platoon leader leaves a two-man OP at the turn. The PSG and the last fire team will obliterate any tracks from the turn into the patrol base. The platoon moves into the patrol base as depicted in Figure 5-42. All squad leaders move to the left flank of their squad sector. 5-180. The platoon leader and support element or weapons squad leader start at 6 o’clock and move in a clockwise manner to adjust the perimeter (meeting each squad leader at his squad’s left flank). If the platoon leader and support element leader find a better location for one of the machine guns, they reposition it. 5-181. After the platoon leader has checked each squad’s sector, the squad leader and another squad member report to the CP as an R&S team. The platoon leader issues a contingency plan to the three R&S teams and reminds them that they are looking for the threat, water, built-up areas or human habitat, roads and trails, and any possible rally points. (Squads occupying a patrol base on their own do not send out R&S teams at night.) 5-182. The R&S team departs from the left flank of its squad’s sector and moves out a given distance, as stated by the platoon leader in his instructions. The team moves in a clockwise direction and reenters the patrol base at the right flank of the squad’s sector. Whenever possible, the R&S team should prepare a sketch of the squad’s front and report to the CP.

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NOTE: The distance the R&S team moves away from the squad’s sector will vary depending on the terrain and vegetation (anywhere from 200 to 400 meters). All members of the platoon are on 100 percent alert during this time. The R&S team is of little value at night without the use of NVDs. The RTO must be able to establish communications with higher headquarters using a directional antenna. NOTE: If the platoon leader feels the platoon may have been tracked, he may elect to maintain 100 percent security and wait a while in total silence before sending out the R&S teams. 5-183. Once all squad leaders (through their R&S teams) have completed their reconnaissance, they report back to the platoon leader at the CP. The platoon leader gathers the information from his three R&S teams and determines if the platoon will be able to use the location as a patrol base.

PATROL BASE ACTIVITIES 5-184. If the platoon leader determines that he will be able to use the location as a patrol base, he gives the following information to his PSG and squad/section leaders. Platoon leader also disseminates other information such as daily challenge and password, frequencies, and call signs. Squad/section leaders return to their squads/sections, give out the information, and begin the priorities of work as stated by the platoon leader. The patrol base must be sterilized upon departure. NOTE: Squads/sections have the same requirements with their squad/section patrol bases as platoons. SECURITY 5-185. Only one point of entry and exit is used. Noise and light discipline is maintained at all times. Everyone is challenged. Squad leaders supervise the placement of aiming stakes and ensure Claymores are put out. Each squad/section establishes an OP and may quietly dig hasty fighting positions. Squad/section leaders prepare and turn in sector sketches, to include range cards and fire plans. ALERT PLAN 5-186. The platoon leader states the alert posture (for example, 50 percent or 33 percent) and the stand-to time for day and night. He sets up the plan to meet the following conditions:

· · ·

Positions are checked periodically. OPs are relieved periodically. At least one leader is awake at all times.

WITHDRAWAL PLAN 5-187. The platoon leader specifies the following information:

·

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Which signal to use if contact is made (for example, colored star cluster).


·

The order of withdrawal if the unit is forced out of the patrol base (for example, squads/sections not in contact will move first).

·

The platoon rendezvous point (if the platoon is not to link up at an alternate patrol base).

MAINTENANCE PLAN 5-188. The platoon leader must ensure that machine guns, other weapon systems, communications equipment, and NVDs are not broken down at the same time for maintenance. He also redistributes ammunition. NOTE: Weapons should not be disassembled at night. SANITATION AND PERSONAL HYGIENE PLAN 5-189. The PSG ensures that the platoon slit trench is dug and marked at night with a chemical light inside the trench. Squad/section leaders designate squad urine areas. All soldiers accomplish the following activities daily: shave; brush teeth; wash face, hands, armpits, groin, and feet; and darken (polish) boots. Soldiers ensure that no trash is left behind. MESS PLAN 5-190. Leaders monitor mess activities to ensure not more than half the platoon eats at one time. WATER RESUPPLY 5-191. The PSG organizes a watering party. They carry canteens in an empty rucksack.

PASSIVE (CLANDESTINE) PATROL BASE 5-192. The purpose of a passive patrol base is to give a smaller-size element time to rest. A Claymore mine is emplaced on the route entering the patrol base. Teams sit back-to-back facing outward, ensuring that at least one individual per team is alert and providing security.

SECTION VI – OBSERVATION POSTS 5-193. Surveillance is the systematic observation of a specific area. Scouts watch, listen, and employ electronic devices to observe their assigned sector of responsibility. The OP, the primary means of maintaining surveillance of an assigned avenue of approach or NAI, is a position from which scouts observe the threat and direct and adjust indirect fires against him. From the OP, the scouts send SALUTE reports to their commander to provide early warning of threat activity. 5-194. The reconnaissance platoon can occupy one short-duration OP per squad for up to 12 hours if the squads are at full strength. For extended periods (12 hours or longer), the platoon occupies long-duration OPs by sections; this limits long-duration OPs to a maximum of two for recce

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platoons and three for most other platoons. The general requirement for each long-duration OP is two vehicles in CFV/RV platoons and three vehicles in a HMMWV platoon. These guidelines are based on the manpower requirements for OP operations (occupy the OP, provide security, execute a proper sleep plan to sustain long-duration operations). 5-195. The platoon can array OPs either in linear positions or in depth. Depth is the preferred method for maintaining contact with a moving threat. Linear placement is effective when the threat is not moving; it provides maximum eyes on the threat.

CRITICAL TASKS 5-196. Critical tasks for the platoon in employing OPs include the following:

·

Determine the type of OP (mounted, dismounted, or a combination), depending on requirements for either maximum stealth or rapid movement.

·

Position the OPs either in linear positions or in depth to allow for observation of the assigned sector. Several factors will affect proper positioning, such as the following:

·

·

·

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n

The need for observation from several OPs to reduce the chance of the threat entering the sector undetected.

n

A requirement for the platoon to observe the entire sector by placing OPs along the threat’s most likely avenues of approach.

Select a position for each OP that affords the best possible force protection. Selection criteria include the following: n

Covered and concealed routes to and from the OP.

n

Unobstructed observation of the assigned area.

n

Effective cover and concealment.

n

Sites that avoid natural lines of drift and that do not call attention to or skyline observers.

Occupy the OP. The platoon should employ the most secure method of moving into position; dismounted occupation is the preferred method. Occupation steps include these: n

Establish overwatch.

n

Reconnoiter the position.

n

Establish security.

n

Clear the site and ensure sector visibility.

n

Establish vehicle hide positions.

n

Develop sector sketches.

Man the OP. The platoon leader must ensure that each OP has the necessary personnel and equipment to perform the following tasks: n

Observe the assigned area.

n

Provide local security (including planning preparation for contact and actions on contact).

and


n

Report information.

n

Call for and adjust indirect fire.

·

Conduct local reconnaissance patrols when necessary to cover dead space, provide local security, and observe avenues of approach and/or NAIs from different vantage points.

·

Employ active and passive protective measures. Scouts are extremely vulnerable in the OP. Their best self-defense is not to be seen, heard, or otherwise located by the threat.

·

Improve the position. The platoon can enhance OP protection using the following steps: n

Dig in the OP position.

n

Camouflage the position.

n

Install communications equipment.

n

Emplace hasty obstacles.

TYPES OF OBSERVATION POSTS 5-197. OPs can be executed dismounted or mounted, or as a combination of these two types, as outlined in the following discussion. DISMOUNTED OPs 5-198. The dismounted OP provides maximum stealth and thus has the greatest likelihood of remaining undetected by the threat. The disadvantages of the dismounted OP are the time it takes to remount and move if necessary and, if a ground-mounted thermal device is not available, the lack of optics capability. If rapid movement or displacement is anticipated, the OP should mount or remain mounted. MOUNTED OPs 5-199. These offer the advantages of rapid movement and vehicle optics and protection. Because the threat can more easily detect them, however, they are potentially much less effective than dismounted OPs. COMBINATION OPs 5-200. The platoon can employ an OP that combines the advantages of both the dismounted and mounted types. For example, the vehicle could be used to monitor a particular NAI while other crewmen dismount to observe a threat dismounted avenue of approach. The combination OP can offset the limitations and vulnerabilities of the other types, but some of these weaknesses may still apply, including lack of mobility and ease of threat detection.

POSITIONING THE OP 5-201. As noted, OPs may be placed on the battlefield either in a linear configuration or in depth. Linear placement (illustrated in Figure 5-43) allows the platoon to observe the assigned sector from several OP sites, reducing the chance of the threat entering the sector without being observed. This method works well when the platoon has been assigned a large sector with few avenues of approach or is in desert-type terrain. Indepth OP placement (refer to Figure 5-44) allows the platoon to observe the entire sector by placing OP sites where the platoon can observe the

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most likely avenues of approach in the sector as well as along the sector flanks. This method works well when the platoon is assigned a sector with several avenues of approach or is in heavily wooded terrain. Indepth placement allows for redundancy in observation and better coverage of the sector.

Figure 5-43. Linear Positioning of OPs

Figure 5-44. In-depth Positioning of OPs

SELECTING AN OP SITE 5-202. Based on his commander’s guidance, the platoon leader selects the general location for the platoon’s OPs after analyzing METT-TC factors. From his analysis, he determines how many OPs he must establish; he also decides where they must be positioned to allow longrange observation along the avenues of approach assigned by his commander and to provide depth through the sector. Section and squad leaders select the exact position for each OP on the ground. OPs should have the following characteristics:

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·

Covered and concealed routes to and from the OP. Scouts must be able to enter and leave the OP without being seen by the threat.

·

Unobstructed observation of the assigned area or sector. Ideally, the fields of observation of adjacent OPs overlap to ensure full coverage of the sector.

·

Effective cover and concealment. Scouts should select positions with cover and concealment to reduce their vulnerability on the battlefield. They may need to pass up a position with favorable observation capability but with no cover and concealment in favor of a position that affords better survivability.

·

A location that will not attract attention. OPs should not be sited in such locations as a water tower, an isolated grove of trees, or a lone building or tree; these positions draw threat attention and may be used as threat artillery TRPs. The OPs should also be located away from natural lines of drift along which a moving threat force can be expected to travel. These locations might include a route on the floor of a valley or a site near a major highway.

·

A location that does not skyline the observers. Avoid hilltops. Position OPs farther down the slope of the hill or on the side, provided there are covered and concealed routes into and out of the position.

OCCUPYING THE OP 5-203. The reconnaissance platoon leader selects a technique to move to the screen line based on his analysis of METT-TC. Unless the area has already been cleared, the platoon should conduct a zone reconnaissance to the screen line. This is the most secure method of moving to the screen line, but also the most time-consuming. The following steps provide an example of how the platoon’s elements, in this case a section, might occupy an OP:

·

The section stops short of its OP site. The section leader directs the drivers into positions to overwatch the general OP site and any terrain the threat could use to dominate movement into or out of the position. (See Figure 5-45.)

·

The section leader dismounts with scouts from each vehicle. The squad leader stays with the vehicles. Drivers and gunners remain on their vehicles to overwatch the dismounted personnel as they move forward to reconnoiter the OP. (NOTE: Because of the requirement to leave the driver and gunner with each vehicle, only one scout per vehicle can dismount in a HMMWV platoon.)

·

The section leader moves the dismounted scouts to the OP site, establishes security overwatching the far side of the site, and checks the site for mines, booby traps, and threat personnel. He verifies that he can observe his sector or area of responsibility from this site and determines which exact position is best for the OP.

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·

The section leader selects hide positions and fighting positions for his vehicles. Once the area around the OP is cleared and secure, he signals the vehicles forward to move into their fighting positions.

·

The driver and a dismounted scout from each vehicle mark their vehicle position with a ground stake. The stake, which enables a vehicle to reoccupy the fighting position at a later time, is centered on the driver’s station. It must be tall enough for the driver to see as he drives into position. The driver uses engineer tape or luminous tape on the stake so he can see it during limited visibility operations.

·

The gunner and vehicle commander for each vehicle complete and check their sector sketch. Each vehicle then moves back out of its fighting position into a hide position. The section leader checks the sketches to ensure they provide complete coverage of the sector. Sector sketches or range cards allow the OP to use the vehicle’s thermal sights for observation; they are also a valuable reference if the vehicle is ordered to fight.

Figure 5-45. Vehicles Overwatching a Potential OP Site

MANNING THE OP 5-204. A minimum of two scouts man each OP. They must be equipped to observe the area, report information, protect themselves, and call for and adjust indirect fire. One scout observes the area while the other provides local security, records information, and sends reports to the section/squad leader or platoon leader. The two scouts should switch jobs every 20 to 30 minutes because the observer’s effectiveness decreases quickly after that time. Essential equipment for the OP includes the following:

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· · · ·

Map of the area, with required graphic only.

·

SOI extract.

Compass. Communications equipment (wire and/or radio). Observation devices (binoculars, observation telescope, and/or NVDs).


· ·

Report formats.

· ·

Seasonal uniform and load-bearing equipment (LBE).

Weapons, such personal, crew-served, and/or light antitank weapons (LAW). Mines are included, if necessary. Appropriate NBC equipment and IPE to achieve the highest MOPP level.

IMPROVING THE POSITION 5-205. Once the section leader has established the OP and assigned the scouts their sectors of observation, the section improves the position. The section leader prepares a sector sketch, an example of which is illustrated in Figure 5-46. This sketch is similar to a fighting position sketch but with some important differences. As a minimum, the sketch will include the following:

·

A sketch of key and significant terrain, including NAI and avenues of approach.

· · · · · · · · ·

Location of the OP.

·

Locations of protective obstacles, such as Claymores and trip flares.

Location of the hide position. Locations of vehicle fighting and observation positions. Alternate positions (hide, fighting, observation). Routes to and from the OP and fighting positions. Sectors of observation, with dead space identified. Preplanned artillery targets. TRPs for direct fire. Prepared spot reports and calls for fire, based on trigger lines and projected locations where the threat will first be seen.

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Figure 5-46. Section Leader’s OP Sketch 5-206. Personnel manning the OP site begin digging in to provide protection from indirect and direct fires. They also camouflage the position, install wire communications equipment and directional antennas for FM communications, and emplace hasty obstacles for local protection. Vehicle commanders (or gunners) and drivers reconnoiter the routes to their fighting/observation positions and alternate positions, perform maintenance, and camouflage vehicles and positions.

OP COMMUNICATIONS 5-207. The scouts occupying the OP use wire, radio, or both as their primary means of communications. Wire is preferred because it is secure and is not vulnerable to threat direction-finding equipment or jamming. The scouts can conceal the wire so the threat cannot see it. If possible, the scouts in the OP use wire to communicate with their section/squad leader or his representative, who is located with his vehicle in the hide position behind the OP. 5-208. The scout in the vehicle in turn relays reports or information to the platoon leader by radio. Ideally, if the vehicles are in a hide position, their signals are masked from the threat by terrain. If they anticipate being in the position for a long period of time and expect to have to use the radio, scouts should construct a directional antenna to further reduce their vulnerability to threat jamming or direction-finding. The scouts in the OP should carry a radio as a backup means of communications; they can use it to send reports or to talk directly to their FIST or mortar section for indirect fire support.

OP SECURITY 5-209. As noted, scouts are extremely vulnerable in an OP; their best self-defense is not to be seen, heard, or otherwise located by the threat. They employ active and passive measures to protect themselves from threat detection and direct and indirect fires. 5-210. The first step is to locate the OP in a covered and concealed position to reduce the chance of being seen by the threat. The scouts add camouflage to the position to enhance natural concealment. If they have enough time, they dig in the position and add overhead cover to increase survivability against threat fires. The scouts enforce strict light and noise discipline and reduce activity in and around the OP to essential movement only. All vehicles remain hidden because the threat can easily identify their large signatures. Scouts in the OP also must maintain secure communications; refer to the discussion earlier in this section. 5-211. To provide early warning of threat movement around the screen line or OP position, the scouts emplace their PEWS in areas that they cannot observe or in the dead spaces between OPs. Trip flares and M18A1 claymore mines provide additional early warning and protection from threat personnel. 5-212. Active patrolling around and between OPs also enhances security. Patrols give the platoon the ability to observe areas that cannot be observed from the OPs and to clear the area around the OP of threat elements. A patrol can be executed by a minimum of two dismounted

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crewmen from the vehicles in the hide position. The platoon executes security patrols as soon after occupation of the position as possible to discover threat elements that might have observed the occupation. The patrol reconnoiters favorable observation positions that might be occupied by the threat. Route selection is critical when organizing patrols because scouts must assume that the OP position is under observation. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of patrols earlier in this chapter.) 5-213. OPs cannot always avoid being seen by the threat, so they must take actions to limit their vulnerability. Covered positions provide protection from threat fires; vehicle dispersion further reduces the effects of these fires. The vehicles in the fighting positions are used to extricate the scouts from the OP when the position has been identified and attacked by the threat.

EXTENDED OP OPERATIONS 5-214. Extended OPs are fixed surveillance positions that require the scouts to remain at the site for up to 72 hours without relief or rotation of scout teams. They provide the maximum degree of stealth available to the scout from a stationary position. Vehicle placement will not be in direct support of the OP. Infiltration and exfiltration, accomplished using any method of aerial and dismounted movement, will be the primary method of occupying and departing the OP. Once the OP is occupied, movement around the OP ceases until mission is complete, evacuation is required, and/or exfiltration begins. 5-215. This discussion addresses the process of selection, construction, and occupation of extended OPs, as used in permissive and nonpermissive operational environments. During this process, the scouts should apply the principles summarized by the acronym BLUES, which is illustrated in Figure 5-47.

B

Blend in with the surrounding area. Does the site look natural? Does it attract unwanted attention?

L

Low-to-the-ground construction techniques must be used. Does the site provide protection against small arms and direct weapons fire?

U

Unexpected sites should be used. Will the threat forces expect you to look out the window or the small hole in the wall?

E

Evacuation routes must be planned during site selection. Where will you go to link up with friendly forces?

S

Avoid silhouetting of the site by using the sides of hills, not the crests. Can the sniper see you silhouetted against the skyline, wall, or other object?

Figure 5-47. BLUES Principles for Extended OPs SITE SELECTION 5-216. In choosing where to position extended OPs, the reconnaissance platoon must ensure that the sites meet the following requirements:

·

Afford adequate visual and electronic line-of-sight target observation and security for the observers.

·

Have as wide a field of view and as little dead space as possible.

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·

Are not near natural lines of drift or in terrain that would naturally draw the attention of threat forces, such as atop a flat rock face on a hill.

· ·

Have covered and concealed exit and entry points.

·

In general, are as close to, or distant from, the target as mission and security considerations dictate.

· ·

Afford effective overhead and side cover and concealment.

·

Support reliable communications between the observers and their main body, security element, and/or communications element.

·

Are, above all, in a location that is not obvious to threat forces.

Are far enough downwind from the target and inhabited areas to minimize the olfactory detection of the position by dogs or people. Keep in mind that wind direction often changes at various times of the day.

Are capable of supporting execution of battle drills if the observers must break threat contact.

5-217. If no single position affords all these features (for example, daytime versus nighttime requirements), it may become necessary to select separate positions suited to the type of surveillance performed. Multiple positions must be mutually supporting so that if one position is compromised, observers in the other position are able to continue the surveillance mission and/or warn the rest of the platoon. Further, if positions are not used during the day, they should be kept under observation. If the positions cannot be secured by observation, they should not be reused the following night. This practice prevents the scouts from walking into an ambush while trying to reoccupy the position. Another consideration in the use of separate positions is that observers must avoid establishing patterns and trails while moving to and from the different positions. CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES 5-218. Several construction techniques are common to all observation positions. These techniques are included in SOPs and practiced during normal training. Dirt Removal 5-219. The primary problem in constructing any position is the removal of excess dirt. Excavated soil expands in volume. In dry climates, the subsurface soil contains the most water. This water content causes the soil to be a different color, meaning this soil must be camouflaged. Under these conditions, construct underground positions before the early morning dew develops. Discarding excess soil before the dew sets in aids in the camouflage process. Consider the effect of the sun drying out the excess soil. This dried soil may need to be camouflaged. The main technique for camouflaging soil, using plastic sheeting or a poncho, entails the following steps:

·

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Lay out the sheeting alongside the position.


·

Place the topsoil to one side of the sheeting. Remember that the topsoil only extends a few centimeters below the surface. Save as much of the vegetation as possible.

·

Dig out the remaining soil. Do not mix the topsoil with subsoil from the hole.

·

Fill sandbags with the (loose) soil dug from the hole and use them to reinforce the sides of the position.

·

Fill surrounding depressions, ruts, or ditches with the remaining excess soil. If this procedure is not possible, spread the soil lightly on the surface in an area away from the position. Avoid putting the excess soil in creeks or streams that may wash the dirt down the waterway and attract unwanted attention.

·

After overhead cover is constructed and waterproofed, replace the topsoil. Place vegetation, leaves, deadfall, or other local materials around the area to finish camouflaging the position.

·

The final step in the process is to recover the sheeting used to contain the soil. Check the vegetation under the sheeting to ensure that it was not matted down under the weight of the soil. If matting has occurred, take the time to brush it with a branch to return it to its natural state.

·

As time passes, continually check the vegetation and soil around the position to ensure that they appear natural. Loose soil often falls through small holes and results in a strangelooking, funnel-shaped hole. Check vegetation to ensure that it blends in with the surrounding area. Remove or replace dead vegetation.

Vegetation 5-220. When applying the “B” in the BLUES acronym, remember that vegetation is critical to blending the OP with surrounding terrain. Replanting and watering vegetation during initial position construction can eliminate the need to continually replace wilted plants. 5-221. Grasses. When removing topsoil, save the grass. Remove the grass in clumps by cutting a circle about 5 to 15 centimeters around the section to be saved with an entrenching tool or shovel; then pry the roots and soil up from the bottom. When replacing the grass around the position, pattern the placement after the natural design. Shake the grass slightly to loosen the roots, then replace it at ground level. If water is available, a small amount placed on the grass will lessen the shock of replanting and extend the life of the camouflage. 5-222. Plants and Bushes. Medium-sized plants or bushes will aid the security of the position. Not only will the plants add to the camouflage of the position, but they will also discourage vehicle and foot movement over the top of the position. The main disadvantage to using plants on top of the position is that the plants may die or fall over due to the shallow depth of the overhead cover. 5-223. Deadfall. Deadfall can restrict movement in much the same way as the plants and bushes discussed earlier. At the same time, the use of

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deadfall as part of the overall camouflage effort presents several disadvantages, including the following:

·

In most regions of the world, deadfall is used for home heating, cooking, and construction. If the position has this fuel near it, the risk of discovery is increased. The only options available to OP personnel if a nonhostile civilian discovers them are emergency exfiltration and activation of the escape and evasion (E&E) plan. Either course of action will result in the mission being terminated.

·

Deadfall provides very limited cover against small arms fire. Most trees decompose quickly on the ground. Modern small arms fire will easily pass through these rotten trees. If deadfall must be used, it is reinforced with dirt.

Sidewall Support 5-224. Depending on the soil condition in the area of operations, the sidewall of the position may require some type of shoring or support to prevent cave-ins. A variety of material for support of the walls is available, such as local timber, branches, deadfall, plastic sheeting, and ponchos. The primary means for supporting the sides, however, is the use of sandbags. These lightweight bags serve a variety of uses and conform to almost any shape required. The exact number of bags required depends on the size and overall design of the position. When cross-bracing sandbagged walls, use freshly cut green timber or a prefabricated support such as PVC pipe, conduit, or other like items. Examples of cross-bracing and revetments can be found in FM 3-34.310 (FM 5-34). OP Kits 5-225. Whenever possible, the unit should assemble prefabricated kits to aid in the construction of the required positions. These kits need not be taken into the operational area; rather, they are assembled as a stockpile from which elements can draw mission-specific equipment during isolation. Items in these kits include the following:

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·

Schedule 80 PVC pipe (elbows, straight connectors, and threeand four-way connectors) and PVC cement. This strong, lightweight material can be formed into a multitude of shapes and designs. It can be used to build a frame for the overhead cover or to form cross-bracing.

·

Parachute suspension line. This has many uses, such as being interwoven to produce a frame for overhead cover.

· · ·

Sandbags.

·

Half-meter square pieces of 1-centimeter plywood. This lightweight material is excellent for constructing overhead cover, platforms for use in trees, and insulation when operating on ice and snow. The squares can be painted to match the terrain in which they are used.

Assorted tapes, cords, and ropes. Plastic bags with press-together or slide-lock “zippers” for closing. These items can be used for general storage.


·

Plastic sheeting. Heavy-gauge plastic sheeting fills many roles. If plastic sheeting is not available, the heavy-duty plastic bags used to cover pallets work well.

·

Hand tools, such as D-handle shovels, hack saws, hammers, and small bow saws.

·

Plastic or aluminum tent stakes. These items save time during construction of the position.

· · ·

Canvas and camouflage netting. Plastic buckets with formaldehyde. Mirrors or periscopes.

EXTENDED OP EMPLOYMENT IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS Urban Environment 5-226. An urban or built-up area forms the economic and cultural focus for the surrounding area. It is characterized by a concentration of people and man-made structures and facilities. Because of the generally limited fields of vision, urban operations normally require more positions than rural operations. Refer to FM 3-06 (FM 90-10) and to the discussion of urban operations in Chapter 7 of this manual. 5-227. Position Selection. As with other observation and surveillance positions, METT-TC dictates the selection of urban OPs. Scouts can construct fixed urban positions in occupied and abandoned buildings, on water tanks, behind shrubbery, on factory chimneys, or in the attics of multistory buildings or other tall structures. If the position is to be set up in an undamaged part of the urban area, the scouts should select buildings of solid construction with serviceable stairs and basements that can be equipped for the rest and shelter of personnel. 5-228. Scouts should avoid wooden buildings and buildings in a significantly deteriorated condition because of the risk of injury from fire and/or structural failure. Fixed positions should not be located in buildings that will attract the threat’s attention; instead, they should be placed in rubble, yards, and gardens. 5-229. When occupying the position, scouts must look for booby traps and mines. If they detect such devices, they must be prepared to take proper precautions, including the following:

· · ·

Disable the devices, if possible. Mark the area if the devices cannot be disabled. Choose another position if the quantity of booby traps or mines prevents safe operation within the position.

5-230. Construction. Position construction may consist simply of being able to look out of a suitable viewing port, or it can be much more elaborate. Considerations and actions should include the following:

·

Construction of the position must be done with particular emphasis on OPSEC.

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·

Fill windows, doors, and other openings (such as bullet holes not used for observation) with bricks, fragments of building materials, or sand bags if available.

·

Remove flammable objects. These may be used for early warning or defensive devices.

·

Establish interbuilding communications by hard wire. Fiber optic cables (telephones), if available, offer even better security.

·

Identify and construct rapid departure routes.

5-231. Avoiding Detection. Because of the higher concentration of people, threat security elements, lighting sources, and movement, friendly forces in urban areas must take additional precautions to avoid detection during surveillance activities. Considerations for detection avoidance include the following:

· ·

A minimum of two scouts are required in occupying the OP.

·

Employ OPSEC to negate or evade threat electronic countermeasures (ECM). For example, technological advances make it possible for mobile units operating from the street to electronically survey a building and detect and identify very small sources of energy. Such capabilities are increasingly widespread and are often found in built-up areas of even marginally developed countries, especially in the “security states” of the Third World.

If operating from an occupied dwelling, do not consume more electric power, water, and heat than average for the normal occupants.

Mountainous Environment 5-232. Rugged, poorly trafficable terrain, steep slopes, and elevations that allow observation of surrounding terrain characterize mountainous areas. This terrain may require more observers and positions than flat areas because of the relatively limited fields of vision. On the other hand, in areas above the tree line or where lower elevations lack vegetation, the number of observers may be decreased. A careful study of the target area will give a good indication of these requirements. For a general discussion of operations in mountainous areas, see FM 3-97.6 (FM 90-6). 5-233. Position Selection. Mountain terrain provides many places for cover and concealment. Position selection is not guided by the height of a given mountain but by factors that include the following:

· · · ·

Irregular fields of observation. Dead space. Cover and concealment. The limits of the observation equipment used by the scouts.

5-234. Scouts may employ a circular, multitiered system of observers. To increase daytime viewing capability, positions are placed not only laterally but also with vertical dispersion. This layering of positions also

5-76


reduces the need for movement when changing from daytime to nighttime operations. Since movement is the main cause of compromise, layering positions also adds to the security effort of the deployed scouts. (See Figure 5-48.)

Figure 5-48. Overlapping Mountain Observation Sites 5-235. Construction. Irregular terrain in mountains often affords natural hiding places for observers. In most mountainous areas, the rocky nature of the ground makes it difficult and often impossible to dig belowground positions. In those cases, boulders and loose rocks can be used in aboveground construction of low-walled positions called “scrapes.” When these positions are constructed, scouts should take the same degree of care in camouflaging the site as they use in all other types of construction. The position must blend in with its surroundings and not be detectable from any angle. Fields of view can often be enhanced if the lower branches on the undergrowth are trimmed back with a wire saw, shears, or knife. 5-236. Night Observation. At night, sending out additional observers into valleys and hollows enhances observation. Observation from below, facing upward against the background of the sky, often gives better results. In addition, the scouts should supplement night observation by monitoring. Monitoring is more effective in mountainous areas than on flat terrain because sounds are often funneled to the head of valleys and are perceptible at great distances. Sounds in the mountains can be deceptive, however. Various obstructions can reduce their volume and change their direction. 5-237. Snow. In mountainous areas, scouts can use certain tactics to reduce the problems associated with operations where snow is expected or known to be on the ground. Some of these tactics are discussed in the following paragraphs. 5-238. Melting conditions. Observers should choose positions that are in shaded areas, on slopes facing away from the equator (north in the Northern Hemisphere, south in the Southern Hemisphere). In moderate temperatures, the heat generated by the observers’ bodies melts the snow on the cover of the position. The result is an unexplainable muddy area in snow. Such melting is, however, common around trees. The melting snow during the heat of the day often falls to the ground and, in turn, melts the snow on the ground. The melting snow falling off the trees often can be used as a water source; unlike snow on the ground, this water source does not require melting over a heat source. The shadows found around rock outcropping and trees also aid in hiding the foot trails leading to the work area and position.

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5-239. Taking advantage of shade also helps to assure even melting, which can prevent compromise of the position. Walking compresses snow under each footprint. The compressed snow melts at a slower rate than the surrounding snow. This effect is like comparing the difference between crushed ice and cubed ice in a drink. The loose, crushed ice melts faster than the dense cubes. In areas where the snow melts fast, such as the sunny side of a hill, the compressed snow will leave footprints or trails leading to the position. 5-240. Avalanche danger. The constant daytime melting and nighttime refreezing of snow on slopes can contribute to increased avalanche danger. Scouts should use shadowed areas and slopes to reduce the risk of starting or being caught in an avalanche. Most danger areas with heightened avalanche risk are well known; these are often plotted on military and civilian maps. TYPES OF EXTENDED OPs Aboveground Positions 5-241. These are the most common type of fixed observation and surveillance positions. The advantages of selecting an aboveground position are the ease and speed with which the position can be selected and occupied and the simplicity of construction. The primary disadvantages in these positions are easy detection and little protection from small arms fire compared to belowground positions. The following discussion focuses on the use of trees as OP positions. 5-242. Operational Considerations. Special skills and equipment are required for operations in trees. The equipment requirements and planning considerations are different from those of ground positions. These considerations are as follows:

· · · ·

Choose trees that are situated well within the forest.

·

Observers must acquire the materials needed to improve the position (such as flat wood pieces on which to stand or sit).

They should never stand out in height, shape, or color. Observers are well camouflaged in the crown of a tree. Further, the observer in the tree must be covered by fire that permits him to exit his location if detected or engaged by hostile forces.

5-243. Advantages. Advantages inherent in positioning extended OPs in trees include the following:

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·

These positions afford a long-range view in open areas. In heavy-growth areas, however, the view may be nothing more than the tops of trees.

·

Most people do not look more than 2 to 3 feet above their heads when walking. When a traveler is carrying a load on his back, he often bends forward at the waist. As a result, he can do little more than look at the ground at his feet to maintain his footing.


·

Trees provide good concealment for the observer even if the threat is trying to look in the trees for him. The key exception is when the observer is moving about in the position.

5-244. Disadvantages. Disadvantages of using trees for extended OPs include the following:

·

Observers face potential problems in getting into and out of the position.

· ·

These positions often lack adequate cover. Slight movement in trees can be seen and heard at great distances.

5-245. Monitoring the Target Area. Monitoring of the target area is critical to accomplishing the mission and providing scouts with operational security. Observers positioned in a tree OP can monitor the target in several ways, including the following:

·

Observers can sit quietly and listen to sounds with their eyes closed. This works best using two scouts; one watches while the other listens.

·

Observers record the sounds of the area on a tape recorder and play the sounds back at a louder volume into headphones.

·

Remote sensors often play a key role in monitoring the target.

Ground Positions 5-246. OPs on the ground are camouflaged to resemble such features as stumps, fallen trees, and bushes. For enhanced surveillance, the scouts locate the position to overwatch the intersection of fire lanes, roads, and footpaths on the edge of sparsely wooded areas and natural clearings. When available, obstacles such as creeks, ditches, or steep slopes should be located between the position and the probable route of threat security forces. At night, even a small creek will cause the threat to make noise; it will also disrupt his formations and generally slow his progress. 5-247. Spider Hole. This type of position is similar to a fighting position with overhead cover. The dimensions are normally about 0.75 meters wide by 1.2 meters long by 1 to 1.5 meters deep. The observer can adjust the dimensions to meet his needs. This one-man position is normally established on a line or ring to provide support and enhance security. If the platoon uses this type of OP, a minimum of two mutually supporting holes must be used. (See Figure 5-49.)

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Figure 5-49. Spider Hole OP 5-248. Scrape. A scrape is the enlargement of a depression in the ground to allow one man to occupy a position. Scrapes are hasty in nature and require little preparation. Often used during darkness, scrapes provide the observer with a position from which he can more effectively use his optical devices. The observer removes as much evidence of occupation as possible when he leaves. He obscures the area by brushing matted grasses, displaced dirt, and footprints. Overhead cover such as a poncho provides limited protection from the elements. If the platoon uses this type of OP, a minimum of two mutually supporting scrapes must be used. (See Figures 5-50 and 5-51.)

Figure 5-50. Scrape OP

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Figure 5-51. Example Scrape Plan 5-249. Tent-Type Position. Larger than a spider hole, this position is constructed for more than one observer. Supports for the overhead cover are made from a variety of material. Branches, aluminum conduit, parachute suspension line, or fiberglass rods all work well as a frame for the cover. A slight arch in the cover multiplies available space the inside the position. The observer avoids grossly breaking the ground plane with the apex of the position. (See Figure 5-52.)

Figure 5-52. Tent-Type OP Underground Positions 5-250. The safest type of OP for the scout is the underground position. The complexity of design and the effort required to construct the position are its primary disadvantages. When the scouts plan to use underground positions, soil type is a critical planning consideration that must not be overlooked during mission preparation. For example, when only light equipment (such as shovels and entrenching tools) is available, underground positions can only be constructed in loose soils.

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5-251. Bunker-Type Position. This position requires extensive construction time and material to complete. The observer can construct the underground bunker-type position using a prefabricated kit. This kit includes the tools needed to excavate and cut local materials such as trees and logs. The kit also contains plastic sheeting for waterproofing the roof, walls, and floor. The sheeting can also be used to reinforce loose soil in the position. Depending on the soil in the area, however, sandbags are often required to shore up the sides of the position; sandbags also lessen the accumulation of condensation produced when plastic sheeting is used. (See Figure 5-53.)

Figure 5-53. Bunker-Type Underground OP 5-252. Caves. Caves can provide the observer with a ready-made observation position. They present special problems, however, and should be avoided if possible. First, caves attract attention; using them for tactical purposes may increase the chance of discovery for friendly forces. Caves are often shown on maps or are known to the local populace. Locals often use caves for shelter and sometimes for storage. They may have equipped caves with early warning devices that could attract the attention of threat forces. In addition, caves also attract animals. Bats, birds, snakes, and larger animals use caves for shelter, posing potential dangers and medical problems.

REMOTE ELECTRONIC/MECHANICAL SURVEILLANCE 5-253. In some cases, the reconnaissance platoon will not have the resources to observe a particular area that is either tasked to the platoon or important to its internal security. Other times, the terrain will not permit such observation. In these situations, the platoon can use mechanical warning devices such as trip flares or electronic devices (for example, GSR, REMBASS, or PEWS) to monitor the area. 5-254. As a general consideration, remote surveillance devices allow the platoon to put maximum effort into the commander’s or platoon leader’s primary area of concern while still maintaining surveillance on secondary reconnaissance objectives. The platoon will back up these devices with patrols to investigate any alarms. An example of the use of mechanical devices is an OP that uses trip flares in dead space along the avenue of approach it is monitoring. When activated, the trip flare gives early

5-82


warning of threat infiltration. A patrol will then be dispatched to verify the warning. (See Figure 5-54.)

Figure 5-54. Integration of Remote Devices into the Screen

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Chapter 6

Other Tactical Operations Several combat operations are routinely associated with successful accomplishment of the reconnaissance and security missions described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual. These operations entail special planning and training considerations because of their complexity. Reconnaissance platoons must execute them based on standardized procedures and must support their parent units’ execution of these operations.

CONTENTS Assembly Areas ............................................ Characteristics ...................................... Quartering Party Responsibilities ........ Occupation ............................................ Actions in the Assembly Area .............. Departing the Assembly Area .............. Road Marches ............................................... Preparing for Road Marches ................ March Columns ..................................... March Column Control ......................... Road March Training ............................ Battle Handover During Passage of Lines ............................ Critical Tasks ......................................... Preparation ............................................ Conduct of the Passage ....................... NBC Considerations ............................. Fratricide Avoidance ............................. Relief in Place ...............................................

6-1 6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-5 6-5 6-6 6-9 6-10 6-10 6-14 6-16 6-16 6-17 6-17

SECTION I – ASSEMBLY AREAS 6-1. An assembly area is a site where a unit regroups or prepares for future operations. Normally, a reconnaissance platoon occupies an assembly area as part of its parent unit, but it may occupy one independently. Once in the assembly area, the platoon prepares and issues orders, conducts resupply operations, repairs and maintains vehicles and equipment, and feeds and rests its soldiers.

CHARACTERISTICS 6-2. The reconnaissance platoon is often directed to find, secure, and occupy an assembly area. There are certain characteristics the scouts must look for when selecting the assembly area:

· · ·

Concealment from overhead observation.

· ·

Adequate entrances, exits, and internal roads.

·

Adequate defensibility and fields of fire.

Cover from direct fire. Good drainage and a ground surface that will support the platoon’s and/or the parent unit’s vehicles. Enough space for adequate dispersion of vehicles, personnel, and equipment.

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QUARTERING PARTY RESPONSIBILITIES 6-3. As part of its parent unit or on its own, the platoon may have to assume quartering party duties. Understanding these duties makes occupying the assembly area much easier. The quartering party’s mission is to reconnoiter the area for threat presence and booby traps, designate vehicle locations, prepare the area for occupation, and assist incoming units during the occupation. 6-4. The platoon leader or PSG designates the vehicles and personnel from the platoon that will be part of the troop quartering party. The entire platoon may also serve as the troop quartering party. If the platoon is part of a troop, the quartering party moves to the new assembly area under the control of the troop XO or troop first sergeant (1SG). The following discussion outlines the primary responsibilities of the quartering party. RECONNOITER THE AREA

6-5. The first task of the quartering party is to conduct an area reconnaissance of the assembly area to find threat forces, obstacles, and NBC contamination. This is a time-consuming process that must be planned for by the parent unit. Once threat forces are eliminated, the area must be secured to prevent threat infiltration. To do this, the quartering party establishes OPs and/or conducts security patrols. If the threat situation warrants, the officer in charge (OIC) or NCO in charge (NCOIC) may need to enlarge the quartering party to include security personnel who can provide adequate security while other members of the party organize and mark the assembly area. DETERMINE ASSEMBLY AREA SUITABILITY

6-6. Once the area is secure, the OIC or NCOIC must conduct a reconnaissance to verify the area’s suitability and to position guides and markings. This task can be conducted in conjunction with the initial area reconnaissance. When checking the position for suitability, the quartering party analyzes cover and concealment, drainage, routes into and out of the area, internal routes, defensibility, and fields of fire. If the area is unsatisfactory, the scouts should immediately begin looking for an alternate site to recommend to the commander. The OIC or NCOIC should notify the commander immediately, reporting his actions and recommendations and requesting further instructions. ORGANIZE THE AREA

6-7. The quartering party designates positions on the ground for the various elements within the assembly area. The siting should be consistent with the commander’s guidance, unit SOP, and follow-on missions. The frontages selected for the various elements must be consistent with terrain considerations and must allow adequate defensive coverage. IMPROVE AND MARK ENTRANCES, EXITS, AND INTERNAL ROUTES

6-8. Once the organization of the assembly area is complete, the quartering party marks the positions. It also reconnoiters and marks routes from the RP to the assembly area. The actual entrance and exit for the assembly area must be well marked to facilitate easy movement. The quartering party designates and marks internal routes to prevent

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excessive movement that could create a large unit signature. Unit SOP should dictate the marking system to be used. Examples of markings include chem lights, engineer tape, unit tactical signs, flashlights, VS-17 panels, and thermal tape. MARK OR REMOVE OBSTACLES AND MINES

6-9. Ideally, the commander should have some indication of current or past presence of a threat in the proposed area. If there is a possibility of mines or CBUs in the assembly area, additional scouts or combat engineers with mine-detection equipment should be requested before the quartering party departs. Obstacle and mine clearance requires prior planning to ensure sufficient quantities of the proper equipment are available. This equipment may include pioneer tools, demolitions, or engineer vehicles. Sufficient time must also be allocated to allow the quartering party to accomplish this mission before the main body arrives. If the first area selected contains numerous obstacles, an alternate area should be reconnoitered. PERFORM GUIDE DUTIES

6-10. The quartering party prepares the assembly area to make the occupation of the new positions swift and efficient. This can be a wasted effort if the guides do not perform their duties properly. Because the quartering party is familiar with the area and the vehicle positions, the vehicle commanders rely, at least initially, on the guides to reach their designated positions; therefore, guides must be thoroughly briefed prior to the mission. 6-11. The guides are positioned between the RP and the assembly area entrance so that each guide can meet his unit as it crosses the RP. The guides must know the proper route from the RP to the new positions; they quickly move their units through the RP and into the assembly area. Once in the new area, the guides direct the vehicles to their tentative positions. Immediately afterward, they walk the platoon leader through the positions, briefing him on the individual vehicle positions, adjacent units, fields of fire, location of the CP, and any other essential information. The guides continue their occupation activities until all vehicle positions are occupied. ACCOMPLISH ADDITIONAL ASSIGNED TASKS

6-12. If the commander assigns any additional tasks, the quartering party must accomplish them. The commander should prioritize these tasks; if he does not, the quartering party leader must designate a priority of tasks that allows for the most important to be accomplished first. Examples of such additional tasks include establishing priorities of work, providing security for the command group, test-firing weapons, and assisting in traffic control.

OCCUPATION 6-13. When a unit arrives at an assembly area, all elements move off the route of march and clear it without slowing or halting. The platoon leader should keep this in mind as he posts guides, selects routes, and allocates space in the assembly area. After a march serial has cleared the route, it can adjust vehicle positions without holding up traffic.

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ACTIONS IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA 6-14. As soon as the platoon occupies its area, it must automatically execute its priority of tasks. Initial tasks include the following:

· · · ·

Position vehicles.

· · ·

Camouflage positions.

Establish local security. Establish lateral contact with vehicles on the flanks. Develop range cards or sector sketches and submit them to the platoon leader for inclusion in the platoon fire plan. Scouts may have to adjust their positions accordingly. Perform PMCS. Initiate and maintain OPSEC.

6-15. Security is a constant concern in assembly areas. Noise and light discipline are especially important, as is limiting the number of vehicles that enter and exit the assembly area. The local security that is initially established will be replaced by more permanent OPs once the platoon is established in position; these OPs are deployed in accordance with procedures outlined in Chapter 5 of this manual. The platoon leader or higher commander may also require patrols (mounted and dismounted) within the assembly area, especially in limited visibility periods. Wire and messengers are the primary means of communications. How many wire lines are laid depends on how long the platoon will be in the assembly area. Radio is used only in emergencies when no other means of communications is available.

DEPARTING THE ASSEMBLY AREA 6-16. Departing an assembly area is a critical and often overlooked task. A well-organized departure sets up the platoon for its next mission. A poorly organized departure can cause delays and other problems that may adversely affect the platoon’s mission before it begins. 6-17. The departure requires thorough planning and preparation, including a walk-through rehearsal. As part of the preparation, a thorough police call must be conducted. This ensures that all evidence of the unit’s occupation is removed and denies the threat any equipment, supplies, or other items (including trash) that might be of tactical or intelligence value. Leaders must carefully supervise execution of the departure to ensure that no delays occur.

SECTION II – ROAD MARCHES 6-18. Units not engaged in combat may have to travel long distances to position themselves for future operations. These movements are planned at battalion/squadron and company/troop level, but they are executed by the subordinate units involved, including the reconnaissance platoon. Success depends largely on unit discipline and the platoon’s ability to execute the plan with strict adherence to SOP.

6-4


6-19. The road march differs from other forms of movement in these

ways:

· · · ·

The purpose is relocation, not making contact. The primary consideration is rapid movement of vehicles. The road march is conducted at a prescribed speed. A prescribed interval is maintained between vehicles.

6-20. The platoon may perform various duties during a road march, including manning traffic control points (TCP), serving as road guides or as a quartering party, or conducting route reconnaissance.

PREPARING FOR ROAD MARCHES 6-21. The basic considerations in planning any road march are METTTC factors (especially the threat situation and the mission), the march order, and the type, number, and characteristics of vehicles available for the movement. When preparing for a tactical road march, the reconnaissance platoon should use the following planning sequence if time permits:

·

Prepare and issue the warning order as early as possible to allow maximum time for preparation.

·

Prepare an estimate of the situation, specifying organization of the march column.

· ·

Organize and dispatch reconnaissance and quartering parties.

· ·

Prepare and issue the march order.

Prepare detailed movement plans based on the organization of the march column and a review of available reconnaissance information. Prepare overlays and issue them to all vehicle commanders and subordinate leaders. The road march overlay should include, as a minimum, the location of the SP, RP, scheduled halts, and checkpoints at critical points along the route.

MARCH COLUMNS 6-22. A tactical march may be conducted in close column or open

column or by infiltration. In dusty conditions, vehicles must be spaced so that the dust from one does not blind the driver of the next.

CLOSE COLUMN

6-23. Close column is normally used for marches during limited visibility conditions. Under these conditions, vehicles are spaced so the driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead, about 25 to 50 meters apart. Close column marching takes advantage of the traffic capacity of the route, but it provides little dispersion. Traffic density is approximately 20 to 40 vehicles per kilometer along the route of march. OPEN COLUMN

6-24. Open column is generally used during daylight. The distance between vehicles is increased to provide greater dispersion; it varies from 6-5

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50 meters to 100 meters, or more if the situation requires. Open column may also be used at night with infrared lights, blackout lights, or passive night-vision equipment. Normal vehicle density is approximately 20 vehicles per kilometer when vehicles are 50 meters apart, 12 vehicles per kilometer when the distance is 75 meters, and 10 vehicles per kilometer when the distance is 100 meters. The increased dispersion of the vehicles in open column movement enhances security. INFILTRATION

6-25. Infiltration provides the best possible passive defense against threat observation and attack, but it may be difficult to control. It is suited to tactical marches when sufficient time and road space are available and maximum security, deception, and dispersion are desired. The advance party usually infiltrates. Vehicles are dispatched individually, in small groups, or at irregular intervals at a rate that reduces traffic density and prevents undue massing of vehicles. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of infiltration.)

MARCH COLUMN CONTROL 6-26. Column control is maintained through the chain of command. Each scout vehicle has a prescribed place in the platoon march column as described in the discussion of tactical movement in Chapter 2 of this manual. This discussion covers a variety of control measures and procedures for the march column. START POINT

6-27. An SP provides all vehicles of a march column with a common

point for starting their movement. The SP is a recognizable place along the route of march, such as a road intersection. It should not be in a defile, on a hill, or at a sharp curve in the road that could cause movement to slow. It should be far enough from assembly areas to allow vehicles to be organized and moving at the prescribed speed when they reach it. Before starting a march, elements of the platoon should reconnoiter the route to the SP to determine times for major units of the serial to arrive at and clear the serial SP. When vehicles use more than one route, each route has an SP.

RELEASE POINT

6-28. An RP gives all vehicles of the march column a common point for reverting to control of the platoon leader. It is a point on the route of march that is easy to recognize on the map and on the ground. Guides should meet vehicles as they arrive at the RP and lead them to their new positions, usually in an assembly area. Multiple routes and cross-country movement from the RP to assembly areas allow vehicles to disperse rapidly. In selecting an RP, leaders should avoid hills, defiles, and sharp curves that may cause elements to slow or stop on the route. No vehicle should be required to countermarch or pass through another element to reach its new position. CHECKPOINTS

6-29. Checkpoints on a route are used for reference in providing instructions to vehicles in the march column. They also aid in identifying

6-6


places where interference with movement might occur or where timing might be critical. RESTRICTIONS

6-30. Restrictions are points along the route of march where movement may be limited or obstructed during certain time periods; examples include bridges, intersections, ferries, or bypasses. The march planner should start the move early enough to pass such a point before a critical time period begins, delay the start of the move to pass a restriction after such a period has ended, or plan to halt the column along the route until the restriction is lifted. TRAFFIC CONTROL

6-31. The parent unit controlling the march normally provides traffic control. TCPs manned by military police and/or other personnel, including members of the reconnaissance platoon, may be located at critical points along the route. Among the factors that can increase traffic control problems are movement on multiple routes during periods of limited visibility and the existence of major intersections, defiles, and detours along routes. Road guides may lead serials or march units on a particular route or portion of a route or through a critical area. These guides must follow the same procedures and guidance as other TCP personnel. Scouts may act as road guides to assist the military police. 6-32. TCP personnel should be employed in pairs, with one directing traffic while the other provides security. They need to know the exact number of vehicles in each march serial, the markings for each serial, and the passing times so that they can adequately control and report the movement of the unit. Considerations for manning the TCP include weather, the marking system for the TCP and route (to include critical turns), limited visibility procedures, and recovery of the TCPs. The reconnaissance platoon leader or PSG has several options in deciding how to man the TCP, to include manning with individual vehicles (up to six TCPs), dropping off platoon personnel with FM communications at each TCP, or requesting augmentation if needed. SPEED CONTROL

6-33. Vehicles in a column of any length may simultaneously encounter many different types of routes and obstacles. This causes different parts of the column to move at different speeds at the same time, producing an undesirable accordion or whip effect. The movement order specifies march speed, rate of march, and maximum safe catch-up speed to reduce “column whipping.” The lead vehicle must not exceed the authorized maximum speed of the slowest vehicle in the column. To minimize vehicle congestion on the near side of an obstacle, vehicle commanders and drivers must be alert and maintain the prescribed minimum following distance. Vehicles should make only gradual speed changes while maintaining their prescribed interval. Vehicle commanders must constantly be aware of the vehicle interval to their front and rear and adjust their speed accordingly. HALTS

6-34. Halts are conducted to allow following traffic to pass and to provide time for rest, personal comfort and relief, mess activities,

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refueling, maintenance and inspection of equipment, and adjustments in schedule. The time and duration of halts are usually specified in the movement order or prescribed in unit SOP. The SOP should also prescribe actions to be taken during halts. Vehicle crews perform maintenance at scheduled halts.

6-35. A short rest halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the first hour of marching. A 10-minute short halt is taken every two hours thereafter. The prescribed rate of march includes the time required for short halts. When possible, march elements using the same route stop at the same time. Route characteristics, however, may make it necessary to halt at a particular point on the route rather than simultaneously at a fixed time. 6-36. Long halts are planned in advance. The length of the halt is added to the total travel time. Locations for long halts are normally selected to allow all vehicles to clear the road and to permit proper dispersion. Halts for refueling should be scheduled in advance by the unit commander. 6-37. The herringbone formation is used to provide security for the

march column during unscheduled halts. All vehicles should move completely off the road to permit passage of vehicles down the center of the column. Movement commanders give permission for execution of unscheduled halts. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of tactical movement in Chapter 2 of this manual. The herringbone is shown in Figure 2-11.)

6-38. The first priority at any halt is local security. OPs are established and sectors of fire assigned to each vehicle. These actions should be automatic and part of the unit SOP (see Chapter 4 of this manual for a discussion of area security operations). MISCELLANEOUS FACTORS Disabled Vehicles

6-39. Disabled vehicles must not obstruct traffic. Their crews must move them off the road and report their status immediately to the PSG. Crews must immediately signal the follow-on vehicles to bypass and continue movement. They then establish security and post guides to direct traffic. If possible, the crews repair their vehicles and rejoin the rear of the column just ahead of the trail element. Vehicles that have dropped from the column should return to their positions only when the column has halted. The trail party recovers vehicles that cannot be repaired by their crews.

Start of Movement

6-40. Vehicle commanders must remain alert and exercise caution

whenever they start to move. Vehicles that move too soon or too late can cause confusion in the formation. Lead vehicles must keep speeds low until all vehicles have moved onto the route of march.

Obstacles

6-41. When obstacles are reported or encountered along the march route, vehicles in the march column should bypass them whenever possible. For additional information on how friendly elements react to obstacles, refer to the discussion of actions on contact in Chapter 2 of this

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manual and to the discussion of actions at an obstacle (during convoy escort operations) in Chapter 4. Observation

6-42. Each vehicle commander assigns sectors of observation to his crewmen to provide 360-degree observation. He also designates one observer as the air guard to provide air security. Each vehicle has a sector of observation as shown in Figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1. Sectors of Observation in a Road March

ROAD MARCH TRAINING 6-43. Overall success or failure of a mission could depend on the ability of units to march rapidly and efficiently over long distances. The unit’s level of road march training is thus a major factor in determining mission success. Important factors in training for tactical road marches include the following:

·

Driver training. The vehicle driver can make or break a road march. He must know the proper march interval and following distances; he must understand the effect the speed of his vehicle can have on the rest of the serial. Drivers can use man-made features (such as utility poles) or time/distance factors to gauge distance between vehicles. For example, at 15 miles per hour (mph) with a 100-meter interval, there are 15 seconds between vehicles; 20 mph and a 100-meter interval equal 11 seconds between vehicles.

·

NBC. All members of the organization must be trained in NBC countermeasures and driving in NBC gear.

·

Air guards. As noted, each vehicle commander designates an air guard who is responsible for detecting threat aerial platforms. Refer to Chapter 8 of this manual for a further discussion of active and passive air defense measures.

·

Actions on contact. The platoon must be ready to execute immediate action drills in accordance with unit SOP at any time during the road march. Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for a detailed discussion of actions on contact.

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·

Constant practice. Road march training must be conducted at every opportunity; road march techniques can be practiced even in routine situations, such as two vehicles moving together outside a motor pool.

·

Systematic training. The unit should first master road march techniques under good conditions (in the daytime, over short distances, and with good communications). It then must work toward mastering these skills under difficult conditions, including operations involving limited visibility, blackout, long distances, and radio listening silence.

SECTION III – BATTLE HANDOVER DURING PASSAGE OF LINES 6-44. Battle handover is an operation conducted by stationary and

passing units in a close-in battle to transfer responsibility for fighting a threat force from one unit to another. Its purpose is to sustain continuity of the combined arms fight and to prevent the threat from moving unopposed on the battlefield as one force picks up the fight from another. It also preserves the fighting capabilities of both friendly units.

6-45. A passage of lines is a tactical event associated with battle

handover. It is the controlled movement of one unit through the positions of a stationary unit, conducted so that neither unit interferes with the other’s scheme of maneuver. A passage of lines often becomes necessary because the combat situation does not permit one unit to bypass another unit’s position.

6-46. A unit may conduct either a rearward or forward passage of lines. When a unit moves toward the threat through a stationary unit, it is considered a forward passage. In a rearward passage, the unit moves away from the threat through friendly units. 6-47. A passage of lines may be conducted for the following purposes:

· · · · · · ·

Continue an attack or counterattack. Envelop a threat force. Pursue a fleeing threat. Withdraw security forces or MBA forces. Facilitate route, zone, or area reconnaissance. Execute a defense or a delay. Execute a screen or guard operation.

6-48. The reconnaissance platoon may perform some of these operations independently (screen and reconnaissance); otherwise, it usually will take part in a passage of lines as part of a larger force.

CRITICAL TASKS 6-49. There are three key elements in battle handover and passage of lines: the stationary unit, the passing unit, and the common commander.

6-10


6-50. The commander exercising command authority over both the stationary unit and the passing unit must designate the battle handover line (BHL); this is a phase line forward of the stationary unit that is recognizable on the ground. He normally does this in coordination with the stationary unit commander, who will recommend the position of the BHL. The line is drawn where elements of the passing unit can be effectively protected by direct fires of the forward combat elements of the stationary unit until the passage of lines is complete. The area between the BHL and the stationary force is the responsibility of the stationary unit commander. The common commander will provide the graphic control measures that depict the BHL and contact points on an overlay issued to subordinate units with the OPORD or FRAGO (see Figure 6-2). 6-51. Battle handover begins on order of the common commander. Defensive handover is complete when the passing unit is clear and the stationary unit is ready to engage the threat. Offensive handover is complete when the passing unit has deployed and crossed the BHL. The common commander prescribes the specific criteria that mark completion of handover; he ensures that both subordinate commanders understand these criteria. 6-52. The reconnaissance platoon, acting independently or as part of a larger element, may be either the stationary or the passing unit. The platoon will normally assist in some portion of the passage of lines and may be required to coordinate the passage. In many cases, the platoon will be required to conduct a passage separate from its higher headquarters.

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Figure 6-2. Battle Handover and Passage of Lines Graphics PASSING UNIT CRITICAL TASKS

6-53. The passing unit must accomplish several critical tasks during battle handover and passage of lines, including the following:

6-12

·

Immediately establish communications, entering the command, OI, and fire support nets of the stationary unit.

·

Collocate a section or vehicle (usually the platoon leader’s or PSG’s vehicle) with the tactical command post (TAC CP) or main CP of the stationary unit as soon as possible to enhance communications and unity of effort.

·

In a rearward passage, continuously report to the stationary unit the location, size, and composition of all threat forces, as well as the threat’s current activity. If the threat is attacking, the passing unit reports the direction of movement, movement formation, and estimated rate of advance of threat elements. If the threat is defending, passing unit reports include threat locations, orientation, composition, fire sacks, reserves (if known), obstacle systems, and flanks.

·

Continuously report to the stationary unit the location, size, and activity of all parent unit elements, to include CS, CSS, and command and control assets.


·

Based on the current dispositions of the parent unit and elements of the platoon, coordinate with the stationary unit to determine contact points at which subordinate elements (such as reconnaissance sections) will physically coordinate handover and passage of lines with representatives of the stationary unit. Once contact points are determined, the passing unit leader sends a FRAGO to all elements specifying where they will physically coordinate the passage with the stationary unit. In addition, the passing unit confirms recognition signals that must be displayed during passage.

·

Ensure that each subordinate element acknowledges where it must physically coordinate the passage and that it dispatches representatives to the assigned contact points to coordinate passage for the element. At the contact points, the representatives confirm recognition signals and exchange required information with their counterparts from the stationary unit.

·

In a rearward passage, maintain visual contact with all threat units and conduct movement back to the BHL, avoiding decisive engagement.

·

During the passage, display correct recognition signals and use correct challenge and password as specified in the SOI.

·

Maintain proper weapons orientation.

STATIONARY UNIT CRITICAL TASKS

6-54. The stationary unit must accomplish a variety of critical tasks when ordered to conduct battle handover and passage of lines. These tasks include the following:

·

Establish communications with the passing unit, coordinate necessary contact points, and direct the passing unit to the contact points based on current dispositions of the designated units.

·

Ensure that contact points are manned and secured and that passing elements have established personal communications with their representatives.

·

Ensure that representatives at the contact points assign each passing element a PP into the area of operations and a route that extends from the PPs to the rear boundary or assembly area (in a rearward passage) or to the attack position (in a forward passage).

·

Ensure that representatives at the contact points exchange required information with the passing unit as outlined in the unit SOP. (NOTE: ST 3-20.983 lists examples of information to be exchanged.)

·

Position elements along the BHL where they have the best possible observation of threat avenues of approach, adjusting as necessary for limited visibility conditions.

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·

If obstacles are emplaced between the FEBA and the BHL, ensure that routes through the obstacle system are clearly marked and physically controlled by guides or that escorts are provided to the passing unit.

·

Ensure that all routes of withdrawal obligated to the passing unit are unobstructed and facilitate rapid movement to the RP.

·

Ensure that obligated routes of advance, attack positions, and routes to the BHL are clear and facilitate rapid movement.

PREPARATION 6-55. Units are particularly vulnerable during a passage of lines. Personnel and subordinate elements may be concentrated, stationary unit fires may be masked temporarily, and the passing unit may not be disposed properly to react to threat action. Effective preparation is critical in overcoming such conditions and ensuring that the passage proceeds quickly and smoothly. The commander may task the reconnaissance platoon with a number of missions, including detailed reconnaissance and coordination, to assist him in preparing for the passage. COORDINATION

6-56. Coordination occurs at a preplanned contact point where critical information is exchanged and coordinated. Coordination for battle handover normally flows from the commander out of contact to the commander in contact. Coordination for the handover and for the passage of lines should be conducted simultaneously. 6-57. The reconnaissance platoon leader plays a major role in coordination for handover and passage of lines. He is responsible for conducting coordination and reconnaissance to obtain information for use by both the platoon and its parent unit. He then uses this information in the coordination process. 6-58. During his reconnaissance, the platoon leader must confirm the following battlefield factors and information:

6-14

·

The disposition of the stationary force through which the platoon and/or its parent unit must pass.

·

The location of contact points where both units are required to make physical contact at a predetermined time.

·

The location of passage lanes that provide a clear route through the stationary unit’s position to facilitate a smooth and continuous passage. The areas selected for the passage should be unoccupied or on the flanks of units in position. If possible, the platoon leader should reconnoiter multiple routes that can reduce vulnerability during the operation.

·

The rear boundary or assembly area (in a rearward passage) or the attack position (in a forward passage). This position should provide cover and concealment and be located where the passing unit will not interfere with the stationary unit.

·

The initial locations for CS and CSS elements of the platoon’s parent unit.


6-59. Based on his reconnaissance, the platoon leader coordinates the following information:

· · · · · · · ·

Contact points (primary and alternate).

· · ·

Traffic control factors, such as number of vehicles by type.

· ·

Actions on contact if required during the passage.

· · ·

Exchange of threat and friendly information.

Applicable PPs. Passage lanes, including the SP, RP, and critical points. The LD. Location and number of guides and guide vehicles. Routes through obstacles. Alternate routes. CSS plans, including resupply (Classes III and V), maintenance, MEDEVAC and/or CASEVAC, and disposition of EPWs. Time of the passage. Rally points, the rear boundary or assembly area (rearward passage), and/or the attack position (forward passage). Times for transfer of responsibility for control of the sector and for handover of the threat and BHL. Fire support during the passage. Direct and indirect fire plans and obstacle plans.

NOTE: The parent unit commander may provide some of this information as part of his order to the platoon. ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMANDER

6-60. Given the capabilities of the reconnaissance platoon, many commanders require the platoon to assist other units in the passage of lines. Primarily, the platoon enhances the command and control function for the commander. The platoon may be required to conduct one or more of the critical tasks of a stationary or passing unit or may assist its parent unit in the following ways:

·

Elements of the platoon may assist in securing contact and PPs where units will meet and pass.

·

The platoon may reconnoiter possible passage lanes (primary and alternate), clearing them of obstacles (within capability) and marking their locations.

·

The platoon may guide units from contact points to or through passage lanes. The platoon may also control traffic at the PP and in the lane.

·

The platoon may conduct area reconnaissance of attack positions (forward passage) and assembly area locations (rearward passage). This may include a requirement to check for NBC contamination.

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·

Platoon elements may be positioned in the passage area to act as a communications link in case units involved in the passage have trouble communicating with each other.

·

The platoon may assist the commander by occupying OPs or conducting patrols to provide a continuous flow of information about the threat situation.

CONDUCT OF THE PASSAGE 6-61. In a forward passage of lines, the platoon leader or unit commander normally performs the coordination. For a rearward passage of lines, the PSG or the commander’s liaison officer normally performs the coordination. The stationary unit is responsible for designating PPs and passage lanes and for providing guides. If contact points have not been designated by higher headquarters, the stationary unit should coordinate their locations with the passing unit. For ease of control, the passing unit’s command group (TAC CP or main CP) temporarily collocates with the stationary unit’s command group (TAC CP or main CP). 6-62. After coordination is made and the passage begins, guides pick up the passing unit at the contact point or PP. Guides exchange recognition signals with the passing unit and move it along the route(s) without pausing, with the stationary unit overwatching the movement. Guides leave the passing unit either at the RP or after it has passed the last stationary unit position. 6-63. Disabled vehicles are recovered by self-recovery methods or by organic recovery vehicles. The stationary unit provides the required medical assistance, maintenance, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) as far forward as possible. As a minimum, the stationary unit should provide emergency medical support.

NBC CONSIDERATIONS 6-64. Because of potential congestion of units at PPs and along routes, stationary and passing units must take protective measures against NBC attack. Techniques to reduce vulnerability include the following:

6-16

·

To minimize exposure time, passing units move as rapidly as possible through PPs and along passage routes to their RPs.

·

Passing and stationary units conduct radiological and chemical monitoring.

·

Stationary units disperse by posting one or two vehicles in primary firing positions, with other vehicles in hide positions. Elements in hide positions prepare for NBC attack.

·

Passing and stationary units put on chemical-protective clothing as prescribed by the commander.

·

If required, the stationary unit requests assistance through channels for decontamination of the passing unit Units normally conduct operational decontamination and then move to a rear assembly area for thorough decontamination. A reconnaissance platoon does not have the internal assets for thorough decontamination of personnel or equipment; it requires assistance from a chemical defense company.


FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE 6-65. Since battle handover and passage of lines are usually conducted in contact with the threat, extreme care must be taken to avoid fratricide. Thorough coordination is critical; all units involved must know the correct recognition signals as well as the exact number of vehicles and time of passage. There will be times when some elements fail to receive necessary information or when stragglers are unaware of the current operation. Planning and coordination must cover the following considerations:

· · · · · · · · ·

Fratricide assessment.

·

Communications procedures and potential problems.

Vehicle marking systems. Navigational aids. Threat situation and composition. Obscuration (limited visibility). Identification friend or foe (IFF) expedients for ground forces. Effective SOPs. Direct fire plans for both units. Indirect fire considerations, including specific procedures for requesting and clearing indirect fires.

6-66. For more detailed information concerning fratricide and risk reduction measures, refer to Appendix H (risk management) and Appendix I (fratricide prevention) of this manual.

SECTION IV – RELIEF IN PLACE 6-67. Relief in place is an operation in which one unit replaces another unit in combat. It may be accomplished during offensive or defensive operations. Its primary purpose is to sustain the combat effectiveness of committed units. A relief may also be conducted to allow a relieved unit to rest, reconstitute, or decontaminate or to change missions. For the reconnaissance platoon, the relief operation may entail such tasks as serving as road guides for the supported unit, performing liaison with the relieved unit, or participating in the relief with its parent unit. 6-68. Relief in place is difficult to plan and conduct because of the nature of the operation and the command, control, communications, and coordination required. It is important that the operation not be disclosed to the threat; security, secrecy, and speed are critical. Though the platoon cannot always wait for optimum conditions, relief in place is best conducted during periods of limited visibility and during lulls in battle. Limited visibility may be achieved by using smoke to obscure the threat’s vision. Using smoke over a large area can confuse the threat as to the platoon’s actual location. 6-69. The relief must be conducted as quickly and as secretly as possible. Relieving scouts must avoid sustaining casualties, hampering

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the operation of the scouts being relieved, or allowing the threat to detect the operation. To reduce confusion and maintain security, the incoming platoon leader must attempt to obtain the following information:

· · · · · · · ·

The time that responsibility for the sector or zone is to pass.

· ·

Handover procedures for artillery and ADA.

·

Procedures for transfer of ammunition, wire lines, POL, and other items between outgoing and incoming units, if necessary.

OPSEC considerations. Deception plans. The time, method, and sequence of relief. Routes and critical control measures. Graphics for alternate and successive fighting positions. Contingency plans for changes of mission. Actions on threat contact, if required before completion of the relief. Obstacle locations and procedures covering the transfer of responsibility.

6-70. Radio traffic must be kept to a minimum; light and noise discipline must be strictly enforced. If possible, the relieving platoon leader conducts a reconnaissance of the new positions. This is usually accomplished with the relieved platoon leader. 6-71. Once the reconnaissance is complete and orders are finalized, the platoon executes its mission. If it is participating in the relief, one of several methods may be used:

·

One vehicle at a time. This is the slowest, but most secure, method.

·

All vehicles simultaneously. This is the quickest, but least secure, method.

·

Occupying adjacent or in-depth positions that cover the same area of responsibility.

·

Exchange of vehicles and equipment. This is done when secrecy is the overriding factor. This is the most difficult and time-consuming method.

6-72. The actual relief in place can be conducted from a hide position behind the relieved element, with individual relieving vehicles moving forward. The relieving platoon can also occupy alternate positions within the relieved element’s sector or zone. In some cases, the platoon may move into the primary positions as soon as the relieved vehicles back out. The relieved element may provide guides to ensure that relieving vehicles can locate those they are replacing. 6-73. The most important transmission during the relief process is the completion call to the incoming platoon’s commander. This is made when the incoming platoon is fully set in position and is prepared to conduct its next operation.

6-18

Chapter 7

Urban Operations Throughout history, military planners have viewed cities as centers of gravity and sources of national strength. Cities are population centers; transportation and communication hubs; key nodes of industrial, financial, and information systems; seats of government; and repositories of wealth. Because the US has worldwide interests that directly relate to global security, deployments into urban environments are likely to become more frequent. Urban operations serve a variety of tactical purposes:

CONTENTS Understanding the Urban Environment ...... Phases of Urban Operations ................ Operational Considerations ................. Characteristics of the Urban Environment ............................ The Threat in the Urban Area ............... Civil Considerations .............................. Planning ........................................................ Collect and Analyze Existing Intelligence ......................................... Develop the Plan .................................... Execution ...................................................... Approach the Urban Area of Operations ...................................... Employ Surveillance Teams ................. Conduct the Multidimensional Aspect of Reconnaissance ............... Conduct Assessment of the Area of Operations ............................. End State ................................................ Support an Assault in the Urban Area ...................................

·

Neutralize or stabilize extremely volatile political situations.

·

Defeat a threat force that has sought protection afforded by urban terrain.

·

Provide assistance to allies in need of support.

7-1 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-5 7-7 7-7 7-8 7-11 7-23 7-23 7-23 7-53 7-62 7-63 7-63

SECTION I – UNDERSTANDING THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 7-1. The reconnaissance scout is the essential element in providing friendly forces with real time information and in facilitating the situational understanding they need to defeat the threat in the urban environment. Cavalry squadrons (RSTA), with their recce platoons, are specifically tailored to conduct the added multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance operations in and around urban areas when the threat level allows. Because of the increased likelihood of urban operations, however, all reconnaissance platoons must understand how to operate in this environment with varying threat levels.

PHASES OF URBAN OPERATIONS 7-2. This chapter focuses on the tools necessary for understanding the urban environment and for planning and executing missions, including reconnaissance, in the urban area. Table 7-1 summarizes the actions

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involved in the planning, preparation, and execution phases of urban reconnaissance. Table 7-1. Phases of Urban Reconnaissance PHASE Planning Preparation

Execution

*

ACTIONS Collect and analyze existing intelligence Develop the plan Refine plan Rehearsals, PCI/PCC Approach the urban area of operations Employ surveillance teams (mounted and/or dismounted) Conduct reconnaissance * Conduct assessment of the area of operations

The multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance is also conducted in permissive and semipermissive environments if executed by recce platoons or by reconnaissance platoons augmented with supporting assets for this mission focus.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 7-3. Reconnaissance units conduct reconnaissance in urban environments to gain critical information for the brigade or regiment. The reconnaissance platoon must have a clear understanding of its information requirements and how they relate to the higher headquarters’ intent. The recce platoon may focus on using traditional techniques of information-gathering, as well as such methods as interaction with the society and tactical questioning. On the other hand, CFV-mounted scouts may focus on the isolation of an urban area to support an infantry assault in a high-threat environment. All reconnaissance platoons, however, must be prepared to transition from one extreme to another as the operational environment changes. No matter the focus, the main goal of the platoon’s reconnaissance effort is to provide the brigade or regiment with a thorough, accurate understanding of the urban environment. 7-4. Crucial to planning operations in urban areas is the urban IPB. Reconnaissance units must identify all relevant forces, along with their strengths and critical vulnerabilities, and be able to identify the critical nodes of the urban area that may provide tactical leverage when controlled. The IPB effort must consider noncombatants, whose presence in the urban area may be substantial and dynamic. Determining the ethnic and religious composition of the population and, if possible, their intent (for example, to flee or remain in the urban area) may prove crucial. If combat operations in the urban area are necessary, the platoon’s mission focuses on achieving informational and situational understanding for the brigade/regiment. Among tasks the platoon may perform for the brigade/regiment are determining trafficability of routes and lateral routes, identifying subterranean entry points and systems, developing communications architecture, and providing a C2 framework. NOTE: Once the urban environment is understood, the brigade or regiment can begin its urban operations. Refer to FM 3-90.3 (FM 71-3) for specifics on the brigade-level framework.

7-2

___________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations

7-5. During the preparation phase, the reconnaissance platoon will determine reconnaissance objectives and conduct urban IPB; for more information, refer to FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130). To begin developing the situation, the platoon will collect and analyze existing map and aerial images (IMINT), as well as all available HUMINT (from such sources as special operations forces [SOF] or the National Security Agency [NSA]). Without proper preparation and planning, entering or operating within an urban environment poses a significant threat to reconnaissance soldiers. The urban environment and the threat must be thoroughly analyzed before reconnaissance operations begin. This discussion describes characteristics unique to the urban environment and the threat, as well as considerations that the platoon must take into account during planning and preparation.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 7-6. Although each operational environment encountered by the reconnaissance platoon has its own distinct characteristics, urban areas are the most complex. There are two primary factors that influence the complexity of urban operations. One is the man-made terrain and supporting infrastructure, which is covered later in this discussion. The other factor is the density of noncombatants in close proximity to combat forces. Of these two key urban factors, noncombatants and the human dimension are the most important and, potentially, the most confusing to reconnaissance units. HUMINT, which focuses on gaining an understanding of how the local populace feels toward friendly and threat forces, is a major part of the RSTA squadron effort. The HUMINT process is discussed later in this chapter and in the discussion in Chapter 3 covering the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance. PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

7-7. Urban terrain presents tactical and operational challenges in an extraordinary mix of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean settings. Four aspects of this physical dimension merit special consideration. Airspace Over the City

7-8. Airspace provides a rapid avenue of approach into the urbanized area. While aviation assets are unaffected by obstacles such as rubble, they must consider towers, signs, power lines, and other obstructions to flight. Scouts can locate these obstructions, determine how they can serve as passive air defense measures, and provide a hazards overlay for the UAV platoon and other aviation assets. The platoon can also identify and mark potential PZs/LZs. Buildings (Super-Surface)

7-9. Buildings provide cover and concealment, limit or enhance fields of fire, and restrict or block movement of ground forces. Scouts must identify buildings that serve as key terrain (for example, as communications nodes or dominant vantage points) throughout the urban area. Rooftops must be considered a separate and unique threat. Whenever possible, TUAV or aviation reconnaissance of rooftops should be employed to identify threats and to assist in preempting threat action.

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Streets (Surface)

7-10. Streets afford avenues of approach and are the primary means for rapid ground movement in an urban area. Forces traveling along streets, however, are often canalized by buildings and have little space for maneuver off of the main thoroughfares. The reconnaissance platoon must identify trafficability of streets (lateral and parallel) within the area of operations. This includes determining width and weight capabilities of streets and the limitations of bridges, culverts, and overpasses throughout the urban area to assist follow-on forces in planning. Subterranean Systems (Subsurface)

7-11. Subterranean systems can easily be employed as avenues of approach and supply routes for dismounted elements. Friendly forces must identify subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems in the urban area; they must also develop an understanding of how the threat may use these systems to conduct ambushes, counterattacks, infiltration, and sustainment operations. Entrances and exits to subterranean areas should be mapped as part of an overlay. “Most of the buildings in the city are equipped with concrete basements. We used to hide there during the first war. Sometimes we lived there for weeks. Many of the cellars are equipped with a water supply. We kept food stocks there and some of the citizens even had electric generators.” Zumrud Alieva, refugee who fled Grozny, Russia (Chechnya) TYPES OF URBAN TERRAIN

7-12. The urban area is classified into six types of urban terrain. For more information, refer to FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130). Dense, Random Construction

7-13. Dense, random construction is typical of the old inner-city pattern with narrow, winding streets radiating from a central area in an irregular manner. Buildings are located close together and frequently close to the edge of a roadway. Closed-Orderly Block

7-14. This type of city block typically has wider streets that form rectangular patterns. The buildings frequently form a continuous front along the blocks. Inner-block courtyards are common. Dispersed Residential Area

7-15. Normally adjacent to closed-orderly block areas in Europe, this pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens, trees, and fences. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving. High-Rise Area

7-16. High-rise areas are typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns. This terrain consists of multistory apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings. Wide streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. These areas are often adjacent to industrial or transportation areas or interspersed with closed-orderly block areas.

7-4


Industrial-Transportation

7-17. This terrain is generally located on or along major rail and highway routes in urban complexes. Older complexes may be located within dense, random construction or closed-orderly block areas. New construction normally consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings. In the Orient, high-rise areas providing worker housing are normally located adjacent to industrial-transportation complexes. Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is critical. These facilities, especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles to military movement. Permanent or Fixed Fortifications and Other Military Installations

7-18. This classification covers several different types of terrain. Prominent examples include isolated forts such as the Hue Citadel, the German fortifications that surrounded Metz, and structures that form part of a fortified line (such as the Siegfried and Maginot lines). While most such fortifications are found in Western Europe, a number can be found in the Balkans, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America. Those in the United States were mostly used for coastal defense. Permanent-type fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or a combination. Some recent variants have been built underground and employ heavy tank or warship armor, major caliber and other weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and NBC overpressure systems. This category also includes urban-area military installations such as Camp Lejeune, Fort Huachuca, Travis Air Force Base, and Norfolk Navy Base.

THE THREAT IN THE URBAN AREA 7-19. Trends indicate increasing availability and integration of sophisticated technology and unorthodox operational approaches by potential opponents in urban operations. To offset their inherent weaknesses, threat forces will seek the advantage in urban and complex terrain by remaining dispersed and decentralized; they will adapt their tactics to most effectively counter the response of US forces and their allies. ORGANIZATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

7-20. In addition to conventional forces, the threat in urban areas may include the following:

· · · ·

Unconventional forces. Paramilitary forces. Militia and special police organizations. Organized criminal organizations.

7-21. These forces employ the full range of military ordnance and organizations, from small arms, mortars, machine guns, antiarmor weapons, and mines to very capable mechanized and armored forces equipped with current-generation equipment. The threat uses these various approaches to counter the technological and numerical advantages of US and allied systems and forces. In addition, threat forces seek to exploit constraints placed on US forces because of cultural bias,

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media presence, ROE/ROI, and distance from the crisis location. Urban environments also provide many passive dangers such as psychological stresses and disease from unsanitary conditions.

7-22. The most dangerous potential opponents will remain those who have the capacity to prosecute full-scale combat actions escalating to MTW operations. These threat forces will employ weapons of mass destruction wherever possible. Such organizations as SOF, statecontrolled terrorist elements, paramilitary units, and guerilla forces will be a part of a strategy of simultaneous, distributed operations both inside and outside the area of operations. Mines and unexploded ordnance will be used to demoralize and hamper US forces.

“We have seen amazing things in Grozny. The guerrillas were hiding in pits covered by reinforced concrete plates camouflaged under masses of rubbish. They lifted the plates with jacks and shot at us. When our attack jets appeared, the bandits drew the plate down. Sometimes they let us pass over them and then (jumped out and) hit our backs.” Pavel, a 21-year-old Russian soldier wounded in Grozny

THREAT TACTICS

7-23. While the nature of active threats will vary widely among specific urban areas, many principles and techniques will be common to all such elements. This discussion examines several operational and tactical tenets that may be used against US forces in the urban environment. Use the Local Populace to Best Advantage

7-24. The populace of a given urban area represents a form of key terrain; the side that manages it best has a distinct advantage. Threat forces will use the population to provide camouflage, concealment, and deception for their operations. Guerilla and terrorist elements will look no different from other members of the community. Even conventional and paramilitary forces will often adopt a civilian look to confuse friendly forces. The civilian populace can also actively provide cover for threat forces, enhancing their mobility in proximity to US positions. 7-25. Threat forces will take advantage of moral responsibilities of US and allies units, attempting to make the civilian populace a burden on the friendly forces’ logistical and force protection resources. Local residents will also serve as a key intelligence source for threat forces, which will attempt to use civilians with access to US bases or perimeters to gain information on friendly dispositions, readiness, and intent. Win the Information War

7-26. Threat forces will take advantage of presence of the media to turn the sentiments of the civilian populace other countries against US forces. Print and broadcast reporters and photographers, video cameras, Internet web sites, and cellular telephones are examples of tools the threat will use to influence popular opinion.

7-6


Manipulate Key Facilities

7-27. Threat forces will identify key facilities and then use them to shape the area of operations in their favor. Examples of facilities that the threat will target to gain a position of advantage against US forces include telecommunication sites, water treatment plants, and power generation and transmission sites. Use All Dimensions of the Physical Environment

7-28. Threat forces will take advantage of every aspect of the urban environment to attack US forces. Rooftops and tall buildings afford vantage points and ambush positions that exceed the maximum elevation capability of many friendly weapon systems. Elevated attack positions allow the threat to strike vehicles at their most vulnerable points and to use enfilading fire against exposed dismounted soldiers. Basements and other subterranean areas provide covered and concealed positions that allow movement and access throughout the area of operations. Many of these positions will be below the minimum depression capability of friendly vehicles and weapons.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS 7-29. The reconnaissance platoon must determine what civil considerations its higher headquarters will encounter through the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance. Information requirements when the platoon is assigned a multidimensional focus include the following:

· · · · · · ·

Political affiliations and grievances. Ethnicity. Factions. Cultural distinctions. Living conditions. Religious beliefs. Attitude toward US forces (friendly, neutral, hostile).

7-30. Analyzing the information gained on the civilian populace will be an important factor in determining COAs for the higher headquarters. The platoon leader analyzes the information collected and assesses what actions are necessary to control the impact of civilians. Options that the platoon leader can recommend to higher headquarters include screening of civilians, prohibition of unauthorized movement, diversion or control of refugee movements, and evacuation.

SECTION II – PLANNING NOTE:

As shown in Table 7-1, the planning phase entails two key actions, which are examined in detail in this section: · Collect and analyze existing intelligence.

·

Develop the plan.

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COLLECT AND ANALYZE EXISTING INTELLIGENCE 7-31. During the planning phase, the reconnaissance platoon leader assesses his assigned reconnaissance objectives and conduct urban IPB. The platoon collects and analyzes existing intelligence, including map and aerial images (IMINT) and HUMINT, to begin developing the situation. The platoon begins mapping of the urban area in the planning phase. URBAN MAPPING

7-32. Before entering an urban environment, reconnaissance units develop urban operations sketches. These reconnaissance products, usually created as overlays, serve several purposes. The sketches are an important supplement to existing maps, which in most cases do not show the level of detail necessary for effective situational awareness. They allow the platoon leader to track his elements with greater accuracy and to give precise location updates to higher headquarters. (NOTE: If such materials are not available from other sources, the platoon may be required to produce a sketch and hand it over to higher headquarters for use by all leaders and soldiers taking part in the operation.) 7-33. In developing urban operations sketches and overlays, the platoon should attempt to gain access to city planner or civil engineer maps, which provide detailed information of the urban area. This information is usually requested and obtained through a higher headquarters. The platoon then conducts initial map and aerial photograph reconnaissance to pinpoint key terrain and other important locations in the area of operations. Figure 7-1 shows an example of this photo reconnaissance, which focuses on areas such as the following:

·

·

·

7-8

Sites that may serve as potential safe havens for threat forces, including the following: n

Hospitals.

n

Police stations.

n

Embassies.

n

Other facilities that are nominally friendly, but that could harbor threat elements.

Hazardous areas, such as the following: n

Construction sites.

n

Dangerous intersections.

n

Bridges.

n

Areas of criminal activity.

Major terrain features, including the following: n

Parks.

n

Industrial complexes.

n

Airports.

n

Power plants and/or power distribution facilities.

n

Dams.

n

Water treatment plants.


CITY HALL

HOSPITAL

Figure 7-1. Initial Photo Reconnaissance in Urban Operations REFINING THE DATA

7-34. Once this basic reconnaissance is completed, the platoon uses the available maps and photographs to refine the information and translate it into a form that can be transferred to the urban operations sketch. This process includes incorporating a reference system to identify buildings and streets. Naming and numbering conventions should be simple (for example, odd-numbered buildings on the left side of the street, even numbers on the right side) to allow for ease of navigation and orientation in the urban environment. Street names should not be used as references as the signs can be missing or changed to confuse friendly forces. The naming and numbering conventions should be standardized in the unit SOP to ensure everyone involved understands the procedure. 7-35. Graphic control measures are added, and sites of tactical and operations significance are identified (see Figure 7-2). The platoon leader can then use the accumulated information to develop a detailed urban operations sketch, as illustrated in Figure 7-3. He must ensure that the sketches the platoon develops and uses are consistent with those used at troop and squadron level. In addition, the platoon leader may develop one or more types of operational overlays based on the information that has been collected. Examples of these overlays, illustrated in Figure 7-4, include terrain conditions, likely threat positions, and subterranean infrastructure.

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7-36. The sketches and overlays are distributed both within the unit and to higher and adjacent elements. Because individual vehicles and squads may have to execute operations on their own, the platoon leader must ensure that every soldier has an understanding of the sketches and overlays and of the reference system used to show information on them. As the platoon conducts operations in the urban area, it confirms the accuracy of the sketches and overlays, adding more detail as necessary. HOME HOM E OF MOU NTED W FAR E OF MOUNTED WAR ARFARE FARE XXI US A ARM O R CE NTER

CITY HALL 33 17 12 10

RT

RE

D

31 8

29 27

13

K

11 PL BRAVO

9

6

25

PL CHAR LIE

15

4

K

23

ADA

7 5

2 PL ALPHA

3

HO SPITAL

RT BLUE

RT

W

HI

TE

21

1

Figure 7-2. Refinement of Urban Operations Photo Reconnaissance U RB A N SK ETCH GOAL: HANDOFF T HE URBAN SK E T C H T O B D E FO R U SE D O W N T O S Q D LEV E L T O A SS IST IN C 2 BRID G E – C L AS S 70

P L C H A R L IE

33

17

14

C ITY HALL

15

12 31

13

10

29 8

11

27

25

4

7

2

H O S P ITA L

3

1

RTE BLUE

RTE WHITE

RTE RED

ADA

5

23 21

PL B R A V O

9

6

PL A L PH A

Figure 7-3. Urban Operations Sketch

7-10


Figure 7-4. Urban Operations Overlays (Terrain Classification, Top Left; Threat Positions and Demonstration Locations, Top Right; Subterranean Infrastructure, Bottom)

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DEVELOP THE PLAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

7-37. HUMINT collection begins with the platoon obtaining all available information, including data from internal military forces and SOF. In particular, the platoon gathers information on locations of reliable sources near the urban area that can be used to gain the most current situation within the area of operations. In diverse multiethnic areas, it is important for platoon soldiers to have an understanding of how the different segments of the local populace will react to them during the course of operations. Operational Considerations

7-38. Using his sources, the platoon leader identifies the best approach route into the urban area, locations or obstacles to be avoided, information sources within the urban area, and any other specific areas of interest. The use of tactical questioning is an invaluable skill in validating the information from HUMINT sources. For additional details, refer to the discussion of HUMINT collection in Chapter 3 of this manual. 7-39. After analyzing the higher commander’s mission and intent, the platoon leader determines how to gain the information required within its area of operations. The platoon will use a combination of stealth, HUMINT, and IMINT, when available, to develop the urban situation. The information-gathering process is conducted progressively from outside the urban area to inside the urban area. As information is gained from the outer ring of the area of operations, the focus of the collection plan is updated and reconnaissance and surveillance objectives within the urban area are refined. It is essential that reconnaissance units continuously maintain situational awareness; the urban situation can change quickly, leading to compromise or attack. The platoon continues to collect and corroborate information as it approaches the urban area. Collection Methods

7-40. The platoon leader then determines whether to use reconnaissance and/or surveillance to gather information on or in the objective areas. 7-41. Reconnaissance. If the platoon leader conducts reconnaissance operations, he must then decide on the movement technique used to enter and move within the urban area. He makes this decision based on METTTC. Mounted or dismounted patrols are used in conjunction with available surveillance assets, such as TUAVs or the RSTA squadron’s surveillance troop, to gain information required by the mission. The air and ground reconnaissance plans must be synchronized to be effective. (NOTE: Urban patrols are discussed later in this chapter.) Although reconnaissance elements can use stealth during limited visibility, the human density within an urban area makes it difficult for these assets to remain undetected. 7-42. Surveillance. When stealth is required, the platoon uses surveillance to collect information on or in objectives. Locating surveillance positions within the urban area requires thorough planning to ensure that teams are not compromised and that the platoon can assist in extraction if necessary. Communications are of vital importance to the

7-12


surveillance team; therefore, redundancy must be incorporated into the collection plan. Other essential security considerations for the team include exfiltration routes, immediate support (direct or indirect fires), and evasion corridors. The duration of the surveillance mission must also be considered for sustainment of the team, covering such requirements as food, water, and batteries.

7-43. Surveillance positions should be placed in low-activity areas and occupied during limited visibility to reduce possibility of compromise. The selection of the hide site and surveillance site(s) is METT-TC dependent. Considerations for site selection are the following:

·

Can the team place the designated surveillance target(s) under continuous and effective observation within the range of surveillance devices to be used?

·

Will the surveillance site have to be moved if weather and light conditions change?

·

Does the area provide concealment and entrance and exit routes?

· ·

Are there dominant or unusual terrain features nearby?

· ·

Is the site in a location the threat would want to occupy?

· ·

Are there roads or trails nearby?

· ·

Could the team be easily trapped in the site?

·

Are there any inhabited areas in the prevailing downwind area?

· ·

Are there any suitable communication sites nearby?

·

Is there a source of water in the area?

Is the area wet? Is there adequate drainage? Is the area prone to flooding? Is the site silhouetted against the skyline or a contrasting background? Are there other natural lines of movement nearby (gullies, draws, any terrain easy for foot movement)? Are there any nearby obstacles that could impede or prevent vehicle movement (roadside ditch, fence, wall, stream, river)?

Is the site in the normal line of vision of threat personnel in the area?

Infiltration

7-44. Depending on the mission and the information gained initially, the platoon may have to conduct infiltration using surveillance teams to observe areas of interest or conduct target acquisition. Plans for infiltration are based on the requirement for conducting movement to the area of operations with the least risk of detection. Infiltration considerations are the following:

·

Concealed primary or alternate routes are selected based on detailed map reconnaissance, aerial photographs, ground reconnaissance, and threat information from other sources.

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·

Infiltrating elements must avoid obstacles, populated areas, silhouetting locations, threat positions, main avenues of approach, and movement on heavily populated routes and trails.

·

Infiltration should be during periods of reduced visibility and reduced threat alertness. This is especially important in critical phases such as moving through populated areas.

·

Scouts must know routes, rally points (primary/alternate), time schedules, danger areas, and the threat situation. These are critical to an optimum balance of speed and stealth.

·

The team should be provided with centralized coordination to ensure that all scouts are acting in accordance with cover and deception plans. Infiltration by land is characterized by centralized planning and decentralized execution.

Exfiltration

7-45. The principles of route selection, movement formations, and movement security are observed during movement to the extraction site. Exfiltration considerations are the following:

·

The amount of time that a team remains in the urban area of operations depends on its mission, composition, and equipment. The exfiltration is critical from a standpoint of morale and mission accomplishment. Plans for extraction are made before the operation, along with alternate plans for contingencies such as the evacuation of sick or injured personnel. During the mission, the team leader may be faced with an unforeseen situation that may demand the utmost flexibility, discipline, and leadership.

·

Each team is given code words in the OPORD for use during exfiltration. For example, one code word may mean that the team is at its pickup zone. Another may mean that both the primary and alternate pickup zones are compromised and to abort the extraction.

·

When a team has missed a certain number of required transmissions, the command assumes that the team has a communications problem, is in trouble, or both. At that time, a no-communication resupply and exfiltration plan is used.

·

Exfiltration of the team may be by means other than linkup with the team’s vehicles. The OPORD may specify dismounted exfiltration or linkup with friendly forces in an offensive operation. Any of these means may also be planned as alternatives in the event the team cannot be extracted by its vehicles or must take action to avoid capture.

·

Teams must be trained in exfiltration techniques so they can walk out singly or in groups.

NOTE: Infiltration and exfiltration are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this manual.

7-14


VEHICLE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

7-46. Urban combat operations are usually conducted by the infantry, with reconnaissance assets providing support. Reconnaissance platoons equipped with CFVs can be employed in built-up areas to assist dismounted forces in seizing and clearing streets and buildings. Reconnaissance platoons equipped with the HMMWV or RV may operate within the urban area in a permissive environment. Once the operational environment escalates to combat operations, however, these elements do not normally operate inside the built-up area because of their lack of armor protection; they may be used to secure the avenues of approach around the perimeter of the area and to support isolation. The CFV, HMMWV, and RV can provide limited suppressive fires for the initial infantry assault on the built-up area during combat operations. CFV Capabilities

7-47. The CFV has these capabilities related to urban operations:

·

It is armed with the 25-mm cannon and 7.62-mm coax machine gun.

·

It is capable of 60-degree elevation, allowing it to engage targets on the upper floors of tall buildings.

·

It can employ 25-mm AP or HE ammunition to penetrate buildings.

· · · ·

It provides armor protection for crew and passengers. It is equipped with multiple FM radios. It can assist in MEDEVAC/CASEVAC operations. It can assist in resupply operations.

CFV Limitations

7-48. The CFV has these vulnerabilities related to urban operations:

·

It is restricted primarily to streets and lacks maneuverability inside built-up areas.

·

There is dead space around the CFV into which the vehicle cannot fire its weapons.

·

It is vulnerable to enemy infantry firing antiarmor weapons from cellars and drains.

·

It is dependent on dismounts for all-around protection.

HMMWV and RV Capabilities

7-49. The HMMWV and the RV have these capabilities related to urban operations:

·

They are armed with the caliber .50 heavy machine gun and/or the MK-19 40-mm machine gun with automatic grenade launcher.

· ·

They can suppress and destroy light armor vehicles. They are highly mobile and have a small thermal signature.

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· · ·

They are equipped with multiple FM radios. They present fewer logistical problems than the CFV. They can operate on narrow streets.

HMMWV and RV Limitations

7-50. The HMMWV and the RV have these vulnerabilities related to urban operations:

· · ·

They provide armor protection only against small arms. The HMMWV lacks the ability to transport infantry soldiers. They have no antiarmor capability.

COMMUNICATIONS

7-51. In the urban environment, effective communications require detailed planning. Because of the effects of urban terrain, the reconnaissance platoon leader must plan for redundant communications that will allow the platoon freedom of movement. In simplest terms, to communicate effectively and continuously, he must minimize the limitations imposed by the urban environment and maximize the advantages of existing civil communications. The platoon should follow this general rule: If you cannot communicate where you are, move until you can. 7-52. The first step is to identify terrain along the approach route and in the urban area of operations that supports line of sight (LOS) communications. Man-made structures can create problems for singlechannel radios; they may inhibit LOS radio communications by absorbing or reflecting transmitted signals. One solution is to establish retransmission (retrans) sites on supporting terrain or structures to facilitate C2 during the platoon’s initial entry into the urban area. The platoon will continue to identify structures within the urban area that can support retrans sites as it moves within the area of operations. If retrans teams are not available, unit vehicles must position themselves to maintain communications with all elements. TUAV retrans capabilities should be requested and coordinated for redundancy; the platoon should also plan to request and coordinate use of aviation assets for C2 and retrans if available. 7-53. At the same time, the urban environment may have exploitable advantages such as the availability of electrical power and commercial telecommunications networks. Electrical power generation stations and other emergency power systems are normally found in protected structures and are probably usable. Enclosed areas offer excellent concealment and protection of communications and other C2 support equipment. Extensive commercial communications networks composed of miles of protected underground cable connecting central telephone exchanges are likely to be available, as are numerous types of public service radio nets (such as those used for police, fire, civil defense, and taxi radios). These systems have existing antennas and retransmission stations.

7-16


HELICOPTER SUPPORT Attack Helicopters

7-54. Reconnaissance platoons may receive support from a variety of attack and armed reconnaissance helicopters, ranging from AH-64s to lightly armed but agile OH-58Ds. Regardless of the specific type of attack helicopter available, the inherent flexibility of Army aviation units allows them to accomplish the same missions and tasks in a variety of situations. Because of the increased risk of small arms and MANPADS engagements, aviation forces normally support urban operations by operating away from built-up areas; their key role usually is isolation of the objective. If risk analysis determines that the payoff is higher than the risk, however, aviation forces can be employed in and around the urban area. 7-55. Primary Missions. The most common missions assigned to attack helicopters during urban operations are the following:

· ·

Escort troop-carrying aircraft during air assaults.

·

Interdict and destroy threat armored vehicles moving against friendly forces.

· · · · · · ·

Isolate urban objectives.

Conduct overwatch and support attacks integrated with the ground commander’s maneuver.

Conduct reconnaissance. Conduct security operations for friendly locations. Conduct convoy escort. Conduct precision engagement of hardened point targets. Participate in show of force operations. Escort mission aircraft during noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).

7-56. Other Missions. In addition to their primary missions, helicopters may be called upon to perform additional, nontraditional roles during urban operations. This is particularly true during stability operations and support operations in urban areas. These additional missions may include the following:

·

Provide assistance for limited periods in the control and coordination of fires in support of the maneuver of ground forces.

·

Provide limited relay of radio messages from isolated ground units.

·

Identify and/or mark specific buildings and areas using smoke, fires, or targeting lasers.

·

Videotape routes or objectives for later analysis by ground commanders.

·

Provide navigational and directional assistance to ground units.

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·

Provide limited area illumination using infrared or white light from either on-board sources or illumination rockets.

·

Conduct armed reconnaissance patrol operations around friendly unit locations to provide countersniper and countermortar support.

7-57. Weapons Limitations. Urban terrain limits the effectiveness of weapons employment in a number of ways, including the following:

7-18

·

The short arming and/or slant ranges available in the urban area may limit employment and effectiveness of helicopter weapons. Precision weapons, such as TOW and Hellfire missiles, require a minimum range of about 500 meters to reliably arm and stabilize on the intended target. Often, fire from longer ranges actually improves accuracy.

·

In urban structures, the shaped charge of the Hellfire produces less damage and overpressurization than the TOW’s high explosive (HE) round. Window engagements are generally not recommended, since the missile will usually strike the far wall of the structure, expending its blast energy away from the structure. Missile impact on the facing structure will normally cause overpressurization inside that structure (in the vicinity of impact) as well as secondary fragmentation of wood/concrete, which can neutralize or stun occupants in the vicinity of the impact.

·

Extensive use of precision weapons by several units in close proximity may cause coordination problems in terms of target identification and designation.

·

The laser designation capability of either ground or aerial systems may be degraded by the large expanses of polished, flat reflective surfaces common in many urban areas. In addition, high volumes of smoke and dust, associated with burning buildings and other conditions of urban combat, can hinder accurate laser designation, a necessity in precision engagements.

·

Aircraft cannon fire against buildings can be devastating. It provides excellent suppression and can drive threat forces away from firing positions or fix them in place until ground maneuver forces can destroy them. On the other hand, threat forces often are able to quickly reoccupy positions that have been struck by fire. In addition, it is common for aircraft-fired rounds to ricochet off urban structures, causing additional collateral damage and posing danger to nearby friendly forces.

·

Target identification and marking may be difficult because of heavy smoke and dust rising from urban fires and explosions. Some smoke from fires in industrial areas may be highly toxic or irritating. Pilots may have to don chemical protective equipment that hinders target detection and engagement. Friendly unit locations and personnel can be marked with colored panels, glint tape, strobe lights, and colored smoke. Targets can be marked with infrared laser pointers (such as the GCP-1 ground commander pointer/illuminator), colored


M203 smoke rounds, M203 or mortar flares burning on the ground, or tracer fires. In some situations, improvised spotlights can also be used.

·

Although firing from stationary positions is more accurate, running fire is normally safer for the aircraft because of threat ground fires. If possible, ground commanders should avoid directing pilots along a gun-target line that passes over friendly troops.

·

Aircraft-fired 2.75-inch rockets with HE warheads (area fire) have a burst radius in excess of 50 meters; they are effective in destroying structures, thin-skinned vehicles, and ADA positions and in damaging and/or breaching concrete and wood structures. When fired in pairs or more, however, the rockets have a large dispersion pattern and can pose problems in terms of accuracy and fratricide.

Assault and Lift Helicopters

7-58. The reconnaissance platoon may receive support from a variety of assault and/or lift helicopters, most commonly the UH-60 and CH-47. These assets can be crucial to effective C2 and in the flexible and responsive movement of troops and supplies. 7-59. Primary Missions. The most common missions assigned to assault and/or lift helicopters during urban operations are the following:

· ·

Conduct air assault operations.

· · · ·

Conduct air movement of troops and supplies.

Conduct casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and/or MEDEVAC operations. Emplace logistical resupply points. Conduct C2 operations. Conduct NEOs.

7-60. Other Missions. In addition to their primary missions, assault and lift helicopters may be called upon during urban operations to perform additional, nontraditional roles, including some that require special mission equipment. These additional missions may include the following:

· · · ·

Conduct EW operations. Conduct combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations. Emplace Volcano minefields. Emplace large and/or heavy obstacles (such as abandoned vehicles or concrete dividers).

7-61. Aircraft Limitations. The need to deliver hovering fires from temporary BPs may require the aircraft to carry less than a full load of munitions or fuel. This is especially true in hot climates and high altitudes. Reduced loads mean more frequent trips to forward area refuel and rearm points (FARP) and less time on station. In addition, long route

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distances during air movements may require the establishment of FARPs along the route prior to operations. Climate will also affect the number of troops and/or amount of supplies the aircraft can transport. Command and Support Relationships

7-62. From the ground unit perspective, helicopters are most effective when they operate under OPCON of the ground unit commander or leader located closest to the threat force. Normally, the RSTA squadron is the lowest level granted formal OPCON of helicopters. During attack helicopter operations, however, the squadron commander is rarely able to identify the precise location of threat forces or to coordinate aerial fires with friendly squad and platoon maneuver. He often must pass the responsibility for close coordination of attack helicopter fires to the troop commander or platoon leader on the scene. Generally, the smaller and more decentralized the combat actions, the better it is to have armed aircraft coordinate directly with the small-unit leader on the ground. 7-63. On the other hand, the ground maneuver leader can effectively direct only a few aircraft at a time. In larger, more centralized combat actions, aviation headquarters will usually find it advantageous to retain control of armed aircraft. It may be more effective for the aviation unit to retain control of its individual aircraft and operate by continuously rotating attack helicopter elements into the battle area where they then coordinate their attacks with the ground commander’s maneuver. 7-64. Whichever command and support relationship is chosen, both the ground leader and the aviation headquarters must understand what is expected of each other. Close liaison and clear, concise oral communications are important. NOTE: For a further discussion of aviation support and capabilities, refer to Chapter 8 of this manual. FIRE SUPPORT

7-65. The reconnaissance platoon leader must plan for employment of indirect fires in the urban area of operations. Mortar fires are best suited for urban environments because of their availability to the platoon and their high-angle trajectory, which reduces the effect of tall buildings and other structures. The platoon should coordinate for targets that will support disengagement from unexpected contact. Mortars also will produce less collateral damage than higher-caliber weapon systems. 7-66. The platoon must also be prepared to employ precision-guided munitions from other sources, including Army artillery and joint and allied military services. This may entail either use of laser or IR designator equipment or special augmentation. The platoon leader must ensure that no fire areas (NFA) are placed on all surveillance positions and that CFZs are coordinated along reconnaissance routes. Fire support considerations for urban operations include, but are not limited to, the following:

· ·

7-20

Determine who controls each fire support asset. Exchange fire plans and observer plans with adjacent units.


·

Develop the observer plan to include OPs in buildings, location of laser designators, and overwatch of trigger points.

·

Identify locations of hazardous sites, both above and below ground, including fuel and industrial storage tanks, gas distribution lines, and any other area where incendiary effects of detonating artillery and mortar rounds will start fires.

·

Identify the general construction or composition of buildings and road surfaces in the area of operations. (NOTE: This may affect the type of munitions used.)

·

Determine where building masking, overhead power lines, or towers may degrade GPS and compass functioning.

·

Determine whether use of obscurants and illumination will favor friendly units or the threat.

·

Determine whether buildings or structures will require fire support personnel to carry/use equipment not normally carried (for example, field expedient antennas, climbing rope, wire gloves, axes, or sledgehammers).

·

Determine the requirements for radar coverage. Do radar zones need to be established? If so, where and for how long?

7-67. In addition to the use of conventional munitions, precision-guided munitions (PGM) must also be carefully considered. The biggest consideration in using PGMs is that some sort of laser or IR designator equipment must be available. If these assets are not available, personnel augmentation may be required.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Resupply

7-68. To preclude compromise, surveillance teams may carry required supplies into the urban environment on their vehicles, allowing them to avoid unnecessary movement in the area of operations. Some missions, however, may require additional supplies that cannot be carried on the vehicles. Resupply operations for deployed surveillance teams are planned and coordinated during the planning phase. 7-69. When resupply is required, a drop point is established. It should be well away from the hide site and the surveillance site, but in a position that is available to all teams. Caches should be used in these instances. Units should standardize the contents of caches so all teams understand what is available. Example items to be carried in the cache include the following:

· · · ·

Emergency Class I items. Batteries (for radios, NVDs, and other devices). Class VIII items, to include intravenous (IV) bags. Nonsensitive mission-specific items.

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Maintenance

7-70. In the urban area of operations, self-recovery within the platoon will be necessary. Vehicles should have a towbar or towing cables and shackles attached and configured for immediate recovery. A secured maintenance collection point outside the urban area is identified by the troop or the supported unit during planning and is then coordinated with the squadron/battalion for maintenance support. All vehicle crews must know this location. Medical

7-71. Organic medical support in the reconnaissance platoon is limited to self aid and buddy aid. Due to the remote deployment of teams, primary medical care is not readily available. Scouts should receive combat lifesaver and emergency medical technician training. 7-72. Additional medical support is requested as needed. When possible, medical evacuation of team members is delayed until the whole team is evacuated from the area of operations. Wounded team members are sent directly to the nearest medical facility that can provide definitive care and treatment. Combat stress is another medical aspect with which teams must cope. The nature of reconnaissance missions subjects the teams to stress in many ways. These factors include the following:

·

Limited visibility. Operations in darkness, smoke, fog, rain, snow, ice, and glare require the extended use of night-vision goggles.

·

Disrupted sleep cycles. Performance suffers from the disruption of the normal sleep schedule.

·

Mental fatigue. This results from having to make decisions of serious consequences in too little time with too little information and while exposed to danger.

·

Physical fatigue. This can result from conducting physical activity excessive to current conditioning or at a strenuous level without rest.

7-73. Combat stress, however, is not solely a medical problem. It is also a command problem in terms of reduced performance and personnel lost from duty. It is a command responsibility to take actions to increase the individual team member’s resistance to stress. This can be done through extensive training under simulated combat conditions and by ensuring all personnel maintain a high level of physical fitness. Proper nutrition is also a major factor in coping with stress. This requires soldiers to have a healthy, balanced diet not only during combat operations, but also before the missions begin. NOTE: For a detailed discussion on preparing for an operation, refer to Chapter 2 of this manual.

SECTION III – EXECUTION 7-22


NOTE: As shown in Table 7-1, the execution phase entails four key actions, which are examined in detail in this section: · Approach the urban area of operations.

· · ·

Employ surveillance teams, both mounted and dismounted. Conduct reconnaissance. Conduct assessment of the area of operations.

7-74. The efforts of the reconnaissance platoon can be a critical factor in

shaping the urban area of operations and in maximizing the effectiveness of the squadron/battalion and, in turn, the brigade. A summary of the platoon’s tasks in the urban environment includes the following:

· · ·

Develop and distribute urban operations sketches.

· · ·

Maintain surveillance on key objectives.

·

Perform continuous HUMINT collection during the operation. Especially vital to the brigade effort is information on personnel attempting to leave or enter the urban area.

Reconnoiter recommended entry points and routes. Locate and recommend breach points or points of penetration for assault operations. Conduct target acquisition. Assist in isolation of the area of operations by conducting screening operations or establishing checkpoints on the perimeter.

NOTE: Refer to the end of the execution discussion for an explanation of actions the reconnaissance platoon takes when it is tasked to support an assault in the urban environment.

APPROACH THE URBAN AREA OF OPERATIONS 7-75. The reconnaissance platoon conducts HUMINT collection and reconnaissance outside the urban area to gain information on the objective. Depending on the time available, the platoon develops the urban situation progressively as it moves from the surrounding area toward the city. The commander may refine objectives and routes as he gains and analyzes information. If available, TUAVs are employed to conduct aerial reconnaissance of routes and objective areas. TUAVs are focused on unit entry points to determine the threat situation, including obstacles in the urban area, ambush positions on rooftops, and movement of personnel and vehicles as reconnaissance units approach. As discussed earlier, the aerial and ground reconnaissance plans must be synchronized to be effective.

EMPLOY SURVEILLANCE TEAMS 7-76. The primary method of employing surveillance teams is in a hide or surveillance site. The terrain, mission, and location of the site, however, may dictate that the teams establish one or more separate surveillance sites to effectively observe the area. A minimum of two soldiers is required to conduct surveillance. One observes while the other records the information in the surveillance log. Because observer

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efficiency decreases rapidly after 30 minutes, the observer and the recorder switch duties about every 30 minutes. When using NVDs, the observer’s initial period of viewing is 10 minutes followed by a 15-minute rest period. After several periods of viewing, the period is extended to 15 to 20 minutes. Hide site personnel should be rotated every 24 hours.

7-77. During limited visibility, two to three (normally three) members may be required to set up a new surveillance site. The site is near the target area so that information can be collected through close-in observation and sound detection. The remainder of the team stays in the hide site. The surveillance site and the routes to and from it are selected during periods of good visibility. Members move into and out of the surveillance site during limited visibility. One member observes, one records, and one maintains security to the rear and flanks. Only passive NVDs are used to help prevent detection. 7-78. The hide site may not be suitable for transmission of the team’s reports. When this is the case, a separate communication sites is needed. A minimum of two personnel is required at this location, one to send the message and erect an antenna, if necessary, and one to provide security. The communications site is occupied long enough to transmit the message and then to conceal any signs of the team’s presence. HASTY SITES

7-79. These are sites the team plans to occupy for a short period (generally less than six hours). This occurs most often during target acquisition missions. Considerations for occupation of hasty sites include these:

·

The team makes the best use of natural cover and concealment. It uses man-made camouflage materials as required to improve concealment, keeping movement to a minimum.

·

Generally, two or three scouts are positioned forward to observe the target area and record information.

·

The hasty hide site is positioned far enough to the rear so it is out of the direct line of threat observation. The distance normally depends on terrain and vegetation. It must be far enough away from the surveillance element so that if a threat force discovers one of the two elements, the other element has enough standoff to prevent it from being discovered as well.

·

The surveillance and hide positions allow the elements to fire on the threat to enable one or both to break contact. Team members in the hasty hide site maintain rear and flank security. Communications are normally conducted after the team moves away from the area.

7-80. A hasty subsurface site is constructed when there is not enough time to construct a complete subsurface site. The site is especially useful when there is little natural cover and concealment. Considerations in the employment of hasty subsurface sites include the following:

· 7-24

Lower profile than surface surveillance site.


·

Better protection against small-arms weapons and indirect fires.

· · · ·

Excellent camouflage. Requirement to conceal soil. Additional time required for construction. Construction noise.

7-81. Figures 7-5 and 7-6 illustrate construction of hasty subsurface sites. Materials that may prove useful in building the position include the following:

· · · · · · · · · ·

Ponchos or other waterproofing. Yetti net or small camouflage net to assist in camouflage. Entrenching tool. 550 cord or bungee cord. Chicken wire (optional). Burlap or canvas (optional). Sandbags. PVC pipe with connectors. Fiberglass rod. Plywood.

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Figure 7-5. Hasty Subsurface Site Using PVC Pipe

7-26


Figure 7-6. Hasty Subsurface Site Using Suspension Lines URBAN SURVEILLANCE SITES

7-82. Surveillance teams can construct fixed urban hide sites in occupied and abandoned buildings, in water tanks, behind shrubbery, on warehouse rooftops, or in attics of multistory buildings or other tall structures. If possible, teams should avoid wooden buildings and buildings in a significantly deteriorated condition because of the risk of injury from fire and structural failure. Fixed sites should not be in buildings that may attract the threat’s attention, but they can be placed in rubble, yards, and gardens. If a site is to be set up in an undamaged part of the urban area, teams select buildings of solid construction with serviceable stairs and basements that can be equipped for the rest and shelter of personnel during artillery bombardments. 7-83. Site construction may consist simply of taking a position at a suitable viewing port, or it can be much more elaborate, with time a 7-27

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crucial factor. Windows, doors, and other openings (like bullet holes not used for observation) are filled with bricks, fragments of building materials, or sandbags if available. Flammable objects are removed. Supplies of water and sand are assembled for fighting fires. If the threat has previously occupied the building, the team takes precautions against booby traps and mines. When the threat is near, several locations in the building are prepared for observation and departure. BUILDING ENTRY TECHNIQUES

7-84. Scouts traditionally do not clear buildings. Rather, they reconnoiter buildings, primarily to determine suitability for potential OPs or while conducting compliance inspections. Scouts enter buildings only when there is a minimum risk of encountering threat forces or when the known size of the threat forces falls within the unit’s engagement criteria. Because stealth is a priority, entry is done quietly, through unsecured doors and windows, with the least amount of exposure possible. If threat forces expect their arrival, however, scouts may not be able to enter buildings with stealth because of booby traps; this must always be a consideration in building entry regardless of the permissive level of the environment in which the unit is operating. NOTE: The principles and fundamentals discussed here to assist scouts in moving through a building while maintaining security are modifications of techniques in FM 3-06.11 (FM 90-10-1). Building clearance operations, which are conducted by the infantry, are discussed in detail in FM 3-06.11. Entry at Upper Building Levels

7-85. Entering a building from any level other than the ground floor is difficult. At the same time, gravity and the building’s floor plan become assets when moving from floor to floor in ensuring there is no threat present within the building. A threat element that is forced to the top of a building may be cornered and fight desperately or escape over the roof. A threat unit forced down to ground level may withdraw from the building, thus exposing itself to friendly supporting forces outside. 7-86. Various means can be used to reach the top floor or roof of a building, such as ladders, drainpipes, vines, helicopters, or the roofs and windows of adjoining buildings. One scout can climb onto the shoulders of another and reach high enough to pull himself up. Another method is to attach a grappling hook to the end of a scaling rope so that a scout can scale a wall, spring from one building to another, or gain entrance through an upstairs window. 7-87. Use of Helicopters. If there is no risk of threat air defense weapons, troops can be transported to the rooftops by helicopter (see Figure 7-7). Helicopters should land only on those buildings that have special heliports on the roofs or parking garages. Scouts can fast-rope onto the roof or dismount as the helicopter hovers a few feet above the roof. Troops then can use ropes to enter the lower floors if necessary.

7-28


Figure 7-7. Occupying a Building Rooftop by Helicopter

7-88. Use of Ladders. Ladders offer the quickest method to access the upper levels of a building (as illustrated in Figure 7-8). Units can get ladders from local civilians or stores, or materials to build ladders can be obtained through supply channels. Although ladders will not permit access to the tops of some buildings, the speed with which they can be used afford a degree of security and safety.

Figure 7-8. Using Ladders to Reach Upper Levels of a Building

7-89. Use of Grappling Hooks. The use of grappling hooks is the least preferred method for gaining entry to upper levels of buildings. It should be used only as a last resort and away from potential threat positions.

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This method may potentially be used on adjacent buildings offering concealed locations and a connecting roof to possible positions.

7-90. If this method is used, a suitable grappling hook and rope are selected. The grappling hook should be sturdy, portable, easily thrown, and equipped with hooks that can hold inside a window. The scaling rope should be 5/8 inch to 1 inch in diameter and long enough to reach the objective window. Knots are tied in the rope at 1-foot intervals to make climbing easier. The soldier should follow the procedures outlined in the following discussion. 7-91. Stand as close to the building as possible when throwing the grappling hook (Figure 7-9). The closer you stand, the less exposure to possible threat elements in the building and the less horizontal distance the hook must be thrown. Making sure there is enough rope to reach the target, hold the hook and a few coils of rope in the throwing hand. The remainder of the rope, in loose coils, should be in the other hand. Allow the rope to play out freely. The throw should be a gentle, even, upward lob of the hook with the other hand releasing the rope as it plays out. 7-92. Once the grappling hook is inside the window or on the roof, pull on the rope to obtain a good hold before beginning to climb. When using a window, pull the hook to one corner to enhance the chances of a good “bite” and to reduce exposure to lower windows during the climb.

Figure 7-9. Grappling Hook Thrown at Close Range

7-93. Rappelling. Rappelling is an entry technique that soldiers can

use to descend from the rooftop of a tall building into a window (as shown in Figure 7-10). Refer to TC 21-24 for more information on rappelling.

7-30


Figure 7-10. Rappelling Entry at Lower Building Levels

7-94. Scouts entering through windows and doors on the lower levels of a building must be aware of the possibility of booby traps. Specific lowerlevel entry techniques are shown in Figure 7-11.

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Figure 7-11. Lower-Level Entry Techniques

7-32


PARTNER ASSISTED LIFT

Figure 7-11. Lower-Level Entry Techniques (Continued) Principles of Building Entry

7-95. Movement in close quarters, such as within a room or hallway, must be planned and executed with care. Reconnaissance units must train and rehearse movement techniques until each team operates smoothly. Each team member must understand the following principles of building reconnaissance, which are similar to those for precision room clearance:

·

Surprise. This is the key to successful operations in close quarters. The team checking the rooms must achieve surprise, if only for seconds, by deceiving, distracting, or startling any potential threat. Silent building entry also supports surprise when individual rooms are entered.

·

Speed. Speed provides a measure of security to the team. It allows scouts to use the first few vital seconds provided by surprise to maximum advantage. In movement in close quarters, however, speed does not mean incautious haste. It is best described as “careful hurry.” There is security in continuous, fluid motion. Never remain in one location within the building too long until the building has been checked for threat presence.

·

Controlled violent action. If contact occurs and termination of threat forces is required, the scouts use controlled violent action to eliminate or neutralize the threat while giving him the least chance of inflicting friendly casualties. This principle primarily applies to, but is not limited to, MTW environments. Its use is based on the ROE/ROI and the commander’s engagement criteria. Controlled violent action is not limited to the application of

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firepower. It domination.

involves

a

soldier

mindset

of

complete

7-96. Each of the listed principles has a synergistic relationship with the others. Controlled violence coupled with speed increases surprise. At the same time, successful surprise allows increased speed. FUNDAMENTALS OF CHECKING ROOMS AND CORRIDORS

7-97. The fundamentals covered in this discussion address actions scouts take while moving along confined corridors to the room to be checked, while preparing to enter the room, during room entry and target engagement (if necessary), and after contact. The examples show various combinations of squad and section configurations (including four-man, three-man, and two-man techniques) used in different types of platoons. (NOTE: These variations may also be used when teams split up to secure the building entry point, various floors, and other sites.) 7-98. The steps are based on infantry fundamentals of precision room clearing, modified so that they may apply to scouts moving through a building. These fundamentals are the following:

7-34

·

Move tactically and silently while scanning the corridors to the room to be checked. Carry only the minimum amount of equipment. Rucksacks and loose items carried by scouts tire them, slow their pace, and cause noise.

·

Remember that bullets follow walls, whether in an alley or the hallway of a building.

·

Arrive undetected at the entry to the room in the correct order of entrance. Be prepared to enter the room on a single command.

·

Enter quickly and dominate the room. Move immediately to positions that allow complete control of the room and provide unobstructed fields of fire.

·

If necessary, eliminate all threat elements in the room by fast, accurate, and discriminating fires.

·

Gain and maintain immediate control of the situation and all personnel in the room.

·

Confirm whether threat casualties are wounded or dead. Disarm and segregate the wounded. Search all threat casualties.

·

Perform a cursory search of the room. Determine if a detailed search is required.

· ·

Evacuate all wounded and any friendly dead.

·

Maintain security and be prepared to react to additional threat contact at any moment.

·

Do not neglect rear security.

Based on unit SOP, mark rooms as checked using simple, clearly identifiable markings.


7-99. Scouts must remain alert throughout movement in buildings and searches of corridors and rooms. Team members provide security at the entry point and to the rear, laterally down corridors, and upward near stairs or landings. Use these basic techniques of hallway movement:

·

Serpentine technique. This is used in narrow hallways. The number-1 man provides security to the front. His sector of fire includes any threat soldiers who appear at the far end of the hall or from any doorways near the end. The number-2 and number-3 men cover the left and right flanks of the number-1 man. Their sectors of fire include any threat soldiers who appear suddenly from nearby doorways on either side of the hall. The number-4 man, normally carrying the squad automatic weapon (SAW)/240B, provides rear protection against any threat soldiers suddenly appearing behind the team.

·

Rolling-T technique. This is used in wide hallways. The number-1 and number-2 men move abreast, each covering the opposite side of the hallway from the one on which he is walking. The number-3 man covers the far end of the hallway from a position behind the number-1 and number-2 men, firing between them if necessary. The number-4 man provides rear security.

7-100. The two techniques for moving in hallways are illustrated in Figure 7-12. Hallway intersections are dangerous areas and should be approached cautiously as shown in Figures 7-13 and 7-14.

Figure 7-12. Hallway Movement Techniques: Serpentine Technique for Narrow Hallways (Left) and Rolling-T Technique for Narrow Hallways (Right)

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Figure 7-13. T-shaped Hallway Intersection Positions

7-36


Figure 7-14. Hallway Intersection Positions (Top) and Sectors of Fire (Bottom) INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT AND WEAPONS CONTROL

7-101. As in all operations, scouts involved in operations inside a building must move tactically and safely. Individuals who are part of a team must move in a standard manner, using practiced techniques. Movement and weapons control fundamentals include the following:

·

When moving, team members hold their weapons with muzzles pointed in the direction of travel. They keep the butt of the rifle in the pocket of their shoulder, with the muzzle slightly down to allow unobstructed vision. Soldiers keep both eyes open and swing the muzzle with their head so the rifle is always aimed where the soldier is looking.

·

Team members avoid “flagging” (leading with the weapon) when working around windows, doors, corners, or areas where obstacles must be negotiated. Flagging the weapon gives advance warning to anyone looking in the scout’s direction, making it easier for a threat soldier to grab the weapon.

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·

Team members should keep weapons safe (selector switch on SAFE and index finger outside of trigger guard) until a hostile target is identified and engaged. After a team member clears his sector of all targets, he returns his weapon to the SAFE position.

·

If a scout has a weapon malfunction while checking a room and becomes engaged, he should immediately drop to one knee and conduct immediate action to reduce the malfunction. Once the weapon is operational, there is no need to return to the standing position to engage targets unless the scout must move to another firing position. Resuming target engagement from the kneeling position saves valuable time. When other members of the team see a soldier drop to one knee, they know immediately that he has a malfunction requiring them to engage targets in his sector.

Actions Outside the Point of Entry

7-102. Actions outside the point of entry must be quick and well rehearsed. The doorway or entry point is a dangerous position. The team is focused on entry and could be surprised by a threat appearing unexpectedly in the corridor. Team members’ positions relative to the door are important as are their weapons’ carry positions. Team members stand as close to the entry point as possible, staying in a semicrouched position. They hold their weapons either in the high-carry or the lowcarry position. Each must ensure that his muzzle is not pointed at another team member. 7-103. All team members must signal one another that they are prepared before the team enters the room. The last man taps or squeezes the arm of the man in front of him, and each one passes this signal along. Team members avoid the use of a verbal signal, which may alert threat elements and destroy the element of surprise. 7-104. All individual equipment must be selected carefully and prepared properly to ensure it is quiet and not cumbersome. The team should carry essential items only while checking rooms. All team members should wear protective vests and helmets. Additional protective equipment such as gloves, kneepads, or goggles may be worn, depending on the situation and the unit’s level of training. Actions Upon Entry

7-105. The team should enter the room as quickly and smoothly as possible and move through the doorway immediately. The door is the focal point of anyone in the room. It is known as the “fatal funnel” because it focuses attention at the precise point where the individual team members are the most vulnerable. Moving into the room quickly reduces the chance that team members will be hit by threat fire directed at the doorway. The sequence of movements described in the following discussion is shown in Figures 7-15 through 7-23. 7-106. On the signal to go, the team moves through the door quickly and takes up positions inside the room that allow it to completely dominate the room and eliminate the threat. Team members stop movement only

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after they have moved away from the door and reached their designated point of domination.

7-107. The first man to enter moves in as straight a line as possible toward the corner for which he is responsible. He may then turn and move deep into the far corner of the room to the point of domination. The depth of his movement is determined by the size of the room, any obstacles in the room such as furniture, and by the number and location of threat soldiers and noncombatants in the room. (See Figure 7-15, which shows examples of both center-fed and corner-fed rooms.)

Figure 7-15. Path of Number-1 Man for Center Door (Top) and Corner Door (Bottom)

7-108. The second man enters and moves toward the corner in the opposite direction from the number-1 man. He follows the wall, but does not place himself directly against it (as shown in Figure 7-16).

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7-109. The number-3 man (team leader) buttonhooks inside the room at least 1 meter from the door, but between the number-1 man and the door (see Figure 7-17).

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7-110. The team leader can either use the number-4 man (normally the SAW/240B gunner) as rear security at the entry point of the room or have him enter the room with the remainder of the team. If he enters, the number-4 man moves in the direction of the number-2 man and buttonhooks between the number-2 man and the door. Once he is no longer needed, he immediately moves back and secures the room entry point and hallway (see Figure 7-18).

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7-111. To make this room entry technique work, each member of the team must know his sector of fire and understand how his sector overlaps and links with the sectors of the other team members. If engagement is required, team members do not move to the point of domination and then engage their targets. Rather, they engage targets as they move to their designated point. At the same time, however, engagements must not slow movement to their points of domination. Team members may shoot from as short a range as 1 to 2 inches. They engage the most immediate threats first. Examples of immediate threats are personnel who—

· · · ·

Are armed and prepared to return fire immediately. Block movement to the positions of domination. Are within arm’s reach of a team member. Are within 3 to 5 feet of the entry point.

7-112. Each team member initially has a designated sector of fire unique to him. This sector later expands to overlap the sectors of the other team members. 7-113. The number-1 and number-2 men are initially concerned with the area along the wall on either side of the door or entry point. This area is in their path of movement, and it is their primary sector of fire. Their alternate sector of fire is the wall they are moving toward, sweeping back to the far corner. 7-114. The number-3 and number-4 men start at the center of the wall opposite their point of entry and sweep to the left if moving toward the

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left or to the right if moving toward the right. They stop short of their respective team member (either the number-1 man or the number-2 man).

7-115. The team members move toward their points of domination, engaging all targets in their sectors. They must exercise fire control and discriminate between hostile and noncombatant occupants of the room. They shoot without stopping, using reflexive shooting techniques. Because the scouts are moving and shooting at the same time, they must move using the “careful hurry” concept. Figure 7-19 shows all four team members at their points of domination and illustrates their overlapping sectors of fire. Once again, the number 4 man may not be required to enter the room, only secure the room door and hallway.

Figure 7-19. Four-Man Team Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire for Corner Door (Top) and Center Door (Bottom)

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7-116. When full four-man teams are not available, three-man and twoman teams can be used. Figures 7-20 and 7-21 illustrate the paths, points of domination, and sectors of fire for a three-man team. Figures 7-22 and 7-23 show the same thing for a two-man team.

Figure 7-20. Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire (Three-Man Team, Corner Door)

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Figure 7-21. Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire (Three-Man Team, Center Door)

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Figure 7-22. Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire (Two-Man Team, Corner Door)

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Figure 7-23. Points of Domination and Sectors of Fire (Two-Man Team, Center Door) Reflexive Shooting

7-117. During room entry, there is little or no margin for error. Although scouts only enter buildings in reduced threat environments, they must always be prepared for threat contact. Too slow a shot at an enemy, too fast a shot at a noncombatant, or inaccurate shots can all be disastrous for a team. The process known as reflexive shooting entails an effective combination of weapon ready position, stance, aiming, shot placement, and trigger manipulation. Scouts must rehearse and perfect these skills to enhance their survivability in urban operations.

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7-118. Weapon Ready Position. The two weapon ready positions are the low ready position and the high ready position. These are illustrated in Figure 7-24. The weapon position and orientation for each team member should be identified prior to entering a building. 7-119. Low ready position. The butt of the weapon is placed firmly in

the pocket of the shoulder with the barrel pointed down at a 45-degree angle. This is the safest carry position. Team member should use it while inside a room, except when they are actually entering the room.

7-120. High ready position. The butt of the weapon is held under the

armpit, with the barrel pointed slightly up, keeping the front sight assembly under the line of sight but within the gunner’s peripheral vision. To engage a target, the gunner pushes the weapon out as if to bayonet the target. When the weapon leaves the armpit, he slides it up into the firing shoulder. This technique is best suited for the lineup outside the door.

Figure 7-24. Weapon Ready Positions: Low Ready Position (Left) and High Ready Position (Right)

7-121. Stance. Feet are about shoulder-width apart. Toes are pointed to

the front (direction of movement). The firing side foot is slightly staggered to the rear of the nonfiring side foot. Knees are slightly bent, and the upper body leans slightly forward. Shoulders are square and pulled back, not rolled over or slouched. The head is up, with both eyes open. When engaging targets, the gunner holds the weapon with the butt in the pocket of his shoulder.

7-122. Aim. Each of the four aiming techniques described in the

following discussion has a place in built-up areas. The aimed quick-kill technique is the one most often used in checking rooms.

7-123. Slow aimed fire technique. This technique is the most accurate. It entails taking up a steady, properly aligned sight picture and squeezing off rounds. It is normally used for engagements beyond 25 meters or when the need for accuracy overrides speed.

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7-124. Rapid aimed fire technique. This technique features an

imperfect sight picture in which windage is critical but elevation is of lesser importance. When the front sight post is in line with the target, the gunner squeezes the trigger. This technique, used against targets out to 15 meters, is fairly accurate and very fast.

7-125. Aimed quick-kill technique. This technique entails using a

good spot weld and placing the front sight post flush on top of the rear peep sight. It is used for very quick shots out to 12 meters. Windage is important, but elevation is not critical with relation to the target. This technique is the fastest and most accurate. With practice, soldiers can become deadly shots at close range.

7-126. Instinctive fire technique. This technique is the least desirable. The gunner focuses on the target and points the weapon in the target’s general direction, using muscle memory to compensate for lack of aim. This technique should be used only in emergencies.

7-127. Shot Placement. When the team is checking rooms, all threat soldiers it encounters must be incapacitated immediately. Shots that wound or are mortal but do not incapacitate the target instantaneously are better than misses, but they may allow the enemy to return fire. Team members should concentrate on achieving solid, well-placed headshots. This shot placement is difficult for some scouts to learn because they previously have been taught to aim at center of mass. Only practice can guarantee that they learn the techniques of accurate shot placement. 7-128. The only shot placement that guarantees immediate and total incapacitation is one roughly centered in the face, below the middle of the forehead and above the upper lip. Shots to the side of the head above the horizontal line passing through the ear opening to just below the crown of the skull and from the cheekbones rearward to the occipital lobe are also effective. Figure 7-25 shows proper head shot placement.

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Figure 7-25. Proper Head Shot Placement (Immediate Incapacitation Zones)

7-129. Shots to the spinal column below the jaw and above the sternum can neutralize a target immediately. The spinal column is a narrow target. Shots that miss by only a few centimeters may cause only a delayed reaction, or no immediate reaction at all, in the target. Even though severely wounded, the enemy soldier may be able to return effective fire. 7-130. Shots to the center of the chest that enter the lung/heart region are normally fatal but may take several seconds to incapacitate the target. During this time, the opponent may be able to return effective fire. Military equipment or protective vests may also shield this region of the body, deflecting or absorbing rounds and preventing immediate incapacitation. 7-131. Even when they are ultimately fatal, shots to the abdomen or lower extremities are rarely effective in rendering an opponent immediately incapable of returning fire. 7-132. Trigger Manipulation. Rapid, aimed semiautomatic fire is the most effective method of engaging targets. As each round is fired from the aimed quick-kill position, the weapon’s recoil makes the front sight post

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move in a small natural arc. The gunner should not fight this recoil. He should let the weapon make the arc and immediately bring the front sight post back onto the target and take another shot. This two-shot combination is known as a double tap. Soldiers must practice the double tap until it becomes instinctive. Team members continue to fire double taps until the target goes down. If there are multiple targets, team members double tap each one and then return to reengage any threat soldiers left standing or who are still trying to resist. Target Discrimination

7-133. Target discrimination is the act of quickly distinguishing between combatant and noncombatant personnel and engaging only the combatants. US forces engage with precision fire to apply discriminating combat power while limiting any unnecessary casualties among the noncombatants. Target discrimination is vital. If no noncombatants are present, there is less need for selective engagements. Even if an area is known to be free of noncombatants, however, other friendly soldiers moving through the area may be mistaken for threat elements; they may be engaged unless team members are disciplined and well-trained in fire control and target discrimination. Even with well-trained, disciplined scouts, room checking can result in unintentional casualties among noncombatants. Commanders must recognize this and take steps to relieve the stress it causes scouts. Safety and Force Protection

7-134. Room entry is extremely dangerous, and even training for it can be hazardous. Only well-trained, disciplined scouts will be able to successfully execute the techniques and procedures required to ensure safety and force protection. 7-135. Weapons Handling. Leaders at all levels must enforce safe handling of weapons. The concern that individual scouts not be injured in accidents is essential to mission accomplishment. Unintentional and unsafe weapons fire can jeopardize the mission of the team and subsequently the entire unit. 7-136. Protective Equipment. If a commander knows his unit will be

conducting lengthy room checking operations, he should request a special issue of threat level III or IV protective equipment. This equipment is excellent, but scouts must train and rehearse wearing it before they enter a real theater of operations. All room checking is tiring, and scouts wearing threat level III or IV protection will tire or overheat quickly.

7-137. Scouts entering buildings should wear all appropriate types of protective equipment. For example, soft body armor, such as the standard Army-issue Kevlar vest, is effective in preventing death or serious injury from high-velocity fragments that strike the torso area. Although the Kevlar protective vest is effective, flexible, and relatively comfortable, it is not designed to stop bullets. As a rule, soft body armor will stop some low-power handgun rounds but not rifle or carbine ammunition. On the other hand, some types of hard body armor will stop almost any round fired at them. They tend to be heavy and stiff, but they have been proven effective. 7-138. The standard Army Kevlar helmet and ballistic protective eyeglasses have been proven to significantly reduce casualties. Hard 7-51

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plastic knee and elbow protectors are also available on special request. They are useful, especially during prolonged operations, in preventing injury from rubble and broken glass when a soldier is kneeling or prone.

7-139. Knowledge of Weapons and Munitions. Detailed knowledge of

weapons and munitions effects is important to the safety of members of the team, as well as to mission accomplishment. Most interior building walls do not stop rifle fire. Fragments often penetrate interior walls. Standard home furnishings or office furniture offer little protection from high-velocity rounds.

BUILDING OPERATIONS DURING DARKNESS

7-140. Mission accomplishment is the most important criterion of night operations. All the specialized night vision equipment in the US armory can never replace a trained, skilled scout intent on mission accomplishment. No failsafe system exists to allow an individual scout to effectively identify and engage targets in total darkness. The commander must carefully consider the situation and the equipment available to him before he decides whether to use visible, invisible, or no artificial light when checking a building in darkness. Equipment

7-141. Several types of specialized night vision equipment are available to scouts. 7-142. AN/PAQ-4 Aiming Light. This device projects a pulsing dot of IR light along the weapons line of sight. The dot is invisible to the naked eye, but personnel wearing NVGs can see it. Gunners with weapons equipped with the AN/PAQ-4 aiming light simply place the projected spot on the target and fire. 7-143. AN/PVS-5 and AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles. These goggles are lightweight, battery-powered passive devices worn on the head. Each has an IR-emitting light source for close-up illumination. 7-144. Tactical Lights. These devices are small, lightweight, batterypowered white lights that can be attached to weapons. Either a pressure switch or an ON/OFF switch activates the light. An IR filter can be attached to most tactical lights to provide covert illumination. The most common example of a tactical light is sold under the name Maglite. These lights can be attached to weapons using hose clamps or heavy tape. They must be checked periodically because they can loosen and shift. 7-145. Red Dot Sights. These are lightweight, battery-powered optical sights attached to the top of the weapon. A red dot in the sight aligns the weapon and the target. These sights are for use in low light levels, not total darkness. They do not assist in identifying targets. 7-146. Active Laser Devices. These lightweight, battery-powered sights emit visible light, projecting a red dot onto the target that corresponds to the point of bullet impact. These devices are not effective in sunlight. NOTE: In the near future, scouts will be able to use thermal weapons sights to detect targets in total darkness.

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Use of White Light

7-147. Although not covert, white light has several advantages in night operations:

· · ·

The equipment is readily available and reliable.

·

It allows color vision.

No additional training is required. It offers the fastest means of identifying targets and searching a room.

7-148. The main disadvantage of white light is that an active light source can compromise the team’s position inside a room or building. Another disadvantage is that a light may be activated too soon and alert threat elements.

CONDUCT THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL ASPECT OF RECONNAISSANCE 7-149. The reconnaissance platoon then conducts the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance of the urban area. The platoon will develop an understanding of the regional, local, and neighborhood level situation. The platoon’s soldiers and leaders generate a sense for their area of operations similar to the awareness of a “cop on the beat” or street detective. The scouts must learn how the urban area operates and identify the sources of power or influence. Examples of this information include the following:

· · · · · ·

The formal and informal political power structure. Police, secret police, and intelligence agencies. Criminal organizations. Military and paramilitary structures. Key terrain. Sensitivities of the populace.

7-150. The recce platoon is ideally suited to conduct the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance, but any reconnaissance platoon may be tasked to conduct this type of reconnaissance with augmentation. Although each vehicle in a recce platoon contains a HUMINT specialist, scouts in all types of reconnaissance platoon must possess the ability to gain information on the local area. NOTE: Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion of the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance. The fundamentals of reconnaissance described in Chapter 3 are applicable in an urban environment, although the type of information and the method by which it is collected takes on a new form. URBAN PATROLLING

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7-151. As noted earlier in this chapter, reconnaissance units will

normally not perform building-to-building clearance in urban areas. They may, however, perform urban patrolling to accomplish reconnaissance missions. (NOTE: Chapter 5 of this manual includes a detailed examination of patrolling techniques and procedures.) Detailed planning, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is accomplished before execution of a patrol. Using maps, aerial photography, and any known intelligence, the platoon leader will conduct preliminary route reconnaissance to identify the following features:

· · · ·

Preliminary route reconnaissance. Insertion and extraction routes. Choke points along the routes. Escape and evasion directions or corridors.

Organization of Urban Patrols

7-152. Urban patrols can be conducted either as a mounted operation or dismounted with vehicles in support. Patrols should never be conducted lower than section level. 7-153. Mounted Patrolling. Mounted patrols capitalize on the mobility of the unit’s vehicles. Mounted urban patrolling principles include the following:

·

Ensure mutual support and depth by maintaining constant observation among vehicles.

·

Coordinate a supporting fire plan with any dismounted units in the area.

· ·

Maintain all-around security.

·

Adjust patrol routes and speed to promote deception and avoid repetitive patterns.

·

Maintain situational awareness.

Develop a reliable communications plan for mounted and dismounted elements.

7-154. Mounted patrols never enter an area via the route they will use to exit it. Vehicles should travel at moderate speeds, with the lead vehicle stopping only to investigate those areas that pose a potential threat or to support the essential tasks of the patrol. Use a vehicle speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour to allow for adequate observation and quick reaction. Slower speeds may allow noncombatants or a more aggressive group to impede movement. On the other hand, vehicles should move at high speeds only when responding to an incident. Equipment stored externally should be secured high enough on the vehicle to prevent the problems of locals trying to snatch equipment and weapons. 7-155. When vehicles must stop, designated crewmembers dismount to provide security. The vehicle gunner is at the ready, and the driver remains in his seat with the engine running. It is imperative that units maintain situational awareness during patrols; this includes orientation on other patrols in the urban area. If an element comes under fire, it

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should be capable of communicating with other patrols to obtain assistance and support. Figure 7-26 illustrates a mounted patrol.

Figure 7-26. Mounted Urban Patrol

7-156. Dismounted Patrolling. In support of the multidimensional

aspect of reconnaissance, dismounted patrolling is used to collect HUMINT. At a minimum, patrols are organized at squad level (three soldiers). Section-size patrols (six soldiers) are the preferred organization for security purposes; they can maintain both an information-gathering team and a security team.

7-157. Leaders of dismounted patrols must maintain communications with vehicles and the patrol headquarters throughout the mission. In the reconnaissance platoon, vehicles must be prepared to react to any situation the dismounted element may encounter. Patrols should avoid areas with large masses of civilians, who could quickly turn against the presence of foreign soldiers. As with mounted patrols, dismounted patrol leaders must be ready to contact other patrols or supporting elements for support in unfavorable or dangerous situations. 7-158. Figure 7-27 shows how a dismounted recce patrol would operate with vehicles in support. Figure 7-28 depicts a patrol with dismounted soldiers only.

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SCOUT

SCOUT

HUMINT

HUMINT

LINGUIST

SCOUT

SCOUT

SCOUT SCOUT

Figure 7-27. Dismounted Urban Patrol with Vehicle Support

INFORMATION GATHERING SQUAD LDR SCOUT

LINGUIST

HUMINT

SECURITY CONTROL HUMINT

SCOUT

SECTION LDR

Figure 7-28. Dismounted Urban Patrol without Vehicle Support

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7-159. Subterranean Patrolling. Reconnaissance of subterranean systems is accomplished to identify threat use of a passageway, to determine how a subterranean area may contribute to friendly capabilities, or to support isolation of the urban area. The team leader organizes his patrol with one soldier tasked with security to the front (the point man) and one tasked with rear security. If available, an engineer should assist the team leader in classifying the passageway or in neutralizing mines at obstacles. The team leader navigates and records data through the passage. Two soldiers are left as a security post at the point of entry. They are responsible for detecting any threats that come upon the unit’s rear and as a communications link between the team leader and higher headquarters. 7-160. The team leader should carry a map or sketch, compass, street plan, and information requirements. A team member should carry the tools needed to open manhole covers. The point man is equipped with NVGs as well as a feeler for trip wires. All soldiers entering the passageway should carry a sketch of the sewer system, to include magnetic north, azimuths, distances, and manholes. They should also have protective masks, flashlights, gloves, and chalk for marking features along the route. The team should be equipped with a 120-foot safety rope to which each man is tied. The safety rope assists the team in retrieving members who may slip or fall. 7-161. A constant concern to troops conducting a subterranean patrol is chemical defense. When used in tunnels, chemical agents are normally encountered in dense concentrations with no chance of dissipating. A suitable NBC detection system carried by the point man (such as detector paper or a CAM) can provide warning for team members to don their masks. 7-162. In addition to chemical agents, noxious gases from decomposing sewage, especially methane gas, can pose a threat. These gases are not detected by NBC detection systems, nor are they completely filtered out by the protective mask. Physical signs that indicate their prescience in harmful quantities are nausea and dizziness. Team leaders should be constantly alert to these signs and know the shortest route to the surface for fresh air. 7-163. Once the team is organized and equipped, it moves to the entrance of the tunnel, which is usually a manhole. Once the manhole is removed, the team waits 15 minutes to allow any gases to dissipate. The point man then descends into the tunnel to determine whether the air is safe to breathe and if movement is restricted. The point man should remain in the tunnel for 10 minutes before the rest of the team follows. If he becomes ill or is exposed to danger, he can be pulled out by the safety rope. 7-164. When the patrol is moving through the tunnel, the point man moves about 10 meters in front of the team leader. Other team members maintain 5-meter intervals. If the water in the tunnel is fast-moving or if the sewer is slippery or threat obstacles, the intervals should be increased to prevent all members from falling if one man slips. 7-165. The team leader should note the azimuth and pace count of each turn he takes in the tunnel. When the team encounters a manhole to the surface, the point man should open it and determine the location, which 7-57

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the team leader then records. Recognition signals with friendly troops must be coordinated to prevent fratricide as the point man opens the manhole.

7-166. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the commander decides how to use the tunnel. Among his options are sealing off manhole covers and emplacing obstacles in the tunnel. The patrol’s report is converted into an overlay for the urban operations sketch and sent higher. Mobile Patrol Immediate Action Drills

7-167. Reconnaissance units must always resist becoming decisively engaged. At times, however, contact with hostile elements will be unavoidable. In such situations, immediate action drills are essential to the survivability of the unit and the ultimate success of the mission. As the basis for immediate action drills, all soldiers must have a clear understanding of the applicable ROE, which may limit the response to a given situation but do not prevent a soldier from protecting himself or his unit members. The following steps provide an example of an immediate action drill when the reconnaissance platoon encounters a sniper or antiarmor weapon:

·

Upon contact, make positive confirmation of the position or direction from which the fire came.

·

Move the vehicles quickly out of the line of direct fire while returning fire if the threat position can be identified.

·

Use other vehicles to envelop or cut off the sniper’s or antiarmor gunner’s avenue of escape.

·

If vehicles are caught in an area and become decisively engaged, the vehicles must suppress the threat while moving out of the potential kill zone as quickly as possible.

NOTE: When it encounters obstacles or barricades, the patrol should move rapidly to an alternate route and report the obstructions to higher headquarters. The patrol should not try to clear obstacles or barricades, which are usually mined or boobytrapped and covered by threat fire. Tactics of Urban Swarm

7-168. Urban swarm is similar to the tactic used by police forces responding to an emergency that requires backup. The swarm concept is applicable when numerous teams are operating in a dispersed, noncontiguous fashion in the urban environment. As each unit patrols its assigned area, it must be prepared to respond rapidly to a call for assistance by neighboring teams. The patrol’s ability to respond will depend on its own current situation and its distance from the element making the request. 7-169. A call for assistance should include an estimate of the support required. This request is transmitted to all other teams on the platoon and higher nets. The commander directs the appropriate teams to respond and adjusts other teams to fill or cover gaps that are created. An alternative method is for the teams closest to the requesting unit to respond without direction, although these teams should report their

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intention to respond. Situational awareness is critical in avoiding fratricide.

7-170. Command of the teams that respond can be accomplished in several ways. The leader of the requesting unit who has the best situational awareness could assume tactical command of responding units. Another option is to have the higher commander or XO maintain C2 of the responding teams. The commander must guard against having too many leaders on the ground in one area. 7-171. The key to this tactic is speed and flexibility. The requesting group has to be able to quickly and concisely inform the responding units of the situation and maneuver them to positions of advantage as they arrive. Again, the need for an urban operations sketch is of the utmost importance for C2. The responding units also need to have the flexibility and training to enter an emerging situation effectively. Implicit in this concept is the capability of junior leaders to assume increased levels of responsibility and command. 7-172. At all costs, units executing an urban swarm must avoid establishing patterns. If elements respond to crisis situations in similar patterns, threat forces will quickly identify them and deliberately create crises. This can allow the threat to lure responding units into ambushes or to exploit the temporary void created in the area of operations by responding units. METHODS OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION Tactical Questioning

7-173. When conducted properly, tactical questioning will elicit valuable, timely, and accurate information from the local populace. On the other hand, improper questioning will confuse the subject, waste time, and provide information of little or no tactical value. 7-174. While the primary goal of tactical questioning is to learn the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, and HOW of a situation, the process involves more than merely asking questions. Because the questioner is conducting a hasty and often unconventional interrogation, he must know how to tailor the questions to the person who is the subject of the session. For example, a civilian may not understand questions laced with military jargon; a local may not be able to follow a questioner who speaks too quickly. 7-175. At all times, the interrogator must maintain control of the interview. He must stay on guard not to lose the initiative to an uncooperative subject, adhering to these principles of productive interrogation:

· · · · ·

All questions should be brief and to the point. All questions should be simple. Questions should be clear and in one complete thought. Ask for narrative responses. Use of follow-up questions is essential.

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7-176. The following types of questions are most effective for use in tactical questioning:

·

Direct questions. Examples: What is your name? Who is your organization’s leader?

·

Follow-up questions. These are used to exploit a topic of interest. Questions usually flow from one to another based on the answer to the previous question.

·

Control questions. These are used to maintain control and to check the accuracy and truthfulness of the source’s statements. Control questions should be mixed in with normal questions throughout the interview/interrogation.

·

Repeat questions. The interrogator uses this technique to ensure accuracy, particularly when he suspects that the source is lying. Since a lie is more difficult to remember than the truth, errors can often be uncovered when questions that the source has already answered are rephrased or disguised.

7-177. Conversely, there are several types of questions to be avoided:

·

Negative questions. Avoid questions that contain the words “not,” “no,” or “none.”

·

Leading questions. These tend to prompt the source to give the reply he believes the interrogator wants to hear or simply to answer “yes” or “no,” requiring the questioner to ask more leading questions to complete the facts.

·

Compound questions. A compound question contains two or more parts. It can cause the source either to become confused or to intentionally provide incomplete responses.

·

Vague questions. These elicit very broad and general answers. They may enable the source to go on a tangent, giving answers totally unrelated to the topic and providing false or misleading information.

7-178. The questioner should adhere to these deceptively simple guidelines: Ask the obvious, and never take anything for granted. Attempt to have the source clarify vague or ambiguous statements immediately. Ask for specifics when the response includes words like “possible,” “always,” “everywhere,” “everything,” “a few,” “far,” or “near.” If a point is still unclear, try to have the source make a drawing. Annotate the drawing with the source’s name, what the drawing represents, where the drawing was made (such as a hilltop looking south), a directional arrow (pointing north), and the date-time group. Effective Listening

7-179. Along with effective questioning, scouts must learn the skill of effective listening. They must remain calm, gather the facts, and exploit all leads completely. They cannot let excitement fog their judgment when a source divulges information. Showing excitement (or undue interest) may indicate what information the questioner is seeking or what interrogation strategy he is attempting to exploit.

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7-180. Another important skill is learning not to jump the gun during questioning (or listening). Cutting the source off before he finishes answering may cut off a valuable lead. The questioner should ask the question and observe the source. If the source answers and then pauses, the questioner should simply wait, making sure he has finished his thoughts. The source may have more to say. Silence can also be a strong weapon. The interrogator should never put words in the source’s mouth. Understanding Human Reactions

7-181. Along with effective questioning and listening, the skill of “reading” and understanding human reactions can provide valuable information about the source’s responses. During an interaction, people will often break eye contact and avert their eyes momentarily as they search for information to answer a question or think about what they are going to say. Generally, individuals will shift their eyes and take other actions according to the internal system they are accessing. 7-182. In addition to watching eye movements, the observer should take note of the following behavior:

· · · · · ·

Gestures. Posture. Muscle tension. Skin color. Breathing. Voice characteristics, including tone, tempo, and volume.

7-183. The model in the following example is a generalization; therefore, it may be unreliable in some cases. What is reliable is that every person has a unique pattern of accessing internal information. Possible cues to a person’s reactions might include the following:

·

The subject looks up and to the right, indicating he is visualizing something that has not been seen before. He may be creating images.

·

The subject looks up and to the left, indicating he is recalling something he has seen before. He may be recalling a visual memory.

·

The subject stares into space, his eyes not focused, with some pupil dilation. This may signal either visual recall or visualization of something he has seen before.

·

The subject looks directly to the right, indicating he is imagining sounds and creating spoken language.

·

The subject looks directly to the left, indicating he is recalling sounds from memory.

NOTE: The model shown here is for a right-handed person. The cues can be reversed for a left-handed person.

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DEBRIEFING

7-184. As soon as a team returns to an assembly area, it is directed to a secure area to prepare for debriefing. In preparing for a debriefing, the team takes the following actions:

· ·

Accounts for all team and individual equipment.

·

Prepares overlays of the team’s route, area of operations, infiltration point, exfiltration point, and sighting locations.

Reviews and discusses the events listed in the team notebook, from infiltration to return to the assembly area, including the details of each threat sighting.

7-185. Operations and intelligence personnel or the commander normally conducts the debriefing. A communications representative debriefs the team separately after the team debriefing to obtain information related to the communications architecture within the urban area. The team leader gives a step-by-step discussion of every event listed in the team notebook, from the infiltration until the return to the assembly area. When the debriefing is over, the team is released for equipment maintenance and recovery. See Appendix J of this manual for a sample debriefing format.

CONDUCT ASSESSMENT OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS 7-186. The platoon leader receives and analyzes the information gathered by the reconnaissance and surveillance teams. The platoon leader will then assess the area of operations according to the mission and the intent of the higher commander. The assessment will include, but is not limited to, these elements:

7-62

· · · · · · · · ·

Threat composition and activity.

· · ·

Communication facilities.

Areas of vulnerability to friendly forces. Key terrain. Approach routes for mounted and dismounted forces. Entry points or points of penetration. Support positions for direct and indirect fire systems. Civilian disposition. Density and composition of the urban area. Hazard areas (fuel storage, natural gas lines, chemical production sites). Retrans sites. Intent of the civilian populace (such as stay or flee).


END STATE 7-187. The platoon achieves the end state of its reconnaissance effort when the squadron/battalion is able to answer two critical questions for the brigade:

· ·

Is it essential to conduct operations in the urban environment? If so, how can the brigade employ combat power in the most efficient manner?

SUPPORT AN ASSAULT IN THE URBAN AREA 7-188. The reconnaissance platoon may be required to support assaults in urban areas. Units at battalion level and below conduct offensive urban operations through assessing, shaping, dominating, and transitioning the urban area. Reconnaissance platoons support assessment by reconnoitering both avenues to the urban area and the area itself. They then support shaping by pulling the infantry to the enemy weak points as it moves to secure a foothold. The platoons also assist in isolation of the urban area and support the infantry with precoordinated direct and indirect fires. They facilitate the domination phase by continuing these isolation and support actions. Reconnaissance platoons then support transition by consolidating, reorganizing, and preparing for potential stability operations or support operations as the operational environment changes. THE SEVEN PHASES OF URBAN ASSAULT OPERATIONS

7-189. When infantry forces conduct an assault of a built-up area, the reconnaissance platoon can support all seven phases of the operation:

· · · · · · ·

Reconnoiter the objective. Move to the objective. Isolate the objective. Secure a foothold. Clear a built-up area. Consolidate. Reorganize.

Reconnoiter the Objective and Move to the Objective

7-190. Considerations and actions involved in planning and executing the first two phases of the assault operation are covered earlier in this chapter. For information on other operational factors, refer to discussions in Chapter 2 (tactical movement), Chapter 3 (reconnaissance operations), and Chapter 5 (dismounted operations). Isolate the Objective

7-191. The reconnaissance platoon is effective in this phase of the operation, which may entail isolation of a building, village, small town, or large built-up area. Operating outside the town allows the platoon to use its speed, mobility, and if applicable, firepower. The threat force defending the urban area will often position elements outside the town to disrupt an attack and to limit friendly reconnaissance and mobility. The

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platoon may be able to prevent the threat from accomplishing his goals and from withdrawing into the town; it surrounds the objective by seizing key terrain and covering enemy avenues of approach (see Figure 7-29). In addition to security, reconnaissance platoon tasks during the isolation phase may include the following:

· · · ·

Prevent enemy forces from escaping. Prevent reinforcement of the built-up area. Protect the assault force from counterattack. Call for and adjust indirect fires.

Figure 7-29. Isolating the Objective Secure a Foothold

7-192. The reconnaissance platoon can use its weapons sights, including thermals, to conduct long-range reconnaissance and to locate enemy positions and/or vehicles during periods of limited visibility. The platoon can also provide fire support for infantry assaulting the objective. During the assault, the attacking force penetrates the area on a narrow front, concentrating all available supporting fires on the entry point. In support of the assault during this phase, reconnaissance platoon tasks include the following:

· · · ·

Attack by fire. Support by fire. Attack with the infantry. Coordinate and control indirect fires.

7-193. Attack by Fire. If applicable, platoon vehicles such as the CFV can attack by fire while the infantry assaults the objective. Once the assault force establishes a foothold, the vehicles move forward to provide close-in support. This method is used when enemy antiarmor fires or obstacles block the only possible armor avenue of approach.

7-64


7-194. Support by Fire. The platoon can conduct support by fire during

the assault; this may include covering critical areas on the assault force’s flanks. Once the assault force establishes a foothold, platoon vehicles move forward to provide close-in support (see Figure 7-30).

Figure 7-30. Gaining a Foothold (Reconnaissance Platoon Provides Support by Fire)

7-195. Attack with the Infantry. Platoon vehicles and the infantry advance together, with the infantry moving behind the vehicles for protection from small arms fire. Infantry squads or fire teams protect the vehicles from the enemy’s hand-held antiarmor weapons (as shown in Figure 7-31). Attacking with infantry is difficult to coordinate and execute because of differences in speed between the mounted and dismounted forces.

Figure 7-31. Gaining a Foothold (Reconnaissance Platoon Attacks with Infantry)

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Clear a Built-up Area

7-196. Once the infantry seizes its initial foothold, the reconnaissance platoon provides supporting fires while the infantry clears each building. Because of the danger of ambush, scout vehicles should support by fire, if applicable, from cleared positions rather than moving ahead of the infantry. They can sometimes provide fire support without entering the built-up area. 7-197. Because target identification and fire control measures change rapidly as clearance progresses, vehicles in the built-up area must be closely controlled by the infantry leader in charge (see Figure 7-32). Platoon vehicles provide suppressive fires to allow the infantry to establish a foothold in each building. To isolate buildings, vehicles engage known or suspected enemy locations. Once the infantry is inside the building, the vehicles continue to suppress enemy positions on other floors or in adjacent buildings. Specific actions of the reconnaissance platoon in clearing a building include the following:

·

Fire into the upper stories of the buildings to drive enemy forces to lower floors or the basement, where the infantry can trap and destroy them.

· · ·

Suppress and destroy enemy weapons and personnel. Provide antitank protection. Use direct fires to open holes in walls and reduce barricades.

NOTE: Building clearance operations are covered in detail earlier in this chapter.

Figure 7-32. CFV Section Supporting Isolation and Seizure of a Building

7-66


7-198. Seizure and clearance operations can range between two extremes: a systematic, block-by-block, house-by-house reduction of the built-up area or a rapid advance with friendly forces concentrating on seizing and clearing critical areas and buildings. The reconnaissance platoon’s role is roughly the same in either type of operation. For example, Figure 7-33 shows a CFV supporting an infantry squad in seizing and clearing an urban area. The following guidelines, tailored to a CFV-equipped platoon, apply in seizure and clearance operations:

·

·

In clearance of streets: n

CFVs lead, closely followed and supported by infantry.

n

CFVs work in pairs.

n

CFVs concentrate fires on windows and rooftops.

n

Infantry protects CFVs from close-in fires.

n

Infantry moves alongside or directly behind CFVs and scans for potential antiarmor positions.

In seizure and clearance of building: n

CFVs provide suppressive fires, windows, doorways, and rooftops.

concentrating

on

n

CFVs create holes in building walls to allow the infantry to enter through unexpected entrances.

Figure 7-33. CFV Provides Support as Infantry Squad Seizes and Clears a Building Consolidate and Reorganize

7-199. Once the assault operation is complete, the reconnaissance platoon and other elements conduct consolidation activities to co-locate forces, secure the objective area, and guard against enemy counterattack. They conduct reorganization activities to redistribute personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of continued operations.

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COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

7-200. Combat power is difficult to mass during urban operations because fighting is isolated. C2 is further aggravated because units can easily become separated. Such conditions make it necessary to decentralize the fight down to the smallest unit. These small units, reconnaissance sections and infantry squads, must communicate continuously and effectively if they are to survive and win on the urban battlefield. Visual Signals

7-201. Visual signals are the most effective and reliable means of communications between the infantry force and the reconnaissance vehicles. Targets are identified with tracer fire, grenade launcher rounds, smoke grenades, VS-17 panels, or hand-and-arm signals. Visual signals are used to trigger specific actions such as initiating fires, lifting or shifting fires, moving forward to the next position, and providing smoke obscuration. FM Radio and Wire

7-202. The infantry leader and reconnaissance vehicles can use FM radios and/or land lines to communicate while stationary. FM communications may be affected by the terrain; land lines can be used when FM communications are disrupted. To use land lines, run wire through the hatch to the inside of the vehicle or, if applicable (as on the CFV), connect it to the sponson box on the rear of the vehicle. A TA-1 is used to relay fire control instructions to the vehicle. FIRE SUPPORT

7-203. Indirect fires are most effective when used against open spaces within built-up areas; high-trajectory indirect fires are more effective than lower-trajectory fires. Because of these factors, mortars are normally more desirable than artillery for indirect fire support in urban operations. 7-204. Scouts can play a valuable role as the link between infantry squads and platoons and the mortars of the cavalry troop or armored battalion. Reconnaissance sections or squads are trained to call for and adjust indirect fires from these assets in support of the infantry’s attack.

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Chapter 8

Combat Support and Combat Service Support The reconnaissance platoon must take full advantage of available CS assets to accomplish its mission and to reduce its vulnerability on the battlefield. It may receive CS from mortars, FA, ADA, combat engineers, GSR, and TUAV assets. These assets are not organic to the platoon, but they will be available through the platoon’s parent squadron, battalion, or troop. To make effective use of them, scouts must understand the capabilities and limitations of the CS assets. CSS elements provide the platoon with support in the form of resupply, maintenance, medical services, and handling of prisoners and captured materials. The PSG has the primary responsibility for coordinating and managing these support functions for the platoon, which has no organic CSS assets.

CONTENTS Employ Fire Support........................................... Mortar Support ............................................ Field Artillery Support ................................ Naval Surface Fire Support ........................ Fire Support Team ...................................... Striker Team ................................................ Fire Request Channels ............................... Fire Planning in Support of Reconnaissance Missions ..................... Radar Zones ................................................ Call for Fire .................................................. Adjusting Indirect Fire ................................ Refinement and Surveillance ..................... Fire Support Coordination Measures ........ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ................................ The UAV Platoon ......................................... Sensor Capabilities .................................... Relationship of the UAV Platoon and the Reconnaissance Platoon ................. Command and Control ............................... Reconnaissance Operations ...................... Security Operations .................................... Area Security ............................................... Air-Ground Reconnaissance Handover .... Combat Engineers ............................................. Engineer Support in Reconnaissance Operations ............................................... Engineer Support in Security Operations ............................................... Air Defense ......................................................... Passive Air Defense .................................... Active Air Defense ...................................... Short-Range Air Defense Systems ............ Aviation Support ................................................ Fixed-Wing Support .................................... Attack Helicopter Support .......................... Utility and Cargo Helicopter Support ........ Air Assault Operations (Air Infiltration) .... Resupply Operations .................................. Medical Evacuation .................................... Multicapable Sensor Teams .............................. Capabilities and Limitations ...................... Employment ................................................ GSR .............................................................. REMBASS .................................................... IREMBASS ................................................... Combat Service Support ................................... Supply Operations ...................................... Maintenance Operations ............................ Personnel Operations ................................. Medical Treatment and Evacuation ........... Prisoners and Captured Material ...............

8-2 8-2 8-3 8-6 8-8 8-9 8-10 8-12 8-13 8-13 8-16 8-22 8-23 8-28 8-28 8-29 8-29 8-31 8-31 8-31 8-32 8-33 8-35 8-36 8-36 8-37 8-38 8-38 8-40 8-41 8-41 8-44 8-56 8-59 8-65 8-66 8-68 8-68 8-68 8-69 8-71 8-72 8-73 8-73 8-81 8-85 8-86 8-88

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SECTION I – EMPLOY FIRE SUPPORT 8-1. Mortars and FA assets are the primary indirect fire support means available to the reconnaissance platoon, although the platoon may receive fire support from other assets as well, including aircraft and ships. In addition to understanding the capabilities and limitations of these assets, scouts must know what fire request channels to use to request fires. The platoon leader must be prepared to work with both the troop and/or squadron/battalion FSOs to plan and coordinate fire support.

MORTAR SUPPORT 8-2. Mortars can provide indirect fire support that is extremely responsive to the scouts’ needs. They can provide a heavy volume of fires and are ideal for attacking targets on reverse slopes, in narrow ravines or trenches, and in forests, towns, and other areas that are difficult to strike with low-angle fires. Each recce/cavalry troop or supported battalion has an organic 120-mm mortar section dedicated to providing the responsive fires that the platoon needs. The BRT does not have organic mortars, but may obtain mortar support from the lead task force. The 120-mm mortar has a maximum effective range of 7,200 meters and shoots a variety of munitions. Table 8-1 lists capabilities of the various mortar systems and munitions. Table 8-1. Fire Support Capabilities (Mortars)

MORTARS Weapon

Munition available

Max Range (m)

Min Range (m)

Max Rate (rds per min)

Burst Radius

Sustained Rate (rds per min)

60-mm

HE, WP, ILLUM

3,500 (HE)

70 (HE)

30 for 4 min

30 m

20

81-mm

HE, WP, ILLUM

5,600 (HE)

70 (HE)

25 for 2 min

38 m

8

107-mm

HE, WP, ILLUM

6,840 (HE)

770 (HE)

18 for 1 min, 9 for 5 min

40 m

3

120-mm

HE, SMK, ILLUM

7,200 (HE)

180 (HE)

15 for 1 min

60 m

5

TYPES OF MORTAR SUPPORT Suppression

8-3. HE rounds can be used to force the threat to button up or move to less advantageous positions. Unless a direct hit is achieved, however, HE mortar rounds will not destroy armored vehicles.

8-2

___________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Support and Combat Service Support

Smoke

8-4. White phosphorus (WP) rounds are used for obscuration and screening. In obscuration, smoke is placed on or just in front of threat positions to obscure their vision. Screening is achieved by placing smoke between the threat and the platoon position to conceal movement. Mortar smoke can also be used to mark threat positions to enhance friendly maneuver and orient direct fires. Scouts must be careful, however, not to allow smoke to work against them by marking their own positions for threat gunners. Illumination

8-5. Illumination rounds are used to light an area or threat position during periods of limited visibility. Scouts can increase the effectiveness of their image intensification devices by using illumination. This helps them in gathering information, adjusting artillery, or engaging threat targets. Ground-burst illumination can also be used to mark threat positions and to provide a thermal target reference point (TRP) for control of direct fires. As with smoke, illumination is a double-edged sword; care must be taken not to illuminate friendly positions. Also, because US night vision devices are superior to those of most potential adversaries, illuminating the battlefield may be unnecessary or even counterproductive. CAPABILITIES

8-6.

Mortar capabilities include the following:

· · ·

A close working relationship with reconnaissance platoons. Fast response time. Availability for low-density targets.

LIMITATIONS

8-7.

Mortars have the following limitations:

· · ·

They have only short-range capability.

·

Mortar elements ammunition.

Only limited types of ammunition are available. Are extremely vulnerable to threat counterfire radars due to the high angle of fire. can

carry

only

limited

amounts

of

FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT 8-8. The brigade, and hence the reconnaissance platoon, is supported by an FA battalion. As part of its unit basic load, this FA battalion has several different munitions available to support the platoon. It has lethal munitions such as HE, DPICM, Copperhead, WP, and scatterable mines. It also has nonlethal munitions, including smoke and illumination. Tables 8-2 and 8-3 list capabilities of the various FA systems and munitions.

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Table 8-2. Fire Support Capabilities (Field Artillery Systems)

FIELD ARTILLERY Weapon

Max Range (m)

Min Range (m)


Burst Radius


105-mm Howitzer M102, Towed

11,500 14,500 (RAP)

0

10 for 3 min

35 m

3


14,000

0

6 for 2 min

35 m

3 rds for 30 min, then 1 rd per min


18,100 30,000 (RAP)

0

4 for 3 min, 2 for 30 min

50 m

1 rd per min (temperature dependent)

155-mm Howitzer M109A2/A3, SP

18,100 23,500 (RAP)

0

4 for 3 min

50 m

1 for 60 min, then 0.5

203-mm Howitzer M110A2, SP

22,900 30,000 (RAP)

0

1.5 for 3 min

80 m

0.5

Table 8-3. Field artillery capabilities (conventional munitions)

CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS FPF WIDTH

MAXIMUM RANGES (M198) (meters) HE/DPICM

ERDPICM

18,100

28,400

RAP 400m

30,000

RATES OF FIRE SUSTAINED

MAXIMUM

Variable

4 rounds/minute

ILLUMINATION MAXIMUM RANGE

BURN TIME

RATE OF FIRE FOR CONTINUOUS ILLUMINATION

ILLUMINATION DIAMETER

17,500

2 minutes

1 round/minute

1,000 m

SMOKE

8-4

TYPE

TIME TO BUILD EFFECTIVE SMOKE

AVERAGE BURN TIME (minutes)

WP

30 seconds

1 to 1½

Smoke

60-90 seconds

5 to 10


CAPABILITIES

8-9. In support of the platoon, FA elements have the following capabilites:

·

Provide fire support in all weather conditions and types of terrain.

· · · ·

Shift and mass fires rapidly. Support the battle in depth with long-range fires. Provide a variety of conventional shell and fuze combinations. Provide continuous fire support.

LIMITATIONS

8-10. FA support has the following limitations:

· ·

Limited capability against moving targets.

·

Vulnerability to detection by threat target acquisition systems because of its firing signature.

Limited capability to destroy point considerable ammunition expenditure.

targets

without

COMMON USES OF AVAILABLE MUNITIONS

8-11. FA employs a wide variety of munitions that can be tailored for the engagement of different types of targets (refer to Table 8-3). These ammunition types include the following:

·

HE, for use against personnel, field fortifications, and vehicles.

· · · ·

Smoke, for obscuration and screening.

·

DPICM, for use against personnel and light armored vehicles in the open.

·

Scatterable mines. These include area denial munitions (ADAM) for use against personnel and remote antiarmor mine systems (RAAMS) for use against armored vehicles. When an FA battery is firing a scatterable mines mission, it is not available for other fire missions. Scatterable mines require slightly more lead time than do other FA-delivered munitions.

Illumination. WP, for obscuration, burning, and marking. Cannon-launched guided projectiles (Copperhead), for use against point targets.

8-12. In addition to the supporting cannon units, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements may also provide fires. Unlike cannon artillery, MLRS units do not fire a variety of munitions. They provide either rocket or missile fires, but do not offer special munitions, such as smoke, illumination, or WP. The maximum range of MLRS rockets is 32,000 meters. The planning range for MLRS missiles in the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) is 100,000 meters. Both of these munitions are DPICM. 8-5

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NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT 8-13. Destroyers and cruisers are the predominant ships used in NGF roles. Both types of vessels employ 5-inch guns to provide fires. (Table 8-4 provides NGF data for the available types of munitions.) Reconnaissance units will normally receive augmentation from the Marines for NGF missions. These personnel will be used at platoon level for the actual conduct of the NGF mission. In the event this augmentation does not occur and the platoon leader determines that NGF is required, he should request the support using the format illustrated in Figure 8-1. Table 8-4. Fire Support Capabilities (Naval Gunfire)

NAVAL GUNFIRE

8-6

Weapon

Full Charge

Reduced Charge



5 in / 38

15,904

8,114

20

15

5 in / 54

23,133

12,215

35

20

16 in / 50

36,188

22,951

2

1


Figure 8-1. Naval Gunfire Call for Fire Format

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Figure 8-1. Naval Gunfire Call for Fire Format (Continued)

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM 8-14. Except for the BRT, each troop has an organic FIST specifically designed to assist in the planning, coordination, and integration of fire support during operations. (NOTE: The BRT may use the attached Striker platoon leader/PSG for this purpose.) Elements from the FIST may be pushed forward with the reconnaissance platoon in support of security operations when target designation is required for special munitions engagements. The FIST’s C2 link with the artillery makes it a valuable resource; it should not be exposed to direct fire except when absolutely necessary. The FIST is organized, equipped, and trained to provide the following:

· ·

8-8

A fire support advisor and coordinator. A communications link to all available fire support assets.


8-15. The armor and mechanized infantry company team FIST normally monitors the following nets:

·

Attached unit command net (battalion, company team, or scout platoon).

· · ·

Battalion mortar fire direction net. Direct support (DS) battalion fire direction net (digital). Battalion fire support net (voice).

8-16. The armored cavalry or recce troop FIST normally monitors the following radio nets:

· · · ·

Troop command net. Troop fire support net. Supporting artillery fire direction net (digital and voice). Squadron fire support net.

8-17. The FIST serves as the NCS on the troop fire support net. The FSE is the NCS on the squadron or maneuver battalion fire support net. The FIST relays the call for fire to supporting artillery on a digital net (AFATDS) or sends the fire mission to the troop mortar section. The command net allows the FIST to monitor operations and links the FIST to the commander and platoon leaders for planning and coordination.

STRIKER TEAM 8-18. From company/troop to brigade level, a Striker team is placed under the control of a fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) to enhance the lasing capability and to function as a dedicated observation platform. Striker teams are organic to each DS FA battalion and to the howitzer battery of the armored cavalry squadron. The cavalry squadron has one organic Striker team. Striker teams also work closely with BRTs. 8-19. Requests for indirect fire can be sent through the Striker team, which has a secondary mission of processing these requests for the scouts. The Striker team monitors the reconnaissance platoon net and handles the fire request and subsequent adjustments in the same manner as a normal FIST. It can enter the information gained through its primary mission, lasing targets for advanced munitions, such as Copperhead rounds and CAS, directly into initial fire support automated system (IFSAS) channels. 8-20. When pushed forward with the scouts, the Striker team may collocate with one of the reconnaissance platoon OPs for local security and protection. The Striker team may occupy its own position to observe a TAI; in turn, this TAI may be tied to an NAI covered by a scout team. This technique allows the scout team to act as a trigger, with the Striker team executing and adjusting fires. This type of integration is common in BRT units.

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FIRE REQUEST CHANNELS RECCE OR ARMORED CAVALRY PLATOON

8-21. The scouts in a recce or armored cavalry troop normally request all indirect fire support through their troop FIST on the troop fire support net. The FIST selects the best available fire support to engage the target. If the FIST passes the fire mission to the troop mortars, the scouts send all adjustments of the fire mission directly to the mortars (see Figure 8-2). If the FIST passes the fire mission to a supporting artillery unit, the scouts send all adjustments of the fire mission to the FIST, which relays the message to the artillery unit on a digital fire direction net (as shown in Figure 8-3).

Figure 8-2. Recce or Armored Cavalry Scouts Requesting Fire from Mortars

Figure 8-3. Recce or Armored Cavalry Scouts Requesting Fire from Field Artillery

8-10


BATTALION RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

8-22. There are several ways the battalion task force scouts can request indirect fire. The task force SOP should specify which method they will use. The scout platoon leader must also coordinate with the task force FSO and/or FSE on which of these methods, described in the following paragraphs, the scouts will employ. Mortar Requests

8-23. The platoon can send requests for mortar fire directly to the mortars on the battalion heavy mortar net; the FSE monitors these requests. (See Figure 8-4.)

Figure 8-4. Battalion scouts requesting fire from task force mortars Artillery Requests

8-24. The platoon can send requests for artillery fire directly to the FA battalion on a fire direction net; the FSE monitors the requests. (See Figure 8-5.) BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

8-25. Scouts in the BRT’s platoons normally request all indirect fire support through the platoon leader or PSG of the attached STRIKER platoon. If STRIKER elements are not attached to the troop, the scouts usually request indirect fires on the troop command net, coordinating the fires with the XO.

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Figure 8-5. Battalion scouts requesting fire from the FA battalion

FIRE PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS 8-26. The reconnaissance platoon leader must be prepared to use both hasty fire planning and deliberate fire planning in support of the platoon’s missions. He should pay particular attention to the identification of priority targets and to the procedures used to shift priority targets whenever necessary. He forwards all planned targets in support of the scout mission to the FIST, which in turn forwards them to the supporting FSO. The nature of platoon operations dictates that primary consideration for fires should be focused on avenues of approach, OPs, and other key or decisive terrain. 8-27. The platoon leader coordinates priority of fires through normal fire support channels. He should concentrate on placing effective fires in several key locations: short of the line of departure is line of contact (LD/LC), from the LD/LC to the objective, on the objective, and beyond the objective (in case of threat counterattack). He must also coordinate with adjacent units to ensure overlapping fires prior to execution of operations. 8-28. During reconnaissance, the platoon leader uses these doctrinal targeting tasks when the platoon has target responsibilities. The two key areas of concern for the platoon will be short of the LD/LC and from the LD/LC to the objective. The fire support plan must also support the platoon during movement along assigned routes and while it is occupying OPs; fires may be used against threat reconnaissance elements or forward security elements. In the defense, the platoon leader must coordinate with the higher commander for planned targets.

8-12


8-29. During security operations, it is particularly important for the platoon leader to plan fires in support of point obstacles. The locations of obstacles should be refined and passed to the troop FIST or the battalion and/or brigade FSCOORD at the earliest possible time. As much as possible, the platoon leader should ensure that the platoon has mortar priority of fires if available.

RADAR ZONES 8-30. In addition to the planning the platoon leader does for fires, he must also be aware of and consider recommending the use of radar zones. Radar zones are a means of prioritizing radar sectors of search. A zone is a geometric figure placed around an area that designates that area as more, or less, important than some other area. 8-31. There are four types of radar zones; however, the platoon leader needs to be concerned with only one type, the CFZ. A CFZ is an area, usually a friendly unit or location, that is critical. It is used to protect an asset whose loss would seriously jeopardize the mission. Any threat weapon firing into a CFZ will be fired upon. An immediate call for fire is generated by the radar computer and sent to a friendly firing unit.

CALL FOR FIRE 8-32. The standard call for fire for artillery and mortars consists of three basic transmissions, consisting of six elements as follows:

·

Observer identification transmission).

· ·

Target location (second transmission).

and

warning

order

(first

Target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control (third transmission).

8-33. The exceptions to using the full call for fire, with all three transmissions, are requests calling for “suppression” or “immediate suppression” missions. OBSERVER IDENTIFICATION AND WARNING ORDER

8-34. The observer identification tells the fire direction center (FDC) who is calling. It also clears the net for the rest of the call. The warning order tells the FDC the type of fire support mission and the method of locating the target. The types of missions are the following:

·

Adjust fire. This is used when the observer is uncertain of the exact target location. Example: “G24 THIS IS G59 ADJUST FIRE - OVER.”

·

Fire for effect. The observer should always try first-round fire for effect if he is sure that his target location is correct. He should also be sure that the rounds of the first volley will have the desired effect on the target so that little or no adjustment will be required. Example: “G24 THIS IS G59 FIRE FOR EFFECT - OVER.”

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·

Suppression. The word “SUPPRESS” is used to quickly bring fire on a preplanned target only. This is a simplified call for fire and is sent in one transmission. Example: “G24 THIS IS G59 - SUPPRESS AF2401 - OVER.”

·

Immediate suppression. This is used to bring fire quickly on a planned target or a target of opportunity that is firing at a friendly unit or aircraft. As with suppression, this mission uses a simplified call for fire that is sent in one transmission. Examples: n

Preplanned target example: “G24 THIS IS G59 SUPPRESS AF2401 - OVER.” Target description is not announced.

n

Target of opportunity example: “G24 THIS IS G59 IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION GRID 123456 - OVER.”

TARGET LOCATION

8-35. Following the type of mission, the method of target location is announced; this prepares the FDC to receive the data sent by the observer and apply it to locate the target. The three methods for locating targets are grid, polar plot, and shift from a known point. Only the polar plot and shift methods are initially announced to the FDC. If the observer does not specify either polar or shift, the FDC knows the grid method is being used; the word “grid” is not announced in the initial transmission. Example: “H24 - THIS IS H67 - FIRE FOR EFFECT POLAR - OVER.” (NOTE: The word “grid” is announced at the beginning of a subsequent transmission calling for an adjustment of fires. Example: “H24 THIS IS H67 - ADJUST FIRE OVER. H24 THIS IS H67 - GRID 123456 OVER.”) Grid Method

8-36. When using the grid method, the target location is normally sent in six digits (example: “180739”). The direction from the observer to the target (in mils, if possible) must be given to the FDC after the call for fire, but before the first adjusting rounds are shot. Polar Plot Method

8-37. This method requires that the observer and the FDC know the observer’s exact location. The observer determines the direction (to the nearest 10 mils) of the observer-target (OT) line and the distance (to the nearest 100 meters) from his position to the target (see Figure 8-6).

Figure 8-6. Polar Plot Method of Target Location

8-14


Shift from a Known Point Method

8-38. This method can be used if the observer and the FDC have a common known point. To locate the target, the observer must first determine the direction to the nearest 10 mils. If the observer has no compass, he can determine the direction by using a map and protractor or by using his binocular reticle pattern and a known direction to the known point. He should remember to apply the RALS rule (right add, left subtract) in determining direction to the target (see Figure 8-7).

Figure 8-7. Shift from a Known Point Method Using Direction (in Mils)

8-39. The observer then determines the lateral and range shifts (see Figure 8-8). Lateral shifts are left or right from the known point to the OT line and are given to the nearest 10 meters. Range shifts are given as “ADD” (when the target is beyond the known point) or “DROP” (when the target is closer than the known point). Range shifts are given to the nearest 100 meters. FM 6-30 explains in detail how to determine the lateral and range shifts.

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Figure 8-8. Lateral and Range Shifts from a Known Point DESCRIPTION OF TARGET, METHOD OF ENGAGEMENT, AND METHOD OF FIRE AND CONTROL

8-40. The observer includes these elements in his call for fire using the guidelines discussed in the following paragraphs. Description of Target

8-41. The observer describes the target to the FDC. The FDC then determines the type and amount of ammunition needed. The target description should be brief yet accurate. This is the last required element in the call for fire. Method of Engagement

8-42. The observer specifies how he wants to attack the target (type of ammunition, fuze, distance from friendly troops). The FDC may change the ammunition type and/or fuze based on ammunition constraints. If the target is within 600 meters of friendly troops, the observer announces “DANGER CLOSE” to supporting mortars and artillery. When “DANGER CLOSE” is called, the initial rounds in adjustment should use a delay fuze. Method of Fire and Control

8-43. The observer states who will give the command for fire to begin. If the observer wants to control the time of firing, he will say, “AT MY COMMAND.” The FDC will tell the observer when the unit is ready to fire. At the proper time, the observer will say, “FIRE.” If the observer does not say, “AT MY COMMAND,” the FDC will fire as soon as the platoon/battery is ready.

ADJUSTING INDIRECT FIRE 8-44. The goal of every observer is to put rounds on target as quickly as possible. If the five requirements for accurate predicted fire have been

8-16


met, this task is relatively easy, and the observer requests fire for effect in his initial call for fire. With so many variables affecting the accurate delivery of initial rounds, however, observers must be prepared to adjust subsequent rounds onto the target as quickly as possible. Normally, one artillery piece or mortar is used in adjustment.

8-45. The observer must first pick an adjusting point. For a destruction

mission (precision fire), the target is the adjusting point. For an area target (area fire), the observer must pick a well-defined adjusting point at the center of the area or close to it. The observer must spot the first adjusting round and each successive round and send range and deviation corrections, as required, back to the FDC until fire hits the target. The observer spots by relating the burst or group of bursts to the adjusting point. For a further discussion of adjusting mortar and artillery fire, see FM 3-09.3 (FM 6-30).

DEVIATION SPOTTING

8-46. As applied to deviation (left or right), spotting involves measuring the horizontal angle (in mils) between the burst and the adjusting point. An angle-measuring device or technique, such as the mil scale on military binoculars (refer to Figure 8-9) or the hand-and-fingers method (see Figure 8-10), is required to determine deviation. The horizontal scale, divided into 10-mil increments, is used for measuring horizontal angles. The vertical scales, in 5-mil increments in the center and on the left side of the reticle, are used for measuring vertical angles. The scale on the right, if present, is no longer used.

Figure 8-9. Mil Scale in Binocular Reticle

Figure 8-10. Use of Hand And Fingers Method to Determine Deviation

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8-47. A burst to the right (or left) of the target is spotted as “(number) MILS RIGHT (LEFT)” (as shown in Figures 8-11 and 8-12). A burst on the OT line is spotted as “LINE.” Deviation to the left or right should be measured to the nearest 5 mils for area targets, with measurements taken from the center of the burst. Deviation for a destruction mission (precision fire) is estimated to the nearest mil.

Figure 8-11. Deviation Spotting

Figure 8-12. Deviation Spotting with Binoculars DEVIATION CORRECTION

8-48. Once the mil deviation has been determined, the observer must convert it into a deviation correction (in meters). Deviation correction is the distance in meters the burst must be moved to be on line between

8-18


observer and target. It is sent, with the range correction, to the FDC for the next adjusting round or when calling for fire for effect.

8-49. Deviation correction is determined by multiplying the observed deviation in mils by the distance from the observer to the target in thousands of meters. This distance is expressed as the OT factor (illustrated in Figure 8-13). The correction is expressed to the nearest 10 meters (see Figure 8-14).

Figure 8-13. Determining the OT Factor

Figure 8-14. Converting Mil Deviation to Deviation Correction

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8-50. Minor deviation corrections (10 to 20 meters) are necessary to adjust precision fire. In adjustment of area fire, however, deviation corrections of 20 meters or less should be ignored except when such a small change is necessary to determine a definite range spotting. Throughout the adjustment, the observer should move the adjusting rounds close enough to the OT line so that range spotting can be made accurately. RANGE SPOTTING

8-51. As applied to range (short or over), spotting is required to make adjustments to place fire on the target. The following terminology is used in this process:

·

OVER. This term is used for a round that appears to impact beyond the adjusting point.

·

SHORT. This is used for a round that appears to strike between the observer and the adjusting point.

·

TARGET. This spotting term describes a round that hits the target; it is used only in precision fire (destruction missions).

·

RANGE CORRECT. This is used for a round that appears to be at the correct range.

·

DOUBTFUL. This is used for a round that can be observed but cannot be spotted in one of the previous categories (over, short, target, or range correct).

·

LOST. This describes a round whose location cannot be determined.

·

LOST OVER or LOST SHORT. These terms are used for a round that is not observed but that is definitely known to be beyond or short of the adjusting point.

8-52. Any range spotting other than “DOUBTFUL” or “LOST” is definite. Usually, an adjusting round’s burst that is on or near the OT line will give a definite range spotting. The observer can make a definite range spotting even when the burst is not on or near the OT line. He uses his knowledge of the terrain or wind and observes debris scattered by the impact; however, if the observer is not sure (“DOUBTFUL”), the correction he sends to the FDC should be for deviation (“LEFT” or “RIGHT”) only. This is done to bring the burst on line to get a definite range spotting (“OVER, ” “SHORT, ” or “TARGET”). RANGE CORRECTION Bracketing

8-53. In this technique, the observer gives range corrections so that, with each successive correction, the adjusting round intentionally lands over or short of the adjusting point, closing on the target. Fire for effect is called for when a range correction would bring the next round within 50 meters of the adjusting point. (See Figure 8-15.) 8-54. Successive bracketing is a safe technique in that it is sure to bring fire on the target. Time is important, especially when targets are moving or may move to seek cover when they find fire coming their way. Accurate initial location information speeds adjustment and makes the requested 8-20


fire more effective. To shorten adjustment time, the observer should try to bracket the target quickly (in the first two or three adjusting rounds), then try to adjust on the target with as few subsequent rounds as possible.

Figure 8-15. Bracketing Hasty Bracketing

8-55. Experience has shown that effectiveness on the target decreases as the number of rounds used in adjustment increases. An alternative to successive bracketing is hasty bracketing. While successive bracketing mathematically ensures that the fire-for-effect rounds will strike within 50 meters of the adjusting point, it is a slow and unresponsive technique. Therefore, if the nature of the target dictates that effective fires are needed faster than successive bracketing can provide them, hasty

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bracketing should be used. The success of hasty bracketing depends on a thorough terrain analysis that gives the observer an accurate initial target location. The observer obtains a bracket on his first correction in a manner similar to that used for successive bracketing. Once the observer has this initial bracket, he uses it as a yardstick to determine his subsequent correction. He then sends the FDC the correction to move the rounds to the target and fire for effect. Hasty bracketing improves as the observer gains experience and judgment. Every observer must strive to improve his abilities and increase his responsiveness on the battlefield. Creeping

8-56. The creeping method of adjustment is used in “DANGER CLOSE” situations. Here, the initial round is fired beyond the target. Adjusting rounds are brought in 100 meters or less until the target is engaged. This method is slow and tends to use more ammunition than other adjustments; therefore, it should be used only when soldier safety is a major concern.

REFINEMENT AND SURVEILLANCE 8-57. The observer should note the results of the fire for effect and then take whatever action is necessary to complete the mission. Figure 8-16 shows the observer’s actions after fire-for-effect rounds have been fired.

Figure 8-16. Observer's Actions after Fire for Effect

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FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES 8-58. Once established, fire support coordination measures (FSCM) are displayed on maps, firing charts, and overlays and are stored in computers. Graphic portrayal includes, as a minimum, the visual code, the abbreviation for the measure, the establishing headquarters, and the effective date-time group (DTG). Often, the DTG is shown as a from-to time. Usually, coordination measures are labeled at each end of a line or within the graphic, space permitting. Both the graphics and the lettering are in black for all measures. 8-59. With the exception of boundaries, FSCMs are either permissive or restrictive. In essence, the primary purpose of a permissive measure is to facilitate the attack of targets. The establishment of a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific coordination before the engagement of those targets affected by the measure; therefore, the primary purpose of a restrictive measure is to safeguard friendly forces. PERMISSIVE MEASURES Coordinated Fire Line

8-60. The CFL is a line beyond which conventional or improved conventional indirect fire means (mortars, FA, and NGF) may fire at any time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. It covers surface-to-surface fires only. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the attack of targets beyond it. Usually, a brigade or a division establishes the CFL, but a maneuver battalion may also establish it. It is located as close to the establishing unit as is possible, without interfering with maneuver forces, to open up the area beyond to fire support. There is no requirement for the CFL to be placed on identifiable terrain; however, additional considerations include the limits of ground observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the requirement for maximum flexibility of both maneuver and the delivery of supporting fires. Higher headquarters may consolidate subordinate CFLs. 8-61. A dashed black line graphically portrays the CFL, with the notation “CFL” followed by the establishing headquarters (brigade or division) in parentheses above the line and a date-time group below the line. Locations for CFLs are disseminated by message and/or overlay through both maneuver and fire support channels to higher, lower, adjacent maneuver, and supporting units. (See Figure 8-17.)

Figure 8-17. Coordinated Fire Line Fire Support Coordination Line

8-62. The FSCL facilitates the rapid attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordination measure. It is a line established and adjusted by

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the appropriate land or amphibious force commander within his boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. In the Army, this is usually the corps commander; in amphibious operations, it is usually the commander of the landing force (CLF) after coordination with the commander, amphibious task force (CATF). Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line that may affect current tactical operations. The FSCL is used to coordinate all fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features to ease identification from the air.

8-63. The FSCL is not a boundary. The synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary. 8-64. The decision on where to place an FSCL or even whether to use it requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the situation and the concept of operations. Location of threat forces, anticipated rates of movement, weapons capabilities, and tempo of the operation are considered in the commander’s estimate, along with other factors deemed appropriate. The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the defense than in the offense. The exact positioning is situation-dependent. 8-65. Land or amphibious force commanders attempt to establish the FSCL at sufficient depth so as not to limit high-tempo maneuver. FSCLs established at sufficient depth assist them in easing the coordination requirements for attack operations within their area of operations by forces not under their control, such as NGF. (NOTE: The FSCL is a term oriented to air-land operations; there is no similar term used at sea.) 8-66. An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in potential for fratricide. Short of an FSCL, the appropriate land or amphibious force commander controls all air-to-ground and surface-tosurface attack operations. 8-67. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. They employ restrictive measures to improve the protection of friendly forces operating beyond the FSCL or planning to maneuver on that territory in the future. Coordination is also important when attacking forces employ wide-area munitions or munitions with delayed effects. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant attack operations. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL; however, failure to conduct coordination may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources.

8-24


8-68. The land or amphibious force commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change every few hours. The establishing commander quickly transmits the change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure attack operations are properly coordinated. Anticipated adjustments to the FSCL are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force sufficiently early to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations. (See Figure 8-18.)

Figure 8-18. Fire Support Coordination Line Free Fire Area

8-69. The FFA is a specific area into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. It is used to expedite fires and to facilitate the jettison of munitions when aircraft are unable to drop them on a target area. Usually, a division or higher commander establishes the FFA. It is located on identifiable terrain when possible or by grid designation when necessary. It is disseminated through both maneuver and fire support channels. Aircraft operations in a FFA may be extremely hazardous since there is no deconfliction of fires into the FFA. (See Figure 8-19.)

FFA 1ST CORPS 080800-081200Z AUG OR EFF 080800Z AUG

Figure 8-19. Free Fire Area

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RESTRICTIVE MEASURES No-Fire Area

8-70. The NFA is an area into which no fires or effects of fires are allowed. There are two exceptions:

·

When the establishing headquarters approves fires temporarily within the NFA on a mission-by-mission basis.

·

When a threat force within the NFA engages a friendly force. In this situation, the commander may engage the threat to defend his force.

8-71. The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in the area. Usually a division or corps establishes NFAs. NFAs are normally on easily identifiable terrain; however, they may be located by grid or by a radius (in meters) from a center point. Like other FSCMs, the location of an NFA is disseminated through both maneuver and fire support channels to concerned levels. (See Figure 8-20.)

Figure 8-20. No-Fire Area Restrictive Fire Area

8-72. The RFA is an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. The purpose of the RFA is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions. Maneuver battalion or higher echelons of command establish the RFA, although on occasion, a company operating independently may establish one. Usually, the RFA is located on identifiable terrain, by a grid, or by radius (in meters) from a center point. Its location is disseminated in the same manner as that of the CFL. Restrictions may be shown on a map or overlay, or reference can be made to an OPORD stating the restrictions. RFAs are suited for aircraft operations since fires into an RFA can be controlled and deconflicted from the aircraft. (See Figure 8-21.)

8-26


Figure 8-21. Restrictive Fire Area Restrictive Fire Line

8-73. The RFL is a line established between converging friendly forces (one or both may be moving) that prohibits fires or the effects of fires across the line without coordination with the affected force. The purpose of the line is to prevent interference between the converging friendly forces. The commander common to the converging forces establishes it. Its location is disseminated in the same manner as that of a CFL. (See Figure 8-22.)

Figure 8-22. Restrictive Fire Line Airspace Coordination Area

8-74. The ACA is a block of airspace in the target area in which friendly

aircraft are reasonably safe from surface fires. Occasionally, it may be a formal measure (a three-dimensional box in the sky); more commonly, it is an informal space. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous attack of targets near each other by multiple fire support means, one of which normally is an airborne asset. For example, aircraft, FA, and NGF can attack the same target complex or targets close to one another while operating within the parameters of an established ACA.

8-75. Implementation of the formal ACA takes a significant amount of time; therefore, informal ACAs are most often used and are the preferred

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method. The informal ACA can be established by using time, lateral separation, or altitude to provide separation between surface-to-surface and air-delivered fires. An example would be to designate a road as the lateral separation feature, with air support then directed to stay north of the road and FA and NGF restricted to airspace and targets south of the road. The informal ACA established at task force or higher level is normally temporary in nature and is not normally displayed on maps, charts, or overlays.

8-76. Occasionally, there may be a requirement for a separate brigade or higher-level commander to establish a formal ACA. The FSE with the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) element and the FDC coordinates the location of the ACA. It is located above the target area as recommended to the FSE by the air liaison element. The type of aircraft and the ordnance in use dictates the size of the area. 8-77. Vital information defining the formal ACA includes minimum and maximum altitudes, a baseline designated by grid coordinates at each end, the width (either side of the baseline), and the effective times. Information concerning the area is disseminated in the same way as for the CFL. (See Figure 8-23.)

Figure 8-23. Airspace Coordination Area

SECTION II – UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES NOTE: A detailed discussion later in this chapter outlines helicopter support available to the reconnaissance platoon from Army aviation assets.

THE UAV PLATOON 8-78. The UAV platoon, which is led by a lieutenant, consists of four TUAVs. It includes a headquarters element, a mission planning team,

8-28


two ground control teams, a launch and recovery section, and a maintenance team. Its primary mission is to conduct ISR missions. Recce platoons in RSTA squadrons must establish a close working relationship with the surveillance troop’s UAV platoon. In addition, reconnaissance platoons that are not part of RSTA squadrons must also understand UAV support capabilities so they can take advantage of this asset if available.

8-79. Through their mobility and speed, TUAVs provide the ground commander or reconnaissance platoon leader with flexible, versatile platforms that are suitable for employment in numerous types of situations and operations. Employment of TUAVs can increase the speed with which reconnaissance is conducted. These aircraft are also useful in screening between and forward of OPs established by the platoon.

SENSOR CAPABILITIES 8-80. Several types of imagery sensors are available for use on TUAVs, although sensors are currently limited to electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR). Each sensor has unique capabilities, with distinct advantages and disadvantages. Table 8-5 is a matrix of characteristics for the EO and IR sensors currently available. (NOTE: Additional types of sensors and other TUAV payloads are currently under development and may be fielded as their respective technologies mature.) Table 8-5. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Sensor Characteristics SENSOR TYPE Electro-optical (visible light)

ADVANTAGES · · · · ·

Infrared

· · · · ·

DISADVANTAGES

Best tool for detailed analysis during daytime and clear weather. Affords a familiar view of a scene. Offers system resolution that cannot be achieved with other optical systems, thermal images, or radar. Preferred for detailed analysis and mensuration. Offers stereoscopic viewing.

·

Can be deceived by employment of camouflage and concealment techniques.

·

Restricted by weather conditions; visible light cannot penetrate clouds or fog.

·

Restricted by terrain and vegetation.

·

Limited to daytime use only.

Best tool for detailed analysis in darkness with clear weather. Passive sensor that is impossible to jam. Offers camouflage penetration. Provides good resolution. Offers nighttime imaging capability.

·

Not effective during thermal crossover (1 to 1.5 hours after sunrise or sunset).

·

Tactical platforms (TUAVs) can be threatened by threat air defenses.

·

Bad weather degrades quality of sensor images.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE UAV PLATOON AND THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON 8-81. TUAVs are a significant asset in support of the ground commander’s requirements for his scouts. When operating with ground scouts, the platoon is normally OPCON to the squadron or battalion. To be successful, however, the UAV platoon must communicate and coordinate directly with the most forward ground scouts.

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8-82. Complementing ground scouts with the UAV platoon maximizes the capabilities of both elements while minimizing their limitations. When it works with the reconnaissance platoon, the UAV platoon normally operates forward of the ground elements (see Figure 8-24). The exact distances are determined through a thorough METT-TC analysis. 8-83. In a complementary relationship, the UAV and reconnaissance platoons are assigned different objectives or tasks; they work independently as required to support their common commander. This permits more tasks or separate missions to be accomplished simultaneously. Often, the UAV platoon complements ground scouts by performing missions to the flank of or adjacent to the reconnaissance platoon (as illustrated in Figure 8-25). In addition, the UAV platoon may provide the scouts with valuable reconnaissance information acquired during flights to and from its objective.

Figure 8-24. UAV Platoon Operating Forward of a Recce Platoon

Figure 8-25. UAV Platoon Operating on the Flank of a Recce Platoon

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COMMAND AND CONTROL 8-84. C2 is essential to effective air-ground coordination. The command relationship is particularly critical when air and ground elements are complementing each other’s operations. Two different command relationships can be used to coordinate the efforts of the UAV platoon and the reconnaissance platoon: the reconnaissance platoon under OPCON of the surveillance troop commander (this primarily applies to the recce platoon) or both the reconnaissance platoon and the UAV platoon working independently for a common higher commander. 8-85. Although air elements are not placed OPCON to the reconnaissance platoon, the ground scouts and the UAV platoon must closely coordinate their actions. The situation will determine whether the air mission commander is the UAV platoon leader or the surveillance troop commander in the RSTA squadron. RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON OPCON TO THE SURVEILLANCE TROOP COMMANDER

8-86. The OPCON relationship is used when the reconnaissance platoon is operating separately from its parent unit with the surveillance troop commander. The platoon has the preponderance of combat power, leadership, and C2 resources in the area of operations. RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON AND UAV PLATOON UNDER CONTROL OF A COMMON COMMANDER

8-87. This relationship is the most common and is usually the most effective. The reconnaissance platoon and UAV platoon operate independently, allowing each to freely and quickly employ its elements to take maximum advantage of their unique capabilities. Further, the next higher common commander can ensure that guidance is provided to both the UAV platoon and ground scouts so their efforts are coordinated. 8-88. In this relationship, informal coordination also occurs directly between the reconnaissance platoon and the UAV platoon. This is done over the reconnaissance platoon net.

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS 8-89. When the UAV platoon complements the reconnaissance platoon during reconnaissance operations, the air assets, as noted, normally operate 1 to 10 kilometers forward of the scouts, dependent on METT-TC. The UAV platoon can conduct detailed reconnaissance of areas that are particularly dangerous to ground reconnaissance elements, such as open areas and defiles. Upon contact, the UAV platoon provides early warning for the trailing reconnaissance platoon and then maintains contact until the reconnaissance platoon moves up for handover.

SECURITY OPERATIONS 8-90. The UAV platoon can complement the reconnaissance platoon during security operations by assisting in identifying threat reconnaissance and main body elements and providing early warning forward of the scouts. In addition to acquiring threat elements, TUAVs

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can play a critical role in providing security through the depth of the screen by observing dead space between ground OPs.

8-91. Because of the range of its sensors, the UAV platoon does not require positions forward of the reconnaissance platoon to acquire threat elements. The preferred practice, however, is still to position the aerial OPs forward of the ground OPs to provide added depth to the screen, especially during daylight operations. During limited visibility, aerial OPs may be deployed slightly to the rear of ground elements. Ultimately, positioning of the UAV platoon will always depend on the specific METTTC situation. See Figure 8-26, which illustrates positioning of the UAV platoon.

Figure 8-26. TUAVs Complementing a Ground Screen

AREA SECURITY 8-92. The UAV platoon can complement the reconnaissance platoon during area security missions by screening or conducting reconnaissance. An air screen can provide early warning for a reconnaissance platoon executing a convoy escort mission or securing a critical point (see Figure 8-27). TUAVs can identify threat ambush positions forward of the convoy or find bypasses the convoy can use to move around an obstacle (as illustrated in Figure 8-28).

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Figure 8-27. TUAVs Screening for a Recce Platoon

Figure 8-28. TUAVs Feconnoitering for a Bypass

AIR-GROUND RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER 8-93. When the UAV platoon makes contact, particularly during reconnaissance operations, it will update its FBCB2 and will hand over the contact to the ground scouts via FM as quickly as possible. A speedy handover allows the TUAVs to avoid threat air defense weapons and also helps to maintain the tempo of the operation. 8-94. During the handover, the UAV platoon is in charge and provides direction to the ground section or squad charged with establishing contact with the threat. The UAV platoon also is responsible for ensuring the protection of both ground and air assets in that it must maintain contact with the threat until the ground unit is in position and has also established contact.

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8-95. The first action in the handover process is a SPOTREP and a SITREP from the UAV platoon/team leader to the ground section or squad leader (see Figure 8-29A). These reports are sent by FM voice (when immediate communications are necessary) or FBCB2 (when time is available to use the digital system). Next, the UAV platoon reconnoiters the area for secure positions for the ground scouts. If possible, the UAV platoon identifies hide positions, overwatch positions, OP positions, and mounted and dismounted routes into the area (see Figure 8-29B).

Figure 8-29A. Air-Ground Reconnaissance Handover

Figure 8-29B. Air-Ground Reconnaissance Handover (Continued)

8-96. The ground section or squad moves to its initial hide positions along the route selected by the UAV platoon. Scouts then move dismounted to make contact with the threat. Once contact is established, the ground leader sends a SPOTREP to the air mission commander via FM or FBCB2. When the UAV platoon/team leader confirms that the ground scouts can observe all threat elements and have a clear picture of

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the situation, he announces that handover is complete; the ground section or squad leader acknowledges the transmission.

8-97. After handover is completed, the UAV platoon may, if directed, break contact and continue its follow-on missions. As noted previously, the reconnaissance handover sequence may be executed on the reconnaissance platoon’s internal frequency (see Figure 8-29C.)

Figure 8-29C. Air-Ground Reconnaissance Handover (Continued)

SECTION III – COMBAT ENGINEERS 8-98. The commander will decide how best to use attached engineer assets. He has several options for engineer employment: as a distinct unit, attached to the higher unit’s subordinate elements, or in DS of the subordinate elements. The basic engineer unit with which the reconnaissance platoon is likely to operate is a sapper squad from a combat engineer platoon. A parallel consideration is that sapper-qualified scouts enhance reconnaissance platoon capabilities and can provide support to attached engineer assets. 8-99. In offensive operations, engineers are task organized to maneuver units using the breaching operation planning process, based on templated and confirmed threat obstacles. One technique is to attach engineers to a troop or company team in a mobility team configuration. In the defense, commanders generally keep engineer units centralized; this allows the engineers to mass their effort during countermobility operations and to focus on their established priorities of work. 8-100. Engineers are prepared to reorganize and fight as infantry as a secondary mission; however, they are employed as infantry only as a last resort because of resource limitations. Only commanders who maintain a command relationship with engineer elements can make this decision.

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ENGINEER SUPPORT IN RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS 8-101. In reconnaissance operations, an engineer reconnaissance team may be placed in DS to a reconnaissance platoon. The engineers should remain attached to the platoon for the duration of the reconnaissance. The engineer team’s primary objective is to collect OBSTINTEL and report the information back to the squadron/battalion engineer to facilitate breach planning and preparation. The engineer team may perform the following functions:

·

Conduct limited reduction of obstacles, such as log cribs, abatises, and minefields. The actual reduction capabilities of the engineer reconnaissance team are limited to manual and explosive methods. Scouts must provide security for the engineer team while it reduces obstacles.

· · · · ·

Conduct tactical or technical reconnaissance. Conduct route and bridge classification. Assist in locating and marking bypasses around obstacles. Identify the exact composition and dimensions of an obstacle. Identify breach points and points of penetration.

8-102. Engineers conduct tactical reconnaissance in the offense as part of the combined arms team reconnaissance effort; normally, they are attached to reconnaissance elements to facilitate C2 and logistical support. The engineers’ key tactical reconnaissance objective is to provide the commander with OBSINTEL within the area of operations. This information, combined with intelligence obtained by the scouts, allows the brigade to maneuver more effectively against the threat. It tells the commander whether a bypass is possible or, if not, how to conduct breaching operations with the right equipment at the right location. 8-103. Engineers conduct technical reconnaissance to collect specialized information about a designated target, area, or route. This mission is usually conducted under a low level of threat in areas physically controlled by friendly forces to the rear of the FLOT. The technical reconnaissance mission is normally a specified task from higher headquarters or is derived from mission analysis. 8-104. Whenever possible, engineer elements should have a habitual relationship with the scouts to whom they are attached. They should be task organized with the reconnaissance platoon as early as possible in an operation so they can be integrated into the platoon leader’s troop-leading procedures, rehearsals, OPORD, and movement plans.

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN SECURITY OPERATIONS 8-105. In security operations, the reconnaissance platoon does not usually have any engineer assets operating under its control. Engineer assets normally work under squadron/battalion or troop control. The platoon leader must have access to the squadron/battalion or troop obstacle plan, including the locations of lanes and gaps. 8-106. The reconnaissance platoon may interact with the engineers in several roles during security operations. The platoon may be designated to observe NAIs to trigger scatterable mine missions, overwatch

8-36


obstacles, and call for indirect fires. It also may be designated to guard, execute, and overwatch reserve demolition targets that engineers have prepared. The process by which the platoon assumes responsibility for the targets is called target turnover. Refer to FM 3-34-214 (FM 5-250) for detailed instructions for completing target turnover reports. A summary of procedures and considerations for this mission is as follows:

·

Prior face-to-face coordination between the senior member of the emplacing unit (normally an engineer squad leader) and the demolition guard force commander (normally a reconnaissance squad leader) speeds the turnover process. Prior coordination is always conducted if the tactical situation permits.

·

The senior member of the emplacing unit must require positive identification from the demolition guard commander. This may be by means of sign/countersign procedures or by personal recognition.

·

Once identification is established, the emplacing unit gives the demolition guard commander a completed target folder for the target being turned over. The folder contains orders to the demolition guard commander (and to the firing party commander, if one is separately designated). The demolition guard commander reviews the orders to ensure he thoroughly understands them and then signs the orders.

·

The senior member of the emplacing unit then describes the obstacle in detail to the demolition guard commander.

·

Once the demolition guard commander fully understands his responsibilities and he (or the firing party commander, if applicable) is capable of executing the target, the emplacing unit may depart to conduct further operations.

SECTION IV – AIR DEFENSE 8-107. There are no air defense assets organic to squadrons or battalions. Consequently, the reconnaissance platoon must be able to protect itself from threat air attacks during all combat operations. Passive air defense measures employed by the platoon include actions to avoid detection and air attack and actions to limit the damage if attacked. If necessary, the platoon takes active air defense measures to fight back against the threat aircraft. 8-108. The platoon must be aware when the threat is employing airborne reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems that can detect and pinpoint the location of friendly ground forces. These systems emphasize rapid downlink of collected information to artillery and tactical ballistic missile (TBM) fire control centers and to threat maneuver forces. 8-109. Armed utility and attack helicopters are the principal threat CAS weapon systems. They pose a major threat to the platoon and other

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friendly forces. The threat may also employ TUAVs to accomplish RISTA, attack, and deception missions; the TUAVs’ small size and radar cross section and their ability to fly low and slow make them very difficult to detect track and engage.

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE 8-110. Passive air defense is the reconnaissance platoon’s first line of defense against threat air attack and TUAVs. It includes all measures, other than active defense, taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action. There are two types of passive air defense: attack avoidance and damage-limiting measures. ATTACK AVOIDANCE

8-111. If the threat pilot cannot find you, he cannot attack you. Scouts use concealment, camouflage, deception, and any other necessary action to prevent the threat from seeing them. When they are moving, they must also make effective use of air guards to provide early warning of threat aircraft to allow the platoon to avoid detection. 8-112. Reconnaissance positions must provide effective concealment. One technique is to position vehicles inside woodlines and erase vehicle track marks leading to the woods. When concealment is not available, however, vehicles must be camouflaged to blend into the natural surroundings. All shiny objects that could reflect light and attract attention must be covered. DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES

8-113. Dispersion is one of the most effective ways to reduce the effects of threat air attack. It is essential when a unit is occupying static positions such as an assembly area or is preparing to cross a water obstacle or a breached obstacle. When the platoon is on the move and air guards identify a threat air attack, vehicles disperse quickly, move to concealed positions if possible, and stop (a stationary vehicle is more difficult to see than a moving vehicle). 8-114. Another measure is the use of natural or man-made cover to reduce the effects of threat munitions. Folds in the earth, depressions, buildings, and sandbagged positions can provide this protection.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE 8-115. Although passive measures are the first line of defense against air attack, the platoon must be prepared to engage threat aircraft. The decision to fight back against an air threat is based on the situation and the capabilities of organic weapon systems. (NOTE: All platoon members must understand that they can defend against a direct attack but cannot engage aircraft that are not attacking them unless the applicable weapons control status allows it.) 8-116. Scouts may have one of several weapon systems (chain guns, machine guns, and small arms) that can be used against aircraft when they must fight back. Engaging aircraft with volume fire is the key to effective use of small arms and machine gun fires against an air attack. These fires must be coordinated to be effective. Delivered on the platoon leader’s command, they are directed at an aim point in front of the target (see Figure 8-30); gunners do not attempt to track the target. Figure 8-31

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lists guidelines for selecting aim points. These procedures are simple and logical; they must be learned and retained by everyone in the platoon.

8-117. Vehicle commanders should instruct their gunners to fire 20- to 25-round bursts at a high rate to sustain the proper volume of fire when engaging aerial platforms. Accurate target identification is essential in determining which type of ammunition to employ.

Figure 8-30. Aim Points

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Figure 8-31. Guidelines for Selecting Aim Points

SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS 8-118. Although other short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems support divisional units, reconnaissance platoons with dedicated ADA systems are most likely to be supported by MANPADS. Figure 8-32 shows the Stinger MANPADS, which is designed to counter high-performance, low-level, ground attack aircraft; helicopters; and observation and transport aircraft. 8-119. The Stinger missile system employs a two-man crew (crew chief and gunner). The MANPADS crew will normally have a wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) as its assigned transportation. Unit leaders must carefully consider the consequences before separating a Stinger team from its vehicle. Stinger teams operating away from their vehicles have no more than two missiles available for resupply.

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Figure 8-32. Stinger Air Defense System

8-120. If the brigade has an attached SHORAD battery, the platoon will receive early warning alerts from the battery and its elements. The SHORAD C3I Sentinel radar can broadcast early warning of threat air activity to SHORAD elements (battery, platoon, section), FA fire units, and air defense LOs. The battery then provides voice early warning on the brigade command net. When METT-TC permits, the SHORAD platoon may provide voice early warning to maneuver battalions. 8-121. The C3I Sentinel provides 360-degree detection capability for various air tracks (rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, TUAVs, and cruise missiles) to a range of 40 kilometers. Normally OPCON to the respective SHORAD battery commander, it should be integrated into the R&S plan in accordance with the IPB.

SECTION V – AVIATION SUPPORT FIXED-WING SUPPORT 8-122. The US Air Force (USAF), Navy, and Marine Corps provide the Army with five types of fixed-wing air support:

· · · · ·

Close air support (CAS). Combat air reconnaissance. Tactical airlift. Electronic combat. Air interdiction.

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CAS EMPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITIES

8-123. The reconnaissance platoon primarily needs to understand the terminology and concepts for CAS, which is defined as air attacks on hostile ground forces that are in close proximity of friendly troops. CAS can be employed to blunt a threat attack, support the momentum of the ground attack, or provide cover for friendly movements. Nomination of CAS targets is the responsibility of the commander, air liaison officer, and S3 at each level; however, the input received from the platoon leader is very valuable. To make an educated recommendation to the commander regarding the use of CAS aircraft, the platoon leader must know the characteristics of the aircraft predominantly used in the CAS role. Table 8-6 outlines characteristics and capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft available for CAS. Table 8-6. Characteristics and Capabilities of Fixed-Wing Aircraft AIRCRAFT

1

SERVICE

CHARACTERISTICS (Typical Munitions)

AV-8B1

USMC, USN

VSTOL CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 4,000 lbs. Maximum load 9,200 lbs; 25-mm Gatling gun.

A-10 or O/A-101

USAF, USAF Res, USAF NG

Specialized CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum load 16,000 lbs; 30-mm gun.

F-15E

USAF

Multi-role aircraft; priority is air-to-ground; supersonic; maximum load 24,500 lbs; 20mm cannon w/ 512 rounds.

F-161

USAF, USAF Res, USAF NG

Multi-role aircraft; complements the F-15 in an air-to-air role; most accurate air to ground delivery system in the inventory; supersonic; typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum load 10,500 lbs.

F/A-181

USN, USMC

Multi-role fighter; wide variety of air-to-surface weapons; typical load 7,000 lbs. maximum load 17,000 lbs; 20-mm gun mounted in the nose and air-to-air missiles.

AC-1301

USAF, USAF Res

Specialized CAS/RACO aircraft, propeller driven, two models. The A model is equipped with two 40-mm guns, two 20-mm guns, and two 7.62-mm miniguns. The H model is similar, except it has no 7.62 miniguns and one of the 40-mm guns is replaced with a 105-mm howitzer. Both models have advanced sensors and target acquisition system including forward-looking infrared and low-light TV. Weapons employment accuracy is outstanding. This aircraft is vulnerable to threat air defense systems and must operate in a low ADA threat environment.

Aircraft with FM communications.

NOTE:

Typical load is average load for typical support mission; maximum load is the amount the aircraft can carry in an ideal situation.

8-124. The platoon may also receive CAS (or related support known as aviation close fires, or ACF) from Army or Marine helicopters. Refer to the discussion of attack helicopter support later in this section. CAS BRIEFING FORM

8-125. Air Force and Marine Corps personnel have the primary

responsibility for requesting and controlling their respective service’s aircraft. If no personnel augmentation by the other services is available, however, the reconnaissance platoon must employ organic fire support personnel as its primary means of coordinating and controlling CAS aircraft.

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8-126. If Air Force or Marine personnel do not augment the platoon to assist in controlling CAS, the platoon should use a CAS briefing form. An example is shown in Figure 8-33.

CAS Briefing Form (9-Line) Omit data not required. Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard unless otherwise specified. An asterisk (*) denotes minimum essential items in limited communications environment. Bold denotes read-back items when requested.

Terminal controller: "___________________, this is ________________________" (aircraft call sign) (terminal controller) * 1. IP/BP: "___________________________________________________" * 2. Heading: "____________________________________________" (magnetic). (IP/BP to target) Offset: "________________________________________________ (left/right)" * 3. Distance: "______________________________________________________" (IP-to-target in nautical miles/BP-to-target in meters) * 4. Target elevation: "___________________________________" (in feet MSL) * 5. Target description: "_____________________________________________" * 6. Target location: "________________________________________________" (latitude/longitude or grid coordinates or offsets or visual) 7. Type mark: "______________________ " Code: " ______________________" (WP, laser, IR, beacon) (actual code) * 8. Location of friendly forces: "______________________________________" Position marked by: "______________________________________________ 9. Egress: "_________________________________________________________" Remarks (as appropriate): "_____________________________________________" (threats, restrictions, danger close, attack clearance, SEAD, abort codes, hazards) NOTE: For AC-130 employment, lines 5, 6, and 8 are mandatory briefing items. Remarks should also include detailed threat description, marking method of friendly locations (including magnetic bearing and distance in meters from the friendly position to the target, if available), identifiable ground features, danger close acceptance. Time on target (TOT): "_____________________________________________"

OR Time to target (TTT): "Stand by ______________ plus ______________, Hack."

Figure 8-33. Close Air Support Briefing Form.

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ATTACK HELICOPTER SUPPORT AIRCRAFT WEAPON SYSTEMS

8-127. Table 8-7 provides a comparison of the weapon systems, ammunition capacities, and weapons ranges for the AH-64A Apache, AH64D Longbow Apache, and OH-58D Kiowa Warrior attack helicopters. (NOTE: The table also lists weaponry for the AH-1 Cobra, which is no longer in the active Army inventory, and the AH-1W, a version of the Cobra employed by the US Marine Corps.) Table 8-7. Helicopter Weapon Systems WEAPON SYSTEM AIRCRAFT TYPE *

Hellfire or TOW **

AH-1 ****

8 TOW

AH-1W ****

8 TOW or 8 Hellfire

AH-64A *****

16 Hellfire

AH-64D *****

16 Hellfire/ Hellfire II

OH-58D **** *****

WEAPONS RANGE

NOTES: *

Air-to-air missiles

2 Sidewinder

2.75-inch (70-mm) rockets ***

Caliber .50 machine gun (rounds)

20-mm cannon (rounds)

76

750

76

750

30-mm chain gun (rounds)

76

1,200

4 Stinger

76

1,200

4 Hellfire

4 Stinger

14

500

Hellfire 8 km max TOW 3,750 m max

5+ km max

8 km max

2 km max

2 km max

4 km max

Numbers in each column indicate the maximum load for each system. The total amount of ordnance carried will vary based on METT-TC and the aircraft’s weapons configuration.

**

The AH-1 uses the TOW missile as its armor engagement weapon rather than the Hellfire missile.

***

The AH-1W can carry a four-shot, 5-inch rocket pod.

****

One weapon system per side for Hellfire/TOW, air-to-air Stinger/Sidewinder, and 2.75-inch rocket.

*****

Aircraft has a laser for target designation and an airborne target handover system (ATHS).

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR AVIATION CLOSE FIRES

8-128. The platoon may require ACF on the battlefield. These are air actions taken by rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly ground forces. In most cases, Army attack helicopters provide this support, which can be preplanned or provided on request on an immediate or emergency basis. Both types of ACF represent a powerful battlefield asset, capable of destroying threat elements of varying sizes, including large armor formations. NOTE: Most aspects of ACF employment and target effects are similar to those for CAS that is provided by fixed-wing aircraft, in most cases from the US Air Force. Because CAS entails specialized planning and request procedures, the reconnaissance platoon normally will not be involved directly in obtaining this support.

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Employment Considerations

8-129. Mission success in ACF employment is a function of two primary factors. First, detailed coordination must be conducted between the aerial attack team and the ground unit already engaged in close combat. Once execution begins, there must be effective integration of the fires and movement of both elements. 8-130. Planning and Reconnaissance. Planning for attack helicopter

support normally begins at squadron/battalion level or above. The squadron/battalion provides the aviation brigade or task force with information on locations, routes, and communications before the attack team’s departure from its assembly area. As part of this effort, the reconnaissance platoon may be tasked to provide information for ACF employment. Scouts should familiarize themselves with the procedures used to call for attack helicopter support. If attack helicopter assets are working for their squadron/battalion, the scouts should be prepared to provide suppressive fires on any known or suspected threat ADA locations.

8-131. A critical element of the planning process is the procedures and resources to be used in marking and identifying targets and friendly positions; these factors must be considered thoroughly regardless of the time available to the ground and air commanders. Refer to the discussion of target identification and friendly position marking later in this section. 8-132. Coordination. The aerial attack team coordinates directly with

the lowest-level unit in contact on the ground troop FM command net. Before the attack team launches the ACF operation, final coordination is conducted with the attack helicopters in a concealed position known as the aerial holding area. The holding area is a point in space within the supported unit’s area of operations that is oriented toward the threat; it allows the attack team to receive requests for immediate ACF and expedite the attack. The aerial holding area may be an alternate BP positioned out of range of the threat’s direct fire and indirect fire weapons ranges.

8-133. Final coordination between the ground and helicopter units must include agreement on methods of identifying and marking friendly and threat positions. This should take advantage of the equipment and capabilities of the attack team, including the forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system, the thermal imaging system (TIS), and NVDs. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of target and friendly position identification and marking later in this section.) 8-134. Coordination should also cover the BP and/or support by fire positions to be used by the attack helicopters. These positions should be offset from the ground maneuver unit to maximize the effects of the attack team’s weapons and to minimize the risk of fratricide. To prevent indirect fires within the sector or zone from posing a danger to the helicopters, the ground commander should inform DS artillery and organic mortars of the aerial positions. Target Identification and Friendly Position Marking

8-135. In simplest terms, aircraft crews require positive identification of targets and friendly positions before firing their weapons. Aircrews must

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be able to easily observe and then to effectively identify the ground signals marking targets and friendly positions. This capability is a critical factor in reducing fratricide and maximizing the responsiveness and accuracy of aerial fires. The proximity of friendly forces to targets on the modern battlefield makes positive marking and identification especially critical. This discussion addresses several factors that operators should consider when marking targets and friendly positions; the equipment covered includes target-marking devices, NVGs, FLIR, TIS, television (TV) and EO systems, electronic beacons, and laser designators.

8-136. Planning Considerations. As noted, aircrews must work closely

with the ground forces to accomplish positive marking and identification of targets and friendly positions. This coordination requires the ground and air commanders to determine all required marking/identification procedures based on several tactical factors:

·

The signal, or combination of signals, to be used must be generated using devices and items commonly carried by ground maneuver units.

·

Aircrews must be able to acquire signals using available resources on the aircraft, including normal vision, NVDs, and TISs.

·

Signals must be recognizable by the aircrews.

8-137. All participants, ground and airborne, must clearly understand

the marking and identification procedures. They must also be issued the appropriate devices and materials necessary to implement the marking system. Accurate and detailed maps, charts, or other types of imagery will assist the aircrews in learning the friendly ground scheme of maneuver.

8-138. Marking/Identification Techniques. The methods used to identify and mark targets and friendly positions are limited only by the creativity of the ground forces and aircrews. Table 8-8 outlines a variety of marking techniques. Ground and air commanders should use the table as a reference, but they need not limit themselves only to these methods. In any situation, marking methods must be adapted to the conditions prevalent at the time. Positive air-to-ground communications are also essential in coordinating and authenticating marking procedures. 8-139. Often, the simplest methods are the best. Traditional signaling devices such as flares, strobes, and signaling mirrors may be quite effective in marking friendly positions. Common signaling techniques that can be used in target marking or orienting aircrews on threat positions include smoke, laser pointers, and tracers. 8-140. Other devices are available to aid in the recognition of friendly forces and equipment where the fluid tactical situation or the intermingling of friendly and threat forces in the close fight makes identification difficult. For example, the use of glint tape, combat identification panels (CIP), and infrared beacons can assist in the clear identification of friendly ground forces. (NOTE: Such factors as ground

8-46


lighting, thermal contrast, and intermediate obstructions can influence the effectiveness of these devices.)

8-141. All aerial crewmen and ground maneuver leaders should understand the strengths and weaknesses of available aviation sensors when employed in conjunction with a variety of target-marking equipment and methods. Time permitting, attack aircraft may input a target grid into the aircraft GPS/inertial navigation system (INS) to provide fire control cues to the target (such as range, heading, and time); these cues can result in quicker target acquisition and help to distinguish friendly positions from targets and threat positions. (NOTE: Because ACF missions may be “danger close” with short firing ranges, both aircrews and ground forces should expect to have minimum tracking time and thus minimum time to optimize the aircraft sensors.)

Table 8-8. Target and Friendly Position Marking Methods METHOD

DAY/ NIGHT

ASSETS

FRIENDLY MARKS

TARGET MARKS

SMOKE

Day/night

All

Good

Good

SMOKE (IR)

Day/night

All/ NVD at night

Good

Good

GROUND BURST ILLUMINATION

Day/night

All

N/A

Good

SIGNAL MIRROR

Day

All

Good

N/A

SPOTLIGHT

Night

All

Good

Marginal

IR SPOTLIGHT

Night

All NVDs

Good

Marginal

IR LASER POINTER (below .4 watts)

Night

All NVDs

Good

Marginal

IR LASER POINTER (above .4 watts)

Night

All NVDs

Good

Good

REMARKS Easily identifiable. May compromise friendly position, obscure target, or warn of fire support employment. Structures may make placement difficult. Easily identifiable. May compromise friendly position, obscure target, or warn of fire support employment. Structures may make placement difficult. Night marking is greatly enhanced using IR reflective smoke. Easily identified. May wash out NVDs. Avoids compromise of friendly location. Dependent on weather and available light and may be lost in reflections from other reflective surfaces (such as windshields, windows, or water). Highly visible to all. Compromises friendly position and warns of fire support employment. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting. Visible to all with NVDs. Less likely to compromise than overt light. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting. Less affected by ambient light and weather conditions. Highly effective under all but the most highly lit or worst weather conditions. IZLID-2 is the current example.

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Table 8-8. Target and Friendly Position Marking Methods (Continued) METHOD

DAY/ NIGHT

ASSETS

FRIENDLY MARKS

TARGET MARKS

REMARKS

VISUAL LASER

Night

All

Good

Marginal

Highly visible to all. Risk of compromise is high. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting.

LASER DESIGNATOR

Day/night

PGM- or LSTequipped

N/A

Good

TRACERS

Day/night

All

N/A

Marginal

CHEMICAL HEAT SOURCES

Day/night

All FLIR

Poor

N/A

STROBE (OVERT)

Night

All

Marginal

N/A

STROBE (IR)

Night

All NVDs

Good

N/A

ELECTRONIC BEACON

Day/night

See remarks

Excellent

Good

FLARE (OVERT)

Day/night

All

Good

N/A

Visible by all. Easily identified by aircrews.

FLARE (IR)

Night

All NVDs

Good

N/A

Visible to all NVDs. Easily identified by aircrews.

GLINT/IR PANEL

Night

All NVDs

Good

N/A

Not readily detectable by threat. Very effective except in highly lit areas.

COMBAT IDENTIFICATION PANEL

Day/night

All FLIR

Good

N/A

Provides temperature contrast on vehicles or building. May be obscured by urban terrain.

VS-17 PANEL

Day

All

Marginal

N/A

Only visible during daylight. Easily obscured by structures.

SPINNING CHEM LIGHT (OVERT)

Night

All

Marginal

N/A

Night

All NVDs

Marginal

N/A

SPINNING CHEM LIGHT (IR)

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Highly effective with PGM. Because of very restrictive laser acquisition cone, requires line of sight to target. May require precoordination of laser codes. May compromise position. May be difficult to distinguish marking rounds from other gunfire. During daytime use, may be more effective when used to kick up dust surrounding target. Easily masked by urban structures and lost in thermal clutter. Difficult to acquire, but can be effective when used to contrast cold background or when ACFT indicates general location. Visible by all. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting. Visible to all NVDs. Effectiveness dependent up degree of urban lighting. Coded strobes aid in acquisition. Ideal friendly marking device for AC-130 and some USAF fixed-wing aircraft (not compatible with Navy or Marine aircraft). Least impeded by urban terrain. Can be used as a TRP for target identification. Coordination with aircrews essential to ensure equipment and training compatibility.

Provides unique signature. May be obscured by structures. Provides a distinct signature easily recognized. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting. Provides unique signature. May be obscured by structures. Effectiveness dependent on degree of urban lighting.


AIR/GROUND COORDINATION PROCEDURES FOR AVIATION CLOSE FIRES

8-142. Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with the ground maneuver brigade. When the aviation brigade or task force receives a mission to provide assistance to a ground unit engaged in close combat and planning time is minimal, the brigade in contact should provide the air unit with initial information on the situation. This information should be sufficient to get the aviation attack team out of the aviation tactical assembly area to a holding area for direct coordination. The attack team is normally placed OPCON to the unit in contact. Air/ground coordination consists of five major steps:

· · · · ·

Maneuver brigade planning requirements. Squadron/battalion close fight SITREP. Attack team check-in. Employment of aviation close fires. BDA/reattack.

NOTE: This discussion of air/ground coordination also focuses on other aspects of attack aviation in the close fight, including aviation employment considerations and coordination requirements for the maneuver brigade LO.

Step 1 – Maneuver Brigade Planning Requirements

8-143. The maneuver brigade, through the aviation LO, provides the necessary planning requirements to the aviation brigade headquarters. Initial information to be passed to the aviation brigade headquarters should include the following:

·

Current situation. This should include friendly situation and positions; threat situation, highlighting the known ADA threat in the area of operations; and tentative engagement area coordinates.

·

Brigade-, squadron-, and/or battalion-level graphics update. This can be sent via the MCS-P and/or ASAS to assist in integrating the air unit into the friendly scheme of maneuver. It covers critical items such as the LOA, fire control measures, and base maneuver graphics.

·

Fire support coordination information. This can include such information as call signs, frequencies, and locations of DS artillery and organic mortars.

·

Ingress/egress routes for the area of operations. Developed by the LO and the S3-Air, this includes passage points into the sector or zone and air routes to the holding area.

·

Holding area information. The holding area, where face-toface coordination is conducted between the attack team and the battalion in contact, is similar to the assault position for ground units. It must be adequate in size to accommodate the number of aircraft assigned the mission. It must be out of range of threat direct fire systems.

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·

Call signs and frequencies. Air/ground coordination must cover all applicable command frequencies, normally down to troop level, to provide situational awareness for all elements involved.

·

Time check. All units should synchronize their watches by conducting a “time hack” via the SINCGARS radio.

Step 2 – Squadron/Battalion Close Fight SITREP

8-144. En route to the holding area, the attack team leader contacts the ground maneuver squadron or battalion on its FM command net to receive a close fight SITREP. (NOTE: By this time, the ground maneuver squadron/battalion has contacted the ground maneuver unit leader to inform him that the attack aviation element is en route to conduct a hasty attack.) A close fight SITREP includes this information:

·

Threat situation. The SITREP focuses on such information as threat ADA in the area of operations, type and number of threat vehicles and equipment, and position (center mass) and direction of movement of the threat force. If the threat is dispersed, the SITREP should provide a front line trace.

·

Friendly situation. This information may include the location of units in contact, the mission assigned to them, and the method of marking their positions.

·

Call signs and frequencies. The SITREP verifies these items for the unit in contact.

·

Holding area verification. The SITREP lists the location of the holding area and any other pertinent information. If the holding area will be used for face-to-face coordination, ground and air units must agree on a sign/countersign system to identify each other. For example, the ground element could use a light or heat source to provide a recognizable signature, which would then be answered by either aircraft IR lights or visible light flashes to signify which aircraft are approaching.

8-145. Figure 8-34 illustrates an example of the radio transmissions for a close fight SITREP. ATTACK TEAM

GROUND SQUADRON

“Bulldog 06, this is Blackjack 26, over.” “Blackjack 26, this is Bulldog 06, L/C, over.” “Bulldog 06, Blackjack 26 en route to holding area at grid VQ 98454287. Request SITREP, over.” “Blackjack 26, this is Bulldog 06; threat situation follows. Hardrock 06 is taking direct fire from a platoon-size armor element at grid VQ 96204362. Hardrock O6 elements are established on PL Nevada, center mass VQ 96000050. Holding area is at grid VQ 94004000; expect radio coordination only. Contact Hardrock 06 on FH 478, over.”

Figure 8-34. Example Radio Transmissions for a Squadron/Battalion Close Fight SITREP

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8-146. Upon receiving the required information from the ground maneuver squadron/battalion, the attack team leader changes frequency, entering the ground unit’s FM command net. He conducts final coordination before following the ingress route to the established BPs or attack by fire/support by fire positions. Coordination begins with the ground maneuver unit commander, such as the troop commander, and ends with the leader of the lowest-level unit in contact. For those reconnaissance platoons that are not organic to a troop, coordination will begin at battalion level and end with the reconnaissance platoon if the platoon is the unit in contact. 8-147. Regardless of which key ground leaders conduct coordination with the attack team leader, the ground command net is the most suitable net for both the coordination process and conduct of the operation. It allows all key leaders on the ground, including the FIST chief and the attack team leader and his attack crews, to communicate on one common net throughout the operation. Operating on the ground command net also allows the attack team to request responsive mortar fire to suppress threat elements (including immediate suppression missions). The AH-64 Apache and the AH-1 Cobra each have only one FM radio. The OH-58D Kiowa is dual-FM capable, enabling the attack team leader to maintain communications with the ground maneuver unit, its higher headquarters, and/or a fire support element. 8-148. Figure 8-35 illustrates an example of the initial radio transmissions between the attack team and the ground unit, in this case a troop. Step 3 – Attack Team Check-in

8-149. When he makes initial radio contact with the ground maneuver unit in contact, the attack team leader executes a check-in. This process allows him to provide the ground leader with a succinct summary of tactical information, including the following:

·

Current location of aircraft. This is normally the attack team’s ground or aerial holding area.

·

Composition. This is the number and type of attack team aircraft.

·

Available munitions. The attack team armament load and weapons configuration.

·

Total station time. This is the amount of time the attack team will be available to remain on station to conduct ACF. (NOTE: USAF elements use the term “loiter time” in this context during CAS missions.)

·

Night vision capability. The attack team lists available NVDs.

specifies

its

NOTE: In the event a ground holding area is not available because of METT-TC considerations, the attack team will select and occupy an aerial holding area within FM communications range of the ground unit. The attack team will normally remain in the holding area until all required coordination and planning are complete. Figure 8-35 illustrates the radio transmissions for attack team check-in.

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ATTACK TEAM

GROUND TROOP

“Hardrock 06, Blackjack 26 is currently in holding area at grid VQ 98454287 with two Kiowa Warriors, each with 450 rounds of cal .50 and two Hellfires. Station time is 30 minutes. All aircraft are NVG- and FLIR-capable, over.” “Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 06, stand by, over.” “Blackjack 26, roger.”

Figure 8-35. Example Initial Radio Transmission and Attack Team Check-In Step 4 – Employment of Aviation Close Fires

8-150. After the attack team completes its check-in procedures, the ground maneuver unit can use either of two methods in requesting, planning, and employing attack aviation support: preplanned ACF, normally entailing face-to-face contact with the attack team leader, and immediate ACF, which usually is completed using only radio communications. 8-151. The preplanned method is preferred. A major benefit of this faceto-face coordination is the air leader’s ability to talk directly to the ground commander with a map and other resources available. It also allows the attack team to update its maps with the maneuver battalion’s latest graphics. The result is usually more effective integration of the attack team into the ground scheme of maneuver. At times, however, METT-TC factors will dictate the use of immediate ACF. Both ACF methods are covered later in this discussion. 8-152. Weapons Considerations. The attack team’s armaments and munitions are a key factor in coordination and planning for ACF operations. The attack team leader and the ground unit’s key leaders must consider, prior to target selection and engagement, the effects on friendly forces of the various weapons carried by the attack aircraft. The selection of weapon systems and munitions for a given engagement is highly dependent on METT-TC. Point target weapon systems, such as Hellfire or TOW, are preferred when aircraft must engage armor or hardened targets in the close fight. On the other hand, aircraft gun systems and the 2.75-inch rocket are the preferred systems/munitions for engaging troops in the open and soft targets such as trucks and trenchworks. These area-fire weapon systems pose a danger to friendly soldiers who may be in the lethality zone of the rounds or rockets. In this case, the leader on the ground must be extremely precise in describing the target he wants the aircraft to engage. 8-153. Aviation Close Fires Request Procedures. The basic format for ACF requests, which can be adapted as necessary for preplanned and immediate missions, includes the following items:

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·

Friendly location. This is normally the position of the individual requesting ACF support.

·

Heading to target. This is usually the magnetic (compass) heading, although a heading based on grid coordinates can be used if necessary.


· · · · ·

Distance to target. This is given in kilometers.

· · ·

Flight hazards.

·

Clearance for fire authority.

Target description. Target coordinates. Method of target designation or marking. Remarks. This includes any additional information necessary to orient the attack team on the target or friendly forces. Restrictive fire control measures. Enemy threats. This includes threat ADA positions and capabilities.

8-154. Coordination for Preplanned Aviation Close Fires. When employing preplanned ACF, the ground company commander and attack team leader meet at the holding area, face to face whenever possible, and plan the attack. This coordination must cover certain elements of the operation; Figure 8-36 illustrates a sample preplanned ACF checklist.

PREPLANNED AVIATION CLOSE FIRES CHECKLIST Areas to be covered in coordination for preplanned ACF include the following: · Threat situation and target identification. This item details threat activity in the area of operations and identifies specific targets relative to the threat situation. · Friendly situation. This covers the locations of friendly positions, which ideally are identified on a map. The ground and air elements must agree on a method of visually marking these positions. · Engagement area and aircraft fighting positions. As necessary, the ground and air units must verify and/or define the engagement area. The attack team leader then establishes his unit’s BPs or attack by fire/support by fire positions. · Ground maneuver mission/scheme of maneuver. The ground unit provides details of its scheme of maneuver, including the commander’s intent and a description of what is expected to be the decisive point on the battlefield. · Aerial scheme of maneuver. Based on the ground unit’s scheme of maneuver, the attack team leader provides a supporting scheme of maneuver. · Fire coordination and fire restrictions. The ground and air units coordinate the fire control measures necessary to minimize the potential for fratricide. · Map graphics update. The ground commander and attack team leader develop key maneuver graphics as required to support or clarify the scheme of maneuver. They must ensure that all subordinate leaders update their maps with these graphics. · Method of target designation. The ground and air leaders coordinate the required method(s) to be used in designating targets. Refer to the discussion earlier in this section, including information on specific marking methods outlined in Table 8-6. · Request for aviation close fires. The final item in the coordination process is submission of the ACF request; the discussion of request procedures earlier in this section lists items to be covered.

Figure 8-36. Example Preplanned Aviation Close Fires Checklist

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8-155. Consideration of the time available for ACF planning is critical. METT-TC will dictate the extent of preplanning that can be accomplished and the length of time the holding area can be occupied without compromising security. The ground and air commanders must accept increased risk in the holding area if the position is maintained for more than 15 minutes. 8-156. Coordination for Immediate Aviation Close Fires. As noted, immediate ACF differs from a preplanned mission in that coordination is conducted by radio communications only, rather than through face-to-face contact between the ground and air leaders. Basic areas of coordination remain the same, as outlined in the preplanned ACF checklist (see Figure 8-36). In immediate ACF, however, portions of the checklist are omitted as necessary based on METT-TC considerations and the need to provide fires on short notice. (NOTE: The request for ACF, the final item in the preplanned ACF checklist, is always the final step in immediate ACF as well.) 8-157. The coordination process for immediate ACF begins after attack team check-in has been completed. The attack team maintains its position in the holding area. (NOTE: This will be either a ground or aerial holding area, depending on the attack team’s ability to maintain FM communications with the ground element in contact.) Based on METTTC and the specific situation, the ground maneuver leader provides a basic update containing essential elements from the preplanned ACF checklist. He succinctly outlines the concept of his ground tactical plan. This includes updates on threat composition, disposition, and most recent activities, particularly the location of air defense weapons. The ground leader also outlines the friendly situation, including the composition, disposition, and location of his forces and supporting artillery or mortar positions. After providing this information, the ground maneuver leader uses the ACF request format to call for the attack. Figure 8-37 illustrates the ground unit’s information update and request for immediate ACF support. ATTACK TEAM

GROUND TROOP “Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 06, stand by for update. Friendly platoon in contact is located at VQ 96000050, marked by IR strobes. The threat is a platoon-size armor element 800 meters due north. There has been sporadic heavy machine gun fire and tank main gun fire into our position. Fire appears to be coming from road intersection vic VQ 96204362. Negative knowledge on disposition of threat ADA. I'll be handing you down to Hardrock 16 for the ACF request, over.”

“Hardrock 06, this is Blackjack 26. Good copy. Standing by at holding area for aviation close fires request, over.” “Roger, Blackjack 26, Hardrock 16 request follows. Friendly location is VQ 96000050, 360 degrees to target. Range is 800 meters. Target is two T-80s at the road intersection, grid VQ 96000850. PAQ-4 spot is on. No friendly forces north of the 00 grid line. Low wires directly over our position, over."

Figure 8-37. Example Radio Transmissions in Coordinating Immediate Aviation Close Fires

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8-158. After receiving the request for ACF, the attack team leader informs the ground unit leader of the BP or attack by fire/support by fire position (or series of positions) his team will occupy. This position, which ideally affords the best available observation and fields of fire into the engagement area or target area, is the location from which the attack aircraft will engage the threat with direct fire. It includes a number of individual aircraft firing positions. It may be preplanned or established as the situation dictates. Size will vary depending on the number of aircraft using the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of terrain. The BP or attack by fire/support by fire position is normally offset from the flank of the friendly ground position. This helps to ensure that rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure, and the general signature of the aircraft do not interfere with operations on the ground. The offset position allows the aircraft to engage the threat on his flanks rather than his front. It also reduces the risk of fratricide along the helicopter guntarget line. (NOTE: In addition to these considerations, however, the BP or attack by fire/support by fire position must be close enough to the position of the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handover.) 8-159. The attack team leader then provides the ground maneuver unit leader with his concept for the team’s attack on the objective. This may be as simple as relaying the direction or attack route the aircraft will follow, the time required to move forward from their current position, and the location of the BP. Only on completion of coordination with the lowestlevel unit in contact does the attack team depart the holding area for the BP. As the team moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth (NOE) flight along attack routes to mask itself from threat ground observation and direct fire systems. The attack team leader maintains FM communications with the ground unit leader while conducting internal communications on either his VHF or UHF net. 8-160. Conduct of the Aviation Close Fires Operations. After completing the coordination for ACF, the ground maneuver unit and attack team can execute their synchronized attack plan. Execution procedures are virtually identical whether the mission is preplanned or conducted on an immediate basis. The attack team engages targets of opportunity on a case-by-case basis based on information covered in the ACF checklist, the ACF request, and/or subsequent coordination. 8-161. Refer to Figure 8-38 for an example of radio transmissions during execution of an ACF operation. In this case, the ground unit in contact is a platoon. (NOTE: This scenario shows ACF conducted with no operational friction between units. Such ideal conditions are rare. For example, depending on the intensity of the ongoing engagement, grid positions may be difficult for the ground maneuver unit to determine, and actual FM communications between the ground and air elements may not work this well.)

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ATTACK TEAM

GROUND MANEUVER PLATOON

“Hardrock 16, Blackjack elements will attack from the southeast. Turn on IR strobes at this time. We will establish a BP 50 meters to the west of your position, over.” “Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 16. Strobes on at this time, over.” “Roger, Hardrock. Blackjack has your position. Aircraft are en route for attack in 30 seconds, over.” “Hardrock 16, roger.” “Hardrock 16, this is Blackjack 26. Engagement complete. Two T-80s destroyed, over.” “Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 16, roger. Two T-80s destroyed. End of mission, out.”

Figure 8-38. Example Radio Transmissions in Aviation Close Fires Execution Step 5 – Battle Damage Assessment and Reattack

8-162. After the attack team completes the requested ACF mission, the attack team leader provides a BDA to the ground maneuver commander. Based on his intent, the ground maneuver commander will determine if a reattack is required to achieve his desired end state. The ACF operation can continue until the attack team has expended all available munitions or fuel. If he receives a request for reattack, however, the attack team leader must carefully consider how the longer duration will affect the operation; he must determine whether he can continue to provide effective support to the ground commander.

UTILITY AND CARGO HELICOPTER SUPPORT REQUEST PROCEDURES

8-163. Organic Army aviation brigade assets at division, corps, and echelons above corps (EAC) levels can provide utility/cargo support to reconnaissance units, including the platoon. (NOTE: Helicopter resupply assets are limited, normally to support provided by corps aviation assets.) Requests for support are routed through the parent unit S3 to the division G3 for action. Refer to the appropriate brigade or division SOP for the request format. PICKUP ZONE/LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS

8-164. The reconnaissance platoon may be required to establish a PZ or LZ for resupply or for MEDEVAC or CASEVAC operations. In addition, the platoon may be tasked to establish its own PZ to conduct insertion of scouts. Platoon Responsibilities

8-165. As the receiving unit in aerial resupply or another utility/cargo helicopter operation, the platoon will have the following responsibilities at the PZ/LZ:

· · 8-56

Select and control the PZ/LZ. Secure the PZ/LZ.


·

Provide limited weather observations, such as wind velocity and direction, cloud cover, visibility, and approximate ceiling.

·

Provide terminal guidance with appropriate advisories. This information covers such areas as obstacles, wire hazards, and the threat situation, including ADA threats.

Conditions in the PZ/LZ

8-166. This discussion focuses on several key considerations in selecting, securing, and operating the PZ/LZ. 8-167. Size of the PZ/LZ. As a general rule, the PZ/LZ must provide for adequate space to allow aircraft separation, load/passenger avoidance, and obstacle avoidance (refer to the following discussion of helicopter landing sites). If night operations are scheduled, a larger area is normally needed. 8-168. Helicopter Landing Site Requirements. A key consideration in PZ/LZ selection is the number and type of aircraft that will be using the site at one time. Table 8-9 lists recommended minimum distances between landing points within a PZ/LZ. Distances are measured from center of load to center of load. (NOTE: The minimum planning distances in Table 8-9 include the distances required between loads during external load operations, which are also called slingload operations.) Refer to FM 1-113 for additional information. Table 8-9. Minimum Distances between Helicopter Landing Points AIRCRAFT/OPERATION TYPE

MINIMUM LANDING DISTANCE

DAYTIME OPERATIONS UH-60 and like aircraft CH-47 and like (or unknown) aircraft

100 meters

NIGHT OPERATIONS UH-60 and like aircraft CH-47 and like (or unknown) aircraft

150 meters

50 meters

75 meters

NOTE: Height of ground/rooftop obstructions must not exceed 18 inches.

8-169. Surface Conditions. The surface within the PZ/LZ should be solid enough to prevent the helicopter, its load, and/or vehicles that are picking up the load from sinking into the ground. Selection of the site must also take into account the strong winds produced by the helicopter wash; these can stir up blowing dust, sand, snow, gravel, or loose debris that may injure personnel and cause damage to equipment and/or aircraft. In addition, these conditions can cause “brownout” or “whiteout” conditions that can temporarily blind aircrews and ground support personnel. Helicopters cannot land if the site has a slope of 15 degrees or more. The PZ/LZ must have no obstacles or obstructions (such as trees, stumps, bushes, or man-made objects) that could cause damage to the helicopter rotor systems or the load itself. A general guideline is that ground or rooftop obstructions can be no more than 18 inches tall.

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Immovable objects must be clearly marked with a secured VS-17 panel, red chem light, or other marking materials.

8-170. Approach/Departure Direction. When carrying external loads,

aircrews prefer to use gradual approach and departure angles (not a vertical ascent or descent). The avenues of approach and departure for the PZ/LZ should be over the lowest obstacle in the direction of the prevailing winds. Arrival and departure obstacle clearance and wind direction are especially important when visibility is reduced. Figure 8-39 shows a sample radio transmission for terminal guidance as a helicopter approaches the PZ/LZ.

AIRCRAFT

RECCE PLATOON

“Hardrock 16, Comanchero 26 is 30 seconds inbound to your location. Request terminal guidance, over.” “Comanchero 26, this is Hardrock 16. Signal is displayed, over.” (NOTE: Use a prearranged signaling method if possible.) “Roger, Hardrock. Comanchero has green smoke, over.” “Comanchero 26, roger green smoke. Be advised there is a large boulder at the far end of the LZ and a suspected ZSU 23-4 located 5 kilometers to the east, over.”

Figure 8-39. Example Radio Transmissions for Terminal Guidance to Landing Site

8-171. Marking of the PZ/LZ. Considerations for marking the PZ/LZ include the following:

·

Daylight operations. A ground guide will mark the PZ or LZ for the lead aircraft by holding an M16Al rifle over his head, by displaying a folded VS-17 panel chest high, or by other identifiable means.

·

Night operations. The code letter Y (actually, an inverted Y) is used to mark the landing point of the lead aircraft at night (see Figure 8-40). Chem lights or “beanbag” lights may be used to maintain light discipline.

8-172. When more than one aircraft will be landing in the same PZ or LZ, there will be at least one additional light for each aircraft. For observation, utility, and attack aircraft, each additional aircraft landing point will be marked with a single light, emplaced at the exact point that each aircraft is to land. For cargo aircraft (such as the CH-47, CH-53, or CH-54), each additional landing point will be marked with two lights. The two lights will be placed 10 meters apart and will be aligned in the aircraft direction of flight.

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Figure 8-40. Inverted Y Marking Signal for PZ/LZ

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS (AIR INFILTRATION) 8-173. These operations entail the integration of air assault forces (combat, CS, and CSS) with helicopter assets to maneuver on the battlefield, engage and destroy threat forces, and/or seize and hold key terrain. The reconnaissance platoon may be part of the air assault force. In addition, helicopter assets may support the platoon in a variety of roles, including mobility (insertion, infiltration), MEDEVAC, and resupply. Refer to FM 3-18.12 (FM 90-4) for further discussion of air assault operations. ACTIONS AT THE PZ

8-174. Prior to arrival of the aircraft involved in an air assault operation, the PZ must be secured, the PZ control party positioned, and the troops and equipment positioned in a unit assembly area. Air assault elements then move to and occupy the chalk assembly area, where they load the aircraft for departure to the LZ. The final step in this phase is closure of the PZ. PZ Organization

8-175. The PZ for the air assault operation may be either one-sided or two-sided. A one-sided PZ has all unit assembly areas and chalk assembly areas on one side of the zone, with security teams usually located on the opposite side beyond where the aircraft will land (see Figure 8-41). In a two-side PZ, unit assembly areas and chalk assembly areas are located on both sides of the aircraft landing site, with security elements interspersed around the site as necessary. Figure 8-42 illustrates a two-sided PZ. Occupation of the Unit Assembly Area

8-176. Once the PZ is secured, the next step in the execution of the air assault is occupation of the unit assembly area. Unit leaders should accomplish the following:

· · ·

Maintain all-round security of the assembly area. Maintain communications. Organize soldiers and equipment into chalks and loads in accordance with the unit air movement plan.

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· ·

Conduct safety briefings and equipment checks for soldiers.

·

Brief the location of the straggler control points as necessary.

Establish priority of loading for each soldier and identify bump personnel.

Figure 8-41. One-Sided PZ

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Figure 8-42. Two-Sided PZ Movement to and Occupation of the Chalk Assembly Area

8-177. Linkup guides from the PZ control party will meet with designated units in the unit assembly area and coordinate movement of chalks to an RP. As chalks arrive at the RP, chalk guides will move each chalk to its assigned chalk assembly area. (NOTE: To reduce the number of personnel required, the same guide may be used to move the unit from the unit assembly area to the chalk assembly area.) If the unit is part of a larger air assault, no more than three chalks should be located in the chalk assembly area at one time. Noise and light discipline will be maintained throughout movement to maintain the security of the PZ. Additionally, no personnel should be allowed on the PZ unless they are loading the aircraft, rigging vehicles for a slingload, or acting as directed by PZ control. While remaining in chalk order, each soldier is assigned a security (firing) position by the chalk leader; he assumes a prone position, with weapon at the ready and facing out (away from the PZ) to provide immediate close-in security. Loading of the Aircraft

8-178. After reaching their chalk assembly areas, units should adhere to the following principles for loading the aircraft:

·

Maintain tactical integrity by keeping fire teams and squads intact.

·

Maintain self-sufficiency by loading a weapon and its ammunition on the same aircraft (for example, the Javelin and its individual missiles).

·

Ensure that key personnel, weapons, and equipment are cross-loaded among aircraft to prevent the loss of control, or of all of a particular asset, if an aircraft is lost.

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·

Prior to loading, ensure that all troop gear is tied down and checked; short antennas should be placed in radios, folded down, and secured.

·

Direct squad and team leaders to check their soldiers’ equipment to ensure it is complete and operational.

·

Turn radios on and perform communications checks (unless directed otherwise).

·

Assign specific aircraft seats to all personnel.

8-179. UH-60 Loading Sequence (Split Chalk). These considerations and procedures apply (see Figure 8-43):

·

The chalk leader (squad leader) initiates movement once the aircraft has landed.

·

The far side and near side groups move to the aircraft in file, with the chalk leader always leading the near side group.

·

The chalk leader should take the following actions: n

Ensure that all personnel know which aircraft and which position to load.

n

Ensure that all personnel wear or carry rucksacks on the aircraft.

n

Notify the crew chief when all chalk members are on board and are ready for liftoff.

·

All personnel buckle up as soon as they are seated in their assigned seats. The chalk leader will always sit in the left front seat unless a platoon leader or company commander is on the same aircraft.

·

The chalk leader hands the chalk card to the pilot and answers any questions the pilot may have, using the aircraft intercommunications (troop commander’s) handset.

Figure 8-43. UH-60 Loading Diagram (Split Chalk)

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8-180. UH-60 Loading Sequence (Whole Chalk). considerations and procedures apply (see Figure 8-44):

These

·

The chalk leader (squad leader) initiates movement once the aircraft has landed.

·

The far side and near side groups move to the aircraft in file, with the No. 1 man leading the load to the appropriate side.

NOTE: The far side group will always move around to the front of the aircraft.

·

The chalk leader stops at the near side of the aircraft to ensure that the near side group loads properly; then he moves around the front of the aircraft to the far side and checks the other half of the chalk.

·

All personnel buckle up as soon as they are seated in the correct seats.

·

The chalk leader hands the chalk card to the pilot and answers any questions the pilot may have, using the aircraft intercommunications (troop commander’s) handset.

Figure 8-44. UH-60 Loading Diagram (Whole Chalk) PZ Closure

8-181. During platoon air assault operations, the PSG is responsible for ensuring that all personnel and equipment are loaded (clearing the PZ) and that security is maintained. The PSG can use either the single lift or multiple lift technique in completing the closure. 8-182. Single Lift. The PSG positions himself at the last aircraft and collects “bumped” personnel, if required. He will be the last man to load on the aircraft. Once on the aircraft, the PSG will notify the crew chief and/or air mission commander (AMC) that all personnel and equipment

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are loaded, using the troop commander’s radio handset. The aircraft door gunners will provide close-in security.

8-183. Multiple Lift. The duties of the PSG are the same as for a single lift. In a multiple lift, the security teams will maintain security of the PZ and be the last element to depart with the PSG. Depending on their initial locations, the security teams may have to reposition closer to the PZ. Whenever possible, the aircraft will land as close to the security team positions as possible to enhance security and minimize the movement required by the teams. ACTIONS AT THE LZ

8-184. All elements and personnel involved in the air assault operation must adhere strictly to the priority of actions upon landing at the LZ. Unloading

8-185. Unloading of the aircraft does not begin until directed by the crew chief or pilot. The following actions occur (see Figure 8-45):

·

Once an aircraft lands, personnel unbuckle their seatbelts and exit as quickly as possible with all equipment.

·

Prior to leaving the aircraft, the chalk leader obtains the landing direction from the pilot (if it was not determined during the approach into the LZ). This will aid in orientation to the LZ, particularly at night.

·

Individuals move 15 to 20 meters out from the side of the aircraft and assume the prone position, facing away from the aircraft with weapons at the ready, until the aircraft has departed the LZ.

Figure 8-45. UH-60 Unloading Diagram Immediate Actions on a Hot LZ

8-186. If the decision is made to use a hot LZ or if contact is made upon landing, troops quickly dismount and move 15 to 20 meters away from

8-64


the aircraft. They immediately return enemy fire to allow the aircraft to depart. The following actions occur:

·

If the contact is similar to a far ambush, troops fire and maneuver off the LZ to the closest location offering cover and concealment.

·

If troops are engaged from nearby enemy positions, they treat it as a near ambush by immediately returning fire. Soldiers who consider themselves in the kill zone may assault the enemy positions or attempt to get out of the kill zone. Soldiers not in the kill zone provide supporting fire to facilitate movement of troops in the kill zone.

· ·

The squad or platoon leader calls for fire support, if available. Once friendly elements disengage from the enemy force, the squad or platoon leader moves the unit to a covered and concealed position, accounts for personnel and equipment, and assesses the situation as to whether or not the unit can continue the mission.

Chalk Assembly on a Cold LZ

8-187. After the aircraft is unloaded, the chalk leader (squad leader) moves the chalk to its predetermined locations using the traveling overwatch movement technique. All soldiers and/or elements move at a fast pace to the nearest concealed position. Once at the concealed assembly point, the chalk leader makes a quick count of personnel and equipment and then proceeds with the mission.

RESUPPLY OPERATIONS 8-188. As noted, the helicopter resupply assets available to the reconnaissance platoon are limited. Refer to FM 4-20.197 (FM 10-450-3), FM 4-20.198 (FM 10-450-4), and FM 4-20.199 (FM 10-450-5) for discussions of various aspects of aerial resupply and slingload operations. PLANNING

8-189. Planning for aerial resupply requires close coordination, with elements reviewing the entire mission and resolving all limitations and problem areas. If a resupply item poses a problem that cannot be resolved, another mode of transport should be considered. Planning factors include the following:

· · · · · · ·

Priorities of cargo/unit resupply.

· ·

PZ/LZ security.

Integration of the resupply operation into the tactical plan. Selection, identification, and marking of the PZ/LZ. Type/amount of cargo to be carried. Helicopter assets available. Requirements for slings, cargo nets, and/or cargo containers. Ground crew training requirements, such as those for ground guides and hookup personnel. Flight routes.

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8-190. The selection of a usable PZ or LZ is extremely important. Logistical and tactical considerations must be analyzed and taken into account to ensure that the PZ/LZ is positioned at the right place to support the ground unit. The area must also be accessible to the aircraft involved in the resupply operation. The final decision on PZ/LZ selection and acceptance will be made by the AMC, the pilot in command (PIC), an aviation LO, or a Pathfinder-qualified officer or NCO. PLATOON RESPONSIBILITIES

8-191. The reconnaissance platoon receiving the supplies is responsible for preparing the PZ/LZ. In addition to the general PZ/LZ responsibilities covered earlier in this discussion, the platoon will perform the following specific tasks for aerial resupply:

· ·

Recover and assemble equipment and supplies. Train available ground crews. Tasks include the following: n

Guide the aircraft during unloading/loading, and departure.

n

Derig the load.

approach,

landing,

· ·

Train hookup personnel.

·

Prepare, coordinate, and inspect backloads (such as slings and A-22 bags) and have them ready for hookup or loading when the aircraft arrives.

Coordinate with the sending unit for the control and return of that unit’s transport equipment, such as slings and A-22 bags.

MEDICAL EVACUATION 8-192. The reconnaissance platoon will contact the medical company on the medical company command frequency for all ambulance requests. (NOTE: If it is unable to contact the medical company on that frequency, the platoon should attempt to relay the request on the next higher command frequency.) Refer to Figure 8-46 for an example of the radio transmission for initial contact and terminal guidance during evacuation operations. The platoon then uses the standard nine-line air evacuation request format (see Figure 8-47). 8-193. The medical company will prioritize the request with others it receives to determine if air evacuation is possible. In conducting the evacuation operation, the reconnaissance platoon must accomplish the following tasks:

· · ·

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Prepare a suitable PZ/LZ for the aircraft. Secure the PZ/LZ. Provide terminal guidance during the aircraft’s approach to the PZ/LZ.


EVACUATION AIRCRAFT

RECCE PLATOON

“Hardrock 16, Dustoff 26 is 30 seconds inbound to your location. Request terminal guidance, over.” “Dustoff 26, this is Hardrock 16. Signal is displayed, over.” (NOTE: Use the signaling method specified in the nine-line evacuation request.) “Roger, Hardrock. Dustoff has red smoke, over.” “Dustoff 26, roger red smoke, over.”

Figure 8-46. Example Radio Transmissions for Terminal Guidance to an Air Evacuation Site

NINE-LINE AIR EVACUATION REQUEST FORMAT Units must use the following nine-line format to provide the necessary information when requesting air evacuation (either MEDEVAC or CASEVAC) for casualties. LINE 1 – LOCATION. ___________________________________________________ Specify the grid coordinates for the six-digit grid location, preceded by the 100,000-meter grid identification. LINE 2 – RADIO FREQUENCY/CALL SIGN. _________________________________ The frequency and call sign should be that of the radio at the site of the unit requesting evacuation. LINE 3 – PATIENT CATEGORY OF PRECEDENCE. ___________________________ Classify the casualties’ priority for evacuation using the following terms: · Urgent. Evacuation required within 2 hours to save life or limb. · Priority. Patient’s medical condition will deteriorate, becoming urgent within 4 hours. · Routine. Evacuation required, but patient’s condition is not expected to deteriorate for several hours. · Tactical immediate. Evacuation required so casualties do not endanger the tactical mission. LINE 4 – SPECIAL EQUIPMENT/EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPLIES. ____________ List all requirements. LINE 5 – NUMBER AND TYPE OF CASUALTIES. Provide a complete, accurate list.

____________________________

LINE 6 – SECURITY OF PICKUP SITE. _____________________________________ Describe conditions for security at the LZ/PZ. LINE 7 – SIGNALING AND SITE MARKING. _________________________________ Specify the signaling and marking methods to be used. LINE 8 – PATIENT NATIONALITY AND STATUS. _____________________________ Provide a complete, accurate list. LINE 9 – NBC CONTAMINATION AREA. ____________________________________ Specify locations of any contaminated areas affecting the evacuation operation.

Figure 8-47. Format for Air Evacuation Requests

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SECTION VI – MULTICAPABLE SENSOR TEAMS 8-194. Sensor teams employing GSR and REMBASS can enhance the surveillance capability of the reconnaissance platoon. The teams can detect targets and provide accurate range and azimuth readings to threat locations during limited visibility conditions. A sensor team consists of five soldiers, one AN/PPS-5b, one REMBASS, and a HMMWV. Refer to Figure 8-48 (GSR) and Figure 8-49 (REMBASS) for a summary of features and capabilities of the two systems. 8-195. The teams may be attached or OPCON to troops or platoons for specific missions. When a sensor team is attached or OPCON to the reconnaissance platoon, the platoon leader must plan its employment. He should work with the commander to position the GSR/REMBASS assets in conjunction with reconnaissance OPs to provide local security and protection.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 8-196. Sensor teams provide mobile, all-weather battlefield surveillance. When employed, they can provide observation from a given vantage point 24 hours a day. 8-197. GSR/REMBASS targets are classified as dismounted, light vehicle, heavy vehicle, or tracked vehicle. The AN/PPS-5b (GSR) has a line-of-sight range of 10,000 meters against vehicles and 6,000 meters against personnel. It can detect targets through light camouflage, smoke, haze, light snow and rain, and darkness. Foliage, heavy rain, and snow seriously reduce its capability. 8-198. Both GSR and the REMBASS are designed to detect targets moving against a background. They are generally ineffective against an air target unless the aircraft is flying close to the ground. They are vulnerable to threat direction-finding and jamming equipment. The sensor team is normally equipped with a single radio. If employed forward with the scouts, the team should send all reports to the platoon leader to be passed higher.

EMPLOYMENT 8-199. The sensor team should be assigned a specific sector of surveillance and frequency of coverage. Because the threat can detect radar signals, however, the GSR cannot be used for continuous surveillance. Surveillance tasks assigned to sensor teams include these:

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·

Search avenues of approach or possible threat positions on a scheduled or random basis to determine location, size, and composition of threat forces and the nature of their activity.

·

Monitor point targets such as bridges, defiles, or road junctions and reporting quantity, type, and direction of threat vehicles and personnel moving through the target area.

·

Extend the observation capabilities of the scouts by enabling them to survey distant points and areas of special interest.

·

Vector patrols to keep them oriented during limited visibility.


GSR 8-200. GSR must be positioned in an area that is free of ground clutter such as trees, thick vegetation, and buildings and that affords long-range observation and a wide field of view. Normally, the team will be assigned a general area, and the GSR team leader will select the specific position. To avoid threat suppressive fires, the team should be prepared for rapid displacement and have several alternate positions selected and reconnoitered. See Figure 8-48 for a summary of the GSR system. 8-201. During reconnaissance operations, GSR is best employed to the flanks of the reconnaissance platoon or oriented on potential threat locations. Since reconnaissance is a moving operation, the GSR teams will have to move as necessary to support the scouts. 8-202. In security operations, GSR teams can be used to provide redundancy in surveillance of NAIs and to add depth to the screen line by supplementing OPs.

GSR SYSTEM SUMMARY FEATURES: · Portable, battery-powered radar set. · Locates and identifies ground targets at ranges up to 10,000 meters. · Discriminates between personnel and vehicular traffic. · Remote operations. TABULATED DATA: Detection range: With control indicator Personnel: 50 to 10,000 m Vehicles: 50 to 10,000 m Without control indicator Personnel: 50 to 3,000 m Vehicles: 50 to 5,000 m Range Accuracy: +/- 20 m Frequency: Tunable: 16.0 to 16.5 GHz Power: Battery: 6 volt DC vehicle or 24 volt DC Azimuth: Automatic sensor scanning: 533; 1,067; 1,600; 1,955 mils Accuracy: +/- 10 mils Elevation: Coverage: -600 mils to +400 mils Accuracy: +/- 10 mils Figure 8-48. GSR System Summary

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COMPONENTS

8-203. The AN/PPS-5B is a portable, battery-powered, line-of-sight radar set. It is used in battlefield surveillance to detect, locate, identify, and track moving ground targets at ranges up to 10,000 meters; it can do this under various conditions of terrain, visibility, and weather. To detect the presence of moving targets, the radar set transmits pulses of radio frequency (RF) energy out to 10,000 meters away. Between pulses, it listens for RF energy reflected back from the target(s). The energy reflected back by a target is called an echo. The radar set receives these echoes and presents them in four ways:

· · · ·

As a bright spot on a B-scope display. As a waveform on an A-scope display. As a tone in the headphones. As a deflection of a meter pointer.

8-204. Once a target has been detected, it can be located by using the counter type indicators on the radar set to obtain the azimuth and range of the target(s). Target identification is accomplished by the operator’s recognition of characteristics sounds heard in the electrical headsets. The operator can track the target by means of a control switch; he can turn the antenna either to the left or to the right and stop it at any azimuth. 8-205. When emplaced, the radar set consists of two major operating assemblies, the tripod-mounted components and the control indicator. These are connected by the remote cable, which permits the control indicator to be placed as far as 50 feet away from the tripod. 8-206. The tripod-mounted components are the tripod, column assembly, antenna drive, and the receiver-transmitter, which in turn supports the waveguide horn, antenna reflectors, battery box, telescope, and two electrical headsets. (NOTE: When needed, the radar set mount adapter allows the radar set receiver-transmitter to be mounted on a stationary vehicle with a 50-caliber machinegun mount.) 8-207. The control indicator components are the control indicator and the viewing hood. The power supply provided with the equipment can be used instead of the battery when a 24-volt DC source is available.

8-208. The carrying packs are designed for backpacking the radar set. The transport case is a protective enclosure to house the radar set during transit or storage.

DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

8-209. The AN/PPS-5B can be unpacked and set up or taken down in about 10 minutes by two persons. It can be operated using either battery or vehicular power. Remote operation allows each GSR team to acquire targets up to 50 meters from the power source. To detect the presence of moving targets, the radar set searches an area either by sector scanning or by searchlighting. 8-210. In sector scanning, the antenna can be set to automatically scan, by azimuth, over sector widths of 533 mils, 1,067 mils, 1,600 mils, and 1,955 mils. This allows the GSR team to search for threat activity on

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likely avenues of approach, withdrawal, or counterattack. It also allows for the monitoring of key terrain, areas of interest, and route surveillance.

8-211. In searchlighting, the operator can use the control switch to turn the antenna either to the left or to the right and stop it at any azimuth. This allows the GSR team to monitor point targets and gaps between friendly units, to vector friendly units and fire control support, and to track moving targets. 8-212. The GSR system requires an unimpeded line of sight. It can detect moving targets only and cannot distinguish between threat and friendly targets. Weather also affects the system’s performance; heavy rain, snow, or winds in excess of 25 knots seriously degrade the radar set’s ability to acquire targets.

REMBASS 8-213. Refer to Figure 8-49 for a summary of the REMBASS, which consists of a variety of components: sensors, radio repeater, code programmer, sensor monitoring set, portable monitoring set, power supply, and the antenna group. The following list outlines the functions and capabilities of these parts:

·

Magnetic sensor (MAG), DT-561/GSQ. The MAG is a count indicator sensor. It is able to detect, count, and determine the direction of travel when objects containing ferrous metal (iron) come within its detection radius.

·

Seismic acoustic sensor (SA), DT-562/GSQ. The SA is classification sensor. It is able to detect and classify targets by analyzing the targets’ ground vibrations and acoustic signals. It classifies targets with one of the following codes: P for personnel, V for vehicles, W for wheeled vehicles, T for tracked vehicles, and – (a dash) for unidentified.

·

Infrared-passive sensor (IR), DT-565/GSQ. The IR is count indicator sensor, capable of detecting, counting, and determining the direction of travel by sensing the temperature change of a target against a steady thermal background.

·

Radio repeater (RT-1175/GSQ). The repeater relays data transmission between the sensors and the monitoring site.

·

Code programmer (C-10434/GSQ). The code programmer allows the team members to manually program frequencies, identification codes, and other parameters into the memory of the sensors and repeaters.

·

Sensor monitoring set (SMS), AN/GSQ-187. The SMS receives, decodes, and displays up to 70 sensor and repeater messages on two separate channels. It records up to 60 sensor and repeater messages on a hard-copy printout.

·

Portable monitoring set (PMS), R-2016 GSQ. The PMS can receive, decode, and display up to 10 sensor and repeater messages on a single channel.

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·

Power supply (PP-8080/GSQ). The power supply is used as an alternate source to power the SMS, radio repeater, and sensor signal simulator when a suitable source (115 volt AC, 220 volt AC, or 24 volt DC) is available.

·

Antenna group (OE-239/GSQ). The antenna group provides up to four SMSs with adequate signal strength to receive transmissions from extended ranges.

REMBASS SYSTEM SUMMARY FEATURES: · Ground-based, all-weather, day and night battlefield surveillance system. · Detects targets and classifies them as dismounted personnel, wheeled vehicles, or tracked vehicles. · Provides information for use in determining target location, direction of travel, rate of speed, length of march column, and number of targets. TABULATED DATA: Detection range: DT-561/561A magnetic sensor Personnel: 0 to 3 m Wheeled vehicles: 0 to 15 m Tracked vehicles: 0 to 25 m DT-562/562A seismic-acoustic sensor Personnel: 0 to 50 m Wheeled vehicles: 0 to 250 m Tracked vehicles: 0 to 350 m DT-565/565A infrared-passive sensor Personnel: 3 to 20 m Vehicles: 3 to 50 m Frequency: 138 to 153 MHz Figure 8-49. REMBASS Summary

IREMBASS 8-214. The improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system (IREMBASS) consists of the following components:

· · · ·

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Magnetic sensor (MAG), DT-561A/GSQ. Seismic acoustic sensor (SA), DT-562A/GSQ. Infrared-passive sensor (IR), DT-565A/GSQ. Radio repeater (RT-1175A/GSQ). The sensors and radio repeater perform and operate the same as in the REBASS. The major differences are that the IREMBASS components are smaller and lighter than the REMBASS components.


·

Monitor programmer set (AN/PSQ-7). This unit combines the functions of the REMBASS code programmer and PMS into one component. It also has the ability to output data into a field tactical computer system or communications interface.

·

Advanced monitoring display system (AMDS). The Windows 95-based AMDS software provides the IREMBASS hardware with real-time data display, logging analysis, and graphing and reporting capability. The system also provides support of tactical digital maps depicting a mission’s region of interest. IREMBASS sensors can be displayed as icons on the screen. Full real-time sensor activation alerting is provided, with color code flashing of sensor icons and message displays. AMDS software can also be operated in no-map mode; if needed, user-drawn maps can be created.

SECTION VII – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 8-215. CSS elements arm, fuel, fix, feed, and provide transportation and personnel for the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon, however, has no organic CSS assets. This creates unique planning and operational challenges, with most of the responsibility falling to the PSG. 8-216. The PSG is the CSS coordinator for the platoon; in supervising CSS within the platoon, his role is similar to that of the 1SG in the company and troop. He is responsible for advising the platoon leader of the platoon’s logistical requirements during preparation for combat operations as well as its current logistical status once operations are under way. The platoon’s NCOs assist the PSG in executing resupply operations and in determining the platoon’s logistical needs. In combat operations, the PSG coordinates directly with the 1SG, informing him of requirements and problems. (NOTE: Platoons in the BRT will coordinate for CSS using this procedure.) With prior coordination, elements such as the task force reconnaissance platoon can coordinate support with the 1SG of the company team that is nearest them.

SUPPLY OPERATIONS 8-217. Reconnaissance platoons have a large amount of equipment and require frequent resupply to accomplish their mission. Periodic checks are required by all leaders to make sure the platoon’s equipment, especially high-use items, is accounted for and ready to use. Leaders must anticipate expenditures and request supplies before an operation begins. SQUADRON SUPPORT

8-218. The recce platoon in a RSTA squadron or the reconnaissance platoon in a divisional or regimental squadron receives all of its CSS through its parent troop. The PSG coordinates with his 1SG for everything the platoon requires. The 1SG is thus the key operator in the service support chain. He does most of the coordination with the squadron combat trains command post (CTCP) and controls the logistics package

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(LOGPAC) and its operation. Based on the tactical situation, the 1SG will also choose the techniques of resupply. BATTALION TASK FORCE SUPPORT

8-219. The battalion task force reconnaissance platoon presents complex logistical problems for the task force staff. As explained in previous chapters, the platoon normally operates to the front of the task force. It will probably move earlier and stay away longer than any other battalion element. It can be resupplied in one of several ways. 8-220. One method entails the battalion dedicating a LOGPAC to the platoon. The LOGPAC responds to the platoon’s needs and is brought forward by the headquarters company 1SG, the support platoon leader, the headquarters company XO, or another responsible individual. The support package is small and flexible, tailored specifically to the platoon’s requirements. One technique, designed to limit the size of the LOGPAC, is to have it provide three days of supplies. Load capability of the platoon vehicles must be taken into consideration when pushing this type of package forward; an important factor in reducing the size of this package is developing an understanding of what supplies scouts still have on their vehicles. (NOTE: The LOGPAC may have a maintenance team; refer to the discussion of maintenance operations later in this chapter.) The LOGPAC links up with the scout PSG at a specifically designated RP as far forward as possible. The PSG is then responsible for distribution of supplies to the scout sections and/or squads. He may distribute supplies by himself or be assisted by the individual who brought the LOGPAC forward; the latter choice is significantly faster. This resupply method is best for the scout platoon, but is difficult for the battalion because of its own limited CSS resources. 8-221. The platoon can also use the nearest company team’s CSS assets for its resupply and maintenance. If this technique is used, the HHC commander and reconnaissance platoon leader should coordinate with the company team commander for support. The HHC commander and battalion S4 should ensure that the supplies dedicated for the resupply of the platoon are forwarded with the company team’s regular LOGPAC. If possible, scout supplies pushed forward with the company team LOGPAC should be separated to ensure rapid resupply of the scouts. 8-222. Another method is to make the scouts responsible for their own supplies. Not only must the PSG coordinate for supplies, but he also must pick up the LOGPAC, distribute the supplies, and return the LOGPAC to its parent-unit location. This method requires the reconnaissance platoon to operate without the PSG for extended periods of time. In addition, it does not provide dedicated CSS assets to the platoon. As a result, this is the easiest method of resupply for the battalion but the worst for the platoon. 8-223. Whatever support the reconnaissance platoon receives must be keyed to a fast transfer of supplies. The scouts must be able to pull in, resupply, and leave as quickly as possible. The actual time when the scouts need to conduct resupply operations often does not coincide with the standard LOGPAC times for the rest of the battalion. The battalion S4, the support platoon leader, the reconnaissance platoon leader and PSG, and any other key leaders must anticipate events to coordinate for the best time of resupply. 8-74


BASIC AND COMBAT LOADS

8-224. Two sets of guidelines, for the basic load and the combat load, prescribe the quantities of supplies required by the reconnaissance platoon during tactical operations. (NOTE: A summary of the classes of supply follows this discussion.) Basic Load

8-225. The basic load is the quantity of supplies in Classes I, II, III, IV, V, and VIII that the platoon is required to have on hand to initiate combat operations. The platoon’s higher headquarters designates the basic load based on analysis of the platoon’s mission and the anticipated threat.

Combat Load

8-226. The combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the platoon must have on hand to sustain operations in combat for a prescribed number of days. Like the basic load, the platoon’s combat load is designated by higher headquarters. The platoon’s parent unit must be capable of moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets, into combat in a single delivery. CLASSES OF SUPPLY Class I

8-227. This class includes subsistence items. Meals, ready to eat (MRE) rations are stocked on each vehicle, usually a three- to five-day supply. Hot meals are brought forward when possible, if only to supplement MREs. Potable water should be replenished daily, either by refilling from the water trailer or by rotating 5-gallon cans with the 1SG or supply sergeant. Each combat vehicle should maintain a minimum of 30 gallons of potable water; it must have more water on hand during operations in arid climates or in MOPP gear. (NOTE: Recce vehicles with five- or sixman crews may also require more water.) 8-228. All meals should be eaten in shifts, and they should never be served at one centralized location. The platoon leader and PSG must make sure not only that the platoon is fed, but also that the scouts eat nutritious meals to maintain the energy levels required in combat. During continuous or cold-weather operations, soldiers will eat more than three meals per day; the platoon leader and PSG must plan for this extra allowance. Class II

8-229. This class includes field sanitation, cleaning, and administrative items, as well as organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE). Sanitation, cleaning, and administrative supplies are requested and received from the troop or company supply NCO and can be brought forward with the LOGPAC. OCIE items are replaced on an individual, asneeded basis. Class III and Class V

8-230. Class III comprises all types of POL products. Class V covers all types of ammunition, including small arms, artillery and tank rounds, mines and demolitions, fuzes, missiles, and bombs. For optimum security,

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rearming and refueling should occur simultaneously under cover of darkness. This usually occurs daily or at the conclusion of major operations. The techniques of refueling and rearming are covered later in this section.

8-231. The platoon leader must control the redistribution of supplies when fuel and ammunition cannot be delivered or when only limited quantities of supplies are available. The PSG continuously monitors the platoon’s supply status through logistical reports (NOTE: Refer to the outlines and examples of report formats in Appendix B of this manual.) He notifies the platoon leader when a specific vehicle or the platoon as a whole is critically short of these major classes of supply. The PSG should make sure ammunition is equally distributed throughout the platoon before any tactical operation and during consolidation on an objective. 8-232. When planning for refueling, the platoon leader should keep the range and fuel capacity of his vehicles and the requirements of future operations in mind. The amount of fuel required determines how much time it will take to refuel. The platoon leader must realize that the cruising range and estimated fuel consumption of a vehicle are only approximations, subject to the effects of weather, terrain, and other factors. The platoon must top off vehicles whenever the tactical situation permits. 8-233. When time is limited, the platoon leader must choose between topping off vehicles that need the most fuel first or giving limited amounts to each vehicle. Every vehicle must maintain a stock of oil, grease, and hydraulic fluid, replenishing these POL products each time refueling takes place. 8-234. RSTA units with OPCON air assets have the flexibility to conduct resupply operations by helicopter. This is done when distance or time would severely tax conventional resupply methods. Leaders should consider location and security of the resupply site, types of supplies to be delivered, signals, and assistance required by the delivering unit. Class IV

8-235. This class includes construction and barrier materials. Barrier materials such as lumber, sandbags, concertina or barbed wire, and pickets are used by the platoon to construct OPs and obstacles and to improve fighting positions. These materials are requested through the platoon’s higher headquarters.

Class VI

8-236. This class covers personal demand items. Tobacco products,

candy, and toiletry articles are normally sold through the exchange system during peacetime or for units not in a combat environment. In a combat environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and comfort packs.

Class VII

8-237. Class VII includes major end items. These pieces of equipment, assembled and ready for intended use, include combat vehicles, missile launchers, and major weapon systems. Major end items that are destroyed are reported immediately by means of logistical reports (as

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outlined in Appendix B of this manual). They are replaced by the parent unit as they are reported. Class VIII

8-238. This class includes medical supplies, which are provided through the squadron/battalion medical platoon. These supplies include individual medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits, water purification tablets, and foot powder. Class IX

8-239. This class comprises repair parts. Class IX supplies are requisitioned through the higher unit maintenance section. Common items such as patches and clamps may be distributed in a battle damage repair kit that vehicles can carry to sustain operations and minimize maintenance support. Class X

8-240. Class X includes most of the material necessary to support nonmilitary programs, such as agriculture and economic development, not covered in other supply classes. Class X items are requested, obtained, and delivered by the S4 based on requirements from civilmilitary and/or operations channels. Specific instructions for request and issue of these supplies are provided at troop level and higher. TECHNIQUES OF RESUPPLY

8-241. The tactical situation is the major factor dictating which technique of resupply each type of reconnaissance platoon will use. The most common techniques are those involved in routine resupply using a LOGPAC: tailgate resupply, service station resupply, a variation of one type, or a combination of both types. The platoon may also receive supplies by other techniques, such pre-positioning or aerial resupply. 8-242. The situation will also dictate when resupply takes place. Medical support should be brought forward with the LOGPAC as needed. Generally, scouts attempt to avoid resupply during reconnaissance operations; rather, they should conduct resupply during mission transition. Resupply is unavoidable during security missions of long duration. Routine Resupply Techniques

8-243. In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition are brought to the reconnaissance sections or squads by the PSG or another responsible individual who is assisting him (see Figure 8-50). This technique is used when routes leading to vehicle positions are available (including successful infiltration routes) and the unit is not under direct threat observation and fire. Tailgate resupply is time-consuming, but it is useful in security missions when the scouts are not moving because stealth is more easily maintained. If necessary, supplies can be hand-carried to vehicle positions to further minimize signatures. 8-244. In the service station technique, vehicles move to a centrally located rearm and refuel point, either by squad or section or as an entire platoon (refer to Figure 8-51). Service station resupply is inherently faster than the tailgate technique. Because vehicles must move and concentrate, however, it can create security problems. During screening 8-77

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missions, the platoon must be careful not to compromise the location of OPs. This technique is commonly used during mission transition.

8-245. The platoon leader can vary the specifics of the two basic techniques, or he can use them in combination. During a screening mission, for example, he may use the tailgate method for his most forward OPs and the service station method for his OPs in depth (see Figure 8-52).

Figure 8-50. Tailgate Resupply Technique

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Figure 8-51. Service Station Resupply Technique

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Figure 8-52. Combination of Resupply Techniques Other Resupply Techniques

8-246. In addition to the techniques of routine resupply, the reconnaissance platoon can use several other methods of obtaining needed materials. 8-247. Aerial Resupply. Helicopters can be a vital lifeline when scouts are forced to operate forward of friendly lines for extended periods; they reduce the risks associated with conducting ground resupply operations under such conditions. Aerial assets are also useful in resupplying dismounted scouts in OPs in restricted terrain. On the other hand, aerial resupply sometimes will not be feasible because helicopters are not available. In addition, the signature of resupply helicopters can compromise scout positions. Careful choice of resupply routes and landing zones helps to minimize this risk. Refer to the discussion of utility and cargo helicopter support earlier in this chapter.

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8-248. Pre-positioning and Cache. These resupply techniques, also called prestock resupply, differ in the level of security provided for the supplies. In pre-positioning, supplies are generally left unattended, without security, although steps should be taken to prevent detection of the location by threat elements. When it resupplies by cache, the unit should leave security personnel to guard the site. 8-249. Both pre-positioning and cache techniques can be used in a variety of reconnaissance platoon operations. During reconnaissance, prestock positions can be established along the intended route of advance or near the objective by advance elements. In security operations, the platoon can set up prestock points throughout the area of operations. These points should be in each alternate or supplementary OP, in addition to other locations throughout the depth of the sector. Scouts can also use prestock to provide resupply for patrols. 8-250. Prestock operations must be carefully planned and executed at every level. Prestock points should be placed where they can be found by simple instructions that are clear to someone who has never visited the site. All leaders, down to squad leader and vehicle commander, must know the exact locations of prestock points. As noted, the platoon leader must take steps to ensure security and survivability of the supplies by digging in prestock positions, selecting covered and concealed positions, and considering the effects of weather and terrain. He must also have a plan to remove or destroy prestock supplies to prevent the threat from capturing them. The discussion of the cache site annex (Annex G) to patrol orders, found in Appendix A of this manual, lists considerations and procedures for establishing and reporting a cache site. 8-251. Medical Resupply. Because the reconnaissance platoon does not have an attached medic or medical vehicle, it must depend on its parent unit for medical services, including resupply. The PSG is responsible for monitoring the platoon’s medical supply status (Class VIII) and for ensuring that the combat lifesavers are resupplied through the LOGPAC.

MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS 8-252. Proper maintenance keeps equipment and materiel in serviceable condition. It includes PMCS, as well as the functions of inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, recovering, and evacuating equipment and materiel whenever necessary. 8-253. Maintenance operations are divided into several distinct levels: unit (operator and organizational), intermediate (direct support and general support), and depot levels. The reconnaissance platoon leader is concerned primarily with unit maintenance and repair of equipment in intermediate (DS) maintenance. 8-254. Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible. When equipment cannot be repaired on site, it is moved to the rear (but only as far as necessary for repair) to the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP), which is established and operated by squadron/battalion maintenance support.

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LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES Platoon Leader

8-255. The platoon leader has ultimate responsibility for the condition and performance of the platoon’s equipment and material. In that role, his duties include the following:

·

Coordinate with the XO in planning, directing, supervising unit maintenance for the platoon.

·

Develop and supervise an ongoing maintenance training program.

·

Ensure that all platoon vehicles, weapon systems, and equipment such as night observation devices (NOD), mine detectors, NBC equipment, and communications equipment are combat-ready at all times within the platoon’s maintenance capabilities. The platoon leader also ensures that equipment that cannot be repaired at platoon level is reported to the commander as soon as possible.

·

Know the current status of equipment, to include document numbers, job order numbers, and the stage of maintenance of his vehicles. The platoon leader keeps the parent unit XO informed of the current maintenance status.

·

Ensure that crews have the appropriate technical manuals and are trained and supervised to complete the required level of maintenance properly.

·

Ensure that unit-level PMCS are performed on all assigned equipment in accordance with the appropriate operator’s manuals.

·

Ensure that drivers and assistant drivers are trained and licensed to operate platoon vehicles and equipment.

·

Plan and rehearse a maintenance evacuation plan for every mission.

and

Platoon Sergeant

8-256. The PSG has primary responsibility for most of the platoon’s maintenance activities. His duties include the following:

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·

Ensure that DA Forms 5988-E and 2408-18 are filled out and updated in accordance with DA Pam 738-750.

·

Direct and supervise unit maintenance of platoon equipment, vehicles, and weapon systems.

·

Assist the platoon leader in complying with his responsibilities and assuming these responsibilities in his absence.

·

Coordinate with the maintenance representative to arrange unit repairs or to request intermediate (DS) maintenance.

·

Supervise and account maintenance periods.

·

Ensure that repair parts are used or stored on a timely basis as they are received.

for

platoon

personnel

during


·

Collect and consolidate reports of the platoon’s maintenance status in the field and send the appropriate reports to higher maintenance personnel.

·

Ensure that vehicles are always topped off with fuel in garrison and that they receive fuel in the field.

·

Keep the platoon leader informed maintenance and logistics status.

of

the

platoon’s

Vehicle Commander

8-257. Vehicle commanders are the platoon’s first-line maintenance supervisors. In large part, the platoon’s maintenance status, and thus its combat readiness, depends on their commitment to proper maintenance procedures. The vehicle commander’s duties in this area include the following:

·

Ensure that DA Forms 5988-E and 2408-18 are filled out and updated in accordance with DA Pam 738-750.

·

Ensure that the crew is properly trained in PMCS procedures and that PMCS are performed on the vehicle and all assigned equipment in accordance with the appropriate technical manuals.

·

Ensure that, as a minimum, the assigned vehicle driver or equipment operator is properly trained and licensed. In preparing for continuous operations, vehicle commanders must ensure that all crewmembers are trained and licensed as drivers.

·

Ensure that repair parts are installed upon receipt or are stored in authorized locations.

·

Ensure that all tools and basic issue items (BII) are properly marked, stored, maintained, and accounted for.

·

Ensure that the vehicle is always topped off in garrison and that it receives as much fuel as possible at every opportunity in the field.

·

Constantly update the PSG on the maintenance and logistics status of the vehicle.

LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE Operator Level Maintenance

8-258. Operator maintenance includes proper care, use, and maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew equipment such as weapons, NBC equipment, and night vision devices. The driver and other crewmembers perform daily services on the vehicle and equipment, to include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication, cleaning, preserving, and adjusting. The driver and gunner are required to use DA Form 5988-E to record these checks and services, as well as all equipment faults that they cannot immediately correct. The driver’s and gunner’s reports are the primary means of reporting equipment faults through the vehicle commander to the PSG, platoon leader, and ultimately to organizational maintenance personnel.

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8-259. Checks and services prescribed for the automotive system, weapon systems, and turret are divided into three groups:

· · ·

Before-operation checks and services. During-operation checks and services. After-operation checks and services.

8-260. These services are explained in every operator’s manual and

should be conducted as stated in the manual. Although operators must learn to operate equipment without referring to the manual, maintenance must always be performed using the appropriate technical manual. Organizational Level Maintenance

8-261. The RSTA squadron has small, light armored vehicle (LAV)-based battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) teams attached from the base support company (BSC) and controlled by the squadron S4. These teams are the first echelon of organizational-level maintenance for the recce platoon. They provide maintenance at the site of a breakdown using a limited number of combat spares and BDAR kits. Their objective is to quickly return vehicles to mission capable status using accurate diagnostics (preferably embedded) and limited tools. If the BDAR team is unable to repair a system quickly, the maneuver unit (usually the platoon) is responsible for like-vehicle recovery to the BSA. 8-262. In non-RSTA units, organizational maintenance is also the responsibility of the unit assigned the equipment. It is performed by the operators and unit mechanics. Because the CFV’s design allows rapid modular replacement of parts, many faults can be corrected, and the vehicle returned to the platoon, rapidly. 8-263. When the operator identifies a problem that is beyond his level of maintenance capability, he notifies his chain of command so the problem can be isolated and corrected. The company or troop maintenance team has trained mechanics who are authorized to perform unit maintenance tasks as prescribed in the technical manuals for the vehicle. When company, troop, battalion, or squadron maintenance teams are not authorized to make a particular repair, they will arrange to have it done by DS maintenance assets. Intermediate (Direct Support) Maintenance

8-264. Once a vehicle reaches the BSA, the maintenance control section will assess it to determine if it can be returned to mission capable status. If not, the vehicle will be moved to a cannibalization point and stripped of parts that can be used on other vehicles. Vehicles that cannot be returned to mission capable status in the area of operations are taken rearward to a sustainment maintenance facility as time permits. 8-265. Replacement vehicles will be brought forward as the situation permits. Given their austere organic maintenance capabilities, the RSTA squadron and recce platoon will depend on replacement vehicles in maintaining their combat readiness. EVACUATION

8-266. Evacuation is necessary when a vehicle is damaged and cannot be repaired on site within two hours or when it is the only means available

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to prevent capture or destruction by the threat. (NOTE: Repair times are dependent on METT-TC; the two-hour limit is only a guideline for planning purposes.) With the exception of an entire vehicle, most damaged equipment can be transported by the platoon until it can be picked up by the troop or squadron/battalion support elements. It is then evacuated by troop or squadron/battalion maintenance personnel or by the DS maintenance unit.

8-267. When a vehicle must be evacuated, the platoon leader or PSG reports the exact location, vehicle type, and extent of damage, if known, on the proper net to personnel designated in the unit SOP. Two soldiers should remain with the vehicle to assist in evacuation and repair, provide security, and deliver the repaired vehicle back to the platoon as soon as possible. A recovery vehicle from the higher-level maintenance team will evacuate the damaged vehicle. It is vital that the damaged vehicle be placed in a covered position that allows the recovery vehicle to reach it without exposing the recovery crew to threat fire. 8-268. If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time is critical, selfrecovery will be the platoon’s primary method of vehicle evacuation. Other platoon vehicles can evacuate the damaged vehicle for short distances. Self-evacuation is a last resort that should be considered only to avoid losing the damaged vehicle to the threat. The decision to do this rests with the platoon leader. Procedures for towing are covered in the operator’s manual. If the damaged vehicle will be lost for an extended period, the platoon can replace other vehicles’ damaged equipment (such as weapons and radios) with properly functioning items from the damaged vehicle. Damaged equipment can then be repaired or replaced while the vehicle is being repaired. DESTRUCTION

8-269. When evacuation of damaged or inoperable equipment is impossible, it must be destroyed to prevent it from falling into the threat’s hands. The platoon leader must get the commander’s permission before destroying any equipment. Every reasonable effort must be made to evacuate secure equipment, classified materials, and all weapons.

PERSONNEL OPERATIONS SERVICES

8-270. Personnel services include awards and decorations, leaves and

passes, command information, mail, religious services, financial services, legal assistance, welfare, rest and relaxation, and any other service designed to maintain the health, welfare, and morale of the soldier. Many of these services are provided automatically by higher-level support elements; nonetheless, the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for arranging for and providing them to his platoon.

MANAGEMENT

8-271. Personnel management includes classification, assignment, promotions, and reenlistment. Although the platoon leader requests these actions through the troop/battalion, they are normally performed by the squadron/battalion staff or by a division-level organization. The platoon

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leader must submit accurate strength reports to make sure critical personnel shortages, such as vehicle commanders and gunners, are filled with qualified personnel.

MEDICAL TREATMENT AND EVACUATION HEALTH AND HYGIENE

8-272. The platoon leader and PSG must emphasize and enforce high standards of health and hygiene at all times. This “preventive maintenance” approach should cover all aspects of the soldier’s health and well-being, including the following:

· · ·

Daily shaving to ensure proper fit of the protective mask.

·

Battle fatigue prevention, including strict implementation of the unit sleep plan.

Regular bathing and changing of clothes. Prevention of weather-related problems. These include coldweather injuries like frostbite, trench foot, and immersion foot and heat-related injuries such as heat exhaustion and heat stroke. Soldiers must understand the effects of such conditions as sunburn and windchill.

WOUNDED SOLDIERS

8-273. Battlefield positioning and dispersion make treatment and evacuation of wounded personnel two of the most difficult tasks the reconnaissance platoon must execute. Operational planning or SOPs must cover evacuation procedures in detail. 8-274. In the reconnaissance platoon, the combat lifesaver and/or the vehicle commander are almost always the first ones on the scene to begin the process of treating WIA personnel. With the help of the vehicle commander, the combat lifesaver provides initial first aid to wounded or injured soldiers. He prepares them for medical evacuation or returns them to duty status after rendering first aid. There should be at least one combat lifesaver on each platoon vehicle at all times. 8-275. Vehicle commanders and their crews must be prepared to give immediate first aid as necessary and to continue the mission, without stopping, with a limited crew. The vehicle commander is responsible for ensuring that the PSG is informed of casualties. He coordinates with the PSG for ground or aerial evacuation. 8-276. Evacuation procedures must be part of the platoon plan and should be rehearsed as part of mission preparation. Regardless of the method of evacuation, all reconnaissance leaders must have the necessary CSS graphics available, including the locations of higher headquarters casualty collection points. When wounded crewmen require evacuation, the platoon leader or PSG can take one of the following steps:

8-86

·

Coordinate for aerial evacuation through the troop or battalion.

·

Conduct self-evacuation with organic platoon assets.


·

Request that higher command task organize a dedicated ambulance to the platoon for operations forward of the larger element.

·

Coordinate with the closest troop/company team for ground evacuation.

8-277. Aerial evacuation, if it is available, is preferred because of its speed. The scouts coordinate with their higher command and then switch to the designated frequency to coordinate directly with the MEDEVAC or CASEVAC aircraft. They must pick a relatively flat, open position with adequate cover and concealment for the aircraft’s LZ. The location should be given to the aircraft by radio and marked with colored smoke when the aircraft has the area in sight. (NOTE: This type of double-check identification, using both the radio and smoke, should always be used, even though all Army aircraft have GPS and should have no difficulty in spotting the LZ. Threat elements may release smoke of the same color to confuse the aircraft crew and draw it to the wrong area.) The platoon provides local security of the LZ until the evacuation is complete. 8-278. A wounded crewman’s individual weapon becomes the responsibility of the vehicle commander. Personal effects, weapons, and equipment are turned in to the company or troop supply sergeant at the earliest opportunity. The crewman’s protective mask stays with him at all times. All sensitive items such as maps, overlays, and SOPs should also remain with the vehicle. 8-279. The vehicle commander ensures that casualty feeder and witness statement forms are completed. The casualty feeder card stays with the wounded soldier; witness statements are given to the PSG. The PSG ensures that the witness statements are turned over to the 1SG. SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

8-280. The squadron/battalion S4 designates the location of the collection point for soldiers who are KIA. The reconnaissance platoon leader selects the location of a platoon KIA collection point and reports its eight-digit grid to higher headquarters. This collection point will be used only as a last resort when KIA soldiers must be left on the battlefield. The name of each dead solider, the exact location of the body, and the circumstances are reported higher as soon as possible within the limits of the mission. 8-281. The platoon leader designates a primary and alternate vehicle to extract KIAs from the battlefield to the next scheduled LOGPAC location. The remains of these personnel are placed in a body bag or sleeping bag or rolled in a poncho for evacuation. The lower dog tag is removed for turn-in to the PSG; he forwards it to the 1SG during the next resupply operation along with witness statements from those who witnessed the action. The personal effects of the KIA soldier remain with the body. The soldier’s weapon, equipment, and issue items become the responsibility of the vehicle commander until they can be turned over to the supply sergeant or 1SG by the PSG. 8-282. As a rule, every effort must be made not to place the bodies of KIA soldiers on the same vehicle as wounded soldiers. If the platoon leader or 1SG cannot expedite evacuation, however, KIAs and WIAs may

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be carried together on a vehicle until it reaches its next stop. In the attack, this destination may be the objective. In the defense, it may be the next BP.

PRISONERS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL 8-283. EPWs and captured threat equipment, materiel, and documents are excellent sources of combat intelligence; they must be processed and evacuated to the rear quickly. If threat soldiers want to surrender, it is the responsibility of the reconnaissance platoon or individual vehicle crew to take them into custody and control them until they can be evacuated. The reconnaissance platoon leader will employ a HUMINT soldier, if available, to perform an initial assessment and screening of all EPWs and captured materials to aid in processing and information-gathering. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for additional information on the HUMINT collection process.) 8-284. The platoon leader will designate a primary and alternate vehicle responsible for the handling of EPWs as well as the transportation of the EPWs to the collection point designated in paragraph 4 of the troop/battalion OPORD. The prisoners are then evacuated to the rear for interrogation. HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR

8-285. The basic principles for handling EPWs are covered by the “fiveS” procedures: search, segregate, silence, speed, and safeguard. See Figure 8-53 for a summary of these procedures. In addition to these steps, the reconnaissance platoon leader must ensure that prisoners are tagged with all necessary information before they are transported to the rear; refer to the discussion later in this chapter.

Figure 8-53. The “Five-S” Principles for Handling EPWs

8-286. The senior officer or NCO on the scene is legally responsible for the care of EPWs. If the unit cannot evacuate a prisoner within a

8-88


reasonable time, he must be provided with food, water, and medical treatment.

8-287. The rights of EPWs have been established by international law, and the United States has agreed to obey these laws. Once a threat soldier shows he wants to surrender, he must be treated humanely. It is a court-martial offense to physically or mentally harm or mistreat an EPW or to needlessly expose him to fire. In addition, mistreated EPWs or those who receive special favors are not good interrogation subjects. 8-288. Scouts should never make the initial approach to a threat soldier. He may have a weapon hidden nearby, or he may be booby-trapped. To be safe, the scouts should gesture for him to come forward until it is clear that he is honestly surrendering and not trying to lure friendly troops into an ambush. They can use a thermal sight to locate possible ambushes. The scout who searches the prisoner should always have another friendly soldier cover him with a weapon. The searcher must not get between the threat soldier and the soldier covering him. 8-289. If an EPW is wounded and cannot be evacuated through medical channels, a combat lifesaver will treat the wounds and attempt to stabilize the prisoner. The supporting troop/battalion XO or 1SG will be notified of the prisoner’s status, and evacuation will be coordinated using other means. 8-290. Before evacuating the EPW, the platoon leader must ensure that a tag is attached to him listing all pertinent information and procedures. A copy of this tag is forwarded to higher headquarters. Tags may be obtained through supply channels or made from materials available on the battlefield. The tag should contain the following information:

· · · · · · · · · ·

Date of capture. Name of prisoner. Prisoner’s rank. Prisoner’s serial number. Prisoner’s date of birth. Prisoner’s unit. Location of capture. Capturing unit. Special circumstances of capture. List of weapons or documents in the prisoner’s possession at the time of capture.

CAPTURED THREAT DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

8-291. Captured threat documents (such as maps, orders, records, and photographs) and equipment are excellent sources of intelligence. If captured items are not handled properly, however, the information in them may be lost or delayed until it is useless. These items must be evacuated to the next level of command as rapidly as possible. 8-292. The platoon should tag each captured item. If the item is found in the EPW’s possession, include the prisoner’s name on the tag and give the item to the guard. The guard delivers the item with the EPW to the next 8-89

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higher headquarters. The captured items should be tagged with the following information:

· · · · ·

Type of item (such as document or piece of equipment). Date and time of capture. Location of capture. Capturing unit. Special circumstances of capture, including the names of EPWs in possession of the captured items.

CIVILIANS

8-293. Civilians who are captured as the result of curfew violations or suspicious actions are treated the same as EPWs. The platoon evacuates them quickly to higher headquarters using the “five-S” principles discussed earlier in this section. They should be tagged in the same manner as prisoners.

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Chapter 9

Essential Field Data This chapter includes information that will be useful to the reconnaissance platoon’s leaders and crewmen during execution of platoon missions. It covers TTP the platoon will need to conduct an effective route reconnaissance operation, in particular the tasks involved in route classification and inspection and classification of bridges. NOTE: For quick-reference information in other areas critical to reconnaissance platoon operations, refer to ST 3-20.983.

CONTENTS Route Reconnaissance Symbols ................ Route Classification .................................... Route Classification Overlay ............... Route Classification Formula .............. Examples of Route Classification Formula .............................................. Curve Calculations ...................................... Measuring Methods .............................. Curve Symbol ........................................ Series of Sharp Curves ........................ Slope Estimation .......................................... Slope Percentage .................................. Slope Symbol ........................................ Constrictions ................................................ Constriction Symbol ............................. Underpasses ......................................... Tunnels .................................................. Overhead Clearance ............................. Stream Reconnaissance ............................. Measurements ....................................... Preexisting Data .................................... Stream Width ......................................... Current Velocity .................................... Stream Approaches .............................. Ford Reconnaissance .................................. Ferry Reconnaissance ................................. Civil Ferries and Ferry Sites ................. Military Ferries and Rafting .................. Ferry Information .................................. Bridge Classifications and Reconnaissance ............................ Required Information ............................ Hasty Bridge Classification Techniques ........................................ AVLB Crossing Reconnaissance ........ Bridge Condition ................................... Weight and Height Restrictions ........... Bridge Traffic Control Procedures ...... Full NATO Bridge Symbol .................... Bypasses ...................................................... Measurement Conversions .........................

9-1 9-7 9-8 9-9 9-12 9-13 9-13 9-15 9-15 9-16 9-16 9-19 9-20 9-20 9-21 9-22 9-23 9-24 9-25 9-25 9-25 9-26 9-27 9-27 9-30 9-30 9-30 9-31 9-32 9-33 9-35 9-53 9-53 9-53 9-55 9-55 9-57 9-58

SECTION I – ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE SYMBOLS 9-1. Figure 9-1 outlines a variety of symbols that the platoon can use to illustrate reconnaissance data on its overlays. Figure 9-2 shows symbols for various materials, facilities, equipment, and services. An 9-1

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example of how these graphics are used in overlays is illustrated in Figure 9-3. The graphics in this section are adapted from information provided in FM 3-34.212 (FM 5-170).

Figure 9-1. Reconnaissance Overlay Symbols

9-2

_________________________________________________________ Chapter 9 – Essential Field Data

Figure 9-1. Reconnaissance Overlay Symbols (Continued)

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9-4



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9-6


Figure 9-2. Material, Facility, Equipment, and Service Symbols

SECTION II – ROUTE CLASSIFICATION 9-2. This section describes how to perform the technical aspects of a route reconnaissance. Route classification is a tool that helps a unit determine what vehicles can travel on a particular road network and how fast they can travel. The results of route reconnaissance are displayed on map overlays. During SSC operations, stability operations, and support operations, only the necessary and essential facts about a route are gathered. The goal is to assemble this information as quickly and safely as possible. (NOTE: This information is recorded on a route classification overlay and supplemented by additional reports.) During peacetime operations, detailed route classification missions are performed to obtain in-depth information for future use.

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ROUTE CLASSIFICATION OVERLAY 9-3. The first step in understanding the technical portions of a route reconnaissance is understanding what information is needed to complete a route classification overlay. This overlay graphically depicts a route’s entire network of roads, bridge sites, and other key locations and terrain features. (NOTE: These items are reconnoitered, and the data recorded as support documentation for the complete route.) A route classification gives specific details on what obstructions will slow down a convoy or maneuver force along the route. As a minimum, the following information will be included on the route classification overlay (see Figure 9-3 for an illustration of how the information is recorded on the overlay):

· ·

The route classification formula.

· · · ·

The unit conducting the classification.

The name, rank, and social security number (SSN) of the person in charge of performing the classification. The DTG showing when the classification was conducted. The map name, edition, and scale. Any remarks necessary to ensure complete understanding of the information on the overlay.

Figure 9-3. Route Classification Overlay

9-8


ROUTE CLASSIFICATION FORMULA 9-4.

A route classification must cover the primary route (such as a road, highway, street, or trail), as well as every alternate route on which movement can be made, to determine what type of vehicles and traffic load each specific portion of the route can handle. Routes are classified by obtaining, through the route reconnaissance, all pertinent information concerning trafficability and applying it to the route classification formula. The formula, which is recorded on the route classification overlay (see Figure 9-3), consists of the following elements (an example of these items follows this listing):

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Example:

(1) 5.5/

Route width, in meters. Route type (based on ability to withstand various types of weather conditions). Lowest military load classification (MLC). Lowest overhead clearance, in meters. Obstructions to traffic flow (OB), if applicable. Special conditions, such as snow blockage (T) or flooding (W). (2) Y/

(3) 30/

(4) 4.6

(5) (OB)

(6) (T or W)

ROUTE WIDTH

9-5. The route width is the narrowest width of traveled way on a route (see Figure 9-4). This narrow width may be the width of a bridge, a tunnel, a road, an underpass, or other constriction that limits the traveled way. The number of lanes is determined by the traveled-way width. The lane width normally required for wheeled vehicles is 3.5 meters; for tracked vehicles, this width is 4 meters.

Figure 9-4. Route Width

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9-6.

Based on the number of lanes, route width is classified as follows:

·

Limited access. This type of route permits passage of isolated vehicles of appropriate width in one direction only.

·

Single lane. A single-lane route permits use in only one direction at any one time. Passing or movement in the opposite direction is impossible.

·

Single flow. This route permits the passage of a column of vehicles and allows isolated vehicles to pass or travel in the opposite direction at predetermined points. It is preferable that such a route be at least 1.5 lanes wide.

·

Double flow. This route permits two columns of vehicles to proceed simultaneously. It must be at least two lanes wide.

ROUTE TYPE

9-7. The route type defines the ability of the route surface to withstand various types of weather. It is determined for the worst section of road on the entire route and is categorized as follows:

·

Type X. This is an all-weather route that, with reasonable maintenance, is passable throughout the year to a volume of traffic never appreciably less than its maximum capacity. This type of route is normally formed of roads having waterproof surfaces that are only slightly affected by rain, frost, thaw, or heat. This route is never closed because of weather effects other than snow or flood blockage.

·

Type Y. This is a limited, all-weather route that, with reasonable maintenance, is passable throughout the year but at times is limited to a volume of traffic considerably less than maximum capacity. This type of route is normally formed of roads that do not have waterproof surfaces and that are considerably affected by rain, frost, thaw, or heat. A type Y route is likely to be closed for short periods (up to one day at a time) by adverse weather conditions, during which heavy use of the road would probably lead to complete collapse.

·

Type Z. This type of route is passable only in fair weather. It is so seriously affected by adverse weather conditions that it may remain closed for long periods. Improvement of a type Z route is possible only through construction or realignment.

MILITARY LOAD CLASSIFICATION

9-8.

A route’s MLC number represents its safe load-carrying capacity and indicating the maximum vehicle class that the route can accept under normal conditions. Usually, the lowest bridge MLC (regardless of the vehicle type or conditions of traffic flow) determines the route’s MLC. If there is no bridge on the route, the worst section of road will determine the route’s overall classification. These are the broad MLC categories:

· · · 9-10

Class 50. This is an average-traffic route. Class 80. This is a heavy-traffic route. Class 120. This is a very heavy-traffic route.


9-9. When a unit’s vehicles have a higher MLC than the route, its first alternative may be to seek an alternate route. On the other hand, the unit may conduct additional reconnaissance of the roads within the original route to determine whether a change in traffic flow (such as single-flow crossing of a weak point) will permit heavier vehicles on the route. Whenever possible, the unit should ensure that the route network includes a number of heavy-traffic roads as well as average-traffic roads. This helps staff planners to manage heavy-traffic loads and to decrease the bottleneck effect. OVERHEAD CLEARANCE

9-10. The lowest overhead clearance is the vertical distance between the road surface and any overhead obstacle (power lines, overpasses, tunnels, and so forth) that denies the use of the road to some vehicles. Use the infinity symbol ( ) for unlimited clearance in the route classification formula. (NOTE: Any point along the route where the minimum overhead clearance is less than 4.3 meters is considered to be an obstruction.) ROUTE OBSTRUCTIONS

9-11. Route obstructions restrict the type, amount, or speed of traffic flow. They are indicated in the route classification formula by the abbreviation “OB.” The platoon must depict the exact nature of each obstruction it encounters on the route classification overlay. 9-12. Specific types of obstructions that the platoon may face on a route include the following:

·

Overhead obstructions with a clearance of less than 4.3 meters. Examples include tunnels, underpasses, overhead wires, and overhanging buildings.

·

Reductions in traveled-way widths that are below the standard minimums prescribed for the type of traffic flow (see Table 9-1 for examples). This category includes reductions caused by bridges, tunnels, craters, lanes through mined areas, projecting buildings, or rubble.

· ·

Slopes (gradients) of 7 percent or greater.

· ·

Ferries.

Curves with a radius of 25 meters and less. Curves with a radius between 25.1 and 45 meters are not considered to be obstructions; however, they must be recorded on the route reconnaissance overlay. Fords.

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Table 9-1. Traffic-Flow Capability Based on Route Width Limited Access

Single Lane

Single Flow

Double Flow

Wheeled vehicles

At least 3.5 m

3.5 to 5.5 m

5.5 to 7.3 m

Over 7.3 m

Tracked and combination vehicles

At least 4.0 m

4.0 to 6.0 m

6.0 to 8.0 m

Over 8 m

SNOW BLOCKAGE AND FLOODING

9-13. In cases where snow blockage is serious and is blocking traffic on a regular and recurrent basis, the symbol used in the route classification formula is “T.” When flooding is serious and is blocking traffic on a regular and recurrent basis, the symbol in the route classification formula is “W.”

EXAMPLES OF ROUTE CLASSIFICATION FORMULA 9-14. The following are examples illustrating the use of the route classification formula:

9-12

·

6.1m/Z/40/ . This is a fair-weather route (type Z) with a minimum traveled way of 6.1 meters, and an MLC of 40. Overhead clearance is unlimited ( ). There are no obstructions to traffic flow. Based on its minimum traveledway width, this route accommodates both wheeled and tracked, single-flow traffic without obstruction.

·

6.1m/Z/40/ (OB). This formula indicates a fair-weather route (type Z) similar to the previous example, except that there is an obstruction. This obstruction could consist of overhead clearances of less than 4.3 meters, grades of 7 percent or greater, curves with a radius of 25 meters and less, or fords and ferries. A traveled way of 6.1 meters limits this route to one-way traffic if there is no width obstruction. If the route is used for double-flow traffic, 6.1 meters of traveled way is considered an obstruction and is indicated in the formula as an obstruction.

·

7m/Y/50/4.6(OB). This limited, all-weather route (type Y) has a minimum traveled way of 7 meters, an MLC of 50, an overhead clearance of 4.6 meters, and an obstruction. This route width is not suitable for double-flow traffic (wheeled or tracked). This width constriction is indicated as OB in the route classification formula if the route is intended to be used for double-flow traffic.

·

10.5m/X/120/ (OB)(W). This formula shows an all-weather route (type X) with a minimum traveled-way width of 10.5 meters, which is suitable for two-way traffic of both wheeled and tracked vehicles. The route has an MLC of 120, unlimited overhead clearance, an obstruction, and regular, recurrent flooding.


SECTION III – CURVE CALCULATIONS 9-15. The speed at which vehicles move along a route is affected by sharp curves. Curves with a radius of 25 meters and less are obstructions to traffic and are indicated by the abbreviation “OB” in the route classification formula. Curves with a radius between 25.1 and 45 meters are recorded on the overlay but are not considered obstructions.

MEASURING METHODS 9-16. The platoon can use several methods to measure curves:

· · ·

Tape measure. Triangulation. Formula.

TAPE MEASURE METHOD

9-17. A quick way to estimate the radius of a sharp curve is by using a tape measure to find the radius (see Figure 9-5). Imagine the outer edge of the curve as the outer edge of a circle. Find (estimate) the center of this imaginary circle; then measure the radius using a tape measure. Start from the center of the circle and measure to the outside edge of the curve. The length of the tape measure from the center of the imaginary circle to its outer edge is the curve’s radius. This method is practical for curves located on relatively flat ground and having a radius of up to 15 meters.

Figure 9-5. Tape Measure Method TRIANGULATION METHOD

9-18. You can determine a curve’s approximate radius by “laying out” right triangles (3:4:5 proportion) at the point of curvature (PC) and point of tangency (PT) locations (see Figure 9-6). The intersection (o), which is formed by extending the legs of each triangle, represents the center of the circle. The distance (R) from point o to either point PC or PT represents the curve’s radius.

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Figure 9-6. Triangulation Method FORMULA METHOD

9-19. This method of determining the curve’s radius (illustrated in Figure 9-7) is based on the following formula (all measurements are in meters): R = (C2/8M) + (M/2) R = radius of the curve. C = the distance from the centerline of the road to the centerline of the road at the outer extremities of the curve. M = the perpendicular distance from the center of the tape to the centerline of the road. 9-20. Example: If C is 15 meters and M is fixed at 2 meters, the formula becomes the following: R = (152/16) + 2/2 = 15.0625 9-21. The result of this calculation (a radius of slightly more than 15 meters) would be an obstruction to traffic flow, and “OB” would be entered in the route classification formula. NOTE: When conditions warrant, set M at 2 meters from the centerline, then measure C 2 meters from the centerline. Use this method when there is a time limitation or when natural or man-made restrictions prevent proper measurements.

9-14


Figure 9-7. Formula Method

CURVE SYMBOL 9-22. Sharp curves with a radius of 45 meters or less are symbolically represented on maps or overlays by a triangle that points to the curve’s exact map location. In addition, the measured value (in meters) for the radius of curvature is written outside the triangle (as shown in the top drawing in Figure 9-8). All curves with a radius of 45 meters or less are reportable.

SERIES OF SHARP CURVES 9-23. A series of sharp curves is represented by two triangles, one drawn inside the other. The outer triangle points to the location of the first curve. The number of curves and the radius of curvature for the sharpest curve in the series are written to the outside of the triangle (bottom drawing in Figure 9-8).

Figure 9-8. Curve Symbols

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SECTION IV – SLOPE ESTIMATION 9-24. The rise and fall of the ground is known as the slope or gradient (grade). The percentage of the slope is used to describe the effect that inclines have on movement rates. It is the ratio of the change in elevation (the vertical distance divided by the horizontal ground distance) multiplied by 100 (see Figure 9-9). It is important to express the vertical distance and the horizontal distance in the same unit of measure. Slopes of 7 percent or greater affect the platoon’s movement speed along a route and are considered an obstruction. Record all slopes greater than 5 percent on the route classification overlay.

Figure 9-9. Formula for Slope Percentage

SLOPE PERCENTAGE 9-25. The following discussion focuses on four methods for determining the percent of slope. CLINOMETER METHOD

9-26. A clinometer is an instrument that directly measures percent of slope. It can be found in engineer survey units, as part of an artillery compass, and as part of an engineer platoon sketch set. Follow the instructions included with the instrument. PACE METHOD

9-27. The pace method is a quick way to estimate percent of slope. The first step in using this method is to accurately determine the height and pace of each soldier of a reconnaissance team. As a rule of thumb, the eye level of the average soldier is 1.75 meters above the ground. The pace of the average soldier is 0.75 meter. Determine the percent of slope using these steps:

· ·

9-16

Stand at the bottom of the slope with head and eyes level. Sight a spot on the slope. This spot should be easily identifiable. If it is not, another member of the team should go forward to mark the location.


·

Walk forward and stand on the marked spot. Record the number of paces. Repeat this procedure until you reach the top of the slope (estimate fractions of an eye level).

·

Compute the vertical distance by multiplying the number of sightings by the eye-level height (1.75 meters). Compute the horizontal distance by totaling the number of paces and converting them to meters by multiplying by 0.75 (or the known pace-to-meter conversion factor).

·

Calculate the percent of slope by substituting the values into the percent-of-slope formula (see Figure 9-10). Because this method considers horizontal ground distance and incline distance as equal, you can obtain reasonable accuracy only for slopes of less than 30 percent. This method requires practice to achieve acceptable accuracy. A line level and string can be used to train this method.

Figure 9-10. Pace Method for Percent of Slope MAP METHOD

9-28. The platoon can use a large-scale map (such as 1:50,000) to estimate the percent of slope quickly. After identifying the slope on the map, find the difference in elevations between the top and bottom of the slope by reading the elevation contours or spot elevation; then measure and convert the horizontal distance (usually road distance) to the same unit of measurement as the elevation difference. Substitute the vertical and horizontal distances in the percent-of-slope formula as shown in Figure 9-11.

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Figure 9-11. Map Method for Percent of Slope ANGLE OF SLOPE METHOD

9-29. The angle of slope method is a quick way to estimate the percent of slope. The angle of slope is first measured by using an elevation quadrant, aiming circle, M2 compass, or binoculars with a standard reticle. If the instrument used to take the angle of measurement is mounted above ground level, the sighting must be taken a corresponding, and equal, distance higher on the slope to compensate for the height difference. (NOTE: This corresponding distance is the height of the instrument above the ground.) You must take the angle of measurement at the base of the slope. Once you obtain the angle of measurement, consult Table 9-2 and enter the column corresponding to the measured angle of slope. You can then read the percent of slope directly from the table. Figure 9-12 illustrates this method.

9-18


Table 9-2. Conversion of Degrees and Mils to Percent of Slope DEGREES OF SLOPE

MILS OF SLOPE

PERCENT OF SLOPE

1

18

1.7

2

36

3.5

3

53

5.2

4

71

7.0

5

89

8.7

10

175

17.6

15

267

26.7

20

356

36.4

25

444

46.6

30

533

57.7

35

622

70.0

40

711

83.9

45

800

100.0

50

889

108.7

55

978

117.6

60

1,067

126.7

Figure 9-12. Angle of Slope Method for Percent of Slope

SLOPE SYMBOL 9-30. Most vehicles will be slowed when they must negotiate slopes of 7 percent or greater for a significant distance. Such slope characteristics must be accurately reported. The symbols illustrated in Figure 9-13 are used to represent various slope percentages.

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Figure 9-13. Percent-of-Slope Symbols

9-31. A single arrowhead along the trace of a route pointing in the uphill direction indicates a grade of at least 5 percent but less than 7 percent. Two arrowheads represent a grade of at least 7 percent but less than 10 percent. Three arrowheads represent a grade of at least 10 percent but less than 14 percent. Four arrowheads represent a grade of 14 percent or more. As noted previously, no symbol is required for slopes of less than 5 percent. 9-32. The percent of slope is written to the right of the arrow. When the map scale permits, the length of the arrow shaft will be drawn to map scale to represent the approximate length of the grade. NOTE: Slopes of 7 percent or greater are obstructions to traffic flow and are indicated by the abbreviation “OB” in the route classification formula.

SECTION V – CONSTRICTIONS 9-33. Reductions in the traveled-way width, known as constrictions, include narrow streets in built-up areas, drainage ditches, embankments, and war damage. Constrictions may limit vehicle movement; therefore, the physical dimensions of the vehicles that will be using the route must be known and considered when conducting the route classification.

CONSTRICTION SYMBOL 9-34. Constrictions that reduce the traveled-way width to below minimum requirements are depicted on maps and overlays by two opposing shaded triangles. The width of the usable traveled way (in meters) is written next to the left triangle. The length of the constriction (in meters) is written next to the right triangle (see Figure 9-14).

9-20


Figure 9-14. Route Constriction Symbol

NOTE: Constrictions of traveled-way widths below the minimum standard for the type and flow of traffic are obstructions; they are indicated by the symbol “OB” in the route classification formula.

UNDERPASSES 9-35. An underpass is depicted on a map or overlay by a symbol that depicts the structure’s ceiling. The symbol is drawn over the route at the map location of the underpass. The width (in meters) is written to the left of the underpass symbol, and the overhead clearance (in meters) is written to the right of the underpass symbol (see Figure 9-15).

Figure 9-15. Underpass Symbols

9-36. If sidewalks permit emergency passage of wider vehicles, the sidewalks are symbolically represented. The traveled-way width is recorded first, followed by a slash, then the structure’s total width, including sidewalks.

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NOTE: Features that result in a decrease in overhead clearance, such as arched ceilings or irregularities in ceilings, must be noted. In such cases, an extension of width does not necessarily mean that the structure will accommodate wider vehicles. 9-37. Both minimum and maximum overhead clearances, if different,

will be recorded. The minimum will be recorded first, followed by a slash, then the maximum overhead clearance.

TUNNELS 9-38. A tunnel is a section of roadway along the route that is either artificially covered (such as a covered bridge or a snowshed) or underground. A tunnel reconnaissance determines essential information such as the serial number, location, type, length, width (including sidewalks), bypasses, alignment, gradient, and cross section. A tunnel consists of a bore, a tunnel liner, and a portal. TUNNEL BORE TYPES

9-39. Common shapes of tunnel bores are semicircular, elliptical, horseshoe, and square with an arched ceiling (see Figure 9-16).

Figure 9-16. Types of Tunnel Bores TUNNEL SYMBOL

9-40. Basic tunnel information is recorded on maps or overlays using symbols (as shown in Figure 9-17). The location of the tunnel entrance is shown by an arrow from the symbol to the location of the entrance. For long tunnels (more than 30.5 meters), both tunnel entrance locations are indicated. 9-41. For later reference purposes, each tunnel on a particular map or overlay is assigned a serial number. (NOTE: Check for an existing fixed serial number on the actual tunnel or map sheet; if there is no serial

9-22


number, assign a number based on unit SOP.) Serial numbers are not duplicated on any one map sheet, overlay, or document. The number is recorded inside the symbol. The traveled-way width is shown in meters and is recorded below the symbol.

Figure 9-17. Tunnel Symbols

9-42. If sidewalks permit the emergency passage of wider vehicles, they are symbolically represented. The traveled-way width is written first, followed by a slash, then the total width including the sidewalks. NOTE: Structures with arched or irregular ceilings will decrease overhead clearance. An extension of width does not necessarily mean that the structure will accommodate wider vehicles.

OVERHEAD CLEARANCE 9-43. Overhead clearance is the shortest distance between the surface of a traveled way and any obstruction vertically above it. The measurement of overhead clearance must be accurate. Figures 9-18 and 9-19 show methods and considerations for obtaining these measurements.

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Figure 9-18. Overhead Clearance Measurements

Figure 9-19. Overhead Clearance in Tunnels

SECTION VI – STREAM RECONNAISSANCE 9-44. A stream crossing site is a location at a body of water where vehicles can “swim” across and not touch the bottom. Identify and report locations that permit smooth traffic flow and reduce route obstructions as much as possible. When conducting reconnaissance of a stream crossing area, record the stream’s depth, width, approaches, velocities, and natural and man-made obstacles (see Figure 9-20).

9-24


Figure 9-20. Dimensions Required for Streams

MEASUREMENTS 9-45. Stream depth is usually measured using field-expedient devices such as poles or weighted ropes. Measure the depth every 3 meters along the planned stream crossing route. Recheck depths and currents frequently during inclement weather. Sudden, heavy rainfall may turn a sluggish stream or river into a torrent very quickly, particularly in tropical and arid regions. Monitor weather reports of the surrounding area. Storms occurring miles away can cause flash flooding. Always consider the importance of upstream dams and locks that may cause elevated levels or flooding when opened or destroyed. (NOTE: When there is little time for reconnaissance, the actual measured depth should be recorded as the normal depth.)

PREEXISTING DATA 9-46. In developed areas of the world, special water navigation maps containing data on specific bodies of water are available through government agencies. The S2 can obtain copies of such maps. When using these maps, however, check the actual site whenever possible; there is no substitute for in-person reconnaissance.

STREAM WIDTH 9-47. Determine stream width using one of several available methods: the compass method; an aiming circle, azimuth indicator, or alidade; the GPS; or a direct measurement. COMPASS METHOD

9-48. In this method, use a compass to take an azimuth from a point on the near shore, close to the water’s edge, to a point on the opposite shore, also close to the water’s edge (as illustrated in Figure 9-21). On the near shore, establish another point that is on a line with and at a right angle to the azimuth selected. The azimuth to the same point on the far shore is + or - 45 degrees (800 mils) from the previous azimuth. Measure the distance between the two points on the near shore. This distance is equal to the distance across the stream.

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Figure 9-21. Measuring Stream Width with a Compass AIMING CIRCLE, AZIMUTH INDICATOR, OR ALIDADE

9-49. Use an aiming circle, azimuth indicator, or alidade to measure the angle between two points that are a known distance apart on the near shore and a third point directly across the river from one of these points (see Figure 9-22). Using trigonometric relationships, compute the distance across the stream.

Figure 9-22. Measuring Stream Width with a Surveying Instrument GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM

9-50. In this method, calculate the distance using two known grid points taken from the GPS. DIRECT MEASUREMENT

9-51. Measure short gaps with a tape measure or a dark rope that is accurately measured and marked.

CURRENT VELOCITY 9-52. Current velocity varies in different parts of a stream. Velocity is

usually slower near the shore and faster in the main channel. Perform the following procedure to determine stream velocity:

· ·

Measure a distance along a riverbank.

·

Record the time it takes for the object to travel the measured distance. Repeat the procedure at least three times. Use the average time of the test in the following formula (also illustrated in Figure 9-23) to determine the stream’s velocity:

Throw a light, floating object (not affected by the wind) into the stream.

Stream velocity (in meters per second) = measured distance (in meters) divided by average time (in seconds)

9-26


Figure 9-23. Measuring Stream Velocity

STREAM APPROACHES 9-53. Gently sloping stream approaches are desirable for fording and swimming operations. Slope is expressed in percentage. Slope-climbing capability must be considered for the vehicles that are expected to ford/swim the stream. This information is found on the vehicle’s data plate or dash plate or in the vehicle’s technical manual (TM). When considering slope-climbing capability, consider the degrading effects of weather, the condition of the vehicle’s tires or tracks, and the condition of the ground surface of both sides of the stream. 9-54. The platoon should avoid the following obstacles during stream crossing operations:

· ·

High, vertical banks.

·

Debris and floating objects such as logs and brush, poles, or floating objects with wire attached that could foul propellers and suspension systems.

·

Ice crusts.

Mines and booby traps that are located at the entrance and exit points or at likely approaches to the stream; that are submerged in the stream itself; or that are attached to poles or floating logs.

SECTION VII – FORD RECONNAISSANCE 9-55. A ford is a location in a water barrier where the current, bottom,

and approaches allow personnel, vehicles, and other equipment to cross while remaining in contact with the bottom during the crossing. Fords are obstructions to traffic flow and are shown by the abbreviation “OB” in the route classification formula.

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9-56. During high-water periods, low-water bridges are easily confused with paved fords because both are completely submerged. It is important to know the difference between this type of bridge and a paved ford because of corresponding military load limitations. 9-57. Fords are classified according to their crossing potential (or

trafficability) for pedestrians or vehicles. Fordable depths for vehicular traffic can be increased by providing suitable waterproofing and by adding deep-water fording kits. These kits permit fording depths up to an average of 4.3 meters. Check vehicle TMs for further fording information.

9-58. Record the composition of the approaches. They may be paved or covered with mat or track materials, but they are usually unimproved. The composition and the slope of the approaches to a ford should be carefully noted to determine the trafficability after fording vehicles saturate the surface material of the approaches. Identify the ford’s left and right approaches when looking downstream. 9-59. Record the current velocity and the presence of debris to determine their effect, if any, on the ford’s condition and trafficability. Estimate the current velocity using the following categories:

· · ·

Swift (more than 1.5 meters per second). Moderate (1 to 1.5 meters per second). Slow (less than 1 meter per second).

9-60. The composition of the ford’s stream bottom largely determines its trafficability. It is important to determine whether the bottom is composed of sand, gravel, silt, clay, or rock and in what proportions. Record whether the ford’s natural river bottom has been improved to increase the load-bearing capacity or to reduce the water depth. Improved fords may have gravel, macadam, or concrete surfacing; layers of sandbags; metal screening or matting; or timber (corduroy) planking. Determine if material is available nearby that can be used to improve the ford. Record limited ford information, such as the following, on maps or overlays using symbols as illustrated in Figure 9-24:

·

Use an arrow to show the ford’s geographic location from the symbol to the ford location on a map or overlay. The symbol is drawn on either side of the stream.

·

Assign a serial number to each ford for reference (if the map sheet has a preassigned serial number, use it). Follow the unit’s SOP in assigning serial numbers. They must not be duplicated within any one map sheet, overlay, or document.

·

Use the letters “V” for vehicular or “P” for pedestrian to show the ford type. The type of ford is determined by bottom conditions, width, and water depth. Approaches are not considered in determining the ford type.

·

Express the stream’s normal velocity in meters per second. Following the stream-velocity notation, list any seasonal limitations, summarizing the factors with these letters: n

9-28

X. No seasonal limitations except for sudden flooding of limited duration (such as flash floods).


n

Y. Serious, regular, or recurrent flooding or snow blockage. (NOTE: If the “Y” symbol is used, the route type in the route-classification formula automatically becomes type Z.)

·

List the length of the ford, in meters; this is the distance from the near to far shores. Also list the width of the ford, which is the traveled-way width of the ford’s bottom.

·

Indicate the nature of the bottom by the most appropriate letter symbol: n

M. Mud.

n

C. Clay.

n

S. Sand.

n

G. Gravel.

n

R. Rock.

n

P. Artificial paving.

·

Express the normal depth of the ford, in meters. This is the depth of water at the deepest point. During a hasty reconnaissance, the actual water depth, as measured, is used.

·

Label the stream’s left and right banks, as determined looking downstream. Imagine yourself in the middle of the stream and looking downstream. Your left arm would indicate the left bank and the right arm the right bank. In drawing this portion of the symbol, pay attention to the direction of the stream flow. Irregular lines placed on the corresponding side of the basic symbol show a difficult approach.

9-61. All elements of the ford symbol are separated by slashes. If you do not know or cannot determine any item of the ford symbol, substitute a question mark for the required information.

Figure 9-24. Ford Symbols

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SECTION VIII – FERRY RECONNAISSANCE 9-62. Ferries are considered obstructions to traffic flow and are indicated by the abbreviation “OB” in the route classification formula. Ferryboat construction varies widely and ranges from expedient rafts to ocean-going vessels. Ferries differ in physical appearance and capacity depending upon the waterway’s width, depth, and current and the characteristics of the traffic to be moved. Ferries may be propelled by oars; cable and pulleys; poles; the stream current; or steam, gasoline, or diesel engines.

CIVIL FERRIES AND FERRY SITES 9-63. The capacity of a civil ferryboat is normally expressed in tons and its capacity (total number of passengers and/or vehicles, as well as cargo). In addition, it is often assigned an MLC number. Because ferries vary in capacity, be sure to record the capacity of each ferry when more than one is used at a given site. 9-64. Ferry slips (or piers) are usually provided on each shore to permit easy loading of passengers, cargo, and vehicles. The slips may range from simple log piers to elaborate terminal buildings. A distinguishing characteristic of a ferry slip is often the floating pier that adjusts, with changes in the water depth, to the height of the ferryboat. 9-65. Approach routes to ferry installations have an important bearing on use of the ferry. Reconnoitering and recording the conditions of the approaches (including the load-carrying capacity of landing facilities) is very important. 9-66. Limiting characteristics of ferry sites that should be considered include the following:

· ·

Width of the water barrier from bank to bank.

· ·

Depth of the water at each ferry slip.

Distance and time required for the ferryboat to travel from one bank to the other. Factors influencing the possible defense of each landing site.

9-67. Climatic conditions affect ferry operations. The platoon must consider data on tide fluctuations, freezing periods, floods, excessive dry spells, and their effects on ferry operations. For example, fog and ice substantially reduce the total traffic-moving capacity of the water route and increase the danger associated with movement across the water.

MILITARY FERRIES AND RAFTING 9-68. Reconnaissance personnel will be required to locate and report suitable sites for military rafting or ferrying operations. Military floating bridges are currently available for such operations. Desirable site characteristics include the following:

· ·

9-30

Current velocity between 0 and 1.6 meters per second. Banks that preparation.

permit

loading

without

a

great

deal

of


· · · · · ·

Approaches that permit easy access and egress.

· · ·

Suitable raft-construction sites (dependent on type of raft).

Strong, natural holdfasts. Sites with no shoals, sandbars, or snags. Sites clear of obstacles immediately downstream. Sites clear of mines and booby traps. Sites with sufficient depth to prevent grounding of the raft or ferry during loading, unloading, or crossing operations. Holding areas for vehicles awaiting passage. A suitable road network to support crossing traffic.

FERRY INFORMATION 9-69. Record limited ferry information on maps or overlays by using the symbol shown in Figure 9-25. Refer to Figure 9-26 for examples of completed ferry symbols. Ferry information includes the following:

·

Use an arrow to connect the ferry symbol to the geographic location of the ferry on a map or overlay. The symbol may be drawn on the map or overlay on either side of the stream.

·

Assign a serial number to each ferry, using unit SOP, for later reference. Numbers must not be duplicated within any one map sheet, overlay, or document. Some maps will already show a ferry serial number; if so, use this number for the reconnaissance.

·

Identify the type of ferry, listing “V” for vehicular or “P” for pedestrian after the serial number. If the ferry can haul vehicles, it can also haul pedestrians.

·

List the deck’s MLC in the bottom left box of the symbol. Most ferries have this information on their data plate.

·

List the dead-weight capacity of the ferry. This is the MLC plus the actual weight of the ferry, in short tons.

·

Show turnaround time, in minutes, required to cross the waterway, unload, and return.

9-70. When drawing the approach condition portion of the symbol, pay attention to the direction of stream flow. Left and right banks are determined by looking downstream. Approach conditions are determined in the same manner as for fords. Use irregular lines on the corresponding side of the basic symbol to show a difficult approach.

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Figure 9-25. Basic Ferry Symbol

Figure 9-26. Sample Ferry Symbols

SECTION IX – BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION AND RECONNAISSANCE 9-71. Commanders must conduct a bridge reconnaissance to ensure that they know the load-carrying capabilities of each bridge are along a specific certain route and/or to determine what material is needed to destroy a bridge. 9-72. This section reviews the basics of hasty bridge load classification procedures and reconnaissance procedures for bridge destruction. It will help vehicle operators to avoid bridge failure by outlining procedures for determining what vehicles can cross a bridge without causing damage. Vehicle operators may cross without restrictions if their vehicle’s load class (including the load) is less than or equal to the bridge’s load class. The vehicle’s load class can be found in the appropriate TM. 9-73. Common types of bridges that the platoon may encounter include the following (see Figure 9-27 for an illustration of bridges, by span type):

· · 9-32

Timber or steel trestle bridge with timber deck. Steel stringer bridge with concrete deck.


· · ·

Concrete-steel stringer bridge. Concrete T-beam bridge with asphalt surface. Masonry arch bridge.

REQUIRED INFORMATION 9-74. To classify a bridge, you must acquire the necessary information concerning the bridge’s basic components, including the following:

·

Approaches (the portions of a route leading to a bridge). Approaches may be mined or booby-trapped, requiring thorough investigation during a reconnaissance.

·

Substructure (lower part of a bridge). The substructure consists of the abutments and intermediate supports that transfer the bridge’s load to the ground. It is important to measure all aspects of an abutment, including its height, width, and length; the abutment wings; and the intermediate supports for bridge demolition missions. It may be more feasible to destroy the intermediate supports or abutments when compared to the rest of the bridge structure.

·

Superstructure (upper part of a bridge). The superstructure consists of the following components (see Figure 9-28): n

Stringers. These rest on and span the distance between the intermediate supports or abutments. Stringers are the superstructure’s main load-carrying members. They receive the load from the flooring and the vehicles and transfer it to the substructure.

n

Flooring system. This often consists of both decking and tread. The decking is laid directly over the stringers at right angles to the centerline of the bridge. The tread is laid parallel to the centerline of the bridge and between the curbs.

n

Curbs. These are placed at both edges of the flooring to guide the vehicles. A vehicle with an axle that is wider than the traveled-way width (between the curbs) cannot cross the bridge. Most bridges, however, allow for vehicular overhang beyond the normal traveled area. This allowance is called horizontal clearance above the curbs and is a safety factor. Commanders must perform a risk analysis before attempting such a crossing.

n

Railings. These are located along the bridge to guide drivers and to protect vehicular and foot traffic.

n

Trusses. These are used in some bridge superstructures, either above or below the traveled way, to increase the load-carrying capacity. A truss is a structural element made of several members joined together to form a series of triangles.

n

Number of members in each span. This is noted where applicable (for example, for stringer bridges and concrete

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T-beam bridges). Exact dimensions of specific bridge members are taken as outlined later in this section. n

Span length. This is measured from center to center of the supports. The bridge’s classification is usually based on the weakest span. If the weakest span is apparent, no other spans need to be reconnoitered. If the weakest span is difficult or impossible to locate, however, all spans must be classified. Even if several spans look identical, actual measurements should be taken to prevent error.

n

Traveled-way width. This is measured between the inside faces of the curbs. On a truss bridge, however, the horizontal clearance is measured from a point 1.21 meters (4 feet) above the roadway.

NOTE: Figure 9-27 illustrates various types of bridges, by span type, that the platoon may encounter. Figure 9-28 shows components of the bridge superstructure.

9-34


Figure 9-27. Typical Bridges (by Type of Span)

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Figure 9-28. Bridge Components

HASTY BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES 9-75. In wartime, the platoon will sometimes have to cross underclass bridges. To determine whether the bridge can be crossed safely, assess it using the following considerations:

9-36

· ·

Is there a data plate on the side of or underneath the bridge?

·

If the bridge fails, will the vehicle fall a distance not exceeding its own length? The risk is minimized if the drop is shallow enough that the vehicle can be easily retrieved and the crew can avoid serious injury.

·

What does the bridge span? If it spans a railroad track or a highway, the risk of crossing is probably too great. If the bridge crosses a stream, small ravine, or creek, however, it may be worth the risk to attempt a crossing.

Can the unit’s largest vehicle cross with at least two of the bridge supports under it? (See Figure 9-29.)


Figure 9-29. BFV Crossing a Bridge with Two Supports under It

9-76. If the risk is acceptable, the senior member of the crossing element should observe the bridge while the first vehicle crosses. If the first vehicle causes no visible damage to the bridge, subsequent vehicles should cross one at a time, in the center of the bridge, at a constant speed, and without stopping or accelerating. An observer should watch each vehicle from the side of the bridge to detect any sign of bridge damage. 9-77. The following discussion focuses on hasty bridge classification techniques for MLC 30 and MLC 70 bridges. CONCRETE SLAB MLC 30 BRIDGE

9-78. Before crossing a concrete slab MLC 30 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.

Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? If the answer to both of these questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to either question is no, do not cross.

Step 2.

Measure the span length and deck thickness (as illustrated in Figure 9-30). Compare the span length and deck thickness to minimum standards using Table 3. Does the slab meet minimum deck thickness for the corresponding span? If the answer is yes, it safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.

Table 9-3. Measurement Correlations for a Concrete Slab MLC 30 Bridge SPAN LENGTH

MINIMUM DECK THICKNESS

30 feet

18 inches

20 feet

13 inches

10 feet

8 inches

Step 3.

Take into account the following special condition: For each foot under the closest higher span length shown, the deck thickness can decrease by no more than ½

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inch. Does the slab meet minimum deck thickness required according to this special condition? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Figure 9-30. Concrete Slab MLC 30 Bridge CONCRETE T-BEAM MLC 30 BRIDGE

9-79. Before crossing a concrete T-beam MLC 30 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:

9-38

Step 1.

Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is the deck at least 6 inches thick? If the answer to all three questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to any question is no, do not cross.

Step 2.

Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and depth of the stringer (as illustrated in Figure 9-31). Is the stringer spacing no less than 6 feet and no more than 8 feet? If the answer is yes, go to step 3; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Step 3.

Does the stringer depth meet the minimum dimension for the corresponding span length shown in Table 9-4? (NOTE: If the span length falls between designated lengths, use the next higher value.) If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.


Table 9-4. Measurement Correlations for a Concrete T-beam MLC 30 Bridge SPAN LENGTH

MINIMUM STRINGER DEPTH

20 feet

15 inches

30 feet

20 inches

40 feet

25 inches

50 feet

30 inches

60 feet

35 inches

70 feet

40 inches

80 feet

44 inches

90 feet

50 inches

100 feet

57 inches

Figure 9-31. Concrete T-beam MLC 30 Bridge MASONRY ARCH MLC 30 BRIDGE

9-80. Before crossing a masonry arch MLC 30 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.

Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? If the answer to both questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to either question is no, do not cross.

Step 2.

Measure the span length, arch ring, and fill (as shown in Figure 9-32). Compare these measurements to minimum standards using Table 9-5. Do the arch ring and fill meet minimum required dimensions for the designated span? If the answer is yes, it safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.

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Table 9-5. Measurement Correlations for a Masonry Arch MLC 30 Bridge SPAN LENGTH

MINIMUM ARCH RING

10 feet

9 inches

None

15 feet

9 inches

6 inches

20 feet

9 inches

12 inches

30 feet

13.5 inches

18 inches

40 feet

18 inches

12 inches

50 feet

22.5 inches

12 inches

Step 3.

MINIMUM FILL

Take into account the following special condition: Fill can be reduced if the thickness of the arch ring exceeds the specifications above. Compare these measurements using Table 9-6. Does the bridge span meet the minimum fill requirements for the corresponding arch ring thickness according to this special condition? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-6. Special Conditions for Minimum Fill on a Masonry Arch MLC 30 Bridge

SPAN LENGTH

FOR EACH 1-INCH INCREASE ABOVE THE MINIMUM ARCH RING, FILL CAN DECREASE BY:

15 feet

3 inches

20 feet

2-2/3 inches

30 feet

2-2/3 inches

40 feet

1-1/3 inches

50 feet

2-2/3 inches

Figure 9-32. Masonry Arch MLC 30 Bridge

9-40


STEEL STRINGER MLC 30 BRIDGE WITH CONCRETE DECK

9-81. Before crossing a steel stringer MLC 30 bridge with a concrete deck, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.

Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is the deck at least 5 inches and no more than 8 inches thick? If the answer to all three questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to any question is no, do not cross.

Step 2.

Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (as illustrated in Figure 9-33). Using Table 9-7, find the row and column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between the values given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the stringer meet the minimum requirements for overall height and width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-7. Measurement Correlations for a Steel Stringer MLC 30 Bridge with Concrete Deck 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN

STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches)

8-FOOT STRINGER SECTION

24-1/4 x9

24-1/8 x9

17-3/4 x 6-5/8

16-3/4 x 6-1/2

15 x 5-7/8


24-1/8 x9

24 x7

16 x 8-1/2

15-3/4 x 6-1/8

14 x6


21-1/4 x 8-1/4

18-1/4 x7

16-3/4 x 6-1/2

15 x 5-7/8

13-3/8 x 5-3/8


18-1/4 x7

16-1/4 x 7-1/8

15 x 5-7/8

14 x 5-1/2

12 x5

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Figure 9-33. Steel Stringer MLC 30 Bridge with Concrete Deck TIMBER/STEEL TRESTLE MLC 30 BRIDGE

9-82. Before crossing a timber/steel trestle MLC 30 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.

Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is the deck at least 8 inches thick (for 6-foot stringer sections) or at least 6 inches thick (for stringer sections of 4 feet of less)? If the answer to all three questions is yes, go to step 2 for a timber trestle bridge or step 3 for a steel trestle bridge. If the answer to any question is no, do not cross.

Step 2.

For a timber trestle bridge, measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (refer to Figure 9-34). Using Table 9-8, find the row and column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between the values given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the timber stringer meet the minimum requirements for overall height and width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-8. Measurement Correlations for a Timber Trestle MLC 30 Bridge 20-FOOT SPAN

15-FOOT SPAN

10-FOOT SPAN


9-42


22 x 8

18 x 8

16 x 6


20 x 8

16 x 8

14 x 6


16 x 8

14 x 8

12 x 6


Step 3.

For a steel trestle bridge, measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (refer to Figure 9-34). Using Table 9-9, find the row and column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between the values given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the steel stringer meet the minimum requirements for overall height and width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-9. Measurement Correlations for a Steel Trestle MLC 30 Bridge 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN



24 x 7-3/8

24 x7

18-1/8 x 7-1/2

15 x 5-7/8

14-1/8 x 5-5/8


24 x7

22 x7

15 x 5-7/8

14-1/8 x 5-5/8

14 x 5-1/2


20 x 6-1/2

18 x6

14 x 5-1/2

13 x5

10 x5

Figure 9-34. Timber/Steel Trestle MLC 30 Bridge COMPOSITE STEEL-CONCRETE STRINGER MLC 30 BRIDGE

9-83. Before crossing a composite steel-concrete stringer MLC 30 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.

Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is the deck at least 5 inches thick? If the answer to all

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three questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to any question is no, do not cross. Step 2.

Inspect the stringer to see if there is a plate on the bottom. There are three possible configurations: no plate, a plate one-half or less the thickness of the flange, or a plate more than one-half the thickness of the flange. Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (as illustrated in Figure 9-35). Using one of the tables included here, find the row and column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: Use Table 9-10 for no plate, Table 9-11 for a plate one-half or less the thickness of the flange, or Table 9-12 for a plate more than one-half the thickness of the flange. If the span length or stringer spacing falls between the values given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the stringer meet the overall height and width requirements for its corresponding span length, stringer spacing, and plate status? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 30 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Figure 9-35. Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 30 Bridge

Table 9-10. Measurement Correlations for a Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 30 Bridge (with No Plate) 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN


9-44


33-1/8 x 11-1/2

27-1/8 x 10

23-7/8 x9

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


30-1/8 x 10-1/2

26-7/8 x 10

21-1/4 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


30 x 10-1/2

24-1/8 x9

18-1/4 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


26-3/4 x 10

21-1/4 x 8-1/4

18-1/8 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


Table 9-11. Measurement Correlations for a Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 30 bridge (with a Plate One-Half or Less the Thickness of the Flange) 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN

STRINGER HEIGHT x WIDTH (inches) 10-FOOT STRINGER SECTION

30-1/8 x 10-1/2

26-7/8 x 10

21-1/4 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


30 x 10-1/2

24-1/8 x 9-1/8

21-1/8 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


27-1/8 x 10

24-1/8 x9

21 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


26-3/4 x 10

21-1/8 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

Table 9-12. Measurement Correlations for a Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 30 Bridge (with a Plate More than One-Half the Thickness of the Flange) 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN


30 x 10-1/2

24-1/4 x 9-1/8

21-1/4 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


29-7/8 x 10-1/2

24-1/4 x 9-1/8

21-1/8 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


27-1/8 x 10

23-7/8 x9

18-1/4 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


24-1/8 x9

21-1/8 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

CONCRETE SLAB MLC 70 BRIDGE

9-84. Before crossing a concrete slab MLC 70 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.


Step 2.

Measure the span length and deck thickness (refer to Figure 9-36). Compare the span length and deck thickness to minimum standards using Table 9-13. Does the slab meet minimum deck thickness for the corresponding span? If the answer is yes, it safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.

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Table 9-13. Measurement Correlations for a Concrete Slab MLC 70 Bridge SPAN LENGTH

MINIMUM DECK THICKNESS

30 feet

22 inches

20 feet

17 inches

10 feet

12 inches

Step 3.

Take into account the following special condition: For each foot under the closest higher span length shown the deck thickness can decrease by no more than ½ inch. Does the slab meet minimum deck thickness required according to this special condition? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Figure 9-36. Concrete Slab MLC 70 Bridge CONCRETE T-BEAM MLC 70 BRIDGE

9-85. Before crossing a concrete T-beam MLC 70 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross:

9-46

Step 1.


Step 2.

Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and depth of the stringer (as illustrated in Figure 9-37). Is the stringer spacing no less than 6 feet and no more than 8 feet? If the answer is yes, go to step 3; if the answer is no, do not cross.


Step 3.

Does the stringer depth meet the minimum dimension for the corresponding span length in Table 9-14? (NOTE: If the span length falls between designated lengths, use the next higher value.) If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-14. Measurement Correlations for a Concrete T-beam MLC 70 Bridge SPAN LENGTH

MINIMUM STRINGER DEPTH

20 feet

20 inches

30 feet

26 inches

40 feet

32 inches

50 feet

39 inches

60 feet

45 inches

70 feet

50 inches

80 feet

55 inches

90 feet

61 inches

100 feet

66 inches

Figure 9-37. Concrete T-beam MLC 70 Bridge MASONRY ARCH MLC 70 BRIDGE

9-86. Before crossing a masonry arch MLC 70 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.


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Step 2.

Measure the span length, arch ring, and fill (as shown in Figure 9-38). Compare these measurements to minimum standards using Table 9-15. Do the arch ring and fill meet minimum required dimensions for the designated span? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, go to step 3.

Table 9-15. Measurement Correlations for a Masonry Arch MLC 70 Bridge SPAN LENGTH

MINIMUM ARCH RING

MINIMUM FILL

10 feet

9 inches

6 inches

15 feet

9 inches

12 inches

20 feet

9 inches

24 inches

30 feet

13.5 inches

24 inches

40 feet

18 inches

24 inches

50 feet

22.5 inches

24 inches

Step 3.

Take into account the following special condition: Fill can be reduced if the thickness of the arch ring exceeds the specifications above. Compare these measurements using Table 9-16. Does the bridge span meet the minimum fill requirements for the corresponding arch ring thickness according to this special condition? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-16. Special Conditions for Minimum Fill on a Masonry Arch MLC 70 Bridge SPAN LENGTH 10 feet 15 feet 20 feet

FOR EACH 1-INCH INCREASE ABOVE THE MINIMUM ARCH RING, FILL CAN DECREASE BY: Not applicable; fill must be no less than 6 inches 1-1/4 inches If arch rings are 9 to 13.5 inches thick, fill can decrease by 2-1/2 inches (total) If arch rings are more than 13.5 inches thick, fill can decrease by 1-1/4 inches per inch above minimum

30 feet

If arch rings are 13.5 to 18 inches thick, fill can decrease by 2-1/2 inches (total) If arch rings are more than 18 inches thick, fill can decrease by 1-1/4 inches per inch above minimum

40 feet and 50 feet

9-48

1-1/4 inches


Figure 9-38. Masonry Arch MLC 70 Bridge STEEL STRINGER MLC 70 BRIDGE WITH CONCRETE DECK

9-87. Before crossing a steel stringer MLC 70 bridge with a concrete deck, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.

Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is the deck at least 5 inches and no more than 8 inches thick? If the answer to all three questions is yes, go to step 2; if the answer to any question is no, do not cross.

Step 2.

Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (as illustrated in Figure 9-39). Using Table 9-17, find the row and column corresponding to the span length and stringer spacing of the bridge. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between the values given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the stringer meet the minimum requirements for overall height and width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-17. Measurement Correlations for a Steel Stringer MLC 70 Bridge with Concrete Deck 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN


29-1/2 x 11-3/4

23-5/8 x 11-3/4

21-5/8 x 11-3/4

16-3/4 x 11-3/4

14-1/4 x 11-3/4


27-1/2 x 11-3/4

21-5/8 x 11-3/4

21-5/8 x 11-3/4

16-3/4 x 11-3/4

13-3/8 x 11-3/4


23-5/8 x 11-3/4

19-5/8 x 11-3/4

16-3/4 x 11-3/4

14-1/4 x 11-3/4

13-3/8 x 11-3/4


17-3/4 x 11-3/4

16-3/4 x 11-3/4

13-3/8 x 11-3/4

13-3/8 x 11-3/4

11 x 11

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Figure 9-39. Steel Stringer MLC 70 Bridge with Concrete Deck TIMBER/STEEL TRESTLE MLC 70 BRIDGE

9-88. Before crossing a timber/steel trestle MLC 70 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.

Is the roadway width 4.5 meters (14.75 feet) or greater? Is there 4.3 meters (14 feet) of overhead clearance? Is the deck at least 8 inches thick (for 6-foot stringer sections) or at least 6 inches thick (for stringer sections of 4 feet of less)? If the answer to all three questions is yes, go to step 2 for a timber trestle bridge or step 3 for a steel trestle bridge. If the answer to any question is no, do not cross.

Step 2.

For a timber trestle bridge, measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (as illustrated in Figure 9-40). Using Table 9-18, find the row and column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between the values given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the timber stringer meet the minimum requirements for overall height and width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-18. Measurement Correlations for a Timber Trestle MLC 70 Bridge 20-FOOT SPAN

15-FOOT SPAN

10-FOOT SPAN


9-50


24 x 12

24 x 10

18 x 8


22 x 12

22 x 8

16 x 8



Step 3.

22 x 12

20 x 8

14 x 8

For a steel trestle bridge, measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (refer to Figure 9-40). Using Table 9-19, find the row and column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: If these measurements fall between the values given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the steel stringer meet the minimum requirements for overall height and width? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-19. Measurement Correlations for a Steel Trestle MLC 70 Bridge 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN



27-1/2 x 11-3/4

23-5/8 x 11-3/4

19-5/8 x 11-3/4

16-3/4 x 11-3/4

13-3/8 x 11-3/4


23-5/8 x 11-3/4

19-5/8 x 11-3/4

16-3/4 x 11-3/4

15-3/4 x 11-3/4

13-3/8 x 11-3/4


19-5/8 x 11-3/4

16-3/4 x 11-3/4

13-3/8 x 11-3/4

11 x 11

11 x 11

Figure 9-40. Timber/Steel Trestle MLC 70 Bridge

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COMPOSITE STEEL-CONCRETE STRINGER MLC 70 BRIDGE

9-89. Before crossing a composite steel-concrete stringer MLC 70 bridge, use the following evaluation steps to determine if it is safe to cross: Step 1.


Step 2.

Inspect the stringer to see if there is a plate on the bottom. There are three possible configurations: no plate, a plate one-half or less the thickness of the flange, or a plate more than one-half the thickness of the flange. Measure the span length, stringer spacing, and stringer height and width (as shown in Figure 9-41). Using one of the tables included here, find the row and column corresponding to the bridge’s span length and stringer spacing. (NOTE: Use Table 9-20 for no plate, Table 9-21 for a plate one-half or less the thickness of the flange, or Table 9-22 for a plate more than one-half the thickness of the flange. If the span length or stringer spacing falls between the values given, use the next higher measurement.) Does the stringer meet the overall height and width requirements for its corresponding span length, stringer spacing, and plate status? If the answer is yes, it is safe to cross MLC 70 traffic; if the answer is no, do not cross.

Table 9-20. Measurement Correlations for a Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 70 Bridge (with No Plate) 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN


9-52


33-7/8 x 15-3/4

36 x 12

30-1/8 x 10-1/2

24-1/8 x9

18 x 7-1/2


36-1/2 x 12-1/8

35-7/8 x 12

30 x 10-1/2

23-7/8 x9

18 x 7-1/2


36-1/8 x 12

33-1/4 x 11-1/2

29-7/8 x 10-1/2

21-1/4 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2


35-7/8 x 12

30 x 10-1/2

26-3/4 x 10

18-1/4 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


Table 9-21. Measurement Correlations for a Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 70 Bridge (with a Plate One-Half or Less the Thickness of the Flange) 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN



36-3/4 x 16-5/8

35-7/8 x 12

30 x 10-1/2

24-1/8 x9

18 x 7-1/2


36-3/8 x 12-1/8

35-7/8 x 12

29-7/8 x 10-1/2

23-7/8 x9

18 x 7-1/2


36 x 12

33-1/8 x 11-1/2

27-1/8 x 10

21-1/8 x 8-1/2

18 x 7-1/2


33-1/4 x 11-1/2

30 x 10-1/2

24-1/4 x9

18-1/4 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

Table 9-22. Measurement Correlations for a Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 70 Bridge (with a Plate More than One-Half the Thickness of the Flange) 50-FOOT SPAN

40-FOOT SPAN

30-FOOT SPAN

25-FOOT SPAN

20-FOOT SPAN



36-1/2 x 12-1/8

35-7/8 x 12

30 x 10-1/2

23-7/8 x9

18 x 7-1/2


36-3/8 x 12-1/8

33-1/4 x 11-1/2

29-7/8 x 10-1/2

23-7/8 x9

18 x 7-1/2


36 x 12

33-1/8 x 11-1/2

27-1/8 x 10

21-1/8 x 8-1/4

18 x 7-1/2


33-1/4 x 11-1/2

30 x 10-1/2

26-7/8 x 10

18-1/4 x 7-1/2

18 x 7-1/2

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Figure 9-41. Composite Steel-Concrete Stringer MLC 70 Bridge

AVLB CROSSING RECONNAISSANCE 9-90. Generally, the best site to deploy an AVLB is across a span where a bridge has been destroyed or across an existing bridge that will not hold the unit’s vehicles. In both cases, abutments on both sides should be intact, in good shape, and less than 80 feet apart. Crossing at areas without bridge abutments requires a detailed evaluation of both sides to ensure the ground is firm enough to hold both the bridge and the heaviest vehicle in the unit. Once a bridge has been buried in the mud at both ends, it is difficult to retrieve. Refer to Table 9-23 for a summary of AVLB characteristics.

BRIDGE CONDITION 9-91. It is essential to note the bridge’s general condition, paying particular attention to evidence of damage from natural causes (such as rot, rust, and deterioration) or combat action. Classification procedures presume that a bridge is in good condition. If the bridge is in poor condition, the class determined through mathematical computations must be reduced according to the classifier’s judgment.

WIDTH AND HEIGHT RESTRICTIONS 9-92. Table 9-24 summarizes width restrictions for bridges. If a onelane bridge does not meet width requirements, post a rectangular warning sign under the classification sign showing the actual clear width (see Figure 9-42). If it is a route restriction, annotate it in the route classification formula. For a two-lane bridge, downgrade the two-way classification to the highest class for which it does qualify (one-way classification is not affected). Post a limited-clearance sign if the overhead clearance is less than 4.3 meters. These signs must be a minimum of 40 centimeters in height or width, with a yellow background and the appropriate description in black letters. Separate rectangular signs are used if necessary to denote width limitations, height limitations, or other technical information. (NOTE: The same signs are used for tunnels, if applicable.)

9-54


Table 9-23. AVLB Characteristics

ALLOCATION

Engineer battalion of a heavy division: · 12 launchers · 12 bridges Engineer company of an armor/infantry (M) separate brigade: · 4 launchers · 4 bridges Bridge carried on launcher (modified M48 or M60A1 chassis)

TRANSPORTATION

Bridge weights 15 tons 20-ton crane transfers bridge to launcher in 20 to 30 minutes MLC 60 vehicle

CAPABILITIES

One vehicle at a time can cross the AVLB AVLB is 19.2 meters (63 feet) long. It spans these gaps: · 18.3 meters (60 feet) using prepared abutments · 17 meters (57 feet) using unprepared abutments Launched in 2 to 5 minutes by buttoned-up 2-man crew

ASSEMBLY/ PROPULSION

Retrieved from either end; one soldier exposed; guide and connect Allow 0.9 meter (3 feet) bearing for unprepared abutment, 0.5 meter (1.5 feet) for prepared abutment M48A2 requires gas; M60 and M48A5 are diesel

REMARKS/ LIMITATIONS

Scissors launch requires 10 meters (32.8 feet) overhead clearance Maximum launch slope: · Uphill – 2.7 meters (9 feet) · Downhill – 2.7 meters (9 feet) · Sideslope – 0.3 meters (1 feet) AVLB fords water 1.2 meters (4 feet) deep

Table 9-24. Minimum Roadway Widths BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION

ROADWAY WIDTH (meters)

One-way

Two-way

2.75 to 3.34

12

0

3.35 to 3.99

30

0

4 to 4.49

60

0

4.5 to 4.99

100

0

5 to 5.4

150

0

5.5 to 7.2

150

30

7.3 to 8.1

150

60

8.2 to 9.7

150

100

Over 9.8

150

150

NOTE: Minimum overhead clearance for all classes is 4.3 meters.

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Figure 9-42. Width and Height Signs

BRIDGE TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES 9-93. Posting standard bridge signs and other signs needed for proper and efficient traffic control across a bridge is the engineer’s responsibility. Additional signs are used when vehicles require special controls while crossing. When necessary, holding areas, turnouts for parking and unloading vehicles, and checkpoints are installed near bridges to provide the necessary control during crossings.

FULL NATO BRIDGE SYMBOL 9-94. Bridge information is recorded on a map or overlay using the full NATO bridge symbol (refer to Figure 9-43). It is different from an on-site bridge classification sign; do not confuse the two. The information necessary for the full NATO bridge symbol includes the following:

· · · · · · ·

9-56

Bridge’s serial number. Geographic location. Bridge’s MLC. Overall length. Traveled-way width. Overhead clearance. Available bypasses.


Figure 9-43. Full NATO Bridge Symbol

9-95. A bridge serial number is assigned for future reference and is recorded in the symbol’s lower portion (assign a number according to unit SOP). For proper identification, do not duplicate serial numbers within any single map sheet, overlay, or document. The unit S2 can obtain special maps containing bridge information for developed areas of the world. 9-96. An arrow extending from the symbol to the exact map location shows the bridge’s geographic location. The bridge’s MLC number is shown in the symbol’s top portion. This number indicates the bridge’s carrying capacity; classifications for both single- and double-flow traffic are included. In those instances where dual classifications for wheeled and tracked vehicles exist, both classifications are shown. 9-97. The bridge’s overall length is the distance between abutments, measured along the bridge’s centerline. This figure is placed to the right of the circle and is expressed in meters. 9-98. The minimum lane width is the clear distance between curbs. Place this figure below the symbol and express it in meters. Bridges may be obstructions to traffic flow when the traveled-way width on the bridge is less than the minimum standard prescribed for the overall route. Refer to the minimum roadway widths listed earlier in Table 9-24. 9-99. The overhead clearance is the minimum distance between the bridge’s surface and any obstruction above it. This figure is shown (in meters) to the left of the symbol. Underline any overhead clearance less than the minimum required by the bridge classification number (refer to Table 9-25). Unlimited overhead clearance is indicated by the infinity symbol ( ). Often, a telltale (see Figure 9-44) or other warning device can be posted before the bridge to indicate overhead clearance limitations. Report any overhead clearance less than 4.3 meters as an obstruction in the route classification formula. A question mark is used to indicate information that is unknown or undetermined and is included as part of the bridge reconnaissance symbol.

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Table 9-25. Minimum Overhead Clearances BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION

MINIMUM OVERHEAD CLEARANCE

Up to MLC 70

4.5 meters

Above MLC 70

4.5 meters

Figure 9-44. Use of Telltale for Bridge Restrictions

9-100. Bypasses around the bridge site are indicated using arrows similar to (and branching away from) the arrow connecting the bridge symbol to its location on the map. Bypass arrows should show the approximate route of the bypass. Refer to the discussion of bypasses in the following section. NOTE: Railway bridges that could be used by road vehicles in an emergency should be classified and identified on the map or overlay. The symbol for a railway bridge should indicate whether it is “use easy” or “use difficult.”

SECTION X – BYPASSES 9-101. Bypasses are detours along a route allowing traffic to avoid an obstruction. Bypasses limited to specific vehicle types, such as those capable of swimming or deep-water fording, are noted in the reconnaissance report. Each bypass is represented symbolically as an arrow. The bypass arrow extends either from the tunnel, ford, bridge, or overpass symbol itself or from the arrow that connects the symbol to the map location of the tunnel, ford, bridge, or overpass. The arrow should indicate the approximate route of the bypass.

9-58


9-102. Bypasses are classified as easy, difficult, or impossible. Table 9-26 illustrates the map symbols used to indicate each bypass classification. Considerations for the bypass categories include the following:

·

A bypass is considered easy when a 5-ton vehicle can cross the obstacle within the immediate vicinity without work to improve the bypass.

·

A difficult bypass also allows vehicles to cross the obstacle within the immediate vicinity; however, some work will be necessary to prepare the bypass. (NOTE: An estimation of the time, manpower, and equipment necessary to prepare the bypass must be included in the reconnaissance report.)

·

The bypass is considered impossible when it would entail repairing an existing route feature (such as a bridge or tunnel) to cross the obstacle, building a new feature, or providing a detour to cross or move around the obstacle outside the immediate vicinity of the original route.

Table 9-26. Bypass Symbols SYMBOL

CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION BYPASS EASY. Use when the obstacle can be crossed in the immediate vicinity by a US 5-ton truck without work to improve the bypass.

BYPASS DIFFICULT. Use when the obstacle can be crossed in the immediate vicinity, but some work is necessary to improve the bypass.

BYPASS IMPOSSIBLE. Use when the obstacle can be crossed only by repairing or constructing a route feature or by detouring around the obstacle.

SECTION XI – MEASUREMENT CONVERSIONS 9-103. This section includes tables covering the basic computations for converting English measurements to their metric equivalents. The following conversions are included:

·

Table 9-27 lists conversions for common distance measurements (inches to centimeters; feet to meters; yards to meters; miles to kilometers).

·

Table 9-28 shows conversions of miles per hour to kilometers per hour.

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Table 9-27. English to Metric Distance Measurement Conversions

9-60

INCHES to CENTIMETERS

FEET to METERS

1 inch = 2.54 centimeters

1 foot = 0.30 meters

2 inches = 5.08 centimeters

2 feet = 0.61 meters















10 inches = 25.40 centimeter




















YARDS to METERS

MILES to KILOMETERS

1 yard = 0.91 meters

1 mile = 1.61 km

2 yards = 1.83 meters

2 miles = 3.22 km


3 miles = 4.83 km


4 miles = 6.44 km


5 miles = 8.05 km


6 miles = 9.66 km


7 miles = 11.27 km


8 miles = 12.87 km


9 miles = 14.48 km


10 miles = 16.09 km


20 miles = 32.19 km


30 miles = 48.28 km


40 miles = 64.37 km


50 miles = 80.47 km


60 miles = 96.56 km


70 miles = 112.65 km


80 miles = 128.75 km


90 miles = 144.84 km


100 miles = 62.14 km


Table 9-28. Miles per Hour to Kilometers per Hour Conversions MILES PER HOUR

KILOMETERS PER HOUR

1 mph

1.609 kmph

2 mph

3.22 kmph

3 mph

4.83 kmph

4 mph

6.44 kmph

5 mph

8.05 kmph

6 mph

9.66 kmph

7 mph

11.27 kmph

8 mph

12.87 kmph

9 mph

14.48 kmph

10 mph

16.09 kmph

15 mph

24.14 kmph

20 mph

32.19 kmph

25 mph

40.23 kmph

30 mph

48.28 kmph

35 mph

56.33 kmph

40 mph

64.37 kmph

45 mph

72.42 kmph

50 mph

80.47 kmph

55 mph

88.51 kmph

60 mph

96.56 kmph

65 mph

104.61 kmph

70 mph

112.65 kmph

75 mph

120.70 kmph

100 mph

160.94 kmph

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Appendix A

Combat Orders Combat orders are the means CONTENTS by which the reconnaissance Warning Orders ............................................ platoon leader receives and Operation Orders .......................................... transmits information, from Fragmentary Orders ..................................... the earliest notification that Patrol Orders ................................................ an operation will occur through the final phases of execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success. All members of the platoon must be familiar with the formats of warning orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs, as well as the format of patrol orders and the information included in them.

A-1 A-2 A-6 A-7

SECTION I – WARNING ORDERS A-1. The reconnaissance platoon leader will use warning orders to alert his platoon of upcoming missions. The guidelines and directions in the warning order will allow the platoon to begin its planning and preparation activities. The platoon leader then uses a series of warning orders to provide additional information to the platoon as he receives it or as he further develops his plan. The warning order provides answers to the following questions:

· ·

WHO is involved in the mission?

· · ·

WHY are we performing the mission?

WHAT is the nature of the mission and what are we tasked to accomplish? WHEN is the earliest starting time expected for the mission? WHERE is location of the area of operations and where and when will the OPORD be issued?

A-2. At a minimum, all platoon warning orders will include the following elements:

·

·

Situation. The warning order covers the following situational factors: n

Threat. Define the area of operations and the area of interest. Give a brief description of the terrain layout using OCOKA factors.

n

Friendly. State your intent and the mission statements for the next two higher levels. Explain the next higher commander’s concept of the operation and provide a copy of the available operational graphics.

Mission. Give the restated reconnaissance platoon mission.

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·

Coordinating instructions. Provide the platoon with all of the limitations identified up to this point and any other instructions that allow for proactive planning and preparation, including priorities of work. The following elements are included: n

Timeline. Update your earlier timeline(s). Outline all known beginning and ending times, to include those for the next higher unit.

n

Rehearsals. Specify what type of mission-specific rehearsals or drills you expect subordinate units to conduct within the framework of the timeline.

n

Security. Brief the security plan.

n

Service support. Address changes to support requirements for which the platoon may have to plan, such as attachment of an engineer platoon or infantry squad.

SECTION II – OPERATION ORDERS A-3. The OPORD provides the reconnaissance platoon with the essential information required to conduct the operation and to carry out the higher commander’s intent. The platoon leader should provide subordinate leaders with a copy of his OPORD format to facilitate notetaking. All platoon OPORDs will use the format shown in Figure A-1 to present the necessary operational information.

TASK ORGANIZATION · Time(s) of attachment. · Time(s) of detachment. · Support relationship(s).

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy (threat) forces (and battlefield conditions). (1) Weather and light data. · Precipitation. · Temperature. · Other weather conditions (such as wind, dust, or fog). · Light data: BMNT: _____________________. Sunrise: _________________ . Sunset: _____________________. EENT: __________________ . Moonrise: ___________________. Moonset: ________________ . Percent Illumination: ____________________. (2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA). · Observation and fields of fire. · Cover and concealment. · Obstacles. · Key terrain. · Avenues of approach.

A-2

___________________________________________________________ Appendix A – Combat Orders

Figure A-1. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon OPORD Format

(3) Threat forces. · Identification. · Composition/order of battle. · Recent activities. · Strength/weaknesses. · Current location. · Most probable course of action. (4) Civil considerations. · Overview of society/social conditions. · Infrastructure. · Negative effects on military operations. b. Friendly forces. · · · · · ·

Brigade mission and commander’s intent. Squadron mission and commander’s intent. Squadron commander’s concept of the operation. Adjacent unit missions/locations. Unit(s) providing fire support. Other units supporting the squadron.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION The aspects of WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY for the mission.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Commander’s focus, tempo and engagement criteria. (2) Scheme of maneuver. · Offensive operations. -

Passage of lines. Axis or route. Movement formations. Movement techniques. Actions on contact (prior to the objective). Actions at obstacles. Actions on the objective (decisive point). Consolidation and reorganization. On-order and be-prepared missions.

· Defensive operations. -

Security operations. Passage of lines of forward forces. Battle handover. Defense of initial and successive BPs. Displacement. Counterattack.

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-

Consolidation and reorganization.

Figure A-1. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon OPORD Format (Continued)

(3) Fires. · Purpose of indirect fires. · Priority of fires. · Allocation, including use of special fires (such as smoke, illumination, or CAS). · Triggers. · Restrictions/coordinating instructions. (4) Engineer support. · Priority of effort. · Priority of support. b. Tasks to maneuver units. (1) Task for each of the platoon's sections/squads. (2) Purpose for each of the platoon's sections/squads. c. Tasks to combat support units. (1) Engineers. (2) ADA. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Movement instructions. · SP/RP time and location. · Order of march. · Movement route. · RP time and location. · Limit of advance (attack position, tactical assembly area, or other control measure). (2) Passage of lines. · Linkup time and location. · Passage point/passage lane locations. (3) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR). (4) Troop safety. · Exposure guidance (in cGy). · MOPP level(s) and initiation times. · Direct fire weapons control status and warnings. · ADA weapons control status and warnings.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT a. Concept of support.

A-4


· Current location of squadron combat field trains. · Current location of squadron umcp. · Current location of squadron/battalion aid station(s). · Scheme of support.


b. Materiel and services. (1) Supply. · Class I. · Class III. · Class V. · Class IX. (2) Transportation. · Location of squadron supply route. · Location of LRPs and collection points. · Priority of movement on squadron MSR. (3) Service. · Location of mortuary services. · Procedures for evacuation of KIA personnel. (4) Maintenance. · Location of UMCP during the battle. · Method of marking damaged vehicles. · Squadron recovery plan. c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization. · Location of squadron aid station(s) during the battle. · Method of marking vehicles carrying WIA/KIA personnel. · Procedures for evacuation of WIA/KIA personnel. d. Personnel. · Procedures for handling EPWs. · Location of squadron EPW collection point. · Personnel replacement. e. Civil/military cooperation. · Curfews. · Collateral damage restrictions. · Rules of engagement (ROE). · Graduated response guidelines.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command.

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· Location of platoon leader and PSG. · Location of squadron commander. · Location of squadron TAC CP. · Succession of command.


b. Signal. · SOI in effect. · Radio communications restrictions. -

Radio listening silence and the time it is in effect.

-

Alternate frequencies and time or condition for changing frequency.

· Visual and pyrotechnic signals. -

During passage of lines.

-

During movement.

-

During breaching operations.

-

On the objective.

-

During defensive operations.

-

Emergency signals.

· Code words and reports specific to the operation. · Electronic protection, including COMSEC guidelines and procedures.

Time check (for synchronization) Figure A-1. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon OPORD Format (Continued)

SECTION III – FRAGMENTARY ORDERS A-4. The FRAGO is a brief oral or written order that serves to update or clarify a previous order. During the execution of an operation, FRAGOs are the medium of battle command. The commander uses them to communicate changes in the threat or friendly situation and to retask his subordinate elements based on changes in the situation. FRAGOs can serve any of the following purposes:

· · · ·

A-6

Implement timely changes to existing orders. Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders. Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed. Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not require a complete order.


A-5. The content of each FRAGO will depend on the specific operational and tactical situation. In general, reconnaissance platoon FRAGOs will include the following information:

· · · ·

Updated threat or friendly situation. Mission (ensure platoon tasks and purpose are clear). Scheme of maneuver. Specific instructions as necessary.

SECTION IV – PATROL ORDERS A-6. Patrol orders provides the reconnaissance platoon with the essential information required to conduct a patrol in accordance with the higher commander’s intent. The platoon leader should provide subordinate leaders with a copy of his patrol order format to facilitate note-taking. The patrol order format used in this discussion serves as a type of checklist for dismounted operations. This format is not allinclusive; units should tailor it to their specific situations and operations.

TASK ORGANIZATION Explain how the patrol is organized for the operation and confirm the composition of each element. Identify time(s) of attachment and detachment. If there is no change to the previous task organization, the patrol leader indicates that there is no change.

PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy (threat) forces (and battlefield conditions). (1) Weather and light data. · Precipitation. · Temperature. · Other weather conditions (such as wind, dust, or fog). · Light data: BMNT: ___________________ .

Sunrise: _________________ .

Sunset: ___________________ .

EENT: __________________ .

Moonrise: _________________ .

Moonset: ________________ .

Percent Illumination: _____________________ . · How will weather and light factors affect the patrol and threat forces? (2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA). · Observation and fields of fire. · Cover and concealment. · Obstacles. · Key terrain. · Avenues of approach. · How will terrain factors affect the patrol and threat forces?

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(3) Threat forces. · Identification. · Disposition, composition, and/or order of battle. · Recent activities. · Strength/weaknesses. · Current/last known location. This covers only forces that will directly affect the specific mission of the patrol. · Most probable course of action.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format b. Friendly forces. · Mission and commander’s intent two levels higher. · Concept of the operation for the next higher unit. · Location and mission of units on the left, right, front, and rear and of support units. · Missions and routes of adjacent patrols. · Unit(s) providing fire support. · Mission and commander’s intent of the rest of the platoon (in the event the platoon has multiple missions. c. Attachments and detachments. Any special personnel or elements (such as engineers, medics, linguists, FOs) who will accompany the patrol. d. Civilian populace. · Culture. · Political, government, and religious institutions and organizations. · Factions/groups/organizations/terrorists. · Restrictions and curfews.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION The aspects of WHO, WHAT (including the type of patrol), WHEN, WHERE, and WHY for the mission. This includes a clear and concise statement of the platoon’s task and purpose.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Commander’s focus, tempo and engagement criteria. Explain, in general terms, how the patrol will accomplish the mission. Identify the mission essential tasks and other critical tasks. Specify the duration of the patrol. (2) Scheme of maneuver. Explain the scheme of maneuver and graphics (described sequentially as they will occur during the patrol) while simultaneously referencing a terrain board, dirt sketch or map. (3) Fires. Explain how and when fires will be used. Provide the patrol with the target overlay, to include target numbers. Specify priority of fires, use of/availability of special purpose fires (such as smoke, illumination, or CAS), and triggers.

A-8


(4) Intelligence. (5) Electronic warfare. (6) Engineers. b. Tasks to maneuver units. (1) Task and purpose for each of the platoon's teams/sections/squads. (2) Task and purpose for special teams and key individuals. (3) Task and purpose for support/attached personnel.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued) c. Coordinating instructions. (1) Actions at the objective. (2) Time line. Explain the time sequence from the time the patrol order is issued to actions at the objective. (3) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR). (4) Movement techniques. (5) Primary route. (6) Alternate route. (7) Departure and reentry of friendly lines. · Linkup time and location. · Departure point. · Reentry point. (8) Rally points and actions at rally points. (9) Actions on contact (for the eight forms of contact). (10) Actions at danger areas. (11) Actions at halts. (12) Debriefing time and place. (13) MOPP level, initiation time, and exposure guidance (in cGy). (14) Rehearsals (prioritized). (15) Inspections. (16) Equipment/special equipment needed to accomplish the mission. (17) Soldier safety. (18) Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response. (19) Annexes (air assault, airborne, stream crossing, vehicle movement, linkup, evasion and escape, hide site, cache).

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT a. Supply. Focus on supply requirements in Classes I, III, V, and IX. b. Transportation. Specify location and route(s) of mounted elements of the platoon. c. Medical evacuation. Specify procedures for evacuation of WIAs/KIAs. d. Personnel.

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· Procedures for handling friendly and threat wia/kia personnel. · Procedures for handling epws and captured documents and equipment. · Procedures for personnel replacement (alternate team members or assignment changes based on the loss of personnel). e. Civil/military restrictions. · Curfews. · Collateral damage restrictions. · Rules of interaction (ROI), engagement (ROE), and graduated response.

Figure A-2. Sample Reconnaissance Platoon Patrol Order Format (Continued)

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. · Location of patrol leader and assistant patrol leader. · Location of next higher commander. · Succession of command. b. Signal. · Time zone used. · SOI and matrix in effect. · Key hand-and-arm signals. · Code words and reports specific to the operation. · Time(s) radio listening silence is in effect. · Alternate frequencies and times and/or conditions for changing frequency. · Challenge and password (regular; forward of friendly lines; running). · Electronic protection, including COMSEC guidelines and procedures. · Visual and pyrotechnic signals (alternate means of control, emergency signaling).

Time check (for synchronization) Annexes: a. Air assault and airborne. b. Stream crossing. c. Vehicle movement. d. Evasion and escape. e. Linkup. f. Rest overnight, hide site, and surveillance site. g. Cache site. NOTE:

The following discussion covers formats for the seven listed annexes to the patrol order. These annexes may also be applicable to the OPORDs for other operations as well.

Annex A to the Patrol Order

A-10


AIR ASSAULT AND AIRBORNE PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy forces (threat). (1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification (air defense). (2) Weather (how it will affect the air operation). (3) Terrain (how it will affect the air operation). b. Friendly forces (includes units supporting the operation, such as helicopters, artillery, air defense, electronic countermeasures, and USAF assets).


PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION Include only information pertaining to the air operation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Maneuver. (2) Fires. (3) Intelligence. (4) Electronic warfare. (5) Other. b. Tasks to maneuver units. c. Tasks to combat support units. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Time(s) aircraft are available and location of pickup sites. (2) Organization for movement. (3) Time and location for rehearsals, jump refresher, and jumpmaster prejump inspection. (4) Time over FLOT. (5) Information on the landing zone (LZ), drop zone (DZ), and/or pickup zone (PZ). · Grid (primary and alternate, if applicable). · Marking procedures. - Long-range (terrain feature, radio, mirror, flare). - Short-range (terrain feature, radio, man-made feature, VS-17 panels, smoke, light, infrared strobe, chemical light). (6) Flight route from the PZ to the LZ or DZ. · General. · Checkpoints. · Prelanding and/or prejump warning. (7) Formations.

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· At pickup site. · En route. · At the LZ, DZ, and/or PZ. (8) Actions on enemy contact and actions for downed aircraft. · En route. · At the LZ, DZ, and/or PZ. (9) Assembly area (grid, terrain feature, marking, assembly technique). (10) Method for destruction and cache of special equipment. (11) Rehearsal plan.


PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT a. Special equipment needed at LZ, DZ, and/or PZ. b. Special equipment needed for airborne operations.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. (1) Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO in the air and at the LZ/PZ. (2) Location of the jumpmaster, rappel master, SPIES master, FRIES master, pathfinder, and safeties in the aircraft. (3) Location of controlling personnel (platoon leader and PSG). b. Signal.

Annex B to the Patrol Order STREAM CROSSING PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy forces (threat). (1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification. (2) Weather (how it will affect the stream and the crossing operation). (3) Terrain (how it will affect the stream and the crossing operation). · River width. · River depth. · Information on river current. · Vegetation. · Obstacles. b. Friendly forces.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION Include only information pertaining to the stream crossing operation.

A-12


PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Maneuver. (2) Fires. (3) Intelligence. (4) Electronic warfare. (5) Other.


b. Tasks to maneuver units. (1) Elements. (2) Individuals. c. Tasks to combat support units. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Crossing procedures. (2) Security. (3) Order of crossing. (4) Actions on enemy contact. (5) Alternate plan. (6) Rally points. (7) Rehearsal plan.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT This paragraph is optional in stream crossing operations.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO. b. Signal. This subparagraph is optional in stream crossing operations.

Annex C to the Patrol Order VEHICLE MOVEMENT PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy forces (threat). (1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification. (2) Weather (how it will affect movement). (3) Terrain along and adjacent to the route of movement (how it will affect movement).

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(4) Vegetation. (5) Obstacles and potential ambush sites. b. Friendly forces. (1) Units along the route. (2) Unit(s) providing transportation.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION Include only information pertaining to the vehicle movement operation.


PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Maneuver. (2) Fires. (3) Intelligence. (4) Electronic warfare. (5) Engineers. (6) Route-related information. (7) Other. b. Tasks to maneuver units. (1) Teams. (2) Elements. (3) Individuals. Brief vehicle drivers on routes, actions on enemy contact, and vehicle interval and speed. c. Tasks to combat support units. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Time of departure and/or return. (2) Loading instructions and order of movement. (3) Actions on enemy contact. (4) Actions at the dismount point. (5) Rehearsal plan. (6) Inspection plan. Inspect vehicles for the following:

A-14


· Serviceability (DA Form 5988-E). · Fuel. · Trucks (canvas and bows off; troop seats up; safety straps on; air guards up; sandbags on floor). · Physical condition of drivers. · Serviceability and location of fire extinguishers.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT Specify special equipment needed, such as sandbags.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO. b. Signal. (1) Special signals for the movement operation only. (2) Communcations in and between vehicles.


Annex D to the Patrol Order EVASION AND ESCAPE PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy forces (threat). (1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification. (2) Weather. (3) Terrain along the evasion route (route should be broken into sections). (4) Vegetation (along route). (5) Obstacles (along route; rivers; mountains; built-up areas). (6) Identification of other potential enemy pursuers. b. Friendly forces. (1) Potential units providing exfiltration support. (2) Potential partisans providing exfiltration support. (3) Survival features.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION Include only information pertaining to the evasion and escape operation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Corridor (provided by operations element). (2) Designated area of recovery locations (selected by team leader). b. Coordinating instructions. (1) Primary route in the corridor.

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(2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Alternate route in the corridor. Security. Actions at the designated area of recovery. Time the designated area of recovery will be active and closed. How and when the team will rally if separated. Where and when the isolated personnel report will be completed and reviewed.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT Specify special equipment needed for survival.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO. b. Signal. (1) Special signals for evasion and escape only. (2) Isolated personnel report. (3) Information on signals for partisan elements.


Annex E to the Patrol Order LINKUP PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy forces (threat). (1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification. (2) Terrain at linkup site. (3) Vegetation at linkup site. (4) Obstacles at and/or near linkup site. b. Friendly forces. (1) Linkup unit. (2) Designated liaison team.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION Include only information pertaining to the linkup operation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Maneuver. (2) Fires. (3) Intelligence.

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(4) Electronic warfare. (5) Engineers. (6) Other. b. Tasks to maneuver units. (1) Elements (hide sites; reconnaissance and security). (3) Individuals (security). c. Tasks to combat support units. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Time of linkup. (2) Location of linkup site. (3) Rally points. (4) Actions on enemy contact. (5) Actions at the linkup site. (6) Rehearsal plan.


PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT This paragraph is optional for linkup operations.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. . (1) Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO at the linkup site. (2) Location of the designated liaison team. b. Signal. (1) Frequencies and call signs. (2) Long-range recognition signal and identification. · Day. · Night. (3) Short-range recognition signal and identification. · Day. · Night. (4) Posting authentication (oral).

Annex F to the Patrol Order REST OVERNIGHT, HIDE SITE, AND SURVEILLANCE SITE PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy forces (threat). (1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification. (2) Terrain at the site. (3) Vegetation at the site.

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(4) Obstacles at or near the site. (5) Soil conditions at the site. b. Friendly forces.

PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION Include only information pertaining to the rest overnight, hide site, or surveillance site.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Maneuver. (2) Fires. (3) Intelligence. (4) Electronic warfare. (5) Engineers. (6) Other.


b. Tasks to maneuver units. (1) Elements. (2) Individuals. c. Tasks to combat support units. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Occupation plan. (2) Operation plan. (3) Security plan. (4) Alert plan. (5) Priority of work. (6) Evacuation plan. (7) Alternate site.

PARAGRAPH 4 - SERVICE SUPPORT a. Water plan. b. Mess plan. c. Hygiene plan. d. Maintenance plan. e. Rest plan.

PARAGRAPH 5 - COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO at the site. b. Signal.

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(1) Location of communications site. (2) Antennas used.

Annex G to the Patrol Order CACHE SITE PARAGRAPH 1 - SITUATION a. Enemy forces (threat). (1) Disposition, composition, strength, and identification. (2) Terrain at the cache site. (3) Vegetation at the cache site. (4) Obstacles at or near the cache site. (5) Soil conditions at the cache site. b. Friendly forces.


PARAGRAPH 2 - MISSION Include only information pertaining to the cache site and the cache operation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - EXECUTION Commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Maneuver. (2) Fires. (3) Intelligence. (4) Other. b. Tasks to maneuver units. (1) Elements (security, digging). (2) Individuals (report recorder). c. Tasks to combat support units. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Security plan. (2) Recording plan. (3) Site preparation plan. (4) Site digging plan. (5) Spoil disposal plan. (6) Actions on enemy contact. (7) Rehearsal plan.

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PARAGRAPH 4 – SERVICE SUPPORT a. Recording materials. b. Digging materials. c. Spoil containers. d. Cache containers.

PARAGRAPH 5 – COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. Location of the team leader, assistant team leader, and RTO at the cache site. b. Signal. The key signal consideration is the 12-point cache report. The following discussion covers the format of the report and key operational considerations in the cache operation. Items in the cache report are the following: (1) Type of cache. The element for which the cache is established (guerrilla unit, sabotage cell, operator) and the type of cached material (weapons, demolitions, communications). (2) Method of caching. Burial, concealment, or submersion.


(3) Contents. An itemized list of all materials in each container with a description of how each item is packaged. (4) Description of containers. Size, weight, and other descriptive details. If several containers are included in the cache, each container should be numbered. Each container can be referenced by its number on the sketch of the cache. (5) General area. The easily recognizable names of places, which include the country, province, and smaller political divisions, down to the nearest town or village. (6) Immediate area. Description of the area, focusing on the immediate reference point and instructions for proceeding from this point to the final reference point. All landmarks that aid visual recognition of the route should be described. (7) Cache location. Description of the final reference point, with the exact sightings and linear measurements required to pinpoint the cache. All measurements must be stated in the linear units (meters, feet) that the recovery agent can understand and use. (8) Emplacement details. All features of the site or natural conditions that must be considered for retrieving the cache. Essential considerations for emplacement and retrieval, based on the method of caching, include the following:

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· Burial. Exact depth underground of each container. Precise description of shoring (if used). All seasonal variations (surface vegetation, date and depth of ground freezing and thawing). The type of soil and the time required for emplacement also provide useful guides for planning the recovery operation. · Concealment. Exactly how the cache is emplaced at the site, including any covering (plaster, bricks) that must be penetrated or removed to recover the cache. Full instructions should be provided if removing or replacing the covering involves any special problems or techniques (matching the plaster or mortar). All necessary information about the cache custodian, if one is used, should be included. · Submersion. Depth of the water (including high- and low-water marks); submersion depth (if the container does not rest on the bottom of the water); type of bottom; water motion; clearness of the water; usual freezing and thawing dates. (9) Operational data and remarks. List of equipment needed for recovery of the cache. (NOTE: Special consideration should be given to any equipment that may be needed for recovery, even though it was not used in emplacement.) Description of at least two routes to the site that offer maximum natural concealment and means of escape in case of sudden attack. Location of nearby houses and thoroughfares. Description of local security forces, including their regular posts and patrol routes near the cache. Suggestions for cover when visiting the site, including warning of what cover to avoid. Any other information that may aid planning the recovery operation. (10) Dates of emplacement and duration of the cache. Duration estimate based on how long the contents of the cache will remain usable. Pertinent factors include the normal shelf life of items that deteriorate with time (medicine, batteries), the expiration date of official documents (such as driver’s licenses), and how long the packaging will withstand moisture penetration or corrosion. (11) Sketches and diagrams. Whatever sketches and diagrams are necessary to clarify the description of the cache and illustrate the instructions for locating and recovering the cache. These considerations should include at least an area sketch, showing the route from the immediate reference point to the final reference point (see sketch A), and a site diagram showing precisely how the cache is pinpointed (see sketch B). Photographs of the immediate area, immediate reference point, final reference point, and other landmarks near the site are not essential, but they may be helpful.


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Sketch A. Route from Immediate Reference Point to Final Reference Point

Sketch B. Cache Site Diagram (12) Radio message for recovery. A radio message should be drafted in case there is an emergency during the emplacement/recovery process. The best time for drafting the message is when details are fresh in the mind of the emplacer. The message should include type of cache, method of caching, and concise instructions for locating the site. These instructions must be clear and brief enough for secure radio transmission. The preparer considers the intended recovery agent’s familiarity with the area as well as the maps and makeshift surveying instruments that will be available to him. The message must be in a language he is sure to understand; it must be drafted or translated by someone who is fluent in the language.


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The following example radio message gives instructions for recovering the cache shown in sample sketches A and B. This sample message illustrates the minimum information needed for recovery. Additional data should be included in a radio message only when special circumstances require it. For instance, if a cached package is too heavy or too large for one person to carry, the weight or the exterior dimensions should be included. The depth of a submerged cache ordinarily should be specified, but the depth of a buried cache should not be included unless it is buried deeper than the usual 45 centimeters. Example radio message: “Communications cache is in three holes in Y (province), X (country) in graveyard three kilometers east of A (city) on north side of Route 5. Cache is in northeast corner near walled plot. Container 1 is west of the plot one-two (12) meters from northwest corner and onesix (16) meters from southwest corner. Container 2 is four meters west of southwest corner in line with south side. Container 3 is on south side adjacent to southeast corner of plot.” NOTE:

Success of the caching operation may depend on attention to details that may seem minor to a nonprofessional. Security factors such as the cover of the caching party, the sterility of the material cached, and the obliteration of the slightest trace of the operation are vital. Important, too, are the technical factors that govern the preservation of the material in usable condition and the recording of data essential for recovery. Successful caching demands adherence to the basic principles of clandestine operations as well as knowledge of the technicalities of the operation. These high standards of security and “know-how” must be instilled through meticulous training of the elements responsible for both the emplacement and the recovery of the cache.


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Appendix B

Report Formats This appendix focuses on specific formats for reports used by the reconnaissance platoon. Reports are outlined in outline form, with a description of how and when each report is used and a lineby-line explanation of information to be covered. Examples of some reports are included. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for a discussion of digital reporting procedures using FBCB2.)

CONTENTS Contact and Blue Reports (Operations) ..... B-2 Contact Report ...................................... B-2 Blue 1 – Spot Report (SPOTREP) ........ B-2 Blue 2 – Situation Report (SITREP) ..... B-3 Blue 4 – Report for Bridge, Overpass, Culvert, Underpass, or Tunnel (BRIDGEREP) ..................................... B-4 Blue 5 – Report for Ford, Ferry, or Other Crossing Site (CROSSREP) .... B-5 Blue 7 – Route Reconnaissance Report (ROUTEREP) ...................................... B-5 Blue 9 – Obstacle Report ...................... B-6 Blue 10 – Bypass Report ...................... B-6 Blue 11 – Stand-to Report (STANREP) ......................................... B-7 Green Reports (Intelligence) ....................... B-7 Green 2 – Sensitive Items Report (SENSEREP) ....................................... B-7 Green 3 – Splash Report ...................... B-8 Green 4 – Patrol Report ........................ B-8 Green 5 – Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference (MIJI) Report .......... B-10 Green 6 – EPW/Captured Material Report ................................................. B-10 Yellow Reports (Logistics) .......................... B-11 Yellow 1 – Equipment Status Report (ESTAT) .................................. B-11 Yellow 1A – Battle Loss Spot Report .. B-13 Yellow 2 – Ammunition Status Report ................................................. B-14 Yellow 2A – Ammunition Request ....... B-14 Yellow 3 – POL Status Report .............. B-16 Yellow 3A – POL Request ..................... B-16 Red Reports (Personnel) .............................. B-17 Red 2 – Personnel Battle Loss Report ................................................. B-17 Red 3 – Medical Evacuation Request .. B-18 NBC Reports ................................................. B-18 NBC-1 – Observer’s Initial Report ........ B-19 NBC-3 – Immediate Warning of Expected Contamination ................... B-21 NBC-4 – Report of Radiation Dose-Rate Measurement ..................................... B-21 NBC-5 – Report of Areas of Contamination .................................... B-22 Digital Reporting and C2 Messages ........... B-23 Alerts and Warnings ............................. B-23 Combat Reporting Messages ............... B-23 Mission-Planning Information .............. B-25 Geo-referenced Messages ................... B-25 Digital Reports ....................................... B-25

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SECTION I – CONTACT AND BLUE REPORTS (OPERATIONS) B-1. This category of reports is particularly useful in reporting reconnaissance information. Contact reports provide an instant means of reporting encounters with threat or unknown forces. Blue reports cover various aspects of platoon tactical operations.

CONTACT REPORT WHEN USED

B-2.

A contact report is issued immediately upon contact with a threat or unknown force in the area of operations. This alert, which can be very brief, takes priority over all other communications traffic.

FORMAT

B-3. State “CONTACT,” followed by a description of the threat or unknown force and the cardinal direction from the sender. EXAMPLE

B-4.

“THIS IS YANKEE 23. CONTACT, TANK, NORTH, OUT.”

BLUE 1 – SPOT REPORT (SPOTREP) WHEN USED

B-5. A SPOTREP is used when scouts observe any known or suspected threat activity, when they observe any characteristic of the area of operations likely to affect accomplishment of the mission, or when required by the OPORD. Always send threat information in the clear. A SPOTREP takes priority over all other routine radio traffic. The initial SPOTREP should follow no more than 1 minute after the contact report. FORMAT

B-6.

State "SPOTREP" or "UPDATED SPOTREP," followed by pertinent information on these lines: Line ALPHA: Observer or source (omit if it is the calling station; use call signs or description otherwise). Line BRAVO: Activity or characteristic being observed. Use the SALUTE format:

·

Size: The number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other equipment.

· · · · ·

Activity: What the threat is doing. Location: Grid coordinates. Unit: Patches, signs, or markings. Time: Time the activity was observed. Equipment: Description or identification equipment associated with the activity.

Line CHARLIE: Actions you have taken recommendations. Actions usually involve

B-2

of

all

and your conducting

___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Report Formats

additional reconnaissance to determine the complete threat situation or recommending and executing a specific course of action. Line DELTA: Self-authentication (if required). NOTE: Report the center of mass of identical, closely grouped items. Otherwise, report multiple grid coordinates of traces (from ________to ________). EXAMPLE

B-7.

“YANKEE 27, THIS IS YANKEE 23. SPOTREP, OVER. ONE BRDM, STATIONARY, ORIENTED SOUTH AT GRID MS289546; 1725 HOURS. CONTINUING TO OBSERVE, OVER.”

BLUE 2 – SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) WHEN USED

B-8. The SITREP is submitted by subordinate units to their higher headquarters to report their tactical situation and status. It is submitted daily at 0600 and 1800 hours, after significant events, or as otherwise requested by the platoon leader or commander. FORMAT

B-9.

State "SITREP," followed by pertinent information on these lines: Line 1: The as-of date-time group (DTG). Line 2: Brief summary of threat activity, casualties inflicted, and prisoners captured. Line 3: Friendly locations (encoded using control measures or TIRS points). The following can be listed:

· · · · ·

CP locations. First subelement’s center of mass. Second subelement’s center of mass. Third subelement’s center of mass. Any additional elements as necessary.

Line 4: Combat vehicles operational. The following types of vehicles can be listed:

· · · · · · ·

Tanks. CFVs. APCs. ITVs. Mortar vehicles. AVLBs. HMMWVs.

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Line 5: Defensive obstacles (encoded using codes, control measures, or TIR points). The following can be listed:

·

Type and location of obstacles. Abbreviations can include MF (minefield), TD (tank ditch), AB (abatis), RC (road crater), and CW (concertina wire).

· ·

Type and location of executed demoliton targets. Type and location of reserved demolition targets.

Line 6: Personnel strength, classified using these status levels:

· · ·

GREEN: full strength; 90% or more fit for duty.

·

BLACK: reduced strength; 59% or less fit for duty.

AMBER: reduced strength; 80 to 89% fit for duty. RED: reduced strength; 60 to 79% fit for duty; the unit is mission-capable.

Line 7: Classes III and V supplies available for combat vehicles. Status levels for ammunition and fuel are the same (GREEN, AMBER, RED, OR BLACK) as for personnel strength, with percentages referring to the amount of basic load level available. Refer to Line 6 of this report. NOTE: If an item is reported as status level BLACK on lines 6 or 7, the appropriate yellow report (logistics) must follow. Line 8: Summary of tactical intentions. EXAMPLE

B-10. “YANKEE 21, THIS IS YANKEE 02, SITREP, OVER. LINE 1: 062230. LINE 2: NEGATIVE CONTACT. LINE 3: VISIT 7. LINE 4B: 2. LINE 5: ABATIS, FROM X19 EAST ZERO POINT THREE NORTH ONE POINT SEVEN. LINE 6: GREEN. LINE 7A: GREEN. LINE 7B: AMBER. LINE 8: CONTINUING MISSION.”

BLUE 4 – REPORT FOR BRIDGE, OVERPASS, CULVERT, UNDERPASS, OR TUNNEL (BRIDGEREP) B-11. To send this report, state “BRIDGEREP,” followed by pertinent information on these lines:

Line ALPHA: Type and location (for a long tunnel, include both entrance and exit locations). Use either a TIRS point or grid coordinates. Line BRAVO: Overall length. Line CHARLIE: Width of roadway. Line DELTA: Height restrictions. Line ECHO: Length and number of spans. Line FOXTROT: Computed classification. Line GOLF: Bypass locations and conditions. Use a Blue 5 report if necessary.

B-4


BLUE 5 – REPORT FOR FORD, FERRY, OR OTHER CROSSING SITE (CROSSREP) B-12. To send this report, state “CROSSREP,” followed by pertinent information on these lines: Line ALPHA: Type and location, using either a TIRS point or grid coordinates. Line BRAVO: Length of crossing in meters. Line CHARLIE: Usable width. Line DELTA: Current speed in meters per second. Line ECHO: Maximum depth in meters. Line FOXTROT: Bottom material and condition. Line GOLF: Capacity classification of any existing ferry equipment. Line HOTEL: Slope of entry bank. Line INDIA: Slope of exit bank. Line KILO: Other comments as necessary.

BLUE 7 – ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE REPORT (ROUTEREP) WHEN USED

B-13. To report the results of a route reconnaissance, scouts should send an initial report at the SP. As a minimum, the initial report should be followed by updates at any obstructions, at each phase line, and whenever a route change becomes necessary. These update reports should include only the line(s) that have changed from the initial ROUTEREP. FORMAT

B-14. To send this report, state “ROUTEREP,” followed by pertinent information on these lines: Line ALPHA: “From” location, reported using a control measure or TIRS point. Line BRAVO: “To” location, reported using a control measure or TIRS point. Line CHARLIE: Type of route, reported using the following designations:

· · · ·

Highway, reported using the number “1.” Road, number “2.” Trail, number “3.” Cross-country, number “4.”

Line DELTA: Classification of route. Check for height, width, and weight restrictions to determine the appropriate class,

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and report what vehicles the route is capable of handling using the following designations:

·

All squadron/battalion vehicles (70 class minimum), reported using the number “1.”

· ·

Tracked vehicles only, number “2.” CFVs only (35 class restriction), number “3.”

Line ECHO: Seasonal limitations of route based on weathersupport capability, reported as follows:

·

All-weather (usable year-round), reported using the letter “X.”

·

Limited all-weather (use limited during bad weather), letter “Y.”

·

Fair weather (may be impassable during bad weather), letter “Z.”

Line FOXTROT: Rate of movement the route will support, reported as follows:

· ·

Fast, reported using the number “1.” Slow, number “2.”

Line GOLF: Location and type of any critical points (send the applicable report). Report the following obstructions in all cases: curves with a radius of 45 meters or less; uphill slopes with grades of 5 percent or greater; width restrictions of 6 meters or less for one-way traffic, 10 meters or less for twoway traffic; and overhead clearance of 4.3 meters or less.

BLUE 9 – OBSTACLE REPORT B-15. Report all pertinent information using the following format: Line ALPHA: Type of obstacle or obstruction. Line BRAVO: Location, using grid coordinates. For large, complex obstacles, send the coordinates of the ends and of all turn points. Line CHARLIE: Dimensions and orientation. Line DELTA: Composition. Line ECHO: Threat weapons influencing obstacle. Line FOXTROT: Observer’s actions.

BLUE 10 – BYPASS REPORT B-16. Report all pertinent information using the following format: Line ALPHA: Observer or source. Line BRAVO: Length; width; surface type; grade. Line CHARLIE: Coordinates of “from” and “to” locations.

B-6


Line DELTA: Seasonal/weather limitations. Use letter designation (X, Y, or Z) as described for the Blue 7 report (ROUTEREP). Line ECHO: Bypass markings. Line FOXTROT: Observer’s actions.

BLUE 11 – STAND-TO REPORT (STANREP) WHEN USED

B-17. The STANREP is sent to the platoon leader or TOC, as applicable, when stand-to is completed. FORMAT

B-18. To send this report, state “STANREP,” followed by pertinent information on these lines: Line ALPHA: Time stand-to was completed. Line BRAVO: Weapons on hand and functional. Use the term “UP” for functional weapons on hand. Use "EXCEPTION" for weapons either not on hand or not functional. Line CHARLIE: Sensitive and accountable items on hand. Use “UP” or “EXCEPTION” as applicable. Line DELTA: Vehicles and radios on hand and functional. Use “UP” or “EXCEPTION” as applicable. Line ECHO: Report the on-hand/functional status of any other equipment using “UP” or “EXCEPTION.” NOTE: For lines B, C, D, and E, refer to the Yellow 1 report (ESTAT) for equipment line numbers. EXAMPLE

B-19. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 1; BLUE 11. LINE ALPHA: COMPLETE TIME 0600. LINE BRAVO: UP. LINE CHARLIE: ITEM 38, MISSING 1 EACH. LINE DELTA: RED 3 WILL NOT START.”

SECTION II – GREEN REPORTS (INTELLIGENCE) B-20. Green reports cover various areas of the intelligence-gathering process. They are used to report both intelligence information itself and factors that influence and interfere with the collection process.

GREEN 2 – SENSITIVE ITEMS REPORT (SENSEREP) WHEN USED

B-21. This report is sent daily at 0600 and 1800 hours or at other prescribed times (before and after significant movement, after significant events, and after any consolidation or reorganization). Items covered

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include machine guns, personal weapons, night vision devices, binoculars, NBC equipment, CEOI materials, maps/graphics, and special equipment assigned to platoons for particular operations. FORMAT

B-22. To send this report, state “SENSEREP,” followed by pertinent information on these lines: Line ALPHA: Reporting unit (use call sign). Line CHARLIE: Results of sensitive items check. Use the term "UP" for on-hand/functional items. For missing items, report the line description and serial number and provide an explanation. Use additional lines from the Yellow 1 report. Line ECHO: Initials of person sending report. EXAMPLES

B-23. “THIS IS RED 1. SENSEREP. LINE ALPHA: CHARLIE: ALL 'UP.' LINE ECHO: RWS.”

RED.

LINE

B-24. When sent over a wire net: “THIS IS RED ONE WITH A SENSEREP. LINE ALPHA: ONE. LINE CHARLIE: MISSING ONE IM-93 DOSIMETER, NUMBER 64, SEARCH IN PROGRESS. LINE ECHO: TDB.”

GREEN 3 – SPLASH REPORT WHEN USED

B-25. The splash report is used to report downed or missing aircraft. FORMAT

B-26. To send this report, provide all pertinent information on these

lines:

Line 1: Call sign. Line 2: Aircraft data (type and status). Line 3: Pilot status, reported as follows:

· · · ·

Recovered/good condition. Recovered/WIA. Recovered/KIA. Unknown or captured.

GREEN 4 – PATROL REPORT WHEN USED

B-27. Information collected by combat units is normally submitted using SPOTREPs as events occur. The duration and activity of dismounted reconnaissance patrols make a debriefing desirable. In such cases, the report format helps ensure that the patrol reports all important information it has collected. The patrol report may be submitted by radio or wire when required. B-8


FORMAT

B-28. This debriefing format can be used to ensure all pertinent information is provided in the patrol report. (NOTE: See Appendix J of this manual for a more detailed debriefing format.) Designation of patrol. Include these elements:

· · ·

To: _______________ From: _______________ Maps: _______________

Size and composition of patrol. Task. Time of departure. Time of return. Routes (out and back). Terrain. This includes a description of terrain by type (dry, swampy, jungle, thickly wooded, high brush, rocky), depth of ravines and draws, condition of bridges (type, size, and strength), and effect of terrain on tracked and wheeled vehicles. Threat. This includes details of threat strength, disposition, defenses, equipment, weapons, attitude, morale, exact location, and movements. The report should include the time threat activity was observed and coordinates of the location where activity occurred. Any map corrections. Miscellaneous information. This includes pertinent details of NBC warfare, if applicable. Results of encounters with the threat. This includes threat prisoners and casualties, captured documents and equipment, identification of threat elements, and threat disposition after the contact. Condition of the patrol. This includes arrangements for any dead or wounded.

disposition

Conclusions and recommendations. This includes the extent to which the mission was accomplished and any recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics. Additional remarks by the debriefer. NOTE: The report should conclude with the name, rank/grade, and organization/unit of the patrol leader.

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GREEN 5 – MEACONING, INTRUSION, JAMMING, AND INTERFERENCE (MIJI) REPORT WHEN USED

B-29. MIJI are forms of electronic warfare (EW). Whenever the reception of radio signals is hindered, confused, or prevented by any type of disruption, the radio operator first follows the unit SOP to confirm that the disruption is the result of an external signal. Upon confirmation, the operator is responsible for reporting the incident immediately to the troop/battalion TOC; the TOC will forward the report to the S2 and the signal officer. The MIJI report also covers incidents in which imitative deception is suspected (especially when instructions are received from a source that cannot be authenticated). FORMAT

B-30. Report all pertinent information in this format: Line 1: Unit identification. Line 2: Type of interference. Line 3: Location. Line 4: “On” time (DTG interference started). Line 5: “Off” time (DTG interference ended). Line 6: Effects of interference, including operations or equipment affected. Line 7: Frequency (or frequency range) of interference, if known. Line 8: Narrative or additional information. Line 9: Time (when required). Line 10: Authentication.

GREEN 6 – EPW/CAPTURED MATERIAL REPORT WHEN USED

B-31. Use this report only to inform the troop or battalion TOC of EPWs or captured material of immediate tactical value. Normally, EPWs and captured material are tagged immediately to show the place, time, and circumstances of capture. This ensures information of intelligence value is not lost during evacuation of the EPW or material. FORMAT Format for Reporting EPW Capture

B-32. Provide all pertinent information on the following lines (examples in parentheses): Line 1: State “GREEN 6.” Line 2: Item captured (state “EPW”). Line 3: DTG of capture (“260845SEP83”). Line 4: Place of capture, using grid coordinates (“NS 621434”). Line 5: Capturing unit (appropriate call sign). Line 6: Circumstances of capture, described as briefly as possible.

B-10


Format for Reporting Captured Material

B-33. Provide all pertinent information on the following lines (examples in parentheses): Line 1: State “GREEN 6.” Line 2: Item captured (state “MATERIAL”). Line 3: Type of document or equipment (“CEOI”). Line 4: DTG of capture (“160900JUN83”). Line 5: Place of capture, using grid coordinates (“NE 824615”). Line 6: Capturing unit (appropriate call sign). Line 7: Circumstances of capture, described as briefly as possible. NOTE: After sending the report to the company team or troop commander, provide disposition instructions or recommendations, if necessary.

SECTION III – YELLOW REPORTS (LOGISTICS) B-34. Yellow reports cover various areas of the reconnaissance platoon’s logistics status. They are used to report both tactical information and to request logistics support for ammunition and POL resupply.

YELLOW 1 – EQUIPMENT STATUS REPORT (ESTAT) WHEN USED

B-35. Each PSG sends this report by courier or FM radio to the troop/task force TOC between 1200 hours and 1300 hours daily. The information will be as of 1200 hours that same day. FORMAT

B-36. Equipment status is recorded using one of these terms: operational, inoperative, or combat loss. Provide all pertinent information using the following categories and lines: Weapons Line 1:

Bayonet knife, with scabbard, for M16A2.

Line 2:

Pistol, 9-mm, automatic, M9.

Line 3:

Rifle, 5.56-mm, with equipment.

Line 4:

Launcher, grenade, 40-mm, single shot, rifle mounted, detachable, with equipment.

Line 5:

Machine gun, M2, caliber .50, heavy barrel (HB).

Line 6:

Machine gun, 7.62-mm, light flexible.

Line 7:

Squad automatic weapon, M249.

Line 8:

Grenade launcher, 40-mm, MK19.

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Line 9:

Machine gun, 7.62-mm, fixed M24OC RH feed F/FVS.

Line 10: Launcher, grenade, smoke, screening, RP M250. Line 11: Mortar, 4.2-inch, on mount. Line 12: Command launch unit, AAWS-M. NOTE: Lines 13, 14, 15, and 16 are used as needed for additional weapons assigned to the platoon. Vehicles and Vehicle Equipment Line 17: CFV, M3. Line 18: Carrier, 107-mm mortar, self-propelled (less mortar), M106. Line 19: Carrier, personnel, full-tracked, armored, M113. Line 20: HMMWV, M1025/M1026. Line 21: Tank, M1/M1A1/M1A2/M8-AGS. NOTE: Lines 22, 23, and 24 are used as needed for additional vehicles and/or vehicle equipment assigned to the platoon. NBC Equipment Line 25: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, for fulltracked APC and armored recovery vehicle (ARV). Line 26: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, with power supply, for track, utility, 1/4-ton. Line 27: Charger, radiac detector, PP-1578/PD. Line 28: Mask, chemical-biological, multipurpose. Line 29: Radiacmeter, AN/UDR-13. Line 30: Alarm, chemical agent, automatic, portable, manpack. Line 31: Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD. Line 32: Radiacmeter, IM-174/PD. Line 33: Radiacmeter, AN/VDR-2. NOTE: Lines 34, 35, and 36 are used as needed for additional NBC equipment assigned to the platoon.

Radios Line 37: Radio set, AN/GRC-160. Line 38: Radio set, AN/VRC-46. Line 39: Radio set, AN/VRC-47. Line 40: Radio set, AN/VRC-64. Line 41: Radio set, AN/PRC-77.

B-12


Line 42: Radio set, AN/VRC-12. Line 43: Secure set, AN/PRC-91. Line 44: Secure set, AN/PRC-126. Line 45: Secure set, KY-57. NOTE: Lines 46, 47, and 48 are used as needed for additional radios assigned to the platoon. Miscellaneous Equipment Line 49: Demolition set, explosive, initiating, nonelectric. Line 50: Detecting set, mine, portable, metallic and non-metallic. Line 51: Detecting set, mine, portable, metallic, AN/PSS-11. Line 52: Night vision goggles, AN/PVS-7B. Line 53: Night vision sight, crew-served weapon, AN/TVS-5. Line 54: Night vision sight, individual-served weapon, AN/PVS-4. Line 55: Platoon early warning system (PEWS), AN/TRS-2(V). Line 56: Binoculars, modular construction, military scale reticle, 7x50-mm, with equipment. Line 57: Telescope, straight, military. Line 58: Detector, radar signal, AN/PSS-10. Line 59: Position locating reporting system, basic user unit. Line 60: Position locating reporting system, surface vehicle installation kit. NOTE: Lines 61, 62, and 63 are used as needed for any other equipment assigned to the platoon. EXAMPLE

B-37. “THIS IS RED 3. YELLOW 1. LINE 12: ALPHA. LINE 33: BRAVO. LINE 38: CHARLIE. LINE 55: CHARLIE. OVER.”

YELLOW 1A – BATTLE LOSS SPOT REPORT WHEN USED

B-38. The Yellow 1A report is transmitted by the platoon leader or PSG as soon as possible after items are lost or damaged in battle. Losses are reported using line numbers from the Yellow 1 report. FORMAT

B-39. Provide pertinent information on the following lines: Line 1:

Time of loss.

Line 2:

Number of pieces of equipment to be evacuated to troop/battalion or higher for maintenance. Refer to the appropriate line numbers from the Yellow 1 report.

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Line 3:

Number of pieces of equipment destroyed and abandoned in pieces. Refer to the appropriate line numbers from the Yellow 1 report.

Line 4:

Location (encoded) of abandoned equipment.

EXAMPLE

B-40. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW ONE ALPHA, BREAK. LINE 1: ONE FOUR THREE ZERO HOURS. LINE 2: REFERENCE SIX SLANT ONE; REFERENCE TWO-NINER SLANT THREE. LINE 3: REFERENCE TWO-NINER SLANT ONE. LINE 4: I SET VB, IDVRTG.” NOTE: Yellow 1A reports are not cumulative. A Yellow 1 report showing total unit status is sent daily not later than 1300 hours. It gives equipment status as of 1200 hours that day.

YELLOW 2 – AMMUNITION STATUS REPORT B-41. This report is transmitted once daily at 1300 hours or immediately upon completion of threat contact. The following status codes are used: GREEN: 90% or more on hand, all ammunition types. AMBER: 80% to 89% on hand, all ammunition types. RED: 60% to 79% on hand, all ammunition types. BLACK: 59% or less on hand, all ammunition types. NOTE: BLACK status in a Yellow 2 report requires immediate follow-up with a Yellow 2A report. GREEN, AMBER, or RED status does not require submission of a Yellow 2A.

YELLOW 2A – AMMUNITION REQUEST FORMAT

B-42. The required quantity of each type of ammunition will be requested using the following line numbers: Line 1: Report as-of DTG. Line 2: 105-mm/120-mm, HEAT. Line 3: 105-mm/120-mm, HEP. Line 4: 105-mm/120-mm, APERS. Line 5: 105-mm/120-mm, WP. Line 6: 105-mm/120-mm, APDS. Line 7: 40-mm, HEDP. Line 8: Caliber .50 (M85). Line 9: Caliber .50 (M2). Line 10: 25-mm. Line 11: 7.62-mm (coax/M60).

B-14


Line 12: 4.2-inch HE with fuze. Line 13: 4.2-inch WP with fuze. Line 14: 4.2-inch illumination with fuze. Line 15: 81-mm, HE with fuze. Line 16: 81-mm, WP with fuze. Line 17: 81-mm, illumination with fuze. Line 18: Fuze, prox (4.2-inch). Line 19: Fuze, PD (4.2-inch). Line 20: Fuze, prox (81-mm). Line 21: Fuze, PD (8l-mm). Line 22: Fuze, blast, time. Line 23: Blasting cap, nonelectric. Line 24: Fuze, igniter. Line 25: 5.56-mm ball. Line 26: 5.56-mm tracer. Line 27: Redeye, XM41E2. Line 28: Grenade, fragmentation. Line 29: Grenade, smoke. Line 30: Grenade, thermite. Line 31: Grenade, 40-mm, HE. Line 32: Grenade, 40-mm, WP. Line 33: Grenade, 40-mm, AP. Line 34: Javelin. Line 35: AT-4. Line 36: Dragon. Line 37: TOW. Line 38: Stinger missile. Line 39: Mine, AT. Line 40: Mine, AP. Line 41: Mine, Claymore. Line 42: 25-mm HE. Line 43: 25-mm AP. Line 44: 165-mm HE (CEV). NOTE: All Yellow 2A requests will be for the quantity of ammunition required by the platoon unless otherwise specified.

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NOTE: When sending a Yellow 2A report, use only the lines required for specific requests. Additional lines (beginning with Line 45) are used to request any other types of ammunition required by the platoon. Attached units should coordinate with the S4 for additional line numbers for their ammunition requirements. EXAMPLE

B-43. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW TWO ALPHA, BREAK. LINE 1: CVB GHJ. LINE 37: RTY UOL. LINE 42: ERF WDS QTR.”

YELLOW 3 – POL STATUS REPORT WHEN USED

B-44. This report is sent twice daily or as required. FORMAT

B-45. The following status codes are used: GREEN: 90% or more of the required quantity on hand. AMBER: 80% to 89% on hand. RED: 60% to 79% on hand. BLACK: 59% or less on hand. EXAMPLE

B-46. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 4. YELLOW THREE, AMBER, OVER.”

YELLOW 3A – POL REQUEST FORMAT

B-47. The required quantity of each type of POL product will be requested using the following line numbers: Line 1: Report as-of DTG. Line 2: MOGAS (gal). Line 3: Diesel (gal). Line 4: Oil, OE-10 (gal). Line 5: Oil, OE-30 (gal). Line 6: Oil, OE-50 (gal). Line 7: Oil, OE-90 (gal). Line 8: Antifreeze (gal). Line 9: Brake fluid (gal). Line 10: Hydraulic fluid, OHA (qt). Line 11: Hydraulic fluid, OHT (qt). Line 12: Hydraulic fluid, FRH (qt). Line 13: Oil, penetrating (qt).

B-16


Line 14: Oil, PL-special (qt). Line 15: Oil, PL-medium (qt). Line 16: Bore cleaner (gal). Line 17: Oil, LSA (qt). Line 18: Grease, GAA (lb). Line 19: Grease, wheel bearing (lb). Line 20: Solvent (gal). NOTE: Lines 21, 22, and 23 are used as needed for any other equipment assigned to the platoon. Additional lines (beginning with Line 24) are used to request any other POL products required by the platoon or attached elements. EXAMPLE

B-48. “BLACK 3, THIS IS RED 1. YELLOW THREE ALPHA, BREAK. LINE 1: 112000 NOV. LINE 3: 900. LINE l8: 15.”

SECTION IV – RED REPORTS (PERSONNEL) B-49. Red reports cover various areas of the reconnaissance platoon’s personnel status. The reports included here cover battle losses and requests for medical evacuation.

RED 2 – PERSONNEL BATTLE LOSS REPORT WHEN USED

B-50. A Red 2 report is transmitted to the troop/task force TOC as casualties occur. The unit must also complete DA Form 1156, with witness statements, and DA Form 1155 and submit them to the 1SG. Red 2 is an interim report to update information sent in the last Red 1 report. FORMAT

B-51. Provide all pertinent information using the following lines: Line 1: Battle roster number. Line 2: DTG of the incident. Line 3: Location of the incident (encoded). Line 4: Type of casualties, encoded by letter as follows:

· · · · ·

ALPHA: KIA, hostile action. BRAVO: KIA, nonhostile action. CHARLIE: Body recovered. DELTA: Body not recovered. ECHO: Body identified.

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· · · · · · · ·

FOXTROT: Body not identified. GOLF: MIA. HOTEL: Captured. INDIA: WIA, slight, hostile action. JULIET: WIA, serious, hostile action. KILO: WIA, slight, nonhostile action. LIMA: WIA, serious, nonhostile action. MIKE: Accident.

Line 5: Location to which casualties are evacuated.

RED 3 – MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST WHEN USED

B-52. A Red 3 report is sent to the medical team on the troop/company command net to request MEDEVAC support. FORMAT Ground Evacuation Format

B-53. Provide pertinent information on the following lines: Line 1: State “EVAC.” Line 2: Location for pickup (encoded). Line 3: Number of casualties. Line 4: Category of patient condition, encoded by letter designation as follows:

· · ·

ALPHA: Urgent. BRAVO: Priority. CHARLIE: Routine.

NOTE: Use the letter designation with the number of patients in each category; for example, "TWO ALPHA" indicates that two patients require evacuation on an urgent basis. Air Evacuation Format

B-54. Use a format as prescribed in the appropriate SOI, or use the ground evacuation format as above, specifying air evacuation.

SECTION V – NBC REPORTS PURPOSE B-55. The reconnaissance platoon uses NBC reports to provide the TOC with accurate and timely information on all shelling and NBC activity

B-18


within the squadron or battalion area of operations. These reports are used for the following specific purposes:

·

NBC-1. Used by the observing unit to report initial and subsequent data of an NBC attack.

·

NBC-2. Used for passing evaluated data of an NBC attack. (NOTE: The format for the NBC-2 report is not included in this discussion.)

·

NBC-3. Used for immediate warning of expected NBC contamination.

· ·

NBC-4. Used to report radiation dose rate measurements. NBC-5. Used to report locations of NBC contamination or hazards.

RESPONSIBILITY B-56. The squadron/battalion S3 is responsible for collecting, monitoring, and distributing shelling and NBC information. The chemical officer and chemical NCO are responsible for evaluating NBC reports, formulating NBC reports for lower and higher units, and recommending COAs to the commander.

REPORTING SYSTEM B-57. All shelling and NBC reports are forwarded to the TOC over the command net.

NBC-1 – OBSERVER’S INITIAL REPORT Format B-58. To send this report, state “NBC ONE” and give the type of NBC incident (nuclear, biological, or chemical). Other information that may be sent includes precedence of the report, date and time of the report (ZULU time), and security classification with "from" and "to" times the classification is applicable. Provide all pertinent information on the following lines: Line ALPHA: Strike serial number (if known). Line BRAVO: Position of observer (UTM coordinates or name of place). Line CHARLIE: Grid or magnetic bearing (specify which is used) or azimuth of attack from observer (in degrees or mils; specify which is used). Line DELTA: DTG attack started (ZULU). Line ECHO: Illumination time in seconds (for nuclear burst); time the attack ended (toxic agent attack only). Line FOXTROT: Location of attack (UTM coordinates) and/or vicinity of attack (actual or estimated; specify which is given). Line GOLF: Means of delivery (if known).

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Line HOTEL: Type of burst (air, surface, unknown), type of toxic agent, or type of attack. Line INDIA: Number of shells; other data (for toxic attack only). Line JULIET: Flash-to-bang time (in seconds). Line KILO: Crater present or absent; diameter in meters (if known). Line LIMA: Cloud width (degrees or mils; specify which) 5 minutes after burst. Line MIKE: Cloud height (top or bottom; specify which) 10 minutes after burst (degrees or mils; specify which). Line SIERRA: DTG of reading (local or ZULU time). NOTE: DO NOT DELAY REPORTS in an attempt to provide complete format information. Omit information that is not applicable or available. Items that must always be reported are the type of report; lines D and H; and one of the following lines: B, C, F, or G. NOTE: Carefully specify the units of measure used (such as degrees, mils, or grid azimuth). EXAMPLES

B-59. Table B-1 shows sample transmissions sent in NBC-1 reports for the three types of NBC attack. Note that some lines are omitted when information is not applicable or available. Table B-1. Example NBC-1 Reports LINE

NUCLEAR

CHEMICAL

B

"TU 440810"

"MARBERG"

C

"GRID 242 DEGREES"

"MAGNETIC 2650 MILS"

D

"270400 ZULU"

"270400 ZULU"

"270400 ZULU"

E

"270410 ZULU"

"270412 ZULU"

F

"TU459830, ESTIMATED"

"OBERG, ACTUAL"

G

"ROCKET"

"AERIAL"

"NERVE"

"BIOLOGICAL"

H

"UNKNOWN"

"135"

I J

BIOLOGICAL

"65"

K L

"100 MILS"

M S

B-20

"270445 ZULU"

"270430 ZULU"


B-60. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC-1, NUCLEAR. LINE BRAVO: I SET DX, lMNUWS. LINE DELTA: 020945 ROMEO. LINE HOTEL: AIR. LINE LIMA: 100 MILS, ESTIMATED.” B-61. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC-1, CHEMICAL. LINE DELTA: 261003 ROMEO. LINE FOXTROT: NB783089. LINE GOLF: ARTILLERY. LINE HOTEL: VAPOR.”

NBC-3 – IMMEDIATE WARNING OF EXPECTED CONTAMINATION FORMAT

B-62. This report is sent by radio. State "NBC THREE," followed by pertinent information on these lines:

Line ALPHA: Strike serial number (if known). Line DELTA: DTG when attack started. Line FOXTROT: Location of attack (actual or estimated; specify which). Line PAPA: Area of expected contamination. Line YANKEE: Bearing or azimuth of left, then right radial lines (specify degrees or mils; use 4 digits for each line). Line ZULU: Effective downwind speed (in kmph; use 3 digits), downwind effective distance of zone (in km; use 3 digits), and cloud radius (in km; use 2 digits). EXAMPLES

B-63. Table B-2 shows sample transmissions sent in NBC-3 reports for nuclear and chemical/biological attacks. Note that lines are omitted whenever information is not applicable or available. Table B-2. Example NBC-3 Reports LINE

NUCLEAR

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL

A

"54-1"

"23"

D

"270400 LOCAL"

"270400 ZULU"

F

"LB 187486, ESTIMATED"

"LB 206300, ACTUAL" "LB 208320, LB 210320, LB 206310, LB 204310"

P Y

"02700310"

Z

"01902505" or "011"

NBC-4 – REPORT OF RADIATION DOSE-RATE MEASUREMENT WHEN USED

B-64. The NBC-4 report, used for nuclear activity only, is submitted immediately after any radiation is detected and thereafter as required by the OPORD.

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FORMAT

B-65. To send this report, state "NBC FOUR," followed by pertinent information on these lines: Line QUEBEC: Location of reading; use friendly graphics or encryption. Omit this line when transmitting on a wire net. Line ROMEO: Dose rate in cGy/hr (average total dose rounded to the nearest 10 cGy). Specify whether the dose rate is "INITIAL," "INCREASING," "PEAK," or "DECREASING"; specify "SHIELDED" if the dose rate is measured inside a vehicle. Line SIERRA: DTG of reading. Specify the time zone. NOTE: Repeat lines Q, R, and S as often as necessary. Radiation dose rates ideally are measured in the open, one meter above the ground; if the rate must be measured in a shielded location, it is converted (as accurately as possible) to a rate in the open. EXAMPLES

B-66. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC FOUR. LINE QUEBEC: LB 123987. LINE ROMEO: 1, INITIAL. LINE SIERRA: 201735 LOCAL.” B-67. “THIS IS RED 1. NBC FOUR. LINE QUEBEC: LB 123987. LINE ROMEO: 60, PEAK. LINE SIERRA: 201805 LOCAL.” NOTE: Users of NBC-4 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in these examples.

NBC-5 – REPORT OF AREAS OF CONTAMINATION B-68. To send this report, state “NBC FIVE.” Other information that may be sent includes precedence of the report, date and time of the report (ZULU), and security classification with “from” and “to” times the classification is applicable. Provide all pertinent information on the following lines: Line ALPHA: Strike serial number, if known. Line OSCAR: Reference DTG for estimated contours of contaminated areas. Line SIERRA: DTG when contamination was initially detected. Line TANGO: H+1 DTG or DTG of latest reconnaissance of contamination in the area. Line UNIFORM: Coordinates of contour lines marking a dose rate of 1,000 cGy/hr. Line VICTOR: Coordinates of contour lines marking a dose rate of 300 cGy/hr. Line WHISKEY: Coordinates of contour lines marking a dose rate of 100 cGy/hr. Line X-RAY: Coordinates of contour lines marking a dose rate of 20 cGy/hr.

B-22


SECTION VI – DIGITAL REPORTING AND C2 MESSAGES B-69. In addition to its capabilities related to providing situational awareness data, FBCB2 offers a variety of functions that can enhance C2 in the reconnaissance platoon. The system has four categories of C2 messages:

·

Alerts and warnings. Examples include NBC reports and warnings of danger zones such as NBC contaminated areas, obstacles, or enemy locations.

·

Joint support information. This covers interfaces with other branches of service. (NOTE: This type of digital information is not covered in this discussion.)

· ·

Combat reporting. This includes the commander’s SITREP. Mission planning information. Examples include OPORDs and FRAGOs.

ALERTS AND WARNINGS B-70. Alerts and warnings are sent via reports, free text messages, or geo-referenced messages (see Table B-3). They are posted on the FIPR message queue and are displayed on the function bar of the main FBCB2 screen and as a symbol on the map screen. B-71. When the platform penetrates the safety radius of a danger zone, the FBCB2 alarm is triggered, an alert message is displayed on the warnings/alerts marquee, and an entry is made in the warnings tab group. The danger zone tab group will display the type, distance, direction, location and originator of all danger zone information received. Danger zone information is transmitted in specific JVMF messages as situational awareness data. FBCB2 receives the message and displays the situational awareness/danger zone information in the danger zone tab group.

COMBAT REPORTING MESSAGES B-72. These JVMF messages have been modified and grouped together to provide single-button access to the message template, requiring fewer keystrokes to complete and send the message. Combat messages are the following:

· · · · ·

SALT. MEDEVAC. Fire mission (call for fire). Check fire. SITREP.

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Table B-3. FBCB2 Danger Zone Messages Message Type

Type of Danger Zone

Safety Radius (Meters)

NBC-1 Obstacle Report / NBC-1 Obstacle Report / NBC-1 / Strike Warning Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Spot Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Obstacle Report Strike Warning Threat Warning Threat Warning Threat Warning Threat Warning Threat Warning Threat Warning Threat Warning Threat Warning

Chemical

500

Biological

500

Nuclear

1000

Aircraft Formation Field Fortifications Multiple Rocket Launcher Air Defense Artillery Assembly Area Buildings Equipment Command Center Supply Dump Rocket Missiles Vehicles Armor Combat Artillery Mortar Weapons Personnel Unknown Fire Mission Minefield, Antipersonnel Minefield, Antitank Minefield, Mixed Minefield, Unknown Chemical, Nerve Chemical, Blood Chemical, Blister Chemical, Choking Booby Traps Abatis Craters Antitank Ditch Scatterable Mines Bunker Strongpoint Conventional NBC Antiaircraft Artillery Aircraft Air-to-Air Missile Surface-to-Air Missile Surface-to-Surface Missile Air-to-Surface Missile Unknown

5000 4000 1500 4000 4000 4000 1500 4000 1500 1500 4000 4000 4000 4000 8000 1500 1500 4000 600 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 1500 1000 500 4000 10000 10000 1500 10000 15000 4000

MISSION PLANNING INFORMATION B-24


B-73. Mission planning information includes orders and request-type messages that contain JVMF message templates. They include the following:

· · · · ·

Warning orders. OPLANs and OPORDs. FRAGOs. Logistics orders and requests. Free text massages.

GEO-REFERENCED MESSAGES B-74. These messages, which can be used in the C2 categories discussed earlier, create icons linked to a location on the FBCB2 map. They are also disseminated across the TI as situational awareness data. Geo-referenced messages can be used for the following:

· · · · · ·

Obstacle reports. NBC-1 reports. Bridge reports. Supply point status reports. Contact reports. Engagement reports.

DIGITAL REPORTS B-75. The following are example FBCB2 reports, included are illustrations showing FBCB2 report screens for sample situations. DIGITAL BLUE-1 REPORT (SPOTREP)

B-76. The digital Blue-1 report (Figure B-2) is sent to the entire platoon and company/troop when contact occurs. The best way to send this report is by using the far target locator. In addition, if approved by the platoon leader, a call for fire can be requested simultaneously with the Blue-1.

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Figure B-2. Digital Blue-1 Report (SPOTREP) DIGITAL BLUE-2 (SITREP)

B-77. The digital SITREP (Figure B-3) is sent twice daily to the PSG (for example, at 0600 and 1800) or as necessary during tactical situations. The criteria for each category (GREEN, AMBER, RED, and BLACK) are the same as in analog SITREPs; refer to the discussion earlier in this section. Each vehicle will send the Blue-2 to the platoon leader and PSG for consolidation. The PSG will forward the consolidated report to the company/troop commander, XO, and 1SG.

Figure B-3. Digital Blue-2 Report (SITREP)

B-26


DIGITAL YELLOW REPORT

B-78. The digital Yellow report (Figure B-4) is a combination of the analog Yellow 1, 2, and 3 reports. When sending this report, all classes of supply are reported. Each vehicle sends this report to the platoon leader and PSG. The PSG consolidates this information and forwards a platoon rollup to the 1SG, XO, maintenance team chief, and medics. At a minimum, this report is sent once daily before 0900 hours.

Figure B-4. Digital Yellow Report (Logistics Report) DIGITAL RED-3 REPORT (MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST)

B-79. The digital Red-3 MEDEVAC request (Figure B-5) is sent to the PSG, 1SG, medics, and maintenance team.

Figure B-5. Digital Red-3 Report (MEDEVAC Request)

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DIGITAL NBC-1 REPORT (OBSERVER’S INITIAL REPORT)

B-80. The digital NBC-1 report (Figure B-6) is sent on confirmation of contact with NBC weapons. The report is sent to the entire company/troop.

Figure B-6. Digital NBC-1 Report (Observer’s Initial Report)

DIGITAL OBSTACLE REPORT

B-81. The digital obstacle report (Figure B-6) is sent by the vehicle that can best identify the dimensions and type of the obstacle. The report is sent to the entire company/troop.

Figure B-6. Digital Obstacle Report

B-28

Appendix C

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations Military planners recognize that enemies of the United States have learned many lessons in the years since the Gulf War deployment. Rogue nations or insurgent elements, for example, may attempt to use the media to create psychological leverage to sway public opinion and create public discontent. At the same time, they may support such informationoriented efforts with nontraditional forms of combat, such as NBC operations. The ultimate goal may be to break up an alliance or neutralize the commitment of an international coalition to a particular region. Such factors, coupled with US involvement in worldwide operational or support contingencies, increase the probability that U.S. forces will encounter asymmetrical threats, including NBC situations. To accomplish missions on contaminated battlefields, reconnaissance platoons must take precautions to avoid or minimize the effects of NBC hazards. Properly executed, the defensive measures in this appendix will help the platoon to survive, fight, and win.

CONTENTS Principles of NBC Defense ................................... Introduction .................................................... Understanding the NBC Environment .......... Adapting to the NBC Environment ............... NBC Protection ............................................... Decontamination Considerations ................. Contamination Avoidance .................................... Active Defensive Measures ........................... Passive Defensive Measures ........................ Locating, Indentifying, Tracking, and Predicting Hazards .............................. NBC Hazard Warning and Reporting ............ NBC Equipment ..................................................... M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit .......... M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper .............. M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper .............. M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm ...... M22 ACADA System ....................................... Chemical Agent Monitor ................................ Improved Chemical Agent Monitor ............... AN/VDR-2 Radiac Set ..................................... AN/UDR-13 Radiac Set ................................... IM-93/UD Dosimeter ....................................... PP-1578A/PD Radiac Detector Charger ........ AN/PDR-75 Radiac Detector Reader (for DT-236 Dosimeter) ............................... DT-236 Dosimeter ........................................... M272 Water Testing Kit .................................. M34 CM Agent Sampling Kit .......................... Reconnoitering an NBC Environment ................. The Operational Environment and the NBC Threat .................................... NBCRS Platoon .............................................. NBC Movement Patterns ............................... NBC Surveillance ........................................... NBC Warning and Reporting ......................... Locating and Marking NBC Hazards ............ NBC Protection (Reducing NBC Vulnerability) ... General Protection Considerations .............. Pretreatment Activities .................................. Nuclear Hazards and Protective Measures .. Biological Hazards and Protective Measures ..................................................... Chemical Hazards and Protective Measures ..................................................... Decontamination and First Aid ............................ Leadership Considerations ........................... Decontamination Operations ........................ NBC First Aid .................................................. Unmasking Procedures ................................. Managing NBC Casualties .............................

C-2 C-2 C-2 C-2 C-2 C-5 C-5 C-6 C-6 C-12 C-12 C-12 C-13 C-14 C-15 C-16 C-17 C-19 C-20 C-21 C-22 C-23 C-23 C-24 C-25 C-26 C-27 C-28 C-28 C-29 C-31 C-36 C-38 C-42 C-44 C-44 C-46 C-47 C-53 C-56 C-59 C-59 C-60 C-67 C-67 C-69

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SECTION I – PRINCIPLES OF NBC DEFENSE INTRODUCTION C-1. A motivated and determined threat may use NBC weapons to gain strategic leverage and to provide a counterbalance to the precisionguided munitions and sophisticated weaponry of the United States and its allies. NBC hazards could result from terrorist aggression, collateral damage from conventional weapons, or other sources of environmental contamination. C-2. Units at all levels, including the reconnaissance platoon, must be proficient in executing the three principles of NBC defense: contamination avoidance, NBC protection, and decontamination. Coupled with proper tactics and effective retaliatory response, these actions will increase the likelihood of victory in the contaminated environment.

UNDERSTANDING THE NBC ENVIRONMENT C-3. The primary aspect of understanding the NBC environment in the battlespace entails the identification of hazards. It is the key to shaping the NBC defense, enabling the platoon to avoid the hazard or to enhance its protective posture if avoidance is not possible. C-4. NBC situational understanding includes detection of trace fugitive emissions (for example, those escaping from hazardous materials production facilities or during transportation of munitions/materials) prior to deployment. A typical troop or company team is equipped with hand-held and remote automatic alarms, hazard monitors, and detector kits. In addition, organic NBC reconnaissance vehicles, in the squadron/battalion or from division/corps augmentation assets, are equipped with sophisticated detection, identification, and sampling equipment. Significant warning improvements evolve from the ability to interconnect many of these detection devices. C-5. A discussion later in this appendix lists available NBC detection devices and provides a brief description of their capabilities. It also describes how the information from these devices is input into the FBCB2 and the MCS at squadron/battalion level using the multiintegrated chemical agent alarm (MICAD) detection and warning hardware.

ADAPTING TO THE NBC ENVIRONMENT C-6. Adapting the NBC environment to meet the unit’s mission requirements entails the orchestration of NBC defensive assets in support of the principles of contamination avoidance, NBC protection, and decontamination. This requires the unit to employ NBC visualization. This process allows the commander to develop a clear understanding of the current and predicted NBC situation, to envision the end state (mission accomplishment without NBC casualties), and to visualize the operational sequence that moves the commander’s forces from their current state to the end state.

NBC PROTECTION C-7. NBC protection prevents or reduces casualties through reduction of the NBC threat, practice of contamination avoidance measures, C-2

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Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

physical protection, and initiation of medical pretreatment procedures. Emerging technologies will enhance the commander’s situational understanding of the NBC environment and allow him to employ an NBC-focused defense. The goal is to increase the MOPP level only for units affected by an NBC event. As noted, refer to the discussion of current NBC defense equipment later in this appendix. DEPLOYMENT VULNERABILITY

C-8. During a major conflict, NBC weapons may be employed early to disrupt and delay the build-up of friendly forces. The areas of greatest vulnerability are large fixed sites such as an aerial port of debarkation (APOD) or seaport of debarkation (SPOD); staging and marshalling areas; hubs and bases; assembly areas; and MSRs adjacent to sites involved in early entry force build-up activities. The hazards and potential damage caused by NBC attack may require relocation of bases and health service support facilities, major redirection of supply flow, reallocation of transportation and engineering services, and short-notice transfer of replacement personnel or units from one part of the battlefield to another. C-9. Given the importance and size of potential NBC NAIs and highrisk locations, the reconnaissance platoon must be proficient in NBC reconnaissance and surveillance tactics and techniques so it can independently execute NBC missions in the ISR plan. Additionally, recce platoons must be trained to integrate with the NBC reconnaissance and surveillance (NBCRS) platoon assigned to the surveillance troop and with other theater NBCRS augmentation assets to assist in the conduct of multiple, wide-area NBC reconnaissance and surveillance missions. (NOTE: Other types of reconnaissance platoons must be trained to accomplish similar integration with theater NBCRS augmentation assets to assist in NBC missions.) NBC DEFENSE DURING FORCE PROJECTION

C-10. Force projection usually begins as a contingency operation—a rapid response to a crisis. Forces committed to these operations are tailored and task organized for rapid deployment, forcible entry (if needed), effective employment, and mission accomplishment. Contingency operations may be executed by joint or combined forces. Leader and Unit Requirements

C-11. Leaders in the squadron/battalion, troop/company team, and platoon must understand the potential NBC missions and know how to synchronize their operations closely with chemical staff members. The reconnaissance platoon must be prepared to operate under NBC conditions across the range of military operations. Phases of Force Protection Operations

C-12. Ideally, force projection operations are phased. There are generally eight phases to a force projection operation (mobilization, predeployment, deployment, entry operations, operations, postconflict operations, redeployment, demobilization), although a particular crisis response may not be included every phase. C-13. Mobilization and Predeployment. Chemical staff members work closely with the brigade and squadron/battalion S2 and other intelligence centers and/or agencies. Their mission is to determine and C-3

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predict the NBC threat and nonstandard hazards presented by accidental or incidental bombing or destruction of laboratories, nuclear facilities, industrial plants, or commercial and military factories. The reconnaissance platoon can expect that most of these will be deemed NFAs and must be coordinated accordingly to avoid or predict targeting.

C-14. Once the threat is understood and the risks considered, chemical units are identified to provide tailoring and/or augmentation of the brigade. Chemical defense equipment (CDE) undergoes premovement precombat inspections, testing, and packaging. Soldiers receive final inoculations (as required), draw individual protective equipment (IPE), and conduct limited training of perishable NBC individual and collective tasks. A chemical staff may be part of the brigade early entry command center (EECP) if one is required to establish the C2 architecture and facilitate rapid introduction of air-land combat forces. C-15. Deployment. If the threat has the capability to employ WMD, the use of these weapons during this phase may provide him with the optimum payoff against US forces. While the NBCRS platoon may deploy with other units, decontamination and smoke assets typically arrive later, based on the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD). C-16. Brigade and/or squadron/battalion commanders will weigh the risks and approve the airflow of NBC assets. To provide effective augmentation to NBC defense units, chemical staffs must monitor force projection plans and consider the capabilities of host nation, allied, or coalition forces. C-17. Entry Operations. Force protection is key to success in the

entry of US forces into the theater. NBC staffs contribute to stabilization efforts for whatever challenge is presented. As soon as the NBC staff members arrive in theater, they reexamine the threat, define the COP, assess the risk, and track arrival and integration of NBCRS vehicles. When NBC defense augmentation assets arrive, they are integrated into a defense network that maximizes the capabilities of host nation, allied, and coalition forces.

C-18. Scouts and the NBCRS platoon arrive in theater prepared to move out quickly, deploy, and engage the threat if necessary. After their arrival, they rapidly maneuver to expand the security zone. C-19. Tactical Operations. The brigade commander will employ conventional and NBC reconnaissance and surveillance assets as he seeks to gain information dominance and positional advantage. When this is accomplished, the commander can conduct multiple and simultaneous decisive operations to shape the battlespace and sustain his forces, unhindered by the threat of NBC hazards and the reduced operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and increased logistical burden they impose. C-20. Postconflict, Redeployment, and Demobilization. Postconflict threat levels dictate which conventional and NBC units are no longer required and can thus be redeployed. Before redeployment, decontamination units may participate in vehicle washdown to bring vehicles, equipment, and supplies to environmentally acceptable “peacetime clean” levels. Both conventional and NBC reconnaissance and surveillance elements may be tasked to conduct BDA, environmental monitoring, and continued surveillance of areas of suspected or actual

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contamination. Postconflict missions may also include sensing to substantiate agreements for the destruction of WMD and related storage and production facilities. Once forces return to their home stations, reserve component units are returned to the appropriate status. All units conduct AARs and prepare written summaries of lessons learned.

DECONTAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS C-21. Despite avoidance efforts, reconnaissance elements may become contaminated. This may occur either by direct attack or by accidental exposure, such as when the mission dictates movement through a previously unidentified contaminated area. C-22. Following NBC contamination, reconnaissance forces must quickly restore combat power by conducting decontamination operations and providing medical treatment for soldiers incapacitated due to exposure. Immediate decontamination procedures and operational decontamination, which entails MOPP gear exchange and vehicle washdown, will restore a degree of combat power. Full restoration, however, will require reconnaissance units to conduct thorough decontamination. The key to effective medical intervention is quick diagnosis of NBC exposure. C-23. The evolving warfighting trends of smaller, more widely dispersed reconnaissance elements and use of advanced visualization assets should serve to reduce the percentage of a unit that is actually contaminated. The keys to maintaining OPTEMPO are timely and accurate BDA and employment of decontamination triage to sort equipment according to the type and extent of decontamination required. Rapid identification of uncontaminated equipment will allow units to recover quickly, resume normal operations with the clean equipment, and focus needed decontamination efforts only on contaminated vehicles and equipment. In turn, this will enable commanders to best allocate scarce decontamination assets. Decentralized decontamination as far forward as possible will remain a critical factor in limiting the spread of contamination and in preserving combat power and OPTEMPO.

SECTION II – CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE C-24. Avoiding contamination, the most important principle of NBC defense, requires the ability to recognize the presence or absence of NBC hazards in the air and on water, land, personnel, equipment, and facilities. If an NBC hazard cannot be avoided, the reconnaissance platoon must be prepared to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of exposure. C-25. Contamination avoidance is absolutely critical to the success of the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon should constantly analyze its vulnerability to NBC attack and take appropriate actions. This discussion focuses on four measures the platoon can take for contamination avoidance:

· ·

Employ active defensive measures. Employ passive defensive measures.

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Locate, identify, track, and predict contamination. Warn and report.

ACTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES C-26. The reconnaissance platoon may conduct active NBC defense measures to seek out and find threat chemical munitions, production facilities, storage depots, or delivery systems and to coordinate with higher headquarters for destruction of weapons and facilities before they are used against friendly forces. Because some NBC NAIs pose significant hazards if targeted by threat or friendly forces, the platoon may be required to conduct surveillance of such locations or facilities to provide early warning of the hazard. This can be best achieved through augmentation of the reconnaissance platoon by NBCRS platoons, which are organic to Chemical Corps units and to the surveillance troop within the SBCT’s cavalry squadron (RSTA). See the discussion later in this appendix covering NBC reconnaissance and surveillance with and without NBCRS platoon augmentation.

PASSIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES C-27. Passive measures are those the reconnaissance platoon takes to avoid being targeted and to mitigate the effects of an NBC attack. This discussion focuses on a variety of passive measures. PLAN AHEAD

C-28. Leaders of the reconnaissance platoon must have a clear understanding of the NBC threat, the level of platoon training and preparedness, and the risks associated with each mission. They then must develop battle drills and conduct rehearsals of them until the platoon’s reaction becomes instinctive should NBC hazards arise. The platoon’s leaders must remain aware of the physiological and psychological impact of wearing IPE or MOPP gear for extended periods in difficult climates. Prolonged periods in MOPP may result in degradation of the platoon’s combat power. AVOID DETECTION

C-29. This is the best way to prevent NBC attacks, with OPSEC the most effective defense. Specific measures include camouflage, wellexecuted tactical movements (stealth), and noise and light discipline. PROVIDE EARLY WARNING

C-30. When the reconnaissance platoon is stationary, it can position remote chemical agent alarms upwind to provide early warning of a chemical attack. While it is on the move, especially when conducting NBC reconnaissance and surveillance, the NBCRS platoon uses on-board and stand-off NBC sensors to detect and identify most chemical warfare agents and radiological hazards. Prompt and accurate NBC-1 reports and/or SPOTREPs enhance situational awareness by providing “need-toknow” warnings (and “de-warnings,” if applicable) to units in the affected area and to adjacent and follow-on elements. Instinctive dissemination of these reports represents a fundamental discipline of contamination avoidance. The goal is a set of streamlined messages that define a

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common operational picture and prevent panic and unnecessary overreaction in the execution of NBC defense. MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE

C-31. Discipline is a must if the platoon is to survive and overcome the shock of an NBC attack. Soldiers must be physically and mentally capable of functioning in an NBC environment for extended periods. MOPP acclimation training is essential to developing stamina, teamwork, confidence, trust, and reliability for soldiers and the platoon leadership. Risk assessment and rest cycle management must become fundamental disciplines during mission planning. SEEK PROTECTION

C-32. When the platoon is mobile, natural cover may provide some shelter from chemical agents; however, the platoon must be aware of lowlying areas such as ditches, valleys, depressions, and ravines. Like fog, chemical agents are frequently released early in the morning and late in the afternoon, when they are likely to linger for longer periods. When the platoon is in the defense or is halted, leaders should remember that heavily wooded areas provide limited protection from liquid agents. At the same time, however, some semipersistent agents, uninhibited by climatic conditions, may prove more lasting, with toxic vapors lingering for unpredictable periods. MOPP gear, overhead cover, and mounted operations afford the best, most reliable protection. DISPERSE

C-33. Effective dispersion should reduce the platoon’s vulnerability without compromising the tactical mission. Leaders must understand the advantages of dispersing combat forces, as well as equipment and critical classes of supply, when the threat of NBC attack is high. In such a situation, using dispersion to create multiple targets increases platoon survivability and sustainability and presents a more formidable challenge for the threat. Conversely, the disadvantages of dispersing the platoon must be weighed against the risk of NBC attack. Extended distances may have a detrimental impact on the conduct of C4ISR, on treatment and handling of conventional and NBC casualties, and on logistics operations, including necessary decontamination operations. Reconnaissance platoon leaders must know how to use METT-TC to develop an effective dispersion plan. REMAIN MOBILE

C-34. The platoon’s primary function is to maneuver to gain positional advantage for reconnaissance and surveillance. Should crews or leaders determine that the threat has detected the platoon and may target it using NBC or conventional weapons, maintaining tactical mobility is the best method of contamination avoidance. The FBCB2 provides the platoon with information and situational understanding on battlefield debris and contaminated areas. Leaders should use this information to assist them in maintaining mobility, weighing mission objectives against the risk of exposure before deciding on the best COA. COVER SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

C-35. If an NBC attack is imminent, the platoon should cover its supplies and equipment to avoid contamination. This is especially critical C-7

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when the platoon is in the defense. Tarpaulins and plastic sheeting can be used, as well as field expedient items such as canvas and cardboard. Leaders should remember that expedient NBC protective covers provide protection but must be monitored closely because contamination will seep through covers over time. After exposure to heavy contamination, covers should be replaced as soon as possible, ideally within one hour after contamination. CONDUCT PREMOVEMENT/PRECOMBAT ACTIONS

C-36. Actions taken by the platoon before departing for a mission include premovement/precombat inspections, evaluation of the potential for an NBC attack, and identification of mitigation techniques (such as cover, close, seal) that may be required Leaders must determine what items cannot be decontaminated and then take steps to guard or protect them (as well as platoon personnel) from accidental exposure. Measures that the platoon (or attached elements) should take before crossing or operating in an NBC environment include the following:

·

Update the COP and/or FBCB2 to reflect the tactical situation and identify NBC hazards.

·

Select the most favorable route(s) using principles of contamination avoidance.

·

Notify higher headquarters of the platoon plan. Include checkpoints and halt positions.

·

Rehearse passage of lines and coordination procedures, to include communications frequencies, call signs, and passwords.

·

Conduct inventory and PMCS activities for NBC sensors and detection equipment.

·

Apply NBC detection tape (M9 paper) so that it can be observed by vehicle occupants and/or dismounted soldiers.

·

Remove gear, supplies, and equipment affixed to the vehicle exterior. Secure them inside or leave them at the base camp. Chemical protective covers may be used to retard hazards or to improve the chance that items can be effectively decontaminated.

· · · ·

Install and test NBC detectors and sensors.

· ·

Conduct risk assessment and MOPP analysis.

·

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Rehearse the designated crossing technique or method. Rehearse casualty treatment and evacuation plans. Rehearse techniques and procedures of the NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS). Upgrade to the appropriate MOPP level to prevent troop exposure. (NOTE: Overpressurized vehicles may require a lower level of protection.) Secure hatches and doors before entering or crossing the contaminated area.

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LIMIT EXPOSURE

C-37. While the FBCB2 helps to improve NBC situational understanding, leaders of the reconnaissance platoon may be required to plot a course through contaminated areas to achieve their mission goals. In doing so, they should evaluate METT-TC to guide conventional tactical considerations. They must be prepared to use their experience and leadership, coupled with focused terrain analysis, to minimize exposure to NBC hazards, to maintain platoon lethality, and to avoid degradation as a result of wearing NBC protective equipment. The following discussion covers specific measures and considerations for limiting exposure to contamination in various NBC environments. Radiological Environment

C-38. US forces continue to face radiation dangers from a variety of sources: nuclear weapons, depleted uranium, damaged research facilities, damaged power plants, and the release of radiological isotopes. Scout elements must be prepared to take measures before, during, and after operations to reduce the consequences of incidental or accidental exposure. C-39. Radiation presents a penetrating hazard, and the only complete protection from radiological contamination is avoidance of the area entirely. The purpose of nuclear reconnaissance is ONLY to detect the outermost low-level readings or the extent of the hazard. The reconnaissance concentrates on location of the radiation rather than intensity or dose rate, regardless of the source. This helps to limit crew exposure. The impact of radiation exposure on combat power can be further mitigated by establishing and employing appropriate operational exposure guidance (OEG). Setting the OEG too high or failing to adhere to the guidance may result in severe loss of combat power or even the loss of reconnaissance and surveillance teams. C-40. Radiation Risk. The brigade commander will make a decision, based on METT-TC and previous unit exposure criteria, on the amount or degree of continued radiation exposure (total dose) for his units. See Table C-1 for the risk categories associated with total dose exposure. Table C-1. Radiation Risk Categories TOTAL RADIATION DOSE

RISK CATEGORY

Up to 50 cGy

Negligible Risk

51 to 70 cGy

Moderate Risk

71 to 150 cGy

Emergency Risk

C-41. Radiation Exposure Criteria. The reconnaissance platoon will report its cumulative radiation exposure and it radiation exposure status (RES) to the next higher commander in the daily NBC summary report. Table C-2 outlines the RES categories used to report exposure.

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Table C-2. Radiation Exposure Status Categories TOTAL RADIATION DOSE

RES CATEGORY

No exposure

RES-0

Greater than 0, equal to or less than 70 cGy

RES-1

Greater than 70, equal to or less than 150 cGy

RES-2

Greater than 150 cGy

RES-3

C-42. To determine the RES, the platoon leader collects readings from each of his sections and/or squads, adds the individual readings together, and then divides to calculate a platoon average. As an example, the platoon leader receives the following readings from squad leaders through the NBC NCO:

· · · ·

1st Squad dosimeter reading average (total dose) = 60 cGy. 2d Squad dosimeter reading average (total dose) = 90 cGy. 3d Squad dosimeter reading average (total dose) = 70 cGy. 4th Squad dosimeter reading average (total dose) = 30 cGy.

C-43. The platoon average (total dose) is 63 cGy. The platoon exposure status is RES-1. Chemical Environment

C-44. The longer a platoon is exposed to chemical contamination, the greater the casualty rate. If the mission requires exposure to chemical hazards, only mission-essential personnel should be required to dismount or enter the contaminated area. Many times, the effects of weather and time will act as a natural decontaminant; unless the mission dictates otherwise, the reconnaissance platoon can reduce contamination and exposure levels simply by waiting to enter a contaminated area. C-45. Preventing the Spread of Contamination. Contaminated

environments pose a significant hazard to combat, CS, and CSS vehicles, which in turn can easily spread contamination over the battlefield. While METT-TC does not always allow for consideration of an alternate scheme of maneuver, leaders must take steps to reduce the contamination footprint, coordinating with higher echelons to verify the proper course of action as necessary. For example, mission orders may dictate a “dirty” route or MSR for contaminated vehicles.

C-46. Protecting Dismounts. Dismounted troops pose particular problems and risks for the reconnaissance platoon. The platoon’s NBC battle drills must include procedures to be followed by potentially contaminated dismounts before they attempt to reenter troop carriers. Leaders must consider trace hazards, both visible and invisible, that dismounts may bring inside the vehicle. Suits and boots can pick up hazardous substances from ground residue, resulting in the emission of toxic vapors inside the vehicle. Dismounts with gross contamination may require MOPP gear exchange. Weapons and gear should also be monitored for visible and toxic vapor hazards. Battle drills also must

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address procedures used to monitor for safe “all clear” conditions before reconnaissance platoon soldiers unmask. These steps may include employing the chemical agent monitor (CAM) or improved CAM (ICAM) and the M256A1 kit.

C-47. Preventing Exposure of Externally Stored Materials. Reconnaissance platoon crews frequently store gear, equipment, and some supplies on the external hull of their vehicles; these materials can be splattered with hazardous substances when the platoon crosses or maneuvers in a contaminated area. During preparations for such operations, each crew must ensure that anything stored on the outside of the vehicle is wrapped in garbage bags or some type of chemical protective container. An important consideration for leaders is that some materials cannot be adequately decontaminated and therefore will have to be discarded if they become contaminated. They must take preventive contamination avoidance measures, covering both predeployment and preexposure actions, to safeguard these materials for later use in a clear environment. Biological Environment

C-48. Reconnaissance platoon crews must prepare themselves and their vehicles for operation and movement in a biologically contaminated environment using the same procedures as in a chemical environment. The contamination avoidance procedures employed before, during, and after exposure are identical. Toxic Industrial Materials

C-49. Preparations and procedures used before, during, and after exposure to mitigate the effects of toxic industrial materials (TIM) are similar to those for chemical and biological hazards. Like those agents, some TIMs are invisible, although they can be detected by other methods (HUMINT, NBCRS). If TIMs are detected by a sensor external to the battalion/squadron, the brigade NBC officer or S2 will use the most expedient method to warn the platoon and advise crews to immediately exchange vehicle or masks filters that have been damaged or defeated by accidental or incidental toxic exposure. Actions taken to prevent the spread of contamination and to minimize or avoid accidental or incidental exposure are the same as for chemical and biological threats. NOTE: Carbon-based filters used in military protective masks provide poor to medium protection against toxic industrial materials (TIM) and toxic industrial chemicals (TIC). The masks should be used only during evacuation of the immediate hazard zone following the release of industrial chemicals or materials. DO NOT conduct reconnaissance missions or stay for any length of time in industrial hazard areas with these masks or filter systems. Many hazard areas are oxygen-depleting and require self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA), which most units do not have in their TOE authorization. Additionally, some TIMs and TICs can easily degrade the performance of pass-through filters due to molecular size and weight. Standard military masks and/or filters have not been tested against these industrial chemicals. Refer to FM 3-11.4 (FM 3-4) for additional information.

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LOCATING, IDENTIFYING, TRACKING, AND PREDICTING HAZARDS C-50. Many types of friendly and threat NBC sensors and detectors exist on the modern battlefield. Refer to the discussion later in this appendix for a detailed description of the NBC defense equipment that may be authorized for the reconnaissance platoon. C-51. The platoon may receive notification of NBC hazards from any of several types of sensor-detectors: remote (M22 alarm), standoff (NBCRS), or point (CAM, M256A1 kit, M8 paper). When a sensor-detector indicates potential contamination, the platoon prepares NBC reports and/or SPOTREPs as required and submits them via FBCB2 to the prescribed and, if indicated, restricted audience. The platoon must practice and develop instinctive warning procedures to alert units in proximity to the hazard and to notify units affected by the downwind hazard. At the same time, exercising discipline in the warning and reporting process allows the platoon to exploit the full potential of the modern digital battlefield technologies. Reporting procedures must include prudent “stove-piped” NBC reports aimed at higher headquarters. Discreet warning up the chain of command can guard against overreaction by unaffected units, prevent unnecessary force degradation, and contribute to the preservation of friendly force combat lethality. C-52. Leaders in the reconnaissance platoon will monitor reports from human, sensor-detector (MICAD), and digital (FBCB2) sources. They use this information to track the movement or redistribution of hazards and to predict the impact on existing combat forces and future operations. To further develop NBC situational awareness and protect friendly forces, the commander may direct the platoon to conduct or assist in a variety of actions, including the following:

· · ·

Detailed NBC survey and marking missions. ISR missions for NBC NAIs. Missions to monitor hazards using standoff sensors on board NBCRS vehicles.

NBC HAZARD WARNING AND REPORTING C-53. With the ultimate objective of protecting the force and preventing the spread of contamination, the reconnaissance platoon will use the NBCWRS. In the near term, digitized platoons may use various appliqué systems to automate the process of detection, reporting, analysis, and information distribution for NBC attacks. Used in conjunction with tools embedded in the MCS, these appliqué assets will allow for a rapid flow of information to digitized units. At present, the NBCWRS consists of six manual and digitized reports. For more information on the NBCWRS, refer to the discussion later in this appendix.

SECTION III – NBC EQUIPMENT C-54. This section describes NBC defense equipment that may be organic to the reconnaissance platoon. For a complete updated list of NBC C-12

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defense equipment, refer to the appropriate unit MTOE authorizations, to CTA 50-970, and to the appropriate Chemical Corps field manuals, including FM 3-11.4 (FM 3-4).

C-55. Leaders in the platoon are responsible for ensuring that their soldiers conduct required maintenance for organic NBC defense equipment. They should inspect the equipment for serviceability, completeness, batteries (as required), test samples (as required), and a technical manual. The troop/company NBC NCO is the subject matter expert (SME) for NBC defense equipment.

M256A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR KIT USE

C-56. The platoon uses the M256A1kit (see Figure C-1) in detecting and identifying field concentrations of nerve, blister, and blood agents and in conducting unmasking procedures. The kit’s detector paper changes color upon contact with harmful chemical agent concentrations. Tests take 20 to 25 minutes to complete. Positive readings must be promptly reported to higher headquarters using the appropriate report (NBC-1, NBC-4, or SPOTREP). The national stock number (NSN) for the field kit is 6665-01133-5639. The NSN for the training kit is 6665-01-293-2149.

Figure C-1. M256 Sampler DESCRIPTION

C-57. This kit consists of a carrying case, 12 sampler-detectors, instruction cards, and ABC-M8 chemical agent detector paper. See Figure C-2.

Figure C-2. M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit

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LIMITATIONS

C-58. The M256A1 cannot be used to detect chemical agents in water. High temperatures, DS2, and petroleum products can cause false readings. The kit is not operable at temperatures below 25 degrees Fahrenheit. UNIT ISSUE

C-59. Standard issue is one per squad, crew, or section. DECONTAMINATION

C-60. Decontamination is not applicable for this item.

M8 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR PAPER USE

C-61. Soldiers in the reconnaissance platoon use M8 paper to detect and identify liquid V- or G-type nerve agents or H-type blister agents. DESCRIPTION

C-62. M8 paper comes in a book of 25 perforated sheets. A colorcomparison bar chart is printed on the inside front cover for identification of chemical agents. The sheets turn dark green (V), yellow (G), or red (H) upon contact with liquid chemical agents. See Figures C-3 and C-4. The NSN is 6665-00-050-8529. LIMITATIONS

C-63. The paper must touch the liquid agent, so soldiers must use caution when attempting to take a sample. M8 paper does not detect vapor or chemical agents in water. Exposure to high temperatures, DS2, or petroleum products may cause false readings.

Figure C-3. M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper

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Figure C-4. Chemical Agent Identification Chart for M8 Paper UNIT ISSUE

C-64. Standard issue is one per soldier. DECONTAMINATION


M9 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR PAPER USE

C-66. This detector paper is actually a tape that identifies the presence of liquid chemical agent aerosols. M9 is primarily used attached directly to the soldier’s body; it has a sticky backside allowing the individual to place strips on his nonfiring arm, one leg, and backside, as well as other places expected to be exposed to potential hazards. The tape strips should be positioned with protruding flaps that are long enough to be observed by protected troops, such as those who are masked or buttoned up inside tactical vehicles. Doors, hatches, and areas with which troops come into frequent contact should be considered the first choice when applying M9 tape to tactical vehicles. C-67. M9 paper will turn pink, red, reddish brown, or red-purple when exposed to liquid chemical agents. It cannot, however, identify the specific agent. As soon as the paper indicates the presence of chemical agents, protective action must be taken. DESCRIPTION

C-68. M9 paper is issued in a 7-ounce dispenser box that contains one 30-foot roll of 2-inch-wide detector paper and a plastic storage bag. See Figure C-5. The NSN is 6665-01226-5589.

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Figure C-5. M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper LIMITATIONS

C-69. M9 paper must be read with a white light. It can be used in rain, snow, and sleet, but cannot be used to detect vapors or chemical agents in water. It will not stick to dirty, oily, or greasy surfaces. A colorblind soldier may not be able to read contamination indications. Do not attempt to read M9 with a red flashlight lens. False readings can be caused by temperatures above 125 degrees F (52 degrees C), brake fluid, DS2, petroleum products, and insect repellent. M9 has a six-year shelf life. UNIT ISSUE



M8A1 AUTOMATIC CHEMICAL AGENT ALARM USE

C-72. Positioned upwind from defensive positions, the remote detector (M43A1) is connected, using WD-1 communications wire, to the alarm unit (M42). It can provide early warning of potential nerve agents (vapor only). DESCRIPTION

C-73. As illustrated in Figure C-6, the M43A1 detector (larger unit; NSN 6665-01-081-8140) and M42 alarm unit (smaller unit; NSN 66650859-2215) are the major components of the M8A1. When the M43A1 detects a nerve agent, it sends an electronic signal along the communications wire to the M42 alarm, setting off a remote audible/visual signal (or visual signal only when noise discipline is a concern). The M10A1 power supply (NSN 6135-00-859-2225) provides DC power to the detector from an AC source (115 or 220V). The detector uses one BA-3517/U battery; the alarm uses four BA-3030 or BB-3203/UF (D cell) batteries.

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Figure C-6. M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm LIMITATIONS

C-74. Accidental or incidental destruction of this detector must be reported immediately to the NBC officer or NCO. It contains Americium 241, a radiation hazard. False alarms may result from screening and signaling smoke, engine exhaust, rocket/missile propellant smoke, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The M8A1 is being replaced by the M22 ACADA (covered later in this discussion). UNIT ISSUE

C-75. Standard issue is one per platoon, subject to the applicable modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). DECONTAMINATION

C-76. The M8A1 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

M22 ACADA SYSTEM USE

C-77. Positioned upwind from platoon defensive positions, this remote detector is connected by WD-1 communications wire to the alarm unit (M42). It provides early warning of potential nerve and blister agents (vapor only). DESCRIPTION

C-78. The M22 ACADA (NSN 6665-01-438-6983) is an advanced manportable, point sampling, chemical agent alarm system. See Figure C-7. The system will detect and identify all standard nerve and blister agents in vapor form. The detector provides unit warning through the MICAD. It replaces the M8A1 alarm as a point detector and will augment the ICAM. The M22 uses one nonrechargeable lithium battery (BA-5590/U) and the XM28 power supply kit (NSN 6665-01-438-6960)

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Figure C-7. M22 ACADA System LIMITATIONS

C-79. Accidental or incidental destruction of this detector must be reported immediately to the NBC officer or NCO. It contains a beta radiation hazard. False alarms may result from screening and signaling smoke, engine exhaust, rocket/missile propellant smoke, and EMP. UNIT ISSUE

C-80. Standard issue is one per platoon. DECONTAMINATION

C-81. The M22 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water. NOTE: The following procedures and considerations, illustrated in Figure C-8, are applicable in the positioning of chemical agent detectors and alarms, including the M8A1 and M22 systems: · The NBC detector unit (powered by a larger battery) is positioned upwind from the platoon defensive position and can support up to five alarm units. It is connected to the smaller alarm unit (M42), which is powered by D cell or BA3030 batteries. The maximum distance between detector and alarm, connected by communications wire, is 400 meters.

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·

Detector units are positioned no more than 300 meters apart from each other.

·

Position detector units upwind at least 150 meters from the platoon defensive position to provide adequate time to mask if the alarm units sound. To ensure survivability, check wire and batteries frequently, and camouflage the detector units.

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Figure C-8. Positioning of Chemical Agent Alarm Systems

CHEMICAL AGENT MONITOR USE

C-82. The CAM is a hand-held device used to monitor personnel, equipment, vehicles, buildings, and other specific locations for the presence of nerve and blister agent (vapor only). DESCRIPTION

C-83. The CAM (NSN 6665-01-199-4153) weighs about 2 kilograms (4.5 pounds). Refer to Figure C-9.

Figure C-9. Chemical Agent Monitor LIMITATIONS

C-84. Troops must use caution to avoid touching the “nose” of the CAM with whatever is being monitored. This is not an area monitor or device. CAM operators must be in full MOPP gear when operating the device.

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UNIT ISSUE

C-85. Standard issue is one per troop/company. DECONTAMINATION

C-86. The CAM can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

IMPROVED CHEMICAL AGENT MONITOR USE

C-87. The ICAM provides the reconnaissance platoon with instantaneous feedback of chemical hazard levels by means of real-time detection of nerve and blister agents. This can reduce the need for decontamination operations. DESCRIPTION

C-88. The ICAM (NSN 6665-01-357-8502) is more reliable and needs less maintenance than the CAM. During routine maintenance, the platoon can use the battery assembly training (BAT) kit and inexpensive D cell batteries or AC power instead of the more expensive lithium batteries (NSN 6910-01-333-3631). See Figure C-10.

Figure C-10. Improved Chemical Agent Monitor LIMITATIONS

C-89. Limitations for the ICAM are the same as those for the CAM. UNIT ISSUE


C-91. The ICAM can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

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AN/VDR-2 RADIAC SET USE

C-92. Soldiers in the reconnaissance platoon use this NBC instrument for several purposes:

·

Detect and measure gamma radiation dose rates (how much radiation an individual can expect to absorb in one hour at a specific point).

·

Measure total dose (how much total radiation the individual has absorbed).

·

Monitor for turn-back dose rates during radiological survey missions.

·

Provide a means for dismounted monitoring and surveying of personnel, equipment, supplies, buildings, and other specific locations.

NOTE: The AN/VDR2 can detect but not measure beta radiation. DESCRIPTION

C-93. The AN/VDR-2 is a lightweight, EMP-hardened, tactical dose rate meter. It is composed of one radiacmeter (IM-243) (illustrated at the circled “1” in Figure C-11), a radiac probe (DT-616), and one carrying pouch with strap. The hand-held probe (the circled “2” in Figure C-11) is used for monitoring personnel, supplies, or equipment. The AN/VDR-2 set also has a carrying case (the circled “3” in Figure C-11) with shoulder straps (the circled “4” in Figure C-11). Power comes from three 9-volt DC batteries (BA-3090) or vehicle power (24-volt DC). The NSN is 6665-01222-1425.

Figure C-11. AN/VDR-2 Radiac Set (Complete) LIMITATIONS

C-94. The AN/VDR-2 cannot detect or measure alpha contamination resulting from nuclear fallout, as a byproduct from depleted uranium

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munitions, or from melting/destruction of depleted uranium armaments by kinetic energy munitions. UNIT ISSUE

C-95. Standard issue is one per platoon. DECONTAMINATION

C-96. The AN/VDR-2 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

AN/UDR-13 RADIAC SET USE

C-97. This instrument measures gamma radiation only, with the capability to monitor total dose (how much total radiation an individual has absorbed) or dose rate (how much radiation the individual can expect to absorb in one hour). DESCRIPTION

C-98. The AN/UDR-13 (NSN 6665-01-407-1237) is a compact, lightweight device that replaces the IM-93 dosimeter. It uses four AAA alkaline batteries (NSN 6135-00-826-4798). See Figure C-12.

Figure C-12. AN/UDR-13 Radiac Set LIMITATIONS

C-99. The AN/UDR-13 will not detect or measure alpha or beta radiation. UNIT ISSUE

C-100. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company headquarters.

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DECONTAMINATION

C-101. The AN/UDR-13 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

IM-93/UD DOSIMETER USE

C-102. This is currently the Army’s standard tactical dosimeter for

measuring total radiation dose (how much radiation a unit has absorbed). It is not designed to monitor total dose for a single soldier. The IM-93/UD is worn as close to the body as possible.

DESCRIPTION

C-103. The IM-93/UD is a tubular device, about the size of a fountain pen. The user points one end toward a light source and reads the illuminated scale from the other end. The optical end has a dust cap. The device requires a charging unit (PP1578A/PD). See Figure C-13.

Figure C-13. IM-93/UD Dosimeter LIMITATIONS

C-104. The IM-93/UD is being replaced by the AN/UDR-13 radiac set, covered earlier in this discussion. UNIT ISSUE

C-105. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company headquarters. DECONTAMINATION

C-106. Denatured alcohol can be used to decontaminate the IM-93/UD.

PP-1578A/PD RADIAC DETECTOR CHARGER USE

C-107. The PP-1578A/PD provides the electrical charge required to zero the IM-93 dosimeter.

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DESCRIPTION

C-108. The charger is a small, electrostatic-charge generator designed to serve all US and certain NATO combat dosimeters. The NSN is 6665-00542-1177. See Figure C-14. LIMITATIONS

C-109. Users must have direct light (such as from sunlight, flashlight, or vehicle headlights) to obtain a reading. UNIT ISSUE

C-110. Standard issue is one per platoon and one per troop/company headquarters.

Figure C-14. PP-1578A/PD Radiac Detector Charger DECONTAMINATION

C-111. The PP-1578A/PD can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

AN/PDR-75 RADIAC DETECTOR READER (FOR DT-236 DOSIMETER) USE

C-112. The meter on this device reads and displays accumulated neutron and gamma radiation recorded by the DT-236 dosimeter (worn by each soldier in the reconnaissance platoon). Leaders and medical personnel can use this reading as an indication of the total gamma and neutron dose received by exposed personnel. The AN/PDR-75 is maintained by the troop NBC NCO. DESCRIPTION

C-113. The AN/PDR-75 is housed in a heavy green box approximately 2 feet long by 1½ feet tall. The set consists of the radiac computer indicator (reader) (CP696/PDR-75), carrying case (CY-8420/PDR-75), two-piece

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battery box, and three power cables. It can be powered by a 24-volt DC source, either a 12/24-volt DC lithium battery (BA-5590/U) or a 24-volt DC vehicular battery. The NSN is 6665-01-211-4217. The reader is shown in Figure C-15. LIMITATIONS

C-114. The reader measures from 1 to 1,000 cGy.

Figure C-15. AN/PDR-75 Radiac Detector Reader UNIT ISSUE


C-116. The AN/PDR-75 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water. Refer to the appropriate TM for more specific information on decontamination of the internal tray, external parts and carrying case, and electronic components.

DT-236 DOSIMETER USE

C-117. Worn by every soldier in the reconnaissance platoon, this wristwatch-like instrument measures total dose radiation. It is worn under MOPP gear. See Figure C-16. The soldier wearing the dosimeter cannot read it; it requires the AN/PDR-75 reader (discussed earlier and illustrated in Figure C-15) to determine cumulative gamma and neutron radiation exposure levels. The reader is maintained by the troop NBC NCO. DESCRIPTION

C-118. The DT-236 looks and is worn like a wristwatch. Readings are used to determine a unit’s RES. The NSN is 6665-01-043-2191.

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LIMITATIONS

C-119. This device is not designed to act as a stand-alone radiac instrument; instead, it augments the IM-93 dosimeter or UDR-13 radiac set. Together, these tactical radiation meters help to paint a clear picture of how much radiation (total dose) soldiers have accumulated.

Figure C-16. DT-236 Dosimeter UNIT ISSUE


C-121. The DT-236 can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

M272 WATER TESTING KIT USE

C-122. The M272 detects and identifies dangerous levels of chemical contamination in either raw or treated water sources. DESCRIPTION

C-123. The kit consists of a variety of easy-to-use collection and testing materials contained in a lightweight carrying case. The NSN is 6665-01143-0885. See Figure C-17. LIMITATIONS

C-124. The kit requires soldiers to dismount to collect water samples. UNIT ISSUE

C-125. Standard issue is one per troop/company.

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Figure C-17. M272 Water Testing Kit DECONTAMINATION

C-126. External decontamination of the kit is possible using the M295/M291 decontamination kit(s) or using a nonstandard decontamination solution consisting of one part household bleach and three parts hot water.

M34 CM AGENT SAMPLING KIT USE

C-127. This lightweight kit contains materials used to collect soil, surface matter, and even water and to test these samples for hazardous agents and contamination. DESCRIPTION

C-128. Contents of the M34 kit include a carrier, a plastic scoop, 2 extraction fluid bottles, 2 soil extraction bags, 16 individually wrapped ampoules, 6 soil collection bags, 10 plastic-covered wire ties, M8 chemical agent detector paper, 3 radiation hazard tags, and 8 shipping tags with envelopes. See Figure C-18. LIMITATIONS

C-129. The kit requires soldiers to dismount to collect samples. UNIT ISSUE

C-130. Standard issue is one per team that is conducting sample collection. DECONTAMINATION

C-131. The interior of the M34 kit cannot be sufficiently decontaminated for safe use once contamination occurs. The exterior of the kit can be decontaminated using the M295/M291 kit(s) and/or hot soapy water.

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Figure C-18. M34 CM Agent Sampling Kit

SECTION IV – RECONNOITERING AN NBC ENVIRONMENT C-132. This section focuses on assets, processes, and procedures for NBC reconnaissance in an NBC environment. Considerations include the NBC threat in the operational environment; the NBCRS platoon’s role; NBC reconnaissance movement patterns; NBC surveillance techniques; the NBCWRS; and location and marking of NBC hazards.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE NBC THREAT C-133. The modern battlefield will challenge reconnaissance elements to fight within a multidimensional area of operations that goes beyond the traditional dimensions of height, width, and depth in both contiguous and noncontiguous environments. The employment or threat of NBC weapons and other toxic materials pose unique challenges to reconnaissance units and the units they support. C-134. In NBC environments, successful battle command requires

synchronization and proper integration of ISR capabilities. The brigade battlestaff assesses NBC threat considerations and develops the NBC COP using data gathered from a wide variety of sources that provide improved NBC situational awareness and early warning. These assets include the following:

· · · · ·

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Government and nongovernment agencies. Remote NBC sensing devices and standoff NBC detectors. Weather and terrain mapping satellites and aircraft imagery. HUMINT. SIGINT.

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C-135. The nature and scope of the NBC threat may force commanders to reallocate forces and priorities based on their NBC situational awareness. In doing this, they must employ the visualization process described earlier, using intelligence information gathered by the assets outlined earlier. They may determine, for example, that the NBC hazards have rendered MOPP gear incapable of providing the necessary protection. In such cases, avoiding the hazard may be the only acceptable course of action. C-136. Risk and vulnerability assessments often overlook hazards that result from collateral damage. The leaders of the reconnaissance platoon and ISR mission planners must carefully address these dangers, which can result when toxic materials are released following accidental friendly and threat conventional bombing, targeting mishaps, or incidental (terrorist) sabotage of civil and military facilities or industrial complexes. Assessments must identify the immediate impact on military operations (air, land, sea) and the short- and long-term consequences to deployed forces, population centers, and the environment if these facilities are degraded or destroyed.

NBCRS PLATOON C-137. The NBCRS platoon, which is part of the surveillance troop

within the SBCT’s cavalry squadron (RSTA), is a valuable and critical asset in helping reconnaissance units to maintain a high state of situational understanding (both friendly and threat). The platoon is capable of day or night operations, in all geographical areas, in adverse weather, and under all types of battlefield conditions. NBCRS vehicle commanders are challenged to maintain a constant state of readiness. They remain postured to respond quickly in investigating WMD attacks, industrial hazards, and/or accidental or incidental release of toxic material. Enhanced NBCRS systems are capable of detecting and identifying NBC materials and hazards that may go undetected by standard sensors and detectors. As a result, commanders at every level must carefully weigh the risks when NBCRS vehicles conduct these critical functions while being required to execute multiple, flawless, and daring operations (such as day/night passages of lines, tactical movement over complex terrain, and navigation) on an extended, high-risk battlefield.

NBCRS VEHICLE

C-138. The NBCRS platoon is equipped with three NBCRS vehicles (see Figure C-19), a wheeled, light-armored reconnaissance platform equipped with a medium-caliber machine gun. This high-speed, highly mobile vehicle is capable of performing NBC reconnaissance on primary, secondary, or cross-country routes throughout the battlefield. The current NBCRS vehicle, however, cannot collect vapor samples or monitor hazard density over time; in addition, its ability to detect and identify vapor agents is severely limited. The NBCRS vehicle protects its crew of four from NBC contamination by means of an overpressure system. Refer to Table C-3 for a summary of the vehicle’s capabilities and limitations.

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Figure C-19. NBCRS Vehicle

Table C-3. NBCRS Vehicle Capabilities and Limitations Key Performance Parameters

Specifics / Comments

Traveling Range (one tank of fuel)

400 km

C130 Transportability

No (without extensive preparation and JI authorization)

Maximum Land Speed

80 kmph (50 mph)

Weapon System

7.62-mm M240E1

Armor Protection

7.62-mm (including glass)

Swim Capability

Yes; maximum speed 6 mph

FBCB2

Yes

Communications

3 FM SINCGARS radios

Standoff Sensing

Yes; out to 5 km, but not while mobile

Biological Vapor Sample

No

Biological Matter Collection for Analysis

Limited to vectors and small soil and vegetation samples

Climate Control System

Cooling and heating

Marking System

Yes (large missions require more vehicles)

Self-Recovery

Yes

Towing

2 NBCRS vehicles required for towing

Water Analysis

Yes; requires crews to exit vehicle

Decontamination

Between gross contamination missions

NBCRS TASK ORGANIZATION

C-139. The NBCRS platoon can be organized to operate as a pure element or, depending on the factors of METT-TC, decentralized to respond to asymmetrical threats over a large operating environment. The

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platoon normally operates as one of three configurations: team, squad, or platoon.

NBC MOVEMENT PATTERNS C-140. This discussion focuses on the movement patterns used by the reconnaissance platoon, NBCRS platoon, and supporting elements during NBC-related operations. ROUTE

C-141. NBC route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain information on a specific route. The route may encompass a single road or an axis of advance. This mission is appropriate when there is a likelihood of encountering contamination along the route. Once contamination is found, the NBC reconnaissance unit can take any or all of the following actions:

· · ·

Conduct a survey to define the extent of contamination.

·

Continue the mission.

Locate and mark clean bypass routes. Terminate the mission with permission of the controlling headquarters.

C-142. NBC route reconnaissance entails a number of critical tasks, including the following:

·

Reconnoiter the route and determine the location of any contamination.

·

Locate and mark encountered.

·

Report and mark all NBC hazards along the route.

bypass

routes

if

contamination

is

ZIGZAG

C-143. The zigzag pattern may be used when NBC reconnaissance elements are on line. The pattern is most commonly employed during zone reconnaissance. An example would be reconnaissance of a mobility corridor or an axis of advance; Figure C-20 shows an NBC reconnaissance squad/team conducting a zone NBC reconnaissance of a mobility corridor using the zigzag pattern. Vehicles will normally move parallel to each other, but in a staggered formation, along the corridor. The element checks all key terrain throughout the area for NBC contamination hazard. Key terrain includes road networks, low-lying areas, and designated critical points (choke points). C-144. In the example in Figure C-20, Team 1 detects contamination in its assigned lane or sector. Team 1 stops, and the vehicle commander notifies Team 2. Team 1 verifies the presence of contamination and sends an NBC-4 report to higher headquarters. Team 2 continues to check for contamination in the assigned sector. Team 1 moves back approximately 200 meters to the last clean point in the azimuth of travel and emplaces a contamination marker. (NOTE: The contamination marker must be visible.) Team 1 then moves laterally 100 to 200 meters (left or right), turns in the azimuth of travel, and continues the zigzag pattern. If

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contamination is encountered again, Team 1 moves laterally (100 to 200 meters or until there is no longer a reading on the MM-1), emplaces another marker, and sends an NBC-4 report to higher headquarters. Team 1 again turns and continues on the original azimuth of travel in the zigzag pattern. At the end of the survey, the team will have marked the outer boundary of the NBC contaminated area.

Figure C-20. NBC Reconnaissance in the Zigzag Pattern BOX

C-145. The unit uses the box pattern when the commander wants to know the limits of contamination (boundaries). The box pattern (see Figure C-21) is time-consuming, however, and is not normally a standalone task for reconnaissance platoon elements or for the NBCRS platoon. This pattern is normally used to mark large areas in “pass-back” missions conducted with theater NBC reconnaissance augmentation or by followon elements in rear areas.

Figure C-21. NBC Marking Mission Employing the Box Pattern

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C-146. In the example in Figure C-21, two vehicles conduct the survey while moving in a staggered column formation. Team 2, which is in the lead, encounters contamination and notifies Team 1. Team 1 stops and, if no contamination is detected, emplaces a contamination marker. Team 2 backs out of the contamination until it is even with the Team 1 marker and turns to the right 90 degrees. Team 1 makes a 90-degree left turn. The teams move along the new azimuth until contamination is found again. If no contamination is found after 100 to 200 meters of travel, they each drop a marker and make a 90-degree turn along the original azimuth. They again travel 100 to 200 meters and take a measurement. C-147. The following actions then take place as each team reconnoiters for the limits of the contaminated area:

·

If the team detects contamination, it returns to the last clean point and makes another bound (100 to 200 meters) in the direction perpendicular to the original azimuth. It emplaces a marker if no contamination is detected, then moves again 100 to 200 meters along the original azimuth. The team follows this procedure until it obtains a negative reading along the original azimuth, indicating the lateral boundary of the contaminated area. A contamination marker is emplaced for each negative reading.

·

After each 100- to 200-meter bound along the lateral boundary with no contamination detected, the team turns 90 degrees and makes a bound perpendicular to the original azimuth and “inward” toward the contaminated area. If it detects contamination in the new location, the team backtracks to the last clean point and continues its bounds along the original azimuth, emplacing markers at each new clean point.

·

If no contamination is found at the new, inward location, the team emplaces a marker and makes another 100- to 200meter bound perpendicular to the original azimuth. Again, a positive reading will cause the team to return to the last clean point, while a negative reading will indicate continued movement in the same direction.

·

Teams continue this process until they link up on the far side of the contaminated area.

STAR

C-148. The star pattern enables the commander to determine the approximate size of a contaminated area. It is normally used when a small area of contamination is suspected. It is, however, one of least preferable search techniques because it exposes the teams executing the mission to more contamination than other methods. One vehicle moves forward, using the star pattern to detect and verify the presence of contamination. If the area is large enough, more teams or vehicles should be used to check the area. The reconnaissance team also marks the boundaries of the contaminated area, updates the COP using the FBCB2, and submits an NBC-4 report to higher headquarters. If only one NBCRS team is used to conduct the star pattern of the area, the wingman assigned provides security.

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C-149. Once the area is reconnoitered, the NBCRS element links back up

with its assigned unit and continues with the mission. Figure C-22 illustrates NBC reconnaissance vehicles using the star pattern to determine the boundaries of the contamination.

Figure C-22. NBC Survey Missions Employing the Star Pattern

C-150. The reconnaissance team uses NBC SPOTREPs or NBCWRS messages (NBC-4 reports) to notify friendly elements that will be affected by the hazard, either immediately and in the near term, and to warn follow-on forces where to look for the NBC contaminated area. At the same time, it must take extreme caution to tailor these reports and messages to prevent panic and overprotective measures by the forces that receive them; improper reporting could lead to unnecessary force degradation and a decrease in combat effectiveness. CLOVERLEAF

C-151. The commander can employ the cloverleaf when he wants to know the limits of the NBC contamination hazard at a specific location. Reconnaissance/NBCRS teams, squads, sections, or platoons can use the cloverleaf pattern, with vehicles checking for NBC ground contamination by moving around the point of interest in four different directions. This pattern is time-consuming and is most likely to be used when the area is secured; however, it provides detailed coverage and information about the contaminated area. Refer to Figure C-23 for an example of an NBC reconnaissance element using the cloverleaf pattern while conducting a survey.

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Figure C-23. NBC Survey Missions Employing the Cloverleaf Pattern BOUNCE AND BYPASS

C-152. This is the best pattern when the reconnaissance team wants to avoid unnecessary contamination exposure. It allows the team to quickly find the outer edges of the contamination for avoidance marking and/or an uncontaminated bypass route around the contamination, at the same time helping to prevent the loss of maneuver force momentum. Reconnaissance/NBCRS teams that encounter contamination “bounce” laterally, moving 100 to 200 meters to the left or right, and then resume movement in the original direction of travel. If contamination is encountered again, the team repeats the lateral movement (see Figure C24). Depending on the tactical situation, the maneuver commander will specify whether the unit will bypass the contamination to the right or left. In addition, the commander must provide direct fire overwatch to independent reconnaissance/NBCRS teams as they use the bounce and bypass pattern. In turn, reconnaissance teams must be prepared to react effectively to threat contact (direct and indirect fire, mines, and obstacles).

Figure C-24. Bounce and Bypass NBC Reconnaissance Pattern

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NBC SURVEILLANCE C-153. It is impossible to understate the importance of NBC surveillance. If deterrence fails, the maneuver commander must be able to observe and understand the threat’s NBC intent and to conduct subsequent electronic analysis or searches for WMD precursors. In many cases, NBC NAIs become the center of gravity on the battlefield, affecting friendly force maneuver and skewing planners’ attempts at time-sequencing combat and CS operations. Some toxic emissions are invisible to other collection media (satellite or air photography); therefore, mission success may hinge on surveillance teams as they sense, identify, and provide timely and accurate NBC reporting and warning. Effective NBC surveillance allows the commander to detect threat weapons, WMD facilities, and contaminated areas and then to neutralize them before they can affect friendly forces. C-154. Surveillance of threat infrastructure for presence of NBC or toxic industrial materials should cover such facilities as hydroelectric or nuclear power plants, water treatment facilities, and rail cars and land transportation vehicles used to transport hazardous and explosive cargo. Other potential NAIs that may be specified in the NBC section of the battalion/squadron ISR plan include factories that use harmful or toxic solutions, storage depots for petroleum or agricultural products, and commercial and military research facilities. THE ISR PLAN

C-155. Commanders use the NBC ISR plan to guide their NBCRS assets and reconnaissance elements as they attempt to detect threat capabilities and then destroy the threat’s ability to use NBC weapons and toxic materials against friendly forces. In the event of threat activity, the ISR plan will specify how subordinate leaders are to array their conventional and NBCRS reconnaissance teams. It outlines surveillance procedures and positions that will enable NBCRS assets to most effectively perform critical tasks, including the following:

· ·

Detect NBC hazards and toxic materials.

·

Establish threshold and toxicity levels as quickly as possible.

Warn (and “dewarn”) friendly forces in the immediate area so they can avoid contamination and the consequences of employment of toxic materials.

C-156. In developing their ISR plans, commanders must carefully

consider the NBC surveillance capabilities and limitations of all applicable assets This evaluation covers technological capabilities as well as logistical considerations, such as manpower. Several factors influence the decision of which of the NBC surveillance methods (covered later in this discussion) the unit will employ, including IPB and the brigade commander’s PIR and IR.

SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES Upwind Surveillance

C-157. This technique, shown in Figure C-25, reduces the likelihood that the NBC surveillance asset (reconnaissance element and/or NBCRS team) will be exposed when conducting NBC surveillance. On modern

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contiguous and noncontiguous battlefields, which may require elements to conduct NBC surveillance of a threat several kilometers from the brigade main body, WMDs and NBC contamination can pose a significant downwind environmental hazard to exposed or unprotected soldiers and civilians.

Figure C-25. Upwind Surveillance Technique Downwind Surveillance

C-158. While this technique offers early warning in NBC situations, reconnaissance crews may be exposed to hazards that are sometimes invisible and that potentially can quickly break down or defeat vehicle and protective mask filtration systems. Application of this technique must weigh these risks against the potential benefits of identifying the threat. The IPB, risk assessment, and vulnerability analysis processes must consider the cost-benefit factors, as well as the likelihood and impact of NBC exposure on reconnaissance vehicles and crews. C-159. Reconnaissance platoons and NBCRS teams may employ the downwind surveillance technique when they operate forward of the main body, executing the ISR plan to contribute to COP development; this will include actions taken to enhance NBC situational awareness. The ISR plan should identify the most effective location at which NBC and conventional reconnaissance assets can be positioned both to gain situational understanding and to provide critical operational information to friendly forces (detect to avoid, detect to warn, and identify to treat). Figure C-26 illustrates a reconnaissance element located downwind, but well forward of the main body.

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Figure C-26. Downwind Surveillance Technique Neutral Wind Surveillance

C-160. When conventional reconnaissance or NBCRS teams conduct neutral wind surveillance, they are positioned to observe NBC NAIs without regard to head or tail winds. This technique is recommended for situations in which contamination avoidance is the foremost consideration, with the unit capable of conducting observation and sensing using standoff sensors and dismounts. See Figure C-27.

Figure C-27. Neutral Wind Surveillance Technique

NBC WARNING AND REPORTING C-161. The Army’s NBCWRS comprises six basic reports covering actual or predicted NBC hazards. This system helps the reconnaissance platoon

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and associated elements plan what protective measures to take before, during, and after exposure to an NBC hazard. Refer to Appendix B of this manual and to GTA 3-6-8 for formats, letter codes, and other information on the six standardized NBC reports:

·

NBC-1 – Observer’s initial report. Used by the observing unit to report initial and subsequent data of an NBC attack.

· ·

NBC-2. Used for passing evaluated data of an NBC attack.

·

NBC-4 - Report of radiation dose-rate measurement. Used to report radiation dose rate measurements.

·

NBC-5 - Report of areas of contamination. Used to report locations of NBC contamination or hazards.

·

NBC-6 - Detailed NBC plots.

NBC-3 – Immediate warning of expected contamination. Used for immediate warning of expected NBC contamination.

NOTE: The reconnaissance platoon sends the NBC 1 and NBC 3 reports to higher headquarters. All other reports are sent to the platoon from higher headquarters or other elements. DIGITAL WARNING AND REPORTING (FBCB2)

C-162. When so equipped, reconnaissance platoons send NBC-1 reports using the FBCB2 (see Figure C-28). This is the most expeditious method, allowing immediate use of data in digital systems. NBC-1 reports sent by nondigital means (free text or voice) to the next echelon will require MCS operators to execute a time-consuming process of manually entering the data. This in turn slows the warning process to other brigade and squadron/battalion units. Initial NBC reports will be sent with FLASH precedence.

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Figure C-28. FBCB2 Screens for NBC-1 Report

C-163. The squadron/battalion may direct its reconnaissance platoons to conduct an NBC survey to validate reports from specified locations. An NBCRS team/vehicle may be task organized down to the reconnaissance platoon to assist in the conduct of this survey. The element(s) conducting the survey will use FBCB2 to send NBC-4 reports to define the type of agent, location of contamination and/or its boundaries, dose rate, and the date and time the contamination was identified. (NOTE: NBC-4 reports may be used as often as necessary to provide a comprehensive report of the contamination.) See Figures C-29 and C-30.

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Figure C-29. FBCB2 Screen for Creating an NBC-4 Report

Figure C-30. FBCB2 Screen with NBC-4 Report Displayed AUTOMATIC WARNING AND REPORTING

C-164. In the near future, NBC staffs and NBCRS vehicles will have the joint warning and reporting network (JWARN) or a similar appliqué system. Other near-term technologies will combine electronic systems linking NBC detectors to tactical communications to enhance NBC

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warning, “dewarning,” reporting, and battlespace management. These technological improvements will assist commanders and leaders in developing the COP of the NBC battlespace, portraying all detected NBC hazards for consideration and assessment.

C-165. Versions of the MICAD system, which is illustrated in Figure C31, are being developed to interface with existing and developmental NBC sensors, detectors, alarms, and communication systems at battalion level and below. MICAD automates several aspects of the NBCWRS throughout the battlefield, including the gathering of NBC contamination data from NBC detectors and sensors and the formatting and transmission of NBC-1 and NBC-4 reports up the command chain.

Figure C-31. Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Alarm (MICAD)

LOCATING AND MARKING NBC HAZARDS C-166. NBC marking procedures are the same regardless of who conducts them. The purpose is to find contamination boundaries and/or routes around or through a contaminated area. Reconnaissance teams may have an ICAM, M256 detector kit, M8 and M9 paper, M272 water test kit, automatic chemical agent alarm, M34 soil sampling kit, and M274 marking set (shown in Figure C-32). They use this equipment to determine the following:

· · · · ·

C-42

Are chemical agents present? If an agent is present, what type is it? Where and when was the agent first detected? Where are the boundaries of the contamination? Are there clean routes through area? If so, where are they?

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Figure C-32. M274 Marking Set

C-167. Marking contaminated areas prevents friendly units from entering them. Once contamination is found, the reconnaissance team reports it and asks for guidance on marking the area. NATO units use standard marking signs and/or symbols. The color of the sign identifies contamination types. Figures C-33 and C-34 illustrate standard NBC contamination marking signs.

Figure C-33. NBCRS Standard Marker

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Figure C-34. Standard NATO Marking Signs

SECTION V – NBC PROTECTION (REDUCING NBC VULNERABILITY) C-168. Shielding the force entails the action necessary to reduce the NBC threat and prevent NBC casualties, including medical pretreatment, contamination avoidance, and physical protection. Shielding begins in the predeployment phase, when units pretreat soldiers to minimize the chemical, biological, and residual radiation threat. Contamination avoidance allows the reconnaissance platoon to move around hazards or to relocate before the occurrence or arrival of a hazard. Physical protection, which covers both units and individuals, provides a contamination-free environment in which the platoon and its soldiers can operate successfully. Enhanced sensing and shaping capabilities will allow commanders and platoon leaders to use scientific concepts and methods to achieve an effective NBC-focused defense.

GENERAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

C-169. Reconnaissance soldiers may train and practice combat operations in one of several types of chemical protective overgarments included in the Army inventory. The two types that soldiers use in training are the battledress overgarment (BDO) and the chemical protective overgarment (CPOG). Each has characteristics that may make it the protective suit of choice. C-170. A new type of chemical protective overgarment, known as joint service lightweight integrated suit technology (JSLIST), will be issued should the reconnaissance platoon deploy to combat operations. JSLIST will provide 24 hours of protection for soldiers exposed to NBC hazards. See Figure C-35. Deploying soldiers are issued two chemical protective packages with overgarments, replacement hoods, filters, gloves, tinted mask eye lens, overboots, individual decontamination kits, detection paper, antidotes, and pretreatments.

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Figure C-35. Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) MOPP LEVELS

C-171. In an NBC environment, the reconnaissance platoon will operate using the seven MOPP levels: MOPP READY, MOPP ZERO, MOPP 1, MOPP 2, MOPP 3, MOPP 4, and MASK ONLY. These graduated levels are characterized by the extent to which the MOPP uniform and equipment (protective mask, overgarment, overboots, and gloves) are carried and/or worn. Figure C-36 illustrates the standardized MOPP levels; Figure C-37 shows mounted soldiers operating in MOPP 4.

Figure C-36. MOPP Levels

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Figure C-37. Mounted Operations in MOPP Level 4

PRETREATMENT ACTIVITIES C-172. Medical pretreatment for potential hazards is a passive defensive measure. Reconnaissance leaders can initiate several types of pretreatment procedures on order or when they anticipate chemical or biological threats. C-173. The platoon can greatly enhance survivability in an NBC environment with nerve agent pyridostigmine pills (NAPP), used in conjunction with the nerve agent antidote kit (NAAK). NAPPs, also known as pyridostigmine bromide (PB) pills, are issued to soldiers on cards with 21 tablets (see Figure C-38); pills are carried in any hook-andpile pocket on the overgarment. The commander will order the platoon to start taking the pills in the event of imminent threat (in the next few hours or days) of nerve agent exposure. Pills are taken every eight hours until the 21 tablets on the card have been taken or the unit is ordered to discontinue use.

Figure C-38. Pyridostigmine Bromide Tablets

C-174. Rogue nations may counter precision guided munitions and U.S. military superiority through covert dissemination of biological weapons. They may introduce biological weapons against early entry forces in an attempt to sway public opinion and create discontent among coalition, NATO, and host nation forces. Passive biological defensive measures by the platoon may include using plague vaccines or other immunizations during predeployment operations (in H-minus sequences).

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NUCLEAR HAZARDS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

US POLICY STATEMENT The United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons. C-175. Soldiers cannot taste, feel, or see radioactivity; radiation can be lethal to unprotected, untrained, and unwarned troops. As a result, the reconnaissance platoon must be prepared to take contingency actions to reduce the effects of accidental or deliberate dissemination of radioactive material on the battlefield. Nuclear risks can result from several types of events: nuclear weapon detonations, discharge of radioactive munitions, environmental exposure of research isotopes or materials, and nuclear plant by-product spills or radiation releases. Each of these presents formidable and difficult challenges. TYPES OF NUCLEAR BURSTS

C-176. The altitude at which a nuclear device is detonated determines blast, heat, and nuclear radiation effects. The four fundamental types of nuclear detonations are air, surface, subsurface, and high-altitude. Air Burst

C-177. The following considerations and characteristics apply for this type of nuclear detonation (illustrated in Figure C-39):

· · · · · · ·

Detonation occurs at an altitude of 30 km or less. Fireball remains in the air. Blast causes significant damage and injuries. Thermal radiation is significant. Initial radiation is significant. Produces no local fallout. Used against ground troops.

Figure C-39. Nuclear Air Burst

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Surface Burst


· · · ·

Detonated on or slightly above the surface of the earth.

· ·

Local fallout is significant.

Fireball touches the surface. Blast is less powerful than with air burst. Thermal radiation and initial radiation are less extensive than with air burst. Cratering occurs.

Figure C-40. Nuclear Surface Burst Subsurface Burst


C-48

· · · ·

Detonates beneath the surface of the earth.

·

If penetration occurs (breaking the surface of the earth), local fallout can be extensive.

Cratering occurs. Blast is less powerful than with air burst. Thermal radiation and initial radiation are less extensive than with air burst.

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Figure C-41. Nuclear Subsurface Burst

High-Altitude Burst


· ·

Detonation occurs at an altitude of 30 km or more.

· · ·

Ionizing radiation travels for miles.

Produces a larger fireball than other types, but with less debris and less “nuclear darkness” than air burst or surface burst. Produces severe communication failures. Produces larger EMP effects than other types.

Ground level

Figure C-42. Nuclear High-Altitude Burst

NUCLEAR HAZARDS

C-181. This discussion focuses on the immediate and subsequent effects of a nuclear detonation, as well as the nuclear material hazards a blast can create.

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Blast

C-182. The blast, or shock wave, from a nuclear air burst causes equipment damage and casualties. It occurs a fraction of a second after detonation. The front of the wave moves like a wall of compressed air from ground zero. Thermal Radiation

C-183. Thermal radiation, the heat and light produced from an air burst nuclear detonation, can cause significant additional damage after the blast effect has passed. The strength of thermal radiation is directly proportional to the yield of the detonation. The higher the nuclear yield, the greater the thermal radiation. Ranging into the millions of degrees, thermal radiation travels at light speed, burning anything in its path. It causes skin burns and eye injuries. One key side effect, flash blindness, is caused by the flash’s extreme brightness; it takes two primary forms:

·

Dazzle. The most common type of flash blindness, dazzle impairs the victim’s vision for a period ranging from minutes to days.

·

Retinal burns. A more serious cause of flash blindness, retinal burns occur when the eye lens focuses the fireball image onto the back of the eyes. Small, pinpoint retinal burns may heal; however, more severe burns may cause greater damage, including permanent blind spots.

C-184. Initial Radiation. This occurs within the first minute after detonation. It consists mostly of gamma rays and neutrons, with few alpha and beta particles. Its impact on electronic equipment, especially communications devices and computers, is known as transient radiation effects on electronics (TREE). Damage can be temporary or permanent. C-185. Residual Ionizing Radiation. This radiation occurs after the first minute following detonation. The primary hazard of residual radiation is fallout. After detonation, primarily in surface and subsurface bursts, a mushroom-shaped cloud forms containing radioactive debris and particles, which can be spread over an area possibly extending tens of thousands of meters from ground zero. This radioactive material reaches the earth’s surface primarily in two ways:

C-50

·

Fallout. This occurs when the radioactive debris and/or particles from the nuclear mushroom cloud fall to the ground.

·

Rainout. This term applies when radioactive material from the nuclear cloud is carried to earth with rainfall or when rain occurs after fallout has already reached the earth. As noted, this threat results primarily from a surface or subsurface burst. Rainout may increase or decrease the size of the fallout area and can cause hot spots in the fallout area. Rain can wash radioactive particles from such locations as hillsides, mountains, and buildings, decreasing the intensity; however, it may increase radioactive intensity in low-lying areas, ditches, or drainage systems.

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Electromagnetic Pulse

C-186. EMP produces an electric and magnetic field that can burn out electronic components and upset system operations. It poses an injury risk for soldiers only if they are touching metallic collectors, such as cables, during an EMP surge. Secondary hazards can result when electronic equipment catches fire. EMP effects can be reduced by shielding electrical and electronic components and disconnecting antenna cables. Depleted Uranium (DU)

C-187. Leaders must remain aware of equipment or vehicles hit by DU munitions. Smoke and dust clouds formed by DU munitions will contain DU and mixed waste. This can result in a radioactive hazard, especially for soldiers downwind or in the vicinity of burning vehicles. Like lead, DU is a heavy metal that can poison the body. Kidney damage, tissue decay, and other effects on body processes can result. When operating around DU smoke and residue, soldiers must wear MOPP 4 gear. ACTIONS BEFORE A NUCLEAR ATTACK

C-188. The best defense against a nuclear attack is distance, combined with protection from natural terrain and/or reinforced structures (preferably below ground). If the tactical situation or other circumstances do not allow the reconnaissance platoon to move an adequate distance away from a detonation, the best defense against the effects of a nuclear attack is to get below ground with overhead cover and improved shielding. Use of natural terrain can also reduce nuclear casualties; effective terrain features include the reverse slopes of hills and mountains; low areas such as gullies, ravines, ditches, and natural depressions; fallen trees; and caves. Sandbags and blocking and bracing material can improve shelter and vehicle shielding. Wet sandbags enhance neutron radiation shielding. ACTIONS DURING A NUCLEAR ATTACK (WITH ADVANCE STRIKEWARN)

C-189. The platoon should receive a STRIKEWARN message detailing the known direction of the strike, expected yield, and minimum safe distances (if known). METT-TC will dictate whether the commander can afford to direct dispersal and evacuation of soldiers and civilians. Additional actions include the following:

·

Disconnect the FBCB2. Operate only one radio for C2; otherwise, disconnect radios, cease traffic, lower antennas, and move radios below ground level to avoid EMP effects.

·

Orient vehicles with the front facing the blast, gun tubes to the rear, and the breach closed (if applicable). Vehicle crews should remove anything from the outside of the vehicle/trailer that could become a projectile in strong winds.

·

Soldiers in the open will seek shelter below ground with overhead cover.

·

Separate food, water, ammunition, and other critical supplies and equipment. Move them below ground under cover.

·

Separate flammable material and keep it away from shelters for soldiers.

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·

Conduct rapid, but thorough, PMCS of radiac equipment, then begin continuous monitoring. Identify leaders to count flash-to-bang time.

·

Use sandbags to increase shielding of vehicles and reinforced masonry building floors, ceilings, and windows. Wet sandbags reduce the effects of neutron radiation.

·

Do not don IPE/MOPP gear. Use goggles, handkerchiefs or surgical masks to protect eyes, nose, and mouth from fallout. If you don’t have these, wear the protective mask.

·

Follow this bottom-line guideline for a nuclear strike: If you cannot relocate to gain distance between your vehicle/unit and the burst effects, take immediate action to relocate below ground, ensuring you have overhead cover.

ACTIONS DURING A NUCLEAR ATTACK (WITHOUT ADVANCE STRIKEWARN)

C-190. The following actions apply when the unit fails to receive a STRIKWARN report of an impending nuclear attack:

·

·

C-52

If in the open, take the following actions: n

Keep your eyes tightly closed and hit the ground face down. NEVER RUN FOR COVER OR ATTEMPT TO FACE AWAY FROM THE BLAST.

n

Start counting flash-to-bang time.

n

While still laying down, secure your Kevlar helmet and cover exposed skin.

n

Secure your weapon under your body.

n

When winds from the blast arrive, try to orient your body slowly to face the blast, making yourself more aerodynamic and less susceptible to flying objects.

n

Keep your eyes closed until you no longer feel forced to do so. Squint before totally opening your eyes.

If in an armored vehicle, take the following actions: n

Do not peer through driver or optical devices. Keep your eyes tightly closed, and start counting flash-to-bang time.

n

Feel and reach to find open hatch doors, and if necessary, close them.

n

Close the weapons breach, and traverse gun tube(s) away from the direction of the blast or high winds.

n

Attempt to turn the vehicle and orient the front to face the blast. Then quickly turn off electronic equipment and the vehicle engine.

n

Keep your eyes closed until you no longer feel forced to do so. Squint before totally opening your eyes.

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ACTIONS AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK

C-191. The following actions apply once the nuclear attack has concluded:

· · ·

Wait for both shock waves to pass and debris to stop falling.

· ·

Seek shelter from fallout.

·

Treat casualties. Refer to the discussion later in this appendix for information on treatment of casualties from nuclear detonations.

·

Reconnect the FBCB2, radios, and antennas, and attempt to reestablish communications.

·

Prepare and submit an NBC-1 nuclear report. Make sure it has “flash” precedence if it is the first reported attack in theater.

·

Begin monitoring for radiation. Report the arrival of fallout using an NBC-4 report when the radiation level reaches 1 cGy/hr.

·

Never relocate your vehicle or unit based on a fallout prediction (NBC-3 report).

· · ·

Reorganize, consolidate, and continue your mission.

·

Regardless of the applicable exposure criteria, never move until the crossing risk is known and NBC personnel have developed evacuation procedures.

·

Improve shelter and shielding.

Record the flash-to-bang time. Cover your mouth with a handkerchief, and wear goggles to protect your eyes from fallout contamination. If you do not have these items, put on the protective mask. Take these precautions quickly before fallout arrives. If fallout arrives while you are exposed, routinely shake the handkerchief or the mask filter element to remove dust particles and to prevent accumulation of contamination.

Conduct PMCS on tactical dosimeters. Consider previous exposure (total dose) and report new exposure in accordance with the OPORD or unit SOP.

BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

US POLICY STATEMENT The United States will not use biological weapons under any circumstances. C-192. Biological attacks against US forces are more likely on the modern battlefield than in the past. In 1998, Defense Secretary William Cohen cited “the danger of biological and chemical weapons as the chief threat to US security today.”

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C-193. Biological agents are often referred to as the “poor man’s weapon” because they are easy and cheap to produce and dispense. In addition, biological attacks are hard to disseminate, detect, and identify. Small, even tiny, doses of biological agents can infect thousands of personnel. Counteracting these agents may require extensive use of quarantine. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS

C-194. Biological warfare is defined as the employment of living organisms, toxic biological products, and biological plant growth regulators to injure, incapacitate, or kill. Biological agents are generally created to target the respiratory system, skin, or digestive tract. The capability to directly enter the bloodstream and body tissue maximizes their effectiveness. Types of Agents

C-195. Biological agents are divided into the following categories:

·

Pathogens. These are disease-causing substances. There are over 150 known infectious diseases; they are either contagious or noncommunicable.

·

Toxins. These are poisonous chemicals derived biological sources. Toxins can be natural or synthetic.

from

NOTE: Both types of biological agents are derived from a range of sources, including animals, plants (including fungi), and microorganisms (bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, protozoa). Dissemination and Delivery of Biological Hazards

C-196. Numerous crude, low-tech methods (dry powders, droplets) exist to disseminate biological agents. For example, water and food supplies can be contaminated by human means. In general, however, there are two primary methods for disseminating biological agents:

·

Aerosol attacks. There are numerous devices and media capable of disseminating agents in quasigaseous form, including aircraft spray tanks, boat- or truck-mounted aerosol generators, and explosive bomblets in air- or ground-burst munitions.

·

Vectors. These are carriers that spread disease. Examples include infected insects or rodents that bite humans or parasites that invade the human body through exposed scratches or cuts in the skin.

Criteria (Signs, Symptoms, and Effects) of a Biological Attack

C-197. Observable criteria for a biological warfare incident include the following:

· ·

C-54

Large numbers of sick or dead animals. Sudden appearance of a large number of strange insects or ticks.

_________________________________


·

Epidemic number of casualties occurring within a short time of each other (mostly within 24 hours, although the time frame may range up to three days).

·

Generalized outbreaks of diseases, or increased outbreaks of a particular disease not normally encountered in a particular region or country.

·

High number of respiratory aliments reported.

ACTIONS BEFORE A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

C-198. The effects of biological agents are extremely unpredictable. Vulnerability reduction methods include the following:

·

Identify regional biological hazards and threat biological threats.

· ·

Complete immunizations.

·

Limit exposure to hazards. Develop methods to reduce dirt and dust collection in vehicles and closed quarters. Wear a handkerchief, scarf, surgical mask and goggles, or protective mask (when necessary).

·

Never occupy buildings with animal or rodent droppings and urine. Structures must be washed down with chlorine bleach or detergent to kill germs. NEVER sweep with a straw or push broom before decontamination is completed.

· ·

Rehearse medical treatment plans and NBCWRS procedures.

·

Eat only food from sealed containers or with protective wrappers.

·

Drink only purified potable water that has been boiled for at least 15 minutes.

· ·

Conduct PMCS on NBC defense sensors, detectors, and kits.

Maintain a high order of health, personal hygiene, and sanitation discipline.

Button clothing and cover skin to avoid unnecessary exposure to insects.

Periodically monitor for suspected hazards.

ACTIONS DURING A SUSPECTED BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

C-199. The following actions apply when commanders or leaders suspect a biological attack is under way:

· ·

Stay alert to suspicious activity.

· ·

Sound visual, vocal, or mechanical alarms to warn others.

When signs, symptoms, and effects are recognized, STOP BREATHING and quickly don protective gear. This includes handkerchief, scarf, surgical mask and goggles, or protective mask (when necessary). Inspect detectors and sensors.

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·

Ready treatment and decontamination equipment, and be prepared to request for external assistance.

·

Dismounted personnel go to MOPP 4.

ACTIONS AFTER A SUSPECTED BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

C-200. Once the suspected attack has concluded, the unit takes the following steps:

·

Submit an NBC-1 report using the FBCB2. Indicate symptoms or signs you observe.

·

Begin continuous monitoring using existing NBC defense sensors, detection materials, and kits. If you do not have these items, request assistance from higher headquarters.

·

Report and seek treatment for illness, scratches, or cuts promptly. Refer to the discussion later in this appendix covering treatment of casualties resulting from biological agents.

CHEMICAL HAZARDS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

US POLICY STATEMENT The United States will never use chemical weapons. C-201. Chemical warfare is widely regarded as brutal and barbaric. Nonetheless, the worldwide availability of advanced military and commercial technologies permits adversaries to develop and employ chemical weapons. This leaves open the potential for use of chemical weapons in a wide range of actions: terrorism during peacetime, limited use during urban operation, even large-scale employment during conflict or war. CLASSIFICATION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS

C-202. Chemical agents are classified according to their effect on the body. There are six major types: nerve, blood, blister, choking, irritants, and vomiting. The terms persistent (P) and nonpersistent (NP) describe chemical agent duration. C-203. The threat employs nonpersistent agents over areas that it believes friendly forces will use for crossing or occupation. These agents provide the threat with flexibility to use the terrain because it knows the duration of the chemical effects. On the other hand, nonpersistent agents may force friendly soldiers into protective posture for long periods, thus degrading combat effectiveness. C-204. Persistent agents are employed to produce casualties, deny terrain use, force opposing soldiers into protective posture for extended periods, degrade combat effectiveness, force decontamination operations, disrupt LOGPACs, and deny entry points.

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ACTIONS BEFORE A CHEMICAL ATTACK

C-205. Friendly forces can use the following actions to limit vulnerability to the effects of chemical weapons:

·

At a minimum, commanders and leaders should consider using MOPP level 2 if soldiers must conduct operations in anything other than overpressurized vehicles or shelters. Soldiers should apply M9 detector paper to their chemical protective overgarments. They attach one strip on the bicep of the nonfiring arm, one on the forearm of the firing arm, one on the calf of the nonfiring side, and one on the ankle of the firing side.

·

Prepare to initiate entry and exit procedures for personnel in vehicles and shelters.

·

Alert adjacent friendly forces, especially analog (nondigital) units.

·

If a vehicle or shelter is unavailable, the next best solution is some type of overhead cover.

·

Heavy canvas, plastic bags, or chemical resistant covers are required for combat gear, ammunition, supplies or equipment stored on the outside of vehicles.

·

Ensure that vehicle decontamination serviceable and adequate.

·

Secure water and other valuable commodities inside the vehicle or structure.

·

Conduct PMCS NBC sensors and alarms and test them for accuracy.

·

Position M9 detector paper so that protruding tabs are visible to personnel inside vehicles or shelters through windows, firing port glass windows, and driver and TC stations.

·

Inspect for adequate supplies of antidotes, such as the Mark 1 NAAK and the convulsant antidote for nerve agents (CANA).

·

Rehearse self-aid, procedures.

buddy-aid,

and

materials

medical

are

evacuation

ACTIONS DURING A CHEMICAL ATTACK

C-206. Whether they are mounted or dismounted, reconnaissance platoon soldiers must be prepared to react promptly to protect themselves and warn others of the dangers. Dismounted Actions

C-207. The following steps apply for dismounted leaders, soldiers, and elements:

·

Stop breathing; close eyes and mouth; and don, clear, and seal the protective mask.

· ·

Give visual and vocal alarms. Upgrade to MOPP level 4.

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·

Perform immediate decontamination as required using the M291 decontamination kit.

· ·

Seek shelter. Prepare and submit NBC-1 reports and/or SPOTREPs as necessary using the most expedient means available.

Mounted Actions

C-208. The following steps apply for mounted leaders, soldiers, and elements:

·

Stop breathing; close eyes and mouth; and don, clear, and seal the protective mask.

·

Close vehicle hatches, and activate the overpressurization system (if applicable).

CAUTION In an overpressurized vehicle, DO NOT unmask until sensors and alarms are reset; use the ICAM to confirm “all clear” conditions and to verify the reliability of vehicle sensors and alarms. If the vehicle interior is exposed to a chemical hazard, assume MOPP 4 regardless of the availability of overpressurization.

· ·

Wake sleeping personnel. Observe crewmembers for symptoms of chemical poisoning.

ACTIONS AFTER A CHEMICAL ATTACK

C-209. The following actions and procedures apply after the commander or leader determines that the chemical attack has concluded:

C-58

·

Conduct self-aid and buddy-aid and administer antidotes as required. A discussion later in this appendix covers treatment information for casualties of a chemical attack.

·

If the tactical situation permits, provide responsible and disciplined digital warning (NBC-1 or SPOTREP) via SINCGARS and/or FBCB2 to friendly forces in the attack area and to elements potentially downwind of the hazard. (NOTE: Avoid sending poorly worded or overdramatic warnings that might prompt elements that are not in the attack area or downwind to assume an inappropriate MOPP level. The result could be degradation of their combat effectiveness.)

· ·

Activate or reset detectors and sensors. Gather information on the attack, including means of delivery, number of munitions, and direction of attack; note the DTG for the start and end of the attack. Prepare and submit an NBC-1 follow-up report.

_________________________________


·

If the tactical situation permits, perform operator spraydown with available decontamination supplies and equipment.

·

When the tactical situation permits, coordinate for thorough decontamination.

·

Conduct MOPP gear exchange as necessary to avoid hazards that may result from exceeding the “wear-out” or maximum usage time for overgarments. See Figure C-43.

Figure C-43. MOPP Gear Exchange

SECTION VI – DECONTAMINATION AND FIRST AID C-210. Sustaining the force includes decontamination, medical intervention, and unmasking. These operations, coupled with effective leadership, facilitate the rapid return of reconnaissance platoon personnel to a near-normal operating capability after an NBC attack.

LEADERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS C-211. When confronted with an NBC situation, reconnaissance platoon leaders face major decisions. It is impossible to predict when or where nuclear, biological, chemical, or other toxic hazards will occur; to the contrary, leaders must face the reality that many potential enemies have NBC capability and may use it at virtually any moment. In the face of such demands, the ability to exercise steadfast, determined, and proactive leadership can make an incalculable difference. At the bottom line, every reconnaissance platoon leader must have confidence in his soldiers, his equipment, and his own ability to lead. C-212. The maxim “know your soldiers” has always summarized a key component of successful leadership. Under NBC conditions, this quality

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becomes even more important in the reconnaissance platoon. Some soldiers, for example, have difficulty operating in chemical protective overgarments and NBC gear. A leader who knows his soldiers can develop realistic NBC training situations that provide an indication of performance in combat. This will allow him to anticipate behaviors and responses to battlefield stress. He can then direct subordinate leaders and medical personnel to closely monitor the soldiers identified as having potential problems and to assist them as necessary.

C-213. Reconnaissance platoon leaders must also consider the impact of NBC defense operations on logistics, mission continuation, and mission success. In most cases, the platoon will operate well forward of CS and CSS functions. Based on METT-TC, a clear understanding of the NBC threat is the leader’s first step in determining what will be needed; how long protective equipment, gear, and supplies will last; when to expect resupply; and whether the platoon’s on-hand quantities of NBC defense supplies and equipment will be sufficient until decontamination functions can take place. Troop/company, squadron/battalion, and brigade chemical personnel provide expert advice to assist leaders at each level in developing plans and actions to meet the challenges of operating in a toxic and hazardous environment.

DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS C-214. Decontamination is the removal, destruction, or neutralization of contamination. Its purposes are to reduce the impact of an NBC attack, prevent erosion of platoon combat power, and reduce casualties. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

C-215. The reconnaissance platoon leader must take into account several important factors in planning, preparing, and conducting decontamination operations. Principles of Decontamination

C-216. There are four principles of decontamination:

· · · ·

Conduct decontamination as soon as possible. Decontaminate whatever is necessary. Conduct decontamination as far forward as possible. Conduct decontamination by priority.

Planning Factors

C-217. Before decontamination occurs, the platoon leader must consider a variety of conditions that will affect the operation, including the following:

· · · ·

C-60

The toxicity/lethality of the NBC agents involved. Actual and anticipated performance degradation. Equipment and personnel limitations. Actual and potential transfer and spread of contamination.

_________________________________


LEVELS OF DECONTAMINATION

C-218. The three levels of decontamination are immediate, operational, and thorough. Battlefield elements, including the reconnaissance platoon, conduct immediate decontamination virtually automatically and instantaneously whenever they encounter NBC conditions. Operational level decontamination is accomplished with organic assets located at the squadron/battalion. Thorough and fixed site decontamination will require augmentation by a chemical decontamination platoon, host nation emergency response assets, or other service, coalition, or NATO unit. The platoon may have to provide augmentation support at operational and thorough decontamination sites. Immediate Decontamination

C-219. Units and soldiers conduct immediate decontamination as necessary using supplies and equipment they have on hand. This discussion focuses on the elements of immediate decontamination: skin decontamination, personal equipment wipedown, operator’s vehicle spraydown (when applicable), and removal of biological and radiological agents (when applicable). C-220. Skin Decontamination. This is a basic soldier survival skill that is conducted as an immediate action drill. Some chemical agents can kill if they remain on the skin for longer than a minute, making removal or neutralization of the agent a must for survival. This can be done with the new M291 skin decontamination kit, shown in Figure C-44. Leaders must ensure that their soldiers are trained to execute skin decontamination automatically and without orders. Soldiers who have conducted skin decontamination should be observed for symptoms. C-221. Each soldier is issued two M291 kits. One is carried in the mask carrier, the other in the right cargo pocket of the BDU/BDO trousers or according to unit SOP. Each kit contains six individual decontamination packets. Units maintain at least one M291 kit per soldier for resupply.

Figure C-44. M291 Skin Decontamination Kit

C-222. Personal Equipment Wipedown. Reconnaissance platoon soldiers must devote care and consideration to personal gear, supplies, and equipment that have been exposed to NBC hazards. These items are often stored on the outside of vehicles, where they are threatened by

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whatever environment exists. Once a soldier recognizes or suspects the presence of contamination, he conducts immediate decontamination to neutralize harmful agents. Prompt action may prevent unnecessary destruction or disposal of critical supplies and equipment that cannot later be rendered safe for continued use.

C-223. The M295 individual equipment decontamination kit (IEDK), illustrated in Figure C-45, removes or neutralizes contamination on the soldier’s hood, mask, gloves, and personal weapon. One M295 IEDK is issued to each soldier in the platoon; it is stored in the right cargo BDU/BDO pocket or according to unit SOP. Units maintain at least one IEDK per soldier for resupply.

Figure C-45. M295 Individual Equipment Decontamination Kit

C-224. As noted, soldiers use the M295 kit to wipe down their masks, hood, gloves, and other essential gear. If the chemical agent is thickened or present in large globules on the BDO or CPOG, however, they must scrape it off with a stick or other object. They should not attempt to decontaminate the agent on the BDO/CPOG. Chemical agents are easily absorbed in the stocks and handgrips of weapons and may present a vapor hazard. For biological agents, plain soap and water will remove the contamination. Radiological contamination dust can be brushed, washed, or shaken off equipment. C-225. Operator’s Spraydown/Wipedown. The platoon conducts operator’s spraydown/wipedown to remove or neutralize chemical agents on frequently touched or occupied equipment surfaces and to prevent contamination spread. The process is most effective when accomplished within 15 minutes of contamination. It is done using the M13 decontamination apparatus, portable (DAP) and DS2 decontamination solution, the ABC-M11 DAP and DS2, or the M100 sorbent decontamination system (SDS). C-226. M13 DAP. The man-portable M13 consists of a vehicle mounting

bracket, a prefilled fluid container containing 14 liters of DS2, and a brush-tipped pumping handle connected to the fluid container by a hose. The fluid container and brush head are both disposable. The M13 can decontaminate 1,200 square feet per fluid container. The combination of

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spray pump and brush allows personnel to decontaminate hard-to-reach surfaces and remove thickened chemical agent residue, as well as mud, grease, and other material. The primary users include US Army, Marine, and Air Force units. (See Figure C-46.)

C-227. Before departing for the linkup point at the decontamination site, the vehicle crew sprays DS2 onto all contaminated surfaces and scrubs the DS2 into the surfaces, allowing 30 minutes for contact time. Decontamination crews will wash the surfaces to remove excess DS2.

Figure C-46. M13 Decontamination Apparatus, Portable

C-228. ABC-M11 DAP. The ABC-M11 decontaminates small areas, such

as steering wheels or other equipment operating areas with which personnel may come into contact. It is a steel container with an aluminum spray-head assembly and a nitrogen gas cylinder that provides the pressure. It is filled with 1-1/3 quarts of DS2, which is sufficient for decontaminating 135 square feet. The effective spray range is 6 to 8 feet. Refer to the previous discussion of the M13 DAP for guidelines on application of the DS2. (See Figure C-47.)

Figure C-47. ABC-M11 Decontamination Apparatus, Portable

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C-229. M100 SDS. The M-100 is intended to replace the M11 and M13

units currently employed in operator’s spraydown operations associated with immediate decontamination. (NOTE: It is not approved for skin decontamination.) The system uses powdered sorbent to remove chemical agent residue from surfaces. The reactive sorbent is nontoxic and noncorrosive and requires no water. The SDS is designed to operate at temperatures between –25 and 120 ° F. (See Figure C-48.)

Figure C-48. M100 Sorbent Decontamination System

C-230. Biological Agents. A bleach solution is the preferred means for neutralizing and removing biological agents; if it is not available, hot, soapy water will suffice. The crew applies the solution or water with brushes, scrubs all surfaces well, and rinses. The 30-minute wait is not required for biological agents. C-231. Radiological Agents. Radiological contamination can be

removed by brushing or scraping. Water is effective for flushing the contamination, but runoff must be carefully controlled using a ditch or sump setup. The vehicle crew must remember that the runoff is still hazardous because contamination is not destroyed, only moved. If time permits, brushing or removing an inch of topsoil from fighting positions lowers the radiological contamination hazard.

Operational Decontamination

C-232. If immediate decontamination is insufficient to quickly return platoon vehicles and personnel to action, the flow of battle may require the unit to conduct operational level decontamination. Also known as operational decontamination, this level of decontamination limits the spread of contamination and allows temporary relief from MOPP 4 restrictions and limitations; in doing so, it helps to sustain the platoon’s combat capability and increase its maneuverability. MOPP gear exchange and vehicle washdown, covered later in this discussion, are the two most common techniques of operational decontamination. C-233. The reconnaissance platoon conducts operational level decontamination, which is less resource-intensive than thorough decontamination, either unsupported, using only squadron/battalion

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assets, or with external support from the chemical platoon. Decontamination usually takes place in the platoon’s area of operations. The squadron/battalion augments the operational level decontamination site with personnel to facilitate rapid turnaround of platoon combat power. The platoon will run MOPP gear exchange using the buddy system; it may have to provide soldiers to augment squadron/battalion operational decontamination stations and to provide security.

C-234. Preparations.

As they get ready for operational decontamination, the troop/company and squadron/battalion battlestaffs should have a clear understanding of the type of contamination, number of vehicles and soldiers to be decontaminated, and the route “dirty” crews will travel to the operational decontamination linkup point. Squadron/battalion planners should ensure that all operational decontamination sites have sufficient quantities of decontamination solutions and water to complete the mission; they should also be prepared to augment the site with medical personnel should an emergency occur. Reconnaissance platoon leaders focus their planning on how to avoid the spread of gross contamination on the battlefield.

C-235. Before departure for the operational decontamination linkup point, platoon leaders must take extensive measures to prepare their vehicles and crews for the decontamination operation. If MOPP gear exchange is planned, the dirty platoon elements will arrange for adequate quantities of replacement gear to facilitate overgarment exchange. They will also make the necessary coordination for replacement of equipment and supplies. C-236. Vehicles without overpressure systems will dismount at least one crewmember to conduct spraydown at least 20 minutes prior to arrival at the operational decontamination linkup point. This allows for sufficient contact time and increases the chances of neutralizing harmful agents. Focus of the spraydown should be directed to areas with which crews frequently come into contact (doors, hatches, crew compartments). NOTE: To prevent crews from coming into contact with harmful and sometimes invisible agents or vapors, the platoon leader must ensure that equipment, gear, rations, or ammunition secured on the exterior of vehicles is decontaminated and checked with monitors (ICAM, M8 paper) before being moved inside the vehicles.

C-237. MOPP Gear Exchange. As noted in the discussion of shielding the force earlier in this appendix, this procedure entails soldiers exchanging contaminated MOPP gear for new, uncontaminated gear at squad level (see Figure C-49). MOPP gear exchange is conducted upwind from the vehicle washdown site. The squadron/battalion provides decontaminants and replacement overgarments. MOPP gear exchange removes nearly all liquid and solid contamination from soldiers and their individual equipment. Refer to FM 3-11.5 (FM 3-5) for detailed procedures.

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Figure C-49. MOPP Gear Exchange

C-238. Vehicle Washdown. This procedure, which limits contamination

spread and transfer, should be conducted between one to six hours after contamination and as soon as possible after the operator’s spraydown portion of immediate decontamination. Vehicle washdown uses hot, soapy water to speed the weathering process. The squadron NBC decontamination specialist operates power driven decontamination equipment (PDDE) to conduct washdown. His primary tool is the M17 lightweight decontamination system.

NOTE: When the platoon has completed operational decontamination and soldiers face little, if any, vapor hazard, they may use hazard-free areas to temporarily unmask to eat, drink, and rest. Operational decontamination, however, does not guarantee that conditions are safe enough to allow unmasking on or near equipment. Before unmasking and lowering the MOPP level for temporary relief, the platoon must conduct unmasking procedures using the CAM or M256-series chemical detector kit. In addition, leaders must conduct continuous contamination checks and monitoring to ensure that soldiers unmask in clean areas. Units must develop effective SOPs and training for unmasking. Refer to the discussion of unmasking procedures later in this section. Thorough Decontamination

C-239. This is the most effective and resource-intensive level of decontamination, requiring external support by platoon- or company-size NBC elements. It takes place after combat operations, during reconstitution, and after a passage of lines to restore combat power by removing nearly all contamination from unit and individual equipment; this allows soldiers to operate equipment safely for extended periods at reduced MOPP levels. C-240. Thorough decontamination techniques are detailed troop decontamination (DTD) and detailed equipment decontamination (DED). During DTD, soldiers remove contaminated MOPP gear, to include

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protective masks. The decontamination unit can provide technical assistance. DED procedures remove or neutralize contamination on interior and exterior equipment surfaces. The decontamination unit performs DED with some assistance from contaminated unit.

C-241. Before their units take part in thorough decontamination, reconnaissance platoon leaders must accomplish several activities, including the following:

·

Segregate equipment according to priority or degree of decontamination required.

· ·

Prepare vehicles and crews for decontamination.

·

Prepare the platoon or individual soldiers as necessary to support operation of the DTD site.

Coordinate with the decontamination unit leader (platoon or company).

NBC FIRST AID C-242. Nerve agent poisoning requires immediate first-aid treatment. Soldiers are issued three Mark 1 NAAKs (see Figure C-50). The kit consists of one small autoinjector containing atropine and a second autoinjector containing pralidoxime chloride. The NAAK is stored in the accessory storage pocket inside the mask carrier. The CANA, used when nerve agent poisoning incapacitates a soldier, uses a disposable device to provide intramuscular delivery of diazepam to the casualty (as shown in Figure C-51). It is administered only through buddy-aid and in conjunction with the NAAK.

Figure C-50. Mark 1 Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (NAAK)

Figure C-51. Convulsant Antidote for Nerve Agents (CANA)

UNMASKING PROCEDURES C-243. Leaders should conduct unmasking procedures only after all applicable NBC chemical agent detection procedures indicate that no C-67

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hazard is present. Once the environment in which soldiers will operate (area, vehicle, or building/shelter) is determined to be free of contamination, unmasking should be conducted as soon as possible to reduce the MOPP level. NOTE: Unmasking procedures for biological agents must be coordinated through the troop/company headquarters.

C-244. Unmasking procedures are conducted either with the aid of NBC detection equipment (such as an M256A1-series chemical detector kit, a CAM, or an NBCRS vehicle) or without such equipment. The following discussion describes the steps for both types of unmasking. UNMASKING PROCEDURES USING DETECTION EQUIPMENT

C-245. This 15-minute procedure is conducted after all detection equipment and liquid contamination checks are negative. At the same time, however, leaders must remain on guard because current equipment cannot detect all chemical agents. The senior leader takes the following steps for this procedure:

· ·

Select one or two soldiers and instruct them to disarm.

·

Direct the soldiers to unmask for five minutes, then to reseal and clear their masks.

·

Observe the soldiers for chemical agent symptoms for 10 minutes.

· ·

If no symptoms appear, give the all-clear signal.

Position the selected soldiers in a shady area; bright light will constrict pupils, potentially giving false nerve agent symptoms.

Continue to watch all soldiers for any delayed symptoms; have immediate first-aid treatment available.

UNMASKING PROCEDURES WITHOUT DETECTION EQUIPMENT

C-246. If detection equipment is not available, unmasking procedures will take about 25 minutes. Use M8 paper to check for liquid contamination. Only then should the platoon leader or other senior leader initiate unmasking procedures using the following steps:

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· ·

Select one or two soldiers and instruct them to disarm.

·

Direct the soldiers to take a deep breath and break their mask seal for 15 seconds, keeping their eyes wide open. Then direct them to clear and reseal the masks.

· ·

Observe soldiers for chemical agent symptoms for 10 minutes.

· ·

Observe the soldiers for 10 minutes.

Move the soldiers to a shady area; have immediate first-aid treatment available.

If no symptoms occur, direct the soldiers to unmask for five minutes and then remask. If no symptoms appear, give all-clear signal.

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·

If symptoms appear, decide whether to move to a new area and retest. If movement is not possible, however, conduct a retest after one hour.

·

Continue to observe all soldiers, especially those involved in the unmasking procedure, for delayed symptoms.

MANAGING NBC CASUALTIES C-247. Leaders must ensure that their soldiers can correctly identify and treat NBC casualties. This discussion describes both how to recognize NBC symptoms and how to provide first aid and treatment for victims. NUCLEAR CASUALTIES

C-248. The majority of casualties from a nuclear detonation will be from the blast damage, thermal radiation, or heat burns. These can be treated by the reconnaissance platoon’s combat lifesavers. Medical personnel, however, will usually be required to treat radiation victims. Nuclear fallout creates dust similar to volcanic ash that can travel great distances. It collects and creates many types of environmental hazards not related to radiation; these hazards, such as limited visibility and slick roads, can result in further casualties. The international symbol for nuclear hazards is shown in Figure C-52.

Figure C-52. Symbol for Nuclear Hazards Symptoms

C-249. Refer to Figure C-53 for a list of conditions related to radiation poisoning.

Nausea and vomiting

Hair loss

Bloody stool

Nose mouth, lung ulcers

Vomiting blood

Skin burns

Bruising, redness, blistering

Diarrhea

Weakness, fatigue

Exhaustion, fainting

Dehydration

Open skin sores

Inflammation

Tenderness

Swelling

Esophagus ulcers

Gastrointestinal ulcers

Rectal bleeding

Bleeding gums

Bleeding of the mouth

Nose bleeds

Figure C-53. Symptoms of Radiation Poisoning and Sickness

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First aid

C-250. As noted, medical professionals should treat radiation poisoning/sickness; however, reconnaissance platoon leaders and soldiers (especially combat lifesavers) can perform the following first aid before medical personnel arrive:

· · ·

Check the victim’s breathing and circulation.

·

Place the victim in a protective environment (such as MOPP or an overpressurized vehicle).

· ·

DO NOT apply ointments to burned areas.

Remove contaminated clothing. Vigorously wash the victim’s body with soap and water (handle affected areas gently). The goal is to remove dust that is potentially radioactive. Prevent dust from coming in contact with open wounds, eyes, nose, and mouth.

DO NOT remain in exposed clothing (change into clean, serviceable MOPP gear, if necessary).

BIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES

C-251. In terms of military purposes, the most significant biological agents are anthrax, Q fever, botulism, tularemia, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB). Figure C-54 shows the symbol for biological hazards.

Figure C-54. Symbol for Biological Hazards Anthrax

C-252. Anthrax, an infectious disease caused by a bacterium, is not only highly lethal, but also easy to produce and deliver. The reconnaissance platoon should deploy only after all soldiers have been inoculated with the anthrax vaccine as a preventive measure. Anthrax has three forms: cutaneous (absorbed through the skin), inhalation, and digestive. C-253. Symptoms. Inhalation anthrax, the deadliest and most militarily significant form, produces symptoms in two stages:

·

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Stage one. These symptoms appear 24 to 48 hours after exposure: n

Mild fever.

n

Fatigue.

n

Myalgia (muscle pain).

_________________________________

·


n

Headache.

n

Congestion.

n

Dry cough.

Stage two. These symptoms appear more than 24 to 48 hours after exposure, followed in most cases by the death of the victim: n

Severe shortness of breath.

n

Cyanosis.

n

Low or high body temperature.

n

Profuse perspiration.

n

Pleural effusion.

n

Stupor.

C-254. Mortality. Without effective treatment (covered later in this discussion), the mortality rate for persons exposed to anthrax is generally 80 to 90 percent.

C-255. Disinfection. The anthrax pathogen can be destroyed only through steam sterilization or burning of contaminated materials.

C-256. Treatment.

If nonvaccinated personnel are not treated immediately after exposure and BEFORE the first symptoms occur, death is virtually inevitable. Vaccinations taken prior to exposure, coupled with antibiotic treatment, can decrease the mortality rate to less than 10 percent.

Q Fever

C-257. This is an incapacitating condition that is acquired through inhalation. C-258. Symptoms. Symptoms of Q fever exposure, which appear 10 to 20 days after inhalation, include the following:

· · · · · ·

Fever. Chills. Headache. Fatigue. Muscle aches. Pneumonia (detected by chest x-rays).

C-259. Duration. Symptoms usually last from two days to two weeks. C-260. Mortality. Fewer than 1 percent of Q fever victims die from its effects.

C-261. Disinfection. Materials exposed to the Q fever pathogen can be disinfected using a 0.05 percent bleach solution (1 tablespoon of bleach per gallon of water). C-262. Treatment. A 10-day course of antibiotics, administered beginning 8 or more days after exposure, can prevent Q fever from

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occurring. Antibiotics given in the first 8 days following exposure will delay symptoms for three weeks. Botulism

C-263. The toxin produced by the botulism bacterium is one of the most toxic substances known. The likely method of dissemination would be as a toxic cloud, but food and water supplies could be sabotaged as well. C-264. Symptoms. Symptoms of botulism normally appear 24 to 36 hours after exposure. They include the following:

· · · · · ·

Drooping eyelids. Dry mouth and throat. Difficulty in talking or swallowing. Blurred or double vision. Muscle weakness. Muscle paralysis.

C-265. Disinfection. Materials exposed to botulism can be disinfected using a 0.05 percent bleach solution (1 tablespoon of bleach per gallon of water). C-266. Treatment. Antibiotics are ineffective against botulism. Use of antitoxins and mechanical ventilation (breathing), however, can reduce the mortality rate from around 60 percent to 5 percent. Tularemia

C-267. The tularemia pathogen, a bacterium, is transmitted to humans by animal contact, flea and tick bites, contaminated food and water, and inhalation. C-268. Symptoms. Symptoms of tularemia, which appear 2 to 10 days after exposure, include the following:

· · · · · · · · · · ·

Fever. Dry cough. Pneumonia. Skin sores. Abdominal pains. Diarrhea. Chills. Chest discomfort. Weight loss. Swollen lymph nodes. Nausea and vomiting.

C-269. Disinfection. Materials exposed to tularemia can be disinfected using a 0.05 percent bleach solution (1 tablespoon of bleach per gallon of water). C-270. Treatment. Antibiotics are effective against tularemia.

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CHEMICAL CASUALTIES

C-271. As noted previously, chemical agents are classified as either persistent or nonpersistent. This discussion covers the militarily significant types: nerve, blood, and blister agents. Refer to Figure C-55, which shows the symbol for chemical hazards.

Figure C-55. Symbol for Chemical Hazards Nerve Agents

C-272. These typically enter the body by skin absorption or inhalation. They can be delivered by missile, rocket, artillery, mines, spray tanks, or cruder, lower-tech dissemination methods. C-273. Symptoms. Symptoms of nerve agent poisoning appear within seconds of exposure. They include the following:

· · · · · · · ·

Dizziness. Blurred vision and pinpoint pupils. Runny nose. Uncontrolled salivation. Difficult breathing. Tightness in the chest. Stomach cramps. Muscular twitching.

C-274. Treatment. The most common forms of treatment for nerve agent victims are the Mark 1 NAAK and the CANA, which are covered in the discussion of NBC first aid earlier in this section. Blood Agents

C-275. These agents, which emit a smell of like bitter almonds, enter the body by skin absorption or inhalation. Blood agents attack the way the body transfers oxygen in the blood stream. Death can occur within minutes within minutes of exposure. Delivery methods include missiles, rockets, artillery, mines, spray tanks, and crude, low-tech dissemination systems. Blood agents evaporate quickly.

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C-276. Symptoms. Symptoms of blood agent poisoning appear within seconds of exposure. They include the following:

· · · · · · · ·

Dizziness. Blurred vision and dilated pupils. Runny nose. Chills. Slowed breathing. Pink fingernails, lips, and skin. Nausea. Vomiting.

C-277. Treatment.

THERE IS NO ANTIDOTE FOR BLOOD AGENTS. Soldiers exposed to them must immediately put on (or be helped into) MOPP 4 gear and move into a clean environment. They must receive medical attention and/or be evacuated as quickly as possible.

Blister Agents

C-278. These enter the body by absorption and inhalation. Their odor can vary from garlic to freshly mown hay to a fruity smell. The inventory includes persistent, nonpersistent, and semipersistent blister agents, which can be delivered by missiles, rockets, artillery, and mines. C-279. Symptoms. Timing for the appearance of blister agent symptoms is highly variable, from almost immediate to a delay of four to six hours. Symptoms include the following:

· · · · · ·

Headache and dizziness.

· · ·

Nausea.

Intense pain. Runny nose. Difficult breathing. Eye and nose irritation. Skin, nose, and throat irritation, including reddening of the skin and blister formation. Vomiting. Sever diarrhea.

C-280. Treatment. If a blister agent comes in contact with skin or eyes, remove it immediately. To remove an agent from the eyes, flush repeatedly with plain water. Decontaminate the skin using the M258A1/M291 kit. If severe blisters form, seek medical attention as soon as possible.

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Appendix D

Stability Operations and Support Operations Each type of reconnaissance platoon, especially the recce platoon, has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to Army units executing missions as part of stability operations and support operations. The platoon may be called upon to perform a variety of missions in a wide range of political, military, and geographical environments and in both combat and noncombat situations (see Table D-1). These operations will almost always be decentralized and can require the platoon leader to make immediate decisions that may have strategic or operational consequences. The distinction between these roles and situations will not always be clear, presenting unique challenges for the platoon, its leaders, and its soldiers.

CONTENTS Introduction ........................................................... General Considerations ........................................ The Range of Military Operations ................. Activities in Stability Operations and Support Operations .................................... Planning and Operational Considerations ... Stability Operations ............................................... Characteristics of Stability Operations ........ The Army’s Role in Stability Operations ...... Types of Stability Operations ........................ Considerations for Stability Operations ....... Support Operations ............................................... Characteristics of Support Operations ........ The Army’s Role in Support Operations ...... Categories of Support Operations ................ Types of Support Operations ........................ Considerations for Support Operations ....... Role of the Reconnaissance Platoon in Stability Operations and Support Operations ..... Platoon Employment Considerations ........... Specific Platoon Tasks .................................. Roadblocks ..................................................... Checkpoints .................................................... Searches of Personnel and Vehicles ........... Cordon and Search Operations .................... Light/Medium Operations in Stability and Support Environments ........................... Role of the Reconnaissance Platoon ........... The Threat ....................................................... Capabilities and Limitations of the Reconnaissance Platoon ........................... Light/Medium Urban Operations ...................

D-1 D-2 D-2 D-4 D-4 D-11 D-11 D-12 D-13 D-16 D-17 D-17 D-17 D-18 D-18 D-21 D-22 D-22 D-23 D-23 D-25 D-32 D-39 D-41 D-41 D-41 D-42 D-42

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION NOTE: US Army policy normally does not allow a unit to modify its warfighting METL unless and until the unit is selected for stability operations and support operations. Only then should a unit train for specific mission-related tasks. Chief among these are operations with very restrictive ROE/ROI and orientation on the area, its culture, and the nature of the conflict.

D-1. Stability operations apply military power to influence the political environment, to facilitate diplomacy, or to interrupt or prevent specific illegal activities. These operations cover a broad spectrum. At one end are

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development and assistance activities aimed at enhancing a government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. At the other are coercive military actions; these involve the application of limited, carefully prescribed force, or the threat of force, to achieve specific objectives.

D-2. US military forces conduct support operations to assist designated groups by providing essential supplies and services in the face of adverse conditions, usually those created by man-made or natural disasters. Mission success in support operations, which are normally characterized by the lack of an active opponent, is measured in terms of the ability to relieve suffering and to help civil authorities respond to crises. Primary goals of these operations are to meet the immediate needs of the supported groups and to transfer responsibility quickly and efficiently to appropriate civilian authorities. D-3. The general considerations discussion of this appendix focuses on several important aspects of stability operations and support operations. Later segments examine stability operations and support operations, respectively, in greater detail, followed by discussions of tasks specific to the reconnaissance platoon and of the role of light/heavy operations in stability and support environments. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of urban operations, which provide the operational framework for many types of stability operations and support operations.

SECTION II – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS D-4. Stability operations and support operations entail the adaptation of capabilities developed for warfighting to the political and military environments of peace and conflict. The warfighting doctrine described in this manual is used, with suitable modification, to accommodate such situations.

THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS D-5. Stability operations and support operations that take place in the peacetime and conflict environments may entail the full range of military operations (refer to Table D-1). These operations may also require working closely with other state and/or federal agencies, civilian agencies, and host-nation governments if the operation is outside the United States. PEACETIME

D-6. In peacetime, a variety of measures are employed to achieve national objectives; these include political, economic, and informational measures, as well as military actions short of combat operations or active support of warring parties. Within this environment, US forces may conduct training exercises to demonstrate national resolve; conduct peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities; conduct disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance to friends and allies; or execute shows of force. Confrontations and tensions may escalate during peacetime to reach a point of transition into a state of conflict.

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Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations

Table D-1. The Range of Military Operations STATES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WAR

GOALS

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Fight and win

WAR

MISSIONS · Large-scale combat operations · Attack

RECENT OPERATIONS

DESERT STORM

· Defend CONFLICT

Deter war and resolve conflict

STABILITY AND SUPPORT

PEACETIME

Promote peace

STABILITY AND SUPPORT

· Strikes and raids · Peacekeeping or peace enforcement · Support to insurgency · Antiterrorism · NEOs · · · · ·

Counterdrug operations Disaster relief Civil support Peace-building Nation-building assistance

RESTORE HOPE

HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF

CONFLICT

D-7. Conflict can encompass numerous types of situations, including the following:

·

Clashes or crises over boundary disputes and land and water territorial claims.

·

Situations in which opposing political factions engage in military actions to gain control of political leadership within a nation.

·

Armed clashes between nations or between organized parties within a nation to achieve limited political or military objectives.

D-8. While regular military forces are sometimes involved, the use of irregular forces frequently predominates in conflict actions. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and limited in weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military response to a threat is exercised indirectly, usually in support of other elements of national power. Limited objectives, however, may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of military force. Conflict approaches the threshold of a state of war as the number of nations and/or troops, the frequency of battles, and the level of violence increase over an extended time. IMPACT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

D-9. Stability operations and support operations involving the reconnaissance platoon will occur most often in the state of peacetime. The platoon can assist in a variety of activities during these operations, such as populace and movement control (checkpoints and roadblocks), the

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handling of EPWs or refugees, or EPW exchanges. Refer to the discussion later in this appendix for specific examples of stability and support situations in which the platoon may participate. NOTE: Military operations involving reconnaissance platoons occur most often in the state of conflict. These may include standard security and reconnaissance missions in support of offensive and defensive operations. Refer to the appropriate portions of this manual for information on these operations.

ACTIVITIES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS D-10. As outlined in FM 100-5, the Army’s missions in stability operations and support operations are categorized into several types of activities. Examples of these missions are listed in Figure D-1; for additional details, refer to the discussions of stability operations and support operations later in this appendix. D-11. Although the activities of stability operations and support operations have distinct characteristics, they often overlap in execution. For example, forces involved in a peacekeeping operation must protect themselves and the local populace against terrorism; conversely, a terrorist incident may result in the execution of a specific operation to combat terrorism.

Figure D-1. Military Activities in Stability Operations and Support Operations

PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS D-12. Although stability operations and support operations can take place in any part of the world, they are most likely to occur in third world countries, where social, political, economic, and psychological factors contribute to political instability. Each country or region is unique, with its own history, culture, goals, and problems. US forces deployed to these areas can be subject to rapid and dramatic changes in situations and missions. The reconnaissance platoon leader must understand this environment; he must plan for rapid changes in the situation or mission and constantly be prepared to adapt to them. In addition, the platoon must be prepared to operate in any type of terrain and climate. D-13. The following paragraphs examine several important considerations that will influence planning and preparation for stability operations and support operations. For a detailed discussion of these subjects, refer to FM 3-07.3 (FM 100-23).

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ENVIRONMENT NOTE: The term “environment” in the following discussion is not equivalent to the states of the operational environment (peace, conflict, war) examined earlier in this appendix. As an operational consideration, the environment refers to the cultural, political, and military context in which stability operations and support operations take place, as well as to terrain and weather in the area of operations.

D-14. Stability operations and support operations can take place in any part of the world. To deal effectively with the diverse situations they may face, US forces must undergo orientation training on the complex conditions and factors at work in a specific region. Each soldier must understand the political and economic situation, as well as the cultures, climates, and terrain of the region. He should understand the military situation, especially the doctrine, tactics, and equipment that are employed by belligerent, guerrilla, and terrorist forces. Orientation training should also clarify the following environmental factors as well as the planning and operational considerations covered in the remainder of this discussion. Tempo

D-15. Although extreme tension may underlie stability operations and support operations, the tempo of these operations is generally slow. Nonetheless, the speed of military action can vary widely, from fast, violent tactical movement by a reaction force for the purpose of relieving encircled friendly forces to the deliberate occupation of stationary defensive positions to provide overwatch at traffic control points. D-16. Throughout stability operations and support operations, the threat can be expected to execute both overt and covert operations to test friendly reaction times and security procedures. Units that are predictable or that lack sound OPSEC leave themselves susceptible to attack. For the reconnaissance platoon, the key to a secure environment is not only to maintain the highest possible level of OPSEC, but also to vary the techniques by which security procedures are executed. Role of US Forces

D-17. All soldiers should be aware of the role US forces will play in the overall mission. This is especially vital when Americans are part of a combined force that requires constant interaction and coordination with the soldiers of foreign nations. In all cases, the commander’s intent and his projected end state should be simplified and presented in a way that gives soldiers the guidance they need to accomplish the mission. Peacekeeping versus Peace Enforcement

D-18. Training for stability operations and support operations should also focus on the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping is a highly visible activity; force protection is often more difficult. Peace enforcement operations are more likely to involve the use of force, cover and concealment, and the tactical considerations of OPSEC. Leaders at every level must understand the role of U.S. forces based on the commander’s intent. If this role is not clear, they must seek clarification. D-5

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INTELLIGENCE

D-19. Intelligence is crucial during the execution of stability operations and support operations. The threats faced by military forces in these operations are more ambiguous than those in other situations because combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily blend with the civilian population. Before forces are committed, intelligence must be collected, processed, and focused to support all planning, training, and operational requirements. (NOTE: For additional information, refer to FM 3-07 [FM 100-20].) DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS

D-20. Although stability operations and support operations are normally centrally planned, execution often takes the form of small-scale, decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. Responsibility for making decisions on the ground will fall to junior leaders. Effective command guidance and a thorough understanding of the applicable ROE (refer to the following discussion) are critical at each operational level. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

D-21. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations. The ROE are directed by higher military authorities based on the political and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these restrictions may require that the forces involved limit their use of firepower to a certain geographical area or that they limit the duration of their operations. Refer to Figure D-2 for an example of ROE for one possible situation. D-22. ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all operations. The unit’s TTP will require adjustment based on each particular situation’s ROE. Understanding, adjusting for, and properly executing ROE are especially important to success in stability operations and support operations. The restrictions change whenever the political and military situations change; this means ROE must be explained to friendly soldiers continuously.

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Figure D-2. Example Rules of Engagement

D-23. ROE provide the authority for the soldier’s right to self-defense. Each soldier must understand the ROE and be prepared to execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition, ROE violations can have operational, strategic, and political consequences that may affect national security; the threat can be expected to exploit such violations. RULES OF INTERACTION AND GRADUATED RESPONSE

D-24. ROI and graduated response embody the human dimension of stability operations and support operations; they lay the foundation for successful relationships with the myriad of factions and individuals that play critical roles in these operations. ROI encompass an array of interpersonal communication skills, such as persuasion and negotiation. Graduated response deals with the process of applying greater levels of force to a situation in response to the changes in that situation; refer to Figure D-3 for an example of a graduated response card.

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Graduated Response Card Situation: Your unit is conducting an operation (i.e.. secure a weapons storage facility). Signs have been posted that no crowds are allowed near the facility. After a period of time, a crowd of civilians begins to gather. You are given the order to disperse the crowd as quickly and safely as possible. Use the following steps, listed in ascending order of intensity, either independently or in combination to disperse the crowd: 1.

Employ linguists assigned to your unit to inform the crowd that it must disperse.

2.

Employ airborne speaker teams to transmit instructions to the crowd to disperse.

3.

Employ bullhorns to relay instructions to the crowd to disperse.

4.

Use loud noise speaker teams to assist in dispersing the crowd.

5.

Honk the horns of unit vehicles to disperse the crowd.

6.

Emplace concertina wire to keep the crowd from gaining access to the area.

7.

Start the unit vehicles to show the crowd that you will move on them if necessary.

8.

Employ mechanized vehicles (RVs) as a show of force to the crowd.

9.

Take pictures or videotape of instigators in the crowd.

10.

Employ military working dogs to disperse the crowd.

11.

Fix bayonets.

12.

Conduct procedures as prescribed in civil disturbance drills.

13.

Use pepper spray to disperse the crowd.

14.

Show the crowd that you have CS gas canisters.

15.

Employ CS gas to disperse the crowd.

16.

Employ helicopter blade wash to disperse the crowd.

17.

Fire rounds into the air.

18.

Employ the use of deadly force.

Figure D-3. Example Graduated Response Card

D-25. These are tools the individual soldier will need to deal with the nontraditional threats that are prevalent in stability operations and support operations, including political friction, unfamiliar cultures, and conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI and graduated response enhance the soldier’s survivability in such situations. They are based on the applicable ROE for a particular operation; they must be tailored to the specific regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by the operation. Like ROE, ROI and graduated response can be effective only if they are thoroughly rehearsed and understood by every soldier in the unit. FORCE PROTECTION

D-26. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in stability operations and support operations, precautions and operations D-8

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required to minimize casualties and collateral damage become particularly important operational considerations during these operations. At the same time, however, force protection must be a constant priority. Reconnaissance forces are commonly employed in a force protection role.

D-27. In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in stability operations and support operations, leaders must avoid making tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary risks. On the contrary, an overpowering use of force, correctly employed and surgically applied, can reduce subsequent violence or prevent a response from the opposing force. This must be covered in the ROE and the OPORD from higher headquarters. D-28. OPSEC, tempered by restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an important tool for the platoon leader in accomplishing his force protection goals. Security procedures should encompass the full range of antiterrorist activities for every soldier and leader. Examples include proper RTP; strict noise, light, and litter discipline; proper wear of the uniform; display of the proper demeanor for the situation; as well as effective use of cover and concealment, obstacles, OPs and early warning devices, the protection afforded by armor vehicles, and safe locations for eating and resting. D-29. A final consideration in force protection is hygiene. Many stability operations and support operations take place in underdeveloped nations; proper field sanitation and personal hygiene are mandatory if soldiers are to stay healthy. TASK ORGANIZATION

D-30. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and support operations, the reconnaissance platoon may be task organized to operate with a variety of units. Examples may include an armor or mechanized company team or a light infantry company or battalion. CSS CONSIDERATIONS

D-31. The operational environment the reconnaissance platoon faces during stability operations and support operations may be very austere, creating special CSS considerations. These factors include, but are not limited to, the following:

· ·

Reliance on local procurement of certain items.

· ·

Special Class V supply requirements, such as pepper spray.

Shortages of critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supply materials, and lubricants. Reliance on bottled water.

MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS

D-32. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every soldier involved in stability operations and support operations. All leaders and soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the growth of news coverage via international television and radio broadcasts and the Internet. They must realize that operations that run counter to

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official US policy may damage the nation’s interests and international standing.

D-33. Reconnaissance platoon soldiers must learn how to deal effectively with broadcast and print reporters and photographers. Training should cover any information restrictions imposed on the media. Soldiers must also gain an understanding of which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to higher authorities, such as their chain of command or the public affairs office (PAO). PAOs usually issue daily guidance dealing with these subjects. OPERATIONS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

D-34. US Army units may conduct certain stability operations and support operations in coordination with a variety of outside organizations. These include other US armed services or government agencies as well as international organizations, including private volunteer organizations (PVO), such as Doctors Without Borders; NGOs, such as the Red Cross; and UN military forces or agencies. SOLDIERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES

D-35. US soldiers may have extensive contact with host-nation civilians during stability operations and support operations. As a result, their personal conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus the support, of the local population. As noted, soldiers must understand that misconduct by US forces (even those deployed for only a short time) can damage rapport that took years to develop. US soldiers must treat local civilians and military personnel as personal and professional equals, affording them the appropriate customs and courtesies. D-36. Every soldier must be updated continuously on changes to operational considerations (such as environment, ROE/ROI, media, and force protection). Such changes can have immediate impact on his freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the soldier informed of changes enhances his situational awareness and his ability to adapt to changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this information quickly and accurately. D-37. Every individual is an intelligence-collecting instrument. The collection of information is a continuous process, and all information must be reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources, including friendly forces, threat elements, and the local populace. From the friendly standpoint, each soldier must be familiar with the local PIR and other applicable intelligence requirements. At the same time, threat soldiers will be continuously seeking intelligence on US actions, often blending easily into the civilian population. US soldiers must be aware of this and use OPSEC procedures at all times. D-38. To emphasize soldier responsibilities, leaders conduct PCCs and PCIs that focus on each soldier’s knowledge of the environment and application of the ROE. These checks and inspections should also identify possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the soldier and his equipment at risk. Leaders should stress that terrorists and thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either to steal equipment and supplies or to cause harm to US forces or facilities.

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D-39. To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the reconnaissance platoon leader is responsible for obtaining a key word and phrase card from the S2 to assist in translation of key English phrases into the language of the host nation. These phrases should apply specifically to the area of operations.

SECTION III – STABILITY OPERATIONS D-40. The overall purpose of stability operations is to promote and sustain regional and global stability. At the same time, stability operations are conducted outside the United States and US territories to promote and protect US national interests by influencing political, civil, and military environments and by disrupting specific illegal activities. These goals are accomplished by supporting diplomatic initiatives, by improving military-to-military relations, and by deterring or resolving conflict. D-41. Stability operations encompass a range of actions that shape the strategic environment and respond to developing crises. The military activities that support stability operations are diverse, continuous, and often long-term in nature. D-42. This section provides an introductory discussion of the activities associated with stability operations; for detailed information, see FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) and FM 3-21.98 (FM 7-98).

CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS D-43. Stability operations are normally executed in the context of the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy. Commanders employ military forces to complement and reinforce other elements of national power as part of their theater engagement plan (TEP). OPERATIONAL GOALS

D-44. Stability operations may include both developmental and coercive actions. Developmental actions enhance a host-nation government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply carefully prescribed limited force or threat of force to change the environment of the area of operations. Military forces conduct stability operations to accomplish one or more of the following activities:

·

Protect national interests (as defined by the National Command Authority).

· · · · · · ·

Promote peace and/or deter aggression. Satisfy treaty obligations or enforce agreements and policies. Reassure allies, friendly governments, and agencies. Encourage a weak or faltering government. Maintain or restore order. Protect life and property. Demonstrate resolve.

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· ·

Prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism.

·

Eliminate or contain subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Reduce the threat of conventional arms and WMD to regional security.

OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES Peacetime Military Engagement

D-45. Peacetime military engagement (PME) activities are stability operations designed to have a positive impact on the regional security environment and preclude conflict. The objectives of peacetime military engagements are to open communication, increase interoperability, increase regional military professionalism, educate a host-nation’s forces on the role of the military in a democracy, and increase regional stability. Examples of PME activities include multinational training exercises, individual training and observers, medical and engineer projects and exercises, and staff information exchanges. Rapid Response and Preclusion

D-46. Rapidly responding in the early stages of an imminent or on-going crisis is a critical component of stability operations. For example, rapidly responding to an SSC can defuse a crisis situation and restore regional stability. The deployed force must be capable of conducting decisive offensive and defensive operations to achieve successful preclusion. Presence and Deterrence

D-47. Presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic and economic programs designed to eliminate root causes of instability may flourish. It can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets in an area of operations. D-48. Deterrence for both smaller regional conflicts and MTWs is the

sustainable presence of strong, capable ground forces. If deterrence fails, or if required, military forces, including the reconnaissance platoon, must be ready to transition to decisive combat operations. Effective deterrent forces should ideally be capable of conducting decisive operations immediately.

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS D-49. Army forces are particularly well suited for stability operations because they are trained, equipped, and organized to control land, populations, and situations for extended periods of time. The depth and breadth of Army force capabilities provide the commander with vital options in meeting theater operational requirements. This routinely includes conducting peace operations, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian demining operations, and multinational training exercises or exchanges. D-50. Stability operations are inherently complex and place greater demands at the small-unit level. Junior leaders are required to develop engagement skills while maintaining warfighting skills. Capable, trained, disciplined, high-quality leaders, soldiers, and teams are especially critical to success. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and

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adaptive. Stability operations often require the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.

D-51. Stability operations conducted by Army forces complement and are complemented by offensive, defensive, and support operations. The ability of Army forces to stabilize a crisis is directly related to their ability to attack and defend. Offensive and defensive operations may be necessary to defeat adversaries intent on preventing the success of a stability operation. Shows of force often precede offensive and defensive operations in attempts to deter aggression and provide opportunities for diplomatic and economic solutions. During support operations in unstable areas, stability operations can be conducted to help restore law and order. D-52. Army forces may conduct stability operations before hostilities, in crisis situations, during hostilities, and after hostilities. Before hostilities begin, stability operations focus on deterring or preempting conflict. In a crisis situation, they may resolve a potential conflict or prevent escalation. During hostilities, stability operations can help keep armed conflict from spreading and assist and encourage committed partners. Following hostilities, they can provide a secure environment that allows civil authorities to regain control.

TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

D-53. Peace operations encompass three general areas: diplomatic activities (peacemaking and peace-building), traditional peacekeeping, and threatened or actual forceful military actions (peace enforcement). The reconnaissance platoon may participate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Peacekeeping Operations

D-54. A peacekeeping force facilitates truce negotiations and political settlement of disputes. In doing so, it must assure each side in the dispute that other parties are not taking advantage of settlement terms to their own benefit. Peacekeeping differs from internal security in that the force does not act in support of a government. Rather, the peacekeeping force must remain entirely neutral; if it loses a reputation for impartiality, its usefulness within the peacekeeping mission is destroyed. Peace Enforcement

D-55. Several unique characteristics distinguish peace enforcement activities from wartime operations and from other stability operations. The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore peace under conditions broadly defined at the international level. It may entail combat, armed intervention, or physical threat of armed intervention. Under provisions of an international agreement, the squadron/battalion and its subordinate elements, including the reconnaissance platoon, may be called upon to use coercive military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions. OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

D-56. Forces may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after a conflict. These operations include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace

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building. Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chances for success by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. Preventive Diplomacy

D-57. Preventive diplomacy is diplomatic action taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Army forces are not normally directly involved in preventive diplomacy but may support a state department effort by providing transportation and communications assets. In some cases, military forces may conduct a preventive deployment or show of force as part of the overall effort to deter conflict. Peacemaking

D-58. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issue that led to the conflict. It includes military actions that support the diplomatic process. Army forces participate in these operations primarily by performing military-to-military contacts, exercises, peacetime deployments, and security assistance. Peace Building

D-59. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic in nature, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid a relapse into conflict. Military actions that support peace building are designed to identify, restore, and support structures that strengthen and solidify peace. Typical peace building activities include restoring civil authority, rebuilding physical infrastructure, providing structures and training for schools and hospitals, and helping reestablish commerce. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

D-60. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The main objective is to promote stability by helping a host nation establish and maintain institutions and facilities responsive to its people’s needs. D-61. Army forces in foreign internal defense normally advise and assist host-nation forces conducting operations to increase their capabilities. When conducting foreign internal defense, all Army forces provide indirect or direct support (not involving combat operations) or conduct combat operations to support a host nation’s efforts. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

D-62. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales. The primary object is to further national policies and objectives. Army forces support security assistance efforts through military training teams (MTT), maintenance support personnel and training, and related activities.

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HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ACTION

D-63. Humanitarian and civic action programs consist of assistance provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. They are planned activities. Humanitarian and civic actions are limited to the following categories:

·

Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.

· · ·

Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES

D-64. This type of support includes assistance provided by US forces to help a friendly nation or group that is attempting to combat insurgent elements or to stage an insurgency itself. This type of stability action is normally conducted by SOF. COMBATING TERRORISM

D-65. In all types of stability operations, antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities are a continuous requirement in protecting installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism. Antiterrorism focuses on defensive measures. Counterterrorism encompasses a full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Refer to JCS Publication 3-07.2 for more information on these activities. SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

D-66. U.S. military forces may be tasked for a variety of counterdrug activities, which are always conducted in conjunction with another government agency. These activities include destroying illicit drugs and disrupting or interdicting drug manufacturing, cultivation, processing, and smuggling operations. Counterdrug support may take the form of advisory personnel, mobile training teams, offshore training activities, and assistance in logistics, communications, and intelligence. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

D-67. NEOs are primarily conducted to evacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger, although they may also include natives of the host nation and third-country aliens friendly to the United States. NEOs involve swift insertion and temporary occupation of an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal. Leaders use only the amount of force required for self-defense and protection of evacuees. ARMS CONTROL

D-68. The reconnaissance platoon may work with another nation’s military to conduct arms control or nation assistance activities. These are usually entail short-term, high-impact operations. SHOW OF FORCE

D-69. Forces deployed abroad lend credibility to a nation’s promises and commitments. In support of this principle, show-of-force operations are

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meant to reassure a friendly nation or ally through a display of credible military force directed at potential adversaries. These operations may also be conducted to influence foreign governments or political-military organizations to respect U.S. interests.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS D-70. The process used in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing stability operations is fundamentally identical to that for offensive, defensive, and support operations. Army forces, however, can use the following considerations to help develop tailored concepts and schemes for stability operations. LEVERAGE INTERAGENCY, JOINT, AND MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION

D-71. Unity of effort is fundamental to success in stability operations. Achieving unity of effort requires constant coordination with all involved agencies. Commanders must adapt to situations where there may not be a clear delineation of authority and responsibility. This is especially important in stability operations since the military is often the supporting rather than the supported agency. ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES AND LEGITIMACY OF THE HOST NATION

D-72. Army forces must demonstrate the proper respect for the host nation’s government, police, and military forces. The host nation’s military and police forces must be integrated as much as possible with all aspects of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing every operation. D-73. When host-nation capabilities are inadequate for the task, Army forces focus on enhancing those capabilities through training, advice, and assistance. Commanders make maximum use of host-nation forces and personnel as lead for all possible activities. These include offensive and defensive operations, protection of the civilian populace, security of critical facilities and installations, intelligence and counterintelligence tasks, new construction and reconstruction, psychological operations, police duties, and civil affairs. UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS

D-74. Individual and small-unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic impact. Recognizing and avoiding these potential problems requires trained, disciplines, and knowledgeable leaders and soldiers at every level. Every soldier must be aware of the operational and strategic context of the mission. Additionally, each soldier must understand the potential military, political, and legal consequences of the actions they take or fail to take. Dissemination of this information throughout the force minimizes any possible confusion regarding desired objectives. DISPLAY THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE WITHOUT THREATENING

D-75. Army forces conducting stability operations must be capable of limited combat operations for self-defense. The intent is to demonstrate strength and resolve without provoking an unintended response. To be effective, shows of force in stability operations cannot be perceived as attempts to goad or bully an opponent into an attack.

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D-76. Units can display preparedness by routinely conducting demanding combat training in the area of operations. Training should include challenging soldiers to react to situations involving weapons use, levels of force, and rules of engagement. ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION

D-77. Army forces must always be prepared to act with speed and determination when carrying out assigned tasks. Opponents of stability may perceive hesitation to act decisively as weakness. Units and individuals must pursue military objectives energetically and apply military power forcefully. By doing so, Army forces assure friend and foe alike that they not only can protect themselves and the people and facilities under their charge but also achieve stability objectives. APPLY SELECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATIVE FORCE

D-78. Commanders must make sure their units apply force consistent

with and adequate to the assigned objectives. In addition, they must employ combat power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed legal and policy limitations. They use the ROE to guide the tactical application of combat power. The commander on the ground is best qualified to estimate the correct degree of force that must be used, consistent with the ROE.

SECTION IV – SUPPORT OPERATIONS D-79. Domestic support operations are always conducted in support of local, state, and federal civil authorities. Overseas support operations are almost always conducted in support of and in concert with other agencies; these may be American or international organizations of either governmental or private affiliation. D-80. Support operations may be independent actions. Conversely, they may complement offensive or defensive operations or stability operations. FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) provides a detailed examination of support operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS D-81. Support operations involve Army forces providing essential supplies, capabilities, and services to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their control. Army forces may provide relief or assistance directly. Army force activities in support operations, however, most often involve setting the conditions that facilitate civil authorities or nongovernment organizations in providing required direct support to the affected population.

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS D-82. The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support operations. Instead, Army elements and forces, tailored for warfighting, are rapidly adapted to dominate a crisis or disaster situation. In support operations, Army forces apply decisive military capabilities to set the conditions for the supported civil authorities to achieve success. In most situations, Army forces involved in the support

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operations covered in the following discussion will execute combinations of multiple overlapping activities.

CATEGORIES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-83. Domestic support operations (DSO) are those activities and measures taken by the US Department of Defense (DoD) to foster mutual assistance and support between DoD and any civil government agency. The objective is to ensure planning or preparedness for, or the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies or major disasters. D-84. Domestic support operations focus on the condition of all types of natural and man-made properties, with the goal of helping to protect and/or restore these properties as requested. Typically, these operations are conducted in response to such events as forest and grassland fires, hazardous material releases, floods, and earthquakes. FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

D-85. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations are peopleoriented operations, focusing on the well-being of supported populations; they provide critical supplies to designated groups at the request of local, state, federal, or international agencies. D-86. FHA is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disaster or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or loss of property. FHA is limited in scope and duration and focuses exclusively on prompt aid to resolve an immediate crisis.

TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS D-87. Support operations generally fall into the eight categories covered

in this discussion. Of these, only relief operations apply to both DSO and FHA equally. Support operations may be independent actions, or they may complement offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

RELIEF OPERATIONS Types of Relief Operations

D-88. The actions Army forces execute during relief operations can be characterized as either humanitarian relief, which focuses on the well being of supported populations, or disaster relief, which focuses on recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural or man-made disaster. Most relief operations combine both types of actions. Considerations include the following:

D-18

·

Humanitarian relief focuses on life-saving measures to alleviate the immediate needs of a population in crisis. It often includes the provision of medical support, food, water, medicines, clothing, blankets, shelter, and heating/cooking fuel. In some cases, it involves transportation support to move affected people from a disaster area.

·

Disaster relief encompasses those actions taken to restore or recreate the minimum infrastructure to allow effective

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humanitarian relief to be accomplished and set the conditions for longer-term recovery. This includes establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working conditions, minus security measures necessary to protect relief workers and the affected population from additional harm. Disaster relief may involve repairing or demolishing damaged structures, restoring or building bridges, roads and airfields, and removing debris from critical routes and relief sites. Phases of Relief Operations

D-89. Although each operation is unique, support operations are generally conducted in three broad phases:

· · ·

Response. Recovery. Restoration.

D-90. Army elements can expect to be most heavily committed during the response phase. They will be progressively less involved during the recovery phase, with only very limited activity, if any, during restoration. D-91. Response Phase. In the response phase, commanders focus on life-sustaining functions that are required by those in the disaster area. The following functions dominate these response operations:

· · · · · · · · · · ·

Search and rescue. Emergency flood control. Hazard identification. Food distribution. Water production, purification, and distribution. Temporary shelter construction and administration. Transportation support. Fire fighting. Medical support. Power generation. Communications support.

D-92. Recovery Phase. This phase begins the process of returning the community infrastructure and related services to a status that meets the population’s immediate needs. Typical recovery operations include these:

· · · · ·

Continuation of response operations as needed. Damage assessment. Power distribution. Water and sanitation services. Debris removal.

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D-93. Restoration Phase. Restoration is a long-term process to return the community to normal predisaster status. Restoration activities do not generally involve large numbers of military forces. When they are involved, Army elements generally work with affected communities in the transfer of responsibility to other agencies as military support forces redeploy. SUPPORT TO CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

D-94. Consequence management entails those services and activities essential to mitigating damage, loss, hardship, or suffering resulting from disasters or catastrophes, either man-made or natural. It is primarily a state and local responsibility. Military forces may be employed in support of the lead agency after an event to save lives, to prevent human suffering, and to mitigate property loss. SUPPORT TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

D-95. Military operations that assist civil authorities in protecting US territory, population, and infrastructure against hostile attacks involving WMD are similar to other consequence management situations. In addition, they include operations that are designed to deter and mitigate the effects of such an attack both inside and outside the United States. DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

D-96. Domestic preparedness includes training, exercises, expert assistance, and response. SUPPORT TO CRISES MANAGEMENT

D-97. Crisis management includes measures to resolve a hostile situation and to investigate a criminal case for prosecution under federal laws. Army forces provide military capabilities that support the achievement of defusing or resolving a crisis situation. PROTECTION OF CRITICAL ASSETS

D-98. The purpose of these support operations is to identify critical assets and to assure their integrity, availability, survivability, and capability to support vital DoD missions across the full spectrum of military operations. SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT

D-99. Support to domestic civil law enforcement generally involves activities related to counterterrorism, counterdrug, or civil disturbance operations. Army support may involve providing resources, training, or direct support. Support to Counterterrorism

D-100. Military units in support of the lead agency may operate to eliminate identified threats. Assistance may be provided in the areas of transportation, equipment, training, and personnel. When terrorists pose an imminent threat to US territory, its people, and critical assets, the US military may be used to support operations to counter these threats, using ground, air, space, special operations, or maritime forces. Support to Counterdrug Operations

D-101. Army support to domestic counterdrug operations is very limited and will usually be in a support role only. D-20

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Civil Disturbance Operations

D-102. The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order when local and state law enforcement agencies are unable to quell civil disturbances. Federal military forces assist in restoring law and order when the magnitude of a disturbance exceeds the capabilities of local and state law enforcement agencies, including the National Guard. The Army is usually tasked to apply the minimum force necessary to restore order to the point where civilian authorities no longer require military assistance. COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE

D-103. Community assistance is a broad range of activities in which Army personnel and organizations provide support and maintain a strong connection between the military and civilian communities.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS D-104. The process of planning and executing support operations is fundamentally similar to that involved in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing offensive, defensive, and stability operations. While each support operation is unique, however, the following broad considerations can help forces develop mission-specific concepts and schemes for executing support operations. PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO THE LARGEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE

D-105. Commanders will be required to allocate finite resources to achieve the greatest good. To do this, they must have an accurate assessment of what needs to be done to effectively employ military power. They must determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit the most people in the most efficient way. COORDINATE ACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

D-106. DSOs are typically joint and interagency, while FHA operations are usually multinational as well. Achieving unity of effort and efficient use of resources requires constant coordination. HAND OVER THE MISSION TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES AS SOON AS FEASIBLE

D-107. Army support operations are almost always designed to assist government and nongovernment agencies in accomplishing their missions. The following considerations determine handover feasibility:

· · · ·

Condition of supported population and governments.

·

Maturity of the support effort.

Competing mission requirements. Domestic and international political environments. Specified and implied commitment levels in terms of time, resources, and forces.

ESTABLISH MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

D-108. A critical aspect of mission handover is to have objective standards for measuring progress.

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SECTION V – ROLE OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS D-109. Because military operations involving the reconnaissance platoon occur most often in the state of conflict, the platoon is most likely to operate in support of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In addition to executing standard platoon missions, reconnaissance platoons must be prepared to execute missions or tasks unique to stability operations and support operations. (NOTE: Many of the tasks required during stability operations and support operations will be performed in an urban environment. Refer to Chapter 7 of this manual for information on urban operations.)

PLATOON EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS D-110. As noted, the reconnaissance platoon has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to US and combined forces executing missions in stability operations and support operations. Whether it is operating organic to the troop/company or squadron/battalion or task organized to another light or heavy force, the platoon may be called upon to support a wide range of operations in various political and geographical environments. USING THE PLATOON’S CAPABILITIES

D-111. Because of the resources necessary to deploy, operate, and sustain forces in stability and support environments, the reconnaissance platoon is used to execute activities that take maximum advantage of its inherent capabilities of stealth, reconnaissance, surveillance, and HUMINT collection (if this asset is organic or attached). On the other hand, the factors of METT-TC and the operational considerations prevalent in stability operations and support operations may modify the conditions for successful mission accomplishment. This means the platoon occasionally may be assigned operations that are normally handled by specially trained and equipped elements. For example, the platoon could be tasked for crowd and riot control if a shortage of military police exists. TRAINING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-112. Disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready leaders and soldiers can adapt to the specialized demands of stability operations and support operations. To achieve this degree of readiness, however, the platoon must be thoroughly trained before deployment on such factors as the operational environment, the ROE and ROI, force protection, and individual soldier responsibilities. Refer to the discussion of these operational considerations earlier in this appendix. The training must be updated continuously after deployment. LEADER REQUIREMENTS

D-113. Flexibility and situational awareness are paramount requirements, especially for the reconnaissance platoon leader. The platoon’s role and/or objectives in stability operations and support operations will not always be clear. The platoon leader will sometimes be called upon to make on-the-spot decisions that could have an immediate,

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dramatic effect on the strategic or operational situation. In this uniquely tense setting, leaders who disregard the will of belligerent parties and the lethality of these groups’ weapons compromise the success of their mission and risk the lives of their soldiers.

SPECIFIC PLATOON TASKS D-114. As part of a force involved in stability operations and support operations, the reconnaissance platoon can expect to perform these tasks:

·

·

Security operations, including the following: n

Convoy security (refer to Chapter 4 of this manual).

n

Checkpoints.

n

Roadblocks.

n

Searches of personnel and vehicles.

n

Cordon and search operations.

Reconnaissance operations, including the following: n

Route reconnaissance (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual).

n

Building searches (refer to Chapter 7 of this manual, covering urban operations).

D-115. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and searches are used to control the movement of vehicles, personnel, or material along a specific route. Roadblocks and checkpoints help to prevent trafficking in contraband and stop the movement of known or suspected belligerents. They are used to control access into restricted or contested areas by individuals or elements that could cause hostilities between warring parties. They also assist friendly forces in detecting and evaluating the behavior patterns of the local populace, a critical part of the intelligence process. D-116. Roadblocks and checkpoints are either deliberate or hasty and can be established on a permanent, temporary, or surprise basis. Individual roadblocks and checkpoints can be established and manned by reconnaissance platoons, sections, or squads, depending on the operational environment and the amount of traffic expected to move through the checkpoint.

ROADBLOCKS D-117. A roadblock is used to stop the movement of vehicles along a route or to close access to certain areas or roads. Roadblocks can be established separate from checkpoints or used to channel traffic into a checkpoint. These factors apply in positioning a roadblock:

· · ·

It must be covered by observation and direct fire. It must be positioned so that it cannot be bypassed. If required, positioning must channel traffic into a checkpoint.

D-118. A roadblock is considered an obstacle and is set up or constructed like an obstacle. Figures D-4 and D-5 illustrate types of organization that can be used in establishing a roadblock. Armored vehicles make excellent roadblocks, but local dismounted security must be established to protect

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vehicles from dismounted attack. Concertina wire should be used to prevent vehicles from running through the roadblock (see Figure D-6).

Figure D-4. Recce Platoon Roadblock

Figure D-5. Two-Vehicle Recce Section Roadblock

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Figure D-6. Concertina Wire Roadblock

CHECKPOINTS D-119. Checkpoints are manned locations used to accomplish the following:

· · · · ·

Control movement along specific routes.

·

Check vehicles and personnel for weapons, ammunition, and explosives.

·

Ensure proper use of routes by civilian and military traffic.

Maintain continuous monitoring of road movement. Apprehend suspects. Prevent smuggling of controlled items. Prevent infiltration of unauthorized civilians or military forces into or through a controlled area.

DELIBERATE CHECKPOINTS

D-120. The deliberate checkpoint is a relatively fixed position established in a town or in open country, often on a main road (see Figure D-7). Deliberate checkpoints are classified to handle either heavy traffic or light traffic, based on the amount of traffic expected to pass through them. Reconnaissance sections and squads can operate only light traffic checkpoints (see Figure D-8). The reconnaissance platoon can operate both heavy and light traffic checkpoints; Figure D-9 shows a platoonoperated heavy traffic checkpoint.

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Figure D-7. Deliberate Checkpoint Organization

Figure D-8. Reconnaissance Section Manning a Light Traffic Checkpoint

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Figure D-9. Recce Platoon Manning a Heavy Traffic Checkpoint Establishing a Deliberate Checkpoint

D-121. The physical layout and level of preparation of the checkpoint depend on the amount of traffic expected to pass through it and the duration of its operation. Regardless of the type, all checkpoints have common characteristics and organization. A checkpoint consists of the following parts:

· · · ·

Obstacles (barriers). Search areas. Security overwatch and fighting positions. Holding area.

D-122. Obstacles. A checkpoint is established by placing two parallel obstacles (each with a gap) across the road. These obstacles should be large enough and deep enough to prevent vehicles from running over or through them. The gap must be negotiable by slow-moving vehicles only. The distance between obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that is held in the search area. A barrier pole is placed midway between obstacles to control movement from the search area to the exit obstacle.

D-123. Search Areas. The amount of traffic held in the search areas is determined by the type of search (see Figures D-7 through D-9 earlier in this discussion for illustrations of the various checkpoint search areas). Separate search areas for the following should be set up as needed:

· · ·

Vehicles. Females. Other individuals. These include suspects and other persons detained for further interrogation.

D-124. Fighting Positions. Fighting positions for vehicles, automatic weapons, and individuals must be emplaced to overwatch, protect, and secure the checkpoint.

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D-125. Holding Area. A holding area is established several hundred meters forward of the checkpoint to control the flow of traffic so that the checkpoint is not overwhelmed. Task Organization

D-126. Personnel manning the checkpoint are organized into the following teams or elements to accomplish specific tasks:

· · · ·

Headquarters element. Security force. Search teams. Sentry teams.

D-127. Headquarters Element. The headquarters element consists of the reconnaissance platoon leader, PSG, or section leader; an RTO; and medical personnel. D-128. Security Force. The security force consists of a security element and a checkpoint reaction force. D-129. The checkpoint security element mans overwatch positions and/or perimeter security positions. Security element personnel maintain overwatch of activities in the search area and provide security for personnel operating the checkpoint. Overwatch positions also provide security for sentry teams and the holding area. D-130. The checkpoint reaction force is a concealed element whose purpose is to prevent traffic from avoiding or bypassing the checkpoint. This force can be part of the perimeter security and can react to surprise attacks against the checkpoint or to other emergency situations. It can be located at a position away from the checkpoint, but it must be able to quickly move to the checkpoint to provide necessary support. The reaction force should be no smaller than a reconnaissance section. D-131. Search Teams. The search team, comprising two to three soldiers, searches vehicles and personnel. The team is organized into a guard security element and a search element. The guard element provides security during the searches; at least one member of the guard element guards or observes the individuals or vehicles being searched at all times while the searcher conducts the search. D-132. Sentry Teams. Sentry teams secure the entrance and exit of the checkpoint and the holding area. They control the flow of traffic through the checkpoint, including movement from the entrance into the search area and from the search area to the exit point. D-133. Other Personnel. Whenever possible, the following should be on

hand to assist reconnaissance platoon personnel with checkpoint activities:

D-28

·

A civil affairs officer, a liaison officer, or a member of the civilian police or other local authority.

· ·

An interpreter. A trained female searcher.

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HASTY CHECKPOINTS

D-134. Hasty checkpoints are set up to achieve surprise. They are established in locations where they cannot be observed by approaching traffic until it is too late to withdraw and escape without being observed. Possible locations for hasty checkpoints include the following:

· · · · · · · ·

Tunnels and large culverts. Bridges. Defiles. Positions beyond sharp curves. Highway intersections. Key terrain on highways. Reverse slopes of hills. Other locations that limit detection from long distances.

D-135. The hasty checkpoint has the same basic layout as a deliberate checkpoint; however, because hasty checkpoints are temporary and mobile, the platoon or section establishing the checkpoint must carry the materials necessary to construct it. D-136. The reconnaissance platoon or section uses its vehicles, reinforced with concertina wire, as the obstacle. The vehicles are positioned to partially block the road or route (see Figure D-10). The search area is the space between the vehicles. Sentries are positioned at each end of the checkpoint and are covered by mounted or dismounted automatic weapon positions. A reaction force is designated and concealed nearby.

Figure D-10. Recce Platoon Manning a Hasty Checkpoint

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SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS Signs

D-137. Portable signs in the local language and in English are required. Signs should denote the speed limit of approach, as well as the vehicle search area, male and female search areas, and dismount point. Communications

D-138. Communications must be established between the checkpoint or roadblock and higher headquarters. FM radios and wire are used within the checkpoint and between the checkpoint and overwatch positions, reaction forces, the checkpoint CP, and sentry posts. Checkpoint personnel also plan for additional means of communications, such as pyrotechnics, flags, hand-and-arm signals, or code words. Lighting and Night Observation Devices

D-139. Adequate lighting for the obstacle, search area, and perimeter area is necessary during night operations. Reaction forces and overwatch elements use NODs to observe outside the perimeter; however, these elements must consider how white light will affect operation of the devices. Barriers

D-140. Obstacles should be positioned across the road and around the search area. These can include barrels filled with concrete or sand, barrier poles, clearly marked barbed wire, buses parked sideways in the road, felled trees, abandoned or disabled vehicles, or other readily available items strong enough and big enough to prevent motorists from driving through or around them. Hasty minefields, both dummy and actual, can be used to reinforce an obstacle. Weapons

D-141. Soldiers must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to stop a vehicle that is attempting to flee or crash through the checkpoint. Crew-served weapons must be loaded and manned at all times. Linguists

D-142. Soldiers familiar with the local language are valuable in all roadblock or checkpoint operations. If they are not available, soldiers must be familiar with basic phrases necessary for the operation. They should have a printed reference such as a key word and phrase card; this should be obtained from the civil affairs section, translation detachment, local authorities, or liaison officers as soon as the mission is received. Other Equipment

D-143. Other specialized equipment may be required to support the checkpoint. Figure D-11 provides a list of equipment that may be helpful. OTHER PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

D-144. The reconnaissance platoon leader must take the following requirements into account when planning the checkpoint mission:

· ·

D-30

Obtain indirect fire support on key terrain near the checkpoint. Ensure that checkpoints are designed so that the minimum number of soldiers are exposed at any given time.

__________________________________


·

Position automatic weapons to provide protection when soldiers are exposed.

·

Ensure that reinforcement and counterattack plans are developed and rehearsed.

·

Ensure that ROE/ROI are clear and understood by all soldiers manning the checkpoint.

· · ·

Plan for 24-hour operation of the checkpoint. Obtain logistical support. Coordinate for medical assistance and MEDEVAC and CASEVAC assets.

Figure D-11. Equipment List for Roadblocks and Checkpoints PREPARING FOR CONTINGENCIES AT CHECKPOINTS

D-145. The reconnaissance platoon leader must develop tactics and procedures to respond to various situations that can develop at a checkpoint. For example, a high volume of pedestrian and vehicle traffic can be expected to pass through a checkpoint; this congestion can be compounded by undisciplined driving habits of the local population and by the shortage of soldiers able to speak the local language. Belligerents can use the resulting confusion to smuggle weapons and explosives through the checkpoints. In addition, checkpoints face the constant threat of violence. D-146. Leaders must plan for these contingencies when preparing personnel to man checkpoints. The ROE/ROI must be clear and flexible enough to accommodate rapid changes in any situation that may develop.

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Figure D-12 lists some examples of situations encountered at checkpoints, along with possible responses.

Figure D-12. Responses to Situations at a Checkpoint

SEARCHES OF PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES D-147. Searches of people, material, and vehicles are commonly used at roadblocks and checkpoints to control unauthorized movement of individuals and prohibited items (contraband). PLANNING GUIDELINES FOR SEARCH OPERATIONS

D-148. Planning for a search operation should cover these points:

· · · · ·

Search authority. Conduct of the search. Search rates. Use of force. Courtesy.

Search Authority

D-149. Checkpoint personnel perform searches to apprehend suspects or confiscate contraband only in areas within their military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful). Proper use of search procedures gains the respect and support of the local population, enhances credibility, and demonstrates impartiality. Conversely, misuse of search authority can undermine the credibility of forces conducting operations in the area; it

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can also affect future operations. Checkpoint personnel must ensure that search procedures are conducted in accordance with established guidelines and the applicable ROE/ROI. Conduct of the Search

D-150. All checkpoint personnel must thoroughly understand the instructions issued for the conduct of searches. Instructions may cover, but are not limited to, the following points:

·

Personnel, vehicles, and/or items allowed to pass through the checkpoint.

·

Personnel and/or vehicles not allowed to pass through the checkpoint.

· · ·

Procedures for detaining vehicles or personnel. Items to be confiscated. Procedures for handling confiscated items.

Search Rates

D-151. Search operations are conducted slowly enough to allow for a thorough search but rapidly enough to prevent the threat from reacting to the threat of the search. Use of Force

D-152. In accordance with established ROE, minimum essential force is used to eliminate any active resistance encountered during the search. Courtesy

D-153. Search personnel should remain polite and considerate at all times. Refer to Figure D-13 for a list of guidelines for personal conduct during search operations.

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Figure D-13. “Dos” and “Don’ts” of Search Operations SEARCH PROCEDURES Search of Individuals

D-154. To avoid making a threat of a person passing through a checkpoint, searchers must be polite, considerate, patient, and tactful. Since the very presence of checkpoints can cause uneasiness or fear, it is during the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatest caution is required. At least one member of the search team must provide security at all times while others conduct the search. The following methods can be used to search an individual:

· · · ·

Frisk search. Wall search. Strip search. Female search.

D-155. Frisk Search. This is a quick search of an individual for

weapons, evidence, or contraband. It should be conducted in the presence of an assistant (guard) and a witness, when available. In conducting the frisk search, the searcher positions himself to prevent possible endangerment (see Figure D-14). The searcher’s guard takes a position from which he can cover the individual with his weapon. The searcher must avoid moving between the guard and the individual being searched. The searched individual is required to raise his arms above his head. The searcher slides his hands over the individual’s entire body, crushing the clothing to locate concealed objects. If the individual being searched is

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carrying a bag or wearing a coat or hat, these are also searched, with special attention given to the linings.

Figure D-14. Frisk Search

D-156. Wall Search. The wall search affords the searcher some safety by placing the individual being searched in a strained, awkward position (see Figure D-15). This search method is useful when two searchers must search several individuals. The individuals to be searched can be positioned against any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, tree, or telephone pole. The following discussion covers factors that must be considered during the wall search. D-157. Position of individual being searched. The individual must

face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with his hands over his head, placed far apart with fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart as far from the wall as possible; they are turned outward so they are parallel to the wall. The individual must keep his head down as illustrated in Figure D-15.

D-158. Position of the searcher’s guard. The searcher’s guard stands

to the rear of the individual being searched on the opposite side from the searcher (see Figure D-15). The guard uses his weapon to cover the individual being searched. When the searcher moves from his original position to the opposite side of the individual being searched, the guard also changes position. The searcher walks around the guard to avoid coming between the guard’s weapon and the individual being searched.

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Figure D-15. Wall Search

D-159. Position of the searcher. The searcher approaches the individual being searched from the right side. The searcher must secure his weapon so that the individual being searched cannot grab it.

D-160. When searching from the right side, the searcher places his right foot in front of the individual’s right foot, making and maintaining ankleto-ankle contact. If the individual offers resistance, this position allows the searcher to push the individual’s right foot back and out from under him, causing him to fall to the ground. When searching from the left side, the searcher places his left foot in front of the individual’s left foot and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. Figure D-16 illustrates the ankle-to-ankle position.

Figure D-16. Ankle-to-Ankle Position for a Wall Search

D-161. Wall search procedures. In taking his initial position, the

searcher must remain alert to prevent the individual being searched from

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making a sudden move to disarm or injure him. The searcher first searches the individual’s headgear. Then he checks, in sequence, the individual’s hands and arms, the right side of his body, and his right leg. The searcher repeats the procedure on the left side of the individual. He crushes the person’s clothing between his fingers rather than merely patting the surface of the clothing. The searcher pays close attention to the armpits, back, waist, legs, groin area, and tops of boots or shoes. Any item that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the individual’s pocket. If the individual resists, attempts to escape, or must be thrown down before the search is completed, the search is restarted from the beginning.

D-162. Search of multiple individuals. When two or more individuals

are to be searched, they must all assume a position against the same wall or object but far enough apart that they cannot reach each other. The guard takes a position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search starts with the person on the right end of the line. Upon completing the search of the first individual, the searcher moves that individual to the left end of the line; the individual assumes the proper position against the wall. The searcher resumes with the individual now on the right end of the line. The searcher must be careful to approach and search the remaining individuals without coming between them and the guard (as illustrated in Figure D-17).

Figure D-17. Wall Search of Multiple Subjects

D-163. Strip Search. This extreme search is used only when the

individual is suspected of carrying documents or other contraband on his person. The search is conducted in an enclosed area such as a room or tent. Several search techniques are available. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while an armed guard provides security. The individual’s clothing is removed and searched carefully. A search is then made of all possible concealment areas, including the mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, and groin area. A medic is a good choice to conduct this search. Care must be taken not to subject the individual to unnecessary embarrassment. Searchers must ensure that the person’s privacy and dignity are maintained as much as possible.

D-164. Search of Females. Women should be used to search other females whenever possible. If female searchers are not available, consider

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using doctors, medics, or designated males from the local population. If male soldiers must search females, all possible measures must be taken to prevent any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. Search of Vehicles

D-165. Vehicles searches may require special equipment such as metal detection devices and mirrors. Because a thorough vehicle search is a time-consuming process, a separate search area should be established to prevent unnecessary delays. Table D-2 shows an example of a search rate planning guide. Table D-2. Example Rate Planning Guide for Vehicle Searches

D-166. Searchers instruct all occupants to get out and stand clear of the vehicle. The driver should be made to watch the search of the vehicle. A guard watches the passengers and provides additional security at all times. If sufficient searchers are available, the passengers should be searched at the same time. Figure D-18 lists some examples of vehicle search procedures.

Figure D-18. Example Vehicle Search Procedures

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CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS D-167. When intelligence identifies and locates members of an insurgent infrastructure, cordon and search operations are mounted to neutralize them. This discussion covers procedures for the reconnaissance platoon in support of the company/troop or battalion/squadron conducting these operations. (NOTE: The discussion and accompanying illustrations cover the role of a recce platoon in the cordon and search.) TASK ORGANIZATION

D-168. Task organization for cordon and search operations includes a security force (cordon force), a search force, and a reserve force. The reconnaissance platoon will normally operate as part of the security force or the reserve force; if required, however, it can operate either by itself as the search force or as part of a larger search force. CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION

D-169. Search zones are designated; a search party is assigned to each zone. Each search party has its own search force, security force, and reserve force. Procedures

D-170. An effective cordon is critical to the success of the search effort. Cordons isolate the search area, prevent the escape of individuals, and protect the forces conducting the operation. Deployment to the search area is rapid and is synchronized so it does not provide early warning to the local population; the security force surrounds the area while the search force moves in (see Figure D-19).

Figure D-19. Recce Platoon Establishes 360-Degree Security

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D-171. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established along roads entering and exiting the area (as shown in Figure D-20). OPs are established, and security patrols are executed in the surrounding area. Members of the security force orient mainly on people or vehicles attempting to escape or evade the search in the populated area; however, the security force can also cut off elements or individuals trying to reinforce threat forces in the search area.

Figure D-20. Recce Sections Establish Hasty Roadblocks Reserve Force

D-172. A mobile reserve force is located near the search zone. Its specific mission is to reinforce OPs, patrols, or the search force and to assist the other elements as required by the mission. Figure D-21 shows the recce platoon operating as the reserve.

Figure D-21. Recce Platoon Operates as the Reserve Force

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SECTION VI – LIGHT/MEDIUM OPERATIONS IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT ENVIRONMENTS D-173. During stability operations and support operations, situations may arise requiring medium and light forces to operate together. The use of a mixed force capitalizes on the strengths of both forces while offsetting their respective weaknesses. Light/medium operations take advantage of the light unit’s ability to operate in restricted terrain (such as urban areas, forests, and mountains), while increasing the light unit’s survivability. Conversely, the medium unit’s mobility, protection, and firepower complement the light infantry unit’s capabilities. D-174. The reconnaissance platoon may operate with light infantry forces in various task organizations. Examples of these organizations include the following:

·

The squadron/battalion or troop is attached or OPCON to a light infantry brigade.

·

A light infantry squadron/battalion.

·

The reconnaissance platoon is attached to a light infantry brigade as part of a company team.

company

is

attached

to

the

D-175. Regardless of the task organization, the key challenge in light/medium operations is to understand the capabilities and limitations of light and medium forces, to develop plans that take full advantage of their capabilities, and to correctly employ the two types of forces for maximum effectiveness. The goal of this section is to assist the reconnaissance platoon leader in understanding the platoon’s role in the light/medium force and in planning and executing the platoon’s missions during these operations. (NOTE: FM 3-21.10 [FM 7-10] provides detailed information on light infantry organizations.)

ROLE OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON D-176. The reconnaissance platoon normally does not conduct close support of infantry operations. In stability operations and support operations, however, the platoon can use its unique capabilities to conduct combat operations in support of or in conjunction with light infantry. D-177. Along with conventional reconnaissance and security missions, the platoon can support infantry in urban operations and in cordon and search operations. A CFV reconnaissance platoon can also provide limited protection against threat armored forces.

THE THREAT D-178. Light infantry fights a variety of threat forces. These may range from crudely equipped insurgents to technologically advanced conventional forces. Potential threat targets include the following:

·

Nonarmored targets, including the following: n

Bunkers.

n

Automatic weapon positions.

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· · · ·

n

Buildings and walls.

n

Roadblocks and obstacles.

CPs. Logistical positions. Light-skinned vehicles. Armored vehicles.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON CAPABILITIES

D-179. Reconnaissance platoon capabilities in support of light/medium operations include the following:

·

Ability to suppress or destroy threat positions with direct fires.

·

Ability to breach walls and reduce some obstacles with direct fire.

· · · ·

Enhanced communications assets. Thermal sights and NODs. Capability for rapid movement and limited penetrations. Use of vehicles to provide protection against small arms and fragments.

LIMITATIONS

D-180. The reconnaissance operations include these:

platoon’s

limitations

in

light/medium

· · ·

Restricted mobility and fields of fire in close or urban terrain.

·

Need for augmentation of transportation assets to support CSS requirements.

·

Inability to move over heavily wooded terrain traversable by light infantry.

·

Inability of bridges and roads to support certain types of reconnaissance vehicles.

Vulnerability to antiarmor weapons in built-up areas. The consumption of large quantities of Classes III, V, and IX, in some situations requiring daily resupply.

LIGHT/MEDIUM URBAN OPERATIONS D-181. Urban battlefields are complex and three-dimensional; they are characterized by the close, restricted terrain typical of built-up areas, resulting in severely limited fields of fire and maneuver space. Mounted avenues of approach, restricted mostly to streets and alleys, are narrow, canalized, and easily obstructed. On the other hand, cover and concealment are plentiful for dismounted forces. Dismounted avenues of

D-42

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approach are literally everywhere: along edges of streets, over rooftops.

underground, through buildings,

D-182. While urban operations are predominantly an infantry fight, the reconnaissance platoon can support light infantry units by providing security, protection, mobility, and firepower. The platoon can perform the following tasks to increase the combat power of the light infantry force:

·

Isolate objectives with direct fire to prevent withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack.

· · · · · ·

Suppress or destroy threat positions.

· ·

Suppress sniper fires.

·

Overwatch likely armor avenues of approach.

threat

Breach walls and blocked doorways. Reduce some barricades and obstacles with direct fires. Reduce threat strongpoints. Establish roadblocks. Protect against counterattacks.

threat

light

armored

attacks

or

Use vehicles to provide protection from small arms and fragmentation rounds.

NOTE: Chapter 7 of this manual provides a detailed discussion of the reconnaissance platoon’s role in urban operations.

D-43

Appendix E

Antennas In its role of providing CONTENTS battlefield information to the Siting Considerations ................................... commander, the reconnaisField-Expedient Repairs ............................... sance platoon operates along Repair Techniques ................................. extended frontages and over Field-Expedient Repair Items ............... long distances. To perform its Field-Expedient Antennas ............................ missions successfully, the Advantages and Disadvantages ........... Determining Antenna Lengths ............. platoon must employ effective Omnidirectional Antennas .................... communications systems, Bidirectional Antennas .......................... equipment, and techniques. Unidirectional Antennas ....................... This appendix covers Field-Expedient 500- to 600-Ohm/2-Watt antennas, a critical aspect of Resistor ............................................... Antenna Connections ............................ the communications system. (NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for a discussion of the means of communications and the correct application of operational terms and effective RTP. Appendix B includes formats and employment considerations for reports the platoon uses.) The discussion focuses on considerations related to the employment of radio antennas, a critical factor in the effectiveness of the reconnaissance platoon’s communications capabilities. Included are discussions on how to site antennas for best results, how to make field-expedient antenna repairs, and how to construct a variety of field-expedient antennas.

E-1 E-2 E-2 E-4 E-5 E-5 E-6 E-6 E-9 E-12 E-16 E-17

SECTION I – SITING CONSIDERATIONS E-1. A radio station should be located in a position for best communications while maintaining a degree of physical and communications security. Hills and mountains between stations normally limit the range of radio sets. Whenever possible, select a location that will allow line-of-sight communications. Avoid locations that provide the threat with jamming capability, visual sighting, or easy interception of friendly transmissions. E-2. Dry ground has high resistance and limits the range of the radio set. If possible, locate the station near moist ground, which has much less resistance. Water, particularly salt water, greatly increases the range of the radio set. E-3. Trees with heavy foliage absorb radio waves. Leafy trees have more of an adverse effect than evergreens. Keep the antenna clear of all foliage and dense brush, but try to use available trees and shrubs for cover and concealment and for screening from threat jamming.

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E-4. Do not select an antenna position in a tunnel or beneath an underpass or steel bridge. Transmission and reception under these conditions are almost impossible because of high absorption of radiofinding energy. E-5. Buildings located between radio stations, particularly steel and reinforced concrete structures, hinder transmission and reception. Try to use buildings, however, to camouflage antennas from the threat. E-6. Avoid all types of poles that carry wires. Wires absorb power from radiating antennas located in their vicinity. They also introduce hum and other noise interference in receiving antennas. E-7. Avoid positions adjacent to heavily traveled roads and highways. In addition to the noise and confusion caused by tanks and trucks, ignition systems in these vehicles may cause electrical interference. E-8. Do not locate battery-charging units and generators close to the radio stations. Do not locate radio stations close to each other.

SECTION II – FIELD-EXPEDIENT REPAIR E-9. Antennas are sometimes broken or damaged, causing either a communications failure or poor communications, When there is no spare, you may have to construct an emergency antenna. The following paragraphs are suggestions on repairing antennas and antenna supports, and on constructing and adjusting emergency antennas.

REPAIR TECHNIQUES WHIP ANTENNAS

E-10. As an example, for a metallic whip antenna broken into two pieces, a splint job is the quickest type of repair. Scrape off the paint 3 to 6 inches from the broken ends; use sand, rocks, metal, or a knife to scrape the ends clean. Using about 1 foot of copper wire (stripped WD-1 if available), overlay the cleaned ends and wrap them together tightly with the copper wire. Place a dry stick, pole, or branch on each side of the break and wrap the splint tightly with WD-1, rope, tape, or whatever is available. If everything else is working right, the radio should be ready to use. E-11. In combat, a common emergency would be for the 9-foot whip antenna getting knocked off in an artillery barrage. To get back on the air, you will need a pole about 10 feet long, about 9 feet of WD-1, and some tape. First, scrape off the paint from the top 2 inches of the whip’s stub. Tightly wrap 12 inches of bare wire around the scraped portion of the stub. Pass the wire over the top of the stub, jam it in the hole with a wooden peg, and tape it to hold it securely. Then take the 10-foot pole and tie it tightly to the antenna base and stub. Attach the WD-1 along the length of pole with tape. The total length of the upright WD-1 and antenna stub should not be more than 9 feet. Trim away any extra wire, and you are ready to communicate. This makeshift mast will not withstand abuse like the original, but it will serve you well in an emergency.

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________________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Antennas

E-12. You cannot splint an AT-912 or AS-1729 fiberglass whip antenna, but you can construct a makeshift whip antenna. Measure off a 5-foot length of coaxial cable. Strip the rubber sleeve from the cable, and separate the braided shield from the center conductor. Lash a dry, 10-foot pole to the antenna base. Tape the center conductor to the top of the pole and the braided shield to the bottom. Tape the stripped cable several more places along the pole so it will stay in place. If there is a BNC (twistlock type) connector on the cable, attach it to the radio; if not, wedge the center conductor firmly into the antenna connector and attach the braided shield to a screwhead on the radio case. This is an ideal system, but it will work as a temporary solution. Replace it as soon as possible. WIRE ANTENNAS

E-13. Emergency repair of a wire antenna may involve the repair or replacement of the wire used as the antenna or transmission line or the repair or replacement of the assembly used to support the antenna. E-14. When one or more wires of an antenna are broken, the antenna can be repaired by reconnecting the broken wires. To do this, lower the antenna to the ground, clean the ends of the wires, and twist the wires together. Whenever possible, solder the connection. Use electrical tape, if available, for added support. E-15. If the antenna is damaged beyond repair, construct a new antenna. Make sure the length of the wires for the substitute antenna is the same as on the original. E-16. Antenna supports may also require repair or replacement. A

substitute item may be used in place of a damaged support; if properly insulated, it can be made of any material of adequate strength. If the radiating element is not properly insulated, field antennas may be improperly grounded and therefore ineffective. Many common items can be used as field-expedient insulators. The best items are plastic or glass, such as plastic spoons, buttons, bags, and bottle necks. Wood and rope, or both, are less effective than plastic or glass but still are better than no insulator at all. The radiating element (the actual antenna wire) should touch only the antenna terminal and should be physically separated from all other objects (other than the supporting insulator). Figure E-1 shows various improvised insulators.

NOTE: Insulation materials (ranked by effectiveness as an insulator) include the following: · Best insulation properties: plastic, glass.

· ·

Good insulation properties: wood. Fair insulation properties: cloth, rope.

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Figure E-1. Improvised Insulators

FIELD-EXPEDIENT REPAIR ITEMS E-17. The items listed in Table E-1 may be valuable in field-expedient

repairs.

Table E-1. Example Field-Expedient Repair Items ORIGINAL ISSUE ITEM

FIELD-EXPEDIENT REPAIR ITEMS

Antenna wire

WD-1, barbed wire electrical wire, coaxial cable

Antenna mast

Tree, stick, lance pole, telephone pole

Coaxial cable

WD-1, electrical wire

Antenna guy rope

Wire, cloth belt

Guy stakes

Rocks, vehicles, trees, tent pins

Whip antenna

Wire, WD-1, coaxial cable

Pulleys

Wire, nylon rope

Insulators

Plastic rings, plastic spoons, plastic bags, wood, rope, glass/plastic bottles

SECTION III – FIELD-EXPEDIENT ANTENNAS E-4


E-18. Direction and distance are critical factors in determining how well the reconnaissance platoon is able to communicate. There are three basic types of antennas, based on their directional features:

· ·

Omnidirectional. These antennas transmit in all directions.

·

Unidirectional. These antennas transmit in any one direction.

Bidirectional. These antennas transmit in any two opposite directions.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES E-19. Each type of antenna has advantages and disadvantages. The omnidirectional or whip antenna enables the sender to communicate without worrying about the location of the receiving station, but it makes him vulnerable to threat radio direction-finding capability. The bidirectional antenna allows communications with two or more stations in opposite directions, but the sender must make sure the antennas at these stations are parallel to his. The antenna should be positioned at 90 degrees to the threat lines to reduce the possibility of interception. A terminated long-wire antenna is unidirectional and is the least open to threat interception if positioned properly. One disadvantage is that the radio can transmit and receive best in only one direction. Also, the transmissions are affected by whether the antenna is located vertically or horizontally to the ground. Waves from a vertical antenna are vertically polarized; waves from a horizontal antenna are horizontally polarized. A vertical antenna receives from a radio with a vertical antenna, with a corresponding match required for radios with horizontal antennas. The sender must make sure that his own antenna and the antenna at the distant station are either both vertical or both horizontal. Figure E-2 shows examples of each type of antenna.

Figure E-2. Antenna Types

DETERMINING ANTENNA LENGTHS

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E-20. To determine the length of the antenna you need, use the proper formula below:

·

To calculate a quarter-wavelength antenna in feet, divide 234 (constant) by the operating frequency (in MHz). Example: 234 divided by 44.8 = 5.22 or 5 feet, 2 inches.

·

To calculate a half-wavelength antenna in feet, divide 468 (oonstant) by the operating frequency (in MHz). Example: 468 divided by 56 = 8.36 or 8 feet, 5 inches.

·

To calculate a full-wavelength antenna in feet, divide 936 (constant) by the operating frequency (in MHz). Example: 936 divided by 45 = 20.8 or 20 feet, 10 inches.

OMNIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS MOBILE WIRE ANTENNA

E-21. The mobile wire antenna is basically a whip antenna without the stiffness of a fiberglass whip. With the appropriate insulators and a support system, it can become a vertical whip antenna (see Figure E-3). This antenna is severely degraded when the range is unknown. Since the vehicle acts as a reflector, the loose wire should be laid over the portion of the vehicle that faces the receiving station. This ensures that the reflected radio waves are radiated toward the receiving station. The coaxial 52-ohm RF cable can be the same cable that is installed in the vehicle (from the radio antenna receptacle to the antenna matching unit), or it can be fabricated by the unit communications platoon. If fabricated, the cable should be only long enough to reach from the radio to the outside of the vehicle. QUARTER-WAVELENGTH VERTICAL ANTENNA

E-22. Vertical antennas are omnidirectional. Most tactical antennas are vertical, including the man-pack portable radio and the radios in tactical vehicles. A vertical antenna can be improvised by using a metal pipe or rod of the right length, held erect by guy wires. The lower end of the antenna should be insulated from the ground by placing it on a large block of wood or other insulating material. A vertical antenna may also be a wire supported by a tree or a wooden pole (see Figure E-4). For short vertical antennas, the pole may be used without guy wires (if properly supported at the base). If the length of the vertical mast is not long enough to support the wire upright, it may be necessary to modify the connection at the top of the antenna (see Figure E-5).

E-6


Figure E-3. Examples of Mobile Wire Antennas

Figure E-4. Field-Expedient Substitutes for Support of Vertical Wire Antennas (Part One)

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Figure E-5. Modified Support Substitutes for Vertical Wire Antennas (Part Two)

E-23. A quarter-wavelength antenna may be used to replace a regular whip antenna. The following steps explain how to erect a quarterwavelength vertical antenna:

·

Step 1. Using the reference chart in Table E-2 or the formula for a quarter-wavelength antenna provided earlier in this discussion, determine the length of WD-1 wire needed.

·

Step 2. Attach an insulator to one end of the wire and insert the other end (stripped) into the antenna connector on the radio.

·

Step 3. Tie a rope to the insulator end and throw the rope over a limb.

·

Step 4. Pull the insulator up until it is vertical.

Table E-2. Quarter-Wavelength Antenna Reference Chart OPERATING FREQUENCY (in MHz)

ELEMENT LENGTH (radiating element and ground-plane elements

30

2.38 m (7 ft 10 in)

32

2.23 m (7 ft 4 in)

34

2.1 m (6 ft 11 in)

36

1.98 m (6 ft 6 in)

38

1.87 m (6 ft 2 in)

40

1.78 m (5 ft 10 in)

43

1.66 m (5 ft 5 in)

46

1.55 m (5 ft 1 in)

49

1.46 m (4 ft 9 in)

52

1.37 m (4 ft 6 in)

55

1.3 m (4 ft 3 in)

58

1.23 m (4 ft)

61

1.17 m (3 ft 10 in)

64

1.12 m (3 ft 8 in)

68

1.05 m (3 ft 5 in)

72

.99 m (3 ft 3 in)

76

.94 m (3 ft 1 in)

E-24. If insulated wire is used, be sure to loop the wire around the handle of the radio before attaching it to the antenna connector. If the antenna is made of bare wire, use a stake and insulator to keep the antenna wire from pulling out of the antenna connector on the radio.

BIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS END-FED HALF-WAVELENGTH ANTENNA

E-8


E-25. An emergency end-fed hail-wavelength antenna can be constructed from available materials such as field wire, rope, and wooden insulators. The electrical length of this antenna is measured from the antenna terminal on the radio set to the far end of the antenna. The antenna should be constructed longer than necessary and then shortened, as required, until best results are obtained. For this antenna to function efficiently, the ground terminal of the radio set should be connected to a good earth ground. This type of bidirectional antenna will normally be used as a field-expedient retrans station. The user must position his antenna parallel to the ground between the sender and the receiver stations. (See Figure E-6.)

Figure E-6. Field-Expedient End-Fed Half-Wavelength Antenna

E-26. Long-wire antennas of unspecified length are bidirectional. They are most effective along a line extending from the two ends of the wire. A 100-foot, long-wire antenna will work when the radio is operating in the 30 to 80 MHz frequency range. For high-frequency operation, the antenna wire must be longer. This antenna will improve the range of the radio in the directions in which the wire is stretched. The following steps explain how the bidirectional antenna works:

·

Step 1. Erect a pole or select a tree in line with the direction you want to communicate. The antenna should be at least 20

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feet high. If you use a tree, make sure the antenna does not touch any of the branches.

·

Step 2. Tie the rope to the pole or tree. While holding the other end of the antenna wire, pace off 100 feet from the direction in which you want to communicate. Tie an insulator to the end of the wire.

·

Step 3. Prepare a mast or pole for the second support. To make a substitute pulley, tie a length of WD-1 wire or nylon rope to the top of the mast. Leave a good, firm loop.

·

Stop 4. Put a rope or wire halyard through the loop and attach it to the other aide of the insulator. Leave enough rope to pull the antenna up once the mast is erected.

·

Stop 5. Attach 25 feet of WD-1 wire to the antenna side of the insulator. Make a good electrical connection because this is the antenna lead-in.

·

Stop 6. Put up the second support about 6 feet beyond the end of the 100-foot antenna. This allows for the insulators at each end.

·

Step 7. Attach guy supports to both sides of the antenna. This will not be necessary if a tree is used, but any pole you put up will require a back guy wire because stretching the antenna puts considerable strain on it.

·

Step 8. Pull on the halyard until the antenna is level, then tie the halyard to the supporting pole.

·

Step 9. Connect the WD-1 wire lead-in to the radio.

VERTICAL HALF-WAVELENGTH ANTENNA

E-27. Figure E-7 shows an improvised vertical half-wavelength antenna. This technique is used primarily with FM radios. It is effective in heavily wooded areas to increase the range of portable radios. The top guy wire can be connected to a limb or passed over the limb and connected to the tree trunk or a stake.

E-10


Figure E-7. Improvised Vertical Half-Wavelength Antenna WIRE ANTENNA

E-28. Pick a support that is at least 15 feet high and pointed in the direction you need to communicate. Move your vehicle/radio so the support is on a line with the station you need to reach and 100 feet from you. Tie a piece of rope or WD-1 wire to the tree or pole you have selected as a support. Attach an insulator to the rope or WD-1 wire tied to the support. Connect 100 feet of WD-1 wire (antenna) to the insulator. Pull the slack out of the antenna. Wrap the other end of the WD-1 wire around the lower part of the broken whip to secure it, and connect the wire to the antenna connector on the radio. Make sure you remove the control cable and antenna cable connecting the matching unit and radio. You are now ready to operate, as illustrated in Figure E-8. Remember to point your antenna in the right direction. In addition, do not tie the antenna close to the tree’s foliage. Also remember that you have converted the original omnidirectional antenna into a bidirectional antenna.

Figure E-8. Field-Expedient Wire Antenna

E-29. Note that the antenna you have constructed has a long piece of wire as a replacement for the whip. Long-wire antennas are covered later in this discussion. Do not expect optimum transmission quality in all directions from this antenna.

UNIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS E-30. Dismounted patrols can greatly improve their communications in the jungle by using field-expedient antennas. While moving, you are generally restricted to using the short and long antennas that come with

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your radios. When you are not moving, however, a field-expedient antenna will allow you to broadcast farther and receive more clearly. Keep this fact in mind: an antenna that is not tuned to the operating frequency is not as effective as the whip antennas that are supplied with your radio. Circuits inside the radio load the whip antennas properly so that they are tuned to give maximum output. A whip antenna is not as effective as a tuned doublet or tuned groundplane, but the doublet or ground-plane must be tuned to the operating frequency. VERTICAL HALF-RHOMBIC AND LONG-WIRE ANTENNAS

E-31. The vertical half-rhombic (VHR) antenna (see Figure E-9) and the long-wire antenna (see Figure E-10) are unidirectional. These antennas consist of a single wire, preferably two or more wavelengths long. The wire is supported on poles and hung 3 to 7 meters (approximately 10 to 20 feet) above the ground. The antennas will, however, operate satisfactorily as low as 1 meter (approximately 3 feet) above the ground. The far end of the wire is connected to the ground through a noninductive resistor of 500 to 600 ohms. To make sure the resistor is not burned out by the power output of the transmitter, use a resistor rated at one-half or more of the wattage output of your transmitter. A reasonably good ground, such as several ground rods or a counterpoise, should be used at both ends of the antenna. The radiation pattern is directional. The antennas are used primarily for transmitting or receiving high-frequency signals.

Figure E-9. Vertical Half-Rhombic Antenna

E-12


Figure E-10. Long-Wire Antenna Vertical Half-Rhombic Antenna

E-32. If you need more distance and direction than your whip antenna will allow, try making a VHR antenna. Before building the antenna, determine the direction of the station you need to reach. Line up your antenna and plan all of your work in that direction. Use the following steps to build a VHR antenna:

· ·

Cut 100 feet of wire for the antenna itself.

·

Connect an insulator to each end of the antenna wire and one at the middle as illustrated in Figure E-9. Add a tie-down wire outside the insulators on each end of the antenna wire.

·

Connect the counterpoise to the insulators at the same point as the tie-down wire.

·

Select or erect a middle support (a tree, a pole, or a wire or rope suspended between two trees or structures). The midpoint must be at least 30 feet high.

·

Stretch the counterpoise in the direction of the target station, with the middle of the counterpoise at the center support. Drive stakes near each tie-down wire. Stretch the counterpoise tightly and tie it to the stakes. Elevate the center of the antenna until it is tight.

·

Run a wire from the antenna terminal and connect it to the antenna above the insulator. Run a second wire from a screwhead on your radio case to the bottom of the insulator.

·

Place a 600-ohm, 2-watt carbon resistor at the end toward the desired station; this will allow the antenna to transmit toward the desired station only. Make sure the resistor is carbon and not wire wound. A 2-watt resistor will work for the AN/PRC77, but a resistor with a wattage rating of half the power output is needed for higher-power radios.

Cut 91 feet of wire for a counterpoise. This is a wire stretched across the bottom of the antenna that acts as an artificial ground to help produce the required radiation pattern. This antenna can be used without the counterpoise, but it will not work as well.

Long-Wire Antenna

E-33. When erecting a long-wire antenna, do not forget the basics. The overall length of the antenna wire must be 3 to 7 wavelengths of the operating frequency. Use the reference chart in Table F-3 or the appropriate formula provided earlier in this discussion to calculate the

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correct wire length for the frequency on which you are operating. This antenna is unidirectional for low power VHF radios if you use the 500- to 600-ohm, 2-watt carbon resistor. It is bidirectional, however, for highpower VHF and HF, because in the field you will not be able to obtain a carbon resistor large enough to terminate the higher-powered radios. Set it up for the direction in which you want to communicate because it is definitely not omnidirectional.

E-34. Erect the antenna as shown in Figure E-10. You will have to use some side guys on the 9- to 10-foot poles to hold them up firmly. You will find you can communicate over longer distances in either one or two directions. V-ANTENNAS

E-35. The V-antenna is another field-expedient unidirectional antenna. It consists of two wires forming a V, with the open area of the V pointing toward the desired direction of transmission/reception (see Figure E-11). To make construction easier, the legs may slope downward from the apex of the V. This is called a sloping-V antenna (see Figure E-12). E-36. To achieve maximum performance, the angle between the legs varies with the length of the legs. Use Table E-3 to determine the angle and length of the legs. When the antenna is used with more than one frequency or wavelength, use an apex angle that is midway between the extreme angles indicated in the chart. E-37. To make the antenna radiate in only one direction, connect noninductive terminating resistors from the end of each leg (not at the apex) to the ground. The resistors should be approximately 500 ohms and have a power rating at least half that of the power output of the transmitter being used. Without the resistors, the antenna radiates bidirectionally, both front and back. E-38. The V-antenna must be fed by a balanced transmission line.

Figure E-11. V-Antenna

E-14


Figure E-12. Sloping-V Antenna

Table E-3. Leg Angle for V-Antennas ANTENNA LENGTH (wavelength)

OPTIMUM APEX ANGLE (degrees)

1

90

2

70

3

58

4

50

6

40

8

35

10

33

VERTICAL WHIP ANTENNA WITH REFLECTOR

E-39. A reflector placed approximately one-quarter wavelength behind a vertical whip antenna may also improve the performance of a whip antenna. A reflector is a vertical wire or metallic pole (or another whip) that is insulated from the ground. It is placed so that the reflector, the whip, and the distant station are on a straight line. The reflector will reflect radio energy striking it and will cause the energy to travel toward the distant station, thereby increasing the total energy radiated in the desired direction. To work properly, the reflector must be longer than the whip. If the reflector is shorter, it will act as a director and cause the radio signal to be directed away from the distant station. Remember: a reflector is longer and is placed behind the whip; a director is shorter and is placed between the whip and the distant station. While listening to the

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distant station, adjust the position of the reflector until the strongest signal is received. (See Figure E-13.)

Figure E-13. Vertical Whip Antenna with Reflector

FIELD-EXPEDIENT 500- TO 600-OHM/2-WATT RESISTOR E-40. The following materials are needed to construct a field-expedient resistor:

· · · ·

One BA-30 (D size) battery. Two nails or metal spikes. Tape or wire. One wood insulator.

E-41. The following steps (illustrated in Figure E-14) explain how to make the resistor and how to attach it to the antenna and counterpoise wires:

E-16

·

Step 1. Drive nails into each end of the BA-30, leaving room to attach a wire at each end.

·

Step 2. Attach a wire (approximately 6 inches long) to each nail (metal-to-metal contact must be made).

·

Step 3. Secure the BA-30 to the wooden insulator with tape or wire.

·

Step 4. Attach the antenna wire to the insulator while simultaneously attaching the wire from the BA-30 to the antenna wire (metal-to-metal contact must be made).

·

Step 5. Attach the counterpoise wire to the insulator while simultaneously attaching the loose wire from the BA-30 to the counterpoise wire (metal-to-metal contact must be made).


Figure E-14. Field-Expedient Resistor

ANTENNA CONNECTIONS E-42. Of all the antennas used In the Army, the whip antenna is the most common. It is omnidirectional and can be used to communicate while on the move. The OE-254 antenna takes a little time to set up, but it produces a stronger signal than the vehicle-mounted whip and is omnidirectional. Bidirectional and unidirectional antennas are somewhat more difficult to construct and align, but the security gained from being less open to the threat may be worth the effort. On the other hand, no antenna is worth much if you do not have a good connection. You must make sure the antenna’s lead connections are clean and free of corrosion.

E-17

Appendix F

Demolitions and Obstacles This appendix deals with demolitions and obstacles that scouts may have to breach or construct. A reconnaissance section’s basic load of demolitions will provide enough explosives and mines to breach or construct an obstacle during a mission.

CONTENTS Demolitions ................................................... Priming Explosives ............................... Firing Systems ....................................... Safety ...................................................... Modern Demolition Initiator Firing Systems .............................................. Fundamental Considerations ............... Selection and Calculation of Charges . Placement of Charges .......................... Steel-Cutting Charges .......................... Bridge Abutment Destruction .............. Timber-Cutting Charges ....................... Obstacle Destruction ............................ Cratering Charges ................................. Mines .......................................................... Mines Employed by US Forces ............ Types of Minefields ............................... Minefield Emplacement Requirements ..................................... Hasty Protective Minefield .................... Minefield Marking .................................. Obstacle Characteristics and Report Formats ........................................... Obstacle Types ...................................... Report Formats ..................................... Obstacle Turnover ........................................ Obstacle Breaching Capabilities ................ Actions on Contact (with Obstacles) ... Breaching and Clearing Operations .... Obstacle-Crossing Capabilities ........... Field-Expedient Mines and Demolitions .... Expedient Mines .................................... Expedient Demolitions ......................... Miscellaneous Improvised Demolitions ........................................ Field-Expedient Delays ......................... Common Chemicals in Field-Expedient Demolitions ............

F-1 F-2 F-3 F-3 F-5 F-11 F-12 F-16 F-17 F-20 F-20 F-22 F-25 F-26 F-27 F-33 F-33 F-34 F-35 F-36 F-36 F-36 F-38 F-38 F-38 F-40 F-41 F-42 F-42 F-47 F-49 F-55 F-55

SECTION I – DEMOLITIONS F-1. This discussion outlines basic guidelines for the employment of demolitions in military operations. Table F-1 summarizes the characteristics and uses of military explosives.

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WARNING The following discussion and accompanying illustrations may not provide enough information to allow safe employment of explosives; therefore, scouts must be thoroughly familiar with fuzes, charge settings, and firing demolitions before using this information. For further information, refer to FM 3-34.310 (FM 5-34) and FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-250).

Table F-1. Characteristics of Military Explosives

PRIMING EXPLOSIVES F-1. Explosives may be primed, either electrically or nonelectrically, with a detonating cord. Refer to the illustration in Figure F-1.

Figure F-1. Detonating Cord Priming

F-2

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Appendix F – Demolitions and Obstacles

FIRING SYSTEMS F-2.

Firing systems may be electric or nonelectric. A dual-firing system is composed of two completely separate systems. They may be dual electric, dual nonelectric, or a combination of electric and nonelectric. Figure F-2 illustrates a combination dual-firing system.

Figure F-2. Combination Dual-Firing System

SAFETY F-3. To ensure safety in the employment of explosives, scouts must maintain a minimum safe distance. Table F-2 lists the minimum safe distances for detonation of explosives in the open. F-4. Explosives may be prematurely detonated by induced currents. Figure F-3 shows the distances at which transmitters can detonate explosives by transmitted induced currents. The left column indicates average power and peak power for all other transmissions. F-5. Electric firing should not be performed within 155 meters (504 feet) of energized power transmission lines. When it is necessary to conduct blasting operations at distances closer than 155 meters, nonelectric firing systems should be used or the power lines de-energized.

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Table F-2. Minimum Safe Distances for Explosives EXPLOSIVES (pounds of charge)

SAFE DISTANCE in meters (feet)

EXPLOSIVES (pounds of charge)

SAFE DISTANCE in meters (feet)

1 to 22

300 (900)

120

534 (1,590)

24

311 (930)

140

560 (1,690)

28

327 (980)

160

585 (1,750)

32

342 (1,020)

180

609 (1,820)

36

356 (1,070)

200

630 (1,890)

40

369 (1,100)

220

651 (1,950)

48

392 (1,170)

240

670 (2,000)

56

413 (1,240)

260

688 (2,070)

64

431 (1,290)

280

705 (2,100)

72

449 (1,330)

300

722 (2,160)

80

465 (1,390)

320

737 (2,210)

100

500 (1,500)

340

750 (2,250)

NOTE:

The safe distances listed in this table will normally apply to peacetime conduct of ranges. To detonate a road crater (about 4 X 40 pounds of cratering charges), it would not be appropriate to move 800 meters away, especially when using an electric circuit to detonate it.

Figure F-3. Premature Detonation by Induced Current

CAUTION If electric blasting caps are to be transported near operating transmitters or vehicles (including helicopters) in which a transmitter is to be operated, the caps must be placed in a metal can. The cover of the can must be snug and lap over the body of the can to a minimum depth of 1/2 inch. Caps should not be removed from the container in proximity of the operating transmitters. The metal container must have metal-to-metal contact with the lid.

F-4

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F-6. Misfires should be handled by the person who placed the charge. For safety purposes, allow 30 minutes before investigating the misfire on all nonelectric or buried charges. Aboveground misfires should be blown in place by priming at least 1 pound of explosive and placing it as close as possible to the charge without disturbing it. When dealing with buried misfires, remove excess earth, except for at least 1 foot of earth around the charge. Then blow the charge in place with at least 2 pounds of explosive. Do not attempt to move or disarm a misfire, and do not abandon misfired explosives.

MODERN DEMOLITION INITIATOR FIRING SYSTEMS F-7. Modern demolition initiators (MDI), a family of nonelectric blasting caps and associated items described in Table F-3, have been used in the civilian sector for more than 20 years. The snap-together components simplify initiation systems and some types of explosive priming. The MDI system was developed to effectively replace electric demolition systems. It removes the requirement to dual-initiate demolition systems except when there is a high probability of the system becoming cut. Refer to FM 3-34.310 (FM 5-34) and FM 3-34.214 (FM 5250) for more information on MDI. F-8. Nonelectric priming with MDIs is safer and more reliable than the current nonelectric priming methods. MDI blasting caps are factorycrimped to precut lengths of shock tube or time-blasting fuse. Because the caps are sealed units, they are moisture-resistant and will not misfire in damp conditions. A shock tube may be spliced using excess shock tube from an M12 or M13 or a precut splicing-tube splicing kit. Every splice in a shock tube reduces the reliability of the priming system. Prime military explosives with the MDI the same as with standard, nonelectric initiation systems. Use only high-strength MDI blasting caps (M11, M14, M15) to prime explosive charges. M12 and M13 relay-type blasting caps do not have sufficient power to detonate most explosives, although you can use all MDI blasting caps to initiate a shock tube. Use only the M11, M14, or M15 blasting caps to initiate detonating cord or military explosives directly.

WARNING Use care when cutting and splicing the shock tube. When cutting the shock tube, always tie an overhand knot in the left over shock tube.

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Table F-3. MDI Components

TYPES OF MDI FIRING SYSTEMS

F-9. With the introduction of MDI components, there will be two types of firing systems: a stand-alone firing system and a combination firing system. Both systems can be emplaced as single- or dual-firing systems. The choice of which system to use for a particular demolition mission is left to the experience of the reconnaissance leader. The combination firing system, however, is the preferred method for reserved demolition targets. See FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-250) for detailed instructions on both systems. Stand-Alone System

F-6

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F-10. The stand-alone firing system is one in which the initiation sets and transmission and branch lines are constructed using only MDI components and the explosive charges are primed with MDI blasting caps. It is important to ensure that the firing system is balanced. All charges must have the same distance in shock-tube length from the firing point to the charge. Figure F-4 shows the single-firing MDI system; Figure F-5 shows the dual-firing MDI system; and Figure F-6 shows a branch-line array.

Figure F-4. MDI Single-Firing System (Single-Primed)

Figure F-5. MDI Dual-Firing System (Single-Primed)

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Figure F-6. Branch-Line Array (M11s or M16s)

F-11. The disadvantage of a single-firing system is that if the transmission line is cut, any charges down line from the cut will not detonate. If there is a possibility of the transmission lines being cut (for example, through artillery fires), a second firing system should be added as shown in Figure F-5. Note that the charges in this case are now dualprimed. The transmission line is laid in the opposite direction of the first transmission line to create a balanced system.

CAUTION When making multiple shock tube installations, take care to protect the shock tubes from the effects of nearby relay caps and charges. The shrapnel produced by a cap or charge could easily cause a (partial or complete) misfire. When there are many shock tubes involved in a shot, place them carefully away from the junction.

F-12. Use the stand-alone MDI firing system for all types of demolition missions, including bridge demolitions. The MDI firing system can be used to initiate reserved demolition targets; however, under current internationally agreed-upon doctrine, charges cannot be primed with blasting caps until a change of readiness from state 1 (safe) to state 2 (armed) is ordered. Priming every charge with MDI blasting caps at this critical moment would take a considerable amount of time and be unacceptable to the maneuver commander. Priming charges with detonating cord is the preferred method on reserved demolition targets. Combination Firing System

F-13. A combination firing system is one that consists of the MDI initiation set; either a detonating-cord line or ring main; and branch lines that can be either MDI, detonating cord, or a mix of both. Figure F-7 shows a combination firing system.

F-8

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F-14. Use the combination firing system (MDI and detonating cord) for all types of demolition missions. It combines the advantages of MDI components with the simplicity and flexibility of detonating cord. The combination firing system is the preferred method for reserved demolition targets, underwater operations, and operations where subsurface-laid charges are used.

WARNING Do not dispose of used shock tubes by burning them because of potentially toxic fumes given off from the burning plastic.

Figure F-7. Combination Firing System (MDI and Detonating Cord; Dual-Primed) SPLICING THE SHOCK TUBE

F-15. MDIs are extremely reliable because all of the components are sealed. Unlike standard nonelectric priming components, they cannot be easily degraded by moisture. Cutting the shock tube makes the open ends vulnerable to moisture. Dampening the explosive film on the inside of the shock tube will stop a detonation from going beyond such a damp spot. Use care when cutting and splicing the shock tube. When cutting the shock tube, always tie an overhand knot in the leftover shock tube. Use splicing to repair a break in the shock tube of a transmission or branch line (caused, for example, by shrapnel from artillery fires) or to extend the shock tube of another MDI blasting cap, but only when necessary. This is done by using excess shock tube from an M12 or M13 shock-tube blasting cap when the entire length is not needed. F-16. Every splice in the shock tube reduces the reliability of the firing system. Keep the number of splices in a shock-tube line to as few as practicable. Unless splicing is absolutely necessary, use of a full, sealed MDI component is recommended. (NOTE: Do not splice the shock tube while conducting water or diving demolition missions.)

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CAUTION Taping two cut ends of the shock tube together does not make a reliable splice.

SAFETY PROCEDURES

F-17. When conducting training and missions with MDIs, follow the general safety considerations for demolitions as given in FM 3-34.310 (FM 5-34), FM 3-34.214 (FM 5-250), and AR 385-63. Because MDI components are delivered from the factory precrimped, they are more reliable and safer to handle and use than the current standard military blasting caps. Test results for MDI components have shown that the blasting caps always function correctly if the shock tube is properly initiated. Misfires normally occur only under the following conditions:

·

The M81 fuse igniter is not properly connected to the shock tube before initiation.

·

The shock tube is cut by shrapnel during the initiation process.

·

The shock tube is incorrectly inserted into the holders on the M12 or M13 blasting caps or into the M9 holder.

·

The shock tube is cut using crimpers.

WARNING Use of MDIs is not authorized for belowground or internal charges.

F-18. Transportation and storage of blasting caps require special consideration. When transporting or storing MDI blasting caps, do not mix them with other explosives. The caps must be placed in a suitable container or in a separate vehicle. MDI MISFIRE CLEARING PROCEDURES

F-19. In most misfires of shock tube blasting caps, which are nonelectric, these standard rules apply:

F-10

·

If the primer in the M81 does not fire (the most common problem), recock the M81 by pushing in on the pull rod to reset the firing pin, and then actuate the igniter again. If two or three retries result in a nonfiring, cut the shock tube, replace the igniter with a new one, and repeat the firing procedure.

·

If the M81 fires and blows the shock tube out of its securing mechanism without it firing, cut about 3 feet from the end of the shock tube, replace with a new igniter, and repeat the firing procedure.

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·

If the M81 appears to have functioned properly but the charge did not fire, cut a 1-foot section from the shock tube starting 6 inches from the igniter. Hold the 1-foot piece of shock tube so one end is over your palm; gently blow through the other end. If a fine powder comes out from the shock tube, it has not fired. Install a new igniter on the freshly cut end of the priming shock tube and repeat the firing procedure. If no fine powder comes out from the shock tube or the shock tube was heard to fire or its flash was seen, wait for 30 minutes before moving downrange to check the components in the firing system.

·

After waiting 30 minutes, proceed downrange and check all components in the firing system. The most likely cause of a misfire is the incorrect placement of the shock tube in the plastic connectors of the M12/13s or the M9 holder. If incorrect placement was the problem, replace the fired section and properly connect and refire the device.

·

If the first component of the firing train did not fail, check out each succeeding component until you find the one that failed. Replace the failed or fired relay components back to the initiating site and refire.

·

If the final high-strength blasting cap seems to be the failed component, replace it if it is easily accessible. However, if it is used to prime an explosive charge, do not disturb it. Place a new, primed 1-pound explosive charge next to the misfired charge and detonate it when it is safe.

FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS F-20. The amount of explosive used in any demolition project is determined by the demolition charts. The following critical factors apply:

·

Type and strength of material. A demolition target may be constructed of timber, steel, or other material. Concrete reinforced with steel increases the strength of the target.

·

Size and shape of target. Large targets, such as concrete piers and steel I-beams, may be attacked more economically using multiple charges rather than a single charge.

·

Desired demolition effect. Consider the extent of demolition and other desired effects. For example, in constructing an abatis, consider which direction the trees should fall.

·

Type of explosive. All charts in this chapter reflect the number of M112 (1¼-pound) blocks of C4 to be used.

·

Size and shape of charge. Use the demolition charts in this chapter to calculate the amount of explosive needed. When external charges are used without special placement techniques, a flat, square charge with a thickness-to-width ratio of 1-to-3 or more will give acceptable results.

·

Charge placement. For cratering, place charges in holes below the ground. For breaking or collapsing stone or

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concrete, locate charges on the surface or in boreholes. For cutting timber, tie charges on the outside surface or place them in boreholes, whichever is more practical. Fasten charges to the target by wire, adhesive compound, tape, or string. Prop charges against the target with a frame made of scrap wood or metal or other available materials.

·

Method of initiation. The method of initiation is not critical except for special types of charges, such as shaped charges or diamond charges.

·

Method of tamping. Detonating an explosive produces pressure in all directions. If the charge is not completely sealed or confined or if material surrounding the explosive is not equally strong on all sides, the explosive force will escape through the weakest point. To keep as much explosive force as possible on the desired objective, pack the material around the charge. This material is called tamping material; the process is tamping.

F-21. For the most destructive effect, an explosive charge must be of the size and shape that best fits the target; it must be detonated in close contact with the target. Any significant air or water gap between the target and the explosive will lessen the force of the shock wave. Several types of charges, such as sheet explosives or plastic explosives, can be cut or molded to fit odd-shaped targets. F-22. Whenever possible, place explosive charges to act on or through the smallest or weakest part of the target. Internal charges produce the greatest destructive effect for the least amount of explosive. Internal charges are placed in boreholes in the target. They are confined by tightly packed sand, wet clay, or other material. This is called stemming. Tamp and pack the stemming material against the explosive to fill the hole to the surface. F-23. Place external charges on the surface of the target. Tamp the charges by covering them with packed sand, clay, or other dense material. This increases their destructive effect. Tamping may be loose or in sandbags. To be most effective, the thickness of the tamping should at least equal the breaching radius. Small breaching charges on horizontal surfaces are sometimes tamped by packing several inches of wet clay or mud around them. This process is called mudcapping.

SELECTION AND CALCULATION OF CHARGES F-24. Figure F-8 shows charge calculation steps. Tables F-4 through F-7 provide solutions for the number of C4 M112 (1¼-pound) blocks/boxes of C4 explosive that are required to destroy or neutralize a target.

F-12

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Figure F-8. Explosive Calculation Steps BREACHING CHARGE TABLES

F-25. To use the tables for calculating breaching charges (Tables F-4 through F-7), determine the type of material in the object you plan to destroy. If in doubt, assume the material to be the stronger type. The four tables cover breaching charges to be used in destroying the following materials:

· · ·

Reinforced concrete (Table F-4).

·

Earth (Table F-7).

Dense concrete or first-class masonry (Table F-5). Ordinary masonry, hardpan, shale, rock, good timber, ordinary concrete, or earth construction (Table F-6).

Table F-4. Breaching Charges for Reinforced Concrete

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Table F-5. Breaching Charges for Dense Concrete or First-Class Masonry

Table F-6. Breaching Charges for Ordinary Masonry, Hardpan, Shale, Rock, Good Timber, Ordinary Concrete, or Earth Construction

F-14

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Table F-7. Breaching Charges for Earth Structures

CORRELATING THICKNESS OF OBJECT AND PLACEMENT OF CHARGE

F-26. In deciding how to place the charge against the object, compare the method of placement with the diagrams in Figure F-9. Use the letter matching the diagram to select the appropriate column in the breaching charge tables (NOTE: Refer to Tables F-4 through F-7; as noted, the tables are based on the material to be destroyed.) Then determine the thickness of the material. On the breaching charge tables, find the intersection of these two factors (placement and thickness) to determine how many M112 (1¼-pound) blocks of C4 it will take to destroy the object.

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Figure F-9. Methods of Placement for Explosive Charges NUMBER OF CHARGES

F-27. Calculate the number of charges required to demolish a pier, slab, or wall using this formula: N = W/2R N = Number of charges W = Width of pier, slab, or wall (in feet) R = Breaching radius (in feet) NOTE: The multiplier 2 in the formula is constant. F-28. If the calculated value of N is between zero and 1¼, use one charge. If the value is between 1¼ and 2½, use two charges. If the value is greater than 2½, round it to the nearest whole number.

PLACEMENT OF CHARGES F-29. For best results, arrange the charges in a flat square shape with the flat side toward the target. The first charge is placed in from one side of the target; the remainder of the charges are spaced at a distance of 2R apart. When breaching hard-surface pavements, use one M112 (1¼-

F-16

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pound) block of C4 for each 2 inches of surface. If you are breaching concrete-beam bridges, breach each beam individually. Figure F-10 lists the thickness of the charge relative to the number of charges used.

Figure F-10. Thickness of Breaching Charge

F-30. The positions available for placement of explosive charges on piers and walls are limited. Unless a demolition chamber is available, place the charge (or charges) against one face of the target. A charge placed above ground level is more effective than one placed directly on the ground. When several charges are required to destroy a pier, slab, or wall and elevated charges are desired, they are distributed equally at no less than one breaching radius above the base of the object to be demolished. This method makes best use of the shock wave of the blast. If time permits, tamp all charges thoroughly with damp soil or filled sandbags. Tamping must be equal to or greater than the breaching radius. For piers, slabs, or walls that are partially submerged in water, place charges equal to or greater than the breaching radius below the waterline, if possible.

STEEL-CUTTING CHARGES F-31. In the employment steel-cutting charges, the type of explosive is critical to success. Confinement or tamping of the charge is rarely practical or possible. Placement of the charge in direct contact with the target is more important with steel than with other materials. F-32. Select steel-cutting charges for their cutting effect and adaptability to placement. The M112 block (C4) is a highly adaptable explosive. Its size and shape are suitable for most steel-cutting operations, and it can be used without cutting or reshaping. In addition, the M112 block adapts well to steel targets because of the adhesive compound on one face, which allows it to be affixed securely to the target. F-33. The amount of steel-cutting charge to be used depends on the type and size of steel and the kind of charge to be used. Figure F-11 shows formulas for the use of TNT in steel-cutting operations. Table F-8 lists the amount of C4 explosive required in steel-cutting operations.

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Figure F-11. Formulas for Use of TNT in Steel-Cutting Charges

Table F-8. Amount of C4 (M112) Required to Cut Steel Sections

RULES OF THUMB FOR STEEL-CUTTING CHANGES

F-34. In the following examples of steel-cutting situations, the required explosive is either TNT or plastic explosive (the RE factor is not needed). Rails

F-35. Cut rails at crossings, switches, or curves. Cut at alternate rail splices for a distance of 500 feet. The rules of thumb are the following:

· · ·

For rails less than 5 inches high, use ½ pound. For rails 5 inches or higher, use 1 pound. At crossings and switches, use 1 pound.

Cables, Chains, Rods, and Bars

F-36. To cut through these items, use the following rules of thumb:

· · F-18

Up to 1 inch in diameter, use 1 pound. From 1 inch to 2 inches in diameter, use 2 pounds.

_________________________________________________

·


Over 2 inches in diameter, use the formula P = 3/8 A. (Refer to Figure F-11.)

NOTE: These guidelines apply to chains and cables that are under tension. Both sides of the chain link must be cut. CHARGE PLACEMENT

F-37. The size and type of steel section will determine the placement of the explosive charge. Cut extended sections by placing all of the explosive on one side of the section along the proposed line of rupture. In some steel trusses with individual members fabricated from two or more primary sections (such as angle irons or bars separated by spacer washers or gusset plates), place the charge with opposing portions offset the same distance as the thickness of the section being cut. This will produce a shearing action. Heavier I-beams, wide flange beams, and columns can also require auxiliary charges. Never place the charges directly opposite each other because this tends to neutralize the explosive effect. F-38. For an illustration of charge placement for cutting steel members and railroad rails, refer to Figure F-12.

Figure F-12. Placement of Charges on Steel Members BUILT-UP MEMBERS

F-39. Built-up members frequently have an irregular shape, making it difficult to obtain close contact between the explosive charge and a sufficient portion of the surface. If it is impractical to distribute the charge properly to obtain close contact, increase the amount of explosive. IRREGULARLY SHAPED STEEL

F-40. Composition C4 is effective for cutting irregularly shaped steel because it can be easily molded or pressed into place to give maximum contact. The M112 block explosive has an adhesive coating on one side, which makes placement easier.

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PRECAUTIONS

F-41. Place the steel-cutting charge on the same side as the firing party because explosive charges throw steel fragments (missiles) long distances at high velocities.

BRIDGE ABUTMENT DESTRUCTION F-42. Procedures for destroying bridge abutments vary depending on the thickness of the abutment. Refer to Figure F-13 for an illustration of charge placement. THICKNESS OF 1.5 METERS (5 FEET) OR LESS

F-43. Beginning 1.5 meters (5 feet) in from one side of the road, place 18.1 kilograms (40 pounds) of cratering charges in holes that are 1.5 meters (5 feet) deep, 1.5 meters (5 feet) on centers, and 1.5 meters (5 feet) behind the river face of the abutment. If the abutments are over 6.1 meters (20 feet) high, add a row of breaching charges on the river face of the abutment. THICKNESS OF 1.5 METERS (5 FEET) OR MORE

F-44. Calculate charges using the breaching charge tables (see Tables F-4 through F-7) and information provided earlier in this chapter. Place the charges against the rear face at a depth equal to the thickness of the abutment and space them the same as other breaching charges. When the abutments are more than 6.1 meters (20 feet) high, add a row of breaching charges on the river face at the base of the abutment and fire all charges simultaneously.

Figure F-

13. Charge Placement for Bridge Abutment Destruction

TIMBER-CUTTING CHARGES F-45. Use composition C4 for untamped, concentrated, external charges because it can be easily tied or fastened to the target. Because types of timber vary widely from locality to locality, it is impractical to try to cut all kinds of timber with charges calculated from a single table. It may be necessary, therefore, to make test shots to determine the size of charge

F-20

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needed to cut a specific type of timber. Table F-9 shows the amount of M112 (1¼-pound blocks) C4 needed for the various sizes of timber. Figure F-14 provides several formulas for determining timber-cutting charges and illustrates charge placement.

F-46. Place the charge in a borehole parallel to the greatest dimension of the cross section and tightly tamp it with moist earth. If the charge is too large for one borehole, make two boreholes side by side in the dimensional timber. For round timber, make two boreholes at approximate right angles to each other, but do not intersect them (see Figure F-15). Tamp both boreholes and fire the charges simultaneously. Table F-9. Amount of C4 (M112) Required for Timber-Cutting Charges

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Figure F-14. Timber-Cutting Formulas and Charge Placement

Figure F-15. Internal Timber-Cutting Charges

OBSTACLE DESTRUCTION F-47. The reconnaissance platoon may be tasked to destroy obstacles. The illustrations in Figures F-16 through F-20 show the recommended methods for explosives placement to achieve the greatest destructive effect with various types of obstacles.

Figure F-16. Breaching of a Backfilled Log Wall

F-22

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Figure F-17. Breaching of a Log Crib

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Figure F-18. Placement of Charges for Breaching of Walls

Figure F-19. Explosive Packs Required to Destroy Typical Small Concrete Obstacles

F-24

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Figure F-20. Placement of Charges for Destruction of Steel and Log Obstacles

CRATERING CHARGES F-48. The explanation and sketches in Figure F-21 includes explanations and illustrations for procedures to be used in creating various types of road craters.

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Figure F-21. Road Cratering Charges

SECTION II – MINES F-49. This discussion provides examples of mines employed by US forces, including the reconnaissance platoon. The discussion also examines the types of minefields the platoon may encounter on the

F-26

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battlefield. It covers how to record minefields after they have been emplaced and how to mark and record lanes that have been cleared through a minefield.

MINES EMPLOYED BY US FORCES F-50. Figure F-22 illustrates various aspects of mine employment by the US military, including the reconnaissance platoon. The information covers characteristics of mines and firing devices and procedures for mine installation, arming, and disarming.

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Figure F-22. US Mines

Figure F-22. US Mines (Continued)

F-28

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F-30

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NOTE: M = Mobility kill. K = Crew kill. CAUTION 1.

Antipersonnel tripwire may not deploy properly if mines land in mud or snow.

2.

Mine antihandling devices may cause premature destruction of mines if placed on snow.

3.

Mine self-destruct times are classified CONFIDENTIAL and are available through unit.


F-32

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TYPES OF MINEFIELDS F-51. The reconnaissance platoon may employ or encounter one of four main types of minefields. Refer to Table F-10 for a summary of characteristics and uses of these minefields. Table F-10. Minefield Types and Characteristics

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

TACTICAL USE

REPORTS REQUIRED

RECORDS REQUIRED

MINES USED AP

AT

S*

X

X

X

AUTHORITY (Delegated to) **

Protective Hasty protective

Deliberate protective

Tactical

Nuisance

Phony

Above-ground; random pattern; no antihandling devices

Aids in unit’s local, close-in protection of defensive perimeter

Intention Initiation Completion Change/ removal

DA Form 1355-1-R (to parent unit)

Standard pattern; fenced and marked

Same as hasty deliberate minefield

As above (to authorizing HQ)

DA Form 1355 (to authorizing HQ)

Standard or random pattern; scatterable

As part of obstacle plan

As above

DA Form 1355 (to authorizing HQ)

Random pattern; surface or buried

Enhance obstacles; hinder use of key areas

As above

Same as live minefield being simulated

Simulate other types of minefields

Same as simulated minefield

As above

Brigade commander (Battalion or company commander)

X

Division commander

X

(Installing commander) X

X

X

Division commander (Brigade commander)

X

X

X

Brigade commander (Battalion commander)



*

Use the scatterable minefield report and records for all scatterable minefields (under “S” column).

**

The corps commander is the initial employment authority for all scatterable minefields (“S” column). Long self-destruct minefields (more than 24 hours) may be delegated to division and brigade level. Short selfdestruct minefields (24 hours or less) may be delegated to battalion/task force level.

MINEFIELD EMPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS F-52. Of the four types of minefields, the reconnaissance platoon will most frequently be tasked to emplace a hasty protective minefield. It will rarely emplace a deliberate protective minefield. Scouts may employ a row minefield and, occasionally, if time allows, a standard pattern minefield. F-53. Emplacement of a row minefield (three rows, 60 meters by 100 meters, 100 AT mines) consumes about 30 platoon minutes (30 scouts) if done by hand. This time does not include fuzing and uncrating of the mines.

HASTY PROTECTIVE MINEFIELD

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F-54. Hasty protective minefields are generally emplaced by small units at outposts, work sites, bivouac areas, or ambush sites. The reconnaissance platoon may also use them to supplement manned weapons, prevent tactical surprise, or provide early warning of threat advances. F-55. Mines should be readily detectable and removable. They should be sited across likely avenues of approach and within range of organic weapons and visual observation. If the minefield includes M18A1 AP mines or will be employed for more than 72 hours, it should be marked by signs or fences or have guards to warn friendly troops. F-56. The hasty protective minefield must be recorded on DA Form 1355-1-R, which is illustrated in Figure F-23. If the form is not available, improvise one. The unit that installs the minefield should warn adjacent units and inform higher headquarters. This unit must either remove the field before leaving the area or transfer the responsibility to the relieving unit commander.

Figure F-23.

Hasty Protective Minefield Record

MINEFIELD MARKING

F-34

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F-57. Figure F-24 shows a standard pattern minefield with appropriate markings. Figure F-25 illustrates several methods of marking lanes through a minefield.

Figure F-24. Standard Pattern Minefield (Fenced, Marked, and Referenced)

Figure F-25. Standard Rear Area Lane Marking Procedures

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SECTION III – OBSTACLE CHARACTERISTICS AND REPORT FORMATS OBSTACLE TYPES F-58. Figure F-26 shows various obstacles that the reconnaissance platoon may encounter during combat operations.

Figure F-26. Common Obstacle Types

REPORT FORMATS OBSTACLE REPORT

F-59. Table F-11 shows a sample format for an obstacle report. For further information on reporting procedures for obstacles, refer to Appendix B of this manual.

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Table F-11. Obstacle Report Format REPORT LINE

INFORMATION

ALPHA

Map sheets

BRAVO

Date-time group for observation of obstacle

CHARLIE

Location (grid reference)

DELTA

Type of obstacle

ECHO

Threat elements -and/or weapons with coverage of the obstacle (if applicable)

FOXTROT

Any other information that could affect breaching or bypassing; for example, terrain restricts bypass or work required (in personnel hours) to breach obstacle

DEMOLITION RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

F-60. Figure F-27 outlines information to be included in the critical items of the demolition reconnaissance report (DA Form 2203-R).

ITEM NO 8 11

12

13

INFORMATION REQUIRED Provide details of what and where the target is (such as town, bridge, or general vicinity). Sketch must show relative position of objects to be demolished, terrain features, safe distances, routes, avenues of approach, and location of features of the site. One sketch must show fully dimensioned plan view, side views, and cross sections of object and each member to be cut (this may be listed under item 12). Show the plan and cross-sectional sketch of each member to be cut. Show details of chambers, line of cut, and location of charges. Show quantity of explosive per charge and method of ignition. Sketch must show firing circuits and firing points. Describe each item in detail and show location on the situation map sketch.

Figure F-27. Demolition Reconnaissance Report

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SECTION IV – OBSTACLE TURNOVER F-61. A target prepared for demolition by engineers may be turned over to another unit for safeguarding or execution provided the following turnover procedures are followed:

·

The senior member of the emplacing unit (normally an engineer squad leader) and the demolition guard commander (normally a reconnaissance squad leader) will conduct face-toface coordination before the turnover if the tactical situation permits. This prior coordination greatly aids and speeds the turnover process.

·

The senior member of the emplacing unit will require positive identification of the demolition guard commander by means of sign/countersign or by personal recognition.

·

Once identification is established, the emplacing unit will give the demolition guard commander a completed target folder for the target being turned over. The folder contains orders to the demolition guard commander and the firing party commander. These orders must be signed and thoroughly understood by the demolition guard commander.

·

The senior member of the emplacing unit will then describe the obstacle, in detail, to the demolition guard commander.

·

Once the demolition guard commander fully understands his responsibilities and he (or the firing party commander, if separately designated) is capable of executing the target, the emplacing unit may depart to conduct further operations.

SECTION V – OBSTACLE BREACHING CAPABILITIES F-62. This section provides information on breaching capabilities. It will assist the reconnaissance platoon in determining fordability and trafficability, as well as in determining what types of equipment and/or vehicles can be used for certain situations.

ACTIONS ON CONTACT (WITH OBSTACLES) F-63. Use this format to conduct actions on contact with obstacles:

F-38

· · · ·

Reconnoiter the obstacle and report.

·

If the obstacle is covered by fire, use smoke to cover movement.

Seek a bypass. If a bypass is impossible, attempt a breach. As a last resort, force through the obstacle. All reconnaissance sections should have a chain saw (issued or locally procured) for clearing roads wooden obstacles from roads or trails.

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MINE DETECTORS F-64. The reconnaissance platoon may use mine detectors to help detect mines and clear lanes in minefields. AN/PSS-12 CHARACTERISTICS

F-65. The AN/PSS-12 mine detector (see Figure F-28) is a man-portable metallic mine-detection system that is used to detect AT and AP land mines. Its search head contains two concentric coils—the transmitting coil and the receiving coil. During operation, the transmitting coil is energized with electric pulses to build up a magnetic field. The magnetic field induces currents in metal objects near the search head, and the currents build up a magnetic field in the metal objects. Depending on the metal's composition and quantity, the magnetic field may be strong enough to be picked up by the receiving coil. The signals from the receiving coil are processed in the AN/PSS-12's electronics. When a signal is considered positive, the electronic unit provides an audible alarm to the operator.

Figure F-28. AN/PSS-12 Metallic Mine Detector

WARNING Users must keep in mind that magnetic detection is effective only when there is a sufficient amount of alloy in the mine to trigger an alarm from the detector. The detector’s sensitivity control may require frequent adjustment during operation.

SEARCH METHODS Use the following procedures and guidance in searching for mines using the AN/PSS-12: · Move the search head in sweeping motions a maximum of 5 centimeters above the ground. Sweeping speed should be approximately 0.3 meter per second.

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·

Listen for an audible tone indicating that the inner ring of the magnetic search head is over a metal object. The intensity of the tone depends on the size, the shape, the content, the depth, and the position of the object.

·

Make an X-pattern sweeping movement (Figure F-29) across the area when a tone is heard. The tone will be loudest when the search head is immediately above the object.

·

For small, horizontal metal pins, the tone will be louder when the inner ring is near the pin rather than when the pin is in the center of the ring.

·

If you are searching for large, metal objects, detecting and localizing is faster when the sensitivity control is turned down (counterclockwise).

Figure F-29. X-Pattern Sweeping Movement

·

Keep mine detectors at least 2 meters apart during setting and adjustment phases to prevent interference.

·

Change the batteries and readjust the unit if the indicator lamp flashes. The search sensitivity is not affected when the lamp is flashing; if searching continues, a constant audible tone will sound and the unit will be unusable until fresh batteries are installed.

·

Discontinue searching and readjust the unit's sensitivity if the check tone disappears or its frequency decreases.

·

Ensure that only the inner part of the telescopic pole is used when the equipment is operated by a soldier in the prone position.

·

Turn the unit off after completing the search operations.

BREACHING AND CLEARING OPERATIONS F-66. Table F-12 illustrates the characteristics and capabilities of explosive and manual breaching methods. Table F-13 summarizes the

F-40

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characteristics of several types of obstacle breaching equipment. Although the reconnaissance platoon does not have direct access to such assets, the platoon can take advantage of these capabilities by calling on other elements for assistance in breaching operations.

Table F-12. Breaching Assets and Methods EXPLOSIVE BREACHING ASSETS/METHODS

NOMENCLATURE

TYPE

MINES CLEARED

WEIGHT (pounds)

LANE CLEARED in meters (feet) Width

ASSEMBLY TIME

Length

EMPLOYMENT TIME in minutes (speed)

M58A3 (MICLIC)

Trailermounted

AT/AP

3,100

8 (26)

100 (328)

Crane and crew – 35 minutes

4 (25 mph)

M1A1 (Bangalore torpedo)

Portable

AP

130 per kit

0.6 (2)

15 (50)

1 squad – 5 minutes

5

Antipersonnel obstacle breaching system (APOBS)

Portable

AP

115 (in 2 manpack units)

0.6 (2)

45 (140)

2 soldiers – 2 minutes

2

MANUAL BREACHING ASSETS/METHODS BREACHING PROCEDURE

LANE CLEARED Width (type of lane)

MAN-HOURS REQUIRED (per 100 meters of lane)

Location by probing

1 meter (footpath)

16 to 22

Removal by rope or explosives

1 meter (footpath)

38 to 44

Location by detector, assisted by probing

8 meters (one-way vehicle lane)

27 to 33

Removal by rope or explosives

8 meters (one-way vehicle lane)

220 to 247

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Table F-13. Nonexplosive Obstacle Breaching Equipment MILITARY LOAD CLASS

HEIGHT in meters (feet)

WIDTH in meters (feet)

SPEED in kmph (mph)

18

2.3 (7.5)

3.2 (10.5)

48 (30+)

None

D7F dozer

28

2.4 (7.9)

3.48 (11.4)

10 (6)

None

Loader (2½-ton)

20

3.7 (12)

2.6 (8.5)

NA

None

AVLB

57 (with bridge)

5 (16.4)

4 (13.1)

48 (30)

NOMENCLATURE

M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE)

ARMAMENT

MOBILITY EMPLOYMENT Fill craters and ditches Remove road blocks, trees, and rubble Prepare river and ford access Prepare and maintain routes Cut tactical routes Fill craters and ditches Remove rubble and trees Fill craters and ditches Remove wire obstacles

37 (without bridge)

None

Bridge gaps of 18 meters or less Bridge gaps of 15 meters or less for Load Class 70

NOTE: Another nonexplosive breaching asset is the M1-series tank equipped with either the mine-clearing blade or mine-clearing roller. Use of the tank affords a combination of breaching capability, firepower, and mobility. The primary disadvantage is the vehicle’s weight. The blade adds 3.5 tons and the roller 10 tons to the tank’s base weight of more than 60 tons. An M1 equipped with the roller exceeds the weight capacity of the AVLB.

OBSTACLE-CROSSING CAPABILITIES F-67. Table F-14 summarizes the obstacle-crossing capabilities of selected vehicles and equipment of the US Army and allied nations.

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MILITARY LOAD CLASS (MLC)

FORDING DEPTH in meters (feet)

HEIGHT TO CLEAR in meters (feet)

WIDTH TO CLEAR in meters (feet)

MAX GAP TRAVERSE in meters (feet)

GROUND CLEARANCE in meters (inches)

MAX STEP in meters (inches)

MAX TILT (%)

MAX GRADIENT (%)

MAX STRADDLE in meters (feet)

Table F-14. Vehicle/Equipment Obstacle-Crossing Capabilities

US / M113

13

No limit

2.13 (7.0)

2.68 (8.8)

1.60 (5.2)

0.29 (11)

0.64 (25)

30

60

1.78 (5.8)

US/ M2 and M3

24

No limit

2.92 (9.6)

3.04 (10.0)

2.54 (8.3)

0.45 (18)

0.91 (36)

40

60

1.87 (6.1)

US / M60

54

1.22 (4.0)

3.26 (10.7)

3.63 (12.0)

2.66 (8.7)

0.41 (16)

0.91 (36)

30

60

2.21 (7.3)

1.22 (4.0)

3.12 (10.2)

3.63 (12.0)

2.59 (8.5)

0.41 (16)

0.91 (36)

30

60

2.21 (7.3)

COUNTRY/ VEHICLE

US / M48A5

US / M1 series

70 (M1A2)

1.22 (4.0)

2.89 (9.5)

3.60 (11.8)

2.74 (9.0)

0.48 (19)

1.24 (49)

40

60

2.14 (7.0)

Germany / Leopard 2

46

2.25 (7.4)

2.93 (9.6)

3.71 (12.2)

3.00 (10.0)

0.48 (19)

1.15 (45)

30

60

2.15 (7.1)

UK / Centurian

60

1.20 (3.9)

2.96 (9.7)

3.40 (11.2)

3.35 (11.0)

0.51 (20)

0.90 (35)

30

60

2.19 (7.2)

UK / Chieftain

45

1.07 (3.5)

2.90 (9.5)

3.66 (12.0)

3.15 (10.3)

0.51 (20)

0.91 (36)

30

60

2.44 (8.0)

France / AMX30

38

2.00 (6.6)

2.86 (9.4)

3.10 (10.2)

2.90 (9.5)

0.45 (18)

0.93 (37)

30

60

1.96 (6.4)

SECTION VI – FIELD-EXPEDIENT MINES AND DEMOLITIONS F-68. This discussion describes a variety of field-expedient methods for constructing mines and demolitions.

CAUTION The field-expedient devices and techniques described in this discussion are intended for use only by personnel who are experienced in mine and demolition employment and safety. Other units/personnel should NEVER use expedient mines and demolitions in place of standard devices and methods.

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EXPEDIENT MINES F-69. When constructing and employing improvised mines, the reconnaissance platoon must consider safety, neutralization, and disarming requirements. Authorization of employment depends on the minefield in which the mine is to be used. Figures F-29 through F-36 provide design and function guidance for expedient mines. Actual construction will depend on several factors, including the availability of materials.

Figure F-29. Antitank Mine Using High-Explosive Artillery Shell (with Three Different Firing Systems)

Figure F-30. Grapeshot Antipersonnel Mine

F-44

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Figure F-31. Plate Charge Expedient Mine

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Figure F-32. Improvised Claymore Mine

Figure F-33. Fragmentation Grenade Mine (with 5-Second Delay)

F-46

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Figure F-34. Barbed Wire Expedient Mine

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Figure F-35. Improvised Flame Mines

Figure F-36. Expedient Firing Devices

EXPEDIENT DEMOLITIONS CRATERING CHARGE

F-70. To make a cratering charge, use a mixture of dry fertilizer (at least one-third nitrogen; refer to the package contents list) and liquid

F-48

_________________________________________________


(diesel fuel, motor oil, or gasoline) at a ratio of 25 pounds of fertilizer to a quart of liquid. Mix the fertilizer and liquid and allow the mixture to soak for an hour. Place half of the charge in a hole; add 1 pound of primed explosive, and then pour in the other half of the charge. SHAPED CHARGE

F-71. Figure F-37 illustrates how to construct an expedient shaped

charge.

Figure F-37. Improvised Shaped Charge SATCHEL CHARGE

F-72. Melt ordinary paraffin (wax) and stir in ammonium nitrate (fertilizer) pellets. Make sure the paraffin is hot while mixing. Before the mixture hardens, add a ½-pound block of TNT, or its equivalent, as a primer. Pour the mixture into a container. Shrapnel material can be added to the mixture if desired, or it can be attached on the outside of the container to give a shrapnel effect. IMPROVISED BANGALORE TORPEDO

F-73. The principal use of an improvised bangalore torpedo is to clear paths through barbed-wire entanglements using one of the following methods:

·

Use any length of pipe with an approximate inside diameter of 2 inches and a wall thickness of at least .025 inch (24 gauge). Pack the pipe with 2 pounds of explosive per foot of length. Close one end of the pipe with a threaded cap, wooden plug, or damp earth.

·

Use any length of U-shaped picket. Pack the inside section of the picket with 2 pounds of explosives per foot of length. Place the steel section of the U-shaped picket upward.

·

Use any length of board. Attach 4 pounds of explosive per foot of length. Place the explosives to the top side of the board.

DETONATING CORD WICK

F-74. Use a detonating cord wick to widen the boreholes; one strand will generally widen a hole by 1 inch. Tape the desired number of strands F-49

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together, and prime one stick of dynamite with one of the strands. (The dynamite is used to clean the hole.) Place the wick and the dynamite in a hole. The wick must extend from the bottom of the hole to the surface. Prime the wick and detonate the dynamite. Make sure the hole is “cold” before putting in any other explosives. EXPEDIENT TIME FUZE

F-75. Soak a length of clean string (1/8 inch in diameter) in gasoline. Hang it to dry; then store it in a tightly sealed container. Handle expedient fuzes as little as possible, and test them extensively before use.

MISCELLANEOUS IMPROVISED DEMOLITIONS THERMITE

F-76. Using any size can, tie or tape sticks to the sides, and cut a small hole in the bottom. Cover the bottom with paper. Place a round stick wrapped in paper in the middle of the can. Fill the bottom of the can with ¼ inch of magnesium. Over this, place a mixture of three parts ferric oxide and two parts aluminum powder. Remove the stick, and fill the hole with a mixture of three parts potassium chlorate and one part sugar. On top of this, place a paper bag containing the chlorate-sugar mixture. Place a fuze in the top, and tamp with dirt or clay. Refer to Figure F-38.

Figure F-38. Thermite Demolition MOLOTOV COCKTAIL

F-77. Fill a bottle with napalm, jelly gas, or a 2-to-1 mixture of gas and oil. Insert a rag wick dipped in wax. Light the wick before throwing the bottle. (NOTE: Cotton rags burn slower than some other materials, such as silk. Use a rag wick that will burn long enough so the Molotov cocktail reaches the target before exploding.) Refer to Figure F-39.

F-50

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Figure F-39. Molotov Cocktail

SATCHEL CHARGE

F-78. Fill a #10 can with a mixture of ammonium nitrate and melted wax; stir vigorously to ensure a complete mix. Add a small amount of C4 or TNT, and prime the charge with a time-fuze cord before the mixture hardens. A rope handle creates a convenient improvised satchel charge. IMPROVISED BLACK POWDER DEMOLITIONS

F-79. Table F-15 lists materials required for improvised black powder demolitions. Table F-15. Materials in Black Powder Demolitions MATERIALS REQUIRED

PERCENT (by weight)

PARTS (by volume)

POTASSIUM NITRATE

74

28

POWDERED CHARCOAL

16

3

SULFUR

10

2

F-80. Dissolve the potassium nitrate using a ratio (by weight) of three parts water to one part nitrate. In a second container, dry-mix the powdered charcoal and sulfur by stirring with a wooden stick or swirling or shaking them in a tightly closed container. Add a few drops of the potassium nitrate solution to the dry mixture, and blend to obtain a thoroughly wet paste. Then add the rest of the solution and stir. Pour the mixture into a shallow dish or pan and allow it to stand until it has a paste-like consistency. Mix the paste thoroughly with a wooden stick to assure uniformity, and set it aside for further drying. When the mixture is nearly dried, granulate it by forcing it through a piece of wire screen. Spread the granules thinly, and allow them to dry. IMPROVISED FUZES

F-81. The following are three methods for making improvised string

fuzes:

·

Put a string in a mixture of ¾ cup water and 1 teaspoon potassium chlorate. Boil for 30 minutes.

·

Soak a string in gasoline, and allow it to dry. This fuse will burn slowly.

·

Soak a string in a mixture of ¾ cup cold water and 2 teaspoons potassium nitrate.

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IMPROVISED GRENADES

F-82. Use the following steps to make two types of improvised grenades:

·

Combine 7.8 parts potassium nitrate or sodium nitrate, 1.6 parts charcoal, and 1 part sulfur. No detonator is required, just a fuse.

·

Combine 3 parts sodium chlorate and 3 parts sugar. Load the mixture into a lead pipe. No detonator is required, just a fuse.

IMPROVISED DELAY MECHANISMS

F-83. Figure F-40 shows three types of delay mechanisms that can be used with improvised demolitions.

Figure F-40. Types of Delay Mechanisms FLAME ILLUMINATOR

F-84. Fill a container to 3 inches from the top with thickened fuel, and seal the container tightly. Put three wraps of detonating cord on the top inside rim, and pack with dirt or mud. Wrap a grenade with detonating cord. Place the grenade next to the container, and tie it to the main detonating cord line. See Figure F-41.

F-52

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Figure F-41. Flame Illuminator HUSCH FLARE

F-85. To construct a Husch flare, which burns for 90 minutes and lights a diameter of 50 meters, remove the crossbars from a metal 60-mm mortar can. Punch three 3/8-inch holes in each side of the can halfway between the top and bottom. Punch a hole no bigger than 1/8 inch in the bottom of a metal 81-mm mortar shell container. Temporarily fill the holes; then fill the 81-mm container three-fourths full with thickened fuel. Apply heavy grease to the cap, and tighten it. Place the 81-mm container cap-down in the 60-mm container, and use stones or other materials to wedge it tightly. Then fill the 60-mm mortar can up to the holes with thickened fuel. Remove the plug from the hole in the bottom of the 81-mm shell container. Tie an illumination hand grenade between the 81-mm shell containers just above the level of the 60-mm mortar can. Run a trip wire from the grenade pin. DRIED SEED TIMER

F-86. The reconnaissance platoon can use the properties of dried seeds, which expand when they are soaked, to create a time delay device for electrical firing circuits. Required materials are the following:

· · · · · ·

Dried peas or beans or other dehydrated seeds. Wide-mouthed glass jar with nonmetal cap. Two screws or bolts. Thin metal plate. Hand drill. Screwdriver.

F-87. Use the following steps to construct the dried seed timer:

·

·

Step 1. Determine the rate of rise of the dried seeds selected; this is necessary to determine the amount of seeds needed to provide the required delay time. Use these steps: n

Place a sample of dried seeds in the jar that will be used as the timer. Cover the seeds with water.

n

Measure the time it takes for the seeds to rise a given height. Most dried seeds increase in volume by 50 percent in 1 to 2 hours.

Step 2. Cut a disk from a thin metal plate. The disk should fit loosely inside the jar. (NOTE: If the metal is painted, rusty,

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or otherwise coated, it must be scraped or sanded to create a clean metal surface.) Refer to Figure F-42.

·

Step 3. Drill two holes in the cap of the jar about 2 inches apart. The diameter of the holes should be such that screws or bolts will thread tightly into them. If the jar has a metal cap or no cap, a piece of wood or plastic (NOT METAL) can be used as a cover. See Figure F-42.

·

Step 4. Turn the two screws or bolts through the holes in the cap. The bolts should extend about 1 inch (2½ cm) into the jar. (IMPORTANT NOTE: Both bolts must extend the same distance below the container cover.) See Figure F-43 (top).

·

Step 5. Pour the required quantity of dried seeds into the container. The level will depend on the previously measured rise time and the desired delay. Refer to Figure F-43 (middle).

·

Step 6. Place the metal disk in the jar on top of the seeds. Refer to Figure G-43 (middle).

F-88. Use the following steps to activate and employ the dried seed

timer:

·

Step 1. Add just enough water to completely cover the seeds, and place the cap on the jar. Refer to Figure F-43 (bottom).

·

Step 2. Attach the connecting wires from the firing circuit to the two screws on the cap. Refer to Figure F-43 (bottom).

·

Step 3. Expansion of the seeds will raise the metal disk until it makes contact with the screws and closes the circuit, triggering the explosive. Figure F-44 illustrates the complete explosive device with a dried seed timer.

Figure F-42. Cutting and

F-54

Drilling Metal Plate

_________________________________________________


Figure F-43. Inserting Bolts, Seeds, and Metal Disc; Completed Timer with Water Added and Wires Connected

Figure F-44. Explosive Device with Dried Seed Timer Attached TIN CAN GRENADE

F-89. Construction of a tin can grenade requires the following materials:

· · ·

Tin can, jar, or similar container. Bolts, nuts, metal scrap, and/or other solid objects. Commercial or improvised black powder.

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· ·

Commercial or improvised fuse cord. Cardboard or heavy paper and tape.

F-90. Construct a cardboard or heavy-paper cylinder using tape that is approximately one-half the diameter of the tin can or other container. Insert the fuze into one end of the paper cylinder, pack the cylinder tightly with black powder, and tape the ends closed. Insert the cylinder into the can as shown in Figure F-45, and surround it with such items as bolts, nuts, metal scrap, or stones. Close the can with a lid that has a hole in the center through which to pass the fuze. If the container has no lid, it may be closed with a piece of wood, metal, or cardboard of the required size taped in place.

Figure F-45. Tin Can Grenade

FIELD-EXPEDIENT DELAYS F-91. The reconnaissance platoon can take advantage of a variety of materials for use as expedient delay mechanisms in the employment of demolitions. Examples include the following:

· · · · · · · ·

Cigarette (in matchbook or box). Candle (surrounded by flammable material). Spark (from short-circuited electrical wires). Sulfuric acid (sugar chlorate mixture). Glycerine (sugar permangate mixture). Nitrate acid (sugar chlorate mixture). Water delay (see Figure F-40). Watch delay (see Figure F-40).

COMMON CHEMICALS IN FIELD-EXPEDIENT DEMOLITIONS F-92. Table F-16 lists a number of chemicals that are commonly used in expedient demolitions. The table includes sources for these substances,

F-56

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including local sites that may provide the reconnaissance platoon with access to necessary chemicals.

Table F-16. Common Chemicals in Expedient Demolitions CHEMICAL

SYMBOL

POSSIBLE SOURCES

Potassium permanganate

KMNO4

Drug store, hospital, gym

Potassium chlorate

KCLO3

Drug store, hospital, gym

Potassium nitrate

KNO3

Fertilizer or explosives factory

Sodium nitrate Ammonium nitrate Ferric oxide

NgNO3 (NH4)NO3 Fe2O3

Fertilizer or glass factory Fertilizer or explosives factory Hardware or paint store

Powdered aluminum

Al

Paint, electric, or auto parts store

Magnesium

Mg

Auto, machine, or chemical factory

Glycerin

C3H5(OH)3

Drug store, soap/candle factory

Sulfuric acid

H2SO4

Garage, machine shop, hospital

Sodium chlorate

NgClO3

Match or explosives factory

Sulfur

S

Drug store, match factory

F-57

Appendix G

Environmental Protection Protection of natural CONTENTS resources is an everEnvironmental Risk Management Process .......... increasing concern. It is Step 1 – Identify Environmental Hazards ..... the responsibility of all Step 2 – Assess Environmental Hazards ..... unit leaders to decrease Step 3 – Develop Controls and and, if possible, eliminate Make Decisions ........................................... Step 4 – Implement Controls ......................... damage to the Step 5 – Supervise and Evaluate .................. environment when Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet ..... conducting all types of operations. This appendix focuses on measures the reconnaissance platoon must understand and implement to accomplish that objective. TC 5-400 provides a comprehensive listing of procedures and considerations applicable when operating in environmentally sensitive areas.

G-1 G-1 G-1 G-2 G-2 G-2 G-2

SECTION I – ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS G-1. Environmental risk management is similar to safety risk management and is based on the same philosophy and principles. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of safety risk management in Appendix H of this manual.) The environmental risk assessment and management process consists of the five steps outlined in the following paragraphs.

STEP 1 – IDENTIFY ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS G-2. The platoon leader must identify potential sources of environmental degradation during his analysis of METT-TC factors. These environmental hazards are conditions with the potential for polluting air, soil, or water and/or destroying cultural or historical structures, sites, or artifacts. Figure G-1 lists procedures and considerations for identifying possible sources of environmental risks that the platoon may face during a typical tactical operation. The list is organized according to METT-TC factors.

STEP 2 – ASSESS ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS G-3. Leaders of the reconnaissance platoon can use the environmental risk assessment worksheet (Figure G-3), along with the worksheet instructions (Figure G-2), to analyze the potential severity of environmental degradation for each training activity. The worksheet allows them to quantify the risk to the environment as extremely high, high, moderate, or low. The risk impact value is an indicator of these levels of severity. (NOTE: An example of a completed environmental risk assessment worksheet is shown in Figure G-4.)

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IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK (BY METT-TC) MISSION

· · · · · ·

Identify and assess known environmental risks during planning.

·

Rapidly and effectively respond to all petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and/or hazardous waste accidents.

Determine environmental impact on mission execution. Specify areas of risk and/or concern to minimize the impact on the unit’s scheme of maneuver. Select alternate training methods or goals as necessary. Develop maps and/or sketches with detailed areas of environmental concern. Emphasize the importance of every soldier playing an active role in the identification and timely reporting of new environmental risk elements.

ENEMY (THREAT FORCES)

· ·

Identify probable areas of environmental contamination that could affect friendly force movement.

· ·

Develop threat target options to minimize environmental effects.

Evaluate intelligence reports of how the threat will employ his equipment and/or capabilities to overcome or take advantage of environmental factors. Maneuver friendly forces in such a way as to direct threat action away from environmentally sensitive areas, when feasible.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

· · ·

Provide recommended paths of movement to avoid environmentally sensitive areas. Identify well-defined terrain features to assist in navigation accuracy. Obtain and analyze weather data to diminish possible environmental risks, focusing on predominant and developing weather patterns.

TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE

· ·

Brief all soldiers thoroughly on environmental risks, concerns, and/or points of interest.

· ·

Brief troops on how to prevent environmental damage based on anticipated areas of probable risk.

·

Require accurate and timely reporting pertaining to all environmental issues (friendly or threat).

Develop a detailed and accurate SOP that identifies guidelines for avoiding risk areas with inhibiting mission accomplishment. Employ practice scenarios that test soldier response to changing environmental risks and that promote use of the decision-making process in dealing with risks.

TIME AVAILABLE

·

Maximize planning time. (NOTE: One key step is to minimize the complexity and length of the mission briefing as much as possible.)

·

Practice and develop various mission profiles that emphasize adjusting for changing environmental factors, while maintaining the desired momentum.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

·

Identify and emphasize rules of engagement and/or rules of interaction that minimize environmental damage.

· ·

Expect media coverage and analysis of troop actions that affect the environment.

·

Identify environmental targets of value that the threat might attack.

Anticipate and limit collateral damage to civil infrastructure (such as agriculture and other food production, delivery and supply systems, and hazardous chemical storage facilities).

Figure G-1. Example Procedures for Identifying Environmental Risks

G-2

__________________________________________________ Appendix G – Environmental Protection

STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE DECISIONS G-4. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the reconnaissance platoon leader makes decisions and develops measures to reduce significant environmental risks. Risk decisions are made at a level of command that corresponds to the degree of risk. Leaders should brief all responsible individuals and agencies (to include the installation environmental office, if applicable) on the proposed operational and training plans and on pertinent high-risk environmental factors.

STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS G-5. The reconnaissance platoon leader and subordinate leaders implement environmental protection measures at all stages of operational planning, preparation, and execution. They integrate these measures into plans, orders, SOPs, training performance standards, and rehearsals.

STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE G-6. The reconnaissance platoon leader must enforce environmental protection standards during supervision of all training activities.

SECTION II – ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET G-7. To use the environmental risk assessment worksheet (Figure G-3; refer to Figure G-4 for a sample, completed worksheet) for a specific operation or training event, the reconnaissance platoon leader and subordinate leaders first conduct an operational analysis to break down the exercise into events, allowing them to manage the risks for the various tasks. They also identify particular tasks for the operation using the troop’s mission training plan (MTP). Leaders develop the hazard list using their experience, lessons learned, unit SOPs, applicable references, and guidance from the chain of command. They identify applicable environmental standards, laws, and ROE that affect the mission. Leaders annotate each task and associated environmental hazards on the risk management worksheet in blocks E and F. G-8. The platoon leader and NCOs assess each hazard to determine the risk for potential harm to the environment. Their assessment is based upon how often the environmental hazard occurs during the operation (probability) and what effect the hazard has on the environment (severity). They use the probability and severity definitions that are covered in FM 3-100.4. G-9. They develop controls to eliminate or reduce the probability or severity of each hazard. They identify a mix of educational-, physical-, and avoidance-type controls and annotate them in block H (see the example worksheet in Figure G-4). Once all risk control measures are in place, any residual risk is annotated in block I (as shown in Figure G-4). The platoon leader informs the commander of the residual risk and its implications. G-10. Leaders identify how each control would be implemented and assign responsibility to unit personnel. The “how to” for each control is

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annotated in block J. In the sample worksheet (Figure G-4), fueling during resupply operations was identified as a possible environmental concern for the platoon. Leaders identified control measures to include ensuring that operators were properly trained to dispense fuel, and appropriate spill equipment was available. This process requires leaders to anticipate environmental requirements and incorporate them as part long-range, short-range, and near-term planning.

WORKSHEET INSTRUCTIONS Block A–E

Self-explanatory.

F

Identify Hazards. Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or task. Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.

G

Assess Hazards. Assessment includes historical lessons learned, intuitive analyses, experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM3-100.4). Enter the risk level for each hazard.

H

Develop Controls. Develop one or more controls for each hazard to either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. Specify who, what, where, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.

I

Determine Residual Risk. Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM 3-100.4). Enter the residual risk level for each hazard.

J

Implement Controls. Decide how each control will be put into effect or communicated to the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal instruction: tactical, safety, garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.

K

Determine Overall Mission/Task Risk. Select the highest residual risk level and circle it. This level becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides whether the controls are sufficient to accept the residual risk. If the risk is too great to continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional controls or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA. Supervise and Evaluate. This last step is not on the worksheet. Plan how each control will be monitored for implementation (continuous supervision, spot checks), and reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if they can be improved. Communicate lessons learned.

Figure G-2. Instructions for Risk Management Worksheet

G-4

F. Identify Hazards:

G. Assess Hazards:

I. Determine Residual Risk:

J. Implement Controls (“How To”):

Page _____ of _____

C. Date Prepared:

K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one): LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)

E. Task: H. Develop Controls:

B. Date/Time Group Begin: End:

D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)

A. Mission or Task:

__________________________________________________ Appendix G – Environmental Protection

Figure G-3. Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet

G-5

G-6

K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one): LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)

Troop SOP para 7(a), Range regulations.

1. Inform soldiers Low (L) that no open fires are allowed. 2. Brief soldiers on use of pyrotechnics.

Establish a tactical Starting range and Moderate (M) training area fires. assembly area.

J. Implement Controls (“How To”): Troop SOP, paragraph 8, conduct training prior to STX.

I. Determine Residual Risk:

Page 1 of 1.

1. Train drivers and Low (L) fuel handlers on proper fuel handling procedures 2. Provide spill equipment. 3. Locate refueling sites away from waterways.

Fuel spills during refueling

Conduct resupply

G. Assess Hazards:

22 MAY XX

C. Date Prepared:

Moderate (M)

F. Identify Hazards:

E. Task:

SFC Smith, PSG

H. Develop Controls:

B. Date/Time Group Begin: 010600 JUN XX End: 020100 JUN XX

D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)

Platoon STX Lanes

A. Mission or Task:

FM 3-20.98 __________________________________________________________________________

Figure G-4. Sample Environment Risk Assessment Worksheet (Completed)

1

Appendix H

2

Risk Management

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Risk is the chance of CONTENTS injury or death for Risk Management Procedures ............................. individuals and damage Step 1 – Identify Hazards ............................... to or loss of vehicles and Step 2 – Assess Hazards to Determine equipment. Risks, and/or Risks ............................................................ the potential for risks, Step 3 – Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions .................................. are always present in Step 4 – Implement Controls ......................... every combat and Step 5 – Supervise and Evaluate .................. training situation the Implementation Responsibilities ........................ reconnaissance platoon faces. Risk management must take place at all levels of the chain of command during each phase of every operation; it is an integral part of all tactical planning. The reconnaissance platoon leader, his NCOs, and all other platoon soldiers must know how to use risk management, coupled with fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the mission is executed in the safest possible environment within mission constraints.

31

H-1 H-1 H-3 H-4 H-5 H-5 H-6

SECTION I – RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

H-1.

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

H-2.

The primary objective of risk management is to help units protect their combat power through accident prevention, enabling them to win the battle quickly and decisively, with minimum losses. This appendix outlines the process that leaders can use to identify hazards and implement a plan to address each identified hazard. It also includes a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the platoon’s leaders and individual soldiers in implementing a sound risk management program. Refer to FM 5-19 (FM 100-14) for additional information on risk management. This discussion outlines the five steps of risk management. Leaders of the reconnaissance platoon must always remember that the effectiveness of the process depends on situational awareness. They should never approach risk management with “one size fits all” solutions to the hazards the platoon will face. Rather, in performing the steps, they must keep in mind the essential tactical and operational factors that make each situation unique.

STEP 1 – IDENTIFY HAZARDS H-3.

A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential condition that could entail injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and property; or some other sort of mission degradation. Tactical and training operations pose many types of hazards.

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H-4.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

The reconnaissance platoon leader must identify the hazards associated with all aspects and phases of the platoon’s mission, paying particular attention to the factors of METT-TC. Risk management must never be an afterthought; leaders must begin the process during their troop-leading procedures and continue it throughout the operation.

H-5.

Figure H-1 lists possible sources of risk that the reconnaissance platoon might face during a typical tactical operation. The list is organized according to the factors of METT-TC.

SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK (BY METT-TC) MISSION · Duration of the operation. · Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily understood?) · Proximity and number of maneuvering units.

ENEMY (THREAT FORCES) · Knowledge of the threat situation. · Threat capabilities. · Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER · · · ·

Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, rain, snow, and smoke. Precipitation and its effect on mobility. Extreme heat or cold. Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, water obstacles).

TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE · · · · · · · ·

Equipment status. Experience the units conducting the operation have working together. Danger areas associated with the platoon’s weapon systems. Soldier/leader proficiency. Soldier/leader rest situation. Degree of acclimatization to environment. Impact of new leaders and/or crewmembers. Impact of operating and/or interacting with NATO, UN, or other multination forces.

TIME AVAILABLE · Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by subordinates. · Time available for PCCs/PCIs.

CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS · Applicable ROE and/or ROI. · Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with civilians (such as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism). · Potential for media contact/inquiries. · Interaction with civilians from the host nation or from organizations participating in nation support.

10

Figure H-1. Examples of Potential Hazards

11

H-2

_________________________________________________________ Appendix H – Risk Management

1 2 3 4

STEP 2 – ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS H-6.

Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct impact of each hazard on an operation (in the form of hazardous incidents). Use the following steps:

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

·

Determine which hazards can be eliminated, minimized, or avoided.

·

Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated, minimized, or avoided to determine the probability that the hazard can occur.

·

Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated, minimized, or avoided. Severity, defined as the result or outcome of a hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree of injury or illness (including death), loss of or damage to equipment or property, environmental damage, or other mission-impairing factors (such as unfavorable publicity or loss of combat power).

·

Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, determine the associated risk level (extremely high, high, moderate, and low). Table H-1 summarizes the four risk levels.

·

Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, and risk level, as well as the operational factors unique to the situation), complete the risk management worksheet. Figure H-2 shows an example of a completed risk management worksheet.

Table H-1. Risk Levels and Impact on Mission Execution RISK LEVEL Extremely high (E) High (H)

MISSION EFFECTS Mission failure if hazardous incidents occur in execution. Significantly degraded mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards. Not accomplishing all parts of the mission or not completing the mission to standard (if hazards occur during mission).

Moderate (M)

Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards. Reduced mission capability (if hazards occur during the mission).

Low (L)

Expected losses have little or no impact on mission success.

28

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Figure H-2. Example Risk Management Worksheet

STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS DEVELOPING CONTROLS

H-7.

After assessing each hazard, develop one or more controls that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of potential hazardous incidents. When developing controls, consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard by itself. MAKING RISK DECISIONS

H-8.

A key element in the process of making a risk decision is determining whether accepting the risk is justified or, conversely, is unnecessary. The decision-maker (the reconnaissance platoon leader, if applicable) must compare and balance the risk against mission

H-4


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

expectations. He alone decides if the controls are sufficient and acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he determines the risk is unnecessary, he directs the development of additional controls or alternative controls; as another option, he can modify, change, or reject the selected COA for the operation. The decision-maker must always keep in mind that an important step in reducing or eliminating risk factors is to keep the next higher level of command involved in and informed of the risk management process.

STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS H-9.

Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to eliminate hazards or reduce their risk. Implementing controls is the most important part of the risk management process; this is the chain of command’s contribution to the safety of the unit. Implementing controls includes coordination and communication with appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and with individuals executing the mission. The reconnaissance platoon leader must ensure that specific controls are integrated into OPLANs, OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to ensure that controls are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood by all levels.

H-10. When the leaders conduct a thoughtful risk assessment, the

controls will be easy to implement, enforce, and follow. Examples of risk management controls include the following:

·

Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including related hazards and controls.

· · ·

Conduct thorough PCCs and PCIs.

· · ·

Use buddy teams.

·

Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on dangerous terrain.

·

Establish marked and protected sleeping areas in assembly areas.

· · ·

Limit single-vehicle movement.

·

Ensure that all leaders maintain situational awareness while staying alert to prevent complacency among their soldiers.

Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels. Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as possible (at least 4 hours in any 24-hour period). Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety. Establish recognizable visual distinguish maneuvering units.

signals

and

markers

to

Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel. Ensure that all soldiers are in the proper uniform and/or at the correct MOPP level.

STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE H-11. During mission execution, it is imperative for leaders to ensure

that risk management controls are properly understood and executed.

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1 2

Leaders must continuously evaluate the unit’s effectiveness in managing risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement.

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

SUPERVISION

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

EVALUATION

26

SECTION II – IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES

H-12. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that effective risk management controls are implemented. In general, a constant concern for soldier health and welfare is the key to fostering an environment for successful, risk-free operations. All leaders are responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce established safety policies as well as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections, SITREPs, confirmation briefs, buddy checks, and close supervision.

H-13. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk

management controls, both to determine whether they are effective and to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, identify, and assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning and execution reflect changes in hazard conditions.

H-14. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also

include an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit performance in identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should then incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions.

H-15. Leaders and individuals at all levels are responsible and

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

accountable for managing risk. They must ensure that hazards and associated risks are identified and controlled during planning, preparation, and execution of operations. The reconnaissance platoon leader and his senior NCOs must look at both tactical risks and accident risks. The same risk management process is used to manage both types. The platoon leader alone determines how and where he is willing to take tactical risks. With the assistance of his PSG, NCOs, and individual soldiers, the platoon leader manages accident risks.

H-16. Sometimes, despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a risk taken or about to be assumed, the risk management process may break down. Such a failure can be the result of several factors; most often, it can be attributed to the following:

40 41 42 43 44

H-6

·

The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to know about the risk.

·

A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job and does not want to bother his platoon leader or section leader.


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

·

Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk involved.

·

Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in the capability to avoid or recover from a hazardous incident.

·

Subordinates not fully understanding the higher commander’s guidance regarding risk decisions.

H-17. The platoon leader gives the platoon direction, sets priorities, and

establishes the command climate (values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires him to embed risk management into individual behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the platoon leader must exercise creative leadership, innovative planning, and careful management. Most important, he must demonstrate support for the risk management process. The platoon leader and others in the platoon chain of command can establish a command climate favorable to risk management integration by taking the following actions:

·

Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management behavior through leading by example and by stressing active participation throughout the risk management process.

·

Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is responsible for obtaining the assets necessary to mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate leaders.

·

Understand their own and their soldier’s limitations, as well as their unit’s capabilities.

· ·

Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.

·

Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their trade and their ability to execute a chosen COA.

· ·

Keep subordinates informed.

Prevent a “zero defects” mindset from creeping into the platoon’s culture.

Listen to subordinates.

H-18. For the platoon leader, his subordinate leaders, and individual soldiers alike, responsibilities in managing risk include the following:

·

Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly communicate risk decision criteria and guidance.

· ·

Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.

·

Accurately evaluate the platoon’s effectiveness, as well as subordinates’ execution of risk controls during the mission.

·

Inform higher headquarters established limits.

Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates understand the who, what, when, where, and why of managing risk and how these factors apply to their situation and assigned responsibilities.

when

risk

levels

exceed

H-7

1

Appendix I

3

Fratricide Prevention

5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47

Fratricide is defined as the employment of friendly weapons that results in the unforeseen and unintentional death or injury of friendly personnel or damage to friendly equipment. Fratricide prevention is the commander’s responsibility. He is assisted by all leaders across all operating systems in accomplishing this mission. This appendix focuses on actions the reconnaissance platoon leader and his subordinate leaders can take with current resources to reduce the risk of fratricide.

CONTENTS General Considerations ...................................... The Reconnaissance Platoon’s Fratricide Risk ............................................ Role of Training in Fratricide Prevention .... Effects of Fratricide .............................................. Causes of Fratricide ............................................. Failures in the Direct Fire Control Plan ....... Land Navigation Failures .............................. Failures in Combat Identification ................. Inadequate Control Measures ...................... Failures and Reporting and Communications ........................................ Weapons Errors ............................................. Battlefield Hazards ........................................ Reliance on Instruments ............................... Fratricide Risk Assessment ................................. Fratricide Prevention Measures .......................... Principles of Fratricide Prevention .............. Additional Guidelines .................................... Stopping a Friendly Fire Incident ........................ Actions as Victim of Friendly Fire ................ Actions as Firing Element ............................. Actions as Observer of Friendly Fire ........... Leader Responsibilities ................................

I-1 I-1 I-2 I-2 I-3 I-3 I-3 I-3 I-3 I-3 I-4 I-4 I-4 I-4 I-6 I-6 I-7 I-8 I-8 I-8 I-8 I-9

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

SECTION I – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS I-1.

The underlying principle of fratricide prevention is simple: Leaders who know where their soldiers are, and where they want them to fire, can keep those soldiers alive to kill the threat. At the same time, leaders must avoid at all costs any reluctance to employ, integrate, and synchronize all required operating systems at the critical time and place. They must avoid becoming tentative out of fear of fratricide; rather, they strive to eliminate fratricide risk through tough, realistic, combined arms training in which each soldier and unit achieves the established standard.

THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON’S FRATRICIDE RISK I-2.

More than any other maneuver element, the reconnaissance platoon is at risk of being the victim of fratricide. The platoon is particularly vulnerable because it often maneuvers in dispersed elements forward and to the flanks of other friendly combat forces. In a battalion, company teams often do not keep up with the plan or with the disposition

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__________________________________________________________________________

of the reconnaissance platoon. For these reasons, situational awareness on the part of all reconnaissance leaders, particularly the platoon leader, is critical not only to mission success but also to survival.

I-3.

In any tactical situation, it is critical that all scouts know where other friendly elements are operating. With this knowledge, they must anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps to either avoid or mitigate them. The platoon leader must always be vigilant of changes and developments in the situation that may place his elements in danger. He must also ensure that all section or squad positions are constantly reported to higher headquarters so that all other friendly elements are aware of where the scouts are and what they are doing. At troop level, NFAs can be designated to control friendly direct and indirect fire into areas in which the platoon is or will be operating. When the platoon leader perceives a potential fratricide situation, he must personally use the higher net to coordinate directly with the friendly element involved.

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

ROLE OF TRAINING IN FRATRICIDE PREVENTION

30

SECTION II – EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE

I-4.

Training allows units and soldiers to make mistakes, with the goal of reducing or eliminating the risk of errors occurring in combat. A key role of the reconnaisance platoon training program is to teach vehicle crews what targets to engage and when to engage them. Just as important, crews must learn and practice restraint in what and when to engage; for example, every vehicle commander must know that he must confirm the target as hostile before issuing and executing any fire command.

I-5.

Eliminating the risk of fratricide is no less critical as a training standard than are other mission requirements. All leaders must know all aspects of the applicable training standard, including fratricide prevention, and then ensure that their soldiers train to that standard.

I-6.

31 32 33

Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always affects the unit’s ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:

· · · · · · · · ·

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 I-2

Loss of confidence in the unit’s leadership. Increasing self-doubt among leaders. Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems. Oversupervision of units. Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations. Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver (fire and movement). Loss of initiative. Disrupted operations. General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.

_______________________________________________________ Appendix I – Fratricide Prevention

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

SECTION III – CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE I-7.

The following discussion covers the primary causes of fratricide. Leaders must identify any of the factors that may affect their units and then strive to eliminate or correct them.

FAILURES IN THE DIRECT FIRE CONTROL PLAN I-8.

These occur when units do not develop effective fire control plans, particularly in the offense. Units may fail to designate target engagement areas or adhere to target priorities, or they may position their weapons incorrectly. Under such conditions, fire discipline often breaks down upon contact.

I-9.

The reconnaissance platoon can use a number of techniques and procedures to help prevent such incidents. An example is “staking in” vehicle and individual positions in the defense, using pickets to indicate the left and right limits of each position. An area of particular concern is the additional planning that must go into operations requiring close coordination between mounted elements and infantry squads. For example, because of the danger posed by discarding petals, sabot rounds should be fired over friendly infantry elements only in extreme emergencies.

LAND NAVIGATION FAILURES I-10.

Units often stray out of assigned sectors, report wrong locations, and become disoriented. Much less frequently, they employ fire support weapons from the wrong locations. In either type of situation, units that unexpectedly encounter an errant unit may fire their weapons at the friendly force.

FAILURES IN COMBAT IDENTIFICATION I-11.

Vehicle commanders and gunners cannot accurately identify thermal or optical signatures near the maximum range of their systems. In limited visibility, units within that range may mistake one another for a threat target.

INADEQUATE CONTROL MEASURES I-12.

Units may fail to disseminate the minimum necessary maneuver fire control measures and fire support coordination measures; they may also fail to tie control measures to recognizable terrain or events. As the battle develops, the plan then cannot address obvious branches and sequels as they occur. When this happens, synchronization fails.

FAILURES IN REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS I-13.

Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical situations change. This distorts

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__________________________________________________________________________

the tactical “picture” available at each level and can lead to erroneous clearance of supporting fires.

WEAPONS ERRORS I-14.

Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS

25

SECTION IV – FRATRICIDE RISK ASSESSMENT

I-15.

A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on the battlefield: unexploded ordnance; unmarked or unrecorded minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark, record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to casualties.

RELIANCE ON INSTRUMENTS I-16.

A unit that relies too heavily on systems such the FBCB2 and GPS devices will find its capabilities severely degraded if these systems fail. The unit will be unable to maintain situational awareness. To prevent potential dangers when system failure occurs, the reconnaissance platoon leader must ensure that his he and his scouts use a balance of technology and traditional basic soldier skills in observation, navigation, and other critical activities.

I-17.

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

Figure I-1 is a worksheet for evaluating fratricide risk in the context of mission requirements. The worksheet lists six missionaccomplishment factors that affect the risk of fratricide, along with related considerations for each factor. Leaders should assess the potential risk in each area (low, medium, or high) and assign a point value to each (one point for low risk, two for medium risk, three for high risk). They then add the point values to calculate the overall fratricide assessment score.

I-18.

The resulting score is used only as a guide, however. The leader’s final assessment must be based both on observable risk factors, such as those listed on the worksheet, and on his “feel” for the intangible factors affecting the operation. Note that descriptive terms are listed only in the low- and high-risk columns of the worksheet. The assessment of each factor will determine whether the risk matches one of these extremes or lies somewhere between them as a medium risk.

I-4


1 Potential risk categories (with variable conditions and point values) Low risk (1 point)

Factors affecting fratricide

Medium risk (2 points)

High risk (3 points)

UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLAN Clear

Vague

Complexity

Simple

Complex

Threat situation

Commander’s intent

Known

Unknown

Friendly situation

Clear

Unclear

ROE/ROI

Clear

Unclear

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS Intervisibility

Favorable

Unfavorable

Obscuration

Clear

Obscured

Battle tempo

Slow

Fast

100 %

None (0 %)

Positive target ID

CONTROL MEASURES Joint/combined

Command relationships

Organic

Audio communications

Loud / clear

Jammed

Visual communications

Easily seen

Obscured

Graphics

Standard

Not understood

SOPs

Standard

Not used

Liaison personnel

Proficient

Untrained

Sure

Unsure

Location/navigation

EQUIPMENT (compared to US equipment) Friendly Threat

Similar

Different

Different

Similar

TRAINING MOS-qualified

Untrained

Unit proficiency

Trained

Untrained

Rehearsals

Realistic

None

Individual proficiency

Habitual relationships

Yes

No

Endurance

Alert

Fatigued

PLANNING TIME (based on 1/3 - 2/3 rule) Higher headquarters

Adequate

Inadequate

Own unit

Adequate

Inadequate

Subordinate elements

Adequate

Inadequate

Overall risk assessment (by total point value) NOTE:

2

Low risk 26 - 46 points

Medium risk 42 - 62 points

High risk 58 - 78 points

Point values alone may not accurately reflect fratricide risk. The commander must tailor his assessment to the unit’s requirements.

Figure I-1. Fratricide Risk Assessment Worksheet

3

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FM 3-20.98

1

__________________________________________________________________________

SECTION V – FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES

SPECIAL NOTE

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive target identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must ensure positive target identification before they issue commands to fire. In addition, all units must accurately report their locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must carefully track the location of all subordinate elements in relation to all friendly forces.

I-19.

The measures outlined in this section, including those listed in the special note above, provide the platoon with a guide to actions it can take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative. Commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC factors.

PRINCIPLES OF FRATRICIDE PREVENTION I-20.

At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are five key principles.

22 23 24

IDENTIFY AND ASSESS POTENTIAL FRATRICIDE RISKS IN THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

25 26 27 28 29 30

MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

ENSURE POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION

39 40 41 42 43

MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE FIRE CONTROL

I-21.

Express these risks in the OPORD and/or applicable FRAGOs.

I-22.

Focus on such areas as current intelligence; unit locations and/or dispositions; denial areas (minefields/scatterable mines); contaminated areas, such as ICM and NBC; SITREPs; and METT-TC factors. FBCB2 will provide the reconnaissance platoon with a distinct advantage in situational awareness.

I-23.

Review vehicle and weapons identification (ID) cards. Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and threat vehicles, including silhouettes and thermal signatures. Learn the conditions, including distance (range) and weather, under which positive identification of various vehicles and weapons is possible. Enforce the use of challenge and password, especially during dismounted operations. (NOTE: Refer to the special note earlier in this discussion.)

I-24.

Ensure fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated. Make it mandatory for crewmen to ask for clarification of any portion of the fire command they do not completely understand. Stress the importance of the chain of command in the fire control process; ensure

I-6


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

crewmen get in the habit of obtaining target confirmation and permission to fire from their leaders before engaging targets they assume are threat elements. Know who will be in and around the area of operations. ESTABLISH A COMMAND CLIMATE THAT EMPHASIZES FRATRICIDE PREVENTION

I-25.

Enforce fratricide prevention measures, placing special emphasis on the use of doctrinally sound TTP. Ensure constant supervision in the execution of orders and in the performance of all tasks and missions to standard.

ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES I-26.

Additional guidelines and considerations fratricide reduction and prevention include the following:

·

Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit cohesion by taking quick, effective action to alleviate stress.

·

Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training covering fratricide awareness, target identification and recognition, and fire discipline.

· ·

Develop a simple, decisive plan.

·

Give complete and concise mission orders. Include all appropriate recognition signals in paragraph 5 of the OPORD.

·

To simplify mission orders, use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine. Periodically review and update SOPs as needed.

·

Use common language/vocabulary and doctrinally correct standard terminology and control measures, such as the FSCL, zone of engagement, and RFL.

· · ·

Ensure thorough coordination is conducted at all levels.

· · ·

Designate and employ LOs as appropriate.

·

Be in the right place at the right time. Use position location/navigation devices (GPS and POSNAV); know your location and the locations of adjacent units (left, right, leading, and follow-on); and synchronize tactical movement. If the platoon or any element becomes lost or misoriented, leaders must know how to contact higher headquarters immediately for instructions and assistance.

· ·

Establish, execute, and enforce strict sleep and rest plans.

Strive to provide maximum planning time for leaders and subordinates.

Plan for and establish effective communications. Plan for collocation of CPs whenever it is appropriate to the mission, such as during a passage of lines. Make sure ROE are clear. Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows the platoon adequate time to do so.

Include a discussion of fratricide incidents in all AARs.

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FM 3-20.98

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

__________________________________________________________________________

SECTION VI – STOPPING A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT I-27.

The reconnaissance platoon may become involved in a friendly fire incident in one of several ways: as the victim of the fire; as the firing element; or as an observer intervening in an attack of one friendly element on another. This section covers actions that leaders and crewmen must be prepared to take when they encounter such situations.

ACTIONS AS VICTIM OF FRIENDLY FIRE I-28.

The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the crew falls victim to friendly fires:

· · · ·

React to contact until you recognize friendly fire.

·

Report the following on the next higher unit net:

Cease-fire. Take immediate actions to protect soldiers and vehicles. Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to cease fire. n

Announce that you are receiving friendly fire.

n

Request medical assistance as needed.

n

Give the location and direction of the firing vehicles.

n

Warn the higher unit not to return fire if you identify the firing unit as friendly.

ACTIONS AS FIRING ELEMENT I-29.

The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level when the crew has engaged friendly forces:

· ·

Cease-fire. Report the following on the next higher net: n

Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report number and type of vehicles).

n

The location of the incident.

n

Direction and distance to the engaged force.

n

The type of fire.

n

The target effects.

ACTIONS AS OBSERVER OF FRIENDLY FIRE I-30.

The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the crew observes a friendly fire incident:

· ·

39 40 41

I-8

Seek cover and protect yourself. Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to cease-fire.


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

·

·

Report the following on the next higher net: n

Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report number and type of vehicles).

n

The location of the incident.

n

Direction and distance to the victim and the firing unit.

n

The type of fire.

n

The target effects.

Provide assistance as needed (when it is safe to do so).

LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES I-31.

In all situations involving the risk of fratricide and friendly fire, leaders must be prepared to take immediate actions to prevent casualties as well as equipment damage or destruction. Recommended actions in fratricide situations include the following:

·

Identify the incident and order the parties involved to ceasefire.

· ·

Conduct an in-stride risk assessment. Identify and implement controls to prevent the incident from recurring.

I-9

1

Appendix J

2

Debriefing Format

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Team Number: __________

15

Maps Used:

5-1. This appendix outlines information that should be included in the debriefing of friendly personnel following the completion of tactical operations. The information and format are applicable to virtually every type of operation. The reconnaissance platoon leader can adapt the format according to the commander’s intent, unit SOP, and other operational requirements.

1:25,000 1:50,000

16 17

A.

Size and composition of team.

18

B.

Mission.

19

C.

Time of departure (DTG).

20

1. Method of infiltration.

21

2. Point of departure.

22

D.

Threat forces observed en route.

23

1. Ground activity.

24

2. Air activity.

25

3. Miscellaneous activity.

26 27

DTG: __________

E.

Routes out. (Team provides a detailed description, written and overlay, of routes from assembly area to objective.)

28

1. Planned primary and alternate routes.

29

2. Actual routes taken and reason for deviation from planned routes.

30

3. Halts en route, to include security and objective.

31

4. DTG arrived at objective area.

J-1

FM 3-20.98

F.

1

__________________________________________________________________________

Terrain throughout the objective area. 1. Roads, trails, railroad tracks.

2 3

a. Type (single or multilane, hard, gravel, or dirt surface).

4

b. Condition (dry, wet, muddy, well-used, seldom used).

5

c. Trafficability (types of vehicle terrain will support).

6

d. Trails or roads not on the map.

7

e. Bypasses and/or alternate routes. 2. All open areas.

8

a. Type (pasture, cultivated, new tree farm).

9 10

b. Suitability for use as a PZ, LZ, or DZ.

11

c. Will the ground support tracked or wheeled vehicles? 3. Forested areas.

12 13

a. Type of trees.

14

b. Thickness.

15

c. Undergrowth.

16 17

d. Effects on maneuverability of vehicles and dismounted soldiers.

18

e. Thickness of overhead cover. 4. Rivers, streams, and lakes.

19 20

a. Length.

21

b. Width.

22

c. Depth.

23

d. Fordability to vehicles and soldiers.

24

e. Bridges (classification report).

25

f. Trafficability under the bridge for boats or barges.

26

5. Key terrain.

27

6. Restrictive terrain.

28

7. Major obstacles to vehicles and soldiers.

29

8. Availability of cover and concealment.

30 31

9. Major avenues of approach (any that an attacking element, battalion-size or larger, could maneuver through).

32

10. Any map corrections not already given.

J-2

_________________________________________________________ Appendix J – Debriefing Format

1

G. Threat forces and installations (include sketches).

2

H.

Miscellaneous information.

3

1. NBC.

4

2. Abandoned equipment (type, number, location, and markings).

5

a. Out of fuel.

6

b. Destroyed or damaged.

7

c. Abandoned towns or villages.

8

I.

Results of encounters with threat forces or local populace. 1. All sightings (DTG, activity, location).

9 10

a. Did soldiers appear clean-shaven? What was morale?

11 12

b. Did uniforms appear clean? Were all soldier in the same uniform? List types of uniforms.

13

c. Weapons (type; locked and loaded?).

14

d. Conditions of vehicles and equipment.

15

e. Nationality and language.

16 17

f. Actions of local populace (friendly, confrontational, oblivious).

18 19

2. Results of threat contact (DTG; location; EPWs; personnel killed, wounded, or MIA).

20

J.

Captured threat equipment and material.

21

K.

Routes back.

22

1. Planned primary and alternate routes.

23

2. Actual routes taken and reason for deviation from planned routes.

24

3. Halts en route, to include security and linkup with vehicle.

25

4. DTG arrived at assembly area.

26

L.

Exfiltration.

27

1. DTG of exfiltration.

28

2. Method of exfiltration.

29

3. Point of exfiltration.

30

M. Time and point of return.

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FM 3-20.98

N.

1

__________________________________________________________________________

Condition of team.

2

1. Disposition of dead and wounded personnel.

3 4

2. Team leader’s estimate of when team will be ready to start a new mission.

5

3. Personnel and equipment shortages. O. Items of potential tactical value.

6 7 8

1. Were all maps and any other identifiable material returned with the team?

9

2. If not, what is missing? (State item and approximately where lost.) P.

10

Conclusions and recommendations.

11

1. To what extent was the mission accomplished?

12

2. Recommended changes in tactics or procedures.

13

3. What additional information is needed in the OPORD?

14

4. Recommended equipment changes.

15

5. Effects of weather on team’s operational capability.

16

6. What else should another team know before going into this area?

17 18

7. Additional areas or information that has not been covered. Is there something that should be highlighted?

19

Team Leader (print name and grade): ___________________________

20

Unit: _____________

21

Debriefer (print name and grade): ______________________________

22

Unit: _____________

23

Additional remarks by debriefer:

24

Enclosures:

Signature: ___________________________

Signature: ___________________________

Patrol log Communications log Surveillance log Photograph log

25 26 27 28

J-4

Glossary A A2C2 AA AAR ABCS

Army airspace command and control avenue of approach; assembly area after-action review Army Battle Command System

ABF

attack by fire (position)

ACA

airspace coordination area

ACE

armored combat earthmover

ACF

aviation close fires

ACR

armored cavalry regiment

ADA

air defense artillery

ADAM AFATDS AGMB AI A/L ALICE AM AMC

area denial munitions advanced field artillery tactical data system advance guard main body (enemy force) area of interest administrative/logistics all-purpose lightweight individual carrying case amplitude modulation (radio) air mission commander

AMDS

advanced monitoring display system

ammo

ammunition

AO AOR AP APC APDS APOBS APOD ARTEP ASAS AT ATACMS

area of operations area of responsibility antipersonnel armored personnel carrier armor-piercing, discarding-sabot (ammunition) antipersonnel obstacle breaching system aerial port of debarkation Army Training and Evaluation Program all-source analysis system antitank Army tactical missile system

ATGM

antitank guided missile

ATHS

airborne target handover system

AVLB

armored vehicle launched bridge

B BAT

battery assembly training

BCT

brigade combat team

BDA

battle damage assessment

Glossary-1

FM 3-20.98

__________________________________________________________________________

BDAR bde

battle damage assessment and repair brigade

BDO

battle dress overgarment

BDU

battle dress uniform

BFV

Bradley (infantry) fighting vehicle

BHL

battle handover line

BII BMNT

basic issue item beginning of morning nautical twilight

bn

battalion

BP

battle position

BRIDGEREP

report of bridge, overpass, culvert, underpass, or tunnel

BRT

brigade reconnaissance team

BSA

brigade support area

BSC

base support company

BSFV

Bradley Stinger (missile) fighting vehicle

C C2 C4I C4ISR cal CAM CANA CAS CASEVAC CATF cav CBU CCIR CDE cdr CEOI

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance caliber chemical agent monitor convulsant antidote for nerve agent close air support casualty evacuation commander, amphibious landing force cavalry cluster bomb unit commander’s critical information requirements chemical defense equipment commander communications-electronic operation instructions

CFF

call for fire

CFL

coordinated fire line

CFSO

counterintelligence force protection source operations

CFV

(Bradley) cavalry fighting vehicle

CFZ

critical friendly zone

cGy/hr

centigray(s) per hour

CI CIP CITV

Glossary-2

command and control

counterintelligence combat identification panel commander’s independent thermal viewer

_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

CLF co tm; co/tm COA COLT COMSEC COP CP CPOG CROSSREP CRP CS CSAR CSS CSSCS CTA CTCP

commander, landing force company team course of action combat observation lasing team communications security common operational picture command post; checkpoint (graphics only) chemical protective overgarment report of ford, ferry, or other water crossing site combat reconnaissance patrol (threat unit) combat support; O-chlorobenzyl-malononitrile (CS gas) combat search and rescue combat service support combat service support control system common table of allowances combat trains command post

CVC

combat vehicle crewman

DA

Department of the Army

D DAP DC DD; DoD DED div div cav DoD DP DPICM DS

decontamination apparatus, portable direct current Department of Defense detailed equipment decontamination division division cavalry (United States) Department of Defense decision point (illustration text) dual-purpose improve conventional munitions direct support

DSO

domestic support operations

DST

decision support template

DTD

detailed troop decontamination

DTG

date-time group

DU

depleted uranium

DZ

drop zone

E E&E EA

evasion and escape engagement area

EAC

echelons above corps

ECM

electronic countermeasures

EECP

early entry command center

Glossary-3

FM 3-20.98

__________________________________________________________________________

EENT

end of evening nautical twilight

EFST

essential fire support task

EMP en; EN engr EO EPLRS EPW ESTAT

electromagnetic pulse enemy engineer(s) electro-optical enhanced position location and reporting system enemy prisoner of war equipment status report

EW

electronic warfare

1LT

first lieutenant

1SG

first sergeant

FA

field artillery

F

FAC FARP FBCB2

forward area refuel and rearm point Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (system)

FCR

fire control radar

FDC

fire direction center

FEBA

forward edge of the battle area

FFA

free fire area

FHA

foreign humanitarian assistance

FIPR

flash immediate priority routine

FIST

fire support team

FKSM

Fort Knox Supplemental Material

FLIR

forward-looking infrared (system)

FLOT

forward line of own troops

FM

frequency modulation (radio); field manual

FO

forward observer

FPF FRAGO FS

final protective fires fragmentary order fire support

FSCL

fire support coordination line

FSCM

fire support control measure

FSCOORD

fire support coordinator

FSE

fire support element; forward security element (threat forces only)

FSO

fire support officer

ft FWF FY

Glossary-4

forward air controller

foot; feet former warring factions fiscal year

_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

G GCT

ground cavalry troop

GHz

gigahertz

GIRS

grid index reference system

gpm

gallons per minute

GPS

global positioning system

GS GSR

general support ground surveillance radar

H H HAB HE HEI-T HEP-T HHC HMMWV

hour (used for timeline designation) heavy assault bridge high explosive high explosive incendiary tracer (ammunition) high explosive plastic tracer (ammunition) headquarters and headquarters company high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

HN

host nation

hp

horsepower

HPT HQ hr HUMINT HVT

high-priority target headquarters hour(s) human intelligence high-value target

I ICAM

improved chemical agent monitor

ICE

individual chemical equipment

ICM

improved conventional munitions

ICOM ID IEDK IFF IFSAS illum IMINT in

integrated communications security (COMSEC) identification individual equipment decontamination kit identification friend or foe initial fire support automated system illumination image intelligence inch(es)

INS

inertial navigation system

IPB

intelligence preparation of the battlefield

IPE

individual protective equipment

IR IREMBASS

infrared; information requirements improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system

Glossary-5

FM 3-20.98

__________________________________________________________________________

ISR IV

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance intravenous

J K JAAT JSLIST JSTARS JVMF JWARN KIA

joint air attack team joint service lightweight integrated suit technology joint surveillance target attack radar system joint variable message format joint warning and reporting network killed in action

kmph

kilometer(s) per hour

LAV

light armored vehicle

LAW

light antiarmor weapon

L

lb

pound(s)

LBE

load-bearing equipment

LBV

load-bearing vest

LD

line of departure

LD/LC LO LOA LOGPAC LOS LP LRP

line of departure is line of contact liaison officer limit of advance logistics package line of sight listening post logistic release point

LT

lieutenant

LU

linkup (point)

LZ

landing zone

M m MAG MANPADS MASINT

magnetic sensor man-portable air defense system measurement and signal intelligence

MBA

main battle area

MC

mobility corridor

MCOO

modified combined obstacle overlay

MCS

maneuver control system

MDI

modern demolition initiator

MDMP mech

Glossary-6

meter(s)

military decision-making process mechanized

_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

MEDEVAC MELIOS METL METT-TC

medical evacuation miniature eye-safe laser infrared observation set mission essential task list mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (factors taken into account in situational awareness and in the mission analysis process)

MFD

multifunction display

MGS

mobile gun system

MHz

megahertz

mi

mile(s)

MI

military intelligence

MICAD MIJI min MLC MLRS mm MMS MOPMS MOPP MOS MOUT MP

multiintegrated chemical agent alarm (device) meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference minute(s) military load classification multiple launch rocket system millimeter(s) mast mounted sight modular pack mine system mission-oriented protective posture military occupational specialty military operations on urbanized terrain military police

mph

mile(s) per hour

MRE

meals, ready to eat

MSR

main supply route

MTOE

modified table(s) of organization and equipment

MTP

mission training plan

MTT

military training teams

MTW

major theater of war

N NA NAAK NAI

not applicable nerve agent autoinjector kit named area(s) of interest

NAPP

nerve agent pyridostigmine pill

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC NBCRS NBCWRS NCO NCOIC

nuclear, biological, chemical NBC reconnaissance and surveillance NBC warning and reporting system noncommissioned officer noncommissioned officer in charge

Glossary-7

FM 3-20.98

__________________________________________________________________________

NCS

net control station

NEO

noncombatant evacuation operation

NFA

no-fire area

NGF

naval gunfire

NGO

nongovernmental organization

NLT

not later than

NOD

night observation device

NOE

nap of the earth

NP

nonpersistent chemical agent (abbreviation on overlays)

NSA

National Security Agency

NSN

national stock number

NVD

night vision device

NVG

night vision goggles

O ob obj OBSTINTEL OCIE OCOKA

OEG OI

obstruction (in route classification) objective obstacle intelligence organization clothing and individual equipment observation and fields of fire; cover and concealment; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach (considerations in evaluating terrain as part of METT-T analysis) operational exposure guidance operations and intelligence

OIC

officer in charge

OP

observation post

OPCON

operational control

OPLAN

operational plan

OPORD

operation order

OPSEC

operations security

OPTEMPO ORP OT

operational tempo objective rally point observer-target

P P PAO

public affairs office; public affairs officer

PB

pyridostigmine bromide

PC

point of curvature (in curve calculation)

PCC PCI PDDE

Glossary-8

persistent chemical agent (abbreviation on overlays)

precombat check precombat inspection power-driven decontamination equipment

_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

PEWS PFC PGM

platoon early warning system private first class precision-guided munitions

PIC

pilot in command

PIR

priority information requirements

PL PLGR PLL plt PMCS

phase line; platoon leader precision lightweight GPS receiver (“Plugger”) prescribed load list platoon preventive maintenance checks and services

PME

peacetime military engagement

PMS

portable monitoring set

POC

point of contact

POL

petroleum, oils, and lubricants

PP PSG

passage point (abbreviation on overlays) platoon sergeant

psi

pounds per square inch

PT

point of tangency (in curve calculation)

PVO

private volunteer organization

PX

post exchange

PZ

pickup zone

Q QRF

quick reaction force

R&S

reconnaissance and surveillance; reconnaissance and security (patrol elements)

RAA

reconnaissance avenue of approach

R

RAAMS RC recon rd; rds recce REDCON regt REMBASS RES

remote antiarmor mine system reserve component reconnaissance; reconnoiter round; rounds reconnaissance readiness condition regiment remotely monitored battlefield sensor system radiation exposure status

retrans

retransmission

RF

radio frequency

RFA

restrictive fire area

RFL

restrictive fire line

Glossary-9

FM 3-20.98

__________________________________________________________________________

RHO RHOCP

reconnaissance handover reconnaissance handover coordination point

RHOL

reconnaissance handover line

RISTA

reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition

ROE

rules of engagement

ROI

rules of interaction

ROUTEREP RP RRP RSI

route (reconnaissance) report release point reentry rally point reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence

RSOI

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

RSTA

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

RT

receiver-transmitter

rte

route

RTO

radiotelephone operator

RTP

radiotelephone procedure

RV

reconnaissance vehicle

RVT

remote video terminal

2LT

second lieutenant

S S1

personnel staff officer (US Army)

S2

intelligence staff officer (US Army)

S3

operations and training staff officer (US Army)

S3-Air S4

logistics staff officer (US Army)

S5

civil-military operations staff officer (US Army)

S6

signal staff officer (US Army)

SA

situational awareness

SALT

SALUTE SAW

size, activity, location, and time (simplified format for the initial contact report of enemy information; used in FBCB2 reporting) size, activity, location, unit identification, time, and equipment (complete format for reporting enemy information) squad automatic weapon

SBCT

Stryker brigade combat team

SCBA

self-contained breathing apparatus

sct

scout

SDS

sorbent decontamination system

SEB

staphylococcal enterotoxin B

sec SENSEREP

Glossary-10

air operations staff officer (US Army)

section; second(s) sensitive items report

_____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary

SERE

survival, escape, resistance, evasion

SFC

sergeant first class

SGT

sergeant

SHORAD SIGINT SINCGARS SIR

short-range air defense signal intelligence single channel ground/airborne radio system specific information requirements

SITEMP

situational template

SITREP

situation report

SME

subject matter expert

smk

smoke

SMS

sensor monitoring set

SOF

special operations forces

SOFA

status of forces agreement

SOI

signal operation instructions

SOP

standing operating procedure

SOR

specific orders and requests

SOSRA SP

suppression, obscuration, security, reduction, and assault (actions executed during breaching operations) start point

SPEC

specialist

SPOD

seaport of debarkation

SPOTREP

spot report

sqd

squad

SSC

small-scale contingency

SSG

staff sergeant

SSN

social security number

ST STANREP

special text stand-to report

T T T&EO TAC CP TACFIRE TACSAT

snow blockage (in route classification) training and evaluation outline tactical command post tactical fire direction system tactical satellite

TAI

target area(s) of interest

TBM

tactical ballistic missile

TC

technical circular

TCP

traffic control point

TEP

theater engagement plan

TF

task force

TI

tactical internet

Glossary-11

FM 3-20.98

__________________________________________________________________________

TIC

toxic industrial chemical

TIM

toxic industrial material

TIRS

terrain index reference system

TIS

thermal imaging system

TM

technical manual

TOC

tactical operations center

TOE

table(s) of organization and equipment

TOR

terms of reference

TOT

time on target

TOW

tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (missile)

TPFDD

time-phased force deployment data

TP-T

target practice-tracer (ammunition)

TREE TRP TSOP

transient radiation effects on electronics target reference point tactical standing operating procedure

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

TTT

time to target

TUAV TV

tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) television

U UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

UHF

ultra high frequency

UMCP UN UNMO US

unit maintenance collection point United Nations United Nations military observer United States (of America)

USAARMC

US Army Armor Center

USAARMS

US Army Armor School

USAF

US Air Force

USAR

US Army Reserve

USMC

US Marine Corps

VWX veh

very high frequency

VHR

vertical half-rhombic (antenna)

W

flooding (in route classification)

WIA WMD

Glossary-12

vehicle

VHF

wounded in action weapons of mass destruction

WP

white phosphorus

XO

executive officer

Bibliography AR 385-63. Policies and Procedures for Firing Ammunition for Training, Target Practice, and Combat. October 1983. ARTEP 17-97F-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Reconnaissance Platoon. July 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published FY 2003. DA Form 1155. Witness Statement on Individual. June 1966. DA Form 1156. Casualty Feeder Report. June 1966. DA Form 1355-1-R. Hasty Protective Minefield Record. September 2001. DA Form 1971-R. Radiological Data Sheet-Monitoring or Point Technique. September 1994. DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. February 1974. DA Form 2408-18.Equipment Inspection List. November 1991 DA Form 5988-E. Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet. March 1991. DA Pamphlet 738-750. Functional Users for the Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS). August 1994. DD Form 551. Record of Interment. August 1984. DD Form 1077. Collecting Point Register of Deceased Personnel. July 1984. DD Form 1833. Isolated Personnel Report. February 1984. FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1]. Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997. FM 1-04.10 [FM 27-10]. The Law of Land Warfare. 15 July 1976. FM 2-01.3 [FM 34-130]. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994 FM 3-01.21 [FM 90-43]. Multiservice Procedures of Joint Theater Missile Target Development. 27 October 1999. FM 3-04.513 [FM 1-513]. TTP for Aerial Recovery of Aircraft. 27 September 2000. FM 3-05.70 [FM 21-76]. Survival. 5 June 1992. FM 3-05.204 [FM 31-20-5]. Special Reconnaissance TTP for Special Forces. 23 March 1993. FM 3-06.11 [FM 90-10-1]. Combined Arms Operations In Urban Terrain. February 2002. FM 3-15.3 [TC 20-32-3]. Foreign Mine Handbook (Balkan States). 15 August 1997. FM 3-15.4 [TC 20-32-4]. Foreign Mine Handbook (Asia). 15August 1997. FM 3-20.8 [FM 17-12-8]. Scout Gunnery. March 2002 (Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published FY 2003. FM 3-20.15 [FM 17-15]. Tank Platoon. 1 November 2001. FM 3-20.95 [FM 17-95]. Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996.

Bibliography-1

FM 3-20.98 ___________________________________________________________________________

FM 3-20.96. Cavalry Squadron (RSTA). September 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published FY 2003. FM 3-20.97 [FM 17-97]. Cavalry Troop. 3 October 1995. FM 3-20.151. MGS Platoon. June 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published. FM 3-20.971. Reconnaissance Troop. September 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published FY 2003. FM 3-21.38 [FM 57-38]. Pathfinder Operations. 9 April 1993. FM 3-21.92 [FM 7-92]. The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry). 23 December 1992, Change 1, 13 December 2001. FM 3-22.26 [FM 3-25.26]. Map Reading and Land Navigation. 20 July 2001. FM 3-34.32 [FM 20-32]. Mine/Countermine Operations. 29 May 1998. FM 3-34.214 [FM 5-250]. Explosives and Demolitions. 30 July 1998. FM 3-34.310 [FM 5-34]. Engineer Field Data. 30 August 1999. FM 3-34.343 [FM 5-446]. Military Nonstandard Fixed Bridging. 3 June 1991. FM 3-55.93 [FM 7-93] Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations. 3 October 1995. FM 3-50.3 [FM 21-76-1]. Multiservice Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery. 29 June 1999. FM 3-90.1 [FM 71-1]. Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. August 2002 (Final Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published FY 2003. FM 3-90.2 [FM 71-2]. Armor and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. December 2001 (Coordinating Draft). DA-authorized edition to be published FM 3-90.3 [FM 71-3]. The Mounted Brigade Combat Team. 1 November 2001. FM 3-97.12 [FM 31-70]. Basic Cold Weather Manual. 12 April 1968. FM 5-0 [FM 101-5]. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997. FM 5-19 [FM 100-14]. Risk Management. 23 April 1998. FM 6-41 [FM 90-41]. JTF Liaison Handbook for Multiservice, TTP for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Operations. 26 August 1998. SH 21-76. Ranger Handbook. April 2000. ST 3-20.153. Tank Platoon SOP. January 2002. ST 17-16-1. Combating Terrorism. October 2001. STP 17-19D1-SM. Soldier’s Manual, Skill Level 1, MOS 19D, Cavalry Scout. 14 July 1997.

Bibliography-2

Index A actions on contact, 3-15 – 3-21, 3-32, 7-29 – 7-30 eight forms of contact, 3-16 advanced field artillery tactical data system, (AFATDS), 1-13, 2-31, 6-8, 6-12

brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), 1-2, 1-11 – 1-12, 3-1, 3-13, 3-22 – 3-23, 4-36

C cavalry squadron (RSTA), 1-2, 1-3 – 1-8 CHAT, 2-38

air defense, 6-60 – 6-62

COLT, 1-8, 1-12, 5-32, 6-12 – 6-13

all source analysis system (ASAS), 2-31, 3-29

combat service support, 6-57, 7-31

analysis and control team (ACT), 3-29

combat health support, 8-26 – 8-28

area of responsibility (AOR), 1-22 – 1-23

enemy prisoners of war (EPW), 8-29

Army aviation, 6-25

evacuation, 8-26 – 8-27

air cavalry, 6-25 – 6-26

FBCB2 role, 8-5 – 8-6

air-ground integration, 6-26 –6-32, 7-18 – 7-20

for brigade reconnaissance troop, 8-13

attack helicopter support, 5-32, 6-33 –6-41 assault and cargo helicopter support, 6-42 – 6-44 Army battle command system, 2-31 – 2-32 Army tactical command and control system (ATCCS), 2-31 assembly area, 5-33 – 5-36, 5-41

B battle command methodology, 2-2 – 2-5

digital systems, 2-31 – 2-38 FM radio nets, 2-29 – 2-30 troop-leading procedures, 2-12 – 2-28 command post, 1-6, 1-11, 2-6, 2-33 battle drills, F-5 – F-6 BRT, 1-11 – 1-12 communications, F-6 – F-11 continuous operations, F-3 displacing, F-5 positioning, F-4 responsibilities, F-1 – F-2

graves registration (GRREG), 8-24 – 8-25

SOP, F-11 – F-19

maintenance and recovery operations, 8-22 – 8-24 personnel and administration center (PAC), 8-25 resupply operations, 6-42 – 6-44, 8-16 – 8-22 in stability and support operations, D-25 supply operations, 8-14 – 8-16 tactical functions, 8-2 – 8-4 troop trains, 8-7 – 8-10

breaching, 5-45 – 5-47

unit ministry team, 8-28

ISR operations, 1-10

command and control (C2), 2-6 – 2-12

for RSTA squadron , 8-10

battle handover, 5-43, 5-46 brigade combat team (BCT), 1-9 – 1-12, 3-2 – 3-11, 3-13, 3-15 – 3-17, 3-19, 3-22 – 3-23, 3-31, 3-39, 3-45, 3-50, 4-3 – 4-5, 4-9 – 4-11, 4-18 – 4-19, 4-29, 4-31

multisensor ground platoon, ground sensor platoon, NBC reconnaissance platoon, engineer operations (BCT), air defense.

security, F-4 – F-5 recce troop, 1-6 commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), 1-2, 3-1 commander’s reconnaissance guidance, 3-4, 3-11, 4-3 engagement criteria, 3-12 focus, 3-11 tempo, 3-11 – 3-12 common operational picture (COP), 1-1, 2-7

combat service support control system (CSSCS), 2-31, 8-2

communications, 2-28 – 2-30, 7-3, 7-6, 7-10, 7-12 – 7-14, 7-17, 7-19, 7-24, 7-25, 7-27, 7-28

combat support. See intelligence, fire support, target acquisition, army aviation, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platoon,

compliance inspection. See stability operations and support operations, reconnaissance troop employment.

Index-1

FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________

contiguous operations, 1-21 – 1-22, 3-35 counterreconnaissance, 2-37, 3-34, 4-2, 4-5, 4-8, 4-11, 4-12, 5-17, 5-20

(FBCB2), 2-4, 2-31, 2-33 – 2-42, 4-10, 5-7

control measures. See graphic control measures.

forward area air defense command, control, communications, and intelligence system (FAADC3I) 2-31

course of action (COA), 3-17, 3-20, 7-2

fratricide, 2-41, 5-22, 5-29, B-6 – B-13 full spectrum operations, 1-30

D decontamination. See nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC). defensive operations, 1-26 – 1-28, 6-11, 6-58, 8-10. See also economy of force. engagement area development, 5-21 deployment, E-1 – E-5

E economy of force 5-15 – 5-31 defend an AO, 5-19 defend a troop BP, 5-18 engagement area development, 5-21 – 5-31 engineer operations (BCT), 3-42, 3-48, 3-53, 4-8, 6-56 – 6-60 environmental risk management, G-1 – G-6 exfiltration, 3-33 – 3-34, 7-23

F fire control, 5-19 – 5-21 fire support, 6-8, 7-12, 7-14, 7-18

G global command and control system–Army (GCCS-A), 2-31 graphic control measures, 2-35 – 2-37, 4-20, 5-41 – 5-43 ground sensor platoon, 1-4, 1-9, 6-48 – 6-50 ground surveillance radar, 3-24, 3-29, 4-8, 6-50 – 6-51

H hasty attack, 5-11 – 5-14 human intelligence (HUMINT), 1-7, 3-11, 3-36, 6-1 – 6-7, 7-2 collection operations, 6-3 – 6-4 document exploitation (DOCEX), 6-4 tactical questioning, 6-4 – 6-6

I improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system (IREMBASS), 1-8, 3-29, 4-8, 6-49

assets and capabilities, 6-13 – 6-25

infiltration, 3-28 – 3-33, 4-12, 5-42, 7-23

coordination measures, 6-19 – 6-25

actions on contact, 3-32

fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), 6-8 fire support team (FIST), 1-7, 1-17, 5-32, 6-9 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below

Index-2

aerial insertion, 3-31 dismounted, 3-30 employment by section, 3-30 employment by unit, 3-30 mounted, 3-30

multiple lane, 3-31 single-lane, 3-31 intelligence, 6-1 – 6-7, 6-57. See also human intelligence. intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), 1-2, 1-3 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 1-1, 1-3, 1-10, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 2-13, 2-19 – 2-22, 2-28, 2-30, 3-2, 3-3 – 3-4, 3-13, 7-2, 7-21

J joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS), 3-4, 3-18, 3-23

L linear operations, 1-21 – 1-23 local area network (LAN), 2-31

M major theater of war (MTW), 1-1, 1-31, 3-8, 3-50 maneuver control system (MCS), 2-31 medical evacuation, 6-44 – 6-45, 7-19 mission, enemy, terrain, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), 2-13 – 2-18 mortar section, 1-8, 4-20, 4-33 multisensor ground platoon, 1-4, 1-9, 6-51 – 6-54

N noncontiguous operations, 1-21 – 1-22, 3-35 nonlinear operations, 1-21 – 1-23 nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) operations, 3-16, 3-27, 3-53, C-1 casualties, C-7 decontamination, C-11 – C-13

_____________________________________________________________________________________Index

defense, C-1 – C-3, C-5 – C-6 operations, 6-54 – 6-56 marking, C-8 – C-9 mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), C-4 protection, C-3 reconnaissance and security, C-13 – C-14

and security, 3-16. See also nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC). and surveillance (R&S), 3-13 – 3-15, 4-22, 4-30, 4-36 aerial, 3-26 – 3-27 area, 1-4, 3-43 – 3-49 dismounted, 3-28

reconnaissance platoon, 1-4, 1-9

engagement criteria, 3-13

reports, C-10

fundamentals of, 3-2 – 3-6

unmasking, C-9 – C-10

handover, 3-21 – 3-26, 5-36

focus of, 3-1, 3-7, 3-11

screen, 1-4, 4-10 – 4-30 situational awareness, 1-6, 1-11, 1-16, 1-30, 2-5, 2-7, 2-27, 4-4, 4-8, 4-10, 4-18, 4-30, 4-34, 5-1, 5-10, 5-15 situational understanding, 1-2, 1-31, 2-3, 2-5, 2-7, 3-5, 3-6, 3-20, 4-3 smaller-scale contingencies (SSC), 1-1, 1-3, 1-30 – 1-31, 3-8, 3-10, 3-50, 6-3, 6-7 stability operations, D-1 – D-9. See also stability operations and support operations. arms control, D-7

O

missions, 1-13

observation and fields of fire, cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA), 2-15, 3-10, B-9

mounted, 3-28

combating terrorism, D-6 – D-7

multidimensional, 3-7, 7-25

diplomatic effort operations, D-4 – D-5

planning, 3-11 – 3-14, A-11 – A-19

peace enforcement operations, D-4

platoon, 1-7 – 1-8, 1-12

peacekeeping operations, D-4

obstacles, 3-16, 3-19, 3-32, 3-33, 3-38, 3-42, 3-44, 3-48, 3-50, 3-51, 3-53, 5-25 offensive operations, 1-25 – 1-26, 5-9 – 5-14, 6-10, 6-57, 8-9 operational environment, 1-20 – 1-32, 3-6 – 3-7, D-16, D-25 orders 2-5, 2-10 – 2-12, 2-35

route, 3-49 – 3-54 sensor, 3-26 tempo, 3-11 – 3-12 zone, 1-4, 3-38 – 3-43, 4-12 rehearsals, 2-24 – 2-27, 4-8, 4-30, 5-32, 5-37

show of force, D-7 stability operations and support operations, D-1 compliance inspections, D-32 – D-33 environment, D-16

FRAGO, A-8 – A-9

relief in place, 5-36 – 5-40

intelligence, D-17

OPORD, 2-22 – 2-23, 2-35, A-1 – A-7, B-10 – B-13

risk management, B-1 – B-6

media interviews, D-39 – D-40

WARNO, A-9 – A-11

rules of engagement (ROE), 3-11, 3-18, 3-46, D-22 – D-23 rules of interaction (ROI), D-24

presence operations, D-30 – D-32

S

reconnaissance troop employment, D-15

P passage of lines, 5-40 – 5-45 PROPHET, 3-29, 5-32, 6-52 – 6-54

R readiness condition (REDCON), 5-35 recce troop, 1-2, 3-1, 3-6, 3-23, 3-36, 4-36, 4-38 organization structure and personnel responsibilities, 1-5 – 1-9, 1-15 – 1-19 reconnaissance, 1-1, 7-24 – 7-31

minefield clearance, D-42 – D-43

security drill, 4-26 – 4-30 security operations, 1-28 – 1-29, 4-1 – 4-5, 4-31 – 4-32, 8-10, 8-13, 8-21 security missions, 1-4, 1-10, 1-13, 4-2 area security, 4-30 – 4-34 convoy security, 4-34 – 4-38 drill, 4-26 – 4-30

tempo, D-17 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 3-23 – 3-24, 4-16 support operations, D-9 – D-15. See also stability operations and support operations. domestic support, D-10

fundamentals, 4-3 – 4-5

foreign humanitarian assistance, D-11

high-value asset, 4-33

relief operations, D-11

Index-3

FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________

surveillance troop, 1-8 – 1-9, 7-22 – 7-23

T tactical internet, 2-31 – 2-32 tactical movement, 1-29 – 1-30, 5-3. See also tactical road march. tactical road march, 4-12, 5-4 – 5-9 target acquisition, 5-27, 5-32 – 5-33, 6-8 – 6-9 terrain, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-10, 3-11, 3-13, 3-14, 3-18, 3-19, 3-27 – 3-30, 3-34, 3-36, 3-38, 3-39, 3-42 – 3-46, 3-48 – 3-51, 3-53, 5-2 – 5-5, 5-7, 5-9, 5-10, 5-17, 5-18, 5-20, 5-21, 5-23, 5-29, 5-33, 5-35, 5-38, 5-40, 5-42, 5-46 – 5-48

Index-4

threat, 1-20, 1-25, 1-28, 3-8, 4-26 troop-leading procedures, 2-12 – 2-28, 3-11, 3-13, 3-14, 3-17, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45, 3-51, A-1

U unmanned aerial vehicle, (UAV), 1-4, 1-9, 3-2, 3-4, 3-14, 3-17, 3-18, 3-22 – 3-24, 3-27, 3-29, 3-40, 3-42, 3-45, 3-46, 3-48, 3-51, 3-53, 4-9, 5-32 platoon, 6-45 – 6-48 urban operations, 3-7 infrastructure, 3-9, 7-10

patrolling, 7-25 – 7-29 physical environment, 7-6 – 7-10 society, 3-8, 7-10 terrain, 3-10, 7-5 threat, 3-8, 7-10 – 7-11

W wide area network, 2-31

FM 3-20.98 2 December 2002

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0232407

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 111041, requirements for FM 3-20.98.

PIN: 080503-000

fm3-20

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