G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951
OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. Petition:
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after tr ial, convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said court. Facts:
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both bot h dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel). After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and we eklies of general circulation , not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife Suicide letter: “Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over deep. Over my grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them. Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to burried among Christians. But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives. My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Roxas. Tell the whole world about about this. And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte. Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one. I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government. I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own own self.”
Issue:
Whether or not the article published is a valid exercise of the r ight of freedom of speech.
Held:
the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state o f feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to t he laws." Ratio:
the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4" the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4" Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with t he writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or write r is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty. the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4"
1. G.R. No. L-12592
March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Petition:
Appeal for the decision convicting the accused for libel. Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province o f Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe
and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. they submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. 1. That Francisca Polintan , desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;" 2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of t he peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost t he case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice t old him that he could still win if he would pay P50; 3. That Leoncio Quiambao , having filed a complaint for assault against four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved.
The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. And acquitted Punsalan. Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing. The judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same. Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information: That on or about the month of De cember, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of the peace o f Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano (according to the petitioner the petition executed was libelous)
Issue:
Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press. Held:
defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. Ratio:
It is to the credit of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirtysix years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court, 5 to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for such an approach. The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of v ital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring t he facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on t he part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to t he appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. Public policy, the welfare of society, and t he orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think t hat malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
2. G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
Petition:
Appeal. Facts:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992 , in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number o f times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." He was Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority. The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use o f the language stated in the beginning of this decision and set out in the information and he was convicted thereof. Perez has appealed the case to this court. Issue:
Whether or not the words uttered by Perez is protected by the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Held:
The words uttered is is not prote cted because there is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and Ratio:
Criticism is permitted to penetrate eve n to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious . But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition
must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the pre stige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and t he existence of the State. Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of t he Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
3. G.R. No. L-38753 August 25, 1982 RAFAEL S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY and VIRGINIA M. MERCADO, respondents.
Petition:
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceeding to quash an information for libel quoted in full the alleged offensive telegram.
Facts:
On October 14, 1972, petitioner (Rafael) filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation, against the private respondent (VIRGINIA), for alleged grave violations of the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules. Fourteen (14) days after the filing of the aforementioned administrative complaint by petitioner against the private respondent, the said petitioner sent the subject libelous telegram or communication to the S ecretary of Public Works and Communication, which reads as: “Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and [Communications] Manila In line with President Marcos appeal t o give information on undesirable employees in the government service to achieve the objectives of the New Society request that investigation image of the activities of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of Public Service Commission as we have reason to believe that she has enriched
herself thru corrupt practices considering that she has properties and spending above what her salary can afford with the husband jobless stop If investigation confirms this we trust you take necessary action stop In case you need further details wire me at 101 Mariano Cuenco Quezon City and I will give further details stop Expecting prompt action on this matter. “
Rafael Mercado
The telegram or communication was indorsed for investigation to the Board of Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first endorsement of the said Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board of Transportation. On November 23, 1972, the petitioner filed an amended administrative complaint against the private respondent with the same Board of Tr ansportation charging the private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices, and misconduct or discourtesy. The private respondent, submitted her answer to the said administrative charges, and after due hearing, the Boar d of Transportation rendered a decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent of the charges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her. The private respondent, submitted her answer to the said administrative charges, and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered a decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent of the charges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her. On July 17, 1973 petitioner, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Transportation, but the said Board denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination before the Board of Transportation, petitioner, to further harass and malign the good character and reputation of the private respondent, filed a complaint accusing the private respondent and of se lling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped and a complaint for corrupt pr actices against the private respondent both complaints was dismissed for lack of evidence. Issue:
whether or not the telegram being qualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Held:
petition is dismissed. Ratio: United States v. Bustos, 4 as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision. It is to the credit of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirty-six years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court, 5 to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for
such an approach. ït¢@lFº The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. 2 . Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this is one such instance, may be "lost by proof of malice." 6 His opinion continues: " 'A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.' 7 He then gave what was referred to by him as a "pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege, " namely, "a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege." 8 What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is a summary of his conduct, viz a viz private respondent: a letter complaint for grave violation of Republic Act No. 2260 and civil service rules was filed by him with t he Chairman of the Board of Transportation on October 14, 1972. Fourteen days later, on October 28, 1972, the telegram subject of this litigation, was sent to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Then on November 23, 1 972, there was an amended complaint with the Board of Transportation to include such charges as dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices and misconduct. The Board of Transportation found private respondent innocent, in an order of June 26, 1973. There was a motion for reconsideration on July 17, 1973 filed by petitioner. It was denied on August 2 9, 1973 and during the pendency of such administrative case, petitioner not content, filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint against private respondent and her husband, a relation, accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped. After due hearing, a re solution was issued recommending that said case be closed for lack o f evidence. Again, during the pendency of such administrative complaint, petitioner filed with t he Criminal Investigation Service, a complaint for corrupt practices against private respondent, likewise found without support in the evidence submitted. The tenacity with which pet itioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be e ntertained as to the bona fides of petitioner. ït¢@lFº The prosecution should be given the opportunity then of proving malice. Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand. In People v. Monton, 9 the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on a qualified privilege should be upheld was decided adversely against the claim of those accused of libel, This Court made clear that malice can be shown. It "simply puts the burden of doing so on the prosecution." 10 The ponencia of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal distinguished the Bustos decision, thus: "That case is not here
applicable, because the acquittal of the accused therein on the ground that the defamatory imputation was qualifiedly privileged was adjudged only after trial, wherein the prosecution tried to establish, although unsuccessfully, the element of malice." 11 Further, the opinion stated: " It need only be added that in the instant case the information alleges that the defendants, appellees here, wrote and sent the subject letter to the President 'with malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, v irtue and reputation of one Jose J. Monteclaro ... and with malicious intent of exposing (him) to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive.' Under the foregoing allegation, the prosecution is e ntitled to go to trial and present the necessary evidence to prove malice; and the denial, to it o f the opportunity to do so, upon the defendants' motion to quash, constitutes reversible error." 12
4. G.R. No. 107566. November 25, 2004] BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, OSEO HAMADA AND CECILLE AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (AND RAMON LABO, JR., respondents.
Petition:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 07 January 1992, and the Resolution,[2] dated 29 September 1992, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dated 14 June 1990 , which dismissed herein private respondents claim for damages. Facts:
Before the 18 January 1988 loc al elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her column a series of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective positions in Baguio City. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from said articles, as well as the respective dates when they were published in the B aguio Midland Courier:
January 3, 1988 . . . Of all the candidates for mayor, Labo has the m ost imponderables about him, people would ask, Can he read and write? Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanese Senator or a barrio kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18 million aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept all advertisements for him if he pays his old accounts first .[4]
January 10, 1988
I heard that the Dumpty in the egg is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo, because he has not also paid their medical services with them. Since he is donating millions he should settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If he wins several teachers were signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio.[5]
Claiming that the aforequoted portions of petitioner Afables column we re tainted with malice, private respondent instituted separate criminal and civil actions for libel against herein petitioners. On December 26 1988, the Department of Justice dismissed the criminal case due to insufficiency of evidence[6] while the civil suit was raffled off to RTC, Branch 6, Baguio City. In the complaint for damages, private respondent alleged that in her 03 January 1988 and 10 January 1988 columns, petitioner Afable made it appear that he could not comply with his financial obligations; that Yuko Narukawa Labo (Narukawa Labo), his co-plaintiff in the case before t he trial court, was accused of misrepresenting her social status to the general public thereby subjecting her to public ridicule; that the subject articles we re written solely for the purpose of destroying his reputation, integrity, and personality as well as that of Ms. Narukawa Labo; and t hat said articles were false, untrue, libelous, and published with evil intent. In their answer,[12] petitioners Baguio Midland Courier and Hamada denied that petitioner Afables 03 and 10 January 1988 articles were libelous. They also claimed that per their companys records, private respondent still owed them a cer tain sum of money for the political ads and campaign paraphernalia printed by Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., during private respondents 1984 c ampaign, and that the 03 January 1988 column did not accuse Ms. Narukawa Labo of misrepresenting herself before the public. Moreover, they asserted that petitioner Afables write-ups were fair comments on facts and reports that were of public interest as private respondent was a mayoralty candidate at that time. In her answer,[13] petitioner Afable also denied that the quoted portions o f her 03 and 10 January 1988 column were libelous, insisting that they were devoid of m alice and at most contained valid and timely doubts.[14] She also contended that the conte nts of her column were protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press and that the same were privileged as they dealt with a public figure. In its decision, dated 14 June 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. According to the trial court, the article in question was privileged and constituted fair comment o n matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation, and honesty of private respondent who was a candidate for local elective office at that time. This decision of the trial court was, however , reversed by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the 10 January 1988 article of petitioner Afable was defamatory. Held:
we hold that petitioner Afables article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of private respondent who was running for the top e lective post in Baguio City at the time. Considering that private respondent assured his would-be constituents that he would be donating millions of his own money, petitioner Afables column with respect to private r espondents indebtedness provided the public with information as regards his financial status which, in all probability, was still unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is the inevitable result of the application of the law. The effect would have been adverse to the private respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs the interest of private respondent. Ratio:
“
It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Plainly, private respondent has the bounden duty to present before the c ourt evidence that a third person could easily identify him as the person libeled. In this case, private respondent has utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility.
Concededly, private respondent was not yet a public official at the time the 10 January 1988 article was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove said article from the mantle of protection guaranteed by t he freedom of expression provision of the Constitution. Indeed, as early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano ,[44] this Court had recognized the publics right to be informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of candidates for public office.
It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of
candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion must be privileged. ... In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent: any one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual malice or go remediless. The privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.”
It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that they
more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private per sons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion must be privileged. ...
LOPEZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 172203 ,FEB 14 2011 Petition: Facts:
That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Philippines the accused put up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz City and at Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows:
CADIZ FOREVER ______________ NEVER
thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extr aordinary attention from the residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word NEVER. Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein private complainant BADING and the name of t he City of SAGAY before the word NEVER thus making the billboard appear as follows: CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER
In the early part of November 2002, The respondent, while exerc ising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City saw billboards with the printed phrase C ADIZ FOREVER with a blank space before the word NEVER directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena
streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and wondered on what the message conveyed since it was incomplete. Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating that the blank space preceding the word NEVER was filled up with the added words BADING AND SAGAY. The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a tuta of Sagay, private respondent, afte r consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA which, rendered judgment on August 31, 2005, affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC. Issue:
whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication.
Held: Ratio
