consti part 6: equal protection clause distri districts cts authori authority ty to levy levy for public public purpose purposes s just & uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
ORMOC SUGAR CO., INC. vs. TREASURER of ORMOC •
FACTS: •
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The The Mu Muni nici cipa pall Boar Board d of Ormo Ormoc c City City pass passed ed Ordi Ordina nanc nce e No. No. 4 impo imposi sing ng “on “on any any and and all all productions productions of centrifugal centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormo Ormocc Suga Sugarr Co., Co., Inc., Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.” (Section 1) Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormo Ormoc c Suga Sugarr Co, Co, Inc (OSC (OSCII) tota totali ling ng P12,087.50. OSCI OSCI file filed d a comp compla lain intt in the the CFI CFI of Leyt Leyte e alleging: 1. the the ordi ordina nanc nce e is uncon unconst stit itut utio iona nall for for bein being g violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation 2. it is an export export tax forb forbidde idden n under under Sec. Sec. 2887 2887 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) 3. the tax tax is neit neither her a produ producti ction on nor a licens license e tax tax whic which h Ormo Ormoc c City City is auth author oriz ized ed to impose under Sec. 15-kk of its charter and under Sec 2 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) 4. the the tax tax amoun amounts ts to a cust custom oms s duty, duty, fee fee or charge in violation of par. 1 of Sec 2 of RA 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar. CFI upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and and decl declar ared ed the the taxi taxing ng powe powerr of defen defenda dant nt chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. Thus, this appeal.
has been repealed by Sec 2 of RA 2264 •
YES
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Felwa Felwa v Sa Salas las: : The equal equal protect protection ion clause clause applie applies s only only to persons persons or things things identi identica cally lly situ situa ated ted and does does not not bar bar a rea reasona sonabl ble e classification of the subject of legislation.
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A classi classific ficati ation on is reason reasonabl able e where where (1) it is based on substantial substantial distinctions distinctions which make real differences (2) it is germane to the purpose of the the law law (3) it appli applies es not not only only to pres presen ent t conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present (4) it applies only to those who belong to the same class
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The questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the OSCI and none other .
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RATIO:
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YES
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OSCI questions the authority of the Mun. Board to levy such an export tax in view of Sec 2887 of the RAC which states: “It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods & merchandise merchandise carried into the municipali municipality, ty, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import/export import/export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void.”
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Cour Courtt ther therei ein n expr expres esse sed d awar awaren enes ess s of the the transcendent ental effects that municipal export/import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy and stated that there was no other other altern alternati ative ve ‘til ‘til Congres Congress s acts acts to provid provide e remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.
2.
ISSUES:
1. WON WON defe defend ndan antt Mu Muni nici cipa pall Boar Board d has has auth author orit ity y to levy such an export tax 2. WON cons consti titu tuti tion ona al limit imits s on the the powe powerr of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation were infringed
On the the inconsistency betw etween the two provisions, provisions, the Court held in Nin Bay Mining Co v Municipality of Roxas that Sec 2887 of RAC
While it its true that at the time of the ordinan ordinance’ ce’s s enactm enactment ent the OSCI OSCI was the only only sugar cent entral in Ormoc City, still, the classi classific ficati ation, on, to be reason reasonabl able, e, should should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and excl exclus usiv ive e as to excl exclud ude e any any subs subseq eque uent ntly ly established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it can’t be subj subjec ectt to the the tax tax becau because se the the ordi ordina nanc nce e expressly points only to OSCI as the entity to be levied upon. OSCI, however, is not entitled to interest on the refund refund becaus because e the taxes taxes were were not arbitr arbitrari arily ly collected. At the time of collection, the ordinance prov provid ided ed a suffi uffici cien entt basi basis s to prec preclu lude de arbitr arbitrari arines ness, s, the the same same being being then presum presumed ed constitutional until declared otherwise.
HELD:
CFI CFI decis ecisio ion n REVER EVERS SED ED.. Ordin rdinan anc ce dec declare lared d UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Defendants ordered to refund the P12,087.50 paid.
Subsequently however , Sec 2 of RA 2264 gave charte chartered red cities cities,, munici municipal paliti ities es & munici municipal pal
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consti part 6: equal protection clause
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
FACTS: •
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Petitioners are Dumalao (as a candidate), Igot and Salapantan (as taxpayers) Dumlao questions constitutionality of BP blg 52 allegi alleging ng it is discri discrimin minato atory ry and contra contrary ry to equal protection and due process insofar as Sec 4 provide provides s for a specia speciall disqua disqualif lifica icatio tion n (“any (“any retired retired electi elective ve provin provincia cial, l, city, city, or munici municipal pal official who has received payment of retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, elected, shall not be qualified qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired”) Igot and Salapantan on the other hand assail the the vali validi dity ty of secon econd d para paragr grap aph h of sec sec 4 prov provid idin ing g for for disq disqua uali lifi fica cati tion ons s of cert certai ain n candidates who have cases against them which are are file filed d but but have have not not yet yet been been deci decide ded d (“a (“a judgment of conviction tion for any of the afor aforeme ement ntio ione ned d crim crimes es shal shalll be conc conclu lusi sive ve evidence of such fact”)
grievance. There is no personal or substantial inte intere rest st.. Prov Provis isio ions ns can’ can’tt be assa assail iled ed by taxpayers bec they do not involve expenditure of publ public ic mon moneys. eys. Peti Petiti tion oner ers s do not not seek seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds. Court has discretion as to WON a taxpayer’s suit should be entertained 3. Unavoi Unavoidab dabili ility ty of consti constituti tutiona onall question questionss- the issue issue of consti constituti tutiona onalit lity y must must be the the very very lis mota presented. Petitioners are actually without cause of action. In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who who has has retir retired ed from from a prov provin inci cial al,, city city,, or munici municipal pal office, office, there there is reason reason to disqua disqualif lify y him from running for the same office from which he had retired. He ha already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same govt work. Equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is prosc oscribed is a classification which is arbitr bitra ary and unreasonable. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questi questione oned d provis provision ion.. There There must must be a clear clear unequi unequivoc vocal al breach breach of the consti constituti tution. on. Unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyo beyond nd reas reason onab able le doub doubt, t, it is with within in the the comp compet eten ence ce of he legi legisl slat atur ure e to pres prescr crib ibe e qualifications HOWEVE HOWEVER!! R!!!! Accdg Accdg to Igot Igot and Salapa Salapanta ntan, n, second par of sec 4 “a judgment of conviction for any any of the the afor aforeme ement ntio ione ned d crim crimes es shal shalll be conclusive conclusive evidence of such fact” contravenes contravenes the consti constituti tutiona onall presum presumpti ption on of innoce innocence nce.. The court agrees with them. •
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Held: Held: (yup, (yup, held held agad. agad. Walang Walang issues issues!!! !!! Kiddin Kidding! g! Non justiciable kasi siya in a way except sa isa… yun huli) This case is unacceptable for judicial resolution For one, there is a misjoinder of parties (dumlao not related to the latter 2) Next Next,, ther there e stan standa dard rds s to be follo followe wed d in the the exercise of function: Existence of appropriate case o Pers Persona onall and and subs substa tant ntia iall inter interes estt in o raising the constitutional question Plea Plea that that the functi function on be exerci exercised sed at o the earliest opportunity (this has been met by petitioners) Nece Neces ssity sity tha that the the const onstit itut utio iona nall o question be passed upon to decide the case Explained further… 1. Actual Actual Case Case and Contr Controve oversy rsy-- judicia judiciall review review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversi controversies. es. Dumlao has not been adversely adversely affec affected ted by the the appl applic icat atio ion n of the the assa assail iled ed provisions. There is no petition seeking for his disqualification (so WTF is his problem?). He’s rais raisin ing g a hypo hypoth theti etica call issu issue e and and his his case case is within the jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC. 2. Proper Proper Party Party-- person person who who impugns impugns the the valid validity ity of a statute must have a personal personal and substantial substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. enforcement. Neither Igot nor Salapantan Salapantan has been alleged to have been adversely affected by the operat operation ion of the statut statutory ory provis provision ions s they they assail assail as unconstitutional unconstitutional.. Theirs Theirs is a general general • •
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WHEREFORE, 1st par of sec 4 BP blg52= valid, the portion of the 2nd par of sec 4 providing providing that “the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after after prelimi preliminar nary y invest investiga igation tion shall shall be prima prima facie evidence of such fact”=null and void
PEOPLE vs. CAYAT
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FACTS:
Being a member of a non-Christian tribe, the accused, Cayat, acquired and had under his possession a bottle of A-1-1 gin, a liquor other than the native wines of his tribe. This was in violation of Act. No. 1639 (sec 2 and 3). While he admitted to the facts, the pleaded not guilty. He was found guilty and fined to Php50. Sec. Sec. 2 make makes s it unla unlawf wful ul for for any any Phil Philip ippi pine ne nonnonChristian native to buy or possess any alcoholic beverage or liquor liquor other other than than the “so-ca “so-calle lled” d” native native wines and liquors that they have been made accustomed to. It is then the duty of the police or any authorized agent to seize and destroy the liquor.
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consti part 6: equal protection clause Sec. Sec. 3 fine fines s a viol violat ator or of not not more more than than Php200 Php200 or imprisoning them of as term not exceeding 6 months. Cayat now challenges the constitutionality of the Act for being: 1) 2) 3)
disc discri rimin minato atory ry and deni denies es equa equall prote protect ctio ion n of the laws viol violat ativ ive e of of due due proc proces ess s an imprope improperr exerc exercise ise of poli police ce power power
Also noted by the court is that due process does not always always accord accord notice notice and hearing. hearing. Propert Property y may be seized by the government in 3 circumstances: 1) in paym paymen entt of of tax taxes es 2) when when use used d in viol violat atio ion n of law law 3) when when proper property ty caus causes es a corpus corpus delict delictii In this case, the third circumstance is present. 4)
ISSUE
1) Whet Whethe herr or not not Act. Act. No. No. 1639 1639 satis atisfi fies es the the requirements of proper classification 2) Whet Whether her or not not Act. Act. No. 1639 1639 is viol violat ativ ive e of the due process clause 3) Whet Whethe herr or not not it is an impro imprope perr exer exerci cise se of police power
In discu discussi ssing ng polic police e power, power, the the court court state states s that the Act serves a purpose, that of peace and order. In discussing whether the means are reasonable, the courts merely stated that this is in the realm of the legislative.
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
HELD FACTS:
1) 2) 3)
Yes it it do does. No it it is is no not. No it it is is no not.
1. The The Legi Legisl slat atur ure e pass passed ed R.A. R.A. 1180 1180 (An Act Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having having a strang strangleh lehold old upon the people’ people’s s economic life.
RATIO
1) So as to qualify under the equal protection of laws, the law in questi question on must must satis satisfy fy the requir requiremen ements ts of proper classification. These are: must must rest rest on subs substan tantia tiall disti distinct nction ions s must must be germa germane ne to to the the purpos purposes es of the law must must not be be limited limited to exis existin ting g condit condition ions s only only must must appl apply y equal equally ly to all all members members of the the same same class Accord According ing to the court, court, the classi classific ficatio ation n is real real and substantia substantial, l, as the term “non-Christian “non-Christian tribes” refers, not to religious belief, but to geography and to the level of civili civilizat zation ion (rememb (remember er Rubi Rubi v. Provinc Provincial ial Board Board of Mindoro).
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1) 2) 3) 4)
Secondl Secondly, y, it has a clear clear purpos purpose. e. The prohibiti prohibition on of possessing alcoholic beverages other than local wines is designed designed to insure insure peace and order in the tribes, as free use use of thos those e proh prohib ibit ited ed bev beverag erages es oft often led to lawlessness and crimes. Thirdly, it is not limited as it is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. T his is due to the fact that the process of civilization is a slow proce ss.
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Lastly, it applies equally to all membe rs of the class. 2) Due process means: 1)
there there shall shall be be a law pres prescri cribed bed in harmony harmony with with the general powers of the legislative department 2) it shal shalll be reasona reasonable ble in its its opera operation tion 3) it shall shall be enfo enforc rced ed acco accord rdin ing g to the regul regular ar methods of procedure 4) it shall shall be applic applicab able le alike alike to all citiz citizen ens s of the the state or a class
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a prohibition against aliens and against associations, part ne nerships, or corporations the capital of which are not who wholl lly y own owned by Filip ilipin inos os,, from rom engagi engaging ng direct directly ly or indire indirectl ctly y in the retail trade alie aliens ns actua actuall lly y enga engage ged d in the the reta retail il business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, law, unti untill thei theirr deat death h or volu volunt ntar ary y retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. Citi Citize zens ns and and juri juridi dica call enti entiti ties es of the the United States were exempted form this Act. provision provision for the forfeiture of licenses licenses to eng engage age in the the reta retail il busi busin ness ess for for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and and labor labor and and other other laws laws rela relati ting ng to trade, commerce and industry. provision provision against against the establishmen establishmentt or opening opening by aliens aliens actual actually ly engage engaged d in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business
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consti part 6: equal protection clause 2.
Lao Icho Ichong, ng, in in his own own behalf behalf and and behalf behalf of of other other alien residents, residents, corporation corporations s and partnership partnerships s affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons: •
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State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency. 6. Whil While e the citiz citizen en holds holds his his life, life, his pers person on and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
it denies to alien residents the equal protecti protection on of the laws and deprives deprives them them of their their libert liberty y and and prope property rty without due process
7. The The alien lien reta etailer iler has has shown hown suc such utte utterr disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegit illegitima imate te use of pernici pernicious ous design designs s and practices, the alien now enjoys a mono monopo poli lis stic tic contr ontrol ol on the the nati nation on’s ’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emer gency.
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title the Act violates violates international international and treaty obligations the the prov provis ision ions s of the the Act Act agai agains nstt the the transm transmiss ission ion by aliens aliens of their their retail retail business thru hereditary succession
IMPT. ISSUE:
WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws. HELD:
The The law law is a vali valid d exerc exercis ise e of poli police ce power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alie alien n and and a citi citize zen, n, whic which h fully fully just justif ify y the the legislative classification adopted. RATIO:
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2.
The The equ equal prot rotect ection clause use does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and condit condition ions s both as to privil privileges eges confer conferred red and liabilities enforced. The The classification is actual, real eal and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
3. The The diff differ eren ence ce in stat status us betw betwee een n citi citize zens ns and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. 4. Offi Offic cial ial stati tatis stics tics poin pointt out out to the the ever ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act. 5. The mere mere fact fact of of alien alienage age is is the the root root cause cause of of the distin distincti ction on between between the alien alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spir pirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily temporarily stays and makes his living. living. The alien alien owes owes no allegi allegianc ance e or loyalt loyalty y to the
KOREMATSU vs. U.S.
December 18, 1944 MR. JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of theCourt. FACTS
The petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a "Military Area," contrary to Civili Civilian an Exclus Exclusion ion Order Order No. 34 of the Comman Commandin ding g Genera Generall of the Western Western Command, Command, U.S. U.S. Army, Army, which which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area. No question was raised as to petitioner's loyalty to the United States. The The Circ Circui uitt Cour Courtt of Appe Appeal als s affi affirm rmed ed,, and and the the impo importa rtanc nce e of the the cons consti titu tuti tion onal al ques questi tion on invo involv lved ed caused the court to grant certiorari. Pros Prosec ecuti ution on of the the peti petiti tion oner er begu begun n by info informa rmati tion on charging violation of an Act of Congress, of March 21, 1942, , which provides that ". . . whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secr Secret etar ary y of War, War, or by any any mili milita tary ry comm comman ande der r desi designa gnatted by the the Secr Secreta etary ry of War, War, contr contrar ary y to the the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $ 5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense." Exclusion Order No. 34, which the petitioner violated,
was one of a number of military orders and procla proclamat mation ions, s, all of which which were were substa substanti ntiall ally y based based upon Executive Order No. 9066. That order, issued after we were at war with Japan, declared that "the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection
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consti part 6: equal protection clause against against espio espionage nage and against against sabotage sabotage to nation national al- - defe defens nse e mater materia ial, l, nation national al-d -def efens ense e prem premis ises es,, and and national-defense utilities. . . ."
Peti etitioner oner urges that when Order No. 34 was promulgated, all danger of Japanese invasion of the West Coast had disappeared. The court rejects the argument.
ISSUE
Here, Here, as in the Hiraba Hirabayas yashi hi case, case, the court court cannot cannot
WON the President and Congress went beyond their war powers by implementing implementing exclusion and restricting restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent HOLDING
No, No, ruli ruling ng affi affirm rmed ed.. The The Cour Courtt sided ided with ith the the government and held that the need to protect against espionage espionage outweighed outweighed Korematsu's Korematsu's rights. rights. Compulsory Compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified in circumstances of "emergency and peril."
reject reject as unfounded unfounded the judgment judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal member members s of that that popul populati ation on,, whose whose number number and stre streng ngth th coul could d not not be prec precis isel ely y and and quic quickl kly y ascert ascertain ained. ed. We canno cannott say that that the war-ma war-makin king g branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constitut constituted ed a menace menace to the national national defense defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it."
Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed deemed necess necessary ary becaus because e of the presen presence ce of an unascert unascertaine ained d number number of disloyal disloyal members of the group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was because we could not reject the
RATIO
Validity of Law In Hira Hiraba baya yash shii v. Unit United ed Stat States es,, 320 320 U.S. U.S. 81, 81, we sustai sustained ned a convic convictio tion n obtain obtained ed for violat violation ion of the curfew order. The Hirabayashi conviction and this one thus rest on the same 1942 Congressional Act and the same basic executive and military orders, all of which orders were aimed at the twin dangers of espionage espionage and sabotage. The 1942 Act was attacked in the Hirabayashi case as an unco uncons nsti titu tuti tion onal al dele delega gati tion on of powe power; r; it was was contended that the curfew order and other orders on whi which ch it rest rested ed were were beyon beyond d the the war war powers powers of the the Congress, the military authorities and of the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army; and finally that to apply apply the curfew curfew order again against st none none but citize citizens ns of Jap Japan anes ese e ance ancest stry ry amou amount nted ed to a cons consti titu tuti tion onal ally ly prohibited discrimination solely on account of race. To these questions, we gave the serious consideration which which their their import importan ance ce justif justified ied.. We uphel upheld d the curf curfew ew orde orderr as an exer exerci cise se of the the powe powerr of the the gover governme nment nt to take take steps steps necess necessary ary to preven preventt espio espiona nage ge and and sabot sabotage age in an area area threat threatene ened d by Japanese attack. In the light of the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was was beyo beyond nd the the war war powe powerr of Cong Congre ress ss and and the the Execut Executive ive to exclud exclude e those those of Japan Japanese ese ancest ancestry ry from the West Coast war area at the time they did.
True, exclusion from the area in which one's home is loca located ted is a far far grea greate terr depri depriva vati tion on than than cons consta tant nt confinement to the home from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. Nothing short of apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutio constitutionally nally justify justify either. But exclus exclusion ion from from a threatened area, no less than curfew, has a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage. The military authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores, conc conclu lude ded d that that curf curfew ew prov provid ided ed inad inadeq equa uate te protection and ordered exclusion.
finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from from the the loya loyall that that we sust sustai aine ned d the the vali validi dity ty of the the curfew curfew order as applyi applying ng to the whole group. In the the instant case, temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the military on the same ground. The judgment that exclusion of the whole group was for the same reason a military imperative answers the contention that the exclusion was in the nature of group punishment based on antagonism to those of Japanese origin. That there were members of the group
who retained loyalties to Japan has been confirmed by inves investi tiga gati tions ons made made subs subseq equen uentt to the the excl exclus usion ion.. Appr Approxi oxima matel tely y five five thou thousa sand nd Ameri America can n citi citize zens ns of Jap Japan anes ese e ance ancest stry ry refu refus sed to swea swearr unqu unqual alif ifie ied d alle allegi gian anc ce to the the Unit United ed Stat States es and and to reno renoun unce ce alle allegi gian anc ce to the the Japa Japane nese se Empe Empero ror, r, and and seve severa rall thousand evacuees requested repatriation to Japan. “Conflict of Order” contention It is argued that on May 30, 1942, the date the petitioner was charged with remaining in the prohibited area, there were conflicting orders outstanding, forbidding him both to leave the area and to remain there. The only order in effect touching the petitioner's being in the the area area on May May 30, 30, 1942 1942,, the the date date spec specif ified ied in the the inform informati ation on agains againstt him, him, was the May 3 order order which which prohibited his remaining there, and it was that same orde order, r, whic which h he stip stipul ulat ated ed in his his tria triall that that he had had violated, knowing of its existence. There is therefore no basis for the argument that on May 30, 1942, he was subject to punishment, under the March 27 and May 3 orders, whether he remained in or left the area. “Inseparability of orders” contention It is argu argued ed that that the the vali validi dity ty of the the excl exclus usion ion order order cannot cannot be considered considered apart from the orders requiring requiring him, him, to repor eportt and to rema remain in in an assemb sembly ly or relocation center. The contention is that we must treat
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consti part 6: equal protection clause thes these e sepa separa rate te orde orders rs as one one and and inse insepa para rabl ble; e; if detent detention ion in the assembl assembly y or reloca relocation tion center center would would have illegally deprived the petitioner of his liberty, the excl exclus usion ion order order and and his his conv convic icti tion on unde underr it cann cannot ot stand. Had petitioner here left the prohibited area and gone to an assembly center the court cannot say either as a matter of fact or law that his presence in that center would would have have result resulted ed in his detention detention in a reloca relocation tion cente enter. r. This This is made made clea clearr when when we anal analyz yze e the the requirements of the separate provisions of the separate orders. These separate requirements were that those of Japanese ancestry (1) depart from the area; (2) report to and temporarily remain in an assembly center; (3) go under under milita military ry control control to a reloca relocation tion center center there there to rema remain in for for an inde indeter termi mina nate te peri period od unti untill relea release sed d cond condit itio iona nall lly y or unco uncond ndit itio iona nall lly y by the the mili milita tary ry authorities. Each of these requirements, it will be noted, imposed imposed distinct distinct duties in connection connection with the separate separate steps in a complete evacuation program. Since the petitioner has not been convicted of failing to report or to remain in an assembly or relocation center, we cannot in this case determine the validity of thos those e sepa separa rate te prov provis isio ions ns of the the orde order. r. It is sufficient here for us to pass upon the order which petitioner violated. The power to exclude includes the power to do it by force force if necessar necessary. y. And any forcible forcible measure must nece necess ssar aril ily y enta entail il some some degr degree ee of dete detent ntio ion n or restrain restraintt whatever whatever method method of removal removal is selected selected.. But whichever view is taken, it results in holding that the order under which petitioner was convicted was valid.
Conclusion
the calm perspective of hindsight -- now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.
PLESSY vs. FERGUSON
BROWN, J.
FACTS:
This case centers on the constitutionality of an act of the genera generall assembl assembly y of the state state of Louisia Louisiana, na, passed passed in 1890, providing for separate separate railway railway carriages for the white and colored races. The petitioner was a citizen of the the Unit United ed Stat States es and and a resi reside dent nt of the the Stat State e of Loui Louisi sian ana, a, of mixe mixed d desc descen entt (7/8 (7/8 Cauc Caucas asia ian, n, 1/8 1/8 African). On June 7, 1892 he paid for a first class ticket on the East East Louisi Louisiana ana Railway Railway from from New Orlean Orleans s to Covington. Upon entering the passenger train he sat in a vacant vacant seat reserved for white passengers. passengers. Despite this, the petitioner was required by the conductor to transfer transfer to the seats assigned to colored passengers. When the petitioner refused he was forcibly ejected from the said coac coach h and and was was char charge ged d with with viol violat atin ing g the the assa assail iled ed Louisiana statute. The The consti constitut tution ionali ality ty of this this act is attack attacked ed upon the ground that it conflicts both with the 13th Amendment of the Consti Constituti tution, on, abolis abolishin hing g slaver slavery, y, and the 14th 14th Amen Amendm dmen ent, t, whic which h proh prohib ibit its s cert certai ain n rest restri rict ctiv ive e legislation on the part of the states. ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/O Not the statute is unconstitutional for being in conflict with the 13 th Amendment, Amendment, abolishing abolishing slavery? slavery? NO
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards towards the United United States. States. Regardless Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers , we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion orde order. r. To cast cast this this case case into into outl outlin ines es of raci racial al preju prejudic dice, e, witho without ut refere reference nce to the real real milita military ry dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area bec becau ause se of host hostil ilit ity y to him him or his his race race.. He was was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, Empire, because because the properly properly constitut constituted ed military military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained constrained to take proper proper security security measures measures,, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ance ancest stry ry be segr segreg egat ated ed from from the the West West Coast oast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders determined that they should have the power to do just this. We cannot -- by availing ourselves of
2. W/O Not the statute is unconstitutional for being in conf confli lict ct with with the the 14th Amendmen Amendment, t, which which prohibi prohibits ts certain restrictive legislation in part of the States? NO RATIO:
1. A stat statut ute e whic which h impl implies ies merel merely y a lega legall dist distin inct ctio ion n betw betwee een n the the whit white e and and colo colore red d race races, s, has has no tenden tendency cy to destroy destroy the legal legal equali equality ty of the two race races, s, or re-e re-est stab abli lish sh a stat state e of invo involu lunt ntar ary y servi ervitu tude de.. The The obje object ct of the the amen amendm dmen entt was was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it coul could d not not have have been been inte intend nded ed to aboli bolis sh distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as dist distin ingu guis ishe hed d from from polit politic ical al,, equa equali lity ty,, or a commin mingling of the two rac races upon term erms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the
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consti part 6: equal protection clause exercise of their police power. It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instan instance ce the white race is propert property, y, in the same sense sense that that a right right of action action,, or of inheri inheritan tance, ce, is property. Conceding this to be so for the purposes of this this case, case, we are unable unable to see how this this statute statute deprives him of, or in any way affects his right to, such property. If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may have his action for damages against the company for being deprived of his socalled called property property.. Upon Upon the other hand, hand, if he be a colo colored red man and and be, so assi assign gned ed,, he has has been been deprive deprived d of no property property,, since since he is not lawfully lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.. 2.
So far, then. as a conflict with the t he 14th Amendment is conc concer erne ned, d, the the case case redu reduce ces s itse itself lf to the the questi question on wheth whether er the statut statute e of Louisia Louisiana na is a reason reasonabl able e regula regulation tion,, and with with respec respectt to this this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of reaso reasona nabl blene eness ss it is at libe libert rty y to act act with with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this stan standa dard rd,, we cann cannot ot say say that that a law law whic which h authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable or more obnoxious to the 14th Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures. If the two races are to meet on terms of social equality wit must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a volunt voluntary ary consen consentt of indivi individua duals. ls. Legisl Legislati ation on is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinction distinctions s based upon physical physical differences, differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in acce accent ntua uati ting ng the the diff diffic icul ulti ties es of the the pres presen entt situ situat atio ion. n. If one one race race be infe inferi rior or to the the other other social socially, ly, the the Consti Constitut tution ion of the United United States States cannot put them upon the same plane.
DISSENT: Justice HARLAN
I am of opi opinion nion tha that the the stat statut ute e of Loui Louisi sian ana a is inconsistent with the personal liberty of citizens, white and black, in that state, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United States. If laws of like character should be enacted in the several states of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery as an institution tolerated by law would, would, it is true, have disapp disappear eared ed from from our country, but there would remain a power in the states, by sini sinist ster er legi legisl slat atio ion, n, to inte interf rfer ere e with with the the full full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race;
and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now constituting a part of the politi political cal community community,, called called the people people of the United United States, for whom and by whom, through representatives, our our gove govern rnmen mentt is admi admini nist stere ered. d. Such Such a syst system em is inconsistent ent with the the guarantee given by the Cons Consti titut tutio ion n of each each stat state e of a repub republi lica can n form form of government, and may be stricken down by Congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA vs. BAKKE
(June 28, 1978) Ponente: J. Powell FACTS:
The The Medi Medica call Scho School ol of the the Univ Univ of Cali Califo forn rnia ia had had 2 admis admissi sion ons s prog progra rams ms for for an enter enterin ing g clas class s of 100 100 studen students. ts. Under Under the regular regular admissio admissions ns program, program, candidates who had an undergrad GPA below 2.5 (on a scale of 4.0) were summarily rejected. Applicants who pass this requirement undergo an interview (rated on a scale of 1 to 100 per interviewer), which composed their respective “benchmark scores” based on the interviewers’ summaries, overall GPA, science courses GPA, Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), letters of recommendati recommendation, on, extracurric extracurricular ular activities activities and other biographical data. A separate committee, a majority of whom were members of minority groups, composed the special admissions program. Under it, applicants were asked to indicate in their application forms if they wished to be considered as “econo “economic micall ally y and/or and/or educati educationa onally lly disadv disadvant antage aged” d” appl applic ican ants ts/m /memb embers ers of a mino minori rity ty grou group p (bla (black cks, s, Chicanos, Asians, American Indians). If an applicant was found to be “disadvantaged,” he would be rated in the same same mann manner er as the the one one emplo employe yed d by the the gener general al admiss admission ions s committ committee. ee. However However,, they they did not have have to meet the 2.5 grade point cutoff and were not ranked against candidates in the general admissions process. No disa disadv dvan anta taged ged whit whites es were were admi admitte tted d under under the the special program, though many applied. Respondent, a white male, applied in 1973 and 1974, in both years being being consid considered ered only only under under the the genera generall admissions program. Though he had a 468 out of 500 score score in 1973, 1973, he was rejected rejected since since no late late genera generall appl applic ican ants ts with with scor scores es less less than than 470 470 were were bein being g accepted. At the time, 4 special admission slots were still unfilled. In 1974 respondent applied early, and though he had a score of 549 out of 600, he was again again rejected.
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consti part 6: equal protection clause In both both years, years, specia speciall applic applicant ants s were were admitt admitted ed with with significantly lower scores than respondent’s. After his 2nd rejection, respondent filed this action for mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief to compel his admiss admission ion,, allegin alleging g that that the special admissions
that white people take for granted.” In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications classifications that would violate the Equal Equal Protection Clause or the 5th Amendment.
program operated to exclude him on the basis of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment , a provision of the California Consti, and 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2.
The trial court found that the special program operated as a racial quota because minority applicants in that progra program m were were rated rated only only agains againstt one anothe another, r, and 16 places out 100 were reserved for them. Declaring that petitioner could not take race into account in making admissions decisions, the program was held to violate the Federal and State Constis and Title VI. Respondent’s admission was not ordered, however, for lack of proof that he would have been admitted but for the special program. The California SC, applying a strict-scrutiny standard, concluded that the special admission program was not the least intrusive means of achieving the goals of the admi admitt ttedl edly y compe compell llin ing g inter interes ests ts of inte integr grat atin ing g the the medical profession and increasing the number of doctors willi willing ng to serve serve minori minority ty patien patients. ts. Petiti Petitioner oner’s ’s specia speciall admi admiss ssio ions ns prog progra ram m was was held held to viol violat ate e the the Equa Equall Protection Clause. Since petitioner could not satisfy its burden of demonstratin demonstrating g that respondent, respondent, absent absent the specia speciall progra program, m, would would not have have been been admitt admitted, ed, the court ordered respondent’s admission. ISSUES
HELD:
1.
WON a right of action for private parties exists under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 YES 2. WON the special admissions program is necessary and and appr approp opri riat ate e in real realiz izin ing g peti petiti tion oner’ er’s s goal goal of diversifying its student body NO 3. WON petitioner could satisfy its burden of proving that respondent would not have been admitted even if there had been no special admissions program NO
Application of Judicial Scrutiny
Parties disagree as to the level of judicial scrutiny to be applie applied d to the special special admiss admission ions s progra program; m; but it is undisputed that it makes a classification based on race and ethnic background. Nevertheless, petitioner argues that the court below erred in applying strict scrutiny to the program bec white males, such as respondent, are not not a “dis “discr cret ete e and and insu insula larr mino minori rity ty”” requ requir irin ing g extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. This rationale, however, has not been invoked in deci decisi sion ons s as a prere prerequ quis isit ite e to subj subjec ecti ting ng raci racial al distinctions to strict scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness discreteness and insularity insularity constitute necessary necessary preconditions to a holding that a particular classification is invidious. They are subject to stringent examination regardless of these characteristics. 14th Amendment: Equal Protection Clause •
•
Yick Yick Wo v Hopk Hopkin ins: s: “Th “The guar guaran ante tees es of equa equall protection protection are universal universal in their application application to all persons persons within the territorial territorial jurisdicti jurisdiction, on, without without rega regard rd to any any diffe differen rence ces s of race race,, of colo color, r, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” Altho Althoug ugh h the the fram framer ers s conc conceiv eived ed of its its prima primary ry function as bridging the vast distance bet members of the the Negr Negro o race race and and the the whit white e “maj “major orit ity, y,”” the the Amendm Amendment ent itself itself was framed framed in univer universal sal terms, terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition prior to servitude. There is no principled principled basis for decidi deciding ng which which groups groups would would merit merit “heigh “heighten tened ed judicial solicitude” and which would not. Nothing in the Consti supports the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer suffer otherwise otherwise impermissible impermissible burdens burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups.
Purposes and Means
“No person in the US shall, on the ground of race, colo color, r, or nati nation ona al ori origin gin, be exc exclude luded d from from partic participa ipatio tion n in, be denied denied the benefits benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
PURPOSE: 1. Reduc educin ing g the the hist histor oric ic defi defic cit of trad tradit itio iona nall lly y disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the profession 2. Counte Counterin ring g the effects effects of socie societal tal discr discrimi iminat nation ion 3. Incre ncrea asin sing the the numb number er of phys physic icia ian ns who will ill practice in communities currently underserved 4. Obtain Obtaining ing the the educati educationa onall benefit benefits s that flow flow from from an ethnically diverse student body MEANS: special admissions program
The problem confronting Congress was discriminat discrimination ion agains againstt Negro Negro citize citizens ns at the hands hands of recipi recipients ents of federal moneys. Proponents of the bill detailed the plight of Negroes seeking equal treatment in federally funded programs. The purpose of Title VI was “to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Consti and the moral sense of the Nation” and “to give fellow citizens – Negroes – the same rights and opportunities
Cour Court, t, hold holdin ing g that that the the means means is not not esse essent ntia iall in realizing the purposes: 1. Pref Preferr errin ing g members members of any any one group group for no reaso reason n other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. 2. The State State certa certainl inly y has a legiti legitimat mate e and substa substanti ntial al inte intere rest st in amel amelio iora rati ting ng or elim elimin inat atin ing g wher where e feasi easibl ble, e, the the dis disabli ablin ng effe effec cts of iden identi tifi fied ed
RATIO: 1.
601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
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consti part 6: equal protection clause disc discri rimi mina natio tion. n. Howev However, er, the the Court Court has has neve neverr approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members members of relati relativel vely y victim victimize ized d groups groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitution constitutional al or statutory statutory violations. violations. Without such findings, it cannot be said that the gov’t has any grea greater ter inter interes estt in help helpin ing g 1 indi indivi vidu dual al than than in refraining from harming another. 3. Ther There e is no evid eviden enc ce on rec record ord indi indic catin ating g that that petiti petitioner oner’s ’s specia speciall admiss admissions ions progra program m is either either needed or geared to promote such goal. There are more precise and reliable ways to identify applicants who who are are genu genuin inel ely y inte intere rest sted ed in the the medi medica call problem problems s of minori minoritie ties s than than by race. race. There There is no empirical data to demonstrate that any one race is more selflessly socially oriented or by contrast that another is more selfishly acquisitive. 4. Academic freedom has long been viewed as a special conc concern ern of the the 1st Amendm Amendment. ent. The freedom freedom of a univ univer ers sity ity to make make its its own own judg judgme ment nts s as to education includes the selection of its student body. Four essential freedoms: (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted. It is true that the contribution of diversity is substantial, with the Court making a specific reference to legal education: “The “The law school, school, the provin proving g ground ground for legal legal learni learning ng and practi practice, ce, cannot cannot be effect effective ive in isolation isolation from the individuals individuals and institutions institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.” HOWEVER, ethnic diversity is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body. Although a university must have wide ide dis discre cretio tion in maki makin ng the sen sensiti sitive ve jud judgm gmen ents ts as to who who shou should ld be admi admitt tted ed,, constitutional limitations protecting individuals may not be disregarded.
all all perti pertine nent nt eleme element nts s of dive divers rsit ity y (i.e. (i.e. exce excepti ption onal al persona personall talent talents, s, unique unique work work or servic service e experie experience nce,, lead leader ersh shiip pote potent ntia ial, l, matu maturi rity ty,, demo demons nstr trat ated ed compassion, ability to communicate with the poor, etc) in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and place them in the same footing for consideration, altho althoug ugh h not not nece necess ssar aril ily y acco accord rdin ing g them them the the same same weight. This kind of program treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. petitioner’s special admissions admissions program In sum, sum, the petitioner’s involves the use of an explicit racial classification never before before counte countenan nanced ced by this this Court. Court. The fatal fatal flaw flaw in peti petiti tion oner’ er’s s prefe prefere rent ntia iall prog progra ram m is its its disr disreg egar ard d of th individual rights as guaranteed by the 14 Amendment. Such Such righ rights ts are are not not abso absolu lute te;; but but when when a Stat State’ e’s s distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of one’s skin, that individual is enti entitl tled ed to a demo demons nstr trat atio ion n that that the the chal challe leng nged ed classification is necessary to promote a substantial state intere interest. st. Petiti Petitioner oner has failed failed to carry carry this this burden; burden; hence, its special admissions program is constitutionally deemed deemed invali invalid. d. However However,, the State State has a substa substanti ntial al interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the consideration of race and ethnic origin. Thus, California SC’s judgment enjoin enjoining ing petiti petitioner oner from from taking taking race race into into accoun accountt is reversed. 3. Peti Petiti tione onerr has has concede conceded d that it could could not carr carry y its burden of proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful unlawful special special admissions admissions program, program, respondent respondent still still would would not have have been been admitt admitted. ed. Hence, he is entitled to injunction and should be admitted there. JJ. JJ. Bren Brenna nan, n, Whit White, e, Mars Marsha hall ll,, concurring and dissenting.
and and
Blac Blackm kmun un;;
Gov’t may take race into account when it acts not to demea demean n or insu insult lt any any raci racial al grou group, p, but but to remedy remedy disa disadv dvan anta tage ges s cast cast on mino minori riti ties es by past past raci racial al prejudice, prejudice, at least when appropriate appropriate findings findings have been made by judicial, judicial, legislative, legislative, or administra administrative tive bodies with competence to act in this area.
Racial classification = Diversity?
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specif specified ied percen percentag tage e of the the student student body is in effect effect guaranteed to be members of selected groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity diversity that furthers furthers a compelli compelling ng
GRATZ vs. BOLLINGER/ GRUTTER vs. BOLLINGER
Grutter v Bollinger, 02-241 (June 2003)
state state interest interest encompasse encompasses s a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethn ethnic ic orig origin in is but but a sing single le thou though gh impo import rtan antt element. Petitioner’s special program, focused solely on
O'Connor, J. NATURE: certiorari to the US CA
ethn ethnic ic dive divers rsit ity, y, woul would d hind hinder er rath rather er than than furth further er attain attainmen mentt of genuin genuine e divers diversity ity.. The assign assignmen mentt of a fixe fixed d numbe numberr of plac places es to a mino minori rity ty grou group p is not a nece necess ssar ary y means means towar towards ds that that end. end. Race Race or ethn ethnic ic backgr backgroun ound d may be deemed deemed a “plus” “plus” in a partic particula ularr applicant’ applicant’s s file, yet it does not insulate the individual individual from comparison with all the other candidates for the available seats. An admissions program should operate in such a way that would be flexible enough to consider
School), one of the Nation's top law schools, follows an official admissions policy that seeks to achieve student body diversity through compliance with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. Focusing on students' academic ability coup couple led d with with a flexi flexibl ble e asse assess ssmen mentt of thei theirr tale talent nts, s, expe experi rien ence ces, s, and and pote potent ntia ial, l, the the poli policy cy requ requir ires es admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all all the the infor informa mati tion on avai availa labl ble e in the the file file,, incl includi uding ng a personal statement, letters of recommendation, an essay
University ty of Michig Michigan an Law School (Law FACTS: The Universi
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consti part 6: equal protection clause descri describin bing g how the applic applicant ant will will contri contribut bute e to Law Schoo chooll life ife and dive divers rsit ity, y, and and the the appl applic ican ant' t's s under undergr grad adua uate te grad grade e poin pointt aver averag age e (GPA (GPA)) and and Law Law School School Admiss Admission ions s Test Test (LSAT) (LSAT) score. score. Additio Additional nally, ly, officials must look beyond grades and scores to so-called "soft variables," such as recommenders' enthusiasm, the qual qualit ity y of the the unde underg rgra radu duat ate e inst instit itut utio ion n and and the the appl applic ican ant' t's s essa essay, y, and and the the area areas s and and diff diffic icul ulty ty of underg undergrad raduat uate e course course selecti selection. on. The policy policy does not define define divers diversity ity solely solely in terms terms of racial racial and ethnic ethnic stat status us and and does does not not restr restric ictt the the types types of dive divers rsit ity y contributions eligible for "substantial weight," but it does reaffirm the Law School's commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American students, who otherwise migh mightt not not be repr repres esen ente ted d in the the stud studen entt body body in meaningful meaningful numbers. By enrolling enrolling a "critical "critical mass" of underrepresen underrepresented ted minority minority students, students, the policy seeks to ensure ensure their their abilit ability y to contri contribut bute e to the the Law School's School's character and to the legal profession. When the Law School denied admission to petitioner Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 161 LSAT LSAT scor score, e, she she file filed d this this suit suit,, alle allegi ging ng that that respondents had discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the 14th Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U. S. C. §1981; §1981 ; that she was rejected because the Law School uses race as a "predo "predomina minant" nt" factor factor,, giving giving applic applicant ants s belong belonging ing to certain minority groups a significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups; and that respondents had no comp compell ellin ing g inte interes restt to just justif ify y that that use use of race race.. The The District Court found the Law School's use of race as an admissions admissions factor unlawful. unlawful. The Sixth Circuit of the CA reversed, reversed, holding that Justice Justice Powell's Powell's opinion in Bakke was was bind bindin ing g prec precede edent nt esta establ blis ishi hing ng dive divers rsit ity y as a compelling state interest, and that the Law School's use of race was narrowly tailored because race was merely a "potential "potential 'plus' factor" and because the Law School's prog progra ram m was was virt virtua uall lly y iden identi tica call to the the Harv Harvar ard d admissions admissions program described described approvingly approvingly by Justice Justice Powell and appended to his Bakke opinion. Pettioner (Barbara Grutter) :
- respondents respondents discriminated discriminated against against her on the basis of race in violation of the 14th Amendment; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d; and Rev. Stat. §1977, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1981 - her application was rejected because the Law School uses race as a "predominant" factor, giving applicants who belong to certain minority groups "a significantly greater greater chance chance of admission admission than students students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups." - respondents "had no compelling interest to justify their use of race in the admissions process" Respondents (Lee Bollinger, former Law School dean, present UMich pres; jeffrey Lehman, Law School dean; Denis Shield, Admissions Director): -the -there re was was no dire direct ctiv ive e to admi admitt a fixed fixed/p /par arti ticu cula larr percentage or number of minority students, but rather to consider an applicant's race along with all other factors - 'critical mass' " means " 'meaningful numbers' " or " 'mea 'meani ning ngful ful repr repres esent entat ation ion,' ,';; there there is no numb number, er,
percenta percentage, ge, or range range of number numbers s or percent percentage ages s that that constitute critical mass. - the policy did not purport to remedy past discrimina discrimination, tion, but rather to include include students students who may bring to the Law School a perspective different from that of members of groups which have not been the victims of such discrimination - the Law School School actual actually ly gives gives substa substanti ntial al weight weight to diversity factors besides race - the university policy of promoting diversity constitutes a "compelling interest" ISSUES:
1. Whether or not diversity diversity is a compelling interest interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission to public universities 2. Whether or not the narrowly-tailored use of race in admissions admissions decisions decisions to further a compelling compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits of a diverse student body is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause (14th Amend) HELD:
1. YES. In the landmark Bakke case, Bakke case, this Court reviewed a medical school's racial set-aside program that reserved 16 out of 100 seats for members members of certai certain n minori minority ty groups. groups. The decision produced six separate opinions, none none of which which command commanded ed a majori majority. ty. Four Four Justic Justices es would have upheld the program on the ground that the government can use race to remedy disadvantages cast on mino minori riti ties es by past past raci racial al prej prejud udic ice. e. Four Four other other Jus Justi tice ces s woul would d have have stru struck ck the the prog progra ram m down down on statuto statutory ry ground grounds. s. Justic Justice e Powell, Powell, announ announcin cing g the Court' Court's s judgmen judgment, t, provid provided ed a fifth fifth vote vote not only for invalidating the program, but also for reversing the state court's injunction against any use of race whatsoever. In a part of his opinion that was joined by no other Justice, Justice Powell expressed his view that attaining a diverse stud studen entt body body was was the the only only inter interes estt asser asserte ted d by the the univ univers ersit ity y that that surv surviv ived ed scru scruti tiny ny.. Groun Groundi ding ng his his analysis in the academic freedom that "long has been viewed viewed as a specia speciall concer concern n of the First First Amendm Amendment, ent, Justi Justice ce Powell Powell emphas emphasize ized d that that the " 'natio 'nation's n's future future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the the idea ideas s and and mores mores of stud studen ents ts as dive divers rse e as this this Nation." However, he also emphasized that "it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups," that can justify usin using g rac race.Ra e.Rath ther er,, "the "the dive divers rsit ity y that that furt furthe hers rs a compel compellin ling g state state intere interest st encompa encompass sses es a far broader broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethn ethnic ic orig origin in is but but a sing single le thou though gh impor importa tant nt element." element." Since Since Bakke, Justic Justice e Powell's Powell's opinion opinion has has been the touchstone for constitutional analysis of racecons consci ciou ous s admi admiss ssio ions ns poli polici cies es.. Publ Public ic and and priv privat ate e universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views. Courts, however however,, have have strugg struggled led to discer discern n whethe whetherr Justic Justice e Powell Powell's 's divers diversity ity ration rationale ale is bindin binding g preced precedent. ent. The
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consti part 6: equal protection clause Court finds it unnecessary to decide this issue because the Court endorses endorses Justice Justice Powell's Powell's view that student body body dive divers rsit ity y is a comp compel elli ling ng stat state e inte interes restt in the the context of university admissions. 2. NO. The Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obta obtain inin ing g the the educa educati tion onal al bene benefi fits ts that that flow flow from from a divers diverse e studen studentt body body is not prohibite prohibited d by the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, or §1981 a. All government government racial racial classi classificat fications ions must must be analyz analyzed ed by a review reviewing ing court court under under strict strict scruti scrutiny. ny. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña . Peña . But not all such uses are invali invalidat dated ed by strict strict scrutin scrutiny. y. RaceRace-bas based ed action action necessary to further a compelling governmental interest does not violate the Equal Protection Clause so long as it is narrow narrowly ly tailor tailored ed to further further that that interes interest. t. Shaw v. Hunt . Cont Context ext matt matters ers when when revi review ewin ing g such such acti action on.. Gomillion v. Lightfoot . Not every decision influenced by race race is equall equally y object objection ionabl able, e, and strict strict scrutin scrutiny y is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importa importance nce and the sincer sincerity ity of the governm government ent's 's reasons for using race in a particular context. b. The Court endorses Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can can justif justify y using using race race in univer universit sity y admiss admissions ions.. The Court defers to the Law School's educational judgment that diversity is essential to its educational mission. The Court' Court's s scruti scrutiny ny of that that interes interestt is no less less strict strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area area that that lies lies prim primar aril ily y with within in the the univ univer ersi sity ty's 's experti expertise. se. Attaining Attaining a divers diverse e studen studentt body body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission, and its "good faith" is "presumed" absent "a showing to the contra contrary. ry."" Enroll Enrolling ing a "criti "critical cal mass" mass" of minori minority ty students simply to assure some specified percentage of a partic particula ularr group group merely merely becaus because e of its race or ethnic ethnic origin would be patently unconstitutional. But the Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference to the substantial, substantial, important, and laudable laudable educational educational benefits benefits that diversity diversity is designed to produce, produce, including including cross-raci cross-racial al understandi understanding ng and the breaking breaking down of racial racial stereot stereotypes ypes.. The Law School School's 's claim claim is further further bols bolster tered ed by numero numerous us expert expert stud studies ies and and repor reports ts showing that such diversity promotes learning outcomes and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce, for society, and for the legal profession. Major Americ American an busine businesse sses s have have made made clear clear that that the skills skills needed in today's today's increasingl increasingly y global global marketplace marketplace can only be developed developed through exposure to widely widely diverse diverse people, people, cultures, cultures, ideas, ideas, and viewpoints. viewpoints. High-ranking High-ranking retired officers and civilian military leaders assert that a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps is essential to national security. Moreover, because universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large large number number of the Nation's Nation's leaders, leaders, Sweatt v. Painter , the path to leadership must be visibly open to talent talented ed and qualif qualified ied indivi individua duals ls of every every race race and ethn ethnic icit ity. y. Thus Thus,, the the Law Law Scho School ol has has a comp compel elli ling ng interest in attaining a diverse student body. (d) The Law School's admissions program bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. To be narrowly tailored, tailored, a race-consc race-conscious ious admissions admissions program cannot cannot
"insul "insulat[ at[e] e] each each categor category y of applic applicant ants s with with certai certain n desired qualification qualifications s from competition with all other applicants." Bakke . Inst Instea ead, d, it may may cons consid ider er race race or ethnicity only as a " 'plus' in a p articular applicant's file"; i.e., it must be "flexible "flexible enough to consider consider all pertinent pertinent elem elemen ents ts of dive divers rsit ity y in ligh lightt of the the part partic icul ula ar qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the the same same foot footin ing g for for cons consid ider erat atio ion, n, alth althou ough gh not not necessarily according them the same weight." It follows that universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial or ethnic groups or put them on separate admis admissi sion ons s trac tracks ks.. The The Law Law Scho School ol's 's admi admiss ssio ions ns progra program, m, like like the Harva Harvard rd plan plan approv approved ed by Justic Justice e Powell Powell,, satisf satisfies ies these these requir requiremen ements. ts. Moreov Moreover, er, the program is flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluate evaluated d as an indivi individua duall and not in a way that make makes s race race or ethni ethnici city ty the the defi defini ning ng feat featur ure e of the the appl applic icat atio ion. n. The The Law Law Scho School ol enga engage ges s in a high highly ly individual individualized, ized, holistic review of each applicant's applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic acce accept ptan ance ce or rejec rejecti tion on base based d on any any sing single le "sof "soft" t" variable. Gratz v. Bollinger . Also, the program adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfull meaningfully y considered considered alongside alongside race. Moreover, the the Law Law Scho School ol freq freque uent ntly ly acce accept pts s nonm nonmin inor orit ity y appl applic ican ants ts with with grad grades es and and test test scor scores es lowe lowerr than than unde underr rrepr epres esent ented ed mino minori rity ty appl applic ican ants ts (and (and othe otherr nonmin nonminori ority ty applic applicant ants) s) who are reject rejected. ed. The Court Court rejects the argument that the Law School should have used other race-neutral means to obtain the educational benefits of student body diversity, e.g., a lottery system or decreasing the emphasis on GPA and LSAT scores. Narrow Narrow tailor tailoring ing does does not requir require e exhaust exhaustion ion of every every conceivable race-neutral alternative or mandate that a university choose between maintaining a reputation for exce excell llen ence ce or fulf fulfil illi ling ng a comm commit itme ment nt to prov provid ide e educa educati tion onal al oppor opportu tuni niti ties es to member members s of all all raci racial al groups. Wygan Wygantt v. Jacks Jackson on Bd. Bd. of Ed . The The Cour Courtt is satisfied that the Law School adequately considered the available alternatives. The Court is also satisfied that, in the the cont contex extt of indi indivi vidu dual aliz ized ed cons consid ider erat atio ion n of the the possible possible diversity diversity contribution contributions s of each applicant, applicant, the Law School's School's race-consc race-conscious ious admissions admissions program program does not unduly harm nonminority nonminority applicants. applicants. Finally, Finally, raceconscious admissions policies must be limited in time. The Court takes the Law School at its word that it would lik like noth nothiing bett better er than than to find find a raceace-ne neut utra rall admissions formula and will terminate its use of racial preferences as soon as practicable. The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today. c. Beca Becaus use e the the Law Law Scho School ol's 's use use of race race in admi admiss ssio ions ns deci decisi sion ons s is not not proh prohib ibit ited ed by Equa Equall Protection Clause, petitioner's statutory claims based on Title VI and §1981 also fail. US CA decision affirmed.
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consti part 6: equal protection clause ISSUE:
WON WON a fema female le,, duly duly qual qualif ifie ied d in resp respec ectt of age, age, charac character, ter, and learni learning, ng, claim, claim, under under the fourteen fourteenth th amendm amendment, ent, the privil privilege ege of earnin earning g a liveli livelihoo hood d by practicing at the bar of a judicial court. DECISION:
Yes, judgement reversed BRADWELL vs. ILLINOIS
RATIO:
I. FACTS:
Mrs. Mrs. Myra Myra Brad Bradwel well, l, afte afterr obta obtain inin ing g the the requ requis isit ite e qualif qualifica ication tions, s, applie applied d the the judges judges of the Supreme Supreme Court of Illinois for a license to practice law. This was accompanied by an affidavit claiming that she was born in Vermont and was formerly a citizen of that state. However, she is now both a citizen of the United States and the state of Illinois after residing in Chicago for many years. years. Accordin According g to the Chicago Chicago statut statute, e, no individual is allowed to practice law without obtaining a license from two justices of the state supreme court. The Supreme Court refused to issue Bradwell a license for the reason that her marital status would prevent her from being bound by her express or implied contracts which the law upholds between attorney and client. In providing its decision, the State Supreme Court relied on an existi existing ng state state statute statute prohib prohibitin iting g persons persons from from prac practi tici cing ng law law with withou outt a lice licens nse e obtai obtaine ned d from from two two Supreme Court justices. Furthermore, the issuance of a licens license e requir requires es a certif certifica icate te of good good moral moral charac character ter provided by any county court. Other rules of admission are left to the discretion discretion of the members of the Supreme Court. This discretion is subject to two limitations: 1) The term erms of admi dmission mus must promo omote the proper administration of justice 2) The cour courtt should should not not admit admit any any perso persons ns or clas class s of perso erson ns who are are not inte intend nded ed by the the legisl legislatu ature re to be admitt admitted, ed, even even though though their their excl exclus usion ion is not not expr express essly ly requi require red d by the the statute. The The cour courtt conc concen entr trat ated ed on the the seco second nd limi limita tatio tion, n, contemplating that admitting women to engage in the practice of law would be exercising authority conferred to them in a manner different from what the legislature intended. It argued that at the time of the establishment of this statute, the U.S. had adopted the Common Law syst system em of Engl Englan and d in whic which h fema female le attor attorne neys ys were were unknown. God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth.
Constitutional am amendment:
Orig Origin inal al:: A citi citize zen n emig emigra rati ting ng from from one one stat state e to anothe anotherr carried carried with him, him, not the privil privileges eges and immunities he enjoyed in his native state, but was enti entitl tles es,, in the the stat state e of his his adop adopti tion on,, to such such privil privilege eges s and immunitie immunities s as were were enjoye enjoyed d by the class of citizens to which he belonged by the laws of such adopted state. 14th Amendment: Amendment: It executes executes itself in every every state of the union. It contains a class of privileges that a state may not abridge. Question: Does admission to the bar belong to that class of privileges which a state may not abridge, or that class of political rights as to which a state may discriminate between its citizens? -
Court Court beli believ eves es that that the the pract practic ice e of law law is a privilege which belong to a citizen of the United States.
Cases: Cumm Cummin ings gs
all men men have ave certa ertain in vs. vs. Miss Missou ouri ri:: all inal inalie iena nabl ble e righ rights ts.. In the the purs pursui uitt of happ happin ines ess s all all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one, and that in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law
Ex Parte Garland: Attorneys and counselors are officers
of the court and not of the United states. They are not appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. Therefore, they must be admitted as such by its order, upon upon evid eviden ence ce of thei theirr poss possess essin ing g suffi suffici cien entt lega legall learning and fair private character. Conclusion: The profession of the law, like the clerical profession and that of medicine, is an advocation open to every citizen of the United States. The legislature may prescribe qualifications but may not discriminate a class of citizens from admission to the bar. II.
Difficulty of clients in enforcing the contracts they might make with her because of her being a married woman and on the ground of her sex.
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This kind of malpractice may be punishable by fine, imprisonment, or expulsion from the bar. Her clients would not be compelled to resort to actions at law against her.
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Mrs. Bradwell, brought this case to the Federal Supreme Court.
consti part 6: equal protection clause JUSTICE MILLER, DISSENTING:
RATIO:
In regard to that amendment counsel for plaintiff claims contains contains privileges privileges and immunities which belong to a citi citize zen n of the the U.S. U.S.,, the the prac practi tice ce of law law has has neve neverr depend depended ed on the concep conceptt of citiz citizens enship hip.. The right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a state is one of those powers which are not transfer transferred red for its protection protection to the Federal Federal government. Judgement affirmed. JUSTICE BRADLEY, DISSENTING:
The The clai claim m that that unde underr the the 14th amend amendme ment nt of the the constitution, which declares that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immuni immunitie ties s of citiz citizens ens of the U.S. U.S. assume assumes s that that the practice of law is one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to engage in any and every profession. Civil law has recognized recognized wide differences differences in the spheres and desti destinie nies s of man and woman. woman. Man is woman woman’s ’s protector and defender. Timidity and delicacy belong to the female. The founders of the common law believed that that a woman woman had no legal legal existen existence ce apart apart from from her husband. Their destiny is to become wives and mothers. Judgement affirmed
GOESART vs. CLEARY
FACTS:
As part of the Michigan system for controlling the sale of liqu liquor or,, bart barten ender ders s are are requ requir ired ed to be lice licens nsed ed in all all cities, but no female may be so licensed unless she be “the wife or daughter of the male owner” of a licensed liquor establishment. The case is here on direct appeal from an order of the Distri District ct Court, Court, denyin denying g an injunc injunctio tion n to restra restrain in the enfo enforc rceme ement nt of the the Mich Michig igan an law. law. The The clai claim m is that that Michig Michigan an cannot cannot forbid forbid females females general generally ly from from being being barmaids and at the same time make an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of the owners of liquor establishments. ISSUE:
WON the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause of the Fourteenth Fourteenth Amendment barred barred Michigan Michigan from making making the classification the State has made between wives and daught daughters ers of owners owners of liquor liquor places places and wives wives and daughters of non-owners. HELD: No.
(The Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the roots, and the regulation of the liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of legislative powers. Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from wor worki king ng behi behind nd a bar. bar. This This is so desp despit ite e the the vast vast changes changes in the social and legal position position of women. The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly, in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic.) The Constitution does not require situations 'which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.' Since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of fema female les s othe otherr fact factor ors s are are oper operat atin ing g whic which h eith either er elimi elimina nate te or reduc reduce e the the moral moral and and soci social al probl problems ems otherwise otherwise calling calling for prohibition. prohibition. Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar bar by a barm barmai aid' d's s husb husban and d or fath father er mini minimi mize zes s hazard hazards s that that may confro confront nt a barmai barmaid d withou withoutt such such protec protectin ting g oversi oversight ght.. This This Court Court is certai certainly nly not in a posi positi tion on to gain gainsa say y such such beli belief ef by the the Mich Michig igan an legi legisl slat atur ure. e. If it is enter enterta tain inab able le,, as we thin think k it is, is, Mich Michig igan an has has not not viol violat ated ed its its duty duty to affor afford d equa equall protection of its laws. We cannot cross-examine either actu actual ally ly or argu argume ment ntat ativ ively ely the the mind mind of Mich Michig igan an legislators nor question their motives. Nor is it unconstitutional for Michigan to withdraw from women the occupation of bartending because it allows women to serve as waitresses where liquor is dispensed. The District Court has sufficiently indicated the reasons that that may have have influe influence nced d the legisl legislatur ature e in allowi allowing ng women to be waitresses in a liquor establishment over which a man's ownership provides control. Nothing need be added to what was said below as to the other grounds on which the Michigan law was assailed. What if it’s a female owner? Gender classification. What is the basis of distinction? Heigthened Mr. Mr. Just Justic ice e RUTL RUTLED EDGE GE,, with with whom whom Mr. Mr. Just Justic ice e DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MURPHY join, dissenting.
The statute arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners of liquor establishments. A male owner, although he himself is always absent from his bar, may employ employ his wife and daughter daughter as barmai barmaids. ds. A female female owne ownerr may may neith neither er work work as a barma barmaid id herese hereself lf nor nor employ her daughter in that position, even if a man is always present in the establishment to keep order. This inev inevit itab able le resu result lt of the the clas classi sifi fica cati tion on beli belies es the the assu assump mpti tion on that that the the stat statut ute e was was moti motiva vate ted d by a legislativ legislative e solicitude solicitude for the moral and physicial physicial well-
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consti part 6: equal protection clause being of women who, but for the law, would be employed as barmaids. Since there could be no other conceivable justi justific ficati ation on for such such discri discrimin minati ation on agains againstt women women owners of liquor establishments, the statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal protection.
of benefits to appellees. Thus, the appellees were ruled inelig ineligibl ible e for disabi disabilit lity y benefit benefits s and are now suing to enjo enjoin in its its enfo enforc rcem emen entt and and are are chal challe leng ngin ing g the the constitutionality of such provision. Beca Becaus use e
of the the
Insu Insura ranc nce e
Rentz Rentzer er v Calif Calif Unemp Unemplo loyme yment nt and the revised Appe Appeal als s Boar Board d
administrative guidelines that resulted from it, three of the appell appellees ees whose whose disabi disabilit lities ies were were attrib attributa utable ble to caus causes es othe otherr than than norm normal al preg pregna nanc ncy y and and deliv delivery ery,, became entitled to benefits under the program and their claims have since then been paid.
GEDULDIG vs. AIELLO
Issue : WON the California disability insurance program Gudeldig, etc. v Aiello et al. 1974
Cali Califo forn rnia ia has has admi admini nist stere ered d a disa disabi bili lity ty insu insura ranc nce e syst system em that that pays pays bene benefi fits ts to pers person ons s in priv privat ate e empl employ oyme ment nt who who are are temp tempor orar aril ily y unab unable le to work work beca becaus use e of disa disabi bili lity ty not not cove covere red d by work workme men’ n’s s compensation for almost 30 years. This is funded from contributions deducted from the wages of participating empl employ oyees ees.. Such Such parti partici cipa patio tion, n, whic which h requ requir ires es an employee to contribute one percent of his salary ($85 max. annually), is mandatory unless the employees are protected by voluntary private medical plans approved by the the Stat State. e. These These cont contri ribut butio ions ns are are plac placed ed in the the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund. In the event ent a participant emp employee suffers ers a compensable disability, he can receive a “weekly benefit amount” to be paid on the eighth day of disability. If he is hospitalized, the payment would be on the 1 st day of hospitalization and he can also get additional benefits of $12 per day). Weekly benefit amounts for one disability are payable for 26weeks so long as the total amt paid doesn’t exceed one-half of the wages received during the base period while additional benefits are for a max of 20days. The individual employee is insured against the risk of disability from a no. of mental or physical illness(es) and mental mental or physic physical al injuri injuries. es. It is not every disabl disabling ing condit condition ion that that trigge triggers rs the obliga obligation tion to pay benefit benefits s thou though gh.. No bene benefi fits ts are are paid paid for a sing single le disa disabi bili lity ty beyo beyond nd 26 weeks weeks or for for a disa disabi bili lity ty resu result ltin ing g from from individual’s court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict or sexual psychopath. 2626 of Unemployment Insurance Code also excludes disabilities resulting from pregnancy. Gudelgig, the Director of the California Dept of Human Resources is responsible for the administration of this progra program. m. Aiello Aiello et al. became became pregna pregnant nt and suffere suffered d employment disability as a result of their pregnancies. Three Three of the appelle appellees’ es’ disabi disabilit lities ies are attrib attributa utable ble to abno abnorm rmal al comp compli lica cati tions ons enco encoun unter tered ed duri during ng thei theirr preg pregna nanc ncie ies s whil while e Jara Jarami mill llo o experi experienc enced ed a norm normal al pregna pregnanc ncy, y, which which is the sole sole cause cause fo her disabi disabilit lity. y.1 Gudelgig applied 2626 of UIC to preclude the payment 1
See meaning of disability as defined in 2626 of Unemployment Insurance Code, page 2488 of case.
invidiousl invidiously y discrimina discriminates tes against against Jaramillo Jaramillo and others similarly situated by not paying insurance benefits for disabi disabilit lity y that that accom accompan panies ies normal normal pregna pregnancy ncy and childbirth. \Underlying \Underlying Issue: WON the Equal Protection Clause requires such policies to be sacrificed in order to finance the payment payment of benefi benefits ts to those those whose whose disabi disabilit lity y is attributable to normal pregnancies. No. California intended to establish this benefit system as an insu insura ranc nce e prog progra ram m to func functi tion on in acco accord rdan ance ce with with insu insura ranc nce e conc concept epts. s. It never never drew drew on gene genera rall stat state e revenues to finance disability or hospital benefits. The one-percent contribution bears a close and substantial relationship to the level of benefits payable and to the disabi disabilit lity y risks risks insured insured under under the program program.. Over Over the the years, California has been committed to not increasing the contribution contribution rate above the one-percent level. It has soug sought ht to prov provid ide e the the broad broades estt poss possib ible le disa disabi bili lity ty protection that would be affordable by even those with low-incomes. To To orde orderr the the Stat State e to pay pay bene benefi fits ts for for disa disabi bili lity ty accompanying normal pregnancy and delivery is to order them to make reasonable changes in the contribution rate, rate, the max benefit benefits s allowa allowable ble and other other varia variables bles affecting the solvency of the program. These variables represent a policy determination by the State. California doesn’t discriminate with respect to persons or grou groups ps whic which h are are eligi eligibl ble e for for disa disabi bili lity ty insu insura ranc nce e prot protec ecti tion on unde underr the the prog progra ram. m. The The clas classi sifi fica catio tion n chal hallen lenged ged in thi this case rel relates ates to the the ass asserte erted d “underinclusiveness” of the set of risks that the State has selecte selected d to insure. insure. The State State has not chosen chosen to insu insure re all all risk risks s of empl employ oymen mentt disa disabi bili lity ty and and this this decision is reflected in the level of annual contributions exacted exacted from participating participating employees employees.. Plus, there there is no evidence evidence that the selection selection of risks risks insured insured worked to discriminate against any definable group or class from the program. The Court has held previously previously that, consistent consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, “a State may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which which seems seems acute acute to the legisl legislati ative ve mind… mind…The The legislature may select one phase of field and apply a Particularly with remedy remedy there, there, neglecti neglecting ng others.” others.” Particularly
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consti part 6: equal protection clause respect respect to social social welfare welfare programs, programs, so long as the line drawn drawn by the State State is ration rationall ally y suppo supporta rtable ble,, the Cour Courts ts will will not not inter interpo pose se their their judg judgeme ement nt as to the the appropriate stopping point. With With respec respectt to how a change change of the variable variables s would would result result in a more more compre comprehen hensiv sive e progra program, m, the Court Court expr expres essed sed that that such such woul would d inev inevit itab ably ly requi require re stat state e subsidy or some other measure. The Court held that the State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the selfsupp support ortin ing g natu nature re of its its insu insura ranc nce e prog progra ram m and and in distri distribut buting ing the availa available ble resour resources ces in such such a way to keep eep bene benefi fitt paym paymen ents ts at an adeq adequa uate te level evel for for disabi disabilit lities ies covered covered.. Also Also it has legiti legitimat mate e concer concern n in maintaining the contribution rate at a level that won’t unduly unduly burden burden partic participa ipatin ting g employe employees. es. Moreov Moreover, er, it said that here is nothing nothing in the Consti that requires the Stat State e to subo subord rdin inat ate e or comp compro romi mise se its its legi legiti tima mate te interests solely to create a more comprehensive social insurance program that it already has. Brennan’s dissent: Despite the Code’s broad goals and scope of coverage, comp compen ensa sati tion on is denie denied d for disa disabi bili liti ties es suff suffer ered ed in connec connectio tion n with with a “norma “normall pregnan pregnancy” cy” – disabi disabilit lities ies suff suffer ered ed only only by wome women. n. By sing singli ling ng out out for for less less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar to women, women, the State State has created created a double double standa standard rd for disability compensation. One set of rules is applied to females while another to males. This is sex discri discrimin minatio ation. n. Where Where the State State employs employs legisla legislativ tive e classifications with reference to gender-linked disability risks, “the Court is not free to sustain the statute on ground ground that that iot ration rationall ally y promot promotes es legiti legitimat mate e govtl govtl interests; interests; rather rather such classificatio classifications ns can be sustained sustained only when the State bears the burden of demonstrating that that the challe challenge nged d legisl legislati ation on serves serves overri overridin ding g or compelling compelling interests that cannot be achieved achieved by more carefully tailored legislative classification or by the use of feasible, less drastic means.”
MISSISSIPPI UNIV. SCHOOL for WOMEN vs. HOGAN
July 1, 1982 JUSTICE O'CONNOR
School of Nursing has its own faculty and administrative officers and establishes its own criteria for admission. Respondent, Joe Hogan, is a registered nurse but does not hold a baccalaureate degree in nursing. Since 1974, he has worked worked as a nursin nursing g superv superviso isorr in a medical medical center in Columbus, the city in which MUW is located. In 1979, 1979, Hoga Hogan n appl applie ied d for for admi admiss ssio ion n to the the MUW MUW School of Nursing's baccalaureate baccalaureate program. Although he was otherwise qualified, he was denied admission to the School of Nursing solely because of his sex. Hogan filed an action in the United States District Court for the the Norther Northern n Distri District ct of Missis Mississip sippi, pi, claimi claiming ng the single-sex admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Amendment. Hogan sought injunctive injunctive and declaratory declaratory relief, as well as compensatory damages. Issue
WON WON the the stat state e stat statut ute e whic which h prev prevent ented ed men from from enrolling enrolling in MUW violate the Equal Protection Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Holding
Yes The Court held that the state did not provide an "exceed "exceeding ingly ly persuas persuasive ive justif justifica icatio tion" n" for the gendergenderbased distinction. The state's argument, that the policy constituted constituted educational educational affirmative affirmative action action for women, was "unpersuasive" since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. Ratio
We begin our analysis aided by several firmly established princi principle ples. s. Becaus Because e the challe challenged nged policy policy express expressly ly discriminates among applicants on the basis of gender, it is subjec subjectt to scruti scrutiny ny under under the the Equal Equal Protect Protection ion Clau Clause se of the the Four Fourte teen enth th Amen Amendme dment nt.. That That this this statutory policy discriminates against males rather than than agai agains nstt fema female les s does does not not exem exempt pt it from from scruti scrutiny ny or reduce reduce the standa standard rd of review. review. Our decision decisions s also establish establish that the party party seeking seeking to uphold uphold a statute statute that classifies classifies individua individuals ls on the bas basis is of thei theirr gend gender er must must carr carry y the the burd burden en of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. classification. The burden is met only by showing
at leas leastt that that the the clas classi sifi fica cati tion on serv serves es "imp "impor orta tant nt govern government mental al object objective ives s and that that the discri discrimina minator tory y mean means s emplo employe yed" d" are are "subs "substa tant ntia iall lly y rela relate ted d to the the achievement of those objectives."
FACTS:
In 1884 1884,, the the Miss Missis issi sipp ppii Legi Legisl slat atur ure e crea create ted d the the Missis Mississip sippi pi Indust Industria riall Instit Institute ute and Colleg College e for the Education of White Girls of the State of Mississippi, now the oldest oldest statestate-sup support ported ed all-fe all-femal male e colleg college e in the the United States. The school, known today as Mississippi Univer Universit sity y for Women Women (MUW), (MUW), has from from its incept inception ion limited its enrollment to women.
Care Care must must be take taken n in asce ascerta rtain inin ing g wheth whether er the the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "pro "prote tect ct"" member members s of one one gend gender er beca becaus use e they they are are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.
In 1971, MUW established a School of Nursing, initially offering a 2-year associate degree. Three years later, the school school institu instituted ted a 4-year 4-year baccal baccalaur aureat eate e progra program m in nursing and today also offers a graduate program. The
If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we next determine whether whether the requisite requisite direct, direct, substantial substantial relationship between objective and means is present. The purpose of requiring that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through
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consti part 6: equal protection clause reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women. The State's primary justification for maintaining the single single-se -sex x admis admissio sions ns polic policy y of MUW's MUW's Schoo Schooll of Nursing Nursing is that it compensa compensates tes for discrimin discriminatio ation n again ainst wom women and and, ther theref efo ore, con constit titutes utes educa educatio tiona nall affir affirma mativ tive e action action.. As appli applied ed to the Schoo Schooll of Nursi Nursing, ng, we find find the the State' State's s argume argument nt unpersuasive.
In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened. burdened. However, we consistently have emphasized emphasized that that "the "the mere mere reci recita tati tion on of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."
It is read readil ily y appa appare ren nt that that a Sta State can can evok evoke e a compe ompen nsato satory ry purp purpos ose e to jus justify tify an oth otherw erwise ise discri discrimin minator atory y classi classific ficati ation on only only if members members of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvant disadvantage age related related to the classifica classification. tion. Mississippi has made no showing that women lacked oppo opport rtun unit itie ies s to obta obtain in trai traini ning ng in the the fiel field d of nursing or to attain positions of leadership in that field field when the MUW School School of Nursing Nursing opened its door or that women currently are deprived of such fact,, in 1970, 1970, the the year year befor before e the the opportunities. In fact
School of Nursing's first class enrolled, women e arned 94 percent of the nursing baccalaureate degrees conferred in Mississippi and 98.6 percent of the degrees earned nationwide. As one would expect, the labor force reflects the same predominance of women in nursing. Rather Rather than than compen compensat sate e for discri discrimin minato atory ry barrie barriers rs faced faced by women, women, MUW's MUW's policy policy of excludin excluding g males males from from admissio admission n to the School School of Nursing Nursing tends to perpetuat perpetuate e the stereotype stereotyped d view of nursing nursing as an exclusively woman's job. By assuring that Mississippi
allots allots more more openin openings gs in its statestate-sup suppor ported ted nursin nursing g schoo chools ls to women omen than than it does does to men, men, MUW' MUW's s admissions policy lends credibility to the old view that women, not men, should become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for women a selffulfilling prophecy. Thus, we conclude that, although the State recited a "benign, compensatory purpose," it failed to establish that the alleged objective is the actu actual al purp purpos ose e unde underl rlyi ying ng the the disc discri rimi mina nato tory ry classification. Thus, considering both the asserted interest and the relationship between the interest and the methods used by the State, we conclude that the State has falle fallen n far short short of establ establish ishing ing the the "exce "exceedi eding ngly ly persu persuasi asive ve justif justifica icatio tion" n" needed needed to sustai sustain n the the gender-ba gender-based sed classifi classificatio cation. n. Accordin Accordingly, gly, we hold hold that that MUW's MUW's polic policy y of denyin denying g males males the right to enroll for credit in its School of Nursing violates the Equal ual Pro Protect ection ion Claus lause e of the Fou Fourte rteent enth Amendment.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.
. Of the State's 8 universities and 16 junior colleges, all excep exceptt MUW MUW are are coedu coeduca cati tion onal al.. At leas leastt two two othe otherr Mississippi universities would have provided respondent with the nursing curriculum that he wishes to pursue. No other male has joined in his complaint. Nor is respondent significantly disadvantaged by MUW's all-fe all-femal male e tradit tradition. ion. His consti constituti tutiona onall compla complaint int is based upon a single asserted harm: that he must travel to attend attend the statestate-sup suppor ported ted nursin nursing g school schools s that that concededly are available to him. The Court characterizes this injury as one of "inconvenience." The The argu arguab able le but but reco recogn gniz ized ed bene benefi fits ts of sing single le-s -sex ex coll colleg eges es must must also also be cons consid ider ered. ed. They They provi provide de an element element of divers diversity ity,, and [an environm environment ent in which which women] generally, speak up more in their classes, hold more positions of leadership on campus, and have more role models and mentors among women teachers and administrators." The issue in this case is whether a State transgresses the Consti Constitut tution ion when when it seeks seeks to accommo accommodat date e the legiti legitimat mate e person personal al prefere preferenc nces es of those those desiri desiring ng the advantages advantages of an all-women's all-women's college. In my view, the Court Court errs errs seriou seriously sly by assumi assuming ng that that the the equal equal protec protectio tion n stand standard ard genera generally lly applic applicabl able e to sex discrimin discriminatio ation n is appropria appropriate te here. here. That standard standard was was desi design gned ed to free free wome women n from from "arc "archa haic ic and and overbroad generalizations . . . ." In no previous case have have we appli applied ed it to invali invalidat date e state state effor efforts ts to expand women women's 's choice choices. s. Nor Nor are there there prior prior sex sex discrimin discriminatio ation n decision decisions s by this Court in which which a male plaintiff, as in this case, had the choice of an equal benefit.
By applying heightened equal protection analysis to this case, case, the Court Court frustr frustrate ates s the libera liberatin ting g spirit spirit of the Equal Equal Protec Protection tion Clause Clause.. It prohib prohibits its the States States from from providing women with an opportunity to choose the type of university they prefer.
MICHAEL M. vs. SUPERIOR COURT
FACTS: •
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Petitioner, then a 17 ½ yr old male, was charged with violation violation of California’ California’s s statutory statutory rape law, which which defines defines unlawf unlawful ul sexual sexual interc intercour ourse se as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under 18” Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on both state and feder deral constitutional grounds asserting that the statute unlawfully unlawfully discriminated discriminated on the basis of gender since since men alone alone can can be held held crimin criminall ally y liable liable ther thereun eunder der.. The The tria triall cour courtt and and CA denied denied
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consti part 6: equal protection clause peti petiti tion oner’ er’s s reque request st for for reli relief ef and and peti petiti tion oner er sought review in the SC of California. •
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California SC upheld the statute. It justified the gender classification because only females may be vict victim ims s and and only only male males s may may viol violat ate e the the section. It subjected the statute to strict scrutiny stating that it must be justified by compelling state interest. interest. It found that the classific classification ation was “supported not by mere social convention but by the immutable fact that it is the female exclusively who can become pregnant” Canv Canvas assi sing ng the the tragi tragic c cost costs s of ille illegi giti tima mate te teenage pregnancies, including the large number of teenage teenage abortio abortions, ns, increa increased sed medical medical risk risk asso associ ciat ated ed with with teen teenag age e preg pregna nanc ncie ies, s, & the the social social consequenc consequences es of teenage teenage child-beari child-bearing, ng, court concluded that the State has a compelling interest in preventing such pregnancies.
ISSUE:
WON California’s statutory rape law violates the Equal Protection Clause. NO RATIO:
On the proper test Gender-based classifications are not “inherently suspect so as to be subje ubjec ct to the the “str “striict scrutiny” but will be upheld if they bear a “fair and substantial relationship” to legitimate state ends. The traditional minimum rationality test applies. Because the Equal Protection Clause does not demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all all pers person ons s or requ requir ire e thin things gs whic which h are are different in fact to be treated in law as though they were the same, a statute will be upheld where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes sexes are are not not simi simila larl rly y situ situat ated ed in cert certai ain n circumstances. On the legit imate state interest One One of the the purpo purpose ses s of the the Cali Califo forn rnia ia stat state e statute in which the State has a strong interest is the the prev preven enti tion on of ill illegit egitim ima ate teen teena age pregnancies pregnancies.. Teenage Teenage pregnancies pregnancies,, which have increased dramatically over the last 2 decades, have significant significant social, social, medical, medical, and economic economic consequences for both the mother and her child, and the State. The The stat statut ute e prot protec ects ts wome women n from from sexua exuall intercourse and pregnancy at an age when the phys physic ical al,, emot emotio iona nal, l, and and psyc sycholo hologi gic cal consequenc consequences es are particular particularly ly severe. Because virt virtua uall lly y all all of the the sign signif ific ican antt harm harmfu full & identifiable consequ3ences of teenage pregnancy fall on the female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No simi simila larr sanc sancti tion ons s dete deterr male males. s. A crim crimin inal al •
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sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly “equalize” the deterrents on the sexes. On underinclusivity/overbr underinclusivity/overbroadness oadness There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that the statute is impermissibly underinclusive and must, must, in order order to pass pass judi judici cial al scru scruti tiny ny,, be broadened so as to hold the female as criminally liable as the male. The relevant inquiry is not whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the line chosen by the California Legislature is w/n constitutional limi limita tati tion ons. s. In any any even event, t, a gend genderer-ne neutr utral al statut statute e would would frustr frustrate ate the State’ State’s s interes interestt in effecti effective ve enforc enforcemen ementt since since a female female would would be less likely to report violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to prosecution. Nor Nor is the the stat statut ute e imper impermi miss ssib ibly ly overb overbro road ad because because it makes unlawful sexual intercourse intercourse wit with h prep prepub ubes esce cent nt fema female les, s, inca incapa pabl ble e of becoming becoming pregnant. Aside from the fact that the statute could be justified on the grounds that very young females are particularly susceptible to physical injury from sexual intercourse, the Consti Constitut tution ion does not requir require e the Califo Californi rnia a Legislature to limit the scope of the statute to older teenagers and exclude young girls. On age consideration And And the the stat statut ute e is not not unco uncons nsti titu tuti tion onal al as applied to petitioner, who, like the girl involved, was under 18 at the time of the sexu exual interc intercour ourse, se, on the asserte asserted d ground ground that that the statute statute presumes presumes in such circumstances circumstances that the male is the culpable aggressor. The statute does not rest on such an assumption, but is an atte attemp mptt to prev preven entt illeg llegit itiimate mate teen teenag age e pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent for men. The age of the man is irrelevant since the young men are as capable as older men of inflicting the harm sought to be prevented. •
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HELD: US SC affirmed California SC. Statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
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PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR vs. FEENEY
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v Feeney (1979) ponente: Stewart J Facts: Helen Helen Feen Feeney ey is a nonv nonvet etera eran. n. She She alle alleges ges that that the the Mass Massac achu huse sett tts s Vete Vetera ran ns Prefe refere renc nce e Sta Statute tute is unconstition unconstitional. al. The statute statute grants grants an absolute absolute lifetime lifetime preferen preference ce to vetera veterans ns by requir requiring ing that that "any "any person person male or female, including a nurse," qualifying for a civil service position, who was honorably discharged from the US Armed Forces after at least 90 days of active service, at least one day in wartim wartime, e, must must be consid considered ered for appoin appointme tment nt to a civil civil service service position position ahead ahead of any qualified qualified nonveterans. nonveterans. This formula excludes excludes women
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consti part 6: equal protection clause from consideration for the best Mass civil service jobs thus denying women the equal protection of laws.
discri discrimin minatio ation n in the formul formulati ation on of a law, law, it is still still constitutional.
She passed her first civil service exam for the position of Seni Senior or Clerk Clerk sten stenog ogra raph pher er and and was was prom promot oted. ed. She She competed in other civil service exams during her 12 year career to avail herself of a better job and promotion. She consistently passed and was ranked quite high in some but but she she was was alwa always ys pass passed ed over over by lowe lowerr rank ranked ed veterans. She lost her job when it was abolished and concluded concluded that further competing competing in civil sercice sercice exams is useless because the veterans would always get ahead of her.
When a gender neutral statute is challenged, there must be a two-fold inquiry: 1) Whether or not the statutory statutory classificat classification ion is indeed neutral; notgender-based, 2) Whether or not the adverse effects reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. In 2 impact is a starting point but it is purposeful discrimination that offends consti.
The district Court agreed with her saying that it had a severe exclutionary impact on women hiring. hiring. In the 1st appea ppeall to the the US Supr Suprem eme e Cour Court, t, the the case was was remanded so that the district court can consider it in light light of the Washingt Washington on V Davis Davis ruling ruling that states a neutra neutrall law does not violat violate e equal equal protec protectio tion n solely solely because because it results results in a racially racially disproportionat disproportionate e impact; impact; it must be traced traced to a purpose purpose to discriminate discriminate on race. race. The district court reaffirmed their judgment. ISSUE:
Does Does the the Veter Veteran ans s Prefe Prefere renc nce e Statu Statute te viol violat ate e equa equall protection by discriminating against women? RULE:
When a distinction drawn by a statute is not a pretext for gender discrimination and the law does not reflect a purpose to discriminate then it is constitutional RATIONALE:
The Mass Veterans Preference statute was a measure measure designed to ease the transition from military to civil life by vetera veterans ns and to attrac attractt loyal loyal and well-d well-disc iscipl ipline ined d people people to civil civil servic service. e. It is written written in gender gender neutral neutral language (the use of person, male or female), though in 1884, when the 1st such statute was promulgated, no women were in the armed forces. It has been conceded by the the appel appella lant nts s that that the the civi civill posit positio ions ns open open for for competi competitio tion n result resulted ed in a dispro disproport portion ionate ate amount amount of males being preferred because over 98% of the veterans at that time consisted of men. Equal protection does not take away the ability of the state to classify as long as it is rationally based though the the effe effec cts may may be unev uneven en.. Howe Howev ver, er, certa ertain in classifications are, like race, presumptively invalid and can can only only be upheld upheld upon extraor extraordin dinary ary justif justifica icatio tion, n, even even if that that classi classific ficati ation on is suppos supposedl edly y neutra neutral. l. If a neutral law has a disproportionate effect on a minority then it unconstitional only if ther there e can be traced a discriminatory purpose. Neutrals laws that have a disparate affect on minorities tradit traditiona ionally lly victim victims s of discri discrimin minati ation on may have have an unconstitut unconstitutional ional purpose. But equal protection means equal laws, not equal results. So long as there is no
The appellee acknowledged acknowledged and the district court found that the distinction between veterans and non-veterans is not a pre-text for gender discrimination. Vetera Veteran n is a gend genderer-ne neutr utral al word word.. The The dist distin inct ction ion between between vetern vetern and non-v non-veter eteran an is not gender gender based. based. Men and women can be veterans. The appellee and district court contends that 1) ther there e is gend gender er bias bias beca becaus use e it pefe pefers rs a stat status us generally reserved for men, 2) the impact of absolute lifetime employment is too inevitable to be unintended. The 1st contention presumes that the state incorporates a panoply of sex-based laws to favor the employment of men in armed armed forces forces to become become vetera veterans. ns. But veteran veteran pref prefere erenc nce e is not not disc discri rimin minato atory ry to wome women n and and the the appell appellee ee and distri district ct court court contra contradic dicts ts itself itself that that a limited hiring preference for veterans could be sustained. Just Just becaus because e few women women become become vetera veterans ns does not mean that the veteran preference statute was intended by the state state to discriminate discriminate against women. There must be discriminatory intent but the state is simply Preferring veterans not men. The legislative classification between vets and non-vets has not been disput disputed ed to be illegi illegitima timate. te. The Enlist Enlistmen mentt policies of the US armed forces may be gender biased but that is not the issue here. The appellee presumes that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions. The Veteran Veteran preference preference would would necessarily necessarily place place more men men on civi civill serv servic ice e posi positi tion ons s than than wome women n and and the the legisl legislatu ature re is aware aware of this. this. However However,, "disc "discrim rimina inator tory y purp purpos ose" e" impl implie ies s that that the the legi legisl slat atur ure e selec electe ted d a particular course "because of", not "in spite of", adverse Effects on an identifiable group. The veteran preference was was not not show shown n to be enac enacte ted d beca becaus use e of gend gender er discrimantion against women. DISPOSITION:
judgment reversed CONCURRING: Stevens w/ White
Disadvantaged males disadvantaged females.
are
almos most
as
large
as
DISSENT: Marshall w/ Brennan
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There There is discri discrimin minato atory ry intent intent becaus because e the statut statutory ory scheme bears no substantial relationship to a legitimate governm government ent object objective ive.. Just Just becaus because e the object objective ive of a statute is to prefer one group does not always mean that it does does not not have have anot anothe herr purpo purpose se to disa disadv dvan anta tage ge another.
Nobody can ever know what the legislature is thinking at a given time, therefore, critical constitutional inquiry is not whethe whetherr an illici illicitt consid considera eratio tion n was the primar primary y cause but rather whether it had an appreciable role in shaping a given legislative enactment. There is no reliable evidence for subjective intentions so to discern discern the purpose purpose of a facially neutral neutral policy, policy, the cour courtt must must cons consid ider er the the degr degree, ee, inev inevit itab abil ilit ity y and and foreseeability of any disproportionate impact as well as the alternatives reasonably available. Here, the impact on women is undisputed. The burden of proof should be on the state state to prove prove that that sex-ba sex-based sed consid considera eration tions s played no part. To survive a challenge challenge under equal protection protection clause, clause, statu tatute tes s mus must be subst ubsta antia ntiallly rela relate ted d to the the achievement of important govt objectives.
ISSUE: W/N unlawful discrimination on the basis of
national origin was the reason for denying employment to Fragrante. HELD: No evidence of unlawful discrimination was
found but it is Fragrante’s lack of the occupational requirement of being able to communicate effectively with the public that was the reason for his being denied the job. RATIO:
The appellants contend that the statute: 1) assists veterans in their readjustment to civilian life 2) encourage military reenlistment 3) reward those who have served their country. To 1st objective, the statute is overinclusive because of it's it's perman permanent ent prefere preference nce.. The majorit majority y of those those who currently enjoy the system have long been discharged and have no need for readjustment. To 2nd object ective, it doe does not actua tually induce reenlistment and there is no proof to be found that the statute influenced reenlistment. Also it bestows benefits equally on those who volunteered and those who were drafted. To 3rd objective, rewarding veterans does not adequately justify justify visiting visiting substantial substantial hardships hardships on another another class class long subject to discrimination. The legislation cant be sustained sustained unless unless carefully carefully tuned to alternative alternatives. s. Here there are less discriminatory means available to effect the Compensatory purpose.
In disparate treatment cases, under which theory this case was brought under, the employer is normally alleged to have “treated a person less favorable than others because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” o Plaintiff has the initial burden of proving by preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.
4 factors in McDonnell Douglas test: 1. that that he has has an ident identifi ifiabl able e nationa nationall origin origin;; 2. that that he applie applied d and was was qual qualifi ified ed for a job job which which the employer was seeking applicants; 3. that he was rejected despite his qualifications; 4. that, after his rejection, the position remained open open and and the the empl employ oyer er cont contin inue ued d to seek seek appl applic ican ants ts from from pers person ons s of comp compla lain inan ant' t's s qualifications.
YICK WO vs. HOPKINS
FRAGRANTE vs. CITY & COUNTY of HONOLULU
FACTS:
At the age of 60, Fragrante immigrated to Hawaii. He applied for an entry level job as a Civil Service Clerk at the City’s Division of Motor Vehicles and Licensing. Fragrante scored the highest among 721 test takers in the written examination and was rank first on a list of eligibles for two clerk positions. Following the interview, it was noted by the two interviewers that he had a very pronounced accent and was difficult to understand and therefore, as a result of this, he was not chosen for the job and he was so notified by mail.
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Employer then has burden of “arti “articu cula latin ting g some some legi legiti tima mate te,, nonnondiscrimina discriminatory tory reason” reason” for the adverse adverse action. employe employerr still still has degree degree of freedom of choice given to him
o
To succeed in carrying the ultimate bur burd den of pro provin ving int intentio ntion nal disc discri rimi mina nati tion on,, a plai plaint ntif ifff may may establish a pretext either directly, by showing that the employer was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason, or indirectly, by showing the empl emplo oyer's er's prof roffere ered reas reaso on is unworthy of credence.
While Fragrante was able to establish a prima facie case since jurisprudence and the
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consti part 6: equal protection clause guidelines of the Equal Employment Oppurtunity Commission has defined discrimination to include denial of equal employment opportunity on the basis that a person has the linguistic characteristics of a national origin group… an adverse employment decision may be predicated upon an individuals accent when it interferes materially with job performance. o
The oral ability to communicate effectively in English is reasonable related to the normal operations of the clerk’s office who must often be able to respond to the public’s questions in a manner in which they can understand. In sum, sum, the the reco record rd conc conclu lusi sive vely ly show shows s that that Frag Fragan ante te was was pass passed ed over over beca becaus use e of the the deleterious effect of his Filipino accent on his abil abilit ity y to comm commun unic icat ate e oral orally ly,, not not mere merely ly because he had such an accent.
Supreme Court of the United States Manuel T. FRAGANTE, petitioner, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, et al No. 89-1350 April 16, 1990
Case below, 699 F.Supp. 1429; 888 F.2d 591. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Denied. 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1811, 108 L.Ed.2d 942, 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 848, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,796 END OF DOCUMENT
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO ARTICLE ( The The “New” Equal
Protection
The The Phil. Phil. Consti Consti.. Provid Provides es “nor “nor shall shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws” which it got from the American Const. Amendment “no state shall… deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”. EP is generally based on moral equality“although not every person is the moral equal others, there are some traits and factors, of which race is a paradi paradigma gmatic tic example example,, by virtue virtue of which which no person person
ought to be deemed morally inferior to any other person” whe where re race race-d -dep epen ende dent nt , gend gender er-d -dep epen ende dent nt and and illegitimacy-dependent classifications are now generally disfavored. Therefore the threshold question is whether simi simila larl rly y situ situat ated ed indi indivi vidu dual als s are bein being g trea treate ted d differently. In the US, it was substantive due process instead of EP which was used to justify court intervention with state economic economic legislation legislation but in the 1960s the Warren Court went further where it used EP as a far-reaching umbrella for judicial protection of fundamental rights not specified in the Const. One difference is that if the governmental act classifies persons, it will be subjected to EP analysis; otherwise, it would be subjected to due process analysis. EP tests whether the classific classification ation is properly properly drawn, drawn, while procedural due process tests the process to find out out whet whethe herr an indi indivi vidu dual al fall falls s withi within n or with withou outt a specific classification. Standards of Judicial Review There must be a sufficient degree of relationship between the perceived purpose of the law and the classification which the law makes. The choice of a standard of review reflects reflects whether whether the Court Court will will assume assume the power power to override democratic political process, or whether it will limit the concept of a unique judicial function. The The old EP doctri doctrine ne applie applies s the ration rational al relati relations onship hip test- it will be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the Const. The new EP doctrine doctrine applies the strict strict scrutiny scrutiny test. It will not accept every permissible governmental purpose as to support a classification; it will require that it is pursuing a compelling end. The newer EP doctrine of the past 10 years has gone beyond beyond the the two-ti two-tiered ered level level of review review,, and applies applies the intens intensifi ified ed means means test. test. Accordi According ng to Prof. Prof. Gunthe Guntherr of Stan Stanfor ford, d, the the Cour Courtt shoul should d acce accept pt the the arti articu cula lated ted purpose of the legislation, but it should closely scrutinize the relationship between the classification and purpose. Two-tiered standard of review Unde Underr this this,, the the firs firstt tier tier cons consis ists ts of the the rati ration onal al relationship test and the second tier the strict scrutiny test. Strict judicial scrutiny is applied when legislation impinges on fundamental tights, or implicates suspect classes (classification based on race or ethnicity). According to American cases, fundamental rights are: a. marr marria iage ge and and proc procrea reati tion on-- “fun “funda dame ment ntal al to the the very existence and survival of the race b. voti voting ng-- “pre “prese serv rvat ativ ive e of othe otherr basi basic c civi civill and and political rights” c. fair fair admini administ stra rati tion on of just justic icee- fundam fundamen enta tall as established in Griffin v. Illinois d. inte inters rsta tate te trav travel el-- star starte ted d with with the the land landma mark rk decision in Shapiro v. Thompson e. other other cons consti titu tutio tiona nall righ rights ts-- fund fundam amen enta tall righ rights ts protected by the first 8 amendments Suspect classes include: a. race race or nation national al origin origin-- in the the case case of Koremat Korematsu su v. US “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
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b.
rights of a single racial groups are immediately suspe uspect ct.. That That is not not to say tha that all such uch restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that court courts s must must subj subjec ectt them them to the the most most rigi rigid d scrutiny” alienage- established in the case of In re Griffiths
Benign classifications and affirmative action The The US SC has held that that racial racial classi classific ficati ations ons which discriminate against minorities are inherently “suspect” and will be subject to strict scrutiny and upheld only if necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Thee ques questi tion on of beni benign gn clas classi sifi fica catio tion n is will will the the same same standa standard rd of review review apply apply to governm government ent action action which which discriminates in favor of racial or ethnic minorities? It was addressed in the case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke where they held it is not prohibited if discrimina discrimination tion remedies disadvanta disadvantages ges of members of a group resulting from past unlawful discrimination but is stil stilll open open to ques questi tion ons s (int (inter erme medi diat ate e or stri strict ctes estt standard) as to what level of standard to applied. In the Phil. Benign classific classification ation and affirmativ affirmative e action action does not necessarily fall under EP. It is specified in the Const. Art. XV, Sec. 11 “the state shall consider the customs, tradit traditions ions,, beliefs beliefs,, and interes interests ts of nation national al cultur cultural al minorit minorities ies in the formul formulati ation on and implem implementa entatio tion n of state policies”. (it has only to show rational relationship in order to survive judicial challenge) Appraisal of the Two-tiered standard Critic ticized by Justice Harlan, an, he was saying “clas “classif sifica icatio tions ns which which are either either based based upon certai certain n “suspect” criteria or affect “fundamental rights” will be held held to deny deny EP unle unless ss just justif ifie ied d by a comp compel elli ling ng governmental interest (calling it the compelling interest doctrine). He was saying that if classification is based upon upon the exercis exercise e of rights rights guaran guaranteed teed agains againstt state state infrin infringeme gement nt by the Federal Federal Const. Const.,, then then there there is no need for any resort to the EP clause. He was also saying tha that the the fund fundam amen enta tall righ rightt is unfo unfort rtun una ate and and unn unneces ecessa sary ry sinc since e it crea create tes s an exc excepti eption on whic which h threatens to swallow the standard equal protection rule. In extend extending ing the compel compellin ling g interes interestt rule rule to all such cases would go far toward making the Court a superlegislature. Notwithstanding such criticisms, the Warren Court gave cruc crucia iall supp support ort sayi saying ng that that sinc since e total total equa equali lity ty is impossible and undesirable, the judiciary in the name of the constitution must select the areas in which quality is to be imposed. With the advent of the new legal equality, the US has declared it the duty of government to take positive action to reduce reduce social social discrimi discriminat nation. ion. In the the Phil. Phil. It is not neces ecessa sary ry sinc ince the the Cons Const. t. mak makes the the posi positi tiv ve comman commands: ds: “the “the state state shall shall promote promote social social justic justice e to ensure ensure dignity, dignity, welfare welfare and security”, “shall maintain and and ensu ensure re adeq adequa uate te soci social al serv servic ices es in the the fiel field d of education, education, health, housing, housing, employment, employment, welfare welfare and social security…” , “it shall afford protection to labor, promote full employmen ment, ens ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed”. Therefore in the Phil. it will not always be necessary to extend the two-tiered two-tiered standard standard of judicial judicial review to cases cases involving involving social discrimination. Models for an open-ended standard Under Under the the trad tradit itio iona nall appr approa oach ch,, the the idea ideall limi limitt of reason reasonabl ablenes eness s is reache reached d when when the public public mischi mischief ef sought to be eliminated is interchangeable with the trait, as the the defi defini ning ng char charac acte teri rist stic ics s of the the legi legisl slat ativ ive e classi classific ficati ation. on. Problem Problems s only only arise arise when when it is underunderinclusive or over-inclusive. There are 3 models drawn by Prof. Nowak of the Univ. of Illino Illinois is for determi determinin ning g the approa approach ch that that the Court Court should take: a. susp suspec ectt-pr prohi ohibi bite ted d clas classi sifi fica cati tion on-- when whenev ever er a classification burdens persons on the basis of their their race, race, the court court would would invali invalidat date e the law unle unless ss the the legi legisl slat atur ure e can can prov prove e that that the the clas classi sifi fic catio ation n is nec necess essary to achi chieve eve a compelling state interest. This standard will be almost impossible to meet. b. Neut Neutra rall clas classi sifi fica cati tion onss- neutr eutral al when whenev ever er it treats treats person persons s in a dissim dissimila ilarr manner manner on the basis of some inherent human characteristic or status (other than racial heritage) or limit the exercise of a fundamental right by a class of persons. The court should validate a statute only if the means used bear a factually demonstrable rela relati tion onsh ship ip to a stat state e inte intere rest st capa capabl ble e of withstanding analysis. c. Permi Permiss ssiv ive e clas classi sifi fica catio tionn- when wheneve everr legi legisl slat atio ion n treats classes in a dissimilar manner but does not employ a prohibited or neutral classification as the basis of dissimilar treatment, it will be upheld as long as there is any conceivable basis upon upon whic which h the the clas classi sifi fica catio tion n coul could d bear bear a rational relationship to the state end. Another model drawn by Prof. Gary Simson of Univ. of Texas (discriminatory effect test) His model is based upon the prescribed balance between discriminatory effect and governmental justification: 1) courts courts shoul should d first first decide decide whethe whetherr the indivi individua duall interest affected by the classification before them is fundamental, significant, or insignificant. 2) Wheth ether the the disadva dvantag tage to the the affected interest is total, significant, or insignificant. 3) Next is ascert ertaining wheth ether the interes rest info inform rmin ing g the the clas classi sifi fica cati tion on is compe compell llin ing, g, significant, insignificant, or unlawful 4) Cour Courts ts shou should ld also also dete determ rmin ine e the the nece necess ssar ary, y, sign signif ific ican ant, t, insi insign gnif ific ican ant, t, or nonnon-ex exis iste tent nt character of the relationship between means and ends. After all the factors, they should compute: Natu Naturre of the the affec ffecte ted d inte interrest est x magn magnit itud ude e of disadvantage Nature Nature of the state’ state’s s intere interest st x relati relations onship hip between between means and end The Philippine Experience
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consti part 6: equal protection clause The Phil. SC continues to apply the permissive criteria of the tradit tradition ional al EP. The Phil. Phil. Court Court while while ostens ostensibl ibly y applyi applying ng the ration rational al relatio relationsh nship ip test, test, was implic implicity ity applying the strict scrutiny test in People v. Vera where it held that the Phil. Probation Act was unconstitutional because application of the statute depended upon salary appropriati appropriations ons for probation probation officers by the provincial provincial boards (since residents of a province could be denied of the benefits of probation if the provincial board failed to appropriate the necessary amount). In an unfortunate development, the court upheld the Act which made it unlawful for any native of the Phil. who was a member of non-Christian tribe to possess or drink intoxicating liquors other than native liquors. It was held to be reasonable because it was designed to insure peace and order among non-Christian tribes but the rational relationship test would consider this distasteful. There are still other cases such as the Laurel v. Misa where the court failed to use the strict scrutiny test and was considered unworthy of emulation. The The leng length thy y sear search ch in Phil Phil.. juri jurisp spru ruden dence ce can can be abbr abbrev evia iate ted d by adop adopti ting ng the the cate catego gory ry whic which h the the American Court labeled under the two-tiered standard of judicial review, as the category of cases calling for strict judicial scrutiny. Scenario for the “new” equal protection
foreig foreign n diplom diplomats ats and other other tempora temporary ry residen residents. ts. As such, they hire their teachers both from the Philippines and from abroad. To indicate whether they are foreign hires or local hires, they they take take into into cons consid ider erat atio ion n 1) domi domici cile le 2) home home econ econom omy y 3) econ economi omic c alle allegi gian ance ce 4) was was the the schoo schooll responsible for bringing the individual to the Philippines. The problem lies in the salary of the teachers. As foreign hires, they are accorded benefits that local hires do not have. These include, housing, transportation, shipping costs, costs, taxes, taxes, and home home leave leave travel travel allowa allowance nce.. Their Their salari salaries es are also higher by 25%. 25%. The school school gives gives 2 reasons: 1) dislocation factor and 2) limited tenure. In a new collective bargaining agreement, ISA educators contested this difference in salary. Filing a strike, DOLE assumed jurisdiction. Acting secretary Trajano decided in favor of the school, and DOLE secretary Quisumbing denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Petitioner claims claims that the point-of-hi point-of-hire re classific classification ation is discriminatory to Filipinos. Respondents claim, however, that this is not so as a number of their foreign educators are in fact local-hires. ISSUE:
The tired slogan of Filipino politicians “those who have less in life should have more in law” should be taken on a serious level as an affirmative action on the part of the government, government, and perhaps perhaps the formulation of “benign” “benign” classific classification ations. s. Contemporary Contemporary developments developments argue for expanding expanding the contours contours of constitution constitutional al equality, equality, by adopting strict judicial scrutiny in cases where the laws seek to restrict fundamental rights or to classify on the basis of suspect criteria. In the Phil. the equal protection clause, phrased as it is afte afterr the the Amer Americ ican an mode model, l, may may pose pose prob proble lems ms of legislative and administrative classifications, of linkages between legal and socio-economic opportunity, of equal rewa reward rds, s, and and most most fund fundam ament ental ally ly of the the exten extentt of compatibility of political liberty and economic equality. In the resolu resolutio tion n of these these proble problems, ms, the the “new” “new” equal equal protec protection tion could prove to be a useful useful and equita equitable ble techni technique que of judici judicial al analys analysis, is, in the hands of a SC sentie sentient nt to the the contin continuin uing g need to prevent prevent invidi invidious ous disc discri rimi mina nati tion on agai agains nstt disa disadv dvan anta tage ged d vict victim ims s of legisl legislati ative ve classi classific ficati ation on or in the exerci exercise se of certai certain n fundamental rights by the Filipino people, as a justice constituency.
Whet Whethe herr or not not the the 25% 25% diff differ eren enc ce discriminatory.
in salar alary y is
HELD:
Yes it is. RATIO:
In deciding the case, the court points first to the 1987 Constitution Constitution,, particular particularly ly the Article Article on Social Social Justice Justice and Hu Huma man n Right ights s, whic which h the the cour courtt says this this discrimination is against. They also point to international law, which likewise looks down on discrimination. discrimination. It then goes further to say that this is even worse when the discrimination is done in the wor workp kpla lace ce.. Point Pointin ing g agai again n to the the Cons Consti titut tutio ion, n, they they asse assert rt that that it prom promot otes es “equ “equal alit ity y of empl employ oyme ment nt opportunities to all”, as well as the Labor Code, which ensure equal opportunity for all. Article 135 of the Labor bor Code looks down own on discrimination in terms of wages. Article 248 declares such a practice unfair. Also cited is the International Covenant on Economic, Social Social and Cultura Culturall Rights Rights.. Article Article 7 talks talks about about the ensu ensuri ring ng of remun remuner erat atio ion, n, as well well as fair fair and and equa equall wages and remuneration.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE vs. UISIMBING
FACTS
Intern Internati ationa onall School School Inc., Inc., pursua pursuant nt to PD 732, 732, is an educational institution targeted towards dependents of
In this this case case,, ther there e is no evid evidenc ence e in a diff differe erenc nce e of workload nor of performance, so the presumption is that all the employees are performing at equal levels. There is
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consti part 6: equal protection clause no evidence of the foreign hires being 25% more efficient. The school’s claimed need to entice these foreign hires is not a good good defense defense,, either either.. As for compen compensat sation ion,, the other forms of compensation are enough. Before ending, the court says, says, however, however, that the foreign and local hires are not part of the same bargaining unit, nor is there any showing of an attempt to consolidate the two.
join Interact or Rotaract, Rotaract, organizati organizations ons sponsored by Rotary International. In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California, admitted Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to active active members membership hip.. Rotary Rotary Interna Internation tional al notifi notified ed the Duarte Club that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary Rotary consti constituti tution. on. After After an intern internal al hearin hearing, g, Rotary Rotary Interna Internatio tional nal's 's board board of directo directors rs revoke revoked d the chart harter er of the the Du Duar arte te Club Club and and term termin ina ated ted its memb member ers ship. hip. The The Du Dua arte rte Club Club''s appea ppeall to the the International Convention was unsuccessful. The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a comp compla lain intt in the the Cali Califo forn rnia ia Supe Superi rior or Cour Court. t. The The complaint complaint alleged alleged that appellants' appellants' actions actions violated violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code T he court ruled in favor of Rotary International citing that neither Rotary Inter Interna nati tion onal al nor nor the the Du Duar arte te Club Club is a "bus "busin ines ess s establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act.
BOARD of DIRECTORS vs. ROTARY CLUB
May 4, 1987
JUSTICE POWELL FACTS: When the Duarte Duarte chapter chapter of Rotary Rotary Internat Internationa ionall violated club policy by admitting three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was was expe expell lled ed.. The The Cali Califo forn rnia ia Cour Courtt of Appe Appeal als, s, however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that that Rota Rotary ry Inte Intern rnat atio iona nal' l's s acti action on viol violat ated ed a Cali Califo forn rnia ia civi civill righ rights ts act act proh prohib ibit itin ing g sexu sexual al discrimination.
Rotary International, "an organization of business and prof profes essi sion onal al men men unit united ed worl worldw dwid ide e who who prov provid ide e humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Individual members belong to a local Rotary Club rather than to International. In turn, each local Rotary Club Club is a memb member er of Inte Intern rnat ation ional al.. Indi Indivi vidua duals ls are are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club according to a "class "classifi ificat cation ion system" system" The genera generall rule rule is that that "one "one active member is admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose an additional active member, who mus must be in the the same same bus busines iness s or profe rofes ssion sional al classification." Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new members. members. Rotary Rotary Intern Internati ationa onall has promul promulgat gated ed Recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates for memb embers ership will be considered by both a "cla "class ssif ific icat atio ions ns comm commit itte tee" e" and and a "mem "membe bers rshi hip p committee." Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. It was test testif ifie ied d that that the the exclu exclusi sion on of women women resu result lts s in an "aspect of fellowship, that is enjoyed by the present male memb member ersh ship ip," ," and and also also allo allows ws Rota Rotary ry to oper operat ate e effectively in foreign countries with varied cultures and social mores. Women are however, permitted to attend meeting meetings, s, give give speech speeches, es, and receiv receive e awards awards.. Women Women rela relati tive ves s of Rota Rotary ry memb member ers s may may form form thei theirr own own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that both Rotary Rotary Intern Internati ationa onall and the Duarte Duarte Rotar Rotary y Club Club are are business establishments subject to the provisions of the Unruh Unruh Act. Act. The The Cour Courtt of Appea Appeall iden identi tifi fied ed seve severa rall "bus "busin ines essl slik ike e attr attrib ibut utes es"" of Rota Rotary ry Inte Intern rnat atio ional nal,, including its complex structure, large staff and budget, and extensive publishing activities. The court held that the trial court had erred in finding that the business advantages advantages afforded by membership membership in a local Rotary Club are merely incidental. In particular, the court noted that members receive copies of the Rotary magazine and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to wear and and disp displa lay y the the Rota Rotary ry embl emblem em,, and and may may atte attend nd confere conference nces s that that teach teach manag manageria eriall and profes profession sional al techniques. The The cour courtt also also held held that that memb member ersh ship ip in Rota Rotary ry International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "conti "continuo nuous, us, persona personal, l, and social social"" relati relations onship hip that that "takes place more or less outside public view." The court further concluded that admitting women to the Duarte Club would not seriously seriously interfere with the objectives objectives of Rota Rotary ry Inte Intern rnat atio iona nal. l. Fina Finall lly, y, the the cour courtt reje reject cted ed appell appellant ants' s' argume argument nt that that their their policy policy of exclud excluding ing women is protected by the First Amendment principles set out in Roberts v. United States Jaycees. The court ordered ordered appellant appellants s to reinst reinstate ate the the Duarte Duarte Club as a member, and permanently enjoined them from enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender requirement against the Duarte Club. ISSUE:
WON a Califo California rnia statute statute (Unruh (Unruh Act) Act) that that requir requires es Cali Califo forn rnia ia Rota Rotary ry Club Clubs s to admi admitt wome women n member members s violates the First Amendment. HOLDING:
No. The Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which which warrants warrants First First Amendment Amendment protection. protection. Because Because many of Rotary's activities are conducted in the presence
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consti part 6: equal protection clause of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending sexual discrimination. RATIO Application of the Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interf interfere ere unduly unduly with with club club member members' s' freedo freedom m of private association
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the court upheld against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that required required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members. members. Roberts provides provides the framework for analyzing analyzing appellants appellants'' constitutio constitutional nal claims. claims. As obser bserve ved d in Rober Roberts, ts, our cases cases have have affor afforded ded const constitu itutio tiona nall protection to freedom of association in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that the Constitution Constitution protects against unjustified government interference interference with an individual's choice to enter into and maint intain certain intimate or private relat relation ionshi ships ps.. Secon Second, d, the the Court Court has uphel upheld d the the freedom of individuals to associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities.
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. Such relationships may take various forms. In dete determ rmin inin ing g whet whethe herr a part partic icul ular ar asso associ ciat atio ion n is sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection, protection, we consider consider factors factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship The The evid eviden ence ce in this this case case indi indica cate tes s that that the the relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate intimate or private private relation relation that warrants warrants constitu constitution tional al protectio protection. n. The size of local local Rotary Rotary Clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to more than 900. There is no upper limit on the membership of any local cal Rot Rotary ary Club. ub. About bout 10 perc percen entt of the the membership of a typical club moves away or drops out during a typical typical year. The clubs clubs therefor therefore e are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge the membership. The purpose of Rotary "is to produce
an incl inclus usiv ive, e, not not exclu exclusi sive ve,, memb members ershi hip, p, maki making ng possible the recognition of all useful local occupations, and enabling the club to be a true cross section of the busi busine ness ss and and prof profes essi sion onal al life life of the the comm communi unity ty." ." However beneficial this is to the members and to those they serve, it does not suggest the kind of private or pers person onal al rela relati tion onsh ship ip to whic which h we have have acco accord rded ed protection under the First Amendment. Applicat Application ion of the Act to California California Rotary Clubs does does not not viol violat ate e the the Firs Firstt Amen Amendm dmen entt righ rightt of expressive association.
Many Many of the Rotary Rotary Clubs' Clubs' centra centrall activi activitie ties s are carried on in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are are requ requir ired ed to admi admitt any any memb member er of any any othe otherr Rota Rotary ry Club Club to thei theirr meet meetin ings gs.. Memb Member ers s are are enco encour urag aged ed to invi invite te busi busine ness ss asso associ ciat ates es and and compe competit titor ors s to meetin meetings. gs. In sum, sum, Rotary Rotary Clubs Clubs,, rath rather er than than carr carryi ying ng on thei theirr acti activi viti ties es in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows and doors open to the whole world," world," We therefore therefore conclude that application of the Unruh Act to local Rotary Rotary Clubs Clubs does does not not interf interfere ere unduly unduly with with the members' freedom of private association.
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." In this case, however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions on "public questions," including political or international issues. To be sure, Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of commendable service activities that are protected by the First Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. Nor does it requir require e them them to abando abandon n their their classi classific ficati ation on system or admit members who do not reflect a cross sect sectio ion n of the the comm commun unit ity. y. Inde Indeed ed,, by open openin ing g membersh membership ip to leading leading business business and professi professiona onall women in the community, Rotary Clubs are likely to obta obtain in a more more repr repres esen enta tati tive ve cros cross s sect sectio ion n of community community leaders leaders with a broadene broadened d capacity capacity for service. Even Even if the the Unru Unruh h Act Act does does work work some some slig slight ht infringement infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringement is justified because it serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination discrimination against women.. On its face the Unruh
Act, like the Minnesota public accommodations law we consid considered ered in Roberts Roberts,, makes makes no distin distincti ctions ons on the basis of the organization's viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodati accommodations ons laws "plainly "plainly serve compelling compelling state inte intere rest sts s of the the high highes estt orde order. r."" In Robe Robert rts s we recogniz recognized ed that the State's State's compelli compelling ng interest interest in assu assuri ring ng equa equall acce access ss to wome women n exte extend nds s to the the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible goods and services. The Unruh Act plainly serves this interest. We therefore hold that applicati application on of the Unruh Act to Californ California ia Rotary Rotary Club Clubs s does does not not viol violat ate e the the righ rightt of expr expres essi sive ve association afforded by the First Amendment. Finally, Finally, appellant appellants s contend contend that the Unruh Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these contentions were not properly presented to the state courts. It is well settled that this Court will
not review a final judgment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear impl implic icat atio ion n that that the the feder federal al clai claim m was was adeq adequa uatel tely y
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consti part 6: equal protection clause pres presen ented ted in the the stat state e syst system. em."" Appel Appella lant nts s did did not not present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The court denied the petition without opinion.
RATIO:
1.
Forcing a group to to ac accept ce certain me members may may impa impair ir the the abil abilit ity y of the the grou group p to express those views, and only those views, that that it inte intend nds s to expr expres ess. s. “Free “Freedo dom m of asso associ ciat atio ion n … plai plainl nly y pres presup uppo pose ses s a freedom not to associate.”
2.
The co constitution’s pr protection of of e ex xpressive associ associati ation on is not reserv reserved ed for advoca advocacy cy group groups. s. But But to come come with within in its its ambi ambit, t, a group roup mus must enga engag ge in some ome form form of expression, whether it be public or private.
BOY SCOUTS of AMERICA vs. DALE
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE (2000)
(ponente: Chief Justice Rehnquist) FACTS:
3.
The Boy Scouts seeks to instill values in young young people by having having its adult adult leader leaders s spen spend d time time with with the the yout youth h memb member ers, s, instructing and engaging them in activities like camping, archery, and fishing. During the time spent with the youth members, the scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy Scou Scouts ts’’ valu values es–b –both oth expres expressl sly y and and by examp example le.. It seems seems indi indisp sputa utabl ble e that that an association that seeks to transmit such a syst system em of valu values es enga engage ges s in expre express ssiv ive e activity.
4.
The va values th the Bo Boy Sc Scouts se seeks to to in instill are “based “based on” those listed listed in the Scout Oath Oath and Law. The Boy Scouts Scouts explains explains that that the Scout Oath and Law provide provide “a positive moral code for living; they are a list of ‘do’ ‘do’s’ s’ rath rather er than than ‘don ‘don’t ’ts. s.’’ ” The The Boy Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsiste inconsistent nt with the values values embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly with the the valu values es repr repres esen ente ted d by the the term terms s “morally straight” and “clean.”
5.
The te terms “m “morally st straight” an and “c “clean” ar are by no means self-defining. Different people wou would ld attri ttribu butte to thos those e term terms s very ery differe different nt meanin meanings. gs. The BSA, BSA, throug through h its official official written written statements, statements, believes believes that that enga engag ging ing in homo homos sexua exuall cond conduc uctt is contra contrary ry to being being “moral “morally ly straig straight” ht” and “clean.”
6.
It is is no not tth he ro role of of th the co courts to to re reject a group group’s ’s expres expresse sed d valu values es beca becaus use e they they disagr disagree ee with with those those values values or find find them intern internall ally y incons inconsist istent ent.. As is true true of all expressions expressions of constitution constitutional al freedoms, freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irrati irrationa onal. l. As we give give deferenc deference e to an asso associ ciat ation ion’s ’s asse assert rtio ions ns rega regard rdin ing g the the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.
1. Jame James s Dale Dale was a forme formerr Eagle Eagle Scout Scout who who also also beca became me an assi assist stan antt scou scoutm tmas aster ter.. Whil While e in college, he was very active in gay and lesbian issues. He even became the copresident of his university’s Gay/Lesbian Alliance. 2.
3.
When When the Boy Boy Scout Scouts s of Ameri America ca lear learned ned that that he he is an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist, it revo revoke ked d his his adul adultt membe members rshi hip p in the the Boy Boy Scouts of America (BSA) because the organization forbids membership to homosexuals. Dale Dale filed filed a compla complaint int agains againstt the BSA in the New Jersey Superior Court alleging that the BSA had violated New Jersey’s public acco accommo mmoda dati tion ons s statu statute te by revok revokin ing g his memb member ers ship hip bas based sol solely ely on his his sexua exuall orien orienta tati tion on.. The The NJ Super Superio iorr Cour Courtt gran granted ted judgm judgment ent in favor favor of Dale. Dale. The decision decision was affirmed by the NJ Appellate Division.
4. The The New New Jers Jersey ey Supre Supreme me Court Court affir affirme med d the the judgment of the Appellate Division. It held that the Boy Scouts was a place of public accommo mmodation subject ect to the public accommodations law; that the organization was not exempt from the law under any of its express exceptions; and that the Boy Scouts violated the law by revoking Dale’s membership based on his avowed homosexuality. 5. BSA raised the issue in the US Supreme Court. ISSUES:
1.
WON WON Boy Boy Scou Scouts ts is an expre express ssiv ive e asso associ ciat atio ion n and and that that the the forc forced ed inclusion of Dale would significantly affect its expression. - YES
2.
WON apply applying ing New Jersey Jersey’s ’s public public acco accomm mmod odat atio ions ns law law in the the way way appl applie ied d by the the NJ Supr Suprem eme e Cour Courtt viol violat ates es the Boy Boy Scouts Scouts’’ righ rightt of expressive association. - YES
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consti part 6: equal protection clause 7.
Dale, by by hi his ow own ad admission, is is on one of of a grou group p of gay gay Scout Scouts s who who have have “bec “becom ome e leaders in their community and are open and honest about their sexual orientation. . Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very very least, least, force the organi organizat zation ion to send end a mess essage, both to the youth memb member ers s and and the the worl world, d, that that the the Boy Boy Scouts accepts accepts homosexual homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.
8.
Associations do do no not ha have to to as associate fo f or the “purpos “purpose” e” of dissem dissemina inatin ting g a certai certain n mess messag age e in orde orderr to be enti entitl tled ed to the the prot protec ecti tion ons s of the the const onstit itut utio ion n. An association mus must merel rely eng engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.
9.
State public accommodations laws were originally enacted to prevent discrimination in traditional places of public accommodatio accommodation–lik n–like e inns and trains. trains. New Jersey’s statutory definition of “ ‘[a] place of publ public ic acco accomm mmod odat atio ion’ n’ ” is extr extrem emel ely y broad. The term is said to “include, but not be limit limited ed to,” to,” a list list of over over 50 types types of plac places es.. . Many Many on the the list list are are what what one one would expect to be places where the public is invited. For example, the statute includes as places of public accommodation taverns, rest restau aura rant nts, s, reta retail il shop shops, s, and and publ public ic libr librar arie ies. s. But But the the stat statut ute e also also incl includ udes es places that often may not carry with them open invitations invitations to the public, like summer camps and roof gardens. In this case, the New Jers Jersey ey Supre Supreme me Cour Courtt went went a step step further and applied its public accomm accommoda odation tions s law to a privat private e entity entity witho without ut even even attempt attempting ing to tie the term term “pla “place ce”” to a phys physic ical al loca locati tion on.. As the the definition definition of “public “public accommodati accommodation” on” has expanded expanded from clearly clearly commercial commercial entities, entities, such as restaurants, bars, and hotels, to membership organizations such as the Boy Scouts Scouts,, the potenti potential al for confli conflict ct between between state public accommodations laws and the constitutiona constitutionall rights of organizatio organizations ns has increased.
10 .
In th t he Hu H urley ca c ase, we w e sa s aid th t hat pu p ublic accommodations laws “are well within the Stat State’ e’s s usua usuall powe powerr to ena enact when when a legi legisl slat atur ure e has has reas reason on to beli believ eve e that that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First Amendment. But we went on to note that in that case “the Massachusetts [publ [public ic acco accomm mmoda odatio tions ns]] law law has has been been applie applied d in a peculi peculiar ar way” way” becaus because e “any “any contingent of protected individuals with a message would have the right to participate in petitioners ers’ speech ech, so that the
commun communica icatio tion n produc produced ed by the privat private e organi organizer zers s would would be shaped shaped by all those protected by the law who wish to join in wit with h some some expr expres essi sive ve demon demonst stra rati tion on of their own.” 11 .
A st state re r equirement th t hat th t he Bo B oy Sc Scouts retain retain Dale Dale as an assist assistant ant scoutma scoutmaste sterr would significantly burden the organization organization’s ’s right to oppose oppose or disfavor disfavor homose homosexua xuall conduc conduct. t. The state state interes interests ts embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association. That being the case, we hold that the cons consti titu tuti tion on proh prohib ibit its s the the Stat State e from from imposing such a requirement through the application application of its public accommodations accommodations law.
12.
Justice St Stevens’ di dissent ma makes mu much of of it its observ observati ation on that that the public public percepti perception on of homosexuality in this country has changed. Indeed, it appears that homosexuality has gained gained greate greaterr societa societall accepta acceptance nce.. But this this is scarce scarcely ly an argume argument nt for denyin denying g protec protection tion to those those who refuse refuse to accept accept thes these e view views. s. The The cons consti titu tuti tion on prot protec ects ts expression, be it of the popular variety or not. not. And And the the fact fact that that an idea idea may may be embra embrace ced d and and advo advoca cate ted d by incr increa easi sing ng numbers of people is all the more reason to protec protectt the rights rights of thos those e who wish wish to voice a different view.
13.
We ar are no not, as as we we mu must no not be be, gu guided by by our our view views s of whet whethe herr the the Boy Boy Scou Scouts ts’ ’ teac teachi hing ngs s with with respec respectt to homos homosexu exual al cond conduc uctt are are righ rightt or wron wrong; g; publ public ic or jud judic icia iall dis disappr approv ova al of a tenet enet of an organization organization’s ’s expression expression does not justify justify the State’s effort to compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance woul would d derog derogat ate e from from the the orga organi niza zati tion on’s ’s expressive message. “While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere wit with h speec speech h for for no bett better er reas reason on than than promo romoti ting ng an app approv roved mes message sage or discou discourag raging ing a disfav disfavored ored one, one, howeve howeverr enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”
GOODRIDGE vs. DEPT. of PUBLIC HEALTH
Ponente : CJ Marshall FACTS:
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consti part 6: equal protection clause The The plai plaint ntif iffs fs are are four fourte teen en indi indivi vidu dual als s from from five five Mass Massac achu huse sett tts s coun counti ties es.. Amon Among g them them are are Hill Hillar ary y Goodri Goodridge dge,, fortyforty-fou fourr years years old, old, and Julie Julie Goodrid Goodridge, ge, fortyforty-thr three ee years years old, old, who had been in a committ committed ed relationship for thirteen years and lived with their five year old daughter. In March and April, 2001, each of the plaintiff couples attempted to obtain a marriage license from a city or town clerk's office. As required under Genral Laws c.7, they completed notices of intention to marry on forms prov provid ided ed by the the regis registr try, y, see see G.L. G.L. c. 207, 207, § 20, 20, and and presented these forms to a Massachusetts town or city clerk clerk,, toge togeth ther er with with the the requ requir ired ed heal health th form forms s and and marria marriage ge licens license e fees. fees. In each each case, case, the clerk either either refused refused to accept accept the notice notice of intent intention ion to marry marry or denied a marriage license to the couple on the ground that that Mass Massac achu huse sett tts s does does not reco recogn gniz ize e samesame- sex marria marriage. ge. Becaus Because e obtain obtaining ing a marria marriage ge licens license e is a necessary prerequisite to civil marriage in Mass Massac achu huse sett tts, s, deny denyin ing g marr marria iage ge lice licens nses es to the the plaintiffs was tantamount to denying them access to civil marr marria iag ge itse itsellf, along long with ith its its socia ociall and legal egal protections, benefits, and obligations. On April 11, 2001, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court against the Department of Public Health and the commissioner seeking a judgment that "the exclusion of the the plai plaint ntif ifff coupl couples es and and other other qual qualif ifie ied d samesame-se sex x couples from access to marriage licenses, and the legal and and soci social al stat status us of civi civill marri marriag age, e, as well well as the the protections, benefits and obligations of marriage, violates Massachusetts law." The Superior Superior Court judge ruled for the department. department. In a memorandum of decision and order dated May 7, 2002, he dismis dismissed sed the plaint plaintiff iffs' s' claim claim that that the marria marriage ge stat statut utes es shou should ld be cons constr true ued d to perm permit it marr marria iage ge between between persons of the same sex, holding holding that the plain wording of G.L. c. 207, as well as the wording of other marriage statutes, precluded that interpretation. He also held held that that the marriage marriage exclus exclusion ion does not offend the liberty, freedom, equality, or due process provisions of the the Mas Massach sachus uset etts ts Cons Consti titu tuti tion on,, and that that the the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not guarantee "the fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex." After the complaint was dismissed and summary judgme judgment nt entered entered for the defenda defendants nts,, the plaint plaintiff iffs s appealed.
equali equality ty of all individu individuals als.. It forbids forbids the creati creation on of second second-cl -class ass citize citizens. ns. The defend defendant ants s have have failed failed to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples. RATIO:
Civil marriage is created and regulated through exercise of the police police power. power. Marria Marriage ge also also bestow bestows s enormou enormous s private and social advantages on those who choose to marry. The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death. It is undoubtedly for these concrete reasons, as well as for its intimately personal significance, that civil marriage has long been termed a "civil right." The The Massac Massachus husetts etts Consti Constitut tution ion protec protects ts matter matters s of pers persona onall libe liberty rty agai agains nstt gove govern rnme ment nt incu incurs rsio ion n as zealou zealously sly,, and often more more so, than than does the Federa Federall Consti Constituti tution, on, even even where where both both Consti Constituti tutions ons employ employ essentially the same language. The individual liberty and equality equality safeguards safeguards of the Massachus Massachusetts etts Constitution Constitution protect protect both "freedom from" unwarranted unwarranted government government intrusion into protected spheres of life and "freedom to" partake partake in benefits benefits created by the State for the common good. It also requires, at a minimum, that the exercise of the State' State's s regulat regulatory ory authori authority ty not be "arbit "arbitrar rary y or capricious." The plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine the the inst instit itut ution ion of civi civill marr marria iage ge.. They They do not not want want marr marria iage ge abol abolis ished hed.. They They do not atta attack ck the the bina binary ry nature of marriage, the consanguinity provisions, or any of the other other gate-ke gate-keepi eping ng provis provision ions s of the marria marriage ge licensing law. Recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity validity or dignity dignity of opposite-se opposite-sex x marriage, marriage, any more than recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of a different race devalues the marriage of a person who marries someone of her own race. Civil marriage is now construed to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others others.. This This refor reformul mulat ation ion redr redres esse ses s the the plai plaint ntif iffs fs'' constitutional injury and furthers the aim of marriage to promote promote stable, stable, exclusive exclusive relationship relationships. s. It advances advances the two two legi legiti tima mate te Stat State e inte interes rests ts the the depa depart rtmen mentt has has identified: providing a stable setting for child rearing and cons conser ervi ving ng Stat State e reso resour urce ces. s. It leav leaves es inta intact ct the the Legislature's broad discretion to regulate marriage.
ISSUE:
WON the the Mas Massach sachus uset etts ts Stat Statut ute e may may deny deny the the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.
TECSON vs. COMELEC
(March 3, 2004) Ponente: J. Vitug FACTS:
HELD:
The Court concluded that it may not. The Massac Massachus husetts etts Consti Constitut tution ion affirms affirms the dignit dignity y and
•
Dec 31, 2003: 2003: respon responden dentt Ronald Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for the
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consti part 6: equal protection clause posi positi tion on of Pres Presid iden entt of the the Repu Republ blic ic of the the Philippines Philippines under the Koalisyon Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisa Nagkakaisang ng Pilipino. In his COC, FPJ represented himself to be a natura natural-b l-born orn citiz citizen en of the Phils with his date of birth to be Aug 20, 1939 and his place of birth in Manila. •
Jan 9, 2004: petitioner Victorino Fornier filed with the Comelec a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his COC upon the claim that FPJ made made a material material misrepresen misrepresentati tation on in his COC COC by claimi claiming ng to be a natur naturalal-bor born n Filipi Filipino no
when in truth: 1.
•
•
•
his moth mother, er, his paren parents ts were were forei foreign gners ers – his
Bessie Bessie Kelley Poe, was an Americ American an and his father father,, Allan Allan F. Poe, Poe, was a Spanis Spanish h nation national, al, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject 2. granting that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he coul could d not not have have trans transmit mitte ted d his his Fili Filipi pino no citizenship to FPJ, the the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother (Allan F. Poe contra contracte cted d a prior prior marria marriage ge to a certai certain n Paulit Paulita a Gomez Gomez before before his marriage marriage to Bessi Bessie e Kelley. Even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.) Jan 23: Comelec dismissed the petition for lack of merit; subsequent MFR was denied Peti Petiti tion oner er Forn Fornie ierr invo invokes kes § 78 of the the Omnib Omnibus us Election Code: “§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC. COC. – A verifi verified ed petiti petition on seekin seeking g to deny deny due course or to cancel a COC may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresent misrepresentation ation contained contained therein therein as required required under § 74 hereof is false.” Petitioners Tecson, et al. and Velez invoke Article VII, § 4, par. 7 of the Consti in assailing the jurisdiction of the Comelec.
ISSUES
HELD:
1.
WON the Court has jurisdiction over the petitions YES, but only with regard to Fornier’s petition 2. WON FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his COC NO, hence, hence, he is indeed indeed a natura natural-b l-born orn Filipino citizen RATIO: 1.
With regard to petitioner Fornier’s petition, the Court recogn recognize izes s its own jurisd jurisdict iction ion under under § 78 of the Omnibu Omnibus s Electi Election on Code Code in conson consonanc ance e with with the general powers of the Comelec. Their decisions on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the SC per Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as well as § 7, Art IX of the Consti. The petition was aptly elevated to and could well be taken cognizance by the CS, as opposed to that of petitioner Tecson’s, Tecson’s, which refers to a contest in a post-election scenario, and hence, not applicable in this case.
2. Citizenship: Citizenship: Brief Historical Background
During the Spanish regime, there was no such term as “Philippine citizens” but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.” The natives, as we know, were called “indios,” deno denotin ting g a lowe lowerr rega regard rd for the the inha inhabi bita tant nts s of the the archipelago. The Civil Code of Spain came out with the 1st categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. Upon ratification of the Treaty pending Treaty of Paris and pending legislation by the US Congress, the native inhabitants of the the Phil Phils s ceas ceased ed to be Span Spanis ish h subj subjec ects ts.. The The term term “citizens of the Philippines” first appeared in the Phil Bill of 1902, the 1st comprehensive legislation of the US Congress on the Phils. Under this organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Phils, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a nativ native-b e-born orn inhabi inhabitan tant, t, 2) an inhabi inhabitan tantt who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtain obtained ed Spanis Spanish h papers papers on or before before 11 April April 1899. 1899. While there were divergent views on WON jus soli was soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Consti brought an end to any such link with common law by adopting jus sanguini sanguinis s or bloo blood d rela relati tion onsh ship ip as the the basi basis s of Filipino citizenship: “Sec 1, Art III: The following followi ng are citizens of the Phils: 1. Thos Those e who are are citize citizens ns of the the Phil Isla Island nds s at the time of the adoption of this Consti 2. Thos Those e born in the the Phils Phils of foreig foreign n parent parents s who, who, befo before re the the adop adoptio tion n of this this Const Consti, i, had had been been elected to public office in the Phil Islands 3.
Those Those whose whose fathe fathers rs are are citizen citizens s of the Phils
4.
Those Those whose whose moth mothers ers are are citiz citizens ens of the Phils Phils and and upon upon reac reachi hing ng the the age age of majo majori rity ty,, elec electt Phil Phil citizenship 5. Those Those who are are natura naturaliz lized ed in accor accordan dance ce with with law” Subs Subsec ecti tion on 4 of the the abov above e prov provis isio ion n resu result lted ed in discriminatory situations that incapacitated women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children children and required illegitimate illegitimate children children of Filipino Filipino mothers mothers to still still elect elect Filipi Filipino no citiz citizens enship hip.. The 1973 Consti corrected this by adding the provision: “2. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Phils
3. Those who elect Phil citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Consti” The 1987 Consti generally generally adopted the provision provision of the 1973 Consti, except for subsection 3: “3. “3. Thos Those e born born befo before re Jan Jan 17, 17, 1973 1973 of Fili Filipi pino no mothers, mothers, who elect Phil citizenship citizenship upon reaching reaching the age of majority” The Case of FPJ
Sec 2, Art VII of the 1987 Consti states that “No person may be electe elected d Preside President nt unless unless he is a natura natural-b l-born orn citize citizen n of the Phils, Phils,”” among among other other qualif qualifica icatio tions. ns. The term “natural-born citizens” is defined to include “those who are citizens of the Phils from birth without having to perf perfor orm m any any act act to acqu acquir ire e or perf perfec ectt thei theirr Phil Phil citizenship.” Considering the reservations made by the part partie ies s on the the vera veraci city ty of the the evid eviden ence ce,, the the only only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty are that: 1. the the paren parents ts of FPJ FPJ were were Allan Allan F. Poe Poe and Bess Bessie ie Kelley
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consti part 6: equal protection clause 2. FPJ FPJ was was born born to to them them on 20 Aug Aug 193 1939 9 3. Alla Allan n F. Poe Poe and and Bess Bessie ie Kelle Kelley y were were marri married ed to each other on 16 Sept 1940 4. the father father of Allan Allan F. Poe Poe was was Loren Lorenzo zo Pou Pou 5. at the the time time of his his death death on on 11 Sept Sept 1954, 1954, Loren Lorenzo zo Pou was 84 years old The death certificate certificate of Lorenzo Lorenzo Pou would indicate indicate that he died in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that he was born sometime in 1870 when the Phils was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner argues that Lorenz Lorenzo o Pou was not in the Phils during during the crucial crucial peri period od of 1898 1898 to 1902 1902,, cons consid ideri ering ng ther there e was was no existing record about such fact. However, he failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under the Civil Code of Spain until the effectivity of the 1950 Civil Code, acknowledgement (judicial/compulsory or volu volunt ntar ary) y) was was requ requir ired ed to esta establ blis ish h fili filiat atio ion n or paterni paternity. ty. In FPJ’s FPJ’s birth birth certif certifica icate, te, nowher nowhere e in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed by decedent Allan F. Poe, Poe, the the only only othe otherr proo prooff of volu volunt ntar ary y recog recogni niti tion on remained to be “some other public document.” The 1950 Civil Code, on the other hand, categorized recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal, or compulsory. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last duri during ng the the life lifeti time me of the the chil child, d, an acti action on to clai claim m acknow acknowled ledgeme gement nt could could only only be brought brought during during the life lifeti time me of the the pres presum umed ed pare parent nt.. The The Fami Family ly Code Code,, however, liberalized the rules, as found in Articles 172, 173 and 175 re: filiation. Civil law provisions point out to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. Such discrimination may be traced to the Span Spanis ish h fami family ly and and prop proper erty ty laws laws that that soug sought ht to dist distri ribu bute te inhe inheri rita tanc nce e of titl titles es and and weal wealth th stri strict ctly ly accor accordin ding g to bloodli bloodlines nes.. These These distin distincti ctions ons between between legiti legitimac macy y and illegi illegitim timacy acy were were thus codifi codified ed in the Spanish Civil Code and later survived in our Civil Code. Such Such distin distincti ction on,, howeve however, r, remai remains ns and shoul should d remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law. The proof of filiatio filiation n or paternity paternity for purposes purposes of determin determining ing his citizensh citizenship ip status status should should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Civil Code Code or Famil Family y Code Code provis provision ions s of proo prooff of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
FPJ’s citizenship
Petiti Petitioner oner argue argues s that, that, since since FPJ was an illegit illegitima imate te child, he followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, Kelley, an Americ American an citize citizen. n. Amicus Amicus curiae curiae Joaqui Joaquin n Bernas, SJ states: “If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, it would be a decision constituting doctrine under stare decisis; but if it was irrelevant to the lis mota, it would not be a decision but a mere obiter obiter dictum, which which did not establi establish sh doctri doctrine. ne. (He then then proc proceed eeds s to disc discre redit dit all all the the case cases s cited cited by petitioner, as being obiter dicta). Aside from the fact that that such such a pronoun pronouncem cement ent would would have have no textua textuall basis in the Consti, it would also violate the Equal Protection Clause TWICE. First, it would make an illegitim illegitimate ate distincti distinction on between between a legitimat legitimate e and illegitim illegitimate ate child, and second, second, it would would make an illegitim illegitimate ate distinct distinction ion between between the illegitim illegitimate ate chil child d of a Fili Filipi pino no fath father er and and the the ille illegi giti tima mate te children of a Filipina mother. The distinct distinction ion between between legitimat legitimate e children children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. But real real differ differenc ences es alone alone do not justif justify y invidi invidious ous dist distin inc ctio tion. Real Real dif differen erenc ces may just ustify ify dist distin inct ctio ion n for for 1 purp purpos ose e but but not not for for anot anothe herr purpose. What What poss possib ible le stat state e inte intere rest st can can ther there e be for for disqua disqualif lifyin ying g an illegi illegitim timate ate child child from from being being a public officer? It was not the child’s fault that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive him of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor nor ration rationali ality ty in that. that. And And if there there is neith neither er justice nor rationality in the distinction, then it transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.” reprobated.” WOOHOO! Nai-imagine ko si Father Bernas…
Hence, Hence, where where jurisp jurisprud rudenc ence e regard regarded ed an illegi illegitima timate te child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line line with with the the assum assumpti ption on that that the mother mother,, who had custody, custody, would exercise exercise parental parental authority authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him. In fact, the 1935 Consti can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, it states that among the citizens of the Phils are “those whose fath father ers s are are citi citize zens ns of the the Phil Phils” s” rega regard rdle less ss of whether such children are legitimate or not.
well well and and shoul should d gove govern rn.. Thus Thus,, the the duly duly nota notari rize zed d declar declarati ation on made made by Ruby Ruby Kelly Kelly Mangah Mangahas, as, sister sister of Bessie Kelley Poe, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ (i.e. living together with Bessie Kelley and their children in 1 house and as 1 family).
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