DURA LEX SED LEX People vs Patricio Amigo GR 116719 Facts: Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the regional trial court, Davao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and pleads for sympathy. Held: The duty of court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused. "Dura lex sed lex".
People v. Suriaga, 381 SCRA 159 (2002) FACTS: Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of hisolder brother, Johnny who was taking care of his 2year old daughter, Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. arrived. He was accompanied by hislive-in-partner Rosita. Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, but the latter declined, saying he did nothave the keys. Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his house because a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she could take Nicole with her to buy barbeque. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and because he trusted her, Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the childleft, Suriaga joined them. More than an one hour has passed but the two failed to return with Nicole. Edwin,Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, then began searching but they could not find their daughter and Rosita. Nicole’s grandfather then receive a call from Suriaga asking for ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny immediately reported the call to the PACC Task Force. The next day,Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself and asked herif she and her husband would give the amount to which the latter responded in the positive. Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to the how the money should be delivered to him with a warning that if she will not deliver the money,her daughter would be placed in a plastic bag or thrown ina garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and while being tailed by PACC agents, Mercida proceeded to deliver the money to Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested Suriaga and his companion Isidera after Mercida gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty where Rosita’s sister lived. HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled within dubitable proof of the accused’s intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the child’s liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the child’s custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransomhave been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1) appellant, aprivate individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from her father;
2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rosita’s sister lived, without informing her parents of their whereabouts; 3) He detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day; and 4) he demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave instructions where and how it should be delivered
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, respondent. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Facts: Angelito C. Bugayong was able to illegaly acquire a title over a forest land located in Bocana, Kabacan, Davao City on September 26, 1969 which during that time was still not declared 1) alienable and disposable 2) the land was marshy and covered by sea water during high tide; and (3) Bugayong was never in actual possession of the land. Subsequently, Bugayong subdivided the land and sold it to different persons/entity and one of them is Lourdes Farm,Inc., who in turned mortgaged to the said Petitioner, Land Bank of the Philippines. It was find out later on that the titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands are void ab initio as forest land is part of a public domain and therefore, should be reverted to PUBLIC DOMAIN and the original title No. O.C.T. P-2823 and its subsequent titles be declared null and void. Issue: initio.
Whether or not the CA erred in declaring the OCT P-2823 and its subsequent titles void ab
Held: FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the cross-claim of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines against Lourdes Farms, Inc. is REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. died. She then married married an American Citizen, Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions petitio ns for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt. HELD: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification certificatio n of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and wellbeing.
Obiasca vs. Basallote
Antecedents For purpose of this dissent, the background of this controversy is as follows. On 26 May 2003, respondent Jeanne O. Basallote was appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-1998 of the Department of Education (DepEd), Tabaco National High School in Albay Province by City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso. [3] cralaw In a letter dated 4 June 2003, 2003 ,[4] cralaw the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy O. Oyardo (Oyardo), advised School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales (Gonzales) that the papers of the applicants for the position of Administrative Officer II of the school, including those of the respondent, were being returned; and that a school ranking should be accomplished and submitted to her office for review.In addition, Gonzales was advised that only qualified applicants should be indorsed. The respondent assumed as Administrative Officer II on 19 June 2003.Thereafter, however, she received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz (Diaz), Human Resource Management Officer I, City Schools Division of Tabaco City, Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the CSC because of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales. The respondent sought to obtain Gonzales signature, but the latter refused to sign despite repeated requests. When the respondent informed Oyardo of the situation, she was instead advised to return to her former teaching position of Teacher I.The respondent followed the advice. In the meanwhile, on 25 August 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin O. Obiasca to the position of Administrative Officer II. The appointment was sent to and was properly attested by the CSC. [5] cralaw The respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales, and Diaz.
In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholding information from the respondent on the status of her appointment, and suspended them from the service for three months; but Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing. [6] cralaw The respondent also filed a protest with the CSC Regional Office V, docketed as Adm. Case No. ND-ARU 04-290. The protest was dismissed on the ground that it should first be submitted to the Grievance Committee of the DepEd for appropriate action. [7] cralaw On motion for reconsideration , the protest was reinstated, reinstated, but it was eventually dismissed for lack of merit.[8] cralaw The respondent appealed the dismissal of her protest to the CSC Regional Office, which dismissed the appeal for failure to show that her appointment had been received and attested to by the CSC.[9] cralaw The respondent elevated the matter to the CSC, which granted the appeal by its 29 November 2005 resolution, approving the respondents appointment and recalling its approval of the petitioners appointment. appointment .[10] cralaw Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that the CSC thereby acted without factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment, and praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. Ruling of the CA In its 26 September 2006 decision, [11] cralaw the CA denied the petition for certiorari , and upheld the respondents appointment effective immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority on 26 May 2003, considering that the respondent had accepted the appointment upon her assumption of the duties and responsibilities of the position. The CA found that the respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the position of Administrative Officer Officer II; that due to the respondents valid appointment, no other appointment to the sameposition could be made without the position being first vacated; that the petitioners petitioners appointment to theposition was thus void; and that contrary to the argument of the petitioner that he had been deprived of his right to due process by not having been allowed to participate in the proceedings in the CSC, it was the petitioner who had himself failed to exercise his right by failing to submit a single pleading despite being furnished with copies of the pleadings in the proceedings in the CSC. The CA opined that Diaz had unreasonably refused to affix her signature on the respondents PDF and to submit the respondents appointment to the CSC on the ground of non-submission of the respondents PDF, because the PDF had not been required to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration , but his motion was denied on 8 February 2007. [12] cralaw Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari . Issues: The petitioner maintains that the respondent was not validly appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II, because her appointment was never attested by the CSC; that without the attestation, the respondents appointment as Administrative Officer II was not completed and did not vest a permanent title upon the respondent; that for that reason, the appointment might still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority; that under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 ( Administra ( Administrative tive Code of 1987), of 1987), every appointment is required to be submitted to the CSC within30 days from the date of issuance; otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective; ineffective ;[13] cralaw that the respondents appointment issued on 23 May 2003 should have been transmitted to the CSC not later than 22 June 2003 for proper attestation; and that because the respondents appointment had not been sent to the CSC within the proper period, her appointment ceased to be effective and the position of Administrative Administrative Officer II was already vacant when the petitioner was appointed to it.
In her comment,[14] comment,[14] cralaw the respondent, though admitting that her appointment was not submitted to the CSC for attestation, points out that the reason given by Oyardo for the non-submission of her appointment papers to the CSC the failure of the respondent to have her PDF duly signed by Gonzales was not valid because the PDF was not even a requisite for the submission of her appointment appointment for attestation by the CSC.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992] Facts: Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, DavaoCity. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house. Police Officers had an information that the petitioner’s residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the housesince the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search thehouse in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the houseof herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing containin g assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house. The case was referred for preliminary investigation investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against herein petitioners petitioner s for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). No bail was recommended. Issue: Whether or Not Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of theConstitution.
Held: The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy. Petitioners' contention contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. construc tion. Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidenti Presidential al Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations interpret ations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them. Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional constitutional right against unreasonable unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products products of an illegal search, violative violative of their constitutional constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissib inadmissible le in evidence against them. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of amoving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]). None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners petitioner s is that it was reported reportedly ly being used as a hideout and recruitment recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enterthe house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the housebut only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, applicab le, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez. As a result of Ramirez’s recording, of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Ramirez was charged of violation of the said Act, in an information dated 6 October 1988. Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an order dated 3 May 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the violation punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. From the trial court’s Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9 February 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s order of 3 May 1989 null and void. Consequently, on 21 February 1990, Ramirez filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 June 1990. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the party sought to be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. Held: Section 1 of RA 4200 provides that “It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using, any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.” The provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under said provision of RA 4200. Further, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore, the contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of RA 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
Ursua vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases” by the RTC of Davao City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of request to the
Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name “Oscar Perez” when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was charged under the wrong law. HELD: The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
