Herma Shipyard Inc. & Esguerra vs. Oliveros et. al. G.R. No. 208936 April 17, 2017 Topic: Project employees
Facts: On June 17, 2009, the respondents filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch III, San Fernando City, Pampanga a Complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization, and non-payment of service incentive leave pay with prayer for the payment of full backwages and attorney's fees against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they are Herma Shipyard's regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks usually necessary and desirable in its business. On various dates, however, petitioners dismissed them from employment. Respondents further alleged that as a condition to their continuous and Uninterrupted employment, petitioners made them sign employment contracts for a fixed period ranging from one to four months to make it appear that they were project-based employees. Per respondents r espondents,, petitioners resorted to this scheme to defeat their right to security of tenure, but in truth there was never a time when they ceased working for Herma Shipyard due to expiration of project-based employment contracts. For their defense, petitioners argued that respondents were its project-based employees in its shipbuilding projects and that the specific project for which they were hired had already been completed. Issue: Are the respondents r espondents project-based project-based employees? Ruling: Yes. A project employee under Article 280 (now Article 294) of the Labor Code, as amended, is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. The records of this case reveal that respondents were hired for each and every project. They were adequately informed of their employment status as project-based employees at least at the time they signed their employment contracts. They were fully apprised of the nature and scope of their work whenever they affixed their signature to their employment contract. Here, a meticulous examination of the contracts of employment reveals that while the tasks assigned to the respondents were indeed necessary and desirable in the usual business of Herma Shipyard, the same were distinct, separate, and identifiable from the other projects or contracts services. The nature of Herma Shipyard's business is only to hire workers when it has existing contracts for shipbuilding and repair. It is not engaged in the business of building vessels for sale which would require it to continuously construct vessels for its inventory and consequently hire a number of permanent employees. The completion of work or project automatically terminates their employment, employment, in which case, the employer is, under the law, only
obliged to render a report on the termination of the employment. Hence, Herma Shipyard should be allowed to reduce its work force into a number suited for the remaining work to be done upon the completion or proximate accomplishment of each particular project. As to the requirement that the completion or termination of the specific project or undertaking for which respondents were hired should be determined at the time of their engagement, it is enough that Herma Shipyard gave the approximate or target completion date in the project employment contract. Given the nature of its business and the scope of its projects which take months or even years to finish, the court does not expect Herma Shipyard to give a definite and exact completion date. In sum, considering their employment contracts and all other circumstances present, the respondents are deemed project employees.
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas vs PLDT G.R. No. 190389-190390 April 19, 2017 Topic: Redundancy, Authorized Cause
Facts: Manggawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP), representing the employees of PLDT, filed two notices notices of strike and charged PLDT of unfair unfair labor practices practices for PLDT’s alleged transfer of several employees of its Provisioning Support division from Bicutan to Taguig, abolition of a division, farming out of jobs to casuals and contractual, unreasonable refusal to provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel downsizing/ reorganization and closure of exchanges, continued hiring of "contractual," "temporary," "project," and "casual" employees for regular jobs performed by union members, resulting in the decimation of the union membership and in the denial of the right to self-organization to the concerned employees, alleged restructuring of its [Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation Services and its closure of traffic operations at various regional operator services. MKP then went on strike. PLDT declared only 323 employees as redundant as it was able to redeploy 180 of the 503 affected employees to other positions. The Secretary of Labor certified the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration. All striking workers were directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours except those who were terminated due to redundancy. MKP challenged the SOLE’s order insofar as it created a distinction dist inction among the striking workers in the return-to-work order. Meanwhile the NLRC dismissed the charges of ULP against PLDT and ruled that PLDT’s redundancy program was valid and did not constitute ULP. Issues: 1. Whether or not the redundancy program of PLDT is valid va lid
2. Whether the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment was rendered moot when the National Labor Relations Commission upheld the validity of the redundancy program Ruling: 1. Yes. Redundancy exists when the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded demanded by the actual requirements requirements of the enterprise. enterprise. Redundancy is one of the authorized causes for the termination of employment provided for in Article 298 of the Labor Code, as amended. For the implementation implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. To establish good faith, the company must provide substantial proof that the services of the employees are in excess of what is required of the company, and that fair and reasonable criteria were used to determine the redundant positions. In order to prove the validity of its redundancy program, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company has presented data on the decreasing volume of the received calls by the Operator Services Center for the years 1996 to 2002. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company's declaration of redundancy was backed by substantial evidence showing a consistent decline for operator-assisted calls for both local and international calls because of cheaper alternatives like direct dialing services, and the growth of wireless communication. With these, the court ruled that the redundancy program of PLDT is valid. Nonetheless, there is a need to review the redundancy package awarded to the employees terminated due to redundancy. For either redundancy or retrenchment, the law requires that the employer give separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay of the affected employee, or at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The employer must also serve a written notice on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the effective date of termination due to redundancy or retrenchment. While the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company complied with the notice requirement, the same cannot be said as regards the separation pay received by some of the affected workers. 2. No. A return-to-work order is issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment when he or she assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry that is considered indispensable to the national interest. Article 278(g) of the Labor Code provides that the assumption and certification of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall automatically enjoin the intended or impending strike. When a strike has already taken place at the time the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute, all striking employees shall immediately return to work. Moreover, the employer shall immediately resume operations, and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Return-towork and reinstatement orders are both immediately executory; however, a return-towork order is interlocutory in nature, and is merely meant to maintain status quo while the main issue is being threshed out in the proper forum. In contrast, an order of reinstatement is a judgment on the merits handed down by the Labor Arbiter pursuant to the original and exclusive jurisdiction provided for under Article 224(a) of the Labor Code. In the case at bar, there is no basis to reinstate the employees who were terminated as a result of redundancy. The order of the Secretary of Labor is proper while the main issue is still being threshed out.
Catotocan v. Lourdes School of Quezon GR No. 213486 April 26, 2017 Topic: Retirement Facts: Catotocan was a music teacher at the Lourdes School of Quezon. She has taught for 35 years in that school. She is now 53 years old. The school made an addendum to its retirement policy stating that the employee will be retired upon reaching 60 years old or upon having served for 30 years, whichever comes earlier. Not wanting to retire yet, Catotocan opposed the addendum and requested that they be retired only upon reaching 60 years old. The school did not grant her request. Since she has already served for more than 30 years, she was considered retired by the school. She then made use of the money from her retirement. The school re-hired her three times as a contractual employee but refused to do so on the fourth year. She filed for illegal dismissal. She argued that she was illegally dismissed when the school made her retire. Issue: Is an employee illegally dismissed when she retired pursuant to a retirement plan and availed of its benefits? Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the employer has the prerogative to lower the retirement age subject to the consent of the employees. It must be embodied in a mutually instituted retirement plan. The Court also ruled that as long as there is a mutually instituted retirement plan, there is no need for the employer to consult the employee afterwards if she really wants to retire since this would constrict the management’s prerogative in making their employees retire. A notice is only needed. In this case, there was a retirement plan. Catotocan ratified her consent to the retirement plan when she availed of the benefits under it.
RE: Dropping from the Rolls of Rowie A. Quimno A.M. No. 17-03-33-MCTC April 17, 2017 Topic: Absence Without Leave Facts: Rowie was a utility worker for an MCTC in Ipil, ZamboangaSibugay. He has been on absence without official leave (AWOL) since February 1, 2016. Issue: Should a court personnel on AWOL for over a year be separated from service? Ruling: Ruling: Yes. Under Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, “[a]n official or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service service or dropped from the rolls without without prior notice.” Since Rowie has been on AWOL since February 1, 2016, he should be separated from service.
The Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Justin Aventurado A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212 April 18, 2017 Topic: Irregularity and Serious Misconduct of Judges; J udges; Retirement Facts: Administrative Circular No. 43-2004 states that when a judge files his application for optional retirement, he shall cease from performing his functions as a judge. Judge Aventurado filed his application on January 30, 2009, but he asked for an extension until February 20, 2009 in order to decide 12 cases. He failed to decide those cases, while he decided other cases where he either dismissed the case or acquitted the accused. His extension was not ruled upon by the Court. Issue: Is Judge Aventurado liable for irregularity and serious misconduct and for violation of Administrative Administrative Circular No. 43-2004? Ruling: Yes. “Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandated that cases or matters filed in the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the time they are submitted for decision or resolution.” Judge Aventurado disregarded the litigants’ constitutional right to the speedy dispositi on of their cases. It was also odd for Judge Avenurado to fail in deciding the 12 cases where he even asked for an extension to do so. He decided other cases instead where he either dismissed the case or acquitted the accused.
Judge Aventurado also also violated Administrative Circular Circular No. 43-2004. It states that "if on the date specified in the application as the date of the effectivity of the retirement, the applicant has not yet received any notice of approval or denial of his application, he shall shall cease working and discharging his functions unless directed otherwise.” Hence, Jude Aventurado’s Aventurado’s retirement was already effective the moment he filed filed the application. application. Since he continued working after that, he is liable for violating Administrative Circular No. 43-2004.
Sumifru Corporation v. Baya G.R. No. 188269 April 17, 2017 Topic: Constructive Dismissal Facts: Baya was a supervisor of AMS Farming Corporation (AMSFC). He founded an agrarian reform cooperative of the regular employees of AMSFC. He was reassigned as supervisor to DFC, a sister company. He remained active with the coop he founded in AMSFC. Later on, the coop filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform. The banana plantation of AMSFC was then covered by the Agrarian Reform and awarded to the beneficiaries, including Baya. AMSFC tried to convince Baya to transfer to the pro-company cooperative. He refused. Baya was then transferred back to AMSFC. When Baya returned to AMSFC, he was told that there are no more available supervisory positions in the company so he was transferred to a rank-and-file position instead. Both AMSFC and DFC knew that there were no available supervisory positions in AMSFC at that time. This happened on August 30, 2002. A month later, on September 20, 2002, the DAR went to the plantation to effect the takeover of the land by the beneficiaries. The next day, the rank-and-file employees where no longer allowed to work because they have been replaced by contract workers. The employees who were members of the pro-company cooperative were allowed to work. AMSFC argued that the terminations were a result of the takeover of the plantation. Issue: Is an employee constructively dismissed when the company transfers him from supervisory to rank-and-file position position as a result of an agrarian reform dispute? Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that constructive dismissal exists when an employee ceases to work because continuing to work for the employer is unreasonable, impossible or unlikely. This happens when there is demotion or a diminution in salary, wages or benefits. In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer or demotion was an exercise of management prerogative and not a means to remove the employee. If the employer fails to prove it, he will be liable for constructive dismissal. In this case, both companies knew that there were no more supervisory positions available in AMSFC. It was alleged that the company also employed tactics to bust the cooperative which included harassing Baya and the other employees. The company also tried to convince Baya to transfer to the pro-company cooperative in order
to secure his employment. These allegations by Baya was not refuted ref uted by AMSFC. Lastly, AMSFC argued that the dismissal was a result of the takeover of the plantation. However, the instances indicating constructive dismissal was already present on August 30, 2002 (when Baya was demoted to a rank-and-file position). The takeover only happened a month later on September 20, 2002. The two companies are then liable or constructive dismissal.
University of Santo Tomas v. SamahangManggagawang SamahangManggagawang UST G.R. No. 184262 April 24, 2017 Topic: Regular, Project Employee Facts: The SamahangManggagawang UST were composed of workers who maintained the classrooms and facilities of the University of Santo Tomas (UST). They were laborers, electricians, masons, etc. They were repeatedly hired for ten years. They alleged that they are regular workers because they perform services which are necessary and desirable to the business of UST. On the other hand, UST argues that they are project employees since they were hired on a per-project basis as evidenced by the Contractual Employee Appointments (CEA) they signed. The contracts they signed stated that they are tasked “to assist” in various carpentry, c arpentry, electrical and masonry work. Issue: Are the workers project employees when they signed a contract stating the term of their employment but the description of the job is vague? Ruling: No. They are not project employees. A valid project or fixed term employment is when the terms of the employment were agreed upon by the parties without any force or duress upon the employee or where it appears that the employer or employee dealt with w ith each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. However, when it appears that the periods were used to evade the employee’s right to security of tenure it will be stricken down for being contrary to public policy. The contract they signed appears that they were engaged for all-around maintenance work. Their jobs were not clearly delineated. The contract only tried to compartmentalize their jobs as projects in order to evade their right to security of tenure. They are regular employees. There are two types of regular employees: (a) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. The workers under the SamahangManggagawang SamahangManggagawang UST belong to the second category. They have been employed for at least one year. In fact, they have been continuously engaged for ten years already.
Ramon Manuel T. Javines Vs. Xlibris A.K.A. Author Solutions, Inc., Joseph Steinbach, And Stella Mars Ouano G.R. No. 214301 June 1, 2007 Topic: Dismissal for Just Cause Facts: Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as Operations Manager. Approximately 10 months after, J a vines was terminated for falsifying/tampering falsifying/tampering three meal receipts. The falsification was discovered when Javines submitted the meal receipts for reimbursement to the finance department. On July 27, 2012, Xlibris terminated Javines' employment through an end of employment notice. Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the NLRC'S finding that Javines was dismissed for just cause Ruling: NO. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC uniformly held that Javines' employment was terminated for just cause under Article 297 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code. It is undisputed that from this unanimous finding, Javinesfailed to move for reconsideration nor challenged said ruling before the CA. Consequently, the NLRC decision finding Javines to have have been dismissed dismissed for just cause became final. final. For failure failure to file the the requisite requisite petition before the CA, the NLRC decision had attained finality and had been placed beyond the appellate court's power of review. Although appeal is an essential part of judicial process, the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Settled are the rules that a decision becomes final as against a party who does not appeal the same and an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the court below. Hence, the finding that Javines was dismissed for just cause must be upheld.
Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. ArjanHassaram GR No. 217730 June 5, 2017 Topic: Retirement Benefits; Article 287. Facts: Hassaram filed a case against PAL for illegal dismissal and payment of retirement benefits, damages damages and attorney’s fees. He applied for retirement from PAL in August 2000 after rendering 24 years of service as a pilot, but his application was denied. PAL thereby informed him that he lost his employment as of June 9, 1998, by his failure to comply with a Return to Work Order on June 7, 1998. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Hassaram by awarding retirement benefits and attorney’s fees to Hassaram. It ruled that
he did not defy a Return to Work Order, as he was already on leave when the order was implemented. implemented. The LA arbiter applied Art. 287 in the computation of benefits.Hassaram’s benefits.Hassaram’s other claims were dismissed. PAL appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision to award retirement benefits based on Article 287 of the Labor Code. PAL filed an MR, which the NLRC granted. The NLRC reversed its earlier decision by setting aside the ruling of the LA on account of Hassaram’s receipt of retirement benefits. Hassaram sought reconsideration of the new NLRC Resolution but his motion was denied. Hassaram elevated the matter to the CA via Petition for Certiorari. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the ruling of the LA. It ruled that the funds received under the Plan were not the retirement benefits contemplated by law. Hence, Hassaram was still entitled to receive retirement benefits in the amount of Php2,111,984.60 pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code. PAL sought for reconsideration reconsideration but was denied. Issue: Whether Hassaram is entitled to received retirement benefits under Art. 287 of the Labor Code. Ruling: No. Article 287 would entitle a retiring pilot to the equivalent of only 22.5 days of his monthly salary for every year of service. This scheme was thus considered by the Court as inferior to the retirement plans granted by PAL to the latter’s pil ots in the alike cases Elegir and PAL. It is to his advantage that PAL’s retirement plans were applied in the computation of his retirement benefits.
Luis S. Doble, Jr. vs. ABB Inc. / NitinDesal G.R. No. 215627 June 5, 2017 Topic: Security of Tenure; Illegal Dismissal; Voluntary vs. Constructive Dismissal Facts: Petitioner Luis Doble, a licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB, Inc. as Junior Design Engineer on March 29, 1993. Doble rose through the ranks and was promoted from Design Engineer in 1994 to Vice-President and Local Division Manager of Power System Division in March 2010. ABB Inc. conducts yearly Performance and Development Appraisal of all its employees. In all years prior to 2008, Doble was rated with grades 3 or 4, equivalent to Strong Performance or Superior Results. In 2008 to 2010, he received a performance rating of 4 for superior results. In March 2, 2012, the company manager and president, informing him that his performance rating for 2011 is 1, equivalent to unsatisfactory performance, called Doble. On March 13, 2012, Doble was called to a meeting where he was informed of a change in leadership due to the extent of losses and level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Doble was given the option to resign as Local Division Manager of the PS Division, in exchange for a separation pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided he would submit a letter of resignation, giving him until 12:45pm within which to decide. Doble was shocked by the abrupt decision of the management. Doble narrated in his Position Paper how he was constructively dismissed and forced to resign.
On March 26, 2012, Doble filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, other monetary claims and damages. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was involuntary, and ordered ABB Inc and Desai to pay his backwages and separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer feasible. ABB Inc. and Desai filed an appeal, and Doble filed a partial appeal from the dismissal of his monetary claims. In June 26, 2013, the 2 Commissioners of the NLRC 6th Division granted the appeal filed by ABB Inc. and Desai, and dismiss the partial appeal of Doble. The resignation of Doble was voluntary, hence there was no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of other monetary claims, damages and attorney’s fees. One NLRC Commissioner dissented. Doble filed an MR, but the NLRC denied the motion in a Resolution dated Aug. 14, 2013, for lack of compelling reason to disturb its findings and conclusions. Dissatisfied, Doble filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed outright Doble’s Petition for Certiorari. Doble then filed a petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Was Doble illegally dismissed? Ruling: No. He voluntarily resigned. In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer interposes the defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned necessarily rests upon the employer. Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his employment/position under the circumstances. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. Considering the abovementioned, the Court agrees with the NLRC that ABB Inc and Desai were able to prove by substantial evidence that Doblevoluntarility resigned. Doble’s defenses and allegations were all not proven by him, and Doble failed to present substantial documentary or testimonial evidence to corroborate the same. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence. Even if the option to resign originated from the employer, what is important for resignation to be deemed voluntary is that the employee’s intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment.
Sumifru Philippines Corp. vs. NagkahiusangMamumuosaSayapa NagkahiusangMamumuosaSayapa Farm G.R. No. 202091 June 7, 2017 Topic: Unions; Unions; Employer-Employee Employer-Employee Relationship; Relationship; Four-Fold Test Facts: Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger with Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). FBAC was engaged in the buying, marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas. The private respondent NagkahiusangMamumuosaSuyapa Farm (NAMASUF A-NAFLU-KMU), a legitimate labor organization, filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI in Davao City. NAMASUFA sought to represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering around one hundred forty, of packing plant 90 (PP 90) of Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). NAMASUFA claimed that there was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment. FBAC filed an Opposition to the Petition. It argued that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it and the workers involved. It alleged that members of NAMASUFA are actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services (A2Y), a duly licensed independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter. NAMASUFA, in its Comment to Opposition countered, among others, that its members were former workers of Stanfilco before FBAC took over its operations sometime in 2002. It further alleged that the members of NAMASUF A were working at PP 90 long before A2Y came. Pending resolution of the petition, FBAC was merged with SUMIFRU, the latter being the surviving corporation. The DOLE Med-Arbiter issued an Order granting the Petition for Certification Election of NAMASUF A and declared that Sumifru was the employer of the workers concerned. The Med-Arbiter Med- Arbiter held that the “four“four -fold test” will show that respondent FBAC is the employer of petitioner’s members. The most important element is the employer’s employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. On the first factor, (selection and engagement of the employer), it is that the staff of FBAC advised that those who are interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become members first of CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it. On the second factor (payment of wages), while the FBAC tried to impress that workers are paid by A2Y Contracting Services, this at best is but an administrative arrangement. The payroll summary submitted does not contain the relevant information such as the employee’s rate of pay, deductions made and the amount actually paid to the employee. On the third factor (the power of dismissal), it is very clear that FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against erring workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary authority authority over them. Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent FBAC gives instructions to the workers on how to go about their work is sufficient indication that it exercises control over their movements. The workers are instructed as to what time they are supposed to report and what time they are supposed to return. re turn. They were required to fill up monitoring sheets as they go about their jobs and even the materials which they used in the packing plant were supplied by FBAC. Sumifru appealed to the
DOLE Secretary and in a Resolution dated Feb. 8, 2010, the DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal. The DOLE Secretary ruled that Sumifru is the true employer of the workers. Sumifru then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA raising the issue of whether the DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring it as the employer of the workers at PP 90. The CA dismissed the petition. The CA ruled that the DOLE Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion because the latter’s ruling that Sumifru was the employer of the workers was anchored on substantial evidence. The CA, after reviewing the records, accorded respect to the findings of facts of the DOLE Secretary, which affirmed the Med-Arbiter, as they have special knowledge and expertise over matters under their jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship when the company required monitoring sheets and imposed disciplinary actions for non- compliance with “No Helmet – No Entry” “No ID – No Entry” policies. Ruling: Sumifru gave instructions to the workers on how to go about their work, what time they were supposed to report for work, required monitoring sheets as they went about their jobs, and provided the materials used in the packing plant. In affirming the MedArbiter, the DOLE Secretary relied on the documents submitted by the parties and ascertained that Sumifru indeed exercised control over the workers in PP 90. The DOLE Secretary found that the element of control was present because Sumifru required monitoring sheets and imposed disciplinary actions for non-compliance non- compliance with “No Helmet – No Entry” “No IDID -No Entry” policies.
Spectrum Security Services V. David Grave GR No. 196650 June 07, 2017 2017 Topic: Illegal Dismissal Facts: The petitioner – a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing security services – employed and posted the respondents at the premises of Ibiden Philippines, Inc. (Ibiden.) The controversy started when the petitioner implemented an action plan as part of its operational and manpower supervision enhancement program geared towards the gradual replacement of security guards at Ibiden. On August 14, 2008, the respondents filed their complaint against the petitioner for constructive dismissal in Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, claiming that the implementation of the action plan was a retaliatory measure against them for bringing several complaints along with other employees of the petitioner to recover unpaid holiday pay and 13th month pay. Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. The petitioner assailed the adverse ruling of the NLRC in the CA on certiorari. The CA promulgated its assailed decision upholding the NLRC, hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the CA erred in finding that the petitioner was guilty of illegally dismissing the respondents despite the fact that the totality of the circumstances negated such finding Ruling: Yes. The NLRC and the CA concluded that there was illegal or constructive dismissal in this case as the private respondents were not given new assignments immediately after being placed on reserved status; that the lack of any indication from the "Notices to Return to Unit" of their re-assignments was a badge of bad faith; and that the timing was off because the action plan was implemented by the petitioner after the respondents had filed the complaints for their monetary claims against the petitioner and received a favorable decision thereon. Security guards, like other employees in the private sector, are entitled to security of tenure. Indeed, there should be no indefinite lay-offs. After the period of six months, the employers should either recall the affected security guards to work or consider them permanently retrenched pursuant pursuant to the requirements of the law; otherwise, the employers would be held to have dismissed them, and would be liable for such dismissals.
Yolando T. Bravo Vs. Urios College (Now Father Saturnino Uri Os University) And/Or Fr. John Christian U. Young G.R. No. 198066 June 7, 2017 2017 Topic: Just Cause, Procedural Due Process, & Payment of Separation Pay, Backwages and Attorney’s Fees Facts: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher by Urios College, now called Father SatuminoUrios University. In addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the school's comptroller. Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new ranking system for non-academic employees for school year 2001-2002. Under the proposed ranking system, the position of Comptroller was classified as an office head while the position of Vice-President for Finance was classified as middle management. Bravo suggested that since he assumed the duties of Comptroller and Vice-President for Finance, his salary scale should be upgraded. The committee allegedly agreed with Bravo and accepted his recommendations. Later, Bravo obtained his employee ranking slip, which showed his evaluation score and the change of his rank from office head to middle manager-level IV. The change, however, was merely superimposed. In October 2004, Urios College organized a committee to review the ranking system implemented during school year 2001-2002. The committee found that the ranking system for school year 2001-2002 caused salary distortions among several employees. There were also discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo and of two (2) other employees. The committee recommended that Bravo be administratively charged for serious misconduct or willful breach of trust under Article 28227 of the Labor Code. On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his services for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon receipt of the termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees. Issues: 1. WON petitioner's employment was terminated for a just cause 2. WON petitioner was deprived of procedural due process 3. WON petitioner is entitled to the payment of separation pay, backwages, and attorney's fees Ruling: 1. Yes. To warrant termination of employment under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code, the misconduct must be serious or of such grave and aggravated character. In addition, the misconduct must relate to the performance of the employee's duties that would render the employee unfit to continue working for the employer. Thus, to warrant the dismissal from service of a rank-and-file employee under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code, the misconduct (1) must be serious, (2) should relate to the performance of the employee's duties, (3) should render the employee unfit to continue working for the employer, and (4) should have been performed with wrongful intent. In this case, it appears that petitioner was neither induced nor motivated by any wrongful intent. He believed in good faith that respondent had accepted and approved his recommendations on the proposed ranking scale. Nevertheless, due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's employment may be terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article 297(a), of the Labor Code. A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions. Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. In addition, there was no reason for the Comptroller's Office to undertake the preparation of its own summary table because this was a function that exclusively pertained to the Human Resources Department. Thus, it was reasonable that he should be held liable by respondent on the basis of command responsibility. responsibility. 2. Yes. In termination based on just causes, the employer must comply with procedural due process by furnishing the employee a written notice containing the specific grounds or causes for dismissal. The notice must also direct the employee to submit his or her written explanation within a reasonable period from the receipt of the notice. Afterwards, the employer must give the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself or herself. A hearing, however, is not a condition sine qua non. A formal hearing only becomes mandatory in termination cases when so required under company rules or when the employee requests for it. In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural due process in terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished petitioner a show cause memo stating the specific grounds for dismissal. The show cause memo also required petitioner to answer the charges by submitting a written explanation. Respondent even informed petitioner that he mayavail the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a thorough investigation. Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate occasions. The findings of the investigation
committee were then sent to petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination containing respondent’s final decision. Hence, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that he was deprived of due process. 3. No. Under Article 294 of the Labor Code, the reliefs of an illegally dismissed employee are reinstatement and full backwages. backwages. Backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of the employee's dismissal from employment. It is computed from the time that the employee's compensation was withheld until his or her actual reinstatement. However, when reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay is awarded. Considering that there was a just cause for terminating petitioner from employment, there is no basis to award him separation pay and backwages. There are also no factual and legal bases to award attorney's fees to petitioner.
Mario C. Madridejos Vs. Nyk-Fil Ship Management Inc. G.R. No. 204262 June 7, 2017 Topic: Seafarer Disability Benefits Facts: Petitioner Madridejos was a Filipino seafarer hired by respondent NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. (NYK-FIL), a registered local manning agency operating by virtue of Philippine laws for its foreign principal, International Cruise Services, Limited. Madridejos signed an employment contract with NYK-FIL as a Demi Chef. Madridejos commenced to work aboard the vessel. Two (2) weeks after, he claimed that he suddenly slipped on a metal stairway and fell down, hitting his abdomen and chest on a metal pipe. He was brought to the ship doctor and was diagnosed to have a sebaceous cyst to the right of the umbilicus. After two (2) months, NYK-FIL terminated Madridejos' services through its foreign principal. Madridejos insisted that he did not finish his employment contract with NYK-FIL due to his unwanted health condition. Not being at fault for the pre-termination of his employment contract, he made demands upon NYKFILto pay his disability benefits Issue: Is Madridejos entitled to disability benefits? Ruling: No. Madridejos cannot claim disability benefits since he was not medically repatriated. Even assuming that Madridejos was medically repatriated, he still cannot claim for disability benefits since his sebaceous cyst was not work-related. Illnesses not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32 of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels are disputably presumed to be work-related. However, seafarers must prove through substantial evidence the correlation between their illness and the nature of their work for their claim for disability benefits to prosper. For an illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the
seafarer. It is enough that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had. Madridejos cannot solely rely on the disputable presumption. For his failure to substantiate his claim that his cyst was either workrelated or work-aggravated, this Court cannot grant him relief. For this reason, this Court cannot presuppose that it is work-related. Furthermore, Furthermore, it was already settled that Madridejos was not repatriated due to his alleged medical condition but due to the expiration of his contract as a probationary employee. Clearly, it becomes unnecessary for NYK-FIL to overcome the disputable presumption that Madridejos' illness was work-related.
Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. And/Or Ms. Eileen Morales Vs. Heirs Of Ricardo S. Ganal, Gemma B. Boragay, G.R. No. 220168 June 7, 2017 Topic: Seafarer entitlement to death and other benefits and Damages Facts: Petitioners employed Ricardo Ganal (Ganal) as an oiler aboard the vessel MV Stadt Hamburg. Ganal commenced his employment. Around 7 o'clock in the evening of April 15, 2012, a party was organized for the crewmen of MV Stadt Hamburg while the ship was anchored at Chittagong, Bangladesh. Ganal joined the party. The ship captain noticed that Ganal was already drunk so he directed him to return to his cabin and take a rest. Ganal ignored the ship captain's order. The crewmembers attempted to accompany him back to his cabin but he refused. They tried to restrain him but he resisted and, when he found the chance to escape, he ran towards the ship's railings and, without hesitation, jumped overboard and straight into the sea. The crewmembers immediately threw life rings into the water towards the direction where he jumped and the ship officer sounded a general alarm and several alarms thereafter. Contact was also made with the coast guard and the crew members searched for Ganal, to no avail. Ganal was later found dead and floating in the water. Issue: Are respondents entitled to death and other benefits as well as damages by reason of the demise of their predecessor-in-interest during the effectivity of his contract of employment? Ruling: No. In the present case, it may be conceded that the death of Ganal took place in the course of his employment, in that it happened at the time and at the place where he was working. However, the accident, which produced this tragic result, did not arise out of such employment. The necessary question that follows then is whether Ganal's act was willful. The term "willful" means "voluntary and intentional", but not necessarily
malicious. In the case of Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck and committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman. This Court held that the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. In the same manner, Ganal's act of intentionally intentionally jumping overboard, while in a state of intoxication, could be considered as a deliberate and willful act on his own life, which is directly attributable to him. Indeed, Ganal may have had no intention to end his own life. For all we know he was just being playful. Nonetheless, he acted with notorious negligence. Notorious negligence has been defined as something more than mere or simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. In any case, regardless of Ganal's motives, petitioners were able to prove that his act of jumping was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners should not be held responsible for the logical consequence consequence of Ganal's act of jumping j umping overboard.
Ravengar Ibon vs. Genghis Khan Security Services and Marietta Vallespin G.R. No. 221085 June 19, 2017 2017 Topic: Constructive Dismissal
Facts: Ravengar G. Ibon was employed as a security guard by Genghis Khan Security Services. He was initially assigned to certain Mr. Solis in New Manila, Quezon City. He was transferred to the 5 th Avenue Condominium. Later, he was transferred to the Aspen Tower Condominium Condominium which was his last duty on Oct. 4, 2010. Thereafter, Genghis Khan Security promised to provide him a new assignment, which, however, did not happen. On May 10, 2011, Ibon filed a complaint against Genghis Khan Security for illegal dismissal and money claims. He alleged that he was no longer assigned to a new post after his last duty. For his part, Genghis Khan Security denied that Ibon was placed on a floating status for more than 6 months. It claimed that he was suspended on Oct. 4, 2010 for sleeping on the job. Genghis Khan Security added that Ibon was endorsed to another client for re-assignment, which the latter refused because his license was due for renewal. Since then, Ibon failed to report for work. Sometime in Nov. 2010, Ibon went to Genghis Khan Security’s office to claim his 13 th month pay, but the same was not given to him because it was not yet due. Genghis Khan Security then received a call from DOLE regarding Ibon’s claim claim for 13th month pay, which was later on settled during the proceedings before the DOLE. It then sent letters to Ibon requiring him to report for work, but he did not show up. Hence, Genghis Khan Security was surprised to receive summons regarding the complaint for illegal dismissal. Issue:
Whether or not the notice to report to work by a security agency to a security guard during the 6-month off-detail period should include deployment to specific client to prevent constructive dismissal from setting in. Ruling: Yes. The SC held that in Reyes vs. RP Guardians Security Agency, it was ruled that temporary off-detail of a security guard is generally allowed, but is tantamount to constructive dismissal if the floating status extends beyond 6 months. Citing Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation, the court held that the SC in such case initially found that the security guard was constructively dismissed notwithstanding the employer’s letter ordering him to report back to work. It expounded that in spite of the reort-to-work order, the security guard was still constructively dismissed because he was not given another detail or assignment. On motion for reconsideration, however, the court reversed its ruling after it was shown that the security guard was in fact assigned to a specific client, but the latter refused the same and opted to wait for another posting. A holistic analysis of the court’s disposition in JLFP Investigation reveals that: (1) an employer must assign the security guard to another posting within 6 months from his last deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed; and (2) the security guard must be assigned to a specific or particular client. A general return-to-work order does not suffice. Referring to Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation vs. Serrano, the SC held that the employer was absolved even if the security guard was on a floating status for more than 6 months because the latter refused the reassignment to another client. Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, Genghis Khan Security should have deployed Ibon to a specific client within 6 months from his last assignment. The correspondences sent to Ibon merely required him to explain why he did not report to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if Ibon actually received the letters of Genghis Khan Security, he was still constructively dismissed because none of these letters indicated his reassignment to another client. Unlike in Exocet Security and JLFP Investigation, Genghis Khan Security is guilty of constructive dismissal because it never attempted to redeploy Ibon to a definite assignment or security detail.
Norman Panaligan, et. Al. v PHYVITA Enterprises Corporation G.R. No. 202086 June 21, 2017 2017 Topic: Illegal Dismissal
Facts: PanaliganEt. Al. (petitioners) were the employees of Phyvita assigned as Room boys at “Starfleet” Starfleet” which was engaged in the business of health club massage parlor, spa and other related services. Phyvita Enterprises Corporation reported an alleged theft incident to the Police Station but the latter was not able to gather sufficient information that would lead them as to who committed said theft. While the police investigation was pending, Petitioners together with other employees filed a complaint against Starfleet for underpayment of wages. Subsequently, Starfleet’s Assistant Operations Manager issued individual Office Memoranda against Petitioners directing them to explain in writing for the alleged violation Starfleet's rules and regulations, particularly any act of dishonesty, more specifically their alleged involvement in a theft wherein important documents and papers including cash were lost which happened. Petitioners were, likewise, placed on preventive suspension. Petitioners contend that the charge of theft against them was baseless. In fact, the said criminal complaint against them was dismissed by the City Prosecutor for the simple reason that there was no direct, solid or concrete proof directing them to the commission of theft. Starfleet also has no basis to terminate them on the ground of loss of trust and confidence since said ground for dismissal was without any basis or proof. Starfleet, on the other hand, claim that petitioners' dismissal was legal since the commission of theft is a serious misconduct and an act which gives rise to fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. Thus, it is a sufficient ground to justify their dismissal. The dismissal of the criminal complaint against petitioners is immaterial since they were still validly dismissed based on breach of trust. They even alleged that the filing of the instant labor complaint was a mere afterthought. Issue: whether or not there exists just and valid cause for the termination of PANALIGAN et al.'s employment by PHYVITA? Ruling: No. In order to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, the employee must be guilty of an actual and willful breach of duty duly supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence, which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause. In the case at bar, PHYVITA failed to adduce substantial evidence that would clearly demonstrate that PANALIGAN, et al., have committed serious misconduct or have performed actions that would warrant the loss of trust and confidence reposed upon them by their employer. Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter, no substantial evidence supports the allegation of theft leveled by PHYVITA against PANALIGAN, et al. - the said criminal act being the underlying reason for the dismissal of the latter from being employees of the former.
Zambrano, et. Al. v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation Corporation G.R. No. 224099 June 21, 2017 2017 Topic: illegal dismissal; unfair labor practice
Facts: Zambrano, et. Al. averred that they were employees of private respondent Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (Phil Carpet). They were notified of the termination of their employment on the ground of cessation of operation due to serious business losses. The petitioners argue that Phil Carpet did not totally cease its operations; that most of the job orders of Phil Carpet were transferred to its wholly owned subsidiary, Pacific Carpet; and that the signing of quitclaims did not bar them from pursuing their case because they were made to believe that the closure was legal. On the other hand, Phil Carpet averred that the termination of the petitioners' employment as a consequence of its total closure and cessation of operations was in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence; that the petitioners could only offer bare and self-serving claims and sham evidence such as financial statements that did not pertain to Phil Carpet; and that under the Labor Code, any compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the regional office of the DOLE was final and binding upon the parties. In their Reply, the petitioners alleged that the losses of Phil Carpet were almost proportionate to the net income of its subsidiary, Pacific Carpet; and that the alleged sale, which transpired between Phil Carpet and Pacific Carpet, was simulated. Issue: Were the petitioners terminated from employment for an authorized cause? Did the dismissal of the petitioners’ amount to unfair labor practice? Ruling: Yes, Under Article 298 of the Labor Code, closure or cessation of operation of the establishment is an authorized cause for terminating an employee. Closure of business, as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims to prevent further financial drain upon an employer who cannot pay anymore his employees since business has already stopped. In such a case, the employer is generally required to give separation benefits to its employees, unless the closure is due to serious business losses. Phil Carpet continuously incurred losses starting 2007, as shown by the Audited Financial Statements, which were offered in evidence by the petitioners themselves. The petitioners, in claiming that Phil Carpet continued to earn profit in 2011 and 2012, disregarded the reason for such income, which was Phil Carpet's act of selling its remaining inventories. Notwithstanding such income, Phil Carpet continued to incur total comprehensive losses in the amounts of P9,559,716 and P12,768,277 for the years 2011 and 2012, respectively Thus, when an employer complies with the foregoing conditions, the Court cannot prohibit closure "just because the business is not suffering from any loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued employment. No, the dismissal dis not amount to unfair labor practice (ULP). Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize. There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to selforganize. The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of
proving it. Although there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of unfair labor practice, the alleging party has the burden of proving it. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Moreover, good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They did not identify the acts of Phil Carpet, which, they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point out the specific provisions, which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they would have the Court pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground that they were dismissed from employment simply because they were union officers and members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice, however, cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor f avor of labor.
Claudia’s Kitchen, Inc. v. v. Ma. Realiza S. Tanguin G.R. No. 221096 June 28, 2017 2017 Topic: illegal dismissal; separation pay in lieu of reinstatement reinstatement Facts: Ma. RealizaTanguin, RealizaTanguin , a billing supervisor of Claudia’s Kitchen, was placed on preventive suspension suspension by the Human Resources Manager, Manager, for allegedly forcing her co-employees to buy silver jewelry from her during office hours and inside the company premises. Tanguin denied that she was selling during office hours but Claudia’s Kitchen contends that some employees reported the same and eventually discovered her habitual tardiness and gross negligence in the computation of the total number of hours worked by her co-employees. Subsequently, they sent letters of notice to her. Tanguin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Hence the appeal at bar, Claudia’s Kitchen argued that the CA erred in awarding separation pay in the absence of any authorized cause for termination of employment; and that its conclusion that it sought to terminate respondent due to loss of confidence was refuted by the evidence on record. Tanguin averred that the petitioners sent her notices to return to work only after she had filed an illegal dismissal complaint against them before the Labor Arbiter; that on October 27, 2010, she was barred from entering her workplace by the Cost Comptroller; and that the charges of negligence in computing the number of hours worked by her co-employees and habitual tardiness were merely concocted. Issue: Was there proper dismissal of employment? Was there abandonment on the part of tanguin? And is the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement proper? Ruling No, Tanguin was not dismissed but merely placed in preventive suspension. In cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.16 But before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employees must first establish by substantial evidence that indeed they were dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof. Tanguin miserably failed to discharge this
burden. She simply alleged that a security guard barred her from entering her workplace. Yet, she offered no evidence to prove the same. Absent any evidence that she was prevented from entering her workplace, what remained was her bare allegation, which could not certainly be considered substantial evidence. At any rate, granting that she was barred, there was a lawful basis therefor as she had been placed under preventive suspension pending investigation. On the other hand, the petitioners were able to prove that they did not dismiss Tanguin from employment because she was still under investigation as evidenced by several notices20 requiring her to report to work and submit an explanation as to the charges hurled against her No, Tanguin was not guilty of abandonment. To constitute abandonment there must be a clear and deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In this regard, two elements must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. In this case, records are bereft of any indication that Tanguin 's failure to report for work was with a clear intent to sever her employment relationship with the petitioners. Mere absence or failure to report for work, even after a notice to return to work has been served, is not enough to amount to an abandonment of employment. Moreover, Tanguin's act of filing a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement negates any intention to abandon her employment. NO, the grant of separation separation pay in lieu of reinstatement has no no legal basis. Separation pay is warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault, such as those provided in Articles 298 and 299 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal where reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 297 of the same Code, being causes attributable to the employee's fault, is not, as a general rule, entitled to separation pay. There was neither dismissal nor abandonment. The complaint had no basis at the time Tanguin initiated the illegal dismissal case. The status quo ante was that she was being asked to explain the accusation against her. Instead of complying, she opted to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. It was premature, if not pre-emptive, which the Court cannot tolerate or accommodate. At this time, her plea for reinstatement, backwages and/or separation pay cannot be granted. Respondent should return to work and answer the complaints against her and the petitioners should accept her, without prejudice to the result of the investigation against her.
