UP VS. DIZON DIGEST
G.R. No. 171182 : August 23, 2012 UP V DIZON FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance. On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City. Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution. On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds. Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: I. Whether or not the UPs funds can be validly garnished? II. Whether or not the UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed out of time? HELD: The petition for review is meritor ious. FIRST ISSUE: UPs funds, being gover nment funds, are not subject to garnishment. POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under
Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.
SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II
Justice Cruz 1998 FACTS: Petitioner:
Sanders – Special Services Director of NAVSTA (Naval Station)
Moreau – Commanding Officer of the Subic Naval Base
Respondents:
Rossi and Wyer – American Citizen employed as game r oom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA
Events:
Private Respondents employment had been converted from permanent full-time to part-time
Respondents filed protest and a recommendation report was made by the hearing officer stipulating the reinstatement of both respondents plus back wages. Report on hearing contained the observation that “Special Services Management practices an autocratic form of supervision.”
Sanders disagreed with recommendation report with the later containing statements that: Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors
Mr. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise. Grievants placed the records in public places where other not involved in the case could
hear.
Moreau sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent’s employment status and requesting concurrence therewith.
Filling of Case:
Respondents filed a case in Court of F irst Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against petitioners; plaintiffs claimed that lette rs contained libelous imputations.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that acts complained of were performed by them in their discharge of official duties; consequently, court has no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
Petitioner’s motion was denied on ground that petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts.
An order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filling of a P10,000 bond on plaintiffs, against properties of Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines.
Moreau was declared in default.
Petitioner’s Motion to lift the default order was dismissed on ground that Moreau’s failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some understanding.
Motion for reconsideration of the denial motion was also dismissed.
ISSUES:
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Preliminary Injunction was thereafter filed before this court.
W/N petitioners were performing their official duties when they did acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondent.
RULING:
Petition was granted. Challenged Orders were set aside. Respondent Court is directed to dismiss the case.
Court held that he acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders wrote the letter as a reply from Moreau for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. Even without such request, he has the rights in reacting to the hearing officer’s criticism.
Moreau’s letter is clearly official in nature as the Commanding Chief of the Naval Base
answerable to the naval personnel in matters involving the special services departme nt of NAVSTA.
Court concludes that petitioners acted behalf of t he government, within the scope of their authority making the action a suit against the government without its consent.
Republic vs. Sandoval (Consti1) Campos, Jr., March 19, 1993 Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority Facts:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre (background: Wiki ) , together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform" The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands such as:
giving lands for free to farmers
zero retention of lands by landlords
stop amortizations of land payments
Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on January 15, 1987 On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meet ing Tension mounted the next day The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air t heir demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML) Government intelligent reports were also rece ived that the KMP was heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was impending
Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola
The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place; "pandemonium broke loose" After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo) 39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of marchers Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffere d minor physical injuries The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on February 27, 1 987 as follows
The march did not have any permit
The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law
There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
It is not clear who started the firing
The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire (prohibited by law)
The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks w ere not put into operation because:
there was no order to use them
they were incorrectly prepositioned
they were out of range of the marchers
The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at t he direction of the marchers The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the W estern Police District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who we re armed be prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended
It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally without permit and for inciting sedition Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola:
Gen. Ramon E. Montaño
Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz
Col. Cezar Nazareno
Maj. Filemon Gasmin
Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded v ictims to be compensated by the government
It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in t heir claim for damages from the government No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims
On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent
Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit
Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
Issues: 1.
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this is a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State Holding: 1. No.
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
2. No.
Ratio: 1. Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean t hat liability automatically attaches to the State The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State immediately President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the St ate; they are not tantamount to a waiver by the State
2. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper: 1.
When the Republic is sued by name;
2.
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the c ase is such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government
Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their official functions during the incident, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. Their main purpose in the rally was to e nsure peace and order, but they fire d at the crowd instead
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WI LLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch X V, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc Doctrine: implied consent Date: May 22, 1985 Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos
Facts:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair co ntract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of t he U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific pe rformance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projec ts.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States o f America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of pre liminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued t he writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to r estrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a St ate from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental ac ts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts) The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only w hen the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where t he contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act
Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 19 93 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by S ultan Security Agency in the various prem ises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in t he case Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character o f the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the
very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute mo ney claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
