CONSTI Case Digests bernas case book

CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113

People vs. Gozo | 53 SCRA 476, October 26, 1973

Facts: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. Issue/s: Whether or not the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the naval base leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces.

sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not it appearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory."

Held: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its

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CO KIM CHAN vs VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil 113, 1945 November 16

FACTS: Plaintiff Co filed motions in a Japanese-controlled court in Manila to recover property from the defendant. Although Manila was still under Japanese control, the Commonwealth government had been reestablished a month ago, and plaintiff was surely aware that the liberation of Manila was imminent.

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ISSUE: WON judicial processes during the Japanese occupation are valid after the Commonwealth government was already reinstated. •

HELD: Yes. RATIO: Under international law, specifically the Hague Conventions, the functioning of courts and municipal laws remain valid during occupation. The acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. This reduces the harm done to the people of the occupied territory, and reversing judicial processes strips parties, without due process, of vested rights acquired under these processes. Only legislative, constitutional and administrative processes are affected, and these are the “processes” MacArthur’s proclamation was construed to refer to. Motion for reconsideration denied. OPOSA VS FACTORAN Facts: • This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 34 children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of “inter-generational responsibility” and “intergenerational justice.” The minors filed the action for themselves as representing “their generation as well as generations yet unborn.” • Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,

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seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae (parent of the nation). The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts. In the lower court, the government argued that no legal right of the petitioners had been violated and that the issue of whether to grant or not to grant timber licenses was not a matter for the courts to decide but for political departments, namely Congress and the President. The case was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Issue: Did the children have the legal standing to file the case? Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility,” their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. The Court, on the basis of Section 16 linked with the right to health, recognized a “right to a balanced and healthful ecology” and the “correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.” In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections [GR 161872, 13 April 2004] En Banc, Tinga (J): 12 concur


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 Facts: Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on 17 December 2003. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to Pamatongʼs Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution 6558 dated 17 January 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include Pamatong as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. On 15 January 2004, Pamatong moved for reconsideration of Resolution 6558. The COMELEC, acting on Pamatongʼs Motion for Reconsideration (SPP [MP] 04-001) and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution 6604 dated 11 February 2004. The COMELEC declared Pamatong and 35 others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for Pamatong. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired. Pamatong filed the Petition For Writ of Certiorari, seeking to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, Pamatong argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Pamatong likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared

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by the COMELEC. Pamatong claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidateʼs bio-data and his program of government. Issue: Whether there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency. Held: There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 imposition of a clear State burden. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution 645210 dated 10 December 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. Herein, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

GARCIA vs COMELEC | Initiative and Referendum FACTS: •

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In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10, Serye 1993, The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act 7227. On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10.

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The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productivity, and futility. COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is “merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance.

ISSUE: WON Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative HELD: Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10 is a propoer subject of an initiative RATIO: •

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The constitutional command to include acts (i.e. resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor” o Section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions (3 systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution, initiative on statutes, initiative on local legislation) o Section 16 states “any proposition on ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified, or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom” COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2300 entitled “In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct on Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws” o Section 5, Article 1: “The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance”



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Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. o Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book 1 of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.

The provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all “subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact,” which includes resolutions Eastern Shipping Lines v Philippine Overseas Employment Administration | Non-delegability

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Tablarin v Gutierrez | Non-delegability FACTS: •

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The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000 by the POEA for the death of her husband, Vitaliano Saco, who was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris and was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but the Social Security System. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the complainant. The petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Order No. 2 itself as a violation of non-delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delagation of legislative powers HELD: The issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is not a violation of nondelation of powers.

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The authority to issue the said regulation is provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797 which states that the POEA shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration.

Petitioners argue that Section 5(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 (Medical Act of 1959) violates non-delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. o Section 5. Functions. The functions of the Board of Medical Education shall be: ! (a) To determine and prescribe minimum requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; ! (f)To promulgate and prescribe and enforce necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions

ISSUE: WON Section 5(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 is a violates nondelegation of legislative power by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate HELD: Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 2382 does not violate non-delegation of legislative power. RATIO: •

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Administrative bodies have the power of subordinate legislation, which is the power to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. o With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.

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The standards set for subordinate legislation may be either expressed or implied. o The standard does not have to be spelled out specifically. o It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. The necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and regulation of medical education” and in Section 5(a) and 7 (admission requirements) of the same Act, and the body of the statute itself.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 • Free Telephone Workers Union v Minister of Labor | Non-delegability FACTS: Petitioner claims that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 is an undue delegation of legislative power. o The provision empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the National Labor Relations Commission.

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ISSUE: WON the issuance of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 violates the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. HELD: The issuance of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 does not violate nondelegation of legislative power.

The Secretary of Labor issued an Implementing Order which prohibits the employer from crediting CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with RA No. 6640.

ISSUE: WON an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement HELD: The Implementing Order cannot provide such prohibition. RATIO: • • •

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RA No. 6640 does not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases. Implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations should be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative act cannot amend an act of Congress.

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Tatad v Secretary of Energy | Non-delegation

Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is most commonly indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation requires a course of continuous decision. A rigid application of the non-delegation doctrine would be an obstacle to national efforts at development and progress.

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Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., In. v Secretary Drilon | Nondelegation FACTS: •

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Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage by 10 pes os per day for private sector employees, and 11 pesos per day nonagricultural workers outside Metro Manila.

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Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes,” and E.O. No. 372, which implemented the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry through E.O. No. 372. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180: " Petitioners claim that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the world market,” and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are unclear and inconcrete in meaning. " They claim that these phrases do not provide the “determinate or determinable standards” which can guide the President in his decision to fully regulate the downstream oil industry. E.O. No. 372: Petitoners claim that E.O. No. 392 is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.

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WON Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power WON E.O. No. 372 misapplied R.A. No. 8180

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Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate the constitutional provision on undue delegation of power E.O. No. 372 misapplied R.A. No. 8180.

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Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 can pass both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test " Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it. " The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of deregulation before the end of March 1997. " Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President: a. When the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining b. When the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable " The dictionary meanings of the words “as far as practicable,” “declining,” and “stable” are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. E.O. No. 372 misapplied R.A. No. 8180. " Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 only enumerated two factors to be considered: stability of crude oil prices in the world market and stability of the exchange rate of the peso to dollar. " Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. " By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. No. 8180. People v. Dacuycuy | Non-delegability

FACTS: • Petitioner assails Sec 32 of RA 4670 (penalizing those who willfully interfere

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with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights) which states that the penalty of imprisonment is “in the discretion of the court.” • No prescribed term or period for the imposable penalty of imprisonment was specified. ISSUE: • WON a judicial determination of the penalty is an undue delegation of legislative power HELD: • The judicial determination of the penalty in Sec 32 of RA 4670 is an undue delegation of legislative power. The penalty of imprisonment provided in Sec 32 is unconstitutional. RATIO: • It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. • The exercise of judicial discretion by courts is not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration of justice and application of existing laws, however, the law must specify and designate the limits to fix the length of service or term of imprisonment. Employees Confederation v. National Wages Commission FACTS: Emloyers Confederation of the Philippines is questioning the validity of Wage Order NCR-01-A of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board of NCR promulgated pursuant to the Wage Rationalization Act (RA 6727).

ISSUE: WON the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards being in charge of prescribing minimum wage rates is constitutional and inviolative of the nondelegability of legislative power HELD: The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards being in charge of prescribing minimum wage rates is constitutional and inviolative of the nondelegability of legislative power. RATIO: The Congress may delegate the power to fix rates as long as sufficient



standards are supplied. Art. 124 provides standards that impressed the court in the light of the floor-wage method’s failure.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC || Party-List GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000 FACTS: In the May 1998 elections, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the partylist system. On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. Other party-lists followed through Motions of Intervention seeking the same relief as PAGASA. On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC through a Resolution granted the petition of PAGASA. The Resolution also held that "at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives” disregarding the 2% requirement under Section 11 of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up."First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage the multi-party system.” The petitioners contend the said resolution for being invalid and unconstitutional. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the

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Constitution is mandatory or merely a ceiling. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation should be filled up completely and all the time. 2. Whether or not the 2% threshold requirement and three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional. 3. How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined.

HELD: For issue #1: Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. In the foregoing, the Constitution does not require all such allocated seats to be filled up all at the same time and under all circumstances. For issue #2: The two-percent requirement is precise and crystalline (constitutional). For issue #3: Step One- to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each receive; all parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each, only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats Step Two- determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties Step Three- solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitle to, based on proportional representation RATIO: R.A. 7941: Important note: the court held that the COMELEC violated the legal parameters set by the Constitution and RA 7941 therefore the resolutions are declared invalid and unconstitutional for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. Four INVIOLABLE (Legal) Parameters: 1. Twenty percent allocation. Combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives



2. Two percent threshold. Only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives 3. Three-seat limit. Regardless of the number of votes actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats 4. Proportional Representation. Additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes”

For issue #1: The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. For issue #2: Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having sufficient number of constituents deserving or representation are actually represented in Congress. The two percent threshold is consistent with the very essence of “representation”. To have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. In addition, the threeseat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House. For issue #3: Six percent bench mark: If the proportion of votes received by the first party WITHOUT ROUNDING IT OFF is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats. If the proportion is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, the first party shall have one additional seat.

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Criticism: Formula being too strict

-Court held that the formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematica; equation, no more no less.

Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC || Party-List GR NO. 147589, June 26, 2001 FACTS: At the onset of the 2001 election, the COMELEC received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. The COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 granting the accreditation of 154 parties and denied the others. The Akbayan party-list and other party-lists as well filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of the respondents. Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before the Supreme Court on April 16, 2001. This petition assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. ISSUES: (there are actually 4 issues, but only three (2nd, 3rd, and 4th) are relevant as in the case book) 1. (2nd) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. 2. (3rd) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented” sectors and organizations. 3. (4th) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. HELD:

Why other qualified parties are allotted less additional seats than the first part:

For issue #1: Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. Therefore, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.

1. The ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1 2. The formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat

For issue #2: The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Therefore, the Court held that it cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and


prostituted by those underrepresented.


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factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies.

For issue #3: From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. It seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system. The COMELEC committed grave use of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Proportional representation: refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented (e.g. labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous communities, etc.)

RATIO:

*there are 8 points in the original case, the third one was omitted.

For issue #1: The reason behind the inclusion of political parties in the partylist system is to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in Congressional district elections in winning a seat in Congress. Practically, they have no voice in the Assembly. But in this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. Party: (according to Section 3 of RA 7941) is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties Political Party: an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office For issue #2: The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must

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Guidelines for Screening Party-list Participants: (as listed in the case book) 1. The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identifies in Section 5 of RA 7941 2. While even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors… to be elected to the House of Representatives” 3. A party or organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 4. Party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government 5. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law, but must also comply with Section 9 of RA 7941 (Qualifications of Party-List Nominees) 6. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees 7. While lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Section 9, RA 7941: Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least



ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY ET.AL. V. COMELEC, ET. AL GR NO. 147589, June 25,2003 Panganiban J. FACTS: Various party-list participants filed for motions for proclamation. They raised the question “Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners?” The Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of party-list organizations has reduced the “total number of votes cast for the party-list elections.” Because of which, the 2% benchmark required law has now allegedly attained by movants. Thus, they pray for their proclamation as winners. ISSUE/S: Whether Labo v. COMELEC GR Nos. 105111 and 105384, July 3, 1992 and Grego v. COMELEC, 340 Phil 591, June 19,1997 and related cases should be deemed applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections. Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualified for having failed to meet the eight-point guideline contained in June 26, 2001 Decision should be deducted from the “total votes cast for the party-list system” during the said elections. HELD: Having obtained at least 2% of total valid votes cast, BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS, ABANSE! AND PINAY are declared elected with one nominee each. COMELEC shall proclaim these winners and their nominees thereby lifting TRO dated May 9, 2001. For issue #1: Labo vs. Comelec and Grego vs. Comelec are not applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections. In Labo, the Court declared that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority and defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

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The pronouncements in Grego refer to regular elections for local offices and involved the interpretation of Sec. 6 of RA 6646. They were not meant to cover party-list elections, which are governed by RA 7941.

For issue #2: Sec. 10 of RA 7941 can be made to apply in this case. It clearly provides that a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or a coalition “not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted”. In short, the votes cast for a “notoriously disqualified” candidate may be considered “stray” and excluded from the canvass. Subtracting the votes garnered by disqualified party-list groups from total votes cast will reduce base figure and 2% threshold can be more easily attained by the marginalized and under-represented groups. RATIO: RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives and is the controlling law in matters pertaining thereto. The Court answered by citing June 26, 2001 Decision that enumerated the eight-point guideline and four unique parameters of Philippines party list system. Four unique parameters of Philippines party list system 1. 20% Allocation (combined number of party list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of total membership in House of Representatives 2. 2% threshold (only parties garnering a minimum of 2% of total valid votes cast for party list systems are qualified to have a seat in House of Representatives 3. 3-seat limit (each qualified party is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats) 4. proportional representation – additional seats shall be computed in proportion to total number of votes. BANAT v. COMELEC GR No. 179295, 21 April 2009 Carpio, J. FACTS: COMELEC applied the Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula upon the completion of the canvass and party-list results, thereby proclaiming 15 party-lists to have obtained 21 seats in Congress. Barangay Association for



National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives (all 55 seats have to be proclaimed) provided by the Constitution before the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC denied the said petition, stating that it had already become moot and academic.

Issues: 1. W/N the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. 2. W/N the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. 3. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

shall consist of party-list representatives.

The Court strikes down the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941.1 The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

ISSUES AND RULING: 1. W/N the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. YES. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

3. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of RA 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: (1)The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in RA 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

2. W/N the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. NO. In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the 2% threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. The Court finds that the 2% threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives

4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? 1 Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

HELD: Petition is partially granted. The COMELEC resolutions dated Aug. 3, 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 and July 9 2007 in NBC No. 07-60 are set aside. The twopercent threshold in the distribution of additional party list seats is declared unconstitutional. Allocation of additional seats under the Party-list system shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections.

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CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 votes cast!for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, that those!garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in!proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, that each party,!organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three seats. NO. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. In defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as either “a political party or a sectoral party,” RA 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and RA 7941. Furthermore, under Section 9 of RA 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee “wallow in poverty, destitution, and infirmity” as there is no financial status required in law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. According to Chief Justice Puno’s dissent, the party-list representatives are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena; and that if major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list system electoral process, the voices of the marginalized would be surely suffocated, and that the democratic spirit of the Constitution would be betrayed. He cited the 2001 party-list elections where the major political parties figured in the disproportionate distribution of votes. 8 Justices concurred. Additional Note: Justice Nachura concurs with Justice Carpio and further adds that the 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a political party-list group to a seat in the HR in RA 7941 is unconstitutional because, according to him, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list representatives will exceed

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50, regardless of the number of district representatives. He then submits the standard of “proportional representation” and the adoption of a gradually regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list seats. He proposes this new formula for the threshold: 100% (total number of votes cast for party-list) --------------------------------------------------------=1.818% 55 party-list seats And that the minimum vote requirement should gradually lessen as the number of party-list seats increases. Doctrines: A Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters: 1.20% allocation. The combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list; 2.2% threshold. Only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; 3.Three-seat limit. Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats; 4.Proportional representation. The additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. In declaring the 2% threshold unconstitutional, the Court does not limit the allocation of additional seats to the two- percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats (the difference between the maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the two-percenters). The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, one party-list seat is assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. Finally, the three-seat cap is applied to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. TOBIAS v ABALOS || Apportionment FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”. Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election. Petitioner's first objection to the R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes Constitutional rule of "one subject-one bill" for embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) as said RA would increase the members of the House Of Rep beyond that provided in the Constitution, and (4) of the Constitution, since said RA was not made pursuant to any census ISSUE 1: WON RA 7675 violates the one-title one subject rule. HELD: No. RATIO: The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion, and not a subject separate and distinct from it. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one

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subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. ISSUE 2: WON RA 7675 preempts the right of the Congress to reapportion legislative districts HELD: No.

RATIO: There is no mention in the assailed law of any census but nevertheless enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. It was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right, which pertains to itself. ISSUE 3: WON the present limit of 250 members is absolute. HELD: No. RATIO: The limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." MARIANO v COMELEC || Apportionment FACTS: Petitioners assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati” as unconstitutional. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba, who are suing as taxpayers. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati, the rest are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig. Petitioners claim that said RA did not identify the territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, as required by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Said RA is also claimed to be an attempt to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials. Petitioners also claim that thee addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. ISSUE 1: WON RA 7854 in failing to use metes and bounds, and technical description in identifying the Makati district is unconstitutional and violative of the Local Gov Code. HELD: It is not unconstitutional.



RATIO: The uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units which will consequently sow conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers what the Local Government Code seeks to address in requiring that the land area of a local government unit be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. However, Congress deliberations show that metes and bounds with technical description were not used in RA 7854 because of an unsettled territorial dispute between Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio at the time. The Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Also the territorial jurisdiction in this case was reasonably ascertained by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities.

ISSUE 2: WON Sec 51, provisions on the officials of the city of Makati, of said RA is unconstitutional for colliding with Sec 8 of the Constitution HELD: It is not unconstitutional. RATIO: Petitioners say that RA 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. This however merely poses a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. ISSUE 3: WON the addition of another legislative district in Makati through a special law is unconstitutional HELD: It is not unconstitutional. RATIO: To hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. Reapportionment through a special law is constitutional as in the case of Tobias v. Abalos. ISSUE 4: WON it is unconstitutional to add another legislative district in Makati given its population of 450,000 HELD: It is not unconstitutional. RATIO: Section 5 of Art VI provides that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000).

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MONTEJO v. COMELEC

FACTS: Cirlo Montejo, representing First District of Leyte pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. Petitioner seeks to transfer Tolosa from his district to Leyte’s Second District, which Sergio Apostol, representing the second district opposed ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in exercising the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment HELD: Yes the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion. RATIO: The COMELEC has power only to make “minor adjustments” as in the case where a municipality in between is forgotten but is still in the territory of one district or when there is an error in the correct name of a municipality. The COMELEC cannot change the allocations per district. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution does not authorize COMELEC to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another. BAGABUYO v. COMELEC || Apportionment FACTS: ! !

Petitioner insists that R.A No. 9371 converts and divides Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit. It does not merely provide for the City’s legislative apportionment.

ISSUE: Misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of apportionment of legislative districts and division of local government units. HELD: No requirement of plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision…. RATIO: ! Legal apportionment (Black’s law dictionary): the determination of the number of representatives which a State, country or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.



Reapportionment: realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. - DISTINCTION ON REQ. of PLEBISCITE !

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Article VI, Section 5 Article X, Sec. 10 authority to act vested in the Constitution means to make a ! speaks of how local legislative district government units may be sufficiently represented so “created, divided, merged, that the people can be abolished, or its boundary effectively heard. substantially altered.” “equalize population and ! 2 specific standards: voting power among 1. criteria established in districts.” LGC Mandates 2. approval of majority of reapportionment as soon votes cast in a plebiscite as the given standards are in the political units met. directly affected. -

ISSUE: WON Gallego had been resident of Abuyog for at least one year prior to DECEMBER 10, 1940 elections. HELD: Petioner did not lose his domicile of origin. He reacquired it more than one year prior to December 1940 RATIO: ! !

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GALLEGO v. VERA || Residence Qualification

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC || Residence Qualification

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“Residence” (election law) is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence. 1. Residence or bodily presence in new locality 2. intention to remain (indefinite time) “animus manendi” 3. intention to abandon old domicile Vivero v. Maurillo: mere registration in a municipality in order to be an elector therein does not make one a resident of said municipality. Larena v. Teves: prima facie evidence of fact of his residence is required in order that he could register himself as a candidate. Not conclusive. PURPOSE of Law in fixing a residence qualification: is to exclude a stranger or newcomer who is not familiar with the needs of the community.

Pedro Gallego native of Abuyog, Leyte . He was elected mayor last December 1940 elections with 800 votes against Vicente Verra. He was defeated at first try and because of it he decided to look for a job and ended up in sitio Kaato-an, Malaybalay Bukidnon on June 20, 1938 as a nurseryman in chichona plantation of the Bureau of Forestry, He returned to Leyte on July 30 for he was offered a job but he decided to go back again in BUkidnon on August 23,1938 until September 1940. During his stay in Bukidnon, his family stayed in Abuyog, Leyte. He visited in August of 1938 and 1940. He never availed of the offers of the Government (land, house etc.) He registered as a voter in Bukidnon on October 1, 1938. He didn’t fill up the blank, which requires his length of stay in Bukidnon. In January 20, 1940, he paid for his residence cert—he stayed in Bukidnon for a year and a half.

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Imelda Marcos filed her COC for Representative of the 1st district of Leyte on March 8, 1995. Private Respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo (incumbent Rep.) filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification of Marcos on the basis of she lacks he constitutional requirement of residency. Marcos entered “seven” months in her COC, she changed it to “since childhood” She said it was an honest misinterpretation, since she always maintained Tacloban City as her Domicile or residence.”

ISSUE: WON petitioner was a resident, foe election purposes of the 1st district of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of May 9, 1995 elections. HELD: Petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualification to run for office. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during



the past four decades. And none of those point to her intending to abandon her domicile in Leyte. RATIO: ! ! ! !

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Article 50, CC: …domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. Ong v. Republic: Domicile=permanent home; Domicile: physical presence and animus manendi. Fact of residence should be decisive in determining the constitutional requirement of residency. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study, or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. (Despite the fact that she lived outside metro manila) DOMICILE OF ORIGIN is not easily lost except when (needs a clear and positive proof): 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one. 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose Art. 110 CC: concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing, which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage. Art, 110 : The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should lie abroad unless in the service of the Republic. Aquino v. COMELEC | 1-year Residency Requirement G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

FACTS: • The Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy in the Second District of Makati City for the 1995 elections. • Petitioner leased a condominium unit in the area. The terms in the leasing agreement is 2 years but his intention was really for only 1 year, because he has other “residences” in Manila and Quezon City. • COMELEC en banc found in the petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy for 1992 elections that:

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he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992, he was resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election, o he was a registered voter of the same district, and o his birth certificate places Conception, Tarlac as birthplace by his parents Benigno and Aurora. It was clear and unassailable that is domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent Certificate of Candidacy was in Conception, Tarlac. o o

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ISSUE: WON the one year residency of Aquino in the Second District of Makati enough to qualify him as a candidate for Representative of the same. HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as candidate, he “must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.” (COMELEC) RATIO: • The intention of the petitioner was not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing of a condo unit instead of buying one. • The fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condo in Makati, indicate that the sole purpose of Aquino in transferring physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but to only qualify as candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati. • The lease agreement (he entered into) was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for his candidacy by establishing a commencement dated of his residence. [NOTE: The petitioner’s contention that it legally impossible to impose the 1year residency requirement in a newly created political district lacks basic logic because the district was not created out of thin air. People actually were domiciled in the area before the district was created.] Domino v. COMELEC | 1-year Residency Requirement G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999 FACTS: • This case is a petition for preliminary injunction of the Resolution of COMELEC declaring the petitioner (Juan Domino) disqualified as



candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections. • The petitioner alleged that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the 1-year residence requirement. • The petitioner maintains that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997(more than 1 year). • COMELEC disqualified DOMINO on the basis of the ff. findings: o Petioner’s Voter’s registration Record is dated 22 June 1997(less than 1 year preceding the election) and his address indicated 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. o Petitoner ran for the same position in the 3rd District of QC during 1995 elections. ISSUES: 1. WON the judgement of Metropolitan Trial Court of QC declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not QC id final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the COMELEC; 2. WON petitioner has resided in the Sarangani for at least 1 year immediately preceding the 1998 elections; 3. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner. HELD: 1. The contention of Domino that the decision of MTC of QC in declaring him a resident of Sarangani and not QC is final and conclusive upon COMELEC cannot be sustained. [reason: held#3] 2. The SC holds in the negative. Not a resident of Sarangani for 1 year. 3. COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition as provided in Sec. 78, Art IX of the Omnibus Election Code. RATIO: Issue 1 & 3: 1. The judgement of MTC of QC is neither conclusive on the voter’s political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as voter in any other election because COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition as provided in Sec. 78, Art IX of the Omnibus Election Code. • COMELEC has the competence to determine whether a false representation as facts was made in the Certificate of Candidacy. • The MTC of QZ merely determined the right of Domino to be included/excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within it territorial jurisdiction, and does not preclude the COMELEC in the

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determination of Domino’s qualification as a candidate to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.

Issue 2: • Record show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 1991 he acquired new domicile in Quezon City (as shown in his previous Cert. of Candidacy) • A person’s “domicile” once established is considered to continue and will not deemed lost until a new one is established. • The mere absence of a person from his permanent residence, no matter how long, will not result in loss or change of domicile. • As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. • Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in QC is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in QC (gives rise to strong presumption of residence) • While the fact that the petitioner did the ff. he still fell short of the 1 year residency requirement under Sec.6, Art. VI of the Constitution. o bought the house he was renting (4 Nov 1997) o sought cancellation of his previous registration in QC (22 Oct 1997) o applied for transfer of registration to Sarangani ( 30 Aug 1997) Co v. House Electoral Tribunal || Citizenship FACTS: •

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The grandfather of the respondent, Ong Te, came to the Philippines from China. Ong Te resided in Samar and was able to obtain a certificate of residence. The respondent’s father, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China, but grew up in Samar. He got married to a Filipina and was naturalized as a Filipino citizen when the respondent was nine years old. The respondent, Jose Ong Jr., studied and worked in Manila. But he frequently went home to Samar, where he grew up. He later on married a Filipina. The respondent registered as a voter of Laoang, Samar. He voted there during the elections of 1984 and 1986. In 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the 2nd district of Northern Samar and won.



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The respondent’s citizenship was questioned. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared that Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Samar. Petitioners seek to set aside the decision of the HRET.

ISSUE: WON the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that Jose Ong Jr., is a natural-born citizen and a resident of Samar HELD: The HRET did not act with grave abuse of discretion because Jose Ong Jr. is a natural born citizen based on Article IV of the Constitution. RATIO: •

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Section 3 of Article IV provides that: " Natural-born Citizens are those who: a. are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship b. elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section 1 Paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article IV provides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are considered natural-born citizens. " Under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born with Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. " The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against women. " This provision is curative in nature. It has a retroactive effect – anybody who elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. Petitioners argue that respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship when he reached the age of majority. " HOWEVER, we have jurisprudence that states that election is both a formal and an informal process. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Petitioners argue that respondent’s father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen.

" "

HOWEVER, the respondent traces his natural-born citizenship through his mother, not through his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determin WON the respondent elected Filipino citizenship. Bengzon v. Cruz || Citizenship

FACTS: • • • • • •

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He enlisted in the Unites States Matine Corps and, without consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. Petitioner asserts that Cruz cannot run for public office since he can no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino.

ISSUE: WON the respondent, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship HELD: The respondent can still be considered a natural-born Filipino. RATIO: •

There are 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. o Repatriation may be had by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1. Desertion of the armed forces 2. Service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II 3. Service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time 4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien 5. Political and economic necessity



Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry. o Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originall a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former statues as a natural-born Filipino. ALSO, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. o Under the present Constitution, there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. o The absence of a separate category for persons who reacquired citizenship means that they are either natural-born or naturalized. o Respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. o

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Dissenting Opinion (Sandoval-Gutierrez) •

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If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen cannot be considered natural-born. o The term ‘natural-born’ Filipino citizen refers to those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship and to those who elect Philippine citizenship. o Repatriation is the resumption of recovery of the original nationality upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. o Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen. o Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. Respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen (taking of oath of allegiance, registering oath with the local civil registry, renouncing citizenship, executing affidavit of reacquisition). Valles v Comelec || Citizenship

FACTS:

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Private respondent is running for governor of Davao Oriental. Her citizenship is questioned by the petitioner. Petitioner claims that Lopez cannot run for governor since she has renounced her Filipino citizenship by applying for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICCR), and for having an Australian passport. Petitioner also claims that if Lopez did not renounce her Filipino citizenship, her dual citizenship disqualifies her from public office, as stated in Section 40 of the Local Government Code which disqualifies from running for any elective local position those who have dual citizenship. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Western Australia. Her father is a Filipino, while her Mother is an Australian.

ISSUE: WON respondent is a Filipino citizen HELD: Respondent is a Filipino citizen. RATIO: •

•

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The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis (child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth). o Thus, private respondent, having been born to a Filipino father, is a Filipino citizen. o The laws in force at the time of the private respondent’s birth were the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law. According to such organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. On renunciation of Filipino Citizenship o In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. o The mere fact that respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship. On Dual Citizenship o The Court clarified that “dual citizenship” as a disqualification as used in the Local Government Code refers to dual allegiance (Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution). Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.



o

o

ALSO, the filing of their certificate of candidacy is suffice to renounce foreign citizenship. " In the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and the he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance. Private respondent also executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship and the Australian passport of the respondent was cancelled. These acts are enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Lopez.

Dimaporo v Mitra, Jr. |Term and Tenure FACTS: Petitioner claims that provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress. ISSUE: WON the “term” and “tenure” are the same. HELD: “Term” and “tenure” are not the same. RATIO: • The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature. • Tenure (period during which an officer actually holds the office) may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. • Tenure may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer

[NOTE: When an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion] Fariñas et al. v Executive Secretary FACTS: !

The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives. The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials. The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. Also, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. ISSUE(S): 1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act) is unconstitutional a. Whether or not Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 violates the Equal Protection clause of the constitution b. Whether or not the passage of the act in the House of Representatives had irregularities HELD:


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 1. The court held that the law does not transcend constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power; therefore it is constitutional in its entirety. a. Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the constitution. b. The court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, wherein which the court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress. RATIO: Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code: Any candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. -Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. On Equal Protection Clause: The equal protection of the law clause is not absolute and is subject to reasonable classification. It does not demand absolute equality among residents, it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike. On the irregularities in the Enrolled Bill Doctrine: Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Effectivity Clause (of RA No. 9006): “this act shall take effect upon its approval” -This clause was held to be defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. Codilla v. De Venecia

4th legislative district of Leyte. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin, on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. Despite the receipt by the House of Representatives or a copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, no action was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner’s party sent a letter addressed to the Speaker of the House requesting the House of Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner can avail of whatever remedy is available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise indecisive. Speaker De Venecia replied that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is a matter that can best be adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which shall act on it most expeditiously.

FACTS: The respondent Maria Victoria Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino Codilla by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of the

FACTS: Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr. was nominated and became the VicePresident of the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Resolution 84 of

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ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the rightful Representative of the 4th District of Leyte Whether or not the Speaker and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives should implement the COMELEC decision HELD: The COMELEC finally settled that the rightful representative of the 4th District of Leyte is Eufrocino Codilla. Therefore the Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of the petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. RATIO: The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of the land. Tolentino v. COMELEC


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 the Senate therefore certified the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and called on the COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. The resolution further provided, that the Senatorial Candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Guingona, which ended on June 30 2004. After the canvassing of votes, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 proclaiming candidates as the elected Senators. The petitioners filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single-three year term seat. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge Whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified: (1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645. HELD: The Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition. The COMELEC’s failure to give notice of the time of the special election did not negate the calling of such Election. Therefore where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is therefore valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election. RATIO: The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.

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The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. The Nature of the Petition and the Court's Jurisdiction A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate. Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001 Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices; to be voted for. A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases 25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single threeyear term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election. In view of COMELEC's failure The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . . . not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call and give

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notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the instant petition.We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for." Similarly, petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience. The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC's failure to so call and give


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections.

People vs.Jalosjos | Immunity from Arrest FACTS: Romeo G. Jalosjos, a Congressman of the first district of Zamboanga Del Norte is now confined at the national penitentiary for his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused filed a motion (motion to be allowed to discharge mandate as member of the HRET) asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, which includes attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Though he is in prison he was provided an office at the administration Building, new bilibid prison, muntinlupa city. He was also able to pass several bills and resolutions. ISSUE: Whether or not being an elective official that he is, results in a substantial differentiation, which allows him to be removed as a prisoner. HELD: Motion denied. The court ruled against the claim of the accused that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State. RATIO: The Executive, Judicial and LEGISLATIVE are subject to the majesty of law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption. It is also granted in a restrictive sense. *1935 Constitution: exempt from arrest in case of treason, felony and breach of peace during their attendance at the sessions of Congress. !

*1973 Constitution: Immunity from arrest in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same. For offenses punishable by more than six years of imprisonment, NO IMMUNITY from ARREST and the BP is required to surrender the member within 24 hours after its adjournment or recess. * 1987 Constitution: adheres to the same restrictive rules but without the need to surrender and the requirement that he should be attending sessions was removed. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS. Jimenez vs. Cabangbang | Privilege of Speech FACTS: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. The defendant was accused by the plaintiffs (Nicanor jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban) for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress was not in session and defendant caused the publication of the said letter in newspapers of general circulation. Cabangbang moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the letter in question is not libelous and it as a privileged communication. ISSUES: (1) Whether the publication in question is a privilege communication (2) And if not, is it libelous or not HELD:


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 Communication is not absolutely privilege. In causing the said communication the defendant was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. RATIO: “Speech or debate” refers to utterances made in the performance of official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, votes cast, as well as bills introduced and other acts done in the performance of official duties. To come under the privilege, it is not essential that the Congress be in session when the utterance is made. What is essential is that the utterance must constitute “LEGISLATIVE ACTION”. It is intended to leave the legislator unimpeded in the performance of his duties and free from fear of harassment from outside. It extends to the agents of the assemblymen precisely in assisting the legislator in the performance of legislative action. Liban v. Gordon || Forfeiture of Seat FACTS: A petition requiring respondent Gordon to show what authority he has for exercising some right or power he claims to hold as PNRC Chairman and Senator at the same time (Quo Warranto). Petitioner seeks to declare Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the senate. ISSUE/S: 1. WON the PNRC is a government-owned corporation 2. WON Sec 13 can be applied with the respondent who is the Philippine National Red Cross Chairman and a Member of the Senate HELD: The court held that the petition has no merit. RATIO: 1. The PNRC is a private organization performing public functions. RA 95 or the PNRC Charter was signed by Pres. Roxas. It provides non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian assistance !

without the control of the government. It is not governmentowned but privately owned. The vast majority of PNRC members are private individuals. The PNRC Charter provides that any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon donating. 2. Sec 13, which provides that “No senator or member of the hous of the representative may hold any other office or employement in the government or any subdivision, agency, or including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat” may not be applied since the PNRC is not any of the types of government organization enumerated in the provision. Puyat v. De Guzman Jr. || Prohibition FACTS: The Puyat Group claims that SEC Commissioner De Guzman, and then Interim Batasang Pambansa Justice Fernandez orally entered as counsel for respondent Acero. The Puyat Group claims that this appearance as counsel of Fernandez is unconstitutional since Section 11, Art. VIII or the 1973 Constitution provides that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and the SEC was an administrative body. Petitioner filed a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against SEC Commissioner De Guzman granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in an SEC Case. It turned out that in the SEC case, Assemblyman Fernandez purchased 10 shares of stock of IPI for Php200 upon Acero’s request, and later filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of shares. ISSUE/S:


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 1. WON Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution 2. WON Assemblyman, in appearing as counsel before an administrative body, although indirectly, is unconstitutional HELD: Commissioner De Guzman’s granting Fernandez leave to intervene is reversed and set aside. RATIO: The “indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body” through the Urgent Motion for Intervention was a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The circumstances during which Fernandez purchased the Php200 10 IPI shares show that said shares were acquired after the quo warranto suit, after the Puyat Group first objected to his appearance. Before his move to intervene, Fernandez also signified his intention to appear as counsel for Acero. The court held that the “intervention” was an afterthought to enable Fernandez to “intervene on the ground of legal interest” upon realizing the validity of Puyat’s objection. Avelino v. Cuenco || Prohibition FACTS: Sen. Tanada reserved his right to formulate charfes against then Sen. Pres. Avelino. Hours before the opening of the session, Sen Tanada and Den Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against Avelino and ordering investigation thereof. On the day of the appointed session, Sen. Pres. Avelion, with colleagues Sen. Francisco and Sen. Tirona, pursued a premeditated plan to use dilatory tactics to prevent Sen. Tanada from delivering his opening speech. Motions to dispense with the rollcall and reading of the minutes were opposed, in spite of being a long established tradition. Avelino, the presider, continuouslty ignored Tanada when he repeatedly claimed his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech, !

and even warned that any senator would be arrested if he spoke without being recognized by the presider. Sen. David, a follower of Avelino, moved for adjournment which Sen. Sanidad opposed. David reiterated his motion but *Cuenco moved to submit adjournment to a vote. Presider Avelino, with David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona, and Clarin then walked out of the session hall. Sen. Cabili, one of the senators left in the hall asked to record the happenings. They continued the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the senate and Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested *Cuenco preside, which suggestion was carried out unanimously. Abad was appointed Acting Secretary. Sen. Tanada was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. The Resolution was read in full and was unanimously approved. RA 67, declaring vacant the Senate President seat and designating Cuenco Acting Senate President, was introduced by Sen. Sanidad and unanimously approved. Sen. Cuenco took the oath and on the next day, was recognized by the President. Avelino asks the court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines. ISSUE/S: 1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? 2. If it has, were resolution nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? a. Was the session after Avelino, et.al.’s walkout a continuation of the morning session validly assembled with 22 of the senators? b. Was there a quorum in that session? 3. Should the petition be granted? HELD: Avelino’s petition was dismissed. RATIO: 1. In light of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy places it outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Senate has power to elect its own president with which the court should not interfere. The remedy lies in the Senate Session


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 Hall, not in the Supreme Court especially that the Chief Executive accorded recognition to respondent Cuenco. 2. The Court may not pass on the question of the validity of resolutions. a. However, the Court unanimously views the session under Arranz as a continuation of the morning sessions and that a minority of 10 senators may not prevent the other 12 from passing a resolution unanimously endorsed. b. There was a quorum because the minutes say so and there was at least 14 senators at the beginning of the session. 12 senators constitute a majority, and the Constitution declares that a majority of each of the House shall constitute a quorum. The 12 senators who approved the resolutions could ratify their acts and place them beyond the shadow of doubt. Santiago v. Guingona || Officers FACTS: On the day of the election of officers, Sen. Ople nominated Sen. Fernan for the Senate President position, while Sen. Defensor-Santiago nominated Sen. Tatad. By a vote of 20 to 2, Fernan was declared winner. Tatad, with two votes, said he should assume the position of the minority leader. Majority leader later informed the body that he received a leter signed by the 7 Lakas NUCD UMDP senators stating that they had elected Guingona as the minority leader, which Sen. Pres. Fernan recognized. Tatad and Santiago files a petition for quo warranto claiming that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUE/S: 1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the petition 2. WON there was an actual violation of the Constitution 3. WON Guingona was usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader !

HELD: Neither was there was any constitutional infirmity nor grave abuse of discretion. RATIO: 1. The Court has jurisdiction to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of functions and prerogatives. The validity of the selection of members was not a political question nor did it depend on the Senate’s “full discretionary authority,” but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. 2. Petitioners claim that Guingona cannot be Senate minority president since he voted for Fernan as Sen. Pres, who won, and that the only those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no chairmanships have the right to determine the minority leader. The court however, finds no constitutional or legal basis for this claim. The constitution does not provide that the members who do no vote for the winning Senate President shall ipso facto constitute the minority. In the composition of the Senate in this case, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of them has the right to select minority leader. Such method must be prescribed by the senate itself. The Rules of Senate do not provide for the positions of majority or minority leaders, neither is there an open clause on the matter. Being merely procedural matters, their observance are of no concern to the courts for they may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of the majority. It is only within the power and prerogative of the Congress to prescribe parameters for the exercise of it. 3. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality tainted Guingona’s assumption of the minority leader position. No grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize his specific acts as minority leader Arroyo, et al. De Venecia | Officers


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 FACTS: • This is a petition for certiorari challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so called “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. • Petitioners suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are “constitutionally mandated” so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the constitution. • During interpellation, Rep. arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. • Petitioner claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. arroyo’s interpellation. However, in order to expedite the resolution of the petition, they admit the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. ISSUES: WON RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House under the constitutional mandate of Art. VI, Sec. 16. Specifically, violation of • Rule 8, sec 35 and Rule 17, sec.103 of the rule of the house. (Chair not asking for yeas or nays, but simply asked for approval) • Rule 19, Sec. 112, 3 (Chair ignores petitioners query) • Rule 16, Sec. 97 (Chair refused to recognize petitioner) • Rule 20, sec. 112-122, Rule 21, Sec.123, Rule 18, sec.109 (suspension of session without ruling first on petitioners query, a point of order or a privileged motion.) HELD: Case dismissed

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RATIO: 1. What have been violated in the enactment of RA 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. In Osmena v. Pendatun, it has been said that “parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern… May be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.” Petitioners must realize that each of the 3 departments of our government has its own separate sphere 2. Under Art.8, sec.1, “nothing involving abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.” But the court’s function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. Absence of a showing, there is no occasion for the court to exercise its corrective power. 3. The passage of the law was not railroaded. • No rule of the HoR has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the chair must reinstate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. • Nor does the constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the members be taken every time a house has to vote… 4. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H.No. 7198 are conclusive of its due enactment. Osmena v. Pendatun | Internal Discipline FACTS: • Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr., submitted to the court a verified petition for “declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction” against the 15 members of the special committee created by House Resolution 59.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 •

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A special committee of 15 members is created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines, made by the petitioner, in his privilege speech. o Committee is authorized to summon, subpoena/subpoena duces tecum. Osmena refused to produce before the House committee, evidence to substantiate such imputations. Hence, he was suspended from office for a period of fifteen months, for serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES: Whether or not, o The constitution gave petitioner complete parliamentary immunity. o Petitioner’s speech constituted no disorderly behavior for which he could be punished. o Supposing the petitioner could be questioned and disciplined, House had lost power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving HR 59. o House has no power, under Constitution to suspend one of its members.

Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan | Internal Discipline FACTS: • While Congressman Paredes was still provincial governor, charges of violations of Anti-Graft Law were filed against him before the Sandiganbayan. He was elected to Congress. • During his second term in Congress, Sandiganbayan imposed a preventive suspension on him pursuant to the A-G law. ISSUES: Petitioner challenges the authority of the SB to suspend a district representative. HELD: Suspension holds.

HELD: Court refuses to intervene. RATIO: 1. Our constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege, but it does not protect one from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of parliament or congress have been or could be censored, committed to prison…(Kilbourn v. Thompson) The Rules of Phil. House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the US shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings. !

2. On WON House may take against action against the petitioner, after he has given his speech and before approving Resolution 59 it had take up other business. • Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

RATIO: Petitioner’s invocation of Sec.16(3) Art.6 of the constitution is unavailing. Suspension spoken of in Sec.13 of A-G law is no a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure. The law is not being imposed on the petitioner for misbehavior as a member of the House of Representatives. United States v. Pons | Journals FACTS: Appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act. No. 2381. His counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Phil. Legislature of 1914 was Feb. 28, 1914


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 and that the said act under which Pons must be punished, if found guilty, was not passed or approved on Feb. 28 but on March 1. Thus, the date of adjournment of the Legislature is a vital question. Page 793, Vol. 7 of the Commission Journal of 3rd Phil. Legislature states: “The Journal for Saturday, Feb. 28, 1914 was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the Phil. Legislature, adjourned sine die.” ISSUES: 1. Whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. 2. Whether the printed Act No. 2381 published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed. 3. Whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. HELD: The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on Feb. 28, 1914. The court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. (1) Yes. The law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of adjournment. They show with absolute certainty that Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 midnight on Feb. 28, 1914. (2) Yes. The contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of the adjournment. (3) No. To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature , when they are clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of organic laws. RATIO:

Nature and character of evidence involved a.) Evidence – “that which proves or disproves any matter in question or to influence the belief respecting it”; b.) Conclusive evidence – “that which establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive presumptions.” Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez | Journals

FACTS: Petitioners claim that the term “urea formaldehyde” in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde” and that respondent, the Auditor General and the Auditor of Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. ISSUE: Whether or not “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by the law from the payment of the margin fee. HELD: No. It is well settled that the enrolled bill – which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” – is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. RATIO: If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system – the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. Astorga v. Villegas | Journals Petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (An Act defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, further amending for the purpose Sections 10 and 11 of RA 409, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) FACTS:

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CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 On March 30, 1964, House Bill No. 9266 was filed in House of Rep and was passed on 3rd reading without amendment on April 21, 1964. The bill was sent to Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Gov’t and Cities headed by Sen. Gerardo Roxas. They recommended approval but amending that instead of the City Engr, it is the President Pro tempore of the Municipal board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter’s incapacity to act as Mayor. On 2nd reading on Senate on May 20, 1964, Sen. Arturo Tolentino introduced amendments, which the Senate approved. The amendment by Sen. Roxas does no appear in the journal of Senate proceeding as having been acted upon. The Senate sent a letter to the other house that HB 9266 had been passed with amendments. The letter attached however was the amendments of Roxas and not Tolentino’s. Lower house signified the bill and authenticated by the Speaker and Senate president. The President affixed his signatures and the bill became RA No. 4065 on June 18, 1964. On July 1965, Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed to law was a wrong version of the bill. Senate President issued several letters stating that the enrolled bill is invalid and no effect and that the Senate had never approved the bill. The president withdrew his signature stating that “it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by two houses of Congress.” Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to disregard RA 4065 and issued an order to Chief of Police to recall 5 members of city police force who had been assigned to the Vice Mayor under authority of RA 4065. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the “enrolled bill doctrine” or the “journal entry rule” should be adhered to in this jurisdiction.

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2. Whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. HELD: Petition is denied and RA No. 4065 is declared to not have been duly enacted and did not become law. RATIO: The Court rendered decision by resorting to Senate journals. The Journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced in the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. The Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and did not become law. Angara v. Electoral Commission - Electoral Tribunal (NOTE: This case has no facts!! It talks about the history and intention of the framers in drafting Sec.17 of Art.6) Fact: The 2nd proposition in this case is whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. The counsel of the petitioner pointed out that the issue hinges on the interpretation of Section 4 of Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution. Section 4 states, “There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 Issue: The scope and meaning of power of the Electoral Tribunals. Held: • If there is no question about the election of the members [of the assembly], there is nothing to be judged. • There is no need of confirmation on the election of those whose election is not contested. • The Electoral Commission cannot refuse to confirm the election of the members. • The Electoral Commission has NO power and authority to pass upon the qualification of a member of the National Assembly (all was stated by Roxas in his remarks on the ConConvention) Ratio: • The purpose is to give to Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged. • If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word ‘judge’ is used to indicate a controversy o E.g. ! Where a person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected; ! In case when a residence of the man who has been elected is in question; or ! in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question. • Reason why retained in the Consti? (some members of the Convention opposed the creation of such provision) • The assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members. So that before a member can question the eligibility [of another member], he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission. Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not contested.

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NOTE: The delegates of CONCON voted 98 against 56 in favor of giving Electoral Commission of the power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National assembly (as opposed to the proposed amendment of restoring the power to the National Assembly itself). Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal | Electoral Tribunal FACTS: • 1st (Oct. 9, 1987) The petitioner filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest against 22 candidates of the Laban coalition who were proclaimed senator-elect by the COMELEC • 2nd (Nov. 17, 1987) The petitioner filed against the members of the Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the SenatorsMembers thereof from the hearing and resolution of the previous case filed before the respondent Tribunal. On the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. (In short, the 1st case filed before the respondent Tribunal was against the members of the same; hence the Motion for Disqualification for the 2nd case.) • Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy, norms of fair play, and due process require the mass disqualification sought and the amendment of the respondent Tribunal’s Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal. (The three remaining Justices) • The proposed amendment to the Tribunal’s Rules o Section 24: requiring the concurrence of 5 members for adoption of resolution of whatever nature. o Required Amendment: where more than 4 members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than 3 including 1 Justice, and may adopt resolution by majority vote with no abstentions.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 ISSUE: Whether or not resolution of the contest can be left to the remaining 3 members of the Tribunal, all Justices of the Court, whose disqualification is not sought. HELD: The petitioner’s thesis is repugnant and unfeasible to the constitution (therefore, unconstitutional) RATIO: • The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself. • Article 6 Section 17 of the 1987 Consti creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. • By staffing the Tribunal by both Justices and Senators, it is a clear intention of the Consti that both “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to elections, returns and qualifications of Senators. • Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that the proportion of Senators and Justices in the Electoral Tribunal is 2:1 – an indication that the “legislative component” cannot be excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial contests, without doing violence to the SPIRIT and INTENT of the Constitution. • The Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law. Bondoc v. Pineda | Electoral Tribunal FACTS: (1987) In the congressional elections for the 4th district of the province of Pampanga, respondent Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was PROCLAIMED WINNER against petitioner Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) by difference of 3,300 votes. !

Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). After the revision of the ballots and due process, Bondoc’s protest was submitted for decision in which Bondoc WON over Pineda by 23 votes. By then, LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on reappreciation and recount of the ballots, thereby delaying the finalization of decision by 4 months. The recount resulted in the INCREASE in Bondoc’s lead over Pineda to 107 votes. In the Tribunal, Congressman Camasura, along with the 3 justices and 1 congressman, voted to proclaim Bondoc as winner of the contest . Moved by candor and honesty, Cong. Camasura revealed to the LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally of the ballot but also his vote in the Tribunal which stirred a hornet’s nest in the LDP. LDP expelled Cong. Camasura therefrom for having ALLEGEDLY helped organize other political party; acts that are “a complete betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to the LDP” The HOR, on the basis of the letter from LDP regarding the expulsion of Cong. Camasura, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong. Camasura Jr. to the HRET. The 3 Justices of the SC promptly apprise the Chief Justice about this “distressing development” and asked to be relieved of their assignments in the HRET. On the same day, Tribunal issued a Resolution cancelling the promulgation of its decision regarding the Bondoc case (HRET Case No. 25). On March 19, 1991, SC resolved to:


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 1. Decline the request of the 3 justices to be relieved from their membership in the HRET and instead DIRECT them to resume their duties in the Tribunal. 2. EXPRESS concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors on the proceedings of the HRET. 3. NOTE the view that term of all members of the ET, including those from legislature, is CO-EXTENSIVE with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only by valid legal cause On March 21, 1991, Bondoc filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Representatives Marciano Pineda, Magdaleno Palacol, Juanita Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita Camasura, Jr., anf the HRET. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the HOR can, at the request of the dominant political party, change the party’s representation in the House of Electoral Tribunal (2) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over Electoral Commissions HELD: (1) No. That action of the HOR is violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. 6, 1987 Constitution) (2) Yes. The SC has jurisdiction over Electoral Commissions for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relation to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. RATIO: (1) The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal, so zealously guarded by the framers of Consti, would be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the HOR, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and

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manipulate the political component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. The resolution of the HOR removing Camasura from HRET for disloyalty to the LDP, bec. he cast his vote in favor of the NP’s candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the HOR in the work of HRET would reduce the tribunal to amere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP). Reasons for nullity of Camasura’s expulsion in the HRET: 1. Disloyalty to party is not valid cause for termination of memebership n HRET – as judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. 2. His expulsion violates his right to secure tenure – membership in HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member cannot be expelled on grounds of “party disloyalty” short of proof. His expulsion from LDP and from HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. The purpose of the expulsion of Cong. Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET’s decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP soto nominate a replacement for Cong. Camasura in the Tribunal. (2) The judicial power of SC has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of majority party in the HOR. This Court cannot be deaf to his lea for relief, nor indifferent tohis charge that the HOR has acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Cong. Camsura from the HRET. The Court must perform its


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 duty under the constitution “even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself.” RULE: The resolution of HOR on March 13, 1991, withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Cong. Camasura as member of HRET declared NULL and VOID ab initio. Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. Cost against respondent Marciano A. Pineda Guerrero v. COMELEC || The Electoral Tribunals FACTS: • Before the elections, Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman on the grounds of his Farinas’ failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office. • COMELEC dismissed the petition. • Farinas was proclaimed winner in the elections. • After the elections, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, stating that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farinas since Chevylle was not the official candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Thus, Farinas’ certificate of candidacy was defective. • Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. • COMELEC refused to rule on the Farinas’ case and said that the HRET has jurisdiction over the case. • Petitioner Guerrero claims that the refusal of COMELEC to rule on the case amounted to grace abuse of discretion on its part. ISSUE: WON COMELEC commited grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. HELD: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

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RATIO: • COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of Farinas. " Under Article VI, Section 17, HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. " Once a winning candidate has assumed pffice as a member of the House of Represenatatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends and the HRET’s jurisdiction begins. • The HRET does not assume jurisdiction only if there is a valid proclamation of the winning candidate. o When the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of is raised, the issue is best addressed to the HRET. • The jurisdiction of the HRET is not limited to qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. o The word “qualifications” cannot be read as qualified by the term “constitutional.” o Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Garcia, et al. v. HRET || The Electoral Tribunals FACTS: • Petitioners (registered voters in the 3rd District of Manila) filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET against Congressman Harry Angping. o They claim that Angping was not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. They pray that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume or hold office and for the candidate who received the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates be proclaimed winner. • Upon filing of the petition, petitioners paid the required P5,000 filing fee.



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HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000 cash deposit, in addition to filing fees, for quo warranto cases. Petitioners then paid the P5,000 cash deposit and attached the receipt of a Motion for Reconsideration they filed with the HRET. Petiton was denied in view of the failure to pay the cash deposit required under Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules. o Rule 32: In addition to filing fees, a petitioner in quo warranto proceedings should make a P5,000 cash deposit with the Tribunal.

ISSUE: WON the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners in refusing to reinstate the same even after the payment of the required P5,000 cash deposit. HELD: The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion. RATIO: • It was a judgment call of the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. • Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities preciselt designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation. F. Pimentel, et. al. v. HRET || The Electoral Tribunals FACTS: • Petitioners filed petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for write of preliminary injunction. • Petitioners assail the composition of the HRET and the CA (Commission on Appointments). o They pray that respondents be ordered to “alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure” the composition of the HRET and the CA. o They also pray that party-list representatives be included in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 !

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Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941 (Party List System Act) Petitioners also pray that the HRET and CA be enjoined from exercising their functions until they have been reorganized.

ISSUES: 1. WON the present composition of the HRET violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. 2. WON the present membership of the House in the CA violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the CA. 3. Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 4. [Based on Solicitor General’s comment] WON the petitions are procedurally defective and substantially lacking in merit for having been filed prematurely. HELD: 1. The present composition of the HRET does not violate the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. 2. The present membership of the House in the CA does not violate the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. 3. The HRET and CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. 4. The petitions are filed prematurely. RATIO: 1 and 2. • Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the CA. • Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution states that each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose who



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among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4(a) of the 1998 Rules of the HRET and on Section 1 of the Rules of the CA.

3. • There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of HRET and CA because under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. 4. • Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. o Party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. • Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recouse to this Court under its power of judicial review. o The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and CA. • Also, it is a well-settled rule a constitutional question will not be hear unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry occur: 1. There must be an actual controversy. 2. The person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy. 3. The controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity. 4. The resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final determination of the controversy.

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" The parties do not possess the personal and substantial interest required to confer them with locus standi. They did not claim that they have been unlawfully deprived of seats in the HRET or CA. Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec Section 17 | The Electoral Tribunals Facts: Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the HOR, hence, Comelec ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s election protest against Unico regarding canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of Unico’s proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for certiorari in the SC. Issue: WON the court should take cognizance of Chato’s election protest. If not, to who is this issue best addressed to? WON his civil action for certiorari will prosper. Held: The court should not take cognizance of Chato’s election protest for it would amount to usurpation of the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. Civil action for certiorari will not prosper. Ratio: - In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. Reason: it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies with due regard to the people’s mandate. " Special civil action for certiorari shall prosper if the following requisites concur: o Tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction o There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. " In this case, COMELEC did not commit rave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon Unico’s proclamation. It demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat regarding HRET. Limkaichong v Comelec Section 17 | The Electoral Tribunals Facts: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st district of Negros Oriental against Paras. Together with other citizens, Paras filed a petition for



disqualification against Limkaichong on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement. She contended that these petitions should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. May 14, 2007 - Election continued and Limkaichong emerged as the winner. May 17, 2007 – COMELEC disqualified Limkaichong and ordered PBOC to strike out her name from the list of eligible candidates. May 25, 2007 - Notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner, in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras then petitioned before COMELEC, regarding its proclamation. Issues: WON Limkaichong’s proclamation was valid. WON, upon Limkaichong’s proclamation, HRET instead of COMELEC should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction over such case. Ratio: " COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. " The SC has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the HOR, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. " Wrt to Limkaichong not being a Filipino citizen, such should have been challenged in appropriate proceedings. " It is the ministerial duty of the Sec Gen and HOR upon presentation by such member of a valid certificate of proclamation and oath of office to

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enroll a member in the roll of members and to recognize her as such. For to arbitrarily unseat someone who won in the elections would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. Daza v. Singson Section 18 | Composition of the Commission on Appointments

Facts: • The House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber (Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NPUnido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL). " Petitioner Raul Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. • On September 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized. " This resulted in a political realignment in the House. " 24 members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP. " Turnout: LDP = 159 members | Liberal Party = 17 members • The House of Representatives revised its representation in the CA by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-founded LDP. • Petitioner came to the court to challenge his removal from the CA and the assumption of his seat by respondent. The court issued a TRO to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the CA. Petitioner’s claims: a. He cannot be removed from the CA because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan (a shifting of votes at a given time does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission). b. The organization of the House is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not attained political stability. Respondent’s claims: a. The question raised is political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. b. He has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the CA. c. Nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the CA. Issue: 1. WON the court has competence to act on the matter at bar.


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WON there was indeed a permanent political realignment which justifies the House’s revision of representation in the CA.

Held: 1. The Court has competence to act on the matter at bar. 2. There was a permanent political realignment. Ratio: First Issue: What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the CA. And even if the issue presented was political in nature, the court would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it that now covers, in propoer cases, even the political question (Article VII, Section 1). Second Issue: • The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. The constitutional provision connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. • Also, the COMELEC, in an en banc resolution, granted the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. • Contrary to the petitioner’s claims, the party also need not pass the test of time to prove its permanence, as in the case of the Liberal Party. • As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, that the party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed the test. It has the biggest following in the House of Representatives. The party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. Coseteng v. Mitra Section 18 | Composition of the Commission on Appointments Facts: • Petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as the sole representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. • Her request was endorsed by 9 congressmen. • Coseteng alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA as a representative of the Minority because she has the support of 9 other congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority. Issue: WON the support of the 9 congressmen qualifies her to sit in the CA as a representative of the minority.

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Held: The support of the 9 congressmen does not qualify her to sit in the CA as a representative of the minority.

Ratio: The congressmen who endorsed her are not members of her party, and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap. Guingona Jr. v Gonzales Section 18 | Rounding Off Seats in CoA FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LPPDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation. ISSUE: 1. Whether the election of Romulo and Tañada as members of the CoA is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 2. Whether or not the senate act in grave abuse of discretion in electing the respondent senators 3. Whether or not the elected senators to the CoA should be prohibited from sitting as members of and participating in the proceedings of the CoA HELD: 1. Membership of Romulo and Tañada to the CoA is not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution therefore violative of the same 2. The nomination and election was done in grave abuse of discretion by disregarding the rule on proportional representation 3. Election of Romulo and Tañada are null and void for being in violation of the rule of proportional representation, therefore



prohibiting them from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as member of CoA

RATIO: 1. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CoA by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. a. Coseteng v Mitra: political party must have at least two senators in the senate to be able to have a representative in the CoA b. The court laid down guidelines: i. In the senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected senators for every seat in the CoA ii. Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a political party/ coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the commission 2. The constitution does not contemplate that the CoA must necessarily include twelve senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives, therefore it is not mandatory. Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Section 21 | SBC inquiry into private affairs FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless

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and malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Bengzon et al filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case 2. Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s (SBRC) inquiry has no valid legislative purpose (it is not done in aid of legislation) 3. Whether or not the sale or disposition of the Romualdez is a “purely private transaction” which is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into 4. Whether or not the inquiry violates their right to due process HELD: 1. The court is of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy 2. The contemplated inquiry by the Committee is not really in aid of legislation 3. (John Watkins v. US) There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. It is the function of the executive and the judiciary. (would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers) 4. Petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it (right against selfincrimination), it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation.

RATIO: 1. for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the SBRC to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation 2. It is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of the Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President and Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated RA 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.



The power of both houses of congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Sabio v. Gordon Section 21 | Legislative Investigations Facts: • On Feb 2006, Senate Resolution No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors” was introduced by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago • May 8, 2006, Camilio L. Sabio, chairman of the PCGG was invited, through a letter authorized by Sen. Richard Gordon, to be one of the resources in the public meeting to deliberate on Sen. Res. No. 455 jointly conducted by the 2 Committees namely, Committee on Government Corporations and Pubic Enterprise and Committee on Public Services. • Sabio declined the invitation 3 times even after a Subpoena Ad Testificandum was issued requiring him and other 4 PCGG Commissioners. He invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. • The petitioners, in their Compliance and Explanation, contended that Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry; that E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way; and that the issue investigated by Sen. Res. No. 455 are subject of pending cases before the regular courts, SB, and the SC. Issue: Whether or not the said provision constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry. Held: No. A mere provision of law cannot pose limitations on the power of Congress Ratio: • •

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investigatory power and the mechanism, which the Houses can take in order to perform its investigative function, are also available to the Committees. Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with the Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution. Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee Section 21 | Legislative Investigations

Facts: • P.S. Resolution No. 166 “directing the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation into the illegal sale of unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank, which resulted in the billions of pesos of losses to the investing public,” was introduced by Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of the said Committee. • The respondent invited the SCB-Philippines, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. • The petitioners complied and presented their position, challenging the jurisdiction of the respondent to continue with the inquiry. They argue that the subject matter of the Resolution is the very subject matter of several cases already filed in court. • The petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by the respondents was, in fact, “in aid of collection” not of legislation. And that the Committee has allowed itself to be used as the conveniently available vehicle to effect the recovery of investments of Manuel Bavierra and Atty. Bacobo. • HOWEVER, the respondents correctly pointed out otherwise. • Subsequently, after the court denied the petitioner’s prayer of TRO to restrain the hearing, the respondent, outraged by petitioners’ imputation that it conducted the investigation “in aid of collection” held the petitioners with their counsel in contempt and ordered their detention for 6 hours. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners, being held in contempt was without legal basis

“The power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch” (Senate v. Ermita) The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to the government agencies created by Congress and officers within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish”. The PCGG belongs to this class. 1987 Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of “any of its committee.” The

HELD: No. The principle that Congress or any of it bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. RATIO: • Said power is needed by the legislative body to require and compel the disclosure of knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation • Also, So that legislative body can assert its authority and punish acts of refusal, defiance and contumacy against it, without the



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need for it to resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy. The exercise by Congress or by its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. Senate Blue Ribbon v. Judge Majaducon Section 21 | Legislative Investigations

Facts: This case has two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and preliminary injunction: 1. assailing the resolution of Judge Majaducon (RTC of General Santos City, Branch 23) which denied the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction filed by private respondent Atty. Flaviano 2. for review of the resolution declaring petitioner Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt of court. Antecedent Facts: First Issue: • Senator Ople filed Senate Resolution No. 157 directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup d’etat to prevent the Estrada administration from probing alleged fund irregularities in the AFP. • Senator Sotto filed Resolution No. 160 directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). • During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City for P10,500 per square meter from Atty. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. • The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. • Flaviano filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. • The trial court issued a TRO directing the Committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry on matters affecting parenting/titling and sale of said lot to AFP-RSBS in General Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI or Manila.

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The Committee filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction and (b) failure to state a valid cause of action. " Other Claims: TRO was invalid for being issued ex-parte, and that it was not enforceable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and granted the writ of preliminary injunction which enjoined the Committee from enforcing its subpoenas to petitioner in Region XI.

Second Issue: • The Philippine Star published a news report on the filing of the petition for certiorari by the Committee. • The news report quoted portions of the petition, alleging that Judge Majaducon committed “gross ignorance of the rules of procedure” or “gross ignorance of the law.” • Judge Majaducon initiated a charge for indirect contempt of court against Senator Pimentel, Jr. and other employees of The Philippine Star. Pimentel was found guilty of indirect contempt. Issues: 1. WON respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. 2. WON respondent Judge erred in convicting petitioner Pimentel of indirect contempt of court. Held: 1. Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion. The assailed resolution of respondent Judge was issued without legal basis. 2. Respondent Judge erred in convicting petitioner Pimentel of indirect contempt of court. Ratio: First Issue: • When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. • The RTC, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and testify before it. • The ruling in Bengzon, cited by respondent, does not apply in this case. Bengzon Instant Case No intended legislation was involved There is a clear legislative purpose, and the subject matter of the inquiry as stated in Senate Resolution No.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 was more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

The issue had already been preempted by the court. The case was pending with the Sandiganbayan.

160, and the appropriate Senate Committee was directed to investigate with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the AFP. The case was still pending before the Office of the Ombudsman when the Committee served the subpoena. No court had acquired jurisdiction over the matter.

Second Issue: • Contrary to the Judge’s claims, Petitioner Pimentel is not guilty of improper conduct which obstructs or degrades the administration of justice. " It does not appear that Pimentel cause the publication. Also, it is the publisher which decides which news events will be reported in the broadsheet. " Respondent Judge’s allegation that petitioner made it appear that an administrative complaint was filed against him is without basis. No formal administrative complaint was instituted separately from the petition for certiorari. " The phrase “gross ignorance of the rules of law and procedure” is ordinarily found in administrative complaints. Senate v. Ermita Section 22 | Executive Privelege Facts: From sept 21-23, Various executive officials were invited by the committee of the senate as a whole to appear on sept 28 05 as resource speakers in a public hearing to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. The Senate Committee in National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations on sept 22 to several AFP officials to attend the public hearing on matters relating to the role of the military in the "gloriagate scandal", 05 election fraud and the wire-tapping of the president scheduled on sept 28. On the 28th of september, AFP chief of staff Senga requested for the postponement because the invited AFP officers, including him are attending to urgent operational matters. The North Luzon Railways Corporation also requested for the postponement to wait for the UP Law Center's is secured. Exec Sec Ermita likewise requested for the postponement to allow invited

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officials to prepare. Sen Pres Drilon however said the notices had been issued and preparations had already been completed.

On the same day of sept 28 pres. Arroyo issued EO 464 which provides that senior officials of exec depts, generals and flag officers of the AFP, PNP officers, and senior national security officials shall secure prior consent of the president prior to appearing before either House of the Congress pursuant to the principle of separation of powers, executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials. Drilon received letters from Ermita and Senga saying that no invited official will be able to attend in obedience to EO 464. The president has not authorized then to appear before the any congressional hearing The constitutionality of mentioned EO is challenged. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed. Issues: 1. WON EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress 2. WON it violates the right of people to information on matters of public concern 3. WON respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing EO 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circ Held: 1. Sections 3 and 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated. No infirmity can be imputed to sec 2(a). 2. The impairment of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464 is direct. 3. The challenged order must covered by the publication requirement. Ratio: Definition muna!! [Executive privilege] is the power by the president and high-level branch officers to withhold information from congress, the courts and ultimately the public. It is recognized only in relation to certain types of information (military, diplomatic, national security matters and closed-door Cabinet meetings). 1. Sec 2(b) virtually states that exec privilege covers persons, a misuse of the doctrine. Exec privilege may only be invoked in relation to specific categories of info and not to categories of persons. also, the requirement of securing the president's consent is construed as a declaration that the



president or office head has determined that the requested information is privileged. Therefore an invocation of EO 464 is an implied claim that the info withheld is by the authority of the president on the basis of exec privilege.

In ermita's letter the claim of privilege is implied. However it does not suffice that the President or an authorized office head has determined that it is so and that the president has not overturned that determination. It threatens the congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the info that it has requested. There must be a statement of specific basis of a claim of exec priv to determine if it should be respected. The claim of priv under EO 464 is invalid for only implying and not asserting. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of the congress. 2. The exec order limiting disclosure of info from investigations in aid of legislation, which are generally public, necessarily deprives the people of info which they can use in formulating opinion which they can communicate to their reps. This deprives the public of being able to formulate its will intelligently. 3. The exec order has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern even though it applies to executive officials only. It is a matter of public interest and due process requires that the people should have been apprised prior to its implementation. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations Section 22 | Executive Privilege Facts: On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he was probed further on PGMA’s and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were: 1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project. 2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it. 3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it. The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the

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questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

Issues: 1. Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system? YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution. The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke exec privilege granted by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does not apply in this case. In this case, it was the President herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec privilege on a specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and China, which was the subject of the 3 questions asked. If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized. 2. WON there is a factual or legal basis to hold the communications elicited be covered by the exec. Priv. -Respondent alleges that the elements of the presidential communications privilege are not present. a) Power to enter into executive agreement is a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power quintessential: most perfect embodiment of something The fact that the President needs to secure a prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to the Congress its report before agreeing to the foreign loans, DOES NOT DIMINISH the EXECUTIVE nature of the power. Doctrine of separation of powers: checks and balances Final decision is still lodged in the office of the President. b) Doctrine of operational proximity Precisely to limit the scope of presidential communications; not conclusive (in re: sealed case) Privilege should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with ensuring that the confidentiality of the President’s decision-making process is adequately protected. Not everyone can qualify for the privilege: ( but only to the white house advisor’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility for investigation and formulating the advice to be given the President on the particular matter to which the communications relate.



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c)

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In the case at bar: officials involved: “cabinet = advisor” of the President In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the president, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. The fear that the scope will be expanded is unfounded President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on generalized interest; the Court did not disregard the 1987 consti: transparency, accountability and disclosure of information Re: letter of exec.sec. ermita : The information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with china. Privilege character of diplomatic negotiations: Chavez v. PCGG “ information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.” PMPF v. Manglapus “ the President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries.” No executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process. The Constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency: twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government

3.

WON the communications elicited in the questions covered y exec.priv. are critical to the exercise of the respondent’s functions. - The respondent simply generalized that the information re: 3 questions is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and nonspecific reference to pending senate bill. - the information being elicited is not so critical after all. - The general thrust of the three questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the OP. While it may be worthy, it is not the job of the legislature to perform. Legislature: make laws and not adjudicate or prosecute. - Legislative inquiries (Sec 10, Senate rules and procedures) are not subject to exacting standards of evidence to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. 4. Did the respondent committee commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order? - YES, an unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked executive generates its own abuses. - Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of

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the executive to function effectively. - The Legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus prevent “roving commissions.” ( kilbourn v. Thompson) - When a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into the Congress’ compliance. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. - The court although a co-equal branch of government to the legislature, must look into the internal rules of congress w/ regard to ensuring compliance by congress to it. Since, the issuance of a contempt order must be done by a vote of majority of all its members. The issuance of the order was w/o concurrence of the majority. Held: RESPONDENTS COMMITTEES’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 08APRIL2008 IS HEREBY DENIED. GARCIA v. MATA (“AFP Provision in Appropriations Bill case” ) Section 25 | Riders Facts: Ernesto Mata was reserve officer of AFP, held position of Captain, reverted to inactive status by virtue of RA No. 2332. During that time, he served 9 yrs, 4 mos, 12 days. Relied upon Par. 11 of Special Provision for Armed Forces on the Gen. Appropriations Act w/c provides that reserve officers w/ at least 10 yrs service shall not be reverted to inactive status.

Issue: WON R.A No. 1600, par 11 violates Sec. 25 par 2, which prohibits riders in appropriations bill. Held: Petition was denied. Such provision is a rider, a non-appropriation item in an appropriation measure. It Also violates one subject embraced in the title rule. It is not germane to the subj. matter of the law – it confers no right & affords no protection. Demetria v. Alba Section 25 | Transfer of funds Facts: • Petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the 1st paragraph of section 44 of PD 1177, Budget Reform Decree of 1977. • Petitioners filed as concerned members of the country and as taxpayers o Paragraph 1 of sec 44 of PD 1177 states that; the president shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different depts…. Which are included in the Gen. Appropriations act, to any program, project… included in the Gen. Appropriations Act or approved by its enactment.



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Constitutional provision, Sec. 16(5) state, “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the president… may by lawbe authorized to augment any item in the gen. appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

Issue: WON Par1 of Sec44 of PD1177 is unconstitutional. Held: Par1 of Sec.44 of PD 1177 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Ratio: • Prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical in the 1973 constitution. o However for considerable flexibility, constitution allowed enactment of a law authorizing transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the govt branch or constitutional body concerned. • Leeway was thus limited. o Purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation • Par1 of Sec.44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) for it empowers the president to indiscriminately transfer funds. Phil. Judges Association v. Prado Section 26 | Subject and Title of Bills Facts: Republic Act 7354, entitled “An Act Creating the Phil. Postal Corporation, Defining its Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for the regulation of the Industry and for other Purposes Connected Therewith,” was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28, the franking privilege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTCs, MTCCs, Land Registration Commission, Register of Deeds, and other government offices were withdrawn from them. The petitioners, who are members of lower courts, raised the issue of constitutionality of the said Act. Issues; WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

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a.) Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." b.) Paragraph 2, Sec 35 of RA 7354 us Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.” c.) Violative of the Equal protection clause HELD: Petition is partially UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

granted.

Section

35

of

RA

7354

is

RATIO: a.) The petitioner’s contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. The title fairly indicates the general subject, reasonably covers all the provisions of the act and is not misleading; thus, it is in sufficient compliance with constitutional requirement. b.) Petitioners argue that the second paragraph of Sec 35 was not included in original versions of House and Senate Bills and only appeared in Conference Committee Report; thus violating Sec 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioner’s argument is unacceptable. Conference Committee has broader function in resolving differences between two houses as it can produce unexpected results, even beyond mandate. This is a symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee. c.) Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. Sec. 35 provides “All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or


unauthorized use thereof.”


The repealing clause is a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary equal protection of he laws guaranteed for all person or things similarly situated. Fariñas et al. v Executive Secretary Section 26 | Subject and Title of Bills FACTS: The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives. The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials. The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. Also, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act) is unconstitutional a. Whether or not Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 violates the Equal Protection clause of the constitution b. Whether or not the passage of the act in the House of Representatives had irregularities

HELD: 1. The court held that the law does not transcend constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power; therefore it is constitutional in its entirety. a. Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the constitution. b. The court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, wherein which the court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress. RATIO: Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code: Any candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. -Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. On Equal Protection Clause: The equal protection of the law clause is not absolute and is subject to reasonable classification. It does not demand absolute equality among residents, it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike. On the irregularities in the Enrolled Bill Doctrine: Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Effectivity Clause (of RA No. 9006): “this act shall take effect upon its approval” -This clause was held to be defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. Notwithstanding express statement, the law took effect 15 days after its publication in OG/newspaper. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board Section 26 | Subject and title of bill Facts: • Petitioners assails the constitutionality of PD 1987, “An act creating the Videogram Regulatory Board”, with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. • The rationale behind the enactment of the Decree, is set out in its preambular clauses. • Petitioner’s attack on the constitutionality of the Decree o Sec10, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and not germane to the subject matter. Issue: WON Sec 10 of PD 1987 is unconstitutional.

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CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 Held: The title of the decree is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its preamble and reasonably covers all its provision. Ratio: • Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. • The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. o The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the decree. Petitioner’s contention that the tax provision of the decree is a rider is without merit. • The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of the legislation. o The tax provision as a tool of regulation is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. Tan v. Del Rosario Section 26 | Subject and Title of Bills Facts: • 2 consoidated special civil actions challenged the constitutionality of RA 7496 a.k.a (SNIT) Simplified Net Taxation Scheme amending certain provisions of Regulation No: 293 of National Internal Revenue • The FULL text of the title reads: “An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.” • Petitioner claim to be taxpayers affected by the continued implementation of said amendatory law • The petition asserts that RA 7496 violates the ff: o Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1) – 1 subject, 1 title o Art. VI, Sec. 28 (1) – Taxation shall be uniform and equitable ! Petitioner intimates that law would not attempt to tax single proprietorship & professionals any

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differently from the manner it impose tax to corporations & partnerships Art. III, Sec. 1 – due process and equal protection

Issue: WON RA 7496 is unconstitutional Held: No. It is CONSTITUTIONAL Ratio: Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1)’s objectives are: (1) Prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislator who favor any one of unrelated subjects in the support of the whole act (2) To avoid surprises, or even fraud, in the legislature (3) To fairly apprise the people of the subjects of legislation # Above objectives sufficiently met. # Anything else would require a virtual compendium (summary) of the law $ not the intendment of Consti mandate Art. VI, Sec. 28 (1) # The system of imposing tax differently to single proprietorship & professionals from corporation & partnership has long been prevailing even before RA 7496 Art. III. Sec. 1 # Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects of taxation are to be treated alike both in privilege & liabilities # Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) standards used are substantial, not arbitrary (2) categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose (3) law applies to both present and future conditions (4) classification applies to well to all those belonging to the same class Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Section 26 | Subject and Title of Bills Facts: • These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. " RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.



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Several bills were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. The bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure (H.B. No. 11197). After the approval of the House Bill, the bill was sent to the Senate. The Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630. The bill submitted was in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129 taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197. The bill was passed by the Senate and was referred to a conference committee which recommended that House Bill 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill 1630, be approved. The Conference Committee Bill was thereafter approved by the House of Reps and by the Senate, and was later on signed by the President.

A. First Issue (Procedural): Does RA 7716 violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution? • Held: It does not. • Petitioner’s Arguments: 1. RA 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives because it is the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. 2. The verb “shall originate” is qualified by the word “exclusively.” To be considered as having originated in the house, R.A. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197. • Court’s Answer: 1. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. 2. As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” This would violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and make the House superior to the Senate. 3. Given the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. • Petitioner’s Arguments: 1. The Constitutional design is to limit the Senate’s power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House.

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Court’s Answer: 1. Legislative power is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. 2. The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. Petitioner’s Arguments: 1. S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 1197 but of another Senate Bill (S. No. 1197) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to take H. No. 1197 into consideration. Court’s Answer: 1. There is no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 1197 up to the enacting clause and writing its own version following the enacting clause (an amendment by substitution) and separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. The result will still be two bills on the same subject. 2. What the Constitution means is that the initiative for filing such bills must come from the House of Representatives. 3. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

B. Second Issue (Procedural): Does RA 7716 violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution? • Held: It does not. • Petitioner’s Argument: S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. • Court’s Answer: 1. This was because the President certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. 2. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, Section 26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: i. The bills has passed three readings on separate days and ii. It has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved


3.

•

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The “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. Petitioner’s Argument: The certification on the bill was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a “growing budget deficit” not being an unusual condition in this country. Court’s Answer: No member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. By passing the senate bill, the Senate accepted the President’s certification. The factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements should elicit a different standard of review.

the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before.

E.

F. C. Third Issue (Procedural): What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee? • Petitioner’s Arguments: 1. The Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were “surreptitiously” inserted by the Conference Committee. 2. Under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives, a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill. • Court’s Answer: 1. It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bill before the committee. 2. Nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. 3. The nature of the bill (of the conference committee) requires that it be acted upon by each house on a “take it or leave it basis.” D. Fourth Issue (Procedural): Does RA 7716 violate Article IV, Section 26(1) of the Constitution? • Held: It does not. • Petitioner’s Argument: The removal of the exemption from VAT of Philippine Airlines, Inc. was not included in the republic act’s title. • Court’s Answer: The amendment is fairly embraced in the title of R.A. 7716. Since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand

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First Issue (Substantial): Does the law violate Sections 1, 4, 5 and 10 of Article III (Bill of Rights)? • Held: The absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners’ attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. Second Issue (Substantial): Does the law violate Art. VI, Section 28(1) and Art. VI Section 28(3)? • Held: The issues are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition. • Petitioner’s Argument: 1. The VAT is regressive and it violates the requirement that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equiatable and Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.” 2. VAT payment by low-income households will be a higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than payments by higher-income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive. • Respondent’s Argument: The VAT distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-income groups. • Court’s Answer: 1. Regressivity is not a negative standard for the courts to enforce. 2. Such provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially-enforceable rights. 3. In the case of Kapatiran, similar arguments made against the original VAT Law were held to be hypothetical. 4. Further debate on the desirability and wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress. 5. The parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. ! The Contract Clause has never been thought of as a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals



Section 27 | Item Veto

FACTS: RA No. 6110 or Omnibus Tax Law was passed by the Congress and approved by Pres.Marcos. Sec 42 of HB No. 17839 (now RA No. 6110) pursuant to provisions of Sec 20 (3), Art Vi of Constitution, however, was vetoed by the President. By this virtue, the petitioners assessed Manila Golf & Country Club fixed tax rates in amount of PhP 32, 504. 96. The club protested claiming the assessment to be without basis because Sec 42 was vetoed by Pres. Marcos. The protestation of the club was denied by the petitioner who maintains that Sec 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words “hotels, motels and resthouses” on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry. This was also the position of the House of Ways and Means Committee. It was by reason of this interpretation of the Committee that RA 6110 was published in the OG in such a way that Sec 191-A was included in the text save for the words “hotels, motel and resthouses.” The Court of Tax Appeals declared the collection of caterers’ tax under Sec 191-A of RA 6110 illegal because Sec 42 of HB No. 17839 which carries the proviso was vetoed by Pres. Marcos and that the Congress has not taken any step to override Presidential veto. ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipts of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshments, parlors, bars and other eating places which are maintained within the premises OR compound of motel, hotel or resthouses. HELD: The petition is GRANTED. The decision of CTA is set aside. Sec 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable hence, Manila Golf & Country Club is liable for the amount assessed against it. RATIO: An item in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of the revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates the persons liable therefore with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word “item” as referring to the whole section would tie the Presidents hand in choosing wither to approve the whole section at the expense of approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of the foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil

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which was sought to be prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile. Gonzales v. Macaraig Sec. 27 || Item Veto

FACTS: Petitioners, who are members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate, filed a petition for Prohibition/Mandamus and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Resrtraining Order assailing the legality of the Presidential (Aquino') veto of Sec 55 of the General Appropriations for FY 89. Sec 55 provided for the prohibition against restoration or increase of recommended appropriations disapproved by and/or reduced by the Congress. A similar provision, Sec 16 of the General Appropriations Act of '90 which prohibits the president, senate president, HOR speaker, Chief Justice, and the heads of constitutional commissions from restoring or increasing items of appropriation from their respective office's savings when disapproved or reduced by the Congress, was also vetoed by the President. The Senate issued Resolution No. 381 expressing that the Presidential Veto on Sec 55 was unconstitutional, void, and without any force and effect. Petitioners claim that: 1. The president's veto power is limited to items, and does not cover provisions (Sec 16 & Sec 55) 2. In Objections to a provision, power to veto the entire bill must be exercised instead of the item-veto power 3. Item-veto power does not include power to strike conditions or restrictions, which would infringe the separation of powers 4. The power of augmentation in Art VI Sec 25 of the consti has to be provided by law, and may be restricted by the Congress 5. The presidential veto power must be strictly construed since it partakes the nature of legislative powers The Solicitor General contends that: 1. A political remedy, to override the veto, is available 2. Sec 55 is a rider 3. The augmenting power of the president has been provided by PD 1177 4. The President is empowered by the Consti to veto provisions or other distinct and severable parts of an appropriation bill ISSUE: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution HELD: Petition was dismissed. Sec 55 and Sec 16 are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President's veto. The constitutionality of the presidential veto is upheld.



RATIO: The legislature cannot circumvent the president's veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions on an item of appropriation. The provisions nullify the constitutional and statutory authority of the president and the officials enumerated under sec 25(5) Art VI of the Constitution to augment any item in the gen app law for their respective appropriations. The Constitution mandates that provisions, a distinct and severable part of a bill, may be vetoed. Also The courts will always presume the constitutionality of the chief executive's veto. The provisions apply generally and do not relate specifically to particular appropriations. Even as restrictions or conditions, they do not exhibit connexity with money items. They are more of an expression of congressional policy to restrict the augmenting power of the president and other key officials and thus should be the subject of a separate legislation. NOTE: Par 1 of Sec. 27 - general veto power (veto of the entire bill) Par 2 - item-veto or line-veto power (veto over a particular item)

implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority.

PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ Section 27 | Item Veto

1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. (on par.1 “ payment of principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness” – germane to law)

FACTS: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1,1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsa prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the

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ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? HELD: • Countrywide Development Fund: The proposals and identification made by the members of the Congress are merely recommendatory. This fund makes an attempt to make equal the unequal. “The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the law. It can be as detailed and as broad as the Congress wants it to be.” • Realignment of Operating Expenses: The members of the congress are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses the need to augment. However the Senate President and the Speaker of the HR shall approve the alignment: (1) actual savings (2) if realignment is to be made

2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. ( since it will lead to the reduction of the financing sources of GAA) 3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio for works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. 4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of



modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.

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Special provision on purchase of medicines by AFP. President vetoed the special provision of medicines in compliance with Generics Drugs Law. The provision is an “appropriate provision” for it is a mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an existing law, the Generics Drugs Law of 1988. Being directly related to an inseparable from the appropriation item, the provision cannot be vetoed without also vetoing the said item. VETO VOID

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5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Constitution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. 6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. “ A provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws”. VETO VALID. Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. Basis (1) expressly or impliedly granted by Congress (2) President being the Commander-in-Chief (3) Faithful Execution Clause 7. Conditions on appropriation for SC, Ombudsman, COA and CHR: Conditions being questioned were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, the President merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. The Statements are mere reminders that disbursements must be made in accordance with the law. They did not add anything to what was already in place at the time of the approval of the GAA of 1994. Faithful execution Clause: president has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. Gerochi v. Department of Energy Art. 6, Sec 28 | Power to tax Facts: • Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, katulong ng bayan (kb), and environmentalist consumers, Inc.

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Original action praying that sec34 of the RA 9136(electric power industry reform act of 2001, EPIRA), in imposing the universal charge, and rule 18 of rules and regulations (IRR) be declared unconstitutional Petitioners submit assailed provision of law unconstitutional on the following grounds: o Said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional. o ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected be used. o Imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amount to taxation without representations the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.

Issue: Whether or not the Universal Charge imposed under sec34 of EPIRA is a tax. Held: Court holds that the assailed Universal charge is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of State’s police power. Ratio: 1. To resolve the issue, the court finds it necessary to distinguish the state’s power of taxation from police power. • POWER TO TAX- is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature, which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay. It emenates from necessity; without taxea, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well being of the people. • POLICE POWER- is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. Most pervasive, the least limitable and most demanding power of the state • Distinction rests in the purpose for which the charge is made o If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax. o Regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.



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Assailed Universal charge through Sec34 of the EPIRA, the state’s police power, particularly its regulatory dimension is invoked. Garcia v Executive Secretary Section 28 | Taxation. Exemptions.

Facts: The president issued EO 438 which imposed an additional duty of 5% ad valorem, apart from other taxes and charges imposed by law, to all articles imported into the Philippines. It was subsequently increased to 9% ad valorem by EO 443. After this, by request of the Department of Finance, the Tariff Commission pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code, scheduled a public hearing for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil and petroleum products. Meantime, EO 475 was issued reducing the additional duty on all imported articles from 9% to 5% ad valorem, except for crude oil and other oil products which remained to be 9% ad valorem. Upon completion of the public hearing, the Tariff Commission submitted a report to the president and 7 days later, issued EO 478 which levied a special duty of P 0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P 1.00 per liter of imported oil products, in addition to the existing 9%. Petitioner assailed the validity of EO 475 and 478, saying that they are violative of Sec. 24, Art. VI of the Constitution. He contends that the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, hence the president may not assume such power of issuing EO 475 and 478 which are revenue-generating measures. He also contends that the President is authorized to act under the Tariff and Customs Code only “to protect local industries and products for the sake of the national economy, general welfare and/or national security” and that since we produce only minimal quantities of crude oil, we don’t have to protect such local industry. Issue 1: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional? 2. Whether the Tariff and Customs Code is an absolute limitation of the authority of president to levy taxes specifically only to “protect local industries”? Held 1: Yes, both EO 475 and 478 are constitutional. 2. No. Ratio: Issue 1: Although EO 475 and 478 are assumed to be characterized as revenue measures, it cannot be said that they are prohibited to the President, and that they must be enacted instead by the Congress. Sec. 28 Art. VI of the Constitution is an explicit constitutional permission that

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Congress, may by law, authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates and other duties or imposts.” The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, specifically sections 104 and 401. Customs duties are rarely designed to achieve one policy objective only. Instead they have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving purposes. In the case, the imposition of a special duty on imported crude oil may be seen to have some protective impact upon indigenous oil production. At the same time, it cannot be said that substantial revenues are raised by such duties.

Issue 2: The courts believe that such is a confined and a closed view of the legislative standards and policies. Tariff rates are not imposed, increased or decreased only for the purpose of protecting local industries but also to protect consumers, for revenue purposes or to discourage importation of certain items. Customs duties are levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing local industries to protect. Systems Plus Computer College v Caloocan City Section 28 | Taxation. Tax Exemption FACTS: Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is a non-stock and non-profit educational institution enjoying property tax exemption on its buildings but not on the parcels of land which petitioner is renting from Consolidated Assembly Inc. and Pair Management and Development Corporation. Petitioner requested respondent city to extend tax exemption to the parcels of land claiming that the same were being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes pursuant to Article VI, Section 28 (3) of the 1987 Constitution and applicable provisions of the Local Government Code. Request was denied on account that it was Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management’s land, and they were using it as a form of income. A year after the denied request (February 15, 1999), the petitioner, Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management novated their existing contracts of lease and converted them to donations of the beneficial use. On light of the new acquisition by donation, the petitioner requested the City of Caloocan to reconsider their petition for tax exemption. This was again denied by the respondent because it may be implied that the donation was means of evading payment of Real Property Tax and there was no showing that the land was actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Petitioner filed petition for mandamus with the lower court which however was dismissed by the latter. ISSUE:



Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that the petition for mandamus was premature on the basis of • mandamus does not lie against public respondents; and that • petitioner failed to exhaust available remedies

1.failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders 2.channel 7 taken over by rebels & Marcos loyalists 3.plan of Marcoses to return from Hawaii w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer *proof that they can stir trouble from afar & fanaticism & blind loyalty of followers 4.Honasan’s failed coup 5.Communist insurgency movements 6.secessionist movements in Mindanao (setting up own gov’t w/aim to overthrow current gov’t thru arms or propaganda 7.devastated economy due to a.)Accumulated foreign debt b.)Plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

HELD: Petition is dismissed. RATIO: • Mandamus: a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law • Petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the courts • When the law provides for remedies, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedied provided therein o Under Section 226 of RA 7160, the remedy of appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals is available • Mandamus may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise of either Marcos vs. Manglapus Section 1 | Executive Power FACTS: The petitioners are Ferdinand E. Marcos and his immediate family, while Raul Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the respondent. The call is about the request of Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the president’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Substantive Facts: • Feb. 1986 – Marcos was deposed from presidency by means of the People Power. He was forced into exile in Hawaii. • After 3 years, Marcos, now dying, prays that he and his family be allowed to return to the country. • Aquino – barred Marcoses from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

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By enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the breadth and scope of “executive power”? Petitioner’s Argument: • The President’s powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution (Article VII, Sections 14 to 23). • The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusion alterius. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. HELD: Petition was dismissed. President did not arbitrarily or with grave of discretion in determining that return of former president Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to returned to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated power of the president which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the president to determine whether it must be granted or denied.



Congress has recognized the President’s power by coming up with a HR Resolution no. 1342 to urge Aquino to allow Marcoses to return. The resolution does not question the President’s power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather it appeals to the President’s sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.

RATIO: Though the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. Any power not vested on the judicial and legislative bodies belong to the executive. (Springer vs. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands) The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In the exercise of Presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for the plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things and adhere to them. ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. The President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. The Constitution aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. The problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The

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power involved is the President’s residual power. Residual powers dictate that the President can do anything w/c is not forbidden in the Consti (Roosevelt), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, AmericanPresident) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. It is a power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. A power implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed- President’s power as “protector of peace”. ESTRADA v. DESIERTO Section 2 | Executive Immunity Facts: Petitioner (Estrada) makes two submissions: 1. The cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him. 2. He enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil (non-sitting) Antecedent facts: (just a refresher ! just in case!) In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected VicePresident. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a



letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day. After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not President Estrada is entitled to immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. 2. What is the extent of the immunity HELD / RATIO: 1. First Argument: He cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Court’s Answer: • Held: He is not. • In Re: Saturnino Bermudez: Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability • Petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. " The impeachment trial was aborted by the walkout of the prosecution and by the events that led to his loss of presidency. " Senate issued Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is functus officio” • The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. • Impeachment proceedings became moot and academic due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may be filed against him. 2. Extent of Immunity • The crimes charged against the petitioner cannot be covered by the mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. • When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest on confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the

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fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice (US v. Nixon). • The immunity of the President from civil damages covers only “official acts” (Nixon v. Fitzgerald). ----------------Principle of non-liability does not mean that the Chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to act which he claims to perform as such official. The governor-general, like the judges of the courts and the members of the legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duty Justice Johnson: the consequences if no grant of immunity from suit: disrespect, unrest, disorder resulting in a distrust as to the integrity of the government itself. *1935 Constitution: no immunity from suit *1973 Constitution: EXPLICIT statement of immunity. (1) extended to include criminal cases and other claims. (2) cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. (3) include also persons who acted upon orders of the President. - Romulo: violated principle that Public office is a Public Trust. – “King can do no wrong” , but his efforts failed. *1987 Constitution: Fr. Bernas: it is understood in present jurisprudence that he is immune from suit. There’s no need to specify.

Forbes, etc. v. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: The President will be protected from personal liability for damages when: 1. He acts within his authority 2. He acts without authority, PROVIDED that he actually used discretion and judgment in determining whether he had the authority to act or not. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. ARTICLE XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and



efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. Soliven v. Makasiar Section 1| Executive Immunity

Facts: • President Corazon Aquino sued Beltran for libel for having written that the President having written that the President hid under the bed during an attempted coup. • Petitioner Beltran argues that o The reason which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit o If criminal proceedings ensue the President may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution and testifying on the witness stand, bringing her to the trial court’s jurisdiction. This will indirectly defeat her privilege of immunity Issue: WON the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through a filing of a complaint-affidavit Held: No. The accused in a case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense. Ratio: • Rationale for the grant to the President of privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of the Presidential duties and functions free from hindrances and distractions. The Chief Executive’s job demands undivided attention

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The privilege of immunity from suit may be invoked only by the power holder of the office; not by any other person on the President’s behalf. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely on the President’s prerogative and cannot be assumed by any other person. Tecson v. COMELEC (2004) Section 2 – Citizenship Qualification

Facts: • The case at bar is the 3 consolidated cases challenging the qualifications of a presidential candidate, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr. • In FPJ’s COC, he represented himself to be: o natural-born citizen of the Philippines; o his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe; o his date of birth to be August 20, 1939; and o his place of birth to be Manila. • Victorino Fornier (G.R. No. 161824) initiated a petition before COMELEC to disqualify FPJ of his candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his COC claiming to be a natural-born citizen when in truth his parents were foreigners o Mother: Bessie Kelley Poe is an American o Father: Allan Poe is a Spanish National being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject and that even if his father was a Filipino, he could not have transmitted his father’s Filipino citizenship because he was an illegitimate child • Petitioner’s bases of allegation of illegitimacy o Allan Poe Sr. contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez; and o Even if there is no prior marriage, that Allan Poe Sr. married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth FPJ • COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of merit. 3 days later, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc. • Feb 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court AND the other petitions consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the



Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Issue: (1) WON the SC has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue in this case (2) WON Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

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• Held: (1) No. Although it is sufficiently clear that SC could take cognizance of this case, Presidential Electoral Tribunal can only contemplate a post-election scenario. (2) Yes. 1935 Consti confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate Ratio: (1) Jurisdiction of the Court • Art VIII, Sec 1 of 1987 Consti provides the Supreme Court the power to (1) settle actual controversies involving legally demandable and enforceable rights; and (2) determine WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. • Art VII, Sec 4, Par 7 states that “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or VP, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” • However, “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,” as promulgated by SC speaks of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the ERQ of the “President” and “Vice-President,” of the Phil, and not of “candidates” • It is therefore safe to conclude that the jurisdiction of the SC would NOT INCLUDE cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency BEFORE the elections are held. • The case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity the petitions in GR 161434 and GR 161634

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(2) The Citizenship Issue • Art. VII, Sec. 2 provides that “No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Phiippines…” •

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The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." The year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 1939, which is under the regime of the 1935 Constitution. It confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. The ff. conclusions could be drawn from the veracity of some entries in the 3 documents presented (i.e. FPJ’s birth certificate, his parents’ marriage certificate, and Allan Poe’s death certificate): o The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; o FPJ was born to them on August 20 1939; o Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September 16, 1940 o The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and o At the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. These 3 documents are public document record in the custody of a public office and have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Such public doucments are givem trustworthiness and value because it was made in the performance of the duty of public officers. But although the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate IN HIS FAVOR enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his COC. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.



Macalintal v. Comelec Section 4 | Election and Canvass

Facts: • Petition for certiorari and prohibition • Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeks a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. • Section 18.5 of RA 9189 empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates • Petitioner’s argument: " Section 18.5 violates paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President. • Solicitor General: " Section 18.5 should be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and the Vice-President. Issue: Does Section 18.5 of RA 9189 violate the constitutional mandate under paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution? Held: The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Ratio: • The phrase “proclamation of winning candidates” in Section 18.5 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for presidency and the vice-presidency. " Said section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the position of President and Vice-President. " The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president must remain in the hands of Congress. • The Court also notes that Section 18.4 of the law which authorizes the chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers to transmit the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission clashes with

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paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the constitution (the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress). Congressman Lopez v. Senate and House Section 4 | Election and Canvass

Facts: • Petition for prohibition and mandamus • Petitioner seeks to nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress o Said Section creates a Joint Committee which shall preliminary canvass the votes of the candidates for President and VicePresident during the May 10, 2004 elections • Petitioner claims that such section violates the constitution Issue: Whether or not the creation of the Joint Committee constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Held: The court resolves to dismiss the petition on the ground that it failed to show that Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating such Joint Committee. Ratio: • Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution empowers Congress to “promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.” " The Court has no authority to restrict or limit the exercise of congressional prerogative granted by the Constitution. • The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogative. " Under the Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both houses of Congress, voting separately. • Arroyo v. De Venecia: The Court has no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. • Santiago v. Guingona: The Court – under the doctrine of separation of powers – has “no authority to interfere” in the “exclusive realm” of a coequal branch, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee Section 4 | Election and Canvass Facts: This is a petition for prohibition by Senator Pimentel seeking a judgment to declare null and void the continued existence of the Joint



Committee of Congress in the May 2004 elections after the adjournment of Congress sine die. Petitioner contends that with the adjournment sine die of the 12th Congress of its last regular session, its term terminated and expired and the 12th Congress serving from 2001 – 2004 passed out of legal existence. Therefore, all pending matters and proceedings terminated upon expiration of Congress. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition. 2. Whether or not the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, illegal and unconstitutional following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions on June 11, 2004. Held: 1. Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition 2. The existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are valid, legal and constitutional following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress. Ratio: 1. Court’s Jurisdiction is pursuant to its power and duty “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” under Sec. 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution and its original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under Sec. 5 of the same Article. 2. Petitioner’s Arguments: I. Petitioner claims that his arguments are supported by legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress. This is directly contradicted by Sec. 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate which provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than 30 days after the elections in accordance with Sec. 4 Article VII of the Constitution. Precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. On both cases, despite the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President, convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and proclaimed the elected President and Vice-President.

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II.

He cites Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution which reads: The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

" Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session. Even with the adjournment sine die, the Twelfth Congress cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." " The legislative functions may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. " Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. Fernando Poe, Jr. v Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Section 4 | Election and Canvass Facts: Before the election protest of FPJ could be decided, he died. Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the death of her husband and in his representation and for the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is need to substitute/intervene for FPJ, who died, to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for FPJ who died during the pendency of his protest case? Held: No



Ratio: • Acc. to Rule 14 of the PET Rules: Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice President who received the 2nd or 3rd highest number of votes may contest the election of the President. They are the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. • This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals. • Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. o Mrs. FPJ seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant. o However, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. o Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. ! Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias: we recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. ! De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections: we struck down the claim of the surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases before other electoral tribunals, we denied substitution by the wife or heirs. • This does not mean that death of the protestant stops the pending action. An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. o A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. ! Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the

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•

•

one duly elected cannot assume office. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest. A contest before election tribunals has two aspects: First, it is in pursuit of one’s right to a public office, and second, it is imbued with public interest. She avers that she is “pursuing the process” to determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest but whether he is a real party in interest.

3 Estrada v. Desierto Sec 8 | Vacancy Situations During the term

3

Petitioner: Joseph Ejercito Estrada (alleges that he is President on leave) Respondent: Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo (claims she is the President) Facts: On May 11, 1998 Estrada was elected president; Arroyo as Vice President. On October 4, 2000 Ilocos Sur Rep Chavit Singson accused Estrada of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. On Oct 5, Senate Minority Leader Teofisto Guingona Jr in his privilege speech, accused Estrada of receiving 220 M jueteng money from Singson from Nov 1998 to August 2000; and 70 M excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. Joint investigation was called by Senate President Franklin Drilon. House of Representatives also decided to investigate the said expose. Rep Alvarez, Herrera and Defensor moved to impeach the petitioner. Calls for resignation filled the air: Oct 11: Arch. Jaime Cardinal Sin in behalf of Presbyteral Council of Archdiocese of Manila asking petitioner to step down from presidency Oct 13: CBCP also asked petitioner to resign Oct 17: Former President Aquino demanded that petitioner take “supreme self-sacrifice” of resignation; Former Pres. Ramos Nov 1: Four Senior Economic Advisers resigned Nov 2: DTI Sec Mar Roxas resigned Nov 3: Sen Pres Drilon, Speaker Villar and 47 representatives defected from the ruling of coalition Lapian ng Masang Pilipino Nov 13: Speaker Villar transmitted Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all members of HR to Senate; Senate Pres Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel; Speaker Villar was unseated by Rep Fuentabella



Nov 20: Senate opened the impeachment trial of petitioner; 21 senators took oath as judges with CJ Davide Dec 7: Impeachment trial started. Clarissa Ocampo, Senior VP of Equitable PCI Bank testified that she was one-foot away from Estrada when he affixed Jose Velarde signature on docus involving 500M investment agreement with their bank on Feb 4, 2000 *Impeachment trial adjourned and resumed on January 2, 2001

Jan 26: Arroyo signed laws (Solid Waste Management Act; Political advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act) Feb 6: Arroyo nominated Guingona Jr as Vice President Feb 7: Senate issued Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination; HR approved nomination in Resolution No. 178; Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated Several cases previously filed against Estrada were set in motion

Jan 11: Sec of Finance Atty Edgardo Espiritu alleged that petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corp with Mr. Dante tan who was facing charges of insider trading Jan 16: Vote of 11-10 of senator-judges against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3B in secret bank account of Jose Velarde caused outrage; Public and private prosecutors walked out in protest; Sen. Pimentel resigned as Sen. President Jan 17: Public prosecutors collectively resigned Jan 18: 10km line of people in EDSA demanding petitioners resignation Jan 19: AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes had defected and announced withdrawing support to Estrada government on behalf of 130,000 AFP members; Petitioner agreed holding a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate but did not diffuse the crisis; PNP Chief Panfilo Lacson, Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, asst secretaries also resigned; Petitioner ordered lawyers to agree of opening of second envelope but again did not diffuse the crises Jan 20: There were negotiations for peaceful and orderly transfer of power; At 12 nn CJ Davide administered the oath of Arroyo at noon at EDSA Shrine; At 230 pm Estrada and family left Malacanang and issued press statement Estrada transmitted a letter declaring that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and Constitution, the VP shall be acting president (HR received the letter at 8:30 am, Jan 20; Senate received the letter at 9pm, Jan 20) Jan 22: Arroyo discharged powers and duties of presidency; appointed members of her Cabinet, ambassadors, special envoys; foreign governments recognized Arroyo government; Court issued Administrative Matter 01-1-05 Jan 23: 100+ foreign diplomats including US Pres Bush recognized Arroyo Govt Jan 24: Rep Belmonte was elected Speaker and Passed Resolution No. 175 and 176 expressing support to Arroyo Admin

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Feb 5: In GR No. 146710-15, petitioner sought to enjoin Ombudsman from conducting proceedings filed cases and in future cases that may be filed until after his term as President is over and only if legally warranted; in GR 146738, petitioner filed for quo warranto praying that he be confirmed incumbent President, only temporarily unable to discharge duties of his office and declare respondent as only acting president Feb 20: Court resolved GR 146738: (a) Court did not issue a reso declaring that Office of President vacant; (b) parties cited for contempt to refrain from making comment while cases are still pending; (c) enjoin Ombudsman for 30 days from deciding cases filed against petitioner ISSUES : (1) Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question Respondents view: Cases at bar pose political question a. It assails the legitimacy of Arroyo admin b. Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power c. Arroyo has taken oath as 14th President d. She has exercised powers of presidency e. She has been recognized by foreign govts There is a legal distinction between EDSA I and EDSA II. EDSA I: exercise of the people of power of revolution which overthrew the whole government; extra constitutional - legitimacy of govt cannot be subject to judicial review; result of revolution by sovereign people EDSA II: exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the govt for redress grievances which only affected the office of the President; intra constitutional – resignation of Pres and succession of VP are subject to judicial review; not revolutionary; took oath under 1987 Consti and swore to preserve and defend the Consti Court ruled: It is not a political question. The issues require the interpretations of provision of Constitution (Sec 1, Art II; Sec 8, Art VII; Sec 11, Art VII). It calls ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit and right of petitioner against presidential publicity.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 (2) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned when respondent took her oath as President Petitioners view: a.) Petitioner denies that he resigned as President or that he suffers from permanent disability; b.) Office of President was not vacant when Arroyo took oath; Petitioner did not write any formal letter that he has resigned from office c.) Petitioner did not resign but only took temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern; the letters dated Jan 20 sent to Senate Pres And House Speaker support the claim d.) Petitioner contended that could not resign as matter of law (Sec 12 of RA No. 3019 “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” provides “No public officer shall be allowed to reign retire pending an investigation….. for any offense under this act under provisions of RPC on bribery”) e.) Impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation under Sec 12 of RA 3019 bars him from resigning. Take note of Sec 8, Art VII: In case of death, disability, removal from office or resignation of Pres, VP shall become Pres to serve the unexpired term……..” Resignation is a factual question and its elements are: (a) there must be intent to resign and (b) intent must be coupled with acts of relinquishment. Validity can be oral or written or implied. As long as it is clear, it must be given effect. Court ruled: Using totality test (totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence), we hold that petitioner has resigned as President. Resignation of petitioner cannot be doubted a.) Quotations from Angara diary b.) In his press release he acknowledged oath taking of respondent although with reservation about legality c.) Pressure arising from defection of principal executive officers and call of people for his resignation

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d.) Court cannot give legal significance to petitioners letter e.) The court rejected petitioners contention that he could not resign as matter of law. Sec 12 of RA No. 3019 could not be invoked because when petitioner resigned, the cases filed against him were filed but Ombudsman refrained from conducting preliminary investigation f.) There was no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned because the process already broke down when senatorjudges voted against opening of second envelope and when public and private respondents walked out.

(3) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President Petitioners view: a.) The inability claim is contained in Jan 20 letter to Senate Pres and Speaker. b.) Contends that Congress has the ultimate authority under Constitution to determine whether the President is capable of performing his functions as provided in Sec 11 of Art VII. Acts of Congress: a.) Despite the receipt of letter, the House passed HR No. 175 and 176 expressing full support of HR to GMA administration as President and HR No. 178 confirming Guingona’s nomination as VP b.) Despite the receipt of letter, Senate passed Resolution No. 82 confirming Guingona’s nomination as VP and Resolution No. 83 recognizing that impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated c.) Senate issued Resolution No. 84 calling COMELEC to fill up Senate seat vacancy d.) Both houses started sending bills to be signed into law Court ruled: In the question of whether the Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability, the court rules that it is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. The claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is de jure President is made by co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by Court.



(4) Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (answered in (1))

Even assuming that Angara Diary was an out of court statement, it is still not covered by hearsay rule.

(5) Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity Petitioner contends that Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting investigations against him due to prejudicial publicity on his guilt.

Evidence is called hearsay when its force depends in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it sought to produce it.

Court applied doctrine in People v. Teehankee Jr, and Larranaga v. COA: “Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial…… Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard offcourt evidence and on-camera performances of parties to an investigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts hoes not pre se fatally infect their impartiality.” HELD: Petitions of Estrada challenging Arroyo as de jure 14th president are DISMISSED. Estrada v. Arroyo In line with the facts above - Estrada v. Desierto. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the use of Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against admission of hearsay evidence Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions to a party: a.) his proposal for snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate b.) his statement that he obly wanted the 5 day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes c.) his statements that he would leave by Monday if 2nd envelope would be opened by Monday d.) “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado ng masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga” Court held: Angara is not an out of court statement but is part of the pleadings in the cases of bar. Petitioner could not invoke that he was not given copies because three parts of diary were published in PDI and used by Sec of Justice Perez in his oral arguments. The petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of diary but failed to do so.

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Three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of crossexamination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; (3) absence of oath. Not all hearsay evidence however is inadmissible evidence. Some hearsay evidence are admitted by courts due to their relevance, worthiness and necessity. (2) Whether or not Angara Diary is binding on the petitioner; Petitioner argues that the diary is not his; thus non-bonding. Executive Sec Angara was an alter ego of the President; thus, admissions of Angara as an agent are binding on the petitioner. Ratio: (Doctrine of adoptive admission: party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.) In the diary, options of the petitioner started support from him. Executive Sec Angara had advide petitioner to consider dignified exit or object but said that he could never leave the

to dwindle when AFP withdrew to ask Sen Pres Pimentel to resignation. Petitioner did not country.

(3) Whether or not the use of Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta Petitioner also contends that use of the said diary violated rule on res inter alios acta. Rule on res inter alios acta is expressed in Sec 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. Court ruled: Res inter alios acta has exceptions: Sec 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Sec Angara was an alter ego of the President; thus, admissions of Angara as an agent are binding on the petitioner. (4) Whether or not the Court misinterpreted the meaning of Sec 11, Art VII



The issue was resolved in the above-mentioned case, Estrada v. Desierto. Congress has already determined, by their acts, the claim of temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner.

act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.”

Issue: • Whether or not the petitioner violated Art.7 Sec 13 of the constitution, even without the possession of any signed document alleging his involvement with the DECS after petitioner became PCGG Commissioner.

Court ruled: Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the question; determination of Congress is a political judgment which Court cannot review. The doctrine of separation of powers constitutes an insuperable bar against this court’s interposition of power of judicial review to review the judgment of the Congress rejecting the petitioner’s claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and that Arroyo is merely acting as vice president.

Held: •

Petitioner contends: Acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal significance because they are (a) post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.

Ratio: • The DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest. • Sec13 of Art7 provides, “the president, Vice-president, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not during (their) tenure, directly or indirectly participate in any business.” • Constitutional ban is similar to prohibition in the Civil Service law (PD 807, Sec36, subpar.24) that “pursuit of private business without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations” shall be ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service.

Court ruled: There is nothing in Sec 11, Art VII which states that declaration of Congress of President’s inability must always be a priori or before the VP assumes the presidency. Congress was not in session in the case at bar, and had no opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. Moreover, petitioner cannot contend that Congress recognized Arroyo as constitutional successor to presidency post facto because before the oath taking, Sen Pres Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella prepared a joint statement of support and recognition from Senate and HR. (5) On issue of resignation under Sec 8, Article VII Court ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before Arroyo took her oath. Doromal v. Sandiganbayan Art. 7 Sec 13 | Prohibitions Facts: • Complying with that memorandum, a new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that: o “the above-named accused (Doromal), a public officer, being then commissioner of the presidential Commission of Good Government, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the president, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which

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The petitioner “can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Sec.13 of Art.7 of the constitution.”

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Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary Art. 7 Sec 13 | Prohibitions Facts: • Petition to declare the unconstitutionality of EO 284 by President Corazon C. Aquino. • The petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to sec.13, art7 other than those provided in the Constitution, are challenging EO 284. o Petitioners insist that because of the phrase, “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” used in sec13 of art7, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice president being allowed to become a member of the cabinet under the second paragraph of Sec3, Article 6 or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar council under Art8, Sec8(1).



o

Respondents maintain that the phrase makes reference to sec7, par2, of Art 9-B insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.

therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials’ office. o The reason is that these posts do not compromise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.

Issue: Whether or not the prohibition in Sec13, Art7 of the Constitution admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Sec7,par2, Art 9-B. Which I quoted anew states; “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries.” Held: In light of the construction given to sec13, Art7 in relation to sec7, par2, art 9-B of the constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Court hereby orders respondents still holding office to immediately relinquish office or employment. During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. Ratio: • Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec13, Art7 prohibiting them from doing so unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. • A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Sec7, par2, art 9-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Sec13, Art7 is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, Vicepresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. • The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned, and prohibition to president and his official family covers both public and private office or employment. • But the prohibition under Sec13, Art7 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified

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Bitonio, Jr. v. COA Sec. 13 | Prohibitions FACTS •

Petitioner Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE.

•

Pursuant to the Sec. 11 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 (RA 7916), petitioner was designated by then Acting Sec. Brilliantes of the DOLE to be said department’s representative to the Board of Directors of Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Board, for which he received a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.

•

The COA issued Notices of Disallowance of the payment of per diem to the petitioner pursuant to:

•

1.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. ExecSec declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of compensation therefore

2.

COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997, implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in 1998, which was subsequently denied by the COA in 2001. Hence, this petition to annul said decision.

Petitioner’s Grounds: 1.

The SC Resolution (Aug. 2, 1991) clarified that the prohibition does not cover officials equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary. The prohibition applies to Cabinet Sec, Undersec, and their assistants.

2.

The PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union case became final:


3.


a.

Expressly authorized the payment of per diems in Sec. 11, thus he is entitled to the compensation

b.

Thus, it is presumed that the legislature was aware of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.

The PEZA Charter (RA 7916) is presumed to be valid, until declared unconstitutional, thus the provision on the payment per diem (Sec. 11) remains in force.

4.

The PEZA Charter cannot be rendered nugatory by a mere memorandum circular, for a statute is more superior to an administrative directive.

5.

In the Resolution of the Court, petitioner’s position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited to receive additional compensation.

4.

5.

for such attendance, they are not entitled to additional compensation. Attendance as Brilliantes’ representative: Although Director IV is not covered by the prohibition, petitioner attended the board meetings as the representative of the Labor Secretary. Petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot be likewise entitled, for sitting in the same capacity and for being limited by the same prohibitions. Basic Tenet: Any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of the land which is the Constitution. RA 7916, for being in violation of the rule on multiple positions, was amended by RA 8748. a. Option of designating representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted b. Payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted. Public Interest Center v. Elma

ISSUE WON the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor HELD The petitioner is not entitled to receive per diem for his attendance at the PEZA board meetings. Petition dismissed. The decision of the COA is affirmed. RATIO 1.

2.

3.

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Civil Liberties Union Case: EO 284 (which allows government officials to hold multiply government positions) was in violation of Sec 13, Art VII of the Constitution. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries are prohibited to hold other government position in addition to their primary position, and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases provided by the Constitution. COA Memorandum: Disallowance of any additional compensation to cabinet secretaries, deputies, assistants, or representatives in violation of the rule on multiple positions was urged pursuant to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report. Also, additional compensation given to and received by officials concerned from the time of the finality of the Civil Liberties Union Case was ordered to be refunded. Dela Cruz v. COA: Executive Department Secretaries, as ex officio members of the Board, are performing the primary function of their office covered by the compensation attached to the primary office thus,

Sec. 13 | Prohibitions FACTS This action seeks to declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of Elma as (1) PCGG Chairman, and (2) Chief Presidential Legal Counsel for violating Sec 13 of Art VII, and Sec 7(2) Art IX-B of the Constitution. ISSUE WON the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against multiple offices [Sec 13, Art VII & Sec 7(2), Art IX-B] HELD The court declared Respondent Magdangal B. Elma’s concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. RATIO Art IX-B Sec 7: The general rule is, an appointive official is permitted to hold more than one office only if “allowed (1) by law or (2) by the primary function of the position.” •

Quimson v. Ozaeta: A government official may occupy 2 government offices and perform the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.



People v. Green: The test of incompatibility is to determine whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other. (Incompatibility = Inconsistency in the functions of the two offices)

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The law seeks to avoid questions on impartiality in the exercise of an office: An incompatibility exists between the positions of PCGG Chairman and the CPLC, since the PCGG Chairman is subject to the review of the CPLC. Questions of impartiality in giving legal advice regarding the executive departments, which clearly includes the PCGG, will inevitably be raised.

•

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• ***NOTE: “In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do not require an appointment to the other post.” ***EX-OFFICIO POSITION: “denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office”

•

• •

IN RE APPOINTMENTS OF VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA Section 15 | Prohibited Appointments

DE LA RAMA v COURT OF APPEALS Section 15 | Prohibited Appointments

FACTS: •

On March 30, 1998, Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta were both appointed as judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62 of Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on appointments imposed by Sec 15, Art VII of the Constitution overrules the requirement to fill vacancies in the judiciary provided by Sec 4 (1) and 9 of Art VIII. HELD: The Court resolved to declared void the said appointments and also issued a cease and desist order preventing the 2 judges from discharging the office to which they were appointed. RATIO:

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The court’s view is that during the period stated in Sec 15, Art VII of the Constitution, the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec 15 of Art VII. Section 15 of Art VII provides for the prevention of appointments (1) made for buying votes and (2) made for partisan considerations (midnight appointments). The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The court said that the prevention of vote-buyings and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of the court vacancies or the disposition of some cases and that the vacancies in lower courts can be temporarily filled by designation to avoid prohibited appointments which are permanent in character that could be tainted with partisan politics. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally comes to exist only once in every six years. While the filing of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

FACTS: •

•

•

Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, who lost her bid for re-election as Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, made several appointments within the space of 27 days, from June 1 1995 to June 27, 1995, just three days before she bowed out of the service. The winning candidate, Conrado L. De Rama then wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission, seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees made by the former mayor on the grounds that it was done in violation of the Section 15 of Article VII of the Constitution. Sec 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive



positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety ISSUE: Whether or not the said appointments are covered by the Section 15 of Art VII HELD: The CSC held that the said provision only covers appointments made by Presidents and Acting Presidents. DISSENTING OPINION (Judge Mendoza) •

•

The rule binds all, including mayors, who are vested with the power of appointment, and it flows from the principle that a public office is a public trust. What the majority overlooks is that Art VII, Sec 15 is simply an application of broader principle that after the appointing authority has lost the elections, his is the duty of a prudent caretaker of the office, and, therefore, he should not fill positions in the government unless required by the imperatives of public service. Government vs. Springer Section 16 | Power of Appointment

Facts: No facts were given. Issue: Whether or not the power of appointment is executive. Held: Yes, the power of appointment is executive. Ratio: In Concepcion vs. Paredes, the court had a law which attempted to require a drawing of lots for judicial positions in derogation of executive power. After prolonged consideration, the questioned power of the law was held invalid as in violation of the provisions of the Organic Act. It was announced “Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion.” This is because appointment to office is an executive function. However, the legislature may create an office and prescribe the qualifications of the person who may hold office, but it cannot specify who shall be appointed to such office or to actually appoint him. The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the president, upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the

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limited exercise of power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office. The power to appoint includes the power to decide who among the various choices is the best qualified, provided that the person chosen has the qualifications provided by law. The president can even override the Civil Service Commission. However, the legislature has authority to impose additional duties on existing offices. Under the 1935 Constitution, while it was clearly the prerogative of the president to appoint members of the Supreme Court, Roxas vs. Lopez upheld the authority of the Congress to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Justices of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the act did not create a new office nor specify who should hold the office but merely imposed additional duties and powers upon the Supreme Court. When a statute does not specify how an officer is to be appointed, the appointment must be made by the President because Section 10 says that he “appoints all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.” Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary Section 16 | Power of Appointment Facts: Petitioner Bermudez together with his co-petitioners Llobrera and Dayaon who are both assistant provincial prosecutors of Tarlac filed a petition for prohibition or injunction and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO against respondent Quiaoit challenging the validity of the appointment of Quiaoit to the post of provincial prosecutor of Tarlac by Pres. Fidel Ramos on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. However, the RTC dismissed the petition. A reconsideration of the order was also denied. Hence, this case is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the order of the RTC. There is a vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Tarlac. Bermudez, the 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-incharge of the OPP was a recommendee of then Justice Teofisto Guingona Jr. for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. On the other hand, Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Jose Yap of the 2nd Legislative district of Tarlac.



On June 30, 1997, Quiaoit received a certified Xerox copy of his appointment and then he took his oath of office. He assumed office and immediately informed the President as well as the Secretary of Justice and Civil Service Commission of the assumption. Bermudez refused to vacate the OPP claiming that the original copy of Quiaoit’s appointment had not been released by the Secretary of Justice. However, Quiaoit performed the functions and duties of the OPP by issuing office orders and memoranda, signing resolutions on preliminary investigations and filing several information before the courts. He also had been regularly receiving salary, RATA and other emoluments of the office.

On Sept 17, 1997, Bermudez and Quiaoit were summoned to Manila by Justice Secretary Guingona. Bermudez was ordered to wind up his case until October 15, 1997 and to turn over the contested office to Quiaoit the next day. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides, “All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the president upon the recommendation of the secretary.” Petitioners contend that an appointment of a provincial prosecutor mandatorily requires a prior recommendation of the Secretary of Justice endorsing the intended appointment. They cited the case of San Juan which involved Executive Order No. 112. It provides that all budget officers of provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be appointed by the Minister of Budget of Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned. They claim that this provision can be likened to the provision of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal or mandatory to the appointment of respondent Quiaoit. Held: No, it is not mandatory. Petition is denied. Ratio:

The President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard the action of the department and bureaus even in the exercise of discretionary authority. It cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. The recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and appointment of the President are acts of the Executive Department itself wherein there is no sharing of power and it is being deemed for all intents and purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the president. Generally, if no consequential rights or liabilities depend on the statute and no injury can result from ignoring it and that the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished, then the statute should be regarded merely as directory rather than mandatory in character.

An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance by the appointee in order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. The power to appoint is discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely deciding for himself who is best qualified. It is a prerogative of the appointing power. When the constitution gives the president the power to appoint a subordinate officer, it must be understood as necessarily carrying with it as ample discretion of whom to appoint. The president has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. The president can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. In the case of San Juan, the court has explained that the president merely exercises general supervision over local government units and local officials. Hence, in the appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer, the Executive department through the Secretary of Budget and Management, had to share the power with the local government.

The phrase “upon recommendation of the secretary” found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 should be interpreted to be a mere advice which is persuasive in character and it is not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is nothing more than advisory in nature.

Flores v Drilon Section 16 | Power of Appointment FACTS: *Petitioners:

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ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES -taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines

*Par. (d) , Section 13, R.A. 7227: (d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis supplied). *Petitioners maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," 3 because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", ; 5 and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code ISSUE: Whether or not par (d), Section 13, of RA 7227 is unconstitutional HELD: Par (d), Section 13, of RA 7227 is unconstitutional. The appointment of respondent Gordon is invalid.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

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The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph

Violation of Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution • since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts • appointment: designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust; selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same • when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment • while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative Violation of Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code • the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections

RATIO: Violation of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution Provision: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Sarmiento v. Mison Section 16 | Power of Appointment FACTS:

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Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII • It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required • The President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs o Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34: ! The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines

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ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Mison is a violation of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution HELD: The President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. RATIO: • Four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2 Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3 Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. • The innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments • Power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character • The clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,

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! Quintos-Deles, et al. v. COA Section 16 | Power of Appointment Facts: On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter, the appointment of the said sectoral representatives to Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr. On April 18,1988 Speaker Mitra scheduled them to take their oaths. However members of the Congress then Members of the COA insisted that sectoral representatives must be confirmed by COA. Hence, the suspension of the oath. On April 25, 1988 Exec. Sec. transmitted letter to COA dated April 11 submitting to COA the President’s nomination in pursuant to ARTICLE VII, sec.16 and ARTICLE XVIII, sec. 7 of the Constitution. Petitioner was invited by the COA for deliberations but she rejected questioning the jurisdiction of the COA on appointments over sectoral representatives. Petitioner: contends that her appointment as Sectoral Representative for Women by the President pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the House of Representatives. SOL.GEN.: "In view of the President's submission of the four sectoral representatives, the petitioner included, to the Commission on



Appointments by letter dated April 11, 1988, then confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required." COA:

(1) the appointment of petitioner Deles was not acted upon by the Commission on Appointments when Congress went into recess as required by the Constitution; (2) the case of petitioner Deles for appointment as sectoral representative to the House of Representatives has become moot and academic not having been finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress pursuant to See. 23 of the Rules of the Commission Section 23. Suspension of Consideration of Nomination or Appointments to be Returned to the President.Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President, and unless resubmitted, shall not again be considered by the Commission.

Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 recognized that his appointing power re: the petitioner requires confirmation by COA when he invoked par. 2 of sec. 16 Art VII as authority. Petitioner further contends that E.O. 198, did not mention for the need of the confirmation of the COA. The court held that E.O. 198 confines itself to specifying sectors to be represented, their number and the nomination of such sectoral representatives. Ratio:

Note: Article VI, Section 5 (sectoral representatives) Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the appointment of sectoral representatives is vested upon the President until otherwise provided by law, as follows: SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution. Issue: Whether the constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Held: Yes. Petition was dismissed. The Court reiterated in Sarmiento v. Mison that Sec. 16 of Article VII par.1 covers sectoral representatives. SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this

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The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Calderon v. Carale Section 16 | Presidential Appointment FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715.



Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments, which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. Note: CRUZ dissent: “we should not persist in error on the ground merely of adherence to judicial precedent however unsound.

HELD: No. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. The Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, it is unconstitutional because:

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RATIO: With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required. "Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase "and other officers required by law" at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent of the Commission on Appointments" at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions. The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members of the Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution 1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. Matibag v. Benipayo Section 16 | Power of Appointment Facts: • Petitoner Angelina Matibag questions the constitutionality & legality (for the Cinco) of appointment and right to hold office of the ff: o Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC chairman o Resurreccion Borra & Florentino Tuazon, Jr. as COMELEC Commissioners o Velma Cinco as Director IV of COMELEC’s Education & Information department (EID) • For 3 years (1999-2001), Matibag was appointed by COMELEC as “Acting Director IV” of EID in a “Temporary” capacity • (March, 2001) Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each with a term of 7 years, expiring on 2008. o The 3, likewise, took their oaths of office and assumed their position o The president submitted said appointments to the CoA for Confirmation o However, the CoA DID NOT ACT on said appointments • (April, 2001) In his capacity as COMELEC chairman, Benipayo did the ff: o designated Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID, w/o consulting the incumbent OIC of the EID o reassigned herein petitioner Matibag from being the Director IV of EID to the Law Department • Matibag requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of EID, however, it was denied. • (June, 2001) The President renewed the ad interim appointments for the same position, appointees took again their oath and the OTP submitted their appointments to COA. o HOWEVER, Congress adjourned before the CoA could act on their appointments.

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(June, 2001) The President renewed again (3rd time) the ad interim appointments, passed it to the CoA and the 3 took their oaths (3rd time) During the pendency of Matibag’s complaint before the Law Department, she filed this instant petition. In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, the President renewed ONCE AGAIN the ad interim appointmets of Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners, which term shall expire on, still, February 2008. All took their oaths of office anew.

Issues: (1) WON the assumption of Office of BENIPAYO, BORRA & TUASON on the basis of ad interim appointments issued by the President amount to a temporary appointment (2) Assuming, 1st appointments and assumption to office are legal, WON the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption to office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment Held: (1) NO. SC rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, do not constitute temporary or acting appointment prohibited by Section 1(2), Article IX-C of Constitution. (2) No. The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of the appointment of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the CoA. Ratio Issue #1 Petitioner’s arguments • Ad interim appointments can be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can be disapproved or simply bypassed by the CoA • Ad interim appointee cannot assume office until his appointment is confirmed by CoA to guarantee independence of COMELEC because a confirmed appointee is beyond the influence of the President and members of CoA because his appointment can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Court says: • Ad interim appointment is permanent appointment because tot takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the president once the appointee has qualified into office and was made by permanent in character by the Constitution itself



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Constitution makes ad interim appointment terminated only for two causes: o Disapproval by the CoA; and o Adjournment of congress without the CoA acting on such appointments o NOTE: Disapproval by CoA is only by action, never by omission Therefore, the fear that President can revoke or withdraw at any time and for any reasons such appointment is utterly without basis

Petitioner’s argument • Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “ad interim” as “in the mean time” or “for the time being”, therefore such appointment is undoubtedly temporary in character Court says • Such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. • The term is not descriptive of the NATURE of appointment BUT the MANNER in which the appointment was made, which is during the Congress is not in session or in recess. • Ad interim means, under the legal meaning of Philippine Jurisprudence, a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that the Congress is in recess Issue # 2 Petitioner’s argument • Once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the CoA, his ad interim appointment, assuming that it is permanent, can no longer be renewed because it will violate Section 1(2), Article IX-C of Constitution which PROHIBITS REAPPOINTMENTS Court says: • Although an ad interim appointment DISAPPOVED by the CoA can no longer be extended a new appointment, a BY-PASSED ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval, as in this case. •

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Constitution prohibited reappointments for 2 reasons: o To prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they serve for less than 7 years. (Prohibition in reappointment of any kind) o To insure that the members of the 3 constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of 7 years. Reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment, in this case, there was none.

The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these 3 respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano Section 17 | Power of Control

Facts: • The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reversed a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. • Petitioners pray that a judgment be rendered declaring: 1. That the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources has full force 2. That the decision of the Executive Secretary if contrary to law and of no legal force and effect Issue: May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources? Held: Yes. Ratio: • Petitioner’s Argument: " The decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power. " The Constitution does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. " It is the Constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter. • Court’s Answer: " The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. " The Office of the Executive Secretary if an auxiliary unit which assists the President. ! The Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order. • Petitioner’s Argument: " The Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than anyone of them.



One department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department secretary. Court’s Answer: " Where the Executive Secretary acts “by authority of the President,” his decision is that of the President’s. " Unless the action taken is “disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed (Pozon v. Exec Sec; Villena v. Secretary of Interior; Ykalina v. Oricio). Ang-Angco v. Castillo Section 17 | Power of Control !

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• Facts: • The Executive Secretary, with the authority of the President, took direct action on the administrative case of petitioner without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service. • Petitioner’s Argument: o It would entirely nullify the beneficient purpose of the whole civil service system, which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the classified service ! This is in derogation of the constitutional provision that “no officer or employee in the civil service shall be remover or suspended except for cause as provided by law” (Section 4, Article XII, 1935 Constitution). Issue: WON the President, acting through the Executive Secretary or directly, may take disciplinary action against a Civil Service officer bypassing the procedure prescribed by the Civil Service Law. Held: No. Ratio:. • Power of Control - “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter” (Hebron v. Reyes; Mondano v. Silvosa) o The decision does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department. o The power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. • The President’s control over the executive department refers to matters of general policy.

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Policy – a settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, body, or individual. o It cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over a specific policy of government The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. o HOWEVER, the power of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service. Re: appointments vested on head of departments: o The constitutional authority in congress to vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed. o The head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to officers independently of legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is incident thereto. Namarco v Arca Section 17 | Power to Control o

Facts: • NAMARCO BOD dismissed Juan T. Arive from his position in NAMARCO. President reversed such decision and ordered his reinstatement. • Respondents’ contention: Under Sec. 10 Art. VII of the Constitution, “President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law and take care that laws may be faithfully executed” • Petitioners’ contention: " The word “offices”, interpreted in the light of the preceding words “executive departments” and “bureaus” refer to offices performing governmental functions which have no juridical personality and therefore does not include GOCCs. " Instead of Sec. 10 Art. VII of the Constitution, what should apply is Sec. 13 d of RA 1345 (NAMARCO Charter), which vests in the GM the power and/or duty with the approval of the BOD, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline for cause any subordinate employee of NAMARCO. " In reversing such order, president arrogated into himself a power not authorized by law and constitution, hence his actions were legally ineffective and cannot be subject for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 Issue: WON the president had authority to reverse such decision of the BOD of NAMARCO and order the reinstatement of Juan T. Arive

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Held: Yes, this is a constitutional power of the president. Ratio: • His authority to review and reverse the decision of the NAMARCO BOD of dismissing Juan T. Arive and order his reinstatement is within the constitutional power of the president over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. • Corporations owned and controlled by the government, such as NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices which are supervised by Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, who is a head of an Executive Department and is responsible to the President under whose control his functions shall be exercised. De Leon v Carpio Section 17 | Power to Control Facts: • This is a petition for mandamus involving the issue against Director of NBI, who refused to reinstate petitioners, Estavillo and De Leon, in defiance of the orders of the Civil Service Commission as referred by the Secretary of Justice. • Respondent’s contention: He questioned the authority of the Board, contending that it had no authority to review dismissals made under the Freedom Constitution and that the dismissals are already final, not having been seasonably appealed. (Solicitor General also commented on the various government reorganizations but did not touch on the matter at hand) Issue: WON Director of NBI can disobey and explicit and direct order issued to him by Secretary of Justice. Held: No he cannot. Director Carpio should have dutifully obeyed the order of Secretary Ordoñez, being his superior in the DOJ. Ratio: • Secretary Ordoñez was acting in the regular discharge of his function as an alter ego of the president. His acts should have been respected by the Director of NBI, which is under the DOJ under the direct control of is Secretary. As a subordinate, respondent was and is bound to obey Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President.

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It is an elementary principle of republican government, enshrined in the Constitution…that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the president. This was embodied in the Commonwealth Constitution, 1973 Constitution and retained in Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. President’s power is directly exercised by him over members of the Cabinet, who by his authority, control bureaus and offices under their jurisdictions in the executive department. This power is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation. Lacson-Magallanes v Paño, a statute which would make decision of department secretaries final and unappealable would not prevent president from reviewing and reversing such decision by virtue of his constitutional power of control over member of his Cabinet. President has full control over all members of his Cabinet and may appoint, shuffle or replace them at his pleasure, subject to confirmation by COA. Villena v Secretary of Interior, Justice Laurel said that personality of department heads is in reality but the projection of that of the president. Hence, their acts unless disapproved or reprobated by Chief Executive, is presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Noblejas v Salas, Secretary of Justice approved recommendation of fiscal who recommended that no criminal action be taken against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence and that he acted in good faith. Subsequently, new fiscal who took over disregarded these acts and included said petitioner in the case. Court set aside the resolution of the trial court and held that fiscal was bound to obey the order of the Secretary of Justice, who was exercising over him the president’s constitutional power of control. Note: What petitioners would have done is to complain to the Secretary first, and thus informed, Secretary would reiterate his orders to respondent. Although, doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not strictly required in the case as this was a pure question of law, they could have easily obtained the relief they are seeking from the court if they did the usual procedure. Blaquera, et al. Alcasid Section 17 | Power of Control

Facts: President Estrada issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining govt agency heads from granting incentive benefits without prior approval and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount. Issue: WON AO is a valid exercise of power of control of the President.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 President can interfere in LGU affairs if the latter acted in contrary to law. LBC 55 went beyond the law it seeks to implement as it violates Sec 458 par (a) (1) (ix) of RA 7160. Said provision does not set maximum limit to addtl allowances of judges. LBC 55 is void on account of lack of publication. Its purpose is to enforce/implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation; thus, must be published.

Held: Yes, the President was just exercising his power of control over executive departments. Ratio: Sec 17, Art VII of 1987 Constitution: President shall have control of all the exec dept, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that laws be faithfully executed. “Control” means power of an officer to alter, modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in performance of his duties and substitute his actions to the judgment of the latter. He can exercise such power without need of any appeal from any party.

(2) Whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Mandaue City that provides for addtl allowance to judges contravenes annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress COA argues that provisions in the ordinance providing for the disbursement are against the law (RA 7896; Gen Appropriations Act of 1995; RA 7663 Gen Appropriations Act of 1994) which specifically identified objects of expenditure of the IRA.

Dadole, et al v. COA Section 17 | Power of Control Petitioners: Mandaue City RTC and MTC judges Respondent: Commission on Audit

Court ruled: Respondent failed to prove that Mandaue used the IRA to spend for addtl allowances of judges.

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 to annul COA decision and resolution Facts: COA affirmed that notices of Mandaue City Administrator which diminished the monthly allowances received by petitioners. Issues: (1) Whether LBC 55 of DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for not having been published Court held: LBC 55 is null and void. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy of LGUs, exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and power of supervision of the President. Sec 4, Art X of 1987 Consti - power of supervision of the President excludes the power of control. Supervision: overseeing the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties Control: power to alter, modify or nullify performance of duties and substitute judgment of the former to latter

Held: Rule in favor of judges. Decision and resolution of COA are set aside.

DENR v. DENR Employees Section 17 | Power of Control Facts: No facts. Issues: • Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid. • Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Held: Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department. Ratio:

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Doctrine of Qualified political agency – “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, Court upheld the continuing authority of the President to carry out the reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department. Such authority includes the creation, altercation, or abolition of public offices.

Chief Executive’s authority to reorganize the National Government finds basis in Book III, Sec20 of EO 292/ Administrative Code of 1987; Sec20.Residual powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. In Larin v. Executive Secretary, court ruled; That under PD 1772, The continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. IBP v. Zamora Section 18 | Martial Law Facts: • In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and Carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. • This is special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a TRO seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Estrada.

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The IBP questions the validity of the order as it asserts itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the constitution.

Issues: • The deployment of the Marines in Metro Manila is violative of the constitution, in that: o No emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify, even remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment is in derogation of ArtII, sec3 of the Constitution. o Said deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government (Law enforcement) in derogation of ArtXVI, Sec5(4), of the Constitution; o Said deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform the civilian functions of the government. Held: Petition has no merit. (1) Petitioner failed to show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. (2) The president did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution. Ratio: (1) One of the requisites before the court can exercise its power of judicial review when questions of constitutional significance are raised is (2nd requisite ) Legal standing. It has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. • IBP anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the constitution; this is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry o But the court will take cognizance of the case because of the current threats in peace and order and in view of the seriousness, novelty and weight of the constitutional issues. (2) The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines. • IBP questions the basis for calling the Marines under Sec18, Art7. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for calling of the military to assist the police force. • When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a



discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. But said power should be exercised within permissible constitutional limits and without Grave Abuse Of Discretion. Hence, absent a showing of GAOD, the Court shall not interfere with the president’s judgment. o Clear textual commitment under Sec18, Art7 of the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. ! Under said provision, the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus to impose martial law needs 2 conditions: (1) An actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. ! The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” this implication is that the president is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. • This can also be ascertained in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commision.

(3) The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force. • IBP assert that by the deployment, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec3, ArtII of the Constitution. • Court disagrees. The real authority in the operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. It is also worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine Jurisdiction.

Lacson v. Perez Sec. 18 | Commander-in-Chief

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Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 (declaration of a “state of rebellion” in NCR) following the attempt of an armed mob to break into Malacanang in May 1, 2001. Arroyo also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion, consequently effecting warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion. The declaration was lifted on May 6, 2001. Petitioners assail the declaration, arguing that: 1. The proclamation was used to justify warrantless arrests. 2. Lumbao (People’s Movement against Poverty leader): a. The proclamation is an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to “determine or interpret” what took place on May 1. b. The declaration cannot be an exception to the rule of separation of powers. Defense 1. No particular order was issued to arrest specific persons 2. The Justice Department & police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants and conduct preliminary investigation.

ISSUE: WON the declaration of a state of rebellion and the warrantless arrests by virtue thereof have no basis in fact and in law

HELD: Petitions dismissed.

RATIO:

Moot & academic: The lifting of the declaration rendered the petitions moot & academic.

Lawful warrantless arrest: The warrantless arrest is not based on the declaration of a “state of rebellion” but is provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

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Art VII Sec 18: expressly provides that the President is the Commander-inChief of all armed forces and may call out such forces to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

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Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon Zamora: The President has a vast intelligence network to gather information (some highly confidential or affecting national security) to establish factual necessity, compared with the judiciary, which also lacks textual standards to arrive at such judgment. Thus, the President is empowered to make on-the-spot decisions imperatively necessary in emergency situations. ***FOR YOUR REFERENCE LANG POWS YOU GUYS SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112, (5a)

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

corruption in the AFP, demanded the resignation of Arroyo, the Defense Secretary, and the PNP Chief. The Oakwood occupation ended the same evening after long negotiations, however the declaration was not lifted until 5 days after. Several petitions were filed challenging the validity of the declaration, however, the Solicitor General claimed that petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.

ISSUE: WON the proclamation and the general order are valid

HELD: Petitions dismissed.

RATIO: “Capable of repetition yet evading review”: Notwithstanding the mootness of the case, the court still decided this legal issue to lay to rest the reemerging questions on the validity of the declaration of a “state of rebellion” in the exercise of the President’s calling out power. IBP v. Zamora: Among the graduated powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the criterion for the most benign, the calling out power, is ‘whenever it becomes necessary.’ The power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and power to declare martial law, both require (1) an actual invasion or rebellion and (2) that public safety requires the exercise of such power.

Sec. 18 | Commander-in-Chief Sec. 18 Art VII: does not prohibit the president from declaring a state of declaration. FACTS: •

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Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 (declaring a “state of rebellion” and calling out the armed forces to suppress the rebellion), in response to the Oakwood Mutiny, where some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, deploring

Declaration as an utter superfluity, devoid of any legal significance: At most it gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. It may not diminish nor violate constitutionally protected rights.



Lawful warrantless arrest: The warrantless arrest is not based on the declaration of a “state of rebellion” but is provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Warrantless arrests may be done with or without the presidential declaration of a “state of rebellion”.

The declaration of a state of rebellion is neither a declaration of martial law nor an indirect exercise of emergency powers: There was no indication that the president attempted to exercise or exercised martial law powers, or emergency powers which need to be granted by the Congress. Petitioners failed to support their assertion that the President acted without factual basis and did not cite a specific instance wherein the President acted beyond her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. The power to declare a state of rebellion and the calling out power is a wedding of her powers, first and foremost, as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief.

Rizal and this conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court.

On September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. On October 1986, the Minister of Justice issued an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. He was arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Petitioner questions the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his constitutional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa and the crime of sedition. He also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison. And thus, he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause.

Issue: Torres vs. Gonzalez Section 19 | Pardon

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and to serve the balance of his original sentence.

Facts: Held: On April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on condition that the petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phils.” If this condition would be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was released from prison. On May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. The evidence showed that on March and June 1982, petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa which were still peding trial in the RTC of Rizal. He was convicted of the crime of sedition by the RTC of

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No, it is not necessary. Petition is dismissed.

Ratio: There are 3 similar cases in which this court based its decision:

In Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons



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the court held that by accepting the terms under which the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that the Governor-general’s determination that he had breached the conditions of his parole by committing adultery, was binding and conclusive upon him. the court also relied upon Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code which partly provides: “the Governor-general is empowered to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of his pardon, parole or suspension of sentence.”

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Sales claimed that Article 159 of the RPC repealed Section 64(i). And that Section 64(i) was repugnant to the due process clause “Since Article 159 of the RPC defines a distinct felony, the parolee who is regarded as having violated the provisions must be charged and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.” the court held that Article 159 did not repeal Section 64(i). Article 159 preserved the authority of the president by Section 64(i). the court also held that Section 64(i) was not repugnant to the due process clause. Since the petitioner was a convict who had already been seized in a constitutional way and had been convicted of a crime and sentenced to punishment, then he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense

In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol • •

the court reaffirmed Section 64(i) of the RPC it held that due process is not necessarily judicial. The appellee had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial. The acceptance of the conditional pardon by the convict carried with it the authority of the Executive to determine whether conditions of the pardon have been violated

To sum up these rulings:

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2) The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach may either be: a. A purely executive act and to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) b. A judicial act consisting of atrial and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the RPC

In Sales vs. Director of Prisons •

1) The grant of pardon and determination of the conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

If president opts to proceed under Section 64(i), no judicial pronouncement of guilt and conviction by final judgment is necessary before a convict can be recommitted. In the case at hand, the President has chosen to proceed against petitioner under Section 64(i). That choice is an exercise of a President’s executive prerogative and not subject to judicial scrutiny.

3) Because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been afforded due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64(i) is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

Dissenting opinion of Cruz, J:

I would grant the petition. No matter how many charges there may be, the point is that none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction, without which he cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pardon. Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. A person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is not done by the accuser but by the judge. The executive can only allege the commission



of a crime and try to prove it through evidence. If prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the allegation in a judgment of conviction. Section 64(i) holds that the President may in his judgment determine whether the conditions of the pardon has been violated. This authority is valid only if the condition does not involve commission of a crime. But if it allows the president to determine whether or not a crime has been committed, this would be an encroachment on judicial functions.

In Re: Torres vs. Director of Bureau of Prison Section 19 | Executive Clemency

On October 1986, the Minister of Justice issued an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. He was arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.

The court ruled that the president may proceed against him under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code wherein conviction by final judgment is not necessary. This choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. Petitioner was recommitted back to prison.

In the case at hand, the wife and children of Torres petitioned for habeas corpus. They pray for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President’s prerogative under Section 64(i) to determine the occurrence of a breach of the conditions of a pardon, is in violation of the pardonee’s right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence. And it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts: Issue: (From previous case: Torres vs. Gonzalez) On April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on condition that the petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phils.” If this condition would be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was released from prison. On May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. The evidence showed that on March and June 1982, petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa which were still peding trial in the RTC of Rizal. He was convicted of the crime of sedition by the RTC of Rizal and this conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.

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Whether or not the exercise of the president’s prerogative to determine whether there has been a breach in the conditions of a pardon is unconstitutional and that it amounts to grave abuse of discretion.

Held: No, it is not unconstitutional. The petition for habeas corpus is dismissed.

Ratio: A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Eexcutive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if



he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms of the pardon. The pardonee cannot invoke the aid of the courts. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

A final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia has the right claim for payment of back wages, after he was reinstated to the service pursuant to an executive clemency

HELD: Petitioner is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency therefore he is entitled to back wages. Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages

RATIO: •

Garcia v. Commission on Audit • Section 19 | Executive Clemency

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FACTS: Petitioner Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. He was summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case No 975 for the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not appeal on the decision. On January 23 1980, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged. Petitioner sought to be reinstated to his former position but it was denied. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency and was granted in Resolution No. O. P. 1800.

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Monsanto v. Factoran: The very essence of pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages. However, while it is a rule that an administrative case is separate and distinct from a criminal case and an acquittal in the latter case foes not ipso facto result in the exoneration in the former case, yet an exception could arise if the basis for the acquittal was the innocence of the accused as in the case of petitioner Garcia The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind that grant of executive clemency to him. o Bestowal of executive clemency obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service o Executive clemency exculpated petitioner from administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of pardon. ! No need to apply for reinstatement Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages



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Serves as relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service Right to back wages is afforded to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them

HELD:

President did not act arbitrarily or with abuse granting executive clemency to respondent governor and that the same is not unconstitutional. The court denies the rest of the prayers in the petition for being unmeritorious, moot and academic.

Llamas v. Orbos Section 19 | Executive Clemency

RATIO: Petitioner claims that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases

FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac. He assumed governorship by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President. Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days because he was found guilty of serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority for entering into a loan contract with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation Inc. (LTFI) grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Province. This complaint was filed by petitioner. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of filing of this petition and is being impleaded having issued the assailed resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor. Orbos issued a resolution in O.P. Case No. 4480 granting executive clemency to Ocampo reducing his 90-day suspension to the period already served. By virtue of the resolution, respondent governor reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to the petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: 1. 2.

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Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinquire debemos: if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish o The constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases • President can grant reprieves and pardons in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. • When court says the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, the court refers only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government Petitioner claim on lack of jurisdiction President and public respondent •

Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases Whether or not the questioned act was characterized by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend and remove provincial or city officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and Local Government (Secs. 61 and 65, BP Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President (Sec. 66) under his “supervision and control” power. o Control: power to substitute one’s own judgment for that of a subordinate o Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency: the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President; their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her Petitioner’s argument that private respondent’s motion for reconsideration has abated the running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment therefore the pardon granted was premature and of no effect •



Upon acceptance of a presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed • Monsanto v. Factoran: Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to this appeal Petitioner’s argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated •

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Unmeritorious Pardon: the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court Notice of executive clemency is unnecessary o Petitioner’s claim that respondent governor has not begun serve sentence id belied by his very own factual allegations in his petition, more particularly that he served as Acting Governor of Tarlac effective from the date he took his Oath of Office on February 28, 1991 up to the time respondent governor reassumed the governorship of Tarlac on May 21, 1991. ! It is error to say that private respondent did not serve any portion of the 90-day suspension meted upon him

It appears that sometime in 1973, the private respondents were charged with double murder before Military Commission No. 34. On July 27, 1973, the military promulgated a decision acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard labor.

Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to serve sentence until he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest under guard. In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez directed State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against the private respondents for the above murders. The private respondents moved for dismissal, in Ganzon's case, on the ground that he:

Ganzon, had been extended an absolute pardon by the President Ferdinand Marcos, and he, having been previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in Paredes' case, on the ground that he, Paredes, had been acquitted. Trampe, however, denied both requests and reconsideration having been likewise denied, the private respondents went to the Court of Appeals on prohibition.

Separate Concurring Opinion: Cruz, J. •

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The correct approach is to uphold the resolution solely on the strength of the President’s power of “control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices” under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution President had the authority to do this and she could exercise is through the Executive Secretary o His act, not having been reprobated or disauthorized by her, is presumed to be the act of the President herself

The Court of Appeals GRANTED the petition of the Ganzon and paredes. Petitioners alleged that CA committed a grave abuse of discretion:

(1) Rodolfo presidential pardon;

Ganzon

has

not

adequately

proved

the

fact

of

(2) there exists no evidence in the files of the Govemment to prove DRILON v. Court of Appeals Section 19 | Pardon

Facts:

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pardon; (3) Ganzon's copy is a bare machine copy and Ganzon has failed to adequately establish the loss of the original; (4) the alleged pardon (or copy of it) had not been properly sealed and authenticated, or executed in official Malacañang stationery; and



(5) the disposition of the murder cases by the military does not preclude the filing of new information by the civilian government.

Issue:

1973 Constitution: the “pardoning power” of the President is final and unappealable so is the commutation of the sentence, in which the Chief Executive reduces a sentence. It extinguishes criminal liability partially, and has the effect of changing the penalty to a lesser one.

Whether or not Ganzon could be reinvestigated for the same offense despite the pardon granted to him by Pres. Marcos.

People v. Salle Jr. Section 19 | Limits on Executive Clemency

Held: No.The Court held that irrespective of the “pardon” Ganzon has served his sentence and to reiterate, he can no longer be reinvestigated for the same offense, much more undergo further imprisonment to complete his service. The Court also need not consider w/n Ganzon had been pardoned, and whatever “pardon” the President may have extended to him did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, he was a free man. Ganzon is scotfree.

Ratio: As to alleged grant of pardon: as can be seen on the evidence the Court finds that Mayor Ganzon was extended absolute pardon by Pres. Marcos. As attested by Venus (deputy Pres.EA) that the President signed the said pardon, and it was also attested by Tuvera (assistant of Venus). The Court finds that they are trustworthy and their testimony be deserving of full faith and credit.

Facts/HELD: CASE is more on the INFORMATIVE side.. konti lang facts… as in e2 lang!

On the instant case. Appellant Ricky Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal up to this date the conditional pardon extended to him should not have been enforced. Nonetheless, this rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency of the grantee's appeal. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of noncompliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation. ISSUE:

Dilemma: Military has not explained why Mayor Ganzon has been enjoying unrestrained freedom since January 1986 and the records also show that he had served time until 1978. In 1987 he was placed under “house arrest” (conditional pardon) by Marcos and claims that he was pardoned in 1986. The Court held that the President commuted (give or take a few days) ganzon’s sentence, he has therefore served his sentence fully and if he did serve his sentence in full he can no longer be reinvestigated.

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The enforceability of a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court. RATIO: • Review of the Philippine Laws* Jones Law Section 21 thereof provided in part as follows: Sec. 21. That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer, whose official title shall be "The Governor-General of



the Philippine Islands.". . . He is hereby vested with the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures. . . . 1935 Constitution. Paragraph 6, Section 10, Article VII thereof provided as follows: (6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the Congress. After conviction operated as one of the limitations on pardoning power (1) power exercised after conviction (2) such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. 1973 Constitution provides that pardon could be granted only after final conviction. Section 14 of Article IX thereof reads as follows: The Prime Minister may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, after final conviction, and, with the concurrence of the National Assembly, grant amnesty. (emphasis supplied) *The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution, however, removed the limitation of final conviction, bringing back the provision of the Jones Law. Section 11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.

(a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected

(b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.

Jurisprudence: (merely an obiter dictum) 1. 2.

REASON behind the prohibition: To prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power. A becoming regard for the DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS demands that such exclusive authority of the appellant court be fully respected and kept unimpaired.

•

In the implementation of Section 19, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.

•

Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be.

•

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.

1987 Constitution restored the original limitation in the 1973 Constitution. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. XXX Note: if ‘conviction’ power of pardon could be exercised after conviction and even if there is an appeal; whereas if ‘final conviction’ no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. When does a judgment of conviction becomes final?

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People v. Crisola: pardon granted under 1973 Constitution Monsato v. Factoran : pardon granted under the 1981 amendments



Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

Section 19 | Limits on Executive Clemency

Facts: Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be executed by lethal injection (RA 8177) The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order restraining the execution of said party. Said execution was set for Jan. 4, 1999 but the petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on Dec. 28, 1998. The Court was in recess at the time but a Special Session was called to deliberate on said matters. Furthermore, Congress was a new one with about 130new members whose views on capital punishment were still unexpressed. The suspension was temporary (until June 15, 1999,unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made). It was alleged that sine it is already final and executory, the Supreme Court has lost its jurisdiction with the case.

Held:

(1) NO. It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. What the SC could not do is alter the decision. In the case at hand, the SC did nothing of the sort. Jurisprudence tells us “the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment Still, in line with questioning the Court’s jurisdiction, in the Motion by the Respondent seeking for the date of execution to be revealed by the Court: * in relation to Sec. 19 Art.VII:

Issue:

The date of the execution of Echegaray was kept unknown to the public, in line with this the Secretary of Justice in his motion, which reads: (1) Whether or not in issuing the temporary restraining order, the Supreme Court has gone beyond its jurisdiction since the case is already final and executory.

(2) Whether or not the decision of the case has been final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit authority of the executive department.

(3) Whether or not there is a basis for the Court to suspend the execution of the respondent (issue TRO on execution) on the ground that the death penalty law might be repealed in the future by Congress.

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On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied)

* right to information of the public and right to due process of Echegaray



The Jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of the litigants. it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

(2) No. The Court did not usurp on the power of the Executive. Respondent cited Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, which reads: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The court held that the provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused that has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.

(3) No. The respondent’s claim was unfounded.

Respondent: invoked several grounds: (a.) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b.) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment;

Court: The Court’s majority did not rush for life was at stake. The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. Even the public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will

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repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows: a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes. b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. Ratio:

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The Court in postponing the execution of the judgment It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also



granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.

ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.

But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

Issue: WON the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Phil. Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness.

! Pimentel v. Ermita Section 21 |Foreign Relations Power

Ratio:

Facts: •

•

•

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Held: No. Court held in the Negative. AND it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to compel the executive branch of the gov’t to submit the signed text of the Rome Statute to the senate.

The Philippines signed the Rome Statute on December 28, 2000 through the Charge d’ Affairs of the Philippine Mission to United Nations o Said statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.. and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” o Its provision, however, require that it be subject to ratification , acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents – Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs – to transmit the signed text of the Treaty to the Senate for ratification. Petitioners’ theory: ratification of a treaty is function of the Senate. o Hence, it is the duty of the executive dep’t to transmit the signed copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow the latter to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties o That the Phil. has ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under international law. ! Petitioners invoke Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to

•

•

• •

In our system of government, the President is the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. She has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties. HOWEVER, Constitution provides a limitation requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by her. The participation of the Senate in the treaty-making process is to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations The power to ratify is vested in the PRESIDENT, subject only to the concurrence of the Senate. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to a Senate or, having secured its content for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. It is within her official duties.

Petitioners equate the signing of the treaty by the Phil. representative with ratification •

Court explains that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process as discussed in the book of Justice Isagani Cruz on International Law o Signature is intended as means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of good faith of the parties. Usually performed by state’s authorized representative.



Ratification is a formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty. Signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It must still be ratified. o

•

E.O 459 issued by Pres. Ramos provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Treaty signed by a Phil. Representative The same shall be transmitted to the DFA DFA shall then prepare ratification papers Forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President President ratifies DFA shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence DFA comply with the provisions of a treaty to render it effective.

Beginning of 2002, personnel from Armed Forces of US started arriving in Mindanao to take part in conjunction with the Philippine Military in “BALIKATAN 02-1” o Balikatan exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers • The entry of American troops is proximately rooted into the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by Pres. Bush in reaction to the tragic event that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001. • When Senate conducted a hearing on Balikatan (2002) VP Guingona, who is currently the Secretary of Foreign Affairs presented the Draft of Terms of Reference, which he approved five days later. Petitioners’ arguments: •

1.

Lim v. Executive Secretary Section 21

The Phil and US signed MDT to provide mutual military assistance in the case of an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country against one of them. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf bandits in Basilan constitute an external armed force that has subject the Philippines to an armed external attack to warrant US military assistance under the MDT of 1951

2.

Neither does the VFA of 1999 authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory, not even to fire back “if fired upon” Solicitor General assails: Petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the socalled “Balikatan 02-1” and issuing prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

1. 2. 3.

Petitioners’ legal standing to file suit Prematurity of the action Impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact

Issues: Facts •

•

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Prior to this case, the Philippines and US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty / MDT (1951) a bilateral defense agreement to provide mutual assistance in the case of an armed attack by an external aggressor. (1999) Phil and US, likewise, entered into the Visiting Forces Agreement / VFA

(1) WON Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement (2) May American troops actually engage in combat in Philippine Territory? (3) Are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise?

Held:



(1) Yes. “Balikatan 02-1” is covered by the VFA (2) No. Neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in offensive war on Philippine territory. (3) This is a question of fact and the SC is not a trier of facts!

Issue #3 •

Ratio:

•

Issue #1 • • •

• •

The Terms of Reference of the Balikatan rightly fall within the context of the VFA VFA permits US Personnel to engage in “activities” w/in the Philippines o The term “activities” was viewed by the Court as deliberately made to give US and Phil leeway in negotiation. In this manner, US forces may sojourn in the Philippine territory for purposes other than military. VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that “Balikatan 02-1” a mutual antiterrorism advising, assisting and training exercise” falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the MDT and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities such as the one subject in the instant petition are indeed authorized.

•

Bayan v. Executive Secretary Section 21

Facts: •

Issue #2 •

•

•

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The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section1 stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat “except in self-defense”. We wryly note that this sentiment is admirable in the abstract but difficult in implementation (since nature of Abu Sayyaf…). Abu Sayyaf cannot reasonably expected to sit idly while the battle is brought at their very doorstep. o This indirect violation is the petitioners’ worry, that in reality, “Balikatan 02-1” is actually a war principally conducted by the US gov’t and that the provision on selfdefense served only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. In the Court’ opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in offensive war on Philippine territory.

As a rule, the Court do not take cognizance of newspaper, or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence Court find that the holding of the Balikatan joint military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for correction on our part. Respondents have not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petition dismissed.

•

•

March 14, 1947: The Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. August 30, 1951: The two countries entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty to further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.

The Philippines and the United States negotiated in 1991 for a possible extension of the military bases agreement with the pending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. o

o

However, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed agreement that would have extended the presence of the US military bases in the Philippines. Nonetheless, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents’ Argument: • •

•

July 18, 1997: The United states panel met with the Philippine panel to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the United states and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” After a series of conferences and negotiations, President Fidel Ramos approved the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which was signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary and US Ambassador on February 10, 1998.

•

October 5, 1998: President Joseph Estrada, through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.

•

The President, through Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the letter of the President and the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

•

•

Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of US personnel engaged in joint military exercises. Court’s Ruling: The VFA is governed by Section 25, Article XVIII. The Constitution makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent” agreements.

The 1987 Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII Deals with treaties or international agreements in general • Lays down the general rule

Section 25, Article XVIII • Applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. • A special provision The concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty/agreement valid and binding.

• •

The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations and its Committee on National Defense and Security for their joint consideration and recommendation.

•

May 3, 1999: The Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation.

•

May 27, 1999: Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.

•

On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

• •

The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. Thus, Section 25 should be applied. A special provision or law prevails over a general one.

Respondents’ Argument: Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Court’s Answer: •

Issue 1: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

•

Petitioners’ argument:

!

•

The clause “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” does not refer to “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The provision contemplates three different situations – a military treaty the subject of which could be either:


1. 2. 3.

Foreign bases Foreign troops Foreign facilities

CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 o

Issue 2: Whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are met: 1. 2. 3.

• •

It must be under a treaty The treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum Recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state

The first two requisites were met. As to the third requisite: Petitioners’ Argument: The phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the VFA should have the advice and consent of the US Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process and should not be considered merely an executive agreement. Respondent’s Argument: •

The letter of the US Ambassador stating that the VFA is binding on the US is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the US. Court’s Ruling: •

•

•

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The phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is compliance with the constitutional mandate. o Under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

Held: Absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents, the Court has no power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in nature. --------------------------Dissenting (Puno):

In the US, executive agreements may be classified into three types: 1. 2. 3.

Treaty-authorized executive agreements Congressional-executive agreements Presidential or sole executive agreements

The VFA does not fall under the first and second types. At best, the VFA would be more akin to a sole or presidential executive agreement which would be valid if concluded on the basis of the US President’s power under the US Constitution.

The distinction between the legal force of treaties and executive agreements may be treated on three levels: 1. 2. 3.

• • •

State law Acts of Congress and treaties The US Constitution

The Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution provides the constitutional basis for the superiority of a treaty over state law. Sole executive agreements are supreme over state law and policy. While treaties and sole executive agreements have the same legal effect on state law, sole executive agreements pale in comparison to treaties when pitted against prior inconsistent acts of Congress.



Unlike treaties, sole executive agreements cannot prevail over prior inconsistent federal legislation. • The Court will be standing on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty. There is still a cloud of uncertainty hanging on the exact legal force of sole executive agreements under US constitutional law. • The VFA, as a sole executive agreement cannot climb to the same lofty height that the dignity of a treaty can reach. ----------------------------o

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

Held: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

Note: Treaty – an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.

Ratio:

1.

Ratification – an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, through which the formal acceptance of a treaty is proclaimed.

P.D. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extradite shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court. Section 6. Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order…

Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion

"

Section 21

"

Facts: •

On January 18, 2000, the Court dismissed the petition at bar and orders the petitioner to: 1. furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers 2. grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence

2.

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The summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. 1069 which gives the extradite the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. o A court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice.

All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 • Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.” Preambular Paragraphs of P.D. 1069: …the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped… "

"

Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. The RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of extradites from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. o The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. o Private respondent’s demand for advance notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its accompanying papers.

Santiago v Bautista Section 1, Art VIII | Judicial Power Facts: Apellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade 6. As school year 1964-65 was about to end, the “Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor” was constituted for the purpose of selecting honor students. Socorro Medina, Patricia Lingat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. were selected to be the first, second and third honor awardees, respectively Before graduation, Santiago, represented by his mother, (with his father as council), contested the rankings and instituted the civil case at hand. Petitioners alleged, among others, that: • Patricia Lingat has never been a close rival of Santiago, except in Grade 5

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•

Medina received summer tutorials from a teacher who consequently became their English teacher, thus unjustly benefiting Medina Committee was illegally constituted since the said it was composed of all grade 6 teachers in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools, which provides that the committee must be composed of Grade 5 and 6 teachers.

Petitioners prayed for mental and moral damages, to set aside such list of honor students, and to enjoin respondents from formally publishing and proclaiming such list. Petition was denied by the lower court and the graduation continued as scheduled. Appellant assails the decision of the lower court stating that his petition states no cause of action. Issue: Whether or not the Committee exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Held: No, the committee exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions. Ratio: • Before a tribunal, board o officer, may exercise judicial or quasijudicial acts, there must be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made. • No rule or law on record that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are automatically vested with judicial or quasi-judicial functions. What’s worse is that appellant failed to appraise the court regarding pertinent provisions of the Service Manual. • Felipe v Leuterio, et al: Issue was whether or not courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. Court held that judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of that contest. This is so for it is unwritten law that board’s decision is final and unappealable. No rights may be asserted by contestants because theirs is merely a privilege to compete and such privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless they are proclaimed as winners. • Error v Wrong: Judge reasoned that Imperial suffered some wrong in the hands of the judges. There is no wrong but an error. Wrong is the deprivation of or violation of a right. Marcos v. Manglapus Section 1, Art VIII | Judicial Power



Facts: Solicitor General proposes that the case (the barring of Aquino of Marcoses’ return from Hawaii) is a political question which is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. Court disagrees as the Constitution limits the invocation of the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry. Issue: Whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses. Held: Yes, there were factual bases for barring the return of the Marcoses. The President did not arbitrarily act and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Ratio: • Extent of Review: Judicial Power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1) • The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry. But there remain issues which are beyond the court’s jurisdiction. For example: o President’s recognition of foreign government, presidential pardon o Amending the constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute, such power is reserved to the people • Framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but did not intend for the courts to settle all actual controversies. • When political questions are involved, the Court only decides if there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose actions are being questioned. If there is no grave abuse, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned • Lansang v Garcia: Executive’s power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Under the principle of separation of powers, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere, but this is not absolute. Executive is supreme if and when he acts within the sphere allocated to him by the Basic Law. The authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the judiciary. • System of Checks and Balances - the Court will merely check, not supplant, the Executive, to ascertain whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power of the Executive or determine the wisdom of the act. Echagaray v. The Secretary of Justice Section 1, Art VIII, Judicial Power

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Facts: This is an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order restraining petitioner’s execution. Public respondents: a.) issuance of TRO trenches the sphere of executive authority b.) TRO creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because of the claim that Congress may repeal a law

Petitioner: a.) TRO is within the scope of judicial power; it does not trench executive or legislative powers; b.) Court’s exercise of power to stay execution was reasonable; c.) Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental powers involved; d.) public respondents are estopped from challenging Courts jurisdiction; e.) there is no certainty that law on capital punishment will not be repealed Issue: Whether or not the court has lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and cannot restrain the execution of petitioner Held: No. Power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Ratio: Finality of judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case; but rather loses jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Jurisdiction of the court to execute judgment continues even after judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same terminates when judgment becomes final Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance: “in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for the reopening has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment as its jurisdiction has terminated” Postponement of date can be requested. Under common law, postponement can be: a.) command of King; b.) court discretion; c.) mandate of law Under discretion of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of execution has been fixed and notwithstanding the general rule that after the court has performed its ministerial duty of ordering execution… and its part is ended, if a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, then there is an imperative duty



to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement

Note: Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or a tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, law or existing jurisprudence. United States v. Nixon Section 1 | Judicial Power Facts: This is a review of the denial of the motion to quash third party subpoena duces tecum issued by US District Court pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim Procedure 17 (c ). Subpoena is directed to US Pres to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with his aides and advisers. District court rejected US President’s claims of executive privilege, lack of jurisdiction and failure to satisfy requirements of Rule 17( c). Hence this appeal. President’s counsel: a.) Constitution provides an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all presidential communications; b.) there is a valid need for protection of communications between high government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; c.) claim of absolute privilege rests on doctrine of separation of powers

interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”

Legitimate needs of judicial process may outweigh presidential privilege. President and his aides must be free to explore alternatives in shaping policies and making decisions; however, such privilege must be considered in light of commitment under the rule of law. There is a need to employ adversary system of criminal justice in which parties contest all issues before a court of law. Thus, when the ground for executive privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice. The generalized assertion must yield to demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. Infotech Foundation, et al. v Comelec Section 1, Art VIII | Judicial Power Facts: For the automation of the counting and canvassing for the 2004 elections, Comelec Awarded the contract to “Mega Pacfic Consortium, an entity that had not participated in the bidding.

Issue: WON District court erred in authorizing the issuance of subpoena. Held: No, Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the District court. Ratio: In Marbury v. Madison, it has been held that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Claim of absolute privilege Court: There is no absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process absent any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the judicial branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of courts under Art III. Framers of Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system but separation of powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence. “While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but

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Comelec awarded undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections. Issue: Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the Mega Pacific E-solution incorporated the contract for automation of the counting and canvassing for 2004 elections. Held: The Commissions on Elections approved the assailed Resolution and awarded the subject contract not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure. Ratio: There is grave abuse of discretion; 1. When an act is done contrary to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or 2. When it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 NOTE: Moot Cases. One that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. However, courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: • First if there is a grave violation of the constitution. • Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved. • Third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; • Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Malaga v. Penachos, Jr. Section 2, Art. VIII | Creation of Courts Facts: What is involved in the present controversy is the noncompliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required stict observance. The purpose of the rules implementing PD 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. Issue: The extent and applicability of PD 1818, which prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government. Held: The purpose of PD 1594 was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC. Ratio: In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, this court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in PD 605, the law after PD 1818 was patterned. The court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla, made it clear the on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by PD 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. RADIOWEALTH, INC. v. AGREGADO Section 3 | Fiscal Autonomy

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FACTS: • Clerk of the SC certified the purchase and installation of a Webster Tetetalk, Model 206 MA, and Webster Telephone speakers, totaling P585 • Dacanay, Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee disapproved the purchase and installation, for being contrary to the following o EO 302, series of 1940, paragraph 4 (**which I cannot find, sorry) o Policy of discontinuing open market purchases adopted by the Cabinet in the preceding year o Violated the requirements of EO 298, series of 1940 • Petitioner Radiowealth Inc requested with the Auditor General that the payment be approved; that the treasury warrant was in the process of issuance; that the auditor for the SC refused to countersign it ISSUE: WON the court’s independence is limited to the exercise of judicial functions, and does not include the purchase of property HELD: NO. The Constitution secures against interference not only in the power to adjudicate, but in all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice. RATIO: Maxim of distribution of powers: The SC is independent of executive or legislative control. Tarlac v. Gale • POWER: The judiciary has power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice. • PROVINCIAL OFFICERS: May not deprive the court of anything which is vital to their function nor exercise discretion to escape an obligation to the court which the law lays upon them (Power to interfere is the power to control. Power to control is the power to abrogate). • DUTY OF PROV OFFICERS: o Furnish court room, furniture, fixtures, supplies, equipment which must be of such character as to permit the court to exercise its functions in a reasonably effective manner (Act No 83, Sec 10); o Provide construction or purchase or renting offices (Act No 83, Sec 13) o IN CASE OF CONFLICT: Yield to the court • FINAL AUTHORITY OF THE COURT: Certain discretion lies with the officials but is subject to the paramount and final authority of the court



in determining what is necessary for the proper administration of justice o The court has power to purchase things (purchase, legal charge on the province) 1. directly or 2. by proper proceedings to compel officials to perform their duty imposed by law With regard to acquisition of fixtures: Subject to its dependence upon Congress for appropriation, but supreme and independent of the executive. o The court could not maintain its independence and dignity as the Constitution intends if the executive personally or through a subordinate could determine for the court what it should have or use in the discharge of its functions. BENGZON v. DRILON Section 3 | Fiscal Autonomy

FACTS: • Petitioners, retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, are receiving monthly pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. • (Apparently through misinformation) then Pres. Aquino vetoed a provision in the GAA for FY 1992 relating to the adjusted pensions of the retired justices, which had long been in effect and upheld by the Supreme Court • Office of the Solicitor General claims that removal of special privileges granted by law to former Justices o Is to eliminate “grant of distinct privileges” or “preferential treatments” o That paying off public funds to individuals already leading private lives & have ceased performing public service constitute robbery ISSUE: WON the Presidential veto of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the SC & the CA is constitutional HELD: The Court invalidated her veto and made additional pronouncement about fiscal autonomy. RATIO: FISCAL AUTONOMY: Guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require; power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not

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exceeding the highest rates provided by law in the course of discharge of their functions; freedom from outside control • Veto power trenched upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary since it is tantamount to: o Dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized o Withholding the Chief Justice’s freedom to adjust funds appropriated for expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of savings to cover deficits and shortages • The imposition of restrictions & constraints of the independent constitutional offices’ allocation and utilization of appropriated funds is anathema to fiscal autonomy, and violative not only of the Constitutional mandate, but especially of the independence and separation of powers upon which the constitutional system is based. • The judiciary knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints • Gonzales v. Macaraig & Art VI, Sec 25(5): Upheld the authority of the Chief Justice, among others key officials, to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency & efficiency. DE LA LLANA V. ALBA (Significance of judicial independence): It is an added guarantee that justices & judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence; that their judgments are to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives; transcending that of a purely personal right.

POSITION PAPER: The DBM not only allocates less that 1% for the judiciary but also examines with a fine-toothed comb how the funds are spent. • The DBM submits its own version of the proposals without informing the agency of major alterations • The DBM prunes budget proposals to below subsistence levels, compelling the Chief Justice, Chairmen of the Commissions, & Ombudsman to make pilgrimages to the DBM for additional funds RIGHT OF RETIRED JUSTICES TO A PUBLIC PENSION: is a vested right pursuant to RA 1797, founded on services rendered to the state. • When a judge has complied with statutory prerequisites for retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and may not thereafter be revoked or impaired. • Retirement laws serve to entice competent people to enter the government service and to permit them to retire with relative security ARGUMENTS OF OSG ARE IMPOLITE & OFFENSIVE: The OSG must show continuing esteem and good manner to the retired Justices.



Fortich v Corona Section 4, Art VIII | The Supreme Court

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Facts: The respondents in this case filed for motions for reconsideration which were handled by a Supreme Court division. The division voted 2-2 on separate motions resulting to a tie. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution affirming its earlier decision. The respondents argued that the Resolution released by the Supreme Court did not really resolved the motions since the required number (three) to carry a decision was not met and further argued that it should be handled then by SC en banc (allegedly pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution).

quorum when the case was deliberated. This is because the decision was signed by only 7 justices. The court granted the Motion for Reconsideration The court’s decision was concurred in by a majority of the members of the court who actually took part in the deliberations. It was unanimously signed by the 7 justices who were present in the deliberations

Issue: Whether or not the seven constitute a quorum of the 14-member court Held: The case was resubmitted to the Court en banc for re-deliberation considering that the life of the accused is at stake. Ratio:

Issue: •

Whether or not it should be heard en banc

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Held: No. The failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie leaves the earlier decision unconsidered, thus affirming it.

•

Ratio: • • •

•

•

It involves the statutory construction principle reddendo singula singulis Only cases which failed to satisfy the required minimum number of votes shall be referred to Court en banc. In this issue, what we have is only a matter which is to be resolved to which the requirement for minimum number of votes does not apply. The votes resulting to a tie does not mean that the matter was not resolved. The resulting tie implies that the motions were not considered, thus affirming the earlier decision. People vs. Ebio Section 4 | The Supreme Court

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A “quorum” is that number that makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid corporate act As a general rule, a majority of the members of a court is a quorum for the transaction of business and the decision of cases. Based on paragraph 3 of Section 4, when the court meets by division, there should at least be 3 members present for the division to conduct its business However, paragraph 2 of Section 4 does not state the number of justices required to be present to constitute a quorum when the court meets en banc The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum when the court is composed of only 14 members In case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused Marbury vs. Madison Section 5 | Judicial Review

(Marbury is a Justice of Peace in Columbia and Madison is the Secretary of State of the US) 1803 Facts:

Facts: •

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Appellant Gerry Ebio was convicted by this court of qualified rape and sentenced suffer the death penalty. The Public Attorney’s Office moved for reconsideration on the ground that the court lacked a

At the December term 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel severally moved the court for a rule to James Madison, secretary of state of the United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their



several commissions as justices of the peace in the district of Columbia. The applicants have requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their said commissions but the Secretary of State did not comply. The court, through Chief Justice Marshall, reviewed the case considering the following questions: (1) Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? (2) If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? (3) If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court? The answers that were given are as follows: (1) …Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right. (2) ...having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy. (3) To enable this court to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. Issue: W/N an act repugnant to the constitution (in this case, issuing a mandamus in an original jurisdiction) can become part of the law of the land Held: NO Ratio: “It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.” “The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised. “ Connection to Art. VII:

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“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is… So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.” “The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.” “It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.” “Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.” Note: The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other hand, if the Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had acted out of fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the supremacy of the law. In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to chastise the ‘Jeffersonians’ and yet not create a situation in which a court order would be flouted. Angara v. Electoral Commission Section 5 | Judicial Review

FACTS: National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8 ) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.



ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the National Assembly which confirmed the election of petitioner has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: [I based this from the previous digest on this case in Article VI, Section 17] The court held that there is no question about the election of the members of the assembly, then there is nothing to be judged by the Electoral Commission. There is no need of confirmation on the election of those whose election is not contested; therefore the resolution of the National Assembly did not cut off the power of the Electoral Commission.

RATIO: • Power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers • Angara c. Electoral Commission: (Conception of judicial power) the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them o This conception does not add anything to invoke this “duty” to justify the Court’s intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication: This duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as VIII, Section 5, paragraph 2 clearly defines our justification in terms of cases • Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law o Judgment according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day

RATIO: • Judiciary asserts the solemn and sacred obligation to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantee to them • Judicial supremacy: power of judicial review under the Constitution • Judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries • Upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly o Generally, in this case, the court reiterates its power and obligation to interpret the Constitution because the nature of this controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Section 5 | Judicial Review FACTS: [No facts. I guess same facts apply as in the case in Section 26 of Article VI. Pero mejo irrelevant yung facts kasi focused lang sa judicial review yung nakacite sa case book under this Section]

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HELD: The court has jurisdiction over the case

TAN v. MACAPAGAL Section 5, Art VIII | Judicial Review FACTS: A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people They filed a five-page pleading it is understandable, therefore, why the petition could hardly be characterized as possessed of merit. The Court issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on the last day of that month a printed thirty-two-page motion for reconsideration. It is evident that petitioners took some pains this time, although the main reliance seems to be on a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence.



Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. ISSUE:

Assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution, dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, would have this Court declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." HELD: Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Such a principle (separation of powers) applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility according to its lights. There is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to be respected. It cannot be otherwise if it is to perform its function well. Such should be the case not only because it is a coordinate agency but also because its powers are transcendent, amounting as it does to submitting for popular ratification proposals which may radically alter the organization and functions of all three departments, including the courts. It is therefore much more imperative that the rule of non-interference be strictly adhered to until the appropriate time comes. More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration cannot therefor be sustained. RATIO:

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The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative] action ... ." The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but only "when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding." PACU V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION Section 5 | Judicial Review FACTS:

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Act No. 2706 otherwise known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. The defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that: 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the court dismissed the petition for prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional? HELD: Petition denied. Law is Constitutional.



Petitioner: contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education.

SOL GEN: petitioners have no cause of action to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law—and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. RATIO: It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.) When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.) As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.) The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their

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protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.) Bona fide suit.—Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.) Joya v. PCGG Section 5 | Locus standi Facts: 35 Petitioners, who were Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on Jan. 11, 1991 by Christie’s of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from the Marcoses Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents in acting against the latters’ public duty to conserve the artistic creations mandated by Art. XIV, Sec. 14-18 of the Constitution and R.A. 4846. Issue: WON this petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review this case. Held: The instant petition lacks 2 legal requisites namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party (legal standing); and that there must be an actual controversy. Rule: No question involving the constitutionality or validity of law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry: • That the question must be raised by the proper party; • That there must be an actual case or controversy; • That the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and • That the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Ratio: First requisite of LEGAL STANDING Petitioner Court The painting and Devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and silver ware are public in law.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 properties collectively owned by the Filipino people in general. By auctioning the same, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property in violation of the Constitution.

The paintings were NOT public property. They were donated by PRIVATE persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum. The painting was not a Philippine art. The antique silverwares was given to the Marcos couple as gifts for their anniversary, the confiscation of these should not be understood to mean that the ownership has automatically passed on to the government without complying with the constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation.

This petition can be allowed as taxpayer’s suit.

No. They are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege as public properties. The questioned act of the government in this case does not involve the disbursement of public funds for administering unconstitutional acts.

Second requisite of ACTUAL CONTROVERSY Petitioner Court This case is an exception to the rule on The purpose in this moot and academic cases. case has become stale That although the sale of the paintings and and has long past, silverwares has long been consummated, the therefore the issues novelty and importance of issues raised have become moot and deserve the Court’s attention to establish academic. future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of nation’s treasures. Although the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of cases w/c does not satisfy the requirement of actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved, We find that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule. NOTE: Petitioners brought up RA 4846 as amended by PD 374. It declares it to be the policy of the state to preserve and protect important cultural properties and national cultural treasures of the nation. However, Director of the Museum issued a certificate that the Italian paintings and silverwares do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.

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Findings of such Director is controlling because of their acknowledged expertise in their fields of specialization.

Definitions: Legal standing – personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. Interest – material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Interest must be personal not one based on the desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.

Macasiano v. National Housing Authority Section 5 | Locus standi Facts: The petitioner seeks to have Section 28 and 44 of RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) declared unconstitutional. The provisions in question provide for rules regarding eviction and demolition and provides for a moratorium of 3 years. His locus standi is based on his being a consultant of the DPWH and his being a taxpayer. As a consultant of DPWH, he alleges that said provisions serves as a drawback to his task of demolition of illegal structures and that he was unable to continue the demolition which he has assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past. As a taxpayer, he alleges that he has direct interest in seeing to it that the public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed. Issue: WON the petition has all the essential requisites for the Court to review the case. Held: No. The first 2 fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy and the petitioner is not a “proper party.” Rule: The essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.


CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 Ratio: • There is no actual controversy. The petitioner did not claim that the provisions actually prevented him from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner. He has no locus standi. • The petitioner is not a proper party. As a consultant of DPWH he is not vested with the authority to demolish properties of public domain, much less on private lands. Nor does the petitioner claim that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected by the challenged provisions. • Although he anchors his locus standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it does not mean that the Court should hear the parties in each and every instance where such ground is invoked. • The Court has discretion whether or not it should entertain a taxpayer’s suit. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections Section 5, Art VIII | Judicial Review: Locus Standi Facts: • Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 51, Article X of RA No. 7854 which provides: Section 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The present elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assumed their offices. Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continue exercising the functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. •

Petitioner’s Arguments: Said section collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide that elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representatives, have a term of 3 years and are prohibited from serving for more than 3 consecutive terms. o By providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, Section 51 of RA No 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them.

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Section 51 favors incumbent Makati mayor Binay who has already served for 2 consecutive terms. ! Should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another 3-year consecutive term since his previous 3-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. ! Section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

Issue: Whether or not the court can entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. Held: The court cannot. Ratio: 1. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events. a. That Mayor Binay will run again in the coming mayoralty elections b. That he would be re-elected in said elections c. That he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections. o These contingencies may or may not happen. Petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. 2. ALSO, petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. 3. Petitioners hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which the Court has no jurisdiction Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. Section 5, Art VIII | Judicial Review: Locus Standi Facts: • Principal plaintiffs, now principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI). o Petitioners assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. • Orginal defedndant was the Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., then DENR secretary, substituted by the new Secretary Hon. Angel Alcala. •

This complaint prays for the judgment that all existing timber license agreements in the country be cancelled and that defendant and his



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agents cease and decist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or approving new TLAs, and other reliefs. The complaint as instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs “are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical rainforests. The minors also claim that they “represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.” Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss based on 2 grounds: 1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him. 2. The issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question. Petitioners maintain that: 1. The complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action. 2. The motion is dilatory. 3. The action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant’s abuse of discretion. Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to dismiss.

Issue: WON petitioners have legal standing. Held: Petitioners have legal standing. Ratio: • Petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. • Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. " Every generation had a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. " The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. Note (side issue): Re definiteness of the specific legal right involved • While a right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of State Principles and State Policies (Section 16, Article II) and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.

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Kilosbayan v Guingona, Jr.

Facts: Petitioners seek to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the “Contract of Lease” executed by PCSO and Philippine Gaming Management Corp (PGMC) in connection with the online lottery system or lotto. Kilosbayan is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and ay leaders committed to the cause of truth, justice and national renewal. They are suing as members of the Board of trustees of Kilosbayan, as taxpayers and as concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tanada, Rep. Arroyo are suing as members of Congress, as taxpayers and as concerned citizens. Public respondents allege that petitioners have no standing. Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to maintain the instant suit. Held: Yes, issue of locus standi should be resolved in their favor. Ratio: • A party’s standing is a procedural technicality which the court may, in its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. • Emergency Powers Cases: SC brushed aside this technicality because “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.” • People v Vera: “Person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” • Basco v PAGCor: “Objections to taxpayers’ suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar…this Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petitions.” • It is within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. • In line with the liberal policy of this court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Coirt to question the constitutionality



or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various gov’t agencies or instrumentalities. Tatad v Garcia

Facts: In 1989, DOTC planned to construct an LRT line along EDSA, to be known as EDSA LRT III. In 1992, an agreement was reached with EDSA LRT Corp., a foreign corporation. Petitioners argue that the agreement is unconstitutional insofar as it grants EDSA LRT Corp. the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility. Respondent Garcia, Secretary of DOTC and EDSA LRT Corp. claim that petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest and they have no legal standing to institute the petition. Petitioners seek to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing the “Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA”. Sen. Tatad, Osmeña and Biazon are suing in their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers. Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. Held: Petitioners as taxpayers have legal standing to institute the resent action. (Kilosbayan v Guingona) Ratio: Prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s suits: allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the National Government o GOCC allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved. Concurring Opinion: Mendoza, J. – Petitioners have no standing to sue as legislators, taxpayers or citizens. Concur with decision of majority to dismiss petition. • Concur in all except with the decision that petitioners have standing to sue. • As members of Congress: because they allege no infringement of prerogatives a slegislators • As taxpayers: because they allege neither an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing or spending powers of Congress nor illegal disbursement of public money. • Bugnay Const an Dev. Corp. v Laron: “A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contracts. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.”

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As citizens: only if it is claimed that it is if transcendental importance Lotto Case: (Kilosbayan v Guingona) Court took into account the “paramount public interest” involved which immeasurably affected the social, economic and moral well-being of the people and the effects the online lotto system. Court then invalidated the contract for the operation of lottery. For citizen’s actions to be allowed: Party must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government. Holding that a citizen has standing to question a government contract unduly expands the scope of public actions and sweeps away the case and controversy requirement embodied in Art. VIII sec. 5. It would controvert the court into the office of the Ombudsman for ventilation of generalized grievances. KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al. Section 5 | Locus Standi

FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the Equipment License Agreement (ELA) invalid on the ground as the Contract of Lease between Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Phil Gaming Management Corp (PGMC) nullified in G. R. No.113373. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and is violative of PCSO’s charter. Petitioners: a.) Kilosbayan is an organization “composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders commited to the cause of truth, justice and national renewal” b.) Kilosbayan trustees are suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens c.) Sen Freddie Webb, Sen Wigberto Tanada and Rep Joker Arroyo, are members of Congress suing as such and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. On Jan 25, 1995, PCSO signed ELA where PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO with rental equivalent of 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sale. On Feb 21, 1995, this suit, GR No. 118910, was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases nullified in the first case. PCSO and PGMC question the petitioners’ standing: 1. ELA is a diff lease contract with the Contract of Leases nullified in prior



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case ELA did not have to be admitted to public bid because of the exception in EO No. 301 Only Board of Directors of PCSO has the power to determine whether ELA is advantageous PCSO lacks fund to purchase own online lottery; thus, has to enter lease contract Petitioners are only seeking moral crusade and political agenda in this suit

ISSUE: #1: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. #2: Whether or not petitioners are real parties in interest within the meaning of Rule 3 Sec 2 of Rules of Court HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Petition to declare ELA between PCSO and PGMC invalid is DISMISSED. RATIO:

ISSUE #2: Whether or not petitioners are real parties in interest within the meaning of Rule 3 Sec 2 of Rules of Court.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. Respondents Contention: Petitioners, not being parties to the Contract of lease which they seek to nullify, have no right to bring the suit as they have no personal and substantial interest to be injured by the enforcement of contract. Petitioners Contention: The ruling in the previous case sustains their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract is now “law of the case” and thus, question of standing can no longer be reopened. Court: Neither the doctrine of stare decisis, law of the case or conclusiveness of judgment poses barrier to determination of petitioners’ right to maintain the suit. a.) Stare decisis: Concern for stability in the decisional law, in this case, does not call for adherence to what has been recently been laid down as a rule. a. Valmonte v. PCSO: Court denied the standing to a party, in questioning validity of a form of lottery, claimed the right to sue as a taxpayer, citizen and member of the bar. b. Philconsa v. Enriquez: If complaint is not grounded on

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the impairment of powers of Congress, legislators do not have standing to question the validity of any law or official action. b.) The voting on standing in previous case was narrow 7-6. There are also changes in members of Court with retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and appointment of Justice Francisco. c.) Doctrine of the law of the case is not applicable as the latter case is a sequel to GR 113375 and not its continuation. Since present case is not same as the former, the ruling there cannot be regarded as the law of this case. The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after ruling by an appellate court. a. “law of the case” means whatever is once irrevocably established as controlling legal rule of decision between same parties continues to be the law of these case, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be facts of the case before the court. b. It differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality.

Rule 3 Sec 2 of Rules of Court: “Every action may be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest” Baker v. Carr: Standing is “whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions” Salonga v. Warner Barnes: real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit Petitioners do not have substantial interest in the ELA as would entitled them to bring this suit. “present substantial interest” is the interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a payment by him” *Regalado J, dissenting:



The right of petitioners to file and maintain this action – whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of action – has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case.

There would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities or excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal capacity of standing to sue. Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts. The case should be decided on the merits and substantive considerations and not technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry into the validity of the supposed amended lease contract. The people are entitled to the benefit of duly clarified and translucent transaction. The argument that previous judgment must be revisited in lieu of change of membership is “magistrate shopping” or “court packing” and does not sit well with the public as a judicious policy. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action of two lotto cases: a.) Subject matter, identity of parties: The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of contract, which continue to operate under the same basis for the same purpose and same parties does not suffice to extinguish the identity of subject matter in both cases. New contract is the same as the original with just some variants in the terms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. b.) Cause of action: Under Sec 49(c) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, there is still a collateral estoppel or conclusiveness of judgment. Thus, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive between the parties conclusive between the parties in the case now before us and that definitely includes that petitioners have the locus standi or the right to sue respondents on the contacts concerned. The court has clearly indicated that it sets aside objections grounded on judge-made constitutional theories only under cogent reasons of substantial justice and paramount public interest; thus the stance of majority that taking cognizance of this case and resolving it on merits will invite others to unduly overburden the Court with avoidable opportunities is unimpressive. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC Section 5 | Locus Standi Facts: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phil

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(TELEBAP), an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters, and GMA Network Inc., which operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under franchise granted by Congress, together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Sec 92 of BP 881. Section 92 of BP Blg 881 requires radio and tv broadcast companies to provide free time to COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.

Petitioner: The requirement that radio and tv time be given free (1) takes properties without due process of law; (2) it violates eminent domain clause which provides just compensation; (3) it denies broadcast media the equal protection of the laws; and (4) that it violates the terms of franchise of petitioner GMA Network Inc. (5) it is in excess of the power given to COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media communication or information during the election ban Issue: WON petitioners have legal standing to bring the constitutional challenge Held: TELEBAP has no legal standing over the petition. The Court however will still take cognizance of the case because of the legal standing of GMA Network Inc. GMA operates radio and tv broadcast stations in the Phil and thus, is affected by the enforcement of BP Blg 881. Ratio: Legal Standing of TELEBAP suing as a.) citizen: No, a citizen will only be allowed to raise constitutional question if he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as the result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government. In the instant case, petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of BP Blg 881. b.) Registered voters: No, case does not concern their right of suffrage. c.) Taxpayers: No, it does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. He has not shown sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation or that he will sustain direct injury as a result. d.) Corporate entity: No, standing jus tertii will only be recognized if he has substantial relation to the third party, third party cannot assert constitutional right, or right of third party be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse third party’s constitutional claim. None of which is present. e.) Lawyers in broadcast industry: No, it does not entitle them to bring the suit in their names as representatives of affected companies.



Gonzales v. Narvasa Section 5 | Judicial review: locus standi

Facts: • Petition for prohibition and mandamus, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. • Petitioner also asks the court to enjoin the Exec.Sec. Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations, to enjoin COA from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential assistants and consultants. Petitioner prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner information on certain matters. o Petitioner disputes die constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds; ! Contends the PCCR is a public office which only the legislature can create by law ! That by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the constitution. o Respondents allege the case has become moot and academic. • NOTE: Upon submission of recommendations the president dissolved the PCCR. Issues: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to invoke judicial power insofar as the PCCR is concerned Held: Prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. Case has become moot. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation PCCR. Ratio: • Action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. o Upon submission of recommendations the president dissolved the PCCR. It likewise spent the funds allotted to it, thus ceased to exist, having lost its raison d’etre.

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There is legal standing when a party can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. A taxpayer is deemed to have standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the constitution. o In the case, it is apparent that there is no exercise by congress of its taxing or spending power. Under sec.7 of EO 43, the 3mil is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the president. Del Mar, et al. v. PAGCOR Section 5| Judicial review: locus standing

Facts: • Petitioner Raoul del Mar initially filed a petition for prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai, by itself or in agreement with Belle corporation. o On the ground that the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter. • However, respondent PAGCOR entered into an agreement with private respondents BELLE and FILGAME. In the agreement it was agreed that BELLE will make available to PAGCOR required infrastructure facilities, as well as provide the necessary funding for the jai-alai operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles the actual management and operation of jai-alai. • A supplemental petition was filed questioning the validity od said agreement, on the ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or power to enter into such Agreement for the opening, establishment, operation, control and management of jai-alai. o Respondents allege that petitioners have no legal standing to file a taxpayer’s suit because the operation of jai-alai does not involve the disbursement of public funds. o Petitioners complain that the operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement of the legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise. To the extent the powers of congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof. Issues: Whether or not petitioners suing as taxpayers and in their capacity members of the House of Representatives possess legal standing to sue. Held:

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The record is barren of evidence that the operation and management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involved expenditure of public money. In line with the liberal policy of this court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society, court find and so hold that as members of the House, petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions at bar.

FACTS: • The Malate Tourist and Development Corporation filed a complaint for declaratory relief (prelim injunction &/or TRO) against Mayor Lim’s City Ordinance prohibiting short-time admission, wash-up rate schemes in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses, and similar establishments. • White Light Corp, as well as Titanium Corp, Sta Mesa Tourist & Development Corpioration filed a motion to intervene

Ratio: A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the constitution in his office.! MACALINTAL v. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner, filing as a taxpayer and as a lawyer, seeks to declare some provisions of the Oversees Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (RA 9189) as suffering from constitutional infirmity ISSUE: WON the Court should uphold Macalintal’s right to file the present petition HELD: Court upheld his right to file the petition. RATIO: • TAXPAYER’S STANDING: RA 9189 appropriates funds to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers thus have the right to restrain public officials from wasting public funds through enforcing unconstitutional statute. • TECHNICALITIES: Technicalities of procedure may be set aside in cases where 1. petitioners have presented an issue of transcendental significance and 2. because it is the court’s duty to determine whether other govt branches have acted within the limits of the Constitution " 15 YEARS SINCE THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: requiring Congress to provide for a system of absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad • PREMATURITY OF QUESTION OF PRORPRIETY: There are no ongoing proceedings (judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial) o In legislative acts which are claimed to contravene the Constitution, the judiciary not only has the right but also the duty to settle the dispute WHITE LIGHT CORP v. CITY OF MANILA

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ISSUE: WON these establishments have requisite standing to plead for protection of their clients’ equal protection rights Petitioners 1. The ordinance unlawfully interferes with their business 2. The equal protection rights of their clients are interfered with. Court General rules on standing, “extancy of direct and personal interest” admit of several exceptions: 1. Over-breadth doctrine (HELD APPLICABLE) • Assuming arguendo that petitioners have no relationship with their patrons, challengers are in effect permitted to raise the rights of 3rd parties where a statute needlessly restrains constitutionally guaranteed rights. o The ordinance is a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. 2. Taxpayer’s suit 3. Third party standing (HELD APPLICABLE) a. Litigant suffered injury-in-fact, giving him sufficiently concrete interest in the issue’s outcome business of petitioners are likewise injured by the ordinance b. Litigant must have a close relation to the 3rd party petitioners rely on their customers’ patronage for their viability which is threatened by the ordinance c. There must exist some hindrance to the 3rd party’s ability to protect his own interests relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest may be construed as hindrance of customers to bring suit 4. Transcendental importance The Davide Impeachment Section 5



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In June 2003, an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide was filed by former President Joseph Estrada endorsed by Reps. Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen On October 13, 2003- The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment was sufficient in form but insufficient in substance so they voted to dismiss it. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Sec Gen of the House by Reps. Teodoro and Fuentebella against Chief Justice Davide founded on the alleged results of a legislative inquiry.

It was stated in the memorandum submitted to the Court of First Instance, that during the preliminary investigation, the petitioner assisted by his counsel was asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. His counsel moved that complainant present her evidence so that he can cross-examine such. The prosecutor and the fiscal objected invoking Sec. 11 of rule 108, which denies defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 11 of Rule 108 infringes sec. 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution (Sec. 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution) Held: Motion was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the case involves political question.

Ratio:

Held: The case involves a justiciable controversy.

Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.

Ratio: There are two species of political questions: (1) truly political questions (2) not truly political questions. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government. POLITICAL QUESTION -“those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government” Bustos v Lucero Section 5 Facts: Petitioner filed a motion to the Court of First Instance that his case be remanded from the Justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that he be able to cross-examine and question the complainant and her witness.

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As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process of law. While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In Re Cunanan Section5 | Rule-making Power Facts: Under the rules governing admission to the bar, “In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 percent in all subjects, without falling below 50 percent in any subject.” However, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, the court passed and admitted candidates to the bar who had obtained certain



averages below the minimum grade of 75. The congress then passed Republic Act No. 972. (Please refer to the act in p. 537 of the case). The Act has for its object to admit to the Bar those Candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. By its declared objective, the court holds that the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.

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Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional. Held: No, it is not. 1. All the mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946-1952 inclusive are denied. 2. All candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 percent or more, without having a grade below 50 percent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. Ratio: Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1. Because they are not within legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers 2. Because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles 3. Because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects. The admission of the 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952 deprives the Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the bar. Paras, C. J. Dissenting: Resolutions of the Supreme Court on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. 1. Resolutions especially on motions filed for reconsideration are subject to revision of this court.

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Retroactive Laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair the obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection of the law. The Act does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the law. Bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946 are being discriminated against because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 percent has always been the passing mark during said period. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 percent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely the bar admissions of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 percent. Javellana vs. DILG Section 5 | Rule-making Power

Facts: Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Council of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracio filed a complaint against him stating that Javellana, an encumbet member of the city Council f Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director of DLG in accordance with the DLG M.C. No. 80-38. Issue: W/N DLC M.C. Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new LGC are unconstitutional in violation of Section 5 of Art. 8 Held: No. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the SC’s power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The LGC and DLC M.C.s simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflict of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their professions, in those instances where the law allows it. People v Mateo Section 5 | Judicial Review: Review of Death Penalty



[walang facts but it provides an additional rule regarding the review of death penalty and penalties higher than reclusion perpetua]

election of the Officers of the IBP are governed by the IBP By-Laws and are exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the authority and jurisdiction in allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals in cases where the penalty imposed is death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: Procedural matters fall in the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of the Congress. The rule allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals is such a procedural matter. RATIO: • Fundamental law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however has it proscribed an intermediate review. • Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. • If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, and refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court. o In the 11-year period since the re-imposition of death penalty, judgment of death has either been modified or vacated consist of 71.77% of the total of death penalty cases elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review ! 651 out of 907 appellants saved from lethal injection • It is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court [now the Court of Appeals] for automatic review of conviction. In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera Section 5 | Judicial Review: bar integration FACTS: This is a petition filed by Attys. Oliver Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez seeking the disqualification of Atty. Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the

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HELD: Under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, Section 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP. Moreover, RA No. 6397 confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. RATIO: • Abovementioned sections are considered as sources of this Court’s authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. o Bar: collectively of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys • IBP By-Laws ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP o Section 77: vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP by-laws, either motu proprio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP o Section 15: Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national o Section 44: empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the"members"of"the"Board"of"Governors" MACEDA v. VASQUEZ Section 6 | Supervision of Courts FACTS: Respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged in his affidavit-complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned



cases. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan,, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. ISSUE: (1) Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court. (2) Assuming that it can, Whether the referral should be made first to the SC. HELD: Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the case and refer the same to the Court or appropriate action. (1) NO. (2) NO.

Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. RATIO: Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against

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them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. PEOPLE V. GACOTT, JR. Section 6 | Supervision of Courts FACTS:

Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration in lieu with the decision of the Court of his penalty. He questions the competence of the second division of this Court to administratively discipline him. ISSUE: W/N a division of this Court is competent to administratively discipline a member of the Judiciary. HELD: Yes. Only cases involving the dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P 10,000 or both that administrative matter may be decided in division. Circular No. 2-89 A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court RATIO: The respondent relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII which reads: “The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon”



The word “en banc” was relied upon by the respondent for he argues that it is only the full court, not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him. In the deliberations Justice Concepcion in pointing out to its counterpart in the 1973 constitution, referred to the “court” without qualification. That it necessarily means the Court en banc. It was only decided to state “en banc” because all internal procedural and administrative matters, as well as ceremonial functions, are always decided by or conducted in the Court en banc. Two situations arises: (first clause): “The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,..” - is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof, by the Court en banc. (second clause) : the Court en banc can order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon” - Evidently the administrative case must be deliberated upon decided by the full court itself. In lieu with the Bar matter No. 209.

But, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require the action of the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing of three, five or seven members. Judge Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman Section 6 | Supervision of courts Facts: The present case involves 2 members of Judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture

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Issue: WON an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before an Ombudsman is already pending with the Court should still be referred to the Supreme Court.

Held: YES. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a complaint against a judge or court employee involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to refer to the Supreme Court the determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved in all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it. Ratio: • Under Sec. 6 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and personnel. • The Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it. He should also give DUE RESPECT for and RECOGNITION of the administrative authority of the Court. • The Ombudsman cannot dictate nor bind the Court to its findings because to do this is to deprive the Court of its administrative prerogative and arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. • From the Presiding Justice of CA down to the lowest MTC court clerk, it is only the SC that can oversee their compliance with all laws and take proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. • No other branch of gov’t may intrude into this powers without running afoul the doctrine of separation of powers.

In Re: JBC v. Judge Quitain Section 7 | Qualification of Justices and Judges AMPF! Pwede paki basa na lang yung case book? Hahaha.. Facts: Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from service for grave misconduct by the former President of the Phil per AO 183. He was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct Held: Every prospective appointee to the Judiciary should apprise/inform the appointing authority on every matter regarding his fitness for judicial office, including circumstances reflecting his integrity and probity. It did not matter that he had resigned from office and that the administrative case against him had become moot and academic.



Kilosbayan v. Ermita Section 7, Article VIII | Qualifications Facts:

Petitioners: People’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the people’s rights to selfgovernance and justice Respondents: Executive Secretary (in charge of releasing presdt’l appointments including those of Supreme Court justices) and Gregory Ong. • •

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Ong was appointed as Associate Justice of the SC to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of Associate Justice Callejo, Sr. Petitioners contend that Ong’s appointment is unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimcial, and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. o Petitioners claim the Ong is a Chinese citizen. o His own birth cert indicates his Chinese citizenship. o At the time of respondent Ong’s birth, his father and mother were both Chinese. Executive Secretary: o Ong’s appointment was made in pursuant to the powers vested in the President by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution. o The President appointed ONg from among the list of nominees who were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8. o The appointment was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of Ong’s citizenship.

Issue: WON Ong is qualified to be an Associate Justice of the SC. Held: Ong cannot accept an appointment to the SC that would be a violation of the Constitution. He is enjoined from doing so until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Ratio: • It is clear from the records of the court that Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. • No substantial change in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. • Section 2(3) of RA 9048: A summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply

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to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections should be made through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Note: • Ong was already a Justice of the Sandiganbayan (also requires that a person be a natural-born Filipino citizen) when the case was being litigated. • Ong filed a Petition for the “amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of an entry in his Certificate of Birth” in the RTC of Pasig City. • While the RTC case was pending, private citizen Topacio filed a quo warranto case. o A quo warranto case may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. o A private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office. Nitafan v. Commission of Internal Revenue Section 10 | Salary of Justices and Judges Facts: • Petitioners (Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53 of the RTC, NCR) seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the SC, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. • Petitioners’ Argument: Any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII. • The Court has already reaffirmed the Chief Justice’s standing directing to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes. Issue: WON the salaries of members of the Judiciary are exempt from income tax. Held: No. Ratio: • The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission (based on the deliberations) was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary. • The salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to income earners. The payment of such



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income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. The ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution” in Perfecto v. Meer as affirmed in Endencia v. David must by declared discarded.

Vargas v Rilloraza Facts: Before the court is a case for treason which was contended to be adjudicated according Sec. 14 of the People’s Court Act which provides for additional grounds for disqualification of a Justice of the SC. The provision provides that members of the Court “who held any office under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the Philippine Republic” would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case. Moreover, it provides for designation by the President of a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-Large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge to sit temporarily as Justice of the SC. Issue: 1. WON Congress had power to add to the pre-existing grounds of disqualification of a Justice of SC 2. WON a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the COA, even only as a ‘designee’ 3. WON by ‘designation’ of a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-Large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge, designated by the President can constitutionally sit temporarily as Justice of the SC Held: 1.

2. 3.

No. No act of legislature repugnant to the Constitution can become a law. Such grounds for disqualification provided by Sec. 14 of Commonwealth Act 682 to those already existing is arbitrary, irrational and violative of the organic law. Sec. 14 of People’s Court Act is unconstitutional. No person not so appointed by the President with the consent of the COA may act as Justice of the SC. No. A mere ‘designation’ does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of appointment.

Ratio: 1st Issue • No act of legislature repugnant to the Constitution can become a law. Best test is to compare pertinent constitutional provision without Sec. 14 People’s Court Act with their operation with Sec.

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14 People’s Court Act if it were to be allowed to produce its effects o Before enactment of said act, it is the bounden duty of all members of the SC to sit in judgment in all treason cases, like the instant case. (1935 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 4 – how the court shall be composed and how it may sit and Sec. 9 (now Sec.11) – they shall hold office during good behavior until they reach 70 yrs or become incapacitated to discharge duties, and other pertinent provisions) o After enactment of said act, the effect would be that Sec. 14 People’s Court Act would prohibit what the Constitution ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by members of the Court. What the Constitution directs, the provision prohibits. o For repugnancy to result, it was not necessary that there be an actual removal but that application of said act would have been an uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced Justice. He should left unhampered to exercise all powers and fulfill all responsibilities of his office. Also SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction over criminal cases where penalty is death or life imprisonment. Treason is punished by such penalties. Therefore, jurisdiction of the SC may only be exercised by the Chief Justice and his associate justices, sitting in banc. To disqualify this constitutional component results to deprivation of the Court of its jurisdiction and the deprivation of judicial power, thereby affecting judicial independence. Also SC concedes to the Legislature’s authority to enumerate instances which judges may sit but the rules must be promulgated before event happens or litigation arises. For to promulgate them after would wield the legislature the power to interfere with judicial functions. Also SC is the same but the membership will be different. Constitution admits only the Chief Justice and Associate justices as members of the SC no one else.

2nd Issue • Allowing the designees to sit as substitute of Justices of the SC would be to allow members who do not possess the required Constitutional qualifications of a regular member of the court. • Also allowing them would result to the composition of the SC having 4 members appropriately appointed and 6 members not so appointed and confirmed. • No temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution. SC is a permanent institution.



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“Unless otherwise provided by law in Sec. 4 of Art. VIII of organic law – cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition, qualification nor mode of appointment of members of the Court but to the number of Justices who would compose the Court.

3rd Issue • Mere designation would entirely dispense with requirement of appointment and confirmation by the COA. • “Provisions of a constitution are mandatory rather than directory, and mandatory provisions are binding on all departments of the Government.” Designees cannot sit temporarily as Justices of the SC. De La Llana v Alba Facts: In 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. It was assigned to formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, CA, CFI, city and municipal courts and Special courts but excluding the Sandiganbayan. A report was submitted stating the basic and urgent need for the restructuring of the Judicial system for they said that more and more suits are brought to the courts resulting to ‘clogged dockets’. This is why the committee suggests that there is a need for institutional reform in the Phil. Judiciary. Thereafter, Cabinet Bill 42, basis of Batas Pambansa blg 29, was introduced. Its objectives were the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, reallocation of jurisdiction and revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out of justice. It proposes to increase rather than diminish the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court to enable it to assist the Supreme Court. It further mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts, except those in the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts, would be separated from the judiciary. Petitioner’s contention: i. The Act has ignored and disregarded the security of tenure provision since it would result to termination of their incumbency. ii. Its enactment was tainted by arbitrariness and lack of good faith by the legislature. Issue: Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg 29 “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes” is constitutional.

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Held: Batas Pambansa Blg 29 is constitutional and valid.

Ratio: • Task of Judicial review which is exacting and delicate is never more so than when judicial reorganization, a conceded legislative power, may collide with the principle of the independence of the judiciary as embodied in Art. VIII – security of tenure provision. • i. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is involved but only the validity of their offices. It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. • ii. It is obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study (590 pages of discussion) before said act was signed by the president. The allegation then that its enactment was tainted by arbitrariness is lacking in factual basis. Instead, good faith characterized its enactment from inception to the signing by the president. •

Teehankee dissenting: 1. Security of tenure (express guarantee) should prevail over power to abolish (merely implied from power to create courts). 2. Act achieves something short of abolition and substantial change in the system, 3. The spirit that ruled the enactment of the law was not desire for reorganization but to use reorganization as mass purge.

Air France V. Carrascoso Section 14 Facts: This case is for review on certiorari. Carrascoso was bound for Lourdes and was issued by defendant Air France, a ‘first-class’ round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. The plaintiff traveled in first class from Manila to Bangkok but at Bangkok, he was asked by the Manager of Air France to vacate because there was a “white man” who had a “better right” to the seat. A commotion ensued and Mr. Carrascoso gave his “first-class” seat in the plane. Petitioner seeks that the Court review all the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it Ratio:



Sec 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court: Judgment determining the merits of the case shall state, “clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.”

generalize and form conlusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.

Braga v. Millora: The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the “essential ultimate facts” upon which the court’s conclusion is drawn.

People v. Lizada Section 14 | Content of Decisions

Reyes v. People: So long as the decision of the CA contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold information from “any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense.”

Facts: • Accused-appellant contends that the decision of the trial court convicting him of 4 counts of rape is null and void as it failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 1. The court a quo made no findings of facts in its decisions. 2. The court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and those of accused-appellant and his witnesses. 3. The trial court failed to state in said decision the factual and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. • Solicitor General’s Arguments: 1. There should be no mechanical reliance on the constitutional provision. 2. Trial courts may synthesize and simplify their decisions considering that they are harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. 3. Even if the trial court did not elucidate the grounds as the legal basis for the penalties imposed, the decision is still valid.

People v. Maniqgue: The mere fact that the findings “were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant’s side in the controversy as shown by his testimony” would not vitiate the judgment. Valdez v. Court of Appeals Facts: An examination of the decision of the trial court shows that there are no findings of facts to serve as basis for its conclusions. Issue: Whether or not the conclusion that the trial court arrived at is what was contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules of Court Held: No, the decision rendered by the trial court constitutes a mere conclusion of facts and of law arrived at by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the basis thereof. The Court has to wade through the records and make its own findings rather than delay the disposition of the case.

Issue: WON the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Held: Yes.

Ratio: The Court is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. Sec 14, Art VIII: No decision shall be rendered without expressing therein clearly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefore. Sec 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court: All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctively the facts and the law on which it is cased, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court. Admin Circular No. 1 reminded all judges to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to

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Ratio: • The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of witnesses and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of the parties. • The court failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. •

Note (purpose of provision) 1. To inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it was reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws.


2. 3. 4.


To give the losing party an opportunity to analyze the decision so he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. To persuade the losing party to accept the verdict in good grace. To constitute the decision as a valuable body of case law. Velarde v. Social Justice Secretary Section 14 | Content of Decisions

Facts: • This is a petition for review assailing the decision and order of the RTC of Manila. • The challenged decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed before the RTC-Manila by the Social Justice Society (SJS) against Velarde, Cardinal Sin, Manalo, Villanuevam and Soriano. o The petition sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment of the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. • Herein petitioners allege that the Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion. Issue (Procedural): Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief? Requisites for declaratory relief: 1. There is a justiciable controversy. 2. The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse. 3. The party seeking relief has a legal interest in the controversy. 4. The issue is ripe for judicial determination. There is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. HOWEVER, the issues raised are of paramount public interest. Issue 1 (Substantive): Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? No.

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Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure and Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure provide that the judgment or final order must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the judge and filed with the clerk of court. Yao v. CA: Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a parampunt component of due process and fair play. Essential parts of a good decision (must all be present and identifiable in the decision): 1. Statement of the case 2. Statement of the facts 3. Issues or assignments or errors 4. Court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved 5. Dispositive portion The assailed decision contains no statement of facts – much less an assessment or analysis thereof – or of the court’s findings as to the probable facts. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her decision with the ckause “SO ORDERED.”

Issue 2 (Substantive): May religious leaders be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? May they be banned from campaigning against said candidates? • Despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, the Court deems the constitutional issue to be of paramount interest. • However, counsel for SJS has failed to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. Held: The Order of the RTC of Manila is declared NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. Note: Rule is different in military tribunals. • Proceedings terminate with a simple guilty or not guilty plea • A military commission is not a court of record within the meaning of this Article (Buscayno v. Enrile) Nor does Section 14 apply to the COMELEC, which is not a court (Mangca v. COMELEC). RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN

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CONTRERAS.CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DUMA.33/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113 1. WON the Sandiganbayan is covered by Art VIII, Sec 15 (1) & (2)

ISSUE: WON respondent’s acts warrant administrative sanctions

No.

HELD: Taking into account his failing health and having already compulsorily retired, Judge Quinanola was fined (P40,000).

The provision refers regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals. Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the CA, with the inherent powers of a court of justice, and functions of a trial court. SPECIAL COURTS: Judicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction over particular categories of actions. Court of Tax Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Shari’a Courts. The Sandiganbayan’s power to promulgate its own rules of procedure was repealed by the Congress who prescribed that the SC’s Rules of Court should apply.

RATIO: Code of Judicial Conduct: Judges are required to decide promptly and expeditiously the cases and matters pending before them within the period prescribed by law. Respondent judge’s acts constitute gross inefficiency.

2. What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide cases falling within its jurisdiction? Court Administrator: • In cases falling within its original jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court within the 3-month reglementary period • In cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan has the reglementary period of 12-months for collegiate courts. HELD: • Section 6 of PD 1606, which created the Sandiganbayan, as well as the rules promulgated by the Sandiganbayan (Sec. 3), clearly provide a maximum period of 3 months from the date of submission for decision for the termination of cases. • The Sandiganbayan functions as a trial court. “Trial” allows introduction of evidence by the parties. • It has the discretion to weigh evidence, admit those which are credible, and reject those which it regards as perjurious or fabricated. COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. QUIŇANOLA FACTS: • Respondent made no effort to inform this Court of his reasons for the delay in resolving the cases, much less to request any extension. • He signed certifications that all pending cases and motions were already resolved within the prescribed period. • Poor health and heavy case load was the judge’s defense.

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