Gentle Savages and Fierce Citizens against Civilization: Unraveling Rousseau's Paradoxes Author(s): Matthew D. Mendham Reviewed work(s): Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 170-187 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25766261 . Accessed: 23/02/2013 21:38 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
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Savages and Fierce Citizens Civilization: Unraveling Rousseau's
Gentle
Matthew D. Mendham
Rousseau
seems
to argue,
against Paradoxes
EmoryUniversity
on one
that moderns
hand,
are
luxurious,
lazy, weak,
and
soft, in opposition
to primitive
hardiness,vigor,ferocity,and rusticvirtue.On theotherhand, he depictsmodern lifeas cruel,frenzied, competitive,and harsh, inopposition toprimitivegentleness,idleness,abundance, and spontaneity.IsRousseau, then,simplyan imaginative
ideologue,forwardingwildly opposed and oscillating characterizationsof theseeras,merely to be contrarian?This article attemptstodemonstratea degree ofcoherenceinhis analyses, byfocusing on thevarious sociopoliticalcontextshe discusses, and thevarious moral characterizationsand normswhich apply to each of thesecontexts.Building upon a half-century of interpretations,it offersan innovative logical typologyofRousseau s social thought?in termsof social complexity, environmental
resources,
and
normative
may
foundation?which
ousseau's many paradoxes and at least apparent contradictions have been noted since the first re to his first significantwork. Here we will JL X^sponses focus upon two clusters of antitheses with significant im plications for the overall tenor of his social thought. On
one hand, we find praises for "sensitivity, gentleness, sen and compassion," apparently inkeeping with timentality,
his reputation as a proto-romanticist or vanguard intel lectual of themodern Left. On the other hand, we find comparable enthusiasm for "manliness, courage, hard ness, and patriotism," apparently in keeping with his reputation as a sternmoralist or classical republican (cf. 1990, 91 ).2 Discerning whatever possible coher ence may lie behind such dualisms and paradoxes seems essential to grasping his fundamental intentions. These
Melzer
particular antitheses become especially relevant inview of
Matthew
D. Mendham
University,
Atlanta,
is Post-Doctoral GA
30322
Fellow,
the Program
inDemocracy
(
[email protected],
explain
many
of his central paradoxes.
recent scholarly inquiries into the Enlightenment theory of "doux commerce" According to this theory, the increase
of commerce?meaning both economic broader social interaction?would make
exchange and societies more
doux (gentle, mild, calm, peaceable, soft, and/or sweet: see Hirschman [1977] 1997, 56-63; 1985, 43). Itwas ad vocated by Jean-Franc;oisMelon, Montesquieu, Voltaire,
David Hume, and indeed a strongmajority of the lead ing intellectuals of the time. Although Rousseau has been
rightly singled out as a uniquely vigorous opponent of doux commerce (Rosenblatt 1997,1-45; Wokler 2001, 56, 91), theways inwhich he opposed it are more problem
atic and complex than has been supposed. For instance, appeals to primitive ways of life seem chiefly intended to discredit the urbane lifestyles celebrated by doux commerce, yet we find a peculiar duality in these
his many
and Citizenship
and the Department
of Political
Science,
Emory
[email protected]).
A previous version of this articlewas presented at the annual meeting of theMidwest Political Science Association. For theirhelpful comments,
generous
I thank Vittorio
support,
Hosle, Michael reviewers. For their Zuckert, Jennifer Herdt, Mary Keys, Shmulik Nili, and three anonymous I thank the the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, and the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced University of Notre Dame,
Study.
References toRousseau's works listsectiondivisions,followedby thepage number in an English translation,then in thePleiade edition. The followingabbreviationshave been used. Formodern editionsofRousseau: EPW = Rousseau 1997a;LPW = 1997b;CW = 1990-;OC = 1959-1995. For frequentlycitedworks ofRousseau: Conf. = Confessions(CW:5/OC:l); DOI = Discourse on the Origin and Foundations ofInequalityamongMen, or SecondDiscourse (EPW/OC:3); DPE = Discourse onPoliticalEconomy (LPW/OC:3); DSA = Discourse on the SciencesandArts,orFirstDiscourse (EPW/OC:3); E = Emile,orOn Education (Rousseau 1979/OQ4); EOL = Essay on theOrigin ofLanguages New Heloise (CW:6/OC:2); LA = Letterto M. d'Alemberton theTheatre (Rousseau 1960/CW:10/OC:5); (LPW/OC:5); Julie= Julie,or the LR = Last Reply (EPW/OC:3); PF = "Political Fragments" (CW:4/OC:3); Rev. = Reveries a of SolitaryWalker (CW:8/OC:l); RJJ= = Rousseau JudgeofJean-Jacques: Dialogues (CW:l/OC:l); SC Of theSocial Contract (LPW/OC:3). Translationshave occasionally been modified.
American
Journal
of Political
Science,
?2010, Midwest Political Science
Vol.
55, No.
1, January 2011, Pp.
Association
170-187
DOI:
10.111
170
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l/j.l540-5907.2010.00468.x
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'SPARADOXES 171
Men or Citizens?
lines of criticism. On one hand, moderns are said to be luxurious, lazy,weak, and soft, in opposition to images of
primitive hardiness, vigor, ferocity, and rustic virtue. On the other hand, modern life is said to be cruel, frenzied, competitive, and harsh, in opposition to primitive gentle ness, idleness, abundance, and spontaneity. Is Rousseau, then, simply an imaginative ideologue, forwarding wildly
During the last half-century, most scholars who have ventured to interpret Rousseau's general teaching have defended its fundamental unity. Some have done sowith
opposed
so long as one, in practice, focuses chiefly or exclusively on a single aspect of it, such as the romanticism of his autobiographical writings or the republican virtue of his
and oscillating characterizations of these eras, revolt against the spirit of his age? in merely This article attempts to unravel Rousseau's central paradoxes, with special reference to gentleness and sever ity. It begins with some of themost influential general
interpretations of his work, and comes to focus on the surprising amount ofmoral variety among "savages" he describes. In the process, it synthesizes and expands upon previous interpretations, offering an innovative typology of the character types he most prominently depicts, and differentiating certain clusters of moral tendencies and
norms which he considers proper to (or characteristic of) differing sociopolitical contexts. As scholars who have
previously offeredmore limited typologies have acknowl can edged (e.g., Todorov 2001, 3), some of the categories we as which tools be offered may bring to helpful only
the texts, rather than all-encompassing, fixed categories Rousseau self-consciously posited. Yet I do contend that
this typology,which systematically depicts several funda mental contrasts and tensions,2 can serve as an illuminat ing prolegomenon, or first approach, to Rousseau's so cial thought. Accordingly, itdoes not attempt to displace
prior interpretations, or pronounce definitively whether Rousseau should ultimately be understood as coherent or contradictory. Rather, it provides a clear schematization
of aspects of his work which are plausibly perceived as a revealing some degree of tension, thereby facilitating in future and of awareness, precision, rigor greater degree
discussions of his coherence. By laying the groundwork formore systematic comparisons of precivilized, civilized, and ideal forms of life in Rousseau, we will also be bet ter positioned to explain his full response to doux com
with it,his basic stance toward modernity as he perceived it. Finally, this endeavor may be of intrinsic value in offering sustained explorations of some of his
merce?and
most acute psychological and sociopolitical observations, as well as his various conceptions of virtue and of the
out clear acknowledgement his thought?a task which
of any deep tensions within can seem plausible enough
political writings. Other scholars have, more plausibly, at tempted to show how his many apparent contradictions might somehow be consistent expressions of some deeper
one principle or stance can be judged principle,3 or how to be his truest or most fundamental, despite substantial and largely unintended incompatibility among the ideals
he praises.4 For our purposes, we will focus upon those who have shown how Rousseau presents multiple ways of lifeor kinds of society which are largely incompatible,
some of which are nonetheless comparably defended by him. A seminal version of this approach is Judith Shklar's Men and Citizens, which argues that Rousseau presents
two radically opposed Utopias as "equally valid" (Shklar 1969, 4). She explains how one of Rousseau's main in fluences, Archbishop Fenelon, had used a similar tactic,
which need not be self-contradictory since these Utopias are offeredmore in the service of diagnosing "the emo
civilization" than as empirical or attainable alternatives. Rousseau's models of "a tran are not meant to be quil household" and "a Spartan city" meets to "the inner psy how each but show reconciled, men inner social and for chic needs of simplicity," unity tional diseases ofmodern
attempts to be half natural and half social, thus rending the self and generating neither true
unlike themodern
3 contradictions Rousseau's For Straussians, many obvious clearly reader, a deep underly indicate, for the careful and philosophical see esp. Strauss (1953, 252-94), Masters (1968), Melzer ing unity:
(1990), andMarks (2005).
4Esp.Cassirer ([1932] 1989). Todorov seems close to Cassirer in considering personal
ethic an intrusion of Rousseau's the autobiographical and rather than a genuine misfortunes, imperfections
ideal (Todorov 2001, 2002; discussed in note 13 below). Wok
ler maintains
a thesis of fundamental
unity, while
allowing
for
chronological shiftsand development ([1995] 2001, 32-33, 68,
good life.
the images, ob claims to "discover Starobinski 125-26). but allows desires" and nostalgic governing Rousseau, and great shifts across inconsistent for fundamentally positions
72, 79,
sessions,
2At this formal level,my reading is perhaps closest toO'Hagan, who
understands
Rousseau
as offering a "recurring
tension"
at the
heart of a "unitarysystematicproject" (O'Hagan 1999, chap. 1; 2004,
73-76).
O'Hagan's
tension,
however,
is between
a morality
of the sensesand one of duty,which overlapsonlyminimallywith
my typology.
time ([1957] 1988,xi, 13-15, 34, 45-48, 162-63, 201-12, 228-29,
texts of that the three "principal maintains Neuhouser 273-77). So Second the Discourse, Rousseau's (i.e., project" philosophical "a single, coherent system of constitute and Emile) cial Contract, in his even though contradictions maybe more common thought," other works (2008,18-19).
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172
"men" nor true "citizens" (Shklar 1969,1-6,31n4,57-58, 213; see E I, 39-40/248-49f). There can be little doubt that Shklar's distinction
lows gentle Christianity to flourish (Shklar 1969, 12-32, 160-61). Along these lines, Shklar's distinction may help us understand Rousseau's recurring contradictions be
tween apparently sincere praises and forceful disparage ment of cosmopolitanism (DOI II, 174/178; "Geneva CW 4:81/OC 1.2, 3:287; cf. Todorov 2001, Manuscript" 26-30). Unlike the citizen, whose duties do not extend be yond the national borders, the cosmopolitan isnot bound to any particular polity, but to humanity as a whole. De
spite Rousseau's occasional praise for cosmopolitanism, it is clear that he saw patriotic fervor to be deeply neces sary in the cultivation of citizen virtue, which is largely understood as love of the polity's common good over pri
vate goods (DPE 15-16,20-21/254-55,259-60f; "Geneva 1.2, CW 4:79/OC 3:284). And since patri Manuscript" otism and cosmopolitanism are virtually impossible to combine in the same soul?and fully impossible to com seems to have found bine among an entire people?he
to preach patriotism one-sidedly in civic contexts.6 This civic virtue is pursued through radical it necessary
to the polity's general will (DPE 13/252; DSA and I, 13/14f)> generates a deep harmony among one's fellows, while naturally tending toward utter indiffer ence and harshness to foreigners (E I, 39/248f; SC IV.8,
dedication
146-47/464-65). However, an alternative vision of amore private moral virtue is also prominent in his writings, and this defines virtue as the strength of will necessary to conquer one's passions, which naturally values and serves humanity as such (E V, 441/812f; cf.Reisert 2003, 8f, 107-13, 135). In another relevant contrast, within the 5Neuhouser exclusive
rejects the contrast of man ideals" (2008, 19-24, 155-61,
and
citizen
172-73,
as
252-60),
"mutually but due
to the significanttheoreticaleffortshe requires to reconcile the
accounts
Contract
of rationality and moral motivation in Emile and Social the categories must remain valuable (236-60), prima facie.
A fulleranswertoNeuhouser isofferedinMendham (2009, section 4.7).
Man
Citizen
political sphere he insists upon severely prosecuting the wicked (in the manner of the Spartans and early Ro mans), lest one indirectly become cruel to the innocent. personal virtue, though, he tends toward a (proto-Kantian) maxim of "severity toward oneself and
Regarding
gentleness [douceur] toward others."7 We may thus di agram a basic dichotomy of Rousseau's thought along Shklar's lines (Figure 1). in depicting these two "psychological Nonetheless,
poles" (Shklar 1969, 31), we might question whether Shklar has adequately depicted that of "man." For equally formidable cases have been made thatRousseau's genuine
alternative to his political ideal is the radically individu alistic, proto-romantic "solitary dreamer." This aspect of his thought is emphasized by many writers, including those influenced by Leo Strauss. In Arthur Melzer's The
Natural Goodness ofMan, which is plausibly understood as the leading comprehensive Straussian interpretation, we find a largely dichotomous reading of the alternatives which Rousseau presents to civilized, divided human ity: "the political solution" and "the individualistic solu
tion" (Melzer 1990, 91-108; see also Salkever 1978, 208, is seen as rigorously 223). On such readings, Rousseau consistent in his ultimate meaning, since he subtly indi cates that his political solution?and with it, his many
to be read as pronouncements in favor of virtue?ought intended for merely popular consumption.8 The one life which is currently available tomoderns, and which re ceives true justification according to his most fundamen tal theoretical or philosophical principles, is that which he most boldly revealed in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality (Strauss 1953, 264; Conf.
7For thepolitical sphere,see LR 64n/72n;E IV, 253/548; SC II.5; cf. LettersWrittenfrom theMountain III, CW 9:186/OC 3:753f; Marks (2007, 735-37). For thepersonal virtue, seeDOI Dedica tion 121/199;"Fragmentson God and Revelation,"CW 12:160/OC Morals inKant (1996,AK 4:1038; RJJII, 179/891;cf. Metaphysics of 6:385, 393). 8 For the Straussian
6"Patriotism
and
humanity,
for example,
are two virtues
incompat
ible in theirenergy,and especiallyamong an entirepeople_This
has never been seen and never will be, because it is compatibility one cannot same the contrary to nature, and because give passion
two aims" (Letters Writtenfrom the Mountain I, CW 9:149n/OC 3:706n). On "an entirepeople," cf.DPE 16/255;E IV, 312n/632n;
Letter
D. MENDHAM
Figure 1 The Shklarian Model
is illuminating, at least preliminarily.5 We might high light, for instance, Rousseau's stark contrast of (on one hand) the true citizen's radical subordination of domes tic life and repudiation of contemplative and univer salist religiosity with (on the other hand) village life's embrace of sweet, "unspoiled family love,"which even al
MATTHEW
to Beaumont,
CW
9:52/OC
4:967.
On
the tension
between
patriotismand humanity,seeDPE 15/254;Kelly (2003, 95-96).
distinction between writings or claims intended for popular audiences and those intended for as ap philosophers, see Strauss 1953, e.g., 258nl5, (1947, 466n36; plied to Rousseau, For the most recent 261n20, 280, 288-89). 265-66, sophisticated interpretation along these lines, see Kelly (2003, e.g., 37, 44-49, 64-65, 127-33, 140-71). We will return to other commentators influenced by Strauss who attempt to avoid this dichotomous read ing (e.g., Cooper, Marks), "Straussian" is the closest
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but
the interpretation himself.
to Strauss
here described
as
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'SPARADOXES 173
Figure 2 The Straussian Model
IX, 314/407). This is also very nearly the life in which he himself indulged in his later years?one of sponta sentimental shorn of human neous, attachments, delight, transcendent moral principles, and their corresponding
Individualistic solution: The solitary Dreamer
obligations and burdens.9 While not entirely neglecting Shklar's idea of "man"?that is, the domestic and virtu
ous lifeof Emile and Julie?such readings would generally agree with Melzer in seeing this romanticization of do
mestic virtue and attachments as mere popularizations of Rousseau's genuine individualistic solution. On this reading, the latter solution is only attainable by someone with extraordinary intellectual gifts.10 If Shklar's distinction between citizen and man
cor
responds to Rousseau's contrast between civic virtue and domestic moral virtue, the Straussian distinction be tween the political solution and the individualistic solu
tion largely corresponds to Rousseau's contrast between "virtue" and "goodness." Unlike the demanding and harsh standard of virtue, this "goodness" is humanity's
(E II, 92/322; IV, 237/525; "Letters CW 5:575/OC l:1135f; Strauss 1953, II, 290; 1959,49-50). It is the healthy and natural expression from the of love of oneself (amour de soi), which?apart
natural endowment toMalesherbes"
corruption of society and the development of pernicious toward one's self-love or vanity (amour-propre)?tends
simple self-interestwith a minimum of harm to others, due to the influence of pity (DOI Preface, 127/126; I, 152-54/154-57; Note XV, 218/219). For our purposes, perhaps themost revealing contrast of the ethics of good ness with that of virtue is found inRousseau's
conflicting pronouncements regarding harm. For, inhis teachings re lated to virtue?and especially political virtue?relevant
others make binding claims upon us and not to overcome one's passions and dedicate oneself to them constitutes a
severe harm (DSA II, 17/18; Observations, EPW 46/OC 3:51; LR 81/91; Preface toNarcissus, EPW 97/OC 3:965; LA 16, 117/262, 337f/15, 107). In his teachings related
to goodness, however, the avoidance of direct and pal can be reconciled pable harms to others, insofar as this with one's self-preservation, appears to be humanity's sole moral requirement (DOI I, 154/156). It seems to be the latter standard to which
the autobiographical
Rousseau
Political solution: The virtuous Citizen
appeals. In surrendering himself to the sweet reveries of solitude, he asks for nothing from society and thusmay offer itnothing in return.11 In thisway he seems to sug
gest that duties differobjectively and to a very large extent, depending on ones social circumstances.12 Along these lines, then,we may depict a second Rousseauian
contrast
(Figure2).
One reason for choosing either the Shklarian or the Straussian dichotomy as the most accurate overall in terpretation is that Rousseau himself characteristically frames his contrasts in a radically dualistic fashion. In this he follows a distinguished line of powerful rhetori are often, for this very cians such as Augustine?who reason, guilty of overstating their dichotomies (cf. Rist 1994,310; Letter toBeaumont, CW 9:29/OC 4:937f). Thus if it remains the case that both dualisms illuminate ba
sic elements of his thought, we might prefer a model which incorporates them both. And since they both in
clude a similar "Citizen" category,we need only consider whether the solitary Dreamer and the domestically vir tuous member of the village or the familymight sensibly
be distinguished, deciphered as significant forRousseau, and placed alongside each other. Here we may find the
work of Jonathan Marks helpful, since he has recently established that Rousseau repeatedly praises a "middle way" between the solitary individual and the collectivized (2005, 7-11, 54-88). Marks finds that although some of Rousseau's most prominent and well-known formulations are framed dichotomously, his considered
Citizen
11 For enthusiastic
depictions
of how he began
sur
"systematically
renderingtohis sweetidleness [douceoisivete']"seeRJJII, 126/822; Rev.VII, 57/1060.At times,though,he displaysregretregardinghis dedication (e.g., Conf. X, 426/509; Rev. VI, 56/1059). or need the advantages of the solitary state for never wanting see "Letters toMalesherbes" II, CW 5:576/OC ing to harm anyone,
lack of moral
On
1:1137;Conf. IX, 382/455;EII, 105n/340-41n.
intentional
9For Rousseau's oretical
teachings
on
subversion
goodness,
of virtue
see esp. Melzer
through his the (1990, 90, 101-6,
258) and Strauss (1947, 482; 1953,282, 290-91; 1959,51-53). Cf. Gourevitch'sEpicurean interpretation(2001,213-15,218-19) and
Masters's
view
cere, personal
on conscience is his sin teaching and is of "radically restricted" importance,
that Rousseau's
view, but
shouldnot be consideredpart ofhis fullypoliticalor philosophical teaching(1968, 76-77, 84-86, 91).
10SeeStrauss (1959,53);Masters (1968,90,96,254); Salkever(1978, 223-26, 223n64, 225n70); Melzer (1990, 90-92, 113, 279-81); Cooper (1999, 172-79; 2008, 152-63, 176);Marks (2005, 70).
12The apparent
contradiction
regarding
the ethics of harm
is par
or tiallyexplained by the concept of a "conditional duty" what
Hosle
terms an "implicative
imperative,"
which
is not a matter
of
subjectivepreferencebut objectivelyrequires that "under condi tionsA youmust do B" (seeHosle 1998,48). As Rousseau puts it:
of society, isolated man, "Outside owing nothing But in society, where a right to live as he pleases.
to anyone, has he necessarily
livesat the expense of others,he owes them theprice of his keep inwork. This iswithout exception" (E III, 195/470;see also Julie V.3, 464/566f;Letter toBeaumont, CW 9:59/OC 4:976; EOL IX, 278n/406n).
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174
In addition to combining the insights of the Shklarian and Straussian approaches, thismodel links Rousseau's
Figure 3 A Synthesis of the Shklarian and Models
Straussian
MATTHEWD. MENDHAM
prescriptions explicitly to three socio a political contexts, thus enabling better explanation of his apparently contradictory pronouncements. For Rousseau
various moral Solitary Existence
Independent Association
Interdependent Multitude
Individual solution:
Domestic solution:
Political solution:
Solitary Dreamer
Moral Human
Citizen
is, in one sense, a radically political and even determin istic thinker,maintaining that characteristic mentalities
a social lifebased around judgments frequently prescribe the tribe or the family to be the ideal situation. In such
state of "independent commerce," one may at tainmany of the sweet pleasures and cultivations of social life,while avoiding the radical interdependence and con comitant servility of advanced societies (Marks 2005, 12, 61-65, 77-82; see also Plan for a Constitution for Corsica, a middle
3:914-15). The virtuous and domes tically sentimental lifepossible under such circumstances
CW
ll:134-35/OC
seem to constitute "the happiness of the moral (E III, 177/444; V, 442-46, 474/814-820, 859). Whereas forMarks (as formany other recent commen would
human"
tators) thismodel based on Emile is clearly Rousseau's genuine ideal,13 we will suspend such final judgments. Instead, we will adopt Marks's argument for our own purposes and suggest that insofar as Rousseau variously recommends amiddle
state of limited societies in addition
to the two better-known extremes, we may schematize his 1999, 19-20, 26-27, thought as tripartite (cf. O'Hagan 272). Rousseau himself suggests a three-tiered distinction
soon afterhis famous "man or citizen" dichotomy, by say ing that a father, in educating his son, "owes to his species men; he owes to society sociable men; he owes to the state citizens" (E I, 49/262; see Figure 3).
of the leading works of a generation ago took or the Social Contract as Rousseau's the Second Discourse
13Whereas most either most
fundamental
most
fundamental.
a as the work, rising trend is to take Emile Rousseau's claim that Emile is his "greatest
and best book" (RJJI, 23/687) is quoted to this end byMarks (2005,4), Cooper (1999,4,18), and Dent (1988,1, see also 79-82; 1998, 63n6); cf.Todorov (2001, 65; 2002, 181). Conversely,some have downgraded the lifeof theCitizen because it is no longer available
to modern
men
(Todorov,
2001,
12-13,
cf.
25, 30, 55;
2002, 180). The lifeof absolute solitude has been downgraded
because
(Todorov
Rousseau
expresses
2001,31-32,57-58;
deep regrets about his final condition Marks 2002,97,103-5; 2005,70-74;
Neuhouser 2008, 85-86), or because the peculiarities of his life and personality
ought
not
to be confused
with
2002,
99-101, trends, Melzer
104; Reisert
argues
2003,
that Emile
does not apply tophilosophersand isaddressed to an inhabitantof
modern
277-81).
France, where
citizenship
is no
a clear continuum of the rigor ofmoral demands across these social conditions. The Citizen, in addition to being the harshest of these three to outsiders, is also called to be
is not to find his happiness in and may take pleasure only secon
the harshest to himself. He
contemplative delights, darily (at best) in domestic ones. He must instead findhis pleasures chiefly through immersion in all things public,
and in deriving his delight from identification with the harmony and well-being of the community.14 Accord not his ingly, it iswith regard to this social state?and teaching in general?that we find Rousseau mak ing his most radically "constructivist" pronouncements.
moral
For, given the naturally asocial (or at least apolitical) char acter of humans and the aggressively competitive nature of amour-propre among any large group of interdepen
dent people, one must offer a correspondingly radical solution tominimize social interdependence and channel amour-propre toward communally salutary ends. Insti
tuting such a people thus requires, "so to speak, changing human nature" (SC II.7, 69/381; cf. E I, 40/250; DOI In the formation of the II, 177/182; DPE 4-5/242-43). "moral
human"
Emile,
by contrast,
Rousseau's
depiction
differs, speaking of "the natural man living in the state of and society" (E III, 205/483; Reisert 2003,21-22,118-19), of allowing natural potentials of "becoming social" to de
velop in due course (EIV, 290/600; "Moral Letters" V, CW 12:196/OC 4:1109). Emile combines a fundamentally cos
disposition and will, with rich domestic and neighborly associations, and extraordinary physical vigor. Although he is typically gentle, this vigor and dedication
mopolitan
enable him to forcibly defend the weak or his country situations require (cf. Julie 1.57, 128/157; E V, 446,
when
456-57, 472-75/820, 834-35, 857-60). In addition, the methods applied to Emile's education seem much gentler than those applied
to the Citizen,
since Emile
is spared
his "fundamental
thought"in its"maturityand perfection"(Cassirer [1932] 1989,40;
see also 95-96, 128; cf. Todorov, 22, 22n). In contrast with these
and habits naturally flow from certain social conditions, and that certain moral norms and obligations are proper to those conditions (cf. Starobinski [1957] 1988, 292). In terms of our themes of gentleness and severity,we find
longer possible
(1990,
92,
14DPE
15-16,
20-21/254-55,
259-60f;
"Geneva
Manuscript"
1.2,
CW 4:79/OC 3:284.Marks plausiblyargues thatShklarexaggerates the extent of the Citizen's subordination of private freedoms and but they nonetheless remain "more narrowly circum pleasures; see E V, scribed than Emile's or the savage's" (2005, 82, 170n35;
363/700).
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UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'SPARADOXES 175 from any commands of a guardian, from the terrors of a wrathful religion, and from regular immersion in the martial glories of his fatherland. Throughout his extreme social isolation during his boyhood and adolescence, he is spared from the unnatural and premature expansion of his passions. Thus when he comes to adulthood, the duties of virtue he learns are far less burdensome
to him. At this
point, nonetheless, the high degree of severityhe requires in relation to himself is especially evident?in his need for natural religiosity,deep moral inspiration, and voluntary submission to his tutor (E IV, 324-26, 442-49/650-53, he is to overcome his burgeoning passions 814-24)?if when socially necessary (E V, 444-45/817-18; cf. Cohen 1997, 137n41).15 By final contrast, the autobiographical
chafes at all constraint and eventually surren ders himself to every natural impulse. He nonetheless
Rousseau
a dogged confidence that?despite his many interactions with society?he alone has maintained prior the soul of original, natural humanity, and that his nat
maintains
ural goodness has been expressed in his deeper, abstract preferences even when social pressures led him to betrayal or abandonment
(Cooper
1999, 194).
Having distinguished three alternative ideals offered by Rousseau, may we be said to have outlined every fun damental social state or moral life he sketches? A fur ther glance at existing interpretations may call this into question. Although what I have called the Shklarian and Straussian paradigms may be among the best-known overall interpretations, other commentators have focused
upon the "human types" or "cast of characters" presented by Rousseau, and have come across a broader array of pos
sibilities (Cooper 1997, 51; cf.Todorov 2001, 3). Tzvetan Todorov, for instance, follows a differentmethodology than that employed here, and finds that there are three
main ways of lifepraised by Rousseau: (1) theCitizen, (2) the physical and solitary individual, and (3) themoral and universal individual (Todorov 2001,18). These ways con verge nicely with what we have depicted, but in addition
Todorov posits a distinction between the "state of soci ety," out ofwhich each of these lives flow, and the "state of nature." Whereas
comprehend reality,not a simple fact" (Todorov 2001,10; see also 13, 47-48; 2002, 82-84). A stillmore comprehensive picture is offered by Lau
rence Cooper, who deciphers five human types repre senting "the fundamental alternatives that are or have
been available to humanity" (1999, 5If; see also 17-26, 51-59; 2008, 139-40, 148-49, 166-69, 175-76). Again converging with our analysis above, among these types are (1) "the virtuous citizen of the ancient, austere po lis," (2) "the Jean-Jacques of the Reveries and selected
other autobiographical depictions," and (3) "Emile," a natural man living in the state of society (1999, 51).16 In addition, Cooper posits?like Todorov, but as a once possible alternative? (4) "the inhabitant of the pure state of nature": a "savage" who is "asocial and pre-moral" (1999,51,54). And finally but least admirably, we find (5)
"the divided, corrupt social man, exemplified most com monly by the bourgeois but most perfectly (according to Rousseau) by the vain, malicious philosophers who con spired against Jean-Jacques" (1999, 51).17 Among these, it is only the divided social man who has in no sense a
or Prescriptive?
Diagnostic
of nature fully among the human ways of life, since on his reading of Rousseau, "The notion of a state of nature is only a mental construct, a fiction intended to help us
the difference between the state of
good or natural life, since he "lacks both moral and psy chological integrity, [living] in contradiction with nature
in the deepest sense" (1999, 52; cf. 1). Ifwe combine Cooper's savage and his divided social man with Todorov's distinction between stages and alter
natives, we may conclude that both the savage and the divided social man represent stages,with the latterbeing the usual historical outcome
of the former (cf. Cooper Neuhouser 1999, 52; 2008, 65, 117). This suggests, in we are to understand properly the world turn, that if historical alternatives presented by Rousseau, we must carefully investigate not only the lives he endorses as con temporary alternatives, but also his broader (and often critical) philosophy of history. Here we approach better trodden interpretive territory, since his basic philosophy
161have altered Cooper's formy own purposes, but this numbering in should not distort his argument since he presents the characters no For his pictorial schematization particular order (1999,51n26). the relation of each to nature?Cooper's of the types, indicating
main
intention?see
49-50n22.
Although
Cooper's
five types come
closest to the six posited below, his logical schema has minimal correspondence
to mine.
nature and the state of society constitutes a crossing from one stage to another, the contrast of lives following upon the state of society constitutes an alternative (Todorov
17Inview the of typologyofferedbyCooper, itbecomes evidentthat Melzer also discusses the savage and thebourgeois (in addition to thenaturalman of the"individualisticsolution"and theCitizen of
15 These and other contrastsof theCitizen and theMoral Human
does not employ themethodology ofdelineatingeach of themajor social types inRousseau, he isnot led tobring each of these types
2001, 13). However, Todorov does not consider the state
are developed 4.6-7).
and
defended
inMendham
(2009,
sections
4.1-2,
the "political
solution,"
discussed
above).
to the forefront together, and consider and Cooper. of Todorov
manner
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Nonetheless,
since Melzer
their interrelations,
in the
176 MATTHEWD. MENDHAM
Figure 4 A Dualistic Model of the Philosophy ofHistory Primitive Peaceful Savage
"Civilized" Frenzied, oppressive
social Man
of history is apparently presented systematically in the Second Discourse, a relatively brief and frequently read work. According to the best-known version of itshistor ical narrative, humans had lived for ages untold in iso lated self-sufficiency, living entirely in themoment from
the spontaneous fruits of the earth (DOI I, 143/144), with a childlike peacefulness in relation to others, whom
they had no vested interest in harming. Their needs were minimal, purely physical, and thus easily satisfied; their days were spent freely enjoying humanity's natural lazi ness in a "delicious indolence" (DOI 1,134/135; 150/152;
II, 1870192;Note X, 208/211;EOL IX,272n/401n;"The
State ofWar," LPW 169/OC 3:605). This idyllic statewas brought rapidly to a close, however, due to various acci dental and external causes, such as the seizure of private property and the founding of states, thus forcing others to leave the natural state for the sake of survival (DOI II, 1730178; E III, 193/467; "The State ofWar," LPW 167/OC 3:603). The "civilization" thatwas then quickly
established is characterized by vanity, fierceambition, and cruel exploitation. Its feigned order and violent essence
may best be exemplified by war, in which "more mur ders were committed in a single day's fighting, and more horrors at the capture of a single town, than had been
committed in the state of Nature for centuries together over the entire face of the earth" (DOI II, 174/179; see also
"The State ofWar," LPW 162-63,167/OC 3:608-10,603). Rousseau's philosophy of history thus seems to suggest a fundamental historical dualism
(Figure 4). of the ultimate status of the state historical Regardless of nature, Rousseau is quite clear that there can be no re turn en masse to the forests and the savage state (DOI
Note
IX, 203-4/207-8f). This provides further justifica tion fornot modeling italongside the three alternatives he prescribes, in various ways, forhis contemporary readers. An additional complication arises in considering whether Rousseau's primitive history can be adequately character ized as a single stage.Arthur Lovejoy and JonathanMarks are among themore careful scholars who have insisted upon the significance of a middle historical stage, be tween what we may call the "primitive" stage of the "pure state of nature" and the stage of advanced civilization.18
18SeeLovejoy (1923, esp. 165-67, 179-82);Marks (2005, 54-88); see alsoMasters (1968,166-75); Gourevitch (1988,36-37); Melzer
stage as "nascent society," inwhich comparative judgments, amour-propre, and the development of reason and foresight have been set inmo
Rousseau
refers to thismiddle
tion,with deeply ambivalent consequences for humanity, which we will explore below (DOI II, 162-67/165-71). Even with the beginnings of amour-propre, however, an
intensive social interdependence could not exist before the invention of agriculture and metallurgy (168/17 If; cf. EOLIX, 272/400). And it is interdependence which seems to be the decisively negative turning point, since as long as humans applied themselves only to tasks and arts "that did not require the collaboration of several hands, they
lived free, healthy, good, and happy as far as they could by their Nature be, and continued to enjoy the gentle sweetness of independent association [des douceurs d'un commerce independant]..." (DOI II, 167/171; seeMelzer 1990, 70n2, 74-81,108,290).19 Although Rousseau's dis cussion of thismiddling stage is terse and?like the "mid
dle way" represented by Emile?often overlooked, he ex states mean that it occupied "a just between the plicitly
indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour-propre, [and thus] must have been the hap piest and themost durable epoch" (DOI II, 167/171; cf. Marks 2005, 64-65; Melzer 1990, 70; Masters 1968, 168, 171-75). It seems significant enough to include in our basic model, then, and upon consideration, these three stages seem to be differentiated by precisely the same so cial structures which differentiate the three prescriptive types.Although some scholars have previously identified
parallels between a descriptive type and a prescriptive type (e.g.,Marks 2005, 70-71, 77-79), tomy knowledge none have anticipated the following systematic analysis (Figure 5). We must
pause to explain the terminology, since usage of "savage" seems looser than his un derlying concepts (cf. E II, 108n/345n; DOI II, 166/170). On one hand, he is remarkably clear in distinguishing the two states in question. The earliest state of humanity, which occurs in "the pure state of nature" or "the prim itive state" (DOI I, 141-42, 159/142-43, 162), is one in Rousseau's
which a human might meet another "perhaps no more
than twice in theirlife" (144/146;cf. II, 161/164f).In
some passages these terms are explicitly contrasted with a nascent state of society,which is characterized by "inde
pendent association," and exemplified by "most" of the "Savage Peoples who are known to us" (DOI Exordium, (1990, 63, 70). Cooper is aware of this "tribal society' (1999, 17,
31-32,
44, 50,
188n5),
but does
not
integrate
it into his five-type
model discussed above,perhapsbecause he does not finditto reveal anythingpivotal about the relationofnature to thegood life. 19Foralternativetranslationsof thisphrase, seeEPW167; CW 3:49; Marks (2005, 61,168nll); Rosenblatt (1997, 78).
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UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'SPARADOXES 177
Figure 5 The Basic Sociopolitical Typology Solitary existence Primitive
Descriptive, Diagnostic Prescriptive, Constructive
Domestic
(DOI 1,157/159f;Marks 2005,101). By contrast, we shall see below how the Essay on theOrigin of Languages uses a "Savage" in a narrower, technical sense, referring to
socialized people who subsist chiefly by hunt ing. Partially on this basis, then, I introduce "Primitive" as a noun to refer to people of the solitary,primitive state.
minimally
an applying Rousseau's broader use of "Savage" in instancewhich clearly refers to one or another social state, I will add a prefix: "solitary-Savage" or "social-Savage."
When
For his overarching category of "Savage," Iwill often sub stitute "noncivilized."
of thismodel hinges largely The plausibility upon a
distinction between diagnostic (or descriptive, or critical) and prescriptive (or constructive) teachings inRousseau. This distinction is central to Kant and later Kantian
to by interpreters of Rousseau, while also appealed non-Kantian interpreters, such as the Straussians.20 Put are understood as diag simply, the two early Discourses
so bleak they nosing the ills ofmodern society, in terms seem later works whereas often (including Julie, hopeless; Emile, and the Social Contract) propose various remedies for those ills, none of which involve a return to the state of nature. Some disputes properly remain regarding how as the unqualifiedly this distinction may be applied, such extent towhich the patterns exemplified in the diagnos tic thought are retained and reapplied in the prescrip tive thought (Marks 2005, 70-79, 113-15; cf. Todorov 2001, 18). Nevertheless, themodel seems accurate inso
far as it suggests a clear distinction between a philosophy the usual course of human social of history?depicting Beginning
of Human
History"
and
froma PragmaticPoint ofView (in 2007,AK 8:116-17 Anthropology and 7:326-27,
respectively).
Frenzied,
Individual solution: Solitary dreamer
these peoples is far less clear, referring to them indiscrim inately as "Savage," in dualistic opposition to "civilized"
Interdependent multitude
Savage
(social-Savage)
Note XV, 218/219).On 132/132;I, 157/160;II, 166f/170;
see "Conjectural
association
(solitary-Savage)
the other hand, perhaps due to the polemical require ments of the Second Discourse in contrasting noncivilized lifefavorablywith civilized life,his terminology regarding
20For Kant,
Independent
solution: Moral Human
oppressive "Civilized" Political solution: Citizen
a series of pro development and moral decline?and from this for process and thus radically breaking posals seen how, in his We its end. have "civilized" avoiding most prominent narrative, Rousseau attributes the rise of civilization to accidental factorswhich are external to hu
man nature (DOI Preface, 124/122f; 1,137f, 159/138,162; EIV, 212/491). Nonetheless, he simultaneously maintains
that this process has unfolded with overwhelming uni formity, and in accordance with human capacities which
he acknowledges to be latent. This has drawn intelligent criticism from the beginning.21
his persuasiveness on this point may be we have seen that he does not believe re challenged, an to earlier, spontaneous social state is an op turning tion. Thus for any prescriptive solution, breaking from However
the course of civilization requires amind and will power ful enough to transcend the usual course of thought and life in instituting a new way. If this were not daunting
enough, certain highly favorable social conditions also seem to be required. In the case of the political solution, "the Legislator" along the lines of Lycurgus is required? someone who is able to "persuade without convincing."
This, in turn, requires a people who areminimally social ized, and thus remain malleable.22 Any robust form of the
21As Charles
Bonnet,
a well-known
Genevan
naturalist,
objected:
"Allthatresultsimmediatelyfromthefacultiesofman, should itnot
It would be as unreasonable to result from his nature7.... have given birth to to complain that these faculties, in developing, that God has given man such that state, as itwould be to complain CW 3:123). See Rousseau's faculties" ("Letter from M. Philopolis,"
be said
repliesat "Letterto Philopolis," EPW 224/OC 3:232; cf.DOI II, Marks appeals to thisexchangeas evidence thatRousseau 167/171. believehis exotericposition, thatthenaturalmust did not sincerely be equatedwith theoriginal (2005, 28-33, 98). 22SC II.7-10,
III.8; Considerations
on the Government
of Poland
II,
LPW180/OC 3:956;Conf.XII, 543-44/648-49; cf.DOI II, 175/180. rela to flourish over time and experience Interestingly, for polities in the natural tions of sweetness, a moderate degree of harshness
environmentalso seems required(SC III.8,101/416;Plan foraCon Corsica,CW ll:136/OC 3:914; LA 60-61, 93/295-96, stitutionfor 319/54-55,85).
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Ij8
domestic solution seems to require a brilliant and benev olent manipulator of circumstances, such asWolmar or Emile's tutor (Shklar 1969, 127-64); alongside a divinely as Julieor Sophie; inspiring paragon of female virtue, such as well as a moderate degree of decency in one's govern
ment and a robust degree of isolation from advanced and urban societies. Finally, the individual solution?in addi
a person of formidable brilliance? seems to require a still higher degree of rustic isolation (cf.DOI Note IX, 203-4/207-8f).
tion to presupposing
Hard or Soft Primitivism? The six-typemodel above seems useful as a firstapproach to Rousseau's teachings on the social forms and moral
possibilities of human life. For those concerned with the issues of gentleness and severity, however, certain com
plications soon emerge regarding Rousseau's diagnos with deep implications for tic thought?complications his critique of civilization and itsmost intensified form, modernity. We have seen how, in the images of the Second Discourse which would prove so influential in later cults of sentimentality and romanticism, Rousseau appeals to
a peaceful and idle primitive existence as a device for exposing the frenzied, unnatural oppressions of self and others which are typical of civilization. It has accordingly
been observed thatRousseau
nowhere uses the term "no
ble savage" with which he is often associated, and that his image of humans in the pure state of nature is not re
motely "noble" in the usual sense (Melzer 1990, 55nl3). Nevertheless, it is equally striking that in the Discourse on the Sciences and theArts and in several other writ
ings, he offers far different images of early humanity?as thoroughly vigorous, stern in theirmorals, and at times
pitiless in their fury and vengeance. Such images are in voked to expose, not the excess harshness or cruelty of civilized and modern life,but rather its softness, weak ness, and decadence. In short, at firstand second glance, seems to engage in a blatant form of philo sophical self-indulgence, seeking to have itboth ways in
Rousseau
describing the softness and severity of both civilization and savagery, and in evaluating themoral status of both
softness and severity.Otherwise put, he seems to insist, somehow, that savage life is to be seen as simultaneously soft,hard, and thus praiseworthy, while civilized life is also
soft, hard, and yet despicable. We can put a finer point on the problem by invoking Arthur Lovejoy and George Boas's distinction between two traditions which they term "hard primitivism" and "soft primitivism." The soft va rietywas exemplified inmany paeans to "the Golden Age
MATTHEW
D. MENDHAM
under the Saturnian dispensation," during which humans enjoyed abundant security, leisure, and simple pleasures, bestowed by Nature as a gentle and indulgent mother
(Lovejoy and Boas 1935, 10-11, 27-28, 46-47, 64-65, 304-14). By contrast, hard primitivism paid tribute to the constant overcoming of physical hardship, poverty,
and threats from harsh climates and predatory animals; among the "rude, hardy fellows" of this tradition were the Scythians, theGetae, and later theGermans (Lovejoy and
Boas
1935, 9-11, 70-73, 315-67). The most immediately apparent solution would be to find in Rousseau's solitary-Savage the bases for soft
primitivism, and to find in his social-Savage those of hard primitivism. In the later state, amour-propre has been awakened, and thus pride, the drive for honor, and the need to be loved and praised superlatively by
Note XV, 218/219;E IV, 213f/493; all (DOI I, 152/154;
RJJ I, 9-10/669-70; II, 112-13/805-6). One then came to as physical harm, judge any intentional wrong not only as but also "contempt for his person," and "vengeances became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and cruel" (DOI II, 166/170). Jealousy springing from new ideas of compara tivemerit, beauty, and romantic attraction also provided powerful new kindling for explosions of social violence (DOI II, 165-66/169-70; cf. E V, 429-3 l/796-98f). In deed, Rousseau was led to reason philosophically toward a gentler, prehistorical, primitive state precisely because of the historical and ethnographical evidence which de
picted the cruel vengeances of humans
in thismiddling
stage: This is precisely the state reached bymost of the Savage Peoples known to us; and it is forwant of drawing adequate distinctions between ideas, and noticing how far these Peoples already were
from the first state ofNature, thatmany hastened to conclude thatman is naturally cruel and that
he needs political order to be made gentle [a be soin de police pour Vadoucir], whereas nothing is as gentle [si doux] as he in his primitive state
when, placed by Nature at equal distance from the stupidity of the brutes and the fatal enlight
enment of civil man, and restricted by instinct and reason alike to protecting himself against the harm that threatens him, he is restrained by Natural pity from doing anyone harm, without being moved to it by anything, even after ithas been done to him. (DOI II, 166/170)
We may note here in passing Rousseau's frequent ap peals to historical and ethnographical evidence regarding the social-Savage state,which deeply undermine the view
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UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'SPARADOXES 179 that he is indifferentto empirical evidence.23 Among this vast range of sources, he takes a special interest in the Caribs, who seem to provide decisive evidence for certain perhaps even the ridiculous to portray
softer elements of thenoncivilized?and "it is all themore
primitive?state: Savages as constantly murdering one another in order to satisfy theirbrutality, as this opinion goes directly counter to experience, and as theCaribs, which of all existing Peo
ples has so far deviated least from the state ofNature, are in fact also themost peaceful in their loves and the least (DOI 1,156/158). Rousseau's claim given to jealousy..." that the Savage soul yields itself "to the sole sentiment of
its present existence, with no idea of the future," is also based partially on observations of the Carib, who "sells
his Cotton bed in the morning and comes back weep ing to buy it back in the evening, not having foreseen that he would need it for the coming night" (143/144).24
This may reflect the profound indifference of all noncivi lized people to all but repose and freedom, in contrast to the citizen's frenzied pursuits of power and reputation? concepts which must have no meaning
for a Carib
(DOI
II, 187/192f).
a complete dichotomy between a soft primitivism grounded in the earliest humans and a hard primitivism grounded in the social-Savage is far from ade Nevertheless,
quate. For, just as the above examples of Carib immediacy 23 One
finds a common
primitive
to distinguish between the pure, reasons (at least which Rousseau
failure
state of nature?about
chiefly)philosophically ratherthan empirically?from themid
account for the error of Shklar dling, savage state. This may largely was "utterly uninterested in history, past in claiming that Rousseau see also 6,17n3), inmain or future" (1969,1; and that of Todorov that "the
taining
state of nature"
a mental
is "only
construct,
a
fiction"and "purely imaginary" (2001, 10, 13; cf. 48, 57; 2002, Contrast
82-84). cludes
the excellent
that it seems
essential
argumentation to Rousseau's
of Kelly, who con project, not that his
correct or that it of the pure state of nature is historically could have been so (2006, esp. 79-80; is not so, but that it perhaps of logical and estimations of the combination other more balanced account
are offered by Meek in the Second Discourse elements empirical 1999, 17-18, 41-42). 1923, 169nl; Cooper 1976, 78-79; Lovejoy
24Theaccountof thesoldbed derivesfroma Jesuit,JeanBaptistedu
inHistoire the natural goodness of the Caribs Tertre, who defended les Francois (1667). For du Tertre's generale des Antilles habiteespar
influenceon Rousseau, seePire (1956,359); DOI Note VI, 195/200;
cf.OC 131).
and Hulme and Whitehead( 1992, esp. 129, 3:1321-22,1346, out the Caribs as seem strange that Rousseau singles
Itmay
being closest to theprimitivestate,given theirreputationforbe ing unusually
cruel to outsiders,
ambitiously
warlike,
and frequent
eatersof beast and human flesh (Abulafia2008, 125-26; cf.Buf fon inOC 3:1345, on 171nl). This reputationis based originally
on
the fearful testimony
more larger and vastly excluded nonetheless, to the state of nature due to their
of the Tamos, the Tainos
group. Perhaps peaceable as closest from consideration
a
were,
extensive intensive practices of agriculture, hierarchical and of canoes, power manship
crafts trade, advanced structures (cf. Abulafia
2008, 117-23). For the conflictingbiases broughtby all European observersof thenewworld, seeMeek (1976,37);Weber (2005,41).
are used to show that some softer aspects of primitive life are retained in the later Savage state, the Caribs are also appealed to in establishing a certain hardness which seems to apply even to the earliest states. The reason why Caribs (likeAfricans) live in "themost profound security" with regard to ferocious beasts, is that they have realized they
surpass such beasts in skillmore than the beasts surpass them in strength (DOI I, 136/136-37, 137n). The prob lem of such beasts may suggest that nature is not as gentle a mother as is sometimes suggested, and human use of
stones, sticks, and arrows is often required to compensate. More generally, Rousseau frequently depicts life in or near the original state of nature as requiring and gen erating an extraordinary hardiness in comparison with civilized humanity. In keeping with the traditions of hard
primitivism, he appeals to the toughening effects of in clement weather, changes of seasons, and fatigue from es caping ferocious beasts (DOI I, 135/135; II, 161f/165). In such a setting those without robust constitutions perish,
and those with strong constitutions give birth to similarly endowed children who undergo the same travails, thus acquiring "all the vigor of which the human species is
capable" (1,135/135; see also 157/160; Note XII, 215/217; EOL X, 279/407; E 1,59/277). Their physical capacities re sharp distinction from the garding self-preservation?in organs concerning softness (la molesse), sensuality, and exceedingly fine-tuned. This reason delicacy?become
ing is confirmed by travelers' reports of "most Savage Peoples," which express astonishment at their strength and acute senses of sight, hearing, and smell (DOI I, 140/140; Note VI, 194-95/199-200). Rousseau similarly
observes that although civilized man, with advanced ma overcome the savage, if they chinery in hand, can easily were both unarmed itwould be a still more unequal contest in the savage's favor (I, I35/135f). At the same time, since primitive man's passions are minimal, and his reason and amour-propre are uncultivated, there are
no temptations to disobey the "gentle voice [douce voix]" of pity, and he will naturally seek his own good with the least possible harm to others, being fierce only oc casionally and as preservation requires (DOI Preface, 154-57; Note IX, 127/125f; I, 135-36, 152-54/136-37, 198f/203). Thus vengeance is only mechanical and im mediate, seldom leading to bloodshed; for such reasons Rousseau declares them "fierce [farouches] rather than wicked"
(154/157).25 By comparison, we have seen above
25Cf.EOL IX, 267-68/395-96,which explainshow conditions of uncertainty,
fear, and weakness
made
it necessary
for each man
of "the firsttimes" to be "a ferocious [feroce]animal" (267/395).
Here, never
who has "Someone is contrasted with wicked: too, ferocious reflected cannot be clement, or just, or pitying; nor can he
be wicked and vindictive" (268/395f). In view of the comment
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180 how in social-Savages, amour-propre makes outbursts of vengeance more intense and less limited by mere self preservation, and thus these outbursts may be described as "cruel" rather than (themore beast-like) "fierce."26 Unfortunately, while one might outline the soft and
primitivism with some con seems how these elements cohere. it far less clear fidence, His primary account in the Second Discourse seems to hard elements of Rousseau's
be one of an overwhelmingly abundant and secure orig inal state (DOI I, 134/134f), which was interrupted by accidental and foreign causes. At the same time, among the difficulties with which "nascent man" is "soon" pre sented are ferocious beasts and the height of trees (II, 16If/165), and these would seem to harden the hu
man
to
condition from nearly the beginning. According Jonathan Marks, we ought to infer that, for Rousseau, these harsher aspects of life?requiring foresight and to the very circumstances?are from present hardening beginning. And thuswe must also infer that inhis genuine teaching, nature and human nature are essentially dishar
monious
cf.Cooper 1999,189). (Marks 2005,5-7,26-28; further argues thatRousseau's depiction of a lush and idyllic state of nature must therefore be a form of
Marks
satire, intended to undermine his previously stated defi nition of "nature" as equivalent to origins and therefore independent of history and circumstance 15-38, 93-104).
(Marks 2005,
on
lack of reflection, this seems to converge with the category of in the the first state of nature in the Second Discourse. However,
Essay, familiesexisted in these firsttimes (267/395), and the rise of sweeter
sentiments
and mutual
occurs with
taming
a mixture
betweenfamilies (277, 278/405f,406), rather thanwith the rise
of families
due
to fixed settlements,
as
in the Second
Discourse
(DOI II, 164/167f).These contrasts seem to derive largelyfrom thedifferingtheologicalassumptions of the twoworks,with the Discourse hypothetical!/excluding the divine bestowal of "lights and Precepts,"
and
accordingly
positing
a
lengthy primitive
state
void of lastingsociality (DOI Exordium, 132/132).The laterand unpublished with ancient
the authority Essay claims to "reconcile records," positing a relapse after Noah's
II, 166/170passage (quoted above) actually
became and terrible, and men bloodthirsty says that "vengeances I have restated Rousseau's ultimate position here as sug cruel. In addi (not men as such) became gesting that vengeances cruel,"
tion, "cruel" another's
However, it is also possible that Rousseau posits two different kinds of primitive states, with one being con can siderably softer than the other, and this possibility
be supported by the Essay on the Origin of Languages. There Rousseau derides European philosophers for pro jecting their own "barren and harsh" conditions onto the firstmen,
since humans
their origins in the farmore
(like all animals) surely had abundant and accommo
datingSouth (EOLVIII, 266/394).These lushand fertile climates allow men to live more easily, and thus with out one another (IX, 272, 277/400, 405; cf. II, 253/380; PF X, 56-57/532-33). This may converge with the claim in the Second Discourse that as humanity spread, "diffi
culties multiplied together with men," leading them to different sorts of terrain and climates, and thus different
ways of life(DOI II, 162/165;cf.Note XVII, 221/222). Itmay be, then, that to whatever extent one inhabited a Southern climate with a low population, ones condi
tionswere quite "prodigal," whereas population pressures may have forced many to themore "miserly" North (cf. EOL X, 279/407). Alternatively, higher population would at least lead to greater scarcitywithin the South, making "the height of trees" (DOI II, 161/165) newly problematic. For such reasons, we may suggest that, forRousseau, al
was prob though an unqualifiedly softprimitive existence are certain soft elements and ably quite rare, although incorporated in perhaps any lifeprior to nascent society and especially civilization, there are some solitary, prim itive states which seem predominantly soft,while others seem predominantly hard.27 In order to avoid confusion
normatively loaded uses of the terms "soft" (mow,molle) and "hard" (dur), we will henceforth dub those primitive existences which predominantly align with Lovejoy and Boas's category of "soft primitivism" as with Rousseau's
"Idyllic Primitives," and those predominantly aligning with their "hard" category as "Vigorous Primitives."
of Scripture Flood "into
thedull barbarism theywould have been in iftheyhad been born of the earth" (EOL IX, 271/399, cf. 269/397).On thesediffering assumptions, seeDuchet and Launay (1967, 428-29); Gourevitch (1986, 125-26,137). 26AlthoughtheDOI
MATTHEWD. MENDHAM
Sweet or Cruel Savagery? In addition to these harsher aspects of solitary life, any strictdichotomy between a softprimitive state and a hard social-Savage state is further undermined by the obser
vation that the romantic love made
possible by nascent
be taken as a momentary indifference to in a moment of rage, rather than a fixed and
here should
suffering
The passage shouldprobably positivedelight inanother'ssuffering.
be taken as rhetorically overstating the cruelty of the social-Savages of whom we have records, accepting the extreme evaluations of one's interlocutors for the sake of argument before charging them
with fallaciouslyinferring originalhumanityfromtheserecords(cf. "Idea of theMethod in theComposition of a Book," EPW 301/OC 2:1243).
27Marks
thus seems
to underestimate
the role of climate
in arguing
thatthepeaceful,easilysatisfiedstatedepicted intheFirstPartof the
Second Discourse
"probably
never existed,
since nature
is harsh
and
does not leavehuman beings inpeace" (2005, 37, emphasis added; see 34-37).
Consider
also Rousseau's
later attempt
to establish
a
colony of rabbits,amid conditionswhich might be described as predominantlysoft (Rev.V, 44/1044).
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UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'SPARADOXES l8l society is not solely a tale of jealousy and violence. Af ter a chain of events led from increased interaction to increased rationality, the use of tools, and finally the development of huts, families could be established and differentiated (DOIII, 164/167). The habit of living to to rise "the first developments of the then gave gether the sweetest [les plus doux] sentiments known conjugal love and Paternal love" (164/168).28 rise of such ideas and sentiments is said to tame
heart...
to man, The
(166/169). In the Essay, Rousseau similarly de picts youths' initial interactions with new, sweeter sights outside their family,which render the heart "less savage":
humans
spirited young people gradually for got their ferociousness [ferocite],littleby little they tamed one another; in striving tomake themselves understood "Beneath old oaks...
they learned to make themselves intelligible" (EOL IX, 277/406). The cultivation of romantic love thus seems to increase sweetness as well as severity, and this paradox is not lost on Rousseau. Indeed, "at the least obstacle" this "tender and sweet [tendre et doux] sentiment" becomes an "impetuous frenzy," "and the gentlest [la plus douce] of all passions receives sacrifices of human blood" (DOI II, 165/169). In addition to these outbursts regarding the
beloved, we also find at this stage the first historical ana on a logue to the insider-outsider distinction exemplified
broader scale by Rousseau's model of the patriotic Citi zen: "Hence the apparent contradictions one sees in the fathers of nations. Such naturalness and such inhumanity, such ferocious ways [moeurs siferoces] and such tender
hearts, somuch love for their family and aversion toward their species. All their sentiments concentrated among their near ones were therefore themore energetic" (EOL
IX, 268/396).29 Thus the state of independent association ismarked by the cultivation of human capacities for the sweeter and gentler sentiments, and at the same time a vast increase in the stakes of threats to the enjoyment or of one's beloveds?whether by romantic competition tribal outsiders' encroachments?which 28This
is part
of the reason
the leading
studies
leads to intense of amour-propre
clearlyestablishthat it isnot simplyevil (asmany accountswould
have
it), but simultaneously
the source of the greatest human
evils
and thehighesthuman possibilitiesand goods. SeeDent (1988, esp. 4, 20-25, 52-58, 76, 85; 1998,63-64); Cooper (1999, esp. 114-72);
Neuhouser
250, 267).
(2008,
esp. 9-11,
53, 59-70,
119, 156, 187-88,
218-19,
in the moeurs of an contradictions 29Explaining merely apparent theme among social thinkers associated cient times is a common
with historicism.Ferocityor crueltyiscommonlythemore negative of would place greatness or magnificence pole, but several thinkers the more positive pole. affection?as than Rousseau's soul?rather
See esp. Vico ([1744] 2001, ?38, 272, 991); Mill ([1836] 1977, 130-31); and Nietzsche ([1887] 1994, 1.11, 26). Formany early
modern
observations
Rahe(1994, 235-51).
on the violence
or cruelty of the ancients,
see
inmore primitive life. this stage "the golden age," since meetings with outsiders so rarely occurred: "Everywhere the state of war prevailed, yet the whole
expressions of cruelty unknown Rousseau nonetheless considers
earth was at peace" (269/396). And although this aspect of his thought is by no means clearly developed, itmay be that it is these harder attributes of both primitive and
later savage life to which Rousseau appeals in the firsr Discourse and the polemics which followed it. In criticiz
ing the luxurious softness ofmodern humanity, he there appeals to the rude, rustic virtues of such (often despised) peoples as the Scythians, the early Persians, the Spartans, (DSA I, 11/11-12; Letter to Grimm, EPW virtues include a vigorous endurance Such 58/OC 3:65). of pain, martial strength, true courage, "good faith,hospi and the Goths
a great horror of debauchery..."
tality,30justice, and...
(LR66/74f).31
In contrast to these conflicting psychological devel opments, certain material attributes of nascent society lead straightforwardly to softening. Due to amore settled
life, the sexes begin to establish differentways of living, with thewomen becoming more sedentary, while "both Sexes... began to lose something of their ferociousness and vigor" as a result of "their slightly softer [un peu plus molle] life" (DOIII, 164/168). Through such factors as the me mastering of useful animals (162/166) and the rise of chanical conveniences, the body is continually weakened in comparison with primitive life (164f/168; cf. DSA II, 20-21/22-23). And just as our domesticated animals are smaller and less vigorous than wild ones, so also humans are enervated from our "soft [molle] and effeminate way
of life"(DOI I, 138f/139). Whereas ominous
here anticipates the luxury, the Essay focuses upon
the Second Discourse
rise of modern
an economic practice which enables much of the leisure we have found in the primitive state, in combination with social sentiments of nascent society. There man consid precisely defines "three stages of
the broader Rousseau
ered in relation to society," where "everything is seen to be related in its principle to the means by which men as... a function of the provide for their subsistence, and nature of the soil." Namely, "The sav climate and of the man age is a hunter, the barbarian a herdsman, civil
a tillerof the soil" (EOL IX, 272/400).32 Although the 30See "The Levite of Ephraim," CW 7:356/OC 2:12126 Rev. IX, 87171097;cf.Montesquieu [1748] 1989,XX.2. 31 DSA Cf. 1,7/8;II, 20-22/22-24. For thesense inwhich thesetraits are natural,
see Cooper
(1999,108-12).
32This three-stage model
is also
related
to languages
(see EOL
V,
257/385).There is a lessformalbut stillevidentdistinctionamong the savage, barbarian,
and
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civilized
states
in the Second Discourse
MATTHEW
182
Essay claims to investigate "the firstmen" (269/396) and "the firsttimes" (cf. 267n/395n), it either bypasses or re
D. MENDHAM
In contrast with the "less active and more
noncivilized.
peaceable majority":
primitive state, since the Essay's "first are united in families, and apparently must engage
vises theDiscourses men"
The most active, themost robust, those who were always on themove could only live off fruit and
in hunting, herding, or farming, in contrast to the Dis course's mere gathering of the spontaneous fruits of the
the hunt; so theybecame hunters, violent, blood thirsty and, in time, warriors, conquerors, and usurpers. History has stained its records with the
earth.33Apparently having already commenced the cycle of human industry responding to new needs, the greater number of people, who were "less active and more peace
crimes of these firstKings; war and conquests are nothing but manhunts. Once they had con quered, it only remained for them to devour
able," stopped this frenzied cycle "as soon as they could" by gathering and taming cattle (271/399). Thus pastoral lifewas born, which Rousseau praises as "the most self sufficient art," since it "almost effortlessly" provides hu
men.
predominantly soft in both labor and social (i.e., familial) relations.We might finallynote that it is of such pastoral images that Rousseau drew many of his most grandil
images, of which he himself was the fondest.34 Accordingly, a more accurate moniker for him and his oquent
theoretical progeny may be "the gentle barbarian," rather than "the noble savage."
However, in the same pages we are introduced to Rousseau's most severe human type?at least among the
as well.
In claiming Rousseau civilization, remained Barbarians
that metallurgy and agriculture gave rise to writes that certain peoples "seem to have as long as they in one of the Arts engaged
without the other" (DOI II, 168/171f;cf.Note VI, 194/199;SC PF XVI, 75/560). See alsoMontesquieu ([1748] III.8, 101f/415f; 1989, XVIII.
11). On
the mode
of subsistence
in Enlightenment
stadial theories,seeMeek (1976, esp. 76, 90-93f);Weber (2005, 40).
ferocious
[feroce]. (EOL
IX,
271/399)35 Such a lifeof hardened and habitual bloodthirstiness does not seem to be paralleled among the noncivilized humans depicted in the Second Discourse.36 It is not immediately
clear how this textual difference should be explained. It may simply be that the purpose of theDiscourse is to indi cate the origins of inequality, and accordingly it can only rapidly outline the intermediate forms of society which are depicted at length in the Essay (cf.Duchet and Launay
1967,434,423).371 would also suggest,more speculatively, that since the Essay began as a fragment of theDiscourse, but was probably not completed until around 1761, the
Essays more impartial and descriptive tone may indicate a shift away from the harsh and somber Discourse.38 The 35 See
the
remarks
on
meat
eating
and
cruelty
in
E
II,
153-55/411-14; JulieIV.10, 372f/453;RJJII, 114/808.Cf. Julieon the desensitizing impactof dueling (Julie1.57, 130/160).On the
other hand, Emile the more dangerous
to to distract him from hunting of his burgeoning sexuality (see EIV,
is introduced passions
320-21/644-45).
33Discussed
in note
25 above.
spontaneous
primitive,
It is noteworthy that Rousseau's "fruits" of the earth do not include animals,
sincehumans arenot originallycarnivorous(DOI Note V, 194/199; contraMeek 1976,84,86f).The incompatibility ofhuntingwith the primitivestatemay be furtherreinforced by theclaim thathunting isnot at all favorableto population growth,quicklydepleting its land of prey. Thus all of "the fathers of large nations" were shepherds rather than hunters, and hunting should be
or
"less as a primary means
of subsistence
farmers
regarded to the than as a supplement
pastoral state" (EOLIX, 271, 271n/399,399n).
34SeeConf. XI, 491/586; "The Levite of Ephraim,"CW 7:356/OC
2:1212f.
him
and makes
(277/406). For such reasons, it seems that at least themajority of people in nascent
ment and boredom"
society enjoyed "the gentle sweetness of independent as sociation" as herdsmen, and the tenor of their liveswas
learned to
firstde hunting, herding, and agriculture?the of velops strength, skill, speed body, courage and cunning of soul, ithardens [endurcit] man
abled countless hours of the romantic taming we have depicted, since "time had no other measure than enjoy
plausible
their successors
the threeways of lifeavailable toman?
do_Of
mans with food, clothing, and tents. "[F]ather of repose and of the indolent passions" (271f/400), pastoral life en
is what
This
are associated with romance images Rousseau's he describes soul, as when
Pastoral
flict within
and
the con
his
intoxica
tions during thewriting of Julie: "and behold the graveCitizen
of Geneva,
behold
the austere
Jean-Jacques,
nearly
forty-five years
old, suddenlybecoming the extravagantshepherdagain" (Conf. IX, 358f/427).
36The origin of hunting is brieflymentioned in theDiscourse, but the hunters' lifestyleis not described. Also, unlike the Es the Discourse say's psychological interpretation, points to climate and terrain: "In forests [humans] made bows and arrows, and be came Hunters
and Warriors..."
(DOIII,
162/165;
similarly, PF X,
56/532). Itmay be thatthemost active,potentiallywarlike people
were
drawn
to the harsh environment
of the forest, or that the harsh
environmentof theforestquickly led to thedominance of themost active, potentially
warlike
people.
37 Consider also thedifferingtheological assumptions of the two works (note 25 above), which allow theEssay to essentiallyomit the solitary
38Gourevitch less critical tioning
stage. also observes
how
ismore descriptive and men (1986, 140). Without seem to distance himself from
the Essay
than the Second Discourse
the Essay,
Rousseau
does
theDiscoursewhen he blames Diderot forgiving ita "harsh [dur]
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UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'SPARADOXES 183 polemical thesis of theDiscourse required it to depict non civilized lifeas characteristically softand gentle, especially during itsmost properly natural phase, which ismore
Figure 6 The Detailed Sociopolitical Typology ofNoncivilized Humans
primitive (and thus gentle) than the lives of most con temporary savages. Itmay be for this reason that it some
times blurs the distinction between the solitary Primitive and the social-Savage (cf.Masters 1968,171-74). By con trast, the Essay may be seen as partially undermining
the Discourse
Whatever
evoked for noncivilized
life as a whole.39
the reasons for this textual difference, theDis
course's closest approximation to the bloodthirsty hunters is found after the invention of landed property and agri
culture, when those who were stronger,more skillful,and more ingenious employed various stratagems which rad
PF VII, icallyheightenedinequality(DOI II, 169f/174;
49/522). This eventually led to a class war inwhich the rich "had scarcely become acquainted with the pleasure of dominating than they disdained all other pleasures..."
(DOI II, 171/175f). Although the Second Discourse thus seems to consign thoroughgoing viciousness to civilized peoples, the polemics following theFirstDiscourse had ul
harmonious conditions
Images of severity: under scarce, violent conditions
vices, degrades reason, depraves the soul, and rendersmen similar to beasts..." {Observations, EPW 49/OC 3:54). such vices despicably feed their self Peoples exemplifying
indulgence, ambition, and idleness "with the sweat, the blood and the toil of amillion wretches" (LR 72/82; cf.Let ter toGrimm, EPW 54/OC 3:62). Such images of vile, non civilized hardness are rare inRousseau, but as we can see from the immediately above, even these could be readily
spontaneous contentment, peacefulness, docility Vigorous Primitive: exertions for
Social-Savage, or Barbarian: sweet and gentle;
occasional bursts of cruelty Hunter-Savage: bloodthirsty, habitual violence to beasts and
sustenance; occasional bursts of ferocity _humanity_
applied to expose the genealogy and character of civilized privilege.40
Figure 6 may schematize Rousseau's images of the softness and severity of noncivilized life.The dotted line indicates a distinction which
is not as explicit or readily as in Rousseau the distinctions indicated by solid implicit lines. His apparent vagueness here could be partially ex plained insofar as the groups on either side of the dotted line are similar in social complexity and historical locus, differing only in the favorability of theirnatural and social environments.
timately conceded the presence of certain vices among the noncivilized. In contrast to the "reasonable" and "mod
est" ignorance which Rousseau finds essential to ancient virtue, "There is a ferocious and brutal ignorance, born of a wicked heart and a deceitful mind; a criminal igno rance even of the duties of humanity, which multiplies the
IdyllicPrimitive:
Images of softness: under abundant,
the polemics of theDiscourse, since in dwelling at length upon the delights of the Barbarians' sociability, itempha sizes an exception to the layer of theDiscourse which was directed against society as such. And in clearly depict ing a habitually bloodthirsty yet preagricultural human type, the Essay may naturally dampen the longing which
Independent association
Solitary existence
Soft or Harsh Civilization? Ifwe turn briefly to Rousseau's depictions of advanced civilization and modernity,41 we might find that the
bulk ofmodern humanity is similarly dichotomized into those under conditions of abundance and softness, and those under conditions of scarcity and severity. Impor tantly, however, these favorable conditions are attained not through the spontaneous abundance of the earth or the pastoral harnessing of animals, but through advanced
40 of savages in general seems Smith's depiction By contrast, Adam For Smith, savages typi far closer to Rousseau's hunter-Savages. encounter harsh which conditions very give rise to hard and cally
an extreme endurance of pain, along virtues, cultivating and for drives vengeance cruelty against their enemies. strong to are often concealed, but are "all mounted latter capacities
austere with The tone" and "dark air" (Conf. VIII,
For the Essay's
326n/389n).
thehighestpitchof fury"(Smith [1759-90] 1982,V.2.8-13,204-9;
begin
ning as a fragmentof theDiscourse, seeDuchet and Launay (1967, 436-37).
For the probable
date of the Essay's
relevant
sections,
see
Meek (1976, 90-91); Starobinski(OC 5:cci-ccii). 39 All
of this being
said, the hunter-Savages
do not
seem
to be af
among themselves. In this way, even theywould parallel the in exemplifying the "essential" moral "good to trait?being
thepeople withwhom one lives" (cf.E I, 39/249).
V.i.g.10, Smith's
III.3.34-38,
152-52;
794). Cf. Rasmussen's defense of commercial
claim
VII.ii.4.2,
306;
[1776]
1981,
ground of his concessions
that the ultimate
societies?despite in regarding their moral and political drawbacks?lies and inse of "the poverty, dependence, Smith's harsher depiction 626). curity that characterized most previous ages" (2006, 620-21, to Rousseau
which divide civilized and inequality flicted by the interdependence peoples Citizen
cf. 1.5, 23-26;
41 These points have been developed at lengthinMendham (2009, chaps.
2-3).
An
abbreviated
Mendham (forthcoming).
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version
of chapter
3 is available
as
I#4 MATTHEWD.MENDHAM
Figure 7 The Comprehensive Sociopolitical Typology I. Solitary existence A. Descriptive: Under abundant, harmonious, or privileged conditions
IA. Idyllic Primitive: spontaneous contentment, peacefulness,
docility
II. Independent association or HA. Social-Savage, Barbarian: sweet and gentle socially; occasional bursts of cruelty
Interdependent multitude IMA. "Civilized"
Elites:
physically soft; habitually "polite" to peers or superiors; habitually harsh to inferiors
B. Descriptive: Under scarce,
Primitive: exertions
violent, or
for sustenance;
oppressive conditions
C
Prescriptive: Decisive breaks from the usual course of civilization
IB. Vigorous
occasional
bursts of
_ferocity_ IC. Solitary Dreamer: heeds only naturally gentle, properly
violence
to beasts and
humanity IIC Moral enables
domestic
sweetness, communal and cosmopolitan
association may be sweet ifvoid of all
occasional,
luxuries necessarily acquired at the expense of
Note IX, 199/203f). To themultitude (DOI I, 137/138;
the extent that a people has become civilized and inter dependent, their interests are fundamentally at odds with
each other, and the great majority of individuals will be deprived of necessities and degraded into habitual de
ceit, betrayal, and theft (cf. PN 101-2n/970n). However, given the intensityof Rousseau's polemics against moder nity, and his concession of certain elements of ferocity
and cruelty in noncivilized life, it is striking that he does not portray his elite contemporaries as ferocious or ac tivelycruel. Rather, he grantsmuch of the descriptive con tent of doux commerce theory, conceding that commer
cial wealth, cross-cultural interaction, and higher learning have made their partakers more polite and less violent in key respects (e.g., DSA I, 7/7; Observations, EPW 47/OC 3:52; LR 65/74). Yet he interprets such gentleness as result ing not from higher moral conviction or more elevated sentiments, but rather from physical softness, psycholog
icalweakness, and moral indifference (LR 70/79; "Moral Letters" II, CW 12:181-82/OC 4:1089-90; EIV, 335/665). In addition, given theworkings of the established state ap
paratus and economic system, they simply have no need for the vigorous ferocity ofmuch noncivilized life (cf. E IV, 236n/524n; Conf. VII, 274/327). Instead, they need only remain largely indifferent to the sufferings of the
is naturally combined with contempt or disdain for them (EIV, 224-25/507-9; "On Wealth," CW ll:8-16/OC 5:471-81). In these ways, Rousseau's funda
masses, which
mental charge against his elite contemporaries
isnot their
1MB. "Civilized" Commoners:
dedication, and moderate
physically
deprived, socially degraded, habitually knavish IIIC Citizen:
Human:
virtuous self-command
voluptuous, immediate impulses;
obligation
economic
MB. Hunter-Savage: bloodthirsty, habitual
virtue as conformity to the general will; patriotic delight in public goods; harsh indifference to foreigners
_severity_
cruelty but their "harshness" or "hardness" (durete: "Let ters toMalesherbes" IV,CW 5:582/OC 1:1145). Although
refraining from charging the elitemoderns with ferocity or active cruelty is a significant concession on its face, Rousseau ultimately faults them for,on one hand, an ex cessive softnesswhich makes them incapable of vigorous
acts, and on the other hand, a lack of authentic senti ment which makes them incapable of the sweet, intimate, spontaneous relations of social-Savages and Barbarians.
Conclusion A final diagram (Figure 7) summarizes the major dis tinctions and social types described above. This analysis
finds our suggests the great extent to which Rousseau morals to be shaped by our surroundings, in terms of social complexity (the horizontal dimension), the favora bility of our environmental resources (the descriptive ele ment of the vertical dimension), and whether a far-seeing intellecthad decisively broken with the usual course of civ
ilization (the prescriptive element of the vertical dimen sion). This schema builds upon and confirms the status
of themain
characters previously identified by Rousseau scholars (who find between two and five types).Without claiming to definitively identify each social type depicted
by Rousseau, it draws attention to additional characters which are theoretically pivotal, and which are neglected or undertheorized inprevious analyses. Moreover, each of
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UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'SPARADOXES 185 these characters has been placed within a typology which attempts to show the interrelation ofmany of Rousseau's
fundamental social principles in a more systematicman ner than has previously been attempted. To be sure, some of these social types and principles aremore evident and fundamental than others inRousseau's
thought. Accord to is rather this offered conversation spur ingly, typology than to conclude it.Yet it ishoped that even in provoking disagreement, itmight enhance the clarity and rigor of our reflections by bringing several basic types and prin ciples systematically to the forefront.
For instance, by framing the various types as arising from our sociopolitical surroundings, this analysis may
suggest a particular understanding of Rousseau's teach ings on perfectibility and the possibilities of human life. Rousseau probably coined the term "perfectibilite" (cf. 1978, 127-28, 134n93), and it became a funda social premise for legions of later progressive and radical reformers, suggesting the prospects for indefinite social improvement. For Rousseau, perfectibility is the
Wokler mental
only facultywhich isundeniably unique to humans; with "the aid of circumstances," it successively develops all our other faculties (DOI I, 142/142). Thus, our survey of the extraordinary range of human types, and the environ mental circumstances which give rise to them, can be read as a study of the implications of perfectibility. Rousseau's
broader anthropology of the possible is regularly used to expose themoderns' complacency in believing their own
is the pinnacle of human possibility (DOI Note X, 210/212f; SC III. 12; Considerations on the Gov ernment ofPoland II, 179f/956; PF XIII, 64/544). In such petty baseness
ways Rousseau is a true father of progressive perfectibility, but in several other ways he differs from this legacy of his. Notably, he reflected so extensively upon the nature and advantages of noncivilized life chiefly because he main tained that, through the strong passions resulting from
interaction and interdependence, advanced civilizations must with overwhelming regularity fall into devastating forms of corruption, degradation, and mutual exploita tion. Ironically to civilized ears, much of this degrada
tion is blamed upon the unfolding of perfectibility itself, which "perfects... human reason, while deteriorating the overcom a species," and develops virtues in few,while
ingthemanywithvices (DOI I, 159/162;II, 184/189;see E III, 204/483;Conf. DOI 1,15117154; alsoDSAII, 16/18;
VIII, 326/388). It is for such reasons that even Rousseau's most thoroughly developed and optimistically prescribed human types?the Solitary Dreamer, theMoral Human, be highly selective in their devel and the Citizen?must
opment of human faculties, and highly secluded from the false delights and sophistications of civilized modernity. Overall, inRousseau's analysis, once human perfectibility has moved
beyond
its rudimentary stages, it allows for
human possibilities which are indeed very high in their greatness and purity, but exceedingly narrow in the social and cultural conditions which enable them. More
appar generally, by interpreting Rousseau's ently conflicting remarks carefully according to sociopo litical context, we can discern many consistencies un derlying his inconsistencies. In analyzing the social types which emerge, we might also find that Rousseau shows a surprising degree of impartiality in openly depicting vari
ous nonmodern weaknesses, while at least observationally and implicitly acknowledging certain modern strengths.
Furthermore, our analysis may reveal a degree of mod eration in his moral stances, in both their critical and prescriptive expressions. For, despite all his bravado in praising the hard sternness of theCitizen or theVigorous Primitive, he consistently repudiates anybloodthirstiness, lust for domination, and universal hard-heartedness.
Similarly, despite all his romanticism in praising the idle ness and abundance of the Idyllic Primitive or the pas toral Barbarian, he consistently repudiates any softness attained through human exploitation, or of frivolous lux ury, or of failure to execute any duties appropriate to one's sociopolitical condition. Yet though his various
social types display moral and phenomenological integrity, theremay remain a degree of arbitrariness in his appeals to them. It is, for instance, rhetorically compelling to expose Civ
moderation
ilized Elite softness through the image of the Vigorous Primitive, the stern Barbarian, or the ancient Citizen. But itwould require a more careful and sustained anal
a substan ysis to show that those moderns who enjoy tial degree of economic security, leisure, and refinement due to economic and technological progress are charac
teristically softer in less appealing ways than the Idyllic Primitive, or harsher inmore deplorable ways than the
hunter-Savage.
Typically,
Rousseau's
approach
is to criti
cize amodern weakness by appeal to an inverse primitive more impartially philosophical ap strength,whereas a proach would surely compare strengths against strengths and weaknesses against weaknesses. For such reasons, our only be consid analysis?insofar as it is convincing?can ered a prolegomenon to future discussions of Rousseau's coherence, rather than a demonstration of it. Some mys tery shall always remain in explanations of how he ap
to both gentle savages and fierce citizens in his campaigns against modern civilization.
pealed
References Abulafia, David. 2008. The Discovery ofMankind: Atlantic En counters in theAge ofColumbus. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni versity Press.
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