I apologize for the Scribd Scribd format of this post. post. Unfortunately I was unable to figure out how to post a chart in Wordpress, so I had to use Scribd to upload this chart. In my view this chart draws some useful distinctions for thinking the objects of object-oriented ontology, as well as for distinguishing distinguishing questions of epistemology and ontology. In Realist In Realist Theory of Science, Science, Roy Bhaskar presents the following chart to distinguish the different domains of reality (RTS, 13): Figure 0.1: Domains of Reality Mechanisms Events Experiences
Domain of Real X X X
Domain of Actual X X
Domain of Empirical
X
real refers to agencies that are independent of both mind and society. The domain of the real refers society. The domain of the actual refers actual refers to events that take place. While the domain domain of the empirical refers empirical refers to what is observed or sensed by human hu man beings. For Bhaskar, the agencies belonging to the domain of the real consists real consists of what he calls “generative mechanisms” or “causal mechanisms”. The generative mechanisms are mind- and society-independent in the sense that they function or act regardless of whether or not anyone observes them or knows about or observes them. The point here isnot is not that that humans cannot relate to these mechanisms-- such relations are the whole point of inquiry of inquiry --but that these generative mechanisms are not dependent on dependent on humans to exist exist and act. In Bhaskar’s language, these generative mechanisms are intransitive to the human. “Intransitive” is just a fancy way of saying that they are independent of minds minds and the social. Thus, for example, the generative mechanisms mechanisms of various diseases do not themselves change with our theories our theories of these diseases. If the If the causes of our shift from explaining these fits in certain fits of shaking uncontrollably are neurological , our shift terms of demonic position to a neurological disorder (epilepsy) is not a shift in the generative the generative mechanism itself. The generative mechanism is what it always always was. It’s the theory that changes. Consequently, the intransitive dimension of generative mechanisms is to be distinguished from what Bhaskar refers to as the transitive dimension. The term “transitive” should, should, above all, evoke connotations of “transition”. “transition”. Where the intransitive intransitive dimension refers to mind-independent mind-independent generative mechanisms that act regardless of whether or not they are observed or known, the “transitive” refers to the domain of the social where we have shifting and changing theories striving to get at this intransitive dimension. The domain of the actual , as opposed to the real , refers to events that are caused by these generative mechanisms. Here, for example, we might think think of the difference between a lightning lightning strike and the generative mechanism by which that lightning strike strike is produced. The lightning strike belongs to to the domain of the actual. It is an event that takes place in nature. nature. By contrast, the domain of the real is the generative mechanism by which the lightning is produced. Likewise, we might consider the difference between genes and a phenotypal characteristic such as eye color or hair color produced by genes. Genes here are the generative mechanism, while while the hair or eye color is is the actuality. If Bhaskar draws a distinction distinction between the real composed of generative mechanisms and the actual composed of events, then this is because generative mechanisms can be present, along with the conditions for the actualization or triggering of these
generative mechanisms, without the without the accompanying event coming-to-be or being actualized. All the conditions can be ripe for lightning without lightning lightning coming to pass. More on this another time. Finally, the third domain is that of the empirical , which consists of what is experienced or observed. Lightning can strike without anyone ever observing it and thus belongs to to the domain of the actual. However, it is also possible possible for lightning lightning strikes to be observed. The key point for Bhaskar is that these three domains of reality both can overlap and diverge. It is possible for generative mechanisms to act and be present without producing any actual events or experiences. In fact, Bhaskar argues that this is thenorm the norm rather than the exception. If this is the case, then it is because nature is an open system where other generative mechanisms intervene preventing or disguising the appearance of the accompanying event in the domain of the actual. This is the point, contends Bhaskar, of scientific experience. Scientific experiment attempts to isolate generative mechanisms from other generative mechanisms so that the powers of these generative generative mechanisms might be discovered. In other words, scientific scientific experiment attempts to create a closed system where generative mechanisms are isolated so that they might be observed. Likewise, if there is is a distinction between the actual actual and the empirical, then this is because events can occur and mechanisms can function without being observed. Here, then, we get a sense with what Bhaskar is getting at with the epistemic fallacy. fallacy. The not consist in raising epistemological questions. epistemic fallacy does not consist questions. Rather, the epistemic epistemic fallacy consists in holding that ontological questions are really epistemological questions of access. Take the example of Hume. Hume argues that causality causality is merely a constant conjunction of our sense-impressions sense-impressions or sensations. In short, Hume Hume only acknowledges the third column in Bhaskar’s graph. Yet if we make this this move, all sorts of mischief emerges. Constant conjunctions of sense-events are the exception rather than the rule in our sense-experience. Consequently, if we took Hume at his word, we would have to reject entire swaths of causal claims on the grounds that they they do not produce constant conjunctions of sense-impressions. If we are to avoid this intolerable result, then it is necessary to hold that generative mechanisms can act without producing their consequent and an d this by virtue of the fact that nature na ture is an open system where other causal mechanisms intervene, veiling, disguising, or preventing generative mechanisms from producing the events we encounter in the laboratory. Yet here we have passed from the empirical realm empirical realm of what is observed to observed to the ontological realm ontological realm of what is. is. Without this ontological realm that is independent of our experience we are unable unab le to render intelligible all sorts of aspects of our experience.
