Angel JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE Angel
Angel PEOPLE v. DECENA Angel BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 ART. 11 RPC SELF-DEFENSE Facts: On Christmas day, around 4pm, Luzviminda (14 y.o., daughter of the Jaime Ballesteros, victim), saw Decena rushing towards her father with a long bladed weapon prompting her to warn her father. Decena, however, stabbed him on the right chest causing his death. Narration of the defense: At about 4pm, the victim was drunk and for no apparent reason, he hel d the appellant by the neck and poked a fork against it. A barangay tanod intervened and advised the appellant to go home. Appellant left but was later followed by Jaime (victim). Biala, uncle of the appellant, testified that he saw Jaime attacking the appellant with a balisong. Appellant was able to parry the blow, and overpowering Jaime, thruste the knife into his body. Issue: W/N the appellant acted in complete self-defense that in killing Jaime Ballesteros absolving him from criminal liability. Held: No. Ratio: In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the prosecution which may rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. However, upon invoking self-defense, the accused admits that he killed the victim and the burden of proof is upon him in proving that he really acted in self-defense. Basic requirement for self-defense as a justifying circumstance is unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. It must be shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger forcing him to inflict wounds upon his assailant According to the defense, the unlawful aggr ession started when the victim started poking the appellant with a fork Elementary rule: when the aggressor leaves, the aggression ceases. It follows that when appellant and Jaime heeded the advice of the barangay tanod, the unlawful aggression had ended. Since the aggression no longer existed, appellant had no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. The defense failed to establish that the victim persisted in his design to attack the appellant Defense: continuing aggression Whenever the victim was drunk, he would look for trouble (refuted by the testimony of the wife) Witnesses: Jaime was staggering or wobbling as he walked – the – the victim could not have persisted in attacking the appellant with his current state. Testimony of the uncle: imaginative or coached witness Angel People vs. Dela Cruz Angel Facts: Daniel Macapagal, a married man, was living-in with a woman for about 2-3 years prior to the woman’s cohabitation with another man, one Roberto dela Cruz. One night, when Roberto dela Cruz and the woman were in the house of the latter, Macapagal arrived. The woman opened the door and Macapagal barged in holding a gun while lookibg for someone. He then went to the closed bedroom where dela Cruz was and banged at the door with his gun while yelling “Come out. Come out.” Dela Cruz
then opened the door but he was greeted by Macapagal’s gun. He thereby immediately closed the door, retrieved his own gun, and reopened the door. Both men grappled for each other’s firearm and a few moments later, four shots were heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor, his body sustaining all four gunshot wounds. Issue: Whether or not Macapagal acted in self-defense. Held: No. Upon opening the door the first time, Macapagal was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he took his own revolver, again opened the door and, brandishing his own firearm, confronted the victim. This encounter removes the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The first element, unlawful aggression, is not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude. It is an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. The second element would demand that the means employed to quell the unlawful aggression were reasonable and necessary. The number of wounds sustained by the victim negates the existence of this element of self-defense. The third element was lost when Macapagal drew his own gun and used it to challenge the initial aggressor. Angel People v. Jaurigue Angel The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue, defendants. Avelina Jaurigue, appellant.
FACTS: Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision mayorto thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her. From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon. On September 20, 1942, at around 8o’clock in the evening, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the of the Seventh Day Adventists o attend religious services. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attending religious services, Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignit y and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan k nife which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. Then three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened
ISSUES: Whether or not the lower court erred in (1) not holding said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor, (2) in not finding in her favor additional mitigating circumstances, and (3) in holding that the commission of the alleged offense attended by aggravating circumstance.
HELD: In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor. Said chapel where the incident took place was lighted with electric lights and there were several people inside; under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. The means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability. The facts that the defendant and appellant (1) immediately, voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered and admitted having stabbed the deceased, (2) had acted in the immediate vindication of grave offense committed against her, (3) had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand, be considered as mitigating circumstances. Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked ordered confiscated. Angel People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983) Angel FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code rec ognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, t he victim was not in the position to su bscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor. 2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights. Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites: Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor. 3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party. No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC. Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered. Angel Sabang v People Angel SECOND DIVISION [G.R. NO. 168818 : March 9, 2007] NILO SABANG, Petitioner , v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent . DECISION TINGA, J.:
On January 17, 1997, in the midst of a drinking spree on the eve of the fiesta in Liloan, Ormoc City, an intoxicated Nicanor Butad uttered the ominous words "I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang, to the horror of young Sabang's father, Nilo, and the other onlookers. Within moments, Butad himself lay dead from four gunshot wounds on his body. Nilo Sabang, petitioner herein, who was charged with and later convicted for the homicide, admits to the killing of Butad, but claims that the shooting was accidental and done as a means of defending his son. An array of witnesses for the prosecution and the defense provides a competing set of particulars as to the shooting. Ultimately, the prosecution's version, supported by the physical evidence, stands out as the truth. This much is admitted. At around 6:30 p.m. on that fateful night, petitioner and Butad were having drinks together with spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor outside the store of Melania Sombilon in Sitio Landing, 1 Barangay Liloan, Ormoc City. Butad, a civilian agent with the Philippine National Police, was then armed with a .38-caliber revolver which was tucked in his holster. In the midst of the drinking spree, Randy Sabang suddenly and unexpectedly appeared before the group. His appearance triggered a negative 2 reaction from Butad, who then uttered the words "I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang. Certain circumstances attaching to this evident threat are disputed, as are the events that consequently followed. What is certain is that shortly afterwards, Butad lay dead, having sustained four (4) gunshot wounds from his own revolver. Petitioner appears to have fled but voluntarily surrendered thereafter, 3 turning over the revolver as he surrendered. 4 Photographs of Butad as he lay dead on the scene were presented in evidence , as was the official report 5 on his autopsy, prepared by the City Health Office of Ormoc City. The autopsy repor t indicated the following findings: GENERAL SURVEY: Examined a fairly nourished/fairly developed male cadaver with approximate height of 165 cm & weight of 65 kg in state of rigor mortis. FINDINGS: 1. Bullet wound 1.0 x 0.5 cm at anterior chest wall, 14 cm from midline, right, along 3rd intercostal space anterior axillary line penetrating thoracic cavity lacerating upper lobe of right lung. 2. Bullet wound 0.7 x 0.5 cm at 4th intercostal space mid-axillary line, right, penetrating thoracic cavity lacerating upper lobe of right lung. 3. Bullet wound 1.5 x 0.7 cm at distal 3rd lateral aspect of right arm injuring skin & muscles. 4. Bullet wound 0.7 cm x 0.7 cm at mid vertebral column fracturing spine of 8th thoracic vertebra. CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemia 2' to multiple bullet wound. During arraignment, petitioner pleaded innocence, but during the presentation of the evidence for the defense, he claimed to have acted in defense of a relative. Petitioner and four (4) other witnesses testified for the defense. The following facts were sought to be established by petitioner: By the time Butad had joined what was to be his last drinking spree, he was already in a belligerent mood. Earlier that afternoon, he had been chasing after Ramil Perez when the latter demanded payment for a bet Butad had lost over a 6 cockfight. 7 The chase was witnessed by Celso Pepito, who would testify for the defense . As to the shooting itself, testifying for the defense were petitioner himself, the storekeeper Sombilon, and an eyewitness, Laurito Caparoso, who was situated right across the road when the shooting occurred. Sombilon testified that when Butad told Randy Sabang, "I will shoot you," the deceased already had his 8 revolver aimed at Randy. At this point, Andresa Villa mor, a niece of the deceased, told Butad, "Please 9 don't[,] tiyo, he's the son of Nilo." Petitioner and Caparoso also testified that at that time, Butad had his 10 revolver pointed at Randy. Petitioner claimed that he then grabbed the arm of Butad, attempting to twist it toward his body and away from his son. As they were grappling and the revolver was pointed towards the body of Butad, petitioner claimed he heard gunshots, and only after the shots were fired was he able to "take the 11 12 gun" from Butad. Petitioner's account is substantially corroborated by Caparoso. This version of the shooting, however, stands in sharp contrast to that presented by the prosecution. Natividad Payud, an eyewitness to the incident, testified that while the group of the deceased Butad, petitioner, and the spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor was having a drinking spree, Randy suddenly entered the scene. Butad, appearing surprised, thrust a glass of Tanduay near Randy's mouth and uttered the words, "I will shoot you." Payud is certain that at this point, Butad was not holding any
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gun. Andresa Villamor, another e yewitness to the incident, confirmed Payud's testim ony that Butad was 14 holding a glass and not a gun when he uttered those words . Petitioner reacted to Butad's statement saying, "Just try to shoot my child because I ll never fight for him 15 because he is a spoiled brat." Andresa Villamor then chided Butad and said, "Do not say that tiyo[,] 16 because it's [sic] the son of Nilo Sabang." Unexpectedly, a person appeared on the scene and punched Butad causing the latter to fall down lying partially on his back. Petitioner, who was then sitting across Butad, stood up and pulled the gun tucked in 17 Butad's waist. He pointed the gun at Butad and fired a shot at the latter's chest . Payud and Andresa 18 Villamor both saw petitioner fire two (2) more shots near Butad's chest. 19 In a Judgment dated November 22, 1999, the trial court convicted petitioner principally on the strength of the testimony of Dr. Edilberto P. Calipayan, the physician who conducted the post mortem examination of Butad's body, to the effect that the absence of powder burns indicates that the gunshots were fired at a 20 distance of more than 10 inches from the victim's body and not close range as claimed by petitioner . 21 The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction in a Decision dated August 16, 2004 and denied 22 reconsideration in a Resolution dated July 6, 2005. 23 In this Petition, petitioner prays for his acquittal contending that he acted in defense of his son, a 24 justifying circumstance under Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code. He claims that Butad's act of aiming a gun at his son while uttering the words "I will shoot you" was an aggression of the most imminent kind which prompted him to try to wrestle the gun from Butad leading to the accidental firing of the fatal shots. Petitioner theorizes that the fact that Butad was then fully clothed could have accounted for the absence of powder burns on Butad's body. He disputes the trial court's finding that the wounds would have looked oblique had the shots been fired during a struggle, claiming that round entrance wounds could likewise be produced in near contact fire. He further avers that Payud was not really an eyewitness to the event, pointing to the testimony of Benjamin Mahusay that he and Payud were already out of Sitio Landing and were heading home when they heard the gunshots. Likewise, Andresa Villamor's testimony is allegedly confined to seeing Butad sprawled on the ground. The Office of the Solicitor General insists on petitioner's conviction but asks that the award of moral 25 damages be reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00. We shall first resolve the question of whether petitioner's insistence on the justifying circumstance of defense of relative deserves merit. In order to successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation been given 26 by the relative attacked. Unlawful aggression is a primary and indispensable requisite without which defense of relative, whether complete or otherwise, 27 cannot be validly invoked. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused has admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased, it is incumbent upon him in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing." Thus, petitioner must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that 28 he incurred no criminal liability therefor . Unlawful aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this case, there is a divergence in the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses as to whether Butad aimed a gun at petitioner's son as he uttered the words "I will shoot you." With this conflict emerges the question of whether petitioner sensed an imminent threat to his son's life. Payud unequivocally testified that petitioner even dismissed Butad's utterance saying, "Just try to shoot my child because I ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat." This indicates to us that petitioner did not consider Butad's words a threat at all. These circumstances led the trial court to conclude that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Butad which could have precipitated petitioner's actions. This finding, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is conclusive on the Court barring any showing of any arbitrariness or oversight of material facts that could 29 change the result.
Furthermore, the presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad's body negates the claim that the killing was justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. Even assuming that it was Butad who initiated the attack, the fact that petitioner was able to wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression which Butad had started already ceased. Petitioner became the unlawful aggressor when he continued to 30 shoot Butad even as he already lay defenseless on the ground . 31 On this point, the defense's own witness, Caparoso, said in his Counter Affidavit and during direct examination that after the first shot was fired, he saw petitioner take possession of the gun as Butad released his hold of it. It was after petitioner already had the gun that Caparoso heard more 32 gunshots. Even petitioner admitted that he had an easy time twisting the hand with which Butad was supposedly holding his revolver because the latter was already very drunk having started drinking before 33 noon that day. Another crucial point to consider is t hat the prosecution's theory is consistent wit h the physical evidence. The distance from which a shot is fired affects the nature and extent of the injury caused on the victim. In close range fire, the injury is not only due to the missile but also due to the pressure of the expanded gases, flame and other solid products of combustion. In 34 contrast, distant fire usually produces the characteristic effect of the bullet alone. A shot fired from a distance of more than 60 cm or about two (2) feet does not produce the burning, smudging or tattooing 35 typically present in loose contact or near fire, short range fire and medium range fire. Powder burns is a term commonly used by physicians whenever there is blackening of the margin at the entrance of the gunshot wound. The blackening is due to smoke smudging, gunpowder tattooing and, to a 36 certain extent, burning of the wound margin. As found by the medico-legal off icer in this case, Butad's body did not have any powder burns. In response to the court's queries, Dr. Calipayan testified: COURT'S QUESTIONS Q Being an expert, is it a scientific fact that every gun burst within ten (10) inches distance as you said, is it always a fact that there is presence of powder burns?cralaw library A It is always a fact, if the caliber of the firearm is higher or I can say, may be .22 caliber as well as there is a gun powder that burst. If it is fired about less than ten (10) inches from the surface of the skin, it will always cause powder burns. Q And in this case, you cannot indicate the presence of powder burns?cralaw library 37 A Because I did not find any. The fact that there were no powder burns on Butad's body indicates that the shots were fired at a distance of more than two (2) feet and not at close range as the defense suggests. Moreover, Butad sustained four (4) gunshot wounds, three (3) of which were in the chest area, circumstances which are 38 inconsistent with the defense's theory of accidental firing. On the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, the defense questions Payud's testimony averring that its witness, Benjamin Mahusay, testified that he and Payud were already on their way home when they heard the gunshots. According to Mahusay, he attended a cockfight which ended at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of January 17, 1997. He went home afterwards and claimed to have met Payud on the 39 way home at around 5 in the afternoon. It was at this time that he and Payud supposedly heard gunshots. Mahusay's account, however, conflicts with the established fact that Butad was shot to death at around 6:30 that night. His testimony all the more loses significance in the face of Payud's compelling testimony 40 that she went back to Sitio Landing to fetch her children and witnessed the killing . Moreover, it is not true, as the defense insists, that Andresa Villamor did not witness the actual shooting. She unequivocally testified that she turned back and saw Sabang take the pistol from Butad and point the gun at the latter. She instinctively covered her eyes shouting, "Do not shoot my uncle!" She uncovered her eyes after hearing the first gunshot, saw petitioner still pointing the gun at Butad, and watched as 41 petitioner shot Butad two (2) more times. In the final analysis, petitioner failed to demonstrate any reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. His conviction of the crime of homicide is certain. Under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal . There being one (1) mitigating 42 circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applying the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
As regards the matter of damages, we affirm the award of civil indemnity in the am ount of P50,000.00 for the heirs of Butad in line with recent jurisprudence. Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the 43 heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. We also affirm the award of P180,000.00 representing loss of earning capacity at a reasonable life expectancy of three (3) 44 years considering that Butad was already 67 years old at the time of the incident. Likewise affirmed are the award of P50,000.00 as burial expenses duly proven, attorney's fees of P40,000.00, and appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing. We, however, agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that consistent with pertinent jurisprudence, 45 the award of moral damages should be reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00. Finally, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly withheld the award of exemplary 46 damages. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2004 and its Resoluti on dated July 6, 2005, affirm ing the Judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court dated November 26, 1999, are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced toP50,000.00. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Angel People vs Dagani Angel Facts:
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Crime of murder was reduced to homicide by the Supreme Court absence proof of treachery and it also dissolved ruling of RTC and affirmation of CA that there was conspiracy between 2 accused. Accused are Dagani and Santiano A t a b o u t 4 : 4 5 i n t h e af t e r n o o n a g r o u p o f m e n w e r e dr i n k i n g i n t h e c a n t e e n located inside the compound of PNR. A l l o f a s u d d e n , a p p e l l a n t s , w h o w e r e s ec u r i t y o f f i c e r s o f t h e P N R e n t e r e d t h e canteen and approached the group. Appellant Dagani Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter. A p p e l l a n ts s a id t h at t h e y w e r e o r d e r e d b y t h e ir d es k o f f i ce r t o i n v e s t i g a t e a commotion at the canteen. That Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber revolver and attempted to fire at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. T h e n s u d d e n l y , w h i l e o u t s i d e t h e c a n t e e n , S a n t i a n o h e a r d g u n f i r e an d , f r o m h i s v a n t a g e p o i n t , h e s a w J a v i e r a n d D a g a n i g r a p p l i n g fo r a . 2 2 c a l i b e r g u n w h i c h belonged to Javier. D u r i n g t h e c o ur s e o f t h e s t r u gg l e , t h e g u n w en t o f f , f o r c i n g S an t i a n o t o f i r e a warning shot H e h e a r d J a v i e r ’ s g u n f i r e a g a i n , s o h e d e c i d e d t o r u sh i n t o t h e c a n t e e n. S a n t i a n o t h en s h o t J a v i er f r o m a d i s t a n c e o f l e ss t h a n f o u r m e t e r s .
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Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self -defense and lawful performance of official duty as PNR secu rity officers.
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They a r g u e d t h a t t h e pr o s e c u t i o n f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t r e a c h e r y a n d c o n s p i r a c y .
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RTC nonetheless find them gui lt y beyon d reas ona ble do ubt of t he cri me of Mur der with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and granting them the benefit of [the] Indeterminate Sentence Law They were asked to pay P50 ,00 0.0 0 as dea th ind emn it y, P31 ,84 5.0 0 as funeral and burial expenses, P 30,000.00 as and for [sic] attorney’s fees, P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel.
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RTC is convinced about the judgment because: appellants failed to prove that Javier attempted to squeeze the trigger of the .22 caliber gun when he pointed it at Dagani t h a t du r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e s t r u g g l e f o r t h e po s s e s s i o n o f t h e . 2 2 c a l i b e r g u n , the danger to the life of the accused ceased to be imminent i n g r a p p l i n g f o r t h e w e a p o n , D a g a n i “ c o n t r o l l e d ” t he h a n d s o f J a v i e r a n d pushed them away from his body; appellants failed to produce the two empty shells as physical evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by Javier; n o po i n t s o f e n tr y o r b u l l e t m a r k i n g s o n t he w a l ls o f t h e c a n t e e n w e r e s h o w n no unlawful aggression was present on the part of the victim appellants failed to prove that they were on official duty at the time of the incidence since it was not establishe d that Javier actually fired his gun, the injury i n f l i c t e d u p o n h i m c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d a s a n e c e s s a ry c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e d u e performance of an official duty; appellants were acting in conspiracy; on the issue of treachery, it is clear that Javier had been shot while his hands w e r e b e i n g h e l d b y D a g a n i a n d h i s b o d y w a s o u t o f ba l a n c e a n d a b o u t t o f a l l ; a n d t h a t t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s ta n c e RTC considered mitigati ng circumstance due to voluntary surrender and penalty was reduced to reclusion CA affirmed decision of RTC with slight modificati on. Appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua Hence, necessary review of Supreme Court Appellants say that RTC and CA erred in not APPRECIATING SELF DEFENSE, LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFICIAL DUTY, unable to CONSPIRACY, thus fail to establish Guilt BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
SC Ruling: - Murder was reduced to homicide absence proof of treachery. Conspiracy between accused was dissolved absence proof. Self-defense and performance of official duty cannot be invoked as justifying circumstance Ratio: On self defense: The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable to present e v i d e n ce t h a t t h e v i c t i m a c tu a l l y f i r e d h i s g u n. N o s p e n t s h e l ls f r o m t h e . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l w e r e f o u n d a n d n o b u l l e t s w e r e re c o v e r e d f r o m t h e scene of the incident. Javier also tested negative for gunpowder residue. Moreover, the trial court found appellant Dagani’s account of the incident to be incredible and self- serving. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without any proof of the existence [15] of its requisites.
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danger to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the v i c t i m a n d g r a p p l e d f o r t he gu n wi t h t he la t t e r . A f t e r t h e vi c t i m h a d b e e n thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression
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Santiano went beyond the call of self- preservation when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, Means that are reasonable and necessary were not satisfied to invoke self defense. Considering the circumstances in its entirety. I t d o e s n o t j u s t i f y a p p e l l a n t S a n t i a n o ’ s [26] act of fatally shooting the victim twice. Regarding exercise of lawful duty as justifying, T wo r eq ui si te s mu st c on cu r be f or e th is defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a d u t y o r i n t h e l a w f u l e x e r c i s e o f a r i g h t o r o f f i c e; a n d 2 ) t h e i n j u r y c a u s e d o r t h e o f f e n s e c o m m i t t e d s h o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e n e c e s s a r y c on s e q u e n c e o f s u c h l a w f u l [31] exercise. These criteria was not satisfied. Accused were not in duty when incident happened. Assuming arguendo that they are, what they did will still not fall within the boundaries of fulfilling their lawful duty. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. Regarding conspiracy, although the victim had been shot by one of the accused while being held by a co-accused, there is no other evidence that the appellants were animated by the same purpose or were moved by a previous common accord. conspiracy must be established by clear 39 and convincing evidence. The prosecution did not establish that the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the gun from Javier and in the process, held the latter’s hands, was for the purpose of enabling Santiano to shoot at Javier Dagani "seem[ed] to be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim" as Javier gradually fell to the ground It must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Angel People v. Palaganas Angel G.R. No. 165483
September 12, 2006
Lessons Applicable: Aggravating circumstance Laws Applicable: Art. 14 FACTS: • January 16, 1998 8pm: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were on a drinking spree in their house because Melton visited his brothers in Pangasinan all the way from San Fernando, La Union. • January 16, 1998 9:45 pm: The brothers decided to go to Tidbits Videoke bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. They were the only customers • January 16, 1998 10:30 pm: Jaime Palaganas, Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived and they occupied a different table. When Jaime sang “My Way”, Melton sang along. But, Jaime resented this, approached the brother and said in Pangasinan dialect "As if you are tough guys. You are already insulting me in that way." Jaime struck Servillano’s head with the microphone and a fight ensued. Virgilio Bautista did not joined in and just left. During the rumble, Ferdinand went out of the bar. Michael was about to pursue him but was stopped by Servillano. They went back to continue to fight with Jaime. Edith Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the bar, arrived and pacified them. Servillano noticed that his wristwatch was missing. Since the brothers could not locate it inside the bar, they went outside. They saw Ferdinand at them and said to Rujjeric Palaganas "Oraratan paltog mo lara" meaning "They are the ones, shoot them." Rujjeric shot Servillano first at the left side of the abdomen penetrating his large intestine and urinary bladder causing him to fall on the ground then Melton with a fatal shot on the head and on the right thigh. When Servillano noticed that Melton was no longer moving, he told Michael "Bato, bato” and they threw stones at Rujjeric and Ferdinand. Michael was hit on the right shoulder.
• The police came and took the Ferrer brothers to Manaoag Hospital and later to Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan. • Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm • Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm • Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm • Criminal Case No. U-9634: using a caliber .38 without first securing the necessary permit/license in violation to Comelec Res. 2958 • Rujjeric and Ferdinand entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" Upon motion of Ferdinand, the four cases were consolidated. • RTC: Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide but acquitted of the charge of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code while Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against him. • CA Affirmed • Rujjeric argued that all the elements of a valid self -defense are present in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun, he was then a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers
ISSUE: W/N Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: • Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm - attempted homicide. There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum period • Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm - homicide is reclusion temporal There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum period • Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm - frustrated homicide. There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum period. • petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self -defense are present in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers • ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability: • 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; • First. Unlawful aggression; o no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not carrying any weapon o When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from the location of the former. He was still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help • Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; o gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers. • Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. x x x. • unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self -defense. It is an essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim • As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution • 1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution. • 2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the nonfulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance. • when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. • If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury • Michal’s wound took six to eight days to heal - attempted homicide • use of an unlicensed firearm - special aggravating circumstance by Republic Act. No. 8294 on June 6, 1997 • Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating circumstance, CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance Angel People v Ricohermoso Angel L – 30527 – 28 | March 29, 1974 | J. Aquino Avoidance of Greater Evil or Inj ury Facts: Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin, Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime. Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermoso’s house and asked him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place, Ricohermoso’s brother -in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito. They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he carried beforehand was gone and that his father was mortally wounded. The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.
Issue: W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or
injury
Held: No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his act in preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the assailants and not an act to prevent infliction of greater evil or injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in the assault. Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones leves, from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon. Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed. (Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecution’s version of the case and trial court’s finding of guilt.) Angel People v Norma Hernandez Angel Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines Defendant-Appellants: Maria Norma Hernandez, Mariano Hernandez (father) & Ramona Martinez (mother) FACTS: Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma Hernandez and after months of courtship, appellant finally accepted Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to bring his parents over her home so that they could talk about their marriage. When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought chickens and goats and they agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the sponsors and to repair the uncle’s roof. While the celebration was going on, appellant was nowhere to be found. Vivencio and his parents waited but she never showed up thus causing them great shame and humiliation. Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but that she wasn’t really in love with him. Her parents tried to persuade her to accept the proposal and that she only accepted it out of obedience to her parents and the uncle’s insistence. Before Vivencio’s parents came to their home, she already counselled them not to bring the chickens and that they should not regret whatever may happen later. Appellant said she felt tortur e because she wasn’t honestly in love with Vivencio and so she decided to leave home as last recourse to prevent the marriage. Appellant’s parents also corroborated her t estimony. RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed. HELD: Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant. RATIO: Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent the marriage after mature consideration. Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the complainant & appellant before the
incident. There always existed good relations between them for they were neighbours so it cannot be sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately frustrating the marriage. Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to marry and it would be utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed simply because she desisted in continuing with the marriage. If she would be liable then that would be tantamount to compelling her to go into a marriage without her free consent. Appellant had the right to avoid t o herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage. (Art. 11 par.4, RPC) Angel People v Delima Angel PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANILO DELIMA (Acquitted) and OSCAR AREO, accused . OSCAR AREO, appellant . DECISION CORONA, J.: [1] This is an appeal from the Decision dated October 13, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 4426, finding herein appellant, Oscar Areo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for killing Roberto Pilapil. The record shows that, on September 3, 1997, Provincial Prosecutor Juan C. Latorre, Jr. filed in the [2] Regional Trial Court of Samar an Information charging Oscar Areo and his co-accused, Danilo Delima, with murder, allegedly committed as follows: th That on or about the 8 day of August, 1997, at nighttime which was purposely sought, at Barangay Bachao, Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hold and hack one Roberto Pilapil with the use of a bolo (sundang) with which the said accused had conveniently provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon said Roberto Pilapil “multiple hacking wounds” in the different parts of his body, which wounds directly caused the death of Roberto Pilapil. Contrary to law. Arraigned on September 25, 1997, appellant, Oscar Areo, and his co -accused, Danilo Delima, [3] pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. [4] The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Pedro Papiona, an alleged eyewitness to the [5] incident; Dra. Lucia L. Astorga, Municipal Health Officer of Daram, Samar; SPO4 Juanito Batayen of [6] [7] Daram, Samar; Saludada Pilapil and Vicenta Pilapil, mother and wife of the victim, respectively. The prosecution’s evidence established the following: On August 8, 1997, at around 6:00 p.m., the victim, Roberto Pilapil, together with his eight children, was inside their house in Barangay Bachao, Daram, Samar, watching over his wife, Vicenta Pilapil, who was about to give birth. Appellant Oscar Areo and his co-accused, Danilo Delima, arrived to ask Roberto if they could have a drinking session inside his house. Roberto agreed, so they drank beer and rhum. During the drinking spree, Oscar reminded Roberto about the parcel of land in Sitio Naparikan which was being occupied by his (Roberto’s) father. Oscar insisted that they (Areos) owned the same, claiming that his mother had previously bought it. Roberto replied that his father owned the land and that he knew nothing about the transaction being referred to by Oscar. At around 11:00 p.m., Roberto’s mother, Saludada Pilapil, arrived and advised them to st op drinking. Consequently, Danilo and Oscar left and proceeded to the latter’s house. A few minutes later, Danilo returned to fetch Roberto who was then already sleeping. Saludada advised her son not to leave but Roberto went with Danilo just the same. On reaching Oscar’s house, Roberto was suddenly hog -tied by Danilo. Thereupon, Oscar pulled out a bolo and started hacking Roberto while Danilo held both hands of the victim. At that instance, Saludada, who followed her son, shouted for help. Upon hearing the cries of Saludada, Pedro Papiona came out of his son’s house. Oscar and Danilo ran away on seeing him.
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On the other hand, the defense presented six witnesses: the appellant himself ; his co-accused [9] [10] [11] Danilo Delima; Manuel Cañete, a friend of Oscar and Danilo; Julita Leona Areo, wife of the [12] [13] appellant; Estelita Delima and Dorina Rosales Delima, wife and mother of Danilo, respectively. According to the defense witnesses, at about 7:00 p.m. on August 8, 1997, t he appellant and his kumpadre, Manuel Cañete, went to the house of Ronilo Lanzarete to watch a betamax movie. They drank liquor while watching the movie. Accused Danilo Delima also went to the house of Ronilo Lanzarete and joined Oscar and Manuel in the drinking session. The movie ended at past 9:00 p.m. Thereafter, Oscar went home and ate supper with his wife and children before retiring to bed. While asleep, Oscar was roused by a loud shout coming from outside urging him to come down. Oscar looked out the window and found that it was the victim, Roberto Pilapil. Roberto continued shouting, warning Oscar that if he did not come down, Roberto would go after him inside the house. While Roberto was opening the door of the kitchen, Oscar quickly got hold of the bamboo pole from their window and struck Roberto’s hand that was holding a bolo. When the bolo fell, Oscar picked it up and hacked Roberto several times for fear that Roberto was still poised to attack him. After Roberto fell to the ground, he pleaded for mercy but appellant ignored his plea. Instead Oscar proceeded immediately to his father’s house with his family for fear of reprisal from Roberto’s relatives. At around 6:30 a.m. the f ollowing day, Oscar was fetched for questioning by a barangay tanod f rom his father’s house. Together they went to the barangay hall, bringing the bolo that he used in hacking the victim. There he met Danilo. Oscar further testified that Roberto challenged him to a fight because the latter was harboring a grudge against him. He (Oscar) admitted cutting 15 minonga trees from the land, formerly owned by a certain Cayang, that was later on sold to Roberto’s mother, Saludada Pilapil. Appellant’s co-accused, Danilo Delima, professed innocence of the crime. Danilo testified in court that, on August 8, 1997, he was in the mountain making charcoal. He went home at around 5:00 p.m. After eating supper, he and his family went to the house of Ronilo Lanzarete to watch a betamax movie. Danilo drank liquor with the appellant and Manuel Cañete until the movie was finished at about 9:00 p.m. He and his family then went home to sleep. As far as he was concerned, nothing unusual happened that whole evening. The following day, Danilo learned that Roberto was killed. He was later arrested as one of the suspects in the killing. The testimonies of the appellant and his co-accused, Danilo Delima, were corroborated by Manuel Cañete, Dorina Rosales Delima and Julita Leona Areo. Julita Leona Areo, wife of the appellant, testified that, at around 11:30 p.m. on August 8, 1997, she was awakened by Roberto who was challenging her husband to a fight. She restrained her husband and told him not to go down. But when Roberto cut the rope which served as a door lock and he was about to enter their house, she released her husband who then struck Roberto in the hand that was holding a bolo. When the bolo fell, appellant picked it up and hacked Roberto. On October 13, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant Oscar Areo guilty of murder and acquitting Danilo Delima for insufficiency of evidence. The judgment read: WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Oscar Areo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the information and for this offense there being no aggravating circumstance proved by the prosecution he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Roberto Pilapil, represented by Mrs. Vicenta Pilapil, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay one-half of the costs. The accused Oscar Areo has been detained since August 9, 1977. For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Danilo Delima is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered. Hence, this appeal. Appellant raises the following assignm ents of error: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER BASED ON THE VERY INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE ALLEGED PROSECUTION WITNESSES. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS CORROBORATED BY HIS W ITNESSES. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCES ADDUCED BY THE ACCUSED DURING THE TRIAL I N FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT THAT T HE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE ATTENDED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE ACT COMPLAINED OF. To escape criminal liability, appellant invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He admits hacking Roberto but vigorously insists that he did so to defend himself and his family. Appellant further contends t hat it was Roberto who started t he aggression by acting in a manner that was threatening and dangerous to him and his family. When appellant saw that Roberto was already opening the door of their kitchen and sensing that Roberto had a bolo, Oscar took the bamboo pole from the window and struck Roberto’s hand holding the bolo. When the bolo fell, Oscar picked it up and, afraid that Roberto was still going to attack him, he hacked Roberto several times. Oscar’s declaration was corroborated by his wife who was present at the scene of the crime. Despite this corroboration, however, we are not convinced by appellant’s theory of self -defense. Jurisprudence holds that, when the accused admits committing the crime but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the burden of proof shifts to him. It necessarily follows that he must now rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the [14] latter’s evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. He must then prove the following elements of self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and lack of sufficient provocation on [15] the part of the one resorting to self-defense. Of these requisites, the most indispensable is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel. And for unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be a strong and positive act of real aggression, not merely a threat or an intimidating stance. Thus, the accused who claims self-defense must positively establish that there was an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger [16] thereof, by the victim. Upon review of the evidence on record, we find that the appellant has failed to discharge this burden. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to speak of. Contrary to the claim of the defense, the prosecution established through its eyewitness that the victim was lured to the appellant’s house and there hacked by the appellant. Appellant’s effort to butt ress his theory of self defense can only be described as desperate. The trial court in its decision found that unlawful aggression was not proven, thus: Defendant Oscar Areo’s claim that he acted in self -defense is unfounded. In order that this defense may prosper, it is necessary that such plea be established by a clear and convincing evidence. He did not receive even a scratch or bruise in the alleged attack which the deceased Roberto Pilapil, armed with a bolo, made upon him. There can be no self-defense unless there was unlawful aggression. Such unlawful aggression was not found in this case. To successfully invoke self-defense, appellant must prove, by satisfactory evidence, the concurrence of all the elements of self-defense, the most important of which is unlawful aggression by the victim. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, and conviction of [17] appellant must follow. Another factor that m ilitates against the appellant’s claim of self-defense is the physical evidence on record, that is, the number of wounds inflicted on the victim. As testified to by Dr. Lucia Astorga, the attending physician, the victim suffered eight wounds, most of them fatal. It is an oft-repeated rule that the presence of many wounds on the victim negates self-defense; it in fact indicates a determined effort to kill him. Even assuming for the sake of argument that it was the deceased who initiated the attack and the accused merely defended himself, clearly there was no need for him to stab the victim several times if the [18] purpose was simply to disable the victim or make him desist from his unlawful assault . One thing more is the matter of flight. Appellant admitted that, immediately after the incident, he fled from the crime scene. Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong indication of guilt, although the opposite does [19] not necessarily imply innocence either . Appellant’s alleged fear of retaliat ion from the victim’s relatives was a figment of his imagination. He failed to report the incident immediately to the barangay chairman and police authorities, negating his claim of self-defense. In sum, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence to prove self-defense. Furthermore, what appellant tries to depict is that it was the accused who was the unlawful aggressor. We do not think so. It would have been totally against human nature for the victim to look for trouble at a time when he was with his family, awaiting the birth of his new baby. Under the
circumstances, we cannot believe appellant that it was the victim who went to his house to commit violence there. For all the foregoing reasons, we accept the testimony of Roberto’s mother that her son was lured to the appellant’s house and hog-tied before he was hacked to death. This constituted treachery which is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means, method and form of execution employed give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that such means, method and form of execution are deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his [20] person. These two conditions were evidently present in the instant case. We, therefore, find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The record shows that the trial court failed to award moral damages. The victim’s widow testified that the death of her husband caused her sorrow and suffering, and left her eight children to support. Moral damages, which include physical suffering and mental anguish, may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in the victim’s death. Therefore, the Court awards the amount of P50,000 as moral damages. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 13, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29 in Criminal Case No. 4426 finding Oscar Areo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODI FICATION that appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Roberto P ilapil the amount of P50,000 as moral damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. Angel PEOPLE VS. LAGATA (1949) Angel BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 ESCAPING PRISONERS Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines Defendant-Appellant: Ignacio Lagata FACTS: The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol plaza of Samar. Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to go look for him. Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He was wounded by the 2nd one. They were already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot. He said he ran away because he was afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions were also probably scared and that is why they ran. Another prisoner, Mariano I bañez stated that Epifanio Labong did not answer their call so Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote plantation and found footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the flattened grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they were assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was shot, he ran away because he also could have been shot. Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from Lagata though his testimony corroborated those of the other prisoners. Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division president, verified the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein.
Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the prisoners were running far from him when he already ordered them to stop. He said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged from duty like the others. He was hopeless already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the prisoner’s work. HELD: Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and serious physical injuries. Appellant was entitled to the benef it of mitigating circum stance of incomplete justifying circumstance. (Art.11 par.5, RPC) RATIO: It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The record does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any act of aggression or that he attempted to escape. According to Lagata himself, Tipace was ru nning towards and around him. How could anyone intending to escape run towards and around the very guard one was supposed to escape from? Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of his duties, the circumstances show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and even kill one of them. While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize them to fire against them. Angel MAMANGUN V PEOPLE Angel
11 FEB GR No. 149152 | February 2, 2007 | J. Garcia Fulfillment of Duty/Lawful Exercise of Right Facts: Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow police officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which prompted residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop and saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who was ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener Contreras (not the suspect) – Contreras died of the gunshot wound. According to the lone witness Cr isanto Ayson, he accompanied the policem en to the lighted rooftop. He was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun pointed his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” and shot him. The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark rooftop when Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!” whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe tow ards Mamangun’s head. This prompted Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that Contreras only said “Hindi ako, hindi ako” only when they approached him. Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are policemen here.” Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer who directed investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof.
Issue: W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioner’ s fulfillment of his duty
Held: No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the petitioner’s testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability. Per Sandiganbayan’s obser vations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and biased with respect to his co-policemen-witnesses because: After supposed introductions and fore warnings uttered allegedly by Mamangun, it is contrary to human experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack one of three policemen with drawn guns Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask the victim “Why did you try to hit me, if you are not the one?” clearly belies their claim The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that the victim instinctively shielded himself instead Additionally, petitioner’s pret ense that Contreras struck him was not initially reported to the desk and was only conveniently remembered when the investigator found a pipe in the crime scene. Acts in the fulfillm ent of duty and self-defense does not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent, which leads to the failure of the petitioner’s plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a privileged mitigating circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying circumstance the injury was caused by necessary consequence of due performance of duty.
Angel People v. Beronilla Angel L – 4445 | February 28, 1955 | J. JBL Reyes Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior Facts: Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from the judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder f or the execution of Ar senio Borjal, the elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy. Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or abetting the enemy. Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he was placed under custody and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents. Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying “…I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case.” Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the murder
of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted on the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after the expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.
Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience to lawful order of superior
Held: Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its illegality. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which called attention to the illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and death sentence review sent to the superior officers. Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to be innocent). Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Gueril la Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there are “any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the accused.” Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted. Angel Tabuena vs Sandiganbayan Angel
Issue: Tabuena and Peralta appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990, as well as the resolution dated December 20, 1991 denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the RPC. Facts: On January 10, 16 and 30 year 1986, TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (25), TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (25), and FIVE MILLION PESOS (5), were withdrawn (from PNB extension office) respectively by principal accused, Luis A. Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International Airport (MIAA). T his purportedly as partial pa yments to the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), for unpaid obligations. All the above withdrawals were done by way of cash placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags, laded on a PNB armored car and delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez (secretary of Pres. Marcos), to which she issued a receipt only on the last day of delivery January 30, 1986 (5 million). Why did Tabuena withdraw the said amount? What authority allowed him to withdraw the amount? It was an order by President Marcos: 1) over the phone 2) another by way of memorandum (see below) Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential antecedents: Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction, to wit: "Office of the President of the Philippines Malacañang January 8, 1986 MEMO TO: The General Manager Manila International Airport Authority You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, through this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said Company mentioned in a Memorandum of Minister Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985 and duly approved by this Office on February 4, 1985. Your immediate compliance is appreciated. (Sgd.) FERDINAND MARCOS."[4] It must be noted that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the months of January to June 1986. Based on the following findings, which will be listed below, the Supreme Court acquitted Tabuena and co-accused Peralta, the dispositive portion says:
Final decision of this case; held: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Why did the court acquit the accused? (herein petitioners, Tabuena and Peralta). 1) On the reason of good faith, a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior. 2) Tabuena did not have to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement (all disbursement above 1000 should be made in check, payment of all claims against the govt. had to be supported with complete documentation) Tabuena did not have the luxury of time to observe all the procedures of disbursement considering that the MARCOS memorandum enjoined hi "immediate compliance", with the directive that he forward to the president's office the P55 Million in cash. 3) The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated the P55 million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC. It must be stressed that the MARCOS memorandum directed Tabuena "to pay immediately the PNCC, through this office, the sum of 55M pesos" Tabuena did exactly as the memorandum ordered, he was acting in good faith when he delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez. 4) Even assuming that the sole purpose of the Marcos Memorandum was for the personal benefit of those in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to Tabuena Why? For the very simple reason that no conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P55 million. 5) Finally, the most compelling reason of all is the violation of the accused's constitutional right to due process. The court revealed its biased nature during its numerous questioning over the witnesses (Monera, Peralta, and Tabuena), alarmingly even exceeding the number of questions of the cross-examiner. In addition the questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of probing, confrontation and insuation. "A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the impression that he is allied with the prosecution"
