1.Casiano vs. CA (158 SCRA 451) -
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In this case, while animus revocandi or or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet the requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with with these requirements. For one, the documents or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to be under the express direction of Adriana.
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, M IRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO,petitioners, MOLO,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J .: This is not the first time that the parties to this case come to us. In fact, two other cases directly related to the present one and involving the same parties had already been decided by us in the past. In G.R. No. L-30479, 1which was a petition for certiorari and mandamus instituted by the petitioners herein, we dismissed the petition ruling that the more appropriate remedy of the petitioners is a separate proceeding for the probate of the will in question. Pursuant to the said ruling, the petitioners commenced in the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Special Proceeding No. 2176, for the probate of the disputed will, which was opposed by the private respondents presently, Panfilo and Felino both surnamed Maloto. The trial court dismissed the petition on April 30, 1970. Complaining against the dismissal, again, the petitioners came to this Court on a petition for review by certiorari. 2 Acting on the said petition, we set aside the trial court's order and directed it to proceed to hear the case on the merits. The trial court, after hearing, found the will to have already been revoked by the testatrix. Adriana Maloto, and thus, denied the petition. The petitioners appealed the trial court's decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which, on June 7, 1985, affirmed the order. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision proved to be of no avail, hence, this petition.
For a better understanding of the controversy, a factual account would be a great help. On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736. However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1, 1964, the parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964. That should have signalled the end of the controversy, but, unfortunately, it had not.
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on April 1, 1967. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will W hen the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner came to us by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court . 3 As we stated earlier, we dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners.
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. For reasons shortly to be explained, we do not view such facts, even considered collectively, as sufficient bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been effectively revoked. There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due execution of the will. The heart of the case lies on the issue as to whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830. Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases: (1) By implication of law; or (2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or (3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court . (Emphasis Supplied.) It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the private respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay. At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations ...." 4 The private respondents in their bid for the dismissal of the present action for probate instituted by the petitioners argue that the same is already barred by res adjudicata. They claim that this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure to appeal timely from the order dated November 16, 1968 of the trial court in the intestate proceeding (Special Proceeding No. 1736) denying their (petitioners') motion to reopen the case, and their prayer to annul the previous proceedings therein and to allow the last will and testament of the late Adriana Maloto. This is untenable. The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy. For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the second action, Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. 5 We do not find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites. For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be final with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the contested will . 6 After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution and validity, something which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is likewise no Identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners instituted this separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the private respondents on this score can not be sustained.
One last note. The private respondents point out that revocation could be i nferred from the fact that "(a) major and substantial bulk of the properties mentioned in the will had been disposed of: while an insignificant portion of the properties remained at the time of death (of the testatrix); and, furthermore, more valuable properties have been acquired after the execution of the will on January 3,1940." 7 Suffice it to state here that as these additional matters raised by the private respondents are extraneous to this special proceeding, they could only be appropriately taken up after the will has been duly probated and a certificate of its allowance issued.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the respondent Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the private respondents. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, and Paras JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part.
2.Molo v. Molo Digest -
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied here the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason. The doctrine is limited to the existence of some other document, however, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law. Revocation of the first will, will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation Facts: 1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces. 2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution. 3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939. The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
3.Rodelas v. Aranza Digest Pursuant to Art. 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic will is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one identifying witness is required and, if not witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost/destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.
Facts: 1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original. Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
4.Federico Azaola v. Cesario Singson G.R. No. L-14003; August 5, 1960 Whether the will is contested/not contested, Art. 811 of the NCC cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to indentify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. The three-witness rule in Art. 811 (when contested) can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 810), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
FACTS:
When Fortunata Vda de Yance died, Francisco Azaola filed a petition for the probate of the former’s will, whereby Maria Milgaros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson. Francisco witnessed that one month before the death of the testator, the same was handed to him and his wife. The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested. ISSUE/S:
1.
WON
the
proponent
was
bound
to
produce
more
than
one
witness
2. WON 811 is mandatory HELD:
1. No. Since the authenticity of the will was not being contested. But even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments. But it cannot be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity
(Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided. Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words “if the Court deem it necessary”, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will’s authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. 2. The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory. Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion, by giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.
5.CODOY V. CALUGAY (312 SCRA 333) Art. 811 is mandatory. The word “shall” in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall,” when used in a statute is mandatory.
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978. Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured. Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence. The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s af fidavit, but failed to as the same was already destroyed and no longer available. The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased. The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure. The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine. Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate. ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory. 2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s holographic will. HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory. In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous
individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. 2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased. The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer available. The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note. The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive. Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document. The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. (As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.) A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand,
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.” The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory. Roberts
6.
v.
Leonidas
129 SCRA 754 The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing two case. FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel. Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.The estate was partitioned. In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit. ISSUE:
Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss. HELD:
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s motion to dismi ss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court). The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
7.Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals Citing Nuguid v. Nuguid: “In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. Thex` probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face, it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Facts: 1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children. 2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner. 3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028. Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner. The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.
8. Nuguid vs Nuguid The declaration of a universal heir and the preterition of other heirs shall result in the nullification of the institution of heirs. However, if the will does not contain any legacies or devises, then the will shall be a complete nullity as well.
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar. Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs. Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
