Digest

PREPARED BY:

Block 1A Class of 2013 Ateneo Law School

TABLE OF CONTENTS Intro to Law Case Digests Block A Class 2013

1

LAW CUSTOM, USAGE. AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

p. 5

The Sources of International Law

HOW TO STUDY LAW

p. 7

How to Study Law

WHAT ARE THE PARTS OF A CASE RATIO DECIDENDI Mercado v. People, [GR No. 149375, 11/26/02] Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, [GR No. 132524, 12/29/98] Phillips v. Irons, [ Il No. 1-03-2992, 2/22/2005]

p.9

OBITER DICTUM People v. Macadaeg [GR No. L-4316, 05/28/52]

p.14

DISPOSITIVE PORTION Manalang v. Rickards [GR No. L-11986, 07/31/58] People’s Homesite & Housing v. Hon. Ericta [GR No. L-40675, 08/17/83] Brother Mike Velarde v. Social Justice Society [GR No. 159357, 04/28/04]

p.15

SEPARATE OPINION Barnes v. Glenn Theater [115 L. Ed. 2d 504] Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah [508 US 520]

p.18

DISSENTING OPINION Ruiz v. Ucol [G.R. No. L-45404, August 7, 1987] Nolasco v. Paño [G.R. No. L-69803, January 30, l987] Tolentino v. Ongsiako [G.R. No. L-17938, April 30, 1963] People v. Malmstedt [198 SCRA 401, 06/19/91]

p.20

LANDMARK CASE Recuerdo v. People [GR No. 133036, 01/22/03] Villaber v. COMELEC [GR No. 148326, 11/15/01]

p.24

LEADING CASE Asufrin v. San Miguel [GR No. 156658, 03/10/04] Philippine Export v. Philippine Infrastructures [GR No. 120384, 01/13/04] Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC [GR No. 162759, 08/04/06

p.27

Intro to Law Case Digests Block A Class 2013

2

Language Mastery

NA

El Poder

NA

COURTS, LAWYERS AND JUDGES

p. 29

JUDGES

Argel v. Pascua [RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01]] LAWYERS Fernandez v. Grecia [ A.C. No. 3694, 06/17/93] Regala v. Sandiganbayan [GR No. 105938, 09/20/96]

SEPARATION OF POWERS

p. 33

Senate v. Ermita [GR No. 169777, 04/20/06] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo [GR No. 171396, 05/05/06] Presidential Proclamation 1017 Francisco v. HRET [GR No. 160261, 11/10/03] Undue Delegation: Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan [293 US 388 (1935)] JUDICIAL REVIEW PP 1017 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo [GR No. 171396, 05/05/06] Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution Estrada v. Escritor (2003) [AM No. P-02-1651, 08/04/03] Silverio v. Republic [GR No. 174689, 10/22/07

p.39

CHECKING THE OTHER BRANCHES EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Estrada v. Desierto [GR No. 156160, 12/09/04] United States v. Nixon [418 US 683 (1974)] – special prosecutor David v. Macapagal –Arroyo [GR No. 171396, 05/05/06] Neri v. Blue Ribbon Committee [GR No. 180643, 03/25/08]

p.41

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Senate v. Ermita [GR No. 169777, 04/20/06] Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee [GR No. 89914, 11/20/91] Blue Ribbon Committee v. Judge Majuducon [GR No. 136760, 07/29/03] Standard Chartered Chartere d Bank Phils. v. Senate Committee on Banks, Banks, Financial Institutions Institution s and Currencies Currencie s [GR No. 167173, 12/27/07] Francisco v. House of Representatives [GR No. 160261, 11/10/03]


3

JURISDICTION

p. 53

Herrera v. Barretto [25 Phil. 245, 09/10/13] People v. Mariano [GR No. L-40527, 06/30/76]

STARE DECISIS

p.55

El Pueblo Filipinas v. Marcaida [GR No. L-953, 09/18/47] Tala Realty v. Banco Pilipinas [GR No. 137980, 06/20/00] Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor [79 Phil. 249 (1947)] MUTATIS MUTANDIS Ebranilag v. Division Superintendent of Schools [219 SCRA 256] –Jehovah students

p.59

ABANDONMENT V. REVERSAL Astraquillo v. Javier [13 SCRA 125 (1965)] People v. Mapa [20 SCRA 1164 (1967)] Relampagos v. Cumba [G.R. No. 118861, 04/27/95] Serrano v. NLRC [GR No. 117040, 05/04/00] Vitarich v. NLRC [GR No. 121905, 05/20/99] Helvering v. Hallock [309 US 106 (1940)]

p. 60

RES JUDICATA

p. 66

Agilent Technologies v. Integrated Silicon Technology [GR No. 154618, 04/14/04] Cayana v. CA [GR No. 125607, 03/18/04] Urbana Velasco v. People’s Homesite [GR No. L-39674, 01/31/78]

LAW OF THE CASE

p.70

Argel v. Pascua [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, 08/20/01] Buaya v. Stronghold [GR No. 139020, 10/11/00] Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading [GR No. 90596, 04/08/91] JM Tuason v. Mariano [GR No. L-33140, 10/23/78] Uy Lee v. CA [68 SCRA 196, 11/28/75] Mercury Group of Companies v. Home Development Mutual Fund [GR No. 171438, 12/19/07] MIESCOR v. NLRC [GR No. 145402, 03/14/08]

FINALITY OF DECISION

see related digests

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice [301 SCRA 96, 01/19/99] Buaya v. Stronghold [GR No. 139020, 10/11/00] Estrada v. Escritor (2006) [AM No. P-02-1651, 06/20/06]


4

OPERATIVE FACT AND PROSPECTIVITY PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS

p.80

th

20 Century Fox v. CA [164 SCRA 655 (1988)] Columbia Pictures v. CA [261 SCRA 144 (1996)] Que v. People [154 SCRA 160 (1987)] People v. Co [227 SCRA 444]

COURTS AS ARBITERS OF RIGHTS AND POWERS

p.84

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd v. Ignacio M. Capulong [GR No. 82398, 82398, 04/29/88] Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA [GR. No. 97336, 02/19/93] Lawrence et al. v. Texas [US Supreme Court, No. 02-102, 06/26/03] People v. Cayat [68 Phil. 12] Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association v. Philippine Blooming Mills [51 SCRA 189] Employment Division v. Smith [494 US 872 (1990)] R.A. v. City of St. Paul [505 US 377 (1992)] Einstadt v. Baird [405 US 438 (1972)] Hernandez v. Robles[7 NY. 3d 338] Sparkman v. Stump [435 US 349 (1978)] Roe v. Wade [410 US 113 (1973)] Gonzales v. Carhart [Nos 05-380, 413 F. 3d 791 and No. 05-1382, 435 F. 3d 1163, reversed (2007)]

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

p.98

People v. Cayat [68 Phil. 12] Goesart v. Cleary [335 U.S. 464 (1948)] Ichong v. Hernandez [GR No. L-7995, 05/31/57] Tiu v. CA [GR No. 127410, 01/20/99]

RIGHT TO LIFE

p. 101

Cruzan v. Director [497 US 261 (1990)] The Schiavo Case (2005)

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE TERMS

p. 103

PP 1017 E.O. 464 Art. VI, Sec. 21-22

p. 106 p. 107 p. 109


5

Language, Custom, and General Principles

THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Domestic laws are found in statute books and in collections of court decisions. decisions . It is an altogether different matter with international law. In the absence of a centralized legislative, executive and judicial structure, there is no single body able to legislate and there is no system of courts with compulsive power to decide what the law is nor is there a centralized repository of international law. Nevertheless international law exists and there are “sources” where, with some effort, the law can be found.

Formal sources- can refer to the various processes by which rules come into existence. Thus, for instance, legislation is a

formal source of law. So are treaty making and judicial decision making maki ng as well as the practice of states. Material sources- on the other hand, are not concerned with how rules come into existence but rather with the substance

and content of the obligation. obligation. They identify what what the obligations are. are. In this sense, state practice, practice, UN Resolutions, treaties, judicial decisions and and the writings of jurists are material material sources in so far far as they identify what what the obligations are. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerate the "sources" of international law as: (1) custom, (2) treaties and other international agreements, (3) generally recognized principles of law, (4) judicial decisions and (5) teachings of highly qualified and recognized publicists.

(1) Custom or customary international law- means “a general and consistent practice practice of states s tates followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opiniojuris].” (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do. The initial factor factor for determining the existence existence of custom custom is the actual behavior of states. states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states. More important than the duration though, is the consistency and the generality of the practice; the basic rule on consistency is, continuity and repetition.

Opiniojuris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule.

Without it, practice is not law. . Even humanitarian humanitarian consideration by itself does not constitute opiniojuris. Would dissenting states be bound bound by custom? Yes, unless they had consistently consistently objected to it while the custom custom was merely in the process of formation. Moreover, a state joining the international international law system for the first time after a practice has become law is bound by such practice.

"Instant custom"

-It comes about as a spontaneous activity of a great number of states supporting a specific line of action. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack, a coalition of forces arose supporting the action taken by the United States. This united action may have given birth to instant customary law classifying the attack as an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter justifying collective self-defense. self- defense. What was peculiar about this


6

collective action was that the object of defense was not an attack from a state but from a non-state organization.

(2) Treaties- Determine the rights and duties of states just as individual rights are determined by contracts. Their binding force comes from the voluntary decision of sovereign states to obligate themselves to a mode of behavior.

(3) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations- This is also referred to by the Restatement as "general

principles of law recognized recognized by or common to the world's world's major legal systems." This has reference not to principles principles of international law but to principles of municipal law common to the legal systems of the world. (4) International Court of Justice Decisions- decisions of the ICJ are not only regarded as highly persuasive in

international law circles; they have also contributed to the formulation of principles that have become international law.

significantt ones are: The (5) Publicists- These are institutions which write on international law. The more significan International Law Commission, an organ of the U.N.; the Institut de Droit International, the International Law Association, a multinational body; the (Revised) Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States; andthe annual publication publi cation of the Hague Academy of International Law. It should be noted, however, that these institutions are generally government sponsored; hence they bear within themselves a potential for national bias. Other sources of International Law: Equity- This is an instrument whereby conventional or customary law may be supplemented or modified in

order to achieve achieve justice. It has both a procedural procedural and substantive substantive aspect. aspect. Procedurally, Procedurally, it means a mandate mandate given to a judge to exercise discretion in order to achieve a determination determination that is more equitable and fair.

UN Resolutions- Declarations of legal principles and Resolutions by the United Nations are generally considered merely

recommendatory. recommen datory. But if they are supported by all the states, they are an expression expressi on of opiniojuriscommunis.

Soft Law or Non-Treaty Agreements- They are international agreements not concluded as treaties and

therefore not covered by the Vienna Convention Convention on the Law of Treaties. Treaties.

HOW TO STUDY LAW

How To Study Law (Kinyon, (Kin yon, Stanley) A.

How To Study Law

1.

Tools Of the Profession


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The primary tools that a student need to endure law school are books, may it be textbooks and casebooks. Certainly, students also need to have their own writing materials for listing and jutting down important notes. Lastly, the most important tool that students must not forget to have is a dictionary of Law. As what the author mentioned in the book law students usually have difficulty in comprehending legal terms that is why a law 2.

dictionary is a must have. Object of Law Study “Law “ a term used in a much broader sense to indicate the whole process by which organized society, through government bodies and personal attempts to apply these rules and reg ulations and thereby establish and maintain peaceful and orderly relations between the people in that society. The study of law should be viewed only within the context of the legal system as a whole. Students must learn how to deal a particular problem or controversy and precisely sort it in a manner possible for everyone, not only to the other students of law but also to those who are non- students of law, to understand and comprehend the

3.

problems that they face everyday in the l egal way. “Case Method” or “Case System” ‘Case System” is based on the idea that the best way to study law is to study the actual court decision in various types of cases. ‘Cases” are published reports of controversies, which have come before the court, including the courts decision and its reasons for it’s decision. “Casebooks” are made up principally of selected cases taken from these reports and arranged according to the type of controversy or subject matter in the case.

4.

Briefing Cases This is a way to make a concise summary or abstract of the case in the student’s own words.. The importance of briefing cases is that the students have the opportunity to read the case thoroughly and carefully, they also will have a condensed written record of each case.

5.

Taking Notes In this way the students will have the overview of what they had taken on their class. Do not write everything that the professor had said, only jut down important details and codes that you can remember when a certain case is brought out.

6.

7.

Review a.

Day to Day review This is a way for the student to have full grasp of what will be discussed and what was already discussed.

b.

Periodic Review Its objective is to get a broad mental picture of the main divisions in each course.

Outline This compels the student to do the reviewing more thoroughly, carefully and systematically.

What Are the Parts of the Case? 1.

A brief Statement of the kind of controversy involved.

2.

A statement of the facts of the controversy a. Who were the parties


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b. c.

What was the case about Who brought the action and what they prayed for

3. 4.

A statement of the question(s) the court is called upon to decide The arguments on the issue

5. 6.

The general conclusion The courts decision may it be affirming or dismissing or modifying the l ower court’s decision.

RATIO DECIDENDI MERCADO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 149375, NOVEMBER 26, 2002 *RATIO DECIDENDI- THE PRINCIPLE WHICH THE CASE ESTABLISHES; THE REASON FOR THE DECISION

Facts

Petition for review of accused Marvin Mercado in the Supreme Court pursuant to the last par. Of Sec 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure Petitioner: Marvin Mercado Respondent: People of the Philippines Date: November 26, 2002 Supreme Court Second Division Ponente: Justice Bellosillo (Supreme Court) Resolution of the Court of Appeals: Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. •

•

•

•

•

•

•

Marvin Mercado with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen—carnapping (RA 6538Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) The petitioner along with the other accused was charged with Carnapping of the Isuzu Trooper, whom they claim they had no intention of stealing but just borrowed the car for joyride. The said car was abandoned in Baguio City by the people accused. In order to gain access to the vehicle, the car’s quarter window was broken. Thereby proving that force was used upon the property to gain access to it. In the Lower court, the petitioner was sentenced to 12 years and 1 day minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal maximum. maximum. When the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, the sentence increased to 17 years and 4 months to 30 years. Court of Appeals relying on People vs. Omotoy (charged with arson, sentenced to reclusion perpetua as maximumcase taken directly to Supreme Court) Carnapping is a special law (Anti-carnapping Act of 1972). Thus, corresponding penalties are not provided under Revised Penal Code. The petitioner in his appeal to the Court of Appeals also raised the issue of whether or not there was indeed carnapping. However, upon review, the Appellate court affirmed the conviction.


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Issue •

• •

Whether the maximum sentence of 30 years given by the Court of Appeals is considered to be within the range of reclusion perpetua which will enable the case to be certified in the Supreme Court for a reevaluation of the facts and evidence. Whether the increase in the sentence term of the penalty is correct as given by the Court of Appeals Whether the sentence of 17 years and 4 months to 30 years rule of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the case at bar

Ratio •

•

•

•

The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals is in accordance to Sec. 14 of RA 6538. Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. The penalty given by the appellate court falls within this range. It should be stressed however, that the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner is under RA 6538 or The AntiCarnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. With this said, it is incorrect to penalize the petitioner based on the terms provided for by the Revised Penal Code. RA 6538 provides for its own penalties. Under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, carnapping without violence is penalized with seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years. On the other hand, if force or violence was used, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. With this, the trial court was wrong to sentence the petitioner with 12 years minimum when based on RA 6538, the minimum should be 14 years and 8 months.

Ruling •

•

The Supreme Court affirms the conviction of the petitioner but disagrees with the penalty imposed. Although the Isuzu Trooper’s window was broken in order to gain access to it and based on RA 6538, if violence/ force was used to gain access to the property, the penalty should be by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, this does not merit the full penalty. The petition of Marvin Marvin Mercado for review in the th e Supreme Court is denied. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with a modification that the penalty to be imposed is reduced to indeterminate prison term of 17 years and 4 months to 22 years, no costs.

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY VS. ISABEL AGUINALDO COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, ET AL. G.R. NO. 132524 DECEMBER 29, 1998 Facts:

Petitioner: Federico Suntay Respondents: Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco-Suntay and Hon. Gr egorio Sampaga Date: December 29, 1998 Supreme Court Second Division Ponente: Justice Martinez •

The parents of the respondent, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, were married in Macao but after 4 years, filed for annullment. The marriage between the two was declared null and void by the Court of First Instance on the basis of the mental disorder of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay who has schizophrenia. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. In 1990, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died without a will.

Main Case


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•

Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco-Suntay filed a petition for issuance of Letter of Administration of grandmother’s estate (5 years after death) stating that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the estate.

•

However, petitioner, Federico Suntay, filed an opposition saying that he has been managing the properties even before death of wife and prayed that he be appointed administratrix administratrix instead.

•

Federico Suntay moved to dismiss the case alleging that Isabel is an illegitimate child (almost 2 years after filing of Isabel’s case) saying that declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother.

•

Trial court denied motion to dismiss Case at hand

•

Federico filed this petition

Issue: •

Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: •

Petition dismissed

Ratio: •

Under Section 1 Rule 16, the time limit for petition to dismiss is long overdue

•

The decision of the CFI declared the marriage between Emilio Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco Suntay is null and void. But according to Article 89 of the New Civil Code, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate

•

Respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay is a legitimate child which is clear under the third paragraph of Article 85 of the New Civil Code.

Ruling •

•

Legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay No grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

Phillips vs. Irons Facts

On Jan 1999, plaintiff, Richard Phillips and the defendant, Sharon Irons began dating. At the time, the defendant informed Phillips that she was married a year ago and claimed that she has been divorced from her husband, Dr. Adebowale Adeleye. Time passed and Phillips and Irons were engaged to be married. The couple talked about the possibility of having children after getting married. Plaintiff informed the defendant that he did not wish to have children, at least not until they are married, and intended that he would use a condom whenever they engage in sex. The defendant understood and agreed. During the course of their relationship, the couples engaged in oral sex 3 times, with 2 of those instances having occurred on the same date. They never engaged in vaginal intercourse because of the defendant’s menses.


11

Around Feb 19 and/or March 19 of 1999, Irons engaged in oral sex with Phillips. She used the semen that hadn’t been discarded to artificially inseminate herself without the plaintiff’s knowledge. On May 1999, the defendant confessed to Phillips that she is still married to her former husband,. She told him that she planned to get a divorce, and showed him a “petition for dissolution of marriage” which was filed on May 20, 1999. In the petition, the defendant swore that she was not pregnant. The couple ended their relationship when Phillips learned that his fiancée was still married to her husband on May 1999. In November 21, 2000, Irons filed a “ Petition Petition to Establish Paternity and Other Relief” against plaintiff, claiming she and plaintiff had a sexual relationship which gave birth to Serena on December 1, 1999, where DNA tests have confirmed that Phillips is the biological father of Iron’s daughter. Phillips asserted that he had no knowledge of Iron’s pregnancy nor the birth of the child until receiving the defendant’s petition to establish paternity. He also claimed that Iron’s continued to live with hi s Adeleye during her pregnancy. Adeleye and the public were led to believe that Serena is Adeleye’s daughter because of the presence of Adeleye’s name on Serena’s birth certificate. Even Serena, doesn’t know that Phillips is her biological father. Phillips filed a complaint before the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill inois against defendant seeking damages for: intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conversion. At the initial filing of the complaint, the plaintiff’s paternity hasn’t been established. FTA: FN1. At the time this case was before the circuit court, and as of the filing of plaintiff's original brief, plaintiff's paternity had not been established. Although the parties agree that plaintiff is Serena's biological father, no documentation is provided in the record on appeal. *2 Following the filing of plaintiff's initial complaint, defendant successfully moved to dismiss undersection undersection 2-615. 2-615. Plaintiff ultimately filed a third amended complaint, which was dismissed with prejudice, the circuit court finding each count “continues to lack sufficient facts” necessary to state a cause of action. Plaintiff timely appeals.

Issues:

Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s plaintiff’s complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress; Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for fraudulent misrepresentation; Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for conversion. Held: Yes. the circuit court erred in dismissing count plaintiff’s complaint for intentional infliction of emotional emotional distress. No. The circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. No. The circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim for conversion.

Ratio for issue 1:

Three elements are needed to state state a cause of action for for IIED: (1) the conduct involved involved must be truly extreme and outrageous (2) the actor must either intend that his or her conduct inflict severe emotional distress, distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that it will cause severe emotional distress and (3) the conduct must, in fact, cause severe emotional distress. An action can be considered “outrageous and extreme” if the nature of the conduct goes beyond the possible bounds of decency and is considered intolerable in a civilized community. In the case at bar, defendant’s actions can be considered “extreme and outrageous” when she deliberately misled the plaintiff that she didn’t want to bear children until after


12

marriage, but deceitfully engaged in sexual acts which no one would would expect could result in pregnancy, and using the plaintiff’s sperm in unorthodox, and unexpected manner yielding extreme consequences. It must also be established that actor must intend that hi s/her actions inflict severe emotional distress, or at least know that there is a high probability that it will cause severe emotional distress. FTA: According to plaintiff, defendant was aware of his desire to have children only after marriage. Further, plaintiff believed defendant could not become pregnant, not only due to the nature of the sexual acts, but because he believed she was infertile at the time as a result of her menstrual cycle. Months later, however, defendant informed plaintiff he fathered her child. From these facts, if proved, it may be inferred reasonably that defendant knew manipulating plaintiff into unwittingly conceiving a child out of wedlock would inflict severe emotional distress Lastly, it must be determined whether the consequence of the actor’s conduct on the acted upon, can be considered severe. The degree of emotional distress depends on its intensity and duration. FTA: In this case, plaintiff claims he “often finds himself nauseated and unable to eat, especially when-as a family practitioner-he treats small children who are the same age as the child he allegedly fathered.” As plaintiff's claim involves a physically and psychologically manipulated nonconsensual pregnancy, it is cognizable that the intensity of his emotional distress is great and its duration long-lasting.

Ratio for issue 2:

The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be applied in the case at bar since historically, it has been limited to cases involving financial transactions where plaintiff suffered monetary harm. It is an economic tort under which one may recover only monetary damages. Therefore, plaintiff may not recover on allegations of physical and emotional distress. Elements of a claim for fraudulent fr audulent misrepresentation: misrepresentation: a false statement of material fact; known or believed to be false by the party making it; intent to induce plaintiff to act action by plaintiff in justifiable reliance on the truth of the statement damage to plaintiff resulting from such reliance. • • • • •

Ratio for issue 3:

Conversion is an unauthorized act that deprives a person of his property permanently or for an indefinite time. It must be shown that the money claimed, or its equivalent, at all times belonged to plaintiff and that defendant converted converted it to his own use. The elements of a claim for conversion are: (1) plaintiff's right in the property; (2) plaintiff's right to immediate, absolute, and unconditional possession of the property; (3) defendant's unauthorized and wrongful assumption of control, dominion, or ownership over the property; and (4) plaintiff's demand for possession. The plaintiff cannot show “right to immediate, absolute, and unconditional possession” of his sperm. Plaintiff presumably intended, and he does not claim otherwise, that defendant discard his semen, not return it to him. FTA: “The essence of conversion is the wrongful deprivation of one who has a r ight to the immediate possession of the object unlawfully held.” note: FTA means “from the article”. The statement following it has been explicitly copied verbatim from the original document


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OBITER DICTUM Obiter Dictum- passing or incidental statements; statements made or decisions reached in a court opinion which were not necessary to the disposition of the case; uttered by way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects; opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. Hon, Higinio Macadaeg, Antonio Guillermo, et al, respondents GR L-4316, MAY 28, 1952 Facts:

Petition to prevent and restrain Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo a.k.a Silver • Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission- Hons. Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, Ramon R. San Jose • Antonio Guillermo- convicted and sentenced for murder • July 15, 1947- case filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte—Mar. 29, 1948- judgment. • Appeal to the Supreme Court- judgment on May 19, 1950— expressly ruled in the judgment of conviction that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty because the murders which he was convicted were committed “not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerilla units.” • Motion for reconsideration- June 5, 1950- denied July 13, 1950 • June 20, 1950- filed for suspension of the proceedings and reference of the case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission- denied July 13, 1950 • Petition for amnesty- July 8, 1950

Issue:

Whether the pronouncement of the Court regarding the amnesty of Antonio Guillermo is obiter dictum and if the Commission has jurisdiction over the petition for amnesty of the convicted? Ruling:

The petition for prohibition was granted and the preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court on Nov. 24, 1950 made absolute with costs against Guillermo. He may not raise again the issue in any tribunal, judicial or administrative and is now estopped from contesting the judgment, of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling. Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2, 1946, at that time, during which date the Guillermo criminal case was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Guillermo’s case was assigned to the Second GAC. Seventh GAC’s claim of jurisdiction of the application was merely based on administrative Order no. 217 which expressly states “in view of the appointments of new Judges of First Instances” and not for the purpose of setting forth cases cognizable by each of the different commissions. The courts are not excluded in deciding any claim for amnesty, thus the Court has jurisdiction over the amnesty petition of Guillermo. It was also found that the petition was an ill-advised attempt to delay execution of the judgment of conviction which no court of justice will countenance. The finding of the Court that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty is final and conclusive, not an obiter dictum, under the principle of res judicata.


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DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Petitioner-Appellants: Petitioner-Appellants: BERNARDO MANALANG, VICENTE DE LEON, AND SALVADOR DE LEON LE ON VS. Respondent-Appellees: ELVIRA TUASON DE RICKARDS G.R. No. L-11986 July 31, 1958 FACTS: •

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01 January 1954: City of Manila increased assessment of a 44,561.80-square-meter-lot being used as a private subdivision in Sampaloc, Manila and rented out by Manalang, et al.  Rickards, who owned the lot, increased rent  tenants insisted on paying former rent 27 April 1954: Rickards filed for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Manila Tenants filed for motions to dismiss RA 1162: expropriation of land estates in Manila, division of such lots and their lease on reasonable terms 14 July 1954: Municipal Judge of Manila denied motions to dismiss and suspended proceedings for 2 years 13 April 1955: Municipal Judge ordered the setting of cases for hearing  tenants asked for reconsideration  denied  tenants filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Manila against Rickards and the Judges of the Municipal Court of Manila  that their previous judgment and order be declared null and void Rickards argued that the July 1954 order for the case to be suspended for 2 years is interlocutory  cannot be reviewed by petition for certiorari 06 February 1956: Court of First Instance dismissed petition for certiorari cannot be reviewed by petition for certiorari and case was heard Court of First Instance: actions for ejectment were filed before the enactment of RA 1162  laws can only be enforced prospectively Tenants took it to the Court of Appeals who then passed it on to the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S, HELD AND RATIO:

1)

2)

Whether or not the July 1954 order of the inferior court is interlocutory o Yes, the order is interlocutory. o Dispositive portion of the order did not contain a definite resolution but instead suspended the hearing of the case. Whether or not the lower court made a mistake in dismissing di smissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition o No, the lower court did not make a mistake. o Since the order is interlocutory and not final, it is not open for certiorari. o Lower court is given the power to reopen the trial and resolve the case.

TERMS: •

Certiorari  to be shown  an order by a higher court directing a lower court to send the record of a case for

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review Interlocutory  order given during the intermediate stage between the beginning and end of a cause of action  not final


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Petitioner: PEOPLE’S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION CORPORATION (PHHC) VS. Respondents: HON. VICENTE ERCITA, Judge of Court of First Instance of Quezon City; ACTING BRANCH CLERK OF COURT; REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY; JAIME O. RIVERA G.R. No. L-40675 August 17, 1983 FACTS: •

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1971: Court ordered PHHC to execute a deed of sale in favor to Rivera, a registered tenant of the land and who was awarded the purchase of the property in its original cost  past rentals considered as partial payment 1975: PHHC filed for a motion of reconsideration  claim: dispositive portion of the Court or der did not include the purchase price of the property

ISSUE/S, HELD & RATIO: •

Whether or not the reconsideration filed by PHHC should be allowed o No, the reconsideration isn’t allowed. o Lack of legal basis for motion. o Case resolution isn’t always found in the dispositive portion.

Petitioner/Plaintiff: Petitioner/Plaintiff: MARIANO “BROTHER MIKE” Z. Z . VELARDE VELARDE VS. Defendant/Respondent: Defendant/Respondent: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004 FACTS: •

(Previous Case) 28 June 2003 – SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against Velarde and other significant religious leaders (Jaime Cardinal Sin, Eraño Manalo, Eddie Villanueva, Eliaso Soriano) before RTC-Manila (Branch 49) o Declaratory Relief Section 1, Rule 64, Rules of Court: A special civil action brought by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, before breach or violation thereof, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties Requisites: 1) Justiciable controversy  involves an active antagonistic assertion of legal right on one side and denial thereof on the other  concerns a real (and not theoretical) question or issue 2) Controversy between persons with adverse interests  material interest 3) Must have legal interest in controversy to seek for declaratory relief 4) Issue must be ripe for justiciable determination Relief  specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the right of the plaintiff  SJS’s objectives: 1) Interpretation of the constitutional provision on separation of church and state 2) Declaratory judgment: whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions


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whether or not Velarde and the other religious leaders in question violated the constitution by endorsing candidates or requiring members to vote for specific candidates for elective office  Filed motions by respondents: 1) Villanueva, Manalo and Velarde  Motion to Dismiss (within original filing period) 2) Cardinal Sin  Comment (within extended period) 3) Soriano  Answer (within extended period) o Dismissal of petition  no cause of action and no justiciable controversy o Court denied Motion to Dismiss and ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement  Decision: endorsement of specific candidates is a clear violation of the separation clause o However, the decision did not include i nclude a dispositive portion  order or judgment of the court irrespective of the contrary statements therein o Motion for Reconsideration denied by lower court (Case at hand ) Petition for Review o 02 September 2003: Court Resolution  SJS and Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as well as respondents to submit comments 

•

ISSUE/S , HELD AND RATIO: •

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Procedural Issues 1) Whether or not Petition For Declaratory Relief contains justiciable controversy controversy o No, the petition does not contain justiciable controversy. o Petition is based on speculations and theoretical issues that had not yet ripened into actual controversy  sheer speculation does not give rise to actual right 2) Whether or not Petition for Declaratory Relief states a cause of action o No, the petition does not state a cause of action. o Cause of action  act or omission of one party in violation of the legal rights of another, causing injury  Essential requirements: 1) Right in favor of the plaintiff 2) Obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right 3) Defendants act or omission in violation of that right  breach of obligation  In a case of declaratory relief, it is presupposed that a breach or violation is impending, imminent or at least threatened, even if it has not actually happened o Petition filed by SJS before the RTC has no explicit allegation that SJS had any legal right it ought to protect o Assumption: Velarde and the other religious leaders in question might participate in partisan politics 3) Whether or not SJS had any legal standing to file for Petition for Declaratory Relief leg al standing. o No , SJS has no legal o No adverse legal interest between Velarde and SJS  no legal right of SJS was threatened by Velarde o Petition did not sufficiently state what specific right was being violated, or what acts were in breach of the law or Constitution Substantive Issues 1) Whether or not the RTC Decision conformed to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court o No, the RTC’s decision did not conform. o Essential parts of a good decision: 1. Statement of case 2. Statement of facts 3. Issue or assignment of errors 4. Court ruling 5. Disposition or dispositive portion  Court order or judgment irrespective of contrary statements


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2)

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Whether or not r eligious leaders, like Velarde, can endorse candidates for public office o Unclear o SJS failed to convince the Court

Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court 1) Dismissal of complaint  complaint should contain clear facts for claim and specify relief sought for 2) Complaint filed, legal fees paid, paid, issued summons to to defendant or respondents respondents by clerk of court court  15 days for defendant to answer, unless different period fixed by court 3) If not answered  relief granted. 4) If answered and counter-claimed counter-claimed  must be answered within 10 days from service. Reply may again be filed 10 days from service of the pleading responded to. 5) Failure to answer  Court directs judgment on pleading

TERMS: • •

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A quo  earliest limiting point; starting point; beginning Locus standi  legal standing  personal or substantial interest  party sustained or will sustain a direct injury as

a result of the act Moto proprio  of one’s own accord  upon motion of the defendant

SEPARATE OPINION Michael Barnes for St. Joseph County, Indiana vs. Glen Theater, Inc. Facts •

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Respondents are 2 establishments in South Bend, Indiana, that wish to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment, and individual dancers who are employed at these establishments. Namely: o Kitty Kat Lounge sells alcoholic beverages and provides “go-go dancing” desires to present totally nude dancing o Glen Theatre, Inc who’s primary business is in supplying adult entertainment in the form of written and printed materials, movie showings, and live entertainment at an enclosed ``bookstore” that features nude and seminude performances through glass panels. Indiana public indecency statute asserts prohibition against complete nudity in public places which violates first amendment

Issues • •

Whether or not the nude dancing involved here was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment Respondents argue their freedom for ‘expressive conduct’—in this case to convey an erotic message—in the form of dancing nude. o Respondents contend that even though prohibiting nudity in public generally may not be related to suppressing expression, prohibiting the performance of nude dancing is related to expression because the state seeks to prevent its erotic message.

Held • •

Decision of Court of Appeals is Reversed Court of Appeals Decision was: “non-obscene nude dancing performed for entertainment is expression protected by the First Amendment, and that the public indecency statute was an improper infringement of


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that expressive activity because its purpose was to prevent the message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the dancers” Ratio •

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the requirement that the dancers don pasties and a G-string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic. The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity while the dancing to which it was applied had a communicative element, it was not the dancing that was prohibited, but simply its being done in the nude

CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. V. CITY OF HIALEAH (508 U.S. 520) FACTS:

• Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (Church) and Ernesto Picardo its president filed an action against the city if Hialeah and its city council named as defendants alleging violation of the their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. • In April 1987, the church announced plans to establish a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum with the goal to bring the practice of the Santeria faith, i ncluding its ritual of animal sacrifice, into the o pen. • On June 9, 1987 and other subsequent days the Hialeah city council held an emergency public session where several ordinances and resolutions where passed in response to the distress of members of the community regarding practices of the Santeria religion specifically specifically animal sacrifice. (1) On June 9, Resolution 87-66, noted the "concern" expressed by residents of the city "that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety," and declared that the City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety. (2) On June 9, Ordinance 87-40, incorporated in full, except as to penalty, Florida's animal cruelty laws which punishes unnecessarily or cruelly killing of any animal. With the consent of the attorney general of Florida the city attorney assured that the prohibition of sacrificing of animals in a religious practice or ritual is not inconsistent with the state law therefore the city council can make ordinances against it. (3) On August 11, Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual sacrifices of animals within the City of Hialeah was passed. (4) On Sept. 8, Ordinance 87-52 prohibiting public ritualistic animal sacrifice, other than for the primary purpose of food consumption was passed. (5) On Sept. 22, Ordinance 87-71 stating that It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida where the word sacrifice shall mean: to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in apublic or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption was passed. (6) On Sept. 22, Ordinance 87-72 stating that it is unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations to slaughter any animal on any premises in the City of Hialeah, Florida, except those properly zoned as a slaughter house, and meeting all the health, safety and sanitation codes prescribed by the City for the operation of a slaughter house was passed. • After a 9-day bench trial the District Courts favored the defendants finding absolute immunity for their legislative acts and that no violation of the petitioners’ rights were made finding four compelling reasons: (1) that animal sacrifices present a


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substantial health risk, both to participants and the general public, (2) that the children who witness the sacrifice of animals suffer from emotional injury, (3) that the city's interest in protecting animals from cruel and unnecessary killing and (4) that the city's interest in restricting the slaughter or sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse use. • The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion stating that the ordinances were consistent with the Constitution. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Hialeah city council is in violation of the First Amendment in enacting Ordinances 87-14, 87-52, 87-71 and 87-72. HELD: The Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioner and reversed the previous decisions concluding that that each of Hialeah's ordinances pursues the city's governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief. RATIONALE:

The US Constitution provides that the Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof through the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment which was applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Amendment. Given that the Santeria is a religion, its beliefs such as animal sacrifice “need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others in order to be protected by the First Amendment. To support the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, (a) neutrality and (b) general applicability in the law needs to be established. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest even if it has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. practice. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. The ordinances of the Hialeah city council fail to satisfy these Smith requirements. (a) Neutrality need not only be facial (evident at the text used in the law) but can also be supported by the equal protection mode of analysis in the formulation of the law. The ordinances were found to be inconsistent with these requirements and led to the conclusion that the ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. (b) General applicability needs to be establish with laws burdening religious practice. The Free Exercise Clause "protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation. The ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendments Amendments rights. The Ordinances 87-40, 87-40, 87-52, and 8771 were claimed to advance two interests: protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals but this may be done not by prohibiting Santeria sacrifice alone and there are far more greater ways to do this that would not discriminate the practice of the Santeria religion. Also a law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny it must satisfy ‘interests of the highest order,' and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests. In this case the ordinances fail to satisfy these requirements as well. Lastly, the Free Exercise Clause commits government to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.


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DISSENTING OPINION RUIZ VS. UCOL GR L-45404, AUGUST 7, 1987 FACTS Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendantappellee Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt Ilocos Norte. In her answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer. Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings in the libel case, complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and participated as private prosecutor. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. ISSUE

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. As earlier stated, on appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel. HELD No. What comprises a decision which can be subject of appeal or special civil action is the majority opinion of the court and not the dissenting opinion. Never has it happen that the dissenting opinion has been the one appealed of. Doing such is contrary to logic and reason. WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for patent lack of merit. BASIS

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant under the above provisions to file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of harassment. First, petitioner Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint. The complaint was dismissed. Second, he filed a criminal case for libel based on portions of Mrs. Ucol's answer in the administrative case. Third, he acted as private prosecutor in the criminal case actively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant. And fourth, after the accused was acquitted on the basis of the facts stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols with implacability by filing a civil action for damages. As stated by


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the trial judge, "court actions are not established for parties to give bent to their prejudice." This is doubly true when the party incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He should set an example in sobriety and in trying to prevent false and groundless suits Guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. A review of the court's findings, however, indicates that the disputed Answer of Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. As stated by the trial court, "As will be shown later, it appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's answer." (Emphasis supplied). The court found the charges against Ucol, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances.

NOLASCO VS. PAÑO GR L-69803 JANUARY 30, 1987 FACTS:

The case at bar is for the motion for partial partial reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents respondents of the SC’s decision that the questioned search warrant by petitioners is null and void, that respondents are enjoined from introducing evidence using such search warrant, but such personalities obtained would still be retained, without prejudice to petitioner Aguilar-Roque. Respondents contend that the search warrant is valid and that it should be considered in the context of the crime of rebellion, where the warrant was based. Petitioners on the other hand, on the part of petitioner Aguilar- Roque, contend that a lawful search would be justified only by a lawful lawful arrest. And since there was was illegal arrest of Aguilar-Roque, the search was unlawful and that the personalities seized during the illegal search should be returned to the petitioner. The respondents, in defense, concede that the search warrants were null and void but the arrests were not. The court decides to use the dissenting opinion of Teehankee regarding this case. ISSUE:

Whether or not the personalities seized using an illegal search warrant be returned? HELD:

Yes, it should be. Following the dissenting opinion of Teehankee stated as follows: ... The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects aqainst unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated' (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights rders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by utlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify. All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary rule rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). ...


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TOLENTINO VS. ONGSIAKO GR L-17938 APRIL 30, 1963 FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant claims claims to be the successor-in-interest of the late Severino Domingo, who was involved in a case against Ongsiako. Plaintiff-appellant Plaintiff-appellant said that Domingo died without ever receiving the decision of the case, and he has just found out of the decision, over 20 years since its promulgation. This prompted him to file a complaint for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion. This was dismissed by the trial trial court for lack of cause of action. action. ISSUES: o o

Whether or not appellant’s claim that decision was erroneous and unjust is tenable? Whether or not one can move for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion?

HELD:

On the first issue, it is untenable. Appellant is barred by res judicata, judicata, the decision of the case being being final and executory for a long time already. On the second issue, the enforcement of the dissenting opinion is ridiculous as the dissenting opinion enforces no right, claim, or whatsoever. whatsoever. It is just a dissent from the conclusion conclusion of the case.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MIKAEL MALMSTEDT “THE SWEDISH NATIONAL WITH HASHISH CASE” 198 SCRA 401 JUNE 19, 1991 FACTS:

Accused Michael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902 from Sagada province to Baguio City on May 11, 1989. On the same day, Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, received persistent reports that vehicles comi ng from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. Cpt. Vasco thus ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. During the inspection of the aforementioned vehicle, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspiciouslooking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) traveling bags from the luggage carrier.The officers confiscated the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same, which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. The officers consequently opened the teddy bears, and they were found to also contain hashish.


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ISSUE:

WON the search of the plaintiff’s person and possessions were illegal, because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search could not have been made admissible as evidence against him.

HELD:

The RTC decision was affirmed by the SC. RATIO DECIDENDI: Ponente: Padilla, J.

The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) the receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately present his passport. Note: Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought i n connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Dissenting Opinion: Narvasa& Cruz “Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant should be absolved on reasonable doubt. There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the offense for which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch and the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence.” -Narvasa

LANDMARK CASE Joy Lee Recuerdo (petitioner) vs. People of the Philippines Philippines and the Court of Appeals (respondents) Landmark Case. The case is a review of an appeal petitioned by Joy Lee Recuerdo on the decision made by the Court of

Appeals on July 16, 1997 affirming the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court Branch 150, which in turn affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67. The petitioner was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa 22 or The Bouncing Checks Law. Yolanda Floro sold to Joy Recuerdo a 3-karat loose diamond stone valued at P420,000. Recuerdo gave a downpayment of P40,000 and issued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which paid in the amount of 40,000 and 1 in the amount of 20,000. All checks were drawn from the petitioner’s Prudential Bank account. Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to L iberty Savings and Loan Association and only 3, dated December 25, 1993, January 25, 1994 and February 25, 1994 were cleared. The other checks were dishonored due to the closure of the petitioner’s


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account. Yolanda went to Recuerdo’s dental clinic and advised her to change the dishonored checks which she failed to do. A demand letter was then sent to Recuerdo, but to no avail, leading Yolanda to file 5 counts of violations of BP 22 at the Makati MeTC. The Makati MeTC found the Recuerdo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of the BP 22 on all 5 counts and sentenced the accused to suffer 30 days of imprisonment for each count and to pay Yolanda Floro P200,000 which is the total amount of the checks issued and another P20,000 as damages to compensate attorney’s fees. On appeal, the RTC affirmed this decision. The CA also affirmed the decision. The petitioner files a petition for review, stating that she has been convicted of an unconstitutional law and that the trial court erred in not upholding her innocence as well as upholding the evi dence of prosecution even if it didn’t prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Issues:

Whether or not Batas Pambansa 22 is a constitutional law? Whether or not Joy L ee Recuerdo violated BP 22 on all five counts? Ruling: Joy Lee recuerdo is found guilty of violating BP 22 affirming the decision of the lower courts but with modification. Recuerdo is ordered a fine equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check. She is also ordered to pay Yolanda Floro P200,000 representing the amount of the dishonored checks. Rationale:

The constitutionality of B.P. 22 has been upheld in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez. The case ruling states that: “It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes,” but it “punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense agains public order.” "A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment." "BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made."

VILLABER VS. COMELEC GR 148326 JANUARY 22, 2003 Facts:

Pablo Villaber, petitioner, seeks the nullification of two resolutions of the COMELEC. First, disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; second is the en banc resolution denying his motion for reconsideration r econsideration.. Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner, and Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of


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Davao del Sur during the 2001 elections. Cagas filed a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged that Villaber was convicted by the RTC of Manila for violation of Batasang Pambansa Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks), a crime which involves moral turptitude; hence, under Sec.12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for public office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Petiition for review on certiorari by Villaber was also dismissed. In response to the suit, Villaber countered that his conviction has not become final and executory, more so it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of BP Blg. 22 does not involve moral turptitude. Moral turptitude – an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to

society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honest, modesty, or good morals. Issue:

Whether or not the violation of BP Blg. 22 by respondent involves moral turptitude which would disqualify him from candidacy. Held: The court affirmed, petition is dismissed. Violation of BP Blg. 22 do es involvemoral involvemoral turptitude. Ratio:

The elements of the offense under Section 1 (checks without sufficient funds) of B.P. Blg. 22 are: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda the Supreme Court held that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person.…" The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez , through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, 23 injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest." Thus, paraphrasing Black's Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. Petitioner 24

contends that this Court's pr onouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda , insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer - argument is erroneous.


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LEADING CASE Bonifacio Asufrin, Jr., petitioner, v. San Miguel Corporation and the Court of Appeals, respondents. G.R. No. 156658 March 10, 2004 Facts:

Petition is a motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner Bonifacio Asufrin. Case stems from an initial case filed by petitioner against respondents San Miguel Corporation Corporation for illegal dismissal. Petitioner initially worked at the Sum-ag Sum-ag sales office in Bacolod City, but was informed in 1996 that his post was declared redundant due to a new pre-selling scheme of the Sum-ag sales office. Petitioner then worked at respondent’s personnel department at the Sta. Fe brewery, pursuant to an earlier directive. However, petitioner and co-workers co-workers were eventually informed informed that they could avail of early retirement packages in line with the respondent company’s retrenchment program; this however, was rejected by petitioner Asufrin, who repeatedly requested in oral and written form of his desire to stay with the company in any capacity. capacity. Request was ignored, hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion when they overturned the decision of the NLRC which found in favor of petitioner, by ruling that 1)petitioner was not singled out for termination; 2) that petitioner’s position at the Sum-ag sales office was indeed redundant; 3)the dismissal of petitioner was valid. Issue:

WON dismissal of petitioner from San Miguel Corporation has just and authorized cause. Held:

SC ruled that it is not enough for a company to declare a position redundant; they must prove that there is an actual situation that justifies the dismissal of affected employees. employees. In the case at bar, records show that petitioner was the only employee who clearly manifested his desire to be transferred to any position in respondent’s company; however, all the other petitioner’s companions who did not accept the retirement package were redeployed to other stations, with the exception of the petitioner. Second, while petitioner was posted at the Sum-ag sales office, he was registered as officially in the payroll of the Sta. Fe Brewery. Therefore, even if the Sum-ag sales office was closed, petitioner should have been returned to the Sta. Fe Brewery. In addition, based on the criteria for dismissing dismissing employees, such as a) less preferred status, b) efficiency, and c) seniority, respondents were not able to show what criteria was used in choosing petitioner as a candidate for retrenchment. Respondents violated an important workman’s workman’s right, which is the security of tenure. Petition is granted. granted. Decision of the Court of Appeals Appeals is set aside, and the the original decision of NLRC is reinstated. reinstated. Petitioner’s dismissal is declared illegal, and respondent San Miguel ordered to reinstate him to his former equivalent position with backwages from April 1, 1996 up to his actual reinstatement. Respondent Respondent is also o rdered rdered to pay petitioner sum equivalent to 10% of his total monetary award for attorney’s fees.


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Philippine Export v. Philippine Infrastructures In resolving the merits of a case, the Supreme Court cites leading cases which illustrates the applicability of a particular law or legal principle to the particular case at bar.

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Export filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against respondents, alleging that petitioner issued 5 separate Letters of Guarantee in favour of respondent PNB as security for various credit accommodations extended by PNB to respond PII. However, upon demand, respondents unjustly refused to comply with their obligations to petitioner. Upon filing a Motion to Dismiss, Judge Roberto M. Lagman issued an Order suspending the case only as against respondent BF Homes. Hearing on the merits ensued and petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence. Acting on the motion to amend, the trial court, at that time presided by, Judge Joselito J. Dela Rosa, issued the assailed Order dismissing the case without prejudice on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, thus in effect, reversing the Order dated June 10, 1987 issued by Judge Lagman five years earlier. Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was thereafter denied by Judge de la Rosa. Years later, a petitioner for review on certiorari was filed by petiti oner against the RTC with the SC. The SC referred the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. The CA then dismissed the petition, stating that: “an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order. If it is erroneous, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, the same cannot be assailed by certiorari, as in this case. Also, that the motion to dismiss was first denied but there is nothing the Rules of Court which prohibits the court from later on reversing itself and granting the motion to dismiss.” In stating the nothing in the Rules of Court which prohibits the court from later on reversing itself and granting the motion to dismiss, the CA cited the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Mariano, et al (L-29157, April 27, 1972) and Vda. De Haberer vs. Martinez, et al (L-39386, Jan 29, 1975) where the trial court dismissed the complaint, then set it aside and finally again ordered it dismissed. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court’s order di smissing the complaint on the ground that

petitioner failed to state a cause of action for not alleging loss or actual payment made by it to PNB under its guarantees? Held: Yes, the CA erred. In arriving at its decision, the SC cited leading cases resolving points raised by both parties.

Loida Nicolas-Lewis, Gregorio B. Macabenta, Alejandro A. Esclamado, Armando B. Heredia, Reuben S. Seguritan, Eric Lachica Furbeyre, Teresita A. Cruz, Josefina Opena Disterhoft, Mercedes V. Opena, Cornelio R. Natividad, Evelyn D. Natividad, petitioners v. Commission on Elections, E lections, respondent. G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006 Facts:

Nicolas – Lewis et al. are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law. Long before the 2004 elections, the petitioners sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voters” pursuant to the Overseas Absentees Voting Law or OAVL. However, they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the U.S. that


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pursuant to a COMELEC letter to the DFA, they have no right to vote yet because they lack the 1 year of residence requirement prescribed by Article 5, Section 1 of the Constitution. In response to the clarification by Nicolas – Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC on the residency requirement, the COMELECE said that their position is that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among the others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not individuals who retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship can vote under the OAVL. Held:

Yes. There is no provision in the Dual Citizenship Law requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. In fact, the Dual Citizenship Law grants under its Section 5 (1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under the OAVL. It cannot be overemphasized that the OAVL aims to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. In the leading case of Macalintal vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend the right suffrage to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. The Macalintal ruling also explains that by the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Article 5, Section 2 should be construed as an n exception to the residency requirement found in Article 5, Section 1. Hence, the Constitutional Commission has in effect intended that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution.

COURTS, LAWYERS AND JUDGES A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 August 20, 2001 MIGUEL ARGEL, complainant vs. JUDGE HERMINIA M. PASCUA, RTC- Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Sur , respondent FACTS OF THE CASE: • Complainant Miguel Argel filed an administrative administrative suit for Gross Ignorance of the Law against respondent Judge Herminia M. Pascua. • On 22 July 1993, the respondent acquitted Miguel Argel of the crime of murder; however, on 19 August 1993, the former convicted the latter of the same crime. • Respondent Judge alleged that she acquitted Miguel Argel because she thought that there was no witness who positively identified the latter • The testimony of eyewitness Tito Retreta was not attached to the records at the time she wrote the decision.


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ISSUE(S):

WON respondent Judge is guilty of Gross Ignoranceof the Law when she acquitted Miguel Argel and changed it to conviction after almost a month because the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records during the writing of the decision HELD: Yes RATIONALE: Decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a mock trial. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled or amended except in cases abovementioned.

Moreover, judges are always reminded to take down their own notes of salient portions of hearings and not to rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes. The respondent, however, did not prepare her own notes. Consequently, the pivotal testimony of the witness was overlooked and disregarded. Therefore, Respondent Judge is guilty of Gross Ig norance of the Law. She is fined P 20,000.00.

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants vs. ATTORNEY A TTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993 FACTS of the CASE:

• Atty. Damaso B. Aves brought an action for damages against St Luke's Medical Center and St Luke's Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome for the death of his 7-month pregnant wife, Fe Linda Aves. • On 04 July 1991, St Luke's produced in court the medical records of the late Mrs Aves as requested by Atty. Benjamin Grecia,the counsel of Atty. Aves. • On 20 August 1991, and the St Luke's Medical Center filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Grecia. • Respondent Atty. Grecia is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which is material evidence in the damage suit against the complainants. • Respondent denied the complaints against him; he alleged that such accusations against him were ways by his opponents to discredit him and destroy his reputation. • The respondent was already disbarred on 12 November 1987. On 18 December 1990 or after more than three years, however, the court reinstated him in the profession. • The lower court disregarded Atty Aves' allegation that it was Atty. Castro, St. Luke's counsel, who stole the medical records and gave them to an unidentified man. • The Court ruled that the Atty Grecia was guilty of stealing 2 pages from the medical record of the late Mrs. Aves and gave them to his driver. ISSUE(S):

WON Atty. Benjamin Grecia's name should be removed from the Roll of Attorneys after the Court found out that he stole 2 pages from the medical records of the late Mrs. Aves and gave them to his driver. HELD: Yes


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RATIONALE:

Based on the evidence gathered from the lower court, the Supreme Court decided that Atty. Grecia was guilty of the charges against him. The SC ruled that Atty. Grecia violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility and canon 7 thereof which provide that: Canon 1, Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. Canon 7. – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. The SC further stated… … that a lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice (People ex rel rel Karlin vs. Culkin). Culkin). …the importance of integrity and good moral character as a part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his profession ( Marcelo vs Javier, Sr., A.C. no.3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14; Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662,676; 662,676; Philippine association of Free Labor L abor Unions (PAFLU) vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.) The SC found the respondent respondent guilty of grave misconduct, misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Thus, it was imposed upon him the penalty of DISBARMENT.

Teodoro R. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Conception, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin and Eduardo U. Escueta v. the Honerable Sandiganbayan, First Division, Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Presidential Commission on Good Government, and Raul Roco Facts: The PCGG filed a case (PCGG Case No. 33) against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. for the supposedly ill-gotten wealth amassed over the years. Sued in the case as well are lawyers Regala, Angara, Cruz, Conception, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta, and Hayudini, as well as Raul Roco (from the ACCRA law firm). They supposedly plotted and conspired among themselves to set up, by using the coconut levy fund, the financial and corporate framework that led to the creation of several entities (UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC are just some of the corporations). Furthermore, they were able to acquire Sam Miguel shares, and eventually ended up holding 3.3% of the UCPB capital stock. The PCGG investigated the groups and intended to find out what services were offered by the firm and who there clients were. Eventually, Roco was excluded from the proceedings because he agreed to reveal the identity of his clients for who he served as nominee/stockholder of the companies involved. Commenting on the motion, the petitioners (ACCRA) demanded they get the same privilege as Roco. The PCGG agreed provided the petitioners identified their clients, submit documents and the deeds of assignments. According to the PCGG, these were the same same conditions imposed on Roco. However, However, the petitioners petitioners argued that the attorney-client privilege gives them the right not to reveal their client. They also argue that since they and Roco are similarly situated, they must be treated equally and thus must also be excluded from PCGG Case No. 33 just as Roco was.

In a resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the counter motion filed by the ACCRA lawyers for exclusion from PCGG Case No. 33. as party-defendants because of their refusal to comply with PCGG’s conditions. The Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan held that while Roco complied with the conditions, the petitioners did not. Hence, the counter-motion was denied due to lack of Merit. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari asking the Supreme Court to set aside and annul the Sandiganbayan resolution. Hence this case. Petitioner’s Contentions: Contentions: Regala/ACCRA – The Sandiganbayan abused gravely gravely abused its discretion and its resolution must be set aside. The attorneyclient privilege prohibits ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client (s), submitting documents substantiating this lawyer-client relationship and submitting deeds of assignments executed in favor of i ts client.

Furthermore, the ACCRA lawyers and Roco are similarly situated. Thus, if Roco was excluded by the PCGG from PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, then the ACCRA lawyers should be excluded as well.


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Respondent’s Contensions: Sandiganbayan/PCGG – Sandiganbayan Resoultion is correct. Revelation of the identity of the client is not within the scope of the lawyer-client lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents the PCGG required (deeds of assignements) protected. Issues

1.

2.

3.

The 1st issue is whether the conditions set by the PCGG for the petitioners to reveal the identity of their client (s) and to disclose other information (including other documents and the deeds of assignments) as a requisite for exclusion from PCGG Case No. 33 are within the scope of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. If they are within the scope of the lawyer-client privilege, then the PCGG cannot demand these from them. A second issue is whether the PCGG, by excluding Roco from PCGG Case No. 33 as a party-defendant but not the ACCRA lawyers due to the former’s undertaking to reveal the name of his client and submission of certain documents, violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Are Roco and the ACCRA lawyers similarly situated and thus deserving of equal treatment? A third issue is whether the ACCRA lawyers should be excluded from PCGG Case No. 33. If it is proven that the PCGG’s conditions are invalid and that Roco and the ACCRA lawyers are indeed similarly situated, is there still anything preventing the justice system from excluding the ACCRA lawyers from PCGG Case No. 33?

Held The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are annulled and set aside. The ACCRA lawyers lawyers must be excluded from PCGG Case No. 33. Rationale:

The PCGG’s conditions set for the ACCRA lawyers’ exclusion are wrong and have no legal basis. The identity of the client (s), the documents that substantiate the client-lawyer relationship and the deeds of assignment executed in favor of clients are under the scope of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege in this case, based on the law and jurisprudence. The PCGG violated the equal protection clause. No substantial distinctions in situation exist between Roco and the ACCRA lawyers from the records of the case at bench. There is no substantial proof that Roco complied with his undertaking. The ACCRA lawyers’ inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. This is an unjust situation which must not be allowed to continue. Dissenting Opinions: “The ponencia's observation then that Roco did not refute the petitioners' contention that he did not comply with his obligation to disclose the identity of his principals is entirely irrelevant.”

Lawyers cannot be forced to reveal the identity of their client.

SEPARATION OF POWERS SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDUARDO R. ERMITA (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF GMA) Executive Order 464 Case Facts: On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations i nvitations to various officials of the Executive Department and the AFP for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers on several hearings, including: a. Alleged overpricing of the North Rail Project, b. Massive electoral fraud in the May 2005 elections


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c. Wiretapping and Gloriagate scandal However, Senate Pres. Franklin Drilon received letters from AFP Chief of Staff General Generoso S. Senga, President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. and Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requesting for postponement of the hearings since requested officials would not be able to attend. Drilon then replied that the hearings would go on as arrangements were already made. On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, “ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. On the same date, Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga sent notices that due to EO 464, invited officials were not authorized to attend the congressional hearings as none were able to secure the consent of the president. Only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attended, and for defying President Arroyo’s order, they were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. Various petitions (Petitioners: Bayan Muna; Ocampo et al; COURAGE; CODAL; Chavez; Chavez; ALG; Senate of the Phils; PDP Laban; Cadiz & IBP) were then filed challenging the constitutionality of EO 464 and requesting that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. Issues: 1. Whether E.O. 464 is valid and constitutional 2. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 3. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and 4. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Decision: The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. 1. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), are declared VOID. 2. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID. Resolution of Issues: 1. Whether EO 464 is valid and constitutional Section 2 (b) and Section 3 are void because: -it states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons. -Because the provisions of E.O. 464, implies claims of p rivilege without any specific basis to government officials, it allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. -The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. - the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. The President may not authorize authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is invalid per se. It i s not asserted. It is merely i mplied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether thewithholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry ofCongress.

Section 1 and 2 (a) are valid because:


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Determining the validity of Section 1 requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to “conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, i t was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. ***The Congress has the right to obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive branch. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Thus: Congress has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so a ssert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. 2. Congress’ Power of Inquiry The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which rea reads: ds: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives Representatives or any of its respective committees committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. impeachment. Thus Congress may exert its power of inquiry, requiring attendance only with hearings in aid of legislation, distinguishing it from the question hour. hour. 3. Right to Information As investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, any executive issuance that would limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of th e legislature’s power of inquiry. 4. Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same i s exempt from the need for publication. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the p eople should have been apprised of this issuance before it was i mplemented. mplemented.

David, et. al., v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Macapagal-Arroyo Facts:

GMA Declares State of national emergency and issues PP 1017 and GO No. 5 on February 24, 2006. The operative portions of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions and are detailed below:


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First provision: provision: "by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion" Second provision: "and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;" Third provision: "as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency." Exactly 1 week later on March 3, 2006, GMA issues PP 1021 declaring that the State of National Emergency has ceased to exist, lifting PP 1017.

During the course of the week PP 1017 was in effect, several events worth noting took place: Warrantless arrests were made Rally permits were revoked, and already assembled groups were forcibly dispersed The Tribune (a known Pro-Opposition publisher) was locked down by the police, searched without a warrant, and had some paraphernalia paraphernalia confiscated Warnings were issued to the press not to contribute further to the instability , and were threatened to comply with the government’s “standards” or face the risk of being recommended for takeover • • •

•

The following led to the 7 petitions challenging the Constitutionality of Proclamation 1017 and G.O. No. 5 ISSUES: First Provision of 1017:

Is it within the president’s authority to call out to the AFP/PNP to assist in suppressing all forms of lawlessness? Second Provision:

Is it within her power to promulgate decrees? Can the president enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? Third Provision:

Can the president declare a state of National emergency and exercise emergency powers to address the emergency? Is it within the capacity/power of the Executive body to take over privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest? HELD: First Provision of 1017:

Yes. It is deemed within the President’s inherent powers to call out to the military military to assist in suppressing lawless violence and is deemed constitutional to that extent. However, the provisions of PP1017 commanding the military to enforce laws unrelated to lawless violence and the promulgation of Presidential decrees were declared as Unconstitutional. Second Provision: Is it within her power to p romulgate decrees? decrees?

No. the Legislative power is always vested vested in congress, and for the president to encroach on this power is a breach on the mandate of Separation of Powers and is therefore unconstitutional. unconstitutional. Can the president enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?


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As mentioned earlier, it is unconstitutional for the president to enforce obedience to decrees because it is not within the President’s power to promulgate decrees. It is also Unconstitutional to enforce obedience to all laws (i.e. customs law, tax law) through the military. It is however, constitutional constitutional to use the military to suppress lawless violence and anarchy. Third Provision:

It is deemed Constitutional for the president to declare a state of National emergency. The exercise of Emergency powers, however, is deemed unconstitutional without delegation from Congress. Congress is the repository of emergency powers, as a check and balance to the awesome magnitude of “emergency powers”. The President cannot legally exercise these powers, until Congress bestows this upon him. It is also not within the power of the Executive body to takeover a privately owned business/utility in times of National Emergencies. Although this is an inherent power of the State, this power is exercised and bestowed upon the Congress. Therefore, this power – like emergency powers – cannot be exercised by the president until it has been delegated onto him by Congress. The declaration of the third provision was deemed constitutional, but the exercise of the emergency powers and the acts of the PNP were deemed unconstitutional.

Francisco v. HRET G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 Facts: •

•

•

•

•

Former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide for culpable violation of the constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes – filed on June 2 2003 – dismissed for lack of substance. nd 2 impeachment complaint was filed by members of the House of Representatives. It was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement signed by at least 1/3 of the House. – filed on Oct 23 2003 nd Several petitions were filed at the courts - trying to prevent 2 impeachment complaint for reaching Senate and trying to declare the House Rules on Impeachment as null and void. Speaker de Venecia intervened with a petition to stop the courts from hearing petitions – courts have no jurisdiction. House House of Representatives Representatives handles all matters matters in filing of impeachment impeachment complaint. complaint. Senator Pimentel, Jr intervened asking the courts to dismiss the petitions – courts of no jurisdiction. Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. impeachment.

Issues: 1. Where or not courts can review the petitions 2. Whether or not House Rules on Impeachment Procedure are unconstitutional unconstitutional nd 3. Whether or not 2 impeachment impeachment complaint is unconstitutional unconstitutional Held: Whether or not courts can review the petitions. YES.

Ratio: Courts are tackling the issue of Judicial Review. The Courts are granted by the 1987 constitution the duty and power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or any instrumentality of the government. In cases of controversy, the constitution gives the judicial branch the power to determine the allocation of powers. Courts are the final arbiters in controversies. Courts have moderating power. It doesn’t mean that the courts are superior over the other branches – they are all equal…the courts are only performing the duty vested by the constitution. There are 4 essential requisites for Judicial Review 1. Actual case or controversy 2. Person challenging must have legal standing 3. Issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest moment 4. Issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case


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Legal standing is the personal or substantial interest in the case such that party has sustained or will sustain an injury. Legal standing will vary with every category of person suing – whether as a citizen, taxpayer, legislator etc. To have legal standing there is the direct injury test or the transcendental importance test. In this case petitioners have legal standing for direct injury…but some don’t. Nevertheless, the courts are liberal with regards to the transcendental importance of the case to the public and the state. However, courts argue that this liberal view has its limitations. Legal standing should still try to have a direct injury involved. Court tackling Ripeness or Prematurity Prematurity of Issue – questioning whether or not the case i s ripe for judicial adjudication – it is ripe for adjudication. adjudication. Contentions that the Senate or HOR should be allowed to handle the issue – BUT the constitution does not grant them the power to settle this controversy. Only the courts have the power, right and authority to settle constitutional controversies – allocate powers and determine whether or not there has been an abuse of discretion. nd Contention that 2 impeachment complaint be revoked – BUT even if it was revoked, this doesn’t eliminate the constitutional mistake made Court tackling Justiciability of the issue Contention that issue at hand is a political question and thus the courts have no jurisdiction over the matter. However, the issue is justiceable and can thus be tackled by the courts. • •

What determines justiciability – constitutional issue in the case + no other body able to rightfully assume jurisdiction and settle the matter Court tackling Lis Mota of the case It is a rule that courts should avoid constitutional issues unless it is truly unavoidable and parties have brought up a constitutional issue. nd Looking at petitions filed – all petitions collectively raised constitutional issues. – House Rules + 2 impeachment complaint The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota or crux of the case.

***Given all of this, the courts therefore have the authority and right to review the petitions*** Held: Whether or not House Rules on Impeachment are unconstitutional. YES. Ratio: Speaker de Venecia contends that House Rules do not violate the constitution in impeachment proceedings. He claims that to initiate proceedings does not mean to file an impeachment complaint.

The House Rules state that a vote of 1/3 of the House endorsing the complaint is sufficient enough to be classified as an initiation of complaint. The court contends that to initiate an impeachment complaint does mean to file the case (as well as referring it to the House Committee on Justice) as provided by the constitution. House Rules on Impeachment therefore violate the constitution in the area of what constitutes a filing of an impeachment complaint. nd

Held: Whether or not 2 impeachment impeachment complaint is unconstitutional. YES. Ratio: nd 2 impeachment complaint violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a 1 year period. (June – October)


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Court Ruling/Dispositive Portion: Rules of House on Impeachment procedure declared unconstitutional nd 2 impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide declared unconstitutional

Panama Refining Co vs. Ryan Argued Dec. 10, 11, 1934. Decided Jan. 7, 1935. Facts:

During the Great Depression oil prices faltered because of overproduction and general economic slowdown. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1934 provided the president authority to prohibit interstate oil shipments if the oil was produced in excess of state quotas. On July 11, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6199 prohibited 'the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation. This action was based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933:

Sec. 9. '(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage…

This 'Petroleum Code' relating to 'Production' for estimates of 'required production of crude oil to balance consumer demand for petroleum products'. This ‘required production' was to be 'equitably allocated' among the several states. Suits that were brought i n October 1933: No. 135, the Panama Refining Company , as owner of an oil refining plant in Texas, sued to restrain federal officials, from

enforcing Regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior under section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The validity of section 9(c) was seen as an unconstitutional delegation to the President of legislative power. No. 260, the Amazon Petroleum Corporation, all being oil producers in Texas and owning separate properties, sued to enjoin the Railroad Commission Commission of that state and the other defendants who were federal officials, from enforcing the state and federal restrictions upon the production and disposition of oil. As the case involved the constitutional validity of orders of the state commission, a court of three judges was convened. The excess oil or “hot oil” provision was seen as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the executive branch, thus violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

Issue:

Whether or not the “hot oil” provision/ statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the executive branch? Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held the statute as unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the executive branch. Ratio:


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The Constitution provides that 'All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' The Court found that Congress failed to provide a primary standard to guide the executive executive branch. This oversight allowed the president to act as he pleased rather than within an administrative role. The Court declared that the principle that 'congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution. Section 9 (c) is brief and unambiguous. It does not attempt to control the production of petroleum and petroleum products within a state. It does not seek to lay down rules for the guidance of state Legislatures or state officers. It gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. When the President is invested with legislative authority as the delegate of Congress in carrying out a declared policy, he necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to such a delegation.

JUDICIAL REVIEW Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, Aug. 4, 2003 J. Puno Facts:

The complainant is Alejandro Estrada, resident of Bacoor, Cavite; while respondent is Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of the RTC of Las Pinas City.

On July 27, 2000, complainant wrote a sworn letter-complaint, to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of the abovementioned Court, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Complainant believes that respondent is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court. Respondent invokes her right to r eligious freedom.

A preliminary conference on October 12, 2000 was held. Respondent testified that she was already a widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., without marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. However, as a member of a religious sect, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. Respondent and her live-in partner executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which approves the marital relationship of the two.

The parties submitted their respective memoranda to investigating judge Maceda who, in turn, recommended recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Escritor. After considering Executive Judge Maceda’s Report and Recommendation, the Office of the Court Administrator, through Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Lock concurred with the factual findings. However, he recommended that respondent be found guilty of immorality and that she be penalized with suspension of six months and one day without pay with a warning that a repetition of the act will be dealt with severely in accordance with the Civil Service Rules.


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Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct,” with the sub-issue, whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable. Held:

The case is remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity to: examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice; to present evidence on the state’s “compelling interest” to override respondent’s religious belief and practice; and to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom. Ratio:

Said case cannot be decided because the OCA failed to demonstrate how the state interest it upholds [preserving the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency] is so compelling that it should override the respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Should the Court punish respondent where her conduct is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The participation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is necessary to the case at bar. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the OSG, and not by a private person (complainant). It is the duty of the OSG to apply the compelling state interest test to this case. Compelling State Interest – not merely any colorable state interest, but must be paramount and compelling to override the

free exercise claim

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines (Republic) G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 Facts:

On November 22, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition to change his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. His name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” and his sex was “male”. Petitioner was a male transsexual and had undergone a sex reassignment surgery in Thailand, and upon return in the Philippines he was examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Reysio-Cruz, Jr., that he had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on the petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married to a man. He then sought his first name to be changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female. On June 4, 2003, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, citing that “ [The] Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.” Moreover, the court believes that “no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition”. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals; it alleged that there were no laws allowing the change of sex in the civil registry and birth certificate through reason of sex reassignment. On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals


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rendered a decision in favor of the Republic and ordered to set aside the decision made by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Issues:

Whether the petitioner has the right to change his first name and sex in the civil registry after acquiring physical features of a female. Held:

Petition to change the petitioner’s first name and sex in the civil registry lacks merit and is denied. Ratio Decidendi: Decidendi:

The Court held that a person cannot change his sex on the grounds of sex reassignment. Furthermore, the State has interests in the names borne by an individual for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. Firstly, RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) provides that the jurisdiction on the change of name lies primarily on the local civil registrar and the trial courts. Also, the ground for a change of name and sex in the civil registry for the reason of sex reassignment is not provided for in the provision. provision. Lastly, this court disagrees with the trial court’s ruling that there there would be no harm, injury or prejudice caused to anybody or the community. Firstly, his marriage to his male fiancée will substantially reconfigure and alter the laws on marriage and family relations, allowing a union of a man with another man that has undergone a sex reassignment r eassignment surgery. This would also affect the Labor Code on women and certain felonies in the Revised Penal Code among others.

CHECKING THE OTHER BRANCHES EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Estrada v. Desierto G.R. No. 156160 Dec. 9, 2004 Facts:

On Jan 23 2001, the BIR placed Erap Estrada’s foreign currency deposit account at Citibank Greenhills branch under constructive distraint. Erap filed a petition before the office of the Ombudsman for allegedly violating (a) Section 8 of the Foreign Currency Deposits Act (b) Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Practices. The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommended the dismissal of the complaint of Erap which was then approved by the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel (OCLC). Erap then filled a petition of Certiorari before the court of appeals. However, the court of appeals is only vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction involving a review of decisions or orders of the office of the Ombudsman in Administrative Disciplinary cases only unless there is abuse of discretion. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. Erap should have filed the action for certiorari in the Supreme court.


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Issue:

Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in dismissing Erap’s case for lack of Jurisdiction. Held:

The CoA was correct in dismissing Erap’s case as mentioned above in the facts. Falio:

Another issue which is the dispositive portion of the case is that the respondents did not did not abuse their discretion thus the instant petition of Erap is dismissed with costs to Erap. Ratio:

The Officer in Charge of the BIR that time (respondent Hefti) observed a huge disparity of complainant’s income as declared by him in his annual income tax return, and the amount of his income as e stablished in the impeachment trial. The protection of the Foreign Currency Deposits Act does not apply to Erap because the law is intended only for depositors who are non residents and are not engaged in trade trade and business in the Philppines thus not exempt from the processes processes duly issued by the BIR. Random Fact:

Most banks will check your account if your bank account had a deposit of 500,000 pesos in one month. The bank will ask where you got the money. They will waive the bank secrecy law (a privacy law which I’m not sure) and report to the BIR if you cannot explain the huge influx of money.

UNITED STATES v. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 73-1766. FACTS:

The case concerns a petition for a writ certiorari before judgment (No. 73-1766) was filed by the Special Prosecutor (representing the United States) to the US Supreme court. Also, President Nixon filed a cross-petition for such a writ challenging the grand jury action (No. 73-1834). •

March 1, 1974- An indictment charging seven named individuals with various offenses (one of which is to defraud United States) was returned by the US District court of Columbia. President Nixon was named as an unindicted coconspirators.

•

April 18, 1974- A subpoena duces tucem was issued by the District Court to the President upon the request of the Special Prosecutor requiring requiring him to submit certain tapes, memoranda, memoranda, papers pertaining to the meeting of the President with his advisers.

•

April 30- The President released released an edited transcriptions of 43 conversations.

•

May 1- The president’s counsel a motion to quash the subpoena; accompanied by a claim of an executive privilege.

•

May 20- the motion to quash the subpoena was denied.


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•

May 24- the president filed an appeal from from the district Court and also a petition for writ writ of mandamus in the court of appeals

•

May 24- the Special Prosecutor filed the petition for a writ of certiorari (No. 73-1766)

•

June 6- The President filed a cross-petition cross-petition (No. 73-1834). 73-1834).

ISSUES

Whether the subpoena duces tucem requested by the Special Prosecutor satisfies the requirements of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 and is justifiable. Whether the subpoena should be quashed to provide absolute privilege of confidentiality for the President’s communications. HELD

The Supreme Court affirms the order of the District court that the issuance of he subpoena was justifiable, thus, the subpoenaed materials be delivered to the court . RATIO

After examining the materials, the Supreme Court concluded that there was a sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes contains conversations relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment and thus the subpoena was justifiable. As to the issue of the confidentiality, the Court concluded that since the District of Court is obliged to provide protection for the subpoenaed materials and since there was an absence of national security secrets, there is no reason for a presidential privilege of immunity against judicial obligations. Also, providing a presidential privilege will upset the balance of "a workable government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III (check and balance).

Neri v. Blue Ribbon Committee G.R. No. 171396 May 5, 2006 FACTS

1.) On April 21, 2007. The Department of Transportation and Communication entered in contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network worth P16 Billion, to be financed by the People’s Republic of China 2.) Four (4) resolutions were introduced into the Senate a.

Resolution No. 127 by Senator Pimentel directing the Blue Ribbon Committee And the Committee on Trade and Industry to iinvestigate nvestigate the circumstances leading leading to the ZTE-NBN deal in aid of legislation

b.

Resolution No. 144 by Senator Roxas urging the President to cancel the said Deal

c.

Resolution No. 129 by Senator Lacson directing the committee on National Defense to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation


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d.

Resolution No. 136 by Senator Santiago directing the proper senate committee to conduct in inquiry in aid of legislation

3.) Respondent Committees initiated the investigation and summoned certain personalities, Including the Petitioner Romulo Neri. He was summoned to testify four times, specifically on September 18, 20, 26 and October 25, 2007. Neri only attended the September 26 hearing claiming that he was out of town on the other dates. 4.) On September 26, 2007, the petitioner testified before the respondent committees for 11 hours, wherein he claimed that then Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him a P200 million bribe for the approval for the ZTE deal. He further said that he informed President Arroyo of the said bribery attempt and was told not to accept the bribe. However, However, he refused to go further invoking “executive “executive privilege” 5.) Despite this, the senate went on to subpoena the petitioner for another hearing on November 20, 2007. In response to this, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita requested the respondent committees to dispense of the petitioner’s testimony on grounds of executive privilege, further stating that the petitioner had “exhaustively discussed the ZTE project in the September 26 hearing 6.) Neri asked for time to consult with his superiors and sought guidance on the invocation of executive privilege on the following questions a. b. c.

Whether the President followed up on the project Whether he was dictated to prioritize the project Whether the president told him to approve the project

7.) On November 20. 2007, the petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees and was thus asked to explain explai n why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, the petitioner replied that he had no intention of ignoring the senate and that he hid not attend because he thought that the only questions that would be asked were the three questions that were claimed to be covered by executive privilege. Furthermore, he stated that if there were new matters to be taken up, he requested that he be furnished the questions in advance so he could prepare for it. The Petitioner, through his counsel further further stated that his non appearance was was upon the order of the president and that his conversation with the president was a delicate matter that could affect diplomatic matters. matters. In Interim, on December 7 , 2007, the the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari certiorari assailed the letter demanding his attendance on the November 20, 2007 hearing. 8.) The respondent committees found the reply unsatisfactory and cited the petitioner for contempt and ordered his arrest and detention. The petitioner promptly promptly filed a motion for reconsideration reconsideration and filed a supplemental supplemental petition for Certiorari seeking the restrain the implementation of the contempt order. 9.) On February 5, 2008, the court issued an order preventing the implementation of the contempt order, requiring the parties to observe the status quo prior to the order and requiring the respondent committees to file their comment. 10.) On March 4, 2008, the oral arguments were held, after which the parties were directed to manifest if they were amendable to having the petitioner resume his testimony to answer other questions. questions. The Senate refused. 11.) On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached memorandum (Which the court granted the next day), stating that


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a.) The communications between the petitioner and the President covered the principle of executive privilege b.) The Petitioner was nit summoned by the Senate Committees in accordance to the law making body’s power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Section 21 of Article VI of the constitution and Senate v. Ermita c.) Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged non-compliance with the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007.

12.) On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo revoked E.O. 464. Issue

1.) Whether the communications elicited by the three subject questions covered by executive privilege and whether the Claim of Executive Privilege was properly invoked. 2.) Whether the Respondent Committees committed grave abuse abuse of discretion di scretion in issuing the contempt order. Held

1.) Yes. The said Communications are covered by executive privilege and the claim was properly invoked. 2.) Yes. The Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Rationale

1.) Drawing on precedents Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, the three elements that define communications covered by executive privilege are as follows. First, the communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-non delegable power”. Second, the communication must be authored or ‘solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President Himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational” proximity with the president. Third, the presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information contains important evidence and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. The court rules that the questions are covered by executive privilege as the three questions are found to have passed these three elements. On the first element, the court court recognized the authority of the president to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. Second, the Petitioner passes the test of “operational’ proximity, being being a member of the Cabinet. Third, the court finds no adequate proof that of compelling need required in overcoming the presidential communications privilege. Section 21 of Article VI, states that the House committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. However, the court holds that he record is bereft of any categorical explanation from the respondent committees to show a compelling need for the answers on the three questions questions in order to enact a law. law. The questions are deemed deemed by the court to be more of the exercise of legislative oversight function as stated under Section 22 of Article VI, which states that although the heads of executive departments can be called to appear before the House, their appearance cannot be compelled in the said matters matters of legislative oversight. The court holds that in determining whether whether


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an inquiry is in aid of legislation or an exercise of the oversight function, much will depend on the content of the questions and manner of inquiry. 2.) The court agrees that the Claim Claim of Executive Executive Privilege was Properly Properly Invoked. Jurisprudence teaches that for a claim to be invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege lodged at the head of the department with control over the matter. The court holds that the letter dated November 17, 2007 from Executive Secretary Ermita, wherein he states that “This office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v . Ermita and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly’ satisfies that requirement. The court rules that the said letter was specific enough on how the requested information was privileged, as Senate v. Ermita only requires that only the particular ground ground must be specified. Thus, as a matter of respect

to a co-equal department, it is held hel d that the congress cannot require the executive to state the reasons for the claim. 3.) The Court holds that the respondent committees have committed grave abuse of discretion, citing five reasons. First, the court rules that the contempt order suffers from constitutional infirmity given the legitimate claim of executive privilege. Second, The court did not comply with the requirement in Senate V. Ermita, as well as Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the constitution that requires an indication of among others, the questions that are relative thereof. That the invitations should include the possible needed statute. It should be be noted that that in his explanation for his absence on the Nov 20, 2007 hearing, the Petitioner stated that he would be willing to attend a hearing on other matters with the request that the questions be furnished to him beforehand. However, the Senate Committees failed failed to send him the list of questions and instead ruled the Petitioner to be in contempt. Third, it was revealed that when the order for contempt was made, only a minority of the members of the Blue Ribbon Committee Committee were preset. The Rules of Procedure Procedure state that in order to cit cite e a witness for contempt, a vote of the majority of its members are required. Thus, there is doubt on the validity of the contempt order. Fourth, the Court finds merit in the argument of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Respondent Committees violated Section Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. The Senate is required to publish the rules of procedure governing inquiries of legislation. The failure of the Senate Respondents to do so renders their inquiry procedurally infirm. Fifth, the Court holds that the Respondent Committee’s issuance of the contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate. The Senate did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and went ahead to declare the Petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory and cited him in contempt. It should be noted that the Petitioner was not an unwilling witness, as he only refused to answer the three questions for which he invoked executive privilege. The Court holds that the Senate should have ruled on the claim of executive privilege before citing the Petitioner in contempt. 4.) Additionally, the Court expounds that it did not abandon its constitutional duty when it required the parties to consider a compromise after the Oral Arguments on May 4, 2008. The court claims that it did so as a test tool to find an effective way of settling similar cases and in order to avert a constitutional constitutional crisis. The Court holds that its mandate is to preserve the constitutional principles of separation, checks checks and balances and co-equality


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of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branch and keep them within constitutional bounds, even in the search for the truth. This is so as it is the only way to preserve pr eserve the democratic institutions and uphold the rule of Law.

CHECKING THE OTHER BRANCHES LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee G.R. No. 136760; July 29, 2003 Facts:

Case concerns a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief from the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring herein petitioners to testify and produce evidence related to the latter’s inquiry on the sale of equity of Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualz to the Lopa Group. In the aforementioned case, case, Romualdez is accused of various acts of corruption and embezzlement of funds, which were supposedly hidden through various corporations. On Sept. 13 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile in his privilege speech called upon to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to RA No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners contend that the order of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee for them to testify is not within its jurisdiction or legislative purpose, and is in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights. Respondent Committee on the other hand claims that the court cannot inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations under the doctrine of separation of powers. Issue:

WON the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee can require the petitioners to attend said inquiries and testify concerning the said case. WON the SC has jurisdiction to review the motives of lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations Held:

SC ruled that the Committee cannot require herein petitioners to participate and answer questions as the law states that officers can only be required to attend legislative inquiries if the purpose of such a session is to aid legislation, as stated in the Constitution. In this case, there is not suggestion of contemplated legislation; the purpose of the said session is merely to find out whether or not violations were committed against RA 3019. In relation to the issue regarding r egarding the separation of powers, the SC ruled that while it is true that each branch of government has their own distinct set of roles and responsibilities, it does not follow that the distinctions between the branches are intended for them to be absolutely absolutely unrestrained and independent independent of each other. The purpose of the principle of checks checks and balances is to ensure that no branch of government abuses abuses its power and overrides another government. government. And since it


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is the mandate of the judicial body to review actual controversies, it is within its realm to review the issues arising from this said conflict, even if it concerns another body of government. Petition for certiorari/prohibition certiorari/prohibition is GRANTED. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is enjoined enjoined from compelling petitioners to testify before it and produce evidence at inquiry.

Blue Ribbon Committee v. Judge Majuducon [GR No. 136760, 07/29/03] Ponente: Ynares-Santiago J. 2 consolidated petitions: [July 29, 2003]

FACTS

1.

Aug 28, 1998. Senator Blas Ople filed SRN 157. ---directing National Defense and Security, to conduct inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup d’etat to prevent the administration administration of then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Aug 28, 1998. Senator Vicente Sotto III filed filed SRN 160. --directing appropriate Senate Committee to conduct inquiry, in aid of legislation, into alleged mismanagement of funds and investment i nvestment portfolio of AFP-RSBS (Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System)

2.

Senate President referred SRNs to: a. Committee on Accountability of Public officers and Investigations [Blue Ribbon Committee] b. Committee on National Defense and Security

3.

In public hearing of Blue Ribbon Committee, appeared that AFP-RSBS purchased lot in GenSan {LOT X MR1160} for Php10,000/sqm. In Deed of Sale, Registry of Deeds, purchase price: Php 3000/sqm.

4.

Blue Ribbon Committee services SUBPOENA to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify. SUBPOENA: a writ commanding person to attend court under penalty penal ty for failure to do so.

5.

Atty. Flaviano refused. He filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 23, {docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496}

6. 7.

Oct 21, 1998. RTC issued Temporary Restraining Restraining Order direction Committee Committee to stop from proceeding with with inquiry and sending subpoenas to witnesses from Region XI, specifically GenSan. Nov 5, 1998. The Committee filed motion to dismiss the petition. Grounds: a) lack of jurisdiction


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b) failure to state valid cause of action. Argued that Temporary Restraining Order= invalid, violated the rule against ex-parte issuance thereof, and it was unenforceable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 8.

Nov 11, 1998. RTC denied petition and granted writ or preliminary injunction. injunction. WRIT of PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: a court order that commands or prohibits an act that the court regards as essential to justice. justice. Purpose – prevent dissolution of plaintiff’s plaintiff’s rights, seek to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm and injustice. [legaldictionary.thefree dictionary.com] dictionary.com]

9.

Phil. Star published a commentary regarding the action made by the Judge on this case.

ISSUES

a) Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion by Judge --when he dismissed motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition, And issued a writ of preliminary injunction. b) Whether or not Judge erred in convicting Sen. Pimentel of indirect Contempt of Court

HELD

A . There is grave abuse of discretion as when the the assailed order is bereft from legal justification. justification. No legal basis for issuing the resolution. B. Sen. Pimentel is not guilty of indirect contempt of c ourt.

RATIO

A. There was no legal basis for the issuance issuance of the resolution by the Judge. a.)

Principles of Separation of Powers Congress

---

legislation

Executive

---

execution

Judicial

---

settlement of legal controversies

When Committee served subpoena, it acted in pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid for legislation. (Art VI, Sec 21, Consti)

b.)

Respondent cited Bengzon v. Blue Ribbon


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“Preliminary injunction may be issued in cases pending before administrative bodies such as the Ombudsman or Office of the Persecutor as long as the right to self-incrimination guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is in danger.” Incrimination: to charge with or prove involvement involvement in a crime or fault. fault. ACCUSE. (Merriam-Webster)

Does not apply in this case.

Bengzon

This case

No intended legislation involved. Offshoot of a speech by Senator Enrile.

Clear legislative purpose indicated in SRN 160.

Subject matter of inquiry was more within the province of the courts than the legislative.

Subpoena was served pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid for legislation. (Art VI, Sec 21, Consti)

Issue has already been preempted before Committee came in.

Still pending with Office of Ombudsman. Therefore, no court has acquired jurisdiction.

B. Sen. Pimentel was not guilty guilty of indirect contempt of court. court. The reasons for conviction conviction were as follows: a.)

Causing the publication publicati on in Phil Star though it was sub judice. i. Sen. Pimentel contends that he had no participation participat ion in the publication. publicati on. ii. pursuant to press freedom. “relevant to matters of public interest.”

b.)

Making derogatory remarks. The derogatory statement was that he showed “gross ignorance of rules of law and procedure.” i. not improper conduct. Does not impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. ii. Necessary description to support a petition seeking the annulment of the order of the Judge. iii. Spouses Bacar v. Judge De Guzman Jr. “When law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if a judge does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the lawn.


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--- Sen. Pimentel did not malign the trial court, rather expressed the violation of the basic principles of separation of powers. iv. Nazareno v. Barnes purpose of court to punish for contempt: contempt: should not be personal. c.)

For making it appear than an admin case was filed against Judge for gross ignorance of law i. Without legal basis. No complaint was instituted separate from petition petition for certiorari.

Standard Charted Bank Phil v Senate G.R. No. 167173 16 7173;; December 27, 2007 Petition for Prohibition - With prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction - Dated and filed Mar 11, 2005. - Purpose: to enjoin respondents from 1. proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Phil Senate (PS) No. 166 2. compelling petitioners (officers of SCB-Phils) to attend and justify before any hearing to be conducted by respondents particularly set on Mar 15, 2005. 3. enforcing any Hold Departure Order (HDO) and/or putting petitioner on Watch List - Also prays for: 1. annulment of SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM and DUCES TECUM issued to P. SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM: A process to cause a witness to appear and give testimony, under a conditions therein mentioned. (legal dictionary.com) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM: a command to produce documents documents (lectlaw.com)

FACTS

1.

Feb 1 2005. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (VC of R) delivered a privilege speech speec h = Arrogance of Wealth. - based on a letter from Atty. Mark Bacobo denouncing SCB Phils for selling unregistered securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799) -according to letter, P is reported to have a sale of unregistered and high-risk securities securities by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to the investing public

-urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, aid in legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. 2. 3.

4.

Sen. Francis Pangilinan motioned the speech to be referred to R. PS Resolution was earler been introduced by Sen. Enrile. R invited petitioners and other resource persons to attend hearing. On Feb 28, 2005 when the investigation was commenced, Senator Enrile moved that subpoena be issued to those who did not attend and requested Dept of Justice to issue an HDO against them or include them in the Watch List. P were later served SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM and DUCES TECUM to compel them to attend the next set hearing, thus they filed this petition.


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5.

The issues raised against SCB Phils regarding the selling of unregistered foreign documents are already foreign securities.

ISSUE

Primary: Did the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee have have jurisdiction over the case at bar?

HELD

Petition for Prohibition -DENIED, lack of merit. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.

RATIO

A

Bengzon Jr v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee – does not apply in this case. -The similarity of Bengzon Jr and of this case is only until the presence of cases already pending in various courts

and admin bodies regarding the matter to be investigated. -Bengzon Jr, was not in aid of legislation. The speech therein contained no contemplated legislation legislation - On the other hand, this case is explicit on the nature of the inquiry, as stated in last 3 WHEREAS clauses in P.S. Resolution No 166. a. exisiting laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate i nadequate b. the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appear to be inadequate. c. there is a need for remedial legislation to address the issue. ----conclusion of Enrile’s privilege speech: conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation. B

landmark case Amault v. Nazareno -the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. -P cannot claim to have been singled out by R before there are other resource persons invited to help them in the case. -purpose of the investigation: quest for remedies, to prevent prevent recurrence - independent of the judiciary, it can assest its authority and punish non-compliance.

C

Right of privacy ---not absolute absolut e right. (Sec 21, ART VI of Consti) Sabio v Gordon, Right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.


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JURISDICTION JURISDICTION GODOFREDO B. HERRERA, as municipal president of Caloocan, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO BARRETTO, judge of first instance of Rizal, and CONSTANCIO JOAQUIN, respondents. respondents. G.R. No. 8692 September 10, 1913 FACTS:

Constancio Joaquin began action against Godofredo B. Herrera as Caloocan municipal president when authorities refused to issue a license to open and exploit a cockpit. Joaquin, plaintiff, asked the court to issue a mandatory injunction directed to Herrera, the defendant, to issue a provisional license for Joaquin to conduct his cockpit. The court issued such order ex parte {from one side} without notice of Herrera due to facts stated in complaint and annexed exhibits. Godofredo B. Herrera then began a proceeding against Honorable Alberto Barretto (judge of the Court of First Instance who had issued the mandatory injunction re cockpit license) and Joaquin (cockpit licensee) for a writ of certiorari {a document filed wherein the supreme court reviews the decision made by a lower court} , alleging that the court had acted w/o jurisdiction in the following statements. Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction because: 1. Cockpit licenses in Loma and Maypajo, Caloocan are issued by the municipal council, not municipal president (Godofredo), according to section 40j, of the Municipal Code and article 4 of municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan, 2.

He did not give the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be issued as required by section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

3.

Cockpit license erroneously issued for Constancio has been cancelled according to ordinance No. ____ of Caloocan, approved by provincial board of Rizal.

4.

There is another pending action between same parties, that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction because it renders null the final decision of court in civil case No. 8673.

5.

Mandatory injunction tends to render inefficacious and null the decision which the Honorable Richard Campbell will render in civil case No. 986.

6.

Constancio Joaquin has neither the license nor the right to run the cockpit in Loma and Maypajo. Objection is based on Bertol and Tanquilina T against municipality to declare null and void Caloocan ordinance No. 8, where complaint of Constancio Joaquin and mandatory injunction was based on.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Alberto Barretto and his alleged act of exceeding jurisdiction relative to issuance of mandatory injunction for the cockpit license of Constancio Joaquin should be granted a writ of certiorari ? DECISION:

The Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari and the proceeding is dismissed.


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RATIONALE:

A writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are decision within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be, cannot be corrected by certiorari . The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in the present case to resolve every question arising in such an action and to decide every question presented to it which pertained to the cause, including issuance of a mandatory injunction to stand until the final determination of the action in which it is issued. While the issuance of the mandatory injunction in this particular case may have been irregular and erroneous, i ts issuance was within the jurisdiction of the court and its action is not reviewable on certiorari . It is not sufficient to say that it was issued wrongfully and without sufficient grounds grounds and in the absence of the other party. It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the municipal president to issue the license, for the reason that he was not the proper person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person, he had the right to exercise discretion as to whom the license should be issued. We do not believe that either of these questions go to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the fundamental questions in a mandamus against a public officer is whether or not that officer has the right to exercise discretion in the performance of the act which the plaintiff asks him to perform. In the case at bar no one denies the power, authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of an action for mandamus {mandate, an order of the court } and to decide every question which arises in that cause and pertains thereto. The contention that the decision of one of those questions, if wrong, destroys jurisdiction involves an evident contradiction. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. The fact that another action may have been pending involving the same subject matter and even between the same parties, which was not the fact in this case, does not touch the jurisdiction of the court to act. A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching the question of certiorari and prohibition fully support the proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, its decision of any question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot be reviewed by certiorari , but must be corrected by appeal. On JURISDICTION and ERRONEOUS DECISIONS: Chase vs. Christianson : “…an erroneous decision of any of these other questions could not impair the validity and binding force of the judgment when when brought brought in question question collaterally collaterally.” .” Freeman vs. Thompson: “ The distinction is between a lack of power or want of jurisdiction in the court, and a wrongful or defective execution of the power… In the first instance the act or judgment of the court is wholly void, and is as though it as though it had not been done; the second is wrong and must be reversed upon error; the third is irregular and must be corrected by motion." Hardin vs. Lee: Lee: “…In a word, error and nullity are not legal equivalent or synonymous."

(See also: Hagerman vs. vs. Sutton, Sutton, Paine vs. Mooreland Mooreland,, Colton vs. vs. Beardsly, Wertheimer Wertheimer vs. Boonville, Boonville, O'Rielly O'Rielly vs. vs. Nicholson, Nicholson, Gray vs. Bowles), On CERTIORARI: States vs. Second Judicial District: “… Certiorari may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court." Lewis vs. Larson: Larson: “The judgment of a justice of the peace will not be reversed on a common-law certiorari , if the justice had jurisdiction to render it, no matter how irregular or erroneous it may be."


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Azardon vs. Chanco: Chanco: “Certiorari is the proper remedy whenever an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its or his jurisdiction, and no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists to correct such excess or extra limitation.

…”it is not light thing that the lawmakers have abolished writs of error with them certiorari and prohibition, in so far as they were methods by which the mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected. As instrument to that end, they no longer exist. Their place now is taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court retains jurisdiction its errors can be corrected only by that method. (sabaw siguro ang counsel ni Herrara dapat nag appeal nalang siya and dapat nag appeal muna siya for reconsideration sa court of first instance ng Rizal bago siya dumeretso sa Supreme court)

STARE DECISIS EL PUEBLO FILIPINAS v. MARCAIDA G.R. No. L-953, September 18, 1947 Facts:

Accused-Appellant Pedro Marcaida appeal on the Decision rendered by the lower court, finding him guilty of the crime of treason on four courts and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua with a fine of P1,000 and the costs, respectively. There is

no evidence presented by the defense, but there are testimonies of (four) witnesses presented thereof. From these testimonies, the respondent Marcaida was found guilty by the lower court, as he allegedly helps the Japanese occupants in arresting and abducting Filipinos who were thought to be members of Guerillas. In this case, there are witnesses that belie the testimonies of the other witnesses, in such a way that as other’s testimonies will be accepted, it means that the other testimonies will be rejected. Thus, there is no legal basis to convict appellant upon the testimony of any one of the witnesses.

(More detailed version)

Pedro Marcaida (appellant) was charged with 4 counts of treason but was found guilty with count no. 3 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua

No evidence was presented by the defense although prosecution presented 4 witness testimonies

Was apparently part of the “Yoin” which is the same as Ganap soldiers of the Japanese

1. Illuminada Zurbano a. Knew appellant as a Japanese soldier because was seen carrying a revolver(left hip) under his camisa


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china and used to arrest guerrillas and took them to garrison b. Appellant arrested her brother, Epimaco Zurbando 2. Marianito Catan a. Brother of Epimaco Zurbando b. Said that appellant had gun on his right hip under a polo shirt c. Said that he did not see Illuminada 3. Domingo Villasoto a. Appellant arrested his father-in-law, Sixto Targa 4. Luisa de Mondragon a. testimony was objected by defense because she was not mentioned in the info as one of the witnesses of the prosecution although the l ower court allowed her to testify b. testified on the arrest of Epimaco

The three witnesses were contradicting each other in their respective accounts (except Villasoto) General rule is that sometimes, sometimes, one witness in enough if truthful or reasonably credible. However, However, treason requires that the accused be given special protection to avoid mi scarriage of justice Cannot convict appellant because of the contradicting witness accounts making them unreliable

Dissent by TUASON, FERIA, HILADO, PADILLA

People’s court was fully sustained with the testimonies of all witnesses since defendant did not introduce any evidence. It turns out that defendant has not been shown to be a Filipino citizen according to the lower court’s judgment.

However, according to Mondragon, she knew the defendant as a native of Lopez for he is always there. In the absence of proof, every man is considered a citizen of the country in which he resides. Issues:

Whether or not the principle of Stare Decisis should be applied to this particular case? Whether or not the defendant was guilty of treason based on the litigation of witnesses

Held:

No. Stare Decisis should not bar the Court from correcting itself. No, the defendant was acquitted from the crime of treason Ratio:

Stare Decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an an error. Furthermore, it is the duty of every court to e xamine its own decisions without the fear and to revise them reluctance. The litigation was not enough to convict the defendant of treason due to the contradicting witness accounts from the prosecution. Aside from this, there was no proof of the defendant’s Filipino citizenship. Before the dissent, the defendant was acquitted due to the unreliability of the witness accounts


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TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK (June 20, 2000) G.R. No. L-40527 Facts •

Banco Filipino ecountered a legal problem with respect to its branch site holdings.

•

Acc to the General Banking Act (RA 337), banks can only invest in real estate up to 50% their net worth

•

•

Respondent’s major stockholders set an entity (TALA) [Tiu, Aguirre, Lim and Aguirre] where its existing branch sites may be unloaded. Entity would acquire new branch sites for it to be leased to respondent bank TALA placed a 3% per annum add-on to their carrying cost. However, respondent says that it was agreed that properties would be returned at the same price since TALA is a mere trustee

•

Petition of ejectment due to the 2 different contracts of lease presented by each party. The petitioner presents an 11-year amended lease (NP Generoso Fulgencio) while the respondent presents a 20 year lease (NP Jose Dimaisip). Petitioner filed a complaint agains the respondent. However, the petitioner lost and therefore goes to the court of appeals which later on dismissed the petition to maintain judicial consistency and stability.

•

Petioner then files a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the court of appeals. The result of this is that the respondents have to pay the petitioner. In turn, respondent also files a motion for reconsideration. The court of appeals then revokes its order for respondent to pay rentals. Because of this, the petitioner filed an appeal to the supreme court saying that the cour t of appeals erred in not ejecting the respondents from the leased premises. As a response, respondent says that it is up to the supreme court to establish jurisprudence and doctrines doctrines

Issue

Whether Stare Decisis should be applied despite the changes in parties and properties Held

Yes, Stare decisis should be applied.

Ratio

From the Decision of the Supreme Court, where the 20-year lease contract should be upheld over the 11-year contract of the petitioner. Thus, from the aforementioned Decision, the Court have no other option but to uphold the 20-year lease contract of the respondents, following the principle of Stare Decisis et non quieta movere (or “Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”).


57

Furthermore, the ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceedings and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. Stare Decisis should apply if the facts are substantially the same even if the parties may be different.

JOSE TAN CHONG v. THE SECRETARY SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No. 47616, September 16, 1947 LAM SWEE SANG v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 47623, September 16, 1947 Facts:

Petitioners on two cases, above-mentioned, are both born of a Chinese Father and a Filipino Mother. The first petitioner Tan Chong was granted Writ of Habeas Corpus since he was declared to be a Filipino citizen due to the doctrine of Jus Soli . The principle of Jus Jus Soli applies in the determination of citizenship. Basically, the citizenship of a person is determined by the place of his birth. Meaning, when one is born in a country, he acquires the citizenship of that country. This is also the situation with the second petitioner. Second petitioner’s Petition for Naturalization was dismissed because he no longer needed to be naturalized. However, the Solicitor General opposed the said Decision, saying that the two petitioners are NOT citizens of the Philippines, pursuant to the laws existing during the time of birth. The principle of Jus Jus Soli was adopted from the U.S. Constitution, which states that all those born and naturalized in the US and placed under its jurisdiction is a citizen of the U.S. A contention from the Solicitor General was made, saying that the principle of Jus Jus Soli was not extended to the Philippines. Furthermore, if ever the principle of jus jus soli was extended, it had its limitations. The law that prevailed, then mentioned that if one was born after a certain date and in accordance with other conditions, which would only be the time when one is considered a citizen. Otherwise, they are not to be considered citizens.

Issue:

Whether or not the principle of Stare Decisis should be followed on the precedents mentioned above, regarding one’s citizenship? Held:

No, the principle of Stare Decisis does not mean being blind adherence to precedents.

Ratio:


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Even if the doctrines laid down have been followed for years, if it has been found to be contrary to law, it should be abandoned or reconsidered. Principle of Stare Decisis should not be applied if there is conflict between law and precedent. Given that the law enforced during the time of birth of the petitioners, it does not allow them to be citizens of the Philippines, even if precedence tells that they be allowed to be citizens of the Philippines, thus, cannot be declared Filipino citizens.

MUTATIS MUTANDIS ROEL EBRALINAG, ET AL. vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, ET AL. G.R. No. 95770 December 29, 1995 Mutatis Mutandis – after making the necessary changes; paying attention to the the corresponding difference between the current and statement, although they are analogous Religious freedom

previous

Facts:

The petitioners are composed of various elementary and high school students from various public and private schools in Cebu who are represented by their parents. The students, members of the Jehovah’s Witness religion, were expelled from their respective schools because of their refusal to participate in the flag ceremony. The act of the respondents to expel the students was in compliance with R.A. No. 15256 and Department Order no. 8 of DECS, which requires the participation in the flag ceremony. The members of the Jehovah’s Witness believe that the flag is an image or idol, in which they are duty bound not to participate because flag ceremonies may be considered as a form of worship. Therefore, participating in such would be contrary to their religious belief. A precedent case, Gerona v Secretary of Education, was also raised wherein the SC ruled that the expulsion of the Jehovah’s Witnesses from their school for non-compliance with the law is not a violation of religious freedom, explaining that the flag is only a symbol of national sovereignty. The petitioners stressed that even though they are not participating in the flag ceremonies, this doesn’t mean that their sense of patriotism and nationalism are wanting and that they have showed their allegiance to the country in other ways such as being law abiding members of the society, obeying the countries laws, paying their taxes dutifully. They also stressed that they do not engage in disruptive behavior during the flag ceremonies as to not disrupt the ceremony. Issue:

Whether or not the students were validly expelled Held:

No Doctrine/Ratio: The Gerona case was reexamined by the Court and ruled that compelling one to take part in a flag ceremony would undermine one’s constitutional rights, especially the Free Exercise Clause. The Court likewise explained the 2-fold aspect of religious freedom, (1) the absolute freedom to believe as long as such is limitedwithin the realm of thought, (2) the freedom to act on one’s belief, which may be regulated. It underscored the rule that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger, both grave and imminent, which is of serious evil to public interest.


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In the case at bar, the Court held that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ non-participation in the flag ceremony in no way poses a clear and present danger to society. Thus, restraint on the part of the government would be unjustified. Moreover, the petitioner’s right to quality education, as granted by the Constitution was likewise violated by effecting the expulsion.

ABANDONMENT V. V. REVERSAL G.R. No. L-20034 January 30, 1965 ISABELO ASTRAQUILLO ASTRAQUILLO and JUANITA J UANITA J. ASTRAQUILLO, petitioners, vs. PRIMITIVO JAVIER, AMPARO S. JAVIER, COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE NICASIO YATCO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance I nstance of Rizal (Branch V, Quezon City), and of QUEZON CITY, CITY, respondents. Facts:

On August 1961, the Court of First Instance of Rizal had rendered a decision in favor to the respondents-spouses Amparo and Primitivo Javier and ordering the petitioners-spouses Isabelo and Juanita Astraquillo to vacate the premises in question and reimburse the defendants to a sum of P19,587.26 and P12,464.24 for damages and for rentals due to the defendants in the time in question. On September 27, 1961 the plaintiffs Astraquillo filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. The plaintiffs submitted their amended record of appeal on October 14, 1961 but were later reset to October 28, 1961. On the other hand, the defendants Javier filed their amended motion for execution pending appeal on October 25, 1961 substantially alleging the insolvency of the plaintiffs. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion on October 28, 1961. Stating the special reasons set for in the instant motion is that, the plaintiffs are insolvent. The plaintiffs contend the issuance of execution, arguing that “the mere allegation that plaintiffs are insolvent without the corresponding finding of proof to that effect is not special or good reason that will justify the issuance of execution pending appeal”. Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that the discretion of the trial court in issuing an immediate execution is to be reckoned from the circumstances that took place during the period of trial. The plaintiffs then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari to set aside the writ of execution pending appeal issued by the lower court and was granted the petition for certiorari but was ultimately denied by the appellate court. On July 14, 1962 the respondents Javier secured a writ of execution in the trial court thereto and the respondent sheriff levied on the personal properties of the petitioners and set the sale thereof. The petitioners prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, and was given due course upon filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00 which the petitioners posted in due time.

Issue:

Whether respondent Court of Appeals correctly upheld the order of the trial courts in executing its decision pending appeal.


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Held:

The petition is dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction injunction dissolved with costs against petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: Decidendi:

The Supreme Court cited that the petitioners Astraquillo contend the appellate courts’ decision to change i ts ruling despite the respondents’ motion to reconsider is based on the very same issues that they had issued beforehand. The Supreme Court sided with the Court of Appeals stating Sec.5,Rue 135 of the Revised Rules of Court “to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice” This power, according to the Supreme Court includes the right to reverse itself, specially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error in judgment. Another issue raised by the petitioners is the burden to prove insolvency lies with the respondents Javier, and since no evidence was submitted to prove insolvency the issuance of the special order was not warranted. The Supreme Court said that the Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence to confirm the order of the trial court executing its decision pending appeal. Considering this decision by the Court of Appeals the Supreme Court cited Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court “the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.”

PEOPLE V. MAPA 20 SCRA 1164 (1967) FACTS

Mapa (the accused) willfully and unlawfully have in possession & under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal.22 without serial number, with six rounds of ammunition without first having secured necessary licenses or permit. A case was filed against him in violation of Section 878 of the New Administrative Code for violation of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. To his defense, he have raised that he was a secret agent for the provincial governor. On November 27, 1963, the lower court found him guilty for crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 2 days to 2 years and to the pay the costs.

ISSUE

Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

HELD

No. The law was very clear and explicit that there was no provision made for secret agents. As such he is not exempt. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the


61

5

manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."

Though the accused relied on a prior ruling in People vs. Macarandang wherein a secret agent was sustained as equivalent to a peace officer (as he assisted in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes), it does not speak of authority in this case as it conflicts with this decisions.

Relampagos Vs. Cumba GR 118861 April 27, 1995 FACTS

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, both the petitioner and the respondent were mayoralty candidates for an election in a town. The respondent (Cumba) won the said election with a margin of only 22 votes, which was protested by the petitioner (Relampagos) in the trial court. On 29 June 1994, the trial court favored the petitioner with the following judgement: WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, re sults, the court hereby declares the protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes. The decision prompted the respondent to file a petition for appeal to the COMELEC on 4 July 1994. The COMELEC decided in favor of the respondent and reinstated Cumba back as the mayor of the town with a resolution issued saying that they have the exclusive jurisdiction over appeal concerning election cases. The decisions is as follows: WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [ sic] has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED. Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the appeal before this Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94. The decision of the COMELEC was contested by the petitioner (Relampagos).


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ISSUE

Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari , prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction?

HELD

Yes there is merit to the stand of the COMELEC that they have jurisdiction.

RATIO

The COMELEC has been granted this jurisdiction through a special law (Section 50 of BP 697) B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides: Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation pre-proclamation controversies. The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. cases. This special law was also found to not have been expressly repealed (the petitioner asserts that it is only a temporary statute). The repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides:

Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. — Presidential Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed . All other election Laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code is hereby repealed , except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII. (Emphasis supplied).


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Serrano v. NLRC G.R. No. 117040; May 4, 2000 FACTS

Isetann Department Store terminated employment of its employees, Serrano included, on October 11, 1991. Isetann however gave its employees thirty days pay which Isetann contended gave their employees thirty days notice because instead of being required to work for thirty days, the employees could look for another job while being paid by the company. Employee Serrano, who reserved the right to take advantage of the offer, filed a few months later a case for illegal dismissal before before the labor arbiter arbiter office. Isetann however however argued argued that Serrano accepted accepted the mode of notice notice and never never questioned the same and that the mode of notice was not raised as an issue in the petition. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Serrano and ordered Isetann to pay backwages on the ground that Isetann failed to gibe petitioner a written notice of termination at least 30 days before the termination of his employment pursuant to Art. 283 of the labor code. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the labor arbiter was reversed, not because it found that Isetann had complied with the notice requirement, but because the dismissal was for a cause authorized by law. NLRC ordered Isetann to give Serrano separation pay.

ISSUES

A) Whether or not the prior written notice of termination may be dispensed with; B) whether or not the SC has authority to inquire into a question necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before it. C) Prospective application of law.

Held:

A) No, 30 days notice is required. B) SC has authority. C) Laws should be applied prospectively (to include case where new doctrine was promulgated)

Ratio:

A) The requirement to give a written notice of termination at lest 30 days in advance is a r equirement of the Labor Code. Isetann does not have the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment payment of thirty days salary. It is not for Isetann to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to.


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Isetann cited previous case where SC ruled that the payment of 30 days salary in lieu of written notice given thirty days before the termination of employment is in accordance with the SC ruling in Associated Labor Unions vs. NLRC.

The SC said this case is not applicable since the employees in the case cited were given advance written notice in addition and were given pay for five days even if they rendered no service for the period.

B). The Supreme Court has authority to inquire into any question necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case

before it.

C). Prospective application application of the rule as ruled in the case of Columbia does does not mean that if a new rule is laid

down in a case, it should not be applied in that case but said rule should apply prospectively to cases arising afterwards. Private respondent’s view of the principal of prospective application of judicial doctrines would turn the judicial function into a mere academic exercise with the result that the doctrine laid down would be no more than a dictum and would deprive the holding in the case of any force.

Vitarich v. NLRC G.R. No. 121905; May 20, 1999 FACTS

Private respondent Redoco was terminated from employment employment by petitioner VITARICH for alleged insubordination. Redoco then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. After hearing, the LABOR ARBITER adjudged petitioner VITARICH of illegal dismissal and ordered them to pay Redoco backwages and separation pay as reinstatement was no longer possible because of their strained. relations. On appeal by VITARICH, the National Labor Relations Commission REVERSED the decision of the Labor Arbiter stating that Redoco’s infraction was enough basis for his termination. REDOCO filed a Motion Motion for Reconsideration. Reconsideration. NLRC REVERSED its own decision and upheld the Labor Arbiter’s findings. VITARICH filed its own motion for Reconsideration. Reconsideration. NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, Reconsideration, hence the this petition for Certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. To warrant certiorari proceedings.


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HELD

No. RATIO

In rectifying its previous appreciation and assessment of Redoco’s dismissal, the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion much less grave. A careful scrutiny of the records records reveals that the decision of the labor arbiter is suffused with with the established fact and a correct understanding understanding of them. Consequently, it is but proper for NLRC to abandon its former stance and adopt, and correctly so the findings of the labor arbiter. One of the inherent powers of the court is to amend and control its processes and orders as to make them conformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion has committed an error or mistake in judgment and that that to adhere to its decision will cause cause injustice to a party litigant.

RES JUDICATA AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES SINGAPORE (PTE) LTD v. INTEGRATED SILICON TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES CORPORATION G.R. No. 154618 April 14, 2004 Facts:

-

Petitioner is a foreign corporation which doesn’t h ave a license to do business in the Philippines. Respondent is a private domestic corporation which is 100% foreign owned. They have a juridical relationship, which can be traced to a 5-year Value-Added Assembly Services Agreement (VAASA).

*Respondent filed a case against petitioner for specific performance and damages for breach of oral agreement to extend the terms of VAASA. Petitioner on the other hand, filed a separate complaint against respondent for specific performa p erformance, nce, recovery of possession, sum of money with replevin, preliminary mandatory injunction, and damages. Petitioner is praying for a writ of replevin or preliminary injunction for the return of equipment and other materials, together with damages. On this complaint, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of capacity of petitioner to sue, litis pendentia, forum shopping and lack of cause o f action. The trial court ordered a writ of replevin and with a motion for reconsideration, respondent immediately immediately appealed to the CA who then set aside the said order and dismissed the case filed by petitioner. Issue: Whether or not there was reversible error on the part of the CA when it dismissed the case of petitioner due to litis pendentia? *Litis pendentia- a latin term which literally means “a pending suit” Held:


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Yes there was. It was erroneous on the part of the CA to say that the lower court had no jurisdiction over second case because of litis pendentia—a pending action doesn’t strip a cour t of its jurisdiction. Ratio: Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending

between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. The identity of the parties in the two cases notwithstanding, there is want of the other 2 requisites for litis pendentia to apply. There are distinct rights being asserted, two different causes of action and reliefs prayed for. Moreover, there wouldn’t be any res judicata since the two causes of action are different from another.

Cayana V. CA G.R. 125607; March 18, 2004 Parties: Petitioners: Rufina Rufin a Cayana Josefina Josefin a Rabina Mercedes de Guzman Susana Sambale

Respondents Marceliano Marceli ano Cayabyab Rosalia Rosali a Cayabyab (wife of Marceliano) Rosemary (daughter of Marceliano) Rafael (former husband of Rosemary)

Petitioners and respondents are children of Raymundo and Eulalia Eul alia Cayabyab. There was a dispute regarding 2 lands owned by Raymundo. Land Lot A was 11,735 m2 located in Lingayen, Pangasinan; worth P1730 Land Lot 2-A was 20,000 m2 located in Lingayen, Pangasinan; worth P2600

In Jan 1976, Raymundo Cayabyab, with consent of wife Eulalia sold these lands to Pastor Cayabyab through two Deeds of Sale. In Mar 1976, Raymundo died. Wife Eulalia executed Affidavit of Adverse Claim saying that the Deeds of Sale were forged. But in June of same year, Eulalia withdrew her statement and recognized ownership of Pastor. Feb 1977, siblings of Pastor continued to question the legality of the Deeds of Sale (forged).


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While the case on going, Pastor made transactions. Feb 1977 he had an agreement of counter guaranty with Insurance Corporation of the Philippines (ICP). June 1977 he mortgaged Land Lot A to Rural Bank of Urbiztondo. Oct 1977, Pastor Pastor sold Lot A to Rosafina Reginaldo for P15000; mortgage over Lot A was cancelled. Dec 1977, Rosafina mortgaged Lot A to Rural Bank of Urbiztondo to secure loan worth P5000. Pastor and Rosita nevertheless answered the allegations of siblings. They asserted the Validity of the Deeds but they were declared in default after not appearing at the pre-trial conference. Decision of the Trial Court (Court of First Instance of Pangasinan): Deeds of Sale null and void. But the request to reconvey the lands was denied. Those belonged to Eulalia Cayabyab. No appeals were made thus the decision was final. Apr 1981, mortgage over Land Lot A was forclosed. Rural Bank of Urbiztondo bought the property. The same sold it to Marceliano and Rosalia for P7221.95. Marceliano and Rosalia sold the lot to Rafael and Rosemarie for P10000. Plaintiff moved to annul the deeds of sale. They filed another case. They say that Lot A and Lot 2-A were donated by Eulalia Cayabyab (deed of donation inter vivos) to the petitioners. At this point, Lot 2-A was still in possession of either ICP or Pastor. Petitioners asked that either of them surrender the title. Trial Court rendered a Decision in favour of the plaintiffs. It claimed that plaintiffs were true owners of landholdings. The defendants ought to pay moral damages, attorney’s fee, exemplary damages, and other costs. Respondents say the court is erred in applying the principle of res judicata.

Court of Appeals (CA)now reviews the case. It says that res judicata is inapplicable. First case covered only issue on Deeds of Sale. The second case aims to annul subsequent transactions over the lands and recovery of the same on the basis of donation inter vivos. So it favored the petitioners. But then, it also says that the deeds of sale were valid. This was in favour of the respondents. CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners appealed but CA denied it. The petitioners maintained their stand that Pastor got the lands through forgery. Respondents say that while their mother said a forgery was made, she eventually changed her mind and recognized its validity by requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims. Besides, Eulalia does not have the right to donate the properties to petitioners because no partition was been assigned to the intestate estate of Raymundo Cayabyab. Petitioners insist that the decision of the first case was final. It cannot be changed since no appeal then was made. By res judicata, respondents respondents can’t adduce adduce evidence to prove prove their ownership of the land. Again CA ruled that res judicata does not apply. The first case made by petitioners is different from the second mage by respondents.


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Held: Therefore, both lands belong to the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab. The partition of the land will be done in accordance with law on succession. Thus, decision of CA was reversed. Decision of trial court reinstated. Land partitioned in accordance with law on succession.

SEC 47 Effect of judgments or final orders 1) Final order is conclusive upon title to the thing, will or administration, unless proven otherwise. 2) Final order is conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest Elements of Res Judicata 1) A former final judgment has been rendered on merits 2) Court must have jurisdiction over the matter and the parties 3) Judgment on the merits 4) Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action on both cases are same

Fourth element was not present in the case at hand. Case 1 was about the legality of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Case 2 was about the determination whether subsequent purchasers are in good or bad faith upon acquiring the land. CA and trial court should have made a conclusiveness of judgment, therefore declaring the Deeds of Sale null and void. The CA is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial court’s final judgment in Case 1. It is still necessary to find out if the respondents were purchasers in good faith. If so, the final decision on Case 1 cannot be applied. An evaluation reveals that respondents are not purchasers in good faith. Subsequent purchasers are also not in good faith. Donation inter vivos presented by the petitioners were also examined. It cannot be upheld.

Urbana Velasco v. People’s Homesite G.R. No. L-39674; January 31, 1978 Facts: Plaintiff occupied the land (Lot 6) and has built a house of strong materials in 1956. She asked respondent an application for the award and sale of that land to her. Later she discovered her applications missing and was awarded to defendants spouses who were supposed to be disqualified from purchasing purchasing land. Plaintiff asks for legality of the awarding of the land to defendant spouses. Defendant corporation said the plaintiff was a mere squatter of Lot 6. Defendant spouses sais that Lot 6 was awarded and sold to them by defendant corporation. Later, defendant spouses changed their answers to allegations. They say that the court orders Urbana and Alfonso Naparan, occupants of Lot 6 to vacate premises in question and pay corporation P500 as attorney’s fees. There was a final decision in the past and plaintiff’s plaintiff’s attempt to question it i t amounts to res judi cata.


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Plaintiff points out that the previous case and the present case are different. Case 1 is for the quieting of the title and/or recovery of possession. Case 2 is for annulment of the award and sale of Lot 6 to defendants-spouses. th

Among the elements of res judicata, it is only in the 4 one that the parties dispute and disagree. 1) A former final judgment has been rendered on merits 2) Court must have jurisdiction over the matter and the parties 3) Judgment on the merits 4) Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action on both cases are same The conclusion is inevitable that one is different from the other case. They are not one and the same cause of action. Court favored the petitioners.

LAW OF THE CASE Buaya V. Stronghold Insurance G.R. No. 139020, October 11, 2000 Facts

Strongold Insurance (respondent) brings Paquito B. Buaya, its then Cebu branch manager (petitioner) to court for non-remittance of company collection money amounting to 678,076.83Php. Petitioner fails to show up to the pre-trial hearing, therefore allowing respondent to present its evidence alone. The court decides in favor of respondent, ordering petitioner to pay the previously-mentioned amount plus legal interest and attorney’s fees. Petitioner files an appeal, and a date is set for the hearing. The previous decision is thus set aside. Petitioner then goes on to request extension after extension, pushing the hearing date further and further back, stating various reasons for his inability to appear. Sick of waiting, the court issues a final fi nal date, after which the petitioner waives his right to present a case upon missing it. A motion to postpone is nevertheless raised by the petitioner’s attorney. It is subsequently denied by the court. Respondent now asks for a reinstatement of the initial decision made by the court, to which it is granted. Petitioner is then denied a motion to reconsider and the court’s decision is made final and executory. A Writ of Execution is drawn up, prompting the petitioner to approach the Court of Appeals for a petition for relief. It is denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari regarding the COA’s decision. Issue 1 (verbatim)

“Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which rendered the decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafter order its execution?” Held (for issue 1)

The decision was never annulled, it was merely set aside, therefore petitioner’s contention is beside the point.


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Ratio (for issue 1)

The decision was set aside pending the petitioner’s appeal and the presentation of his evidence. By the petitioner failing to take this opportunity to make a case, the court’s decision to reinstate the previous judgment is perfectly justified. The mere fact that no additional facts were presented and the only facts that were considered were the exact same ones the previous decision was based upon serves to validate the court’s decision even further. Issue 2 (verbatim)

“When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the petitioner of the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trial court merely require the presentation of evidence for the petitioner and without anymore requiring the presentation of respondent’s evidence for cross-examination by the petitioner?” petitioner?” Held (issue 2)

Remanding a case to lower court for further hearing is not the same as a retrial. The petitioner’s assertion, once again, has no merit. He may not prolong the case any longer as it has already been decided as the law of the case. Ratio (issue 2)

Cross-examination and presentation of evidence by both sides involves a retrial. The court awarded the petitioner further hearing, which only involved the presentation of evidence from his side, as the respondent had already done so in the initial hearing. When the petitioner failed to show up at the final hearing, the evidence presented by the respondent became the sole basis for the court’s judgment. This judgment then became final and executory, making it capable of being executed as a matter of right regardless of any claim otherwise. This judgment may no l onger be altered even at the risk of error, therefore barring the petitioner from making any further claim. This is the only way courts can put an end to otherwise-unending disputes. Dispositive Portion

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision AFFIRMED. AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.

SOLID MANILA CORP. CORP. vs. BIO HONG H ONG TRADING CO., INC., ET AL. (1991)

G.R. No. 139020; October 11, 2000

FACTS OF THE CASE:

1.

2.

The petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land in Ermita, Manila access to which lies on another property, part of which has been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates, which was approved by the City Engineer with the following conditions for it's owner (the respondent) among which are: “(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall impose upon the vendee or new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned.” abovementioned.” Sometime in 1983 the respondent erected steel gates in said alley.


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3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

December 6, 1984 the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent to have the gates removed to allow the petitioner access to the alley The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. While the respondent reacted accordingly by moving to have the injunction lifted on the grounds that (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The trial court issued a “temporary writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final termination of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the plaintiff (the petitioner).” This temporary injunction was made permanent on january 19, 1987, in which the trial court rendered judgement against the private respondent. The private respondent itself went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition for the cancellation of the annotation in question. The court granted g ranted cancellation, and since the private respondent had acquired the title to the property this “merger” brought about the end of the easement. The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court which had rendered summary judgment and that it erred in holding that an easement e asement had been extinguished by merger. RATIO DECEDENDI:

YES While the petitioner was wrong in saying that previous owner in selling the property excluded the alley in question, the petitioner was in fact correct that the alley is retained as an easement regardless of the sale. Also it was mentioned in the Transfer Certificate that the private respondent was charged with following responsibilities: (6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity indemnity for the use thereof. . ." Therefore the construction construction of the steel gates were in violation of these agreements. In line with this the subject of ownership is not a proper argument as the petitioner never claimed that the area in contention is his. He is claiming that the private respondent failed to observe the “limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same.” DECISION:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. The petitioner and its counsel are hereby required to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be punished for contempt of court, and also administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum shopping. IT IS SO ORDERED.” DEFINITION OF TERMS There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion forum shopping - “ There (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative


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processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. “

J. M. TUASON TUASON & CO., INC., ET AL. vs. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, ET AL. (1978) G.R. No. L-33140; October 23, 1978

FACTS OF THE CASE:

1.

2.

3.

Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial allege that land in contention was acquired by their father by means of a Spanish Title issued to him on May 10, 1877. However, around 1960 or after J. Tuason & Co., Inc. allegedly entered upon that land, they discovered that under OCT No. 735 that transfer certificates were wrongly issued to J.M. Tuason & therefrom be declared d eclared Co. Inc., UP, and Nawasa. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles d erived therefrom void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages. Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.

ISSUES:

“WON OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova.” RATIO DECEDENDI:

“NO Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." DECISION:

“Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.”. DEFINITION OF TERMS in forma pauperis (IFP or i.f.p.) is a legal term derived from the Latin phrase in the character or manner of a pauper . In the United States, States, the IFP designation is given by both state and federal courts to someone who is without the funds to pursue the normal costs of a lawsuit or a criminal defense. The status is usually granted by a judge a judge without a hearing, and entitles the person to a waiver of normal costs, and sometimes in criminal cases the appointment of counsel of counsel.. While court imposed costs such as filing fees are waived, the litigant is still responsible for others' costs incurred in bringing the action such as deposition and witness fees. inter alia (i.a.), among other other things; A term used in formal extract minutes to indicate that the minute quoted quoted has been taken from a fuller record of other matters, or when alluding to the parent group after quoting a particular example.


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NOTE FROM THE WRITER: In this case the issue and ration are so explicitly stated that I found it's no longer necessary to paraphrase. Therefore those two are quoted here. I'm citing the JM Tuason vs. Mariano case as source.

VITA UY LEE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. (1975) 68 SCRA 196; November 28, 1975 FACTS OF THE CASE:

TIMELINE

1935: Land in question is issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal under the name of Ignacio Simeon, (father of Emiliano Simeon). 1947: March 27, Following the Death of Ignacio Simeon and his spouse, Lot no. 1 was adjudicated Deogracias Simeon while Lot no. 2 was adjudicated to Emiliano Simeon via a deed of extrajudicial partition of their parents' properties. 1957: January 20, Emiliano Simeon et al. Agreed to sell the land in question to Vita Uy Lee. 1957: February 14, Emiliano Simeon et al. Executed a deed of sale to to Vita Uy Lee.

1958: March 4, The Petitioners' lawyer produced a document a document entitled "Declaration of Heirs and Extrajudicial Partition With Partial Sale", wherein the adjudication of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 to Deogracias Simeon and Emiliano Simeon, respectively, and the sale by the latter of his share to Vita Uy Lee for a consideration of P16,000.00 were affirmed. 1960: June 14, Emiliano Simeon via Atty. Santos sent a letter of demand to Vita Uy Lee advising the latter of his desire to repurchase the land. Requesting Requesting a response within five days days or receipt. Vita Uy Lee et al did not respond. Note that this this letter and the subsequent ones did not have an accompanying tender of the full repurchase price. 1960: November 3, Emiliano Simeon via Atty. Santos sent a second letter to Vita Uy Lee reiterating his demand. Vita Uy Lee received this letter November 5, but as in the case of the first letter did not respond. 1961: June 24, Emiliano Simeon via Atty. Santos sent a third letter to Vita Uy Lee reiterating his demand along along with a warning that if nothing is heard from her within five days from receipt the matter would be brought to court. (However Atty. Santos failed to take court action, therefore Emiliano Simeon et al. Engaged the services of a new n ew lawyer Atty. Narciso Peña.) 1962: March 2, Emiliano Simeon Simeon via Atty. Peña sent a fourth letter to Vita Uy Lee reiterating reiterating his demand that he is "is ready to repurchase from you the land" in question. 1962: March 12, Vita Uy Lee via Atty. Guzman wrote Atty. Peña “that she cannot agree to the repurchase of the lot in question, because even assuming that your client had the right to repurchase the land, the period of five (5) years within which to do so, had already expired".


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1965: June 25, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio husband and wife, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to them the land in question. 1964 / 1966 - ?: January 6, ( Note from the Digest Writer: I'm assuming the resolution was fixed in year 1966. even though the case states that it was resolved January 6, 1964, which is odd considering it was supposedly brought to the CFI during 1965.) The CFI found the case for the Emiliano Simeon et al., among other things ordering the Uy Lee's to return the land

for the repurchase price of P16,000.00; for the defendants to pay for the litigation costs. The Uy Lee's filed for a motion for new trial, and an urgent motion for reconsideration both denied by the trial court. Then they appealed to the Court of Appeals, the CA's decision being to affirm the decision of the CFI. A motion for reconsideration also was filed to no avail. Case moved to Supreme court on a petition for certiorari by the Uy Lee's.

ISSUES:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient and complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law." Pertaining to the CA's non examination of the complete letters from Emiliano Simeon et al.

RATIO DECEDENDI:

NO It is not necessary that the appellate court reproduce in their entirety the exhibits presented by the parties during the trial. To require the Court to do so would be to clutter the pages of the decision with wordy texts of documents when reference to the gist thereof would just as adequately, if not better, serve the purpose of the rule. WON it is an error that the Court of Appeals' finding that the right of private respondents to repurchase the land in question still subsists. It was respondent court's thinking that the first three letters sent by private respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private respondents to redeem the property.

RATIO DECEDENDI:

YES The letters from Emiliano Simeon in stating his intent to repurchase the land in question was not enough to constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. Therefore Vita Uy Lee's silence does not equate to a refusal of repurchase because as mentioned that would require also a refusal of the tender of payment, which Emiliano Simeon could have sent subsequently within the 5 year repurchase period, but failed to do so. DECISION:

The Supreme Court found the private respondents' (Emiliano Simeon et al) right of redemption have passed, the judgement appealed is reversed and another one entered dismissing the complaint. No Costs.


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MERCURY GROUP OF COMPANIES INC., vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (2007) G.R. No. 171438; December 19, 2007 FACTS OF THE CASE: 1.

The Pag-Ibig Fund is a provident savings system for private and government employees which is supported by contributions from their respective employers. Under P.D. No. 1752, coverage of the Fund is mandatory for all employees covered by the Social Security System and the Government Service Insurance System and their employers. The law provides, however, for a waiver or suspension from coverage coverage or participation in the Fund, viz: SEC. 19. Existing Provident/Housing Plans. – An employer and/or employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their own provident and/or employee-housing plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes; “For annual certification of waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund, which shall be granted on the basis of verification that the waiver or suspension does not contravene any effective collective bargaining agreement and that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund or continue to be so.”

2.

Between 1980 until 1995, petitioner and its subsidiaries were, granted annual waiver from coverage of the Fund because their Retirement or or Provident Plan was superior to it. it. 3. On April 26, 1996 the petitioner on behalf of it's subsidies applied for renewal of waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996. Respondent disapproved petitioner's application by letter-resolution dated April 26, 1996, on the ground that the petitioner's retirement/provident housing plan is not superior to Pag-IBIG Fund's. Further, the amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7742 provides that to qualify for waiver, a company must have retirement/provident retirement/provident and housing plans which are both superior to Pag-IBIG Fund’s. 4. On the ground that it was granted exemption from Fund coverage for previous years based on its existing retirement plan the features of which are superior to that of the Fund’s, petitioner appealed respondent’s letterresolution to respondent’s Board of Trustees, which they denied by Resolution of February 21, 1997 which in essence removed the availment of waiver from the mandatory coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund, except for distressed employers. 5. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Q.C.) to declare null and void the 1996 amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended. 6. On September 20 1997, Branch 222 of the QC RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it “failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that respondent’s questioned amendment of the implementing rules was made in the exercise of its legislative/administrative, legislative/administrative, not judicial, function.” 7. Petitioner assailed the Supreme Court for a review “certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 132416. This Court Resolved to Deny the petition by Resolution of June 22, 1998 “for failure to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 222 had committed any reversible error in the questioned order.” The Resolution became final and executory on September 28, 1998.” 8. On May 19, 1999 the Court, in China Banking Corporation v. Home Development Mutual Fund, nullified the 1995 Amendment “insofar as it requires that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan superior to the retirement/provident benefits offered by the Fund and a housing plan superior to the Pag-IBIG housing loan program in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of fund coverage.” 9. Based on the China Banking ruling the petitioner applied a new waiver from Fund Coverage for the years 1996 to 2000. However by July 5, 2002 the respondent required the petitioner to register and remit it's employees and their contributions dating January 1, 1996 onwards. 10. Nevertheless, the petitioner reiterated it's application for waiver but was denied again on May 23, 2003. 11. Petitioner thus filed before the Q.C. RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, Branch 225 of which dismissed it, by Resolution of October 19, 2004, for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to refiling the same in the proper court. 12. Petitioner thus filed on December 10, 2004 an original petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against respondent before the Court of Appeals, which it partly granted by the assailed Decision of August 18, 2005 as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent Re spondent is DIRECTED to entertain petitioner’s applications for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage for the years 1997-to present with the


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concomitant obligation on the part of the latter to register its employees and remit their membership contributions covered by the same periods. (Meaning for the time being the petitioner still has to pay.) 13. With its motion for reconsideration denied, the petitioner filed on March 26, 2006 this current petition for review on certiorari faulting the Court of Appeals of the following:

A. IN DENYING PETITIONER’S PETITIONER ’S PETITION FOR WAIVER/EXEMPTION FOR THE YEAR 1996 IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULING IN CHINA BANK CASE. LAW OF THE CASE ADMITS OF AN EXCEPTION. B. WHEN IT ALLOWED RESPONDENT HDMF TO ENFORCE AN IMPLEMENTING RULE AND REGULATION WHICH WAS DECLARED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN CHINABANK CASE, AS NULL AND VOID.

C. WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE SECOND IMPLEMENTING RULES OF RESPONDENT HDMF ‘DISTRESSED EMPLOYER’ AS THE ONLY GROUND FOR WAIVER/EXEMPTION CONTRARY TO THE CHINA BANK CASE AND THE LAW ON THE RULE MAKING POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.

14. The Court of Appeals responded that via the Law of the Case doctrine the petitioner's application anew for waiver/exemption from Fund Coverage is totally dependent on the decision of the Supreme Court in the China Bank case which declared as null and void Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. [No.] 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund coverage under P.D. [No.] 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742. However the respondent invoked the decision of the Supreme Court in GR 132416 in denying the petitioner's application for waiver. ISSUES: WON the doctrine of the law of the case applies to the present case vis a vis the decision of the Supreme Court in GR No 132416. RATIO DECEDENDI:

NO The current case is not a subsequent proceeding of the same case GR No. 132416. The current case is entirely new , which was commenced by the petitioner's filing of an original petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against the respondent. (Remember that the Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the

court.) WON the doctrine of the law of the case applies to the present case vis a vis the decision of the Supreme Court in the China Banking Corporation v. Home Development Mutual Fund case.

RATIO DECEDENDI:

YES The law of the case doctrine applies to this current case with regards to the Supreme Court ruling in the China Banking Corporation v. Home Development Mutual Fund case. This decision, which attained finality, limits itself only to petitioner’s application for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage for the year 1996 only . Apparently, petitioner applied for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage for the years 1996-2000 by virtue of the decision in the China Bank case. Thus,


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except for year 1996 , respondent may still consider the remaining years, as they are not covered by the earlier application

that was denied by the respondent and eventually decided by the Supreme Court with finality. DECISION:

The Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent is enjoined to process petitioner’s application for waiver from Pag-IBIG Fund coverage for the year 1996.

MIESCOR v. NLRC G.R. No. 145402, March 14, 2008 Facts

Petitioner Meralco Industrial Engineering Services Corporation (MIESCOR) executes a contract with private respondents Ofelia P. Landrito General Services and its proprietor, Ofelia Landrito for the latter to provide janitorial services to the petitioner, supplying it with 49 employees. Petitioner informs respondents of the termination of contract after the enactment of R.A. 6727 (increasing minimum wage), forcing employees out of work. Employees file an illegal termination suit against both petitioner and private respondents before the Labor Arbiter, who decides against the private respondents, ordering only them (not the petitioner) to pay unpaid wages, overtime pay, and separation pay, as well as attorney’s fees. Private respondents then appeal to the NLRC, who then modifies the LA’s decision, making petitioner solidarily liable with the private respondents to the complainants for their monetary claims, stating Articles 107 and 109 as i ts bases, the petitioner being an indirect employer. Both move for reconsideration and are denied. The LA is tasked to make a final determination as to the division of liability. Respondents go to Supreme Court with a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on NLRC’s part, but are dismissed due to insufficient grounds. LA finally issues an order imposing the liability of underpaid wages and overtime pay to both parties solidarily, with a right of reimbursement reserved for the petitioner against private respondents, and the private respondents solely liable for separation pay. Both appeal to the NLRC once again, and reconsideration is granted to resolve the issue. The decision arrived at is similar, therefore prompting the private respondents to bring their case back to the Supreme Court, which turns it over to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn, modifies the NLRC decision now making both parties solidarily liable for everything, including separation pay, quoting Article 109 of the Labor code as its basis. *Finally, we get to the actual Supreme Court case.* Petitioner now comes before the SC with a petition for review on certiorari on the COA’s decision. Issue 1 (verbatim)

“Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals palpably erred when it went beyond the issues of the case as it modified the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter which attained finality after it was affirmed by Public Respondent NLRC and by the Supreme Court which can no longer be disturbed as it became the law of the case.”


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Held (for this issue only)

Petitioner’s application of the law of the case principle to the case at bar regards its liability for payment of separation pay is misplaced. Ratio (for issue 1)

“Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (taken verbatim from case)” The law of the case for this particular proceeding only applies to the NLRC decisions regarding “(1) both parties being jointly and solidarily liable for the judgment awards due the complainants, and (2) the said judgment awards shall be enforced against the surety bond posted by the private respondents.” The decision on separation pay was never decided on by the NLRC as it was turned back over to the Labor Arbiter for final determination, thus a decision on separation pay was never determined, much less made final and executory. Issue 2 (this was never explicitly stated by the petitioner, but the court decided on it anyway)

Whether petitioner is jointly and solidarily liable with the private respondents for the complainants’ complainants’ separation pay. Held (for issue 2)

No, it isn’t. The full liability is to be shouldered by the private respondents. Ratio (for issue 2)

Article 109 of the Labor code must be taken in conjunction with Articles 106 and 107, contrary to the COA’s decision. The employer is only solidarily liable with the contractor if the contractor fails to pay wages of employees. The petitioner can also only be considered an indirect employer with regard to unpaid wages and nothing more (PAL v. NLRC). There was never an employer-employee relationship between between the petitioner and the complainants, so the former could not have dismissed them illegally. The only time the principal becomes solidarily liable with the contractor is when the former has been shown to conspire with the latter regarding the dismissal. Also, based on the contractual agreement between the petitioner and the private respondents, no stipulation was made regarding the provision of separation pay by MIESCOR, thus it is not an issue. Dispositive Portion

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 24 April 2000 and 27 September 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 50806. are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 30 January 1996 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 001737-91 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-04432-89) is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.


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OPERATIVE FACT AND PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS 20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988 Facts: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the October 8, 1985 and January 2,

1986 orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed. It was formal complaint with the NBI for violation of PD 49, as amended. A search warrant was undertaken by NBI. These were confirmed confirmed by two other witnesses. The search warrant sought was duly issued and a search was conducted by the NBI and in the course of the search, they found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted films of petitioner as well as equipment and materials. Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private respondents, the lower court lifted the three search warrants issued earlier against the private respondents by the court. A Motion To Lift Search Warrant was filed but was later denied. Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration reconsideration of the Order was filed. The court granted the said motion and justified it on the ground that the master tapes of the copyrighted films were never presented. At appeal, the CA sustained the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Probable cause within the context of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section 3,

Article IV, 1973 Constitution, now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987 Constitution. Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133 SCRA 800) , we defined probable cause for a valid search "as such facts and

circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."

This constitutional provision also demands "no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified

Furthermore, the provision requires “no less than personal knowledge of the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of search warrant may be justified.”

Holding: NO Ratio: On the ‘probable cause’ needed for a search warrant: The applicant must present a clear linkage containing specific

items and descriptions that can satisfy the requirements of a probably cause. In thais case, copyrighted films linked with pirated ones. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Court believes that the search party should have confined themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual property, but not to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to, a legitimate business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of copyright laws.


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Terms: Operative Fact - fact that affects an existing legal relation esp. a legal claim. Dispositive portion - Resolution of the court on a given issue ; Investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of

the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing. - In a criminal case: the disposition includes a finding of innocence or guilt, specific crime committed, penalty imposed, participation of the accused, modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and c osts. - In a civil case : the disposition should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted and the costs. Presidential Decree No. 49 - Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property (Marcos 1972) Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, is an act prescribing the intellectual

property code and establishing the intellectual property office, providing for its powers and functions, and for other purposes. (http://www.chanrobles.com/legal7code.htm)

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES, 20 TH CENTURY FOX FILM, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. THE WALT DISNE DISNEY Y COMPANY, AND WARNE WARNER R BROTHERS, INC., (PETIONERS) VS COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, DANILO A. PELINDARIO (RESPONDENTS)

FACTS:

Complainants (Columbia Pictures and other companies) sought assistance from the NBI to conduct surveillance on various establishments including Sunshine Home Video Inc. to drive out anti-film piracy. NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court seeking the seizure of all the equipment and paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the piracy of the copyrighted films in question. The search warrant was granted based on the testimonies of NBI Senior Agent Reyes and other witnesses. Sunshine filed a “motion to lift the order of search warrant” with the court. First, it was denied. When a motion for reconsideration was filed again, it was granted. Columbia filed a motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals to reinstate the validity of the search warrant but the said appeal was dismissed. Columbia (and other companies) brought their petition to the th Supreme Court to challenge the validity of the Court of Appeals ruling. It contends that that the 20 Century Fox vs Court of Appeals ruling cannot be the basis for dismissing their appeal and for upholding the quashal of the search warrant. MAIN ISSUE:

Whether or not quashal of search warrant by the trial court and Court of Appeals is valid MINOR ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners, Columbia and other companies, have the legal rights and property rights to maintain a suit in the Philippines th Whether or not retroactive application of the 20 Century Fox case ruling is valid Whether or not production of master tapes is necessary in copyright infringement cases


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HELD:

No, quashal of the search warrant is not valid. Validity of the search warrant must be reinstated. Yes, the petitioners have the legal and property rights to maintain a suit in the Philippines. th Yes, the 20 Century Fox ruling is a retroactive application of the law. No, production of master tapes is not necessary for the determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright i nfringement cases. RATIO: Sunshine’s Contention (Respondent)(Respondent)- As foreign corporations without a license to do business in the Philippines, they do not have the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts. Supreme Court-There is no statutory law or case law, which proves that Columbia and other companies, as copyright owners, have performed acts indicating and proving that they are doing business. Entering into contracts is not regarded as doing business. Also, e exercising xercising one’s legal rights and property rights does not constitute doing business. A certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission stating that the petitioner film companies are not r egistered is of no importance. Therefore, the complaint evidently states no cause of action. Lack of personality to sue or failure to state a cause of action can be used as a ground to dismiss a case. Note: Lack of legal capacity to sue means the plaintiff does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case (ex. minority, insanity) while lack of personality to sue means the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, or complaint evidently states no cause of action. Sunshine’s Contention (Respondent)(Respondent)-The production of master tapes is necessary for the determination of probable cause th to support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases. This is based on the 20 Century Fox ruling. No master copy is produced. Therefore, issuance of the search warrant must be revoked. Supreme CourtArticle 4-Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided . PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVITY decisions applying applying the the laws or the Constitution Constitution shall shall form part part of the the legal system. system. Article 8- Judicial decisions th

The 20 Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactive r etroactively ly applied to justify the quashal of the said search warrant. The principle of prospectivity applies not only to statutes, rulings and circulars, but also to judicial decisions. Judicial decisions alone cannot be considered as an independent source of law. They are merely part of the law, an evidence of what the law means. The th th issuance of the search warrant was in 1987 while the 20 Century Fox ruling was in 1988. Therefore, the 20 Century Fox ruling cannot be applied because it did not yet exist when the search warrant was issued. Presentation of the master tapes is not necessary in copyright infringement cases. The master tapes are merely evidentiary in nature and do not determine existence of a probable cause. The use of testimonial, documentary evidence evidence and other classes of evidence has evidentiary value even in the absence of master tapes. Existence of probable cause is not determined solely by a specific kind of evidence or formula. Production of master tapes cannot be r egarded as a dictum for all infringement cases.

VICTOR QUE vs. v s. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT GR NO. 75217-18, SEPTEMBER 21, 1987 FACTS:

The main petition sought review by certiorari of the appellate court’s decision and, a motion for reconsideration of that same decision on the grounds that the respondent appellate court erred in affirming the judgement of the lower court that, by then had already violated accepted judicial judicial procedures on the issue of jurisdiction. The instant petition is a motion for reconsideration of the minute resolution denying the main petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgement of the RTC of Quezon City.


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This motion raises that a denial by way of minute resolution is insufficient; that the Appellate Court failed to consider material facts as well as the principal element of the crime charged showing that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the instant case; and that the appellate court failed to consider the most important elements of the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of both the trial court and appellate court and the denial of the petition for review are in accordance with the law and evidence? HELD: 1

Yes. Through the findings of fact and, as provided by Secs. 10 and 15(a) Rule 110 of the New Rules of Court , there 2 is no question over the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City in trying the instant case . This court likewise affirms the findings of the Appellate Court that renders without merit the appellant’s claim on a distinction in the contemplated purpose of the issued checks in question since, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 does not distinguish whether a worthless check is issued in payment of or to guarantee an obligation. And the petitioner’s argument on the denial by way of a minute resolution prompted the court to point out that “these ‘resolutions’ are not ‘decisions’ within” Sec. 12 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, as had been previously raised in question to this court but, that it should not be entertained in view of Rule 46 3 of the Rules of Court .

SPS. HENRY CO AND ELIZABETH E LIZABETH CO AND MELODY CO vs. COURT C OURT OF APPEALS AND MRS ADORACION CUSTODIO GR NO. 112330, 112330, AUGUST 17, 1999 FACTS:

Instant case is a petition filed for Review on Certiorary of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in favor of the private respondent Adoracion Custodio. The initial case had the following facts as found by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals: October 9, 1984, private respondent entered a verbal contract with the petitioner Sps. Henry and Elizabeth Co, for her purchase of the latter’s house the considered amount of $100,000.00. Earnest money for reservation of said property and as partial payment of the total purchase price of the same, at the amounts of $1,000.00 and Php40,000.00, was paid by Mrs. Custodio. In a March 15, 1985 letter by the petitioners, they set the schedule of payments of the purchase price of $ 100,000.00 to be payable at $40,000.00 on December 4, 1984, and the balance of $60,000.00 on January 5, 1985. But it wasn’t until January 25, 1985 that Custodio paid $30,000.00 for partial payment. •

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1

Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the

offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged. Sec. 15(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one o f the essential ingredients thereof took place.

The issuance of checks in question having been done at Francis Hill Supply located at No. 194 Speaker Perez Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.

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Sec. 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. The court may dismiss the petition outright with specific reasons for such dismissal or require the respondent to file a comment on the same within ten (10) days from notice. Only pleadings required by the court shall be allowed. All other pleadings and papers may be filed only with leave of court.

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•

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The petitioners’ counsel sent a March 15, 1985 letter to Custodio demanding the payment of the $70,000 balance and, on August 8, 1985 another letter from the same informed the private respondent of her l oss of the “option to purchase” the said property. Mrs. Custodio, through her counsel tried to pay the remaining balance on September 5, 1986 but, after the refusal to accept the payment and the failure to deliver the property in question, Custodio immediately sued for recision of the contract of sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the petitioners to return the $30,000.00 paid by Custodio pursuant to the “option” granted to her over the property in question? HELD:

No. Since the private respondent respondent did not enter into an option contract contract as the petitioners believe believe and assert, conforming with the second par. of Art. 1479 of the Civil Code stating that the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price. The March 15, 1985 letter instead perfected a contract of sale as provided for by Art. 1458 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, under Art. 1482 of the Civil Code, earnest money given in a sale transaction is considered part of the purchase price. Custodio therefore was in the right to attempt to pay the remaining balance of $70,000.00 as the contract of sale was still subsisting. The petitioners’ refusal to accept the payment and failure to deliver the property, under ArticleAnd since under Art. 1385 of the Civil Code as applied to the recision of reciprocal obligations under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals did not err in i ts decision.

COURTS AS ARBITERS OF RIGHTS AND POWERS AYER PRODUCTIONS PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS, PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents. G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988 HAL MCELROY petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988 FACTS: -

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Hal McElroy and his movie prod. company, Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. (Ayer Prod.), wanted to make a motion picture about EDSA Revolution Revolution - “The Four Day Revolution”. Revolution”. Petitioners should consult with appropriate gov’t agencies and with Gen. Fidel V. Ramos and Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile who both had major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. o Film was endorsed by the MTRCB and government agencies consulted. o Gen. Fidel Ramos approved the intended film production. December 21, 1987: Respondent Enrile did not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or tv production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation and further advised similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to (him) or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them. Petitioners deleted name of Enrile from the movie script then proceeded to film February 23 1988: Enrile filed a complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.


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Production without Enrile’s consent violates his right of pr ivacy. February 24, 1988: Trial Court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction. March 9, 1988: McElroy filed filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction. Injunction. Film won’t involve the private life of Enrile nor his family & a preliminary injunction is a prior restraint on their right to free expression. March 16, 1988: Court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioners. Ayer Productions filed for a Petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order. Hal McElroy also also filed a separate petition for for certiorari with Urgent Urgent Prayer for Restraining Restraining Order of Preliminary Injunction. March 24, 1988: The Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming portions of the projected mini-series which do not make reference to Enrile or his family or to any fictitious character based on him. April 6, 1988: Enrile filed his Consolidated answer invoking his right of privacy. o

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ISSUES:

1. 2.

Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under our Constitution Private respondent, on the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.

DECISION: -

The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." a. The Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and made PERMANENT, and b. Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and 4 April 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise of its plenary and supervisory jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET ASIDE and DISSOLVE his Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988 and any Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued by him.

RATIONALE:

1. -

Petitioner’s claim for freedom of speech Freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit them in theatres or to diffuse them through television. In Gonzales v. Katigbak, former Chief Justice Fernando explained that motion pictures are important both as a medium for communication of ideas and expression of artistic impulse. The freedom is available to both locally-owned locally-owned and foreign-owned motion picture picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.


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2. -

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Respondent’s claim to right of privacy The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of a public character. The right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. In Lagunzad v. Vda de Gonzales, the court mentioned that the right to freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties". It is not, however, without without limitations.  Clear and Present Danger Rule and Balancing of Interests Test In Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, G onzales, there was no prior restrain of any kind imposed upon the movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla. In the case at hand, what is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” Revolution” is of public interest or concern. concern. It does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a public figure  A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscriminately, in the decisions that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complain when they received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. He continues to be a "public figure."

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents. G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 NATURE: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals.


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The private respondent, on October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. The respondent, Marilou T. Gonzales, alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. That she is an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City and a high school graduate. The petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. The parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff. The petitioner courted and proposed to marry her and in which she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They both agreed to get married after the end of the school semester. Petitioner visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. She was a virgin before she began living with him. It was a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and is already married to someone living in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. Petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent. He neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. On 16 October 1989 a decision favoring the private respondent (Marilou Gonzales) was rendered by the trial court on account of finding statements of the private respondent more meritorious than that of the petitioner, and with regards to the application of Article 21 of the civil code. Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. He contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. On 18 February 1991, respondent court (CA) promulgated the challenged decision and affirmed the trial court’s ruling of 16 October 1989. Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed this instant petition on 26 March 1991: he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.


87

ISSUE 1: •

Whether or not the previous courts erred in ruling in favor of the private respondent and that damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

HELD/DECISION: •

The instant petition was denied and the decisions of the previous courts were affirmed.

RATIO: •

• •

In the light of above laudable purpose of Article 21, that where a man’s promise is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate and cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant of Article 21 not because of such promise but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Petitioner (BAKSH), has been proven time and again to lack credibility with regards to his claims. Private respondent (Gonzales) has been proven to be a woman of good repute and morals, who had the unfortunate luck of falling prey to the guiles and seductions of this horny-hairy-iraqi-fellow. horny-hairy-iraqi-fellow.

LAWRENCE et al. v TEXAS US SUPREME COURT 02-102 JUNE 26, 2003 Facts: -

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Issue: -

Houston police entered petitioner Lawrence’s apartment and saw him and another adult man, petitioner Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested, charged and convicted in violation of Texas Statute - “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” Petitioners were adult at the time of the alleged offense; conduct was in private and consensual Complaints described their crime as: “deviate sexual intercourse with member of same sex” Petitioners exercised right to a trial de novo, challenging the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; contentions were however rejected; petitioners were each fined $200 plus court costs. State Court of Appeals held that statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment considering Bowers v. Hardwick; constitutional arguments still rejected and convictions affirmed. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District; case remanded for further proceedings.

Whether or not the Texas statute, making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct, is valid; or whether or not it violates the Due Process Clause

Ruling: The Texas statue making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause; unconstitutional


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Ratio: -

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Liberty under the Due Process Clause –Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. It presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. Petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Liberty of the constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. With respect to the issue presented whether the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, early American laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally. This does not suggest approval of homosexual conduct. It does tend to show that this particular form of conduct was not thought of as a separate category from like conduct between heterosexual persons. Certain deficiencies found as regards Bowers v Hardwick. Historical grounds relied upon are overstated. Pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private. Equal Protection Clause When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination discrimination both in i n the public and private spheres. Texas statute furthers no legitimate State interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual’s personal and private life. o Consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character •

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Concurring opinion Justice O’Connor Agrees with the Court that Texas’ sodomy law banning “deviate sexual intercourse” between consenting adults of the same sex, but not between consenting adults of different sexes is unconstitutional; based conclusion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause – “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”

Dissenting opinion Justice Scalia Texas’s prohibition of sodomy does not infringe a “fundamental right” (which the Court does not dispute). Fundamental rights, as defined, are those deeply rooted i n this Nation’s history and tradition. Bowers held, homosexual sodomy do not implicate a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. Court failed to establish that the right to homosexual sodomy is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” On the contrary, Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when the ratified the Bill of Rights. Texas’s prohibition of sodomy is unsupported by a r ational relation to what the Constitution considers a legitimate state interest. Due Process Clause prohibits states from infringing fundamental liberty interest unless infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Texas’s prohibition of sodomy does not deny equal protection of the laws. • •

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89

People of the Philippines vs. Cayat C ayat 68 Phil 12 Facts •

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Cayat, of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment imprisonment in case of insolvency in violation of Act No. 1639 (Sec 2 and 3) On January 25 1937, Cayat, a non-Christian member, is found with possession of one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor.

Issue •

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Act No. 1639 specifies that non-Christians are prohibited to be in possession of alcohol other that the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves This act is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes, due to past experiences showing that highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes The alleged challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: i s discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; o (1) That it is o (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and. o (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Held •

Judgment is affirmed (in favor of the people)

Ratio •

•

The government defends that the act is in line with their efforts to bringing about the advancement in civilization and material prosperity of these tribes. Stating that: o Act No. 1639, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines. In defense against the constitutionality of the Act (issue) o (1) the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes; and the term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area. o (2) the instant case constituted corpus delicti (showing concrete evidence of a crime) o (3) actions in case show legitimate exercise of the police power

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO PADRIGANO, RUFINO ROXAS, MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING BLOOMING MILLS CO., C O., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RELATIONS, respondents. G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973 19 73 FACTS: -

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Petitioner Philippine Blooming Blooming Mills Employees Organization Organization (PBMEO) (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union. Petitioners N. Tolentino, F. Padrigano, R. Roxas, M. de Leon, A. Paciente, B. Vacuna, B. Pagcu and R. Munsod are officers and members of PBMEO. March 1, 1969: Petitioners decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6AM. – 2PM) and in the regular second and third shifts (from 7AM- 4PM and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.


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March 3, 1969: Company and PBMEO officers met at about 11AM at company canteen. o PBMEO said that demonstration can’t be cancelled and did not have anything to do with the management because there is no dispute between them. o Company Rep said that demonstration is an inalienable right of the worker but emphasized that it should not unduly prejudice the normal operations operations of the company. Company warned warned PBMEO reps that those st belonging to the 1 and regular shifts w/o previous LOA approved by the company, particularly officers who are the organizers, who shall fail to report to work on March 4, 1969 shall be dismissed because it is a violation of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) therefore amounting amounting to illegal strike. o Another meeting was held at 5PM. Company appealed to PBMEO reps that while all workers may join the demonstration, the workers for the 1st and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused and should report for work and utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA - Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE. STRIKE. All those who will not follow this shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. March 4, 1969: Company Company received a cablegram from from PBMEO rep at 9:50AM. 9:50AM. - 'Reiterating Request Request excuse day shift employees joining demonstration March 4, 1969.’ Company charged employees composing the first shift who joined the demonstration w/ a “violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'” May 9, 1969: Petitioners Petitioners claim that they did not violate violate the existing CBA. There was a given notice and it was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen and that it was not a declaration of strike. September 15, 1969: Judge Joaquin M. Salvador (Lower Court) found PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein its 8 officers as responsible for perpetrating the unfair labor practice and therefore considered to have lost their status as employees. September 23, 1969: Petitioners claim to have received the order September 29, 1969 (because 28 was a Sunday): Petitioners (PBMEO (PBMEO employees) filed a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969 on the ground that it is contrary to law and evidence as well as asked for 10 days to file their arguments. October 11, 1969: Respondent company stated in its opposition dated October 7, 1969 that filing for motion for reconsideration by petitioners was 2 days late hence should be dismissed. Filing for the 5-day extension should be filed before the 5- day period elapses. October 14, 1969: Petitioners filed their written arguments dated October 11, 1969 1969 in support for their motion for reconsideration. Respondent en banc (Court of Industrial Relations - CIR) dismissed the motion for reconsideration as it was filed beyond the period prescribed by the rules. o Motion for reconsideration shall be filed 5 days from receipt of its decision and appeal shall be perfected 10 days from receipt thereof. October 31, 1969: Petitioners filed with CIR a petition for relief from the order on the ground that failure to file motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake by the union president and office clerk of counsel. November 3, 1969: Petitioners filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court

ISSUES:

1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether or not the workers constitutional rights to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances should be upheld over the company’s right to property. Whether or not the mass demonstration of the PBMEO was a violation of the company’s “No strike and No lockout” rule. Whether or not the company was justified in dismissing the officers of the PBMEO Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations was justified in dismissing PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration reconsideration on the ground that it was filed two days late.


91

RULINGS ON ISSUES:

1.

2.

3.

4.

The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. o The employees were fighting for their survival by using only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammeled enjoyment of their basic human rights. o The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. o It should have been the duty of the company to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. o The Court of Industrial Relations did not make findings as to the fact of loss sustained by the firm. This can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. o On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day which could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages. o It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security. security. This is sheer opportunism. The mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike since it is not rooted in any industrial dispute. o The workers acted well in their constitutional right to rally since the purpose of their m ass demonstration was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses and not against the management. o The Union notified the company two days in advance of the demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to prevent losses it might sustain. The demonstration was not a violation of the ‘No strike and No lockout’ clause because it was not a result to o any industrial dispute even if there was a stoppage stoppage of work. It was in fact a valid exercise exercise of the workers constitutional rights. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice. o The Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion promotion of their moral, moral, social and economic economic well-being." o To regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional. unconstitutional. o The refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances. The respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice. practice. o The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. The CIR should not be confined by technical and procedural rules. o To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations and also does violence to natural reason and logic. o A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration. o The procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must yield to the constitutional rights invoked by petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.


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GENERAL RULING:

1. 2.

Setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and Directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

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Barredo, J. (dissenting) The question at hand is whether the court has the jurisdiction to entertain the request. Refers to the case Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations with regard to the dismissal for the request of a motion for reconsideration due to the failure of meeting the required time 5 and 10-day 10-day periods. There is a no-extension policy. The purpose of the periods is to apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation. States that no doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities but this principle is applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial of due process. Petitioners do not claim being denied of due process. Refers to the teaching of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of Education , following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting , is that "it is one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it". “For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present case has already become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.”

Teehankee, J. (concurring) The CIR committed a grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law since the mass demonstration is not a declaration of strike nor directed against against respondent employer. employer. There was merely a stoppage of work work and no dispute dispute between employees and management. There was also grave abuse in i n the dismissal for petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. “Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.” opinion.”


93

R.A. vs. City of St. Paul 505 US 377, 1992 Facts:

After allegedly burning a cross on a black family's lawn, petitioner R.A.V. was charged under, among other things, the St. Paul, Minnesota, Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibits the display of a symbol which one knows or has reason to know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge on the ground that the ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content based, but the State Supreme Court reversed. It rejected the overbreadth claim because the phrase "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others" had been construed in earlier state cases to limit the ordinance's reach to "fighting words" within the meaning of this Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, a category of expression unprotected by the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the ordinance was not impermissibly content based, because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest in protecting the community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and order. Issue:

W/N the ordinance is Constitutionally valid Held:

No. A few limited categories of speech, such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting words, may be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content. However, these categories are not entirely invisible to the Constitution, and government may not regulate them based on hostility, or favoritism, towards a nonproscribable message they contain. Thus, the regulation of "fighting words" may not be based on nonproscribable content. It may, however, be underinclusive, addressing some offensive instances and leaving other equally offensive ones alone, so long as the selective prescription is not based on content, or there is no realistic possibility that regulation of ideas is afoot. The ordinance, even as narrowly construed by the State Supreme Court, is facially unconstitutional, because it imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on the disfavored subjects of "race, color, creed, religion or gender." At the same time, it permits displays containing abusive invective if they are not addressed to those topics. Moreover, in its practical operation, the ordinance goes beyond mere content, to actual viewpoint, discrimination. Displays containing "fighting words" that do not invoke the disfavored subjects would seemingly be useable ad libitum by those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but not by their opponents. St. Paul's desire to communicate communicate to minority groups that it does d oes not condone the "group hatred" of bias-motivated speech speech does not justify selectively selectively silencing speech on the basis of of its content. content.


94

Einstadt vs. Baird 405 US 438, 1972 Facts/Issues:

Appellee attacks his conviction of violating Massachusetts law for giving a woman contraceptive foam at the close of his lecture to students on contraception. That law makes it a felony for anyone to give away a drug, medicine, instrument, or article for the prevention of conception except in the case of (1) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a married person or (2) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician's prescription. The District Court dismissed appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals vacated v acated the dismissal, holding that the statute is a prohibition on contraception per se and conflicts "with fundamental human rights" under Griswold v. Connecticut. Appellant, inter alia, argues that appellee lacks standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because he was neither an authorized distributor under the statute nor a single person unable to obtain contraceptives. Held/Ratio:

On the issue of standing: If, as the Court of Appeals held, the statute under which appellee was convicted is not a health measure, appellee may not be prevented, because he was not an authorized distributor, from attacking the statute in its alleged discriminatory application to potential distributees. Appellee, furthermore, has standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because their ability to obtain them will be materially impaired by enforcement of the statute. On the constitutionality of the statute: By providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, the statute violates the Equal Protection Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (a) The deterrence of fornication, a 90-day misdemeanor under Massachusetts law, cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute, since the statute is riddled with exceptions making contraceptives contraceptives freely available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope and penalty structure are inconsistent with that purpose. (b) Similarly, the protection of public health through the regulation of the distribution of potentially harmful articles cannot reasonably reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the law, since, if health were the rationale, the statute would be both discriminatory and overbroad, and federal and state laws already regulate the distribution of drugs unsafe for use except under the supervision of a licensed physician. (c) Nor can the statute be sustained simply as a prohibition on contraception per se, for whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike. If under Griswold, the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible, since the constitutionally protected right of privacy inheres in the individual, not the marital couple. If, on the other hand, Griswold is no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives, a prohibition limited to unmarried persons would be underinclusive and invidiously discriminatory.


95

ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ( 1973) Argued December 13, 1971 Reargued October 11, 1972 Decided January 22, 1973 FACTS

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Jane Roe (an alias, real name: Norma L. McCorvey) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life o District court ruled in her favor based on merits but denied to grant injunction on Texas abortion laws (with Henry Wade representing Texas) o Brought case to Supreme Court on Appeal o Case was reargued on 11 October 1972 because of two late judges, Robert Flowers replaced Wade o Has standing to sue  Natural termination of pregnancy did not moot her suit o Was not pregnant at the time of district court hearing (May 22, 1970), appellee suggest case as moot as she and other members of her class were not subject to any 1970 pregnancy  The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated.  Pregnancy as a significant fact, will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. Pregnancy litigation will seldom survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Therefore, pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. Thus Roe has a case.  Halford: licensed physician with two state abortion persecutions was permitted to intervene o District court granted leave to intervene and declaratory relief o Supreme court reversed the judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr. Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in intervention. Does: childless married couple separately attacked laws, grounds: 1. alleged injury on the future possibilities of contraceptive failure 2. pregnancy 3. unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. o Do not have a case: too speculative to present actual case or controversy CASE OPINIONS 1. Majority: Blackmun, joined by Burger, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell 2. Concurrence: Burger 3. Concurrence: Douglas 4. Concurrence: Stewart 5. Dissent White, joined by Rehnquist 6. Dissent: Rehnquist Mr. JUSTICE Blackmun delivered opinion of the court ISSUE

W/N Texas criminal abortion laws are constitutional


96

HELD

Texas law making it a crime to assist a woman to get an abortion violated her due process rights. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed in part, reversed in part. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various stages of the woman's approach to term. -

st

Before end of 1 trimester: abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician st After end of 1 trimester: State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health Stage subsequent to viability: State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother

RATIO

This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. However, this right must not remain unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation. Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the the procedure. The statute, statute, therefore, cannot cannot survive survive the constitutional constitutional attack made made upon it here.


97

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE Goesart v. Cleary

Facts:

Based on the Public Acts of Michigan 1945, no female may serve as a bartender unless she be the wife of daughter of the male owner. Issue:

Whether or not the Public Acts of Michigan was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 th amendment. Held:

“The constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight ir shifting social standards any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards” “A statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did, or because it may not succeed in bringing about the result that it tends to produce.” It isn’t unconstitutional unconstitutional for the state of Michigan to disallow women from serving as barmaids because it allows women to serve liquor as waitresses. Thus, showing that the statue isn’t meant to discriminate women. In other words, just because the Public Acts of Michigan fails to satisfy the occupation of women as bartenders, doesn’t make the statute of Michigan invalid. *Dissenting opinion:

The statute discriminates between men and women bar owners. How so? Well, “a female bar owner may neither work as a barmaid herself nor emply her daughter.” Whereas a male owner may do otherwise, as the public acts of Michigan allows women to serve as barmaids if they are the daughter or wife of the male owner. “the statute should be held invalid as denial of equal protection”


98

Lao Ichong v. Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance, Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila, GR NO. L-7995, May 31, 1957 Facts: •

•

Ichong, filed a petition with regard to certain provisions stipulated in Republic Act No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business”, declaring such to be unconstitutional; and to enjoin Hernandez, Secretary of Finance, et al., from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner’s grounds: o RA 1180 denies alien residents equal protection of law; deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law o subject not expressed in title thereof  title is misleading or defective as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein o Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines o Provision of the act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business from hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in retail business violates constitution In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: o The act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival o The act has only one subject embraced in the title o No treaty or international i nternational obligations are infringed o As regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Issues: •

Whether or not the court shall grant Inchong’s petition with regard to the validity and constitutionality of RA No. 1180

Held: Petition denied, with costs against petitioner Ratio: •

•

•

•

•

• •

Court holds that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business o Court finds alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all sections and groups that compose the Filipino community which could endanger the national interest. Law is not a product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of legitimate desire and determination of the people, to free the nation from economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. Enactment clearly falls within the police power of the state o Law is clearly in the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens Law doesn’t violate equal protection clause of the constitution o Sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien. Law doesn’t violate the due process of law clause o Because law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of alien already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege Wisdom and efficacy of law to carry its objective is evident Provisions of law are clearly embraced in title o Suffers from no duplicity Has not misled mi sled legislators/population 


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•

•

Cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty of obligations o No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject o Police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any conventional agreement Padilla, J. Concurring and Dissenting: o Agrees to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire in to the wisdom of an act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. However courts could still inquire and determine whether the Act is against a provision/s of the Constitution o Disagrees with the clause that prohibits associations and partnerships to engage in retail business, specifically those with capital not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor, administration. o Certain sections of the Act are thereby invalid for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.

TIU V. CA, G.R. No. 127410 1 27410 January 20, 1999 Facts: •

•

•

•

•

•

A petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On March 13, 1992, the Congress with the approval of Pres. Ramos passed into law RA 7227 “An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes,” where section 12 created the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) The said Act gave way for the following benefits for the business enterprises and individuals, (1) free flow or movement of goods and capital; (2) tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment; (3) no exchange control policy; (4) banking and finance shall be liberalized The coverage of the Act are as follows: City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval bases Agreement and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan as secured areas of SSEZ On June 19, 1993, Pres. Ramos issued EC 97-A delineating the areas where the tax and duty-free privilege were effective and operative: secured areas consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the completely tax and duty-free area in SSEZ Individuals who were no longer included in the newly delineated operative areas as a result of E O 97-A raised the constitutionality of the said order on the basis of equal protection of the laws citing that the order had discriminated against them without reason and valid standards

Issue:

Whether or not EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, specifically whether or not the provisions of EO 97-A in confining the operative territory of RA 7227 into secured areas while at the same time excluding residents within the zone are discriminatory or not. Decision: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Ratio: The equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. The fundamental right of equal protection of the law is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Furthermore, RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. •

•

• • •

•


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RIGHT TO LIFE Cruzan v. Director 497 US 261, 1990 Facts

Nancy Beth Cruzan had a car accident on 11 January 1983 as she was travell ing down Elm Road in Missouri, and because of this was placed in a persistent vegetative state which has virtually virtually no chance of recovering cognitive faculties. Her parents asked to hospital to halt the artificial feeding and hydration equipment after the realization that she would not recover from her condition. The hospital refused to halt the artificial artificial life support system as as that required a court court order. A state trial court authorized the termination on the grounds that a person in Cruzan’s condition has the right under the State and Federal Constitutions to direct or refuse the withdrawal withdrawal of death-prolonging death-prolonging procedures. The same court also found that Cruzan’s expressed thoughts to a housemate suggested that if she were placed in such a state she wouldn’t want to be sustained artificially. The Supreme Court (SC) reversed the order of the state trial court on grounds that the applicability of Cruzan’s right to direct or refuse artificial life support in the said case is questionable, and that Cruzan’s statements to her housemate were unreliable for determining her intent. Furthermore the SC concluded that her parents could not decide for her, an incompetent, in the absence of terms expressed in a living will.

Issue

Does the state’s reversal of the initial decision to cease the artificial life support system of Cruzan violate her right to refuse medical treatment?

Ruling •

th

The court found that under the 14 amendment, a person has the right to refuse medical treatment considering that that person is competent and that there is clear evidence that the person did not want artificial means of support to keep them alive.

•

The accident Nancy Cruz survived rendered her incompetent, and without compelling evidence as expressed in a document like a living will, the state is obliged to uphold human life despite the wishes of her guardians.

The Schiavo Case February 11, 2000 Facts: -

Mr Schiavo his wife and the wife’s parents lived together in the same apartment complex On February 25, 1990, in the early morning hours, Terri Schiavo suffered cardiac arrest


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-

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She has never regained consciousness and to this day remains in a comatose state After 8 years of r eliance on life support, Mr. Schiavo filed a petition to discontinue artificial life support There are no written declarations by Terri Schiavo as to her intention with regard to this issue the court is left with oral declarations The testimony before this court reveals that she made comments or statements to five (5) persons, including her husband and her mother o Statements made to Michael Schiavo which were prompted by something on televisoin regarding people on life support that she would not want to live like that also reflect her intention in this particular situation o Also the statements she made in the presence of Scott Schiavo at the funeral luncheon for his grandmother that “if I ever go like that just let me go. Don’t leave me there. I don’t want to be kept alive on a machine.” o And to Joan Schiavo following a television movie in which a man following an accident was in a coma to the effect that she wanted it stated in her will that she would want the tubes and everything taken out if that ever happened to her are likewise reflective of this intent. The medical evidence before this court conclusively establishes that she has no hope of ever regaining consciousness and therefore capacity, and that without the feeding tube she will die in seven to fourteen days

Issue:

The issue in the present case is whether petition of Mr. Schiavo to discontinue artificial life support on his wife

Held: -

the Petition for Authorization to Discontinue Artificial Life Support of Michael Schiavo, Guardian of the Person of Theresa Marie Schiavo, an incapacitated person, be and the same is hereby GRANTED and Petitioner/Guardian is hereby authorized to proceed with the discontinuance of said artificial life support for Theresa Marie Schiavo

Ratio: -

In deciding this case, the court uses 3 pronged test o The surrogate must be satisfied that the patient executed any document knowingly, willingly and without undue influence and that the evidence of the patient’s oral declaration is r eliable; o The surrogate must be assured that the patient does not have a reasonable probability of recovering competency so that the right could be exercised directly by the patient; and o The surrogate must take care to assure that any limitations or conditions expressed either orally or in the written declaration have been carefully considered and satisfied.


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ADDITIONAL REFERENCE TERMS (COMPILED FROM DIGESTS OF EARLIER BATCHES)

Attorney-At-Law: A person admitted to practice law in his respective state and authorized to perform both civil

and criminal functions for clients, including drafting of legal documents, documents, giving legal advice, and representing such before courts, administrative agencies, boards etc.

Law: It is an order backed by threat or sanction. (Austin Definition)

It is a rule of conduct that is just, obligatory, promulgated promulgated by legitimate authority, and is of common observance and benefit. (Sanchez Roman Definition) (favorite definition ni dean roy ang Austin, just expound on it by giving another definition)

Constitution: It is the supreme law to which all other laws must adhere to. Hierarchy of Laws:

1. The Constitut C onstitution ion 2. Statutes / Laws 3. Administrative & Executive Acts, Orders, Regulations

Municipal Laws: Laws that are promulgated by sovereign states which are meant to be binding within their own

respective jurisdictions. jurisdictions.

Customs: These are rules of conduct formed by repetition of acts uniformly observed.

Treaty: An agreement between states or other international entities having obligatory or binding force as

between them; and possibly, as against other entities.

Incorporation Clause: Found in Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, it provides that the generally accepted

principles of International law are deemed incorporated as part of the laws of the land.


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International Law: Body of rules and precepts which govern the relationships among sovereign states and such

other entities as have been granted international personality.

Stare Decisis: Adherence to decided cases; that future cases should be based on previously decided cases. There

are exceptions to the rule, if the ends of justice would be better served.

“Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.”

Dispositive Portion: Part of the case that contains the order of the court.

Obiter Dictum: They are “by the way” statements which are not absolutely necessary to the resolution of the

controversy controversy but are nevertheless discussed to help facilitate an understanding of the decision. Obiter Dictum is only persuasive in nature.

Ratio Decidendi: Part of the body of the case where the court explains the reasons or justifications justifications behind its

decision. Ratio Decidendi has a binding effect . Parts of the Case: 1. Title of the Case 2. The body of the case a. Ponente (writer of the decision) b. Opinion of the court 3. Dispositive Portion

Concurring Opinion: A separate opinion delivered by a judge who agreed with the majority but has a different

reason as to how he reached that decision.

Dissenting Opinion: A mere expression of a dissenting judge from the conclusion upheld by the majority. (Dissenting Opinions are persuasive in character)

Landmark Cases: Decisions of the SC that significantly change the existing law.


104

Double Jeopardy: is a procedural defense that forbids a defendant from being tried a second time for the same

crime.

Leading Cases: Cases that has a unique character and demanded more attention from the judges and have been

frequently looked upon as having settled or determined the law and are used as guides for deciding future cases.

Judicial Power: The power of the courts to settle actual cases or controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable.

Litis Pendentia: A ground for dismissal of a civil action because another action is pending between the same

parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action be deemed as unnecessary and vexatious.

Elements of Litis Pendentia:

1. Identity of the parties. 2. Identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, such reliefs grounded on the same facts. 3. That should the judgment be rendered in one case, it would amount to res judicata as against the other.

litigated and settled may no longer again be re-litigated. Res Judicata: All controversies or matters previously litigated

Elements of Res Judicata:

1. The former judgment must be final; 2. The court which rendered the judgment must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the controversy. 3. It must be a judgment on merits 4. There must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of ac tion between the first and the second actions.


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PROCLAMATION NO. 1017

WHEREAS , over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State -- who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS , these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President; WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS , this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State – by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS , these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS , these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS , Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government; WHEREAS , the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief of the NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President…whenever it becomes necessary,… may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress … rebellion…," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. th

Done in the City of Manila, this 24 day of February, in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and six. SIGNED: H.E. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo President Republic of the Philippines


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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 464 ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES WHEREAS , the Constitution guarantees the separate of powers of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of the government: WHEREAS, Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution provides that heads of departments may, with the prior consent of the President, appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments and, when the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, such appearance shall be conducted in executive session; WHEREAS , pursuant to the rule of executive privilege, the President and those who assist her must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions since this is fundamental to the operation of the government and is rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution; WHEREAS , Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate or House of Representatives shall be respected; WHEREAS , recent events, particularly with respect to the invitation of a member of the Cabinet by the Senate as well as various heads of offices, civilian and military, have highlighted the need to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of persons appearing in such inquiries in aid of legislation and due regard to constitutional mandate; WHEREAS , there is a need to prevent such inquires in aid of legislation from being used for partisan political purposes, disrupting diplomatic relations with foreign government, and weakening the stability of the State, thereby impeding the efforts of the government g overnment to generate and attract foreign investments; WHEREAS , Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that public official and employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest; WHEREAS , Article 229 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits any public officer from revealing any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity or wrongfully delivering papers or copies thereof which he may have charge and which should not be published; WHEREAS , the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 provide that the President shall have control of all government departments, bureaus and offices and shall ensure that all the laws be faithfully executed. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order: SECTION 1. Appearance Appearance by Heads of Departments Departments Before Congress. Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to i mplement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.


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When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SEC. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of Almonte vs. vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution ( Almonte 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that public officials and employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:

i. ii.

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order ( Almonte Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority , G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged ( Almonte Almonte vs. Vasquez Vasquez , G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government , G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).

iii.

Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government , G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

iv.

Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government , G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

v.

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority , G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:

i.

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;

ii.

Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief Chief of Staff are are covered by the executive privilege; privilege;

iii.

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

iv.

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

v.

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. SECTION 4. Repealing Clause. – All executive issuances, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provision of this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SECTION 5. Separability Clause. – If any section or provision of this executive order shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provision not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.


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SECTION 6. Effectivity . – This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. th

DONE in the City of Manila, this 26 day of September in the Year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.

(Sgd. ) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO By the President: (Sgd.) EDUARDO R. ERMITA Executive Secretary

Article VI, Sec. 21-22 1987 Constitution Section 21.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. respected. Section 22.

The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each ea ch House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.


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Digest

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