Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Author(s): Michael J. Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1973), pp. 147-174 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600226 Accessed: 16/08/2010 19:20 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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CognitiveProcess and Foreign Policy Decision-Making MICHAELJ.SHAPIRO

Departmentof Political Science University of Hawaii

G. MATTHEWBONHAM

Departmentof PoliticalScience The AmericanUniversity

As the analysisof foreignpolicydecision-making has become a more theoreticalenterprise,the productionof historically oriented case studies has been supplementedby a growing number of investigationsemployingpsychologicalor socialpsychological perspectives.Early studies of foreignpolicy with a psychologicalorientationemphasized decision-making the influenceof variouspsychologicaltraitson thoseinvolvedin foreign policy decisions (e.g., Levinson, 1957), but, more recently,the emphasishas been on perception,cognition,and information-processing. The cognitiveprocess approaches,by contrast,have attempted,in varyingdegrees,to map out the belief structuresof decision makersand explore the implications of these structuresfor the way internationaleventsare understood and policy alternativesare considered. Studies under this rubric have focused upon the perceptions of particularforeignpolicy decisionmakers(Holsti, 1962), on the perceptionsand choices of groups of personssimulatingthe roles of foreignpolicydecisionmakers(Driver,1962; Hermann, 1969; Hermannand Hermann, 1967; Shapiro, forthcoming), and on the decisionprocessof nationaldecisiongroupsfocused upon particularpolicyproblems(Steinbruner, forthcoming). AUTHOR'S NOTE: This researchwas supportedby the Instituteof International Studies,Universityof California,Berkeley. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17 No. 2, June 1973,

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The theory-buildingeffort reported here relies on the cognitiveprocess ratherthan the personalitytraitapproachto foreignpolicydecision-making. The mostimmediategoal of this investigationis to understandthe identificationof and responses to internationalevents by foreignpolicy decision makers. Our approach has two dimensionswhich we will explicatethroughoutthe restof thispaper. The firstand most importantis our explanationof the cognitivedynamicswhich occur when an individual receives informationabout an internationalevent, processes it through his belief system (which contains concepts about actors and actions in the international system),and reachesa conclusionabout whathas happened and what should be done by his nation.The second dimensionis the mode in which our explanation of foreign policy decision is to be expressed.Eventually,our theorywill be in theformof a computersimulationmodelwhichwillallow us to examinenot onlythe decisionaloutcomeswhichwould be expected,givenour modelof the decisionprocessand the belief systemsof our simulateddecision makers,but also the likely decisionaloutcomeswhichwould resultby alteringeitherbelief systems,or rulesforinformation processing,or both. Afterwe have discussed some of the normativeimplicationsof our we approach to the studyof foreignpolicy decision-making, of our theory. willelaboratethe backgroundand structure

Normative Implications

The choice of a cognitiveprocessapproachto foreignpolicy is based only partlyon the expectationthatit decision-making is a way to build a comprehensive theoreticalframework which will allow us to explainand predictdecisionmakers'responses to internationalevents, includingcrisis decision-making and some situationsthat involve the dynamicsof planningand anticipation.A varietyof theoreticalorientations, perhapseven a personalitytrait approach, mightalso yield predictiveaccuracy.The choice of a cognitiveprocessapproachis relatedto

Shapiro,Bonham/ FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING [149]

our long-range goal forresearch-namely,recommendations for policy planningand executionin international politics.Because our recommendationswill take the formof ways of conceptualizing decision situationsand searchinginformation,it is convenientif the explanatorymodel employed is somewhat congruentwith the way in whichdecisionmakersjustifytheir choices. Cognitiveprocess models, particularlythose which suggestrelationships betweencognitivecomponentslike values and beliefs,are similarin structure in to justificatory arguments which one makesa case fora particularchoice on the basis of argumentsabout priorities(what values should be preeminent) and about beliefs (the evidence for believing in various connectionsbetweenchoicesand objectivesor values). The ultimategoal of the investigationcan thus be termed "policy-oriented."The implementationof such a goal begins not, as is oftensupposed,at the point wheregood predictions or, more generally,valid explanationshave been obtained. Implementationis presupposed when one is selecting the conceptsand thus the kind of explanationto be constructed. Clearly,an explanationmustbe sound on scientificgroundsifit is to be usefulfor purposesof recommendation, but thisis a necessaryand not a sufficient conditionforpolicy recommendation. The kind of explanationselected must be consistent withthe kind of controlover the situationthat one envisions. Because we wishto be in a positionto makerecommendations about how informationshould be categorizedand processed both in terms of adducing inductivesupportfor beliefsand deductivesupportforexplanationsof prevailingsituationsand we are seekingan explanationthat perceivedpolicyalternatives, is consistentwiththe way personsuse constructsand evidence tojustifytheirchoices.

TheoreticalPerspectives

Our model of cognitiveprocessingin foreignpolicydecisionmakingis a synthesisof threesocial-psychological perspectives.

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The firsttheoreticalperspectiveof relevanceis concernedwith the conceptof cognitivecomplexityversussimplicity.For our purposes,the application of this concept is in the extent to whicha decisionmaker'scognitivemappingof theinternational environmentis conceptuallysimple or complex. In general, cognitivecomplexityhas been shownto relateto the accuracy of an individual'spredictionsabout people's behavior-e.g.,the more complextheirperceptualdiscriminations, the bettertheir predictions(Bieri, 1955); and in the specificapplicationof the complexity-simplicity conception to foreignpolicy decisionmaking (in a gaming situation), it was demonstratedthat conceptual complexityis positivelyrelated to the range of and so forthwith behaviors-e.g.,amountof trading,bargaining, nationsin otherdefinedpowerblocs (Driver,1962; Schroderet concept,forour al., 1967). The cognitivecomplexity-simplicity purposes,is reflectedin the scope of the substantiveexplanation thata foreignpolicydecisionmakermaintainswithrespect to the international For example,to the politicalenvironment. in extentthat an individualis more complex or differentiated in the international the way he viewsthe power configuration system,he is apt to considera broaderrangeof approachesto conflictmanagement.This was arguedas well as demonstrated in a recentsymposium.Two critiquesof a speechby a Johnson Administration foreignpolicy spokesmanboth suggestedthat alternativepolicy postureswould be entailedif foreignpolicy decision makersassumed that there now exists a significant on ThirdWorldbloc ratherthan predicatingpolicy alternatives a more simple,bipolar,East versusWestperspective(Washburn and Mitchell,1967). Whileit has been demonstratedthatthe amountof cognitive complexity of decision makers in general (including those situainvolvedin a simulatedforeignpolicy decision-making tion) has an effecton decisionaloutcomes,the implicationsof the degreeof complexityhas not been tracedin the processof in a decisionsituation.In orderto cognitionwhichis triggered observethe way in whichcognitivecomplexityarticulatesitself througha decisionalprocess,we used a crisisgameinventedby

Shapiro,Bonham/ FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING [1511

Steinbruner ( 1970) and modifiedforour purposes.In brief,the crisisgames we ran had threeparticipantswho read a scenario about a crisissituationand were asked to advisethe President about what his response should be. The major eventin the scenario was the placing of nuclear weapons in Syria by the SovietUnion. Because each of the participantsin our game differedin the degreeof complexityin his imageof the international political process,the crisisgame providedan opportunityto scrutinize the relationshipbetween cognitivecomplexity-simplicity and information-processing in foreignpolicy decision-making. To analyze the degreeof cognitivedifferentiation in the mappings of the game participants, we examinedtheirwrittenformsand utterances,which we had taped. To illustrateour conclusions, we will discuss one of the decision-makinggroups that participatedin our experiments.Participant1, a specialistin internationalrelations, tended to see the Middle Eastern situationin a broad contextof an international power struggle featuringthe United States, USSR, and variousuncommitted nations. Participant2, a specialist in comparativepolitics, focused more on relationswithinand betweenregimesin the Middle East. He related this to the internationalcontext primarilythrough speculations about Soviet policy in the Middle East as comparedwithits policy in otherregions-e.g., Asia and Europe. Participant3 is a MiddleEasternspecialistand focused primarilyupon the regionitself.He saw the current situationalmost exclusivelyas a logical consequenceof historical forcesoperatingin theMiddleEast. It shouldbe evidentthatthe participants arrangedthemselves in a convenienthierarchyon a differentiated-undifferentiated continuumfrom Participant1, the most differentiated in his perceptualmappingof the Middle Easternproblem,to Particiin the numberand pant 3 who was the most undifferentiated breadthof categorieswhich he applied to the Middle Eastern situation.The cognitivedifferencesof the threeparticipants revealedthemselvesin a varietyof ways duringthe gaming.At the beginningof the gaming(beforeparticipants wereinformed


of nuclear weapons in Syria), each participantwas handed "Policy PlanningAid A" whichasked, "Whatadditionalpoints of informationwould you like to have about the current situationin the Middle East as describedin the documentsfor Excon III?" In responseto thisquestion,Participant1 (the international relationsspecialist) asked questionsnot only about the Arab positions(those of Lebanon and Syria)on the currentsituation in the area but also about the policiesand recentinvolvements of the Soviet Union, the United States, England,and France. Participant2 (the comparativepolitics specialist)asked about Soviet militarystrengthand then inquired primarilyabout relations withinand between Arab regimesand intragovernmental conflictsin Israel. Participant3 asked about Soviet intentions,the strengthof some of the Arab countries,and the activitiesof the Palestiniancommandos. A transcriptof the discussionsduringthe gamingprovides furtherinsightsinto the impact of the differentperceptual relations mappingsof the threeparticipants.The international specialist(Participant1) saw many possible explanationsfor Soviet behavior-froma move to force Israel to surrenderthe to a move that was part of a global occupied Arab territory strategicinteractionbetween the United States and the Soviet Union: I stillthinkthatthebasicquestionthatfacestheUnitedStatesis an of Sovietintentions. assessment If,indeed,it is theSoviets'intention thatis one simplyto forceIsraelievacuationof occupiedterritories, thing.... But we don't know whetherthatis theSovietobjective, and we don'tknowwhatotherSovietobjectivestheremaybe and howtenaciously theymaybe held.

The Americanresponsehe urgedwas addressedto thisimageof the problem.In case the Sovietswereonlytryingto forceIsrael to withdraw,he advocatedthe beginningof negotiationsalong the lines of the French proposal fora Middle East settlement that had been discussedin the firstmove period. Since Soviet intentionswerenot clear and mightbe moreambitious,he also


recommendedan assortmentof public and privatemoves,the and trainingexercise formerincludinga majornucleartargeting for American naval forces which would focus on Eastern Europeantargets,an approachto India to givenucleartechnical assistanceto Israel(the UnitedStatesis proscribedas a signerof the nonproliferation treaty),and the movingof the SixthFleet into a strategicposition near Syria; the latter consistingof a targetingof PolarismissilestowardSyriaand a threatto attack Cuba ifthe Sovietsdo not removethe weaponsin Syria. The comparativepolitics specialist(Participant2) saw the termsthandid the Sovietmovein somewhatless global-strategic international relationsspecialist.He feltthatSovietbehaviorin this supporting Syriasignaledan eagernessto startnegotiations, interpretation with an argumentbased on the assumptionthat the Soviet Union liked to negotiatefroma positionof strength, and the evidencethatthe missileswereunderSovietcontroland had not been turnedover to the Syrians.His recommendation for Americanpolicy did not involvean international signalling systemof the breadthsuggestedby Participant1, but involved instead a combinationof protestingin the United Nations, demonstrations of militaryreadinessin close proximityto the troublespot,and attemptsto beginnegotiations. The Middle East specialist(Participant3), saw the Soviet move as a resultnot of the internationalstrategicinteraction in systemor of Sovietforeignpolicyalone but of developments the Middle East. He saw the Arab-Israeliconflictas the major determinantof Soviet penetrationinto the MiddleEast. Arab regimes,he felt,looked to the Sovietsbecause no othernation or internationalorganizationseemed sympatheticto their weakened position resultingfrom the 1967 War. His policy recommendations were orientedtoward a more general,longtermsettlementof the Arab-Israeliconflict.He advocatedthe immediate start of negotiations and use of international auspicesto effecta settlementwhichwould touchupon all the relevantsourcesof grievancesin the area. The three participantsthus utilized differentsubstantive in interpretating the environment theoriesof the international

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Soviet move in Syria,and, generally, the moredifferentiated or multifacetedthe theory,the more complexthe policy recommendations. What is particularlynoteworthyis that the cognitiveprocessingof the threeparticipantsparalleled,on the complexity-simplicity continuum,their substantiveperspectives. The cognitiveprocessingof the participantswas determinedby an analysisof theirresponsesto policy planningaids they were asked to fill out. T'wo of the policy planningaids were designed to constructa decision calculus for the respondent.Policy PlanningAid B asked the respondentto state the threemajorobjectivesthattheysaw forAmericanpolicyin the Middle East, and Policy PlanningAid C asked them to indicate the extent to which a numberof alternativepolicy proposals (including the one their policy-making group had selected)would achieveor block each of the objectivestheyhad espoused (see Rosenberg, 1956). As in the case of the subsequentperceptualmappings,the cognitiveprocessingof the participantswas arrangedfromcomplexto simplewithParticipant I the most complex,Participant3 the least complex,and Participant2 in between.Cognitiveprocessingwas analyzedby lookingat the patternof beliefsabout whichpolicyalternatives would achieve which objectives. A very simple cognitive processingtool is one in which the decision makerupholdsa particularaction principleas better in every way than any alternativetype of action. A more complex cognitivestyle is one that views action alternativeson a gains and losses continuumwith some actionsbettersuitedto some objectives and other types of actions more appropriateto alternative objectives.Thus, we can measurethe complexityof cognitive processingfromresponsesto Policy PlanningAid C by looking at the amount of variance in beliefs about the effectsof alternative policieson objectives. Participant3 (the MiddleEasternspecialist)was invariantin his beliefsabout the effectsof the variouspolicy alternatives. He saw the alternativeaccepted by his group as having a moderatelypositivechance (a score of +3) of achievingeach of his threeobjectives.He viewed the other threealternativesas


blockinghis objectiveswith one alternativegivena -5 forall threeobjectives,anothergivena -4 forall threeobjectives,and the other given a -1 for all threeobjectives.The other two participants, by contrast,saw each policyalternative as havinga differential effecton their espoused objectives.ParticipantI had the most variancein his beliefsabout the effectsof the differentpolicy alternatives.He saw the policy alternative chosen by his group as being positivelyrelatedto two of his objectivesand negativelyrelatedto one of them.Generally,his beliefsvariedwidely,ranging, in one case, froma scoreof +5 to a score of -5 for one alternativeas it affectedhis different objectives. Participant2 also saw his group's alternativeas positivelyaffecting two of his objectivesand negativelyaffecting one of them. His beliefs about the effectsof the other alternativesalso varied,but, generally,the variancewas quite smallcomparedwiththe beliefsof Participant1. The degree of cognitivedifferentiation of the participants affectedthe deductivecomponentof theirdecisionprocesses. The moreundifferentiated the overallperspectiveon the Middle East of the participant,the more likely it was that a single policy commitmentwould be used to organizehis calculus on the relationshipbetweenpolicy alternativesand objectives.We found,in addition,that the scope of a participant'scognitive mappingof the MiddleEasternsituationaffectedtheinductive componentof his decision process. The transcripts and postgaming interviewswith participantsindicated, among other things,that the rangeof historicaleventsutilizedin interpreting the event in the game varied with the participants'cognitive complexity.The actions proposed by Participant1, for example,reflectedhis analysisof theCuban missilecrisis: to avoidwriting of WhatI amdoingis deliberately a scenario trying That'swhat reactions thatsimply crisis. replicates theCubanmissile of I am trying to avoid.I havea greatmanymorephase-steps and escalation in therethanwerea partof the 1962 situation, in this,proposalwhichsuggests a thereis nothing consequently, directattackon the SovietUnionwithouta wholerangeof intermediate stepsthatcouldbe taken(whichI amnotsureI am totake,incidentally). willing

( 156] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Participant2 also drew on analogies fromsituationsin other geographicalregions: of abouttheevidence moreconcerned I'm somewhat Quitefrankly, thanI am theIsraelifrontier SovietpilotsinMIG-21's transgressing aboutthe weaponsas such.I thinkwe'removinghereintoa a VietNamtypeof whereyou couldhave,potentially, situation in a conventional actively participating withtheRussians situation scaleintheair. atleastona limited typeofconflict, Participant3, however,referredin the game and the interviews onlyto past eventsthattook place in the MiddleEast. The second theoreticalperspectiveformingthe basis forour model of the foreignpolicy decision-makingprocess was suggestedin our discussionof cognitivecomplexity-thatis, the deductive structureof the decision-making.The degree of cognitivecomplexityin a decisionmaker'sperceptualsystemis representedin termsof the numberof deductivepaths thathe may examine in explainingthe significanceof an event and selectingan appropriateresponse.In order to understandthe logic of any deductivepath, we mustspecifythenatureof and relationsbetweenthe cognitivecomponentsin a path. A varietyof social-psychologicaltheorieshave been developed to explicate the deductive process involved in both One type,forexample, attitudeformationand decision-making. is modeled after the rational choice theoriesof economists whichassumethatthe decisioncalculusis one whichmaximizes expectedgainsminusexpectedlossesas in the following: n

E(U)1-

ViP. i= 1

whereE(U)1 is the expectedutilityof choice 1, n is thenumber of possible outcomesor values,Vi is the ith outcome affected by the choice, and Pi is the probabilitythatchoice 1 willresult in the ith outcome. This generalformulation is commensurate

Shapiro,Bonham / FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (1571

with a number of cognitivemodels which predict attitude formationand choice on the basis of beliefsabout objects and situationsand evaluationsas to the relativeimportanceof the objects or situations. Fishbein's (1967) attitude theory,for example,is expressedalgebraicallyas follows: n

Biai

AO i=l

whereAO is the attitudetowardobject 0, Bi is thestrength of beliefi about 0 (i.e., the probabilitythat 0 is relatedto some other concept Xi), ai is the evaluativeaspect of Bi or the evaluationof Xi and n is the numberof beliefsabout 0. That a decision calculus such as Fishbein's assumes a deductivestructure to decisionsshouldbe evident.If we process the calculusverbally,it says that an individualconfrontedwith a policy alternative-e.g.,sendingthe U.S. Sixth Fleet to a trouble spot in the Mediterranean-willconsider the consequences such a move would produce by decidingthe value of each consequence and the likelihoodthatit will be produced. He thenwill get a positiveor negativescoreof some magnitude forthe alternative, and his decisionwill thenbe (extendingthe logic of the calculus to a numberof policy alternatives)to choose the alternative withthe best(highest)score. In the decisionprocesswe are positingas relevantto foreign we are concerned not only with a policy decision-making, decision calculus, but also with an explanatorycalculus-i.e., the selectionof one of a varietyof plausibleexplanationsof the the decisionprocess.The choice among eventthathas triggered alternativeexplanationsof a situation,like the choice among alternativepossible actions, involvesa calculus in which an evaluation is made of the amount of cognitive(deductive) support for various alternatives.For this reason, the socialpsychologicalformulationof the economic, rational choice modelsis especiallyappropriatebecause it leavesto the decision

[ 1581 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

makerthe specificationof the numberof beliefsabout a given alternative,and thus allows forthe combinationof subjective, perceptualmappingsof the subjectmatter(in this case foreign decisioncalculus. policy)and a structured To illustratethe deductive structureof an explanatory calculus,considerthe followinghypotheticalbeliefsystemof a foreignpolicy decision maker in the process of decidingthe implicationsof Castro's Cuba for one of his majorobjectives, American security.Some cognitivesupport for an attitude mightbe adduced in a syllogisticformas follows(see Bem, 1970, fora similarpresentation): The Soviet Union's cold war activityconstitutesa threat to American security. TheSovietUnionandCuba arecold warallies. Therefore security. Cuba is a threatto American

or lent more This derivedbeliefmightbe furtherstrengthened cognitivesupportas follows: close to theUnitedStates Hostilenationswhichare geographically constitutea greaterthreatto Americansecuritythan thoseat a distance Cuba is a hostilenationwhichis quitecloseto theUnitedStates. Therefore Cuba is a threatto American security.

And the same decision maker mightreinforcethisconclusion further: The independence nationsfromtheSovietsphere of LatinAmerican is essentialto American security. Cuba threatensto bringmoreLatin Americannationswithinthe Sovietsphereofinfluence. Therefore security. Cuba is a threatto American

A partialbelief systemsuch as thisis similarto what Abelson refersto, in his most recent reformulationof his cognitive set of theory,as an irnplicationmolecule, a self-consistent beliefs which is conjoined by one or two basic principles (Abelson, 1968).


The deductiveaspect of a decisional process as discussed above providesan understanding of the way in whichinformation is combinedin the foreignpolicydecision-making process. in A comprehensive and effectiveapproachto decision-making such a settingmust,in addition,addressitselfto the way in whichinformationis selectedby decisionmakersfromamong the welterof diversecues whichsurrounda decisionsituation. This thirdtheoreticalperspectivecontributing to our model of cognitiveprocessingin foreignpolicy decision-making was also suggestedin our discussion of cognitivecomplexityabove. Therewe noted that,in varyingdegrees,the decisionmakersin our gamingsituationused theirperceptionsof past situationsas analoguesto both explain and finda solutionfortheircurrent decision situation.There is, in addition,considerableevidence that actual foreignpolicy decisionmakershave also attempted to resolveuncertainty in structuring and respondingto decision situations by analogizing from the past. Former President Johnson(1971: 46), forexample,reports: he Whena President makesa decision he seeksall theinformation from hisown himself canget.Atthesametimehe cannotseparate Thisis especially truewhenhisdecisions experience andmemory. ofthenation. Itwasnatural, involve thelivesofmenandthesafety as I facedcritical problems during thosefirst months inoffice, thatI ofthepastandhowwehadmetthemorfailedto shouldrecallcrises in theHouseor Senateduring meetthem.No onewhohadserved and themomentous yearsofthenineteen-thirties, nineteen-forties, nineteen-fifties, as I had,couldfailtorecallthemany highsandlows of ourperformance as a nation, Likemostmenandwomenofmy I feltstrongly havebeenaverted thatWorld WarII might generation, if theUnitedStatesin thenineteen-thirties hadnotgivensuchan to aggression in Europeand uncertain signalof itslikelyresponse Asia. The theory of personalitysuggestedby George A. Kelly providesa frameworkfor buildingthis part of the decisional process.An individual'scognitivesystem(forKelly) is arranged in the formof an interrelated set of subordinateand superordinate constructs.Thissystemof constructs, whichKellysaw as a


seriesof dichotomousreferenceaxes, providesthe basis upon which the individual anticipates events and classifies his experienceof them(Kelly, 1955). It is thus the categories decision makers utilize which determinethe informationthat is selected and rejectedin a base for decisionsituation.In orderto preparean informational the deductivedecisionalprocess such as that discussedabove, we mustknowhow the individualconstructsof decisionmakers are utilized.Our model of the foreignpolicy decision-making processassumes that inductiveas well as deductivesupportis frequentlyrequiredfor decisionsto be reached. Some of the inductivesupportfor decisionsis "congealed" in the formof politics.These beliefs firmbeliefsabout aspectsof international have been acquired on the basis of the individual'ssubjective understanding of pasteventsand functionas componentsin the deductivepartof his decisionprocess.Often,however,decision of new events,and, makersare uncertainabout the significance in-the absence of firmbeliefsabout matterswhichdirectlybear upon possible decision alternatives,they scan past experience and attemptto analogize fromwhat they regard,given the categoriestheyutilize,as similarpast experience.The selection of a past eventas "similar"is a functionof theirconstructsor system.Decisionmakers, conceptualmodel of theinternational thus, from our perspective,utilize historyeitherimplicitly, inasmuchas their firmoperational beliefs are predicatedon already digestedand interpretedpast events,or explicitly,as they verbalizeor consciouslyemploy analogiesfromthe past. on whichour modelof Thus, a majortheoreticalpresupposition the decisionalprocess will be based is the impactof historical events on perceptionsand images of foreignpolicy decision makers.

A Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making

As a resultof monitoringthe decision process which took we drew conclusionsnot place duringthe gamingexperiments,

Shapiro,Bonham/ FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING [161 ]

only about the structureand process of cognitionin foreign policy decision-making but also about the sequence of phases withinwhich the cognitivedynamicswe discussedabove are operating. Despite the differencesin information-processing (primarilya functionof degreeof complexity)of each of the participantsin our games, it is possible to ascribe to each decision-making group as a whole a single decision process. Althoughdifferences in substantiveperspectivesand information-processing seem to have had an impacton the information utilized and conclusions reached by each decision maker, individualsmanifestedthe same kindof phasingwithrespectto the variouscomponentsof the decisionprocess.This similarity in phasingsuggesteda generalmodelof foreignpolicydecisionmaking.

Representation of Beliefs

The major theoreticalpresuppositionof our model is that beliefsof foreignpolicydecisionmakersare centralto thestudy of decision outputs and probably account for more of the variancethan any othersinglefactor.Beliefsrepresentboththe congealedexperiencesof the decision maker and his expectations about the decision environment.In the decision-making process, beliefs act like templatesfor channelinginformation and forrelatingpossiblepolicyoptionsto perceptionsabout the intentionsand behaviorof othernations,and also to the policy objectivesof the decisionmaker. Beliefsof decision makersare representedin the simulation as a map of causal linkagesamong threetypes of concepts. "Affective"conceptsreferto the policy objectivesor interests of the actorsin the international system;"cognitive"concepts denote beliefs about actions that occur in the international system;and "conative" concepts indicate possiblealternatives fromwhichthedecisionmakerselectspolicyrecommendations. as arrowswhich The linkagesbetweenconceptsare represented the carryeitherpositiveor negativesignsin orderto distinguish

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directionof the causal relationshipperceivedby the decision maker. Taken together,the concepts and the causal linkages betweenthemforma "cognitivemap" of the decisionmaker's beliefsystem.It is this cognitivemap whichallows a decision maker to relate an event or a series of events to policy alternatives and policyobjectives. This representationof decision makers'beliefsreflectsthe propositionthat decision makerstend to believethatinternational eventsare causallyrelated and thus try to infercausal relationships underlying eventsand the actionsof othernations, even whenthereis littleor no evidenceof a causal nature.Jervis (1970: 29) has observedthistendencyin his studyof theuse of signals and indices by foreignpolicy decision makers.This proposition is also supported by research on attribution phenomenain social psychology,which holds that a person's motivationto exercisecontroloverhis environment is relatedto his attributionof causal relationshipsto the behaviorof others (see Abelsonand Reich, 1969; Kelly,1971; Kanouse, 1971).

Amplification of Beliefsand SearchforExplanations Four processesare invokedin the simulationmodel when a decisionmakeris confrontedwitha new international situation that requiresa responsefromhis government: theamplification of beliefs,the searchforan explanation,the searchforpolicy options,and the choiceof a policy(see Figure1). During the amplificationof beliefs process, the decision makerattemptsto put the new internationalsituationintothe contextof hisexperiences.Thisis a processof bringing together various componentsof the situationwith his existingbeliefs about the nations and actions involvedso that the decision maker can define the situation.It is similarto the cognitive problemthat Abelson (1968: 136-139) has simulatedwithhis ideologymachine,whichmakesnoveleventsunderstandable by themin the referring them to a structurethat has interpreted past: a set of beliefs about past events which are storedat levelsof abstraction. different


At the amplificationof beliefs stage of the simulation, concise statementsdescribingnew internationaldevelopments are fed into the model to activate concepts in the decision a conceptis maker'sbeliefsystem.Whenan eventexemplifying receivedas an input,that particularconcept is "highlighted," and thisinformation is storedin the model'smemory.Afterall concepts directlypertainingto a new internationalsituation have been highlighted, the simulationsearchesfor additional by implication(i.e., those conceptsthat would be highliglhted concepts).Once thatare reachablefromtheinitiallyhighlighted causal paths have been followed from initiallyhighlighted concepts,the decision makerhas an amplifiedset of concepts which is a subset of his conceptualoverviewsof the international environment.This subset is then utilized in the subsequent phasesof the decisionprocess. The second decision-making process,searchforexplanations, is somewhatmore involvedthan the firstprocess.As noted in the flow chart(see Figure 1), a simulateddecisionmakermust determinewhetherhe possesses an adequate explanationof what has occurred.An explanationin our modelconsistsof the arrowsor "paths" connectinga set of two or morehighlighted concepts. The initialconcept in an explanatorypath is most oftenan actor's intentionor motivation.The pathis a sequence fromintentionconcept to the consequence or set of consequences that were initiallyinput in the amplicationof beliefs phase of the decision process. Once new informationhas activatedconcepts in a decision maker'scognitivesystem,the model searches for arrowsbetweenhighlightedconcepts and isolatesthemforfurtherprocessing.For example,a participant in one of the political games we have used to studydecisionmakingprocessesmade the followingstatementabout a crisis thathad developedin the MiddleEast: It wouldappearto me thatthe continuous of Arab occupation thiscausalfactorthatmakesthe territories by Israelis precisely more ofSovietmilitary aidandbrings Arabregimes opentoproffers andmoreSovietpenetration intotheMiddleEast,therefore bringing


It tendsto polarize intheworldsituation. us all to a sortofbrink and it tendsto maketheArabstatesmore morethesituation, ontheSovietUnion. dependent This statementwas coded as part of his cognitivemap and is shown in Figure 2 as a structureconsistingof six concepts linked togetherby five positive arrows. When this person's cognitivemap was used laterin a simulationof a real crisis,the 1970 war in Jordan,the concepts shown in Figure2 were all activatedby the model and then isolated fromthe restof his cognitivestructureas one possibleexplanationforthe crisisin Jordan. The firsttwo processes, amplificationand search, are a representationin the model of the propositionthat decision makers tend to fit incominginformationinto their existing theoriesand images (this is noted by Jervis,1968: 455). The crucial role of images in internationalrelations has been discussed by Boulding (1959, 1956). More recently,Jervis (forthcoming;1968) has analyzedeffectsof imageson information-processingby policy makers and has illustratedthis propositionwith numeroushistoricalexamples. In addition, Holsti (1962) and Finlay et al. (1967) have tested this propositionin a studyof formerSecretaryof StateJohnFoster 1972). Dulles (see also Axelrod,forthcoming; At the operationallevel, amplificationand searchprocesses are accomplishedby treatingthe cognitivemaps of decision makersas directedgraphsor "digraphs"and usingthe rulesof digraph theory for making calculations. Digraph theory,a formal system with elaborate rules for moving about in a networkof interrelatedelements,providesan inferencestructhe elementsin a ture that is convenientforboth representing cognitivestructureand calculatingcognitiveprocesses.Calculation is greatlyfacilitatedbecause the inventorsof digraph betweendigraphsand theoryhave workedout the relationships to it is manipulaterelationships matrix algebra, so possible between and among elements. The set of rules (axioms, theorems,and so on) whichconstitutethe theoryof primitives,

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0~~~

O 0

Z

+*

+

0

0

COm 4)

0

.N

4-~~~~~~~~~~.

cc~~~~~~~. z~~~~ LL~~~~~~~~

0.4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0

LL

[166]


directedgraphsis fartoo elaborateto treathere (see Hararyet al., 1965; Harary,1961). We shall simplynote, as we proceed, those rules which directlypertain to the explication of our model of foreignpolicy decision-making. For example,we use the idea of "reachability"in the amplificationand search calculations. In digraph theory, reachabilitysuggests that concepts connectedby paths to initiallyhighlightedconcepts will also be highlighted. Thus, if conceptV1 in digraphD (see below) is initiallyhighlighted, then the other three concepts, and which are reachable from V1, would be V2' V3, V4, highlighted by implications.

D=V1

V3 V4

The search for additional concepts is accomplished in the computerby constructing a reachabilitymatrixas a basic input for the simulation and then checkingrelationshipsin the matrix. Whena decisionmakerpossessesonly one explanationfora policy situation,the simulationgoes on to the next stage,the search for alternativecourses of action. However,if thereis more than one explanationin his cognitivesystem,the model selects the one with the most "deductivesupport." For our purposes, deductive support is defined as the number of logicallyindependentreasonsthatreinforcean explanation,and it is calculated by counting the number of separate paths comprisinga givenexplanation.At the operationallevel,thisis and manipulatingan adjacency accomplishedby constructing matrix.' This subroutineof the simulationmodel follows directly from the propositionthat decision makers tend to rely on 1. "An adjacency matrixA of a digraphD is a square matrixwith one row and one column for each point of D, in whichthe EntryAij 1 if the line vivjis in D and Aij = 0 if vivj is not in D" (Hararyet al., 1965: 408). The adjacency matrixA(D) for digraphD above is as follows:


explanations supportedby several logicallyindependentreasons. This is stated in this formby Jervis(forthcoming), who notes that it is an applicationof consistencytheoriesand is compatible with theoriesdealing with avoidance of psychological conflicts(see Kelman and Baron, 1968; Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958; Abelson, 1968). In addition, researchon cognitivecomplexityprovidessome evidence forthisproposition(Bieri, 1955; Driver,1962; Schroderet al., 1967). A decisionmaker'sbeliefsystemis usuallydenseenoughfor him to findan explanationfora policy situation,but thereare occasions when he lacks an adequate explanationforan event or seriesof events.If thereis not any explanationin a decision maker's beliefsystemwith sufficientdeductivesupport,then the model beginssearchingforinductiveexplanatorysupport, as indicatedin the flow chart.The simulateddecision maker scanshis memoryand attemptsto findsimilarpasteventswhich mightprovidean explanationforthe currentsituation.During the search,the relevanceof historicaleventsis determinedfor the decision maker by the categoriesor constructsthrough whichhe viewstheinternational system. The logic of the inductivesearch process (in both the explanatoryand choice of an alternative phases)is similarto the precedentsearchin Alkerand Greenberg's(forthcoming) model V1

V2

V3

V4

V1

[

1

0

1

V2

I

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0 ?

V3 [ V4

0

J

Each nonzero element in an adjacency matrix (reading by rows) indicates the numberof paths (of length1) fromthe row elementto all otherelemtns.If we raise the matrixto the power of 2, the nonzero elementsin the matrixwill indicate the numberof paths of length2. Generally,by raisingthe adjacency matrixto the nth power, we can discoverthe numberof paths of lengthn fromeach elementto every otherelement.Thus by raisingthe matrixto the power equal to the longestpath in the reachabilitymatrix, we can count, by adding across matrices,the number of paths fromeach highlightedconcept to everyotherhighlightedconcept. In termsof our theoryof decision-making, this process is one of countingthe deductivesupport forvariousexplanationsof the internationalsituation.


of UN decision-making. The searchofpasteventsscansthestored eventsand initiallychoosestheeventwiththe mostconceptsin commonwiththe currentsituation.If morethanone eventhas the same numberof sharedconcepts,the mostrecenteventis selected. The search then proceeds lexicographically.If the explanatoryor choice of alternativerule in the firsthistorical event leads to a selectionfromamong two or more possible paths,the search is ended. If the firsteventselecteddoes not successfullycontinue or terminatethe decision process, a second one is selected,usingthe same decisionrules,and so on, untila past eventis foundthat overcomesthe uncertainty that led to theinductivesearchprocess. The inductivesearch process of this part of the model is responsiveto the propositionthat decision makers,in the absence of firm beliefs about new events,tend to rely on previousexperience.Writerson foreignpolicy haveoftenmade referenceto the significanceof historicalevents in shaping imagesand decisions.This positionhas been statedsuccinctlyin Holstiet al. ( 1968: 125): Essentially, then,it is byprojecting pastexperience intothefuture thathuman beings makedecisions; andstatesmen, inthisrespect, are human notexceptions. likeother Foreign policydecisions, decisions, notonlyan abstraction butalsothemaking of imply from history, ofprobable outcomes. "predictions"-the assessment Effectsof historicaleventshave been studiedby Deutsch and Merritt(1965), and Jervis(1968: 470-472) has analyzedhow decisionmakersanalogize fromhistoricalexperience.Furthermore,the propositionis a basic assumptionof the CASCON (Beattie and Bloomfield, 1969) and CACIS (Tanter, 1971) models.

Searchfor Optionsand Policy Choice The next decision-makingprocess is the search for an acceptablecourse of action. Once various alternativeexplana-


tions of the situationhave been sortedout, the decisionmaker searches for alternativepolicies with which to respond. To accomplish this, he follows the explanatorypaths fromthe policieshe mightselect (conativeconcepts)to the objectiveshe feels are at stake in the situation(the affectiveconcepts)and calculateswhichalternativeor combinationof alternatives will resultin the maximumnet gainin objectives. The signsof the causal linkages(as well as the probability weightings) in the decisionmaker'scognitivemap are crucialat thispoint in theprocess,because the model mustcalculatehow each policy alternativewill affectevery policy objective to which it is connected by an explanatory path. At the operationallevel, we used a signed digraph,which takes into account whetherrelationshipsbetweenconceptsare positiveor negative.The signed digraphis convertedinto an adjacency matrixwhich preservesthe signedrelationships.This kind of matrix,which is called a valencymatrix,makesit possibleto determinewhetherthereis a positiveor negativepath froma specificconativeconceptto one or moreaffectiveconcepts.2 The search for policy options in our model is restrictedto those that are embeddedin a decisionmaker'sexplanationof a situation.The logic of the searchis simplythat a policymaker looks foroptionsthathe thinkswillgivehimsome controlover eventsin the international system.He thusselectsa policythat he believeswillset offa seriesof eventsthatwillhavean impact on his policy objectives. This propositionis similarto the notion of an "isomorphismof experienceand action," which was first introduced by Asch (1952) and has since been discussed extensivelyby Campbell (1963). They hold that a person'sviewsof the worldand his tendencyto respondto the worldare essentiallyequivalent. As in the case of the explanatoryphase of the decision process, when a decision maker finds that he is ambivalent or none seems adequate, he reflects about possible alternatives on relevant historicalexperiencesin an attemptto adduce additionalconceptswhichwilllead to an acceptablealternative. 2. The procedureparallelsthe explanatorycalculus describedabove. The valency matrixis raisedto powersto capturepolicy implicationpaths and theirsigns.


The choice of a policy option from among a numberof possible alternatives is the finaldecision-making processin our simulation.There are, of course, a varietyof decisionmodels one can employ to deal with the trade-offs involvedin this calculus. For our simulation, we employ a lexicographic decision calculus which assumes that the decision makerfirst uses his most importantpolicy objective to see if the alternatives affectit differently. If thisobjectivedoes not distinguish betweenalternatives, he thenmovesto his secondobjective,and so on, until he gets to an objective that distinguishesone alternative as betterthantheothers. In the simulation,the choice process is operationalizedas follows: A valency matrixis used to trace the connections between policy options and policy objectives,and then the model invokes a lexicographicdecision calculus. To decide whethera particularpolicy objective distinguishes amongtwo or -morepolicy alternatives,the model takes into account not only the signof the relationshipbut also the numberof paths involved.For example,theremaybe threepositivepathsfroma particularpolicy alternativeto a givenpolicyobjective,whereas other alternativeshave only one or two positivepaths to the same objective. Aftera policy option is selected,the model recyclesby adjustingthe decisionmaker'scognitivesystemto take into account any new or strengthened causal linkagesand stores informationabout the decision situation for future reference.

Conclusion In another paper (Bonham and Shapiro, forthcoming)we Warinterview reportedthat, on the basis of a post-Jordanian with the Middle East specialistwhose cognitivemappingwe have used here for purposes of illustration,we successfully predictedwhat his responsewould have been as an advisorto the President.In this paper, however,we are more concerned and policy recommendationimplicawith the theory-building


tions of our model.At a theoreticallevel,the modelis coherent with various social-psychological perspectivesthat have been successfulpredicatesforexperiments on attitudeformationand decision-making. We have integratedthese perspectivesin a cognitive process model of foreignpolicy decision-making, while preservingboth the conceptual bases and operational stipulationsimpliedin each perspective. The policy implications of the model are particularly noteworthy.One implicationwhich suggestsitselfwould be examiningthe kindsof cognitiveadjustments,both in termsof the structureof a cognitive mapping of the international politicalsystemand in termsof the storedperceptualhistories of past events,that would result in policy choices different fromthose thathave been actuallypursued.This is one of the major implicationswe intend to pursue once we have enough data to representthe cognitivemappingsof the variousforeign policy groups that have actually been responsiblefor foreign policychoices. REFERENCES ABELSON, R. P. (1968) "Psychologicalimplication,"pp. 112-139 in R. Abelson et al. (eds.) Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Source Book. Chicago: Rand McNally. ---and C. M. REICH (1969) "Implicational molecules: a metlhodforextracting meaning from input sentences," in D. E. Walker and L. M. Norton (eds.) Proceedings of the InternationalJoint Conference on ArtificialIntelligence, (May). ABELSON, R. P. and M. J. ROSENBERG (1958) "Symbolic psychologic:a model of attitudinalcognition."BehavioralSci. 3: 1-13. ALKER, H. R., Jr. and W. J. GREENBERG (forthcoming)"The U.N. charter: alternativepasts and alternativefutures,"in J. D. Ben-Dak (ed.) The Simulation of Inter-SocietalRelations.New York: Gordon & Breach. ASCH, S. E. (1952) Social Psychology.Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall. AXELROD, R. (forthcoming)"Schema theory: an informationprocessingmodel of perceptionand cognition."Amer.Pol. Sci. Rev. 67 (December). --- (1972) "Psycho-algebra:a mathematicaltheoryof cognitionand choice with an application to the British Eastern Committee in 1918." Papers of the Peace ResearchSociety (International)18: 113-131. BEATTIE, R. R. and L. P. BLOOMFIELD (1969) "CASCON: Computer-Aided System for Handling Informationon Local Conflicts."Centerfor International Studies ACDA/SEC-141, Cambridge,Massachusetts,December.

Shapiro,Bonham/ FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING [ 1731 BEM, D. J. (1970) Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs. Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole. BIERI, J. (1955) "Cognitive simplicity-complexity and predictivebehavior." J. of Abnormaland Social Psychology51: 263-268. BONHAM, G. M. and M. J. SHAPIRO (forthcoming)"Simulatingforeignpolicy decision-making:an applicationto the Middle East," in J. D. Ben-Dak (ed.) The Simulationof Inter-SocietalRelations.New York: Gordon & Breach. BOULDING, K. E. (1959) "National images and internationalsystems." J. of ConflictResolution 3 (June): 120-131. (1956) The Image. Ann Arbor: Univ.of MichiganPress. CAMPBELL, D. T. (1963) "Social attitudesand other acquired behavioraldispositions," pp. 94-172 in volume 6 of S. Koch (ed.) Psychology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw-Hill. DEUTSCH, K. W. and R. C. MERRITT (1965) "Effectsof eventson national and internationalimages," pp. 130-187 in H. C. Kelman (ed.) InternationalBehavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart& Winston. DRIVER, M. J. (1962) "Conceptual structureand groupprocessesin an inter-nation simulation."Ph.D. dissertation.PrincetonUniversity. FINLAY, D. J., 0. R. HOLSTI, and R. FAGEN (1967) Enemiesin Politics.Chicago: Rand McNally. FISHBEIN, M. (1967) "A behavioral theory approach to the relations between beliefs about object and the attitude toward the object," in M. Fishbein (ed.) Readingsin AttitudeTheoryand Measurement.New York: JohnWiley. HARARY, F. (1961) "A structuralanalysis of the situation in the Middle East in 1956." J. of ConflictResolution5 (June): 167-178. Z. NORMAN, and D. CARTWRIGHT (1965) Structural Models: An ---R. Introductionto the Theoryof DirectedGraphs.New York: JohnWiley. HERMANN, C. F. (1969) Crisesin ForeignPolicy. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. --- and M. G. HERMAN (1967) "An attemptto simulatethe outbreak of World War I." Amer.Pol. Sci. Rev. 61 (June): 400-416. HOLSTI, 0. R. (1962) "The belief system and national images." J. of Conflict Resolution 6 (September): 24-52. ---R. C. NORTH, and R. A. BRODY (1968) "Perceptionand action in the 1914 crisis," pp. 123-158 in J. D. Singer (ed.) QuantitativeInternationalPolitics: Insightsand Evidence. New York: Free Press. JERVIS, R. (forthcoming)Perceptionand InternationalRelations. --- (1970) The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniv.Press. ---(1968) "Hypotheseson misperception."WorldPolitics20 (April): 454479. JOHNSON, L. B. (1971) The Vantage Point. New York: Holt, Rinehart& Winston. KANOUSE, D. E. (1971) Language,Labeling, and Attribution.New York: General LearningPress. KELLEY, H. H. (1971) Attributionin Social Interaction. New York: General LearningPress. KELLY, G. A. (1955) The Psychologyof Personal Cpnstructs.New York: W. W. Norton. KELMAN, H. C. and R. BARON (1968) "Inconsistencyas a psychologicalsignal," pp. 331-336 in R. Abelson et al. (eds.) Theories of Cognitive Consistency. Chicago: Rand McNally.

[1741 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY LEVINSON, D. J. (1957) "Authoritarianpersonalityand foreignpolicy," J. of ConflictResolution 1 (March): 37-47. ROSENBERG, M. J. (1956) "Cognitive structureand attitudinalaffect." J. of Abnormaland Social Psychology53: 367-372. SCHRODER, H. M., M. J. DRIVER, and M. STREUFFERT (1967) Human InformationProcessing.New York: Holt, Rinehart& Winston. SHAPIRO, M. J. (forthcoming)"Cognitive rigidityand moral judgments in an inter-nationsimulation," in H. Guetzkow (ed.) Simulation in International Relations: FindingsfromResearch. STEINBRUNER, J. D. (forthcoming) Decisions Under Complexity. Princeton: PrincetonUniv.Press. Excon III (A Middle Eastern Crisis Game), Instruction Manual. ---(1970) Cambridge,Mass.: MIT CenterforInternationalStudies. TANTER, R. (1971) "A computer aided conflict informationsystem(CACIS)." of Michigan,Departmentof PoliticalScience, December. (mimeo) University WASHBURN, A. M. and W. H. MITCHELL (1967) "W. Rostow, Vietnam and the Center futureof Americanforeignpolicy." Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity of InternationalStudies Policy Memorandum33.

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Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making

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