PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy A Concise History The Emergence of Pakistan [Chapter 1] Historical Perspective Perspect ive of Pakistan’s ‘nation-state ‘nation -state’’
Arabs penetrated South Asia via Indus delta in the 8th century. After pirates along the Sindh coast pillaged ships carrying Muslim pilgrims, pilgrims, the Governor of Basra sent a force under Mohammad Bin Qasim in 711 to Debul. Two years later, Multan became the first Muslim province in South S outh Asia. In the late 12th century, Muhammad Ghauri, a Turkic ruler of Ghazni, extended his realm eastwards to Delhi. His successors, Iltumish and Balban, ruled the northern plains during the 13th century. The Delhi Sultanate was taken over by Khilji and Tughlak dynasties until the end of the 14th century. Amir Taimur marched his army through Afghanistan into Punjab and plundered and sacked Delhi before returning to Samarkand in 1399. The Sayyids and Lodhi Afghans subsequently re-established the Delhi Sultanate. In 1526, Baber led his army from Kabul to supplant the last Lodhi Sultan. From his new capital at Agra, he extended his realm, laying the foundation of the great Mughal Empire that rose to its zenith under Shah Jehan in the 17th century. After Aurangzeb, the dynasty went into decline in the 18th century. Its fall was hastened by European empire-builders who scrambled to pick up the pieces. Defeating France and Portugal, Britain put the pieces together to rule the expanding realm through the East India Company, before assuming direct imperial rule after a coalition of the aggrieved local elite tried to wrest power back from the company in the name of the Mughal titular emperor in 1857. The Mughal emperor [Bahadur Shah Zafar] was exiled to Burma and Britain then assumed the reins of government directly until 1947.
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After the British took control, Muslims became suspect and were not only supplanted by loyal non-Muslims but also subjected to suppression, exclusion and exprop riation. [Sir] Syed Ahmad Khan, a social reformer and political visionary, discerned the dangers confronting his community and embarked on a campaign to awaken and inspire the Muslim people to abandon the boycott of the foreign rulers and to acquire contemporary education. He also founded a school that grew into the Aligarh Muslim University where learned ac academics, some of them from England, were employed to teach modern subjects and prepare the youth for gainful opportunities in the professions and participation in the expanding political and economic life and institutions of the land. As contemporary ideas of self-government self-government and ‘nationalism’ began to stimulate political though in the later part of 19th century, different ethnic and religious communities projected their futures in terms of their interest. The Muslim community, comprising a quarter of the population in British India awoke to its predicament, characterized by economic disparities and social exclusion. The future looked bleak as they faced the prospect of a powerless ‘permanent minority. The idea of ‘nationhood’ captured the imagination of the Muslim community as its leaders discerned the loosing danger of political domination across the religious and social fault line. At first, they sought legal and constitutional safeguards to secure and ensure an equitable share in social and political institutions. The rift began to widen after the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1886 with Allan Octavian Hume, a British ex-official, as its first President. Dominated by Hindu elite, the Congress attracted few Muslims as their leaders advised them to keep aloof from this nominally secular party that sought to supplant the British in positions of power and influence. To protect and promote the rights of the Muslim community, the leaders with modern education and political vision established the Muslim League in 1906. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a brilliant barrister with impeccable anti-colonial credentials, successfully promoted a compromise package for the future constitution. The constitution known as Lucknow Pact, after its approval by both the Congress and the League in 1916, included:
separate electorate provincial autonomy a one-third share for Muslims in the central assembly and safeguards in respect of legislation affecting any of the religious communities.
The Indian National Congress, however, went back on its commitment in 1928 when it adopted the Motilal Nehru Report, recommending replacement of ‘separate electorates’
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with a ‘joint electorate’ and the curtailment of provincial autonomy, autonomy, thus striking a fatal blow to any prospect of harmonious politics. The Muslim League’s struggled evolved through four stages: 1. 2. 3. 4.
it sought an equitable share in political and social life. The League’s emphasis was on constitutional safeguards for Muslims Muslims in provinces where they are a minority. minorit y. it sought autonomy for Muslim-majority provinces and it finally sought an independent state.1
The influential poet-philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, in his address to the annual session of the Muslim League at Allahabad, 1930 19 30 said: “I would like to see the Punjab, North-West North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Balochistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of Muslims, at least of North-West North-West India”.2 Allama Dr. Muhammad Iqbal ugeed, in a letter to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was then living in London, to return, as he was the ‘only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to ask for safe guidance”. Eminent Muslims and the Muslim media began to call him Quaid-i-Azam, the Great Leader and the Muslim League first used the titled in 1937.3 The Muslim League, in a resolution adopted in 1938, authorized Mohammad Ali Jinnah to explore the possibility of a suitable alternative political structure which would completely safeguard the interests of Muslims and other minorities in India. The Sindh Muslim League recommended the devising of a scheme for Muslims to attain full independence. The Second World War accelerated the political evolution. ‘The British wanted to win the war first and transfer power afterwards; the Congress demanded power at once, and a Hindu-Muslim settlement afterwards; the Muslims insisted on a Hindu-Muslim settlement first’. 4 On 23 March, 1940, the Muslim League, at its Lahore session, adopted the historic resolution demanding, ‘that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as it in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. [The ambiguity was clarified by the Quaid-i-Azam. When asked whether the resolution asked for one or two States, he said ‘one’]. The The next day newspapers referred to it as the ‘Pakistan Resolution’.5
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The Muslim students in London had first suggested the name of ‘Pakistan’ in 1932. [The signatories of the pamphlet “Now or Never” were Mohammad Aslam Khattak, President, Khyber Union, Choudhury Rahmat Ali, Inayatullah Khan (of Charsadda) and Sheikh nMohammad Sadiq of Mongrol, Kathiawar. They conceived the name ‘Pakistan’ by combining ‘P’ for Punjab, ‘A’ for Afghania (a synonym then for land of Pathan), ‘K’ for Kashmir, ‘S’ for Sindh and ‘TAN’ for Baluchistan].6 In a last attempt to realize their dream of preserving the unity of their Indian empire, the British Cabinet Mission, in 1946, proposed a constitutional plan based on the division of British India into three autonomous zones with the powers of the centre to be limited to foreign affairs, defence and communications. The League first accepted the plan but later rejected it, because the Congress leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, asserted his party ‘regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission plan as it thought best.7 With the plan thus undermined by the Congress refusal to guarantee the autonomy of the zones, the League reverted to the demand for the partition of British India into sovereign states. The British government then proposed the Partition Plan which was accepted by both Muslim League as well as Indian National Congress and was announced on 3 June, 1947. Pursuant to the agreement, Pakistan was established through the exercise of self-determination by the people of the Muslim-majority provinces and parts of provinces of the British Indian Empire, Empire, either in popular referenda or by the votes of the elected representatives of the people on 14 th August, 1947 and India became an independent state on 15th August, 1947. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Abdul Sattar, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 19471947-2005”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan, 2007, pp. 1-4. Shamloo, “Speeches and Statements of Iqbal”, Lahore, 1948, pp.11-12. Sharif Al-Mujahid, Al-Mujahid, “Quaid-i“Quaid-i-Azam Azam Jinnah”, Quaid-i-Azam Quaid-i-Azam Academy, Karachi, 1981, p.41. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, “The Emergence of Pakistan”, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967. Stanley Wolpert, “Jinnah of Pakistan”, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, p. 185. Mohammad Aslam Khattak, “A Pathan Odyssey”, Oxford University University Press, Karachi, 2004, pp.15 & 264. Ibid., p. 67
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] Foreign Policy - Beginnings [Chapter 2]
The Foreign Policy of Pakistan was to be moulded in the crucible of interaction interaction with its neighbour India, but it was imbued from the start with the idealistic vision of the state’s founding father. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first head of new state, was a man of ideals and integrity, committed to the principles of peace with faith and confidence in human capacity to resolve differences through the application logic and law. Another exemplar was Liaquat Ali Khan. A barrister who became Secretary General of the Muslim League in the 1930s and first Prime Minister of Pakistan. Like Jinnah, he believed that Pakistan should be a progressive, democratic polity founded on Islamic principles of social welfare, religious tolerance tolerance and the equal rights of all citizens. The first Foreign Minister, Choudhry Sir Zafarullah Khan, was a jurist of repute and throughout his tenure sought to promote the resolution of international disputes in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Manifest in the views Quaid-i-Azam articulated was a modern intellect with a firm commitment to fundamental principles indispensable for the maintenance and promotion of international peace, progress and prosperity of mankind. This is illustrated in the following excerpts from his speeches: “There lies in front of us a new chapter and it will be our endeavour to create and maintain goodwill and friendship with Britain and our neighbourly dominion, Hindustan, along with other sisterly nations so that we all together may make our greatest contribution for the peace and prosperity prosperity of the world”.1 “Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make the utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed people of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter”.2
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“There is nothing that we desire more ardently than to live in peace and let others live in peace, and develop our country according to our known lights without outside interference, and improve the lot of the common man”.3 In a speech in Karachi, on 21st February, 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Said: “You have to stand guard over the development and maintenance of democracy, social justice and the equality of manhood in your own native soil with faith, discipline and selfless devotion to duty. There is nothing worthwhile that you cannot achieve” Quaid-i-Azam gave the following three golden principles: Faith Unity Discipline In a statement on 11 March, 1948, Quaid-i-Azam said: “Out object should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large….We stand by the United Nations Charter and will gladly make our full contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world. In another statement, Quaid-i-Azam said: “It is of vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent, sovereign states to collaborate in a friendly way to jointly defend their frontiers, both on land and sea against any aggression. But this depends entirely on whether India and Pakistan can resolve their own differences. If we can put own house in order internally, then we may be able to play a very great part externally in all international affairs. The Indian Government should shed their superiority complex and deal with Pakistan on an equal footing and fully appreciate the realities”.4 In a speech to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August, 1947, the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah said: “You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – creed – that that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens, and equal citizens of one State”.5 Addressing the last session of Muslim League, he said: “It is obvious that the Musalmans of Pakistan and India can no longer have one and the same political organization. The Muslims of India would no longer be guided from
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source outside and they would aspire to equal rights and obligations as loyal citizens of India. Pakistan is going to be a Muslim State based on Islamic ideals. It is not going to be an ecclesiastical State. In Islam, there is no discrimination as far as citizenship is concerned”.6 In affirming the principle of equality of citizenship, Jinnah emulated the precedent set by the first Islamic state in the Misaq-i-Madinah that provided for equal rights for all people, Muslims as well as Jews, Madinites as well as those who migrated from Mecca. 7 ‘Quaid’s vision’ of ‘human rights’ antici pated pated the universal Declaration of Human Rights who proclaimed the principle: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration a year later, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. status. Addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947, Quaid-i-Azam said: “I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fair play without any any prejudice or ill-will, in other words, partiality or favouritism. My guiding participle will be justice and complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and cooperation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest nations of the world”. From the very beginning, Pakistan’s foreign policy upheld the fundamental principles of international law, especially respect for independence, non-aggression and noninterference in internal affairs as an indispensable condition for peace and progress. It extended goodwill towards all states and support for the legitimate causes of peoples, the cherishing of fraternal bonds with other Muslim nations and the desire for cooperation with all other states, especially its neighbours. Quaid-i-Azam concept of Pakistan as a Muslim, liberal, democratic and modern nationstate naturally predisposed him in favour of close relations with democratic countries like United States and France for its ideals of ‘liberty, fraternity and equ ality’.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Notes Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Speeches as Governor General, 1947-48, 1947-48, Ferozsons, Karachi, p. 11. Ibid., p. 65 Ibid., p. 62 Ibid., p. 45 Jinnah Papers, Vol. VI, pp. 446-450. Sharif al-Mujahid, al-Mujahid, “DAWN”, Islamabad, 26 December, 2004. Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit., 207
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy A Concise History The Kashmir Question, 1947-57 [Chapter 3]
The state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of some 500 quasi-autonomous princely quasi-autonomous princely states which exercised varying degrees of internal autonomy on the basis of treaties and agreements made during the period of colonial penetration and recognized Britain as their suzerain. The British Indian Act of 1947 affirmed the lapse of British suzerainty over the states and theoretically, theoretically, the states regained the ‘sovereignty’. However, the British Secretary of State for India announced, “We do not, of course, propose to recognize any states as separate, international entities. Earlier, on 25th July, 1947, Governor General, Mountbatten had advised the Princes to accede to Pakistan or India and in doing so, he told them: “You cannot run away from the Dominion government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible. This advice was consistent with the principle underlying the Partition Plan of 3rd June. On the basis of this principle, the Indian National Congress had insisted on the partition of the provinces of Assam, Bengal and Punjab. The partition of British Indian Em pire was based on the principle of ‘self -determination’ by Muslim majority areas forming ‘Pakistan’ and Hindu majority areas setting up ‘Indian’ state in accordance with the ‘Partition Plan’ of 3 rd June, 1947. Pakistan emerged on the map of the world through through the exercise of ‘self -determination’ on th 14 August, 1947 and India became an independent state on 15th August, 1947. All the provinces or parts of provinces that joined Pakistan did so by the express decision of the people either through elected representatives or directly in popular referendums. Tension between the two new emergent states of Pakistan and India is ascribable to:
a difficult and divisive legacy; the clash of political aims and ideologies between All India Muslim League and Indian National Congress; differences of religions and cultures between the two nations and adversarial perceptions of history.
Being agreed to the partition of British India, the two newly independent states could have lived in peace and harmony, had India accepted the existence of Pakistan with
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sincerity. The disputes between the two countries, particularly that of Kashmir had not arisen, had India not denied the right of ‘self -determination’ to the Muslim majority area Kashmiris, violating the very principle of partition and in utter disregard of the United Nations’ Security Council resolutions on the subject. All the princely states except Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir and Junagadh followed the principle of partition and acceded to India or Pakistan. The Nizam of Hyderabad aspired to independence but his state was invaded and occupied by India in 1948. When the Muslim ruler of the Hindu-majority Hindu-majority state of Junagadh announced ‘accession to th Pakistan’ on 15 August, 1947, the Indian Government protested, arguing that the decision by the ruler was ‘in utter violation of the principles on which partition of India was agreed upon and affected’. Pakistan offered to hold a ‘plebiscite’ but India refused, invaded and occupied the state. Two months later, however, the Indian Government itself committed an ‘utter violation of the principles on which partition was based’ when it accepted the offer of accession by the Dogra-Hindu Maharaja of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, even though 77 per cent of its four million people were Muslims. The Maharaja’s decision to accede to India followed events that testify to a pre-conceived pre-conceived design. In June 1947, two months before independence, Nehru betrayed his mind in a note to Mountbatten arguing: ‘The normal and obvious course appears appears to be for Kashmir to join the Constituent Assembly of India’, falsely stating ‘This will satisfy both the popular demand and the maharaja’s wishes’. Gandhi visited Srinagar in July and held talks with the maharaja. After the meeting, the Maharaja appointed a Chief Minister who openly advocated accession to India. Mountbatten connived in the Indian design on Kashmir by influencing Sir Cyril Radcliff, the supposedly impartial Chairman of the Punjab Boundary Commission, to award two Muslim-majority tehsils (sub-divisions) of Gurdaspur district to India. The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh was notorious for his oppressive rule. Whilst decisions were being made on the partition plan, he incarcerated prominent leaders of the two major political parties, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, the most important Muslim party in the state and an ally of the Muslim League, and the National Conference, C onference, a secularist ally of the Indian National N ational Congress. The popular opinion in Jammu and Kashmir made its preference clear. The Muslim Conference adopted a resolution in July 1947 in favour of accession to Pakistan. Majority opinion, even in the National Conference was also said to be of the same view but it was decided to postpone a decision until its leader, Sheikh Abdullah could be consulted. No political party favoured accession to India. Pakistan’s independence day was enthusiastically celebrated in Srinagar with flags. The Maharaja ordered the flags torn down and closed down all pro-Pakistan newspapers.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy A Concise History Search for Security [Chapter 4]
The ‘security’ of a state depends largely on a vigilant policy towards its neighbours which postulates a sound frontier policy. According to Lord Curzon: “Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which, hang suspended modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations”.1 Pakistan has the unique distinction of being surrounded by three of the world’s largest largest nations, i.e. Russia, China and India. The ‘geographical pivot of history’ and strategically the most critical zone in Euroasia is formed by those states which lie along with periphery of the great continental powers powers of Asia, Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China. As a Southwest Asian peripheral state, Pakistan’s security is linked with the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and the Gulf region. It must find an equation with big neighbours and with the United States which has h as global interests. Traditionally, Pakistan has shared a common destiny with its two Muslim neighbours, Afghanistan and Iran. Afghanistan with its high mountain ranges and legendary Khyber and Bolan passes guards the strategic gateway of the Indo-Gangetic plains of the subcontinent and no one has reached them without getting the control of Kabul. Despite the air age, the triangle of land, wedged strategically between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan remains the gateway to the subcontinent. The Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan region provides a land-corridor to any power to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Strait of Hormuz, characterized as the ‘international oil highway’ which connects the world’s largest site of oil reserves and production with world world markets and the hub of international oil tanker traffic is 250 miles off the naval complex of Iran at Chah Bahar which is about 25 miles West of the Pakistan border, thus linked with the crucial geopolitical problems of the ‘life line’ sea-lanes. sea-lanes.
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Foreign Policy is often considered as the first line of defence of any country. This is more pronounced in case of Pakistan. It has inherited a difficult ‘security’ situation because of India’s antagonistic and hostile relationship from the very beginning. The ‘quest for security’ has been at the heart of Pakistan’s foreign policy ever since its independence as its security environment derives its origins from the circumstances in which Pakistan was created. The accompanying violence leading to the emergence of the two independent states of Pakistan and India and the mass migrations of the Muslim and Hindu communities at a scale having no parallel in human history had generated ‘hostility’ which continues to afflict relations between the two countries. India’s efforts immediately after independence to undo Pakistan, particularly its attempt to seize Kashmir were the main causes for the bitterness, tension, conflict and a sense of insecurity which gripped the Pakistani policy-makers from the very outset.
This perception had a profound influence on the formulation of the defence and foreign policies of Pakistan. In the years that followed, the Pakistani policy-makers remained convinced that India which is several times bigger than Pakistan in size, population and resources was conspiring against Pakistan’s very existence and territorial territorial integrity. India’s hostile designs not only consisted of the conventional methods of warfare but also included diverse political and other pressures including a psychological war of relentless propaganda questioning the very raison d’etre of Pakistan’s creation. India sought to isolate and to encircle Pakistan with the help of other countries. Pakistan’s odd and almost indefensible frontiers consisting initially of two separated wings, across a thousand miles of hostile territory added to intricacies of its security problem. On almost every issue that arose in relations with India, Pakistan found itself faced with New Delhi’s refusal to resolve the differences on the basis of principles of law and justice, whether it was:
the transfer of Pakistan’s share of the assets inherited from British India, accession of princely states, or continued flow of river waters,
India sought to impose its own will, in disregard of the principles of the partition agreement between the two countries. Exploiting power disparity, India dismissed in negotiations:
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‘reason’ and ‘equity’ spurned resort to impartial peaceful means of resolving differences and did not hesitate to use force or threat of force to impose its own preferences.
India’s military intervention in Jammu and Kashmir, and its refusal to hold a plebiscite as agreed in the Security Council resolutions, injected a sense of urgency to the fledgling state’s search for ways ways and means to bolster its capacity to resist dictation. ‘India factor’ has always dominated the formulation of Pakistan’s foreign policy as New Delhi, much bigger in size, having much more resources in men and material and exhibiting a ‘hostile’ attitude towards first, the ‘establishment’ and then ‘existence of Pakistan’ right from the beginning, has always overshadowed Pakistan’s foreign policy. Furthermore, as the saying is that “one can choose one’s friends but not one’s neighbours”, Pakistan has no choice than to live with its neighbours, India, Afghanistan and Iran. The attitude of Afghanistan, a Muslim neighbour on the West which shares historical, religious, cultural and ethnic links with Pakistan had not been encouraging at all as it was the only country which voted against the membership of Pakistan into United Nations. Besides, Kabul put up irredentist claims against Pakistan, questioning the validity of ‘Durrand Line’ which was settled long before at the time of the British empire. Afghanistan Afghanistan also backed the secessionist ‘Pakhtoonistan’ movement and was willing to collude against Pakistan’s security with India and later with USSR which adopted a hostile posture and extended vital military and economic econ omic aid to India. The crisis over Afghanistan is having immediate geo-political effects with shifting of the area of Major Powers’ struggle eastward from West Asia towards South Asia. The ethnic ties between Pakistan and Iran as well as with Afghanistan makes this country an ideal place for subversion against them. Thus Pakistan has shown signs of strain under pressures emanating from Afghanistan, India and Russia and at times from Iran as well. There is no defence depth, all its major cities are border outposts. Any army crossing the Khyber Pass or the Punjab border could seek to cut right across Pakistan disrupting the whole communication system and thus bringing about a political and economic chaos in which survival of the state would hand in a precarious balance. [An attempt of such nature was made from the Punjab border in 1965].
The role of Iran had always fluctuated over the years. Sometimes, it was good, sometimes bad, depending upon the ‘national interests’ of the two countries which had been at ‘variance’ at different intervals of time.
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Pakistan’s response to the ‘objective problem’ posed by:
the tyranny of power imbalance, the agony and humiliation of dictation by a major power of the region
was in ‘classical style’ which other states had done throughout history when faced fac ed with such a situation of more powerful neighbour, intent on exploiting ‘disparity’ and trying to achieve its inimical aims. Pakistan, therefore, embarked upon cultivation of ‘sympathy’ and ‘support’ from wherever it could find. It sought ‘friends’ and ‘allies’ and ‘assistance’ over the globe to strengthen the ‘sinews of statehood’ and to preserve its ‘sovereignty’ and ‘security’ which it cherished most. The contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy were thus shaped by the ‘dictates of time’ and the ‘desperate need’:
o
o
o
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for ‘arms’ to ensure the security of the new state and a nd for ‘funds’ to finance its economic development. Hence, the over-riding over-riding motivation in determining Pakistan’s foreign policy has been the desire to safeguard the ‘country’s independence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ at all costs. This exactly explains why Pakistan adopted the policy of ‘alignment’ and signed a number of military pacts with one of the two super powers of the time i.e. United States. Pakistan first approached Great Britain, the only Western country, Pakistani leaders knew at first hand. Britain was, however, too exhausted and debilitated following the World War-II. The British Labour Government was anti-pathetic to Pakistani P akistani Leaders whom it simplicistically blamed for wrecking the British hope of maintaining the unity of their Indian empire – empire – ‘the ‘the Jewel in the Crown’. As Pakistan looked for economic and military cooperation, the Soviet Union was not an ‘option’. It had borne the brunt of Nazi Germany’s powerful war war machine in Europe in which 25-30 million people were killed Its economy was exhaustively devastated and it was hardly in a position to provide any assistance.
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o
Politically, the Soviet system was unattractive to Pakistani leaders who were committed to ‘democracy’.
o
The ‘Communist ideology’ was considered antithetical to ‘Islam’.
o
The Soviet leadership looked with little favour at Pakistan as compared to India.
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The relations between Pakistan and Soviet So viet Union got off to an inauspicious start as USSR did not even send a customary message of felicitations on Pakistan’s independence. Besides, Moscow posed a real threat of expansionist exp ansionist nature of Soviet Communism to Pakistan’s security and its long cherished desire to reach to the warm waters of Arabian Sea and India Ocean.
Hence, Pakistan was in desperate need to find somehow an ‘equalizer’ against a belligerent India. The United States was the only promising source of assistance as:
it had emerged from the 2nd World War with its economy intact and was the wealthiest nation in the world, accounting for over 40 % of global production. its Capitalist economy was closer to Pakistan as compared to the Soviet’s Communist economy, US democratic system was congenial and also close to Pakistan’s democratic credentials, United States was preoccupied with Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe.
From United States’ point of view, Pakistan was well placed geo-politically geo-politically and geo-strategically, next to the oil-rich Middle East which was the life-line for United States and the West. This also explains why Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan accepted and preferred an invitation to visit United States over ov er that of Soviet S oviet Union which also could co uld not settle the dates. It was under these circumstances that Pakistan decided to join the USsponsored military pacts: o
o
In May 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah received the US Charge d’affaires in New Delhi and explained to him that Pakistan’s foreign policy would be oriented towards the Muslim countries of the Middle East and they would stand together against possible Russian aggression and look to the US for assistance. After Pakistan’s emergence as an independent state, President P resident Truman of United
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States sent a warm message on its independence on 14th August, 1947, saying, “I wish to assure you that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America”. o
As North Korea’s forces moved across the 38th parallel on 25th June, 1950, Pakistan promptly denounced denounced the attack as ‘a clear case of aggression’. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan who was in United States endorsed the US decision to invoke UN Charter provisions for collective security. Pakistan voted for the UN General Assembly’s resolution, resolution, authorizing the UN operation for the defence of South Korea. But when the United Nations called upon Members to contribute to the UN action, Pakistan decided against sending a military contingent and limited its contribution to supply of 5,000 tons of wheat for South Korea. [Pakistan was willing to send an army brigade but only onl y if its own security was assured in the event of Indian aggression. Pakistan’s position, combining ‘principle’ with manifest constraints of security, was generally well understood at home and abroad and was appreciated by the Western countries as compared to India’s stance.
o
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Pakistan supported the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan and attended the San Francisco conference convened in 1951 to sign the treaty. On the question question of China’s representation, Pakistan supported the participation by the Peoples Republic of China. When majority voted against, Foreign minister Zafarullah Khan voiced regret over the absence of Peoples Republic of China whose people had suffered the most at the hands of Japan’s erstwhile oppressor regime.
Pakistan’s policy on issues in East Asia, was appreciated by b y Peoples Republic of China, Japan and South Korea and laid the foundation for Friendly relations with these important states. The New York Times was so impressed as to praise Pakistan editorially as America’s ‘one sure friend in South Asia’. Mindful of Peoples Republic of China’s importance, Pakistan was among the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to the new Government soon after it was proclaimed on 1st October, 1949 and a year later opened a diplomatic mission in Beijing. Differences of ‘ideology’ did not obstruct the development of friendly relations between the two neighbours as both conducted bilateral relations strictly in conformity with the principles of non-interference in internal affairs.
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o
With bitter experience of foreign domination, Peoples Republic of China evinced understanding and sympathy for the struggle of other countries of Asia and Africa to maintain their independence and develop their economies. Particularly engaging was Peoples Republic of China’s treatment of small and medium countries on the basis of sovereign equality eschewing big power chauvinism and condescension.
Thus Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy has very largely revolved around the problem of defining and defending its territorial personality and it may continue to be so 2. The specter of Russia and India looms large, a threatening perception for the small states. In the words of Olaf Olaf Caroe, ‘Russia is so tender in Central Asia that it cannot afford the “polarization” of alliances which could bring China in support of Pakistan’s right into Kashmir’.3 Notes 1. 2. 3.
Lord Curzon of Kedleston, “Frontiers, The Romanes Lecture” , 1907, London Clarenden Press, 1908, p.4. Mehrunnosa Ali, “Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 19711998” 2001, pp. 183-184. Olaf Caroe, “Soviet Empire”, Macmillan, London, 1967, p. 49.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] ALLIANCES [Chapter 5]
Pakistan’s policypolicy- planners planners were confronted with a unique ‘security syn syndrome’ drome’ and a ‘dilemma’ as:
tensions with India showed no signs of abatement,
Islamabad’s efforts to mobilize the UN as well as the Commonwealth Commonweal th against India’s intransigence in Kashmir were making no real headwa y,
the Islamic countries were quite weak and in any event, were not responding to Pakistan’s suggestions for an Islamic block and
Soviet Union was not forthcoming and was not really in a position to extend large-scale assistance to any one.
Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in a public meeting at Liaquat Gardens, Rawalpindi in October 1951, introduced a new element of ‘uncertainty’ into Pakistan’s internal stability.
Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings shrank from Rs.2880 Million in 1951 to Rs.1920 Million in 1952 and to approximately Rs.1500 Million in 1953. Gold and Sterling reserves which had stood at 1487 Million on 1st January, 1952 were reduced to Rs.606 Million only by the beginning of 1953.
The prospect of a severe wheat famine in 1953 further aggravated an already serious situation.
At that time, the Indian and American views on ‘capitalism’ and ‘communism’ were poles apart.
Indian Prime Minister Nehru believed that the modern imperialism was an outgrowth of ‘capitalism’ and in his views ‘communism’ was not ‘imperialistic’.
On the crucial question of ‘peace’, Nehru believed in enlarging the area of peace by cooperation without war. The Americans believed that the ‘Communists’ respect only the superior force
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and that it was necessary for the non-Communist non-Communist countries to build up ‘collective defence’. Hence, India and United States did not see eye to eye on three major areas:
the menace of expansionist Communism, the colonialism of European nations and China.
In such a situation of utter disappointment and frustration after courting India zealously and unsuccessfully, most Americans turned to the second largest non-Communist country of mainland Asia, Pakistan. As early as March 1949, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the strategic importance of the Karachi-Lahore Karachi-Lahore area ‘as a base for air operations’ against the Soviet Union and ‘as a staging area for forces engaged in the defence defence or recapture of Middle East oil o il areas’. By November 1952, the US Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific, Admiral Arthur W. Radford paid a visit to Pakistan, stayed in Karachi as the ‘Guest of the Governor General’ visited Khyber Pass and was honoured at a reception hosted by b y the Prime Minister. Before leaving Karachi, he declared that Pakistan enjoyed a strategic position and had an important role to play in the world fight against ‘Communism’. ‘Commun ism’. Pakistan’s position as the world’s largest Muslim state with wit h the best army in the Middle East, its proximity to the Soviet Union and the oilfields of the Persian Gulf was highlighted and even warned that it would be prejudicial to US interests to develop an India policy without taking into account Pakistan’s P akistan’s legitimate legitimate interests. Pakistani leaders lost no opportunity to project the country’s strategic importance. Speaking to a visiting Assistant Secretary of State in October 1949, Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad stressed the ‘importance to the United States …of the the establishment of a block of (Islamic) nations ….as a check to any ambitions of USSR. Ambassador George McGhee was impressed by the directness of Pakistani leaders and their willingness to support any US-backed efforts to prevent communist encroachments in South Asia. Interest in defence cooperation with Pakistan mounted after the Korean War. Analysts in Washington concluded that the North Korean attack which took place less than a year after the triumph of the Chinese liberation struggle, evinced an expansionist design. They were particularly concerned about the security of the Middle East, specially the vital Persian Gulf region with the world’s richest petroleum reserves. The rise of the nationalist Mohammaed Mossadegh in Iran and nationalization of the Anglo-American Oil Company heightened concerns over upheavals in the Middle East
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and lent urgency to the need for insulating the region against Soviet political penetration and ‘stemming any military advance towards the Persian Gulf and in the Near East East in general’. A meeting of US Ambassadors to South Asian countries held in Colombo in February 1951 ‘favoured the idea of Pakistani P akistani participation in the defence of the Middle East’. IN April 1951, American and British officials agreed that Pakistan’s contribution would probably be the decisive factor in ensuring defence of the area. By the end of 1952, the Truman administration in US endorsed the idea of a ‘Middle East Defence Organization [MEDO] that was conceived by London to shore up its sagging position. Changes of regimes in 1953 in Russia, America and Pakistan added new impulses to the moves already underway:
Eisenhower’s inauguration as President of United States with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, brought a new look to politics in Washington.
Muhammad Ali Bogra’s shift from ambassadorship in USA to Prime Ministership in Karahci brought an avowed admirer of America to the helm of affairs in Pakistan and
the death of Joseph Stalin removed a hardliner from Kremlin and brought the lively Khurschev to the fore in Russia.
At the end of 2nd World War, United States and Russia emerged as the strongest powers in the world, each standing for a way of life which the other thought incompatible with her own; rivalry for world supremacy between them was inevitable and by 1947, the ‘Cold War’ had descended upon Europe with the possibility of a hot war and an d CommunistCommunistsupported revolutions always in the offing. With the installation of Eisenhower as the President of the United States in January 1953, the process of Pakistan-US rapprochement was expected to be speeded up. In his inauguration address, he said that the strength of all free peoples lies in unity and that destiny had laid upon America the responsibility of the free world’s leadership. le adership. His administration would help ‘proven friends of freedom’ to achieve their own security and well-being. His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles saw the struggle against Communism as a moral crusade: if it was only power politics and did not involve a threat ‘to the basic moral principles of our Judeo-Christian civilization and indeed the civilization which is based upon other great religions’, it would not n ot be treated as a worldwide struggle. Unless the free world met it everywhere, they would be defeated.
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In May, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles undertook a tour of the Middle East and South Asia and was extended a warmer welcome in Pakistan. Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra and Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan, ‘all stressed their allegiance to the anti-Communist anti-Communist cause and emphasized Pakistan’s desire to join the free world’s defence team. Pakistan’s Commander -in-Chief, -in-Chief, General Ayub Khan expressed his conviction that the threat to Pakistan’s security security could be contained only with the support of a powerful ally and argued that the United States needed to fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal. His strategic assessment of the threat of a Soviet drive to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and and Pakistan’s potential for opposing it, made the most favourable impact on the visiting dignitary. John Foster Dulles was struck by the ‘spirit and appearance’ of the Pakistani armed forces and their leaders and had a ‘feeling that Pakistan is one country country that has the moral courage to do its part in resisting Communism’. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on his return to Washington, he praised the courage and determination of Pakistanis. He publicly spoke of the idea of a defence arrangement of ‘northern tier’ countries – Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran and in July, the proposal was adopted by the US National Security Council and Washington decided in principle to go ahead with the alliance idea. In October 1953, General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan’s Army paid a visit to Washington, followed by in November by Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad and the Foreign Minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan. Their activities in the US Capital gave rise to strengthening of military ties between the two countries and Newsweek wrote that informal talks had involved the possibility of a sizeable military assistance programme for Pakistan, similar to the aid given to Turke y. Americans had long been agreed that their global strategy against Communism demanded a militarily stronger Pakistan. In December, Vice President Nixon, during his three-day stay in Karachi stated that he was convinced the people of Pakistan had a firm determination to thwart Communist ambitions and that the US would be proud to support Pakistan in industrial and defence development. On his return, he urged that the ring around the Soviet empire be closed by creating a military crescent comprising Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Indo-China, Formosa and Japan. He recommended military aid to Pakistan and thought the United States decision on the subject must be guided by what was best for America and should not be deflected by any fear of Indian reaction.
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After President Nixon’s effective presentation at the National Security Sec urity Council, it was finally decided to offer military assistance to Pakistan. Rising security concerns due to India exploitation of its military and economic dominance and recurrent threats were the determining factor that impelled Pakistan to search for foreign defence cooperation. Britain was, however, unsympathetic because of the priority it attached to relations with the larger India. Hence, four alliances were concluded between Pakistan and the United States: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Mutual Defence Assistant Agreement of 1954. South Wast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] in 1954-55. 1954 -55. Baghdad Pact in 1955 and Central Treaty Organization in 1959. Pakistan-US Agreement on Cooperation in 1959.
1.
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement - 1954
Under this agreement signed on 19th May, 1954, United States undertook to provide defence equipment ‘exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self defence, or to permit it to participate in defence of the ara’. [The assistance was to be made available under US legislation – the – the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and Mutual Security Act of 1951 relating to the defence of the free world]. On its part, Pakistan undertook to cooperate with the United States in measures to restrict trade with nations ‘which threaten the maintenance of world peace’. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra lauded Pakistan-US agreement saying the two countries ‘have a great deal in common’ and share convictions regarding freedom and democracy and spiritual strength to fight the totalitarian concept. 2.
South East Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] - 1954
Establishment:
The idea of SEATO was conceived by the United States in 1954 after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in order to create ‘deterrence’ to ‘communism’ in general and Vietnam in particular. US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles was in favour of inclusion of Thailand and the Philippines only but Anthony Eden wanted to include India, Pakistan and Ceylon [Sri Lanka] to give it a colour of local military backing and invited these countries on 18th May to join talks on the defence d efence of the region
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Pakistan was invited to attend the Manila Conference in September 1954 to discuss the plan for the defence of South East Asia – Asia – an an area of which Pakistan was a part on account of East Pakistan. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra was, however, careful to inform Eden that participation in the conference did not ‘imply acceptance of any scheme that might emerge from the discussions in the meeting’. Pakistan’s reservations were due to its disappointment with the small amount of assistance, the United States allocated for Pakistan. The US Secretary of State Dulles asked US Ambassador in Karachi to clarify to the Pakistan government that the US capabilities were limited and that while it would provide equipment to enable Pakistan to play an effective role in the Middle East, Pakistan itself would have to bear the cost of maintaining its forces. Dulles was of the view that it was in Pakistan’s interest to join SEATO and that it should not do so to oblige the United States. He also considered it imperative to clarify to Pakistan that the treaty aimed at defence against ‘communist aggression’ and excluded involvement in Pakistan-India disputes. Pakistan was not satisfied with the first draft of the treaty which:
covered only East Pakistan, provided for ‘consultation’ only and not ‘joint action’ as in NATO in the event of aggression against one of its members, did not have a provision of defence and economic assistance and Pakistan did not want the treaty treat y to refer to ‘communism’ or even to permit its Possible extension to Formosa with a view not to offend China.
During discussions in Manila, the conference agreed to a redraft so as to cover the entire territories of the Asian parties. In Article IV, each each party recognized that ‘aggression’ against any of the parties would endanger its own security. However, the United States remained adamant in appending to the treaty the reservation that its obligations would apply only in the event of ‘communist aggression’. aggression’. Hence, the treaty did not cover Pakistan against Indian aggression so far as the United States was concerned. In the circumstances, the brief required the Pakistani delegation to first consult the government before accepting the document. However, upon urging by Dulles, Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan decided to sign the treaty nevertheless. The Pakistan cabinet was surprised and displeased and some of its members were critical of the Foreign Minister who offered to resign. On reflection, the cabinet quietly acquiesced in his judgment. Pakistan ratified the treaty in January 1955 after receiving an assurance from Dulles that in the event of non-communist non-communist aggression against Pakistan, the US ‘would be by no means disinterested or inactive’.
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United States believed South East Asia to be a crucial frontier in the fight against Communist expansion and viewed SEATO as ‘essential’ to its global Cold War policy of containment. SEATO or the Manila Pact was, therefore, created as an International Organization for collective defence on 8th September, 1954. with headquarters at Bangkok, Thailand. Membership:
The Members of SEATO were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States. The membership reflected a mid-1950s combination of ‘out of area’ powers and ‘in area’ pro-Western pro-Western nations. Although called SEATO, only two South East Asian nations viz. The Philippines and Thailand became its members. Burma and Indonesia preferred to maintain their ‘neutrality’. ‘neutrality’. Observers:
The terms of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, signed after the fall of French Indochina prevented Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from joining any international military alliance, though these countries were ultimately included in the area protected under SEATO and were granted ‘Observer Status’. Principles:
SEATO claimed the adherence of the Member States to the:
principles of peaceful settlement of disputes, declared their intention for collective defence against aga inst external aggression and provided strengthening of free institutions by economic and technical cooperation.
Structure:
Mutual consultations were stipulated in the event of the forms of aggression. A protocol was added to the treaty making Cambodia. Eligible for economic measures under the treaty.
The structure of SEATO was as under: i.
Council of Foreign Ministers:
A Council of Foreign Ministers was set up to decide the policies which usually had a meeting once in a year.
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ii.
Secretariat
A Secretariat of SEATO headed by Secretary General was set up to take day-today decisions. iii.
Military Advisers:
The Military Advisers were named by the respective Governments and were responsible to the Council. iv.
Military Planning Office:
Military Planning Office and a Permanent Working Group, comprising comprising senior staff Members from the armed forces of the Member states was set up who were tasked to prepare plans of military in the light of changing conditions. Aims and Objectives:
SEATO was created as a part of Truman Doctrine of creating the anti-communist bilateral and collective defence treaties. These treaties and agreements were intended to create ‘alliances’ that would contain Communist power. This policy was considered to have been largely developed by American diplomat and Soviet expert George F. Kennan. John Foster Dulless, US Secretary of State in President Eisenhower’s administration [1953-1959] was the primary force behind the creation of SEATO which expanded the concept of anti-Communist collective defence to South S outh East Asia. SEATO was designed to be a South East Asian version of NATO in which the military force of each Member would be coordinated to provide for the collective defence of the Members. A protocol later extended the treaty’s protection to South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. SEATO did use portions of the military forces of its Members in annual joint training maneuvers. SEATO funded mainly to provide collective defence in case of an attack by external aggression against any one of the eight signatories of treaty. The purpose of SEATO was also economic cooperation. SEATO Charter was vitally important to the American rationale for the Vie tnam War.
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Functions:
i.
Joint Military Exercises:
It maintained no military forces of its own but the organization hosted joint military exercises for Member states each year as the Communist threat appeared to change from one of outright attack to one of internal subversion. ii.
Economic Development:
SEATO worked to strengthen the economic foundations and living standards of the South East Asian nations. It sponsored a variety of meetings and exhibitions on cultural, religious and historical topics. iii.
Exchange of Scholars:
Non-Asian Member states sponsored fellowships for South East Asian scholars. Exchange of scholars and other technical assistance and cooperation between the Member nations continued and perhaps was the only tangible result of SEATO. iv.
The Pacific Charter:
Appended to the Treaty was a document called ‘The Pacific Charter’ which stressed the need to develop the area and raise the standard of living. It affirmed the rights of Asian and Pacific peoples to equality and self-determination and setting forth goals of economic, social and cultural cooperation between the Member countries. Like other organizations, this was again a typical measure of the American strategy to create influence in the different regions of the world. Failure:
Despite being intended to provide a collective, anti-communist shield to South East Asia, SEATO was unable to intervene in the conflicts in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam because an intervention required a decision of unanimity which was never reached as France and the Philippines objected. Intervention in the Vietnam conflict was sought once again later, but France and Pakistan withheld support. Given the declining interest of France after 1954 and that of United Kingdom in South East Asia, after the end of Indonesian and Malaysian conflict in 1966. SEATO failed as a collective defence and security organization.
Unlike NATO alliance, SEATO had no joint command with standing force. Unlike NATO, an attack on any Member was not automatically considered an attack on all the Members.
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Unlike NATO, SEATO had no independent mechanism for obtaining intelligence or deploying military forces, so the potential for collective defence was necessarily limited and flawed. It failed to address the problems attached to the guerilla movements and local Insurrections that plagued the region in the post-colonial p ost-colonial years as it called for Consultations only, leaving each individual nation to react individually to internal threats. Each Member could effectively block any collective SEATO action. Because of 1954 accords, settling the First Indochina War, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were not SEATO Members. The United States sought but failed to make the Vietnam War into a SEATO collective defence problem.
Consequently, the question of dissolving the organization arose as early as 1973. On dismemberment of Pakistan and separation of its Eastern wing by naked Indian aggression in 1971, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO on 7th November, 1973 followed by France in June 1974. When the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the most prominent reason for SEATO’s existence disappeared. As a result, SEATO was formally disbanded on 30th June, 1977. 3.
Baghdad Pact -1955/Cemntral Treaty Organization [CENTO] - 1959
Establishment:
Turkey and Iraq laid the foundation of the Baghdad Pact, signing a Pact of Mutual Cooperation for ‘security and defence’ in February 1955 in the Iraqi capital. On receiving an invitation from Turkey and Iraq to join the pact, Pakistan was not enthusiastic Turkey was unpopular in the Arab world for having recognized Israel and Egypt, being considered as the key to a defence arrangement in the Middle East had denounced the pact. Ayub Khan, the then Defence Minister as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was skeptical about the world of the pact pa ct unless the United States also joins. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra did not make a commitment when the Ambassadors of Turkey and Iraq met him. Pressure mounted from United States and Britain which wanted a regional arrangement. Ayub Khan whose opinion was decisive in security matters was invited to Turkey in June where Turkish and Iraqi Premiers Nuri Said and Adnan Menderes succeeded in convincing Ayub Khan, the advantage of joining the pact. Within days the Pakistan cabinet approved accession to Baghdad Pact and on 23rd September, 1955, Pakistan signed the Pact of Mutual Cooperation in Baghdad.
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Membership:
Besides Pakistan, the other members were Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Britain. The United States did not become a full member but decided to become an ‘Observer’ and associate itself with its defence and political committees in 1958. On 14th July, 1958, the unpopular Iraqi regime was overthrown in a bloody coup by Abdul Karim Qasim and the country pulled out of the pact, named after its capital. Consequently, it was renamed as the Central Treaty Organization in August 1959 and its headquarters was shifted form Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey. The name CENTO referred to a central area between the regions that that included in NATO and SEATO. United States withdrew from CENTO on 24th March, 1959 after the revolution in Iraq. Principles:
The treaty was concluded for a period of 5 years. It was renewable for another 5 years. Any Member state could withdraw either at the end en d of a period or at six months’ notice.
Goals: i.
Mutual Aid and Peace
Modeled after NATO, CENTO committed the nations to mutual cooperation and protection as well as non-interference non-interference in each other’s affairs. Its purpose was to contain the Soviet Union by having a line of strong states alaong the USSR’s south-western south-western frontier. ii.
Defence arrangement:
Like SEATO, the development of Baghdad Pact or CENTO had arisen essentially from the need of the United States to have system of defence arrangements with various regions of the world to confront ‘communism’. DRAWBACKS i.
No Military Base
Unlike NATO, CENTO did not have a unified military command structure, nor were many American and British military bases established in Member countries although the United States had communications and electronic intelligence facilities in Iran and operated U-2 intelligence flights over the USSR from a base in Peshawar, Pakistan.
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Likewise, United Kingdom had access to facilities in Pakistan and Iraq at various times while the treaty was in effect. Besides, Turkey had agreed to permit American access to Turkish bases but this was done under the auspices of NATO. ii.
Non Cooperation among its Members:
Middle East and South Asia became extremely volatile areas in 1960s with the on-going Arab-Israeli conflict and Indo-Pakistan hostilities. CENTO was unwilling to get involved in either of the two conflict areas. Likewise, CENTO did little to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence to non-Member states in the area. Whatever containment value, the pact might have had was lost when the Soviets ‘leap-flogged ‘leap-flogged’’ the Member states, establishing close military and political relationships with the Governments in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, Somalia and Libya. Indeed, by 1970, USSR had developed over 20 thousand troops to Egypt and had established naval bases in Syria, Somalia and PDR Yemen. Badaber Base:
The most concrete and strategic benefit of CENTO, drawn by the United States was the establishment of a secret intelligence base at Badaber near Peshawar, consented by Prime Minister Suharwardy to President Eisenhower, during his visit to the United States in July 1957. It allowed permission for US aircraft to use the base which United States described as a ‘Communication Centre’ and used for high level UU-2 ‘spy in the sky’ surveillance aircraft for illegal flights over the Soviet Union for photographic intelligence. It enabled Washington to complete a ring of similar bases around the Soviet Union. The United States was granted ‘extra‘extra-territorial rights’ rights’ on this this base. It It operated the base with 1,200 military and technical personnel, all from the United States and no Pakistani official was ever admitted to the base. Pakistan, later learnt that the facility was also used for the same p urpose against China The operations from this base prompted Soviet Union to circle it with ‘Red’ and threatened to bomb the base if its activities are not put to an end. The base, however, served for a decade as an anchor of US military and economic aid to Pakistan.
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Reaction:
The treaty was seen by the world at large as an attempt by Britain to retain influence in the Middle East as a substitute for the loss of their empire in India. It was generally viewed as one of the least successful Cold War alliances. Dissolution:
The treaty was as good as finished after 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus, leading Britain to withdraw forces that had been earmarked to the alliance.
With the fall of the Iranian monarchy and revolution in 1979, whatever remaining rationale for the organization was lost.
The United States and Britain then conducted defence agreements with regional countries like Pakistan, Egypt and the Gulf States bilaterally.
Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the new Iranian regime announced its withdrawal from CENTO. Shortly afterwards, Pakistan withdrew from the organization in 1979. This rendered CENTO ineffective and an d the same year, it was formally dissolved. 4.
Pakistan-US Agreement on Cooperation - 1959
More important than SEAT and CENTO, the 1959 agreement was negotiated to specifically assure Pakistan of US support in the event of o f aggression. In the years to come, Pakistan spoke of the alliances with the West as ‘the sheet anchor of Pakistan’s foreign policy’. United States was also appreciative of Pakistan as ‘wholehearted ally’ which undertook ‘real responsibilities and risks’ by providing facilities ‘highly important to US national security’. Pakistan invoked this agreement in 1971 when naked aggression was launched by India but United States did not honour its obligations to come to Pakistan’s assistance. assistance. The alliance with United States was not an unnatural one. In ideological terms, Pakistan felt closer to the ‘Capitalism’ of the West/USA than to Communism of Soviet Union. The Russians had been on an expansionist course southwards since the previous two centuries and had annexed the vast Muslim territories in Central Asia with which Pakistan had age-old links.
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Russians’ involvement in an abortive coup d’etat bid bid in 1951 known as ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case’ had infused a new element of suspicion and concern. Pakistan’s close f riends riends in Islamic World i.e. Iran and Turkey were keen k een to join these military pacts as both of them felt directly threatened by the Soviet Union and their stance clearly influenced Pakistan which was eager to join them that could give it a sense of ‘security’ against India and this policy was also in line with its Pan-Islamic approach. Thus, the reality was that the decisive factor for Pakistan in joining these military pacts was its fear of hostile India and Soviet Union and the need to find an ‘equalizer’ to bolster its security. United States with which Pakistan had military pacts and close alliance all along the history has never been a trust-worthy friend as it left Pakistan alone in its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Rather, it suspended all military and economic aid to Pakistan by an announcement of the complete stoppage of military assistance to Pakistan on 12th April, 1967. In 1971 which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan, United States failed to come to Islamabad’s rescue despite its it s military pacts with it while the then super-power, Soviet Union signed a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’ with India - Pakistan’s arch rival in the same year to signal its support to New Delhi. In 1989, United States left Pakistan in the wilderness, following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan to face along the menace of Kalashinkov, drugs and the Mujahideen which in the eyes of Washington turned into ‘terrorists’ after the events of 9/11. In a broader sense, both the Democratic and Republican administrations of United States appear to agree on pre-eminent position of India in the subcontinent as was reflected by the statement of the then US Under-Secretary of State, Warren Christopher in New Delhi in July 1977 that the US had decided to look towards India as the leader of South Asia. Then signing a civilian nuclear energy deal with India in 2006 and refusing to sign a similar agreement with Pakistan was a clear signal that it accords much more priority to India than Pakistan which had played a leading role in its ‘War on Terror’. The fateful decision of United States and the West to send military and other aid to India in complete disregard of the security concerns of Pakistan brought an end to the special relationship between Pakistan and United States and the termination of military pacts.
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Pakistan’s Reaction: Reaction :
Pakistan embarked upon a major effort to improve its relations with its two joint neighbours viz. Soviet Union and China.
Pak-Soviet ties began to mend with the signing of an agreement in 1961 for cooperation in the exploration of gas and oil reserves in Pakistan and trade and air services agreements in 1963.
With People Republic of China, Islamabad was able to cultivate excellent relations which had remained ‘warm’ even when Pakistan signed military pacts with United States as Islamabad made it known to Beijing that its joining the pacts is not aimed at China. In 1960s, Pakistan’s foreign policy entered the phase of ‘bilateralism’ as it successfully cultivated good relations with leading powers in the world viz. USA, USSR and China even though they were antagonistic to each other. This balancing act on the part of Pakistan was a high point in its ‘diplomacy’. Pakistan-China friendship has become all-weathered over the years and is described as the deepest than the Ocean and highest than the mountains. Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Deep Sea Port are of utmost importance to China which provide it a safe route to Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.
In any future crisis in which Pakistan is involved, it is the geo-political interest of China, apart from a firm friendship with Pakistan that may induce China not to remain a silent spectator. Therefore, Pakistanis look at China as a neighbour, favourably inclined to assist them than a distant country of United States.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] Alliances – Alliances – Costs Costs and Benefits [Chapter 6]
The imperative of ‘national security’ is primordial. Lacking adequate adequate means means to ensure defence against the ever-looming Indian threat, it was perfectly ‘rational’ rational’ for Pakistan to look for ‘alliances’ to compensate for the glaring ‘power disparity’. However, on joining Pakistan’s Pakistan’s military alliances of Mutual Defence Assistant Agreement of 1954, Baghdad Pact/CENTO & SEATO of 1955 and Pak-US Cooperation Agreement of 1959, there was a harsh criticism on the part of:
the influential Arab countries, particularly of the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan was suddenly isolated in the African and Asian nations who were suspicious of the West and looked upon the Soviet Union as supporter of the struggle for emancipation from colonial domination and exploitation. The ‘cost’ was more serious in respect of furious Soviet reaction. Assured of the ‘Soviet veto’ in the UN Security Council, India exploited Pakistan’s decision to join the ‘alliances’ and renounced its obligation for a plebiscite in Kashmir.
Arab World:
Concerned about the implications of the ‘alliances’ for the Arab unity and aspiring the leadership of the Arab world, Arab Republic of Egypt denounced the ‘alliances’. Radio Cairo said a Turko-Pakistan Turko -Pakistan alliance would be a catastrophe for Islam … the first stab in our back. The next one will probably occur when Iraq joins the plot.1 President Nasser of Egypt described Iraq’s decision to join the ‘Baghdad Pact’ as a treacherous blow to Arab solidarity and branded non-Arab Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as agents of imperialism. Particularly offensive to Pakistan was Nasser’s partiality to the Indian stand on Kashmir, failing to take the cognizance of the right of self-determination of the Muslim people of the state.
Coming from Arab Republic of Egypt - a country that is the cradle of Islam, this made Pakistanis embarrassed.
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia invited Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru for a visit who was welcomed on arrival by the slogan: ‘Welcome messenger of peace’. peace’. This was a great disappointment to the sentiments of Pakistanis from the Guardian of the Holy shrines of Haram Haram Sharif and Madina-e-Munawarra.
Soviet Union and India:
Discarding its neutral stance in Pak-India disputes, Soviet Union threw its powerful weight behind India as a response to Pakistan’s alliance policy. Promising ‘all help’ to make India industrially strong, the USSR announced aid for a big steel plant. On a visit to India in December 1955, Nicolai Bulganin and Nikta Khrushchev declared they were ‘grieved that imperialist forces succeeded in dividing India into two parts’. The Soviets referred to ‘Kashmir’ as ‘one of the states of India’. The Soviet leaders visited Afghanistan and demonstrated their hostility towards Pakistan by announcing support for ‘ Pakhtoonistan Pakhtoonistan’. United States:
The ‘great disappointment’ was particularly due to the Amer ican ican failure to throw its weight behind Pakistan for a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Opinion in the United States too began to swing within a few years, illustrated by the radical change in evaluation of neutralism. By 1957, neutralism acquired a mantle man tle of respectability, indeed a position of privilege. The US President, Eisenhower endorsed India’s neutrality and in internal discussions, became critical of his own administration’s ‘tendency to rush out and seek allies’. He called the ‘alliance’ with Pakistan, ‘a terrible error’. Senator John F. Kennedy defended Indian ‘neutrality’ calling that during its formative period in the 19th century, America too, followed non-alignment. Opinion in Pakistan was deeply agitated by the change in US policy. While Pakistan was ‘taken for granted’ by its allies and penalized by the Soviet Union, neutral India was courted by both the US and the USSR, The West was becoming lukewarm in its support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and Pakistan government was placed placed on the ‘defensive’. While Pakistan suffered loss of esteem due to its ‘alliance’ with the West, neutralism enhanced India’s prestige, with the Soviet Union and United States competing for India’s goodwill and giving it aid and assistance.
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Under pressure of criticism in the National Assembly, Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon exploded in frustration on 8th March, 1958 by saying: “Our people, if they find their freedom threatened by Bharat will break all the pacts and shake hands’ with people with whom we have made enemies because of others’. Reaction at Home:
Opposition to the policy of ‘alliances’ increased over the years because it cut across other aims and aspirations of the people. Foremost among them was the deep-rooted desire of the people for solidarity with other Muslim peoples because they felt they were part of Umm. Pakistan was, therefore, torn by a fundamental contraction i. e. its national commitment to solidarity with the causes of Muslim nations while loyalty to ‘allies’ called for concession to their concerns. Hence, no other issue in Pakistan’s short history had posed such a sharper dilemma than this ‘contradiction’, particularly on the ‘Suez crisis’.
Prime Minister, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, however, decided on an objective and balanced balanced approach, upholding Egypt’s sovereign right to nationalize the canal, opposing the Anglo-French threat of use of force to restore the dispute and also recognizing the interests of Pakistan and many other nations ‘vitally concerned with the maintenance of the freedom of navigation’.
Mr. Huseyn Shaheed Suharwardy replace Chaudhry Mohammd Ali as the Prime Minister on his resignation and retrieved Pakistan’s self -respect. -respect. However, the Suez episode confirmed the view of those who regarded ‘alliances’ as a liability liability as Pakistan was seen to have obliged ally Britain and supported its imperialist aim at the cost of a Muslim country with a just cause and thus allowed itself to be stood in a corner of isolation.
Although the ‘costs’ of the ‘alliances’ were high but Pakistan could not afford to abandon the policy in view of its precarious security situation which was the demand of its ‘ national interest’ BENEFITS Guarantees against the ever- present present ‘security threat’ constrained reappraisal and Pakistan went on to strengthen the ‘alliances’ with the United States by signing another agreement in April 1959. In the new agreement, the United States went further than before in declaring, in Article 1, that it ‘regards as vital to its national interests and to t o world peace the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan’. It further stated that ‘in case of aggression against Pakistan …the United S tates of America … will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces as may
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be ally agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist Pakistan at its request’. In Article II, the United States pledged ‘to assist the Government of Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence independenc e and integrity and in the effective promotion of economic development’. Benefits were initially meager as the military aid announced by the United States for 1954 was only US $ 29.5 million on which President Ayub’s Ayub’s remark was that ‘it would be better for Pakistan not to be involved in defence arrangements with the United States’. Pakistan’s concerns were not dismissed in Washington and economic and military aid was increased subsequently:
In 1954, the US economic assistance amount to US $ 106 million. In 1955, the US military aid was boosted boo sted to US $ 50 million. [United States Committed to equip four infantry divisions, one armoured division and another armoured brigade to provide modern aircraft for six squadrons for Pakistan Air Force and supply twelve vessels for Pakistan Navy over o ver the coming years]. In 1959, the annual allocations of US economic and military aid were doubled. Over the 1954-1962 period, US economic assistance amount to US $ 3.5 billion. United States also provided US $ 1,372 1 ,372 million for defence support and purchase p urchase of equipment.
From a poorly equipped force in 1954, Pakistan’s armed forces became a powerful defence machine, with heavy armour and artillery, the latest aircraft and ships, confident of its self-defence capability. Speaking in the National Assembly in February 1957, Suharwardy expressed satisfaction over the ‘dividends’ of the country’s foreign policy. He said in the ‘United States’ Pakistan had a ‘friend and an ally’. Having first first sought the ‘alliance’, Pakistan soon felt, it was doing the United States a favour, exaggerating its costs and under-valuing the benefits. Still mismatch was accepted. Later, Pakistan was not alone in having second thoughts about the policy of ‘alliances’. Because of Sino-Indian Sino-Indian border clashes in 1962, India was proclaimed a ‘key country’ in the West’s struggle against communism. The Eisenhower administration which had started cutting aid to India, now swung to the other extreme, increasing the amount from US $ 93 million in 1956 to US $ 365 million in 1957 and a record US $ 822 million in 1980 and in the John F. Kenney’s administration, it increased to US $ 1 billion.
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Reacting to the new trends, Pakistan also sought to normalize relations with the USSR. In December 1960, Pakistan signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for exploration of petroleum resources that marked the beginning of an improvement in bilateral relations. During a visit to United States in July 1961, President John F. Kennedy, in his welcome speech expressed concern over the ‘misunderstandings’ that had arisen. He was evidently aware of Pakistan’s perception of declaring US support. During talks, President Ayub Khan gave gave an account of o f India’s stonewalling on Kashmir. Kennedy recognized the urgency of settling the Kashmir dispute and said that it was a ‘vital interest of the United States’. He affirmed the desire of the United States to see a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir issue and expressed the hope that progress towards settlement would be possible at an early date. In the meantime, Pakistan decided to move the UN Security Council to take up consideration of the Kashmir dispute. Contrary to Kennedy’s commitment to Ayub Khan, the US administration was hesitant to to extend support. The Security Council took up the discussion on Kashmir on 28th April, 1962 while India repudiated its commitment to a plebiscite. In June, Republic of Ireland sponsored a resolution that reminded India and Pakistan of past resolutions of the Security Council, calling for a plebiscite plebiscite in Kahsmir. Seven out of the Council’s nine members supported the resolution but it was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Notes 1.
Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi, 22 February, 1954.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] Relations with China and other Developments [Chapter 7] Features of Pak-China Relations
Pakistan extended ‘recognition’ to China soon after the ‘Communist ‘Communist Revolution’ in 1950. The unique feature of Pak-China Pa k-China relations is that the bilateral ties between the two countries remained on an even keel despite:
Pakistan’s criticism of ‘Communism’ Islamabad’s increasing cooperation with the United States and tension in Sino-US relations.
On Pakistan’s Pakistan’s joining SEATO, China criticized the ‘alliance’ and not Pakistan.
More impressive for Pakistan was was China’s scrupulous avoidance of any ‘partisan’ pronouncement on Pak -India -India disputes.
China did not strengthen its relations with India at the cost of Pakistan.
Pakistan was less careful in its anti-communist rhetoric when Prime Minister Mohammad Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra spoke of ‘international communism’ as the ‘biggest p ‘biggest potential otential danger to democracy in the region’. region’.
Premier Chou En Lai told Pakistani Ambassador that Ambassador that he was ‘hurt’ by Pakistan’ statement as he considered Pakistan, a friend but still said ‘he fully understood Pakistan’s circumstances’.1 He expressed the hope that Pakistan would follow ‘principles of peaceful coexistence’.2
Pakistan did notice Chinese forbearance and henceforth, followed a more ‘balanced policy’. At the Afro-Asian summit conference in Bandung in April 1955 , Prime Minister Bogra requested for a meeting with Premier Chou En Lai who insisted on coming over himself. The meeting was remarkably friendly and Chou En Lai readily
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accepted Premier Bogra’s explanation that ‘Pakistan’s membership of SEATO was not directed against China’. China’. At the summit conference, Premier Bogra state that ‘China is, by no means an ‘imperialist nation’ and has not brought any other country under her heel’. He especially praised Chou En Lai who ‘ has shown a great deal of conciliati of conciliation’. on’. Bandung conference provided an opportunity to both, Prime Minister Bogra and Premier Chou En Lai to discuss bilateral relations. Chou En Lai, publicly acknowledged Premier Bogra’s statement in conversation with him that:
Pakistan was not against China, it had no fear of Chinese aggression and that if the United States should take aggressive action under SEATO, Pakistan would not be involved Prime Minister Chou En Lai’s Lai’s visit to Pakistan in December 1956 led to further development of bilateral understanding. The joint communiqué recorded the shared view of the Prime Ministers that ‘divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the strengthening of friendship between the two countries……They countries……They are happy to place on record that there is no real conflict of interests between the two countries’. Notes
1.
Hindu , Madras [India], 27th November, 1954.
2.
People’s China, 16th October, 1954.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2009] The Pakistan-India War, 1965 [Chapter 8]
Indo-Pak War of 1965, Role of China, USA & Soviet Union and Tashkent Accord
The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 was, in fact:
the culmination of a process of rise and fall of Expectations of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute, popular agitation and state repression in the India-held state, jingoism triggered by border clashes in the Rann of Kutch, a limited operation born out of frustration and desperation, conceived by the Government of Pakistan to draw international attention and unintended escalation.
In the perspective of history, leaders on both sides, leaders on both sides seemed to have lost control over actions decided under pressure, provoking reactions and allowing the build-up of momentum that pushed them into an unwanted war neither side had planned. The fundamental cause of tensions lay in the failure to settle the festering Kashmir dispute. The ceasefire in the state was defined in the 1949 Security Council resolution as the first step towards the holding of a plebiscite under UN auspices to determine the question of the accession of the state. Accepted by Pakistan as well as India, the resolution constituted an international agreement requiring implementation by the parties. But India concocted concocted one pretext after another to evade its obligation.
Even before Pakistan signed a defence defenc e assistance agreement with the United States, Prime Minister Nehru began using the assistance Pakistan might receive as representing a change in the situation, though how that could affect the rights of the people of the state defied logic.
Then India invented the argument a rgument that if the Muslims of Kashmir opted to accede acced e to Pakistan that could trigger a Hindu backlash and massacre of Indian Muslims.
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Another pretext for refusal to implement the resolution was that continued hold over Kashmir was a necessity for maintaining the integrity of India, otherwise, its unity would be destroyed.
In the process, the pledge to the people of the state and to the United Nations was relegated as India sought to freeze the status quo and perpetuate its occupation of twothirds of the state. This was unjustified in law and unacceptable to Pakistan. Expectations rose in 1962, as a result of American and British intercession with India during the Sino-Indian border clashes in which Pakistan had honoured a suggestion from them, not to exploit the situation. It was assured to Islamabad that purposeful negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the festering Kashmir dispute would be held. However, India stalled earliest negotiations after the Sino-Indian war which had registered a panicky perception of Chinese invasion aimed at conquering and occupying India, proved incorrect. Soon, Americans and Britishers also lost their interest to help solve the Kashmir problem and their strategy changed from focusing on the settlement of Kashmir to drawing neutral India, away from its bias in favour of the USSR and towards their own orbit. After the Sino-Indian border war ended and New Delhi received a large quantity of weapons, it reverted back to its rigid position on Kashmir, refusing to consider a solution in conformity with the plebiscite principle. Pakistani disappointment over the failed talks was soon followed by ‘anger’ when in October 1963, India initiated legal maneuvers to erode the disputed status of Kashmir. The puppet Prime Minister of the Indian held Kashmir, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, who was installed by New Delhi and sustained in power through rigged elections, announced changes in the Constitution of the state, designed to bring Kashmir at part with the other states in India. The designation of Sadr-i-Riyasat [President of State] was replaced with the title of ‘Governor’ and the Head of the Government of the state from Prime Minister to the Chief Minister. Indian Prime Minister Nehru announced in November that a ‘gradual erosion’ of the special status of Kashmir was in progress. Pakistan protested, denouncing the proposed changes as ‘clearly illegal’ and a ‘flagrant violation of Indian’s commitments’. Deeply disrupted by New Delhi moves, evidencing once again the Indian design to annex the state against their will, the Kashmiri people launched an agitation which assumed massive proportions, following the theft of Moo-e-Muqaddis [holy hair of the Prophet (PBUH)] from the shrine of Hazartbal. Attributing the crime to Indian authorities, the Kashmiri people poured out in a spontaneous eruption. Demonstrations of unprecedented proportions were held in cities and towns across the occupied valley. Even after the Indian authorities announced the recovery of the relic, the agitation did not stop. Instead, it took a political direction with the Kashmiri people demanding the exercise of their right of self-determination. In the months, following December 1963, Kashmir was in the grip
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of a crisis, with the administration in collapse and India resorting once again to repression against the unarmed Kashmiri people. Pakistan appealed to the UN Security Council which held lengthy debates in February and May, 1964 but was prevented by the threat of a ‘Soviet veto’, not only taking any effective action but even from reaffirming its previous resolutions on the Kashmir question. This failure on the part of the apex organ of the United Nations was yet another blow to prospects of peace between Pakistan and India. In December 1964, the Indian Government resumed moves aimed at the merger of Kashmir with India through the application of the Indian Constitution, enabling it to impose presidential rule and extend Indian laws to Kashmir. The boundary in the Rann of Kutch , a low-lying marsh wedged between the province of Sindh and the Indian state of Gujrat that floods during the monsoon season, was the subject of dispute, dating before 1947 between the princely state of Kutch and the British Government. Although the boundary was not demarcated, an area of about 3,500 square miles, north of the 24th parallel was contested. After independence, India claimed the entire territory and in 1956, sent its forces to seize the Chhad Bet high ground. Pakistan protested but India did not begin negotiations until 1960. In violation of an agreement reached with the Pakistan Government, Indian forces advanced to the north in January 1965 and tried to establish new posts and obstruct Pakistani patrols in the disputed area. Pakistan sent in forces to stop India from solving the dispute unilaterally by force. As both sides strengthened their forces in the Rann of Kutch, fighting flared up in the month of April. The Pakistani forces surrounded the Indian contingent and could have captured it but President Ayub Khan ordered o rdered restraint. The danger of further escalation was averted partly due to the approaching monsoon. British Government persuaded the two sides to agree to a ceasefire on 1 st May. Indirect but intense negotiations were held through British High Commissioners in Islamabad and in New Delhi. Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed ensured that the agreement signed on 30th June, 1965 provided for a time-bound, self-executing mechanism for settlement of the dispute peacefully. The agreement gave two months to the two sides to try to resolve the issue through bilateral negotiations. If that failed, they would submit the dispute to arbitration by a tribunal to be constituted within four months with the UN Secretary General, designating its Chairman. Both sides further agreed that the tribunal’s award ‘shall not no t be questioned on any grounds whatsoever, that it would be implemented as soon as possible and until then the tribunal would remain in being. Relying on evidence as to where the traditional boundary was, the tribunal awarded 350 square miles to Pakistan, a mere 10 % of the territory under dispute while 90 % of the disputed territory was awarded to India. Interestingly, Pakistan was satisfied that the dispute was honourably resolved but India
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was still indignant, always wanting to settle disputes on its own terms and vowed never again to accept third-party mediation or impartial adjudication. Except for Jayaprakash Narayan commended the Kutch agreement ‘as an object lesion in peace-keeping which should be applied to all disputes including that of Kashmir, most Indian politicians and commentators considered the arbitration agreement ‘humiliating’ and denounced it in Lok Sabha. In fact, the Kutch clash, by making India want to settle a score and Pakistan overconfident, proved to be one further stumble towards war towards war which came within five months, as the Kashmir cauldron came once again to the boil. In a statement on 29th April, Prime Minister Shastri threatened that India would fight Pakistan at a time and place of its own choosing. United States diplomacy allowed itself to be placed on the defensive during the Kutch crisis. Washington announced an embargo on the further supply of arms or spare parts. Apparently even-handed, the decision was weighted against Pakistan because almost all of its equipment was of US origin while the restriction had little impact on India which had its weaponry, Soviet-based. President Johnson ordered discontinuation of any additional US aid or loans which worked to Pakistan’s detriment. This contributed to the build up of a mood of desperation in Pakistan. President Ayub described Americans ‘power drunk’. On another occasion, Ayub Khan said Pakistan was seeking ‘new friends, not new masters’ Tension built up when India took additional steps to integrate occupied Kashmir. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, the former Prime Minister of Indian-held Kashmir and his colleague Mirza Afzal Beg, leader of the Plebiscite Front were arrested in May 1965, on their return from abroad, having had meetings with leaders of Muslim countries during Haj and with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in Cairo. The Indian moves triggered another popular uprising in Kahsmir with Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq, leader of the Awami Action Committee, joining the Gandhi-style non-violent disobedience movement. India unleashed its forces to crush the struggle in the state. In Pakistan, recurrent popular uprisings in occupied Kashmir and their brutal repression by India and the ‘rise and fall’ of hopes for a settlement through peaceful means, fostered mounting frustration in Pakistan. In the later part of 1964, there was ‘thaw’ in the situation and Pakistan jolted the world community into recognizing the urgency of fulfilling the pledge given by India, Pakistan and the United Nations to let the Kashmiri people themselves determine their future. President Ayub Khan was disturbed by India’s refusal to agree to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. He was moved by the heroic struggle of the people of Algeria and Vietnam and his own confidence grew after the encounter in the Rann of Kutch, though
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he was still averse to war, agreed for preparation of a plan by GHQ. The plan named ‘Gibraltar’ was approved. Calling for incursions by Kashmiri volunteers into Indian-held Kashmir, it was based on three assumptions:
People in Kashmir would rise to support the guerillas, a large-scale Indian offensive against Azad Kahsmir was unlikely and the possibility of attack across the international border was ruled out. Escalation to War
Volunteers entered Indian-held Kashmir in August, poorly equipped and in desolate conditions of the cold and high mountains and were not joined by Kashmiris who were not prepared for an uprising. Nevertheless, the guerillas inflicted heavy damage on the Indian forces. To cope with the situation, the Indian authorities decided to mount a major offensive across the ceasefire line and occupied a large territory in the Kargil ara in the north and the Haji Pir Pass between Uri and Poonch, posing a threat to Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir. Now the Pakistan P akistan had no choice than to respond and it decided to launch an attack in the Chamb area from its territory. territory. As the Pakistan army advanced towards Akhnur, a nodal point on the transport and supply link between Jammu and the Kashmir valley, India decided to launch an offensive across the international border. Hence, actions and reactions led the two sides to the war which probably they did not plan and did not want. The Indian forces crossed the international border before dawn on 6th September and their offensive was to capture Lahore, the capital of the province of Punjab, 20 miles from the Indian border and the ‘capture’ was also announced by BBC. Although the Pakistan army was caught by surprise but the legendary acts of heroism and sacrifice halted the Indian thrust. The small but highly professional Pakistan Air Force went on the offensive and attacked a number of Indian bass on the evening of 6th September, inflicting heavy losses. The attack by Indian Air Force came two days later on 8th September but was checkmated and particularly the bold initiative of the out-numbered contingent of East Pakistan which not only rose in defence but took the battle into the enemy airspace, bombing targets in India in retaliation for the Indian bombing of Dhakka and Chittagong. In a matter of few days, Pakistan Air Force shot down 75 Indian aircraft for the lost of 19 of its own, clearing the Pakistani airspace, forcing the Indian Air Force to a passive role.
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The tiny Pakistan Navy made an audacious foray into Indian territorial waters to attack Dwarka, a naval base, 200 miles from Karachi and captured almost a hundred coastal ships as the Indian Navy did not join the battle. On 9th September, Pakistan Army launched a major offensive in the Khem Karan area towards Amritsar. The armoured division made good progress but then became bogged down as the Indian forces flooded the countryside by breaching an irrigation canal. The Indian armour then counter-attacked in the Sialkot area where the biggest tank battle of the war was fought in the Chavinda area, containing the Indian advance aimed at cutting off Wazirabad, a communications nodal point. Considering the disparity of size and resources between the two countries and their force levels, the Pakistani armed forces can be legitimately proud of their performance in the war. Pakistan made marginally larger territorial gains but the war ended in a stalemate as neither side achieved any major breakthrough. The role of China
The Peoples Republic of China, a real friend of Pakistan took the lead in relieving pressure on Pakistan by issuing a strong protest against Indian acts of aggression and provocation along China’s border and on 8th September, Beijing demanded an end to India’s frenzied provocation activities. activities. On 16th September, China delivered an ultimatum that unless India dismantled its military structures on the Chinese side of the border, stopped incursions into China and returned livestock and kidnapped civilians within three days, it would have to bear to bear ‘rull responsibility’ for all consequences. On 19th September, China extended the ‘ultimatum’ for three days. The threat of expansion of the war served to inject a sense of urgency into the deliberations of the UN Security Council which had adopted resolutions on 4th and 6th September which were unacceptable to Pakistan. It passed a resolution on 20th September which went beyond earlier resolutions and demanded a ceasefire, withdrawals and promised to take steps to assist towards a settlement of the political problems underlying u nderlying the present conflict. This resolution was accepted by both Pakistan and India on 22nd September. In 1965 crisis, China extended full support to Pakistan, both directly and implicitly. The Chinese foreign ministry used vivid language to manifest their friendship. In transit through Karachi on 4 th September, Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi expressed support for the just action taken by b y Pakistan to repel Indian armed provocations. On 7th September, a day after India launched its offensive towards Lahore, China condemned India’s ‘criminal aggression’ against Pakistan and charged India with trying to ‘bully its neighbours, defy public opinion and do whatever it likes’. It further declared on 12th September that its non-involvement non-involvement in the Kashmir dispute ‘absolutely’ does not
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mean that China can approve of depriving the Kashmiri people of their right of selfdetermination or that she can approve of o f Indian aggression against Pakistan. China responded generously to Pakistan’s request request for assistance, Apart from providing munitions and spare parts, China was prepared to fly in the material by fighter aircraft which it did by sea on Pakistan’s P akistan’s request. The role of ALLIES
Pakistan’s allies made belated and half -hearted -hearted attempt to invoke the alliances, realizing that not all the allies agreed that India was the ‘aggressor’. The SEATO Council did not meet for consultations and CENTO could not be activated. The UK backtracked after India raised a storm over Prime Minister Wilson’s criticism of Indian aggression. The role of United States
The US response to the outbreak of war between Pakistan and India was one of frustration. Finding its policy in South Asia in shambles, with Pakistan and India, using US-supplied arms to fight each other rather than against its enemies, the US adopted a neutral, hands-off stance, leaving it to the Security Council to promote an end to the war. On 8th September, the United States decided to stop the supply of arms to Pakistan and India. When Pakistan protested that the US decision to cut off defence supplies amounted to punitive action against an ally, the US Ambassador said he considered Pakistan to have provoked the war. The US view that it was not bound to come to Pakistan’s assistance provoked a predictable reaction of betrayal as the 1959 bilateral defence agreement had stated: “the US regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan”. The Ayub-Kennedy communiqué of 13th July, 1961, had reaffirmed ‘commitment to the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan’ and the US embassy aide memoir of 5th November, 1962 assured assistance to Pakistan ‘in the event of aggression from India’. But as the US Ambassador Ambassador had expressed the view of ‘Pakistan to have provoked the war’, Washington did not interpret the ‘Indian attack’ as ‘aggression’.
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Assistance from friends
President Soekarno of Indonesia extended memorable assistance, readily agreeing to provide some MIG aircraft and sent two submarines and four missile boats. BY the time, they reached Karachi, Pakistan had agreed to a ceasefire. Iran and Turkey provided planeloads of arms and ammunitions, though the two CENTO allies could not send equipment imported from the United States because of American restrictions on transfer to another country.
President Nasser of Egypt, though often favaouring non-aligned India, echoed sympathy for Pakistan and endorsed the Arab summit’s communiqué which called upon upon India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations. Tashkent Declaration
The Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin offered his good offices to work for a settlement between Pakistan and India. Pakistan accepted the offer on a variety of reasons including the hope that Soviet Union would work for progress in pressing for settlement of Kashmir dispute and its both allied viz. US and UK had left the field open for Soviet diplomacy to promote a post-war settlement. The Tashkent declaration provided:
for the withdrawal of forces to positions held on 5 th August, 1965, repatriation of prisoners of war, return of High Commissioners to their posts and for further meetings between the two sides on ‘matters of direct concern to both countries. [However, it did not make any direct reference to the crucial Kashmir question].
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2009] Policy Ups and Downs: 1965-71 [Chapter 9] Peoples Republic of China:
Pakistan’s acceptance of the UN Security Council’s demand for a ceasefir e surprised Chinese leaders but after President Ayub Khan explained Pakistan’s constraints, they, as usual, showed understanding of Pakistan’s decision even though their their own view was different. An engaging characteristic which has distinguished Chinese leaders, has been their respect for the right of Pakistan, as also other countries, to determine what is in their ‘national interest’. China’s support of Pakistan in the 1965 crisis had made a deep impression on the Pakistani people. President Liu Shao-Chi’s Shao-Chi’s visit to Pakistan in March 1966 was a memorable occasion. In Lahore, Karachi and Dhaka, the welcome of the Chinese leader was enthusiastic multitudes was on a scale rarely seen since independence. His description of Sino-Pakistan relations as mujahidana dosti [friendship in righteous struggle] aptly translated the sentiments of the Pakistani people and boosted their morale. This friendship, forged in the hat of the war, wa r, developed in succeeding years. To help Pakistan’s defence capability after the United States embargoed military sales, China agreed, in 1966, to provide equipment for two divisions of the army as well as MIG aircraft for Pakistan Air Force. China provided US $ 60 million for development assistance in 1965, a further US $ 40 million in 1969 and US $ 200 million for the next five-year plan. Besides, China placed emphasis on the transfer of technology to help Pakistan achieve self-reliance:
Heavy Mechanical Complex, Heavy Re-build Factory, Kamra Aeronautical Complex and Several other industrial plants.
To provide a land link, China played a major part in the construction of the spectacular Karakorum Highways [KKH], linking Gilgit in the northern areas with Kashgar in Xinjiang province, over the second highest mountain range in the world and through the 15,800-foot high Khunjarab Pass.
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USSR:
Pakistan’s policy of normalization of relations with the Soviet Union gathered momentum after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. As a result, Soviet Union provided credit for development projects in Pakistan. Pakistan sent a military delegation to Moscow in 1966 to probe the purchase of military supplies from the Soviet Union. Besides, high level visits by leaders of the two countries were held. Pakistan’s decision, not to renew the lease with the United States for the Badaber electronic base, upon its expiry in July 1968 was appreciated by Moscow. At the same time, Soviet Union announced to built a Steel Mill in Karachi. Later that year, Soviet Union agreed to sell a small quantity of military equipment to Pakistan. Soviet Union committed over a billion dollars in soft loans for 31 development projects. However, acquiescing in Indian pressure, Moscow discontinued the further supply of military equipment in 1970, illustrating to Pakistan, the limits of bilateralism. In East Pakistan crisis, Soviet priority reverted to one-sided support for India, leading to a breakdown of the developing links between the two countries. USA:
The relations between Pakistan and United States were already under strain. The United States was antagonized by antagonized by Pakistan’s allegation of betrayal in 1965, as United States was committed under the 1959 agreement agreement of cooperation to come to Pakistan’s assistance in the vent of aggression but it did not accept such an interpretation of the Indian attack across the border. It was, however, confirmed in December that the alliance between the two countries was over, military aid was discontinued and any further economic aid was made conditional on Pakistan, curtailing its close ties with China which was unacceptable to Pakistan. On 12 April, 1967, the United States announced termination of military assistance to Pakistan (and India), exempting only cash sales of spare parts for the previously supplied equipment on a case-by-case basis. However, neither United States nor Pakistan renounced the 1959 Cooperation Agreement. The alliance was torn apart because of the divergent pulls of ‘national interest’ of both the countries in a fast changing world scenario. President Ayub Khan realized the necessity of mending fences with the United States. In Washington, tempers were cooled down as some people in high places recognized Pakistan’s potential for contributing positively to better understanding between the United States and China. In April, 1966, US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk even asked Foreign Minister Bhutto for Pakistan’s help to arrange a meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister for discussion on Vietnam.
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The US-Pakistan relations improved after President Richard Nixon took office in 1969. An advocate of close relations with Pakistan since the 1950s and appreciative of its role as an ally, he did not view Pakistan-China relations in a frozen inimical perspective. Cognizant Cognizant of the sea change in China’s position following the Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet split and border tensions between them, he was among the first leaders in America to detect a ‘dimly perceived community of interest between the United States and China. Pakistan’s close relations with China, no longer needed to be viewed from the jaundiced eyes of the previous administration. On the contrary, Nixon administration considered Pakistan an asset for opening communications with China. The upbeat tone of Pakistan-US relations was manifest in the strong support the United States gave for ‘aid-to‘aid-to-Pakistan’ Pakistan’ at the World Bank’s consortium meeting in May 1969. In August, President Nixon paid a visit to Pakistan and in early 1970, Pakistan agreed to President Nixon’s Nixon’s request for the opening of a secret channel of communication between Washington and Beijing via Islamabad. In October 1970, the United States relaxed the ban on military supplies, allowing the sale of a limited number of B-57 and F-104 aircraft. Before, the White House activated the secret channel in October 1970 for negotiations with Beijing, the Nixon administration had already been engaged for a year in cautious diplomacy aimed at making ‘a new beginning’ in relations with China. Following China’s China’s split with the Soviet Union, President Nixon and his National Security Council Advisor, Henry Kissinger appraised China to be confronted with the ‘nightmare of hostile encirclement’ in which it might welcome ‘strategic reassurance’ from improved relations with the United States. In January 1970, the United States offered to send a representative to Beijing to consider ideas to reduced tension. The Chinese response was affirmative. To signal serious intent, President Nixon started to dismantle obstacles to better relations by relaxing restrictions on travel and trade. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, well known for his preference for ‘secret diplomacy’, used personal friends for confidential contacts with the Chinese embassy in Paris, in order to prepare the ground for a positive outcome of the proposed direct dialogue. In October 1970, President Nixon asked President Yahya Khan in a meeting in New York to inform the Chinese leaders, during his visit to China in November that President Nixon considered considered rapprochement with China ‘essential’. Upon his return, President Yahya Khan conveyed the Chinese response in an elaborately confidential manner. Henry Kissinger was fascinated by Ambassador Agha Hilaly’s insistence on dictating the message at slow speed which he had to take in long hand. For four months thereafter, messages were passed on this Kissinger-Hilaly-Yahya Khan channel to Beijing in utter secrecy. Pakistan P akistan was equally helpful in arranging Henry Kissinger’s secret trip for talks in Beijing on 9-11 July, 1971. The world was stunned when President Nixon announce the ‘breakthrough’
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simultaneously with a similar announcement form Beijing about an invitation to President Nixon to visit China. Moscow’s reaction to the development was both angry and quick. Taking advantage of the spiraling crisis between Pakistan and India, it concluded a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with India.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY Islamabad Campus Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] 1971 Disaster [Chapter 10]
Shared interest in the protection of cultural, economic and political rights brought he Muslim people of British India to a common platform, with leaders of Bengal playing an important role in the formation of the All India Muslim League and the formulation of the demand for Pakistan. After Pakistan into being, the unity of its two wings, separated by a thousand-mile hostile territory, came under strain as a result of several factors, some of which were inherent in demography and differential colonial legacy and resource endowment, while others arose from narrow and shortsighted politics.
Differences with the distant centre began to surface in East Pakistan soon after independence. A group of students protested when Quaid-i-Azam said, in a speech in Dhaka in 1948, that ‘Urdu’ would be the national language. Expectations of the people for visible self-rule were disappointed. Few of the senior administrative personnel inherited by Pakistan were from East Pakistan and some of those who were appointed to East Pakistan did not win the confidence of the people.* East Pakistan did not have sense of participation in the government in distant Karachi.
In 1950, East Pakistan Muslim League asked for ‘maximum autonomy’. autonomy’. But in 1954 elections, Muslim League eclipsed and the United Front which won 223 out of 237 seats, demanded for ‘complete autonomy’ according to Pakistan Resolution of 23rd March, 1940 ** which called for ‘independent states in the north-western north-western and eastern zones’ ignoring the fact that in 1946, the most representative body of elected Muslim League [which won 446 of 495 seats] had adopted a unanimous resolution declaring that Pakistan would be ‘a sovereign independent state’, thus clarifying the ambiguity of the 1940 Resolution. p olice officers who opted for Pakistan, only 18 were Bengalis. * Of 101 top civil and police ** The resolution adopted in Lahore demanded that contiguous Muslim-majority units in the north-western and eastern zones should be grouped to constitute ‘independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign’. The popular intent was later clarified that left no doubt that Pakistan was to be ‘a sovereign
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independent state’.
Delay in constitution-making and holding of national n ational elections exacerbated East Pakistan’s sense of exclusion. East Pakistan’s isolation during 1965 war and its lack of self -defence -defence capability gave a fillip to the existing demand for autonomy.
In March 1966, the Awami League leader leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman put forward ‘six points’ calling for a new constitution under which the federal government would be responsible ‘only for defence and foreign affairs’ for which purpose, it wo uld be provided with requisite revenue resources’ by the the federating units. President President Ayub Khan’s highly centralized government equated the demand for ‘autonomy’ with ‘secessi ‘secessionism’. onism’. This set in a process of polarization between the people of East and West Pakistan, dubbing Bengalis as dupes of Indian propaganda and Bengali elites, ascribing motives of domination and exploitation to West Pakistanis. Ayub Khan said: ‘They are not going to remain with us’.1 Alert to the brewing trouble and growing alienation in East Pakistan, India encouraged the separatist sentiment. Operatives of its secret service agency, Research and Analysis Wing [RAW] intensified subversion. In 1966, they met with a group of extremists in Agartala to plan sabotage.2 In January 1969, a raid on an armoury led to the arrest of 28 low level civilian and armed forces personnel. The government implicated Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, though he was in custody during the Agartala Conspiracy period. Trial by special tribunal robbed the proceedings of credibility. Opinion in East Pakistan concluded that the case was concocted for political persecution. In November 1970, a cyclone of ferocious intensity left death and devastation in its trail in East Pakistan. A quarter of a million people were drowned and the federal government was charged with indifference to the plight of the people of East Pakistan. In December 1970, Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman swept the polls in East Pakistan, winning 167 of the 169 seats from the province, sufficient for an absolute majority in the 313-member National Assembly. The Pakistan Peoples Party led by Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as the second largest party but all seats won from West Pakistan and sought a share in power. The focus was on constitutional reforms. Although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had earlier told President Yahya Khan that his six-point demand was negotiable but after the electoral triumph, he became a prisoner of his own extremist rhetoric and lost control over hawks in the party who wanted independence. He declined President Yahya Khan’s invitation to visit Islamabad for talks. When President went to Dhaka, he found that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was in no mood for a compromise. President Yahya Khan, then convened the National Assembly on 3rd March in Dhaka hoping the political leaders would settle the issues among themselves. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, now announced that
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his party would boycott the Assembly unless constitutional issues and power sharing formula is first agreed. He went to the extent that those Members of National Assembly who opted to go to Dhaka for the session would do so on one-way ticket and that their legs would be broken. President Yahya Khan gave in to the pressure and postponed the session but went to Dhaka in mid-March for talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The talks failed on 23rd March when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman proposed confederation. President Yahya Khan imposed martial law on 26th March and used military force against the people of East Pakistan. It was a wrong decision as 42,320 West Pakistani troops 3 could not suppress 75 million people of East Pakistan with India determined to obstruct and prevent the effort through instigation, abetment and a nd military intervention. India was bent upon exploiting the internal situation in Pakistan. On 30 th January, 1971, an Indian Airliner Airliner name ‘Ganga’, on a Srinagar -Delhi -Delhi flight, was hijacked to Lahore by two Kashmiri youth. They were lionized as freedom fighters on arrival at Lahore airport. Other than popular opinion, the usually alert Mr. Z. A. Bhutto applauded the ‘brave freedom fighters’. fighters’.3 Their leader set the plane on fire. New Delhi made furious protests, demanding compensation and immediate surrender of the criminals and suspended over flight rights to Pakistan’s planes. Later, Pakistani inquiry tribunal discovered that the leader of the hijackers was a recruit of Indian intelligence, trained and coached for the mission; the weapons given to him and his innocent accomplice were toy pistols and wooden grenades; and the ‘Ganga’ was the oldest plane in the airliner’s fleet. Pakistan had walked into a clever trap. Following President Yahya Khan’s crackdown in East Pakistan, the Indian government had moved into higher gear. India saw in the crisis, an ‘opportunity of the century’ to cut Pakistan into two. two. The Director of the official official Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis said on 31 March, 1971, ‘What India must realize is the fact that the break -up -up of Pakistan is in our interest, an opportunity the like of which will never come again’4 RAW operatives smuggled out Mr. Tajuddin Ahmad, an Awami League leader, escorted him to a border village to proclaim the independence of Bangladesh and installed him as head of the provisional Bangladesh government in Mujibnagar, a house in Calcutta, rented by RAW 5 On 31st March, the Indian Parliament adopted a resolution assuring the East Pakistani insurgents that ‘their struggle and sacrifices will receive wholehearted support of the people of India’. India’.* Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reassured Parliament that she would make timely decisions about the developing situation.
Within days, the Indian border police started operating inside East Pakistan. India embarked on an emergency training programme for Bengali army officers and provided military equipment for armed resistance.6 First secretly and later openly, India began building up a rebel force called the _______________ _______________________ _______________ _______________ ________________ _______________ _______________ ________________ ___________ ___ * Bangladesh Documents, Government of India, Vol. 1, P. 672, quoted in Siddiq Salik, Op. cit. P. 97.
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Mukti Bahini. An estimated 100,000 men were trained in guerrilla skills. 7 Public opinion and the media in the United States and Western Europe were outraged by the Pakistani military crackdown. The excesses committed by Pakistani forces were reported at great length and the number of refugees who entered India was wildly exaggerated. Few bothered to take notice of Indian interference or its rejection of proposals for impartial international inspection. To ease India’s burden on account of the refugees, the United States provided $ 350 million in aid but that did not dissuade Indira Gandhi from her preconceived purpose. purpose. ‘The opportunity to settle scores sc ores with a rival that had isolated itself by its own shortsightedness was simply too tempting’. All efforts by the international community to promote a political solution were resisted as India ;insisted on terms that escalated by the week’. The US President Nixon read the Indian design clearly, but the State Department was swept off its feet by popular reaction. reaction. He acquiesced in the State Department’s decision to embargo delivery of arms to Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi had ordered plans for a lightening ‘Israeli‘Israeli-type’ attack to take over East Pakistan.8 Its implementation had to be deferred in the light of Chief of Staff General Manekshaw’s view that the army needed six to seven months to prepare for war’ 9 The Indian commanders insisted, at a minimum, on waiting until November when weather in the Himalayas would make Chinese intervention more difficult. 10 On 9th August, August, the USSR concluded a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ with India, providing for consultations ‘on major international problems’ of concern to the two sides and requiring each to refrain from giving assistance to any third country taking part in an armed conflict with the other. The treaty was bound to eliminate fears of Chinese intervention.11 With the Soviet shield in place and the th e veto in the UN Security Council in its Pocket, India issued orders to the armed forces to prepare for operations.12 A policy planning committee was established to ensure en sure political and military coordination at home and the buildup of international opinion through propaganda and high level visits.
In contrast, the conditions in Islamabad were confused and chaotic: o o o
o
The army was said to be operating largely on its own; President Yahya Khan was oblivious to his perils; Pakistan’s military leaders were ‘caught up in a process beyond be yond their comprehension’ 13 President Yahya Khan did not no t inform others in the government of his role in providing a secret channel between Washington and Beijing and did not anticipate the strong reaction it was bound to provoke in Moscow. Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi rejected Washington’s suggestion for UN monitoring of the border in order to curb guerrilla activities from its territory.
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By October, Yahya Khan informed Washington that he was willing to grant full autonomy to East Pakistan. A month later, he was even agreeable to a unilateral withdrawal of forces.
Before moving in for the ‘kill’, Indira Gandhi undertook an international tour. She visited Washington on November 4 & 5, mainly for the purpose of influencing the public opinion. President Nixon was not unsympathetic to India as his administration had given $ 1.5 billion in aid to India during the two years of his administration. 14 President Nixon was, however, opposed to her designs against Pakistan and his conversation with Indira Gandhi was a ‘classic dialogue of the deaf’ and he ‘disturbed by the fact that although Mrs. Gandhi professed her devotion to peace, she would not make any concrete offers for deescalating the tensions’. 15 She denied that she was opposed to [Pakistan’s] existence but her analysis did little to sustain her disclaimer. 16 In fact, she argued that Pakistan should not have come into being. President Nixon, later recorded in his diary that Indira Gandhi ‘purposely deceived me in our meeting’, 17 having ‘made up her mind to attack Pakistan at the time she saw me in Washington Wa shington and assured me she would not’. 18 In retrospect, retrospect, Nixon further lamented: ‘how hypocritical the present Indian leaders are’ and how ‘duplicitous’ Indira Gandhi. Beginning of 1965 Indo-Pakistan War
On 21st November, Pakistan protested that India ‘without a declaration of war, has launched an all-out all-out offensive’. nd By 22 November, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger ‘had no doubt that we were now witnessing the beginning of an India-Pakistan war and that India had started it’. While ‘Pakistani repression in East Bengal had been brutal and shortsighted’, in his view, and Nixon’s, ‘it was India’s determination to use the crisis to establish its prominence on the sub-continent’. sub-continent’. 19 ‘From 21 to 25 November, several Indian Army Army divisions, divided into smaller smaller tactical units, launched simultaneous simultaneous military actions’. 20. Troops, tanks and aircraft were used to assist the Mukti Bahini occupy ‘liberated’ territory. The US President Nixon sent another ano ther letter to Indira Gandhi informing her of Pakistan President Yahya Khan’s offer of unilateral withdrawal withdrawal and he wrote to Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to intercede with her. She was implacable. On 29th November, she told the US Ambassador, ‘we can’t afford to listen to advice which weaken us’. On 2nd December, President Yahya Khan invoked the 1959 agreement with the United States for assistance, under which Washington was under obligation to assist Pakistan in case of aggression from any side including India. The US State Department argued that the agreement w did not oblige the US Government to give a positive response which was contrary to the provisions of the agreement. Meanwhile, the military situation in East Pakistan grew desperate by the day. President Yahya chose what he considered the path of honour and ordered a retaliatory attack across the border from West Pakistan on 3rd December. This decision, like the others Yahya Khan made, proved ineffectual and merely helped
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India advance its military plan which was to commence operations on 4th December. 21 On 4th December, the UN Security Council voted 11 to 4 in support of a resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces but it was killed by USSR veto. On 7th December, the UN General Assembly, acting under the ‘Uniting for Peace procedure’ adopted a resolution with 104 members in favour, favour, 10 against and 11 abstentions, recommending a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to their own territories and the creation of conditions for the voluntary return of refugees. The overwhelming vote of the world community had no effect on India as it persisted on its ruthless course of aggression aggression in violation of the principles of the UN Charter. The Chinese Prime Minister Zhou recognized that India was guilty of ‘gross interference’ in Pakistan’s Pakistan’s internal affairs and China continued to supply military equipment under existing agreements and extended political support to the Pakistani position in the United Nations. The United States, although did not fulfill its alliance commitments to help maintain Pakistan’s unity and territorial integrity, reviewed its its posture on learning that Indira Gandhi was determined to continue fighting ‘until the Pakistani army and air force were wiped out’. 22 On 9th December, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger called in the Indian ambassador to warn against such a course. cou rse. th On 9 December, President Nixon authorized the dispatch of a task force of eight ships including the aircraft carrier Enterprise from the Pacific to the Bay of Bengal. The ‘objective was to scare off an attack on West Pakistan …[and] to have forces in place in case the Soviet Union pressured China’. 23 He stressed upon the Soviets, who had ‘proceeded to equip India with great amounts of sophisticated armaments’, to restrain India. On 10th December, Mr. Henry Kissinger sent a message to Soviet leade r Leonid Brezhnev, saying if Indian military operations continued, ‘we must inevitably look toward a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan’. P akistan’. 24 The crisis now involved high stakes and the threat of great power confrontation loomed on the horizon as the USSR encouraged New Delhi in its design, promising that it would initiate military moves if China threatened India. Washington decided it could not allow Moscow to intimidate Beijing if it wanted its China policy to retain credibility. On 10th December, Mr. Henry Kissinger met China’s representative to the UN, Huang Hua and briefed him on the steps the US had taken to help Pakistan. On 12th December, President Nixon sent a ‘hotline’ message to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev saying, ‘I cannot emphasized too much that time is of the essence to avoid consequences neither of us wants’. 25 To make the point more concretely, the Soviet authorities were also informed of fleet movements. On 13th December, Moscow finally responded to say that they the y were conducting ‘a clarification of all the circumstances in India’. Mr. Kuznetsov was sent to New Delhi to work for a ceasefire. On 14th December at 3.00 AM, the Soviet ambassador in Washington delivered a
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message reporting ‘firm assurances by New Delhi that India has no intention of seizing West Pakistani territory’. At this stage, Poland proposed a resolution in the Un Security Council which called for the immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives in East Pakistan from further humiliation. But, as often happens in a crisis, the rush of events overtakes human capacity to make timely decisions. To India’s relief, the resolution was not pressed to a vote. On 16th December, speaking in the Parliament, Indira Gandhi offered an unconditional ceasefire, under mounting US and Soviet pressure. She was reported to have said that she had defeated Pakistan and avenged several centuries of Hindu humiliation at the hands of Muslim Sultans and Emperors. The US President Nixon could credibly claim that his diplomatic signals and the dispatch of the US naval fleet persuaded the Soviet Union to join in pressurizing India, thus saving West Pakistan from India’s evil design. President Pres ident Nixon not only demonstrated his long-standing goodwill towards Pakistan but also manifested a profound understanding of the implications of India and the Soviet Union succeeding in destroying Pakistan. That would have encouraged the Soviet Union ‘to use similar tactics elsewhere … (and) change the balance of power in Asia …. A victory of India over Pakistan would be the same as a victory of the Soviet Union over China. 26 President Nixon’s decision to improve relations with China was a part of the same global vision.
The East Pakistan crisis was the result of the following:
The blunders and follies of Pakistani leaders over the years manifest in the neglect of East Pakistan and its exclusion from due share in power. Political autonomy for East Pakistan would have been consistent with the vision of the founders of Pakistan. United States failed to fulfill its legal obligations under the 1959 Agreement of Mutual Cooperation to assist Pakistan in case of aggression. The United States Congress and media was equally responsible as it opposed President Nixon’s policy and thus became accomplices in Indian crime against peace and international law.
Hence, Pakistan suffered ‘disaster’:
the country was divided into two parts, wrecking the dream of the founding fathers; the nation was demoralized; the people were bewildered and distraught and their pride in the armed forces destroyed; the leadership was exposed to self-centered and incompetence; over 93,000 soldiers and civilians were taken as ‘prisoners of war’; the Indian forces seized 5,139 square miles of o f territory in West Pakistan; a million people were dislocated; the country was isolated in the international community;
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the vast majority of Muslim Umma did not come to its help in the hour of trial and a dark shadow hovered over the prospects of the state. Bhutto’s Dynamic Role, 1972-73 1972 -73
In the tortured and turbulent situation, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed the Office of the first civilian Martial Law Administrator and then President of residual Pakistan. His task was tremendous: to pick up the pieces and bring the nation to grips with the new reality; to rebuild the morale and confidence of the nation; to rehabilitate Pakistan in the world community and to re-orient failed policies both at home and abroad. To rescue Pakistan, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto decided first to turn fr iends iends for sympathy and support.
Even before returning to Pakistan from New York, Mr. Bhutto visited Washington and met President Nixon on 18th December, 1971, saying that now he wanted good relations with the United States. 27 President Nixon promised that the United States would do ‘all within its power’ 28 to help Pakistan and that ‘The cohesion and stability of Pakistan are of critical importance to the structure of peace in South Asia’. 29 In January 1972, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Peoples Republic Repu blic of China after becoming President of Pakistan. China extended diplomatic support and economic and military assistance. Mr. Bhutto undertook a whirlwind tour of Islamic countries in the Middle East and Africa which upheld the principles of law for the unconditional release of Pakistani prisoners and the withdrawal of Indian forces from occupies territories. Mr. Bhutto decided to quit British Commonwealth when Britain recognized Bangladesh and persuaded New Zealand Ze aland and Australia to follow the suit. Mr. Bhutto also visited Soviet Union in March 1972 19 72 in the hope of o f moderating its hostility. However, Moscow did not indicate any an y interest in playing a role.
Pakistan was, however, left to herself to solve its problems with India, primarily of the repatriation of prisoners of war and the recovery of o f territory.
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NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.
22. 23. 24.
25. 26. 27. 28. 29.
Gauhar, Altaf, “Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler”, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1994, P. 411 Raina, Ashoka, “Inside RAW”, RAW”, Vikas Publishing Co., Delhi, 1981, P. 49. Salik, Siddiq, “Witness to surrender”, surrender ”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1977, Lamb, Alastair, “Kashmir – Kashmir – a a disputed legacy”, legacy ”, Oxford Books, UK, 1991, P.288. Sattar, Abdul, “Pakistan’s Foreign Fore ign Policy: 1947-2005 – 1947-2005 – A A Concise History”, History ”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, P. 122. Ashoka Raina, Op. cit. P. 54. Ibid. P. 57 Siddiq Salik, Op. cit. P. 100 Kissinger, Henry, “The White House Years”, Brown, 1979, P. 856. Years ”, Little Brown, Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, “War nd Secession – Secession – Pakistan, Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh”, Bangladesh ”, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1990, P. 209. Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 857. Ibid. P. 867 Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, Op. cit. P. 209 Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 861. Ibid. P. 848. The ‘ Memoirs Memoirs of Richard Nixon’, Vol. I, Warner Books, New York, 1978, P. 651. Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 880. Nixon Op. cit. P. 652 Ibid. P. 658 Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 885. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, Op. cit. P. 213 Kux Dennis, “India and the United States: Estranged Democracies ”, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1993 and “United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 – 1947-2000 – Disenchanted Disenchanted Allies”, Allies ”, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Wshington, DC., 2001, P. 199. Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 901. Ibid. 905. White House Memorandum of conversation between President Nixon and Soviet Minister of Agriculture, Vladimir Matskevich, quoted in Dennis Kux, Op. cit. P. 201. Henry Kissinger, Op. cit. P. 910. Memorandum of conversation with President Pompidou, 13 December, 1972, quoted in Denis Kux, Op. cit. P. 203. Denis Kux, Op. cit. P. 204, quoting Memorandum of Conversation of NixonBhutto meeting, 18 December, 1971, President’s Office Files, NPNP, NA. Memorandum of Nixon-Bhutto meeting, quoted in in Denis Kux, Op. cit. P. 204. Statement of Policy for the 1970s, issued on 3 May, 1973, Documents, Op. cit. P. 207.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY Islamabad Campus Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] Shimla Agreement: Negotiating under duress [Chapter 11]
For over four months after the ceasefire of 17 December, no foreign power power offered to mediate a peace settlement nor did Pakistan or India take the initiative to call for a bilateral meeting. Then India sent Union Minister D.P. Dhar to Islamabad for preliminary talks preparatory to a peace conference. The talks were held in Murree from 26-29 April, 1972 and Pakistan had a glimpse of the demands India had in mind at the meeting. Mr. Dhar proposed that the peace conference should aim at eliminating once and for all the sources of antagonism between the two countries and focus on the determination determination of ‘elements of durable peace’. He did not mention Kashmir and made eloquent disclaimers of any intention to impose a solution on Pakistan. But the assurance rang hollow: India was not prepared to release the prisoner of war and withdraw from occupied territory without conditions. The message was loud and clear that India wanted to dictate a settlement of the Kashmir question. Pakistan, on its part, wanted the peace conference to address issues generated by the war. The Murree meeting did not resolve the question as to whether immediate postwar issues or the establishment of durable peace (i.e. settlement of the Kashmir question) should receive priority at the summit conference. Mr. Dhar and Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Secretary General, Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed agreed to place both the items on the agenda for simultaneous consideration. At Shima conference seems in retrospect a veritable drama in which superb diplomats played skillful roles using words and gestures that masked, but did not conceal, the real aims and intentions of each side from the other. President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the twin directors of the drama without a script were also the principal actors. The chief executives ex ecutives dominated the centre of the stage, even e ven when they were not on it and kept strategic control of the direction in their own hands. hand s. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a leader of exceptional intellect excelled in rhetoric and eloquence. His legal education and superb knowledge of the English language stood Pakistan in good stead at the Shimla conference. He proposed the ‘no‘no- prejudice’ prejudice’ clause in the Shimla agreement which Indira Gandhi accepted, protecting Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir question from compromise. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, seemingly frailin body but robust in mind, was deceptive in her inarticulate speech. The words at her command did not do justice to the clarity and depth
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of her thought but no one could miss the thrust of her remarks. She seemed engagingly shy but was entirely self-confident and unwavering in resolve. A rare leader with a capacity to view her role in history from a vantage point in the future, she spoke and acted with a sense of accountability to her country. The ‘iron lady’ was also intensely nationalistic and probably never felt happier and more self-fulfilled than on the day when India humiliated Pakistan. Ye she was capable of discerning the limits beyond which the adversary could not be pushed or squeezed as she demonstrated by reducing the demands in the final draft in order to prevent collapse co llapse of the peace conference. On 28th June in the opening round at Shimla, the wide gulf between Pakistani and Indian positions was manifest despite formal politeness and courtesies, characteristic of conversations between diplomats. It was reflected more vividly in the initial drafts tabled by India on 29th June and by Pakistan on June 30. Leaving aside the preambular parts, pledging mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Pakistani and Indian drafts diverged fundamentally in concepts about the outcome of the Shimla conference. India proposed an elaborate treaty that already comprised eleven articles, with more to be added later to incorporate a Kashmir settlement. It was a comprehensive in every aspect of interest to India but, rather surprisingly for the Pakistani side, did not include a word about either withdrawals from the occupied territories or release of prisoners, which were, unsurprisingly, the main focus of the unpretentious but pragmatic draft presented by Pakistan. The two drafts presented an interesting contrast in their selection of principles for the conduct and regulation of relations between the two countries. Whilst the Indian selection betrayed intent to construct a rather peculiar and particularistic framework of principles, with not even a mention of the United Nations Charter, Pakistan emphasised the universally recognized principles of relations between sovereign states. Of course, the most substantive difference between the two drafts centred on Jammu and Kashmir. While India proposed discussion on the Kashmir question and inclusion of the envisaged agreement in the suggested treaty, Pakistan omitted any reference to it because, it its view, the purpose of the Shimla conference was limited to resolving the problems resulting from the December war. In the negotiations that followed, both sides tried to give the impression of accommodation, each toning down its own formulations and incorporating portions of the other’s draft, but there was little progress on core issues. By 1st July, a sense of gloom set in which was reflected in the second Indian draft. Premised on the failure to bridge differences on substantive issues, it envisaged an interim agreement, leaving the substantive issues for settlement at a subsequent summit. Pakistan declined to join such a charade that would create an illusion of success. Faced with the collapse of the Shimla conference, India changed text again. On 2nd July, it presented Pakistan with a final draft. That too, was unacceptable to Pakistan. The omission of any reference to the United Nations Charter from the selection of principles included in the Indian draft d raft was rather peculiar. More than surprising the Pakistani side, it served to bare a design in India’s mind to circumscribe and restrict the applicability of some of the Charter and universally recognized principles of relations between sovereign states, including in particular the fulfillment in good faith of the obligations assumed by
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them in accordance with the Charter a pointed reminder that India had failed to implement the obligations arising from the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. When the Pakistan side pointed to the flaw in the Indian draft, the Indian Secretary General in the Prime Minister’s Office, Mr. P. N. Haksar explained the omission by arguing that the two countries did not need to invoke ‘foreign ideas’. However, realizing gap in their logic, the Indian side gave up their stand and reference to UN Charter was incorporated but resisted Pakistan’s suggestion based on Article 33 of the Charter that any dispute between the two countries ‘will be settled settled by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, enquiry, mediation or should these methods prove unavailing, by arbitration or judicial settlement’. Instead, Indian side suggested that the two countries agree to ‘undertake to settle all issues between betw een them bilaterally and exclusively by peaceful means’. Considering the dire situation, Pakistan suggested amendment of the Indian text so that differences would be settled ‘by peaceful means through negotiation or any other peaceful means’. India added the qualification of ‘mutually agreed upon between them’.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] The Nuclear Programme and Relations with USA [Chapter 12] HISTORY
Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme started in mid-1950s mid-1950s and was aimed at scientific knowledge and technology for peaceful uses in agriculture and health. It also envisaged the construction of power plants in due course to meet the energy needs of its developing economy. In 1962, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission [PAEC] obtained a small 5 Megawatt research reactor from the United States for Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology [PINSTECH] near Islamabad under an agreement that provided for inspection and controls by International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. In 1972, another 120 Megawatt nuclear power plant was completed with the cooperation of Canada and it was also placed under the safeguards of IAEA. In early 1960s, it became evident that Pakistan’s arch rival - India was acquiring nuclear technology not only for peaceful purposes as was emphasized in public statements but also to develop nuclear weapons because its entire nuclear-fuel cycle facilities including production of bomb-grade plutonium were directed d irected in that direction to win the prestige, status and economic benefits associated with a Nuclear Power. Po wer. Taking cognizance of the emergent threat to Pakistan’s security and the potential for blackmail in an asymmetrical nuclear situation, the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Bhutto made a statement in 1965 that ‘if India makes an atomic bomb, then we will also do so, even if we have to eat grass … an atom bomb can only be answered by an atom bomb’. 1966, PAEC proposed purchase of a plutonium separation plant that France was willing to sell but the President Ayub Khan did not favour the idea as the military leadership believed that a strong conventional defence will suffice for the ‘deterrence’. Pakistan vested hopes in Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT} and actively participated in efforts at the United Nations to promote its early conclusion. It joined multi-pronged efforts for a fair bargain between nuclear-weapon states and noon-nuclear states that would provide for the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons held by nuclear-weapon powers in exchange for the renunciation of the nuclear weapons
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by other states. At its initiative, a Conference of non-nuclear states recommended that nuclear-weapon nuclear-weapon states should provide ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ guarantees pledging: pledging:
non use of nuclear-weapons against non-nuclear states and assistance to a non-nuclear state threatened with nuclear nuc lear weapons.
Both proposals were conceded in principle but the pledge on reduction of nuclear weapons in the NPT remained non-binding and the resolution on security guarantees adopted by the Security Council of which the five nuclear powers were permanent members was far from reassuring. Pakistan expressed its readiness to sign the NPT provided India did the same which refused to do so and was a reflection of its aims in the nuclear field in future. Pakistan’s reasonableness was contrasted with intransigence on the part of India which championed nuclear disarmament but at the same time persisted in a programme aimed at the acquisition of the weapons option. In 1971, when Pakistan was cut into two pieces with the active aid abetment of India, Islamabad was compelled to undertake ‘reappraisal’ of its nuclear policy as Pakistan’s conventional defence capability had proved inadequate to safeguard its territorial integrity in the face of India’s military might which exploited the gap and intervened militarily crossing the international border to convert ‘East Pakistan’ into ‘Bangladesh’. India’s exploitation of Pakistan’s internal political troubles, t roubles, encouragement and assistance to separatism in East Pakistan, violation of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of another country, aggression and military intervention illustrated India animus, the irremediable imbalance of power, the reluctance of allies to come to Pakistan’s rescue and the powerlessness of the United Nations, Pakistan had to devise its own means to ensure its security and survival. In January, 1972, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, soon after assuming the office of the President of Pakistan reviewed its nuclear programme with nuclear scientists Prof. Abdus Salam and Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan, a nuclear Engineer serving with IAEA. Convinced of the necessity to acquire weapons’ option, President Bhutto appointed Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan as Chairman, PAEC and allocated requisite funds. The decision to pursue the nuclear nuclea r option was more easily made than implemented: implemen ted:
Pakistan did not possess fissile material It did not had explosion technology. Nuclear suppliers were already strengthening controls on nuclear technology transfer.
India conducted nuclear test codenamed “Buddha smiles” on 18th May, 1974 and branded it for peaceful purpose. Following the explosion:
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Canada unilaterally cancelled cooperation agreement with Pakistan although it did not commit any violation of the agreement. United States led other industrial states in the Nuclear Supp liers Group to tighten controls on the export of nuclear technology. United States focused its non-proliferation agenda on Pakistan P akistan alone. France, under US pressure cancelled supply suppl y of a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan which it had signed in 1973 with IAEA safeguards.
Pakistan embarked upon imaginative diplomacy to counter pressures from United States and other industrialized countries. In 1974, on Pakistan’s proposal for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free weapon -free zone in South Asia, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution With Pakistan’s policy, India was cornered into virtual isolation and despite its intransigence, Pakistan gained high moral grounds on international level which exposed the United States’ discriminatory pressures. Pak-US Relations [1972-79]
Following emergence of East Pakistan as an independent state of ‘Bangladesh’, Pakistan withdrew from a military pact SEATO but remained another military pack CENTO which was still valued by Washington in the context of its policy on the Middle East. The Nixon administration expressed some understanding of Pakistan’s dire needs:
In March 1973, it authorized a ‘one time exception’ for delivery of 300 armoured personnel carriers Pakistan had purchased three years earlier. Following visit to the United States by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, United States resumed economic assistance to Pakistan, providing US $ 24 million for wheat and US $ 18 million as AID loan. It further agreed to seek congressional approval for US $ 40-50 million as rehabilitation loan. Ford administration lifted the embargo on arms sales to Pakistan and allowed purchase of arms and spare parts p arts worth US $ 160 million. Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme
Prime Minister Bhutto made no secret of its views on nuclear technology rather than allow itself to be deceived by an international treaty limiting this ‘deterrent’ to the present Nuclear Powers. Pakistan embarked on an alternative e route for production of fissile material. A Pakistani metallurgist, Dr. A. Q. Khan was appointed by the Government in 1976 to build a
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uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. Dr. A. Q. Khan and his team of scientists and engineers faced enormous technological difficulties as United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group refused even export of non-nuclear components. But this goes to the credit of Dr. A. Q. Khan’s team that they succeeded in building the key centrifuges indigenously within a few years and by 1982, they achieved the capability to enrich uranium to the level required for building an explosive device. PAEC was also tasked with the responsibility for pre and post enrichment phases of research. Pakistan manufactured the first atomic device in 1983 and a tunnel was dug in Chagai Mountain of Balochistan province but the Government deferred the test to avert political offence from United U nited States. However, How ever, PAEC conducted on different designs of the bomb the bomb and performed a number of successful ‘cold tests’ to judge its performance. performance. Worsening of Pak-US Relations
In 1977 and 1978, United States, under the legislations of Symington and Glenn imposed restrictions for provision of economic aid and other penalties to a country not party to NPT that imported equipment or technology for production of plutonium and enriched uranium but the American law singled out Pakistan for its practical application excluding India and Israel.
Ford administration tried in vain to persuade Pakistan to abandon its nuclear programme by offering to sell 110 A-7 aircraft.
Pak-US relations suffered another set back when Prime P rime Minister Bhutto termed United States as an adversary in a speech in National Assembly of Pakistan by interpreting an intelligence intercept of a remark by an official of US mission in Pakistan in April 1977 saying ‘My source tells me the party is over’.
The policy of Carter administration in South Asia became Indiacentric and Pakistan was excluded from a tour of Asian countries.
The slide in Pak-US relations accelerated after General Gen eral Ziaul Haq took over in July 1977 and an d the US offer of sale of A-7 A -7 aircraft was withdrawn.
In 1978, President Giscard d’Estaing of France decided to cancel a nuclear processing plant contract with Pakistan under US pressure, inflicting colossal damage to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In April 1979, President Carter decided to apply ap ply ‘sanctions’ against Pakistan and US aid of around aroun d US $ 50 million was cut off.
In August 1979, there were reports that United States considered the option of destroying Pakistan’s nuclear capability by an attack on Kahuta.
On 21st November, 1979, a mob of students from Quaid-i-Azam
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University, Islamabad infuriated by a false report broadcast by an unidentified radio alleging US occupation of the holy Kaa’ba, attacked and burnt American embassy in Islamabad and an American and two Pakistani staff members had perished in the fire. [However, Pakistan Government accepted the responsibility for failure to fulfil its obligations under international law to protect the diplomatic mission and immediately agreed to pay the compensation of US $ 23 million]. m illion]. Steadfast pursuit of Nuclear Programme
Pakistan did not lag behind in the technological progress towards acquisition acquisition of the nuclear option. Overcoming obstacles and resisting discriminatory pressures, it succeeded not only in completing the Kahuta plant but also achieving explosion technology. Scientists at PAEC were able to master the design of the nuclear device. By mid-1980s, Pakistan publicly acknowledged possession of the nuclear capability, disclaiming that it has produced nuclear weapons. In December 1979, Soviet Union militarily intervened in Afghanistan, Reagan administration, after coming to office in January 1981, decided to join Pakistan in supporting and assisting the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation and relegated nuclear sanctions. Indian Plan of attack on Kahuta
In 1981, Indian Air Force concluded a study that an attack on Kahuta enrichment plant was feasible. This was reported by Washington Post on 20th December, 1982 that Indian military advisers had 9 months earlier prepared a plan for strikes on Kahuta and PINSTECH. Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman, PAEC mentioned in a conversation with his Indian counterpart Homi Sethna in 1983 that Indian attack would result in Pakistani retaliation against Indian nuclear power stations in Rajasthan and Trombay. Therefore, New Delhi realized the dangerous consequences of such an adventure. India did not abandon the idea altogether and then considered such a strike in collaboration with Israel but finally New Delhi reached to the conclusion that such an exercise was also not feasible in the wake of Pakistan’s warning that Islamabad Islam abad would presume Indian complicity in such an eventuality. India had to abandon the idea also because United States was then allied with Pakistan as the frontline state assisting the Afghan Mujahideen against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In September 1984, there were reports in US press regarding Indian planning for an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.
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In early 1987, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was reported To have considered a pre-emptive pre-emptive strike on Pakistani’s nuclear facilities before be fore ‘Brasstacks exercises’ but was dissuaded by Indian defence analysts. By 1990, Pakistan was estimated to have accumulated enough enriched uranium for 10 or more explosive devices while India had built up a stockpile of weapon-grade plutonium for an estimated 100 plus Hiroshima-size bombs. Indian Nuclear Programme
As early as 1946, an ambitious and brilliant Indian Cambridge-educated Cambridge-educated Physics Professor Homi Bhaba at Bangalore obtained approval for establishment of the Atomic Energy Research Committee [AERC] at Mumbai. In 1948, speaking in Indian Parliament, Jawaharlal Nehru said, “I think we must develop [atomic energy] for peaceful purposes ….Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use if for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiment of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way”. Under the Atoms for Peace Plan, United States provided training facilities to 1104 Indian scientists and engineers between 1955 and 1974. During training at Argonne Laboratory School of Nuclear Science and Engineering the Indians ‘mined’ the declassified literature for design and operation of nuclear facilities. In 1955, India built the first research reactor ‘ASPARA’ with assistance from UK which provided heavy water. CIRUS, a 40-Megawatt research reactor suitable for generation of bomb-grade plutonium was built with the assistance of Canada which accepted Indian statement that it would use the resultant fissile material for peaceful purposes only. On similar terms, United States provided ‘heavy watger’ for the plant. In 1961, India began construction of the Phoenix plant for reprocessing plutonium. A US firm, Vitro International, was the contractor for preparing the construction blueprints while technological assistance was provided by the British Atomic Energy Commission. In 1963, United States decided to provide two reactors for the Tarapur power plant. In 1963, Bhaba’s successor, Vicram Sarabhai was opposed to nuclear weapons on moral and economic grounds but a group of scientists led by Raja Ramanna, R. Chidambaran and P. K. Iyenger continued work on the project for a nuclear explosion. Meanwhile, Indian foreign policy establishment led by Trivedi protected India’s nuclear option in negotiations on NPT who opposed any prohibition on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, calling it ‘nuclear apartheid’. ap artheid’.
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In 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Government decided not to sign the NPT. In 1972, she authorized preparations for a nuclear test which was conducted codenamed ‘Buddha Smiles’ on 18th May, 1974 termed as ‘peaceful explosion’ but years later, the Indian scientist who played a leadership role acknowledged that it was actually a bomb test. British newspaper ‘Sunday Standard ’ captioned ‘India goes Nuclear at last’ saying the monopoly of Big Five broken. International sanctions and tightened export controls slowed down the programme but India now had proven technology and all the requisite facilities for building a nuclear arsenal. On 11th May, 1998, under the directives of Prime Minister Ata Bihari Vajpai, India tested three nuclear weapons and two days later another two. In response, Pakistan detonated 7 nuclear devices five on 28th May, 1998 and another two a couple of days later. United States condemned the tests publicly but accepted the reality and President Clinton paid an unprecedented 6-day visit to India in early 2000. In 2005, President George W. Bush agreed to extend technological cooperation to India for nuclear power plants, proposing an India-specific exception to US non-proliferation laws as well as to the agreed restrictions of Nuclear Suppliers Group. An equal criteria based treatment was denied to Pakistan. In 2006, United States signed an agreement with India for provision of nuclear technology for civilian use.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] The Afghan Crisis [Chapter 13]
Through history, Afghanistan has seldom known peace. Its ethnic ethnic heterogeneity and, to an extent, its topography, geographical location and the extremity of its climate with bitterly cold winters and scalding summers, have shaped and influenced its violenceridden past. Peaceful coexistence among the ethnic groups led by the Pushtuns, who account for about 50 percent of a population of 16.48 million, and the Tajiks (22.9 percent), Hazaras (12 percent), Uzbeks (6.25 percent) and other small groups such as the Turkmen and Aimaks Aimaks has been alien to the Afghan Afghan experience. The ethnic map of the country, with the groups separated and confined to clearly defined areas, has also militated against national unity. The Hindu Kush range, which translates as the “slayer of Hidus” has served as the rough divide. In the historical perspective, the term “Afghan” was probably first used in the fifteenth century during the reign of Mahmud of Ghazni, a ruler of Turkish descent, while the name of the country, “Afghanistan” was coined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Moguls. History contains no record of an Afghan state before 1947. Eastern Afghanistan formed part of the Mogul Empire while its west was controlled by the Safavids of Iran. Kabul became the capital of Mogul territory west of the Indus. The second major Afghan town, Kandhar was contested between the Mogul and Persian empires up to the time when it was taken by the latter during the reign of the Mogul emperor, Shah Jahan. The Shahs of Iran continued to treat Afghanistan a province of their empire until the nineteenth century.1 In 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali founded the Kingdom of Afghanistan and extended it up to Kashmir as well as the Punjab, Sindgh and Baluchistan of present day Pakistan. He was conferred the title Durr-i-Durran (Pearl of Pearls) and from this his tribe, which was to play so a prominent role in Afghan history, became known as the Durrani. After Abdali’s death in 1773, the empire fragmented into independent city states and spurred rivalry between the British and the Russians for dominance of the country.
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The emergence of Afghanistan as a state in the last two centuries owed itself more to Britain’s imperial ambitions than any desire among its peoples to forge national identity. British writers claimed that their country had contributed significantly to give “a national unity to that nebulous community which we call Afghanistan (which the Afghans never called by that name) by drawing a boundary all around it and elevating it into a position of buffer state between ourselves and Russian”.2 External compression was, therefore, applied by the advancing empires of Britain and Russia to foster effective cohesion among the Afghan groups.3 The conflicting interests of the two imperial powers did not permit either to establish itself in Afghanistan. The alternative to an armed clash over the territory was to transform it into a buffer state. It was also in their interest, if Afghanistan was to play this role, to ensure that chaos and anarchy did not prevail in it. A strong ruler was, therefore, needed in the country. Britain and, to an extent, Russia feared chaos in a leaderless Afghanistan more than the unfriendliness of an Afghan ruler.4 British were also conscious that there was nothing to guarantee Afghanistan’s continued existence as a buffer between England and Russia as no other country cared about its arrival.5 This generated a disproportionate British interest in Afghanistan which played itself out as the “Great Game” in the nineteenth century. The attempt to incorporate Afghanistan in the British sphere of influence led to two Anglo-Afghan wars from 1839 to 1842 and 1878 to 1880. The first resulted in defeat for the British while the second enabled them to control Afghanistan’s foreign policy and annex sizeable territory. These lands, stretched from the Indus to the Durand Line, which demarcates the present-day border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The result was the delimitation of frontiers of Afghanistan in the west, south and east by the British, and in the north by the Russian and British governments. After bringing Afghanistan into existence, the need for a strong ruler or Amir Amir to hold the country together thus became of paramount concern to the British who, on occasions, played a decisive role in the selection of the Amir. So deep was their involvement that British support became essential to ensure any particular Amir ’s continued occupation of Amir ’s the Afghan throne. They provided him the subsidies and weapons to build an army and consolidate power. Furthermore, the subjugation of the ethnic minorities by the Pushtun Amir s was carried out with the encouragement and support of the British. In the words of a Russian historian “after 1849 Dost Muhammad turned to the conquest of non-Afghan non-Afghan peoples living north of the Hindu Kush [Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmen] with the support of the British India Company”.6 With British subsidies, Amir Abdur Rahman, who ruled from 1880 to 1901, sought to establish an absolute monarchy. He was succeeded by his son, Habibullah, who was assassinated in 1919. Habibullah son, Amanullah Khan, then became the Amir but later changed this title to ‘king’ and during his ten-year ten -year rule, tried to modernize the country. He won Afghanistan’s independence in the third Anglo-Afghan Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 but lost the
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subsidy as a consequence of which he failed to establish a resource base or build a reliable army. An insurrection supported by extremist clergy ensued and Kabul was taken by the rebels in January 1929. An ethnic Tajik rebel ruled for the next nine months when the capital fell, yet again, in October 1929 to the Pushtun tribes led by Nadir Khan, a member of the royal family. The power base in Afghanistan has constantly remained extremely narrow. Its exercise has been the privilege of the Pushtuns (or Pathans), within the Pushtuns that of the Durranis and within the Durranis of the Barakzais. For almost half a century during which power rested witht eh Mohammadzai branch of the Barakzai clan, Afghanistan was controlled by an inner cabinet consisting of key members of the royal family and a few of their trusted associates. Command positions in the army were invariably held by members of the royal family and, in some instances, by staunch supporters of the monarchy. On 17th July, 1973, Sardar Mohammad Daoud assumed power in Afghanistan, supplanting King Mohammad Zahir Shah, his cousin and brother-in-law who was a known Pakistan-baiter. It merely ended the monarchy but did not result in any diffusion of power. In effect, power was transferred from the former oligarchy to a single individual. In order to consolidate his power, Sardar Daoud entered into close relationship with the Soviet Union. The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had vitiated right at the beginning when Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan into United Nations and became the first and the only country to do so. On the eve of establishment of Pakistan in 1947, the Afghan Government denounced the ‘Durand Line’ treaty, establishing boundary with British India which was signed by Amir Abdur Rehman in 1889. Afghanistan also laid a territorial claim in the guise of support for ‘Pakhtunistan’. During the period of 1947 to 1958, Pakistan’s Afghan policy was based on the following two main objectives:
settlement of the Durand Line issue and reconciliation over the Pakhtoonistan issue.
There was no improvement in Pakistan’s Afghan policy till 1973. By now, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had assumed the reigns of power p ower in Pakistan after its dismemberment in 1971. By 1976, Sardar Daoud realized that the Soviets had their own agenda as they penetrated in the internal politics of Afghanistan, providing support and assistance to the revolutionary People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA].
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To counter-balance Soviets, Sardar Daoud embarked on improvement of relations with Pakistan, Iran and other Muslim countries. Daoud’s new policy did not please PDPA and Soviet Union. Consequently, a clique of Communists launched a coup on 27th April, 1978 in which Sardar Daoud and his family members were murdered. PDPA called it ‘Saur Revolution,Constitution Revolution,Constitution was abrogated and Nur Muhammad Taraki assumed the Office of the President in the name of o f PDPA. From the beginning, the regime, lacking popular support was faced with opposition in the traditional conservative Afghan society. The party was torn into predominantly rural and Pashto-speaking Pashto-speaking ‘Khalq’ and urbanurban based Persian-speaking Persian-speaking ‘Parcham’ factions. Infighting between the two factions led to Taraki’s murder in September 1979. He was succeeded by Hafizullah Amin whose radical reforms evoked even stronger opposition from the people and he was also defiant to the Soviets. On 26th December, 1979, Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan, eliminating Hafizullah Amin and installing Banrak Karmal, leader of Parcham faction as President of Afghanistan. Indian initial response was strong condemnation by Prime Minister Charan Singh but later Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Government which came into power in January 1980 adopted pro-Soviet stance. Pakistan’s reaction was carefully calculated, sober and cautious: cautious:
It described it as a ‘serious violation’ of the norms of peaceful co existence. expressed Pakistan’s ‘gravest concern’ in the context of its links o f Islam, f Islam, geography and non-aligned policy with Afghanistan. hoped that the ‘foreign troops’ would be be removed from the Afghan soil forthwith. At Pakistan’s request, six non-permanent, non-permanent, non-aligned Members of the UN Security Council sponsored a resolution which strongly deplored ‘the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan’ and called for immediate, unconditional unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops. 13 of the 15-Member Council voted in favour but was vetoed by USSR. At Pakistan’s request, UN General Assembly took up the same resolution and adopted with a majority vote of 104 with 18 abstentions under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure on 14th January, 1980. On 29th January, 1980, an extraordinary session of OIC Foreign Ministers was held in Islamabad which adopted a resolution, strongly indicting Soviet intervention, suspending Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s membership of OIC and affirming solidarity with the struggle of the Afghan people to safeguard their ‘faith, national independence and territorial integrity’. The resolution had the following main provisions:
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immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan; to restore independent and non-aligned non -aligned status of Afghanistan; respect for the rights of Afghan people to determine their own destiny without external interference and creation of conditions to permit Afghan refugees to return to their homes with dignity and honour.
With the arrival of foreign troops to protect and perpetuate a regime with an alien ideology, Afghan resistance took the shape of o f a ‘people’s war’. Pakistan confronted with lack of resources but not lack of ‘will’ decided decided to provide discreet help as it knew that Afghans fighting for their national survival would also be fighting for Pakistan’s security and independence. The initial thrust of Pakistan’s policy was diplomatic in orientation. It sought to build up greater political pressure on the Soviet Union in the regular sessions of UN General Assembly. The resolution sponsored by non-aligned countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America coupled with Muslim countries was adopted with majority votes year after year with the key elements of:
immediate withdrawal of foreign troops preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, integrity, independence and non-aligned status respect for the right of its people to determine their thei r own form of Government and economic system, free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constrain and creation of conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homes in safety and honour. hono ur.
At this time Pakistan had strained relations with the United States because of discriminatory sanctions imposed by Carter administration in 1979. In a strange move, Washington announced an offer of US $ 400 million in economic and military assistance to Pakistan over 18 months but President Ziaul Haq rejected the offer describing it as as ‘peanuts’. However, Pakistan continued its steadfast policy of opposition to Soviet intervention and supported Afghan resistance with the provision of modest assistance out of its own meager resources for more than a year. After President Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter in 1981, Washington revived the offer of cooperation with a new package of loans and grants amounting to 3.2 billion dollars over five years. It included US $ 600 million a year for development and defence. In 10 years, Pakistan received aid worth 10 billion US dollars and became the 3rd largest recipient of US aid.
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The US administration was still reluctant to support a formal security guarantee to Pakistan for its vulnerabilities as a front-line state against Soviet Union. However, it agreed to consider sale of 40 F-16 F-16 aircraft to express its ‘concern’ for Pakistan’s security. On nuclear issue, both countries maintained their formal positions with Pakistan reiterating its intention to continue research and US proclaiming its non-proliferation concern. But Washington accepted President Zia’s assurance that Pakistan would not develop nuclear weapons or transfer sensitive technology. Geneva Accords
Soviet Union was confident that its mighty forces equipped with the latest weapons would rout the Afghan Mujahideen armed with antiquated rifles. But it misjudged the situation as it could not pin down Mujahideen guerillas who were supported by the Afghan populace and received sophisticated weapons including stringer missiles from the United States for guerilla warfare. In 1981, Mr. Diego Cordovez, a diplomat from Ecuador was appointed as Personal Representative of the UN Secretary General on Afghanistan. A fghanistan. In June 1982, negotiations began in Geneva, Switzerland to explore the structure of a settlement that would integrate the components of the UN General Assembly resolution. In November, 1982, hard-liner Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev died and the new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov gave a ‘hint of flexibility’ during a meeting with President Ziaul Ziaul Haq who visited Moscow for Brezhnev’s funeral. In March 1983, UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar and Mr. Diego Cordovez during a meeting with Soviet leader Andropov received ‘new encouragement’ for pursuing UN mediation and counted ‘reasons’ for a for a solution:
cost in lives and money regional tensions setbacks to détente and lost of Soviet prestige in the Third World.
This paved way for successful conclusion of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva between the two sides in April and June 1983 with the agreement on essential components of a comprehensive settlement which included:
non-interference and non-intervention, guarantees by third states and arrangements for voluntary return of refugees.
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Discussions made good progress. Mr. Diego Cordovez was optimistic and envisaged ‘gradual withdrawal’ of Soviet forces within a reasonable timeframe. But Soviet-Kabul side dragged their feet indicating that the hardliners were marking time as Soviet leader Andropov was ailing. On his death, the policy was reversed to a military solution which continued under the leadership of Konstantin Cherneko and Mikhail Gorbachev till the end of summer 1987. The struggle in Afghanistan was unequal but Mujahideen demonstrated courage and resourcefulness in resistance in the face of ferocious Soviet military might including lethal artillery, helicopter gun-ships and bombers for savage and indiscriminate destruction of villages. The United States increased its covert allocations for supply of arms to Mujahideen from US $ 250 Million in 1985 to US $ 470 million in 1986 and US $ 630 million in 1987 which was matched by Saudi Arabia. China, Iran and other countries also provided significant assistance. Pakistan calibrated the flow of assistance to Mujahideen cautiously so as to minimize the risk of spillover of the conflict. Pakistan realized that military might of a super power cannot be defeated but bleeding inside and blows to its prestige outside would bring Moscow down. Negotiations in Geneva [12 sessions in 6 years] and resolutions in OIC, NAM and United Nations were moves in that direction. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko refused to recognize the reality of internal resistance and dismissed the idea of a broad-based Government in Kabul. By late 1986, the texts of the agr eements eements were finalized and Mr. Cordovez remarked: ‘It is now true for the first time that the only issue remaining is the question of timeframe for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan’. By mid-1987, the Soviets wanted 18 months for the withdrawal while Pakistan was inclined up to seven months. In summer 1987, Soviet military offensive failed and Mikhail Gorbachev finally decided to abandon the misadventure as the imperatives of democratic and economic reforms at home necessitated and end to confrontation with the West. Meanwhile, Soviet leaders Gorbachev and Shevardnadze succeeded in getting the endorsement of Communist Party Politburo for terminating military involvement in Afghanistan. The reasons were clear:
Soviet system was faltering Economy was in decline and
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People were alienated.
The cost of military confrontation arms race with the West occupation of Eastern Europe tension with China and finally intervention in Afghanistan had ‘ruined’ the Soviet Union.
On 10th December, 1987, Soviet leader Gorbachev announced at a press conference in Washington that Soviet forces would withdraw from Afghanistan within 12 months of the conclusion of Geneva Accords and that during that period, the forces would not engage in ‘combat’. On 15 February, 1989, the last units of the Soviet forces left Afghanistan, abandoning it to the rebels and the Kabul Government under the Pashtu leader, Muhammad Najibullah who had seized power in May 1986 and was elected President at a General, Assembly on 30 November, 1986. In July 1987, President Najibullah proposed a coalition, offering 12 Ministries and the Office of Vice President to Mujahideen Alliance. Soviet leader Gorbachev also endorsed the idea of ‘national reconciliation’ but Mujahideen Alliance unanimously unanimously rejected a coalition with PDPA and the war continued. Until 16 April, 1992, government troops and various rebel units engaged in fierce battles. As a result, Kabul’s government lost control over almost all the country’s other cities. When at last, the new government of the Russian Federation and USA agreed to stop arms deliveries, Najibullah’s power virtually collapsed and on 16 April 1992, as a result of pressure from the army and he rebels, he was forced to resign. The Jam’iyat-i-Islami Jam’iyat-i-Islami under the Tajik commander from the rebellious Panjsher region, Ahmad Shah Mas’ud was now able to make its influence felt. The 50 men appointed in Peshawar to form an interim government on 25 April – April – five representatives each from the ten major rebel groups – groups – agreed agreed to elect the political leader of the Jubha-yi Njat-i-Islami, Sibgatullah Mujaddidi, as the new President. Only the Hizb-i-Islamiof Gulbadin Hikmatyar resisted and engaged in violent conflicts with Mas’ud’s units prior to the arrival of the new government government in Kabaul. On 28 June, 1992, Mujaddidi handed over his power, as stipulated in the Peshawar agreement, to the provisional President, Burhanuddin Rabbani. Hikmatyar’s statist HizbHizb i-Islami i-Islami was by no means willing to abandon control to ‘the Tajiks’ or ‘the Ubzeks’ Abdul Tashid Dostum [the Lord of the North] and stepped up its attacks on Kabul. In the provinces, the Khans were meanwhile organizing autonomous sovereignties and thus challenging the new Kabul government, which wanted to extend its sovereignty over the entire country.
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Rabbani was in a way continuing the military policy of Najibullah, as was Hikmatyar, who now tried to identify himself as the champion of ‘true Islam’ against the ‘renegades’ of Kabul. The nationalism of the three major parties to the war (Pashtuns, Uzbeks and Tajiks) referred to a united Afghanistan, although with the exception of Hikmatyar’s Hizb-iHizb-iIslami, in the 1980s all had presented themselves as secessionist ethnic parties. The war, which had led to the transformation of the qaum movement into ethnic nationalist parties, continued because no side was prepared to give up Afghanistan as an infidel of the nation-state and allow for actual secession through a complete political reorganization of the country. Islam, which had lent a powerful expression to the resistance against Najibullah’s regime, receded into the background as a political factor. It is true that under Najibullah, Afghanistan was organized as an ‘Islamic republic’ in May 1990, and that two years later, the Shari’a was introduced; but this in practice led to no results, since the institutions of the state and of the autonomous regions exercised their own authority and were no longer influenced by Islamic symbolism. The war between the resistance groups now completely centred on the capital Kabul. But no side succeeded in making a military breakthrough. Two peace treaties (signed in Mecca on 7 March, 1993 and in Jalalabad on 19 May, 1993) mainly served to stabilize the division of regional power by forming a government which embraced all parties to the conflict. However, the regions for the time being remained largely autonomous. 7 NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Murshed, S. Iftikhar, “Afghanistan – Afghanistan – The The Taliban Years” Years ”, Bennett & Bloom, London, England, 2006, P-10. Tate,G. P. “The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch ” Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, 2001, P. 111. Holdich, Sir Thomas, “The Indian Borderland”, Borderland ”, Methuen & Co, London, 1901, Quoted in J. C. Griffiths’ Afghanistan: Key to a Continent , P. 20. Adamec, Ludwing W. “Afghanistan 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History ” University of California, 1967, P.P 4 & 10. Griffiths, John C. “Afghanistan: Key to a Continent” Continent ” Waterview Press, 1981, P. 16. Newell, Richard S. “The Politics of Afghanistan” Afghanistan ” Cornell University Press, 1972. P. 48. Schulze, Reinhard, “A Modern History of the Islamic World”, World ”, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London – London – New New York, 2000, PP. 255-257.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy A Concise History Kashmir: The Struggle for Azadi [Chapter 14] Basis of ‘Kashmir Dispute’
The partition of British Indian Empire was based on the principle of ‘self determination’ by Muslim majority areas forming ‘Pakistan’ and Hindu majority areas setting up ‘Indian’ state state in accordance with the ‘Partition Plan of 3 rd June, 1947’. Pakistan emerged on the map of the world through the exercise of ‘self determination’ on 14th August 1947 and India became an independent state on 15th August, 1947. All the provinces or parts of provinces that joined Pakistan did so by the express decision of the people either through elected representatives or directly in popular referendums. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General/Head of State set the goals of Pakistan’s Foreign policy Foreign policy when he declared: “There is nothing that we desire more ardently than to live in peace and let others live in peace and develop our country according to our own shade. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed people of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter. It would be Pakistan’s endeavour to promote goodwill and friendship with our neighbourly dominion, Hindustan”.1 Tension between the two new emergent states of Pakistan and India is ascribable to:
a difficult and divisive legacy, the clash of political aims and ideologies between All India Muslim League and Indian National Congress differences of religions and cultures between the two nations and adversarial perceptions of history.
Being agreed to the partition of British India, the two new independent states could have lived in peace and harmony, had India accepted the existence of Pakistan with sincerity and disputes, in particular of Kashmir not arisen due to the denial
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of right of ‘self -determination’ to the Muslim majority area of Kashmiris and utter disregard by India of the United Nations’ Security Council Co uncil resolutions on the subject. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of the 562 princely states of British India which exercised varying degrees of internal autonomy under treaties with British suzerainty over the states that lapsed in 1947, Princes were advised to accede to Pakistan or India remembering: ‘You cannot run away from the the Dominion government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible’.2 The rulers of princely states all knew that by August 15 (1947) they had to accede to one or the other dominion, since British paramountcy and its protective umbrella would disappear from their lands on that day; yet many a maharaja, nawab and nazim found it almost impossible to decide which way to jump. Bhopal in central India, chafed at the bit of integration into a domination toward which its nawab felt the strongest personal antipathy. Kashmir and Hyderabad were to prove the most difficult problems. The Himdu maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh refused to join either eith er dominion, fearing he would be dethroned by Jinnah for religious religious reasons, yet ‘hating Nehru with a bitter hatred’ because of his socialist proclivities and democratic demands. The nazim of Hyderabad preferred to join Pakistan, if he was not allowed to remain independent, but surrounded as he was by 85 percent of his of his state’s population Hindu, he was forced the following September by ‘Operation Polo’ to integrate his domain within the Indian union’3. The Muslim Nawab of Junagadh, a small princely state on the coast of Kathiawar, acceded to Pakistan that September, though his domain was surrounded by India and the vast majority of his state’s population was Hindu. The apolitical nawab’s shrewd diwan was Sindi landowner, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto (the enterprising father of Pakistan’s late prime minister, Zulfi Bhutto), who drafted the documents of accession and personally delivered them to Jinnah. Nehru and Patel were outraged when they learned of Junagadh’s ‘treachery’ and delayed martial invasion only till November, driving Muslim courtiers like the Bhuttos to sail from Veraval port to Karachi with their treasure and talents placed at Pakistan’s service.4 On Junagadh’s announcement of accession to Pakistan, the Indian government said that the decision was ‘in utter violation of principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected’.5 India peremptorily invaded and occupied the state. Two months later, Indian government itself committed an ‘utter violation’ of the principle on which ‘partition’ was based when it manipulated accession by Hindu Maharaja of Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. The procrastinating maharaja of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, (had) signed a ‘standstill agreement’ with Pakistan that permitted petrol supplies and other vital needs of that northernmost state of South Asia to continue flowing over the Pakistan roads that served as its major highways to the world. Hari Singh knew that time was running out.
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Muslim peasants in Kashmir’s southern province of Poonch were the first to revolt. That September and early October, neighboring Pakistani Muslims crossed the Poonch border to help their co-religionists co-religionists fight against the maharaja’s forces sent to put down the revolt. By mid-October Pakistan stopped all shipments of vital supplies to Kashmir. New Delhi then ‘decided to step into the breach and and try to send such things as salt, kerosene and sugar’ to ‘blockaded’ Srinagar.6 A Knight of the British Empire, Sir Cyril Radcliff betrayed the trust reposed in him as the supposedly impartial head of Boundary Commission. Departing from the principle of the partition, he unjustly awarded two Muslim-majority tehsils of Gurdaspur district to India, providing a land link to the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Maharaja’s collusion with the Indian government sparked popular agitation and revolt. In Gilgit Agency, the local authority decided with the enthusiastic backing of the people to declare allegiance to Pakistan. The people of Poonch and Mirpur districts, home to sixty thousand demobilized soldiers of the Second World War rose in revolt and declared the formation of Azad (free) Jammu and Kashmir government. The Maharaja’s forces embarked on ‘systematic savageries’ against unarmed Kashmiris. They were assisted by the forces of the state of Patiala which were under Indian control after the state acceded to India.7 On October 23, British trucks and jeeps of the Pakistan army loaded with some 5,000 armed Pathan Afridi, Waziri and Mahsud tribesmen of the North-West Frontier crossed the Kashmir border and headed east along the Muzaffarabad-Baramula road that led to Srinagar itself. Reports of the raiders burning and seizing Muzaffaarabad reached New Delhi unofficially on the night of October 24 and the next morning Pakistan army officially informed New Delhi’s sister -dominion command that ‘tribal volunteers’ had ‘entered’ Kashmir, ‘their advance guard…only 35 to 40 miles from Srinagar. Mountbatten summoned an emergency meeting of the Indian Defence Committee that Saturday morning and they agreed to assemble all the arms and aircraft they could find for possible immediate dispatch to Srinagar. V. P. Menon was sent flying over Himalayan heights to see if he could convince Hari Singh to sign an agreement at this this point. Menon returned early Sunday morning, October 26, to report to Mountbatten, Nehru and Patel that the maharaja ‘had gone to pieces completely’ and could ‘come to no decision’. His state prime minister, M. C. Mahajan (later chief justice of India), however, proved ‘receptive’ to Menon’s mission and returned with him to New Delhi where he met met with Nehru and Patel. “I requested immediate military aid on any terms”, Mahajan recalled, urging Nehru to “Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and give whatever power you desire to the popular party. The army must fly to save Srinagar this evening or else I will go to Lahore and negotiate terms with Mr. Jinnah”. Mahajan reported that Nehru ‘became upset’ and ‘angry’ at the mention of Jinnah’s name and ordered him ‘away’, but Patel detained him, whispering “Of course, Mahajan, you are are not going to Pakistan”. The Sheikh Abdullah, who appears to have been ‘listening’ from an
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adjoining bedroom in Nehru’s Delhi house, sent in a ‘message’ to second Mahajan’s advice, which instantly changed Nehru’s ‘attitude’. The next morning, the defence council met and decided to airlift the First Sikh Battalion from New Delhi to Srinagar. “In the early hours of the morning of the 27th”, Mahajan wrote, “I could hear the noise of the planes flying over Sardar Baldev Singh’s house [where Mahajan spent the the night] and carrying the military personnel to Srinagar. At about 9 a.m. I got a message from …Srinagar that troops had landed there and had gone into action. On receipt of this message, I flew to Jammu with Mr. V. P. Menon … Mr. Menon and myself mete His Highness [Hari Singh had driven down from Srinagar the previous night to his Winter capital] at the palace …after some discussion, formal documents were signed which Mr. Menon took back to New Delhi …I stayed at Jammu. This was a narrow shave”. Mahajan’s autobiographical account of this most important sequence of events is at critical variance with previous reports published by V. P. Menon and others close to Nehru and Patel and associated with the Government of India at the time. Menon insists that Kashmir’s Kashmir’s ‘instrument of accession’ was signed and delivered to New Delhi before any Indian troops were flow into action at ; Mahajan reports the reverse. The Kashmir was, in legal terms, based on having secured a legitimate instrument of accession prior to airlifting any troops into the Vale. Mountbatten, of course, understood that ‘the risk of Pakistan also sending troops would be considerable’ and if that occurred then two Commonwealth armies, each trained and led by British commanding officers, would have had for the first time in history to face one another on the field of battle. It would have been so ignominious, so utterly intolerable a conclusion to his ‘last Chukka in India’ that Mountbatten had to move heaven and earth to avoid so tragic a denouement. He had, in fact, assembled over a hundred transport planes, civil as well as military, at Delhi’s airport with less than a day’s notice, and packed India’s best Sikh regiment inside those planes, fueled up and kept ready to take off before dawn on October 27. All that he lacked was the signed accession, which would, he rightly reported to his royal cousin, ‘fully regularize the position and reduce the risk of an armed clash with Pakistan Pak istan forces to the minimum. I shall relate a little further on how lucky it was that this accession was accepted”. The crisis situation Mountbatten faced during that last terrible week in October obviously did not permit the luxury of holding a plebiscite or referendum. The tribals were burning, looting, raping, shooting and within within a day’s march of Srinagar – where hundred of thousands of people were virtually unprotected or, as Mountbatten quite accurately put it, “time did not, of course, permit the will of the people being ascertained first”, prior to lifting those guardian troops tro ops over the Himalayan wall that separated Delhi from Srinagar. By the same token, then, should time permit the indecision of an autocratic maharaja who had ‘gone to pieces’, fled Srinagar and abandoned his own subjects to a fate worse than death, to stand in the way of their salvation ? “Even after this decision had been reached Lord Mountbatten and the three British Chiefs of Staff of Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks involved in the operation”, V. P. Menon reported. “But Nehru asserted asserted that the only
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alternative to sending troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinaga, which would be followed by a major communal honocaust in India. Moreover, the British residents in Srinagar would certainly be murdered by the raiders, since neither the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief nor the Supreme Commander was in a position to safeguard their lives”. What else Lord Mountbatten possibly have done in the face of such dire warnings, threats and advice ? To hesitate for even an hour might have proved fatal to so precarious an operation. On October 27, as soon as Governor-General Governor-General Jinnah learned of India’s airlift to Srinagar, he ordered his ‘acting’ British commander -in-chief -in-chief (General Messervy was on leave), Sir General Douglas Gracey, to ‘move two brigades of the Pak army into Kashmir …one from Rawalpindi and another from Sialkot. The Sialkot army was to march to Jammu, take the city and make the Maharaja a prisoner. The Rawalpindi column was to advance to Srinagar and capture the city”. Such strategic action action could have secured Kashmir for Pakistan while saving Srinagar from ‘tribal anarchy’. General Gracey refused, however, to accept those orders from his governor-general, informing Jinnah that ‘he was not prepared to issue instructions which would inevitably inevitabl y lead to armed conflict between the two Dominions and the withdrawal of British Officers, without the approval of the Supreme Commander” [Field Marshal Auchinleck]. Mr. Jinnah insisted on the orders being issued at once. General Gracy informed Field Marshal Auchinleck from Rawalpindi by phone at 1.00 A.M. on October 27-28 that he had ‘received orders from Jinnah which if obeyed would entail issue ‘Stand Down’ order, Auchinleck wired his chiefs of staff in London on October 28, a ‘stand down’ order meant the automatic withdrawal of all British officers from a dominion army. The “Auk” flew into Lahore from Delhi that fateful morning of October 28 and was met at the airport by Gracey, who stated that the orders Gracey had not obeyed were nonetheless issued to to Pakistani troops ‘to seize Baramula and Srinagar also Banihal Passa and to send troops into Mirpur Mirpur district of Jammu’. The supreme commander and General Gracey went to confront Jinnah immediately to explain the ‘situation vis-à-vis British officers very clearly’, Auchinleck reported to London. “Gracey also emphasized military weakness of Pakistan while I pointed out incalculable consequences of Kashmir’s sudden accession”. “His approach to Jinnah”, Mountbatten reported of Auchinleck’s crucial confrontation in Lahore, ‘was based on the fact that India’s acceptance of the accession of Kashmir’ was just as legally proper and correct as Pakistan’s acceptance of Junagadh’s accession; that India had a perfect right to send troops to the State in response to Maharaja’s Maharaja’s request; and on the extreme weakness of the Pakistan Army, and its virtual usefulness without British Officers’. Jinnah “withdrew orders”, Auchinleck was able to report at the end of his longest day da y in India’s service. 8 Nevertheless, the fight between the tribals and Indian forces continued unabated. Meeting stiff resistance by the people of Kashmir, India lodged a complaint with the UN Security Security Council. Pakistan filed a counter-complaint. After listening listening to both sides, the Security Council established in January 1948, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan [UNCIP]. At UNCIP’s initiative, the 15-member 15-member Council adopted a st resolution on 21 April, 1948 recommending measures “appropriate to bring about
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cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free impartial plebiscite to decide whether the state of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan”. On 13th August, 1948, UNCIP adopted a more elaborate three-part resolution providing for:
a ceasefire, a truce agreement and plebiscite.
Both India and Pakistan reaffirmed “their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people”. On 5th January, 1949, UNCIP adopted another resolution incorporating:
supplementary principles about truce the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator and arrangement for a free and impartial plebiscite. India leveled baseless accusations of non-compliance by Pakistan.
A joint appeal by President Truman [USA] and Prime Minister Attlee [UK] on 31 August, 1949 for ‘arbitration’ on differences of interpretation of the UNCIP plan did not elicit any positive response from India. The message was sent by US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson to Indian Prime Minister Nehru recommending acceptance of McNaughton’s realistic approach to the demilitarization issue. st
Mr. Owen Dixon of Australia, the next UN representative e, tried to secure India’s agreement agreement to alternative proposals but came to the conclusion that India’s India’s agreement ‘would never be obtained to demiliterization’. Proposals made by the UN Security Council President in December 1949, General A.G.L. Mc Naughton of Canada for reduction of forces on both sides of the ceasefire line prior to the plebiscite were rejected b y India. Pakistan’s decision to enter into alliance with the United States in 1953 was used by India as a pretext to renounce the pledge of plebiscite, refusing to explain how Pakistan’s relations with another country could prejudice the Kashmiri right of selfdetermination or absolve India of its international obligations. Groaning under occupation and suppression, the people of Indian-held Kashmir grasped every opportunity to protest against the denial d enial of their fundamental right to self-determination.
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In 1973, the valley exploded in protest following the discovery of a book in a library in Anantnag with a drawing of the Prophet. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
M. A. Jinnah, ‘Speeches as Governor General ’, ’, Ferozsons, Karachi, 1981, pp. 11, 62 & 65. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Campbell-Johnson, ‘ Mission Mission with Mountbatten’, Robert Hall, London, 1972, pp. 51-56 Stanley Wolpert, ‘Jinnah of Pakistan’, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1989, pp. 335-336. Ibid. p. 347. UN Security Council’s Official Records: 250th Meeting, 18th February, 1948. Ibid. pp. 347-348 Suroosh Irfani, ‘Fifty Years of the KASHMIR dispute’, University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad, 1997, p.13. Ibid. pp. 348-351
PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] The Afghanistan Civil War, 1990-1998 [Chapter 15]
Although Soviet forces had withdrawn from Afghanistan following the signing of Geneva Accords between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Soviet Union and United States on 14th April, 1988 but the crucial question of ‘formation of Government in Kabul’ with the participation of all the Mujahideen leaders was not addressed. In fact, this was the bone of contention between President Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo which cost Mr. Junejo his Government on return from an official visit to Peoples Republic of China. During the military intervention in Afghanistan, Afghan people had suffered grievously in the struggle to recover freedom:
A million people had died in the conflict. Some six million people had to take refuse, largely in Pakistan and Iran. Around three million Afghan refugees were still in Pakistan in 2007. The economic and human infrastructure had devastated on a scale with no parallel. Damage to agriculture, irrigation systems, roads, transport and educational institutions in a traditional tribal society and least developed country was unimaginable.
The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan did not bring peace in the country as Soviets’ installed Najibullah regime fought on for nearly three more years before it collapsed in April 1992. This followed a protracted ‘war of succession’ among the Mujahideen political leaders, progressively exposing its ethnic basis. After Najibullah’s fall, Mujahideen leaders began on a hopeful note of unity at a meeting in Peshawar on 24th April, 1992, setting up an Islamic Council headed by Mr. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi for two months to be followed by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani as President for another four months as a transitional Government was to be formed in two years’ time. Prof. Rabbani refused to hold election for his successor and did not relinquish power when his term expired. This broke fighting among amon g the Mujahideen leaders. Pakistan which had had worked for ‘unity’ among Afghan parties in concert with Saudi Arabia and Iran in brokering ‘Peshawar Accord’ again joined hands and at a meeting in
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Islamabad on 7th March, 1993, Afghan leaders agreed on the formation of a Government for a period of 18 months with Prof. Rabbani continuing as President and Mr. Gulbadin Hekmatyar as Prime Minister. Although Afghan leaders re-confirmed re-confirmed ‘Islamabad Accord’ in Saudi Arabia and Iran but did not implement it as the Cabinet to be formed by Mr. Hekmatyar in consultation with the President could not be agreed upon and Hekmatyar felt too insecure even to enter Kabul. As the accord broke down, Hekmatyar attacked Kabul and intra-Mujahideen fighting began. In 1995, the situation was that:
Tajik-dominated Rabbani Government ruled over 5 central provinces with its seat in the Capital, Mr. Abdur Rashid Dostum’s Uzbek militia controlled northern provinces with his centre in Mazar-e-Sharif, A Pashtun Shura or Council governed eastern provinces from Jalalabad and Taliban controlled southern provinces with their base in Kandahar.
The Mujahideen Alliance, in fact failed to establish an effective central administration. The Northern Alliance led by Tajik Panjsher valley leader Ahmed Shah Masood received assistance from foreign countries to sustain itself in power but did little to either ‘establish security’ or ‘economic reconstruction’ of the ruined country. The absence of a national army, financial resources and administrative reach led to anarchical conditions in the country with warlords and local commanders trying to impose their personal control through intimidation and extortion. On 6th September, 1995, Pakistan’s expectations of a friendly Government in Afghanistan received a severe setback when its embassy in Kabul was ransacked by a Governmentsponsored mob. One employee was killed, Ambassador and 40 officials were badly injured and the building and official record was burnt. Pakistan exercised ‘restraint’ in this difficult situation which paid positively as an Afghan Government delegation in a visit in May 1996 acknowledged ‘liability’ for the reconstruction of the embassy. The Rise of Taliban
Graduates and students of religious seminaries, ‘ The Taliban ’ had played a significant part in the struggle against Soviet occupation but did not have any organization and therefore, could not play a role in the new power structure under Mujahideen leaders.
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The beginning of their rise to prominence was incidental due to a local happening in a southern village in 1994. Outraged by the offensive social behavior of a local commander, the villagers approached the local M ull ah Omar Omar to intercede with the authorities. M ull ah Omar Omar led a procession to the office of the local commander. Unable to province satisfaction or intimidate the angry crown, the commander fled. The people proclaimed M ull ah Omar Omar as their leader. Other people in in the neighborhood who were fed up with the brutalities brutalities of the local Omar who found commanders, violating the Islamic teachings rallied around M ull ah Omar himself at the head of a popular revolt. His Taliban supporters were warmly welcomed in other villages. Consequently, they took over the provincial capital of Kandahar without a fight. Warlord Commanders did not put up any resistance as the Taliban were invited by the people of other provinces. Helmand, Imroz, Uruzgan and Zabul fell one after the other.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Pakistan-India Disputes and Crises [Chapter 16] Sir Creek:
The demarcation of the line in Sir Creek at the western terminus of the Pakistan-India Pa kistan-India boundary in the Rann of Kutch, has remained unresolved since 1969 when the main dispute was settled by an arbitration tribunal. For most of its length, the boundary was demarcated by the tribunal, which did not consider it necessary to take up the question with regard to the 100-km stretch of Sir Creek because here the boundary between the state of Kutch and the province of Sindh was already delimited by a resolution of the British Indian Government 1914 with the annexed map showing Sir Creek on the Sindh side and neither side had contested that fact before the tribunal. Later, with an eye on the th e maritime resources, India claimed first that Sir Creek was on the Indian side and then that the boundary should run in the middle of the Creek because it was a navigable channel. The changed Indian stance aimed to substantially reduce the are of Pakistan’s economic zone. Pakistan sought negotiations to resolve the difference but India said it first wanted to complete an air survey of the area. The Surveyors General of the two countries met in May 1989 but could not reach agreement as India no longer accepted the 1914 resolution map, considered authentic during the proceedings of the tribunal. The stalemate has persisted to the detriment of poor fishermen on both sides, hundreds of whom are arrested by the coastguard forces of the two sides, hundreds of whom are arrested by the coastguard forces of the two sides, charging them with trespass. In 2003, India shot down an unarmed Pakistani aircraft in the area, kipping all its crew and passengers. Siachen Glacier Descending from the lofty Karakorum Range at elevations of 5,000 meters or more, the Siachen Glacier traverses part of Baltistan in the Northern Areas whose inhabitants threw off the yoke of Maharaja of Kashmir in 1947. The area was so difficult to access and so inhospitable that no fighting took place here in any of the three wars between two countries.
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After the two sides agreed to half hostilities, an agreement was reached on 27th July, 1949 at a meeting of the military representatives of the two countries under the auspices of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan [UNCIP] on the ceasefire line. Pakistan exercised control in the glaciated area up to the Karakorum Pass. Following the Sino-Pakistan agreement of 1962, the provincial boundary between the Xinjiang region of China and the Northern Areas of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan’s control started from the tri-junction tri-junction with Afghanistan in the West to the Karakorum Pass in the East. India’s protest against the agreement, claiming that Kashmir was part of its territory, stated that the portion west of the Karakorum Pass was under ‘Pakistan’s unlawful occupation’, implicitly conceding that the pass was under Pakistan’s control.1 Other evidence of Pakistan’s control over the region was available in the ‘permits’ granted by the Pakistan Government to mountain climbing expeditions. After 1965, the two countries agreed agreed to revert to ‘ status status quo’ ante. During the 1971 war, there was no change of control over the territory in the region. The terminus of the ‘Line of Control’ resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 remained the same as that of the 1949 ceasefire agreement.
Salal, Wuller, Baglihar and Kishenganga Projects:
The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 allows construction of run-of-river power plants but forbids the construction of dams on the western rivers in excess of prescribed limits. However, if India plans projects that interfere with the flow of rivers, New Delhi is under obligations of the treaty to provide relevant data to Pakistan. And if Pakistan feels that the magnitude of the dam is in violation of the treaty provisions, it is entitled to raise the issue in the permanent Indus Commission. Even if they fail to reach agreement, either side can refer the dispute to the World Bank for the appointment of a neutral expert whose verdict is binding on both parties. p arties. Four such issues had arisen since 1960:
1.
In 1970s, India decided to build a dam on the Chenab River at Salal, the two governments took up the issue after the Indus Commission failed to settle it. Consequently, India agreed to reduce the height of the dam so as to address Pakistan’s concerns r egarding egarding interference in the flow of the river. In early 1980s, Indian government embarked on the construction of a barrage on the Jhelum River at the mouth of the Wuller Lake, envisaging the creation of storage. Finding it 33 times in excess of the prescribed limit, Pakistan R. K. Jain, ed. ‘China‘China-South Asian Relations’ Vol. 1, p. 197.
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raised the issue in the Commission in 1985 where no progress was made. In 1987, Pakistan asked India to discontinue construction, pending resolution of the question. After some delay, India suspended the work. India then argued that the barrage could be of mutual mutu al benefit. Without entering into a controversy over this argument, Pakistan declined to take part in any discussion that would tinker with the provisions of the treaty, it sanctity being too vital for Pakistan. It asked India to first acknowledge that the project was inconsistent with the treaty. India was unwilling to do so but offered, in 1989, to change the design and operating procedures to eliminate any harmful effects on Pakistan. The two sides then exchanged drafts of a possible compromise. No agreement was reached despite numerous meetings at the level of the commission as well as government. After India suspended implementation of the project because of uprising in Kashmir, the problem lost urgency. Another dispute arose when India decided to build a hydroelectric power project on the Chenab River with a dam at Baglihar upstream from the Salal Dam. The reservoir was far in excess of the prescribed limit and would enable India to manipulate the flow of the river in a way that would lead to either complete stoppage for up to 28 days during the critical wheat growing period of December to February or open the flood gate to inundate the land in Pakistan. At first, India did not provide the requisite data about ab out the project in advance and they delayed a visit by the Pakistani experts to the site as required under the treaty. Negotiations at the level of Commissioners from 2001 to 2004 proved in fructuous as India maintained that the design of the dam did not violate the treaty. The matter was taken up at the level of Government Secretaries in January 2005 but the stalemate remained unbroken. Pakistan offered to continue bilateral negotiations, provided India suspended construction work but India rejected the proposal. As work proceeded to complete the first phase of the project by the end of 2005, Pakistan decided to refer the issue to the World Bank invoking the treaty provision that entitles either party to request the appointment of a neutral expert. The World Bank nominated the expert in July 2005. After learning that India planned to build a power project on the Kishenganga tributary of the Jhelum River, Pakistan objected on the ground that diversion of the stream would violate the Indus Waters Treaty. The Indus Commission commenced discussion of the issue in 2005.
Consular Missions:
When Pakistan and India resumed diplomatic relations in 1976, following the IndoPakistan War of 1971, New Delhi proposed the reopening of Consular Offices of the two countries and offered to lease Jinnah House in Mumbai as Pakistan’s Consulate. Since Jinnah House, owned by the Founder of Pakistan until it was taken over by the Indian government as ‘evacuee property’ was on lease lease to the British Deputy High Commission and its vacation had entailed some delay, India sought permission to open its Consulate in advance. Pakistan agreed to the proposal and the promise by reiterated by Indian External
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Affairs Minister in Parliament on two t wo different occasions, affirming: ‘The property is at present leased out to the British High Commission and on expiry of the lease in December 1981, it is propos4ed to lease out this property to the Pakistan Embassy for use by the Consulate’.2 However, when Jinnah House was vacated by the British Deputy High Commission, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to refuse its lease to Pakistan. Meanwhile in August 1980, the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi sought the permission of the Indian government for the purchase of a plot of land for the construction of the Consular Office in Mumbai. New Delhi refused the request on the ground that the location was not suitable. Nor was India prepared to help Pakistan acquire an alternative site. In August 1992, Pakistan Government sent Consular Staff to open an Office in Mumbai. They had to stay in a hotel and were hounded by the Indian intelligence personnel. Pakistan was obliged to close down the Office in March 1994 but the Indian Consulate in Karachi continued to function even though it was known to the Pakistani authorities that the bulk of its personnel did not belong to the commerce and external affairs ministries of India. After the evidence of subversive and terrorist activities by the Indian Personnel was discovered, Pakistan Government was obliged to order the closure of the Indian Consulate in December, 1994. In 1992, the diplomats of the two countries agreed on a bilateral ‘code of conduct’ for the treatment of the personnel of the missions. But this was a superfluous exercise in view of the fact that their privileges and immunities are spelt out in international conventions on diplomatic and consular relations. The problem was not that of ‘lack of norms’ but of ‘political will’ to observe International International Law as both the Governments had accused each other of using their diplomatic staff for activities incompatible with their legitimate functions. Apart from vigilance which is the right of the host government, the authorities have been accused of violating immunities and Statement of Mr. V. P. Narasimha Rao in Parliament on 2nd September, 1980 and then on 25th March, 1982. even resorting to violence against the staff. Whatever the merits of these allegations, it was obvious that instead of contributing to the furtherance of normal relations between the two countries, the Consular Missions added to the ‘bitterness’.
2.
In April 2005, two countries agreed to reopen the Consular Missions, hoping to open a new chapter in their bilateral relations. Indian Plan for Attack on Kahuta, 1984:
Pakistan received a number of intelligence reports during 1983-85 that India was preparing an air attack on its uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. In 1984, Islamabad received information from a friendly country, alerting it to the imminence of an Indian
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attack. Reports indicated that India might act in collusion with an Israeli agency or the Soviet-installed Afghan regime. Washington, however, informed Islamabad after checking from Tel Aviv that it was false. As for India, Islamabad took the precaution of informing New Delhi through friendly intermediaries that any such attack would be treated as an act of aggression. Concerns on this account subsided after Pakistan and India agreed informally in December 1985 to refrain from attack at tack on each other’s nuclear installations. A formal agreement was later signed which entered into force in 1988. The Brasstacks Crisis, 1986-87:
Another crisis erupted when India decided to hold the largest combined military military exercise in South Asian history, code-named code-named “Brasstacks” in the winter of 1986-87. 1986-87. Planned by the hawkish Indian Army Chief, General Krishnaswami Sundarji, the exercise was comparable in scale to the biggest exercises by NATO or the Warsaw Pact. It envisaged the concentration of a quarter of a million troops, nine army divisions, five independence armoured brigades and 1300 tanks in western Rajasthan, at places hardly 50 kilometers from the Pakistan border, giving the assembled forces the capability to launch a piercing strike into Pakistan to cut off northern Pakistan from the southern part. Contrary to the existing understanding, the Indian Army Chief did not inform his Pakistani counterpart of the location, schedule and scale of exercise. Specific requests to this effect by the GHQ on the ‘hot line’ and by diplomats in New Delhi were rebuffed. Concerned about the situation, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo took up the matter with Rajiv Gandhi in their meeting during the SAARC summit in Banglore in November 1986. He was given to understand that the exercise would be scaled down which was, however, not done. As a precaution, the Pakistan Army decided to extend its own winter exercises and later, in December 1986, as the crisis escalated, moved some of the formations to forward areas, north of the Sutlej river opposite the Indian town of Fazilka and west of the Ravi in Sialkot district. The Indian officials termed the Pakistani action as ‘provocative’. They perceived the Pakistani force dispositions as a pincer posture menacing the security of the troubled Indian state of Punjab where the Sikh people had been up in arms since the Indian Army’s assault on the Golden Temple, their most sacred shrine in 1984. In January 1987, the crisis reached to the peak when the Indian Government demanded a pullback of Pakistani forces ‘within 24 hours’. Pakistan pointed o ut that India should first remove the cause of the Pakistan reaction. Both countries placed their forces on ‘alert’. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi publicly expressed ‘tremendous concern’. N 20th January, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet met in emergency session under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and decided to try to defuse the dangerous situation. Prime Minister Junejo telephoned his Indian counterpart, Rajiv Gandhi and suggested immediate talks at the level of the Foreign Secretaries to discuss the mutual withdrawal of forces to peacetime locations. An agreement was signed in New Delhi on 4th February, providing for deactivation of forward air bases and sector-by-sector disengagement and return of
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forces to their peacetime locations, to commence in the Ravi-Chenab sector in the north. The storm which had been brewing over several months, passed over within days. da ys. In 1991, the two countries concluded an agreement which specified force thresholds and distances from the border that would require prior notification in the event of exercises or troop movements to preclude recurrence of unintentional crises. Under another such agreement concluded in the same year required advance communication about aircraft flying in proximity to the other side’s airspace. Re-entry to the Commonwealth:
British partisan role in the 1971 crisis was disappointing for Pakistan as British British failure to censure Indian military intervention was reflective of an expedient and unprincipled policy. London did not even allow a decent interval to lapse before it decided d ecided to extend recognition to Bangladesh, persuading several countries of Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand to do so simultaneously. In anger, Z. A. Bhutto decided to pull out of the Commonwealth. A Quick analysis revealed that the pullout would not entail any great loss except inconvenience to Pakistani settlers in Britain. National pride would be served by giving a counter-punch to Britain which looked at the Commonwealth as a source of o f comfort in its time of decline from a ranking world power status. If the precipitate decision to quit the Commonwealth was largely Bhutto’s the decision by President Ziaul Haq to rejoin was no less personal. It was made at the suggestion of the visiting British leaders, subject to the condition that re-entry was arranged in an honourable way. For several years, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi frustrated the proposal. She vetoes Pakistan’s return at the Melbourne summit in 1980, despite pleadings by the Australian Prime Minister. Her decision was also quite personal and surprised even the Indian Foreign Secretary who had earlier told the Pakistani Ambassador that India would not stand in the way. Prime Minister Minister Rajiv Gandhi followed his mother’s line, justifying the opposition to Pakistan’s return to the Commonwealth on the ground that Pakistan was ruled by a dictator. Actually democratic rule was not a precondition for membership at that time. In any case, India did not abandon its opposition even after elections in 1985, the installation of a civilian government and an end to martial law. Not until after the 1988 election in Pakistan did New Delhi relent. If Pakistan’s manner of leaving the Commonwealth in a huff was childish, that of suing for re-entry also did not reflect maturity of decision-making in foreign policy.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI Nuclear Tests [Chapter 17]
India conducted multiple nuclear explosions on 11th and 13th May in 1998 and became a declared ‘Nuclear Power’. There were two motives behind b ehind this move:
To demonstrate that New Delhi is the ‘major power’ of the region. To challenge Pakistan’s nuclear capability.
Pakistan was confronted with a dilemma:
not to test the nuclear device tantamount to jeopardizing jeopardizing the national security & conducting the nuclear tests, meant threat of economic sanctions at a time when country’s international debt of US $ 18 billion in 1988 had doubled to US $ 36 in 1998.
For Pakistan, the security argument was irrefutable as the tone and tenor of India had changed after the nuclear tests:
threatening Pakistan to reconcile the ground realities and forget about Kashmir. In case, it persists in its current policy, India would invade and occupy Azad Kashmir.
Indian Home Minister, L. K. Advani (next in power and influence in the ruling BJP to the Prime Minister) warned that Pakistan should realize that the Indian nuclear tests had changed the strategic balance. He demanded that Pakistan roll back what he described as its anti-India an ti-India policy.
The Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. Madan Lal Khurana Challenged Pakistan to a ‘fourth war’.
Besides, there was tremendous pressure from the United States. President Bill Clinton had telephoned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif several times in the week with ‘carrot and stick’ attitude. President Bill Clinton expressed understanding of Pakistan’s concerns and promised to review US sanctions and resume economic assistance but conspicuously missing from the dialogue was the one component, most important to Pakistan, namely assurance on the key issue of ‘security’. Pakistan could not ignore the threats.
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Almost all political parties, political leaders and security analysts, Newspaper editors and columnists, the security establishment and public opinion became vociferous in demanding a response to the Indian tests and a demonstration to adventurists in India that Pakistan too possessed the b omb. Another factor in Pakistan’s decision was the realization that if it did not response immediately, international pressure would make it even more difficult to test later. Pakistan had a bad experience as after the 1974 Indian test, the West Had acquiesced in the fait accompli but targeted Pakistan by a policy of denial and discrimination in an attempt to prevent it from acquiring nuclear capability. Again in May 1998, Western states focused efforts on preventing Pakistan from following suit. Hence, on the afternoon of 28th May, 1998, scientists of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission [PAEC] and Khan Research Laboratories [KRL] conducted nuclear explosion tests in a sealed tunnel in the Chaghi Mountains in Balochistan. More were carried out two days later on 30th May, 1998, 1998, marking the success of a ‘truly ‘truly gigantic endeavours spanning three decades and involving thousands of scientists, engineers, technicians and administrative personnel.1 1.
Sattar, Abdul, “PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: 1947 -2005” -2005” Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 201-2, 201 -2,
2.
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Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] Terrorism [Chapter 20]
After 9/11, Pakistan became a frontline state in the ‘war on terrorism’ and intensified intensified its pursuit of foreign militants many of whom were brought by CIA to assist the Afghan Mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviet occupation occ upation of Afghanistan. In 2003, Pakistan deployed over 70 thousand armed forces personnel in the border areas adjoining Afghanistan to flush out foreign extremists and their local supports, incurring heavy costs in lives during the protracted campaign [over 300 killed by mid-2005 – number much higher than the casualties suffered by International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan] General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan urged world leaders to promote a just resolution of international issues including Palestine and Kashmir, many of which had brought protracted suffering to Muslim people and generated resentment. Pakistan was, however, disappointed at the lack of salutary response. Negotiations at the UN General Assembly on a comprehensive international convention against terrorism were stalled because of disagreements on the definition of terrorism, with a group of states resisting the distinction between terrorism and freedom struggle like in Kashmir and Palestine. The events of 9/11 marked what the then Secretary General Kofi Annan called a ‘seismic shift in international relations’. Some states began to use the label of terrorism terrorism ‘to demonize demonize political opponents, to throttle the freedom of speech and the press and to de-legitimize political grievances. States living in tension with their neighbours make opportunistic use of the fight against terrorism to threaten or justify new military action on long-running long-running disputes’. Ironically, some nations that justified resort to violence against the ruling powers during their own freedom struggle condemned the same means when others under their yoke took to militant struggle. Such a striking contradiction characterized the Indian stance. When Bhagat Singh was hanged for assassinating a British police officer and throwing a bomb in the colonial legislature in New Delhi in 1930, the Indian National Congress described him as a ‘great martyr’ and 70 years later, the Indian Government issued a postage stamp to honour him as a national hero. But by contrast, the Indian Government described the Kashmiris who attacked the Indian Parliament building as ‘terrorists’.
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A French President Jacques Chirac has rightly called terrorism ‘a feverish expression of suffering, frustration and injustice’. Oppressive policies of states against people have historically been a main generator of terrorism.1 No state has contributed more than Israel to the generation of suffering and outrage among Muslims in recent history. As Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London has said: ‘Israel’s expansion has included ethnic cleansing. Palestinians who had lived in that land for centuries were driven out by systematic violence and terror. The methods of groups like Irgun and the Stern gang were the same as those of the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic.2 Mr. Livingstone more forthrightly castigated Ariel Sharon for continuing seizures of Palestinian land, military incursions and denial of the rights of Palestinians. Recalling that Israel’s own Kahan Commission found that Sharon shared responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila massacres, Livingstone noted that more than 7,000 Palestinians were in Israel’s jails. Since its birth, Israel has enjoyed the strong support of the Western countries with influential domestic Zionist lobbies. The United States has provided large budgetary support, allowed tax exemption for private donations, facilitated market access, supplied the latest military weapons and abused its veto power in the Security Council to shield Israel from resolutions condemning its actions, thus emboldening the Jewish state to persist in its iniquitous policies in flagrant violation of international law and the human rights of the Palestinian people. US policy has provoked deep resentment in the Arab world, Pakistan and Palestinians. It has also fuelled rage and the rise of extremism responsible for terrorist attacks on US targets. The US political elite, however, conspicuously ignored this root cause as Zionist lobbies exploited the popular outrage against terrorism and Ariel Sharon’s Sharon’ s government resorted to demonization. demonization. ‘Initial targets were and have now become Muslims. Islam targeted
As the Soviet Union collapsed, Zionists, born-again Christian priests and political lobbyists in the United States supplanted Islam in place of communism as the new threat to the West, insidiously stoking prejudices rooted in medieval crusades c rusades 4 to plant seeds of Islam phobia. For a Western world long accustomed to a global vision and a foreign policy predicated upon super power rivalry for global influence if not dominance - a US-Soviet conflict often portrayed as a struggle between good and evil, capitalism and communism - it is all too tempting to identify another global ideological menace to the ‘threat vacuum’ created by the demise of communism. As Western leaders attempt to forge the the New World Order, transnational Islam may increasingly come to be regarded as the new global monolithic enemy of the West.5 Today, the world is still divided into East and West, but with a new
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East: ‘Islam’ has replaced ‘communism’. Whereas before one spoke of a clash of ideologies, today this has been elevated to a clash of civilizations. “Clash” because the suspicion, hostility, even conflict that marked East-West relations in the old world order have survived in the new. Bernard Lewis, a Jewish authority on Islam coined the phrase ‘clash of civilisations’ 6 which was further developed by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington in an article in the prestigious Foreign Affairs in 1993. The slogan attracted worldwide publicity and influenced powerful circles in US, spreading fear that the Judeo-Christian civilization forever faced a ‘hostile Islamic world hell-bent hell-bent on the conquest and conversion of the West’7 Even though the perpetrators of the 9/11 outrage were not religious men and their motivations were political, the anti-Islamic activities exploited the crime to stoke antiIslamic hysteria. Out-of-context quotations from the Quran and incorrect translations were used to to whip up hate campaigns against Muslims. Samuel Huntington’s theory of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ did not introduce the concept; the West had been searching for a substitute “enemy” ever since it became obvious the Soviet bear was on its last legs. He was the first to articulate and define the new enmity. In particular, he was the first to unite diverse militancies in the Muslim world (Algeria, Bosnia, Palestine, Lebanon, Kashmir) and present them as part of the same whole: Islam. The Islamic civilization that Huntington portrayed was one with a long tradition of bloodshed and warfare, dating back 1300 years. It was different from and fundamentally opposed to the West, and hence – according according to Huntington – Huntington – posed posed a massive threat to it. But the “clash of civilizations” was not dismissed. On the contrary, it found a receptive and appreciative audience. Within the United States, the many vested interests associated with the defence industry seized on the Islamic threat as justification for America to remain armed to the teeth. Outside the US, innumerable governments facing militant Islamic opposition quickly realized that by presenting their conflict as part of the wider “clash of civilizations”, they could garner international sympathy (or at least mute criticism of their human rights abuse). Russia, Israel, India and until recently Serbia, all claim to be engaged in the struggle to hold back Islamic fundamentalist hordes.8 ‘To some Americans, searching for a new enemy against whom to test the mettle and power, after the death of communism, Islam is the preferred antagonist. But, to declare Islam, an enemy of the United States is to declare a second Cold War that is unlikely to end in the same resounding victory as the First.9 Daniel Pipes says: “In a world, it is a battle between secularist and fundamentalist Muslims - to be more precise, a competition between two of the great countries of the Middle East, Turkey and Iran. It’s likely to be a long, and difficult fight”.10 The terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon in Washington on September, the 11th, 2001 provided a pretext to US President George W. Bush to launch strikes against a Muslim Saudi billionaire – billionaire – Osama Osama Bin Laden, his Al-Qaida network and their perpetrators Taliban regime in Afghanistan Afghanistan declaring his ‘war on terrorism’ as “crusade”. Later President Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and others apologetically stated that this war is directed against terrorism and not against ‘Islam’. Likewise, when Islamic Republic of Pakistan had to decide to side with international coalition against terrorism led by United States or fanatic Muslim Taliban regime in Afghanistan who were perpetrators of a Saudi Muslim – Muslim – Osama Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network, it took a
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decision to side with international coalition purely on ‘national interest’ and not on the basis of ‘Islam’ or as a Muslim Muslim state.
The predominant political though in the Muslim world does not regard the West as an adversary. On the contrary, it recognizes the desperate need for cooperation in order to end centuries of stagnation, by benefiting from the undeniable progress the West has made in all fields of knowledge including political, economic and social sciences. As a perceptive US panel observed, ‘Muslims do not “hate our freedoms”, our freedoms”, but rather they hate our policies’. It blamed the government for characterizing the new threat of Muslim militancy in a way that offended most Muslims.11 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan decried ‘the distortion of Islam by a wicked few’ and urged urged the vital need to expose ‘those who wrongly claim that Islam justifies the callous murder of innocents to give this rich and ancient faith a bad name’.12 Islam
The word ‘Islam’ means ‘peace’. Islam emphasizes coexistence. Murder is a crime under Islamic law. Islam upholds the sanctity of human life and abhors the killing of even a single innocent person. The Holy Quran ordains: ‘Whosoever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as it he killed all mankind and whosoever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he saved the life of all mankind’.13
The Holy Prophet [PBUH] said: ‘A believer remains within the scope of his religion so long as he does not kill another person illegally’. Islam teaches the noble noble precept of human fraternity and abhorrence of discrimination on grounds of race or colour, language or national origin, wealth or gender. ‘There is no compulsion in religon’.14 All OIC countries joined in condemning the 9/11 outrage and several of them have also provided logistic support for the fight against terrorists terrorists in Afghanistan. Enlightened leaders in the West were also anxious to avoid besmirching Islam and alienating the large Muslim world. President Bush and Prime Minister Blair took the trouble to quote from the Quran to emphasize that Islam was a religion of peace. 15 They were not oblivious to the value and importance of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s support, not only because of its location, but also because, as a large Muslim nation, its decisions would influence other Muslim nations. Osama bin Laden exploited the concept of jihad jihad in pursuit of his self-proclaimed mission against the government of his country – country – Saudi Saudi Arabia and later against the United States.
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But his influence owed much to his role, with the encouragement and even the instigation of the United States in the Afghan liberation struggle against Soviet occupation. Supporters of the struggle including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Arabia and the United States were not averse to the invocation of jihad by the Mujahideen alliance to fight Soviet expansionism. The CIA reportedly recruited some twenty-five thousand Arabs to join the war.16 After the war was won, some of these and other foreigners skilled in making bombs joined bin Laden and al-Qaida. The United States was not their only target but Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were also their victims. The Islamic doctrine of Jihad is too often mistranslated as ‘holy war’ by militants as at the moment. In fact, the word Jihad means a struggle by thought, by pen or by an action, by an individual or collectively against the anti-Islamic forces to promote the cause of Islam in its letter and spirit with the ultimate goal of achieving the blessings of Almighty ‘maximum effort put in the way of Allah. The word Jihad has been explained as the ‘maximum Almighty Allah to protect the religion in the face of enemies’.17 Syed Maulana Abul A’la Maudoodi explaining the term ‘ Jihad ’ used in Surah: al-Haj, Ayah: 78 of the Holy bu t this word has been used to mean Quran says: ‘ Jihad ’ does not mean ‘Qital’ or ‘war’ but as ‘struggle, conflict and the supreme effort’ which is needed against the resisting forces which put hurdle in the way of Almighty Allah and to achieve His blessings and that one should defeat such forces for the supremacy supremac y of ‘Qalma’ and should fight for its achievement. In Jihad , only the supremacy of Almighty Allah should be the final goal and Jihad could be launched under the leadership of an Imam for which criterion has been set’.18 States have also used this word in the same sense as the doctrine of ‘just war’ but that is the ultimate shape after exploring all the other avenues and aspects of Jihad . But there is no warrant in Islamic law for the use of the term Jihad by the individual or state to proclaim ‘violence’ against another individual, community or the state. Muslims victimized:
Politically motivated exploitation of acts of militancy and violence by an extremist fringe among Muslims unleashed a wave of Islamophobia Islamophobia in countries with significant Muslim immigrant populations, especially the United States, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Muslim citizens, residents and visitors v isitors to be United States were exposed to economic and social discrimination, exclusion and discriminatory surveillance. Doors began to close for the admission of Muslim students to institutions of higher education. In 2009, Pakistani students were apprehended by authorities in London on suspicion of terrorism and following their clearance of the charges after a thorough probe, they are not being allowed to continue their education. Discrimination in employment deprived immigrants of jobs in business and industry. In the United States, ‘profiling criteria came to include ethnicity, national origin and religion, a heightened scrutiny and harassment at airports and selective enforcement of visa regulations.19 Muslims became targets of FBI interrogations while their mosques came under surveillance, creating state of fear.20
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Uncounted number of innocent Muslims including a large number of Pakistanis suffered detention without charge, loss of jobs, deportation and discrimination, not to mention those who were subjected humiliation. Some of the other Western countries known for religious tolerance were beset with an eruption of hostility towards Islam. France prohibited the use of jihab jihab in public schools. The Muslim World’s response: re sponse:
Muslim countries realized the need to project a correct understanding of their faith. 21 The 57-Member OIC, in its meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Doha on 10 th October, 2001 reiterated condemnation of the 11 September outrage, cooperation in bringing perpetrators to justice for deserved punishment and willingness to contribute to the elimination of the scourge of terrorism. It also underlined Islamic teachings that uphold the sanctity of human life, prohibit the killing of innocent people and emphasize tolerance, understanding and coexistence among people of different faiths. Another important conference of Foreign Ministers of OIC and EU held in Istanbul, Turkey in February 2002, provided a unique opportunity for better mutual understanding. Participants rejected the perverse thesis of ‘clash of civilizations’. They emphasized instead the history of mutually beneficial interaction among civilizations. The need was also recognized to combat the extremist fringe within Muslim societies. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia adopted policies to denounce such elements. Both suffered numerous attacks by terrorists. Terrorism and Religion:
Religion has long been abused to justify wars and campaigns of terror. As far back as the first century AD, a Jewish sect of Zealots targeted fellow Jews suspected of aiding the Romans. Extremist interpretations of Christianity misled medieval Christendom to unleash the crusades against Muslims. Muslims. The ‘Assissins’, an extremist sub-sect sub -sect of Muslims, th waged a campaign of terror against other Muslims during the 12 and 13th centuries. In the 15th century, Muslims were liquidated in Spain and the Inquisition carried out brutal burnings of alleged heretics at the stake. The Spanish clergy subjected the indigenous people in Central and South America to a veritable genocide starting in the 16th century. Millions of people perished in the Thirty Years War between Catholic and Protestant Christians in the 17th century.22 State Terrorism:
State terrorism has an equally long history. To deter resistance to his ambition of conquering the world, Alexander burned and razed Persepolis in 325 BC. Reman emperors Tiberius and Caligua executed people to terrorise the opposition. During the French Revolution, the Jacobins officially proclaimed the ‘Reign of Terror’ in 1793 to ensure their power in the face of opposition. Medieval invaders routinely ordered arson and slaughter in cities that resisted their attacks. As recently as the 20 th century, Britain, France and Portugal unleashed terror against freedom movements in their colonies. India
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has used even more savage, if modern, methods to suppress the Kashmiri struggle for freedom and as a result of indiscriminate killings and arson of houses and shops, the number of victims since 1989 is estimated at 60,000-100,000. The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy:
The demonisation of Islam or Palestine and Kashmiris and Chechens represents uncivilized responses to an objective problem that calls instead for a comprehensive strategy combining preventive and deterrence measures with redress of root causes. The High Level Panel of Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by the UN Secretary Secretary General in 2003 recommended such an approach. approach. ‘Terrorism’ it said, ‘attacks the values that lie at the heart of the United Nations: respect for human rights, the rule of law, rules of war that protect civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations, and the peaceful resolution of conflict’. Noting that the war on terrorism, too, ‘has in some instances corroded the very values that terrorists target: human rights and the rule of law’, it recommended: 1.
2. 3.
4. 5.
Discussion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including through promoting social and political p olitical rights, the rule of law and democratic reform, working to end occupations and address major political grievances, combating organized crime, reducing poverty and unemployment and stopping state collapse. Efforts to counter extremism, including through education and fostering debate. Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism, cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights. Building state capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations. Control of dangerous materials and public health defence.23
The High Level Panel emphasized the need to resolve ‘long standing disputes which continue to fester and to feed the new threats we now face. Foremost among these are the issues of Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula’. Peninsula’. Other wise, wise, it warned, ‘no amount of systemic changes to the way the United Nations handles both old and new threats to peace and security will enable it to discharge effectively its role under the Charter’.24 The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan had outlined a similar five-point global strategy for fighting terrorism, comprising discussion of disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals, denial of means for terrorists to attack, deterring states from supporting terrorists, developing state capacity to prevent terrorism and defending human rights and the rule of law. He criticized repressive tactics, saying “terrorism is in itself a direct attack on human rights rights and the rule of law. If we sacrifice them in response, we are handling victory to the terrorists’. 25 Kofi Annan also endorsed the panel’s recommendation for the United Nations to agree on a universal definition of
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terrorism that would stress the fact that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, could justify the targeting of civilians in order to intimidate a population or influence government policy.26 Notes Statement by Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga at 1. SAARC Summit at Kathmandu in 2002. Daily DAWN, Islamabad, 5 March 2005. 2. The Guardian News Service/ Daily Ibid. 3. Manifest in a ‘slip of tongue’ by President George W. Bush. 4. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat – Threat – Myth Myth or Reality, 5. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 4-5. Professor Bernard Lewis, author of the essay The Roots of Musli 6. Rage Quoted by Anjum Niaz in her Sunday column in Dawn, 7 November, November, 7. 2004 Dr. Iffat S Malik, “Civilisational clash or dialogue” The News, 07 8. February, 2001, p. 6 Patrick J. Patrick J. Buchanan, “ Islam - an Enemy of the United States ? 9. “ Sunday News, New Hampshire: November 25, 1990. Daniel Pipes, The National Interest, Spring 1994, No. 35. 10. US Defense Science Board report, DAWN, Islamabad, 26 Nov. 2004. 11. Message to the anti-terrorism conference in Riyadh, DAWN, Islamabad, 10 12. February, 2005. 13. Al-Quran: 5:32 Al-Quran: 2:256 14. Sattar, Abdul, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy - 1947-2005: A Concise History ”, 15. Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, p. 259. Ibid. p. 260 16. Luis Ma’loof, “Al-M unjido fil -luga 17. ”, Nashre Partau, Shiraz, Iran, 1953, Maudoodi, Abul a’la, “Tafheem-ul-Quran ”, Tarjuman-ul-Quran, 18. Lahore, April, 1987, pp. 253-4. US Commission on Civil Rights, quoted in report, “DAWN” 19. DAWN” Islamabad, 18 November, 2004. Report on Convention of American Muslim Voice, San Francisco, 20. DAWN” DAWN” Islamabad, 05 October, 2004. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia called for establishment of an 21. international centre, DAWN” DAWN” Islamabad, 07 February, 2005. Sattar, Abdul, “Pakistan’s 22. “Pakistan’ s Foreign Policy - 1947-2005: A Concise History”, History ”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, p. 262. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 23. UN General Assembly document, 29 November, 2004, p. 41. Ibid., pp. 1, 41 & 42. 24. Address to International Conference on Terrorism, Madrid, AFP 25. Report, DAWN” DAWN” Islamabad, 11 March, 2005. Report to Security Council, 21 March, 2005. 26.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] Pakistan-India Relations: 2001-05 [Chapter 21] Background
The roots of antagonism between Pakistan and India can be traced to the history of Hindu-Muslim relations and contention between Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. The ‘evolution’ of relations between between the two states of South Asia ever since independence could be better understood in the ‘secular paradigm’ of a conflict of aims between a more powerful state, seeking domination and less powerful neighbours, aspiring to protect their rights. Forgetting its own struggle for independence, India ignored the legitimate aspirations of its smaller neighbours for relations based on the principle of sovereign equality. Stepping into Britain’s imperial shoes, India imposed unequal treaties on the Himalayan kingdoms of Hindu Nepal and Buddhist Bhutan while Sikkim was forcibly occupied and annexed despite the treaty India had signed recognizing its separate and autonomous status. Sri Lanka too did not escape Indian hegemonic pressure and became the victim of interference and intervention during the 1980s and 1990s. India’s imperial attitude is partly inherited from the predecessor British rulers but its roots are traceable to great power ambitions cultivated in the minds of the Indian political elite by leaders of the Indian National Congress since the late 19th century whose dream envisaged domination over neighbours. As far back as 1895, a committee Chairman of the annual session of the Indian National Congress, Rao Bahadur V. M. Bhide declared: ‘[India] is destined under providence to take its rank among the foremost nations of the world’.1 Justifying the claim, Gangadhar Tilak argued, in a letter to President Georges Clemencau: ‘With her vast area, enormous resources and prodigious population, she [India] may well aspire to be a leading power po wer in Asia.2 Jawaharlal Nehru, the mentor of the post-Independence generations of Indian strategic thinkers, considered India as a world power, which ‘will have to play a very great role in security problems of Asia and the Indian Ocean, more especially in the Middle East and
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South Asia.’ He envisioned India as ‘the pivot of Western, Southern and Southeast Asia’.3 In India could not impose its will on Pakistan immediately upon Independence, Nehru look forward to a time when it would be able to do so. In a confidential letter (later declassified) he wrote on 25th August, 1952: “We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great to produce results in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan and at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from the armed forces but the industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength, as we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less incli8ned to threaten or harass us, and a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement that we consider fair, whether in Ka shmir or elsewhere.”4 The derive to impose its own preferences on less powerful neighbours in utter disregard of the principles of justice and international law has been manifest in India’s insistence in the bilateral settlement of differences and disputes which allows it to exploit power disparity for duress. To that end, India has refused to utilize the other peaceful means for settlement of disputes evolved by the community of states through centuries of experience. Article 33.1 of the UN Charter provides: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Developments
Ever since the events of 9/11, Indian efforts are to paint Pakistan as a ‘terrorist state’ and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen as the ‘terrorists’ backed b acked by Islamabad. Exploiting worldwide outrage against terrorism, Indian leaders accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism, bracketed it with the Taliban and adopted the pose that India, too, was a victim of terrorism. Pakistan’s point of view is that India is not a victim of terrorism but in fact, a perpetrator of state terrorism. Soon after 13th December 2001, when armed men entered the premises of the Indian Parliament and clashed with security personnel, the shadows lengthened to darken the Pak-India horizon. Without any evidence, the Indian Government charged Pakistan with responsibility for the attacks.
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Exploiting the international condemnation of the terrorist act, New Delhi escalated pressure on Pakistan:
it down-graded diplomatic relations, suspended train and air services and moved its forces including strike formations, forward to the border with Pakistan and the Line of Control Co ntrol in Kashmir. it demanded that Pakistan hand over 20 Indian and Pakistani nations who were alleged to have hijacked Indian airliners and committed other acts of terrorism in India over the previous 20 years.
Faced with the threat of aggression, Pakistan moved its troops to forward defensive e positions. For a year the two armies stood ‘eyeball to eyeball’ and on on more than one occasion, the two countries came dangerously close to the brink of war. Fortunately, the danger of a conflict was averted due to an unprecedented combination of factors:
Pakistan’s capacity for self -defence -defence acted as restraint. The risk of escalation to the nuclear level was another powerful deterrent. All major powers including United States, European Union, Russia, China and Japan counseled restraint.
After nearly a year, having incurred colossal expenditure and exposing Pakistan to a similar burden, India decided to begin withdrawal of its forces towards peacetime positions. In April 2003, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced announ ced a reversal:
High Commissioners were assigned to both the countries again. Over-flights were resumed. Cricket was allowed and Dialogue resumed.
Prime Minister Vajpayee met President Musharraf on 6th January, 2004 during his visit to Islamabad for the SAARC summit and the two leaders announced an agreement to recommence the ‘composite dialogue’ between the two countries, expressing confidence that it would lead to ‘peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues including Jammu and Kashmir’. At a press conference, Prime Minister Vajpayee emphasized that ‘violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented’ and President Musharraf reassured him stating he ‘will not
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permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in nay manner’. Progress was made at meetings held in 2004 at ministerial, foreign secretary and senior official levels to discuss the components of the bilateral dialogue with greater success on normalization issues than on resolution of disputes. President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met in New York on 24th September, 2004 and agreed on a number of normalization measures including the resumption of bus and rail links on old and new routes:
a bus service was inaugurated on Muzaffarabad-Srinagar road in early April 2005. the two sides decided to open Poonch-Rawalakot road and reopen the Khokharpar-Munabao rail link. The two sides also opened talks on Siachen and Sir Creek issues with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions. The two sides addressed the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to continue their discussions in a sincere, purposeful and forwardlooking manner for a final settlement ……and expressed their determination to work together to carry forward the process and to bring the benefit of peace to their region.
President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met in New Delhi on 17th & 18th April, 2005 and reiterated their determination that the peace process was now irreversible. Peace in Kashmir:
The relations between Pakistan and India remained strained and prospects of normalization as distant as ever because of the long lingering issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Hopes of success will remain elusive so long as India persists in its policy of denying or circumventing the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination. Mr. Joseph Korbel, a Czechoslovak member of the UNCIP gives his observations in his book written in 1966: “The people of Kashmir Kashmir have made it unmistakably known that they insist on being heard…The accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India cannot be considered as valid by canons of international law….The law….The issue itself cannot be sidetracked. The history of the case has made it clear that time has only aggravated, not healed the conflict; that neither the Pakistanis nor the Kashmiris will accept the status quo as a
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solution…No high hopes should be entertained entertained that bilateral negotiations will lead to a settlement…The United Nations has a principal responsibility to seek a solution….5 Mr. Korbel’s assessment made in 1966 has stood the test of time. time . Over 60 years of Indian occupation and repression has steeled the will of the Kashmiri people. Their heroic struggle and sacrifices have demonstrated their resolve to win freedom. Nor has India’s threat or use of force intimidated Pakistan to acquiesce acqu iesce in India’s usurpation of Kashmir. The UN Security Council has not resumed consideration of the Kashmir question since the early 1960s and although in its resolution after the nuclear tests in 1998, it implicitly recognized the ‘root cause’ of the tension between Pakistan and India and the threat it poses to the maintenance of international peace and security, the prospect of its addressing the issue remain bleak in the foreseeable future. There is no sign of flexibility from the Indian side as in a speech on 21st November, 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ruled out any an y redrawing of borders or further division. Although diplomacy remains stuck in a blind alley, the people of Kashmir have taken their destiny into their own hands. Their heroic sacrifices in the protracted struggle for ‘independence’ are a guarantee guarantee that the cause will ensure. By contrast, India’s savage repression has exposed the colonial nature of its stranglehold over occupied Kashmir. Civilized opinion in the world and in India itself, cannot fail to recognize the inevitability of conceding to the Kashmiri people their right to determine their own destiny. Debate on Opinions:
At an Iftar Dinner in Islamabad on 25th October, 2004, President Musharraf called for a public debate on options/alternatives to a statewide plebiscite for the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir. He said: a. b. c.
the state had seven geographical regions with different religions, sects and languages, some should remain with one side or the other, and the others could become autonomous, be placed under UN trusteeship or a condominium or divided between the two countries.6
There were other options in the past as well but none was acceptable to all the three parties i.e. the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and India. A statewide plebiscite remained the only formula bearing the imprimatur of Security Council resolutions for determination of the future of Jammu and Kashmir by its people.
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The regional alternative was first conceived in 1950 by UN Mediator, Mr. Owen Dixon whose plan envisaged a plebiscite only in the ‘valley of Kashmir’ of Kashmir’ assuming that some areas were certain to vote for accession to Pakistan and some for accession to India. Sheikh Abdullah floated the idea of independence after New Delhi’s interference in Kashmir’s administration convinced him that his friend Nehru Nehru was intent on maintaining Indian occupation and had no intention of allowing a fair and impartial plebiscite. Realizing he had been deceived and Nehru had merely used him to give the appearance of legitimacy to the Indian grab of the state against the principle of the partition, he belatedly started protesting. Thereupon, he was dismissed and jailed in 1953 and remained there for 12 years. The only serious Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir took place after the Sino-Indian border clash in 1962. At the urging of Britain and the United States, the two countries held six rounds of talks between delegations led by Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Mr. Swaran Singh. At first, the Indian side appeared open to discussion of the idea of partitioning the state on the basis of the presumed wishes of its people but it back-tracked as soon as the Chinese forces withdrew to the pre-war lines and Swaran Singh then spoke of the possibility of only minor adjustments in the ceasefire ceasefire line. After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, India formally put forward the idea of not only freezing the status quo but converting the ceasefire line into an international border at Shimla Conference in 1972. Pakistan resolutely resisted the Indian proposal and despite terrible pressures following the 1971 disaster, refused to barter away the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination. Acceptability to the Kashmiri people has remained an explicit premise for any settlement formula as the Pakistan government has reiterated again and again its stance that a settlement must conform to the aspirations of the people of Kashmir which has virtually been converted into an Indian military camp with deployment of 450,000 military and para-military troops. In a speech in November 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ruled out any redrawing of borders or further division. As a result, public debate on alternatives lost relevance or utility. Prospects:
Pakistan is well aware that it has to ensure its own security and formulate an effective strategy for peace and progress. More than ever before, it has to rely on its own resources, political will and defence capacity. Fortunately, the nation has the scientific talent and the political and economic resilience necessary to overcome technological
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barriers and cope with external pressures and penalties. Better fiscal management and provident policies have rescued Pakistan from the deepening fiscal crisis of the 1990s and improved the State’s capacity to sustain adequate allocations for defence defence as well as enhance allocations for economic growth and social development, thus reconciling the demands of the present with the imperatives better future. The combination of strategic and conventional defence forces has enabled the nation to improve security without excessive demands on fiscal resources. Budgetary allocations for defence have increased at a rate lower than that of economic growth. As a proportion of GDP, defence expenditure declined from 6.5 per cent in 1990 to 3.8 per cent in 2002-03.7 History abhors determinism. The future can and should be different from the past. But the past is surely a guide to the future. It has lessons to offer for dealing with the challenges that continue to hover over Pakistan’s Pakistan’s security horizon.
Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
A. Moin Zaidi & Shaheda Zaidi, The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress (New Delhi, S. Chand & Co.), Vol. II, P. 506. R. Palme Dutt, India Toady (London, Victor Gollance, 1940), p. J. Nehru, Selected Works (Delhi, Oxford University Press), Second Series, Vol. I, p. 406. J. Nehru, Op. cit., vol. 19, p. 322. Joseph Korbel, “Danger in Kashmir”, Kashmir ”, p. 351-52 Sattar, Abdul, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy - 1947-2005: A Concise History”, History ”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, p. 271. Ishrat Hussain, Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, DAWN, Islamabad, 8 October, 2004.
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PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] The UN and International Cooperation [Chapter 22]
Heads of State and Government adopted the ‘Millennium Declaration’ at their meeting held at the United Nations in New York from 6th to 8th September, 2000. They reaffirmed:
faith in the organization and its Charter as the indispensable foundation for a more peaceful, prosperous and just world and recognized collective responsibility to uphold: human dignity and equity at the global level, pledged efforts to strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as well as national affairs, free peoples from the scourge of war, strengthen security, promote disarmament and renewed support for the resolution of disputes by peaceful p eaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.
The declaration was notable for its emphasis on development and poverty eradication and the setting of goals to be achieved by 2015 including:
the halving of poverty, primary education for all children, reduction of maternal morality by two-thirds and halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS.
The summit also called for:
efforts to spread the benefits of globalization, protection of the environment and promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance and for strengthening of the United Nations.
Progress towards the realization of the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ during the first five years fell short of its targets.
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Only the momentum of economic growth in China, India and a few other countries of Asia and North Africa contributed to the reduction of the proportion of people in extreme poverty from 30 to 21 per cent. In sub-Sahara Africa, poverty was intensified and HIV/AIDS took an excessive rate, especially in low-income countries and was projected to increase from 6.4 billion in 2004 to 9 billion by 2050.
In Pakistan, the high population growth rate posed a serious obstacle to the reduction of unemployment, despite the acceleration of economic growth.
Development assistance by affluent countries remained inadequate. Only five of the 22 most affluent countries met the UN-endorsed target of 0.7 per cent of GDP for official dev elopement assistance and Only six of the rest promised to do so by 2015.
Meanwhile, global military exp0enditure began to gallop in 2002, rising nearly 40 per cent to approach a pproach the colossal total of one trillion dollars. R E F O R M of the United Nations
There was a demand for reform of the United Nations on account of:
failing states in the Third World e.g. Somalia and Ethiopia, genocide in Rwanda in 1994, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1995, proliferation of poverty, environmental degradation, rise of terrorism and recurrent crises in international relations.
In early 1990s, a proposal for enlargement of the Security Council surfaced as membership had increased greatly since 1965 when the Charter was amended to add four non-permanent seats. Japan, Germany, India and other major states asserted claims to permanent seats in the UN Security Council. The Millennium Declaration called for efforts to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for pursuing global priorities. Whilst reaff irming irming ‘the central position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative policy-making and representative organ’, the summit called for ‘a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects’. The terrorists attacks on the United States on 11 September, 2001 and the US attack on Iraq in 2003, ignoring the Security Council’s rejection of its proposal for authorization of the use of force, further underlines the need for reform.
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The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annas appointed a 16-Memebr high level panel to recommend ‘clear and effective measures for ensuring effective collective action’. The Panel’s letter, transmitting the report to the Secretary general stated: “The members of the Panel believe it would be remiss of them if they failed to point out that no amount of systemic change in the way the United Nations handles both old and new threats to peace and security will enable it to discharge effectively its role under the Charter if efforts are not redoubled to resolve a number of long-standing disputes which continue to fester and to feed the new threats we now face. Foremost among these are the issues of Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula”.1 Based on the recommendations of the high-level panel and the plan of action prepared by experts, Kofi Annan presented a plan for reform focusing on the three pillars of freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity.2 The summit meeting held in September 2005 remained content with the minimum common denominator acceptable to member states. Enlargement of the Security Council:
Discussion on the enlargement of the Security Council began in the General Assembly in 1993. Recalling that in view of the increased membership of the United Nations since 1945, the Security Council was enlarged in 1956 to add 04 additional non-permanent seats and that membership of the organization had since greatly increased again, a demand arose for further enlargement of the Security Council. At the same time, Germany and Japan staked claims to permanent seats on the ground of their rise in economic power and large contributions to the UN budget. That led demands for regional balance in the permanent category by addition of other states from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Meanwhile, a group of like-minded like-minded states known as the ‘Coffee Club’ including Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea joined together in support of a democratic and accountable Security Council in which they advocated the addition of non-permanent seats only. As consensus eluded the General Assembly and the Millennium Summit, the Secretary General appointed a high level panel for advice on enlargement of the Security Council and other UN reform issues. It too was divided and suggested two alternative models for enlargement:
n ew permanent seats without Model A provided for the addition of 06 new veto power and Model B for the creation of a new category of 08 four-year renewable-term seats.
In electing states to these seats, it would be for the General Assembly to take into account Article 23 of the Charter that provides for ‘due regard being specially paid, in the first
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instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security’. The criteria, as suggested by the panel should include: a.
b. c.
increasing ‘the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically’ diplomatically’ and those developed countries that make substantial progress towards 0.7% contribution in overseas development aid, Bringing in countries that are ‘more representative of the broader membership, especially the development world’, Enlargement should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council.
After Germany, Japan, Brazil and India formed a group (G-4) (G-4) to canvass for ‘Model A’, the ‘Coffee Club’ also became more active in support of ‘Model B’. The latter’s argument against permanent seats was founded on Article 24.1 of the Charter in which UN members ‘agree that in carrying carrying out its responsibilities the Security Council acts on their behalf’. The only way of ensuring that the Security Council actually does so is to make its members accountable to the General Assembly and to achieve that aim the accepted method is periodic elections. To have a chance of election or re-election, aspirants to seats on the Security Council should have to be accountable to the electorate. In the hope of expediting a decision, the G-4 circulated a draft resolution in May 2005, providing for expansion of the Security Council to 25 members with 06 additional permanent seats without the right of veto and 04 non-permanent seats. UN Summit [September 2005]
A Summit held in 2005, on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and attended by 150 Heads of State or Government reaffirmed:
a strong and unambiguous commitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and pledged an additional $ 50 billion a year to fight poverty. the summit resolution voiced unqualified condemnation of terrorism ‘in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes’ and affirmed the resolve to push for a comprehensive convention against terrorism within a year. Deciding to enhance the relevance, effectiveness efficiency, accountability and credibility of the United Nations, the leaders pledged collective action, in a ‘timely and decisive manner’, through the Security Council and in accordance with the Charter, to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it. The leaders agreed to replace the Commission on Human Rights with the Human Rights Council and its 47 members are to be elected by the General Assembly.
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However, no agreement was reached:
on the ‘enlargement of the Security Council,’ due to the opposing approaches of ‘dividing for privilege’ and ‘uniting for consensus’ and on disarmament and nuclear proliferation due to the th e refusal of the big powers with the largest nuclear arsenals to commit themselves to reduction of stockpiles.
Human Rights:
Humanity has coveted, craved and struggled for equal rights since since the dawn of civilization. People have sought to curtail and eliminate distinctions and discriminations based on race and colour and to supplant the arbitrary powers of rulers with a system of laws to protect civil and political rights. Islam promulgated values and laws to sanctify human rights to life, human dignity and equality without distinction of race, language, gender or religion and promoted social justice. The Renaissance movement in Europe built up the philosophic rationale for civil and political rights; these were then embedded in the Constitutions of democratic states. states. But it was not until after the Second World War that the world community embarked on concerted efforts to set international standards of human rights. The United Nations Charter reaffirmed faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women. It also envisioned higher standards of living and full employment and international cooperation for the realization of human rights and fundamental fundamenta l freedoms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly on 10th December, 1948, with only the apartheid regime of South Africa and communist states abstaining, codified as well as extended general concepts. It commenced with the inspiring proclamation ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, without distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth b irth or other status’. Pakistan’s record: record :
The Constitution of Pakistan requires the state to ensure observance of fundamental rights, including the rights to life and liberty, dignity and inviolability of privacy, freedom of religion, speech, association and assembly and provides safeguards against arrest and detention, forced labor and traffic in human beings, etc.
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The state is also party to most of the human rights treaties and has been endeavoring to raise standards of compliance by additional legislation. International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
For the promotion of economic and social progress for all people, the world community has established a number of international agencies to facilitate:
international cooperation for economic development, expansion of trade, monetary stability and the provision of multilateral and bilateral assistance to developing countries.
After the havoc wrought by World War-II, the International Bank for Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] was set up at Bretton Woods in 1944 for the purpose of providing financial assistance for the reconstruction reconstruction and development of war-shattered economies. It was later known as the ‘World Bank’. In 2003, it was operating in over a hundred countries and provided US $ 18.5 billion in assistance. The International Monetary Fund [IMF] – the other Bretton Woods institution was established:
to promote international monetary cooperation, help establish a multilateral payments system, lend out of its resources, under adequate safeguards, to needy member states to maintain adequate exchange reserves and facilitate expansion of international trade.
Unlike the World Bank, the IMF is not a provider of economic assistance but provides loans under adequate safeguards. Both expect the recipient states to follow agreed programmes p rogrammes and conditions. Economies being a developing science, the strategies followed by IFIs have evolved over time, conceding that some past policies were flawed. However, criticism of IFIs for imposing preconceived agendas on borrowers b orrowers misses two essential points:
First, they provide funds only upon application; Secondly, like any provident lender, they try to ensure that the borrower will utilize the loaned funds for the agreed purpose in a manner that will enable it to repay the loan within the agreed period. Neither writes off defaulted loans.
Foreign Assistance:
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Like other developing countries, Pakistan has over the decades received substantial amounts in concessional loans from foreign countries and IFIs. Of the total foreign debt of US $ 38 billion in the year 2000, bilateral debt was US $ 12 billion and the bulk of the rest was owed to World Bank, Asian Development Bank [ADB] and IMF. Development banks usually provide long-term loans for infrastructure projects at interest rates that are lower than the market rate. A significant part of the loans are interest-free and repayable over up to 40 years. In the decade of the 1990s, Pakistan resorted to borrowing from commercial banks, supplier-credit and foreign currency bonds at usurious rates. Most of such high-interest debt was retired by 2004. Pakistan’s dependence on foreign loans has declined declined as a result of increased earnings through exports (US $ 14 billion) and remittances by Pakistanis abroad (US $ 4 billion) in 2005 and increased flow of foreign private investment and higher domestic revenues. Meanwhile, the end of multiple sanctions and resumption of bilateral assistance have facilitated inflows while debt rescheduling has reduced the annual debt-servicing burden from over US $ 5 billion to less than US $ 3 billion. Globalization:
Globalization result from the gathering momentum of mass media, instant radio and video communications, horizontal spread of multinational corporations, expansion in international trade in goods and services and ease of movement of people across international borders has knitted the world together and make humanity more interdependent than ever before. As the Millennium Declaration of the UN General Assembly noted in September 2000, ‘While globalization offers great opportunities at present, its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed’ distributed ’. Developing countries particularly faced special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. The Declaration, therefore, called for:
broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future for humanity through international cooperation for development and poverty eradication, protection of the environment, promotion of human rights and strengthening the United Nations.
Included among measures to be taken in order to realize the objectives were commitment to good governance within each country and at the international level, transparency in financial, monetary and trading systems, enhanced programmes of debt relief and more generous development assistance. International trade, aid and capital for investment and negotiations for an orderly legal framework for enhancing their smooth flows have become an increasingly important part of international diplomacy since the mid-twentieth century. So also servicing the
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expatriater communities in foreign countries. Of course, public diplomacy to inform and influence opinion abroad has been an expanding field. Corruption:
IFIs and the United Nations have recognized ‘corruption’ as a major obstacle to economic development. In 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted an international convention on cooperation to eliminate corruption. When it comes into force, after the requisite number of states have ratified it, the parties will be required to assist one another in the prosecution of persons charged with crimes of corruption, seizing their assets a ssets and returning illicit funds to their countries. Countries that have historically attracted deposits into secret accounts are expected to reform banking laws. Meanwhile, the process of recovering illicit funds remains subject to numerous obstacles including denial of access to information, expensive litigation and interminable delays in court proce edings. World Trade Organization [WTO]:
International trade, increasing 12-fold between 1948 and 1995, has contributed significantly to faster economic growth across the globe. The WTO plays an increasingly important role in the promotion of fair and free trade based on binding rules, ensuring transparency and predictability, liberalization and reduction in tariffs on industrial products and the smooth implementation of existing agreements on trade in agricultural products, textiles and clothing, services and intellectual property and settlements of disputes. Expiry of the Multi-Fabric Agreement and reversion of international trade in textiles and garments to normal General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] rules from 1 st January, 2005 was of special importance to Pakistan as this category accounts for some 60 per cent of its exports. Open international competition was expected to present Pakistan and other major exporters of textile products with an opportunity as well as a challenge. Two principles that govern all trade-related agreements are:
most-favoured-nation [MFN] and ‘national treatment’.
Both proscribe discrimination the former in the rate of customs duty and the latter between national and foreign persons. Members of a group may, however, agree to special rates and rules governing intra-group trade. The latest round of trade negotiations that began in 2001 covers the Doha Development Agenda, focusing on concerns regarding the implementation of existing agreements, especially relating to agriculture and textiles, technical barriers and improvement of dispute settlement mechanisms etc. With the industrialized countries continuing to provide massive support for domestic agriculture, estimated at US $ 400 billion a year
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and to build new barriers, developing countries desire the phasing out of marketdistorting price support and export subsidies and improvement in market access for their goods. Central to the strategy for promoting a level playing field is a fair regime for trade in agricultural products and elimination of non-tariff subsidies on the export of agricultural products. Regional Cooperation:
Pakistan has been engaged in efforts to develop regional cooperation with countries to its west and in the South Asian region. Economic Cooperation Organization [ECO] and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC] are expected to become significant new components in the acceleration of development, although cooperation among developing countries is inherently problematic because their product range is limited and their exports are often more competitive e than complementary. Even in the Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN] region, intra-trade remained about a quarter of their global exports until economic development led to a broadening and sophistication of products that opened up possibilities for profitable exchange. South East Asian Nations [ASEAN]:
The idea of cooperation among the South Asian countries was late to be conceived and has been slow and faltering in evolution. Impulses toward cooperation in South Asia have been historically weak, w eak, primarily because becau se of political discord and the existence of bitter disputes among the states of the region in general and the two major states of the region Pakistan and India in particular. Neither a common threat perception, such as that which actuated states of Western Europe to abandon old patterns of conflicts, nor the shared vision of security through cooperation that motivated countries of South-East Asia, has existed in South Asia. Fears founded in the political experiences of the peoples of the region are compounded by asymmetries of resources. India, the largest and the most industrialized country in the region, accounts for nearly three-quarters of its economic production and trade. Conscious efforts have, therefore, to be made to ensure mutual and balanced exchange of costs and benefits. In 1990, Bangladesh formally proposed that South Asian states begin negotiations for forming a regional forum of cooperation. Actively supported by Nepal and Sri Lanka, the idea was greeted with reservation by Pakistan . Islamabad was apprehensive lest the forum be used by India to realize its dream of hegemony over the region.
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Surprisingly, India, too, appeared unenthusiastic. Its spokesmen apprehended the danger that the neighbours might ‘gang up’ against India. Actually, New Delhi was quite pleased about opportunities for expansion of its exports of industrial products to the markets of the neighbouring countries, but decided to assume a calculated posture of reluctance. In order to undercut the argument that India would be the principal beneficiary of the proposal. In the end, Pakistan decided to defer to the preference of friendly countries in order both to avoid offence to proponents and to mould the proposal so as to preclude damage. The first meeting of the foreign secretaries of the South Asian countries, held in Colombo in April 1981 endorsed the view that regional cooperation in South Asia was ‘beneficial, desirable and necessary’. They also ‘noted the need to proceed step by step, on the basis of careful and adequate preparations’. It was agreed that the decisions should be taken on the basis of unanimity. At India’s suggestion, it was further agreed that bilateral and contentious issues should be excluded from the scope of the regional forum.3 Lengthy preparatory work went into the identification of areas for fruitful cooperation. The list was progressively expanded to encompass agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, health and population activities, science and technology, education and tourism etc. Significantly, cooperation in trade and industry was relegated in early years. Some of the countries of the region wanted to gain experience and in particular, to study the implications of cooperation in trade so that their economies would not be swamped. After four years of intensive preparation, the SAARC was formally launched at a summit meeting in Dhaka in December, 1985. The SAARC Charter defined its aims of accelerating economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the member states and strengthening collaboration in international for a on matters of common interest. It also elaborated on the principles and the organisational structure of the association and the mandates of its various committees.
Notes 1. 2. 3.
UN General Assembly document dated 29 September, 2004, p. 2. Report to the Security Council, 21 March, 2005. From SAARC to SAARC, Vol. 1, SAARC Senatorial, Kakhmandu, p. 9.
4.
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Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005] Policy in a Changing World [Chapter 23]
As a means to an end, a state’s foreign foreign policy adapts to the flux in world affairs affairs in order to safeguard:
independence and integrity, protect the right of the nation to live in peace and security, promote the legitimate aspirations of its people to economic and social progress and attain a position of dignity and honour in the comity of nations.
Past evolutions in Pakistan’s foreign policy reflected adjustments to the imperative of the changing global and regional environment. The process can be expected to continue as the world power structure changes and nations rethink their priorities. Pakistan’s emergence on the world map as an independent-sovereign independent-sovereign state in 1947, only two years after the founding of the United Nations was an era of full hope of durable international peace and security based on:
the principles of justice and international law, respect for human rights and international cooperation for economic development and social progress.
With the end of the colonialism, 53 new states emerged by 1960 and another 56 by 1990 which sought to build a new international order. However, post-war optimism fell victim to the realities of Cold War and the contest for power and conflict of ideologies between the two most powerful states of the time. The Soviet Union, successor to Czarist Cz arist Russia, historically a victim of invasions from the West, sought security by perpetuating its hold over East European countries.
The United States led the policy po licy of containment of ‘communism’ because of the challenge it posed to the existing international order by its aggressive promotion of revolution and overthrow of non-communist governments.
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The Cold War triggered the formation of opposing alliances, each trying to contain the order. The world was polarized and focus shifted away from their agenda of consolidation of independence, acceleration of economic and social progress and support for struggles against colonialism and imperialism. The high hopes of the emergent nations were disappointed by the realities of a divided world as freedom struggles were distorted. The UN Security Council, entrusted with the primary objective of bringing peace and security in the world was paralyzed by the abuse of veto by the USA and the USSR:
The United Nations was rendered ineffective in settling disp utes and promoting peace as issues like Palestine, and Kashmir festered; Algeria and Vietnam suffered protracted agony, and Proxy wars were fought in South Africa and Afghanistan which was destroyed by Soviet intervention.
‘End of History’ History ’
The sudden and spectacular collapse of the Soviet system brought the ideological contest that dominated the 20th century to an abrupt end in 1991, triggering a strategic transformation in world affairs. The Communist-totalitarian system was discredited, liberal democracy demo cracy emerged as ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution… and the final form of human government’.1
Fifteen independent nations emerged out of the former Soviet Union. Germany was reunited. Proxy wars ended in Afghanistan, South Sou th Africa and Central America. [In South Africa, the protagonists of ‘apartheid’ regime reversed policy and it emerged as a new leader on the continent]. With the lapse of confrontation, United States and the resultant Russian Federation agreed on further reduction of their strategic arsenals. The UN General Assembly approved the CTBT. Expecting sharp reductions in military budgets, the developing world hoped that affluent countries would set aside a part of the ‘peace divided’ for alleviation of poverty.
It seemed that the UN Security Council could now fulfill its envisioned role of safeguarding international peace and security.
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Prospects brightened for harmony and cooperation among major powers, with each playing a role in international affairs in proportion to its economic and military power. The Power structure:
The United States, with a GDP of 11 trillion dollars – one-quarter of the world total – total – and and unrivalled capacity to project power globally, became the ‘sole superpower’ with an unprecedented opportunity to influence influence the world community’s response to the old and new challenges to international peace and progress. The European Union, comparable to the United States in global trade and with Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain among the top ten states with the largest economies as its members, is potentially another economic colossus. Sharing strong ties of history and civilization across the Atlantic, the EU is a strategic partner of the United States, with convergent international policies. The 15-member block decided in 2004 to admit ten new states from Eastern Europe. It also agreed to strengthen coordinaiton for a common foreign policy and enhance the role of the European parliament.2 Japan, with a GDP of 4.5 trillion dollars, remains at second place among stated by size of economy. A part of the West by virtue of its economic and political system, it maintains close security links with the United States, and remembering the disastrous consequences of competing for dominance in the Pacific in the 1930s, consciously avoids a high profile foreign policy. China, ranking six at present, is on the way to taking third place in the world hierarchy by GDP, thanks to political stability, development of human resources and sagacious demographic and economic policies. Committed to priority for economic development, it pursues a foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. While eschewing rivalry with other powers, it has opposed hegemony in international affairs. A soughtafter partner in trade and investment, it has broken out of the ring of containment that its erstwhile adversaries sought to erect in the past. In 2000, Colin Powell said China was ‘not a strategic partner’ but ‘a competitor and potential regional rival’. 3 Still, the containment lobby in the United States has advocated policies aimed at the build up of rivals to check China’s rising power. The Russian Federation, largest state by territory and a superpower with the second largest arsenal of strategic weapons, and producer and exporter of modern military equipment, is at sixteenth place in the world by economic size, below Canada, Mexico, South Korea, India, Brazil, Netherlands and Australia. Several developing countries have succeeded in raising per capita annual income to above $ 2,000; they include Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand. India’s rise in economic, technological and military power has added to its international importance and influence. By 2005, it was twelfth in the world hierarchy by GDP, with the potential of rising higher. With a per capita income of $ 500, it has achieved considerable reduction in the proportion of population living below the poverty line. Retaining the traditional cooperative relations with Russia, India has also pursued a policy of normalization of relations with China. China. India’s relations with the United States have continued to improve since the 1980s. In the strategic dialogue in the 1990s, the two sides discussed cooperation for security of the sea-lanes for oil tankers from the Gulf. After 9/11, India underlined a commonality of interests with the West in opposing
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‘Islamic fundamentalism’. IN March 2005, senior American officials said the US would ‘help India become a major world power in the twentytwenty-first century’. An analyst saw the rationale of his this policy of strong of strong states on China’s periphery’. In July 2005, President Bush reversed sanctions on the export of civilian nuclear technology and sophisticated weapons to India. Setbacks to an Emergent Era of Peace:
The prospects of an emergent era of peace and harmony suffered several setbacks in quick succession. Dissolution of the Soviet Union lifted the lid on unresolved unresolved ethnic tensions:
Amenia occupied the enclave of Ngoro-Karabach in Azerbaijan; Georgia was convulsed with separatism; Particularly sanguine was the suppression of Chechnya’s demand for autonomy. The eruption of ethnic tension and strife in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s culminated in a savage ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the Serbs. Serbs. Finally, the United States intervened to bring an end to the travails of the Muslim people of Bosnia and Kosovo. The UN Security Council proved powerless to enforce its resolutions. It suffered further loss of prestige because of its failure to take timely action to prevent the genocide of a million ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda. For a time, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict seemed to be moving towards a solution. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) recognized Israel’s right to exist in 1988. In 1993, President Bill Clinton mediated a successful meeting between President Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Washington, laying the foundation for the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords and the Oslo Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. Rabin, Arafat and Foreign Minister Shimon Perez were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and Arafat returned to Palestine in 1994. Clinton convened another summit in December 2000 at Camp David to promote agreement on the final status of Jerusalem but Ehud Barak obstructed a compromise. The Israeli army’s army’s re-entry re-entry into Palestinian towns, suicide attacks by desperate Palestinians and massive Israeli retaliation, confining Arafat to his small compound in Ramallah in 2001, halted the political process. In 2003, the EU, UN, Russia and USA worked out a ‘roadmap’ aiming to restore the peace process but, despite agreeing to the outline, Israel violated its basic provisions and started to build a ‘security fence’ on Palestinian land. Following Arafat’s death in November 2004, President Bush agreed to recommence efforts for a settlement hoping to see an independent Palestinian state before the end of his second term. Israel also signaled readiness to resume peace negotiations. In February 2005, Ariel Sharon and Muhammad Abbas agreed on a ceasefire, and Sharon announced a decision to dismantle Jewish settlements in Gaza and release 500 of some 8,000 Palestinians from Israeli jails.
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War on Iraq:
Iraq launched on 20th March, 2003 marked a black day in the history of the United Nations. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, a superpower, founder of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council resorted to use of force not only without authorisation by the Security Council, but in defiance of its manifest opposition. The main question before the Security Council was whether Iraq was in breach of o f Resolution 1441 of November 2002, which warned of serious consequences consequences if it did not cooperate with the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission charged with the task of ascertaining elimination of o f weapons of mass destruction. Notes 1. 2. 3.
Fukuyama, Francis, “The End of History And the Lst Man, pp. xi-xiii. Sattar, A. “Pakistan’s Goreign Policy: 1947 -2005 – -2005 – A A Concise History, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 296 Statement of Secretary of State-designate, Colin L. Powell, P owell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 January 2001.
New Great Game
The collapse of the the Soviet Union facilitated the emergence of eight republics of Central Asia and the Caucasian region viz. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia as independent ‘nation‘nation-states’ in 1991. This opened their borders to the southern neighbours of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan [connected by land through a small strip of Afghanistan] and to the Peoples Republic of China to the East. Central Asia and Caucasian region is a new geopolitical creation which has an important strategic role to play in the years to come. It is in the middle of three super civilizations the Islamic, the Christian and the Buddhist and is seen by many experts as one of the most vulnerable areas of instability between them. It can, therefore, become a natural, historically formed 'buffer zone' and can also form the 'hub' of Islamic extremism. Being placed in the middle of the Eurasian continent, it is one of the most convenient routes of 'transit'. It is rich in mineral resources, especially hydrocarbons. As a consumer market, it still remains to be exploited. All these factors lead to increasing interest in the region by various countries, its neighbours, regional states and the major powers. Before the events of September 11, 2001, there was a growing realization that the accumulation of challenges in Central Asia - especially given the escalating crisis in Afghanistan - demanded attention. But despite these concerns, Central Asia was low down in the priorities of the United States and other Governments. Even for Japan, as the
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leading bilateral donor in Central Asia, its pre-eminence was largely the result of the disinterest of others rather than a major priority on the part of the Government in Tokyo. In the 1990s, there was no real vision for the region in the world capitals, and no sense of their interaction with issues of global consequence. This changed with the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the realization that civil war and acute state failure in Afghanistan had facilitated them. Within the Central Asian region, the fate of Uzbekistan was of particular concern as it is in the centre of Central Asian Republics and the most strategically located in the region, with the largest population and the most significant military capabilities and resources. At the same time, it has been a source of regional tension and a logjam for regional developments. The internal political dynamics in Central Asia are conditioned by the pressures exerted from the Middle East and South Asia. China, India and Russia are all out to grab the tremendous economic potential of the region while Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, each projecting a different model of ideology and development has been directly involved in the religious, cultural, economic and political affairs of the CARs. On September 11, 2001, the terrorists' attacks on the Pentagon and the twin towers in New York, followed by the United States "War on Terror" against Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan pushed Central Asia, a region that had been as obscure as the Balkans several years ago, to the forefront of the world attention,. The United States’ Afghan campaign against al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan set the The stage for the "New Great Game" in Central Central Asia and the Caucasian region. region. Coined in early 1990s, the term describes an odd re-run of the first "Great Game" when Tsarist Russia conquered the Central Asian and Caucasian region and subjugated the nomadic tribes of Turkestan that rung alarm bells in London which considered it as a threat to the British Crown Colony of India. In turn, the Russian Government in St. Petersburg feared that the British might incite the Muslim tribes of Central Asia to rebel against the Russian empire. The two empires wrestled with each other for the control of Afghanistan, whose central location offered the most strategically strategically viable base for an invasion of India or Turkestan. The 'Great Game' between colonialist Tsarist Russia and imperialist Britain finally ended when Russian Foreign Minister, Count Alexander Izvolsky and the British Ambassador, Sir Arthur Nicholson signed a secret treaty treaty in St. Petersburg on 31st August, 1907 in which both the colonial powers defined their respective spheres of influence. The Tsarist Russia acceded that 'Afghanistan' lay in the British sphere of influence while in turn, Britain accepted that the rest of Central Asia fell within the sphere of influence of Tsarist Russia.
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Now, more than a hundred years later, the same Great Powers indulge themselves in another competition over the control of the heart of the Eurasian landmass which has emerged as the most promising region blessed with rich hydrocarbon reserves. However, the actors in this 'New Great Game' are more than two and the rules of the new neocolonial game are far more complex than those a century ago.
The United States has taken over the leading role from Britain.
Along with the ever-present Russians, new regional powers such as China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and India have entered the arena.
Another important actor are the 'multinationals' with huge budg ets, more than the Central Asians themselves. They are out to grab the opportunity, pursue their own interests, agenda and strategies and have signed lucrative contracts with the initial investment of more than 30 billion dollars in new production facilities and earmarking another a hundred billion dollars for further investments.
The main difference between the old and the new 'Great Games' is that while in the past, London and St. Petersburg competed over access to the riches of India, today, the 'New Great Game' is focused on the Oil and Gas resources of Central Asian and the Caspian energy reserves where at its shores and at the bottom of the Caspian Sea, lie the world's biggest untapped fossil fuel resources. Estimates range from 50 to 110 billion barrels of oil and 170 to 463 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The US Department of Energy, comfortably assumes a 50 percent probability of a total of 243 billion barrels of oil reserves. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are said to have more than 130 billion barrels of oil, more than three times the United States' own reserves. Only Saudi Arabia, with 262 billion barrels, can claim greater resources. As recently as the summer of 2000, the giant Kashagan oil field was discovered off the Kazakh coast, believed to rank among the five largest fields on earth.39 These newly discovered huge reserves should be viewed in the background of a hard reality that one out of every seven barrels of oil produced in the world is consumed by the United States. Besides, half of the American oil needs are met by imports from the Middle East [where two-thirds of the planet's fossil reserves lie] and where Washington is on the retreat in its 'War on Oil' in Iraq. The then Vice President of the United States, Mr. Dick Cheney and CEO of the oil supply corporation, Halliburton, in a speech to oil industrialists in Washington, DC in 1998 said: "I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian". 40 The Middle East is also the largest oil supplier to Canad a, Venezuela and Mexico. The US-led Afghan campaign has fundamentally altered the geo-strategic power equations in Central Asian and Caucasian region which has become the main focus of
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new American Foreign Policy. It would be naïve to understand that the American military presence in Afghanistan is exclusively for its 'War on Terror' and has nothing to do with its strategic aims in energy-rich Central Asia and the Caucasian region. In Azerbaijan,* the "New Great Game" has its origins in the discovery of oil in the early 19th Century. With the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, Azerbaijan became independent republic along with other 14 republics of the Union and slipped immediately into chaos with several governments ousted each other in a succession of coup d'etats and a totally demoralized Azeri army lost the bloody war with Armenia over the predominantly Armenian populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, bereft of 15 percent of its territory, was on the verge of falling back under Moscow's control when Heydar Aliyev, a distinguished KGB general and a member of the Politburo, was elected President of the republic in October 1993. He quickly realized that the only chance for the independence of the country and for keeping his own power, lay in the oil business for which the _______________ _______________________ _______________ _______________ ________________ _______________ _______________ ________________ ___________ ___ *Azerbaijan was originally known as the 'Land of Fire' because of natural fires, fed by gas from the soil that burnt on the Apsheron peninsula. From the early middle Ages, Zoroastrian pilgrims who worshiped 'fire' as a 'sign of God’ came here from Persia, erecting temples around the mysterious holy fires. One such 'atashgah' (Temple of Fire) still exists north of Baku. country needed money and the technology to exploit its resources, off the Caspian coast. He made his son Ilhan [now President of Azerbaijan], the 2nd Vice President of Socar, the State Oil Company and nominated a team of experts led by him to negotiate a good deal with foreign investors as early as the spring of 1994. It sent tremors in Russia and rumors of an impending Moscow-backed putsch spread throughout Baku. The team had first meeting in Istanbul during the summer of 1994 and finally reached an agreement after 47-day exhausting talks in Houston, Texas, [the unofficial capital of American oil industry] on 24th September, 1994. Several billion dollars flowed into new production facilities, with a majority shared secured by the American company, Amoco, British Petroleum, initially a secondary shareholder and later acquired Amoco and became the most important corporation doing business in Baku. Russia and Iran protested strongly against the contract, accusing Aliyev of handing out concessions for oil fields that Azerbaijan possibly did not own. This may be kept in mind that no agreement exists among the five Caspian littoral states – Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran – Iran – on on a territorial separation of the Caspian Sea. Besides, Iran and Turkmenistan laid claim to oil fields that had been given to the Western consortium for exploitation that further complicated the matter. Several months earlier, on July 21, 1994, Russian President Yeltsin had signed a secretive directive number 396, for the "protection of the interests of the Russian Federation on the Caspian Sea" which clearly stated that Russia should uphold its sphere of influence in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics.41
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Right away, Western investors in Baku were faced with the problem of how to get the oil and gas from the landlocked Caspian Sea to the markets of the industrialized world. Determined to keep precious raw materials out of Russia's reach, the United States equally rejected a southern route through Iran 42 although even American Oil Executives privately conceded that Persian route is shorter, cheaper and safer than any of the other routes through Russia, south Caucasus or Afghanistan. The United States participation in the 'New Great Game' is fully reflected in the statement of US Ambassador in Baku, Ross Wilson made to Mr. Lutz Kleveman, the writer of the book titled: "The New Great Game - Blood and Oil in Central Asia" in which he said: "As you can imagine, this region has become even more important to Washington. We do not see ourselves as part of a Great Game with Russia, least of all in a zero-sum game. We have our interests, the Russians have theirs – but they don't necessarily need to collide. Of course, the Azeris try and play off America and Russia against each other. But they understand that the United States alone is the guarantor of their independence". The US Ambassador expressed Washington's firm determination when he said: "The oil will never go through Russia". As far Iran, Azerbaijan's southern neighbouor, Ambassador Wilson's comments were less tempered. "Iran is a competitor for Azerbaijan and is trying to control the Caspian Sea. On a regular basis, Iranian ships penetrate Azerbaijan's territorial waters, and Iranian fighter jets enter Azeri space". The United States has responded by giving two new patrol boats to the Azeri border police. It remains out of question for the State Department that Caspian oil be pumped through a pipeline running across a country ruled by Sh’ite mullahs. "Iran supports terrorism and is determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we must curtail at its means of generating revenue which would help the government fund those activities", the US Ambassador remarked.43 The heads of United States, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey met in Istanbul on 18th November, 1999 and signed a treaty authorizing the construction of a westbound four billion dollar 42-inch-wide pipeline, covering a total distance of 1,768 kilometers, of which 443 kilometers lies in Azerbaijan, 249 kilometers in the neighboring Georgia and 1076 kilometers in Turkey, linking to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan which is a deep-water port that can accommodate tankers up to 300,000 tons capacity. The planned annual capacity of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was 50 billion tons of oil with pipeline’s capacity of one million barrels a day. More than for any other country on the Caspian Sea, the Mediterranean pipeline is a matter of national security for Georgia. The then Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Foreign Minister under Mikhail Gorbachev signed the agreement on behalf of Georgian Government and concentrated all his efforts into making the pipeline a reality. He says: "His aim is nothing less than Georgia's reestablishment as the center of a new Great Silk Road, linking Europe with Asia".44
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Mr. Shevardnadze's ascendancy to the Office of the President of Georgia in December, 1991 could not hold the country from drifting to chaos, political anarchy and economic melt down. His first few months in power saw the virtual disintegration of the country, as Abkhazia and the pro-Russian South Ossetia province, whose border runs only a few kilometers, north of Tbilisi, practically seceded from the rest of the country. To make matters worse, the President of the Ajaria province along Turkey's border [comprising the entire south-western quarter of Georgia, where the pipeline is to run straight through on its way to Turkey] has for years ignored any instructions from the central government in Tbilisi. Abkhazia is essentially controlled by 1700 Russian troops stationed since late 1993, allegedly to keep the peace between two opposing armies. In return for a ceasefire in Abkhazia in 1994, Russia forced Georgia to join CIS and accept 16 thousand troops on its territory as so-called peace-keepers. In 2002, Moscow conferred Russian citizenship on the residents of Abkhazia. Russia crushed a Georgian assault on the rebel pro-Russian region of South Ossetia in August 2008, sending tanks into Georgia proper and then recognising South Ossetia and the Black Sea territory of Abkhazia as independent states.45 Hence, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have become Moscow's main trump cards in the game over oil pipelines in the South Caucasus and is playing its part of the “ New Great Game” in the region. In May 2002, United States stationed 500 elite US Special forces in Georgia to train the country's raging army in anti-terrorist warfare. The Pentagon's $ 64 million program also included supplying the Georgian military with new small weapons and ammunition, uniforms and communication equipment. The 17-thousand strong Georgian armed forces also received military aid from the United States, including new combat helicopters. Mr. Shevardnadze hailed the US military presence as "a very important factor for strengthening and developing Georgian statehood". After the collapse of Soviet Union, Chechen leaders negotiated a withdrawal of all Russian troops from the republic and by the summer of 1992, not a single Russian soldier was left on Chechen soil. No other part of the former Soviet empire, not even East Germany had seen the Russian troops to leave so quickly. By now, Mr. Boris Yeltsin had become the President of Russian Federation in a fierce power struggle in Moscow with President Mikhail Gorbachev. Powerful people around him argued that tolerating Chechen independence would have set a dangerous precedent as the other predominantly Muslim mountain republics in the North Caucasus – Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Inguishtia and Dagestan could follow the suit. But this partially explains Russia's motives in the region. The most important motive of Russia attacking Chechnya in November 1994 was its strategic location in the 'New Great Game'. Only a few weeks before the invasion, Caspian Sea oil-rich Azerbaijan had signed the 'Contract of the Century' and in case, the plans for a West-bound pipeline failed to materialize, the oil of Azerbaijan would have to be continued to be pumped through the only existing pipeline to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. This pipeline runs straight across Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus. If Russia wanted to profit from the oil boom in Baku through transit fee, while trying to hold on the only export
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route as a powerful lever vis-a-vis Azerbaijan, then it had to regain control over the secessionist republic. Along with its geographic significance, Chechnya sits on considerable oil reserves, discovered and developed in the late 19th century. The capital Grozny was second only to Baku as the biggest oil town in the Russian empire. Oil accounted for two-thirds of all revenues in Chechnya, an estimated $ 800 million to $ 900 million in 1993 alone. Besides, Grozny was the centre of a major network of pipelines linking Siberia, Kazakhstan and Novorossiysk, with the flow of the Caspian pipeline traveling in reverse, from Grozny to Baku. The Soviet leadership decreased production at Azerbaijan’s oil fields to such an extent that Baku was receiving oil via Grozny from West Siberian reserves. Mr. Vahid Mustafayev, CEO of Azerbaijan News Service [ANS], the only independent TV and Radio network in the country says: "All the Caucasian Wars [Azeri-Armenian, Abkhazian, South Ossetian, Chechan etc.] are, at least partly, about oil. In the 1990s, Russia tried to destabilize the southern Caucasus by ensuring that crises and conflicts would percolate indefinitely. Russia still views Azerbaijan as part of its empire. Once it loses this country, the entire Caucasus is lost. To keep the Americans out, Russia had even aligned itself in the south with its old rival, Iran. Together, the two countries were trying to pinch Azerbaijan from both sides to restrict its dealings with the West. In Baku, there are more agents and spies than businessmen – businessmen – most most of them are Russians and Iranians.46 The Baku – Tbilisi Tbilisi – – Ceyhan Ceyhan pipeline from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea connects Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan; of Azerbaijan; Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia; of Georgia; and Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. It is the second longest oil pipeline in the world after the Druzhba pipeline. The pipeline was officially inaugurated on 13th July, 2006 in the Turkish port city of Ceyhan. In Kazakhstan, there was an oil discovery in Kashagan field, of the Caspian Sea in July 2000 which the geologists estimate an astronomical 30 billion barrels of crude while the Kazakh Government put it at 50 billion barrels which would make the Kashagan, the second largest oilfield on earth. [Ghawar filed in Saudi Arabia with 80 billion barrels is the largest while the combined oil fields in the North Sea still hold about 17 billion barrels. According to the estimates, by 2020, Kazakhstan could sell up to 10 million barrels of crude per day to the world as much as the Saudi Arabia. This potential is a nightmare for the international oil cartel Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], as it is unlikely that as non-member, Kazakhstan will respect OPEC production limits and price agreements. Kazakhstan could, therefore, break the Saudi monopoly and be a strategic major force in the 21st Century. This discovery of the Kashagan field promises massive profits which in turn, has shaken up the geo-political balance in the Caspian region, ushering in a new and dangerous round of 'New Great Game' Game' for raw materials and pipelines. The Kazakh Government has already rejected an idea of a
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pipeline, routed through Russia which has triggered a talk of a second pipeline along the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through the southern Caucasus which is both expensive and complicated as the oil will have to be shipped from Kashagan through tankers to the Caspian. However, on 16th June, 2006, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Presdient Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan met in the Kazakh capital Astana and signed an agreement to encourage and create conditions for the Kazakh oil to be delivered from Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and then onward through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline to the world market. Pipeline politics had already become a 'pawn' in the chessboard of 'New Great Game' in early 2001 when oil corporations, exploiting Kashagan oil faced the task of choosing an operator from their midst. ExxonMobil, an American company, subject to US economic sanctions against Iran, was unable to embrace the lucrative Iran option and TotalFinaElf, was unacceptable to the Americans as the French pay little heed to the call of US sanctions against Iran in their dealings with Tehran. A compromise was, therefore, struck among the Kashagan partners of Sharagan in London in February 2001, to elect the politically neutral, Italian Italian Oil Corporation, Agip for the job. United States wants the oil to be shipped by tankers across the Caspian Sea to Baku, to be fed into the Mediterranean Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, during his visit to India in early 2001, hinted the possibility of a south-eastern route through post-Taliban Afghanistan. Kashagan is not the only oil field in Kazakhstan, some 30 miles east of the town of Atyrau is the Tengiz, the sixth largest oil field in the world containing upto 25 billion barrels of oil which was discovered in 1979 for which US Corporaiton, Shevron bought bou ght a drilling concession from Kazakhstan in 1993, being the first Western oil company to massively investing on post-Soviet territory. In a joint venture with the state-owned oil company, Tengizchevroil, Chevron expected a daily output of 700,000 barrels a day by 2010 with an investment of US $ 4 billion, its largest international project, to be pumped across the northern Caucasus to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorissiisk. The Kashagan consortium fears Russia's exorbitant fees, shutdown and acts of bureaucratic sabotage which the operators of the Tengiz pipeline have struggled with, in the past. In November 2002, ChevronTexaco unilaterally decided to indefinitely postpone a long planned $ 3 billion expansion of production at the Tengiz oil field after an intense dispute with the Kazakh Government over how to finance the project which would have increased output up to 430,000 barrels of crude a day by 2005. With one new 1,065-mile pipeline already transporting Tengiz oil across Russian territory, Kazakhstan is cautious, not to make its entire oil exports, dependent on Moscow. Kazakah oil has attracted yet another regional power in the ongoing 'New Great Game' when Chinese National Petroleum Company [CNPC] purchased 60 % of all shares in Kazakhstan's 3rd largest oil field of Aktubinsk. It later bought two additional oil fields. In March 2003, China's state-owned offshore oil company, CNOOC announced the
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purchase of a $ 615 million stake in the Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan, giving the company control over nearly one-tenth of Kashagan. The Chinese Government has also reached an agreement with the Kazakh Government to build a 1,250-mile pipeline from the Caspian Sea through the Kazakh steppe to Urumchi, capital of Xinjiang province of China with an estimated cost of US $ 9.6 billion. CNPC Director General in Kazakhstan, Zheng Chenghu said there was a much larger problem. "Our situation has much deteriorated recently. The Americans are driving us out of the region. Since September 11, the United States has become very aggressive in Central Asia. The fact that they have stationed their troops here is not good news, neither for the local people nor for us. The US troops are here in order to control the oil reserves in Central Asia".47 Once Kazakh Ambassador to Japan, Sabr Yessimbekov and Chief Planner for all oil pipelines in Kazakhstan said: "In general, we do not want to pump our oil o il to the West but to the East, where the hungry markets are". He further said: "Historically, China, together with Russia, has always acted at the expense of the Kazakhs. And now the Chinese have once again become very aggressive. They are trying at all costs to get into Kazakhstan. And that is why it is good that the United States have stationed their troops in Central Asia – Asia – they they keep the Chinese out. The soldiers give us security and make it clear to the Chinese and the Russians that the world has changed. America has now encircled China militarily. Who believes anyway that for the Americans this so-called war on terror is about Osama bin Laden ? This war is about us – us – it it is our oil they want".48 United States encounters a much more hostile rival – Islamic Republic of Iran, in the 'New Great Game' being played in Central Asia, among its various neighbours, regional and major powers of the world today. Iran has suggested a route along the eastern shore of the Caspian in Turkmenistan, and onward through Iran to the Persian Gulf, offering a financial contribution towards the pipeline's $ 1.6 billion price tag. In October 2002, Mr. Mahmood Khagani, Director for Persian Gulf in the Iranian Energy Ministry asked Caspian oil producers to ignore US sanctions and to pie their oil through Iran. He said: "The Golden gate from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf is now open. Companies working in the Caspian Sea can be sure their resources will be delivered in the international markets".49 In its efforts to keep the United States out of the Caspian region, Iran has found an unexpected ally in Russia. American activities in this region have led both countries to temporarily set aside their centuries-old enmity. Now that they no longer share a common border after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and its disintegration, the bilateral relations between the two countries have become cordial. Despite criticism from the United States, Russia encourages its companies in their dealings with Iran and helped build $ 800 million first civilian nuclear power plant in Bushehr, of course, subject to IAEA controls.
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One of the principal architects of this new alliance between Moscow and Tehran was Alexander Maryasov, the long standing Russian Ambassador in Iran who said: "We are in agreement with Tehran that no other great power should gain influence at the Caspian Sea. We are against this project [Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline] because behind it lie political and strategic motives. A pipeline routed through Iran will be supported by Russia" Now the Americans have moved troops into Central Asia. There can be no partnership between us and the United States if the Americans always act unilaterally without even consulting us. The US military has used terrorists in Afghanistan as a pretext to penetrate Central Asia. For the Americans, this is about economic interests, especially the Caspian oil" As soon as our economy regains its strength, we will reestablish our old relations with Central Asia and southern Caucasus, and reassert our sphere of influence in that region.50 On 23rd July, 2001, Azerbaijan and Iran came to the verge of an armed conflict over oil as part of their 'New Great Game'. An Azeri exploratory vessal with geologists and engineers from Baku, operated by BP Amoco had ventured into the southern part of the Caspian Sea to test drill a suspected oil field. Around mid-day, two Iranian fighter jets suddenly roared over their heads and circled above the ship for two hours. A naval officer radioed the BP vessel's captain to immediately cease all drilling operations and leave Iranian territorial waters. When the Azeri ship did not change its coarse immediately, the Iranian gunboat repeated its demand, adding that there would not be a third warning. The BP vessel turned around and sailed back to Baku. The confrontation raised a much larger question that has never been adequately resolved. The five littoral states – Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan – Azerbaijan – have have not come to an agreement on the territorial division of the Caspian Sea. This leads to the contentious question as to to whether the Caspian Sea is a 'sea' and governed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea under which the entire sea-bed and surface would have to be divided among the countries like a pie or a 'lake' in which case, each littoral state would merely control a strip of several nautical miles, stretching out from its respective coastline and the larger central part of the lake would be 'international waters' whose shipping routes, fish stocks and natural resources would have to be used communally in a condominium. Iran maintains that the 750-mile-long Caspian Sea is a 'lake' whose natural resources should be exploited together. It claims a 20 % share of the Caspian Sea, from the sea bottom to the surface and the ensuing nautical border is patrolled by the vessels of the Iranian Navy. Iranian gunboat diplomacy with Azerbaijan, border disputes and the qeustion of undefined 'territorial waters' and 'exclusive economic zones' of the littoral states of the Caspian region in this 'New Great Game' raises the prospects that could lead to a 'scenario for a third world war".51
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Turkmenistan with proven gas reserves of 100 trillion cubic feet and an estimated reserves of upto 260 trillion cubic feet and among top ten in the world, is another pawn on the chessboard of the 'New Great Game' of Central Asia. In mid-1990s, Turkmenistan which exports all its gas through old pipelines to Russia, came up with a plan to lay a pipeline underneath the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan where it was to link with a pipeline to Turkey. The project was enthusiastically embraced by the American Government, seeking to free Turkmenistan from Russia's grip and achieving its own aim of East-West pipeline avoiding Russia and reducing its dependence of the Middle East. The Shell Corporation joined the project and conducted the feasibility study which showed that it was technically and commercially viable. The Shell Managers and President Saparmurat Nyazov signed preliminary contracts in 1991. Then the project was caught up in a fierce struggle of 'New Great Game' between United States and Russia as under sever pressure from Moscow, President Nyazov did not sign the final contract and the opportunity to lay a second pipeline was lost because Ankara had since signed contracts with Iran and for Russia's 'Blue Stream' pipeline to be laid under the Black Sea to the Turkish coast. As early as 1990s, the Argentine energy company, Bridas and the American oil corporation, UNOCOL competed to build two pipelines from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan worth US $ 8 billion. Pakistan and Taliban Governments were inclined towards Bridas as it did not need any loans from international financial institutions [IFI] whereas UNOCOL was handicapped as the IFI's first condition was to have international recognition of Taliban regime. Under pressure from United States, Pakistan turned its back on Bridas and declared its support for UNOCOL. Turkmenistan had earmarked the Daulatabad field with about 45 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves for these projects which was situated about a hundred miles from the Afghanistan's border. President Nyazov signed an agreement with UNOCOL Managers in New York City on October 21, 1995. Later, a trilateral MOU between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan was signed on 15 May, 1996. In February and November 1997, two Afghan Taliban delegations accepted an invitation by UNOCOL and visited Washington and Houston for talks with US Government representatives and UNOCOL Executives. Mr. Gozchmurad Nazdianov, Turkmen Oil Minister from 1994 to 1998 and UNOCOL Vice Presdient, Mr. Marty Miller flew to Kabul at the head of their respective delegations for talks on the oil and gas projects. Both the ruling Taliban and Northern Alliance [led by Mr. Ahmed Shah Masood and General Abdul Rashid Dostam] were very much interested in the pipeline projects and sent high level officials to join in the talks. Yet all efforts turned out to be fruitless as Northern Alliance, under the influence of Russia, India and Iran refused to make peace with Taliban which was a condition for the success of the pipeline projects. The reason was simple:
Moscow did not want that Turkmens get an export alternative to the Russian pipelines, India did not want that its arch rival, Paksitan should extend its influence in the Region and Iran wanted to export its own gas to Pakistan and then onward to India for which
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an agreement was concluded later. Finally, Turkmenistan has been able to break the shackles of Russian imperialism and successfully construct a 7000-kilometer Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline through Uzbekistan [530 kilometers], Kazakhstan [1300 kilometers] and China [4500 kilometers]. On completion, the pipeline is to be inaugurated at a ceremony, attended by the Presidents of China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on 15th December, 2009. Turkmenistan will supply upto 40 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China within 30 years through this pipeline. At the initial stage, the transit of 13 billion cubic meters of gas will be ensured through the construction of facilities for natural gas cleaning and processing at Samandepe and Altyn Asyr gasfields with the remaining volumes coming from new gasfields. Mr. Mahfooz Nedai, Deputy Minister of Industries in Karazai Government said: "Washington has sent their men into our government for good reason. The Americans have not come to Central Asia just for the terrorists".52 Afghanistan's neighbouring countries ruthlessly waged their struggle struggle of interest on the backs of the Afghans so that in later 1998, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan warned of a "deeper regionalization of the conflict" in which Afghanistan would be degraded to a mere "stage for a new version of the Great Game".53 The stationing of United States' troops and those of NATO in Central Asia has given an impetus to the region's new Great Game. The former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular and Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in general, have grabbed the ideal opportunity of 9/11 events to free themselves from the shackles of Russian Federation under the protective shield of the United States. After Chanabad air base in Uzbekistan and a smaller camp in Tajikistan, Manas was the third and largest US base in Kyrgyzstan, the smallest of the five CARs where upto three thousand troops from United States and its French, Spanish and Dutch allies were stationed. The reaction of Russian Federation to the deployment of American troops in Central Asia is clearly reflective from the statement of Mr. Victor Kalyuzny, Foreign Minister during President Putin's era who was involved in the ‘New Great Game’ when he said: "We have a saying in Russia. If you have guests in the house, there are two times when you are happy. One is when they arrive, and one is when they leave again. Americans will have to pullout of Central Asia as soon as they have caught bin Laden". As Oil Minister under President Boris Yeltsin, Mr. Victor Kalyuzny was the fierest opponents of the Mediterranean pipeline through the southern Caucasus. For the majority of the Russian establishment, it is unthinkable to permanently cede the political, economic, cultural and territorial hegemonic claims on the Caucasus and Central C entral Asia.
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In December, 2002, Presdient Putin made an unexpected visit to Kyrgyzstan, signing a new security pact with his Kyrgyz counterpart and deployed a squadron of SU-25 and SU-27 fighter jets, bombers and other aircraft to an airbase in Kyrgyzstan, a vanguard of a force of 20 aircraft and upto one thousand troops, making it one of the most significant deployments of Russian military in the region since 1991. This was to be joined by troops from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to form a new joint rapid-reaction force. The airfield in Kant where the Russians have set up their latest foothold in Central Asia, lies only thirtyfive miles away from the Manas airbase, where the American troops are stationed. Another Central Asian republic of Tajikistan has more than 20 thousand Russian regular army troops and border guards which is Moscow's largest military force outside the Russian borders. Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov had routinely stated that 201 st Motorized Division which is currently building new headquarters in Dushanbe, would stay for at least another fifteen years and the Russian border guards stationed along the mountainous 850-mile Tajik border with Afghanistan are unlikely to pull out any sooner. China also reacted to the American presence on its borders by holding joint military exercises with Kyrgyzstan which was the first time servicemen of the Chinese People's Army ever took part in a maneuver abroad. The two sides subsequently signed an antiterrorism pact and discussed the possibility that Beijing may station troops in Kyrgyzstan.54 The Central Asian and Caucasian region's impoverished populace, disgusted by United States' alliances with the corrupt, despotic and undemocratic rulers, rampant poverty, massive unemployment, worst human rights’ violations and injustice pushes them towards militancy and Islamic radicalism and can become a basis which can determine the fate of 'New Great Game' in Central Asia and Caucasus. In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq which sits on an astromical 112 billion barrels of crude oil, the world's second largest oil reserves, in utter violation of UN Charter and the will of the international community; therby extending the theatre of 'New Great Game' from Central Asian and Caucasian region to the Middle East. Washington has, therefore, further alienated its rivals in the 'New Great Game' viz. Russia, China and Iran. The prevailing scenario does not seem favourable to United States. With the wars loosing in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is unlikely that Washington may win the 'New Great Game' either in the Central Asian and Caucasian region or the Middle East. NOTES
1. 2. 3. 4.
Barnet A. Rubin, “Reverberations in Central Asia” Crosslines, Vol.3, Nos. 12-13, (March 1995), pp. 6-7. International Life, No. 1. (1993), p. 26 Asia, No. 4, (February 1994), p.2. Rai Shakil Akhtar, TURKEY – TURKEY – in in new world perspective,
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4.
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.
25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.
(Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1996), p. 211. Ali Banbuazizi and Myron Weiner, The New Geopolitics of Central Asia – By By Asia, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), (Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia – Sabri Sayari), p. 183. “Turkey Pushing Eastward – By – By Satellite” Washington Post, (22 March, 1992). DAWN, (Karachi), 25 April, 1996. The Economist , 26 December, 1992, p. 46. Richard Frye, Bukhara , (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma University Press, (1965). Economic interests of Iran in the region” Iran Business Monitor, (Sept. 1992). Stephen Black, “Russia and Iran in a new Middle East” Mediterranean Quarterly, 111/4 (Fall 1992), pp. 108-128. Daily “The News” (Islamabad, Pakistan), 14 May, 1996. Daily “DAWN, (Karachi, Pakistan), 14 May, 1996. Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s catapult to independence”, independence”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, (Summer 1992), P. 121. Mehrdad Haghayeghi, “Islamic Revival in Central C entral Asian Republics” Central Asian Survey (1994), 13 (2), p. 260. G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Sov iet Central Asia, (New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 13.) AFP News Agency , 10 August, 1996. Bruce Vaughn, “Shifting geopolitical realities between South, Southwest and Central Asia” Central Asian Survey (1994), 13 (2), pp. 310-311. LINK , 21 June, 1992. The Nation , (Islamabad, Pakistan), 25 January, 2009. MAINSTREAM, (04 April, 1992). The Statesman , (New Delhi), April, 1992. The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 06 January, 2003. Yaqub Zaki, “Israeli Penetration in Central Asia” The Muslim, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 03 July, 1992. Ghani Erabi, “The Promise of ECO hold” DAWN, (Karachi, Pakistan), 19 December, 1992, “The Perils ECO faces” DAWN (Karachi, Pakistan), 20 December, 1992), “New Calculus of Muslim Power” DAWN, (Karachi, Pakistan), 21 December, 1992. Remin Ribao , 05 July, 1995. Remin Ribao , 25 June, 1995(speech by President Akayev to Chinese journalists). The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 27 April, 1996 (AFP). Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p.36. The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 10 January, 1997. The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 03 December, 1996 (AFP). The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 18 December, 1996 (AFP) The NEWS, (Islamabad), 20 December, 1996. Ghani Erabi, “The Promise of ECO hold” DAWN, (Karachi, Pakistan), 19 December, 1992, “The Perils ECO faces” DAWN (Karachi, Pakistan), 20 December, 1992), “New Calculus of Muslim Power” DAWN, (Karachi, Pakistan), 21 December, 1992.
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34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.
See excerpts from the Pentagon’s report (New York Times, 08 March, 1992). Andrei Zagorski, Post-Soviet nuclear proliferation risks, Security Dialogue, September 1992, pp. 28, 31-32. Robert Norris, “The Soviet nuclear archipelago” Arms Control Today, (January/February 1992), p. 25. Ibid., pp. 28-29. REUTERS TV (ASPAC), Story: 314, December 23, 1996. US Department of Energy [www.eia.doe.gov] and International Energy Agency, Paris, France [www.iea.org]. Quoted in "The Guardian", October 23, 2001, P. 19. Amina Parvizi Mehdi, "Towards the Control of Oil Resources in the Caspian Region", New York, 1999, P. 127. Lutz Kleveman, "The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Central Asia" Atalantic Books, London, 2003, Pp. 15, 21-24. Ibid. P. 26. Ibid. P. 32. “The Gulf Today”, Today ”, UAE, 24th July, 2009. Kleveman, Op. Cit. P. 27-28. Ibid. P. 115. Ibid. P. 90-91. BBC Business News, October 04, 2002. Kleveman, Op. Cit. P. 140-141. "The Economist" , 02August, 2001 Kleveman, Op. Cit. P. 225. Ibid. P. 190-163. Ibid. P. 190-193.
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