The Realities of Battle in New Kingdom Egypt (c. 1550-1080BC)
Abstract The ancient Egyptians portrayed themselves themselves as more than adept at preparing and executing executing a battle plan and this is clearly shown in the archaeological and textual record. There is, however, a tendency in the Egyptian literary and pictorial record to oversimplify the nature of battle, being an idealisation of the real situation, purely focused on the role of the king or the service to the king by an elite individual. individual. But in reality how true was this? Hanson (1991) describes the ancient Greek experience of warfare as being the bloody pit of an ugly cockfight, which would often become a deliberate mini-holocaust. With this in mind, could the experience of the Egyptian soldier be as clinical as is often suggested by modern scholars?
Looking at texts and depictions from the New Kingdom the experience of the common soldier will be assessed. What was expected of an individual while death and destruction rained down on the battlefield? Did the Egyptians merely use threats of aggression as a means to control their vassals or was this ‘artistic licence’? Supplemented with evidence from other cultures, the potential hardships and experiences of battle are the topics of this paper.
Introduction
The Egyptian New Kingdom provides a wealth of information describing military activity. From the Euphrates in Western Asia to the Fifth Cataract of the Nile in modern Sudan the Egyptian army is documented as being a visible and formidable force. This active military role resulted in the endeavours of the army being at the centre of both private and royal inscriptions, with kings dedicating a multitude of resources to perpetrating grandiose images of war (McDermott 2002; 26). This evidence is further supplemented by weaponry discovered in towns and tombs, military installations such as the Nubian fortresses and the Ramesside capital Piramesse, as well as literary texts describing Egyptian attitudes and ideals. All this has enabled modern scholars to consider many facets of ancient Egyptian military practices.
Warfare of this period has regularly been described as imperialistic in nature (Redford 1992; 193), yet the real political and economic motivations of warfare including the defence of borders, the acquisition of valuable land, livestock, natural resources and people were often masked by layers of religion and ritual which provided both moral justification and a „universal framework‟ for the more impious aspects of war (Gnirs 1999; 73). This ancient agenda is often masked further by modern analysis which has a tendency to dehumanise ancient Egyptian warfare and conflict, despite psychologists describing combat as being an integral part of human behaviour, both in ancient and modern societies (Shalit 1988; 3). Despite these propagandistic realities, which always need to be observed, a variety of issues can be discussed regarding the actual events that occurred.
In this paper the experience of the soldier abroad will be considered. What was expected of the men under the command of the king and were these expectations always met? What conditions would a soldier face, how did this affect his ability to fight and how did the different sources depict the events that unfolded? A number of different sources, from a variety of contexts, will be explored with these questions in mind and, while they only represent a small proportion of the known evidence on this subject, they do provide a wideranging overview of the topic.
Keeping Control; The army in battle in the New Kingdom
From the reign of Tuthmosis III Egypt began to invest time and resources into the construction of an Asiatic empire. Prior to this, Egyptian rulers had made routine incursions into the region. Ahmose besieged Sharuhen and destroyed the last of the Hyksos strongholds (Urk IV, 3-6), while Tuthmosis I campaigned as far north as the Euphrates, where he constructed stelae documenting his accomplishments. This activity was not followed up with routine patrols and further campaigns, and so did not subdue the local states into submission. Instead Redford (1992; 149-54) believes these raids were used to prevent the Asiatic states interfering in Egypt while they focused their attention south. The submission and complete domination of Nubia, previously occupied in the Middle Kingdom and a region very much considered a part of Egypt by the Egyptian themselves (O‟Connor 1993; 58 ), was the primary objective. The final destruction of the Kushite Kingdom in Nubia can be attributed to Tuthmosis I, who constructed the Tombos stela just north of the Third Cataract, which documents a large battle and the total destruction of the enemy in the region ( Urk IV 83:1785:17). It was at this point that the Egyptians could turn their attention to the north.
From the outset of the sole reign of Tuthmosis III the focus was firmly on the Canaanite city states, along with direct confrontation with the other regional power of the time, Mitanni. This remained a military focal point throughout the remainder of the New Kingdom and though the major protagonist in the region changed to Hatti by the reign of Akhenaten, and reached a height by the time of Ramesses II, the situation remained remarkably consistent. This period is so useful in the analysis of warfare as not only does it provide two well documented battles, those of Tuthmosis III at Megiddo and Ramesses II at Kadesh, but these two battles also flank a period rich in recorded military activity.
The actions of Tuthmosis III are documented in the annals, initially a day by day account of activity while on campaign, which were then transposed onto the walls at the temple of Karnak. Lichtheim (1976; 29) considers these records to be some of the more realistic found in Egypt due to their fact-based origins. The most important of these sixteen campaigns was the first, which not only resulted in the capture of most of the Canaanite leaders at Megiddo, but it also established Egyptian rule over much of the region. This battle is also important as it describes some of the problems faced when organising an army and keeping control of it on the battlefield.
The text states „Then his majesty overwhelmed them at the head of his army... they fled headlong (to) Megiddo with faces of fear, abandoning their horses, their chariots of gold and
silver, and were hoisted up into the town by (being) pulled (by) their garments... Now if his majesty‟s troops had not set their hearts to plundering the possessions of the enemy they would have Megiddo at this moment ‟ (Urk IV 647-650). War booty is at the heart of almost all Egyptian texts, whether royal or private. Kings often dedicated masses of captured foreign gold, objects and people to the temples of Egypt, whereas soldiers such as Ahmose-PenNekhbet describe the wealth they collected fighting for their kings ( Urk IV 32-9). The focus on plunder, however, resulted in a tactical error and enabled the enemy to regroup within the walls of Megiddo.
Keeping control of the army in battle must have been very difficult in the ancient world. While training and battle orders would have been expected to keep the soldiers in line, opportunities would have arisen where the desires of the army as a whole would override the aims of the leaders. It would also be difficult to keep soldiers running into a battle, where they risked death and injury, when a more lucrative and less risky offer of plundering was available. While this ill discipline did not cause a serious threat to the success of this campaign, it did prolong the battle into a seven month siege (Redford 1992; 156-7). The repercussions upon the individuals concerned are not described in the text but it is likely the military leaders considered some form of punishment.
A more disastrous lack of control is witnessed in the Battle of Kadesh in the reign of Ramesses II. In the fifth year of his reign Ramesses II marched into northern Syria in an attempt to remove the Hittites from the region and re-establish Egyptian control. In an attempt to misinform the Egyptians the Hittite king Muwatallis sent two scouts towards the Egyptian army in order to be caught, interrogated and feed the enemy false information. As a result the Egyptians thought they could reach Kadesh unthreatened, with the Hittites still further north at Aleppo, north of Tunip (Spalinger 2005; 211). The Hittites were, however, already stationed at Kadesh and planned to attack the Egyptians while one regiment was still on the march and another setting up camp. The attack on the marching troops is described in the numerous accounts on temple walls, and states „Then they came fort h from the south side of Kadesh and attacked the army of Pre in its middle, as they were marching unaware and not prepared to fight. Then the infantry and chariotry of his majesty weakened before them‟ ( KRI II 26-7). Spalinger (2005; 215) believes Muwatallis‟ aim was to send his chariots through the division of Pre, killing some of the 5000 troops, giving them a mauling but not aiming to liquidate the division. The Hittite chariotry would then charge into the encampment of the king, which had only just been constructed and was still vulnerable.
This tactic would have been very successful. The marching soldiers would have been completely exposed. Fear and panic would have gripped the troops, likely resulting in them fleeing in different directions. If the chariots had charged straight into the soldiers as suggested, then as the army turned to flee, soldiers risked being trampled by their own comrades, as well as the Hittites. Additionally the sight of thousands of men hurtling towards the king‟s encampment would have caused panic within the defences, while also preventing the army of Pre from aiding the king‟s troops within the encampment when it was attacked. This would have created chaos and mayhem in every direction. Although an effective strategy the losses on both sides could have been significant, and as the chariotry were the elite, morale-damaging deaths were likely. Indeed Kitchen (1982; 61) notes that the prince of
Aleppo was upended into the Orontes river and even if he survived, two of Muwatallis‟ brothers, two of his shield bearers, his secretary, his chief bodyguard, four important charioteers and six army chiefs all died. Though the Egyptians do not describe their own casualties (something they almost never did), with such important deaths on one side it is unlikely that the Egyptians escaped similar casualties. In fact, though the Egyptians managed to successfully defend themselves until reinforcements arrived, the tactics deployed by the Hittites were so effective that they even put the life of Ramesses II under threat and the deaths of Egyptian soldiers were inevitable.
In both of these battles the soldiers are described as not meeting the expectations of their superiors. While there is some element of exaggeration in the texts, especially Ramesses II describing himself as standing alone against the Hittite assault ( KRI II 48), such events are still probable, if not highly likely. These two texts clearly show that an Egyptian soldier had much to gain from a career in the military; however, given the opportunity, these men would understandably have avoided combat and the risks involved, going against the command of the king. Goedicke (1985; 112-3) believes that the men caught after fleeing the scene were severely punished, possibly even put to death. He goes on to suggest that the scenes depicted on temple walls were designed to instil fear in soldiers who considered not fulfilling their duties on the battlefield. Whether specifically designed to do so or not, they certainly would have provided a soldier with a great deal to think about.
Conditions of Campaign
As suggested above, surprise attacks were not uncommon; in fact they appe ar to be prevalent. Not only would this tactic give the aggressor the upper hand in battle but it would also hand the enemy a psychological battering. At the battle of Megiddo Tuthmosis III‟s army avoided being seen by the Canaanites by moving through the Aruna Pass and concealing overnight encampments behind bluffs to avoid detection, allowing an attack on the city to be a complete bombshell to the defenders (Goedicke 2000; 48). These tactics are regularly mentioned in New Kingdom texts but all too often the Egyptians were on the receiving end.
A literary text written on P.Anastasi I states “A fugitive has entered the camp. The horse has been set loose… the enemy comes to pillage in secret. They have made away with your possessions” (Gardiner 1935; 21-2). This was a common fear in the ancient world with a similar example described by Greek historian Polybius (V 20.1-9) in 218BC, when the Messenians arrive at Glympeis but do not construct adequate defences around their encampment. Consequently Lykourgas captured most of their horses and much of their baggage train. These textual references indicate that any commander not prepared to defend his army would risk being dealt a fatal blow. It is for this reason that Ramesses II appears to construct an encampment using shields as a defence (figure 1), though this is likely an artistic representation of the actual defence rather than what was actually used. Tuthmosis III also mentions troops being used as sentries, looking out for potential aggressors ( Urk IV, 655-6). All of this evidence clearly suggests the Egyptians feared losses at the hands of covert operations.
As well as the problems faced on campaign, troops stationed more permanently abroad faced similar concerns. An official stationed in the Levant states „I am staying at Kenkenento, unequipped...The things which I brought as requirement have vanished...the sand-fly stings and sucks at every vein...A mns-scribe is here with me, every muscle of his face twitches, the (?)-disease has developed in his eye, and the worm gnaws into his tooth. I cannot leave him to his fate‟ (P.Anastasi IV 12,5-13,8). There is a considerable amount of detail in this text, none of which is unique. This suggestion of everything being stolen while abroad is found in many texts collectively known as the Hardships of a Soldier‟s Life. In one of these texts it states „he is brought back upon the ass, his clothes removed thr ough theft, his attendant run away‟ (P.Anastasi III 6,1-6,2). This is a common motif in the Miscellenies and would have been a serious concern for the military. If the army found their weapons and materials in the hands of the enemy they would be quickly overrun, suffering a heavy defeat in the process. There is also a suggestion that some troops had to foot the b ill for some of the equipment they used. The chariot warrior is described as having to pay for the chariot and the horses he used (P.Anastasi III 6,3-6,10), which could have been a heavy financial burden if any of the equipment was stolen or broken. Clearly this was a serious concern for the Egyptians on campaign and stationed abroad.
The health of a soldier was also a frequent topic of the Miscellanies. As suggested in the text above insect infestation would have been a potential problem and this is supplemented in P.Anastasi IV (9,9-10,1) and P.Lansing (8,7-10,10), which adds water pollution and dysentery to the health risks to soldiers. In-depth analysis of the encampment scene of Ramesses II is believed to have revealed the activities of doctors, shown examining the feet of soldiers who were likely suffering as a result of the long march through Asia (McDermott 2004; 117). To what degree doctors could prevent and treat such infections is unclear but an illness or infestation could have been catastrophic if a large contingent of the army fell ill at once. This could have been even worse if doctors had already had to deal with an influx of casualties after battle, for which the treatments are well attested in medical papyri (Allen 2005). Not only would illness pose a problem but the basic need to eat could become a huge issue, especially during a prolonged campaign. Texts, such as that from P.Anastasi (9,8-9,10) refer to soldiers carrying food and water within their belongings, though this could only sustain them for a short period of time. The use of local sources has frequently been discussed in modern literature and would be reasonably effective, though there could be a risk of the land being completely stripped. It has been suggested that by moving the army by regiments, of which the Egyptians could have up to four, and staggering their advance, a force could support itself without stripping the land completely. In this scenario the land would only have to deal with 5000 men at any given time. The Egyptian army was expected to march about 13-20 miles a day (Murnane 1985; 145-7), and the distance between each regiment is believed to have been around half this distance, in case ambushes or other military needs required the army to unite. The poem account of the Battle of Kadesh actually states that the distance between the regiments of Amun and Pre was 1 iter (Breasted 1906; 139), an Egyptian measurement thought to be around six and a half miles (Spalinger 2005; 212). These descriptions suggest that the Egyptians planned their troop movement to factor in food requirements whilst maintaining military cohesion, both vital to the success of a campaign.
As well as utilising the land invaded by the army there are also suggestions that the ports of Lebanon were used as staging points and depots where one of their functions would be to hold an appropriate amount of grain and other food stuffs to feed an army (Redford 1992, 158; Spalinger 2005, 39). This could then be taken with the army in the baggage train to support the troops, though this would only have sustained the army for a limited time. The provisioning of the army is described in P.Anastasi I, from the late New Kingdom. The letter of Hori presents a hypothetical situation to a student where 5000 troops needed supplies. The 120 small cattle, 1800 cakes, 300 loaves of flour and 30 containers of wines are believed to be too small an amount to feed these troops (Gardiner 1935; 19) but it does show the types of foods that the army would rely on.
The food acquired could also pose significant issues to the health of the army. One text states „He is hungry, his belly is in pain. He is dead whilst yet alive. He receives the corn-ration when he is released from duty, but it is not pleasant when it is ground‟ (P.Lansing 9,8 -9,9). Poor quality or spoiled food would be expected on campaign; if a granary had been contaminated or a poor harvest left a region relying on older grain there would be a severe risk to the health of the army. With frequent reference to dysentery in the Miscellanies it is possible that food could have posed a serious health issue.
Death on the battlefield?
The most important distinction between what t he Egyptians visualised and what was likely to have actually happened is the casualties the Egyptian army would suffer. Gnirs (2001; 401) notes that Egyptian casualties would have been a daily feature on campaign. The infantry would suffer the greater losses due to their closer proximity to the enemy and harsher working conditions but, as the texts of Ramesses II describe above, the elite were far from immune. In fact it is possible to deduce that Egyptian casualties across the army had the potential to be very high. There are strong suggestions that the Nubians, particularly the Kushite Kingdom of the Second Intermediate Period and early New Kingdom, had formidable military capacities. Nubian mercenaries were used in all the armies of Bronze Age Egypt indicating they were not simply aimless hordes (O‟Connor 1993; 26). The Middle Kingdom fortresses in Nubia and the contemporary heavy defences that fortified Nubian centres, such as at Kerma, demonstrate that both the Nubians and the Egyptians would be formidable opponents (1993; 31). O‟Connor (1993; 60) adds that during the New Kingdom the Kingdom of Kush was such a threat that Egypt‟s expansion into Asia could not be undertaken until Nubia had been subdued. This situation could have led to significant battles and, as a result, casualties. One of the most significant suggestions that Egyptians died on campaign is the treatment of the bodies after the battle. Vaughn (1993; 38) notes that besides the emotional pain of soldiers seeing their friends and kinsmen lying among the dead, there was the additional difficulty of identification. The heat of the sun caused rapid decay and could effectively cook the flesh in a few hours. Consequently the body would expand into a grotesque caricature of a human being (1993; 51). This could be one of the reasons that the Middle Kingdom soldiers of Nebhepetre were buried in a mass grave (Winlock 1945), all mummified but suffering
from physical attacks to the body and the skull. These bodies may have been buried together as identification was impossible and this was the only practical solution. Propaganda or Reality? The activities of the Egyptian army are clearly complex and not an easy issue to discuss. Armies would have fought on both a small and large scale, men would have died on the battlefield and booty, tribute and foreigners would all have been prizes for valour. At the same time the king would take much of the glory, being depicted alone on the battlefield, slaying the enemy and enslaving all who stood against him. Clearly both roles had an important place in the minds of the Egyptians but the degree to which they can be believed and interpreted is often a sticking point. While it is certain that the Egyptian king would not fight thousands of troops alone, his prowess on the battlefield would be an important factor for morale. Similarly an Egyptian soldier may go on several campaigns and not witness a single battle, yet another may go on one and be killed by local guerrillas infiltrating a camp and slaying soldiers as they slept.
The Egyptian mindset was never aimed at portraying an accurate historical narrative but this is rarely achieved by any culture. The victor rarely discusses the defeats they suffered nor do they promote the prowess of their foe. There is a different issue with the Miscellanies, which can be more regularly described as a collection of satires and social commentaries, detailing Egyptian opinions of a variety of subjects. These texts can therefore provide a very negative opinion of what would have happened. It is, however, possible to „read between the lines‟ and develop a series of events that may have occurred, acknowledging that both the analysis and the evidence may not be wholly accurate. With these ideas in mind, and the evidence discussed, it is possible to deduce that the Egyptians were well versed in the processes required to achieve a successful campaign. Plans were formulated, depots stocked with weapons and food, soldiers mobilised and bureaucrats sought to organise the whole event. At the same time the Egyptians faced equally organised forces, who aimed to defend themselves and deter the Egyptians from pursuing future campaigns. However all the planning in the world could not stop the soldiers from ignoring orders, suffering illness from contaminated food or water pollution, or dying on the battlefield. While the Egyptians aimed to avoid portraying these events, it is clear that they could, and did, happen.
Dan Boatright University of Liverpool
Figure 1; The Encampment of Ramesses II at the Battle of Kadesh, depicted at Luxor (Breasted 1903; Plate IV).
Abbreviations KRI II ; Kitchen, K.A. (1996). Ramesside Inscriptions, Volume II . Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
P.Anastasi III; in Gardiner, A.H. (1937). Late-Egyptian Miscellanies. Bruxelles: Fondation Egyptologique Reine Elisabeth.
P.Anastasi IV; in Gardiner, A.H. (1937). Late-Egyptian Miscellanies. Bruxelles: Fondation Egyptologique Reine Elisabeth.
P.Lansing; in Gardiner, A.H. (1937). Late-Egyptian Miscellanies. Bruxelles: Fondation Egyptologique Reine Elisabeth.
Urk IV ; Sethe, K. and Helck, W. (1906-1921). Urkunden der 18. Dynastie, 4 vols. Liepzig: Hinrichs.
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