TOPIC: CAN A BIOLOGICAL PARENT WHO HAS A CHILD BUT WAS ADOPTED NY ANOTHER BE ENTITILED OF SSS BENEFITS OF THE CHILD AS “LEGITIMATE PARENT”?
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014 BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME Petitioner v. SOCIAL SECRIT! S!STEM AND Respondents nts SCANMAR MARITIME SER"ICES, INC. Responde ,
,
,
.
Facts:
John Colcol (John) was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. Danville. He was enrolled nder the !overnment"s #mployees" Compensation $ro!ram. %n accident occrred on board the vessel whereby steel plates &ell on John, which led to his ntimely death. John was, at the time o& his death, childless and nmarried. $etitioner 'ernardina 'ernardina $. $. 'artolome, 'artolome, John"s biolo!ical biolo!ical mother mother and alle!edly his sole remainin! beneciary, led a claim &or death benets nder with the SSS at San ernando City, *a +nion. However, the SSS *a +nion oice, denied the claim sayin! that petitioner is no lon!er considered as parent o& John as he was le!ally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. -he denial denial was appeal appealed ed to the #mploy #mployees" ees" Compen Compensat sation ion Commiss Commission ion (#CC), which airmed the rlin! o& the SSS *a +nion In denyin! the claim, both the SSS *a +nion branch and the #CC rled a!ainst petitioner"s entitlement to the death benets on the !rond she can no lon!er be considered John"s primary beneciary becase John and his sist sister er #li #liab abet eth h were were adop adopte ted d by their their !rea !reatt !ran !rand& d&at athe herr, peti petiti tione oner" r"s s !rand&ather, Cornelio Colcol. Conse/ently, as ar!ed by the a!encies, it is Corn Corneli elio o wh who o /al /ali ies es as John John"s "s prim primar ary y bene beneci ciar ary y, not not peti petiti tion oner er.. 0either, the #CC reasoned, wold petitioner /ali&y as John"s secondary beneciary even i& it were proven that Cornelio has already passed away. %s the #CC ratiocinated that +nder $.D. $.D. 121 ( SSS law ), as amended, provides that beneciaries are the 3dependent spose ntil he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneciaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and sb4ect to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the ille!itimate children and le!itimate descendants descendants who are the secondary secondary beneciaries beneciaries55 $rovided5 $rovided5 that the dependent acknowled!ed natral child shall be considered as a primary beneciary when there are no other dependent children who are
/alied
and
eli!ible
&or
monthly
income
benet.3
-he dependent parent re&erred to by the above provision relates to the le!itimate parent o& the covered member. -his Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a le!itimate parent o& the deceased, havin! !iven p the latter &or adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. -hs, in eect, the adoption divested her o& the stats as the le!itimate parent o& the deceased. -he ri!hts which previosly belon! to the biolo!ical parent o& the adopted child shall now be pon the adoptin! parent. Hence, in this case, the le!al parent re&erred to by $.D. 121, as amended, as the beneciary, who has the ri!ht to le the claim, is the adoptive &ather o& the deceased and not herein appellant. ISSUE6
7hether or not the biolo!ical parents o& the covered, bt le!ally adopted, employee considered secondary beneciaries and, ths, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benets nder the #C$
RULING:
-he term 3parents3 in the phrase 3dependent parents3 in the a&ore8/oted %rticle 91: (4) o& the *abor Code is sed and o!ht to be taken in its !eneral sense and cannot be ndly limited to 3le!itimate parents3 as what the #CC did. -he phrase 3dependent parents3 shold, there&ore, inclde all parents, whether le!itimate or ille!itimate and whether by natre or by adoption. 7hen the law does not distin!ish, one shold not distin!ish. $lainly, 3dependent parents3 are parents, whether le!itimate or ille!itimate, biolo!ical or by adoption, who are in need o& spport or assistance. Moreover, the same %rticle 91: (4) clearly shows that Con!ress did not intend to limit the phrase 3dependent parents3 to solely le!itimate parents. %t the risk o& bein! repetitive, %rticle 91: provides that 3in their absence, the dependent parents and sb4ect to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the ille!itimate children and le!itimate descendants who are secondary beneciaries.3 Had the lawmakers contemplated 3dependent parents3 to mean le!itimate parents, then it wold have simply said descendants and not 3le!itimate descendants.3 -he manner by which the provision in /estion was cra&ted ndeniably show that the phrase 3dependent parents3 was intended to cover all parents 8 le!itimate, ille!itimate or parents by natre or adoption. 0owhere in the law nor in the rles does it say that 3le!itimate parents3 pertain to those who e;ercise parental athority over the employee enrolled
nder the #C$. It was only in the assailed Decision wherein sch /alication was made. In addition, assmin! ar!endo that the #CC did not overstep its bondaries in limitin! the adverted *abor Code provision to the deceased"s le!itimate parents, and that the commission properly e/ated le!itimacy to parental athority, petitioner can still /ali&y as John"s secondary beneciary. -re, when Cornelio, in 9<=>, adopted John, then abot two years old, petitioner"s parental athority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the #CC missed, aside &rom Cornelio"s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (?) years a&ter the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at abot &or (@) years o& a!e. John"s minority at the time o& his adopter"s death is a si!nicant &actor in the case at bar. +nder sch circmstance, parental athority shold be deemed to have reverted in &avor o& the biolo!ical parents Domestic %doption %ct, provides6 Section 2A. #ects o& Bescission. 8 I& the petition &or rescission o& adoption is !ranted, the parental athority o& the adoptee"s biolo!ical parent(s), i& known, or the le!al cstody o& the Department shall be restored i& the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. -he reciprocal ri!hts and obli!ations o& the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be e;tin!ished, (emphasis added) -he provision adverted to is applicable herein by analo!y inso&ar as the restoration o& cstody is concerned. -he manner herein o& terminatin! the adopter"s parental athority, nlike the !ronds &or rescission, 4sties the retention o& vested ri!hts and obli!ations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the conse/ent restoration o& parental athority in &avor o& the biolo!ical parents, simltaneosly, ensres that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not le&t to &end &or himsel& at sch a tender a!e. -he Cort were !ided by the catena o& cases and the state policies behind B% =>>2 wherein the paramont consideration is the best interest o& the child, which we invoke to 4sti&y this disposition. It is, a&ter all, &or the best interest o& the child that someone will remain char!ed &or his wel&are and pbrin!in! shold his or her adopter &ail or is rendered incapacitated to per&orm his dties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his &ormative years, and, to Er mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death o& the adopter, no one else cold reasonably be e;pected to per&orm the role o& a parent other than the adoptee"s biolo!ical one.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application named petitioner as one o& his beneciaries &or his benets nder B% =2=2, otherwise known as the 3Social Secrity *aw.3 7hile B% =2=2 does not cover compensation &or work8related deaths or in4ry and e;pressly allows the desi!nation o& beneciaries who are not related by blood to the member nlike in $D 121, John"s deliberate act o& indicatin! petitioner as his beneciary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Conse/ently, the conFence o& circmstances 8 &rom Cornelio"s death drin! John"s minority, the restoration o& petitioner"s parental athority, the docments showin! sin!larity o& address, and John"s clear intention to desi!nate petitioner as a beneciary 8 eectively made petitioner, to Er mind, entitled to death benet claims as a secondary beneciary nder $D 121 as a dependent parent.
