Snubbing Unit Audit Sonatrach ENSP - Snubbing HRS 154 - Snubbing Unit Audit Well Number MD 629
Date: Thursday, January 27, 2011
B.P. 295 Z.I. Hassi Messaoud, Algeria TEL No. 011-213-(0)-29-73-9538 TEL No. 011-213-(0)-29-73-8188 FAX No. 011-213-(0)-29-73-1911 Website www.bootsandcoots.com
Audit Report Audit Name: Audit Type: Audit Date:
Sonatrach, HRS 154 - Snubbing Unit Audit, Well Number MD 629 Snubbing Unit Audit 2011/01/27
Completed By: Comments:
imported audit
Client: Company Man: Snubbing Supervisor: Snubbing Contractor: Country: Field: Well Number: Activity at Time of Audit: Chock Manifold Size: Pressure Rating: Number of Manual Chokes: Number of Hyd. Chokes: Mud/Gas Separator Dimensions: Hyd. Closing Unit Type: No. of Bottles: Wellhead Size: Press. Rate-Lower Conn.: Mud Pumps / HP: Snubbing Unit Manufacturer: Snubbing Unit Number: Year Built / Retrofit: Max Lift Capacity: Max Snub Capacity: Max Rotary Torque: Unit Bore Size: Power Source: BOP Config./Specifications:
Sonatrach DJENANE TOUIL AMOR ENSP Algeria HMD MD 629 Clean out well
Auditors:
Power pack 4 4 1/16 5000 SPM Hydrrig HRS 154 1998 150,000 75,000 500ft/lb 7 " x 4 1/16 Deisel Stripper bowl,2 stripper rams,Pipe rams,Blind rams Guffey, Dennis
Page: 1 / 22
Executive Summary Customer: Location:
Sonatrach
Audit Name:
HRS 154 - Snubbing Unit Audit, Well Number MD 629 Snubbing Unit Audit V1.1
Audit Date:
2011/01/27
Executive Summary: Audit Comments:
The identification of risks associated with any business, and the management of those risks, are important aspects of business management in today’s competitive world. It is even more relevant regarding oil and gas exploration and production. Boots & Coots Audit services help in addressing identified risks and it is used as an analysis tool to proactively prevent loss of control. It helps to visualize and measure the present condition of the components. The implementation of corrective action recommendations will ensure the equipment is in proper condition to prevent an incident. Our Audits can help reduce the likelihood, severity and consequences of an incident and ensure the integrity of your facilities, improve productivity and protect your assets, employees, the public, and the environment. Around the world Boots & Coots Audits have saved many operators time and money by reducing the frequency of critical events. On 27 January 2011 a re-audit of the HRS 154 was completed. Some NDE inspections had been done since previous audit but not for all critical components. The chains have been removed from guy wires and proper system installed. Auditor did not go to workbasket because ladders remain unsecured and without proper fall protection. Much of the non-compliance is in documentation. All testing, including function tests should be documented and the document should be available at time of the audit. The findings in this report are defined and weighted as follows for Non Compliance items:
Critical Findings Critical findings are based on shortcomings found during an audit which have the potential to lead to loss of well control.
Major Findings Major findings are based on shortcomings which may lead to damage to essential equipment or have a detrimental effect on well control operations as a result of inadequate use and/or failure of equipment.
Minor Findings Minor findings are based on shortcomings which may lead to situations that contribute to an incident or to circumstances in which the required standards of operation are not met.
Critical Non Compliant Findings Are there both ground and work basket accumulator controls? (Repeat Finding) Are there both ground and work basket accumulator controls clearly labeled? Is the auxiliary BOP Accumulator routinely manned at critical stages such as pipe light conditions, crossing balance point and pulling on stuck pipe? Have the preventers been field disassembled and inspected in accordance with API Standards (3-5 yrs)? Provide date of last inspection in narrative. (Repeat Finding) Are rams, annular, hydraulic operated valves, and choke manifold low pressure tested (200-300 psi) before pressuring up to the full test pressure? (Repeat Finding)
Page: 2 / 22
Major Non Compliant Findings Is auxiliary equipment and auxiliary BOPs operated from an independent closed-hydraulic circuit? (Repeat Finding) Is there a step set of illustrations showing how to test all BOP items? (Repeat Finding) Are these steps followed after each nipple-up? Are these steps followed at specified intervals after nipple up? Are BOP and valve control handles on ground console and work basket console clearly labeled? Does the blind rams accumulator control have a cover but not lock to allow the blind rams to be actuated from the remote station and prevent accidental or unreasoned closure? (Repeat Finding) In the work basket is there available a full opening TIW safety valve? (Repeat Finding) Are mud pump pop-offs properly set? Are all ladders clamped properly and extension ladders equipped with safety latches? (Repeat Finding) Has inspection and certification been preformed to industry standards on all slip bowls in the past year? (Repeat Finding) Do Company Men, Supervisors and Operators have certificates of well control training for their positions? (Repeat Finding)
Minor Non Compliant Findings Are sufficient fall protection devices in place? (Repeat Finding) Are sufficient fall protection devices periodic inspection documents available? Are the pressure settings of these items monitored daily and recorded? (Repeat Finding) Are the auxiliary controls effective if the work basket unit is destroyed? (Repeat Finding) Is the remote accumulator panel checked every shift to confirm proper pressure settings? Are Weco 1502 hammer unions installed on prior casing valves? (Repeat Finding) Is the BOP closing ratio known? Is there a safety-latch between slip-control handles to prevent opening slips simultaneously but not interfere with closing both slips simultaneously? (Repeat Finding) Is there a safety-latch between stripper rams-control handles to prevent opening rams simultaneously but not interfere with closing both simultaneously? (Repeat Finding) Are "while tripping" drills held at intervals, timed and recorded on the IADC Daily Drilling Report? (Repeat Finding) Are approved well killing worksheets available on location? (Repeat Finding) Are approved well killing worksheets updated after mud density changes? Is there a BOP manual available with a list of necessary expendables that should always be on hand? Has there been any NDE inspections performed on critical components within the last year? (Repeat Finding) Is evidence on file of the inspections done? (Repeat Finding) Are all critical components fully documented with traceable material specifications in line with ISO-9000 standards? (Repeat Finding) Do other crew members have certificates of well control training for their positions? (Repeat Finding)
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Section
Actual Score
Section Header
Possible Score
Actual Compliance %
Desired Compliance %
1
Job Procedures
10.00
20.00
50.00 %
100.00%
2
Power Pack
25.00
30.00
83.33 %
100.00%
3
Accumulator
185.00
260.00
71.15 %
100.00%
4
Blowout Preventer
185.00
275.00
67.27 %
100.00%
5
Choke
0.00
0.00
%
100.00%
6
Gas Separation
0.00
0.00
%
100.00%
7
Inside BOP, Back Pressure Valves and Floats
55.00
65.00
84.62 %
100.00%
8
Control Console
30.00
40.00
75.00 %
100.00%
9
Access Window
0.00
0.00
%
100.00%
10
Pipe Guides
20.00
20.00
100.00 %
100.00%
11
Stripping Rubber
30.00
30.00
100.00 %
100.00%
12
Rental Equipment
0.00
0.00
%
100.00%
13
Tripping Procedures
20.00
20.00
100.00 %
100.00%
14
Drills
0.00
5.00
0.00 %
100.00%
15
Unit Specifications
290.00
350.00
82.86 %
100.00%
16
Crew Training
20.00
35.00
57.14 %
100.00%
870.00
1,150.00
75.65 %
100.00 %
Totals
Rating Scale: 90 - 100: Industy Leader 80 - 89: Average Performer 70 - 79: Exercise Caution, Mitigating and Corrective Action (CAR Closure)to be implemented immediately 0 - 69 : Re-evaluate use of this contractor and/or implement strict controls
Caution, Mitigating and Corrective Action (CAR Closure)to be implemented immediately 100
350
300
80
60
200
Score
Compliance %
250
150
40
100
20 50
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Section
Actual Score
Possible Score
Actual Compliance %
Desired Compliance % Page: 4 / 22
Summary of Non Compliance Findings and Recommendations Critical Findings: 3-0-1
Are there both ground and work basket accumulator controls?
3-0-2
Are there both ground and work basket accumulator controls clearly labeled?
3-0-7
Is the auxiliary BOP Accumulator routinely manned at critical stages such as pipe light conditions, crossing balance point and pulling on stuck pipe?
4-0-24
Have the preventers been field disassembled and inspected in accordance with API Standards (3-5 yrs)? Provide date of last inspection in narrative.
4-0-29
Are rams, annular, hydraulic operated valves, and choke manifold low pressure tested (200-300 psi) before pressuring up to the full test pressure?
Major Findings: 3-0-3
Is auxiliary equipment and auxiliary BOPs operated from an independent closed-hydraulic circuit?
4-0-12
Is there a step set of illustrations showing how to test all BOP items?
No step set of illustrations and no low pressure test 4-0-13
Are these steps followed after each nipple-up?
4-0-14
Are these steps followed at specified intervals after nipple up?
4-0-17
Are BOP and valve control handles on ground console and work basket console clearly labeled?
4-0-23
Does the blind rams accumulator control have a cover but not lock to allow the blind rams to be actuated from the remote station and prevent accidental or unreasoned closure?
7-0-1
In the work basket is there available a full opening TIW safety valve?
15-0-6
Are mud pump pop-offs properly set?
No pop off on pump 15-0-30
Are all ladders clamped properly and extension ladders equipped with safety latches?
15-0-50
Has inspection and certification been preformed to industry standards on all slip bowls in the past year?
16-0-1
Do Company Men, Supervisors and Operators have certificates of well control training for their positions?
Page: 5 / 22
Minor Findings: 1-0-3
Are sufficient fall protection devices in place?
1-0-4
Are sufficient fall protection devices periodic inspection documents available?
2-0-4
Are the pressure settings of these items monitored daily and recorded?
3-0-4
Are the auxiliary controls effective if the work basket unit is destroyed?
3-0-10
Is the remote accumulator panel checked every shift to confirm proper pressure settings? No remote exists
4-0-6
Are Weco 1502 hammer unions installed on prior casing valves?
4-0-16
Is the BOP closing ratio known?
8-0-1
Is there a safety-latch between slip-control handles to prevent opening slips simultaneously but not interfere with closing both slips simultaneously?
8-0-5
Is there a safety-latch between stripper rams-control handles to prevent opening rams simultaneously but not interfere with closing both simultaneously?
14-0-1
Are "while tripping" drills held at intervals, timed and recorded on the IADC Daily Drilling Report?
15-0-1
Are approved well killing worksheets available on location?
15-0-2
Are approved well killing worksheets updated after mud density changes?
15-0-26
Is there a BOP manual available with a list of necessary expendables that should always be on hand?
15-0-39
Has there been any NDE inspections performed on critical components within the last year? Some NDE exists but not for all critical components.
15-0-40
Is evidence on file of the inspections done?
15-0-41
Are all critical components fully documented with traceable material specifications in line with ISO-9000 standards?
16-0-2
Do other crew members have certificates of well control training for their positions?
Page: 6 / 22
Audit Report Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Actual Score
Possible Score
Job Procedures Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 1-0-3
Are sufficient fall protection devices in place? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practice. OSHA Appendix C to 1910.66 Sec. 1-Mandatory. (4). API RP 54. 5.5
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "The attachment point has to be designed to withstand a 5000 pound shock load. Lanyards will be in use when working above 6 feet or 1.83 meters off of the ground." "On a weekly basis a competent person shall physically inspect and document the inspection of all fall protection equipment on each job and in each department." "(4)Self-retracting lifelines and lanyards which automatically limit free fall distance of 2 feet or less shall have components capable of sustaining a minimum static tensile load of 3,000 pounds applied to the device with the lifeline or lanyard in the fully extended position." "All personnel, when engaged in work above 10 feet shall be protected at all times by a fall protection safety device." Consequence Analysis: 1) Failure of equipment inspection or lack of could lead to injury of personnel or loss of life. (2) Being out of compliance to recognized industry standards. 1-0-4
Are sufficient fall protection devices periodic inspection documents available? No REF: Best Industry Practice. OSHA Appendix C to 1910.66 Sec. 1-Mandatory. (4). API RP 54. 5.5
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "The attachment point has to be designed to withstand a 5000 pound shock load. Lanyards will be in use when the distance is above 6 feet or 1.83 meters off of the ground." "On a weekly basis a competent person shall physically inspect and document the inspection of all fall protection equipment on each job and in each department." "(4)Self-retracting lifelines and lanyards which automatically limit free fall distance of 2 feet or less shall have components capable of sustaining a minimum static tensile load of 3,000 pounds applied to the device with the lifeline or lanyard in the fully extended position." "All personnel, when engaged in work above 10 feet shall be protected at all times by a fall protection safety device." Consequence Analysis: 1) Failure of equipment inspection or lack of could lead to injury of personnel or loss of life. (2) Being out of compliance to recognized industry standards.
Page: 7 / 22
Audit Report Actual Score
Detailed Non Compliance Findings Section Score: Section Findings Total:
Possible Score
10.00 / 20.00 2/4
Power Pack Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 2-0-4
Are the pressure settings of these items monitored daily and recorded? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practice.
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: Inspection / Documentation sheet. "Pressure settings should be recorded on the daily report." Consequence Analysis: Proper settings for well program procedures may change daily. By-passing or failure to confirm a protective safety device could result in injury to personnel, damage to equipment or loss of well control. Section Score: Section Findings Total:
25.00 / 30.00 1/4
Accumulator Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 3-0-1
Are there both ground and work basket accumulator controls? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: American Petroleum Institute, (API) 53, Recommended Practice Blow Out Prevention Recommended Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Sec 12.1E and 12.8 and Sec 12.5.3 IADC K Section 2,1.b
0.00 / 15.00
Criteria: 12.1E "The elements of the BOP control system normally include remote control panels for operating the hydraulic manifold from remote locations" 12.8 "The installation should be equipped with an auxiliary remote control panel such that the operation of each auxiliary BOP and control valve can be controlled from position readily accessible from a designated remote station. Considerations should be given to the need of a remote control station a safe distance from the well bore." 12.5.3 "Control valves must be clearly marked to indicate which preventer or choke line valve each control valve operates and the position of the valves; i.e. open, closed, neutral." Sec.2,1.b."The main accumulator with its hydraulic control manifold, separate Page: 8 / 22
Audit Report Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Actual Score
Possible Score
hydraulic manifold, or hydraulic panel should be installed in a safe area protected from falling debris or gas accumulations during a blowout. All of the control functions should be operable from the work basket and/or designated auxiliary BOP control station by use of a remote control panel." Consequence Analysis: A) Increased closing time which allows a greater influx. B) When controls are not clearly labeled there is a potential for closing the wrong BOP. For example, closing the blind rams with tubulars in the hole. 3-0-2
Are there both ground and work basket accumulator controls clearly labeled? No REF: American Petroleum Institute, (API) 53, Recommended Practice Blow Out Prevention Recommended Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Sec 12.1E and 12.8 and Sec 12.5.3 IADC K Section 2,1.b
0.00 / 15.00
Criteria: 12.1E "The elements of the BOP control system normally include remote control panels for operating the hydraulic manifold from remote locations" 12.8 "The installation should be equipped with an auxiliary remote control panel such that the operation of each auxiliary BOP and control valve can be controlled from position readily accessible from a designated remote station. Considerations should be given to the need of a remote control station a safe distance from the well bore." 12.5.3 "Control valves must be clearly marked to indicate which preventer or choke line valve each control valve operates and the position of the valves; i.e. open, closed, neutral." Sec.2,1.b."The main accumulator with its hydraulic control manifold, separate hydraulic manifold, or hydraulic panel should be installed in a safe area protected from falling debris or gas accumulations during a blowout. All of the control functions should be operable from the work basket and/or designated auxiliary BOP control station by use of a remote control panel." Consequence Analysis: A) Increased closing time which allows a greater influx. B) When controls are not clearly labeled there is a potential for closing the wrong BOP. For example, closing the blind rams with tubulars in the hole. 3-0-3
Is auxiliary equipment and auxiliary BOPs operated from an independent closed-hydraulic circuit? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practice
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "Auxiliary BOP control consoles are used for direct control of the auxiliary BOP's not controlled from the work basket. The auxiliary control console's placement, rig-up and proper marking is required to help prevent bodily injury and/or equipment damage." Consequence Analysis: Page: 9 / 22
Audit Report Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Actual Score
Possible Score
During a well control event control of lower BOPs (safety and or blind rams) may not be possible or have a delayed reaction if operation is from the work basket resulting in death or injury to personnel, damage to equipment and/or loss of well control. 3-0-4
Are the auxiliary controls effective if the work basket unit is destroyed? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practice
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "Hoses of sufficient length to allow placement of the remote console at least 50' from the wellhead." "The recommended placement is to the rear of the pipe rack and on the opposite side of the pipe rack from where the helper runs the pipe to eliminate trip hazards. Place up-wind if possible." Consequence Analysis: An independent closed hydraulic circuit operating the auxiliary BOPs are needed. If a common BOP hydraulic system is in use a failure in the work basket would cause the ground unit inoperable leading to loss of well control. 3-0-7
Is the auxiliary BOP Accumulator routinely manned at critical stages such as pipe light conditions, crossing balance point and pulling on stuck pipe? No REF: Best Industry Practice
0.00 / 25.00
Criteria: "Consideration should be given to manning the auxiliary BOP consoles during critical stages of the job. These critical stages will be dictated by specific job conditions and should be discussed during pre-job planning meetings and daily 'tool-box' safety meetings. Critical stages may include, but are not limited to, starting in the hole, crossing balance point, pulling on stuck pipe or high pressure wells." Consequence Analysis: During critical operations delayed function of lower BOPs (safety and or blind rams) could result in death or injury to personnel, damage to equipment and/or loss of well control. 3-0-10
Is the remote accumulator panel checked every shift to confirm proper pressure settings? No REF: Best Industry Practice
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: This action to be added to the "Operator's hand over checklist" notes. Consequence Analysis: BOPs may not be functional. No remote exists
Page: 10 / 22
Audit Report Actual Score
Detailed Non Compliance Findings Section Score: Section Findings Total:
Possible Score
185.00 / 260.00 6 / 29
Blowout Preventer Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 4-0-6
Are Weco 1502 hammer unions installed on prior casing valves? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practices
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "This must be a molded integral flanged connection. A snubbing unit works with pressure, so line pipe connections are not acceptable." Consequence Analysis: Inability to rig up pump/flow lines quickly during a well control event. 4-0-12
Is there a step set of illustrations showing how to test all BOP items? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: API Spec 16C Choke and Kill Systems Sec. 9.17. API 53 Recommended Practices for Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells Section 17.2.4 API Spec 7L Procedures to Mfg., Inspect, Repair, and Remanufacture Drilling Equipment Best Industry Practice
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "The manufacturer shall prepare and have available an Operating Manual for each model and size Choke and Kill System manufactured in accordance to this specification. The operating manual shall contain the following information: -Operation and Installation Instructions -Seals information -Maintenance and testing information -Disassembly and assembly information -Parts information -Storage information " "Technique and step by step or how to test procedure should be developed for each rig because of varying equipment, different installation arrangements and well specific drilling programs. The procedure for testing the BOP stack, drill string safety valves, choke kill lines, and manifold upstream of the buffer chamber are usually similar for most rigs. The mfg. operating and maintenance documents, contractor maintenance programs, and operating experiences should be incorporated into the specific tests procedures." "Documented instructions and procedures for any system assembly, testing, and commissioning that is required to be performed at the installation site shall be available prior to commencing installation." "The following minimum documents shall be prepared in conjunction with HWO Page: 11 / 22
Audit Report Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Actual Score
Possible Score
workovers: (1) Equipment stack drawing. (2) Plan view drawing of the HWO spread. (3) Schematic piping diagram. (4) Time line." Consequence Analysis: Inefficient in testing of BOP components. No step set of illustrations and no low pressure test 4-0-13
Are these steps followed after each nipple-up? No REF: Best Industry Practices.
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "The actual test sequence will vary depending on the BOP components and configuration but all elements of the HWO system shall be tested after R/U, after every 7 days and/ or repair." Consequence Analysis: Inefficient and confusion in testing of BOP components. 4-0-14
Are these steps followed at specified intervals after nipple up? No REF: Best Industry Practices.
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "The actual test sequence will vary depending on the BOP components and configuration but all elements of the HWO system shall be tested after R/U, after every 7 days and/ or repair." Consequence Analysis: Inefficient and confusion in testing of BOP components. 4-0-16
Is the BOP closing ratio known? No REF: Best Industry Practices. API RP 5312.3. (c.)
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "Refer to testing procedures and HWO worksheet." "The minimum calculated pressure to effectively close and seal a ram-type BOP against a wellbore pressure equal to the maximum rated working pressure of the BOP divided by the closing ratio specified for that BOP." Consequence Analysis: Not following manufacture recommended BOP operating pressures per well pressure ratio may result in delay of closing times and damage to elastomeric causing a well control event. 4-0-17
Are BOP and valve control handles on ground console and work basket console clearly labeled? No REF:
0.00 / 10.00
Page: 12 / 22
Audit Report Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Actual Score
Possible Score
API Recommended Practice 53 Blow Out Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Sec 12.5.3.f API 12 Sec 5.3(f) and IADC Ch K Sec 2 (1.C) Criteria: "Control valves must be clearly marked to indicate which preventer or choke line valve each control valve operates, and the position of the valves." (open, closed, neutral) Consequence Analysis: Possible function of incorrect BOP. If left in neutral, there may be a leak when the accumulator is needed. Handle must remain in open or closed position. 4-0-23
Does the blind rams accumulator control have a cover but not lock to allow the blind rams to be actuated from the remote station and prevent accidental or unreasoned closure? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: API Recommended Practice 53 Blow Out Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Sec 12.5.3.f.
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "The control valve handle that operates the blind rams should be protected to avoid unintentional operation, but allow full operation from the remote panel without interference." "Included in the safety system of the well control system." Consequence Analysis: Unable to close blind rams from auxiliary BOP console making the remote station useless. DSCN1139.jpg
4-0-24
Have the preventers been field disassembled and inspected in accordance with API Standards (3-5 yrs)? Provide date of last inspection in narrative. ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: American Petroleum Institute 53 Recommended Practice Blow Out Prevention
0.00 / 15.00
Page: 13 / 22
Audit Report Actual Score
Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Possible Score
Recommended Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Sec. 17.10.3 Criteria: "After every 3-5 years of service, the BOP stack, choke manifolds, and diverter components should be disassembled and inspected in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines. Elastomeric components should be changed out and surface finishes should be examined for wear and corrosion. Critical dimensions should be checked against the manufacturer's allowable wear limits. Individual components can be inspected on a staggered schedule. A full internal and external inspection of the flexible choke and kill lines should be performed in accordance with the equipment manufacturer's guidelines." Consequence Analysis: Surface failure. 4-0-29
Are rams, annular, hydraulic operated valves, and choke manifold low pressure tested (200-300 psi) before pressuring up to the full test pressure? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: API 53, Recommended Practices for Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells Sec 17.3.2.1 IADC Chp.K.Sec.1.F.2.
0.00 / 15.00
Criteria: "All blowout prevention components that may be exposed to well pressure should be tested first to a low pressure of 200 to 300 psi (1.38 to 2.1 MPa) and then to a high pressure." Consequence Analysis: BOP failure at low well bore pressure. Section Score: Section Findings Total:
185.00 / 275.00 9 / 39
Choke Desired Compliance - (100.00%) Section Score: Section Findings Total:
0.00 / 0.00 0 / 17
Gas Separation Desired Compliance - (100.00%) Section Score: Section Findings Total:
0.00 / 0.00 0/3
Page: 14 / 22
Audit Report Actual Score
Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Possible Score
Inside BOP, Back Pressure Valves and Floats Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 7-0-1
In the work basket is there available a full opening TIW safety valve? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: API 53 15.2
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "A spare TIW type safety valve should be readily available (i.e., stored in open position with wrench accessible) in the work basket at all times." All necessary cross-over's must be readily available. Consequence Analysis: A) Unable to run wireline tools - bridge plug; B) It could lead to an inside drill pipe blowout Section Score: Section Findings Total:
55.00 / 65.00 1/9
Control Console Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 8-0-1
Is there a safety-latch between slip-control handles to prevent opening slips simultaneously but not interfere with closing both slips simultaneously? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practices.
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "Safety latch should be installed between slip control handles to prevent opening slips simultaneously and losing control of the pipe." Consequence Analysis: Loss of control of pipe 8-0-5
Is there a safety-latch between stripper rams-control handles to prevent opening rams simultaneously but not interfere with closing both simultaneously? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practices.
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "Safety latch should be installed between stripper rams control handles to prevent opening rams simultaneously resulting in an uncontrolled release of pressure." Consequence Analysis: Release of high pressure gas and or fluids, damage to elastomers. Page: 15 / 22
Audit Report Actual Score
Detailed Non Compliance Findings Section Score: Section Findings Total:
Possible Score
30.00 / 40.00 2/7
Access Window Desired Compliance - (100.00%) Section Score: Section Findings Total:
0.00 / 0.00 0/5
Pipe Guides Desired Compliance - (100.00%) Section Score: Section Findings Total:
20.00 / 20.00 0/2
Stripping Rubber Desired Compliance - (100.00%) Section Score: Section Findings Total:
30.00 / 30.00 0/4
Rental Equipment Desired Compliance - (100.00%) Section Score: Section Findings Total:
0.00 / 0.00 0/2
Tripping Procedures Desired Compliance - (100.00%) Section Score: Section Findings Total:
20.00 / 20.00 0/7
Drills Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 14-0-1
Are "while tripping" drills held at intervals, timed and recorded on the IADC Daily Drilling Report? ( Repeat Finding ) No
0.00 / 5.00
Page: 16 / 22
Audit Report Actual Score
Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Possible Score
American Petroleum Institute 59 Recommended Practice for Well Control Operation, Sec 11.3 MMS 250.408 (a) (5) Criteria: " Drills should be documented, executed, repetitive, and followed-up to correct identified problems." (5) " Tripping pipe. A drill conducted during a trip shall include the following as practicable: (i) Detect kick and sound alarm; (ii) Install safety valve, close safety valve; (iii) Position pipe, prepare to close annular preventer; (iv) Install inside preventer, open safety valve; (v) Record time; (vi) Record casing pressure; (vii) Check all valves on choke manifold and BOP system for correct position (open or closed); (viii) Check for leaks on BOP system component and choke manifold; (ix) Check flow line and choke exhaust lines for flow; (x) Check accumulator pressure." Consequence Analysis: A) Failure to react properly during a well control event since the crew is not well trained; B) Failure to detect kicks before escalating into much larger well control situation. Section Score: Section Findings Total:
0.00 / 5.00 1/2
Unit Specifications Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 15-0-1
Are approved well killing worksheets available on location? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: API 59, Recommended Practice for Well Control Operations, Sec 9.1. Sections a-h
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "Complete the well control worksheet (Refer to Appendix B)" of API 59 "Drilling densities should be recorded on the well control worksheets." "Review and update pump output and hole data and complete the suggested well control worksheet." Consequence Analysis: A) Improper Kill technique when responding to a well control situation; B) Unnecessary fluid lost to the formation; C) Additional influx 15-0-2
Are approved well killing worksheets updated after mud density changes? No REF: API 59, Recommended Practice for Well Control Operations, Sec 9.1. Sections a-h
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "Complete the well control worksheet (Refer to Appendix B)" of API 59 "Drilling densities should be recorded on the well control worksheets." "Review and update pump output and hole data and complete the suggested well control worksheet." Page: 17 / 22
Audit Report Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Actual Score
Possible Score
Consequence Analysis: A) Improper Kill technique when responding to a well control situation; B) Unnecessary fluid lost to the formation; C) Additional influx 15-0-6
Are mud pump pop-offs properly set? No REF: IADC J. J12-3. II. C.
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "Usually, relief valves are set to exceed rated pressure by some given amount." Consequence Analysis: A) Liner failure; B) Stand pipe and rotary hose failure No pop off on pump 15-0-26
Is there a BOP manual available with a list of necessary expendables that should always be on hand? No REF: API 53 Recommended Practices for Blowout Prevention Equipment System for Drilling Wells, Sec 6.4
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "The following recommended minimum BOP spare parts (for the service intended) should be carefully stored, maintained and readily available: a. a complete set of ram rubbers for each size and type of ram BOP being used. b. a complete set of bonnet or door seals for each size and type of ram BOP being used c. plastic packing for BOP secondary seals d. ring gaskets to fit end connections e. a spare annular BOP packing element and a complete set of seals f. a flexible choke or kill line if in use." Consequence Analysis: Loss of rig time waiting on BOP expendables. Could lead to surface failure in event of a kick. 15-0-30
Are all ladders clamped properly and extension ladders equipped with safety latches? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: OSHA 1910.26 C (3)(vi)
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "Ladders must not be tied or fastened together to provide longer sections. They must be equipped with the hardware fittings necessary if the manufacturers endorses extended uses." Consequence Analysis: Personnel injury.
Page: 18 / 22
Audit Report Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Actual Score
Possible Score
DSCN1137.jpg
15-0-39
Has there been any NDE inspections performed on critical components within the last year? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practice. API RP 53. 17.10.3. 17.13.2.
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "This is defined as jobs falling due depending on calendar time or running hours." "(I.e.)After every 3-5 years of service the BOP stack, choke manifold and components should be disassembled and inspected in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines." "Where required, copies of the manufacturer's equipment data book and third party certification should be available for review." Consequence Analysis: Equipment failure. Some NDE exists but not for all critical components. 15-0-40
Is evidence on file of the inspections done? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practice. API RP 53. 17.10.3. 17.13.2.
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "This is defined as jobs falling due depending on calendar time or running hours." "(I.e.)After every 3-5 years of service the BOP stack, choke manifold and components should be disassembled and inspected in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines." "Where required, copies of the manufacturer's equipment data book and third party certification should be available for review." Consequence Analysis: Equipment failure.
Page: 19 / 22
Audit Report Actual Score
Detailed Non Compliance Findings 15-0-41
Are all critical components fully documented with traceable material specifications in line with ISO-9000 standards? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practice.
Possible Score
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "ISO standards are implemented by individual businesses, corporations, and government organizations, the ISO 9000 'family' also provides auditing tools to make sure that you have properly implemented the standards and are meeting the quality requirements." Consequence Analysis: Equipment failure. 15-0-50
Has inspection and certification been preformed to industry standards on all slip bowls in the past year? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: Best Industry Practice.
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: "This is defined as jobs falling due depending on calendar time or running hours." Consequence Analysis: Catastrophic failure with possible injury to personnel or well bore. Section Score: Section Findings Total:
290.00 / 350.00 9 / 53
Crew Training Desired Compliance - (100.00%) 16-0-1
Do Company Men, Supervisors and Operators have certificates of well control training for their positions? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: American Petroleum Institute Specification 54 Recommended Practice for Occupational Safety for Oil and Gas Well Drilling Servicing Operations, Sec 6.1.3 American Petroleum Institute Specification PI T-6 Training and Qualifications for Well Control Equipment and Techniques for Wire line Operations on Offshore Locations Sec. 2.2 (c) API 51 Onshore Oil and Gas Production Practices for Protection of the Environment, Sec 6.1.8 IADC HSE Case Guidelines Part 2 Land Drilling Units, Issue 1.0, October 2007, Sec 2.2.4.3 Competence Assessment and Records
0.00 / 10.00
Criteria: Page: 20 / 22
Audit Report Actual Score
Detailed Non Compliance Findings
Possible Score
"Personnel should be trained in basic well control, as needed, in relationship to their jobs." "To demonstrate that personnel have the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet their responsibilities and perform their job safely and effectively." "Establishing arrangements for identifying both the general and specific ( e.g. well control, fire team leader, etc.) competencies required to meet the responsibilities for each job function." "Maintaining records of each assessment and appraisal." Consequence Analysis: Inability to properly handle or respond to a well control event resulting in a blowout 16-0-2
Do other crew members have certificates of well control training for their positions? ( Repeat Finding ) No REF: American Petroleum Institute Specification 54 Recommended Practice for Occupational Safety for Oil and Gas Well Drilling Servicing Operations, Sec 6.1.3 American Petroleum Institute Specification PI T-6 Training and Qualifications for Well Control Equipment and Techniques for Wire line Operations on Offshore Locations Sec. 2.2 (c) API 51 Onshore Oil and Gas Production Practices for Protection of the Environment, Sec 6.1.8 IADC HSE Case Guidelines Part 2 Land Drilling Units, Issue 1.0, October 2007, Sec 2.2.4.3 Competence Assessment and Records
0.00 / 5.00
Criteria: "Personnel should be trained in basic well control, as needed, in relationship to their jobs." "To demonstrate that personnel have the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet their responsibilities and perform their job safely and effectively." "Establishing arrangements for identifying both the general and specific ( e.g. well control, fire team leader, etc.) competencies required to meet the responsibilities for each job function." "Maintaining records of each assessment and appraisal." Consequence Analysis: Inability to properly handle or respond to a well control event resulting in a blowout Section Score: Section Findings Total:
20.00 / 35.00 2/5
Audit Total Score:
870.00 / 1,150.00
Audit Compliance:
75.65%
Findings Total:
33 / 192
Page: 21 / 22
Section
Actual Score
Section Header
Possible Score
Actual Compliance %
Desired Compliance %
1
Job Procedures
10.00
20.00
50.00 %
100.00 %
2
Power Pack
25.00
30.00
83.33 %
100.00 %
3
Accumulator
185.00
260.00
71.15 %
100.00 %
4
Blowout Preventer
185.00
275.00
67.27 %
100.00 %
5
Choke
0.00
0.00
%
100.00 %
6
Gas Separation
0.00
0.00
%
100.00 %
7
Inside BOP, Back Pressure Valves and Floats
55.00
65.00
84.62 %
100.00 %
8
Control Console
30.00
40.00
75.00 %
100.00 %
9
Access Window
0.00
0.00
%
100.00 %
10
Pipe Guides
20.00
20.00
100.00 %
100.00 %
11
Stripping Rubber
30.00
30.00
100.00 %
100.00 %
12
Rental Equipment
0.00
0.00
%
100.00 %
13
Tripping Procedures
20.00
20.00
100.00 %
100.00 %
14
Drills
0.00
5.00
0.00 %
100.00 %
15
Unit Specifications
290.00
350.00
82.86 %
100.00 %
16
Crew Training
20.00
35.00
57.14 %
100.00 %
870.00
1,150.00
Totals
75.65 %
100.00 %
Rating Scale: 90 - 100: Industy Leader 80 - 89: Average Performer 70 - 79: Exercise Caution, Mitigating and Corrective Action (CAR Closure)to be implemented immediately 0 - 69: Re-evaluate use of this contractor and/or implement strict controls
Caution, Mitigating and Corrective Action (CAR Closure)to be implemented immediately
Page: 22 / 22
