Quasi-Judicial Power Investigation and Adjudication (1) Special Statutory Grant
G.R. No. L-36385
July 25, 1979
ARCADIO R. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO INCIONG, as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission and DOMINGO CINCO, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.: Facts of the Case: This litigation started with private respondent Domingo Cinco filing a verified complaint with the then National Labor Relations Commission, charging petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino with violating the constitution of the Batangas Labor Union by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers in the month of November, 1972, and praying that such election be conducted immediately. Upon receipt of such verified complaint, petitioner on the same date sent an urgent telegram to the respondent National Labor Relations Commission for the cancellation of the hearing of such complaint as he had to appear on that very day before the then Court of Industrial Relations. Petitioner was not informed of the action taken on such motion; instead, he was notified that respondent National Labor Relations Commission issued an order directing the Batangas Labor Union "to hold its election of officers within twenty (20) days from receipt of the order. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. As such motion for reconsideration was not acted upon despite repeated requests, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Secretary of Labor, praying at the same time that the pre-election conference set and the election scheduled be suspended in the the meanwhile. meanwhile. Respondent National National Labor Relations Relations Commission, thru its then Chairman, Amado G. Inciong, informed the herein petitioner that the elections of officers of the Batangas Labor Union would proceed as scheduled . Subsequently, the Batangas Labor Union filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Batangas, for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction, against the respondent Domingo Cinco and the National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor, seeking to annul and to prohibit the respondent National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor from enforcing it. The court of first instance then presided by Judge Jaime delos Angeles, now retired, did not grant the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte as prayed for in the petition but instead set the application thereof for hearing . After such hearing, Judge Jaime delos Angeles reserved his resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. On the same date, shortly before noon and within the court premises, petitioner and Judge Jaime delos Angeles were served with a copy of a subpoena issued by respondent Amado Inciong, Chairman of the then National Labor Relations Commission, requiring them to appear at the National Labor Relations Commission, to explain why he should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the Commission under Presidential Decree 21. A case was filed with the Supreme Court and said court issued this resolution: "Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved: (a) to require the respondents to file an [answer] thereto within ten (10) days from notice hereof, and not to move to dismiss the petition; and (b) to have a [temporary restraining order issued], effective immediately until further orders from this Court." A letter from respondent Inciong received in the Supreme Court which stated that “First of all the issue is not [sic] academic since we do not intend to continue with the contempt proceedings against petitioner Arcadio Tolentino. The union election has been held in accordance with our order and the winner duly proclaimed. Second, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over us. Enclosed is a copy of Presidential Decree 21 for your information and guidance. Third, under the New Society, we are evolving a delegalized labor management system in this country, and we expect the fullest cooperation of the Supreme Court in this endeavour.” The Court Resolved: (a) to [expunge] said letter from the records of this case; and (b) to require said respondent to [comply] with this Court's resolution of March 6, 1973, within five (5) days from notice hereof. Issue: Is the chairman of NLRC empowered to issue subpoena and cite person in contempt by virtue of Presidential Decree 21? Held: The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong that the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 21 be attained thus afforded no warrant for exercising a power not conferred by such decree. He ought to have known that the competence, "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply" certainly cannot extend to a judge of the court of first instance. Correctly construed, it cannot cover the case likewise of a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. It must ever be borne in mind by an administrative official that courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law. That is the very essence of a judicial power. So the rule of law requires. It is true that courts, like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its jurisdiction. In this particular case, it is admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised. The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it. Instead, respondent Inciong took the precipitate step of citing him for contempt. That was an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules. Neither was there any contumacious act committed by petitioner in seeking judicial remedy. It would be a reproach to any legal system if an individual is denied access to the courts under these circumstances. The resort of respondent Inciong to what has been derisively referred to as epithetical jurisprudence, seeking shelter in the opprobrious term "old society tactics," is an implied admission of his actuation being devoid of support in law. As was so well stated by Chief Justice Hughes: " It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted and the assailed order of February 28, 1973, citing the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, as well as petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino for contempt, declared void and of no force or effect, both orders having been issued beyond the power of respondent Amado Inciong to issue. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. Warrant of Arrest/Administrative searches
G.R. No. L-10280
September 30, 1963
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. Facts of the Case:
Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments. Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued but said aliens were provisionally set at liberty upon filing of a surety bond. Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges for the reason, among others, that the same do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied, petitionersappellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila . Petitioners upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. The respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among others, that the Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he was found in the same decision of the trial court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the United States Air Force in order that the latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the investigation of the purchase of $130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was involved. After due trial, the court rendered a decision, upholding the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present appeal. Issue: WON the deportation board has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners and the authority to order their deportation and arrest
Held:
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613). Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:. SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses." Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering, hoarding or black marketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations — an economic sabotage — which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation, i.e., whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The contention that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide — on whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered. Imposition of Fines and Penalties
G.R. No. 4349
September 24, 1908
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant. Facts of the Case:
In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. He was moving her lighter and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power. Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
Issue: WON the act of the Collector of Customs in promulgating such a law are void as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power Held:
NO. Rules for local navigation prescribed by the collector of a port as harbor master pursuant to statutory authority may be sustained as not an undue exercise of a delegated legislative power. The fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is the exercise of a legislative power which cannot be delegated to a subordinate authority. By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows: SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed. SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both. Under this statute, there is no difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she was navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of Manila. The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. . . . Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and is sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we should pass on the questions discussed in the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the complaint is not material, as we have frequently held that where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.
We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section Act No. 1136. So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-43653
November 29, 1977
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and DIEGO MORALES, respondents. G.R. No. L-45378 November 29, 1977 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES. INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and PACIFICO INNOCENCIO, respondents. Treñas & Aligaen for petitioner. R. Mag. Bernardo for respondent Morales. Silvestre T. de la Cruz for respondent Innocencio. Primitivo C. Santos for respondent Board.
MARTIN, J., Facts of the Case: These two petitions (G.R. No. L-43653 and G.R. No. L-45378) for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01-OC, entitled "Diego T Morales vs. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)" and BC Case No. 75-08-OC, entitled "Pacifica Innocencio vs. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)," have been Consolidated as per as they involve the same issue as to whether the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages allegedly suffered by private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., RCPI for short. In BC Case No. 75-01-OC (G.R. No. L-43653) complainant respondent Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. In BC Case No. 75-08-OC (G.R. No. L-45378) complainant respondent Pacifico Innocencio claim that Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said
telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages. After hearing the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. I and Letter of Implementation No. 1. The main thrust of the argument of petitioner is that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence covered by Article 1170 of the Civil Code 1 and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of the Civil Code 2 which according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the Board of Communications. Issue: WON respondent Board has jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints Held:
Court agrees with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by statute".3 The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. In the two cases before us petitioner is not being charged nor investigated for violation of the terms and conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulations of the respondent Board of Communications. The complaint of respondents in the two case was that they were allegedly inconvenienced or injured by the failure of the petitioner to transmit to them telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives which according to them constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. The charges however, do not necessarily involve petitioners failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or regulation of respondent Board of Communication. It is clear from the record that petitioner has not been charge of any violation or failure to comply with the terms and condition of its certificates of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulation of the respondent Board. The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases before Us complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of P200 upon the petitioner. In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI
(G.R. No. L-29236) and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled: There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer . The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio company for an negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress of validity. In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion. WHEREFORE. both decisions of respondent Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01 OC and BC Case No. 75- 08-0C are hereby reversed, set aside, declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of both cases. Judicial Determination of Sufficiency of Standards (9) maintain monetary stability promote rising level of production and real income
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILLIAM ERNEST JOLLIFFE, defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.: This is an appeal taken by defendant William Ernest Jolliffe from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, convicting him of a violation of Republic Act No. 256, and sentencing him to imprisonment for one (1) year, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the costs, as well as decreeing the forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of four (4) pieces of gold bullion valued P35,305.46, and a travellers' check in the sum of $100.00. Facts of the Case:
Appellant was about to board a plane of the Pan American World Airways, four pieces of gold bullion were found in his body. There was also found in his possession a $100 traveler’s check. He was charged with and convicted of violation of RA 265 and sentenced to imprisonment, to pay fine and costs, as well as decreeing the forfeiture in favor of the Gov’t of the gold bullion and the traveler’s check. He appealed and among others challenged the validity of Circular No. 21 of the Central Bank on the ground that it is an undue delegation of powers. That granting, without admitting, that the power to promulgate it was granted to the Monetary Board by Republic Act 265, and granting without admitting, that the power to so promulgate was validly exercised, still it is invalid because it constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional and void
Issue: WON the assailed Circular No. 21 is legal and that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power Held:
It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." Referring the case at bar, section 74 of Republic Act No. 265 conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures to combat such crisis." The Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial measures" to protect the international stability of the peso, "whether the international reserve is falling, as a result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary to the national welfare" (section 70, Rep. Act No. 265). It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265.) These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers Due Process in Administrative Hearings ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS’ BROTHERHOOD, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., Respondents.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations. Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union. Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay." Jose M. Casal; for National Workers’ Brotherhood. Facts of the Case: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial. HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing). The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following: The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. [G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000] HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, petitioner, vs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent. Ne-xold
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.: Facts of the Case: Secretary Gloria filed a complaint against respondent for dishonesty and grave misconduct due to pilferage of some historical documents and the keeping of it on the respondents’ possession. Respondent then receive a copy of the resolution finding her guilty of administrative offenses of dishonesty and was ordered dismissed from the service. Respondent did not appeal the judgment and instead filed for Petition for the Production of the DECS investigation Committee Report. The Petition was, however denied. She then filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution, Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. The appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Gloria’s petition for lack of merit holding that -Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to be informed of the findings of the investigation against him?
Held:
A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him-he is only entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report.
[G.R. No. 129914. May 12, 2000] NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (SECOND DIVISION) and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), petitioners, vs. POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION PARDO, J.: Scsdaad The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police Commission affirming the summary dismissal of Police Chief Inspector Leonardo W. Bernabe as ordered by the Chief, Philippine National Police for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a police officer. The Court of Appeals ordered respondent reinstated, entitled to payment of his salary and allowances withheld from him by reason of the erroneous dismissal, unless suspended for some other lawful cause.[ Facts of the Case:
In a news article respondent appeared to have headed a syndicate encashing THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SIC (376) pieces treasury warrants of PC soldiers, policemen, firemen and jail personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended and separated from the service. President Fidel V. Ramos instructed the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government to conduct an investigation and prosecute respondent if necessary. Acting thereon, the Secretary referred the directive to the PNP Director General, who ordered the Criminal Investigation Service Command to investigate the charges. On the same day, respondent was informed of the Batuigas article with the Presidents marginal note on it and S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through affidavit. Respondent submitted his affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He alleged that all the cases against him were either dismissed by the Ombudsman or pending resolution, except one which was pending before the Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of seven treasury warrants. The Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of respondent from the police service based on the following facts: "x x x That he is in the head of the payroll syndicate; that this syndicate was responsible for the encashing of PC/INP treasury warrants for personnel on leave, AWOL, deceased or terminated from the police service; that the TWs were supposed to be cancelled not to be encashed x x x” Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board but the National Appellate Board, Second Division, rendered a decision sustaining the summary dismissal of respondent from the PNP. The National Appellate Board denied his motion for reconsideration. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975. After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975, but setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board for failure to comply with the due process requirement of the Constitution. The dispositive portion reads: "WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Appellate Board is SET ASIDE. Let the original records be remanded to the Chief, PNP for proper compliance with the Summary Dismissal Proceedings provided for in NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 92-006. In the meantime, petitioner is ordered reinstated, entitled to payment of his salary and allowances withheld from him by reason of the erroneous dismissal, unless he is suspended for some other lawful cause in another forum. Jurissc
Petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal. Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police Commission, on the ground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of the charges filed against him. Held: SC regret that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the issue raised. As we held quite recently, "On the question of due process, we find that the requirements thereof were sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." In this case, the record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a memorandum. Consequently, respondent was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process.[25] WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing respondent Police Chief Inspector Leonardo W. Bernabe from the police service. No costs.
Notice of Hearing When Required [G.R. No. 130685. March 21, 2000] FELIX UY et al vs COA Facts of the Case :
Petitioners were among the more than sixty permanent employees of the Provincial Engineering Office, Province of Agusan del Sur, who were dismissed from the service by then Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. when the latter assumed office, allegedly to scale down the operations of the said office. A petition for reinstatement was filed by petitioners before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) alleging that Governor Paredes was motivated by political vengeance when he dismissed them and hired new employees to replace them. It appears that during the pendency of the petition for reinstatement, Governor Paredes issued Memorandum Order No. 3-A providing for the hiring of casual employees to replace the dismissed employees, allegedly due to exigency of service. The MSPB rendered a decision holding that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. While the Governor of the Province of Agusan del Sur may take measures to retrench or reduce the work force yet this must be done in accordance with law and rules. As the plantilla schedule for the period of January to December 1988 would show, there are 106 employees in the provincial Engineering Office and out of these, 53 employees were terminated. There is no showing that these employees were compared in terms of relative fitness, efficiency and length of service. Thus, there is no basis in removing these employees except for the reason of lack of funds. Pursuant to a Motion for Clarification filed by petitioners, the MSPB issued an Order which directed the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits for the period that they had been out of the service until their reinstatement. The matter was thereafter
brought before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which issued an Order directing the Governor to reinstate the employees with the caveat that should he fail to do so, the CSC would be constrained to initiate contempt proceedings against him and other responsible officials.[5] As per its Resolution No. 94-1567, the CSC actually initiated indirect contempt proceedings against the Provincial Governor who was by then Democrito Plaza. This prompted Governor Plaza to comply, and herein petitioners were finally reinstated to their former positions. The Provincial Treasurer of Agusan del Sur made a partial payment to the reinstated employees but refused to release petitioners remaining back salaries and other monetary benefits. The Provincial Administrator, for and in behalf of Governor Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent COA through the Provincial Auditor, inquiring on whether or not the former Provincial Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., who perpetrated the illegal act of dismissing the 61 PEO employees, would be personally liable for payment of back salaries and other benefits. Respondent COA rendered its Decision No. 96351 holding “‘pursuant, however to CA. No. 327, as amended by PD No. 1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit”. As a result, the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur, through its Acting Provincial Treasurer, refused to release petitioners’ remaining back salaries and other monetary benefits. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by respondent COA hence petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari. Issue: WON COA can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil Service Commission; and WON Gov Paredes should be made personally liable to the backwages of the illegally dismissed employees. Held:
The jurisdiction of the MSPB to render said decision is unquestionable. This decision cannot be categorized as void. Thus, we cannot allow the COA to set it aside in the exercise of its broad powers of audit. The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Payment of backwages to illegally dismissed government employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable. A careful perusal of said Decision will disclose that the MSPB never made a categorical finding of fact that former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith and hence, is personally liable for the payment of petitioners’ back wages. Indeed, the MSPB even found that there was lack of funds which would have justified the reduction in the workforce were it not for the procedural infirmities in its implementation. If the MSPB found bad faith on the part of Governor Paredes it would have categorically decreed his personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the petitioners. To be sure, even the petitioners did not proceed from the theory that their dismissal is the personal liability of Governor Paredes. Familiar learning is our ruling that bad faith cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. Accordingly, the fundamental requirements of procedural due process cannot be violated in proceedings before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hidebound by technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a
mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities. Notice and Hearing When not Required
G.R. No. L-9430
June 29, 1957
EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, and THE HONORABLE CARLOS P. GARCIA, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, respondents. PADILLA, J.: Petitioner was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs and left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. A complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted and private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." Respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. The Embassy was likewise directed to make representation with the State Department that Emilio Suntay's presence outside the Philippines is considered detrimental to the best interest of this Government, that his passport has been withdrawn, and that he is not considered under the protection of the Philippines while abroad. (Exhibit E.) However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceeding in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order. Respondent Secretary denied counsel's request, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration Hence this petition. Issue: WON the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport without hearing violates his constitutional right to due process. Held: The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the o rder of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with
law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. Forms and Promulgation of Judgement
G.R. No. L-23545
November 7, 1979
BENITO SICHANGCO, for and in behalf of his minor children, SI BENG, SI SON and SI LUNA, petitionerappellee, vs. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.: Facts of the Case:
The Bureau of Immigration recognized Benito Sichangco (Sy Te) as a Filipino citizen by birth. He was married to Cheng Yok Ha and had 3 children—Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna—all born in China and allegedly out of their marriage. The Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration admitted into the Philippines these 3 minor children from Hongkong on the basis of the finding that they were children of Sichangco, a Filipino citizen. When the decision was submitted to the Board of Commissioners of Immigration (BCI), it “noted” the decision. The Secretary of Justice (Diokno) issued an order (Memo Order No. 9) setting aside all decisions of the BCI, since it had not been collectively deliberating on the cases filed before it. Thus, the BCI reversed the previous decision and ordered the exclusion from the Philippines of the minor children. Thus, in behalf of these minors, Sichangco filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction before the CFI of Manila to annul the decision of the BCI excluding these minors from the Philippines. The CFI granted the petition. Then Secretary of Justice Jose W. Diokno issued Memorandum Order No. 9, wherein he found "that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming before it," for which reason he set aside "all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from, or on review motu propio of, decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry," and directed the Board of Commissioners "to review in accordance with Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, all decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into this country and give preference to all cases where entry has been permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines, following the principle
laid down in Section 30 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, that 'the burden of proof shall be upon such alien to establish that he is not subject to exclusion “ Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9, findings were forwarded to the Commissioner of Immigration recommending the exclusion of said minors, the revocation of the order declaring Sy Te or Benito Sichangco a Filipino citizen, and the filing of deportation proceedings against him. Hence, petitioner Benito Sichangco, in behalf of the minors Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul the decision of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration excluding the above named minors from the Philippines. After trial by the court a quo, reversed the decision of the previous Board of Commissioners ruliong it illegal and null and void, and the injunction earlier issued was made permanent, with costs against respondent Board. Respondent Board appealed. Issue: WON the action of the Board of Commissioners in "noting" the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry on different dates was a valid decision of affirmance by the said Board of Commissioners in the exercise of its power
Held: The Board of Commissioners of Immigration was, and still is, under the supervision and control of the Department of Justice. By virtue of his power of control, the Secretary of Justice can modify, nullify or set aside the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, as well as the act of "noting" of the said decision by the then members of the Board of Commissioners. The Department Head can even directly exercise the powers of the chief of the bureau or office under him. Hence, then Secretary of Justice Jose W. Diokno validly issued Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners Moreover, the individual action of the members of the previous Board of Commissioners in "noting" the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry on different dates was not a valid decision of affirmance by the said Board of Commissioners in the exercise of its power of review motu proprio under Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940. Respondent-appellant correctly stated that the word "noted" simply meant that the members of the Board of Commissioners had taken cognizance of the existence of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, that a mere notation does not constitute an exercise of its powers of review, motu proprio pursuant to Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended; and that a decision of the Board of Commissioners, requires a judicious review and deliberation by said Board as a body, of the proceedings, the evidence and the law involved, the formulation of findings of facts and conclusion of law. Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and ideas should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion. This process is of the essence of a board's action, save where otherwise provided by law and the salutary effects of the rule would be lost were the members to act individually, without benefit of discussion. "The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual members separately. Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in session, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum present." 'Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a board but of the official body, the members must be together and act in their official capacity, and the action should appear on the records of the board. 'Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of different individuals, that board can act officially only as such, in convened session, with the members, or a quorum thereof, present. Hence, there was no decision rendered by the previous Board of Commissioners that could have been reversed by the respondent Board of Commissioners, as found by the trial court. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM SHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY, REVERSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE.
