51 Spouses Pereña v. Spouses Zarate, G.R. No. 157917, August 29, 2012
Torts Torts and Damages – Heirs of a high school student may be awarded damages for loss income In June 1996, Nicolas and Teresita Teresita Zarate contracted Teodoro Teodoro and Nanette Pereña to transport their (Zarate’s) son, Aaron Zarate, to and fro school! The Pereñas "ere o"ners of a #an $ein% used for pri#ate school transport! At a$out 6&'a of Au%ust , 1996, the dri#er of the said pri#ate #an, *leente Alfaro, "hile the children "ere on $oard includin% Aaron, Aaron, decided to ta+e a short cut in order to a#oid traffic! The usual short cut "as a railroad crossin% crossin% of the Philippine National ail"a- (PN)! Alfaro sa" that the barandilla (the pole used to $loc+ #ehicles crossin% the rail"a-) "as up "hich eans it "as o+a- to cross! .e then tried to o#erta+e a $us! .o"e#er, there "as in fact an oncoin% train $ut Alfaro no lon%er sa" the train as his #ie" "as alread- $loc+ed $- the $us he "as tr-in% to o#erta+e! The $us "as a$le to cross unscathed $ut the #an’s rear end "as hit! /urin% the collision, Aaron, "as thro"n off the #an! .is $od- hit the railroad trac+s and his head "as se#ered! .e "as onl- 1 -ears old! It turns out that Alfaro "as not a$le to hear the train hon+in% fro 0 eters a"a$efore the collision $ecause the #an’s stereo "as pla-in% loudl-! The Zarates sued PN and the Pereñas (Alfaro $ecae atlar%e)! Their cause of action a%ainst PN "as $ased on 2uasidelict! Their cause of action a%ainst the Pereñas "as $ased on $reach of contract of coon carria%e! In their defense, the Pereñas in#o+ed that as pri#ate carriers the- "ere not ne%li%ent in selectin% Alfaro as their dri#er as the- ade sure that he had a dri#er’s license and that he "as not in#ol#ed in an- accident prior to his $ein% hired! In short, theo$ser#ed the dili%ence of a %ood father in selectin% their eplo-ee! PN also disclaied lia$ilit- as the- insist that the railroad crossin% the- placed there "as not eant for railroad crossin% (reall-, that’s their defense3)! The T* ruled in fa#or of the Zarates! The *ourt of Appeals Appeals affired the T*! In the decision of the T* and the *A, the- a"arded daa%es in fa#or of the Zarates for the loss of earnin% capacit- of their dead son!
The Pereñas appealed! The- ar%ued that the a"ard "as iproper as Aaron "as erelerel- a hi%h school school student, student, hence, the a"ard a"ard of such daa%es daa%es "as erelerelspeculati#e! The- cited the case of People #s Teehan+ee "here the 4upree *ourt did not a"ard daa%es for the loss of earnin% capacit- despite the fact that the #icti there "as enrolled in a pilot school! ISSUES: 5hether or not the defense of due dili%ence of a %ood father $- the Pereñas is untena$le! 5hether or not the a"ard of daa%es for loss of incoe is proper! HELD: es, in $oth issues! Defense of Due Diligence of a Good Father This defense is not tena$le in this case! The Pereñas are coon carriers! The- are not erel- pri#ate carriers! (Prior to this case, the status of pri#ate transport for school ser#ices or school $uses is not "ell settled as to "hether or not the- are pri#ate or coon carriers 7 $ut the- "ere %enerall- re%arded re%arded as pri#ate carriers)! Pri#ate transport for schools are coon carriers! The Pereñas, as the operators of a school school $us ser#ice "ere& (a) en%a%ed en%a%ed in transporti transportin% n% passen%e passen%ers rs %enerall%enerall- as a $usiness, not 8ust as a casual occupation ($) underta+in% to carr- passen%ers o#er esta$lished roads $- the ethod $- "hich the $usiness "as conducted and (c) transportin% students for a fee! /espite caterin% to a liited client:le, the Pereñas operat operated ed as a coon coon carrier carrier $ecaus $ecause e thethe- held held these thesel#e l#es s out as a readreadtransportation indiscriinatel- to the students of a particular school li#in% "ithin or near "here the- operated the ser#ice and for a fee! ;ein% a coon carrier, "hat is re2uired of the Pereñas is not ere dili%ence of a %ood father! 5hat is specificall- re2uired fro the $- la" is e
urthe >urther, r, the $asis $asis of the coputation of his earnin% capacit- "as not on "hat he "ould ha#e $ecoe! It "as $ased on the current iniu "a%e! The iniu "a%e "as #alidl- used $ecause "ith his circustances at the tie of his death, it is ost certain that had he li#ed, he "ould at least $e a iniu "a%e earner $- the tie he starts "or+in%! This is not $ein% speculati#e at all!
The Teehan+ee Teehan+ee case "as different $ecause in that case, the reason "h- no daa%es "ere a"arded a"arded for loss of earnin% capacitcapacit- "as that the defendants defendants there "ere alread- assuin% that the #icti "ould indeed $ecoe a pilot 7 hence, that ade the assuption speculati#e! ;ut in the case of Aaron, there "as no speculation as to "hat he i%ht $e 7 $ut "hate#er he’ll $ecoe, it is certain that he "ill at the least $e earnin% iniu "a%e!
52 Victory Victory Liner, Liner, Inc. v Rosalito Rosalito Gammad, et al., November November 25, 2004 Facts Gammad showed that his wife Marie Grace was on board a Victory Liner bus running at high speed when it fell on a ravine, w hich resulted to her death and physical injuries to other passengers. The heirs of the deceased led a complaint for damages arising from culpa contractual. the petitioner claimed that the incident was purely purely accidenta accidentall and that it has always eercis eercised ed etraord etraordinary inary diligence. The trial court ordered Victory Liner to pay actual damages, death indemnity, eemplary and moral damages, compensatory damages, attorney! attorney!s s fees and cost of the suit. The "# a$rmed a$rmed the trial court!s court!s decision decision but reduced reduced the actual actual and eemplary eemplary damages. damages. The "# denied the M%. &ence, the present petition wherein VL argues that the award of damages were without basis and should be deleted.
'ssue (hether the award of damages was proper %uling )etitione )etitionerr was correctly correctly found found liable liable for breach of contract contract of carriage. # common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human human care care and and foresi foresight ght can provid provide, e, using using the utmost utmost dilige diligence nce of very very cautio cautious us person persons, s, with with due regard regard to all the circum circumsta stance nces. s. 'n a contra contract ct of carria carriage, ge, it is presu presumed med that that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. *nless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even ma+e ma+e an epress epress nding nding of fault or negligence negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier eercised eercised etraordinary diligence. There is no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the proimate cause of Marie Grace!s death was the negligence of petitioner. petitioner. evertheless, the award of damages should be modied. #rticle -/0 in relation to #rticle 112/ of the "ivil "ode, holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a
passenge passengerr liable to pay the following3 4-5 indemnity for death, 415 indemnity for loss of earning capacity, and 465 moral damages. 'n the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled to indemn indemnity ity for the death of Marie Marie Grace Grace which which under under curre current nt jurisprudence is ed ed at )72,222. The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceased!s earning capacity should be deleted for lac+ of basis. #s a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. 8y way of eception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence absence of documenta documentary ry evidence evidence when 4-5 the deceased deceased is self9 self9 employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws laws,, and and judi judicia ciall notic notice e may may be ta+e ta+en n of the the fact fact that that in the the deceased!s line of wor+ no documentary evidence is available: or 415 the deceased is employed as a daily wage wor+er earning less than the minimum minimum wage under under current current labor labor laws. %osalito %osalito did not present present evidence attesting to Marie Grace!s earning capacity as 8'% ;ection "hief. &owever, &owever, the fact of loss having been establishe established, d, temperate temperate damage damages s in the amount amount of )722,2 )722,222. 22.22 22 should should be awarde awarded d to respo responde ndents nts.. *nder *nder #rticle #rticle 1110 1110 of the "ivil "ivil "ode, "ode, temper temperate ate or modera moderate te damag damages, es, which which are are more more than than nomina nominall but less less than than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court nds that some pecuniary loss has been sun the other other hand, hand, eemp eemplar lary y damage damages, s, which which are are awarde awarded d by way of eamp eample le or correc correctio tion n for the public good may be recove recovere red d in contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, rec+less, oppressive, or malevolent manner. %espo %esponde ndents nts in the instan instantt case case should should be awarde awarded d moral moral damages damages to compensat compensate e for the grief caused caused by the death of the deceased resulting from the petitioner!s breach of contract of carriage. ?urth ?urther ermor more, e, the petiti petitione onerr failed failed to prove prove that that it eerc eercise ised d the
etraordinary diligence re=uired for common carriers, it is presumed to have acted rec+lessly. Thus, the award of eemplary damages is proper. *nder the circumstances, we nd it reasonable to award respondents the amount of )-22,222.22 as moral damages and )-22,222.22 as eemplary damages. These amounts are not ecessive. #ctual damages should be further reduced to )@,-/2.22, which was the amount supported by o$cial receipts. )ursuant to #rticle 112@ of the "ivil "ode, attorney!s fees may also be recovered in the case at bar where eemplary damages are awarded. The "ourt nds the award of attorney!s fees e=uivalent to -2A of the total amount adjudged against petitioner reasonable. 'n the instant case, petitioner should be held liable for payment of interest as damages for breach of contract of carriage. "onsidering that the amounts payable by petitioner has been determined with certainty only in the instant petition, the interest due shall be computed upon the nality of this decision at the rate of -1A per annum until satisfaction
53 NPC v. CA Facts:
At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. !etitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it e"ercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. #t further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum abs$ue in%uria. Issues:
&'( )hether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a fortuitous event &*( )hether a notice was sent to the residents &( )hether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum abs$ue in%uria Held:
&'( +he obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of od, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article ''- of the /ivil /ode which results in loss or damage. 0ven if there was no contractual relation between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict . Article *'-1 of the /ivil /ode e"plicitly provides 2whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.2 Act of od or force majeure, by definition, are e"traordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. #t is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. +he principle embodied in the act of od doctrine strictly re$uires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. 3uman intervention is to be e"cluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. )hen the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humani4ed and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of od. #n the case at bar, although the typhoon 2Kading2 was an act of od, petitioners can not escape liability because their negligence was the pro"imate cause of the loss and damage. &*( +he letter itself, addressed merely 2+5 A66 /57/0R70D2, would not strike one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their safety8s sake. +he notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible
officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated the warning properly. +hey were delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned, which are the residents beside the Angat River. +he plaintiffs in this case definitely did not receive any such warning. #ndeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them from liability. &( )e cannot give credence to petitioners8 third assignment of error that the damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal in%ury in view of the fortuitous events. +here is no $uestion that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. +he end does not %ustify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways to such e"tent. 7eedless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim. 54. PADILLA MACHINE SHOP VS. JAVILGAS
?#"T;3 Bavilgas was hired by )adilla Machine ;hop. &is wor+ consisted of reconditioning machines. 'n Buly -CC@, his salary was increased and in Banuary -CCC, his salary was again increased until his dismissal in #pril 1221. )etitioners made regular deductions for his ;;; contributions, but sometime in 1221, he found out that his employer was not remitting the contributions to the ;;;: as a result, he was not able to avail of the benets thereof when his wife gave birth. (hen he complained about the failure of his employer to remit his ;;; contributions, the latter transferred him to the ovaliches branch o$ce. Bavilgas further alleged that in #pril 1221, %odolfo )adilla called him by telephone and told him to stop wor+ing but without giving any reason therefor. &e stopped reporting for wor+ and sued petitioners for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for the payment of bac+wages, pro rated -6th month pay, separation pay, and moral and eemplary damages. >n the other hand, petitioner %odolfo )adilla 4%odolfo5, proprietor of )adilla Machine ;hop, alleged that in -CCC, ;;; and Medicare contributions were deducted from Bavilgas!s salary and remitted to the ;;;: that in 1222, they 4petitioners5 submitted a report to the ;;;
that Bavilgas had voluntarily left and abandoned his wor+, and transferred to another shop, %aymond Machine ;hop, located within the same vicinity as )adilla Machine ;hop: that some months after, Bavilgas returned and pleaded to be re9employed with them: that %odolfo )adilla too+ Bavilgas bac+ to wor+, but their customers were not satised with the =uality of his wor+: hence Bavilgas was assigned to the ovaliches branch: that Bavilgas incurred numerous absences in the ovaliches branch: that Bavilgas had opened his own machine shop and even DEFpiratedDE the clients of petitioners: and nally, Bavilgas again voluntarily left )adilla Machine ;hop without prior notice. ecisions of Lower Tribunals -. The Labor arbiter found that he was illegally dismissed. 1. The L%" reversed the L#!s decision as Bavilgas was never dismissed stating that he was never notied of his dismissal nor was he prevented from returning to wor+. Bavilgasa!s allegation as to the dates of his dismissal li+ewise was not appreciated. 6. The "ourt of #ppeals reversed the L%" and reinstated the ecision of the Labor #rbiter. 't held that the burden of proof is on the petitioners, to show that Bavilgas was dismissed for a valid and just cause. #s to the inconsistency in the dates of BavilgasDEH termination, the appellate court noted that it was a case of miscommunication. Bavilgas was found to be illiterate, as he did not even get to nish Grade ;chool. Li+ewise, the delay of eight months in the ling of the complaint should not wor+ against respondent because it too+ time for him to obtain the services of a counsel. ';;*I3 (as there abandonment so as to give a valid cause of dismissalJ &IL3 o. 'n illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that the employee was dismissed for a valid and just cause.)etitioner did not elaborate or show proof of the claimed abandonment. 'nstead, he concluded that Bavilgas abandoned his corresponding duties and responsibilities when he established and created his own machine shop outt. ?or abandonment to eist, it is essential3 4a5 That the employee must have f ailed to report for wor+ or must have been absent without valid or justiable reason: and 4b5 That there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer9employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. The establishment of his own shop is not enough proof that Bavilgas intended to sever his relationship with his employer. )etitioners consistently deny that Bavilgas was dismissed from service: that he abandoned his employment when he wal+ed out after his conversation with %odolfo and never returned to wor+ again. 8ut denial, in this case, does not su$ce: it should be coupled with evidence to support it. 'n the Machica case, the memorandum, among others, represented clear and convincing proof that there was no intention to dismiss the employees: it constituted evidence in support of the employer!s denial. 'n the instant case, petitioners failed to adduce evidence to rebut BavilgasDEH claim of dismissal and satisfy the burden of proof re=uired. #s regards the eight9 month hiatus before Bavilgas instituted the illegal dismissal case, we
sustain the "ourt of #ppealsDEH ruling that Bavilgas led the complaint within a reasonable period during the three9year period provided under #rticle 1C- of the Labor "ode. Machica "ase3 'n Machica v. %oosevelt ;ervices "enter, 'nc.,K-1 we sustained the employerDEHs denial as against the employeesDEH categorical assertion of illegal dismissal. 'n that case, several employees who allegedly refused to sign a memorandumK-6 from their employer, detailing the commission of alleged anomalies that resulted in the overpricing and overcharging of customers, led an illegal dismissal case three days after receiving the said memorandum. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed and were told not to report for wor+ anymore: the employer denied this and asserted that the wor+ers 4who appeared to be the suspects in the anomalies5 were merely given three to ve days o< to decide whether or not to agree to share the loss su> ?#'T& of the employer in resolving a discovered anomaly. ?irst, it is a declaration of #MI;TO and ?>%G'VII;;: it did not name names: it did not state that the guilty ones will be pursued and punished. ;econd, it as+ed for ;&#%'G among the employees for the loss due to the discovered anomaly. Third, it indicated a )>;'T'VI 8*;'I;; '%I"T'> as it ehorted the employees from participating in similar anomalies henceforward
5 D!"#$ ". M#s!%#s O&&#$'(t!) II E)'&t*#& Coo+'*!t#"', I(&. -' !&ts/ Petitioner Virgilio S. David (David) was the owner or proprietor of VSD Electric Sales, a company engaged in the business of supplying electrical hardware including transformers for rural electric cooperatives lie respondent !isamis "ccidental ## Electric $ooperative, #nc. (!"E%$#), with principal o&ice located in "'amis $ity.
o solve its problem of power shortage a&ecting some areas within its coverage, !"E%$# epressed its intention to purchase a *+ !V power transformer from David. -or this reason, its eneral !anager, Engr. /eynaldo /ada (Engr. /ada), went to meet David in the latter0s o&ice in 1ue'on $ity. David agreed to supply the power transformer provided that !"E%$# would secure a board resolution because the item would still have to be imported. "n 2une 3, *445, Engr. /ada and Director 2ose 2imene' (2imene'), who was in6charge of procurement, returned to !anila and presented to David the re7uested board resolution which authori'ed the purchase of one *+ !V power transformer. #n turn, David presented his proposal for the ac7uisition of said transformer. his proposal was the same proposal that he would usually give to his clients. fter the reading of the proposal and the discussion of terms, David instructed his then secretary and booeeper, Ellen !. 8ong, to type the names of Engr. /ada and 2imene' at the end of the proposal. 9oth signed the document under the word :conforme.: he board resolution was thereafter attached to the proposal. s stated in the proposal, the sub;ect transformer, together with the basic accessories, was valued at P<,5++,+++.++. #t was also stipulated therein that <+= of the purchase price should be paid as downpayment and the remaining balance to be paid upon delivery. -reight handling, insurance, customs duties, and incidental epenses were for the account of the buyer. he 9oard /esolution, on the other hand, stated that the purchase of the said transformer was to be >nanced through a loan from the ?ational Electri>cation dministration (?E). s there was no immediate action on the loan application, Engr. /ada returned to !anila in early December *445 and re7uested David to deliver the transformer to them even without the re7uired downpayment. David granted the re7uest provided that !"E%$# would pay interest at 5@= per annum. Engr. /ada ac7uiesced to the condition. "n December *A, *445, the goods were shipped to "'ami' $ity via 8illiam %ines. #n the 9ill of %ading, a sales invoice was included which stated the agreed interest rate of 5@= per annum. B #.SSCESB 8EE/ "/ ?" E/E $? 9E V%#D 8/D "- -EESF hat being said, the $ourt now comes to David0s prayer that !"E%$# be made to pay the total sum of P<,@A5,A55.5A plus the stipulated interest at 5@= per annum from the >ling of the complaint. lthough the $ourt agrees that !"E%$# should pay interest, the stipulated rate is, however, unconscionable and should be e7uitably reduced. 8hile there is no 7uestion that parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate
on any interest rate in view of the $entral 9an $ircular ?o. 4+< s. *435 which suspended the Csury %aw ceiling on interest e&ective 2anuary *, *43G, it is also worth stressing that interest rates whenever unconscionable may still be reduced to a reasonable and fair level. here is nothing in the said circular which grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.*H ccordingly, the ecessive interest of 5@= per annum stipulated in the sales invoice should be reduced to *5= per annum. #ndeed, David was compelled to >le an action against !"E%$# but this reason alone will not warrant an award of attorney0s fees. #t is settled that the award of attorneyIs fees is the eception rather than the rule. $ounselIs fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. ttorneyIs fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily e7uated to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. #n the ordinary sense, attorneyIs fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latterJ while in its etraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. ttorneyIs fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances speci>ed in rticle 55+3 of the $ivil $ode *A which demands factual, legal, and e7uitable ;usti>cation. #ts basis cannot be left to speculation or con;ecture. #n this regard, none was proven. !oreover, in the absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded attorneyIs fees only in case plainti&s action or defendantIs stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith.*3 is !"E%$#Is case cannot be similarly classi>ed. lso, DavidIs claim for the balance of PAG,+<4.AH plus the stipulated interest is denied for being unsubstantiated.
5 L!&so( ". R''s, 12 SCRA 729 DO!RIN"#$
- # lawyer who is both the eecutor and administrator of the estate may not charge the estate, but the &I'%; who are his clients. 1 #ttorney!s fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proved3 i they must be reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject matter in controversy: ii the etent of the services rendered: and
iii the professional standing of the lawyer. 6 'n all cases, #? must be addressed in a full9blown trial and not on the bare word of the parties. #nd always, they are subject to the moderating hand of the courts. F%!#$
#tty. ;er=uina, petitioned the respondent court for the probate of the last will and testament of "armelita ?arlin. &e also petitioned the court in his capacity as counsel for the heirs , the herein petitioners, and as executor under the will. The will was unopposed and the court issued a certicate of allowance.
Later on, #tty. Iphraim ;er=uina led a "motion for attorney's fees" against the petitioners, alleging that the heirs had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the sum of )/@,222.22. Thereafter summonses were served upon the heirs "as if it were a complaint against said heirs" directing them to answer the motion.
Thereafter, the heirs led their answer and denied the claim for )/@,222.22 alleging that the sum agreed upon was only ),222.22, a sum they had allegedly already paid.
%T" Budge %eyes ordered the heirs to pay #tty. ;er=uina. The heirs appealed but the court denied their notice of appeal for failure of the heirs to le a record on appeal. #tty. ;er=uina then moved for eecution, which was granted by Budge %eyes.
I##&"# ' ("LD$
) *+et+er or not %tty. #er-ina s+o-ld +ave aid doc/et ees beore 1lin t+e 3motion or attorneys ees.3 ayment o doc/et ees is mandatory. 't may be true that the claim for attorneyPs fees was but an incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape valve from the payment of doc+et fees because as in all actions, whether separate or as an o
#ssuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti, that #tty. ;er=uinaPs demand for attorneyPs fees in the sum of )/@,222.22 is valid, he, #tty. ;er=uina, should have paid the fees in =uestion before the respondent court could validly try his QmotionQ. 2 !+e resondent co-rt ravely ab-sed its discretion in denyin t+e +eirs notice o aeal or t+eir ail-re to 1le a record on aeal6 and
The court says this is a Rdead issueS since they are annulling the decision anyway. 7 !+e resondent co-rt also ravely ab-sed its discretion in a8ardin attorneys ees contrary to t+e rovisions o #ection 9, o R-le :5, o t+e R-les o o-rt.
GR$ *nder %ule @7, ;ec. an attorney who is concurrently an eecutor of a will is barred from recovering attorneyPs fees from the estate.
"$ #n administrator or eecutor may be allowed fees for the necessary epenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorneyPs fees from the estate. &is compensation is ed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of eecutorPs or administratorPs commissions, and never as attorneyPs fees.
(ho shoulders attorneyPs feesJ (e have held that a lawyer of an administrator or eecutor may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, +is LI"N!.
#ttorneyPs fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proved. They are also subject to certain standards, to wit3 1 6
they must be reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject matter in controversy: the etent of the services rendered: and the professional standing of the lawyer.
'n all cases, they must be addressed in a full9blown trial and not on the bare word of the parties. #nd always, they are subject to the moderating hand of the courts.
The court held that #tty. ;er=uina is entitled to )-7,222.22 for his en March 6-, -C7, however, ?elipes undivided interest in the V. Mapa properties was levied upon in eecution of a money judgment rendered by the %egional Trial "ourt 4%T"5 of Manila in ?iloil Mar+eting "orporation v. MOT", ?elipe Monserrat, and %osario Vda. e Monserrat 4the Manila case5. K0 8) challenged the levy through a third9party claim asserting that the V. Mapa properties were mortgaged to it and were, for that reason, eempt from levy or attachment. 'ssue3 is )etrons liability for eemplary damages and attorneys fees. &eld3 #rticle 112@ lays down the rule that in the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees cannot be recovered ecept in the following instances3 4-5 (hen eemplary damages are awarded: 415 (hen the defendants act or omission has compelled the plainti< to litigate with third persons or to incur epense to protect his interest: 465 'n criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plainti<: 405 'n case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plainti<: 475 (here the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plainti
45 'n actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and s+illed wor+ers: 4@5 'n actions for indemnity under wor+mens compensation and employers liability laws: 4C5 'n a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime: 4-25 (hen at least double judicial costs are awarded: 4--5 'n any other case where the court deems it just and e=uitable that attorneys fees and epenses of litigation should be recovered.K-2
#rticle 112@475 contemplates a situation where one refuses unjustiably and in evident bad faith to satisfy anothers plainly valid, just and demandable claim, compelling the latter needlessly to see+ redress from the courts.K-1 'n such a case, the law allows recovery of money the plainti< had to spend for a lawyers assistance in suing the defendant epenses the plainti< would not have incurred if not for the defendants refusal to comply with the most basic rules of fair dealing. 't does not mean, however, that the losing party should be made to pay attorneys fees merely because the court nds his legal position to be erroneous and upholds that of the other party, for that would be an intolerable transgression of the policy that no one should be penalied for eercising the right to have contending claims settled by a court of law.K-6 'n fact, even a clearly untenable defense does not justify an award of attorneys fees unless it amounts to gross and evident bad faith.K-0
5: "state o t+e Deceased ;R. %ND ;R#. FLOR"NIO . <&%N, reresented by
'n the night of ecember -0, -C70, )riscillo "amaganacan, a pay passenger bound for Grace )ar+, "aloocan, %ial, too+ at ;an ?ernando, )ampanga, )hilippine %abbit 8us o. C belonging to the Istate of Mr. and Mrs. ?lorencio ). 8uan, of which defendants are the administrators. 'n Malolos, 8ulacan, the bus tried to overta+e a La Mallorca bus. The two buses ran a race. #s it overtoo+ the La Mallorca bus in Guiguinto, 8ulacan, and while driven at a fast clip, the )hilippine %abbit bus ran smac+ into a elbros trailer travelling in the opposite direction.
'n conse=uence, )riscillo "amaganacan surthopedic &ospital in Mandaluyong. ischarged on Banuary 11, -C77, he received further treatment until #pril -7, -C77. &is hospital epenses were paid by defendants.-wphW-.XYt
conclusion without a premise, as basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.
5> "astern #+iin vs % GR No. >94)2, )2 ?-ly )>>4 274 #R% 9:
?#"T; The tet of the decision should state the reason why attorneysP fees are being awarded, otherwise, the award is disallowed 4?ed. of *nited amarco istributors, 'nc., et al. vs. ational Mar+eting "orp., L9-@-C, and ational Mar+eting "orp. vs. Tan, etc., et al., L9-/@, 6- March -C/1: Bimene vs. 8ucoy, L9-211-, 1@ ?eb. -C7C: "astillo vs. ;amonte, L9-6-0/, 62 Banuary -C/25. 'ssue3's the award of attys fees proper3 &eld3 no, The very opening paragraph of #rticle 112@ reveals that the award of attorneysP fees remains eceptional in our law, and it is up to the court to ma+e an epress nding of the facts that bring the case within the eecution and justify the grant of counsel fees3 #%T. 112@. 'n the absence of stipulation, attorneysP fees and epenses of litigation, other than judicial costs can not be recovered, ecept3 the general rule being still that it is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate 4Tan Ti vs. #lvear, 1/ )hil. 7/@5: nor should counsel fees be awarded every time a party wins a lawsuit 4Bimene vs. 8ucoy, supra.5. 't is true that, in o. -- of #rticle 112@, recovery of counsel fees is allowed Qwhere the court deems it just and e=uitable that attorneysP fees and epenses of litigation should be recoveredQ, but even in such cases the conclusion must be borne out by ndings of facts and law. (hat is just and e=uitable in a given case is not a mere matter of feeling but of demonstration. This is specially true since the last part of #rticle 112@ epressly adds that the QattorneysP fees and epenses of litigation must be reasonableQ. 'n the present case, for the award of )1,/@2.22 in actual damages the appealed decisions awards no less than )1,222.22 in counsel fees, which is hardly reasonable. &ence, the eercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorneysP fees under #rticle 112@ 4--5 of the "ivil "ode demands a factual, legal, or e=uitable justication upon the basis of which the court eercises its discretion. (ithout such justication, the award is a
Two ber drums were shipped owned by Iastern ;hipping from Bapan. The shipment as insured with a marine policy. *pon arrival in Manila unto the custody of metro )ort ;ervice, which ecepted to one drum, said to be in bad order and which damage was un+nown the Mercantile 'nsurance "ompany. #llied 8ro+erage "orporation received the shipment from Metro, one drum opened and without seal. #llied delivered the shipment to the consignee!s warehouse. The latter ecepted to one drum which contained spillages while the rest of the contents was adulteratedZfa+e. #s conse=uence of the loss, the insurance company paid the consignee, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of consignee against the defendants Iastern ;hipping, Metro )ort and #llied 8ro+erage. The insurance company led before the trial court. The trial court ruled in favor of plainti< an ordered defendants to pay the former with present legal interest of -1A per annum from the date of the ling of the complaint. >n appeal by defendants, the appellate court denied the same and a$rmed in toto the decision of the trial court. ';;*I 4-5 (hether the applicable rate of legal interest is -1A or /A. 415 (hether the payment of legal interest on the award for loss or damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is led from the date the decision appealed from is rendered. &IL 4-5 The "ourt held that the legal interest is /A computed from the decision of the court a =uo. (hen an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damaes awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of /A per annum. o interest shall be adjudged on unli=uidated claims or damages ecept when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. (hen the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes nal and eecutor, the rate of legal interest shall be -1A per annum from such
nality until satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an e=uivalent to a forbearance of money. The interest due shall be -1A )# to be computed fro default, B or IB. 415 ?rom the date the judgment is made. (here the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or IB but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shll begin to run only from the date of judgment of the court is made.
465 The "ourt held that it should be computed from the decision rendered by the court a =uo.
60 Naar v. !aller" #ra$es, G.R. No. 1971, August 1, 201 G.R. No. ):>:9) $ %--st )7, 20)7 907 #R% 47> @ ivil La8 @ !orts and Damaes @ %ct-al and omensatory Damaes @ Leal Rate o Interest is no8 AB Labor La8 @ Labor Relations @ Illeal Dismissal @ om-tation o ;onetary
ario acar led a labor case against Gallery ?rames and its owner ?elipe 8ordey, Br. acar alleged that he was dismissed without cause by Gallery ?rames on Banuary 10, -CC. >n >ctober -7, -CC@, the Labor #rbiter 4L#5 found Gallery ?rames guilty of illegal dismissal hence the #rbiter awarded acar )-7@,C-C.C1 in damages consisting of bac+wages and separation pay. Gallery ?rames appealed all the way to the ;upreme "ourt 4;"5. The ;upreme "ourt a$rmed the decision of the Labor #rbiter and the decision became nal on May 1, 1221. #fter the nality of the ;" decision, acar led a motion before the L# for recomputation as he alleged that his bac+wages should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal 4Banuary 10, -CC5 until the nality of the ;" decision 4May 1, 12215 with interest. The L# denied the motion as he ruled that the rec+oning point of the computation should only be from the time acar was illegally dismissed 4Banuary 10, -CC5 until the decision of the L# 4>ctober -7, -CC@5. The L# reasoned that the said date should be the rec+oning point because acar did not appeal hence as to him, that decision became nal and eecutory.
';;*I3 (hether or not the Labor #rbiter is correct. &IL3 o. There are two parts of a decision when it comes to illegal dismissal cases 4referring to cases where the dismissed employee wins, or loses but wins on appeal5. The rst part is the ruling that the employee was illegally dismissed. This is immediately nal even if the employer appeals [ but will be reversed if employer wins on appeal. The second part is the ruling on the award of bac+wages andZor separation pay. ?or bac+wages, it will be computed from the date of illegal dismissal until the date of the decision of the Labor #rbiter. 8ut if the employer appeals, then the end date shall be etended until the day when the appellate court!s decision shall become nal. &ence, as a conse=uence, the liability of the employer, if he loses on appeal, will increase [ this is just but a ris+ that the employer cannot avoid when it continued to see+ recourses against the Labor #rbiter!s decision. This is also in accordance with #rticle 1C of the Labor "ode. #nent the issue of award of interest in the form of actual or compensatory damages, the ;upreme "ourt ruled that the old case of Iastern ;hipping Lines vs "# is already modied by the promulgation of the 8ang+o ;entral ng )ilipinas Monetary 8oard %esolution o. C/ which lowered the legal rate of interest from -1A to /A. ;pecically, the rules on interest are now as follows3 -. Monetary >bligations e. Loans3 a. 'f stipulated in writing3 a.-. shall run from date of judicial demand 4ling of the case5 a.1. rate of interest shall be that amount stipulated b. 'f not stipulated in writing b.-. shall run from date of default 4either failure to pay upon etra9judicial demand or upon judicial demand whichever is appropriate and subject to the provisions of #rticle --/C of the "ivil "ode5 b.1. rate of interest shall be /A per annum 1.
on9Monetary >bligations 4such as the case at bar5
a. 'f already li=uidated, rate of interest shall be /A per annum, demandable from date of judicial or etra9judicial demand 4#rt. --/C, "ivil "ode5 b. 'f unli=uidated, no interest Icept3 (hen later on established with certainty. 'nterest shall still be /A per annum demandable from the date of judgment because such on such date, it is already deemed that the amount of damages is already ascertained. 6. "ompounded 'nterest [ This is applicable to both monetary and non9monetary obligations [ /A per annum computed against award of damages 4interest5 granted by the court. To be computed from the date when the court!s decision becomes nal and eecutory until the award is fully satised by the losing party. 0. The /A per annum rate of legal interest shall be applied prospectively3 [ ?inal and eecutory judgments awarding damages prior to Buly -, 12-6 shall apply the -1A rate: [ ?inal and eecutory judgments awarding damages on or after Buly -, 12-6 shall apply the -1A rate for unpaid obligations until Bune 62, 12-6: unpaid obligations with respect to said judgments on or after Buly -, 12-6 shall still incur the /A rate.
A) c%#" !I!L"$ Iusta=uio Mayo O #gpaoa v. )eople of the )hilippines G.%. o. C-12ecember 7, -CCG*T'I%%I\, B%., B.3 RINIL"$ M>%#L #M#GI; F%!#$ )etitioner Mayo was charged with the crime of R%ec+less 'mprudence %esulting in amage to )roperty with Multiple ;erious, Less ;erious, and ;light )hysical 'njuriesS. This charge arose from an 'nformation which states that sometime in #ugust of -C@1 at
0pm, Mayo was driving a )hilippine %abbit bus along the Mc#rthur &way in Mabalacat, )ampanga. )rivate respondent 4)%5 Linda avarette, on the other hand, was aboard a Mitsubishi Lancer along with several others including two children. The Lancer was driven by Bune avarette and was cruising steadily at the right lane of the road while the %abbit bus was trailing closely behind the Lancer. 8ehind the bus is a Tamaraw jeep. #t rst, the Tamaraw jeep was ahead, followed by the Lancer, and behind it is the %abbit bus, all travelling towards Manila. The Lancer as well as the %abbit bus following one after the other overtoo+ the Tamaraw jeep. #s the vehicles approached the Mabalacat 'nstitute, the %abbit bus, pic+ed up speed and swerved to the left lane to overta+e the Lancer however an oncoming vehicle from the opposite lane appeared and Nashed its headlights to warn the %abbit bus to give way. The %abbit bus then suddenly swerved to the right in an e
Mayo!s contention was that the "# did not discuss the specic factual circumstances which would justify the award of arbitrary and eorbitant amount of moral damages and instead stated only general terms. The "#, on the other hand, cited the provisions of the "", specically #rts. 11- and 11-C to justify the legal basis of moral
damages and based thereon concluded that the amount is not ecessive and is in accord with the law and the facts of the case.
proimate result of the defendant!s wrongful act or omission. Moreover, #rt. 11-C of the "" provides that3
I##&"Cs$ The sole issue in this case is whether or not the ndings of the lower court justify the award of )hp22+ as moral damages in favor of )% avarette.
#rt. 11-C. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases3
# R&LING$ To arrive at its ecision, the ;" eamined the records of the case and established that prior to the accident, )% avarette was an Iconomist by profession and a graduate of 8; &ome Iconomics at *). ;he was an #sst V) and %esident Manager of "lub ;olviento in " as well as a ?ood consultant receiving a gross income of )hp-+. #s a result of the accident, she su
#ccording to the doctor, )% avarette!s right eye could not be saved since the right eyeball needed to be removed as it was heavily lacerated and there was a necessity of an articial eye placement in the soc+et. *pon advice of her doctor in Ma+ati Med, she had to go to ;an ?rancisco, *;# for further treatment. ;he went twice to ;an ?rancisco and incurred epenses around )hp/2+ to @2+. ?urthermore, )% avarette declared that she had a boyfriend whom she lost after the accident. ;he bro+e down over the misfortune and placed a value of her mental, psychological, and moral su
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#rt. 11-C =uoted above enumerates cases wherein moral damages may be granted. Loss of a boyfriend as a result of physical injuries after an accident is not one of them. either can it be categoried as an analogous case. &eading on to the propriety of the amount of )hp22+ as moral damages, the ;" ruled that the well9entrenched principle is that moral damages depend upon the discretion of the trial courts based on the facts and circumstances of each case. This discretion is, however, conditioned in that the Ramount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously ecessiveS so as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. 'n determining the amount of moral damages, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party and the gravity of the injuries must be considered. ?inally, Rmoral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the epense of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral su%I, the instant petition is partly G%#TI. The =uestioned decision of the "# is M>'?'I in that the amount of )hp22+ as moral damages granted to complainant avarette is reduced to )hp122+. A2 #amson ?r. vs. <I6 ;oral Damaes 0>C)0C20)7 0 omments
G.R. No. )504:9. ?-ly )0, 2007
?acts3 Gerardo ;amson deposited to his 8)' account a )rudential 8an+ "hec+ in the amount of )6,722.22. (hen he as+ed his daughter to withdraw 1, 222 pesos inorder to pay his creditor who came to his house, he came to +now that his previous deposit was not credited to his account. 8ecause of this he was embarrassed infront creditor. Moreover, when petitioner informed respondent of his concern respondentPs manager displayed arrogance, inditherwise, the goal of enabling him to obtain means, diversions, or amusements to restore him to the status =uo ante would not be achieved. (e believe that the award should be increased to )-22,222, considering 4-5 that petitioner was a businessman and was the highest lay person in the *nited Methodist "hurch: 415 that he was regarded by respondent and its o$cers with arrogance and a condescending manner: and 465 that respondent successfully postponed compensating him for more than a decade. This amount is more than the )72,222 granted by the "#, but not as much as the )122,222 granted by the %T".
That petitioner reported the missing chec+ deposit to respondent only after three wee+s did not constitute contributory negligence. The injury resulted from the denial of his withdrawal due to insu$cient funds, an injury he su
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/6 Villanueva v. ;alvador G% o. -6C06/ 17 Banuary 122/ Facts$ ;pouses ;alvador secured two loans from Iver )awnshop, owned and managed by Villanueva. They pledged their jewelry items for the loans that they contracted. The rst and second loan indicate -2 #pril -CC1 and 11 May -CC1, respectively, as the last day to redeem the jewelry. The redemption periods came and went, but the spouses failed to redeem the jewelry. Their son partially paid the rst loan on Bune - while the second loan!s maturity date was etended to Bune 62. o ue to the partial payment of the rst loan, the loan was renewed with regard to the remaining balance. o #s for the second loan, Iver )awnshop provided that the spouses must pay 12A of their second loan obligation on or before Bune 0, else, the jewelry will be auctioned as scheduled. ;pouses ;alvador failed to pay 12A of the second loan on Bune 0 and so, Iver )awnshop issued a notice regarding the public auction sale of the jewelry. The notice appeared in ;anila <-lletin on Bune 0, the very day o t+e a-ction itsel. >n Buly -, the spouses tendered the 12A payment for the second loan, but the pawnshop refused to accept it. The pawnshop informed the spouses that the pledged jewelry had already been auctioned last Bune 0. •
&owever, it was later on found out that pieces of the pledged jewelry items were still in the shop, indicating that the pawnshop either bought some of the unredeemed pledgers or did not sell them. #s for the pledged jewelry for the rst loan, Mrs. ;alvador tried to redeem them as well but all she got in response were unclear information as to their whereabouts. Mr. ;alvador also tried to tender payment of the amounts due on both loans and demanded return of the pledged jewelry. &owever, Iver )awnshop refused to accept the tender. Thus, a complaint was led against Villanueva and Iver )awnshop. The spouses alleged that the public auction sale of the 1 sets of jewelry pledged was not valid because it was done without notice. o #fter summons were served to Villanueva, his counsel informed the ;alvadors that his client is now willing to accept the payment and have the jewelry items for the rst loan redeemed. &owever, the ;alvadors turned down this belated o
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Iss-e$ (Z there was valid notice of the sale 9 > (Z the award of moral damages was proper 9 > • •
The wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proimate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant o The award of damages is predicated on any of the case stated in #rticle 11-C of the "ivil "ode There need not be a showing that the defendant acted in a wanton or malevolent manner, 8*T there must still be roo o ra-d-lent action or bad ait+ or a claim or moral damaes to s-cceed . Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual, ecet 8+en bad ait+ s-ervenes and is roven o
(eld$ No valid notice o sale The Pawnshop Regulation Act accord the pawner a >0= day race eriod rom t+e date o mat-rity of the loan obligation within which to redeem the pawn. #lso, even before the lapse of the C29day period, it also mandates that the pawner be notied of the proposed auction sale through a publication in at least 2 daily ne8saers d-rin t+e 8ee/ recedin t+e date o t+e a-ction sale. o )etitioner failed in both aspects. Iver )awnshop only caused publication of the auction in one newspaper # on the very day of the scheduled auction sale itself. Verily, a notice of the auction sale on the very day of the auction defeats the purpose of the notice which is to inform the pawner beforehand that a sale is to occur. %8ard o ;oral Damaes is Not roer t+e case disc-ssed concets 1rst t+en t+e r-linE )roof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary to justify award of moral damages. &owever, it is essential that the claimant satisfactorily proves the eistence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to the defendant!s wrongful act or omission. o This is so because moral damages, although incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury su
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A4 IGL""RIO ;%(IN%, etitioner, vs. %!!. G%
8efore us is a petition for review of the decision- dated ecember 12, 122- of the "ourt of #ppeals a$rming with modication the Qorder and resolutionQ dated >ctober 6-, -C of the %egional Trial "ourt, 8ranch -/, aval, 8iliran in "ivil "ase o. 892C16, for damages. The instant case arose from the alleged defamatory remar+s of petitioner 'glecerio Mahinay against respondent Gabino #. Velas=ue, Br. #ccording to >lipio Machete, overseer of respondent, petitioner uttered the following malicious and insulting statement against respondent3 QOour master, a candidate for "ongressman, 8en Velas=ue, is a land grabber.Q Machete informed respondent of what petitioner said about him. This impelled respondent to le a complaint for damages against petitioner, claiming that his utterances besmirched his and his family!s reputation and caused him aniety, mental anguish and sleepless nights. #s no amicable settlement could be reached by the parties, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of the sole testimony of Machete and awarded to respondent moral damages in the amount of )-22,222 and eemplary damages in the amount of )72,222.1 o other evidence was adduced by either party. )etitioner appealed to the "ourt of #ppeals alleging that the trial court order lac+ed factual basis. The "ourt of #ppeals, however, modied the award, as follows3 Q(&I%I?>%I, with the M>'?'"#T'> that the award for moral and eemplary damages is hereby reduced to )72,222.22 and )17,222.22, respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby #??'%MI and this appeal ';M';;I. ;> >%I%I.Q6 &is motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner comes to this "ourt arguing that the appellate court gravely erred in3 4a5 a$rming the trial court order despite the lac+ of su$cient factual basis and 4b5 awarding moral and eemplary damages to respondent despite his failure to ta+e the witness stand.0 (e agree.
'n order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral su
either is respondent entitled to eemplary damages. Q'f the court has no proof or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, such indemnity could not be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with respect to the award of eemplary damages where it must be shown that the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.Q@ ?urthermore, this specie of damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no eemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant rst establishes his clear right to moral damages. The a$rmance of the "ourt of #ppeals of the ruling of the trial court is therefore not in order as it lac+ed su$cient factual basis.
A5 ;erc-ry Dr- v. (-an Fast Facts$
)etitioner Mercury rug "orporation 4Mercury rug5 is the registered owner of a si9wheeler truc+ with. 't has in its employ petitioner %olando B. del %osario as driver. %espondent spouses %ichard and "armen &uang are the parents of respondent ;tephen &uang and own the red -CC- Toyota "orolla GL' ;edan. These two vehicles gured i n a road accident on ecember 12, -CC/ at around -2362 p.m. within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. 8oth were traversing the "97 &ighway, north bound, coming from the general direction of #labang going to )asig "ity. The car was on the left innermost lane while the truc+ was on the net lane to its right. (hen the truc+ suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. #t the time of the accident, petitioner el %osario only had a Tra$c Violation %eceipt 4TV%5. &is driver!s license had been conscated because he had been previously apprehended for rec+less driving. The car, valued at )622,222.22, was a total wrec+. %espondent ;tephen &uang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. espite a series of operations, respondent ;tephen &uang is paralyed for life from his chest down and re=uires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. %espondents fault petitioner el %osario for committing gross negligence and rec+less imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury rug for failing to eercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver. 'n contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proimate cause of the accident was respondent ;tephen &uang!s rec+lessness. #ccording to
petitioner el %osario, he was driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped the truc+!s front right tire. The trial court found for petitioners and held )LT and el %osario jointly and severally liable for actual, compensatory, moral and eemplary damages, attorney!s fees, and litigation epenses. Tortious #ct3 "ollision of a -/ wheeler truc+ and a ;edan causing paralysis to the driver. (hat is itJ uasi9elict Legal 8asi s3 #rt. 1127 'ssue3 (hether or not the persumption of negligence was properly rebutted by Mercury rug &eld3 > (e now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury rug as employer of el %osario. #rticles 1-/ and 1-@2 of the "ivil "ode provide3 #rt. 1-/. (hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. ;uch fault or negligence, if there is no pre9eisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a =uasi9delict and is governed by the provisions of this "hapter. #rt. 1-@2. The obligation imposed by article 1-/ is demandable not only for one!s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are li+ewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. The liability of the employer under #rt. 1-@2 of the "ivil "ode is direct or immediate. 't is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. 't is also joint and solidary with the employee. To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury rug should show that it eercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is re=uired to eamine them as to their =ualications, eperience, and service records. (ith respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these re=uirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
'n the instant case, petitioner Mercury rug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. #ccording to Mrs. Merlie "aamic, the %ecruitment and Training Manager of petitioner Mercury rug, applicants are re=uired to ta+e theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological eamination. 'n the case of petitioner el %osario, however, Mrs. "aamic admitted that he too+ the driving tests and psychological eamination when he applied for the position of elivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truc+ Man. Mrs. "aamic also admitted that petitioner el %osario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truc+ during the driving tests. ?urther, no tests were conducted on the motor s+ills development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualiation, eye and hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner el %osario. o 8' and police clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner el %osario attended only three driving seminars [ on Bune 62, 122-, ?ebruary 7, 1222 and Buly , -C@0. 'n e
66 %ierulf v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 4 ?#"T;3 ?ebruary 1@, -C@ 307 pm3 )antranco bus driven by Bose Malanum lost control and swerved to the left Nying over the center island occupying the east9bound lane of I;#. The front of the bus hit the front of the 'suu pic+up driven by Legaspi smashed to pieces and inNicting physical injury to Legaspi and his passenger Lucila ]ierulf. 8oth were treated at the ueon "ity General &ospital The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing I;# espite the impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against a "alte gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing e=uipment
%T"3 proimate cause was the negligence of the defendantPs driver. )antranco orth Ipress, 'ncorporated to pay Lucila ]ierulf, Victor ]ierulf for the damages of the 'suu pic+9up and )orrio Legaspi "#3 #$rmed with modication by adding )17,222 attorneyPs fees and to pay costs ';;*I3 (Z both Lucila should be awarded moral damages &IL3 OI;. #??'%MI with M>'?'"#T'>. The award of moral damages to Lucila and Legaspi is hereby '"%I#;I to )022,222.22 and )72,222.22 respectively: eemplary damages to Lucila is '"%I#;I to )122,222.22. Legaspi is awarded eemplary damages of )72,222.22 %odrigue case ruled that when a person is injured to the etent that heZshe is no longer capable of giving love, a
415 the claimant must rst establish his right to moral, temporate, li=uidated or compensatory damages: and 465 the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, rec+less, oppressive or malevolent manner.Q eemplary damages awarded increased to )122,222 The fact of gross negligence duly proven, we believe that Legaspi, being also a victim of gross negligence, should also receive eemplary damages Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the epense of defendant )orrio that he had been incapacitated for -2 months and that during said period he did not have any income )-/,722 as compensation for loss of earning capacity for the period is amply supported by the records and is demandable under #rticle 1127 of the "ivil "ode LucilaPs claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven # party is entitled to ade=uate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually su
yardstic+ should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously ecessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. either should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inNicted on plainti
67 G.R. No. 188979
September 5, 2012
PEOPLE O !HE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, #s! "HRIS!OPHER P#RE$# % &EL#S"O, Appellant!
?#"T;3
At around ?&?0 a!! of June 16, 00?, AAA "as sleepin% $eside her t"o -ear old nephe", ;;;, on the floor of her sister’s roo, "hen the appellant hu%%ed her and +issed her nape and nec+! AAA cried, $ut the appellant co#ered her and ;;; "ith a $lan+et! 6 The appellant reo#ed AAA’s clothes, short pants, and under"ear he then too+ off his short pants and $riefs! @ The appellant "ent on top of AAA, and held her hands! AAA resisted, $ut the appellant parted her le%s usin% his o"n le%s, and then tried to insert his penis into her #a%ina! The appellant stopped "hen AAA’s cr- %ot louder AAA +ic+ed the appellant’s upper thi%h as the latter "as a$out to stand up! The appellant put his clothes $ac+ on, and threatened to +il l AAA if she disclosed the incident to an-one! Iediatel- after, the appellant left the roo! 9 AAA co#ered herself "ith a $lan+et and cried! 10 The prosecution char%ed the appellant $efore the T* "ith the crie of rape
The T* con#icted the appellant of rape
The *A affired the T* decision! It e
I44BC&
5DN the rape "as consuated!
.CE/&
The *ourt ruled in the ne%ati#e! 5e find that the prosecution failed to pro#e the appellant’s %uilt $e-ond reasona$le dou$t of the crie of consuated rape! 5e con#ict hi instead of attepted rape, as the e#idence on record sho"s the presence of all the eleents of this crie!
>ro the fore%oin%, "e find it clear that the appellant’s penis did not penetrate, $ut erel- Ftouched’ (i!e!, "naidikit" ), AAA’s pri#ate part! In fact, the #icti 'o()*rme+ o( 'ro-e/m*(/t*o( t/t te /ppe/(t +*+ (ot ''ee+ *( *(ert*(3 * pe(* *(to er 4/3*(/ ! 4i%nificantl-, AAA’s 4inupaan% 4ala-sa- ' also disclosed that the appellant "as holdin% the #icti’s hand "hen he "as tr-in% to insert his penis in her #a%ina! This circustance 7 coupled "ith the #icti’s declaration that she "as resistin% the appellant’s attept to insert his penis into her #a%ina 7 a+es penile penetration hi%hl- difficult, if not ipro$a$le! 4i%nificantl-, nothin% in the records supports the *A’s conclusion that the appellant’s penis penetrated, ho"e#er sli%htl-, the #icti’s feale or%an!
4ipl- put, Grape is consuated $- the sli%htest penile penetration of the la$ia a8ora or pudendu of the feale or%an!G @ 5ithout ansho"in% of such penetration, there can $e no consuated rape at ost, it can onl- $e attepted rape Hor acts of lasci#iousness!
, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and con#incin% e#idence to esta$lish the re2uired penile penetration! AAA’s testion- did not esta$lish that the appellant’s penis touched the la$ias or slid into her pri#ate part! Aside fro AAA’s testion-, no other e#idence on record, such as a edicole%al report, could confir "hether there indeed had $een penetration, ho"e#er sli%ht, of the #icti’s la$ias! In the a$sence of testionial or ph-sical e#idence to esta$lish penile penetration, the appellant cannot $e con#icted of consuated rape! Article 6 of the e#ised Penal *ode, as aended, states that there is an attept "hen the offender coenced the coission of the crie directl- $- o#ert acts $ut does not perfor all the acts of e
A: G.R. No. )::A07 ?an-ary )A, 20)7 "OL" OF !(" (ILIIN"#, laintiJ=%ellee, vs. R%;IL R%R&G%L alias 3%;%
8efore this "ourt is the appeal of the Bune 62, 122@ ecision- of the "ourt of #ppeals in "#9G.%. "%.9&.". o. 210-6,1 which a$rmed with modication the May 1C, 122/ ecision6 of the %egional Trial "ourt 4%T"5, 8ranch @/, ueon "ity in "rim. "ase o. 99CC9@102C, entitled )eople of the )hilippines v. %amil %arugal that found appellant %amil %arugal alias Q#may 8isayaQ guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder. >n ecember @, -CC@, the following information for the crime of murder was led against appellant3 That on or about the -Cth day of >ctober, -CC@, in ueon "ity, )hilippine, the above9named appellant, with intent to +ill, =ualied by evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attac+, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one #rnel M. ?lorendo, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the dictober -C, -CC@ at around C307 p.m., while victim #rnel ?lorendo 4?lorendo5 was cycling along ;ampaguita ;treet, 8arangay "apari, ovaliches, ueon "ity, appellant, with the use of a long double9bladed weapon, stabbed ?lorendo: thus, forcibly depriving him of his bicycle. 'mmediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly Ned the scene. This incident was witnessed by %oberto ;it9Bar, who positively identied appellant in court. ?lorendo arrived home bleeding. &e was =uic+ly attended to by his siblings, including his brother %enato. (hen %enato recounted the events of that night to the court, he testied that ?lorendo told him and his other relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then too+ ?lorendo to Tordesillas &ospital but had to transfer him to ueon "ity General &ospital, due to the unavailability of blood. 't was there that ?lorendo died/ on >ctober 1/, -CC@ with the family spending about )1,@C/.22 for his hospitaliation and )17,222.22@ for his funeral. #utopsy %eport signed by Medico9Legal >$cer, r. ominic L. #guda, showed the following )ostmortem ?indingsC3 "yanosis, lips and ngernailbeds
8rain9 pale &eart9chambers, contain small amount of dar+ clotted blood ;T#8 (>*9 sutured, healing, 6.2 cms, located on left chest, -7.2 cms. from the anterior median line directed bac+wards and medially involving the s+in and underlying tissues passing between the /th and th left ribs, entering the thoracic cavity and severed the lower lobe of the left lung with a depth of 9@ cms. T&>%#">;T>MO '"';'>;9 sutured, 6.7 cms., located on the left chest, -C.2 cms. from the anterior median line: sutured, 6.1 cms. located on the right chest 12 cms. from the anterior median line &emothora9 left, 722 cc Visceral organs9 pale ;tomach9 empty "#*;I >? I#T&3 ;T#8 (>*, LI?T "&I;T 'n his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed ?lorendo since he was at that time wor+ing as a farm administrator for the town mayor in )angasinan. &e said he was living with his cousin in *rbitondo, )angasinan on >ctober -C, -CC@, where he had been staying since -CC. &e stated that during the period -CC to -CC@, he did not visit Manila at any point. >n cross9eamination, appellant stated that he was arrested in front of his house in ovaliches, ueon "ity.-2 >n May 1C, 122/, the %T" found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as dened under #rticle 10@ of the %evised )enal "ode. 't stated3 #fter evaluation, the "ourt nds that the guilt of the appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt. (itness ;it9Bar positively identied appellant as the assailant of ?lorendo. 'n view of the positive identication made by ;it9 Bar, the denial and alibi made by Kappellant has no leg to stand on. *nder prevailing jurisprudence alibis and denials are worthless in light of positive identication by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify. Moreover, ?lorendo did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the appellant. ?lorendo, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound, identied his assailant as the appellant %amil %arugal. *nder the rules, statements made by a person under the consciousness of an impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive identication made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein appellant. #s shown by the evidence, the +illing of #rnel ?lorendo was sudden indicating treachery and the appellant being then armed with a +nife, the
+illing was done with abuse of superior strength. These circumstances =ualify the crime to murder, all of the elements of the o%I, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered nding the appellant %amil %arugal alias Q#may 8isayaQ G*'LTO beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him to sun Bune 62, 122@, the "ourt of #ppeals a$rmed with modication the May 1C, 122/ decision of the %T". 't stated that witness ;it9Bar!s positive identication of appellant as the one who stabbed ?lorendo ta+es precedence over appellant!s defense of denial and alibi. Moreover, appellant failed to adduce evidence to show that ;it9Bar had any improper motive to falsely testify against him. T he "ourt of #ppeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner3 (&I%I?>%I, premises considered, the ecision appealed from is #??'%MI with the M>'?'"#T'> that the appellant %#M'L %#%*G#L is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of )1,@C/.22 as actual damages and the amount of )17,222.22 as eemplary damages. The said ecision in all other respect ;T#;.-0 &ence, this appeal.-7 )etitioner!s connement was conrmed by the 8ureau of "orrections on ;eptember 62, 122C.-/ 8oth the appellee- and the appellant-@ waived the ling of supplemental briefs and adopted the briefs they led before the "ourt of #ppeals. (e a$rm the Bune 62, 122@ decision of the "ourt of #ppeals, with modication respecting the award of damages. This "ourt has consistently stated that the tri al court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its decision is a$rmed by the "ourt of #ppeals.-C (e have been reminded in )eople v. "lores12 that3 (hen it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that 4-5 the appellate court will not disturb the factual ndings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had overloo+ed, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have a
415 the ndings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to eamine his demeanor as he testied on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not: and 465 a witness who testies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and fran+ manner and remains consistent on cross9eamination is a credible witness. 4"itations omitted.5 The rationale for these guidelines is that the trial courts are in a better position to decide the =uestion of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed rsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling eamination.1(e see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. #fter a careful review of the records, we nd that appellant failed to negate the ndings of the trial court with concrete evidence that the latter had overloo+ed, misconstrued, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have a
;I". 6. ying declaration. U The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of in=uiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. The "ourt has stated in )eople v. Maglian103 The %ules of "ourt states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present3 Q4a5 it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant!s death: 4b5 it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death: 4c5 the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived: and 4d5 the dying declaration is o
from the defense which the o
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim!s family.6/ 'n addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of /A per annum from date of nality of this ecision until fully paid.6
70 **p*(/ ro/+'/t*(3 4. #3o e+*'/ "e(ter
69 Paz Fores, Petitioner v. Ireneo Miranda, Respondent GR no. L-12163 March 4, 1959 Reyes, J.B.L., J. Miranda was one ofhte passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the jeep was descending Sta. Mesa bridge at an excesisve speed, the driver lost control causing it to swerve and hit the bridge wall. Five of the passengers were injured, including Miranda who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He wa subject to a series of operations yet at the time of the trial, he has notyet recovered the use of his right arm. Luga was charged with serious physicial injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty, was sentenced accordingly. It was alleged that the evidence failed to identify the vehicle but this was rejected by the appellate court which found that the jeep carried the plate no. TPU 1163, series of 1952 and registered in the name of Paz Forez and that the vehicle had the name of “Dona Paz” painted below the windshield. There was no evidence presented to prove the contrary. Fores also said that she allegedly sold the jeep involved to a Carmen Sackerman. ISSUE/s: 1.Is the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same? YES 2. WON moral damages may be awarded. NO.
>A*T4&
1. The CA answered YES to this question. Under Sec. 20 of the Public Service Act it was unlawful for the owner, lessee or operator to sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property among others without the previous approval and authority of the Commission. The transfer without the authority of the PSC is not effective and binding in so far as the respnsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. Fores assails this arguing that the in the rulings being applied, the operator did not convey by lease or by sale, the vehicle independently of his rights under the franchise. SC no basis. The prohibition is clear, it was meant to protect the public interest. Until the approval is obtained, in contemplation of law, the vehicle is still under the service of the owner of operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has to rely on the sale between the parties is still valid. 2. the P2,000 (reduced from P10,000) and the P3,000 as atty's fees were valid awards of actual damages. As for the moral damages, it must discarded. Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions rediccted on a breach of the contract of transportation (art. 2219 and 2220 of the NCC). Thus, in case of breach of contract proof of bad faith or fraud is essential to justify an award of moral damages and that a brech of contract cannot be considered included in the descriptive term analogous cases in Art. 2219. Art. 2176 excludes cases where there is a preexisting contractual relation between the parties. The only exception is where death results from the accident. In this case, Art. 2206 provides that the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguis by reason of the death of the deceased
GRN 1199 $/(/r% 17, 2005 *arpio, J!&
ia L Ale%re "ere host of >;NI radio pro%ra MC;NI, ia and Ale%re Mtransitted alicious iputations and as such, destro-ed plaintiff’s reputation! >;NI "as included as defendant for alle%edl- failin% to e;NI to pa- AOC* ?00+ for oral daa%es! I44BC& 5hether or not AOC* is entitled to oral daa%es! BEIN& A 8uridical person is %enerall- not entitled to oral daa%es $ecause, unli+e a natural person, it cannot e
JDIN TDT >CA4D4 are all the persons "ho coand, insti%ate, proote, encoura%e, ad#ice countenance, cooperate in, aid or a$et the coission of a tort, as "ho appro#e of it after it is done, for its $enefit!
