Wallace - Intrroduction to Blumenberg.pdf

Introduction to Blumenberg Author(s): Robert Wallace Source: New German Critique, No. 32 (Spring - Summer, 1984), pp. 93-108 Published by: New German Critique Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/488157 . Accessed: 28/11/2014 13:31 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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Introduction toBlumenberg, by RobertWallace 1. Blumenberg'sWorkonMyth Hans Blumenbergemergedas a philosopherof major staturewith thepublication,in 1966,ofhisDieLegitimitiit derNeuzeit- TheLegitimacy Modern ofwhichwas publishedbyMIT Pressin Age(mytranslation ofthe 1984). In Germanphilosophicallyorientedscholarship,in theperiod since the 1960s,the seriesof major worksthatBlumenberghas publishedare comparable,forboth path-breaking and widely originality recognizedimportance,onlyto theworksofJiirgenHabermas. Having a broader interestin the historyof ideas than Habermas has (a breadththatis evident,forexample,inhiselaborateanalysisofthehistoricalnexus betweenmedieval Christianity and modernityin The Legitimacy Age),and witha bentthattends(outsidephilosoftheModern ophy) more towardliteraturethan towardsocial theoryand politics (thoughhe also toucheson these),Blumenberghas a greatdeal tooffer to anyonewho wantsto undertandtherelationsbetweenthoughtand imaginationthatare manifestedin modern literature,as well as in modern philosophy. amMythos Especiallyimportantin thisrespectis hisArbeit (1979) onMyth, ofwhichthefollowingpiece,"To BringMythtoan End," Work is a chapter.(The completetranslation willbe publishedbyMIT Press in 1985.) The book's titlerefersto the creativeworkthathas been expended on mythicalstoriesand motifsby writersin the Western traditioneversince Homer, workthatcontinues- with,ifanything, - in the mostrecentcouple of centuriesof even increasedintensity thattradition(centuriesfromwhichBlumenbergdrawsmuch of his illustrative material).The book's purpose is to determinewhatsuch workcan mean inan age likethemodernone,whichostensiblyhas disabused itselfofmyth,alongwithfairy-tales, dogma,and "prejudice"in to "thefacts"ofhumancirgeneral,in orderto turnitsattention strictly cumstancesand whatone choosestomakeofthem.Atthebeginningof "To BringMythto an End" BlumenbergdescribesFontenelle'ssur*The ofthistranslation theTranslation wasmadepossiblebya grant from preparation oftheNationalEndowment oftheHumanities. Program 93


94 Introduction toBlumenberg prise,in thelate 17thcentury,at thewaytheold storiescontinuedto fascinatewritersand theiraudiences(Racinewas a leadinginstanceof this,at the time)- despitethe skepticismthatby thenwas generally acceptedas thenecessaryfirststepinanysearchforthetruthabout the ininterpreting and thesame difficulty world.The same incongruity, it, are stillwith us today. Under the influenceof Romanticism,ethwe mayby now be somewhatless surnographyand psychoanalysis, in (at least)modernart than Fontenelle was at prised myth'slongevity and literature.We understandthatmythhas otherfunctionsbesides thatofexplainingthings,fromwhichithas been displacedbyscience. and how Butwe are unclearabout thestatusofthoseotherfunctions, to relate the one. In Romanticism they (Friedrich Schlegel, explanatory Novalis)theytendto swallowitup: "True science"(i.e.,poetic,mythical science) is expected to be symbolic,to orientus in the world,as to supplyus withcausal explanamythonce did, and onlyincidentally tionsofwhatis thecase. Those ofus who are notwillingto go thatfar, in favorof fantasy, because it seems to implyabandoningrationality have neverthelessbeen led to wonderwhyexplanationis so sharply distinguishedfromsymbolicorientationin our culture,whenethnologyhas discoveredso manyculturesin whichthisis notthecase. But evenpsychoanalysis, which,morethananyothersingleinfluence,has made us awareofthepersistenceofnon-rationalsymbolismand fantasyin our lives,is foundedon theassumptionthattheycannotcoexist withscience:"Whereid was,thereshallego be," thatis to indefinitely say, rationalcomprehensionof the mechanismsof symbolismand mustultimately toan end,finally comfantasy bringtheireffectiveness pletingthe Enlightenmenttaskof clearingthe way forscience. Our pervasiveassumptionis that,likesymbolismand fantasy, mythcannot - byitsnature- coexistwithscience,because thetwoare essentially sequentialphenomena,one ofwhichis destinedto replacetheother. The onlyexceptionbeing cases of atavism,of regression;whichonly underlinethe assumptionof the normalityof progressin the other direction. Blumenberg'sfirstmajor argumentin Workon Mythis thatthis schemaofnecessaryprogress"frommythostologos" is nottheonlyor thebestwayto understandtherelationbetweenmythand rationality; nordoes abandoningitentailceasingtodistinguish logosfrommyth,as tendsto occur in Romantictheories.Whathe proposesis thatinstead ofunderstanding mythin termsofwhatit"comes from"and servesas a "preliminary"substitutefor (namely,logos, science), we should understandit primarilyin relationto whatitcomesafter and servesto overcome. This pointofdepartureis somethingthathe entitlesthe"absolutismofreality,"a situationin which"man comes close to nothav-


Robert Wallace 95

ing controlof the conditionsof his existenceand, whatis more important,believesthathe simplylackscontrolof them." Blumenberg calls thisa "limitconcept,"whichwhileitmay neverhave been fully presentin realityis a necessaryextrapolation,a "limitingcase," which makessense ofwhatwe do observein mythand in therestof human history.It is consistent,he says,withcurrenttheoriesof theoriginof humanbeings- ofwhathappenedwhenourancestorsadoptedan upforestintothe right,bipedalposture;weredisplacedfromthesheltering themhow to and found that their instincts did not tell open savannah; the with this new situation. that dramatically Blumenbergargues cope enlargedhorizonofwhattheycould perceive(and withinwhichthey could beperceived)would be, forthem,a situationofgreatambiguity, one in which some of theircentralinstincts- such as fleeingfrom immediatedanger,an instinctthathad servedto clarifymany situationsforthemin theforest- would be of littlehelp. Our ancestors "came close to nothavingcontroloftheconditionsoftheirexistence" because theyhad become, as we remain,a species withouta clearly definedbiologicalniche.If thissituationwere notdealtwithin some radicallynewway,itwould producethementalstatethatBlumenberg calls "Angst,"whichis normallytranslatedas "anxiety"butwould be betterrenderedbythepsychiatrist's paraphrase,"intensefearordread cause a specificthreat."The resulting an or lacking unambiguous behaviorwould be panic, paralysis,or both. Thus the"absolutismofreality"is a fundamentalthreat,implicitin our biological natureand itsrelationto our naturalenvironment, to our capacityforsurvival.Our responseto thischallengehas been to thatwe lack,culture,in all its develop,in place oftheadaptiveinstincts forms.Amongthoseforms,thatofmythhas a crucialroletoplay.That roleis toovercomeor forestall theAngst thatthe"absolutismofreality" would otherwiseproduce,by"rationalizing"itintoplainfearofspecific, named agencies,more or less personalizedpowers,whomwe can address and (to thatextent)deal with.It also helps thatthesepowers, areplural,and each whichareoften(intheearlystages)theriomorphic, has a limiteddomain - thereis a "separationof powers" between can do to us. And them,whichlimitswhateach ofthem,individually, whatis more,thestoriessay,theyweremorehorrible,and lesspredictable, "in thebeginning."MonsterslikeMedusa (whoislikean emblem ofAngstitself)and thevariousGiants,and theheroeslikePerseusand thelatteraspect.So do thehisHeracleswho overcomethem,illustrate toriesof the Olympiangods themselves- "the old storm-godZeus becomes theworld-orderer," as Blumenbergmentionsbelow. Thus thetemporalaxis is indeedcrucialtoan adequate understanding of myth(as Blumenbergargues below againstLfvi-Strauss'san-


96 Introduction toBlumenberg thropologicalEleaticism).But thisaxis is notthatof myth's"replacement"by logos (a versionof historyto whichLevi-Straussmightcorrectlyobject) but thatof myth'sovercomingof the initialabsolutism of reality. The resultofthis"overcoming"can be describedessentially as "dis"at arm's alien reality tance"- puttingthethreatofan overwhelming, length,"emotionally,so thatone can havetime("breathingspace") in whichto develop means to deal withit.Thus mythand rationality are each other,functionally, fromthebeginning:theone inseparablefromn did makingroom fortheothertodo itsthing.The factthatrationality not get organized as "method" or "science" until(by various reckonings)350 or 2400 yearsago does not,ofcourse,mean thatitwas absent fromhuman functioning beforethatthresholdwas crossed, any more thanit is absent from"primitive"culturestoday.But our preoccupationwiththegreatnew "beginningfromscratch"- from thesole certainty ofthecogito, as in Descartes- thatwe supposedlycarriedout 350 yearsor so ago has made us receptivetoschemasthatpresentthe emergenceof reason (and the supercessionof all thatwent beforeit) as occurringwithinhistory.Contraryto the fundamental modernrule of excludingteleologicalhypotheses,we have regarded thesupposed passage"frommythostologos" as, ineffect, theworking ofdestiny.Blumenberg,in good scientific style,wantsto removethis final,moststubbornillusionfromourviewofourselvesand ourworld. The result,interestingly, whenreasonis removedfromthispedestal,is thatother human accomplishments,such as myth,regainsome of theirproperdignity. The book containsother theoreticalinnovationsthatI can only mentionhere.' It containsa verynovel hypotheticalaccount of the genesisofmythicalcontentsthrougha sortof"naturalselection"over milleniaof story-telling; an account thatsupplementsthatof myth's overallfunctionthatI havejust sketched.This "Darwinismofwords" servestofurther distinguish Blumenberg'sviewofmythfromthecommon Romanticone, prominently exemplifiedin thiscenturyinjung's to which that writings, according mythicalcontentsexpressarchetypes are, as it were, "given" frometernity- outside history.There are extendeddiscussionsofFreud'sand ErnstCassirer'sanalysesofmyth, complementingthe discussionof Levi-Straussin the chapterwe are printinghere.There is a verycarefulanalysisof therelationsand differencesbetween mythand monotheisticreligion,and mythand 1. A morecomprehensive,thoughbrief,summaryis containedin myarticle,"A Reconciliationof Mythand Rationality,"in Humanities, vol. 5, no. 1 (Feb., 1984), 6-8.


Robert Wallace97 intermediate case ofGnosticism dogma,includingtheimportant (which also playedan importantrolein TheLegitimacy ofthe ModemAge).Besides these "analytical"contributions,thereare numerous discussionsof works,comparableto thediscussionofValery'sMon particularliterary Faust in this chapter.And, finally,the latterhalfof the book is an of analyticalsurvey,in thelightofthisnewmethodology,ofthehistory in from thePrometheus its first Hesiod and myth, Aeschylus appearance to thetwentieth ofitbyGide and Kafka.A separate, centurytreatments centralportionofthisstoryisan especiallyintensivestudyoftheroleof the Prometheusmotifin Goethe's lifeand works,fromhis youthful und Wahrheit. This study "Prometheus"ode to Pandoraand Dichtung in a of the most verystriking way many potentand bringstogether such as his problematicelementsin Goethe's thoughtand creativity, combinationofSpinozisticpantheismand aesthetic"polytheism,"his conceptofthe"demonic," his relationto Napoleon, and thepeculiar dictum,"Nemo contradeum nisi deus ipse." It illustratesveryconalmostin themannerof"psychohistory" cretely, (fromwhichitdiffers mainly in that Blumenberg's grasp of the trans-personal,noninwhichGoetheis embeddedis dymanicsofthehistory "psychological" so strong),howdealingswithmythand with"thefacts"as conceivedin our "post-mythical" age can interact. 2. "To BringMythto an End" onMyththatwe are printinghereis chapter4 of The chapterofWork Two of the book the last chapterof the "analytical"portion, part to of the account the prior historyof the Prometheusmyth. The title,"To BringMythtoan End," immediately makesone wonder - whatcan thismean, in a book thatappears to be opposed to the idea thatwe mustmakean end ofmyth- thatis,clear Enlightenment in itoutoftheway- alongwithall our otherinheritedmentaldetritus, order to make room for science? We soon find,however,thatfor Blumenberg"bringingmythto an end" has nothingwhateverto do with"clearingit out of the way." Rather,it refersto a situationthat "workon myth"thatis would be theideal limitingcase oftheliterary the subjectof the book as a whole.Justas the "limit-conceptof the workofmyth"is,Blumenbergsays,the"absolutismofreality,"so "the limit-conceptof workon mythwould be to bringmythto an end, to venturethe most extremedeformation,which onlyjust allows or almostno longerallows theoriginalfigureto be recognized.For the theoryofreceptionthiswould be thefictionofa finalmyth,thatis,ofa myththatfullyexploits,and exhausts,the form." So "to bringmythtoan end" is theideal limitingcase thatis symmetricallyopposite, in the directionof the future,to the absolutismof


toBlumenberg 98 Introduction

in thedirection ofthepast.Fromthewayhe usestheterms, reality, it is evidentthattheexpression, "theworkof hereand elsewhere, essentialaccomplishmentofmythin myth,"refersto thehypothetical

creatingthe"breathing space" thatI described;whereas"workon thatisonlypossibleafter that."One mustalready myth"issomething in havetheworkofmyth behindone ordertobe abletoapplyoneself inthepassagefrom work on whichI to writes myth... ," Blumenberg of "work" is havebeenquoting.The orientation ofthefirst backtype terror thathas to be overcome; wardin time,towarda hypothetical a hypothetical whereastheorientation ofthesecondisforward, toward "thefiction end ofmyth, ofa finalmyththatfullyexploits,and exhausts,the form."What thismeans we learn fromthe examples to whichthe remainderof the chapteris devoted.

3. The "Final Myth"UnderlyingGermanIdealism Blumenbergmoves directlyfromthisschematicoutlineto someinstance,but which thingthathe introducesas merelyan illustrative turnsout to be one of the most novel and illuminatingthesesof the ofphilosophy.This is thesuggeswholebook,in relationtothehistory tionthat"such a finalmythcould have been thefundamentalmythof

summed GermanIdealism"- theIdealismthatSchillerirreverently is a has and as "the ball that the that world thrown ego up asserting only thatit catchesagain in 'reflection'!!" Or thatSchopenhauersummarizedmoresolemnly he hadhimself madefunofit, (notlongafter as Blumenberg showsus),whenhe decidedthat"theworldsare my thatis,thatI, theeternalsubject,am thebearerofthis representation, buta relationship whosewholebeingis nothing to me." universe, Now GermanIdealism- thephilosophy ofFichte,Schelling and "fundamental underlies myth" Hegel,whichthisfamousorinfamous - isofcoursethewatershed thatclaimstoemergefrom phenomenon a critiqueofKant,and againstwhichFeuerbach, Marx,Kierkegaard and Nietzscheall react;so thatanyonewhotakesGermanphilosophy at all seriously (evenifonlyin theworkof,say,eitherKantor Marx) mustsomehowcometo termswithit.Evenfromthedistanceofthe thishasnotprovedtobe easy.Asa careful 20thcentury, studyofMarx treatment of theissuesthatare inor Kantor anyotherthoughtful volvedsoon makesclear,it is notenoughto respondto Idealism iton itshead,"substituting objectforsubject- so merely by"turning thatSchopenhauer's forexample,becomes:"thesubject, formula, whosewholebeingis nothingbuta relationshiptotheuniverse."Even ifweweresatisfiedwiththatas a statement, wewould stillneed toknow

what it is about this "subject" - i.e., about ourselves -

that has at

timesmade us so eagerto giveit(i.e., to giveourselves)an ontological


Robert Wallace99 overthe"externalworld." Is thismerelya syndromeofbackpriority into Ifso,whywas there sliding "pre-Copernican"anthropocentrism? in factno comparably"anthropocentric"ontologyin the (Chronologically pre-Copernican)philosophyof the Greeks? Is Christianity, perhaps,toblameforitsappearanceinmoderntimes,byvirtueofhavattitudesand doctrinesinto ing introducedradicallyanthropocentric our tradition? The relationbetweenChristianity and modernphilosophyisa comwhich plexquestion, Blumenbergexploredindepthin TheLegitimacy of theModemAge.Briefly, he argued therethatthereis no continuityof substance between medieval/Christian concepts and attitudesand modernsecularones - so thata secular,modernanthropocentrism would not simplybe a continuation,"in anotherguise," of Christian Butthisdoes notpreventChristianity fromhaving anthropocentrism.2 in in an role the of played indispensable genesis modernity, thatChristianconcepts- in particular,the conceptof an omnipotentGod led, as theirimplicationswere workedout in such doctrinesas late medievalNominalism(partofthesyndromethatBlumenbergentitles "theologicalabsolutism"),to the crisisof the human relationto the is worldto whichmodern(implicitly secular)"human self-assertion" the response. The factthatsuch "self-assertion"- the determinationto make whatwe can of our lives in thisworld,in viewof the absence of any intelligibledivine"order" thatwe can decide to adhere to or to strive has been sufficiently toward- is notitselfinherently anthropocentric demonstratedby the role, precisely,of the Copernicanrevolutionin whereCopernicus' accomplishment modern man's self-assessment, has become a paradigmof the process of overcominglimited,selfa processthatwe haveto pressforwardifwe are centeredperspectives, toorientour actionto"thingsas theyreallyare" - whichwe mustdo if is to succeed.3It is thatsuccess,ratherthanany our "self-assertion" special ontologicaldignity,thatis the essentialmodernobjective. modern But although it is not itselfnecessarilyanthropocentric, 2. Of courseone could pointto thefactthatFichte,Schellingand Hegel wereall at least nominallyLutherans,and suggestthattheirthinkingis notin fact"modern,"in the sense of being secular. But the relationof selfto God in theirthoughtis so unorthodox,whencomparedto Augustine,Aquinas, Lutheror anyother thoroughly thatitseems desirableto at leasttestthepossibilityof paradigmaticChristianthinker, themas genuinelymodern thinkers, beforeturningthemover to a coninterpreting tinuousChristian"tradition." 3. Blumenberg'ssecond majorbook,Die Genesis derkopernikanischen Welt(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1975), examinesthe consequences of Copernicanism,both as cosmologyand as metaphor,formodern thought.


100 Introduction toBlumenberg did create the historicalcontextin which the human self-assertion characteristic of modernphilosophybecame posanthropocentrism sible.Thissyndromeis epitomizedin Descartes'famousschemaofthe self(rescogitans) versustheworld(resextensa), as which,byarticulating an ontologytherelationship- manversustheworld- thatis implicit in self-assertion, set up the termsof most of modern philosophy. withDescartes'dualism,modernmaterialism, Simultaneously beginthatknowledgeis about theworld(res ningwithHobbes, said in effect so the subjectthatexperiencesor thatpossesses knowledge extensa), can be ignored.Forthosewhostillwantedtothinkintermsofaperspective on sheworld,ofa pointofdeparture(in thespiritof"self-assertion"), ofconnectingtwoseparaterealms,eitherontologically thedifficulties (howdo a bodyand a mindformone individual?)or epistemologically fromit in (how can a mind know somethingthatis totallydifferent made it to to reduce bodies mental contents,as kind?), tempting Berkeleydid; whichwas idealism(also known,later,as phenomenalism).All of thesetheoriescontinueto have theiradvocates,twocenturieslater.Materialismhas the advantagethatit appears not to be as it does not need to draw a line betweenthose anthropocentric, that have minds things (dualism) or have ideas (idealism)and those thatdo not.Butnoneofthemtriestounderstandhowthedebatearose, and whyit did so onlyin themodernage. So TheLegitimacy oftheModern Age,by explainingthegenesisof the Cartesiansyndrome,alreadywenta longwaytowardexplainingGerman as wellas otheridealisms.But,as Blumenbergmakesclearhere, GermanIdealism - theidealismthatwas formedin theaftermath of Kant'sproofoftheimpossibility ofanyproofoftheexistenceofa God who could ensure our knowledgeof the world (as Descartes and Berkeley,in different ways, made him do) - requires additional The explanation. fascinating thingabout thisidealism,in contrastto Berkeley's,forexample,has alwaysbeen itsdynamicquality.In every case it describesa process of movement,of activity, of emergence, whetherthisis called "positing,""reflection,""negation"or "subla- and, abstractthoughtheysound, theseare always tion[AuJhebung]" describedas quasi-temporalprocesses:inthemanner,infact,ofastory. At thesame time,therelationbetweenthesestoriesand theconcrete thatwe are all involvedin has alwaysbeen obscure. So when history Blumenbergsays theyare all formsof a myth- "the fundamental illumythof German Idealism" - we receive,I think,a significant mination.Science, in the sense of a body of theorythatis related, howeverindirectly, toevidence,and capable ofbeingreplacedbynew theoriesthatdo the same job better- thistheydo not seem to be. Metaphysics,in thesense of Plato,Aristotle,or Leibniz, theyalso do


Robert Wallace101

intheusualsense.Butstories notseemtobe.Norhistory, they definitely thatthosewhotellthemwillcerare,andfurthermore theyarestories tainlynotacknowledgehavingmerely"made up." Thus "myth"seems to be the most appropriatecategoryto put themin.

isnot- a derogaItneednotbe- andforBlumenberg itcertainly in initial reaction tory (like"fairy-tale" categorization Schopenhauer's is effort of a serious toFichte, whichBlumenberg It to quotes). part whatisgoingon here.4 Ifwhatisgoingonisnothistory, understand itismyth. or'justa made-up To science, story," maybe metaphysics, been be morespecific, "such a final could have the funmyth maybe ofGerman Idealism." thisexplanation, damental To appreciate myth theterms"final"and "fundamental," we needto understand as wellas "myth." theideaofa "funborrows To taketheeasieronefirst: Blumenberg damental from who myth" (Grundmythos) HansJonas, useditinanalyzin his und Geist Itsignifies Gnosis a Gnosticism ing (1934-54). spiitantiker of schema a that underlies varietyapparently heterogeneous mythical suchas thosethatproliferated sects.It stories, amongtheGnostic ina ismorelikely sucha schema tobedemonstrable seemsasthough inquestion, isalsoa"doctrinal" sidetothestories casewhere there that andphilinparttothepressure ofa literate is,wheretheyrespond audiencethatwants (or theologically) osophically "sophisticated" Thisiscertainly familiar with. "truths" tocompare tothoseitisalready thecasewiththeIdealistmyth, and in anycase,someideaofan inordertodefine whatitisthat isclearly schema necessary underlying thediverse offered andHegelhavein accounts byFichte, Schelling common. Now:Whya 'final" The concept ofa "final fundamental myth? to was what introduced here, illustrate; Idealism, Blumenberg myth" "Theultiso hisdiscussion elucidates bothsubjects simultaneously. ultimate mate[orfinal: a of the was doubt," myth consequence letzter] hetellsus:ofthedoubtthatDescartes introduced withhishypothesis in ofthemalicious version, (anextreme Blumenberg suggested spirit TheLegitimacy ModemAge,oftheNominalists'God) who mightposofthe deceive us sibly completelyabout the externalworld.The insidious

4. Habermastakesanevenmoresympathetic in intheIdealists, interest especially andHuman Interests Knowledge (Boston:Beacon,1971).He findsinFichtean important train ofthought indifferent thatcontinues, andneveradequately clarified (seep. 38ff.) inHegeland inMarx.Buthedoesnottelluswhattomakeof"thesystematic forms, intention of Fichte'sDoctrine to transpose itsreaders, whichpurports ofKnowledge, a singleact,intothecentralself-intuition ofan absoluteego thatproduces through bothitself and theworld"(p. 210).


toBlumenberg 102 Introduction was givenitsfullforce,as I mencreatedbythishypothesis uncertainty ofa proofoftheexistence of the tioned,by Kant'sproof impossibility the latter ofa (perfectly havingbeen Descartes'meansof good) God this "There was onlyone way,"Blumenberg overcoming uncertainty. from theworld,namely,forthe remove this last monster "to writes, into the to make itself authority[Instanz]thatis recognitivesubject knows." As I describedabove, modern for the that it object sponsible is still with the verypreoccupied problemsposed byDescarphilosophy himself(confidentin his mind and which he of tes' analysis body, his to with the aid of solve them ability proofof God as theensperfechis to the extreme with tissimum) pushed hypothesisof themalicious not been possible to refute it has As Leibniz foresaw, deceivingspirit. thathypothesis,howevermuch it may be discreditedin regardto its In general,thetheoreticalproblemofthe possiblepracticakrelevance. relationof the selfto the world is as unsolved as ever,and forpure of science,whichgoes theory(thoughobviouslynot forthepractice this with no merrily along epistemologywhatever) is a threatto itsvery existence.The one definitive way,as Blumenbergpointsout, to put thisultimatetheoreticaldoubtto restwould be tomakethesubjectthe originand ultimatereferencepoint of theworld,whichwould then "come into the horizon of [thesubject's]experienceas somethingit has made" and whichit therefore cannotbe fundamentally deceived about. But in excludingthistheoreticaldoubt, the Idealist fundamental itself.One mythwould also radicallyexclude the absolutism ofreality cannotbe terrified by,any more thanone can be deceived about, a realitythatone has created.Thus theIdealistmythwould be a "final" mythnotonlybecause itwould settletheultimatedoubt,butbecause itwould removethe need foranyothermyth.It would completethe taskthatwas begunbytheprimeval"workofmyth,"inaway thatthose who performedthatoriginalworkcould notevenhavedreamedof:by establishingman,who once thoughthe was at themercyofreality,as itssovereignmaster,instead. But of course such a projectis thoroughlyparadoxical. No more than we criticalmoderns could ultimatelyaccept a myth,once we recognizedit as such, as a solutionto a theoreticalproblem (we are than much more likelyto depreciatetheoryas such,"pragmatically," to knowingly combineitwithmyth)- no morecould we,as "workers on" myth,accept one actual mythas truly"final"and insurpassable. As Blumenbergsaysin thelastsentenceof Work onMyth, afterdiscusKafka's of the version sing amazing one-page "eschatological" Prometheusstory,"Whatiftherewerestillsomethingtosay,afterall?" Here he explains: "For one mythto be distinguishedas an ultimate


Robert Wallace 103

and insurpassable pure representationof its 'form' is the highest stimulusto dealingswiththemythical,but itis nota statusthatcan be also in thatthey shownto be final.Beginningand end are symmetrical over intotheprochas Myth alwaysalreadypassed escape tangibility. ess of reception,and it remainsin thatprocess no matterwhatviolence is applied in order to break itsbonds and to establishitsfinal form." Idealism's fundamentalmythseems to be "an ultimateand insurofmyth's'form'in that,whilecontaining passable purerepresentation with none of myth'straditionalcontents,itaims to deal, definitively, the problem thattraditionalmythexistedin order to deal with:the absolutismofreality.Ratherthandismissingmyth,in theusual manner of modern philosophy,it (implicitly)recognizesthe need forit of philosophy'sat(which,indeed, was suggestedby the frustration its and to meetthatneed by to deal with own seeks problems), tempts means of a singleall-encompassing"final"myth. But,Blumenbergpointsout,thesuccessof such an attemptcannot be demonstrable.The seriesofcompeting"finalmyths"thatGerman philosophyhas produced since the Idealists- a seriesthatincludes of souls, Nietzsche's Schopenhauer's mythof the transmigration Scheler's "werdender "eternalrecurrence," Gott,"and Heidegger's of makes this evident.The sufficiently "story Being" impossibility reason forit, Blumenbergsays,is that"Beginningand end" - the absolutismofrealityand thebringingofmythto an end - "are symmetricalalso in thattheyescape tangibility." Bothare limit-concepts, ideal end-statesthatwe seek(respectively) to escape and to attain,but which we cannot knowlinglyexperience."Myth has alwaysalready passed over into the process of reception .. ." - that is, we can never

experiencethe initial"workof myth,"whichwe imagineas having achievedtheinitialdistancefromtheabsolutismofreality;and consequentlythemythsbywhichthatdistancewas achievedalways"come down" to us as somethingthatwe have notourselvescreated,but can onlyreceiveand "workon." Idealism is notwillingto acceptthisfundamentalreceptivity: withthecreativesubjectthat Itclaimsan identity produces all human culture(indeed, all reality).It wants to "break myth'sbonds [to reception]and establish its finalform." But the plausibilityofthe"finalmyth"bywhichitseeksto do this- themyth of a subject thatis the source of all reality- itselfdepends on the traditionalform(ifnot the traditionalcontents)of mythicalspeech. Withoutthatmythical"mode," whichtheydid notcreate,and whichit would makeno sensefortheir"subject"(which,accordingtothestory, has no priorabsolute realityto deal with)to create,theIdealists(and theotherphilosophicalmyth-makers who came afterthem)could not


toBlumenberg 104 Introduction evenhavegottenstarted.To thatextentatleast,then,myth"remainsin the processof reception"despiteall theirefforts to breakout of that and it to an end. bring process 4. BringingFaust to an End Idealism's attemptat bringingmythto an end is supremelyambivulnerable,sincethatscope tious,in itsscope, but is correspondingly and thus invitescriticismof its reflectsits pretensionsas philosophy, ofliterary mythicalcontent.The apparentscope,and thevulnerability, at bringing traditional myths"toan end" (likeKafka's attempts particular "Prometheus,"whichI mentioned)aremuchmorelimited,sincethey or to presenta do notpretendto be anythingotherthanstory-telling, brand new,and ultimate,story.Butthatdoes notpreventthemfrom beingverypotent.In fact,Blumenbergsays,"In everyclaimtobringa ifonlyimpliedclaimis exposed mythtoan end themorefar-reaching, toan end whenone displaysonefinalmyth."Prethatone bringsmyth theterminability ofsomesumablythisis so because bydemonstrating had that seemed uncreatable and would one interminable, thing prodiminishtheproblem thatthingsofthatsorthad servedto portionately overcome(or - whichamountsto thesame thing- one would proportionatelyenhance the status of the subject that had had the problem). In any case, the transformation thatValerycarriesout in his Mon Faustis,to saytheleast,striking. The keychangesare,first, a reversalof therolesofFaustand Mephistopheles,makingtheformer, now,tempt of the"suprememoment"that the latter;and second, a redefinition was the subject of Faust's wager withMephistopheles,in Goethe's self-oblivionthat, Faust,and which now becomes a mystic/sensual to the fundamental of that contrary premise wager,cannot,in princino Faust ple, "tarry."Consequently, longer "strives,"whetherfor or for else. he is resigned.Likewisehis Instead, knowledge anything Gretchen,here called "Lust," "does not entanglehim and does not redeemhim,"butis merely"a tactileelementin theimpressionism of thegardenscene." Butthesedeformations arenotarbitrary: The reversal ofthetemptationrelationshipreflectsthesheerpowerthatknowledge, as science,has broughtwithit since Goethe'stime,and which dwarfsMephistopheles'sold wares; and the redefinitionof the supreme moment reflectsthe impersonalitythat science has also broughtwithit,whichhas made theold "Faustian"cravingforknowledge as personalexperienceand personalpowerobsolete.5Likewise, 5. The factthatscience does not replacemythdoes not preventthe two from inimportant in thecase ofa mythofthepersonalrelation ways,particularly interacting


Robert Wallace105 Gretchen/Lust's changedrole reflectsthesimultaneousdeterioration of our consciousnessof sin and redemptionas real possibilities.The ofthisFaustwiththeone we knewfromGoetheis reducedto identity thatoftheold triadofhimself,Mephistopheles,and Gretchen/Lust, in whichthetwodyadicrelationsin whichFaustparticipatesare stilldisknowltinguished,at least on the surface,by involving,respectively, and of be edge sensuality(althoughpart Valhry'spoint may that,as experience,thesecoincide). ThusVal&rycomesveryclose to,as Blumenbergsays,"venturing the mostextremedeformation, whichonlyjust allowsor almostno longer allows theoriginalfigureto be recognized."Whatmore undisclosed potentialcould theold storystillcontain?We can't know,of course, unlessand untilitis disclosed,whichiswhytheprovisoalwaysapplies, thatsuccessinbringinga mythtoan end is notdemonstrable.("Whatif therewere stillsomethingto say,afterall?") Butwe can certainlysee how such an approach to the ideal of the "final myth"involves"a consists... in its totality,a perfection,whose fatefuleffectiveness makingitpossible forthefirsttimeto experiencethefascinationthat does notallow one to restuntilone has imitatedthemodel, equalled the standardthat it sets, or even surpassed it." Which is why the havenot attempted"finalmyths"ofmodernphilosophyand literature been followedbythecondition,purifiedofall myth,thatwouldaccord withthe originalexpectationsof modern thought,but have instead formedan unceasingseriesof attemptsto equal or surpassprevious "finalmyths." 5. The Mythof Reincarnationsas Settingthe Standard for "Final Myths" The last section of "To Bring Mythto an End"examines "final myths"proposed by Schopenhauer,Feuerbach,and Hans Jonas,in This orderto focuson "the standardthata 'finalmyth'has to satisfy." standard,Blumenbergsays,"was,ifI see itcorrectly, firstlaid downby of Schopenhauer,"in some unpublishednoteson thetransmigration souls,whichis forSchopenhauer(in Blumenberg'swords)"the epitome ofa storythatcomes as close to philosophicaltruthas anystory thatcould be devised,"and is to be consideredas the"Non plus ultra" of myth,"its richestand most importantinstance." Blumenberg pointsout thatit differsfromNietzsche's"eternalrecurrenceof the same" by focussingon the subject'seventualliberationfromreality, discussion ofthatrelatiorr Anextended andthetransformations toknowledge. ithas in of Western course can be foundin partThreeof The the history, undergone Age:"TheTrialofTheoretical oftheModern Legitimacy Curiosity."


toBlumenberg 106 Introduction oftherealitythathe creates,as the ratherthanon theeternalrepetition a less calculatFeuerbach,preferring argumentforhis responsibility. ingGod thantheone he sees impliedin theidea ofthetransmigration ofsouls,and Jonas,who imaginesa God who has puttheentirefateof hisuniverse,forgood or ill,inhumanhands,bothresembleNietzsche (ratherthanSchopenhauer)in thisrespect,thattheirmythsemphasize responsibilityfor the universe, rather than responsibilityfor oneself. Blumenbergrecentlypublished a shortessay on a sentencethat appears among Nietzsche'snotes fromthe period when Zarathustra was comingintobeing,butwhichsuggestsa different approach from the one thatNietzscheactuallypursued in thatwork.'The sentence reads: "That we could bear being immortal- thatwould be the not to the highestthing." Blumenberginterpretsthis as referring constituted "eternal but to the recurrence," quasi-"immortality" by of one's actions and consetheir possibility remembering following in the world one's death. To continue after eternally quences willingly as the same person whom one would thenrememberfully,without benefitofforgetfulness and repression,and whose fullconsequences one would perceive- to continuethus ratherthan to "dissolve in tothequalityofone's life.Blumenberg shame" - would indeedtestify does notexplicitly call thisconceptiona "finalmyth,"butitappearsto possess preciselywhathe describes,in thepresentpiece, as themost ofsuch a myth(whichSchopenhauer'smyth importantcharacteristic ofreincarnation illustrates here):thatitpresents"thesubject'sresponto himself and for himself." sibility BlumenbergpraisesSchopenhauerfor"tryingto preserve,ifnotto Kant'sconceptof thepostuintensify [in his mythof reincarnation], late."Afterproving,intheCritique Reason,thattherealityofGod, ofPure of freedomand of immortality could neverbe demonstrated,Kant wenton to assert,in theCritique Reason,thatall ofthesewere ofPractical nevertheless presupposed,as "postulates,"in moralaction.Ifimmoritwould interfere withmoral action,whichin talityweredemonstrable, Kant'sviewmustproceed fromreverenceforduty(as formulatedin theCategoricalImperative),and cannotinvolvecalculationsofprobable rewardor punishmentafterdeath. However,while one has no one is permittedto hope, indeed knowledgeofGod or ofimmortality, one musthope thata God and an immortalsoul existso thatgoodness maybe justlyrewardedin thehereafter. Also,pure dutyis sucha 6. "Nachdenken iiber einen Satz von Nietzsche," the second of three hinaus," in "Kurzessays" entitled,collectively,"Uber den Rand der Wirklichkeit Akzente (Munich),Feb. 1983, 16-27.


Wallace107 Robert rigorous requirementthat Kant eventuallyrecognized that actual human behaviorwillneverdo morethanstrivetowardit.This gap betweendutyand human reality(betweenthewilland theaction)gave the"postulate"ofimmortality an additionalfunctionin Kant'sthinkIt individual soul topursuetheinfinite made room for an progress ing: in moral goodness thatalone could bringits actions into fullcompliance withthe CategoricalImperative.But thiswould onlybe possible if the soul had an endless series of lives. Hence Kant's final interestin the idea of reincarnation(an interestthathe shared with Lessing,as well as Schopenhauer). This mayall seem, as Blumenbergsays,likea lot of "obsolete rubbish." However,as he goes on topointout,"theoppressivenessofcondoes notcease." whichliesbehindthemyth[ofimmortality], tingency, This oppressivenessis also the ultimateexplanation of Idealism's mythofthesubjectas origin.As Blumenbergwroteearlierin thechapter,"The deepest conflictthatthe subjectthatreflectson itsabsolute root can have withitselfis the confirmation of itscontingencyin the world,ofitslackofnecessity... [thatis,the]conflictthatconsistsin or arisesfromthefactthata subjectisa resultofa physicalprocessand for but rather, thatveryreason does not experienceitsself-constitution, fromitspossessionofthesole absolutecertainty ofthecogito sum,gains as somethingheterogeneousto it." In addiaccess to thisconstitution - to thepriority tionto thiskindofcontingency ofmatteroversubjecofsociety: tivity we maybe equally oppressed by the priority by (as Blumenbergcalls it a littlefurther on) "the overwhelmingpresumption thatone is produced by alien, social agencies," which existentialismdesperatelyresistswithits doctrinethatexistenceis priorto essence.Bothkindsofcontingency, itseemsclear,will(ifanything)be increasedbytheprogressofscience,whichwhileitcreatesnewmeans forus touse incontrolling a continuouslyincreasingrangeofreality, at thesame timecontinuallystrengthens thepresumptionthatthemost fundamentallayer of our personhood is exogenouslydetermined. This ultimate"contingency"seems to be, in fact,theirreducible,pertheperand thusconstitutes manentformoftheabsolutismofreality, manentissue withwhich"finalmyths"willhave to tryto deal. When thestandardofpresentBlumenbergsaysthata finalmythmustsatisfy to forhimself,"he is sayhimself and "the subject'sresponsibility ing I it is to to deal withthe issue of our that no think, good ing, try for the world as a whole,as the contingency byclaimingresponsibility Idealistsand Nietzsche(theNietzscheofthe"willtopower"and "eternal recurrence")andJonasareall inclinedtodo, butthecrucialthingis to recognize and accept our responsibilityto and forourselves,as in spite of the conindividuals.That we have such a responsibility,


toBlumenberg 108 Introduction tingencythatpreventsus fromknowingthatwe are "in command" in thisarea,iswhatKant'sethics,7hisdoctrineofthe"postulates,"and all of our "finalmyths"aim to tellus. Like the mythof reincarnations, they"reconcile individuationand dependence on the world," and thus- ironically- underminethedepreciationofindividuationthat Schopenhauerhimselfpreached. One mightsay,then,thattheydefendthepossibility ofmodern"individualism"(as impliedbymodern But it is clear thatsome "finalmyths"- thosethat "self-assertion"). toand forourselves- do so moreeffectively suggestour responsibility thanthose thatmake us responsiblefortheworldas a whole. 7. Two importantearlydocumentsof withKant Blumenberg'slong involvement are"Ist eine philosophische 6(1953), mdglich?"inStudium Generale, Ethikgegenwirtig 174-184,and "Kant und die Frage nach dem 'gnidigen Gott,'" StudiumGenerale, 7 (1954), 554-570.

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