Villasis Notes in Civil Procedure (Suprema Legis).pdf

2014 BAR REVIEWER ON CIVIL PROCEDURE

BY: PROF. CHRISTIAN “KIT” VILLASIS *

www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected]

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SUPREMA LEGIS REVIEWS AND SEMINARS UPDATES ON CRITICAL AREAS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE ATTY. CHRISTIAN “KIT” VILLASIS * GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1. THE SUPREME COURT NOW HAS THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN ALL COURTS. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. NOS. 158090, OCTOBER 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.). 2. PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY OF COURTS: A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. (CONSTANCIO F. MENDOZA AND SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BALATASAN, BULALACAO, ORIENTAL MINDORO VS. MAYOR ENRILO VILLAS ET AL., G.R. NO. 187256, FEB. 23, 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.) __________________________________________________________ * Holder, Justice Arsenio Dizon Award in Remedial Law * Chairman, 2012 and 2013 Committee of Experts in Remedial Law * Member, Committee for Revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure * MCLE Lecturer * Professor and BAR Reviewer in Remedial Law - University of the Philippines Law Center (UPLC), Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), New Era University (NEU), University of Manila (UM), Jose Rizal University (JRU), University of Santo Tomas Review Center, Adamson University BAR Review, University of Cebu BAR Review, University of San Carlos BAR Review, UM Bar Review Program, MLQU BAR Review, National Bar Review Center (NBRC), Lex Reviews and Seminars, Inc. (LEX), Philippine Social Justice Foundation (PHILJUST), Magnificus Juris BAR Review Center, Powerhaus Law Review Center, Inc., Center for Professional Reviews and Seminars (CPRS), Suprema Legis Reviews and Seminars, I-Secure On-line BAR Review, Chan Robles BAR Review, Great Minds BAR Review, Primus BAR Review, Sed Lex MCLE Provider, Inc., ACLEX MCLE Provider, Inc., Center for Global Best Practices (CGBP), etc.

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3. DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY: NO COURT CAN INTERFERE BY INJUNCTION WITH THE JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS OF ANOTHER COURT OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION HAVING THE POWER TO GRANT THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE INJUNCTION. (ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI VS. JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG, A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2225, SEPTEMBER 6, 2011, PER CURIAM) 4. RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF THE FRESH PERIOD OF 15 DAYS: To standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Supreme Court ruled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court. In Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. HomenaValencia, the Supreme Court held that thei principle retroactively applies even to cases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure (ELENA JANE DUARTE VS. MIGUEL SAMUEL, A.E. DURAN, G.R. NO. 173038, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

JURISDICTION 1. JURISDICTION OVER THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AND ITS SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF DOES NOT DEPEND UPON THE DEFENSES SET FORTH IN AN ANSWER OR A MOTION TO DISMISS. THE SAME RATIONALE APPLIES TO AN ANSWER WITH A MOTION TO DISMISS (MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.). 2. LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER MAY BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS CONFERRED ONLY BY THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW. IT CANNOT BE ACQUIRED THROUGH A WAIVER OR ENLARGED BY THE OMISSION OF THE PARTIES OR CONFERRED BY THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE COURT. CONSEQUENTLY, QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION MAY BE COGNIZABLE EVEN IF RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. (KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. NO. 192289, JANUARY 08, 2013, REYES, J.) 2.1. DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL OR ESTOPPEL BY LACHES: In TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY (131 Phil. 556 (1968), the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, the Supreme Court held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008, 558 SCRA 63, the Supreme Court cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case (REPUBLIC VS. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G. R. NO. 162322, MARCH 14, 2012, SERENO, J.). *


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2.2. LACHES SHOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENT FOR THE SIBONGHANOY DOCTRINE TO APPLY BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN TIJAM VS. SIBONGHANOY IS MERELY AN EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE. (CELIA VDA. DE HERRERA VS. EMELITA AND CRISANTO BERNARDO, G.R. NO. 170251, JUNE 1, 2011, PERALTA, J.). 2.3. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS CONFERRED BY LAW. R.A. NO. 879945 CONFERRED JURISDICTION OVER INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSIES ON COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION OR RTCS, TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE SUPREME COURT. (VITALIANO N. AGUIRRE II VS. FQB+7, INC., G.R. NO. 170770, JANUARY 9, 2013, DEL CASTILLO, J.) 3. IN CIVIL CASES, JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT MAY BE ACQUIRED EITHER BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS OR BY THE DEFENDANT’S VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE IN COURT AND SUBMISSION TO ITS AUTHORITY. (OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION VS. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., G. R. NO. 183035, JANUARY 9, 2013, SERENO, CJ.) 3.1. THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR TIME IS CONSIDERED A SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT: (ALLAN C. GO, VS. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 164703, MAY 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 3.2. A DEFENDANT WHO FILES A MOTION TO DISMISS, ASSAILING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OVER HIS PERSON, TOGETHER WITH OTHER GROUNDS RAISED THEREIN, IS NOT DEEMED TO HAVE APPEARED VOLUNTARILY BEFORE THE COURT. (EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.) 3.3. WHEN A DEFENDANT’S APPEARANCE IS MADE PRECISELY TO OBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OVER HIS PERSON, IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS APPEARANCE IN COURT. IN THIS CASE, WHILE LIMSON AND AROLLADO GLOSSED OVER THE ALLEGED LACK OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS, HOWEVER, THEY PROCEEDED TO EXHAUSTIVELY DISCUSS WHY SBC’S COMPLAINT COULD NOT PROSPER AGAINST THEM AS SURETIES. ERGO, THEY THEREBY VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE MAKATI RTC (JAPRL DEVELOPMENT CORP., VS. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 190107, JUNE 6, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) 3.4 A DEFENDANT’S VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE IN THE ACTION IS EQUIVALENT TO SERVICE OF SUMMONS. AS HELD PREVIOUSLY, THE FILING OF MOTIONS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF, SUCH AS, TO ADMIT ANSWER, FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE ANSWER, FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND TO LIFT ORDER OF DEFAULT WITH MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, ARE CONSIDERED VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. (DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HON. REINATO G. QUILALA, G.R. NO. 168723, JULY 9, 2008, QUISUMBING, J.)

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3.5. GENERAL RULE: FILING PLEADINGS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF CONSTITUTES VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE, AND THE CONSEQUENT SUBMISSION OF ONE’S PERSON TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. EXCEPTIONS: This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. (JOSE C. MIRANDA VS. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, G.R. NO. 158763, MARCH 31, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.) 3.6. THE RTC HAD INDEED ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHEN THE LATTER'S COUNSEL ENTERED HIS APPEARANCE ON PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S BEHALF, WITHOUT QUALIFICATION AND WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS, AND EVEN FILED TWO MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER. (LEAH PALMA VS. HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, G.R. NO. 165273, MARCH 10, 2010, PERALTA, J.) 3.7 DEFENDANT’S FILING OF A MOTION FOR RE-SETTING OF THE HEARING EFFECTIVELY CURED THE DEFECT OF THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS. (VIRGILIO P. CEZAR VS. HON. HELEN RICAFORT-BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. 136415, OCTOBER 31, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.) 4. THE EXCLUSION OF THE TERM “DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND” IN DETERMINING THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 19 (8) AND SECTION 33 (1) OF B.P. BLG. 129, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 7691, APPLIES TO CASES WHERE THE DAMAGES ARE MERELY INCIDENTAL TO OR A CONSEQUENCE OF THE MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION. HOWEVER, IN CASES WHERE THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION, OR ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION, THE AMOUNT OF SUCH CLAIM SHALL BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT (Administrative Circular No. 0994) (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. NO. 173915, FEBRUARY 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 5. THE PAYMENT IN FULL OF THE DOCKET FEES WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD IS MANDATORY. (THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116121, JULY 18, 2011, MENDOZA, J.). 5.1. THE DOCKET FEES ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT SHOULD BE PAID AT THE TIME OF THE FILING THEREOF. HENCE THE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT SHOULD BE EXPUNGED IF THE DOCKET FEES THEREON WERE *


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NOT PAID. THE TRIAL COURT NONETHELESS DOES NOT LOSE THE JURISDICTION IT HAD ACQUIRED OVER THE CASE WITH THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT. (DO-ALL METAL INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SECURITY BANK CORP., JANUARY 10, 2011, ABAD., J.) 5.2. DUE TO THE NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES ON PETITIONER'S PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM, THE TRIAL COURT NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER IT. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. NOS. 158090, OCTOBER 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.). 6. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER ORDERS, DIRECTIVES AND DECISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASES ONLY. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA, G.R. NO. 151800, NOVEMBER 5, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, PERALTA, J.). 7. EFFECT OF A PARTY’S RELIANCE ON THE CLERK OF COURT’S INSUFFICIENT ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCKET FEES: IF THE PARTY FILING THE CASE PAID LESS THAN THE CORRECT AMOUNT FOR THE DOCKET FEES BECAUSE THAT WAS THE AMOUNT ASSESSED BY THE CLERK OF COURT, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAKING A DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT LIES WITH THE SAME CLERK OF COURT. IN SUCH A CASE, THE LOWER COURT CONCERNED WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY LOSE JURISDICTION, BECAUSE OF A PARTY’S RELIANCE ON THE CLERK OF COURT’S INSUFFICIENT ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCKET FEES. HOWEVER, THE PARTY CONCERNED WILL BE REQUIRED TO PAY THE DEFICIENCY (MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.). 8. A PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S RESIGNATION DOES NOT RENDER MOOT AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE THAT WAS FILED PRIOR TO THE OFFICIAL’S RESIGNATION. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., G.R. NO. 16467, JULY 27, 2011, BRION, J.). 9. THE METC CAN NOW ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER ACCION PUBLICIANA CASES. (BF CITILAND CORPORATION VS. MARILYN B. OTAKE, G.R. NO. 173351, JULY 29, 2010, CARPIO, J.).

RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE 1. IF THE EXTENSION FOR THE FILING OF PLEADINGS CANNOT BE ALLOWED, IT IS ILLOGICAL AND INCONGRUOUS TO ADMIT A PLEADING THAT IS ALREADY FILED LATE. TO ADMIT A LATE ANSWER IS TO PUT A PREMIUM ON DILATORY MEASURES, THE VERY MISCHIEF THAT THE RULES SEEK TO REDRESS. (TERAÑA VS. DESAGUN, G.R. NO. 152131, APRIL 29, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.).

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1.1. THE FAILURE OF ONE PARTY TO SUBMIT HIS POSITION PAPER DOES NOT BAR AT ALL THE MTC FROM ISSUING A JUDGMENT ON THE EJECTMENT COMPLAINT. (TERAÑA VS. DESAGUN, G.R. NO. 152131, APRIL 29, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.). 2. THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A JUDGMENT PROHIBITED UNDER SEC. 19(C) OF THE RSP IS THAT WHICH SEEKS RECONSIDERATION OF A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE COURT AFTER TRIAL ON THE MERITS. THE DISMISSAL ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO APPEAR IN THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE IS NOT A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS AFTER TRIAL OF THE CASE. (LUCAS V. FABROS, 324 SCRA 1).

CIVIL PROCEDURE ACTIONS 1. PERSONAL ACTION AND REAL ACTIONS: In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008, 2ND DIVISION, VELASCO, JR., J.). 1.1. AN ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WOULD STILL BE CONSIDERED A REAL ACTION WHERE IT SEEKS THE CONVEYANCE OR TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY, OR ULTIMATELY, THE EXECUTION OF DEEDS OF CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY. (GOCHAN V. GOCHAN, 423 PHIL. 491, 501 (2001); COPIOSO VS. COPIOSO, 391 SCRA 325 (2002). 2. IN PERSONAM, IN REM AND QUASI IN REM ACTIONS: An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem. (JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710, SECOND DIVISION, June 6, 2011 NACHURA, J.) 2.1. ACTION IN PERSONAM: THE PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE PERSONAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND IN WHICH PERSONAL JUDGMENTS ARE RENDERED ADJUSTING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE AFFECTED PARTIES IS IN PERSONAM. HENCE, ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY OF REAL PROPERTY ARE IN PERSONAM.” (EMERITA MUNOZ VS. ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. AND SAMUEL GO CHAN, G.R. NO. 142676, JUNE 6, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). *


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2.1.1. ACTION IN PERSONAM: THE ACTION FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT IS AN ACTION IN PERSONAM BECAUSE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE SUING TO ENFORCE THEIR PERSONAL RIGHTS UNDER SAID JUDGMENT. (SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., VS. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, ET AL. G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, TINGA, J.). 2.2. ACTION IN REM: A PETITION DIRECTED AGAINST THE "THING" ITSELF OR THE RES, WHICH CONCERNS THE STATUS OF A PERSON, LIKE A PETITION FOR ADOPTION, ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS AN ACTION IN REM. (JESSE U. LUCAS VS. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. NO. 190710, 2ND DIVISION, JUNE 6, 2011, NACHURA, J.).

CAUSE OF ACTION 1. CAUSE OF ACTION: A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action (DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO & CRISTINA TRINIDAD ZARATE ROMERO, G.R. NO. 163827, AUGUST 17, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 2. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION VS. LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION: Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. x x x If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of the elements of cause of action, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented (DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG VS. RENATO & MELBA ZAMORA, G.R. NO. 156375, MAY 30, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 3. AN AMENDED COMPLAINT THAT CHANGES THE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION IS TECHNICALLY A NEW COMPLAINT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ACTION IS DEEMED FILED ON THE DATE OF THE FILING OF SUCH AMENDED PLEADING, NOT ON THE DATE OF THE FILING OF ITS ORIGINAL VERSION. THUS, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION RESUMES ITS RUN UNTIL IT IS ARRESTED BY THE FILING OF THE AMENDED PLEADING. (SPOUSES VICENTE DIONISIO AT ANITA DIONISIO VS. WILFREDO LINSANGAN, G.R. NO. 178159, MARCH 2, 2011, ABAD, J.).

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4. SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions (CATALINA CHU ET AL. VS. SPS. FERNANDO CUNANAN & TRINIDAD CUNANAN, G.R. NO. 156185, SEPTEMBER 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 5. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION: THE RULE ON JOINDER OF ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 5, RULE 2 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REQUIRES THAT THE JOINDER SHALL NOT INCLUDE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS GOVERNED BY SPECIAL RULES. (ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO. 153829, AUGUST 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

PARTIES 1. REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST: EVERY ACTION MUST BE PROSECUTED OR DEFENDED IN THE NAME OF THE REAL PARTY-ININTEREST: A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action (ALLAN C. GO, VS. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 164703, MAY 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 1.1. IN A DERIVATIVE SUIT, THE CORPORATION IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WHILE THE STOCKHOLDER FILING SUIT FOR THE CORPORATION’S BEHALF IS ONLY A NOMINAL PARTY. THE CORPORATION SHOULD THEREFORE BE INCLUDED AS A PARTY IN THE SUIT. (SANTIAGO CUA, JR., ET. AL. VS. MIGUEL OCAMPO TAN ET. AL., G.R. NO. 181455-56, DECEMBER 4, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.). 1.2. IN PROCEEDINGS TO SET ASIDE AN EXECUTION SALE, THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS THE PERSON WHO HAS AN INTEREST EITHER IN THE PROPERTY SOLD OR THE PROCEEDS THEREOF. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION [PEA-PTGWO] VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 170689, MARCH 17, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, NACHURA, J.). 2. LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE” DISTINGISHED FROM “THE LACK OF PERSONALITY TO SUE”. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal *


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capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. (NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA VS. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 157447, APRIL 29, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.) 3. THE GENERAL RULE WITH REFERENCE TO THE MAKING OF PARTIES IN A CIVIL ACTION REQUIRES, OF COURSE, THE JOINDER OF ALL NECESSARY PARTIES WHERE POSSIBLE, AND THE JOINDER OF ALL INDISPENSABLE PARTIES UNDER ANY AND ALL CONDITIONS, THEIR PRESENCE BEING A SINE QUA NON FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER. (MAXIMINA A. BULAWAN VS. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, G.R. NO. 182819, JUNE 22, 2011, CARPIO, J.). 4. NON-JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. PARTIES MAY BE ADDED BY ORDER OF THE COURT ON MOTION OF THE PARTY OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE AT ANY STAGE OF THE ACTION AND/OR SUCH TIMES AS ARE JUST. IF THE PETITIONER OR PLAINTIFF REFUSES TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY DESPITE THE ORDER OF THE COURT, THE LATTER MAY DISMISS THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION FOR THE PETITIONER OR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY THEREFOR. THE REMEDY IS TO IMPLEAD THE NON-PARTY CLAIMED TO BE INDISPENSABLE. (NOCOM VS. CAMERINO, G.R. NO. 182984, FEBRUARY 10, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, AZCUNA, J.). 4.1. INDISPENSABLE PARTIES: WHERE THE EJECTMENT SUIT IS BROUGHT BY A CO-OWNER, WITHOUT REPUDIATING THE CO-OWNERSHIP, THEN THE SUIT IS PRESUMED TO BE FILED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE OTHER CO-OWNERS AND MAY PROCEED WITHOUT IMPLEADING THE OTHER COOWNERS. THE OTHER CO-OWNERS ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS INDISPENSABLE PARTIES TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE. On the other hand, where the coowner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of the property or where the suit is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners are indispensable parties and must be impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects the rights and interests of these other co-owners. (MARMO VS. ANACAY, G.R. NO. 182585, NOVEMBER 27, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.). 5. JOINDER OF PARTIES: WHERE THE OBLIGATION OF THE PARTIES IS SOLIDARY, EITHER OF THE PARTIES IS INDISPENSABLE, AND THE OTHER IS NOT EVEN A NECESSARY PARTY BECAUSE COMPLETE RELIEF IS AVAILABLE FROM EITHER. (HERMANA R. CEREZO VS. DAVID TUAZON, G.R. NO. 141538, MARCH 23, 2004, CARPIO, J.) 5.1. WHENEVER IT APPEARS TO THE COURT IN THE COURSE OF A PROCEEDING THAT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY HAS NOT BEEN JOINED, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO STOP THE TRIAL AND TO ORDER THE INCLUSION OF SUCH PARTY. (ELPIDIO S. UY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 157065, JULY 11, 2006, QUISUMBING, J.)

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6. AN UNLICENSED FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES CAN SUE BEFORE PHILIPPINE COURTS. AN EXPORTER IS NOT DEEMED TO BE DOING BUSINESS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY BY THE SIMPLE FACT OF EXPORTING PRODUCTS TO SUCH FOREIGN COUNTRY. (B. VAN ZUIDEN BROS., LTD., V. GTVL MFG. INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. NO. 147905, 28 MAY 2007). 7. THERE IS NO LAW WHICH VEST JURIDICAL OR LEGAL PERSONALITY UPON A SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP NOR EMPOWER IT TO FILE OR DEFEND AN ACTION IN COURT. (ROGER V. NAVARRO, VS. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, G.R. NO. 153788, NOVEMBER 27, 2009, BRION, J.). 8. IN A CASE INVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, “STANDING” OR LOCUS STANDI MEANS PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE CASE SUCH THAT THE PARTY HAS SUSTAINED OR WILL SUSTAIN DIRECT INJURY AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTION BEING CHALLENGED. TO HAVE LEGAL STANDING, THE PETITIONER MUST HAVE DIRECT, PERRSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST TO PROTECT. (EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO VS. HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 161065, APRIL 15, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.) 8.1. ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE ARE CONSIDERED EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON STANDING: The Court, through Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano (now retired), provided the following instructive guides as determinants in determining whether a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. (CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) VS. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) AND MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), G.R. NO. 174697, JULY 8, 2010, BRION, J.). 9. A CLASS SUIT IS NOT PROPER WHERE THERE IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THERE IS A DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS AND VIEWS AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE CLASS SOUGHT TO BE REPRESENTED, AND NOT ALL ARE IN FAVOR OF FILING THE PRESENT SUIT. In Ibanes v. Roman Catholic Church, 413 Phil. 281 (2001), the Supreme Court held that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper. (ATTY. SILVIA BANDA, ET.AL., V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. NO. 166620, APRIL 20, 2010, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 10. SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL: SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL SHOULD NOT BE PRESUMED FROM THE MERE FILING OF A NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF A NEW LAWYER. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. ANGEL C. PONTILLAS, G.R. NO. 155178, MAY 7, 2008, CARPIO, J.)

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1. VENUE: WHERE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO EITHER FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE OR INCLUDE THE SAME AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, HE IS DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT TO IMPROPER VENUE (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, VELASCO, JR., J.). 1.1. VENUE OF PERSONAL ACTIONS INVOLVING SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS: WHEN THERE IS MORE THAN ONE PLAINTIFF IN A PERSONAL ACTION CASE, THE RESIDENCES OF THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING PROPER VENUE. (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, VELASCO, JR., J.). 2. VENUE OF REAL ACTIONS: REAL ACTIONS SHALL BE COMMENCED AND TRIED IN THE COURT THAT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE AREA WHERE THE PROPERTY IS SITUATED. HOWEVER, THE RULES PROVIDE AN EXCEPTION, IN THAT REAL ACTIONS CAN BE COMMENCED AND TRIED IN A COURT OTHER THAN WHERE THE PROPERTY IS SITUATED IN INSTANCES WHERE THE PARTIES HAVE PREVIOUSLY AND VALIDLY AGREED IN WRITING ON THE EXCLUSIVE VENUE THEREOF. (PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. VS. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 179018, JUNE 18, 2012, SERENO, J.). 3. STIPULATIONS ON VENUE: THE GENERAL RULES ON VENUE OF ACTIONS SHALL NOT APPLY WHERE THE PARTIES, BEFORE THE FILING OF THE ACTION, HAVE VALIDLY AGREED IN WRITING ON AN EXCLUSIVE VENUE. (PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. VS. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 179018, JUNE 18, 2012, SERENO, J.). 3.1. WRITTEN STIPULATIONS AS TO VENUE MAY BE RESTRICTIVE IN THE SENSE THAT THE SUIT MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE PLACE AGREED UPON, OR MERELY PERMISSIVE IN THAT THE PARTIES MAY FILE THEIR SUIT NOT ONLY IN THE PLACE AGREED UPON BUT ALSO IN THE PLACES FIXED BY LAW. (JESUSITO D. LEGASPI VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 160653, JULY 23, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.). 3.2. UNDER THE “COMPLEMENTARY-CONTRACTS-CONSTRUEDTOGETHER” DOCTRINE, AN ACCESSORY CONTRACT MUST BE READ IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TOGETHER WITH THE PRINCIPAL AGREEMENT. THUS, THE SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT CAN ONLY BE ENFORCED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROMISSORY NOTE. ERGO, THE VENUE STIPULATION IN THE PROMISSORY NOTE ALSO APPLIES TO THE SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT AS AN ANCILLARY CONTRACT OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE. (PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS V. LIM, ET.AL., G.R. 158138, APRIL 12, 2005, PANGANIBAN, J.)

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3.3. STIPULATION ON VENUE: THE EXCLUSIVE VENUE OF MAKATI CITY, AS STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES AND SANCTIONED BY SECTION 4, RULE 4 OF THE RULES OF COURT, CANNOT BE MADE TO APPLY TO THE PETITION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE FILED BY RESPONDENT BANK BECAUSE THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4 PERTAIN TO VENUE OF ACTIONS, WHICH AN EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE IS NOT. (SPOUSES HERMES P. OCHOA AND ARACELI D. OCHOA CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 192877, MARCH 23, 2011, NACHURA, J.). 4. THE VENUE OF REAL ACTIONS AFFECTING PROPERTIES FOUND IN DIFFERENT PROVINCES IS DETERMINED BY THE SINGULARITY OR PLURALITY OF THE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING SAID PARCELS OF LAND. (UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. (FORMERLY WESTMONT BANK) VS. ROSEMOORE MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NOS. 159669 & 163521, MARCH 12, 2007, TINGA, J.)

PLEADINGS 1. THE REQUIREMENTS OF VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING ARE NOT JURISDICTIONAL. (SPOUSES EUGENE L. LIM VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 192615, JANUARY 30, 2013, BRION, J.) 2. WAYS OF COMMITTING FORUM SHOPPING: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). x x x If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice. (CHUA VS. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. G.R. NO. 182311, AUGUST 19, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHICONAZARIO, J.). 2.1. THE CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING IS REQUIRED ONLY IN A COMPLAINT OR OTHER INITIATORY PLEADING. THE EX PARTE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION IS NOT AN INITIATORY PLEADING AND THEREFORE NO CERTIFICATION IS REQUIRED. (SPOUSES GODOFREDO AND REMEDIOS ARQUIZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 160479, JUNE 8, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.) 2.1.1. ANSWER IS NOT AN INITIATORY PLEADING WHICH REQUIRES A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING. (KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. VS. HON. ALBERTO A. LERMA, G.R. NO. 143581, JANUARY 7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.)

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2.2. THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT ALL THE PETITIONERS OR PLAINTIFFS IN A CASE SHOULD SIGN THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING. However, the signature of any of the principal petitioners or principal parties,, would constitute a substantial compliance with the rule on verification and certification of non-forum shopping should there exist a commonality of interest among the parties, or where the parties filed the case as a collective, raising only one common cause of action or presenting a common defense, then the signature of one of the petitioners or complainants, acting as representative, is sufficient compliance. (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, VELASCO, JR., J.). 2.3. EXECUTION OF THE CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING BY THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT IS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PARTIES MUST PERSONALLY SIGN THE SAME: (ANITA MONASTERIO-PE ET AL. VS. JOSE JUAN TONG, G.R. NO. 151369, MARCH 23, 2011, PERALTA, J.). 2.4. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE NOT APPLICABLE WHERE A PARTY COMMITTED AN ACT OF DISHONESTY IN FILING THE CERTIFICATE AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING, AS BY MAKING IT APPEAR THAT A PERSON HAD SIGNED THE SAME WHEN HE WAS ALREADY DEAD. (HEIRS OF RETUYA V. CA, APRIL 6, 2011). 2.5. A CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY COUNSEL AND NOT BY THE PRINCIPAL PARTY HIMSELF IS NO CERTIFICATION AT ALL. (WILSON GO VS. ANITA RICO, G.R. NO. 140862, APRIL 25, 2006, SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, J.) 2.6. A DEFECTIVE CERTIFICATION IS GENERALLY NOT CURABLE BY ITS SUBSEQUENT CORRECTION. (BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 168313, OCTOBER 6, 2010) 2.7. WHEN A COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PLAINTIFF, PURSUANT TO SECTION 1, RULE 17 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THERE IS NO NEED TO STATE IN THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN A SUBSEQUENT RE-FILED COMPLAINT THE FACT OF THE PRIOR FILING AND DISMISSAL OF THE FORMER COMPLAINT. (BENEDICTO VS. LACSON ET AL., G.R. NO. 141508, MAY 5, 2010, PERALTA, J.). 2.8. A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING IS NOT APPLICABLE TO A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION. (SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS V. SAMMA CORP., MARCH 3, 2009). 2.9. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING OF A CORPORATION: GENERAL RULE: ONLY INDIVIDUALS VESTED WITH AUTHORITY BY A VALID BOARD RESOLUTION MAY SIGN THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN BEHALF OF A CORPORATION. IN ADDITION, THE COURT HAS REQUIRED THAT PROOF OF SAID AUTHORITY MUST BE *


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ATTACHED. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP), G.R. NO. 143088, JANUARY 24, 2006, AZCUNA, J.) EXCEPTION: IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY ATTACHED A BOARD RESOLUTION STATING THAT THE SIGNATORY OF THE CERTIFICATION HAD BEEN DULY AUTHORIZED TO DO SO. (VICAR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS. FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 157195, APRIL 22, 2005, PANGANIBAN, J.) 2.9.1. CORPORATE OFFICERS WHO CAN SIGN THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING WITHOUT NEED OF AN AUTHORIZING BOARD RESOLUTION: (1) Chairperson of the board of directors, (2) President, (3) General Manager or acting general manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) Employment Specialists in a labor case. (MID-PASIG LAND DEV’T CORP. V. TABLANTE, G.R. NO. 162924, FEBRUARY 4, 2010, NACHURA, J.). 2.9.2. BEING A RESIDENT AGENT DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE IS AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE THE REQUISITE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUMSHOPPING BECAUSE WHILE HE MAY BE AWARE OF ACTIONS FILED AGAINST HIS PRINCIPAL, HE MAY NOT BE AWARE OF ACTIONS INITIATED BY HIS PRINCIPAL WHETHER IN THE PHILIPPINES OR IN THE COUNTRY WHERE SUCH FOREIGN CORP. IS ORGANIZED. (EXPERTRAVEL AND TOURS INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND KOREAN LINES, G.R. NO. 152392, MAY 26, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. J.) 3. NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS: A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, ONCE DULY REGISTERED, MAY BE CANCELLED BY THE TRIAL COURT BEFORE WHICH THE ACTION INVOLVING THE PROPERTY IS PENDING. SECTION 14, RULE 13 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AUTHORIZES THE TRIAL COURT TO CANCEL A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS WHERE IT IS PROPERLY SHOWN THAT THE PURPOSE OF ITS ANNOTATION IS FOR MOLESTING THE ADVERSE PARTY, OR THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTY WHO CAUSED IT TO BE ANNOTATED. (LU VS. LU YM, SR. G.R. NO. 153690, AUGUST 4, 2009, SPECIAL 3RD DIVISION, NACHURA, J.). 4. COMPULSARY COUNTERCLAIM: UNDER SECTION 7, RULE 6 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, A COUNTERCLAIM IS COMPULSORY WHEN ITS OBJECT "ARISES OUT OF OR IS NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE CONSTITUTING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE OPPOSING PARTY’S CLAIM AND DOES NOT REQUIRE FOR ITS ADJUDICATION THE PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES OF WHOM THE COURT CANNOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION". (PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ALFREDO C. FLORES, G.R. NO. 175339, DECEMBER 16, 2008, TINGA, J.). 4.1. A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM DOES NOT REQUIRE A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING BECAUSE IT IS NOT AN “INITIATORY PLEADING. (SPOUSES RODOLFO AND REMEDIOS CARPIO VS. RURAL BANK OF STO. TOMAS (BATANGAS), INC., G.R. NO. 153171, MAY 4, 2006) *


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5. THE RULE IN PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS IS THAT FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION, THE COUNTERCLAIMANT IS BOUND TO PAY THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES.. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. NOS. 158090, OCT. 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.). 5.1. EFFECTIVE AUGUST 16, 2004, UNDER SEC. 7, RULE 141, AS AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 04-2-04-SC, DOCKET FEES ARE NOW REQUIRED TO BE PAID IN COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM OR CROSS-CLAIMS. (KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD. VS. HON. ALBERTO A. LERMA, G.R. NO. 143581, JANUARY 7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.) 5.2. PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS REQUIRE A CERTIFICATE OF NONFORUM SHOPPING. (KOREA EXCHANGE BANK VS. HON. ROGELIO C. GONZALES, G.R. NOS. 142286-87, APRIL 15, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.)

SUMMONS 1. AS A RULE, IF DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT BEEN VALIDLY SUMMONED, THE COURT ACQUIRES NO JURISDICTION OVER THEIR PERSON, AND A JUDGMENT RENDERED AGAINST THEM IS NULL AND VOID. (SAGANA VS. FRANCISCO, G.R. NO. 161952, OCTOBER, 2, 2009, 2ND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 2. PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS: SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND THE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT BY THE PROCESS SERVER UPON THE DEFENDANTS WHILE THEY WERE IN THE COURTROOM IS VALID. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT PERSONAL SERVICE SHOULD BE IN THE DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE. (SANSIO PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES MOGOL, G.R. NO. 177007, JULY 14, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.). 3. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS: IT IS ONLY WHEN THE DEFENDANT CANNOT BE SERVED PERSONALLY WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THAT A SUBSTITUTED SERVICE MAY BE MADE. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT SERVICE SHOULD BE SHOWN BY STATING THE EFFORTS MADE TO FIND THE DEFENDANT PERSONALLY AND THE FACT THAT SUCH EFFORTS FAILED. THIS STATEMENT SHOULD BE MADE IN THE PROOF OF SERVICE. The requisites of a valid substituted service: (1) service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant; (3) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion; (4) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendants place of residence; and (5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the return of service. (GALURA VS. MATH-AGRO CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 167230, AUGUST 14, 2009, 1ST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.). 3.1. EXCEPTION: THERE WAS PROPER SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS WHERE SERVICE WAS MADE UPON DEFENDANT’S BROTHER AT THE

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DEFENDANT’S LAST KNOWN ADDRESS. (SAGANA VS. FRANCISCO, G.R. NO. 161952, OCTOBER, 2, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 3.2. IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE DEFENDANT’S REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS BE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE THE SUMMONS. IT IS ENOUGH THAT HE APPEARS TO BE IN CHARGE. (GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. RICARDO F. CONSULTA, G.R. NO. 183182, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010, ABAD, J.). 3.3. SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON THE SUBDIVISION SECURITY GUARD UPON THE STRICT INSTRUCTION OF THE DEFENDANT IS CONSIDERED A VALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS. (REMELITA M. ROBINSON VS. CELITA B. MIRALLES, G.R. NO. 163584, DECEMBER 12, 2006, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.). 3.4. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS: THE PHRASE “AT THE DEFENDANT’S OFFICE OR REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS” DOES NOT INCLUDE A CORPORATION WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS A CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS (PHILTEL) WHICH IS NOT EVEN A PARTY TO THE SUIT. DEFENDANT DOES NOT REGULARLY HOLD OFFICE OR CONDUCT BUSINESS THEREIN AND HE IS LIKEWISE SUED MERELY ON HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS A SURETY. BESIDES, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER RESPONDENT COULD BE PERSONALLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AS HE HAD TRANSFERRED RESIDENCE TO HONGKONG. (UCPB V. ROBERTO ONGPIN, G.R. 146593, G.R. NO. 146593, OCTOBER 26, 2001, MENDOZA, J.). 3.5. IN CASE OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE, THERE SHOULD BE A REPORT INDICATING THAT THE PERSON WHO RECEIVED THE SUMMONS IN THE DEFENDANT’S BEHALF WAS ONE WITH WHOM THE DEFENDANT HAD A RELATION OF CONFIDENCE ENSURING THAT THE LATTER WOULD ACTUALLY RECEIVE THE SUMMONS. (ORION SECURITY CORPORATION VS. KALFAM ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. NO. 163287, APRIL 27, 2007, QUISUMBING, J.) 4. SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO A DOMESTIC PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY: THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS MUST BE MADE UPON AN OFFICER WHO IS NAMED IN THE STATUTE (I.E., THE PRESIDENT, MANAGING PARTNER, GENERAL MANAGER, CORPORATE SECRETARY, TREASURER, OR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL), OTHERWISE, THE SERVICE IS INSUFFICIENT. (B.D. LONGSPAN BUILDERS, INC. VS. R.S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. G.R. NO. 169919, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.). 4.1. THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON BPI’S BRANCH MANAGER DID NOT BIND THE CORPORATION FOR THE BRANCH MANAGER IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ENUMERATION IN THE STATUTE OF THE PERSONS UPON WHOM SERVICE OF SUMMONS CAN BE VALIDLY MADE IN BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION. (BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. SPOUSES SANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 169116, 26 MARCH 2007).

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5. SUMMONS UPON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS: WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SERVICE OF SUMMONS MUST BE MADE ON THE SOLICITOR GENERAL. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. ALFREDO DOMINGO, G.R. NO. 175299. SEPTEMBER 14, 2011, LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.). 6. AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY: “When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. x x x If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of thefollowing means: (a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs; (b) by publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at the last known address of the defendant; (c) by facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; or (d) by such other means as may be warranted in the discretion of the court” (AM. NO. 11-3-6-SC OR NEW RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON FOREIGN JURIDICAL ENTITIES: MARCH 15, 2011). 7. RULES ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN RELATION TO THE NATURE OF AN ACTION IN PERSONAM, IN REM OR QUASI IN REM: In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case. On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must *


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be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient (SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., VS. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, ET AL. G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, TINGA, J.). 7.1. IN A PROCEEDING IN REM OR QUASI IN REM, JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE COURT, PROVIDED THAT THE LATTER HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE RES. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. The petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. (JESSE U. LUCAS VS. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. NO. 190710, SECOND DIVISION, JUNE 6, 2011 NACHURA, J.). 7.2. THE PRESENT RULE EXPRESSLY STATES THAT THE SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION APPLIES "[I]N ANY ACTION WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS DESIGNATED AS AN UNKNOWN OWNER, OR THE LIKE, OR WHENEVER HIS WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN AND CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED BY DILIGENT INQUIRY." THUS, IT NOW APPLIES TO ANY ACTION, WHETHER IN PERSONAM, IN REM OR QUASI IN REM. (PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., VS PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 170943, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008, CORONA, J.). 7.3. IF THE DEFENDANT IS TEMPORARILY OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY, ANY OF THE FOLLOWING MODES OF SERVICE MAY BE RESORTED TO: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. (SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN VS. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, TINGA, J.) 7.4. SECTION 16 OF RULE 14 REGARDING SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON RESIDENTS TEMPORARILY OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, USES THE WORDS "MAY" AND "ALSO,". THUS, EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS NOT MANDATORY. OTHER METHODS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS ALLOWED UNDER THE RULES MAY ALSO BE AVAILED OF BY THE SERVING OFFICER ON A DEFENDANT-SEAMAN. (DOLORES MONTEFALCON VS. RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, G.R. NO. 165016, JUNE 17, 2008, QUISUMBING, J.) 7.5. EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO A NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT NOT FOUND IN THE COUNTRY APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE ACTION *


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IS IN REM OR QUASI IN REM, BUT NOT IF AN ACTION IS IN PERSONAM. (PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. VS. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 172242, AUGUST 14, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.). 7.6. SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION IS PROVED BY THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE PRINTER, HIS FOREMAN OR PRINCIPAL CLERK, OR OF THE EDITOR, BUSINESS OR ADVERTISING MANAGER OF THE NEWSPAPER WHICH PUBLISHED THE SUMMONS. THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION IS COMPLEMENTED BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY REGISTERED MAIL TO THE DEFENDANT’S LAST KNOWN ADDRESS. (PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., VS. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 170943, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008, CORONA, J.).

DEFAULT 1. EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF DEFAULT: THE MERE FACT THAT A DEFENDANT IS DECLARED IN DEFAULT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESULT IN THE GRANT OF THE PRAYERS OF THE PLAINTIFF. (ERLINDA GAJUDO VS. TRADERS ROYAL BANK, G.R. NO. 151098, MARCH 21, 2006, PANGANIBAN, CJ.) 2. A DEFENDANT PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT RETAINS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT, OR THAT THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW, EVEN WITHOUT NEED OF THE PRIOR FILING OF A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT. (JOSE R. MARTINEZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. NO. 160895, OCTOBER 30, 2006, TINGA, J.) 3. REMEDIES WHEN A PARTY IS DECLARED IN DEFAULT: It is wellsettled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies, to wit: he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; if he discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. Thus, respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial court’s judgment without being considered to have submitted to the trial court’s authority (B.D. LONGSPAN BUILDERS, INC. VS. R.S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. G.R. NO. 169919, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.). NOTE: The following are the additional remedies in cases of default: Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 37), Annulment of judgment (Rule 47) and Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65). 4. WHERE THE ANSWER IS FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD BUT BEFORE THE DEFENDANT IS DECLARED IN DEFAULT AND THERE *


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IS NO SHOWING THAT DEFENDANT INTENDS TO DELAY THE CASE, THE ANSWER SHOULD BE ADMITTED (SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES VS. HEIRS OF MANUEL HUMADA ENAÑO, G.R. NO. 190754, NOVEMBER 17, 2010, CARPIO MORALES, J.).

ALLEGATIONS AND DENIALS IN THE PLEADINGS

1. THERE ARE TWO WAYS OF DENYING ALLEGED FACTS: ONE IS BY GENERAL DENIAL, AND THE OTHER, BY SPECIFIC DENIAL. In this jurisdiction, only a specific denial shall be sufficient to place into contention an alleged fact. Under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a specific denial of an allegation of the complaint may be made in any of three ways, namely: (a) a defendant specifies each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, sets forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial; (b) a defendant who desires to deny only a part of an averment specifies so much of it as is true and material and denies only the remainder; and (c) a defendant who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint states so, which has the effect of a denial. x x x (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 166859, APRIL 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 1.1. A PERSON’S DENIAL FOR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS THAT BY THEIR NATURE HE OUGHT TO KNOW IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE DENIAL. (EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC. VS. JOSEFA BORROMEO CAPISTRANO, G.R. NO. 180157, FEB. 8, 2012, ABAD, J.). 2. ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT: WHERE THE DEFENSE IN THE ANSWER IS BASED ON AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT, A REPLY SPECIFICALLY DENYING IT UNDER OATH MUST BE MADE; OTHERWISE, THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE DOCUMENT WILL BE DEEMED ADMITTED. (CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. PHILBANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 150731, SEPTEMBER 14, 2007, VELASCO, JR., J.) 2.1. IMPLIED ADMISSION RULE UNDER SECTION 8 OF RULE 8 DOES NOT APPLY TO A PLAINTIFF WHO FILES A REPLY NOT UNDER OATH IF THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT ALREADY TRAVERSES THE ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT ATTACHED TO THE ANSWER. (TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORP. V. DAVID, G.R. NO. 169548, MARCH 15, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 3. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS NOT PLEADED EITHER IN A MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ANSWER ARE DEEMED WAIVED. (CATALINA BALAISMABANAG, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, ELEUTERIO MABANAG VS. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, AND RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, G.R. NO. 153142, MARCH 29, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.). 3.1. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT ALLEGATIONS NOT SPECIFICALLY DENIED ARE DEEMED ADMITTED ARE IMMATERIAL ALLEGATIONS AND INCORRECT CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM FACTS SET OUT

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IN THE COMPLAINT. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. DINNAH VILLAVIZA ET. AL., G.R. NO. 180291, JULY 27, 2010, MENDOZA, J.).

AMENDMENTS 1. AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS IS FAVORED AND SHOULD BE LIBERALLY ALLOWED IN THE FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE IN ORDER TO DETERMINE EVERY CASE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ON ITS MERITS WITHOUT REGARD TO TECHNICALITIES. (CHARLES LIMBAUAN VS. FAUSTINO ACOSTA, G.R. NO. 148606, JUNE 30, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) 2. THE PLAINTIFF MAY AMEND HIS COMPLAINT ONCE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT BEFORE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING IS FILED OR SERVED. (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, VELASCO, JR., J.). 3. AMENDMENTS AFTER THE FILING OF A RESPONSIVE PLEADING: The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 289 (2001) even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings. (HENRY CHING TIU VS.PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, G.R. NO. 151932, AUGUST 19, 2009, PERALTA, J.). 4. AMENDMENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION TO THE COURT MAY BE ALLOWED IF AMENDMENT IS A MATTER OF RIGHT. (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE VS. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. NO. 173915, FEBRUARY 22, 2010, VLLARAMA, JR., J.).

FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS 1. AS A GENERAL RULE, WHEN A PARTY IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL OF RECORD, SERVICE OF ORDERS AND NOTICES MUST BE MADE UPON SAID ATTORNEY AND NOTICE TO THE CLIENT AND TO ANY OTHER LAWYER, NOT THE COUNSEL OF RECORD, IS NOT NOTICE IN LAW. THE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE IS WHEN SERVICE UPON THE PARTY HIMSELF HAS BEEN ORDERED BY THE COURT. (SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., VS. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, ET AL. G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, TINGA, J.).

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2. MODES OF SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, NOTICES, ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND OTHER PAPERS: The modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers, are: (1) personal service; (2) service by mail; and (3) substituted service, in case service cannot be effected either personally or by mail. (ROGELIO ABERCA ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER ET AL. G.R. NO. 166216, MARCH 14, 2012, MENDOZA, J.). 3. AS A RULE, JUDGMENTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY SERVED WHEN THEY ARE DELIVERED PERSONALLY, OR THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL TO THE COUNSEL OF RECORD, OR BY LEAVING THEM IN HIS OFFICE WITH HIS CLERK OR WITH A PERSON HAVING CHARGE THEREOF. (SPOUSES ERNESTO AND VICENTA TOPACIO VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, G.R. NO. 157644, NOVEMBER 17, 2010, BRION J.). 3.1. WHEN THE SERVICE OF THE JUDGMENT IS QUESTIONED, THERE IS A NEED TO PRESENT BOTH THE REGISTRY RECEIPT ISSUED BY THE MAILING OFFICE AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE PERSON MAILING. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RESINS INC. G.R. NO. 175891, 12 JANUARY 2010, CARPIO, J.). 3.2. COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE: THE RULE ON SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL CONTEMPLATES TWO SITUATIONS: (1) actual service the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2) constructive service the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five days from the date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster. Insofar as constructive service is concerned, there must be conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. Not only is it required that notice of the registered mail be issued but that it should also be delivered to and received by the addressee. (JOSE MEL BERNARTE VS. PHIL. BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (PBA) ET AL., G.R. NO. 192084, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011, CARPIO, J.). 3.3. THE FAILURE TO ATTACH THE REQUIRED AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE IS NOT FATAL IF THE REGISTRY RECEIPT ATTACHED TO THE PETITION CLEARLY SHOWS SERVICE TO THE OTHER PARTY (PHIL. NATIONAL BANK VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. NO. 172458, DECEMBER 14, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 4. WHERE IT IS CLEAR THAT PERSONAL SERVICE IS NOT PRACTICABLE, AS IN THIS CASE, A WRITTEN EXPLANATION ‘’MIGHT EVEN BE SUPERFLUOUS.’’ THE RIGID APPLICATION OF S11 R13 MAY BE RELAXED IN THIS CASE IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. (SHEKER V. ESTATE OF SHEKER, G.R. NO. 157912, DECEMBER 13, 2007). 5. THE SUPREME COURT HAS STRICTLY CONSTRUED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PROPER SERVICE OF PAPERS AND JUDGMENTS. Both in Heirs of Delos Santos v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 139167, 29 June 2005, 462 SCRA 98 and Tuazon v. Molina, No. L-55697, 26 February 1981, 103 SCRA 365, the service of the trial court’s decision at an adjacent office and the receipt thereof by a person *


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not authorized by the counsel of record was held ineffective. Likewise, the service of the decision made at the ground floor instead of at the 9th floor of a building in the address on record of petitioners counsel, was held invalid in PLDT v. NLRC, No. L60050, 213 Phil. 362 (1984). (SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., VS. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, ET AL. G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, TINGA, J.). 6. NOTHING IN THE RULES AUTHORIZES PUBLICATION OF A NOTICE OF HEARING TO FILE ANSWER. (ROGELIO ABERCA ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, ET AL., G.R. NO. 166216, MARCH 14, 2012, MENDOZA, J.).

MOTIONS 1. THE REQUIREMENTS IN SECTIONS 4, 5, AND 6, RULE 15 OF THE RULES OF COURT THAT THE NOTICE OF HEARING SHALL BE DIRECTED TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AND SHALL STATE THE TIME AND PLACE FOR THE HEARING OF THE MOTION, ARE MANDATORY. IF NOT RELIGIOUSLY COMPLIED WITH, THEY RENDER THE MOTION PRO FORMA. AS SUCH, THE MOTION IS A USELESS PIECE OF PAPER THAT WILL NOT TOLL THE RUNNING OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD. (CITY OF DUMAGUETE VS. PHIL. PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. NO. 168973, AUGUST 24, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 1.1. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED RULE: These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed (KKK FOUNDATION, INS. VS. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, ET AL. G.R. NO. 163785, DECEMBER 27, 2007, SECOND DIVISION, QUISUMBING, J.). 2. HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION RULE: WHEN A MOTION TO DISMISS IS FILED, THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE DEEMED TO BE HYPOTHETICALLY ADMITTED. THIS HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION, EXTENDS NOT ONLY TO THE RELEVANT AND MATERIAL FACTS WELL PLEADED IN THE COMPLAINT, BUT ALSO TO INFERENCES THAT MAY BE FAIRLY DEDUCED FROM THEM. (THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, ET AL. VS. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., ET. AL., G.R. NO. 168289, MARCH 22, 2010, PERALTA, J.) 3. THERE IS NO RULE PROHIBITING THE FILING OF A PRO FORMA MOTION AGAINST AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER AS THE PROHIBITION APPLIES ONLY TO A FINAL RESOLUTION OR ORDER OF THE COURT. THE COURT HELD, NONETHELESS, THAT A SECOND MOTION CAN BE DENIED ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS MERELY A REHASH OR A MERE REITERATION OF THE GROUNDS AND ARGUMENTS ALREADY PASSED UPON AND RESOLVED BY THE COURT (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 182507, JUNE 16, 2010, SECOND DIVISION, NACHURA, J.). *


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4. MOTION OF EXTENSION: A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A PLEADING MUST BE FILED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD SOUGHT TO BE EXTENDED. (REYNALDO POSIQUIT VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 193943, JAN. 16, 2012, REYES, J.).

DISMISSALS 1. NOTICE OF DISMISSAL: THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO DISCRETION OR OPTION TO DENY A NOTICE OF DISMISSAL SINCE DISMISSAL BY THE PLAINTIFF UNDER SECTION 1, RULE 17 IS A MATTER OF RIGHT. (O.B. JOVENIR CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. MACAMIR REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 135803, MARCH 28, 2006, TINGA, J.) 2. INSTANCES OF DISMISSAL DUE TO THE FAULT OF THE PLAINTIFF: (1) IF HE FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE FOR THE PRESENTATION OF HIS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ON THE COMPLAINT; (2) IF HE FAILS TO PROSECUTE HIS ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME; OR (3) IF HE FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OR ANY ORDER OF THE COURT. (GOMEZ VS. ALCANTARA, G.R.NO. 179556, FEBRUARY 13, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHINONAZARIO, J.). 2.1. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER OF THE COURT SHALL HAVE THE EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION UPON THE MERITS. UNLESS THE COURT STATES THAT THE DISMISSAL IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE, THE DISMISSAL SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS AND IS WITH PREJUDICE (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 182507, JUNE 16, 2010, SECOND DIVISION, NACHURA, J.). 2.2. UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 17 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT DUE TO THE FAULT OF PLAINTIFF DOES NOT NECESSARILY CARRY WITH IT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM, COMPULSORY OR OTHERWISE. IN FACT, THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF DEFENDANTS TO PROSECUTE THE COUNTERCLAIM. (EDGARDO PINGA VS. THE HEIRS OF GERMAN SANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 170354, JUNE 30, 2006, TINGA, J.) 2.3. PETITIONER’S COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES ARISING FROM THE UNFOUNDED SUIT SURVIVES NOTWITHSTANDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE. HENCE, THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF PETITIONER’S COUNTERCLAIM IS NOT ELIMINATED BY THE MERE DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT. (PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. VS. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 172242, AUGUST 14, 2007, CHICONAZARIO, J.) 2.4. SINCE AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE HAS THE EFFECT OF AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS, PETITIONERS’ *


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COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE APPELLATE COURT WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. INSTEAD OF FILING A PETITION UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE PROPER RECOURSE WAS AN ORDINARY APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 41. (LULLETE S. KO VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R. NOS. 169131-32, JANUARY 20, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.) 3. WHEN IT APPEARS FROM THE PLEADINGS OR THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE ACTION IS ALREADY BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE COURT SHALL DISMISS THE CLAIM. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. MERELO V. AZNAR ET AL, G.R. NO. 171805 MAY 30, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 4. AN UNQUALIFIED ORDER IS DEEMED TO BE A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. IN OTHER WORDS, DISMISSALS OF ACTIONS (UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 17 OF THE RULES OF COURT) WHICH DO NOT EXPRESSLY STATE WHETHER THEY ARE WITH OR WITHOUT PREJUDICE ARE HELD TO BE WITH PREJUDICE. (SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC., VS.MRS. LETICIA B. MAGSALIN ET AL., G.R. NO. 170026, JUNE 20, 2012, BRION, J.). 5. LITIS PENDENTIA AND RES JUDICATA ARE NOT PRESENT BETWEEN A PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION AND ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE. (SPOUSES VICENTE AND DEMETRIA YU VS. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 147902, MARCH 17, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.) 5.1. RES JUDICATA: THE PREVIOUS FINAL JUDGMENT DENYING A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY BARS A SUBSEQUENT PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE. BOTH PETITIONS ACTUALLY HAVE THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION ALTHOUGH FOUNDED MERELY ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS. HENCE, A PARTY CANNOT EVADE OR AVOID THE APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA BY SIMPLY VARYING THE FORM OF HIS ACTION OR ADOPTING A DIFFERENT METHOD OF PRESENTING HIS CASE. (OSCAR MALLION V. ALCANTARA G.R. NO. 141528, OCTOBER 31, 2006, AZCUNA, J.). 6. THE DEFENDANT MAY REITERATE ANY OF THE GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL PROVIDED UNDER RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN HIS ANSWER. BUT, A PRELIMINARY HEARING MAY NO LONGER BE HAD THEREON IF A MOTION TO DISMISS HAD ALREADY BEEN PREVIOUSLY DENIED, EXCEPT ONLY WHERE THERE WERE SEVERAL DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY ONE OF THEM FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS. (SPS. THELMA AND GREGORIO ABRAJANO VS. HEIRS OF AUGUSTO F. SALAS, JR., G.R. NO. 158895, FEBRUARY 16, 2006, TINGA, J.) 7. GENERAL RULE: THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, IF THERE ARE NO PENDING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS AND THERE EXISTS IN THE *


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FORMER AN ISSUE WHICH MUST BE PREEMPTIVELY RESOLVED BEFORE THE CRIMINAL ACTION MAY PROCEED. EXCEPTION: THE PENDENCY OF A CASE BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) MAY BE INVOKED AS PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO A CIVIL CASE BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. (ANTONIO ABACAN, JR. VS. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. NO. 140777, APRIL 8, 2005, AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, J.)

INTERVENTION 1. INTERVENTION IS A PROCEDURE BY WHICH THIRD PERSONS, NOT ORIGINALLY PARTIES TO THE SUIT BUT CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER, COME INTO THE CASE IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHT OR INTERPOSE THEIR CLAIM. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest,' which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant. (BUKLOD NA NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPANG RAMOS, INC. VS. E.M. RAMOS & SONS INC., G.R. NO. 131481, MARCH 16, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 2. A MOTION TO INTERVENE MAY BE FILED AT ANY TIME BEFORE RENDITION OF JUDGMENT BY THE TRIAL COURT. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. SISON, G.R. NO. 185954, FEBRUARY 16, 2010, VELASCO JR., J.).

PRE-TRIAL 1. PRE-TRIAL IS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE INTENDED TO CLARIFY AND LIMIT THE BASIC ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES AND TO TAKE THE TRIAL OF CASES OUT OF THE REALM OF SURPRISE AND MANEUVERING. IT IS AN ANSWER TO THE CLARION CALL FOR THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES. (ANSON TRADE CENTER, INC. VS. PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 179999, MARCH 17, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.). 2. THE HOLDING OF A PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE IS MANDATORY AND FAILURE TO DO SO IS INEXCUSABLE. (NPC VS. ADIONG, A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2060, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, J.) 3. PRE-TRIAL: Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, it is the duty of the plaintiff, after the last pleading has been *


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served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. On August 16, 2004, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) took effect, which provides that: Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial. (ELOISA MERCHANDISING, INC. AND TREBEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., VS. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK AND ENGRACIO M. ESCASINAS, G.R. NO. 192716, JUNE 13, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 3.1. IF THE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO FILE A MOTION TO SET CASE FOR PRE-TRIAL, THE TRIAL COURT CAN NO LONGER DISMISS THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. (SC Guidelines on Pre-trial and Discovery, effective August 16, 2004; ESPIRITU V. LAZARO, G.R. NO. 181020, NOV. 25, 2009, NACHURA, J.). 4. THE ABSENCE OF THE NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF A PERSON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS: (PNB VS. SPS. ANGELITO PEREZ AND JOCELYN PEREZ, G.R. NO. 187640, JUNE 15, 2011,VELASCO, JR., J.). 5. THE NON-APPEARANCE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE PRE-TRIAL SHALL BE CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. HOWEVER, THE NONAPPEARANCE OF A PARTY MAY BE EXCUSED IF A VALID CAUSE IS SHOWN THEREFORE. (ANSON TRADE CENTER, INC. VS. PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 179999, MARCH 17, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.). 5.1. IF THE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO APPEAR AT THE PRE-TRIAL, THE COURT MAY UPON MOTION, DISMISS THE COMPLAINT AND ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM. (PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE V. DAKILA TRADING, AUGUST 14, 2007). 6. PRE-TRIAL ORDER: THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN A CASE SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER. HOWEVER, A PRE-TRIAL ORDER IS NOT INTENDED TO BE A DETAILED CATALOGUE OF EACH AND EVERY ISSUE THAT IS TO BE TAKEN DURING THE TRIAL, FOR IT IS UNAVOIDABLE THAT THERE ARE ISSUES THAT ARE IMPLIEDLY INCLUDED AMONG THOSE LISTED OR THAT MAY BE INFERABLE FROM THOSE LISTED BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION WHICH ARE AS MUCH INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS THOSE EXPRESSLY LISTED (PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORP. VS. AMALGAMATED MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 177729, SEPT. 28, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

COMPUTATION OF TIME 1. ANY EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE REQUIRED PLEADING SHOULD BE COUNTED FROM THE EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD REGARDLESS *


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OF THE FACT THAT SAID DUE DATE IS A SATURDAY, SUNDAY OR LEGAL HOLIDAY. (DANTE D. DELA CRUZ VS. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., G.R. NO. 172038, APRIL 14, 2008, CORONA, J.)

MODES OF DISCOVERY 1. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES: TRIAL COURTS ARE DIRECTED TO ISSUE ORDERS REQUIRING PARTIES TO AVAIL OF DISCOVERY PROCEDURES. (A.M. No. 03-1-09-Sc, Pars. I.A. 1.2; 2(E)) (HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP. VS. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 147143, MARCH 10, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.) 2. DEPOSITIONS SERVE AS A DEVICE FOR ASCERTAINING THE FACTS RELATIVE TO THE ISSUES OF THE CASE. THE EVIDENT PURPOSE IS TO ENABLE THE PARTIES, CONSISTENT WITH RECOGNIZED PRIVILEGES, TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ISSUES AND FACTS BEFORE CIVIL TRIALS AND THUS PREVENT THE SAID TRIALS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE DARK. (RAMON GERARDO B. SAN LUIS VS. HON. PABLITO M. ROJAS, G.R. NO. 159127, MARCH 3, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.). 2.1. THE RULE DOES NOT MAKE ANY DISTINCTION OR RESTRICTION AS TO WHO CAN AVAIL OF DEPOSITION. THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS A NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN CORPORATION IS IMMATERIAL. THE RULE CLEARLY PROVIDES THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ANY PERSON MAY BE TAKEN BY DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OR WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES, AT THE INSTANCE OF ANY PARTY. (RAMON GERARDO B. SAN LUIS VS. HON. PABLITO M. ROJAS, G.R. NO. 159127, MARCH 3, 2008, AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, J.). 2.2. DEPOSITION: THERE IS REALLY NOTHING OBJECTIONABLE, PER SE, WITH PETITIONER AVAILING OF THIS DISCOVERY MEASURE AFTER PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS RESTED HIS CASE AND PRIOR TO PETITIONER’S PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. TO REITERATE, DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN AT ANY TIME AFTER THE INSTITUTION OF ANY ACTION, WHENEVER NECESSARY OR CONVENIENT. (ISIDRO T. PAJARILLAGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 163515, OCTOBER 31, 2008, QUISUMBING, ACTING C.J.). 3. A MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS UNDER RULE 27 IS SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE DOCUMENTS OR THINGS SHOULD NOT BE PRIVILEGED. (AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. PENNSWELL, INC., G.R. 172835, DECEMBER 13, 2007,CHICONAZARIO, J.).

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1. THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, ARE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE AND MAY NOT BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record (FILIPINAS FIBER SYNTHETIC CORPORATION vs. WILFREDO DELOS SANTOS ET AL., G.R. No. 152033, MARCH 16, 2011, PERALTA, J.) 2. SUBPOENA: A SUBPOENA IS A PROCESS DIRECTED TO A PERSON REQUIRING HIM TO ATTEND AND TO TESTIFY AT THE HEARING OR TRIAL OF AN ACTION OR AT ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES, OR FOR THE TAKING OF HIS DEPOSITION. In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena. Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). (RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA ET AL. VS. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO ET AL., G.R. NOS. 184379-80, APRIL 24, 2012, SERENO, J.). 3. QUAHAL OF SUBPOENA: THE GROUNDS “UNREASONABLE” AND “OPPRESSIVE” ARE PROPER FOR SUBPOENA AD DUCES TECUM OR FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE WITNESS, A COMMAND THAT HAS A TENDENCY TO INFRINGE ON THE RIGHT AGAINST INVASION OF PRIVACY – BUT NOT FOR QUASHING A SUBPOENA AS TESTIFICANDUM. (EMMA K. LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177861, JULY 13, 2010, ABAD, J.) 4. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION MAY BE CURED BY EVIDENCE DURING THE TRIAL AND AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE PRESENTED. (SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC. VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 161135, APRIL 8, 2005, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.)

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5. DEMURRER OF EVIDENCE: WHEN THE DUE EXECUTION AND GENUINENESS OF AN INSTRUMENT ARE DEEMED ADMITTED BECAUSE OF THE ADVERSE PARTY’S FAILURE TO MAKE A SPECIFIC VERIFIED DENIAL THEREOF, THE INSTRUMENT NEED NOT BE PRESENTED AND MUST BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN RESOLVING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. (CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. PHILBANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 150731, SEPTEMBER 14, 2007, VELASCO, JR., J.) 6. THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT UPON THE DISMISSAL OF THE DEMURRER IN THE APPELLATE COURT, THE DEFENDANT LOSES THE RIGHT TO PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE AND THE APPELLATE COURT SHALL THEN PROCEED TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS ON THE BASIS OF PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUAN C. TUVERA, G.R. NO. 148246, FEBRUARY 16, 2007, TINGA, J.)

JUDGMENT 1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN FINAL AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDER: The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. (ANGELA-PAHILA-GARRIDO VS. ELIZA M. TORTOGO ET AL, G.R. NO. 156358, AUGUST 17, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 1.1. A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT, NO MATTER HOW ERRONEOUS, CANNOT BE CHANGED EVEN BY THIS COURT (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. RINA PARAYNO LIM, G.R. NO. 171677, JANUARY 30, 2013, REYES, J.) 1.2. THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT IS NOT AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, BUT A FINAL ORDER. (SILVERIO, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 178933, SEPTEMBER 16, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, VELASCO, J.). 2. INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS: AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS IS INTERLOCUTORY. (MARMO VS. ANACAY, G.R. NO.182585, NOVEMBER 27, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.). 2.1. ORDERS GRANTING EXECUTION ARE INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS. (SPOUSES RICARDO AND ELENA GOLEZ VS. SPOUSES CARLOS AND AMELITA NAVARRO, G.R. NO. 192532, JANUARY 30, 2013, REYES, J.)

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2.2. THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, AS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL UNTIL A FINAL JUDGMENT OR ORDER IS RENDERED IN THE MAIN CASE. (SPOUSES EUGENE L. LIM VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 192615, JANUARY 30, 2013, BRION, J.) 3. WHEN THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OR FALLO OF A DECISION AND THE OPINION OF THE COURT CONTAINED IN THE TEXT OR BODY OF THE JUDGMENT, THE FORMER PREVAILS OVER THE LATTER. THE EXCEPTION IS WHERE THE INEVITABLE CONCLUSION FROM THE BODY OF THE DECISION IS SO CLEAR AS TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS A MISTAKE IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION, THE BODY OF THE DECISION WILL PREVAIL. (THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT VS. COURT OF APPEALS & BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC., G. R. NO. 154559, OCT. 5, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 4. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT: A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT INTENDED TO RESOLVE A MATTER ALREADY UNDER LITIGATION IS A JUDICIAL COMPROMISE. HAVING JUDICIAL MANDATE AND ENTERED AS ITS DETERMINATION OF THE CONTROVERSY, SUCH JUDICIAL COMPROMISE HAS THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT. (RAÑOLA V. RAÑOLA, G.R. NO. 185095, JULY 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 788, 794). 5. MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE: A MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE IS ONE THAT CEASES TO PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY BY VIRTUE OF SUPERVENING EVENTS, SO THAT A DECLARATION THEREON WOULD BE OF NO PRACTICAL USE OR VALUE. (BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS VS. ORIENT COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 148483, JUNE 29, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 5.1 A CASE BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC ONLY WHEN THERE IS NO MORE ACTUAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR NO USEFUL PURPOSE CAN BE SERVED IN PASSING UPON THE MERITS OF THE CASE. (PAGANO V. NAZARRO, JR., OMBUDSMAN VS. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., G.R. NO. 16467, JULY 27, 2011, BRION, J.). 6. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS: WHERE AN ANSWER FAILS TO TENDER AN ISSUE, OR OTHERWISE ADMITS THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE ADVERSE PARTY’S PLEADING, THE COURT MAY, ON MOTION OF THAT PARTY, DIRECT JUDGMENT ON SUCH PLEADING. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. MERELO V. AZNAR ET AL, G.R. NO. 171805 MAY 30, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 6.1. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS: A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS MAY BE SOUGHT ONLY BY A CLAIMANT, WHO IS THE PARTY SEEKING TO RECOVER UPON A CLAIM, COUNTERCLAIM OR CROSS-CLAIM; OR TO OBTAIN A DECLARATORY RELIEF. (ANACLETO R. MENESES VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. NO. 156304, OCTOBER 23, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.)

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6.2. BOTH THE RULES ON JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS HAVE NO PLACE IN CASES OF DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, LEGAL SEPARATION AND EVEN IN ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE. (JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, REYES, R.T., J.) 7. SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR ACCELERATED JUDGMENT, IS A PROCEDURAL TECHNIQUE TO PROMPTLY DISPOSE OF CASES WHERE THE FACTS APPEAR UNDISPUTED AND CERTAIN FROM THE PLEADINGS, DEPOSITIONS, ADMISSIONS AND AFFIDAVITS ON RECORD, OR FOR WEEDING OUT SHAM CLAIMS OR DEFENSES AT AN EARLY STAGE OF THE LITIGATION TO AVOID THE EXPENSE AND LOSS OF TIME INVOLVED IN A TRIAL. (PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK VS. FELIPE CHUA, G.R. NO. 178899, NOVEMBER 15, 2010, BRION, J.). 7.1. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS ARE PROPER WHEN, UPON MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF OR THE DEFENDANT, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE ANSWER FILED BY THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT TENDER A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND THAT ONE PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. (ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, ET AL. VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 170658, JUNE 22, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) 7.2. WHEN THE FACTS AS PLEADED APPEAR UNCONTESTED OR UNDISPUTED, THEN THERE IS NO REAL OR GENUINE ISSUE OR QUESTION AS TO THE FACTS, AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS CALLED FOR. (ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 153827, APRIL 25, 2006, GARCIA, J.). 7.3. THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DECIDE THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON AN ACTION IS IN ORDER. UNDER RULE 35, THE DEFENDING PARTY OR THE CLAIMANT, MUST INVOKE THE RULE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY FILING A MOTION. (FLORENTINO PINEDA VS. HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARA, G.R. NO. 143188, FEBRUARY 14, 2007, TINGA, J.) 7.4. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPEALABLE SEPARATELY FROM THE JUDGMENT IN THE ENTIRE CASE, UNLESS ALLOWED BY THE COURT UNDER SECTION 1 (G), RULE 41. HENCE THE FAILURE TO APPEAL SEPARATELY FROM A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR TO CHALLENGE IT BY A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DOES NOT MAKE THE SAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. (PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK V. CHUA, NOVEMBER 15, 2010). 7.4.1. A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NEVER INTENDED TO BE CONSIDERED A "FINAL JUDGMENT," AS IT DOES NOT "[PUT] AN END TO AN ACTION AT LAW BY DECLARING THAT THE PLAINTIFF EITHER HAS OR HAS NOT ENTITLED HIMSELF TO RECOVER THE REMEDY HE SUES FOR. *


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(PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK VS. FELIPE CHUA, G.R. NO. 178899, NOVEMBER 15, 2010, BRION, J.). 8. DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. “A ‘genuine issue’ means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.” (EUGENIO BASBAS ET AL.. VS. BEATA SAYSON, G.R. NO. 172660, AUGUST 24, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 9. DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT OR IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT: A DECISION THAT HAS ACQUIRED FINALITY BECOMES IMMUTABLE AND UNALTERABLE, AND MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO CORRECT ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND LAW, AND WHETHER IT BE MADE BY THE COURT THAT RENDERED IT OR BY THE HIGHEST COURT OF THE LAND. (RAUL B. ESCALANTE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192727, JANUARY 9, 2013, REYES, J.) 9.1. EXCEPTIONS: THE SO-CALLED NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRIES WHICH CAUSE NO PREJUDICE TO ANY PARTY, VOID JUDGMENTS, AND WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES TRANSPIRE AFTER THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION WHICH RENDER ITS EXECUTION UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SEVERINO LISTANA, G.R. NO. 168105, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 9.2. EXCEPTIONS: IN BARNES V. PADILLA, THE SUPREME COURT LAID DOWN EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON THE FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS IN ORDER TO SERVE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE CONSIDERING (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (PCI LEASING FINANCE, INC. VS. ANTONIO C. MILAN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 151215, APRIL 5, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 10. PRINCIPLE OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT: WHEN A RIGHT OR FACT HAS BEEN JUDICIALLY TRIED AND DETERMINED BY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, OR WHEN AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH TRIAL HAS BEEN GIVEN, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT, AS LONG AS IT REMAINS UNREVERSED, SHOULD BE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE PARTIES AND THOSE IN PRIVITY WITH THEM. STATED DIFFERENTLY, CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT *


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BARS THE RE-LITIGATION IN A SECOND CASE OF A FACT OR QUESTION ALREADY SETTLED IN A PREVIOUS CASE. (CITY OF CEBU VS. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR., G.R. NO. 172852, JAN. 30, 2013, REYES, J.).

POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES 1. PRO FORMA MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION: THE MERE REITERATION OF ISSUES ALREADY PASSED UPON BY THE COURT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MAKE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PRO FORMA. WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF THE RULES. Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof (FERNANDO V. GONZALES VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 192856, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 1.1. GENERAL RULE: A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS GENERALLY A PROHIBITED PLEADING. THE COURT, HOWEVER, DOES NOT DISCOUNT INSTANCES WHEN IT MAY AUTHORIZE THE SUSPENSION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE SO AS TO ALLOW THE RESOLUTION OF A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, IN CASES OF EXTRAORDINARILY PERSUASIVE REASONS SUCH AS WHEN THE DECISION IS A PATENT NULLITY (UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION, G.R. NO. 179593, SEPT.14, 2011, MENDOZA, J.). 1.2. EXCEPTION: NO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A JUDGMENT OR FINAL RESOLUTION BY THE SAME PARTY SHALL BE ENTERTAINED: Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that “[n]o motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC.) decrees viz: “SEC. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration 'in the highest interest of justice' when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration” (JOEB M. ALIVIADO VS. PROCT ER & GAMBLE PHILS. INC. AND PROMM-GEM INC., G.R. NO. 160506, JUNE 6, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 1.3. EXCEPTION: IF A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND ADMIT A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS GRANTED BY THE COURT, A PARTY MAY FILE A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. (LEAGUE OF *


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CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) ET AL, VS. COMELEC ET AL., G.R. NO. G.R. NO. 176951, FEB. 15, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.). 1.4. EXCEPTION: WHEN THERE ARE “EXTRAORDINARY PERSUASIVE REASONS AND ONLY AFTER AN EXPRESS LEAVE SHALL HAVE BEEN OBTAINED” (NIDA VERGINESA SUAREZ VS. JUDGE RENATO DILAG & CONCEPCION A. PASCUA, A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2014, AUGUST 16, 2011, PER CURIAM) 1.5. THE 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS NON-EXTENDIBLE. (PONCIANO VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. NO. 174536, OCTOBER 29, 2008). 1.5.1. THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT TOLL THE FIFTEEN-DAY PERIOD TO APPEAL, CITING HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. JAPSON. NO. L-70895, MAY 30, 1986. However, in previous cases, the Supreme Court suspended this rule in order to serve substantial justice. In Barnes vs. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, June 28, 2005, the Supreme Court exempted from the operation of the general rule the petitioner whose motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. (WINSTON F. GARCIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 169005, JANUARY 28, 2013, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 1.6. A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to the requirement, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency. (NEMIA CASTRO VS. ROSALYN GUEVARRA AND JAMIR GUEVARRA, G.R. NO. 192737, APRIL 25, 2012, MENDOZA, J.). 2. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL: New trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. The effect of an order granting a new trial is to wipe out the previous adjudication so that the case may be tried de novo for the purpose of rendering a judgment in accordance with law, taking into consideration the evidence to be presented during the second trial. Consequently, a motion for new trial is proper only after the rendition or promulgation of a judgment or issuance of a final order. A motion for new trial is only available when relief is sought against a judgment and the judgment is not yet final. (NEMIA CASTRO VS. ROSALYN GUEVARRA AND JAMIR GUEVARRA, G.R. NO. 192737, APRIL 25, 2012, MENDOZA, J.). 2.1. A SECOND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, BASED ON A GROUND NOT EXISTING NOR AVAILABLE WHEN THE FIRST MOTION WAS MADE, MAY BE FILED WITHIN THE TIME HEREIN PROVIDED EXCLUDING THE TIME DURING WHICH THE FIRST MOTION HAD BEEN PENDING. (PCI LEASING FINANCE, INC.

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VS. ANTONIO C. MILAN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 151215, APRIL 5, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.). 3. APPEALS: THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT OR A PART OF DUE PROCESS, BUT MERELY A STATUTORY PRIVILEGE AND MAY BE EXERCISED ONLY IN THE MANNER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW. THE PARTY WHO SEEKS TO AVAIL OF THE SAME MUST COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES, FAILING IN WHICH THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS LOST (HEIRS OF AGAPATIO T. OLARTE AND ANGELA A. OLARTE ET AL. VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 177995, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 3.1. THE PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL IN THE MANNER AND WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY LAW IS MANDATORY. FAILURE TO CONFORM TO THE RULES REGARDING APPEAL WILL RENDER THE JUDGMENT FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND, HENCE, UNAPPEALABLE. (RAUL B. ESCALANTE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192727, JANUARY 9, 2013, REYES, J.) 3.2. WHEN A JUDGMENT IS AMENDED, THE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE DATE OF THE DECISION IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE PERIOD FOR PERFECTING THE APPEAL. (JOVEN DE GRANO V. GREGORIO LACABA, G.R. NO. 15887, JUNE 16, 2009, NAVHURA, J.). 3.3. THE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE THE APPELLANT'S BRIEF WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. (SPOUSES LIWANAG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 143786, October 17, 2008, NACHURA, J.) 3.4. A PARTY WHO HAS NOT APPEALED FROM A DECISION CANNOT SEEK ANY RELIEF OTHER THAN WHAT IS PROVIDED IN THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. VALENTINA GARCIA, G.R. NO. 159625, JANUARY 31, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:) 3.4.1. EXCEPION: VICARIOUS APPEAL: A PARTY'S APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT WILL NOT INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF A CO-PARTY WHO FAILED TO APPEAL; AND AS AGAINST THE LATTER, THE JUDGMENT WILL CONTINUE TO RUN ITS COURSE UNTIL IT BECOMES FINAL AND EXECUTORY. TO THIS GENERAL RULE, HOWEVER, ONE EXCEPTION STANDS OUT: WHERE BOTH PARTIES HAVE A COMMONALITY OF INTERESTS, THE APPEAL OF ONE IS DEEMED TO BE THE VICARIOUS APPEAL OF THE OTHER. (MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION VS. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 158332, FEBRUARY 11, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.) 3.5. AS A RULE, A PARTY WHO DELIBERATELY ADOPTS A CERTAIN THEORY UPON WHICH THE CASE IS TRIED AND DECIDED BY THE LOWER COURT WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO CHANGE THEORY ON APPEAL. (MAXICARE PCIB CIGNA HEALTHCARE VS. MARIAN BRIGITTE A. CONTRERAS, G.R. NO. 194352, JANUARY 30, 2013, MENDOZA, J.) *


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3.5.1. IT IS TRUE THAT QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE. IT IS ALSO TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE INTEREST OF FAIRNESS, QUESTIONS CHALLENGING THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS WILL NOT BE TOLERATED IF THE PARTY QUESTIONING SUCH JURISDICTION ACTIVELY PARTICIPATES IN THE COURT PROCEEDINGS AND ALLOWS THE COURT TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THE CASE, AND THEN QUESTIONS THE PROPRIETY OF SAID JUDGMENT AFTER GETTING AN UNFAVORABLE DECISION. (MAXICARE PCIB CIGNA HEALTHCARE VS. MARIAN BRIGITTE A. CONTRERAS, G.R. NO. 194352, JANUARY 30, 2013, MENDOZA, J.) 3.6. PAYMENT OF DOCKET AND OTHER FEES WITHIN THIS PERIOD IS MANDATORY FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE APPEAL. OTHERWISE, THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS LOST. (D.M. WENCESLAO AND ASSOCIATES, INC. VS. CITY OF PARANAQUE, G.R. NO. 170728, AUGUST 31, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 3.7. THE DESIGNATION OF THE WRONG COURT DOES NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL. HOWEVER, THE DESIGNATION OF THE PROPER COURT SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN THE 15DAY PERIOD TO APPEAL. (JESUS TORRES VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 175074, AUGUST 31, 2011, PERALTA, J.). 4. FRESH PERIOD RULE: In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633, 644, the Court declared that a partylitigant should be allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, so as to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Furthermore, in Sumiran v. Damaso, G.R. No. 162518, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 450, 455, the Court again emphasized that the ruling in Neypes, being a matter of procedure, must be given retroactive effect and applied even to actions pending in this Court. (RAMON TORRES AND JESSIE BELARMINO VS. SPOUSES VIHINZKY ALAMAG AND AIDA A. NGOJU, RESPONDENTS, G.R. NO. 169569, AUGUST 3, 2010, PERALTA, J.). 4.1. THE NEYPES RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO JUDGMENTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. (NATIONAL POWER CORP. V. SPOUES LAOHOO, 23 JULY 2009). 4.2. THE NEYPES RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE JUDGMENT OF THE COMELEC AND THE COA WHICH IS GOVERNED BY SECTION 3, RULE 64. (PATES V. COMELEC, 30 JUNE 2009). 4.3. THE FRESH 15-DAY PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN NEYPES APPLIES TO APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE WORDINGS OF SECTION 6, RULE 122. (YU V. SAMSON-TATAD, G.R. 170979, 9 FEBRUARY 2011, JUSTICE BRION). *


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4.4. AN APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN FROM A JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER THAT COMPLETELY DISPOSES OF THE CASE, OR OF A PARTICULAR MATTER THEREIN WHEN DECLARED BY THESE RULES TO BE APPEALABLE. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;(c) An interlocutory order;(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;(f) An order of execution;(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, crossclaims and thirdparty complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Section 1 of Rule 41) (MARMO VS. ANACAY, G.R. NO. 182585, NOV. 27, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.). 5. IF THE CASE IS TRIED ON THE MERITS BY THE MUNICIPAL COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, THE RTC ON APPEAL MAY NO LONGER DISMISS THE CASE IF IT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION THEREOF. MOREOVER, THE RTC SHALL NO LONGER TRY THE CASE ON THE MERITS, BUT SHALL DECIDE THE CASE ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE LOWER COURT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE ADMISSION OF THE AMENDED PLEADINGS AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. (VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION VS. NIEVES AMIGO, G.R. NO. 169793, SEPTEMBER 15, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.) 6. UNDER A.M. NO. 00-8-10-SC, A PETITION FOR CORPORATE REHABILITATION IS CONSIDERED A SPECIAL PROCEEDING. THUS, THE PERIOD OF APPEAL PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 19(B) OF THE INTERIM RULES RELATIVE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 FOR SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS SHALL APPLY, THAT IS, THE PERIOD OF APPEAL SHALL BE 30 DAYS SINCE A RECORD OF APPEAL IS REQUIRED. (BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. VS. PRYCE GASES, INC., INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, AND NEDERLANDSE FINANCIERINGS-MAATSCHAPPIJ VOOR ONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN N.V., G.R. NO. 188365, 29 JUNE 2011, CARPIO, J.) 7. MODES OF APPEAL: Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides the three modes of appeal, which are as follows: “Section 2. Modes of appeal. — (a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

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(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. (c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45” (emphasis supplied). The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, the petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law (HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS VS. MELBA L. LIMBACO ET AL., G.R. NO. 175291, JULY 27, 2011, BRION, J.). 8. APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT: The RTC the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly, the amount involved P13, 300.00 assessed value of the subject property as declared by respondents, is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved. (SEC. 22 OF B.P. 129; FEDERICA M. SERRANO VS. SPOUSES ANSELMO AND CARMELITA GUTIERREZ, G.R. NO. 162366, NOVEMBER 10, 2006, TINGA, J.) 8.1. GIVEN THAT DARAB DECISIONS ARE APPEALABLE TO THE CA, THE INEVITABLE CONCLUSION IS THAT THE DARAB IS A CO-EQUAL BODY WITH THE RTC AND ITS DECISIONS ARE BEYOND THE RTC’S CONTROL. (SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION, INC. VS. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL BRANCH 40, G.R. NO. 142628, FEBRUARY 6, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.) 8.2. AN APPEAL TAKEN TO EITHER THE SUPREME COURT OR THE COURT OF APPEALS BY THE WRONG OR INAPPROPRIATE MODE SHALL BE DISMISSED. (SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 2-90; GOCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 157449 APRIL 6, 2010 BRION, J.) 9. PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42: AS A RULE, A DECISION OF THE RTC, RENDERED IN ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION, MAY BE APPEALED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS VIA A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. (SPS. ESPEJO VS. ITO, G.R. NO. 176511, AUGUST 4, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.). 9.1. A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42 AND NOT AN ORDINARY APPEAL IS THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE RTC*


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SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT (SAC) IN CASES INVOLVING THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION: (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LUZ L. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. 148892, MAY 6, 2010, MENDOZA, J.) 9.2. PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42: SINCE THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE WAS FILED WITH THE MTC AND AFFIRMED BY THE RTC, PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE FILED A PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 42 OF THE RULES OF COURT, AND NOT A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE RTC. HOWEVER, THE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERED THIS TO HAVE BEEN REMEDIED BY THE TIMELY FILING OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. (ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. VS. SPOUSES GERRY AND ELIZABETH ONG, G.R. NO. 132197, AUGUST 16, 2005, TINGA, J.) 9.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS THE POWER TO TRY CASES AND CONDUCT HEARINGS, RECEIVE EVIDENCE AND PERFORM ANY AND ALL ACTS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED IN CASES FALLING WITHIN ITS ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION, INCLUDING THE POWER TO GRANT AND CONDUCT NEW TRIALS OR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. (LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI VS. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER AND AMANDA, ALL SURNAMED PABALE, G.R. NO. 151243, APRIL 30, 2008, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.) 10. PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43: RULE 43 GOVERNS THE PROCEDURE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS, ORDERS, OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE DAR SECRETARY. (AGAPITO ROM ET AL. VS. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., G.R. NO. 169331 SEPTEMBER 5, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 10.1. AN ARBITRAL AWARD OF THE PHILIPPINE CLEARING HOUSE CORPORATION (PCHC) IS APPEALABLE NOT TO THE RTC, BUT TO THE CA UNDER RULE 43. THE PCHC RULES CANNOT CONFER JURISDICTION UPON THE RTC OVER ARBITRAL AWARDS. (METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 166260, FEBRUARY 18, 2009, NACHURA, J.). 11. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45: THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT IN CASES BROUGHT BEFORE IT FROM THE CA VIA RULE 45 IS GENERALLY LIMITED TO REVIEWING ERRORS OF LAW OR JURISDICTION. THE ABOVE RULE IS NOT IRONCLAD. THERE ARE INSTANCES IN WHICH FACTUAL ISSUES MAY BE RESOLVED BY THIS COURT, TO WIT: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals goes beyond the issues of the case, and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court (in this case, the Labor Arbiter and NLRC); (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of *


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evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (NELSON B. GAN VS. GALDERMA PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. NO. 177167, JANUARY 17, 2013, PERALTA, J.) 11.1. EXCEPTION: WHEN THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE CA CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE LABOR AUTHORITIES, THE COURT IS FORCED TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. (SAMPAGUITA AUTO TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMMISSION, G.R. NO. 197384, JANUARY 30, 2013, BRION, J.) 11.2. TENANCY RELATIONSHIP IS A QUESTION OF FACT THAT IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45. (ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON VS. MERCEDES R. SUSANO & NORBERTO R. SUSANO, G.R. NO. 179024, MAY 30, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 11.3. QUESTIONS OF FACT MAY NOT BE RAISED IN A PETITION BROUGHT UNDER RULE 45, AS SUCH PETITION MAY ONLY RAISE QUESTIONS OF LAW. THIS RULE APPLIES IN EXPROPRIATION CASES. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEIRS OF SPOUSES PEDRO BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. 181218, JANUARY 28, 2013, DEL CASTILLO, J.) 11.4. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CERTIORARI REMEDIES UNDER RULES 45 AND 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT: The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. (SANTIAGO CUA, JR., ET. AL. VS. MIGUEL OCAMPO TAN ET. AL., G.R. NO. 181455-56, DECEMBER 4, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.). 12. PETITION FOR RELIEF: IT IS A REMEDY PROVIDED BY LAW TO ANY PERSON AGAINST WHOM A DECISION OR ORDER IS ENTERED INTO THROUGH FRAUD, ACCIDENT, MISTAKE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE. THE RELIEF PROVIDED FOR IS OF EQUITABLE CHARACTER, ALLOWED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES AS WHERE THERE IS NO OTHER AVAILABLE OR ADEQUATE REMEDY. (SAMONTE VS. S.F. NAGUIAT, INC. G.R. NO. 165544, OCTOBER 2, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, PERALTA, J.). 12.1. THE PETITION MUST BE FILED WITHIN 60 DAYS AFTER THE PETITIONER LEARNS OF THE JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDER, OR OTHER PROCEEDING TO BE SET ASIDE, AND NOT MORE THAN SIX (6) MONTHS AFTER SUCH JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER WAS ENTERED. (JAIME T. TORRES VS. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 165408, JANUARY 15, 2010, PERALTA, J.). *


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12.1.1. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: THE 60-DAY PERIOD IS RECKONED FROM THE TIME THE PARTY ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORDER, JUDGMENT OR PROCEEDINGS AND NOT FROM THE DATE HE ACTUALLY READ THE SAME. (CORAZON L. ESCUETA VS. RUFINA LIM, G.R. NO. 137162, JANUARY 24, 2007, AZCUNA, J.) 12.2. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: A PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OR THE SUPREME COURT. (JULIO B. PURCON, JR. VS. MRM PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. NO. 182718, SEPTEMBER 26, 2008, REYES, R.T., J.). 13. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS A RECOURSE EQUITABLE IN CHARACTER AND ALLOWED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF NEW TRIAL, APPEAL, PETITION FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REMEDIES ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE THROUGH NO FAULT OF PETITIONER” (PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC., G.R. NO. 176628, MARCH 19, 2012, BRION, J.). 13.1. WHILE UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT MAY BE BASED ONLY ON THE GROUNDS OF EXTRINSIC FRAUD AND LACK OF JURISDICTION, JURISPRUDENCE RECOGNIZES LACK OF DUE PROCESS AS ADDITIONAL GROUND TO ANNUL A JUDGMENT. (LETICIA DIONA VS. ROMEO A. BALANGUE, G.R. NO. I 73559, JANUARY 7, 2013, DEL CASTILLO, J.) 13.2. IN A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT BASED ON LACK OF JURISDICTION, PETITIONER MUST SHOW NOT MERELY AN ABUSE OF JURISDICTIONAL DISCRETION BUT AN ABSOLUTE LACK OF JURISDICTION. (SPS. EULOGIA MANILA & RAMON MANILA VS. SPS. EDERLINA GALLARDO-MANZO AND DANIAL MANZO, G.R. NO. 163602, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 13.3. SECTION 4, RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROVIDES THAT “A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER OR RESOLUTION SHALL BE ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE PETITION INTENDED FOR THE COURT AND INDICATED AS SUCH BY THE PETITIONER. (BAGUIO TRINITY DEVELOPERS, INC., VS. THE HEIRS OF JOSE RAMOS, G.R. NO. 188381, DECEMBER 14, 2011, ABAD, J.). 13.4. UNDER B.P. BLG. 129, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS FOR THE ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC. (ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS YUJUICO V. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 168861, OCTOBER 26, 2007, VELASCO, JR.). 13.5. THE RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN ORDER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF NEW OWNER’S DUPLICATE TITLE IF THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE TITLE WAS NOT ACTUALLY LOST BUT WAS IN THE POSSESSION OF A PERSON WHO HAD BOUGHT THE PROPERTY. THE ORDER OF THE RTC MAY BE SET *


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ASIDE UNDER RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND CANNOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS THE ORDER IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. (VICTORIANO VILLANUEVA V. FRANCISCO VILORIA, G.R. NO. 155804, MARCH 14, 2008, AZCUNA, J.). 13.6. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47 DOES NOT APPLY TO CRIMINAL CASES. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RAFAEL BITANGA, G.R. NO. 159222, JUNE 26, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.) 13.7. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47 DOES NOT APPLY TO QUASI JUDICIAL AGENCIES. Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Ombudsman, (Macalalag vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 147995, March 4, 2004) the Civil Service Commission, (Aguilar vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 144001, September 26, 2000) the Office of the President, (Denina vs. Sps. Cuaderno, G.R. No. 139244, July 24, 2000) and, in this case, the PARAD, are not susceptible to petitions for annulment under Rule 47. (VALENTIN P. FRAGINAL VS. THE HEIRS OF TORIBIA, BELMONTE PARAÑAL, G.R. NO. 150207, FEBRUARY 23, 2007, AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, J.) 13.8. RULE 47 APPLIES ONLY TO PETITIONS FOR THE NULLIFICATION OF JUDGMENTS RENDERED BY REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. IT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO THE NULLIFICATION OF DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. (PIO C. GRANDE VS. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 148456, SEPTEMBER 15, 2006, TINGA, J.) 14. RULE 64: DECISIONS, ORDERS OR RULINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT MAY BE BROUGHT TO THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 BY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY. (CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. VS. GUILERMO N. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR.). 15. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65: OVER AND ABOVE OUR STATUTES IS THE CONSTITUTION WHOSE SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII EMPOWERS THE COURTS OF JUSTICE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS IS AN OVERRIDING AUTHORITY THAT CUTS ACROSS ALL BRANCHES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND IS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI THAT RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT PROVIDES. (REYES, JR., VS. BELISARIO G.R. NO. 154652 AUGUST 14, 2009 BRION, J.) 15.1. AS EXTRAORDINARY WRITS, BOTH SECTIONS 1 (CERTIORARI) AND 3 (MANDAMUS), RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT REQUIRE, AS A PRECONDITION FOR THESE REMEDIES, THAT THERE BE NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW. (ERDITO QUARTO VS. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, ET AL, G.R. NO. 169042, OCTOBER 5, 2011, BRION, J.) *


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15.2. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65: A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN ANY TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND THERE IS NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. (HENRY CHING TIU, ET AL., VS.PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, G.R. NO. 151932, AUGUST 19, 2009, PERALTA, J.) 15.3. UNDER RULE 46, SECTION 3, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED, REQUIRES PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI TO BE VERIFIED AND ACCOMPANIED BY A SWORN CERTIFICATION OF NONFORUM SHOPPING. (CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. VS. GUILERMO N. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 15.4. THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS CANNOT BE QUESTIONED IN A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE IS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION. (ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO. 153829, AUGUST 17, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 15.5. TRADITIONAL RULE: PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY: Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court. This Court explained, however, that the rule on "judicial courtesy" applies where “there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court [or court of origin (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), G.R. NO. 166859, JUNE 26, 2006, CARPIO MORALES, J.) 15.5.1. PRESENT RULE: THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHALL NOT INTERRUPT THE COURSE OF THE PRINCIPAL CASE, UNLESS A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HAS BEEN ISSUED, ENJOINING THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FROM FURTHER PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE. (AMENDMENT OF SECTION 7, RULE 65 BY A.M. NO. 07-7-12-SC, DECEMBER 12, 2007). (SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO AND MILAGROS MARCELO VS.LBC BANK, G.R. NO. 183575, APRIL 11, 2011, CARPIO, J.). 15.6. A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (1) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (2) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (3) where there is *


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an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay will prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (4) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration will be useless; (5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (7) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (8) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG VS. SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., G.R. NO. 162575, DECEMBER 15, 2010, PERALTA, J.). 15.7. THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI IS NOT AND CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN APPEAL, WHERE THE LATTER REMEDY IS AVAILABLE. To be sure, a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Indeed, we have noted a number of exceptions to this general rule, to wit: 1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; 2) when the broader interest of justice so requires; 3) when the writs issued are null and void; 4) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority; 5) when, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; or 6) in other meritorious cases. None of the above exceptions are present in the instant case; hence, we apply the general rule. Respondent not having availed himself of the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the case against petitioners, the dismissal has become final and executory. (SANTOS VS. ORDA, G.R. NO. 189402, MAY 6, 2010, NACHURA, J.). 15.8. THIS COURT NOTES THAT GSIS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. PETITIONER AVAILED OF THE IMPROPER REMEDY AS THE APPEAL FROM A FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 AND NOT A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION UNDER RULE 65. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 189206, JUNE 8, 2011, PEREZ, J.) 15.9. IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AMPLE AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE NEW EVIDENCE AND PERFORM ANY ACT NECESSARY TO RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES (SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO AND MILAGROS MARCELO VS.LBC BANK, G.R. NO. 183575, APRIL 11, 2011, CARPIO, J.). 15.10. ERRORS OF JUDGMENT ARE NOT PROPER SUBJECTS OF A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI. (ARTISTICA CERAMICA, INC. VS. CIUDAD DEL CARMEN HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. NOS. 167583, JUNE 16, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

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15.11. NOTICE OF APPEAL IS THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE RTC IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65. (BF CITILAND CORPORATION VS. MARILYN B. OTAKE, G.R. NO. 173351, JULY 29, 2010, CARPIO, J.). 15.12. THE GENERAL RULE IS TO FILE THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITHIN THE 60-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. A 15 DAY EXTENSION IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AND THE REQUEST MAY ONLY BE GRANTED FOR COMPELLING REASON. . THE DISCRETION TO GRANT OR DENY SAID REQUEST LIES SOLELY IN THE COURT. CONSEQUENTLY, HEAVY PRESSURE OF WORK IS NOT CONSIDERED COMPELLING REASON TO JUSTIFY A REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. (HEIRS OF RAMON B. GAYARES, VS. PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION, AND KUWAIT OIL TANKER, CO., S.A.K., G.R. NO. 178477, JULY 16, 201, DEL CASTILLO, J.). 16. DIRECT AND COLLTERAL ATACK ON THE TITLE: The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof (ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO. 153829, AUGUST 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS 1. EXECUTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AND DISCRETION: Normally, execution will issue as a matter of right only (a) when the judgment has become final and executory; (b) when the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right of appeal; (c) when the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d) when, having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin. Execution pending appeal is the exception to the general rule. As such exception, the court’s discretion in allowing it must be strictly construed and firmly grounded on the existence of good reasons. "Good reasons," it has been held, consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity” (ROSARIO T. FLORENDO VS. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP., G.R. NO. 167976, JANUARY 20, 2010, ABAD, J.). 1.1. MOTION FOR EXECUTION: THERE IS NO NEED TO FILE A MOTION FOR EXECUTION IN AN AMPARO OR HABEAS CORPUS DECISION. (LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, ET AL. VS. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEÑO, G.R. NOS. 184461-62, MAY 31, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) 1.2. VARIANCE IN THE TERMS OF THE JUDGMENT AND THE WRIT OF EXECUTION: IF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION VARIED THE TERMS OF THE JUDGMENT AND EXCEEDED THEM, IT HAD NO VALIDITY. (KKK FOUNDATION, *


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INS. VS. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, ET AL. G.R. NO. 163785, DECEMBER 27, 2007, SECOND DIVISION, QUISUMBING). 2. EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING. (TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS CORPORATION VS. LUIS FAJARDO & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PINAS CITY, G.R. NO. 150462, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). 2.1. WHEN THERE IS A PENDING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AN ORDER GRANTING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS IMPROPER AND PREMATURE. (JP LATEX TECHNOLOGY, INC. VS. BALLONS GRANGER BALLOONS INC., G.R. NO. 177121, MARCH 16, 2009, TINGA, J.). 2.2. AN ALLEGED ADMISSION BY THE DEFENDANT OF ITS LIABILITY IS NOT A GOOD REASON FOR ALLOWING DISCRETIONARY APPEAL. (GEOLOGISTICS, INC. VS. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS, G.R. NOS. 174256-57, MARCH 25, 2009, TINGA, J.). 2.3. EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL APPLIES TO ELECTION CASES. (ELENITA I. BALAJONDA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), G.R. NO. 166032, FEBRUARY 28, 2005, TINGA, J.) 3. GENERAL RULE: THE RULE ON EXECUTION BY MOTION OR BY INDEPENDENT ACTION UNDER SECTION 6, RULE 39 APPLIES ONLY TO CIVIL ACTIONS AND NOT TO SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS AN EX PARTE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AS IT IS NOT IN THE NATURE OF A CIVIL ACTION. (SPOUSES ERNESTO AND VICENTA TOPACIO, VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, G.R. NO. 157644, NOVEMBER 17, 2010, BRION, J.). 3.1. EXCEPTION: SECTION 6, RULE 39 REFERS TO CIVIL ACTIONS AND IS NOT APPLICABLE TO SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, SUCH AS A LAND REGISTRATION CASE. (ROLANDO TING VS. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, G.R. NO. 168913, MARCH 14, 2007, CARPIO MORALES, J). 3.1.1 EXCEPTION: UNDER SECTION 6, RULE 39, A FINAL JUDGMENT MAY BE ENFORCED BY MOTION WITHIN 5 YEARS FROM THE DATE OF ITS ENTRY, BUT NOT THEREAFTER. THE RULE HOWEVER IS NOT ABSOLUTE AND ADMITS OF EXCEPTIONS, ONE OF WHICH IS WHEN THE DELAY IN ENFORCING THE JUDGMENT IS CAUSED BY THE PARTY ASSAILING THE FILING OF THE MOTION. (CENTRAL SURETY & INSURANCE CO. V. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., G.R. 149053, MARCH 7, 2007, CORONA, J.). 3.2. THE PROPER VENUE DEPENDS ON THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE PRESENT ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT IS A REAL ACTION OR A PERSONAL ACTION. (ADELAIDA INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO. 156596, AUGUST 24, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.)

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4. EXECUTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS BY THE SHERIFF: MONEY JUDGMENTS ARE ENFORCEABLE ONLY AGAINST PROPERTY UNQUESTIONABLY BELONGING TO THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR. (CRISPIN SARMIENTO VS. ABAD AND LUISITO P. MENDIOLA, A.M. NO. P-07-2383, 15 DECEMBER 2010, CARPIO, J.). 4.1. THE LAW MANDATES THAT IN THE EXECUTION OF A MONEY JUDGMENT, THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR SHALL PAY EITHER IN CASH, CERTIFIED BANK CHECK PAYABLE TO THE JUDGMENT OBLIGEE, OR ANY OTHER FORM OF PAYMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE LATTER. NOWHERE DOES THE LAW MENTION PROMISSORY NOTES AS A FORM OF PAYMENT. THE ONLY EXCEPTION IS WHEN SUCH FORM OF PAYMENT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR. (MERLINDA L. DAGOOC VS. ROBERTO A. ERLINA, A.M. NO. P04-1857, MARCH 16, 2005, CORONA, J.) 4.2. IN DETERMINING PROPERTIES TO BE LEVIED UPON, THE RULES REQUIRE THE SHERIFF TO LEVY ONLY ON THOSE “PROPERTIES OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR” WHICH ARE “NOT OTHERWISE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION.” (GOLDEN SUN FINANCE CORP. VS. RICARDO ALBANO, A.M. NO. P11-2888, JULY 27, 2011 BRION, J.). 5. EXECUTION SALE: THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR ALLEGING LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE POSTING AND PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE AUCTION SALE (SECTION 15, RULES 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT) IS BEHOOVED TO PROVE SUCH ALLEGATION. (RUBEN C. REYES VS. TANG SOAT ING & ANDO G. SY, G.R. NO. 185620, DECEMBER 14, 2011, PEREZ, J.). 5.1. WHEN THE TITLE IS CONSOLIDATED IN THE NAME OF THE MORTGAGEE, THE WRIT OF POSSESSION BECOMES A MATTER OF RIGHT ON THE PART OF THE MORTGAGEE, AND IT IS A MINISTERIAL DUTY ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ISSUE THE SAME. (DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES WILFREDO GATAL AND AZUCENA GATAL, G.R. NO. 138567, MARCH 04, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.) 6. INSTANCES WHERE A WRIT OF EXECUTION MAY BE APPEALED: 1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority. (GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION-INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION VS. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 183122, JUNE 15, 2011, PEREZ, J.). 7. TERCERIA: THE REMEDY OF TERCERIA IS AVAILABLE ONLY TO A THIRD PERSON OTHER THAN THE JUDGMENT OBLIGOR OR THE LATTER'S *


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AGENT WHO CLAIMS A PROPERTY LEVIED ON. HENCE, NOT BEING A THIRD PARTY TO THE EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS, THE REMEDY OF TERCERIA IS NOT AVAILABLE. (PENTA CAPITAL FINANCE CORP. VS. HON. TEODORO BAY ET AL., G.R. NO. 162100, JANUARY 18, 2012, SERENO, J.). 7.1. HUSBAND CAN FILE A THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OR SEPARATE ACTION IF CONJUGAL PROPERTY IS BEING LEVIED UPON TO ANSWER FOR THE SEPARATE OBLIGATION OF THE WIFE WHICH DID NOT REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. (SPOUSES BUADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 145222, APRIL 24, 2009, TINGA, J.). 8. RES JUDICATA: For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, the following requisites must be present: (1) the judgment or order sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the first case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. As to the fourth element, it is important to note that the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: first, “bar by prior judgment” which is provided in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Court and second, “conclusiveness of judgment” which is provided in Section 47 (c) of the same Rule. There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. On the other hand, under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. SIA, G.R. NO. 165836, FEBRUARY 18, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, QUISUMBING, J.). 9. LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE APPLIES IN A SITUATION WHERE AN APPELLATE COURT HAS MADE A RULING ON A QUESTION ON APPEAL AND THEREAFTER REMANDS THE CASE TO THE LOWER COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS; THE QUESTION SETTLED BY THE APPELLATE COURT BECOMES THE LAW OF THE CASE AT THE LOWER COURT AND IN ANY SUBSEQUENT APPEAL. (VIOS VS. PANTANGCO, JR., G.R. NO. 163103, FEBRUARY 6, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.). 10. REDEMPTION: THE GENERAL RULE IN REDEMPTION IS THAT IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT THAT A PERSON OFFERING TO REDEEM MANIFESTS HIS DESIRE TO DO SO. THE STATEMENT OF INTENTION MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ACTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS TENDER OF PAYMENT. (CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS. SPS. MARTIR, G.R. NO. 184252, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, 3RD DIVISION, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.).

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11. DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT: WELL-SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT A DECISION THAT HAS ATTAINED FINALITY CAN NO LONGER BE MODIFIED EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO CORRECT ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS OF FACT OR LAW. (DOMINIC GRIFFITH VS. ANGELITO ESTUR, JUAN OFALSA, AND ROLANDO EREVE, G.R. NO. 161777, MAY 7, 2008, CARPIO, J.).

“The only way to keep what we have is by giving it away. Kindly

share this material to all in need without discrimination of any kind, and surely the blessings will return to you a thousand fold.” Good luck to all of you. See you in Court!

PROF. CHRISTIAN “KIT” VILLASIS

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Villasis Notes in Civil Procedure (Suprema Legis).pdf

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