PRIMITIVE
WAR
ItsPracticeandConcepts
By
HARRYHOLBER TTURNEY-HIGH TTURNEY-HIGH
ProfessorofAnthropologyandSociology,
UniversityofSouthCarolina
UniversityofSouthCarolinaPress,Columhia
1949
PRIMITIVE PRIM WAR Its Practice and Concepts - Professor of Anthropology and Sociology, University of South Caroln
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SU SU CARLINA CARLINA P ' CUMBIA 1949
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ize by
rgnal frm VETY OF HG
Copyright1949bytheUniversityof
SouthCarolinaPress,Columbia.Printed
bytheStateCommercialPrintingCom-
: i "
pany,Columbia.
Cpyrgh 949 by e University f S S Carlna Press Press,, Clmba. Pried y he ae Cmercia Pinng Cpany, olumbia.
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D
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MajorGeneralEwartG.Plank
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and
BrigadierGeneralGordonC.Hollar
JOR GEE
BR GEERL GOR
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Preface
JWOCONSIDERATIONSORIGINA LLYLEDTOTHESTUDYOFWHICHTHIS LLYLEDTOTHESTUDYOFWHICHTHIS
volumeistheproduct.First,consideringtheimportanceofwarto
allpeoples,itis surprisingthatsuchasmalleffort hasbeenmadeto
analyzethecomplexamongnonliteratefolk.Anthropologists,sociolo-
gists,andothersocialscientistshavelargelyconfinedtheirwriting to
deprecatingwarratherthanattemptingtounderstandthisbehavior
patternwhichhasplayedsuchatremendousrolein humanaffairs.
Prface
Second,consideringthequalitativeandquantitativeexcellenceofthe
fieldliteratureofanthropology,severalauthorsconsiderthatitis time
toenterthegeneralizingphaseof thescience.
Thisworkrepresentsanefforttohelp correctthefirstdefect.It
Two
CSOS ORGINALY E
TO
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OF
WC
willatleastraise questionswhichotherstudentsareencouragedto
solve,anditis hopedthatthefieldethnographerswillbe encouraged
tobemoreexplicitin theirtreatmentoftheirinformants'military
behavior.
Civilizedwarwillbediscussedonlybrieflyin ChapterI.Theterm
"civilization"referstocultureswithwriting,metal-smelting,organized
commerce,civilgovernme nt,city-building,tacticalwarfare,andsuch
complexes.ThemilitarypracticesofsuchpeoplesasthePre-Colum-
bianPeruvians,Maya,andAztec,then,willnotbediscussed,astheir
methodswerebasicallymodernanddifferedtoolittlefromour own.
Thisstudy,therefore,treatsofnonurbansocietieswithoutstonearchi-
tectureandliteratemembers.Thetermusedhereis nonliterate,
whichactuallyapproachesthepopularmeaningof"primitive"and
"uncivilized"inmostinstances.
Themethodofthestudyhas beenthis:Everyefforthasbeenmade
toforgetopinionsbasedonsecondary,tertiary,andoftenquatenary
materials.Onlydescriptivefieldliteraturehasbeenused.Every
bookandmonographdiscoveredbytheauthorandhisresearchstaff
hasbeenusedorat leastsampled.Theworksreadexceedthosecited
manytimes.Ifthereaderfinds thathewouldhavepreferredtohave
vii
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ume s e produ Firs, nsiderig he mporane of � popls, s urprisng ha suh a sma efor has been ade naze e ompx : Anhooogss, soio and oher oa ses hae gy oied er wrng o epreang war raher han ampin o udersad his behavor arn whh has plaed c a rendos roe in hn aars Seond, osideg qaiae nd quanave ece of eld eraure of anhopoogy, sevea auhors onsr ha i s m o ene e generazng se of he sene. hs wok repesens an eor o hep orr he rs def. I a leas rise quesions whih ohr sdens are enoraged ve, and s hopd ha he ed ehographrs w be nouraged be more explci heir rean of heir inorans'
b
zed war l b dsused ny brey n hapr The er "izaon refr o lus wh rn, mea-li organized mmere, govemn, ybuidg, acal warae, and su mpexes. he lary raies of suh suh peops peops as he Pr-Colum an Perans, Maya, and Aze, en w no be disussed, as r ehods ere basaly modern and dered oo te from our ow. _s sd herefore, ea o nonrba soiees wiho oe ah re d lierae mers mers Th er used hre s nonlierae auay ao e poplar meang of prmi a uvized n mos nsanes h ehd f e sudy hs been s s Every eor has bee mad o rge opnions bsed on odary, erary, and ofe quaar aeras Only desipe d lerare hs been used. Ever ook and moograph dsod by he auhor and is resear s as een sed or a eas sampled The wors rad xceed ose d any es If he he reader nds ha he would hae preferred o hav vi
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c\
includedsometopicswhicharenot,orto haveothersdiscussedwith
morethoroughness,theauthorshareshiswishes.Hehad toletthe
recordedfactsscream,whisper,orbesilent.Theconditionofthe
fieldliteraturemadethelatternecessaryinmany importantphases.
Thelibraryresearchforthisstudy wasbegunbeforethelatewar.
Astheyear1942drewon, itbecameapparentthatmanyofus would
havetoenteractivemilitaryservice.Inorder toobtaincriticismofa
partofthework,andmindfulof theuncertaintiesofwar,theauthor
requestedtheMontanaStateUniversitytomimeographanddis-
tributeaportionofthe work,whichwasdone.Thefavorablecharac-
teroftheresultantcriticismsuggestedpublicationofthis, thecom-
pletestudy.Again,publicationwasdelayedinlightofthe possibili-
tiesofthetheoreticalpositionbeingweakenedbyfield experience.
Studyofthemanuscriptafterseparation,however,showedthatthe
recentEuropeanwaronlyconfirmedtheoriginalconclusions.
Therearethreedangersintowhichthis typeofstudymighteasily
fall,largelybecauseofitslimitedTwentiethCenturytradition.(First,)
itmightbesaid thatittendsto ignoretheotherpatternsofculture
withwhichwarfaremustcertainlybelinked.Thisworkis meantto
beastudyof warfareonly,anddoesnotpretendtobe ageneralsocial
anthropology.Itishopedthatotherstudentswill describethese
linkages.(Second,;on emightsuspectthatthe materialshavebeen emightsuspectthatthe
pressedintoanarbitrarydevelopmentalpattern.Theauthorhas,
however,onlyfollowedwherethedescriptiveliteraturehasled.War-
fareisarelativelysimple art,evenifithas engagedsomeofthebest
mindsinhistory.Thereareonly afewwaysinwhichwarcanbe
>(^successfullywaged.Thepeopleswhohavediscoveredandpracticed
thesesimpleprincipleshaveengagedinwarproperlyso-called;others
havefailedjtodothisandhave practicedwhatiscalled"primitive
war,''forlackofabetter term.I^ird,onemustalwaysbecautious
ofusingvaluejudgmentswhencomparingnonliteratecultureswith
civilization.Fieldethnographersoftenlivesoclosetotheirinform-
antsthattheydevelopfeelingsoflocalpatriotism;anthropologistsas
awholetendtoconstitutethemselvesacorpsof sympatheticadvo-
catesofallmenwithoutwriting.Worthyas thesesentimentsare,
theyarevaluejudgmentsthemselveswhichtheauthorgladlyre-
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nounces.Butifanystatementofhisthat aforgedsteelaxecutsdown
agiventreemoreefficientlythandoesa stoneonebeconsidereda
valuejudgment,hemustpleadguilty,forhe hasmadetheexperi-
mentaltest.Ifhisstatementthat asocialgrouppracticingwarfare
vni
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nce some tocs c ae ot, o to ave otes iscsse moe ooghnes ooghnesss the auo saes his ishes. ishes. He a o let e ecoe facs scea, hise, o be sent. e codio of e el liteture mae e ltter ecessary ay mpoant phases. he bray esec fo is stu as beg befoe he late a. A e yea dre on, t became appae t many of us ol ve to ete acve mlty serve. I ore to obtain criiism of at o e ok, a midful of he netainties of war the aho requeste e Mona Se Ui o imgh ad disute pon of he ork ih as de. Te rble arac tr of he resulnt riiism sugesd puliai o t e complete sd. Ag pbai pbai s dled in lgh o pobipobies of he eral posin beg weeed d xrience Suy f he musp afer sron owr shoe at he ecent Eurp wr ly cd he oiginl cousons. Tee are hree dages ino wc t pe of u mght fa agely cuse of i limite wenie Cenury dio. }t ih be sd i teds i r s o ce ih w arr us certily be id. i w is et to wrfre oy and oes no preen to be a e socia - is op t oe sts wl dr hese kes. oe might suspec at h� r e ben esse lr. he ur hs, oev oeve, e, only follo folloe e ere ere the the descrip descripve ve raure raure has has ld. Waae i a elael siple art ee f it has egge sme of e best c be mndss n histor. \ Te ly a fe s wc wr c mnd
ed ered d ed discovered p s s w discov weT p sccessull weT sccessu * _ese simpe r es have ed wr r d hers
e_( Q e_(
ie "riie w a a is c "ri
and
e must aways be uous ' o ck of a bete ter. of si vale j p c w iore so close to ir ioreograp es ofen e i a. a. Fie Fiedd eograp vi v plgists as as ahroplgists paom; ahro hat hey devel develop feegs f local paom; nts hat c dvosympahec corss of sympahe tem mselves a cor wole ten to co nstitue te es are, are, hese setim setimes orthy s t hese ing. W orthy outt ing. of al n w ou cates of aor gld rets emsel emselves which e aor jugments tey ae vaue jugmen
axee u do foged ged seel ax saement oof his at fo an saement onces. But f an red a cosiered stoe e oe oe be cosie ently ha oes sto ee more efc ently gvenn ee gve expe-e expe gt,, fo e as de e a gt plea en, he must ple u judgm judgmen, vau va n wa pacn all group pac sa wafae tht a s sateet tht ea t est. If his sate
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tacticallycandefeatanontacticalgroupofthesamesizeand equal
armamentisalsoavaluejudgment,hemust alsoacceptthatcharge.
Historyrepeatedlyhasmadethisexperimentaltest.
Thisworkusestheterm"principles"ofwar becausewarfareisman's
oldestapHmnsfrsiirypssfiilsrvialsHpnrpWar isthefirst socialscience
tobecometrulyscientific,foritis thefirstthepracticeofwhichlias
beenreducedtoafewsimpleprincipleswhichare truewithoutre--/
gardTotimeor place.Thisissoobviousthat itisstrangethat ithas
notbeensaioHJefore..
MythanksgotoProfessorsMelvilleHerskovitsandRalphLinton
fortheirsoundcriticismofthis volume.ProfessorGarvinShallen-
bergerbroughtaphysicist'slogictobear upontheevidence.Thelate
ColonelCopleyEnos,ablecavalier,taughtmemybasictactics.And
manythankstotheotherofficers,noncommissionedofficers,anden-
listedmenoftheAmerican,British,andFrencharmieswhohavecon-
tinuedmyinstructionintheart ofwar.
Finally,thanksareduetothe MontanaStateUniversityforper-
missiontousethematerialoriginallyincorporatedin themimeo-
graphedstudyissuedbythem.
HarhyHolbertTurney-Hich
Columbia,SouthCarolina
April22,1949
tacc ca defeat a otaccal grop of the same size ad eqal aamet i alo a vale jdgmt, he mst alo accept that chage. to epeatedly has made th exeretal test. Ti wor ses the ter "pncils of war becase warfar s ma's War is the t social sciece to bcome as it i th t e e o rducd to sile rinils whih e ue_�ihou re i strane i h rd o me or I! � so obios not n i or. My thanks go o Proesors elvlle Hesovts and alph to ther ound cm of thi volme. Professo Ga Shalleerger broght a hyicists logic to ba on the evidece. The late oloel Cop Enos, able caaler, taught me my basic taccs. Ad any thas to he othr ocr, ocomisioed ocer, ad eted me of the America, Brth, ad French ai who hae coud my inuion in the a of ar. Fnaly, n ae de to oana Sae Uniy or e iion to u he mael originay incorporad n e imeo graphed ud iued by them HRY HOL TUHG olumb, South Crolina
Apl 22, 7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 2 d 2 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
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Contents
PartI.ThePracticeofPrimitiveWar
CHAPTERPAGE
1.TheFormandFunctionofWeapons5
2.TheTheoryofWarand theMilitaryHorizon21
3.Formations39
4.DisciplineandCommand61
5.TheFunctionalDesiderata191
6.Intelligence,SurpriseandCountersurprise107
Contents
7.BattlePlans123
PartII.TheConceptsofPrimitiveWar
8.TheSocio-PsychologicalMotives141
PT I.
9.TheEconomicMotive169
10.MilitaryValues187
11.CertainMilitaryAttitudes205
The Practice of Priitive War
CHPTER
PAGE
12.WarandtheOrganizationofSociety227
Bibliography255
1 Th Form and Function of
Wapons
__
Index267
XI
2.
Th ory of Wa nd th iiary
3.
Formations
4
Discpin and Command
Horzon
_______ _ _ _ __
5 Th Funcona
_
Dsdrata
__ __
___ _ __
6. Intignc Srprs and Contrsrrs 7.
_____
Batt Pans
__
__ _ _ __ __
5 21 39
61 91
107 3
PAR The Concpts of Primiive War 8 Th SocioPsychoogca Motvs 7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 2 d 2 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
__ _ _
9. Th Economc Motiv
_ ___ _
10.
Miitry Vaus
1.
Crtain iitary Atttuds
1.
War nd th Organzation of Socty Bb lgrphy I
_
__
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_ ___ ___ _
_____
_____ ___ _____ _
_ _ __ _
41 169
187 205 27 5 267
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PRIMITIVE
WAR
RIMIVE AR
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PartI
ThePracticeofPrimitiveWar
PA
The Practic of itiv Wa
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CHAPTER1
TheFormandFunctionofWeapons
iJINCEARMAMENTSABEPREEMINE NTINCIVILIANTHINKING,AND
sincethereisgreatvirtue inbeingobvious,material,andfamiliar,the
averageman'smindturnstoweaponswheneverwarismentioned.
Theadvantageofproceedingfromthefamiliartotheunfamiliarsug-
gestsusingthetopicof weaponsasanintroductoryspringboardto
thisprimerofprimitivewar.
Thepartwhichweaponsplayinwaris
farsimplerthanappears
CHAR 1
atfirstglance.Waris war,asocialinstitutionfulfillinga varietyof
motives,endinginmanyways,evokingmanyemotions.Thecentral
factofmiltarytheoryisthat warisasociologicdevice,andweapons
The For and unctin o Weons
aremerelytoolsusedtofacilitateits practice.Thepersistencewith
whichsocialscientistshaveconfusedwarwiththetoolsofwar would
benolessthan astoundingdidnottheirwritingreveal,for themost
part,completeignoranceofthesimpleraspectsofmilitaryhistoryand
theory,andanalmoststubbornunwillingnesstoconceptualizewar-
fareasthegreatcaptainshaveconceptualizedit—andstilldo. It
wouldbeveryhardto findanoncommissionedofficerinthepro-
fessionalarmiesofthesecondratepowerswhohas beenasconfused
asmostanalystsofhumansociety.
Thiscivilianattitudehasresultedin hundredsofmuseumcases
housingweaponsfromallovertheworld,cataloged,markedwith
accessionnumbers,anduncomprehe nded.Adigestofwhatis known
ofthematerialcultureofwar wouldrequireafarlargervolume
thanthis.Eventhebriefestcatalogof suchworkswouldrequire
animpressivepamphlet.Alistofmonographsandarticlesdealing
withthewaysuchweaponsareheld,howmanyfingers areusedin
arrow-release,whichfootisputforwardinhurlingthe javelin,and
justwhichtoesaredug intothegroundduringtheprocesswould
alsorequireafair amountofstationery.Butwhathasthisto do
e l 9 g 1 o 8 o 5 g 3 d 2 p 4 # b . e 1 s c u _ u / s 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 1 d 3 : e z 8 i 0 t i g 3 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
S C
Cl G, AN ice th great vtue beg ovou materal d faml veag a's s o wap wvr wa is miod. The ava of pdig fom h faia o e faiiar ug gs usig e pi o wapos a a odtoy pgboa to pir o iiv a. The pa wh wpos pay wa f sipr han pa fs ga War i wa so ion ffig va movs g i may ays okig ay moios. The enal fac of iay eoy a wa s a sooi dv, a a re mry tls usd t aa is pae. T prsce hc oia sciss hav osd war i e to of ar oud be no lss a astoudig did r wig rva fo e cop goa he Si pc of miay stor n eoy, ad a aot u uiiss o opaize arfare the gea apa hav opuaizd ad tll d I ould b ry ar o fd a noosiod ofce i e r eoal ais of the econ ra pow who ha ben confue most ayts of uman o. Ths a de as ee i re ue cses ousg wapos fro al ove e d aalog, mard ccs bes an omphedd A dge e maal cl o war oud rque fa larger ole han is Even he bref caag of uch work ou equ n mpsse pamhle. A l of moogrphs an tcle el t way sh wapo ar hd o may fgers e ue i rrowse h fo pt fowd ung he javel, ju whh oe a du to he ou u he pocs oul o qe a far mout of aioy. Bu wha a A
PRMENT
IN
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6 6PrimitiveWar
withwar?Verylittle,forall suchquestionsoftheimportancehave
beensolvedsincetheopeningofthe NeolithicAge,andnothing
wasaddedexceptminorimprovementsuntiltheperfectionofpowder-
drivenprojectiles.
Placingadiscussionofweaponsattheforepartof thiswork,then,
doesnotsignifytheirparamountimportance.Itreflectsadesire to
discussthefundamentalsoftheprimitivearmory,relegatethemto
theirproperplaces,andthento proceedtowarfare'smoreimpor-
tantaspects.
Thetheoreticalsummaryofweaponscanbebrieflymade:Aman
wishestodoanotherbodilyharm.Naturehas providedtheaggressor
withteeth7nails,feet^andViands,togetherwithmusclesandawill
todrivetheseforciblyagainstthedefender.Sincethe defenderis
alsoequippedwithaskinand skullofsometoughness,aswellas
adesirenotto behurt^theaggressor'sanatomicalequipmentishardly
adequate.Iftheaggressorpicksupa stonewhichisharderthanhis
fist,hecanmakeaconsiderableimpressionuponthedefender,pro-
ducingabrasionsandcontusionsuponhissurface,andperhapsre-
ducinghisresistanceanddiminishinghiswill.If theaggressorchooses
asharpstone,hecaninsert thisintothedermaland musculartissue
ofthe"deferiderandinjurehimto thepointofdeath.
Thedefender,unlesscaughtbysurprise,ishardlywilling tore-
mainandbepommelled.Hemaybackaway,orhe mayfightback.
Prudenceentersintotheaggressor'sthinking.Hefindsit convenient
eithertoavoidtheflailing armsofthedefenderorto overcomethe
distancebetweenhimselfandhisfoefasterandmore safelythanhis
legscancarryhim.Noonehas everstressedtheimportanceof
humanprudenceinthedevelopmentofweapons,orperhapsitshould
besaidthatno onehascalledenoughattentiontothe aggressor's
.fear.Shouldtheaggressorputhissharpenedstoneon astick,he
hasaspearwhichnotonly willincreasetheleverageofhis man-
piercingtool,butwillenablehimto standatasaferdistanceand
pokehisfoe.Thisspearmayalso behurled.Betteryet,itmaybe
hurledwithabowas anarrow,thedeadliestweaponmanwasto
knowuntillateinthe so-calledRenaissance.Iftheaggressorseeks
protectionbyretiringtoasafe distance,therangeofthearrow(or
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cannonorairplane)mustbeincreased,whileifhe standsinahole
thespearmustthenbe madestrongertoroothimout ofhisrudi-
mentaryengineeringwork.Theprojectile—arrow ,ballista,catapult,
orcannon—musthavegreaterpdwefoFdemolition.Ifthedefender
Pritive Wa
war? Ver litle, for all such quesons of he impoane a e olved in he openng of e Neol Age an noin ddd xpt inor povements unl the preon of oe rjl Pi disussion of weaons at forpat f this wok en n pf 1 to c e fundamenals of e v amo, reeae e o eir oer aces, an n o oced o aes moe mrtant ascs / The ria summary of weapons an b biy ma: A a \- hes o anohr ody ham. Nar has poied he aggess wi ogeher wh m _ dv e a ner. S e i s qiped i a sn ad skl of some ogh as dee no o h aggso's aaomica equipmen s al deae I e agor Cs sn hch s a an his st, he can mae a onseabe upon e poing aaons an conon un his srace, a pha reducing h enc n s . I he a shap son, he can insr hi no he deal an mcla e Oer and ure hi t the pont of dea. deender, unl caught y surpise, is hardly w o re ma and b pomeled He may bac away, or he may t ack Pudence entes io he aggeso's hing. H n t cnvent ther avoi e flaiing am of e efendr or o ovce h istance bewen imself and his foe fase and mor safely than his eg can a him. N one as ever sesed imoae f uman pnce n deeopment of weapons or perhas i should b aid at n one has caled enog no e Shold aggresso put is sone on a he as a ear which not ny wl cease o hs maniercg too t wl enabl h o sand at fer disane and h fe This spe may aso be hurled. Better et, t may d bo as an arow, e adliest wapo an was to I t gessor ses n - rteo by rering to af disan, rag arrow ( an airpan) ust b nrsed wie i ds in ol pea ut n ad songer t rt h ut f dita ngneern wr Te proelerr ist tat annonust geatr di t dfd
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The Fo and Function of Weapons TheFormandFunctionofWeapons7
putshisfortificationonhis ownbodyintheformof defensivearmor,
thesameprocessmustbecarried through.Andsogoesthe circular
process.
Biologicalandsocialscientistshavelong calledattentiontothe
cychcaLnatureofeventsin natureandinhumanaffairs.Nothing
"Illustratesthisbetterthanmankind'sexpenditureofgeniuson weap-
ons.Iftheoffensebecomesstrong,thedefensereplies bybecoming
strong^enoughtovitiate.,theoffense's^weapons._ Theoffensethinks
"upnewweaponsorimprovestheoldones sothatthedefense'sgenius
mustthinkupnewdefensesor becrushedoutofexistence.Thereis
nothingnewnoroldin this.Theentirehistoryandprehistoryof --^|k—
weaponsissummarizedinthiscycle.Once" theoffense-defenseiH-
ventfve~eycle~ lsconceptualized,onehasmasteredthefirst andmost
importantprincipleofarmory.
Oneoftenencountersstatementsofthistype:In formertimes
fightingwasmantoman,whiletodayit iswithlongdistanceweap-
ons.Thisispure nonsense,ofcourse,asanysoldierwillagree.
Fightinghasalwaysbeenmantoman,and stillis.Fireweapons
onlyprepareHFdrThe"shock^Theclosingwiththeenemy,andthat
closingismanto man;thatcontactisthe battle.Thisisstandard
militarydoctrinetheworldover.
TJieriseandperfectionof weapons,then,sprangfromman'sdesire
andneedtoharmEls"neighbor'sbodyanddetermination.Whatever
createdthatdesireandneed,or wheneveritaroseisno concernof
oursatthepresent.The originandperfectionofweaponshadthe
sameoriginastherest ofthematerialculture,pacificor otherwise.
Manhadandhasdeadlyweaponsprovidedbynature—thefeatures
ofhisanatomy.Thesamemaybesaid ofpeacefultools.Yetun-
aidednaturewouldhaveleftmanwithinadequatetoolswherewith
tocarvehimselfacareer uponthisplanetandweaponsinadequate
tocarvehiswill uponhisopponents.Theeconomistshavelong
pointedoutthatthereis notenoughdesirablestuffinthe worldto
satisfyeveryman'swants*,andtheappealtoforce isanancient
methodofdistribution.Theriseofweaponsis theriseofimproving
onnature,orbetter,theart oFcooperatingwithnatureinorderto
makenaturalphenomenaservemilitarymotives.j
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 4 d 2 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
Anunalteredrockorsimple unimprovedstickarestilllethalkillers,
buttheyarenot,strictly speaking,weapons.Atrueweaponmust
exhibitpurposivehumanworkmanship.Itmustbeamodification
7
t h fofcon on his own body in he form of or, e sme oce us be crried ough Ad o goes he crcular roce Boloc d ocl sces ve lon clle enon to the ne of eves i ue nd human ffais. Noig bete hn mnnd's eediue of geius o wa s f he offense sr�, the efese repies b bcom roQ o v . ss wao. he oe iks " p e wepos or provs he od oes so a e defeses geis us hn up ne defeses or be cruhe ou of exnce The s nohg e nor ol n his. sor ad prehisory of e ieapos s sumaiz n hs cce. coaz oe has ared h f d o mor pciple of rmory Oe ofen encouners saemes of this ye: n former times ghg ws ma to man, whle oday s w log disace wa os. is is ure osense of coure s y odir wl agre ighg has lway been m o a d sil is. Fe weaos ae s, he oi w e em, d tha closi s mn o man; h coac s he ble. his adard mr docie the orld over. e rie d pefeco of waos he g fom ms ire d ed o ego a aio. \Vhar reaed hat desire e or whneer i ose no coc of ous he prest e origin d perfecion of weaos had th ame origi s the rs of he maerial culture, pacfic or orwie. Mn hd edly epos prove b nuehe feure of is anaom he same ma be said of peceful ools. Y uied re woul v lef mn w neque tools whrew to crve hilf career upon thi lae nd epos inadque o cve his w upo his oones e economis have log ointe ou ha here s o eoug esble suff in he world o sfy every mas waJ d e p o force s n ncien etho of dirbuion. _he rse of weapons s the se of mrovn on ue, or beter, the r o coe wt nare ode to e nural phenome serve mir moes. A nlee roc or imple unmprove sc e ll el e, the e not, srcl eg wepons A s b ov h on I s be ocn
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'�
8 -ofsomrnaturalobject;inthe terminologyofanthropology,itmust
beanartifact.A weaponr-likeatool,mustbesomethingmaterial,
anditschieffunctionis toserveasan intermediarybetweenthein-
telligenceofthewarriorandhis desires.
Theeconomistsaysthathumanneedsareindefinitelyextensible,
thattheyhaveneverbeencompletelysatisfied,norwill theyeverbe.
Ifmaterialculture,then,is thecorpusoftheresponsesto human
needs,thenmightnotthematerialculture alsobeindefinitelyex-
tensibleandcapableofimprovement,theonlylimitbeing natureit-
self?Nogenerationlikethepresentone, whichascribesalmost
magicalpowertoinventorsandengineers,daressaywhatthe limits
ofinventionmaybe.Whenonetranslatesthis intothespecialized
fieldofweaponshemeetsstaggeringmilitarypotentialities./Should
thisbeso,the futurelooksblackindeedsaveforthis: Warispri-
marilyasociologicart,andthe artofwarimprovessoslowlythat
Alexander'sprinciplesofcombatarestill standard.Theartofmak-
ingweaponschangesrapidly—theartofhandlingthemen whouse
themchangesmuchmoresIowlyA/
Theotherhopefulelementhasalreadybeenintroduced.Weapons
andotherculturalmaterialsareresponsesto needs,butimproved
weaponsandtoolscreateneeds.Certainlywehavecivilianneeds
ofwhichourgreat-grandparentsdreamednot.Everycivilizedfamily
todayconsiderstheautomobileadefiniteneed.PresidentWashing-
tondidnot.Everycommandertodayconceivesofthe tankasa
need.GeneralWashingtondidnot.Newinventionsmakemandis-
coverahostofneeds ofwhichhehadhitherto beenunaware.One
certainneed,whichiscalledto mindbyanewoffensiveinventionor
improvementofanoldone,isthe needofaparryingdefense,material
ortactical.Likewise,whenthedefensethinksoutsomethingnew,
suchastheimprovementincastle buildingunderNormangenius,the
offensehasneedofimprovedsiegeengines,andtheseresponsesto
needsdooccurpartiallyif giventime.Thereforeincallingattention
tothecumulativenatureofinventionand improvementinweapons,
letusalsostress againthecyclicalnatureof offense-defenseinventio n.
Whiletheoffense-defensecycleisthemosthopefulelementof war,
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 4 d 2 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
primitiveormodern,itcannotbe expectedtofunctionperfectly.
Anoffensiveweaponcompletelyeffectiveagainsttheancienthelmet
hasyettobe invented,foritisstill worn.Aperfectdefenseagainst
n he temnolog of anhopology, t us be a aac. A waoq a too, must be somhing ateia, icia, and pposive. !. t s ikewse a sponse to hman eds, and s chi uncon s t srv inmdiy beween he nteignce o e wao and hs dese;� The economist says that human needs ae defly xnsle, that e have nv een complly sasid, no wil thy ev be. If matea ce, then, h corpus o he esposs o hma es, then it ot e mari culr lso e iiiy xtensb ad capae o mprovmn, h oly liit ig nae tH? No genraion ke he rnt o, which ascris almos agca owe o vnos ad eninrs rs say wt e of nvnion my be. When one alas his o e spciized fd o waos h mes saggrig iiay poeniais. I Sould his e o he ure ooks black d save o is: War s prrily a ocioogic ar, and he ar o war provs so so tat Alexnd's ricips o com are s sandrd. 1 art o akng wpos cnges adythe a of handlng e men who se them cgs c more s\J ohr hol eemt has aredy bn ioducd. Wapons and oh clr ris are sos o needs, bt mprovd wpons an oos crae needs. Crly we hav civian neds o wich or rrprs d o. Evr ci iy tody coirs h auomoie a dinie ed Prsidnt Wshington dd o. Evey comand oday conceivs o he ak as a d. Gr Wigon did no. Nw nvons make man discov a ost o nes o whch he ad hio ben awr. One cea need, whch is caed o id y a w onsive vo o prove o n old on, h nd o a prrying dese, ia or acicl. Liwise, wh e dns hks ot sohig w, sch as iprovn cs g r Non gis, the oe s d o provd sige egis an hse sponss to neds do ccr pily giv me. ro in cg aon to e culiv re o ivon and iprovn n wpons, et us so ss in he cycic r o onsnse nvon. Wle h onsnse cc s he mos hop lmnt o war, pmve o moe, t cot e xpcd to ucion prcy A onsve waon compy cve agais e ancn hmet ha ye o be ivend, fo is il wo. A ct dse agnst
8PrimitiveWar
_y"artificial,andpurposive,lit islikewisearesponseto humanneeds,
itive a
'�
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The Fo and Function of Weapons TheFormandFunctionofWeapons9
theUpperPaleolithicspearhasyetto bedevised,foritsmodern
equivalent—thebayonet— isstillan articleofissue.
Weapons,then,aretheintermediariesbetweentheaggressivehu-
manintelligenceanditsdesires,andnaturehas givenmanpowerful
weaponsinhishands.Howthemind helpedproducehumanhands
andhowthehandsin turnestablishedthesuperiorityofthehuman
nervoussystemisoneofthe mostfascinatingproblemsofphysical
anthropology.Fromcertainaspectsitmightbesaidthatthe bulk
ofweapons,ancientandmodern,areprimarilyauxiliariesandgx^
JejisinnBnfthehandsThehands aretheministersofthe mind,but
unaidedtheywouldhaveleftmankinddefenselessinthefaceof hos-
tilenatureandhostilehumanity.Whilehandsare quitesufficientto
squeezethethroatsorgougethe eyesofourill-wishers,especiallythe
Upper aleolhic sear hs e o be devised, or its e ivalethe bayoeis sll n ricle o isse. hen ar h ermediari beeen h ressiv h itel1i�c ad is desres ad natre has giv ma poweru epons i his hands. w he md helped prode hma hads d ho he hands i t estalshed he sperorty o he human ervous ssem is on o he mos aSiaig prolms o phsia hropology. Fom ertai aps i migh be sad ha he blk s an ad modr are prmarly ailars and J4The hands re he misters of h mind, bu
tractableandpliantones,therecouldhavebeenno warbasedonun-
aidedhands.Yetitis welltorecallinthis machineage—andmachine-
gunage—thateffectiveweaponscanbesimple.Thebayonetisstill
oneofthemostlethal weaponsintheworld.
Hardmaterialshavealwaysdefeatedthehumanhand,hencethe
firsttoolsobservedinarcheologyarecuttingtools.Nowthe body
ofanagileopponentis quitehardenoughtodefeatthe unaidedhand,
sothefirstproblemwas tofindpiercingweapons,whichmaybe
lookeduponasextensionoftheprimatefinger nailsandteeth.This
waseffectivelysolvedassoonasthespear andthearrowwereknown.
Theproblemwasthenbasicallysolvedasearlyas theUpperPaleo-
lithicPeriod.Themodernpiercingweapons,thebayonetpointand
thebullet,maybemorphologicallydifferentfromtheantiqueforms,
butfunctionallytheyareonlyderivativesofthem.
Inlightofthe paramountimportanceoftacticaloperations,the
formandstructureofweaponsaretoosecondaryin significanceto
meritfulltreatmentinso shortavolumeasthis. Toallsoldiers,
primitiveandmodern,theresultis theimportantconsideration.
Thereforeinabriefdiscussionofthe effectivenessofthearmory,the
functionalonehasrealvalidity.Afunctionalclassificationofall
weaponswithoutregardtotimeorplaceis veryeasy.Thedoctrine
ofthepresentmilitarypowershasalreadymadesuch aclassification
and,fortunately,itisonewhichis justasapplicabletononliteratewar-
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 4 d 2 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
riorsastothose intheuniformsofthe powers.Thissystemdivides
Weaponsintothefollowingcategories,thoseof:(1)fire,(2) shock,
(3)mobility,and(4)protection.
n aided hey wold ha ve lef ma kid deseless i the a ce o hos ile naure ad hostile humaty. Whe ds are qute suffci to qeeze he hroa ts or goge the eys of our i-wshs, especa l ly he
tale ad pla oes tere could hav bee no ar sed o nided had. Yet i s wel to reall in is mahe agead mahin agethat efft wapos a e sle. he ayo s sil ne of the most lthal eapos i he world. Hard mateials have alwys defatd the hua had, hec he irs ools ored in arheolog are ug tools. Now e body an agl opo is qute had eou to defeat the uadd ad s he first polm was to fd wo w a e ooked po as extesio of he pae figer nis ad teeth. s s effte solved as soo as sp ad te ao were kown. e prole w the asiay soled a ealy as the Uer Paleoihi P. he mode pg wepos the ayo poi ad h ult e moooia dffet from th atique forms b ftioay hey are o driatis of th. I lght o the paaou iporte of tatial operatos h orm ad strte of weaos a too sondary sgfane o eri full att in so sort a volume as his. To all solders, rimitiv d mod te rsl i te ipota osderato. herefore i a bi dsso of the fftvss o te amory, h cion alon has real vadt. A futoal assfiato o l pons witho regard to tie or plae is er eas. The doci he resen miltary pows has alady d suh a lassifaion nd, ortately, i is oe whih is jst as apale to oltrate arors s o hose i he forms o he powers. Thi syste dvides io he folloig ategores, hose of: (1) re (2) shock, ( 3) mo lit, ad (4 protto.
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itive a
10PrimitiveWar
I
Weaponsoffirearedevicesfor gettingatadistantenemywhile
atthesametimeactuallyor wishfullyremainingsafefromhisstrik-
ingpower.Fireweaponsarethereforeprojectiles.Theslingis an
ancientand,ifoneis tojudgebytheresults" ofDavid'sattackon
Goliath,aneffectivefireweapon.Thewritersofclassical antiquity
werewellawareofitsvalue indeliveringallkindsof fire.Caesar
knewhoweffectivetheslingwasevenin prohibitivefire,inkeeping
theenemywallsclearedofdefenderssothat thebesiegerscouldcome
upclosetothe enceinte.
Thegreatestfireweaponofall,from thePaleolithicCapsianuntil
wellintotheageof firearms,wasthearrow,ashortspeardrivenby
aspring.Sinceit isdefinitelyknowntohaveexistedbeforethe
openingofthetrueNewStone Age,mankindhashadadequatefire
weaponsfromthatearlytimeonward.Thisis onemorelinkinthe
contentionthatwarisa sociologictrait,onewhichhadto awaitade-
quateSOCialr.rgani-7nt|piirnmnunrlnnrldfocjplinpTheaiTOWand
bowliteratureisvastand cannotbesummarizedhere,andtheuseof
thedevicewillbementionedtimeand againinthesucceedingchap-
ters.Ourowndayis characterizedbythegreatperfectionoffire
weapons,oftentothebefuddlementofthelaity.Oneshould not
forgetthepartthebow andarrowhaveplayedinthis.The powder
drivenprojectileismorethanthe functionalsuccessorofthearrow.
Itisalso themorphologicaldescendant,inasmuchasthecross-bow,
arlebest,arquebus,andsimilarderivativesofthesimplebowhad to
comefirst.Theexplosivepowerofpowderwasknownlongbefore
themusketbecamepractical.Theimprovedbowhadtoteach the
firefightertheuseof thestocktosustaingreatrecoil, thesight,the
trigger,aswellasthe possibilitiesofgreatrangeandaccuracy infir-
ingaprojectilealongor throughabarrel.Afterthatthe expansive
powerofchemicalscouldbetamedin themusket.
Theblowgunwouldhavetaughtthemodernizinginfantrymanthe
samelesson,buthewasnot awareofitsexistenceoreffectiveness.
Thisdevice,moreofahunting toolthanamilitaryweapon,consists
ofabarrelof metalorreedintowhich apelletisinsertedand blown
withthebreathagainstadistant objectwithgreataccuracyandrange.
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 5 d 2 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
Thepowerofagas underpressurewithbutoneoutlet hasgiven
mankindmanyusefulpacifictoolsandwasknownempiricallyto
thenativesofthetropical forestofSouthAmerica,southeastern
UnitedStates,Malaysia,andelsewhere.Thesenonliteratepeoples
Weapons of fre re devces f o getng t stnt ene t the same me actually or wshful eang sfe fro s sb I) ng power �e weapons e therefore projecles. T sing s ncient and, i oe i to juge by the rsl of Davi! atack Goah, effeve fi weapon. The wie of lassia nqut wee we ware of t vaue deiveng a n of aea ew how effeve e ng wa eve n phibve fie, in epng e enemy walls lared of efender o that te besieg ou oe u ose to the eneine The greatest fie weapon of al, o the Paeoith Capsian we o the age of fea, was the aow hot spea dve b prg. Sie t efine own to have exisd befoe e opning of he ue New Stoe Age, annd a hd adequate fie weapo from hat early me onar. This s one ore nk the ontntio tat ar s iologi ai, oe hih ha a_it adeqte so e rrow n bow ierr is vas and annot be mmize he, and he use of te device wil be mnioned me an again in the scedg hap trs. Ou o day aateriz by the gea pon of fe wepos, oen to the befuddlement of the at One hold not forg te part he bow and aow have pye in this. e powde drven projele i more an the funona ueso of e o It i alo the orpologia seant, namuh as e rossbow rbs, aqubs, and simla deivave of the ipe bow had t ome firs. e explosive oe of powde was o ong bfo e musket beame patia. he mproved bow ha to ta the fie fir he use of te to to usain geat eoil, the gt, th igg, a w as the posibiis of gret ange and auray fi g roje along o though a bare. Ae that the expan ow of hemias oud be tae n the uet The blow wol have taught th oeizing nfanman th same sson, bt he ws not wae of t ee o effeive. devi, mor of unng t thn iiay eapon, osi of a brrl of mea or eed to whih peet nte ad bo t te ba agains a dstt objet th get ua n rge h powe of a gas une pesue t but on outet has give n man uefu pai too n a own empl t ave of the opa foet of ou e oete Ute ate, Maaya, eewhee Thee ontet eope
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The Fo and Fuction of \apons
11
TheFormandFunctionofWeapons11
couldnotappreciatethephysicsoftheblowgun,andhencedid not
developtheweaponashighlyastheymight have.
Theincreasingefficiencyoffireweaponsmadeinfantrytheprinci-
palarmforseveralcenturiesofmodernwarfare.Infantry'sshock
powerwastoofeebletofightmediaevalcavalry.Aneffective
mediaevalinfantrywouldhaverequiredtoomanyspecialiststobe
activeagainsttheknighthood.Itsfirehadto behandledbyarchers
whoweresobusylearningtheir craftandcarryingenoughweapons
thattheycouldbenothingbut firetroops.Thesamewasalsotrue
ofslingers.Whenadequatemusketryarose,theinfantrywasable
tominimizethecavalry'sshockpowerbeforeitreachedtheinfantry
line.Whenandifit did,thepikeinfantrycouldmakeafair stand
againstthearmoredhorseman.Itistrue thattheperfectionofthe
Englishlongbowanticipatedeffectivemusketry.Whenadetach-
ablepointwasaddedtothe musketintheEighteenthCentury,the
bayonetbecamestandardinfantryequipment,providingsuperbshock
andfirepowerinone lightweapon.Theinfantrybattlelinebecame
theQueenofBattles,althoughitseemstodayaboutto returnthe
crowntothecavalryina newform.
Thespearorjavelinhurledfrom thehandisa fireweaponen-
counteredinmanyplacesandtimes.Itsshort range,lowaccuracy,
andweightincarryingaboutin bulkmakeitinfinitelyinferiorto the
arrow.Thelastdisadvantagewasovercomebynopeople.Several
deviceswereinventedfromtimetotimeto increasethejavelin'srange
andaccuracy,suchastheatlatlordart-throwerknowntothe menof
theUpperOldStoneAge,Australia,theEskimo,MiddleAmerica,and
elsewhere.Strapsandthongshavealsobeenaddedto theshaftto
increaseitsaccuracyandrangebyimpartingacircularmotionto its
flight.Thereisalarge literatureonnonliterateman'sattemptsto
overcomethefireinadequacyofthespear.Asummaryofsuchwrit-
inghasbeenmadeby Krause.1
Afireweaponoflimitedvalueis thethrowing-stickorhurledwar
club.TheaboriginalAustraliansarefamousfortheirmanufacture,
perhapstoofamous,sincetoomuchattentionhasbeenpaidto the
boomerang,orthrowing-stickwhichwillmoreorlessreturnto its
pointofpropulsion.Thisis primarilyahuntingtoolandone which
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 5 d 2 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
couldnotbeofany valuetofightingmenarrangedina line.The
Australianthrowing-stickwhichisnotcurvedandwillnottherefore
1F.Krause,"SlingContrivancesforProjectileMissiles,"AnnualReport,Smith-
sonianInstitution,1904(Washington:1905),pp.619-639.
l not appreiat he physics of e blowg, an hce i veop te wea as higy s they ight hve. he asng effcency of e weaons ade infaty te rinci a o sveral centuies of od wafare. Infanys sock wr as to eble ight edaeal caay. A effecti eaea inay would ha reqied to ay secalsts to be ve against th knghthoo. Its e had to e haned y chers o e so busy earing ei crat a cayig oug eapons ey could b noting but e roos. Te sae as aso ue nges. \h deuat mske rs h nfary as b iize h avy's sock power bfor t eah e nn . \Vhe an i it did e pe nfat l make a fai t st t rmr se s tha h erfecti sh on b iiate ffect msk. Wen e bl oin as us n t Eghteth Cent h t cam stndar nfa equipent, prvdin sp h i powe in ne ight eao. Th nfan battl Quee f Baes, hgh t seem td b t h cvaly n ne or. he spea or jaein h o h han s ap ntere in y aces and s. Its sort g, o wt in cyg bot a t nfinitey ferir t h . ast dsaantag was oveco by n el v ices ee innted o e to tie to inceas h aveli's n n acacy suc as the tlatl o datthowr on h m h U O Stone Age Austala e Eso, Mid , lswe. aps and thongs have als bee adde h ncase ts accuacy an ang by iartng ula m it lht. Te is ag liteae on nonlitet m m verco e fe inadquacy o h sear A sm n has ben ae b Kause. A ir eapon f it valu s th hrs e ub. The boigina Asalas re a i n ehaps to aous, sice too ch attento has bee ai beran, thrwisc whi wl s it it of prolsio. This is primal a l no b f ny alu t fight slan thrwigstick whi s i 1 F. Kause, "Slg Convc fr Pj Missile Annu Reo, Smta Ist 194 (Wshto: 195), pp. 66.
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PrimitiveWar
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returntothehurler isamuchbetter weapon.Manypeoplehave
usedaheavierthrowingclub,a warclublightenoughto bethrown
butheavyenoughtocrush,the Polynesiansbeingthemostsuccessful.
Throwing-sticksorclubsarereallypoorweapons.Onlya powerful
mancanthrowthemfar.No onecanhurlthemwith theaccuracy
ofthearroworeven thespear.Theyaretooheavyfor anyfighter
tocarrymanyoftheminto battle.Theirmanufactureisexpensive
intimeandskill.Worst ofall,theirslowmovementandlarge bulk
makethemeasytosee,theirarc easytopredict,andthereforevery
easytododge.Theymustrelyon thestunningcapacityoftheir
weight,fortheirpiercingpoweris nil.
<5k^weapons—arrow s,bullets,artilleryprojectiles,slings,grenades,
bombs,javelins,andspears—arealleffectiveauxiliaries,butshould
nev«t.berelieduponbyintelligentfightersforthe maineffortofthe
battle/JTheyshouldbeusedinpreparationforthe mainengagement,
whichmustbedefinitemovementinthedirection oftheenemy,ac-
companiedbyadesiretoincapacitatehim byassault.Fireandmove-
ment,aswillbeseen,constitutea mosteffectivecombination,and
onewhichonlycourageousfighterscanresist.
Firehastheprimeweaknessoftenoverlookedbycivilianwriters.
Fireweaponsmaybeabletodrive anenemyfromaposition,and
oftendo;theymayalsobe useddefensivelytominimizethestrength
ofanenemyassaultbeforethemomentof contact.Prohibitivefire
mayalsopreventanenemyfromoccupyingalocality,but itiscostly
andoflimitedeffectiveness.Inspiteof allthesevirtues,firetroops
cantakebutcanhold apositionintheopen onlywithdifficulty.
Firefightersmayholdwitheffectivenessonlybehindnaturalor
artificialcover.Fireandfireonly ishopelessifthe enemyever
makescontact.
Weaponsofshockarethe_crushersandpiercerswhich areheldin
thehandnfthfi assailant.ShockweaponsanTT hemilitaryinstru-
mentsparexcellence.Theyarenotonlyemployedbycourageous
fightersanxioustoclosewiththe enemy,deliverhimablow,andwin
adecision,buttheyare thetrulydeadlyones.Theywinbattles.
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 5 d 3 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
Followingchapterswilldescribeactionsofsomepeopleswhorelied
exclusivelyonfireweaponsandlackedthecourageor perspicacity
toclosewiththe foeinshock.Suchactionsneitlier wonanything
norsettledanything.Perhapstheywerenotmeantto.A
firefight
foritsownsakeis hardlymorethananathleticcontest.It isnotwith-
inanytruewarpattern;it
iswastfuloflifesince itisfutile;it
can
o rer i a muc etter eapon May peopl a sed a heaver owng cub, a ar club ght enough to be thro eay enough o crush, e Poyesans beng the mot success owng-scks or clubs ae really poor wapons. Ol powerfu man can thro em far. No oe can hul them wth the cuac of e ao or evn the spea. ey e too heavy for a fhter o many of them nto ble. Th manufacue exensiv i me and sl. Wot of all, the low moemet ad lage bulk make hem eay to see, the c easy to pedct, an heere ery asy o dodg e. They ust r ely on the stunng capacity of ther eght, for the pecg pow i nl. �t � weapaow bu, tiery pjeces sig gae omb, jvel, ad p ll ecve u bt shod ' nevbe eld upn b teget fighter for he ma eot of the shou be se reaat f or e ma �gg_eeJt, acmt _b� -ove t the i cop b a esie t icaacitate him by ault. Fie and ove ment, as wil be se, cou a mot fcve cbiati ad one whc ly courageous fightes ca rt. e h the prime weae te elooked by civiia iter Fie weao may be able to ie a eem m a pii ad often do; ey y ao be use ivl to mmze the sg of a eemy ult before the mmet of cotact. Phbiive fe ma als pevet a ee f occig a loca bt it is costly I
" J
and of imited efecveess. I sie of al these irt ie p ta e bt ca hd a sii the oe o with ic Fe fighters ma hl ith eectivess bhi aa or acl cover . Fie a ie o is hoess i the ever ake cotact in h ae eld - w and are Weapo of military inShock weapos ae are nt only emplyed by crageous mens par ex cel ence. fighters axus to �ose with he eemy , deliver him a bo, ad win a d ecison, but tey are the uly eadl ones. Te win battle F ollin chas ill scibe ac is me eples reled exclusively on fie weapns a lake the cu age ppc acity e hd t
Sch acis ier w ah
nor setld ayg. Pehap ey wee o ea to. A fe fgh for its o se s hardly moe tha a alc cotest. It ot i an u ar patte; it waul of lfe sce t s fue t c
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3
TheFormandFunctionofWeapons13
scarcelybecalledfighting.Itisshockor thethreatofshockwhich
worksone'swillontheenemy.Thevictor ofafirefight isalong
wayfromhisobjective;thevictorina shockfightisrightthere.
Thewarrlnhis primarilyashockweapon,askullcrasher,abruiser,
accomplishingitsendsbystunningandkillingthe foe.Itisa weapon
requiringclosecontact,andthereforecourageonthepartofits as-
sailant.Thedeadliestshockweaponsknowntomilitaryhistoryare
theswordandthe.gpean
Theswordisa derivativeofthewarclub;indeed,itis awarclub
providedwithapiercingpointandsometimeswitha cuttingedge.
Severalpeopleswhohadnotdiscoveredtheuseof metalshadwar
clubswhichweretoallpurposesswords.ThePolynesiansimproved
theedgesoftheirhard woodenwarclubswithshark'steeth,ray's
tails,andothersharpobjectsprovidedbynature.CertainMiddle
Americansenhancedthesharpnessoftheirclubedgesbyinsetsof
obsidian.Otherplainwoodenclubsandsomestoneoneson the
NorthPacificCoastofAmericaweresharpenedsothattheywereto
allintentsandpurposesswords.
ThediscoveryofmetalcastingintheBronzeAge madethesword
thegreatweaponofbothinfantryand cavalryuntilafewyearsago
whentheGeneralStafftookthesaber fromthecavalry.Theolder
bronzeswordswerequiteshort,forthe smithshadnotlearnedhow
tocastalong weapon.Itisregrettablethattheyeverdid. Alesson
whichbothnonliterateandcivilizedsoldiershada hardtimelearning
andretainingisthatit
isnottheedgeof ashockweaponwhichis
dangerousbutthepoint.Anyonewhotriedto traincavalryrecruits
afewyearsbackknowshowhardit wastokeepthemfromslashing.
Theonlygoodfunctionacuttingedgehas istoenablethe assailant
towithdrawhisweaponfromthespasmodicallygraspingtissueof
hisvictim.Aslashingblowis easilyseen,dodged,orparried.It
rarelyhitsavital spotandthereforeonlywoundstheenemywithout
killinghim.Hemaybeleft notonlyalivebutveryangryand venge-
ful.Anyslashingblowleavesthebodyof theslasherwithoutguard
unlesshecancoverwitha shield,amiserableandclumsysubstitute
forskill.
AstheBronzeAgetechniciansincreasedtheirabilitiesincasting,
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 5 d 3 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
swordsbecamelongerandheavierandweretransformedintocutters
andcrushers,havingalltheflawsjust mentioned.Thereplytothis
wasthecastmetalhelmet,afalse replytoafalsethreat.Manypre-
historicEuropeanMetalAgeswordsweresospecificallydesignedas
arey be alled fihn I is sho or the theat of shoc which ors one's wl on the eemy. he vicor of a fie fih is a l ay om is objecve; he vicor in a shoc fih s rih th. s primarily a shoc weapon, a kul rashe, b, aompising its eds b tung and g he f oe. It is a wa requiig close onat, and theefoe couage o the t of s t The deadiest shok wpos own to may isory ae e and he The sword is a rivave of he war lub; indeed, is a wr clb rovided wih a pieri poit a somems w a uti ee. Several poles who had covd the use of mals hd lubs which were to al puss swors. The Polians i e edes of hi had woon wr cls wih sharks s ils, ad oher shap ojects p b nate. Cerai meicns haced the shs of thei c es ts o bsidi. Ohe pl woo cls and some sne ons o te Noth acii Coast of merica we shrpened so at th w to all is d pposes swods. The isc f tl cat i he Bone Ae m t sd he e w f th if c ul a w s whn e Gl a tk the fom he cvl. e brone sw we qie sot f he smihs had no l o ast a l w. It is rle tha the er . l whih bh late ad cii lis had a had time l d retaii is tht i i th of a shock w w dnos e int. o id o ti ca c a few es ck ows how hd it ws o k m f . The onl cio a ci h i t nle the a to wihw his wep frm te spasmicall i te f his vicm. si low is sil se do p. t rel hits a il an thefe ol wds the em i h. He be lf alie bu vr u. n h w las f the slah i nes he can covr wi a sil a mieable d clsy ssie r sll. A he Bonze Ae tehnicias icreased thei abiliis i casi ord beame loner nd haier nd were nsfomd to s and shers, an all he lws just menoed The repl o tis w e ast mea heme a fale rel o a fale reat Man pe Euroea Mea ge swords were o pecifially desied a
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4 14PrimitiveWar
cuttersthattheydevelopedaflairtowardsthe pointend,theso-called
pistiliformswords.Thiscarriedthetypologicaldevelopmentofthe
cuttingswordtoanabsurditynotto beequalleduntiltheheavilyar-
moredknightwithhisponderousandclumsywarsword,mace,bec-
de-corbin,axe,etc.,aroseintheMiddleAge.Thislatter soldierbe-
camemoreofablacksmiththanaswordsman,breedingmassive
horsestocarryhimandhis equipmentabout.Theonlygoodthis
didtheworldwasto developpowerfulpercheronswhichlaterwere
tohauliceandcoal throughcitystreets.TheancientItalianscon-
tinuedanddevelopedthefollyofincreasingthe lengthandweightof
thesword,especiallyover-weightingtheweapontowardsthepoint,
whichthrewitoutof balance.Whentheyreceivedafewthorough
defeatsfromtheCelt-IberiansofSpainwhoretainedthe earlier
weapon,theyreadoptedtheshortsword,muchtothesubsequent
discomfitureoftheGaulsandtheGermans.
WhiletheMetalAgeswordhaspassed outofexistenceasanef-
fectivemilitaryinstrument,itsStoneAgecompanion,thespear,isstill
ingoodfavor.Callit spear,lance,pike,orbayonetedrifle,ithas
perhapscausedmorehumandeathsthananyothermaterialinvention
ofman.OneoccasionallyhearsveteransoftheWorldWarof 1914-
1918,especiallythosefromnoncombatantunits,deprecatethebay-
onet.Medicalofficerssaythattheirhospitalswerefull ofbullet-
woundedmen,whiletheywereseldomcalledupontotreata bay-
onetwound.Suchstatementsarecomplimentstothebayonet.Its
victimsdidnotrequiretheservicesof thehospitalsquadsbutthe
buryingparty.IttookthesecondWorld Wartoreduceitsvalue,
whichdeclinemaynotbepermanent.
Mankind'scowardice,orwishforsecurityifoneprefersthat,im-
pelledhimtolengthenandover-weightthespear,just ashemadea
similarmistakewiththesword.TheGreeksmadethis errorwith
thegreatestcosttotheir liberty.Theydestroyedthefencingpower
ofthespear;madeit amuscularfeattocarryandhandle it;made
themovementofthepointveryslowand predictable,andtherefore
immobilizedthepikemen.TheRomans,ofcourse,wontheBattleof
Corinth.Thispointwillberecalledin thediscussionofAfricanwar.
OnegreatAfricanwarchief,theZuluKingChaka,sawthis flaw
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 5 d 3 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
inthelargespear andrectifiedit.Onlytheappearanceofthewhite
mansavedSouthAfricafrombecomingaZuluempire.
Ifthemotivepowerofthe tribewasadequate,itwaspossibleto
.combineshockweaponswiththemobilityprinciple.Somepeoples
Pritive War
uer ta ey evelope a Har oward e poi end e ole pisfor word. Thi aied e tpologicl developen h ug word o a abudity no o be eae nl e hevily ored kig wih i onderou and ly a word ace, axe, etc, arose i the ddle Age. Thi laer oier bea ore o blackth an a worda breeding maiv orse o ary i and qupen abou. Th only good i did e world wa o develop powerful percheron wic ater er o aul ice an oal hrog city tree. T ancie Italian oninued and developed e olly of ncreang ength n eigt word, espeially vereigtng e ep oward he oin ic trew i ou of balance. Wn ey reeived e orogh efeat fro e CelIberia of a who eained h are eapon, ey readoptd he sor word h ube icoiture of he Ga ad e Geran. le e ea ge ord a psed o ie iv lary insu t Stone Age opaio h�e i oo favor. Cal ea lane, ke bayee e hap aue or h ea r meri nv f man. One caionally hear veter rl Wr 4 918, ealy o r oob n epreca . Mdia ffier h i r u udd e i e ee eld lle n e e woud. uh tmen ar opie h bayon vti did no re e evice o hptal uad bung arty. I ook e eond ord r d a whic dcline ay no erane. ankind oarie r i o euri i e peled lenge vreig h p h ir istake i h wor Te Grek md hi err wt e greaes o e ibery. Ty e f te per; ad lar fea rr d h m e oveet o e poi very lo ibe r iized te keen. Te Rons, o coure, wo e Battle o Corin. Ti oin wil be recaed in iuio ri On grea Afria war ie, e Zulu Kig haka, aw i Ha larg pea iie i Oy pperne h a ave o ri ro beoig mpir If t ove ibe a e b bi k i e mob i i Som e
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TheFormandFunctionofWeapons15
usedthewarhorseas aweapon,whileourautomotivecivilization
hasdevelopedthetank.Firepower,mobility,shock,andprotection
havebeensoughtinoneweapontimeand againbyinventivewarriors.
Thewarelephantwasafairlysuccessfuleffort,butthis animal'sim-
pulsestowardsself-preservationandhislowconfidenceintheom-
niscienceofmenmadehimmoreofa liabilitythananasset.The
moderntankisasimilar attempttocombineallelements,andwhile
itisa mostusefulinstrument,perfectioninthecombinationisstill
faraway.
Thetermmobilityhasnospecialmeaninghere.A mobileweapon's
functionistoenablethefighting mantogettothe enemy,get
aroundhim,orgetawayfromhim fasterthanhecouldaccomplish
theseendswithhisownlegs. FromtheMetalAgesonwardthe
horsehasbeenthemostnotableweaponof mobilityinlandfighting,
combiningashedoesshockpowerwithmobility.Theremightbe
someobjectiontocallingdomesticanimalsweapons,inasmuchas
thewarriordoesnotchangetheirmorphology.Itwas saidthatthe
elementofartificialitymustbeaddedtosome naturalobjecttomake
iteitheratool oraweapon.Whileonecouldhardlycall awarhorse
anartifact,yetanartificialityisinvolved,albeita psychologicalone.
Asimplehorseisnot awarhorse.Cavalryhorsesmustbemeticu-
louslytrainedinorderto makethemchargers,beaststhatwillhave
sufficientconfidenceintheirriderstoplungeinto fire,intoahail of
projectiles,striketheirriders'foeswiththeir forefeetandstampthem,
bitetherightparty withtheirviciousteeth,andotherwisecoop-
erateintelligentlywiththecavalierinstrikingdown opposition.When
onehaslearnedthatthe fundamentalfactorinequinepsychologyis.
self-preservation,asitiswithall grazing,fleet,gregariousanimals,
hehasgonefarin hislessonsinequitation,civilor military.When
oneappreciatesthatittakesmuchskilland patiencetoovercome
thisequinefearandto instillinthe troopmountsadesiretocombat
theenemy,hewillneversaythat theelementofartificialityisabsent
andthatthehorseis notaweapon.
Theelementofprotectionhardlyseemsconsistentwithvalor,but
valorrequiringuselessself-sacrificeishardlymilitary.Tobesure,
thebestprotectionisto stayawayfromtheenemyanddoall ofone's
7 6 7 6 7 9 l e 1 g 3 o 0 o 5 g 1 0 d 9 p 3 . # p e d s u _ m s / 7 s 2 e 0 c 2 c / a t / e g r n . o . e t l d s n u r a t i h . h l t d a h / h . / : w p w t t w h / / / : p t T t h M G / 6 d 3 : e z 7 i 0 t i g 2 i 1 - d 8 l e 0 - g 3 o 1 o 0 G 2 , n n i o a d m e o t D a r c e i l n b e u G P
militaryexerciseontheparadeground."Hewhofightsand runs
awaywilllivetofight anotherday,"isnotentirelystupid,andis also
frequentlynecessary."Discretio niseverthe betterpartofvalor,"
d th � epn, hle tmiv ili ha develped h nk Fire per, mbili, sh, and prteti v been sught in ne ep time nd gin b iveive rrir he ar elepant a fairl sucefu effrt, bt tis nils mlses ard elfpreeti nd hi nfidene i the icience f en made i mre f labili n n et Th dern tan i siilr aemp t mbine ll eleent, nd hil t i t ef strent, pefei in the mbinti r ay The mbili h n peial mening here ble epn' cn i enable the fighig t ge he enemy, ge rnd i r ge a fr h faer thn he ld cmpli hee nds i h n leg Fm the Met ge nrd h re ha ben the st nale eapn f bilit n nd ghi, in a he des s per ih bili There igh b e oeon t llig dei nils eapns, ismh he aior de nt nge he mrphlg sid tt leet f ifiilit must be dded t sme tr bet t mk eier a tl r epn While ne culd hrdly cal ar hr n arif et a rtifiiali i ied, lbei psyclgl n sie o i n ar he ay rses ut be esly aind in rder t e them hrger, bess tt i hv fficint oidene in ei riders t punge in fe, int i prje ie their riders' fes i thei frefeet and stp em, bie te ri part ith thei iius teeh, nd terie perate ilenly ith the cvalier in striing dn ppsitin Whe ne a laed ht the fndenal ftr in equine pslg elfprain, it s ith ll grzing, fleet, gegi nia, he h gne far in his less in eqitin, iil r ilir Wen ne appreciate th it te muc sill nd ptience t er hs equie fear nd t instl n te trp uns deir t cbat he eney e il neer sa t the element f rifiilt i bsent nd t te rse is nt ep The elent f pretn ardly seem nsiste i vlr, but r reqing ees sfaif ie i hardl ilr T be re, h best petin is t sa y frm the enem nd d f n ilir exeris n te prde grund "e h fight nd ill live t fight nthe dy, i nt entiely pid, nd ls etly neessr Dscren i e th bete r l
_