1. Tulk v. Moxhay
FACTS: There is a statue in a property. There are certain houses around the garden. The houses are arranged like the square around the round shaped garden which has a statue. A contract was entered into: the garden was transferred saying you would never construct any house of the garden and the statute should remain as it is. Tulk had transferred property to the Moxhay with the conditions aforementioned. After certain years the properties were transferred and these two weren’t the owners anymore. If D had an idea that there were some conditions between A and B. HELD: The court said that if the parties are allowed to by pass the condition through transferring it, then you could later transfer it i t back to yourself after selling it to someone to avoid the conditions. transfer or and transferee had Tulk v. Moxhay: This was a case where both the transferor changed. But the transferee knew about the existence of certain obli gations. S. 40 2. R. Kempraj v. Burton Industries Limited:
FACTS: In R Kempraj, a property X was leased out by Kempraj Shah to Baton and Sons for 10 years subject to an option of renewal by the lessee that is Barton and Sons. Barton sought to renew the lease but Shah did not oblige. Barton filed for specific performance of the contractual obligation on Kempraj and the suit was decreed. Kempraj appealed stating that the option to renew was an interest tainted by the rule against perpetuity. Rule against perpetuity does not allow creat ion of such interest which perpetually suspend the power of alienation. ISSUE: Section 14 HELD: The court held, that the option to renew was merely a contractual stipulation, 'a contractual obligation' personal in nature [a pers onal covenant] and does not create any interest and hence Section 14 does not apply to it. The remedy for the breach of this covenant lied i n specific performance under the Specific Relief Act which was correctly granted. Even if one considers that the covenant was not personal in nature but was running with the land [jus ad rem] the law states that it does not create any interest in the property as the TP act does not recognize equitable estates. It remains a covenant running with the land which may be enforced under section 40 of the TP Act as a beneficial covenant against the owner or the subsequent transferees provided such transferees had notice or were without consideration. 3. Rajes Kanta Roy v. Shanti Debi :
FACTS: Ramli Kanta Roy, hereafter A, had three sons S1, S2 and S3. A created a trust for the property. Before this happened, the eldest son, Ravindra S1, was ma rried. He had died and left behind the widow (w1). W1 was entitled to maintena nce to be paid out of the property. After a while, they stopped paying maintenance and she sued the brothers and the father. The brothers claimed that her marriage was sagotra and was invalid. However, they reached a compromise and A erected a trust to be managed by S2 and S3. The income from the property in trust was to be used to pay off debts and also to maintain the widow W1. The sons were to divide the surplus among themselves and their heirs. A charge was created when they failed to pay maintenance and W1 filed a suit. The sons argued that they had only a contingent interest in property as they’d get the property only after their father’s death (certain) and after complete payment of debts which was an uncertain event. Therefore, they couldn’t satisy W1’s charge by letting go of an interest that they did not possess. ISSUE: Section 19- Vested or contingent interest? HELD: Father’s intention was that sons should not enjoy property before paying off the debts. However, the fact that the property was inheritable in nature and the benefits were divided among the sons and the income was used for maintenance of family- all this shows that there was always a vested interest only the enjoyment of which had been postponed. 4. Kartar Singh v. Harbans Kaur: FACTS: HK transfers property to KS. She transfer the properties with res pect to her own share and also the son’s share (as a guardian). When the minor turned 18, he filed a suit for declaring the transfer void. Court declares it void but the son dies before getting possession. Due to this, the share reverted to HK, the son’s mother as the son had no other heirs. KS, the original transferee approached the court to reaffirm the sale by appealing to section 43. ISSUE: Section 43 HELD: 1) As per the guardians and wards act, the guardian has to take permission of
the court before making a transfer. This was not done in the particular case, and hence it was declared void. Even the transferee has an obligation to conduct reasonable inquiry as to whether the court had given permission. KS Didn’t do this a nd therefore, the sale is invalid. Section 43 cannot be appealed because the sale had never subsisted.
This case implies that the ambit of Section 43 is broader than Section 6 because Section 6 was not even invoked in this case. 5. Jumma Masjid Mercara v. Kodimaniandara Deviah: A had 3 sons: B1, B2 (wife was W2), B3 (wife was W3) and one daughter S1. S1 had two sons (SS1 and SS2). SS1 had two children GS1 and GS2. SS2 had a child GS3. There was a usufructuary mortgage entered into by the three brothers with Xwhich was to be determined after 20 years. The mortgagee has right to utilise the benefits arising out of the land i.e. the fruits of the property can be used. (He would enjoy the property for 20 years and the brothers would after that pay the outstanding sum). The property was supposed to revert but all three brothers were dead). S1 was dead and so were her sons. W1 was also dead. GS1, GS2 and GS3 claimed to be revesioners as they were grandsons of the sister. GS1, GS2 transfer this property to Y. He made reasonable inquiries. W3 challenged the sale and claimed that it was B3’s self acquired property and thus it should go to her. Court agreed and invalidated the sale. While appeal was being heard she also died. Consequently the property would go to GS1, GS2 and GS3. Jama Masjid argued that W3 had gifted (gift deed) the property to the Masjid and GS3 had sold (sale deed) his share of the property to them .Y invoked Section 43. Masjid said GS1, GS2 and GS3 were only heir apparent. ISSUE: Section 43’s ambit HELD: The court held that 6(a) and 43 operate in different fields. 6(a) lays down a substantive rule and 43 lays down an evidentiary rule of estoppels. 1929 amendment added the word fraudulent and prior to that there was only the word erroneous. A transaction can be fraudulent or non-fraudulent. If it is non-fraudulent, the transaction is perforce erroneous. The presence of malice is irrelevant. Y had made the reasonable enquiries and so the transfer to him was upheld. The contentions of the Masjid were rejected. The court also held that there is no conflict between 6(a) and 43. 6. Ramdas v. Sitabai: Father survived by son and daughter. When father died, the son and daughter were the joint heir. The son sells the property to another person. The daughter files a suit to declare the sale invalid since her consent wasn’t taken. Son claimed that the property was self acquired. The court looked through the evidence and decided that this wasn’t self acquired. The matter went to the civil court.
The court observed that in the case of coparcenary property, the only right that the transferor has is to ask for partition. You don’t know what part of the property B has. In this case there were 4 different plots. In case of a Hindu Coparcenary, the only right that the transferee has is to seek partition and seek an order to specify the share. 7. Nagubai v. Shamarao: FACTS: Father (F) had three wives, W1, W2, W3. W1 had S1 and S2. W2 had S3 and D1. W3 had D2 and D3. F, W1 and W2 die. Survived by 3 sons and 3 daughters. The three sons entered into a mortgage with X for an a mount of Rs 16000. Usurfructuary mortgage on 01.09.1918 for three years. Then as part of the mortgage what they did was they entered into a lease agreement where the three sons became the lessee (you satisfy the proceeds from the property to pay the debt).The lease entered into on 3.09.1918 and on 6.09.1918, a partition happened with the agreement that there would an obligation to maintain W3. On 06.06.1919 a suit was filed by W3 for maintenance out of these properties and also the marriage expenses of D2 and D3 were also demanded. Three suits: one for maintenance by W3, another by W3 as representative of D2 and another for D3 for their respective marri ages. On 12.12.1921 the suit was decreed and the payment had to be made. On 2 Aug, 1928 on execution of the above decree the property were sold to D3. Meanwhile, by 1926 all the three brothers were declared 1926. On 16 Aug 1921 X files a suit against the three br others for the arrears of rent since they hadn’t paid any rent. On 21 Oct 1921 a decree was obtained by X. But X is unable to realise anything since they were on the verge of bankruptcy. On 22 Jan 1926, the exectution proceedings were dismissed since no amount could be realised. In 1931, X files another suit against the brothers for the arrears of rent after 1921 and he also prayed for the possession of the land. Again they couldn’t pay this. In 1932 a decree was obtained because he had a fair cause but the possession could not be claimed. By the end of 1932 X died. His legal representatives decided to carry on the matter. 1934, the representatives file a suit for the enforcement of the mortgage. X’s representatives said that suit filed for maintenance and marriages was collusive suits. The court decided in 1936 that either you pay the money or your property would be sold. The property was sold to another person A. A suit was filed for the enforcement of the mortgage. A gets this and then sells it to B. When B claims possession over the property, C obstructs that he has title of the property since, at some point of time, D2’s husband executed a sale in his favour.
ISSUE: Is this a collusive suit? HELD: Collusive suit is where the contest between the two parties is a sham. In case of collusion both the plaintiff and defendant decide to do something together. Fraudulent suit the contest is real. There is no conspiracy. It is in the consequence that the legal process is misused. This decision shows that the doctr ine applies in the maintenance cases although ‘a right to immovable property is not directly or specifically in question.’ 8. Abdul Shakoor v. Arji Papa Rao: One firm was doing good business. Two parties entered into a contract and start ed the same business. This couldn’t succeed. The firm had to be dissolved. They were under huge debts. This property was sold 5 days after the dissolution of the firm. The creditors claimed that this transaction was aimed at delaying the creditors. The purchaser had to show that he had bought the property in good faith. When the firm is being dissolved, don’t you ask the firm as to what is happening to the property and where is it coming from. The sale was conducted in another plac e. The buyer was from the sellers community and both the communities were small. You may expect the other person to not make a full fledged enquiry. 9. Subash Chandra v. Ganga Prasad: 90 year old grandfather. He had 2 sons. One son goes to the city. B, the other son had decided to farm the land. B had a son. One property was gifted to grandson. The first son comes and claims that there was undue influence. The court said that mere old age doesn’t imply that their will would always be prevailed. You look at the relation of the parties and see what kind of influence has been exercised. 10. Seth Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal: In this case, one person mortgages a property. The terms ar e: Me and my heirs will not redeem the property for 85 years. After 85 years we get a window period for 6 months for redemption. And after that, if they fail to redeem it, it should be considered a sale deed. After 43 years, the s on went and said that we have the money. The argument that was raised was that the suit is premature. The court would have to look at the terms of the contract and the circumstances and the relationship between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. HELD: Merely because a long length of time is specified, it shouldn’t be called a clog. It should be considered a clog only if there is some compulsion exercise d in
their relationship. The court thus held, it is not a clog. Court may relieve a mortgagor , in case, of want of conscience, undue influence and duress. 11. Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram: (email) “the usufructuary mortgage cannot be treated at par with an y other mortgage. The right of a mortgagor here is not only an equitable right but also a legal right” 12. Associate hotels of India v. RN Kapoor: An annual rent of 9600 was being charged per year was being charged by the hotel. The barber applied for the rent control act which s tipulated a rent of Rs. 94. The rent controller held that this was lease and the rent control act would apply. One judge in the SC says it is lease (Subbarao). The other didn’t go into the distinction, because rooms in hotels are exempted from rent contr ol act. Sarkar didn’t express any view. Justice Das, says that he agrees with Subba Rao. The terms of the contract said that the licensor grants licensee leave and license to… Then it said that the charges were… He was also forbidden from adding anything to the property. He should not make any alteration without the permission of the licensor. There was no requirement of notice. This case provided for the right of transfer (somet hing that exists for lease and not license). The terms of not allowing fixtures would also be something relevant (see rights and duties in lease). Held, Subba Rao: It was lease. Substance over form- The real test is the intention- if it creates interest it’s lease- the document gave exclusive control over the property- the terms were such that are generally found in contracts- the right to transfer is something that indicates the existence of lease. Sangai’s critique: there is no untrammelled right of exclusive use. He can’t make alterations. He can be kicked out without notice. Exclusive possession cannot be determinative, but can only be suggestive. No judge discusses the provision of notice. Sangai thinks this is license which shows that there is no untrammelled power and the provisions that nothing can be added without the consent. 13. V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal:
5 judge bench. Authority on the relation b/w ToPA and Rent Control Act. The difference between the two acts in the determination of the lease is that under the ToPA, to recover the property determination of lease is nec essary during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot recover the propert y. Section 111 discusses this. It mentions various grounds like efflux of time (fixed time lease), on the happening or non happening of a pre-decided event, etc. One of the grounds is
forfeiture of lease, on happening of certain events l isted in the section the lease can be forfeited. In the rent control act, the landlord becomes entitl ed to recover the possession of the property on some grounds listed in the act (grounds for the eviction of the lessee). The possession is not recovered merely by determination. Thus Section 111 virtually becomes irrelevant. Section 111 (h) landlord does not have to specify any grounds in the notice for eviction. This position stands completely changed through the rent control act. The rent control act, the landlord cannot snap the relations by merely sending a notice. There are only certain conditions on the basis of which the lease can be determined. Because the rent control act also provides for the rights and liabilities, even section 108 has been rendered useless. Section 106 talks about notice, which is also something that is dealt with by the rent control act. HELD: Determination of the lease under ToPA is not necessar y under the RCA. You
are only obligated to follow the provisions of the RCA. The landlord does not need to comply with the requirement of notice u/s 106. He can directly file a suit under the RCA. Once the RCA conditions are satisfied, there is no practical use of Section 106. The RCA itself places a number of restrictions, there is practically no use of the additional requirement of notice. Even if the landlord sends a notice out of abundant precaution, the fulfilment of the conditions under RCA is necessary. The tenant cannot insist on the requirements under ToPA. But if there is a requirement of notice in the lease deed, which provide additional protection to the tenant, then those benefits would also have to be ext ended to the tenant. Notice is one such example of the benefits being extended. Section 111 mentions one condition of efflux of time. If section 111 doesn’t operate, then what ha ppens to fixed leases. RCA doesn’t mention about this clause on efflux of time as a ground for determination, but a ground for determination would not automatically become a ground for eviction, unless specified in the RCA. The tenant cannot be evicted merely because of the expiration of the time, you would have to pigeon hole it in the clauses of the RCA. 14. Lakshmidas Bapudas v. Rudravva –
This reiterated the proposition mentioned in bold above. You need to look at 4 things: 1. the tenant is laible for eviction only under the grounds listen in the RCA, 2. the additional grounds for eviction in the deed are also ineffective (RCA overpowers it), 3. Generally the period of fixed term lease is insured and remains protected (the
tenant is assured of at least that period), 4. The proceedings for eviction can be initiated within during the fixed time, under the RCA. This would amount to forfeiture. This can only happen if there are grounds of forfeiture in the deed and those clauses of the RCA are mentioned in the deed as grounds for forfeiture. They have to perforce be mentioned in the forfeiture clause. 15. Debi Saran v. Nandalal –
Consideration’ contemplated by Section 122 is a valuable consideration and not the consideration of natural love and affection or of spiritual gains. 16. Sivajogeswara Cotton Press v. Panchaksharappa, AIR 1962 SC 413 –
A leaase of land was executed between the predecessors in interest of the parties, for the purpose of erecting a ginning and pressing cotton factory. The lessee was given the right to give up possession at will. The lessor’s successor in interest sought to terminate the lease on the ground that it was a tenancy-at-will, and the lessee resisted the suit on the ground that it was a case of permanent tenancy. HELD: It is rightly pointed out that when the land is let out for building purposes
without a fixed period, the presumption is that it was intended to cr eate a permanent tenancy. A stipulation entitling the lessee to surrender possession of the premises at his will is not wholly inconsistent with the tenancy being permanent. 17. Hemaji v. Bhikabhai, AIR 2009 SC 103 –
The debate over adverse possession has two sides which are: a. He who sleeps over his rights cannot claim it in equity or law; status of land cannot be left indeterminate; possession respected b. Legally justified theft; unjust enrichment; harsh for true owner; windfall for the rank trespasser; irrational; disproportionate Supreme Court appealed for a re-look into this law in this case and the next one. 18. State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, 2011 (10) SCC 404 –
Same as Hemaji case. 19. Mohammed Sher Khan v. Seth Swami Dayal. 1921 LR 49 IA 60 –
The mortgagor mortgaged his property for 5 years and agreed that if he did not redeem it at the end of that period, the mortgagee had a right to take and keep possession for 12 years, during which time the mortgagor had no right to redeem. The mortgagor committed default at the end of 5 years, but later sued to redeem, but the mortgagor opposed.
HELD: Mortgagor’s right cannot be taken away or limited by the parties. It came in
context of explaining the concept of a ‘clog’. 20. Mirza Beg v. Tukaram, 1942 69 I 98 –
The morgagor mortgaged 16 field to the appellant and sold one of them to the respondent. The aappellant filed a suit against the morgagor without impleading the respondent and in pursuance of a consent decree of foreclosure entered into possession of 9 of the fields, one of which was the one sold to the respondent. The respondent sought to redeem his property. HELD: The respondent could redeem the entire mortgage. Transferee of a part of
mortgaged property entitled to redeem the entire mortgaged property. S. 60 Redemption 21. Narandas Karsondas v. S. A. Kamtam, 1977 (3) SCC 247 –
The respondent Housing Society, the mrogagor had taken a loan from the corespondent Finance Society and mortgaged the pr operty to it under and English mortgage. On default, the mortgagee exercised his right under the mortgage to sell the property without intervention of Court and after notice put the property to sale by public auction. The appellant auction purchaser paid the sums due. Before the sale wass completed by registration, etc. The mortgagor sought to exercise his right of redemption by tendering the amount due. The apppellant based his case on the plea that in such a situation the mortgagee acts as agent of the mortgagor and hence, binds him. HELD: The SC rejected the appeal. The right of redemption under S. 60 is available
to the morgagor unless it has been extinguished by the acts of the parties. This extinguishing only happens on execution of conveyance and registration of transfer of the mortgagor’s interest by registered instrument. If mortgagee is in the possession of the property, the court may instruct him to deliver the possession to t he mortgagor before receiving the money. It was about English mortgage. S. 83 – Redemption. 22. Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit, AIR 1989 SC 436 –
Mortgage deed stipulated a period of 99 years for repayment.
Mortgagee could demolish existing structures and building new ones
Mortgage money payable only after 99 years in the lump-sum.
Court ruled in the favour of mortgagor.
Freedom of contract not for taking advantage of oppressed. In the inflationary world with fast changing values of real estate, long term for redemption raises a presumption of clog on equity of redemption
23. Shivdev Singh v. Surcha Singh, AIR 2000 SC 1935 –
Same as previous case. 24. Vidyadhar v. Manikrao, AIR 1999 SC 1441 –
Mortgage by conditional sale v. out and out sale Intention of parties crucial: Def. 2 executed a deed in the favour of Def. 1 for a sum of Rs. 1500. He tried to pay Rs 5000 to Def. 1 several times but he refused. Meanwhile, he sold the land to the plaintiff. 25. Mohari Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose, 1903 ILR 30 Cal –
Whether a minor can be a mortgagor or not. A minor’s contract i n India is void and he is not competent to contract and hence, a conveyance of land b y a minor is not merely voidable but void. Where a minor fraudulently represents himself to be a major and induces an innocent third party to purchase property frmo him and later sues for its recovery on the ground that the sale was void, the court using equitable principles, will restore the property to him only if he returns the purchase money. 26. Chaganlal v. Anantaram, AIR 1961 Mad 415 –
Mortgagee can treat the interest due on the mortgage as charge on the property. 27. Rosher v. Rosher
FACTS: In a will, Rosher transferred some property to this guy (his son, presumably) with three restrictions- First, if he wants to sell the property, he must offer it to the testator’s wife at Rs.3000. Secondly, if he wishes to l ease for more than 3 years, he must first offer it to the wife for 25 rupees a year. And thirdly, some other restrict ion. ISSUE: Section 10- are these conditions in the nature of absolute restraints? HELD: It was argued that other rights such as mortgage had been left undisturbed. It was held that it was a n absolute restraint as testator’s covenants would attach to all subsequent transfers of the property and thereby, would also be a restrain to subsequent mortgagees and other title-holders. Section 10 is a general rule of equity and operates for all kinds of transfers, including wills. 28. Zoroastrain Co-operative Housing v. District Registrar
FACTS: Land acquired by Zoroastrian community in 1944 to build a society which had certain conditions- First, all members of the society must necessarily be Parsis. Second, any member could transfer his property in the society only to Parsis. One guy
got some property in this society when his father died. He acquired permission from the community to rebuild a residential space for Parsis on his land/ property. He tried to sell to non- Parsis so the community got an injunction restraining him. They argued that the plaintiff had waived his rights by becoming a member of the community and accepting its conditions. ISSUE: Section 10- Is this an absolute restraint? HELD: The plaintiff had no remedy under S.10 as he had self-imposed the restraints. Also, the restraint was not absolute as there were quite a lot of Parsis in the locality so he would have no difficulty in selling the property. 29. Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami
FACTS: B transfers property to C with the condition that he can only transfer it to a member of their caste. ISSUE: Section 10- is it an absolute restraint? HELD: Court held it was an absolute restraint. Acc. To Sangei, this i s a surprising decision as family arrangement restraints are usually valid. 30. Ram Prasad v. Ram Mohan Hazra
FACTS: Property partitioned between two brothers with a pre-emption clause. A sold property to C and B sold to D (after satisfying pre-emption clause). C sold the property to E and D brought a suit against both C and E as the property wasn’t offered to him first. His argument was that if a contract is silent then it includes the parties, their heirs and assignees and therefore, C was bound by the pre-emption clause. E argued that the clause violated the rule against perpetuity. ISSUE: Section 14- Rule against perpetuity HELD: Pre-emption is not an interest in property but only a covenant or condition annexed to the land which is an obligation on the part of the transferor. 31. Emerald Valley Estate v. State of Kerala (Ker. HC 2000)
FACTS: Section 51 was used by lessee to justify altering the property by making some improvements ISSUE: Section 51- good faith belief of absolute entitlement HELD: Good faith would mean that the lessee has carried out reasonable and prudent inquiries before making improvements. This inquiry shoud sustain the mistaken belief that he is absolutely entitled to make improvements. Only then can he approach the court for relief. 32. Austerberry v. Corporation for Oldham 1885
A piece of land was conveyed and it was bounded on both sides by the land of the vendor. The covenant was to build a road and keep it in repair at a ll times and to allow it to be used by the public subject to tolls. Accordingly, the vendee made the road giving access to the vendor’s land. The vendor later sold his lands t o the plaintiff and the vendee sold his land to the defendant. The plaintiff sought to enforce the land against the defendant. ISSUE: Section 40- enforcement of obligations HELD: The covenant could not be enforced because- 1. It was a positive c ovenant and 2. It did not run with the covenantor’s land. This was the law in England which has now also been adopted by India- If the covenant was negative or restrictive on the use r of the land by the covenantor, it will be enforced against the covenantor’s transferee if he had notice of the covenant or if the transfer was gratuitous. And in determining whether a covenant is positive or negative, it is the substance and not the form of the covenant that ought to be analyzed. 33. Saraju Bala Debi v. Jyotirmoyee Debi 1931
FACTS: A hindu granted his properties to his daughter subject to three conditions: 1. The properties were not to pass to the grantee’s daughters. 2. They were not to be transferred by gift except to a limited extent for religious purposes. 3. The transferor and his heirs should have a right of pre-emption on the happening of specified events. There was a defeasance clause on failure of designated heirs, namely the, the sons of the transferee (daughter) and their sons successively. The transferee died without issue but left a will leaving the properties to the respondent. The appellant, claiming to be the nearest reversioner of the last male holder i.e. the transferor, filed a suit againt the respondent. ISSUE- Section 10 (absolute restraints) and Sections 28 and 29 (conditions subsequent) HELD: The first condition is that the properties should not in any case pass to the daughters and her heirs. It is an attempt to alter the legal course of succession and is therefore, void according to the rule laid down in Tagore v. Tagore. The next condition is that neither the grantee not her heirs should transfer by way of gift except a gift for religious purposes. This again is more co nsistent with an attempt to restrict the powers of an absolute owner than an intention to enlarge the power of a life tenant. As such a restriction is repugnant to the absolute estate, it is void on that
ground. The last condition gives a right of pre-emption. This condition implies a power of sale rather than negating it and is inconsistent with the notion of an estate for life. W.r.t. the defeasance clause- A Hindu, no doubt, my give property by way of executory gift upon an event which is to happen, if at all, i mmediately on the close of a life in being and in favor of a person born at the date of the gift and such a gift over might be a sufficient indication that only a life-estate to the first taker is indicated. That, however, is not the case here. The event which is referred to in the grant is an indefinite failure of the male issue of the grantee and the attempted gift over is therefore, void. 34. Sheth Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusji Jamshedji Ginwalla
FACTS: There was an agreement to lease evidenc ed by the correspondence between the parties. The lessee (defendant) was put in possession and rent was accepted from him for several years. No formal lease deed was however executed. There was a suit initiated by the plaintiff to eject the defendant on the ground that he was a trespasser. ISSUE: Section 53 A- Part performance HELD: Section 53A is a partial importation in the statue law of India of the English doctrine of part performance. It furnishes a statutory defence to a person who has no registered title deed in his favor to maintain his possession if he can prove a written and signed contract in his favor and some action on his part in part performance of the said contract. 35. Suraj Lamps v. State of Haryana
FACTS: Four states confirmed SA/GPA/WILL transactions wherein transferred required to be discouraged as they lead to loss of revenue (stamp duty) and increase in litigations due to the defective title - Hence, this Appeal - Whether, SA/GPA/WILL transactions were valid. ISSUE: Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act,1882 HELD: immovable property could be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by registered deed of conveyance - Transactions of nature of GPA sales or SA/GPA/WILL transfers did not convey title and did not amount to transfer, nor could they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property SA/GPA/WILL transactions were not transfers or sales and that such transactions could not be treated as completed transfers or conveyances - They could continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale - However, nothing prevented affected parties
from getting registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their tit le - SA/GPA/WILL transactions could also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under Section 53A of Act - If they were entered before this day, they could be relied upon to apply for regularization of allotments/leases by Development Authorities - It was established that if documents relating to SA/GPA/WILL transactions was accepted acted upon by DDA or other developmental authorities or by Municipal or revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merel y on account of decision - Therefore, SA/GPA/WILL transactions, sale agreements and powers of attorney executed through genuine transactions and were valid. 36. Ma yait- IN PPT
