SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Special Operations Training Group CLOSE QUARTER COMBAT And HOSTAGE RESCUE
Edited and Compiled by SGM Michael E. Weber USA (Ret)
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Special Operations Training Group CLOSE QUARTER COMBAT TACTICS INDEX PREFACE Ten Fundamentals of Close Quarter Combat Importance of Training 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.
INTRODUCTION TO IHR/CQB INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION and REPORTING URBAN HIDE URBAN ROUTE ANALYSIS LOG BOOK AND FIELD SKETCH MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE REACT TO SNIPER ROOM CLEARING TECHNIQUES TROOP CLEARS INTERIOR CONTINGENCY PLAN COORDINATED SNIPER OPEN AIR/SNIPER INITIATED ASSAULT WINDOW ENTRY VEHICLE ASSAULT HOSTAGE HOLDING AREA PERSONNEL HANDLING BODY BUNKER/CORRIDOR INNER/OUTER PERIMETER SECURITY INTEGRATION NIGHT OPERATIONS EVACUATION FROM THE OBJECTIVE WATERPROOFING MARKING AND SIGNALS PHYSIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF GUNFIGHTS RAPID PLANNING IHR ASSAULT ORDER MARITIME ASSAULTS SOP CQB OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT
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PREFACE FUNDAMENTALS OF CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT Ten Fundamentals: The ten fundamentals of close quarters combat address actions soldiers take while moving along confined corridors to the room to be cleared, while preparing to enter the room, during room entry and target engagement, and after contact. Team members must: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10.
Arrive undetected at the entry in the correct order of entrance, prepared to enter on a single command. Enter quickly and dominate the room. Move immediately to positions that allow complete control of the room and provide unobstructed fields of fire. Eliminate all enemy within the room by the use of fast, accurate, and discriminating fires. Gain and maintain immediate control of the situation and all personnel in the room. Confirm whether enemy casualties are wounded or dead. Disarm/segregate the wounded. Search casualties. Immediately perform a cursory search of the room. Determine if a detailed search is required. Evacuate all wounded and any friendly dead. Mark the room as cleared, using simple, clearly identifiable markings in accordance with our unit SOP. Maintain security at all times and be prepared to react to more enemy contact at any moment. Do not neglect rear security.
The Importance of Training Train-up A good team relies heavily upon the professional competence of its NCOs, and particularly the team and squad leaders. These junior NCOs are trainers who know and enforce the highest standards. Each must ensure that his team or squad is mentally and physically prepared for the mission. It is not uncommon to see a team or squad practicing CQB in the battalion area, conducting battle drills on the physical training field, or gathered around a chalkboard during some downtime in garrison. In the field, companies try to spend 75 percent of their time training at squad and platoon level. This is common throughout the SpecOps community and reflects the core belief that if a battalion has excellent squads, it will have excellent platoons and companies as well. Leader training for this mission can take the form of NCO and officer professional development sessions or train-the-trainer classes. To gain and maintain proficiency in CQB, we have all attend the Special Operations Training Course at Fort Bragg, forming a school-trained base of NCOs from which to draw. Leaders have also attended specialized demolition courses to learn nonstandard methods of entering buildings. To build upon that base, the team has conducted professional development sessions at ranges to share the latest techniques in reflexive firing and advanced marksmanship techniques. We also spend time at the
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art's shoothouse live-firing different scenarios and increasing their proficiency at CQB. The troop leaders have also increased their overall night fighting capability and their understanding of battle drills by conducting a live-fire squad attack drill. These leader training techniques can be applied to other air assault battle drills such as breach a wide obstacle, enter and clear a trench line, knock out a bunker, and support-by-fire exercises. Individual Training Like the leader tasks, most of the specific individual training tasks required for the night live-fire mission are clearly spelled out. What is not so apparent is the soldier's proficiency and familiarity with his weapon and NVD system. It entails more than just engaging targets with the M16 and PVS-4/Litton, or the PVS-7 and the PAQ-4/AIM-1. The soldier and his weapon and night vision system must become one. He must be able to zero the PAQ-4/AIM-1, reduce stoppages in his weapon, perform IMTs as a member of a fire team, and engage targets out to 300 meters at night as well as he can during the day. Advanced marksmanship training, day and night, is key to success, and individual proficiency focuses on reflexive firing. Although these tasks require few resources, they are vitally important and must be mastered before a team or squad can progress to collective training. Collective Training Enter Building/Clear a Room (CQB). The days of throwing a hand grenade into a room and then rushing in and sweeping the room with automatic weapons fire went out with the Berlin Wall. Furthermore, it is a waste of ammunition that may not be resupplied in a timely manner. The restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs) do not allow for indiscriminate fire. Adhering to restrictive ROEs while fighting in a built-up area requires training and discipline. The knowledge and discipline of when to shoot and when not to shoot comes with good CQB training. Like the squad attack battle drill, we try to execute this clearing drill up to squad level every six to eight weeks. The training starts with reflexive firing and advanced marksmanship training, taught by the junior NCOs, and it takes a full day and night to execute to standard. Once the chain of command is satisfied with the individual level of proficiency, four-man teams practice "single-team, single-room," then "singleteam, multiple-room" scenarios. The team goal is always "multiple-team, multiple-room" day and night live fires. Recently we began using "blue-tip" ammunition with the M4, M16, and MP 5. The blue-tip is a low-velocity 5.56mm round that disintegrates upon impact. It requires the use of a special bolt and "bullet traps" (plywood sheets with foam padding in between). It enables units to conduct live-fire exercises in training facilities not designed for live-fire. Conducting CQB to standard requires a lot of time, and the skills are highly perishable. While a Operator is initially trained as the Number 1, 2, 3, or 4 man in a clearing team, depending on his duty position in the squad, each must be cross-trained so he can do any job on the team. Lessons Learned The following is a summary of the lessons learned from the teams' night live-fire raid: Proficiency with NVDs is the first step toward being able to operate in the IR spectrum. Leaders and soldiers must be fully trained on their equipment and know both its capabilities and limita-
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tions. The best set of NVGs is of little use to a shooter who does not have a PAQ-4/AIM-1, or who has one but has not learned to zero it. Most teams do not have enough PVS-7s to outfit every operator and was forced to task organize night vision equipment within the company so squads and platoons could train to standard at night. Light discipline has an entirely new meaning. Teams have found that there is a point of diminishing returns in regard to the number of IR lights and lasers. As in most operations, SOPs guide what will be used and by whom. At the same time a unit must carefully assess the enemy's night vision capability as well. Clearly the covert (IR) marking of breach points and friendly elements should become SOP. CQB techniques work. CQB may be a critical element of special operations and works extremely well, but there is nothing secret about it. Every rifle squad, given the training time, can use these same techniques. Under current Army doctrine, the indiscriminate tossing of flash bangs and hand grenades and burst firing upon entering depend upon the ROEs, but this technique still has flaws. Team sstack a team outside a door or desired point of entry, use a shotgun to break any lock or a demolitions charge to breach a wall, then flow into the room as a team. Grenades are used by exception, depending upon the ROEs and building construction. Teams never send one man in alone, as advocated in some of the most recent manuals on the subject. Once in the room, Teams use white light to clear under most conditions; it works much better than IR. The squad/platoon attack is the infantry's fundamental battle drill. If there is no time to do anything else, this drill is the one collective task that should be performed. From it, the infantry derives virtually every other task needed to perform offensive operations. The Detachment has succeeded in maintaining proficiency in all of its offensive METL tasks - as well as in increasing the individual and collective proficiency of fighting at night -simply by focusing on the squad platoon attack battle drill and CQB with a training frequency of every six to eight weeks. Establish unit SOPs for night fighting. Because of the command and control challenges of operating in the IR spectrum, units should establish SOPs that incorporate the Army's technological advances. These SOPs must be thoroughly war gamed and tested, then updated when new equipment is fielded. Consider forming unit night fighting committees at company and battalion levels. The 1st Operator Battalion's night fighting committee provides a forum that allows the junior NCOs and platoon leaders to demonstrate the latest innovations and share their experiences and lessons learned. They developed a battle roster for the battalion that shows which duty position uses which NVD. As new equipment is fielded, the committee makes recommendations to the commander on its disposition and distribution. Although this article has outlined many of the training events and lessons the Detachment learned in its efforts to operate entirely within the IR spectrum, it is only one unit's experience. Force XXI envisions every infantry unit - light, mechanized, airborne, air assault, and Operator - outfitted to operate in the total IR spectrum. Being outfitted correctly, however, is just a part of the picture. We, as the total SpecOps force, must share the information we learn during night training -the lessons and the capabilities and limitations 5
of current and new equipment - and apply it to tomorrow's night battle. As we receive new night vision equipment, commanders must take the time to field it correctly, carefully analyzing which duty positions need which devices. The individual soldier, his weapon, and NVD must become one; and we must encourage NCOs and soldiers to be innovative. Although we may never get away from the use of electrician's tape, it is the ingenuity of soldiers that has led to some of the infantry's greatest breakthroughs in our efforts to "own the night." It is certainly true that they have the latest and greatest "on the other side of the fence," but how they utilize that equipment is ultimately up to their personnel. When you encounter essays such as these in your professional readings, do not discount them simply because you see the word "Operator" in the headline. Perhaps you are not a member of the Operator battalion, but the equipment and tactics they are testing and refining today are the equipment and tactics we will be utilizing tomorrow. Remember that. There is also something to be gained from their philosophy of training. What do you do with your soldiers in garrison? Are you holding classes with available soldiers, anticipating the skills needed for the next field problem, or are you allowing your team leaders to relax with Joe in his barracks room? Use your time wisely and train your men.
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INTRODUCTION TO CLOSE QUARTERS BATTLE AND INEXTREMIS HOSTAGE RECOVERY
1. INTRODUCTION: The mission of Inextremis Hostage Recovery (IHR) was assigned to the Detachment by the National Command Authority (NCA) in 1975. This is not a mission that former Generals dreamed up over a cold beer at the Officers Club. The former Chief of Staff was indeed instrumental in this endeavor however, the President of the United States of America and the Secretary of Defense, then and now, require that the Detachment select, train, certify, and deploy units that have this "special" capability. This word "special" is often misconstrued and taken out of context. There are those of us, our band of brothers, and fellow operators, that believe this "word" denotes elitism and arrogance. It has long been a standing tradition in our Team that elitism will not be tolerated because the Detachment itself is elite. We operators choose not to acknowledge one units attributes better than another’s. This ideology may be one factor that has kept the Detachment as a viable counter terrorist tool, and it has also been suggested that this ideology has made the detachment the first string counter terrorist unit in the Nation. Is this mission special then? Ask any VIP that has sat in the proverbial chair during a live fire training evolution. Ask any State Department employee that is assigned to a foreign post in the Middle East and elsewhere. Yes, IHR is a special operation. 2. OVERVIEW: This section is designed to introduce you to Close Quarters Battle and Inextremis Hostage Recovery. 3. OBJECTIVES: a. Terminal Objective: Upon completion of this period of instruction, in accordance with the SOF Close Quarters Battle Program of Instruction, without the aid of reference, demonstrate a basic understanding of Close Quarters Battle and Inextremist Hostage Rescue. b. Enabling Objective: Upon completion of this period of instruction, in accordance with the SOF Close Quarters Battle Program of Instruction, and without the aid of reference, the shooter will demonstrate a basic understanding of: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
The chain of command related to IHR operations. The terminology related to CQB/IHR. The four assault options. The two types of assaults. The three types of environments. The four principles of CQB. The eight fundamentals of CQB. The three rules of initiative based tactics (IBT). The Reconnaissance and Surveillance reporting procedures.
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BODY 1. The Chain of command for IHR operations. When a crisis occurs that involves the taking of U.S. citizens hostage, a network of individuals and units are alerted. It is important that you know how this network works and where you fall into the equation. The information below is deliberately vague in places due to its sensitivity. The following is a brief description of each link: a. NCA. The National Command Authority consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense. Only the President, or in his absence the Secretary of Defense, can order the detachment to execute an IHR. b. NSC. The National Security Council consists of the NCA, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State. The NSC can be compared to the Crisis Action Team (CAT) for the detachment except on the National level. When a crisis occurs, they assemble and decide how best to remedy the problem. c. NSC advisors. These individuals advise the NSC on matters relative to there agency or department. Those listed in illustration one, are an example of who might attend the NSC meeting. The NCA, NSC, and their advisors can be compared to the detachment's Battle Staff except on the National level. Note: Once the NCA, NSC, and their advisors have reached a general course of action, orders are then passed down to the theater commanders. When a crisis occurs abroad involving U.S. citizens and terrorism, at least two Commanders-in-Chief (CC) will be notified; First, the CC of the theater the crisis is in, and second, the CC of the Special Operations Command (CINCSOC). d. CINCSOC. This Commander is in charge of all Special Operation Forces in the U.S. military. e. Tier one assets. These forces are the primary forces that conduct Hostage Rescue. The Army forces are primarily responsible for land based targets, and Navy forces are primarily responsible for maritime targets. The Air Force is responsible for providing all air assets needed to accomplish the mission. f. Tier two assets. These forces provide a myriad of support assets to the tier one forces. g. Tier three assets. These forces are the primary forces that conduct Inextremis Hostage Recovery. They are the forces that will execute the recovery of U.S. citizens in an inextremis scenario should the Tier one forces not be able to arrive on the scene in time. h. JTF. This Joint Task Force is comprised of all four service components and is commanded by the CG of SOC Command. It conducts missions ranging from IHR to Humanitarian Relief. k. CIF. A CC In extremis Force is a unit from a service component that is part of the JTF. They are primarily responsible for conducting IHR, but can also be used for more conventional missions. 2. Terminology related to CQB/IHR. In order to speak intelligently about CQB and IHR we need to know the terminology associated with the mission. (See illustration one)
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a. In extremis. Webster defines this as "at the point of death". b. Special Purpose Force. A troop asset comprised of a Command element, direct action team, security team, reconnaissance and surveillance team, and any attachments. Their primary focus of effort is the IHR mission. c. Mission Commander. The Mission Commander is normally a field grade officer and is responsible for the overall Mission Planning and Execution with guidance from each of the sub unit commanders. He reports directly to the Detachment Commander and conducts all the liaison from the troop level and higher. He can also be the communications link between the Strike Force and HQ's during action on the objective. He can land or ship based, on the ground, or airborne in a Command and Control aircraft. d. Strike Force Commander. The Strike Force commander is normally a company grade officer and is responsible for the three ground elements plan and execution on the target and ensures all three elements plans mesh together. He is normally the on scene Commander during actions on the objective and may have several attachments, ie., radio operator, FAC, medic, security detail... He reports directly to the Mission Commander. e. Assault Element Commander. The Assault Element Commander is a team operator and is responsible for the teams planning and execution of the assault. He is additionally responsible to ensure his plan meshes with the other two elements. He reports directly to the Strike Force Commander. f. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Element Commander. The R&S commander is a detachment senior operator. He is responsible for planning and execution of deploying the R&S teams in support of the mission(s). He is also responsible for the operation of the Sniper Control Center and ensuring his plan meshes with the other two elements. He reports directly to the Strike Force Commander. g. Security Element Commander. The Security team Commander is a senior operator. He is responsible for planning and executing Security Element duties in support of the assault, or a separate mission if assigned. He reports directly to the Strike Force Commander. h. EOD Detachment. The EOD team is responsible for rendering safe, if possible, any Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that may be encountered in the crisis site. The are also trained as entry men. They report directly to the Assault Element Commander. i. Counter Intelligence Detachment. The CI team is responsible for coordinating and executing Counter- Intelligence/Intelligence operations either alone or with in country assets. If directed, CI personnel can be attached to the Strike Force for missions such as taking Photo's, fingerprinting of dead terrorists, and collection of items with intelligence value. j. Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center. The Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center is an operations and intelligence cell usually in a location that is tailored for the IHR mission. The SARC is where all mission information is gathered for dissemination and planning.
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k. Sniper Control Center. The Sniper Control Center is co-located with the SARC. This is the location that the R&S teams send their reports/traffic to. This intelligence is then deciphered and disseminated to the rest of the MSPF for planning. l. IP/EP. Insert point/Extract point. m. R&S Objective Rally Point. This is a location close to, but not in view of the crisis site where the R&S teams on target report their information to. This information is then sent to the SARC. It is also a location where the Assault and Security Elements can make final face to face to get updated information prior to commencing the assault. n. Release Point. A prominent terrain feature or object in which elements can release to move to separate last covered and concealed positions or other locations. o. LCC. The Last Covered and Concealed position is a location as close to the crisis site as possible. This can be a prominent terrain feature or object, but it must conceal the force from observation of the Crisis Site. This location is where all final preparations are made prior to movement to the objective, ie., equipment checks, preparing breaches, link-up with R&S teams, press-check weapons... This location is also where Comprise Authority should be requested if it is not already granted. An LCC can be on the ground or in the air. p. Breach Point. The Breach Point(s) is the physical location on the objective where the assault force will gain entry. q. Crisis Site, Target, Objective. This is the actual location or object that you will assault for the purpose of recovering the precious cargo. r. Hostage Holding Area. The HHA is a location inside or outside the Crisis Site, depending on the environment, in which all living or wounded personnel are evacuated to. In the HHA you will have a Hostage Pit, Unknown Pit, Terrorist Pit, and a Medical Pit. The HHA can be controlled by DAP or Security Troop personnel. s. R&S Teams. The R&S teams are comprised of 2-4 operators and their mission is to locate the target, confirm presence of the precious cargo, report all pertinent information, and support the assault force during actions on the objective. These teams attempt to gain 360 degree coverage of the target without being compromised. t. Compromise Authority. Compromise Authority can only be granted by NCA. Compromise Authority grants the Strike Force to continue the mission even if compromised. If it is not granted and the Strike Force is compromised, they must withdraw. If the Strike Force does not have compromise Authority, but has an "execute at" time, if they can maneuver to the breach point(s) uncompromised, they can effect the breach at the appointed time. u. Initial Staging Base (ISB). This is the location utilized for planning and rehearsals.
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v. Forward Staging Base (FSB). This is a location forward of ISB that is utilized for planning and rehearsals. This location is usually land based. w. Hostage Corridor. A protected lane leading to the extract point.
CRISIS SITE R/S
R/S
CRISIS SITE
BP
CORRIDOR R/S ORP
L C C
BP
LCC R/S
EP
FACTORY
RP HILL #13
IP
OCEAN
LHA
(ILLUSTRATION TWO)
3. The Four Assault Options. The recovery of U.S. citizens could take place from a variety of objectives. When planning for the recovery operation, four options must be considered. The assault options listed below are listed in order of desirability: a. Open Air Option, or Sniper Option. This option utilizes snipers to eliminate all the terrorists. There are two considerations however, that must be verified. First, the Strike Force must be certain of the number of terrorists, and the terrorists must expose themselves to the snipers all at once. Second, an assault element must be in place and ready to make entry into the objective once the snipers have fired. This option is the most preferred because the assault element is now making entry into an objective undefended
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by personnel. Too much importance cannot be placed on being certain of the number of terrorists in the crisis site. b. Vehicle Option. The second most preferred. This option relies on negotiations with the terrorists. If the terrorists request a vehicle as part of the negotiating process, and the detachment/host nation can support it, it is in our best interest to provide that vehicle. We can now place all the terrorists and the precious cargo in a small linear target, ie., sedan, van, or bus. Movement of the terrorists and precious cargo from the target to the vehicle may also allow the open air option. Should the mobile option become viable, the vehicle that is delivered should be "doctored" to aid the assaulters in the clearing process. Doctoring the vehicle and tactics will be discussed in a future class. c. Stronghold or Barricaded Option. The least preferred option. This option calls for the assault force to assault a defended structure. It probably also calls for the use of explosives to gain entry. As any infantryman will tell you, it is easier to defend than it is to assault or attack. Because of these disadvantages, we will spend the majority of our training time on this assault option. d. Maritime Option. The maritime option is nothing more than a stronghold or barricade option afloat. This includes Merchant vessels, Naval vessels, Gas Oil platforms. Just because our target might be a land structure, we must plan for all four assault options. 4. The Two Types of Assaults. Generally speaking, there are two types of assaults that we must be capable of conducting. Under SOF standards, we have six hours from the receipt of the warning/alert order to be able to start the execution phase. What happens on the target and during the planning phase will determine which of the following assaults we conduct: a. The Emergency Assault. This is the bread and butter of the detachment's "Inextremis" Hostage Recovery capability. It is usually conducted with little intelligence and little time to plan and rehearse. An assault is considered an emergency assault if it is executed because of what has, or is, physically happening on the objective. In other words, the terrorists are forcing our hand because of actions they are taking on the target. For example, if R&S is observing a terrorist physically abusing or killing a known hostage, and the NCA believes this action to be inextremis, this could prompt the order to conduct an emergency assault. Whether we have one hour to plan or one week to plan, this is an emergency assault. We are assaulting on the terrorists timeline. The focus of our training must be on the emergency assault. That is what the "I" in IHR means. If we have an address, a way to get there and back, we should be ready to assault. b. The Deliberate Assault. A deliberate assault is nothing more than the troop assaulting the target when they are ready. The six hours after the receipt of the warning/alert order is usually consumed by emergency assault planning. If the order to execute is not given by the end of the six hours, and the SOF is being fed practical intelligence, the deliberate assault planning phase will begin. Do not let the six hour criteria confuse you. NCA can send the order to assault at anytime. It would not be unreasonable for the NCA to send an alert order, immediately followed by an execute order. The deliberate assault is not the focus of training for operator’s where IHR is concerned. That is not to say operators need not train to assault deliberately. The reasonable man theory however, would suggest if the detachment has enough time to plan and rehearse for an emergency assault, and transition to deliberate planning and rehearsals, the na-
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tional assets may very well be on location. This statement does not down play the importance of the detachment. On the contrary, it shows how important they are should they be required to conduct a short notice, Inextremis Hostage Recovery. Even if the national assets do arrive on location, it doesn't mean the detachment will be non-players. Scenario dependent, the troop may still have a vital role. 5. The Three Types of Environments. When executing an IHR, the environment we are in is an important factor to consider. For example, conducting an IHR in Thailand would greatly differ from conducting an IHR in Iraq. The relationship between the U.S. government and the country the target is in, is the greatest factor in determining what the environment will be. a. Permissive or Non-Hostile Environment. This environment is the best case scenario. The country the target is in will allow and not hinder the operation. In most cases, the host country will even provide some type of support for the operation ie. cordon forces, intelligence assets, facilities for a forward staging base... b. Semi-Permissive or Uncertain Environment. This environment is the second most desirable. The country the target is in will allow the operation to take place but will usually not aid the operation in any way. Also, the country will not take any responsibility for the actions of the local populace, or any reaction force that may attempt to hinder the operation. c. Non Permissive or Hostile Environment. This environment is the worst case scenario. The country the target is in will not allow the operation to take place on their soil. The U.S. and the target country may be adversaries and the assault will probably be opposed. This environment and the emergency assault should be the focus of training for the troop operator. Fight your way in, recover the precious cargo, and fight your way out. 6. The Four Principles of Close Quarters Battle. The three key elements to offensive combat are speed, surprise, and violence of action. The following principles compliment these elements and must be requisite principles for the assault force. a. Marksmanship. This entire program is based on your surgical ability to engage discriminative targets. Up to this point in your training you have trained in marksmanship skills only. Almost any soldier can be trained to shoot accurately and quickly. Not every soldier however, can master discriminative target shooting. If the NCA decides to exercise the detachment SOC to conduct an IHR, it is because they have confidence in, if nothing else, our shooting, and target identification skills. These marksmanship skills are very perishable and must be maintained throughout your tour as a CQB team member. b. Breaching. Without the ability to gain entry into an objective, we have already lost before the fight has begun. All operators have been certified as explosive breachers. This means they can gain entry into a given target medium 100% of the time with minimal collateral damage. What must always be assumed is that behind the breach point is our precious cargo. Therefore, like our marksmanship, breaching is surgical in nature. Any soldier could throw a satchel charge in front of a door and gain entry into a target. This is known as a destruction charge however, and not breaching as related to CQB/IHR. There are four types of breaching commonly used in CQB/IHR.
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(1) Explosive. Most commonly used for external breaching because of the high probability of success and "shock" value. (2) Ballistic. This type of breaching uses a shotgun to breach internal and external doors and locks. It is most commonly used for internal locked doors because of the portability and speed of the shotgun. Specialized shells are used to minimize collateral damage, ie., lockbusters and Avon rounds. (3) Mechanical. This type of breaching utilizes mechanical tools to breach internal and external doors and locks. It is most commonly used as a back-up to explosive and ballistic breaching. Almost every shooter can carry a mechanical tool into the target. Mechanical tools include heavy and light sledge hammers, hooligan tools, bolt cutters, and crow bars. (4) Thermal (Isothermic Cutting Torch). This type of breaching utilizes burning oxygen to defeat a given target. It is the least preferred type of breaching because the time and effort involved to employ the system. If for example however, we are breaching reinforced concrete, the iso-torch would probably be used to defeat any standing rebar after the explosive breach. c. Diversions. Anytime that it is practical, we must plan and utilize a diversion. If we are planning to make entry into the north side of an objective for example, we would want some type of diversion on the south side. Diversions can be audible, visual, or a combination of the two. Explosives are again the most common. The idea is to attract the adversaries attention away from our intentions. d. Mindset. The three principles above are all skills that have been, or will be taught to you during this course of instruction. Mindset however, is a principle that we cannot teach you in just five short weeks. We can however, make you aware of what is required of you in respect to mindset. Being operators though, this list of requirements would be redundant. You would not be here if there was a question on your maturity, judgment, integrity, or ability to operate in an adverse environment. So lets look at a system devised by Jeff Cooper to describe ones mindset, and how that mindset relates to CQB. This system has assigned color codes to different conditions of awareness. (See illustration three). (1) Condition White describes one who is "unready and unprepared" to deal with a lethal confrontation. The FBI conducts studies of convicted felons on a regular basis. One such study focused on convicted armed robbers. When asked if there was a particular type of individual that the robber chose to perpetrate the crime upon, the felons almost unanimously answered, they chose the individual that appeared to be an introvert, walked with his head down, and generally looked uncomfortable in his surroundings. This type of person is an easy target for criminals. This condition obviously has no place in the Army, much less in field of Special Operations. Condition White will see you dead. (2) Condition Yellow is an upgrade from Condition White and describes one is who is in a state of "relaxed alert". In other words he is aware of his surroundings, and understands the possibility of lethal confrontation. This is the condition that you can live in. It is not a paranoid state, simply an awareness of ones environment. As conditions change, our level of alertness may also. (3) Condition Orange is an upgrade from Condition Yellow and describes one who is in a state of "specific alert". Imagine yourself in condition yellow, where you should be, and while you are downtown
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USA you observe an individual looking at you while he reaches rather quickly beneath his jacket. This action should upgrade your level of alertness to a specific alert, or Condition Orange. Should this individual brandish a firearm, you now upgrade to the highest condition of alert or readiness. Condition Orange is not a condition that can be lived in for long periods of time. Undercover police officers often find themselves attempting to live in this condition for long periods of time and many find that it is physically and psychologically exhausting to say the least. (4) Condition Red is an upgrade from Condition Orange and describes one who is in a lethal situation that dictates he "FIGHT"! If you should find yourself in this situation and you have no means to fight, then fleeing might be your best response. The following relates the color code to CQB specifically: - White. Non-player, unready and unprepared. - Yellow. In receipt of a warning order, relaxed alert. - Orange. Leaving the LCC and the target is in sight, specific alert. - Red. Inside the target and an occupant is aiming a weapon at you or a teammate, FIGHT.
WHITE Y AD E R ED UN AR P E PR N U
YELLOW C FI I EC T P S UN ALER
ORANGE IC F CI T E SP LER A
RED
HT G FI
(ILLUSTRATION THREE)
7. The Eight Fundamentals of Close Quarters Battle. The eight fundamentals of CQB describe in sequence what takes place inside a single enclosure or room. (See illustration four). a. #1 - Dominate. The room is dominated from the corners. The corners allow the best coverage of a room by a single shooter. The point of domination is dictated by the location of the entry point in relation to the room. Generally speaking, all shots should be taken while moving to this point of domination. b. #2 - Eliminate. While we are moving to our point of domination, we are eliminating all threat targets. Operationally, what we eliminate will be spelled out in the execution order, rules of engagement. In any case, we must condition ourselves to observe the hands of any potential threat as they are encountered. If what is in the individuals hands is a perceived threat, or any physical actions that are perceived life threatening, then that individual becomes a shoot target. c. #3 - Control. While we are dominating and eliminating, we must control those individuals that will not be shot by the use of verbiage. Once the no-shoot target is recognized by a shooter, he should start the controlling verbiage as soon as it is practical. In no case are we to allow an occupant of a room to exit that
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room. Physically controlling an individual is the last resort technique. The verbiage currently being used is "DOWN, DOWN, DOWN, WE'RE AMERICANS", pause for compliance, "DON'T MOVE". This verbiage may have to be given more than once before the individual's) comply. It must be given in an authoritarian manner and must be clear and concise in its delivery. d. #4 - Dead-check. Those individuals that were engaged must be physically checked to verify their condition. Using a search man and a cover man, the search man will deliver a thump to the eye of a seemingly dead individual. Medical doctors concur that this technique of establishing ones physical condition, dead or alive, is expedient and accurate. Anytime that you choose not to dead-check an individual, you are potentially leaving a threat at your back. Unless this individuals head is in one location, and his body in another, conduct a dead-check! e. #5 - Search the room. Again while using the buddy system, the room or enclosure will now be searched for any hidden or unexposed adversaries or improvised explosive devices (IED's). If the DAP troop is working independently, this search is a detailed search. If working with the security element trailers, the search for the DAP team now becomes a hasty search. f. #6 - Search and cuff the living. Again while using the buddy system, those individuals that were not engaged must now be cursory searched and flex-cuffed. As you will see in your personnel handling class, this is for the individual’s safety and the operators safety. Note: The first six fundamentals above are done in every enclosure. The only exception is that the deadcheck and search of the room might be reversed depending on the configuration of a particular room. The last two fundamentals are conducted when the entire crisis site has been cleared. (Illustration four)
?
H DESK
VERBIAGE
SEARCH & CUFF SEARCH ROOM
T ELIMINATE DEAD-CHECK
S
S POINTS OF DOMINATION S=SHOOTER
T=TERRORIST
H=HOSTAGE
?=UNCLEARED
g. #7 - Send the HUTS report. Once the crisis site is cleared and marshaling is taking place, the hostage holding area (HHA) controller gains accountability of all H's, hostages, U's, unknowns, T's, terrorists,
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and S's, shooters. The HHA controller must be sure of the accountability prior to sending the report to HQ's. A false report could cause a re-clear or mission failure. When sending the report, the categories are reported in HUTS sequence. Example #1: "You this is me, 1 hotel up, 1 uniform up, 5 tangos down, request permission to evacuate, over". Notice that no shooter count was given. This is understood to mean that all shooters are up and accounted for, or reporting by exception. Up means alive, and down means dead. Regardless if an individual is wounded, if he is still alive, he is reported as "up". If a "s" or shooter is wounded, it will be sent at the end of the report. Example #2: "You this is me, one hotel up, one uniform up, five tangos down, Sgt Gordon has a sucking face wound, request permission to evacuate, over". This example indicates that all shooters are up, but one is wounded. Prompting HQ"s of this will assist in the treatment of the shooter once back to rear. h. #8 - Evacuate. Once permission is granted, the evacuation begins. There are three types of evacuations: (1) Deliberate. It is rehearsed and usually means that the assault went as planned. (2) Hasty Deliberate. It is rehearsed and usually means that something on or near the objective is causing the evacuation to be sped up, ie., fire, IED(s), reaction forces... (3) Emergency. It is rehearsed and usually means great loss of life or failure of the mission if it is not executed ie. imminent firing of an IED, imminent failure of the mission due to an overwhelming force or casualties... The eight fundamentals of CQB are the foundation of IHR. Exclusion of even one of these fundamentals will decrease our chance of success. 8. The three rules of Initiative Based Tactics (IBT). Our style of tactics have been coined as initiative based tactics. Because we conduct the "dynamic" assault, or "always changing" assault, the initiative of the individual shooter is what will provide us success in our operation. The following three rules seem to over simplify our tactics, but are really meant only to compliment the eight fundamentals of CQB. a. #1 - Move to the lone shooter or danger area. During the assault, this rule states where you should move to next. If you have just cleared a room and have moved into a hallway, you need only to find where there is a shooter by himself and/or where the next danger area is. That is the next threat that must be dealt with. b. #2 - Shoot only threat targets. As discussed many times previously, we are not in the business of shooting hostages. Be sure of your target and consider the background! c. #3 - Protect each other. If you see a teammate in need of assistance, immediately take the "initiative" and lend a hand. Many a debate has been made on what has priority, the lives of the precious cargo, or the lives of operators in the assault. One side of this debate is, without protecting the lives of operators in the assault, the precious cargo may not have anyone to recover them.
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9. The Reconnaissance and Surveillance reporting procedures. As a member of the Direct Action Team, you must know the basic reporting procedures utilized by the R&S teams. Much of your planning may come from the picture that was painted for you by those teams. (See illustrations five and six).
black
green
red 1
OVERHEAD VIEW
white 1 MAIN ENTRANCE
red
white
(illustration five)
----------------------------------------------------------------(SIDE VIEW)
roof b
a
c
d
T
1
white 1c a
c
b
2
T white 2b b
a
T
3
white 3a a
b
c
d
e
T
4
white 4e T=terrorist
"white side"
(illustration six)
a. Reporting sides of structures. The main entrance or the most traveled side of a structure is labeled the white side. If this is not discernible, the northern most side becomes the white side. Opposing the white side is the black side. As you are looking at the white side, the right side is red, and the left side is
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green. If a side has more than one face, then reading from left to right it is the color first, then the color and the number 1, then number 2... b. Reporting decks or levels on structures. The roof of a structure is simply labeled the roof. The decks are labeled numerically from the top deck and down. This technique of reporting decks was prompted by a real world operation. What a sniper believed to be the first floor, numbering from the bottom and up, was in actuality the third floor. From his hide the first and second deck was not visible. You can see the problem. Since from most hides the top deck can be seen more often than the bottom deck, this technique has proven itself quite accurate. c. Reporting openings on structures. Openings on a deck are reported alphabetically from the left to the right. If there are more than 26 openings on a particular deck, (A to Z), the letters are doubled up... SUMMARY: You can see that there are a lot of academics involved in the IHR mission. You will learn and retain all of this material by memory, or repetition. IHR is a special operation and it requires men who are driven to succeed at all costs. We may be entrusted by our Nation to recover its most vital asset, its citizens. This is most certainly a thinking mans game and in this training, it is only the determined man that excels.
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INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES 1. INTRODUCTION: Tasked to conduct a short notice in extremis hostage rescue there is no time to obtain solid intelligence (intel) on the objective. However, you can get eyes on the objective. But how do you get a clear working picture that contains enough detail to answer critical Essential Element Information (EEIs)'s? 2. PURPOSE: This section is provide you the policies, procedures and standards for the collection and reporting of intelligence information, during an in-extremis hostage recovery operation. Collection activity in an in-extremis operation will be primarily concerned with terrain, enemy, and the objective. The Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH) will form the basis collection effort. The consulate security officer (SRC) will coordinate the transmission of EEI's, the concerns and intentions of the host country and the international community, incident country information, hostage information, and terrorists groups. The collection assets of the detachment will be principally concerned with the collection of information concerning events and activities at the target area, terrain, and helicopter landing zones in and around the target area, real time information of the target area and identification of hostages. 3. COLLECTION OPERATIONS The primary concern of the detachment collection assets will be centered on gathering information about targets. Collection assets must be able to effectively transmit observations about built up areas to the SRC for analysis in graphic terms, with a minimum amount of transmission time. Detachment collection assets must be thoroughly familiar with the architecture of countries in the area of operation, the specifics about construction and engineering, and the materials most often used in construction. a. SHAPE: The first concern for on-scene collection assets is the general shape of the building. Additions such as garages, patios, or porches will not be considered as part of the basic design. In traditional construction there are seven styles that may be observed. (1) Square. A square shaped building is designed so that all four sides are of equal size. Square designs are normally found in inner city construction, smaller family dwellings, and in utility company maintenance buildings. (2) Rectangle. A rectangle shaped building is designed so that opposite sides are equal size. The rectangle is the most commonly used shape in construction. (3) T. A T-shaped building is a modification of a square or rectangle with a wing extending from the center of the front or back. (4) L. An L-shaped building is a modification of a square or rectangle with a wing extending from one end or the other of the front or back. A common design of family dwellings.
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(5) U. A U-shaped building is a modification of a rectangle with a wing extending from each of the front or back. A modification of the U-shaped is the multiple U, with more than two wings extending from the front or back. Common to large official buildings or hospitals. (6) H. An H-shaped building is a modification of the rectangle with the wing extending from each end to the front and back. A modification of the H-shaped building is the multiple H, with more than two wings extending to the front and back. Common to military bases. (7) X. An X-shaped building has a center common area with T-shaped wings extending from the center of each side. X-shaped designs are found in some apartment complexes. (8) Buildings which do not fit the traditional designs will be treated as irregularly shaped and handled in the manner described in paragraph b (3) below. b. Designation of Front and Numbering Sides (1) Once the general shape of the building has been determined, the collections assets will determine on which side the main entrance is located and designate that side the base side. If no side can be identified as the main entrance, the team will agree on which side will be designated as the base side. (2) Once the base side has been determined, the sides will be numbered in a clockwise manner with the base side designated as side one. See enclosure (1) for geometric analysis of traditional design numbering. (3) For irregularly shaped buildings the base side will be identified and the sides numbered, but the team will transmit the direction the sides take relative to each other. Example: "Side one, right. Side two, right. Side three, right. Side four, right. Side five, right. Side one." describes a pentagon shaped irregular design. c. Measurement of side lengths (1) Once the sides have been numbered, the collections assets will transmit the general shape, side numbers, and their length. Example: "rectangle, side one 20 feet, side two 10 feet respectively." See enclosure (1). (2) For irregularly shaped buildings, the same procedure is transmitted, plus the direction the sides take relative to each other. Example: "Irregular, side one 20 feet, side two 20 feet right, side three 20 feet right, side four 20 feet right, side five 20 feet right, side one, describes a pentagon shape.
d. Numbering of floors (1) Once the sides have been numbered, the collection team will number the individual floors. Floors will be numbered from one starting with the first floor.
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(2) Basements will not be included in the numbering, but rather, designated as basements. (3) Roof, floors, or attics will not be numbered if the roof angle extends down to floor level. The floor will be numbered if the angle does not extend down all the way to the floor levels or if the floor width diminishes as it goes up in length. e. Subdivision of Sides (1) After the collection team has numbered the sides, they will subdivide each individual side to follow for reference points and areas when describing features of the side. (2) The side will first be divided down the center line and each half will be further subdivided down their respective centerlines. This division will, in effect, divide the side into quarters. The imaginary subdivision lines will then be identified as the red, white and blue lines for use as reference points for feature description. (3) When transmitting data concerning a particular feature on a particular floor of a particular side, the side number will be given first, followed by the floor number, and the reference point. Example: "2-2 white indicates side two, second floor along the midline of the side. (4) If the feature does not fall exactly on a reference point the reference areas will designated as follows: (a) Left area. The left area is the space between the left edge and the red line. (b) Left Center area. The left center area is the space between the red line ans the white line. (c) Right Center area. The right center area is the space between the white line and the blue line. (d) Right area. The right area is the space between the blue line and the right edge. f. Roof Designations (1) As discussed in subparagraph d. above, a roof designation is given to floors where the roof angle extends down the entire height of the floor. The subdivisions of the sides discussed in subparagraph e. will be extended to the roof to describe any features such as gables, porches, etc. (2) When discussing features of a roof on a particular side, the side number is given first followed by roof and the reference point or area. Example: "2-roof-red" indicates side two, roof, along the red line. (3) If a feature such as a chimney is at the point where the roof angles converge then it is reported on one side only and the roof description is followed by peak. Example: "2-roof peak white" indicates side two, peak of the roof on the centerline.
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g. Brevity Reporting (1) The Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook, Chapter 34, will be the source document for reporting information concerning in-extremis recovery in a built up area. All information concerning measurements will be given in feet. (2) When applying the GIRH to brevity reporting, the collections team will first report the chapter number in the GIRH followed by the paragraph concerning the information being reported. The team will then briefly describe the feature using the procedures outlined in the paragraph. Example: "34-F-1-1 while-work-none-in-left0right- 3 1/2 x 7". This indicates a wooden floor in the center of the first floor of side one. The door does not have any windows, opens inward, hinges are on the left side of the door, the door knob is on the right side, and the door is 3 1/2 feet by 7 feet. 5. COLLECTION OF TERRORIST INFORMATION a. Another major concern of detachment collection assets will center on the gathering of information about the terrorist holding the hostages. Emphasis on the terrorists will be focused on the weapons they use, pattern of activity, physical description, and areas avoided. b. Any change in the number of terrorists at their target must be reported in the most expeditious manner either through the SRC or directly to the Assault Force Commander once the strike force is airborne. c. Brevity Reporting (1) One chapter of the Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook is concerned with terrorist data while another chapter deals with related vehicular data. (2) When applying the GIRH to brevity reporting, the collections team will first report the chapter number in the GIRH followed by the paragraph and subparagraph of the information being reported and the information. If the chapter does not change in subsequent reporting during the transmission, only the paragraph and subprogram need be stated. Example: "31-A-2, blond, 6ft, 180 lbs-A-3, make A0505, appears to be the leader", is a physical description of the apparent leader of terrorists. 6. COLLECTION OF DATA CONCERNING THE HOSTAGES a. Depending on the situation and the target area, the collections team will endeavor to collect information concerning the hostages being held. Emphasis will be on the number of hostages, their physical condition, description, any pattern or routine of their confinement that can be determined, and relations with their captors. b. Any change to the location or treatment of the hostages or if the terrorists begin to execute them must be reported in the more expeditious manner through the SRC or directly to the Assault Force Commander if the strike force is airborne.
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c. Brevity Reporting (1) Another chapter of the Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH) is concerned with information to be passed concerning the hostages. (2) When applying the GIRH to brevity reporting, the collections team will first state the chapter number followed by the paragraph and subparagraph of the information being reported and the information. If the chapter does not change in subsequent reporting during the transmission, only the paragraph and subprogram need be stated to pass additional information. Example: "32-B-2, male, B-3, Caucasian, , B-6, no, B-7 yes, B-8, brown, B-9, 6 ft, B-10, 200, B-11, no, B-12, no, B-13, left arm"' is a description of a hostage. 7. TERRAIN ANALYSIS AND HLA SELECTION a. Detachment collections assets must also provide to the strike force planners an accurate description of the terrain immediately surrounding the target and possible helicopter landing zones around the target. b. When dealing with the terrain immediately adjacent to the target, collections team will use the target itself as a reference. The collections team will number the corners of the target corresponding to the sides which converge on them, take a bisection of the angle of the corner, and give a distance the terrain feature is from the corner. Example: "Tree, 3-4 corner, 50 feet", indicates that a tree is located 50 feet from the corner of side three or four. c. If the terrain feature does not fall exactly on the bisection of the corners, the collection team will utilize the reference points and areas on the side of the building to describe the terrain feature and give a distance the feature is from the building. Example: "Tree,3, white, 50 feet", indicates that a tree is 50 feet from the centerline of side three. d. The collection team will utilize this system to describe terrain features, man made barriers, outside light poles, other buildings, enemy positions, and potential landing zones. e. Potential helicopter landing zones will be stated in reference to the target as described above or by giving a map grid of the zone. f. Descriptions of the potential landing zones will be given in accordance with the General Intelligence Requirements Handbook or a pre-agreed HLA brief.
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THE URBAN OP/HIDE 1. INTRODUCTION: As we all know trying to stay hidden in a city when you’re on the move is fairly easy. But say for instance you needed to observe one specific building. On television all you would need to do is park in a sedan out front and of course no one would see you! In everyday life almost every neighborhood has a neighborhood watch program. Shortly after arriving there you would get a visit from the men in blue. Visiting a structure nearby is better if you do it right. 2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this period of instruction is to teach the student in various methods and techniques to plan, construct and conduct a clandestine urban observation post/hide. BODY: 1. DEFINITIONS. a. Non-Permissive. This condition envisions evacuation of personnel under conditions ranging from civil disorder, terrorist action, to full scale combat operations. b. Semi-Permissive. This environment envisions host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations, do not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended area or country of operations. c. Permissive. This condition envisions no resistance to operations and thus requires little to no displacement of combat forces to support movement. Host nation support can be expected and concurrence for operations is normally given. d. DARE. Designated area for recovery/extraction. 2. PURPOSE. The purpose for utilizing clandestine urban observation posts are: a. Observing and reporting activity of individuals within a particular house, building, area, before, during and after specific operation. b. Providing cover and protection for the strike element on the ground in the area. c. Calling in reserve forces and/or engaging hostile forces. d. Reduction of selected hostile targets. 3. SELECTING AN URBAN HIDE LOCATION. The first thing that you must realize is that until you actually occupy the op/hide it is considered a tentative site. The choice of the OP is usually dictated by the purpose of the OP, the availability of concealment and cover, surveillance equipment available, and the field of view of the target area. You should have several sites selected incase your primary site is a unsuitable.
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a. OP Requirements. (1) Every urban OP must provide the following elements: (a) Cover (b) Observation (c) Concealment (d) Clandestine means of entry and exit. (2) To assist in determining if the OP meets the above requirements, the team can utilize the acronym KOCOA. (3) The R&S team should try to AVOID THE OBVIOUS! If it appears to be a good location for a hide, then the enemy has probably thought of it too. b. Considerations for Selecting a Hide Site. The following are several considerations in selecting your op/hide site. (1) Enemy Situation. (a) Hostile (all personnel). (b) Semi-hostile (local partisans available). (c) Friendly (with small groups of hostiles). (2) Friendly Situation. (a) No friendlies readily available. (b) Partisans able to give limited assistance. (c) Partisans able to assist freely. (3) Location of Hostiles. (a) Approximately what area. (b) Approximately what building(s). (c) Approximately what floor(s).
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(d) Approximately what room(s). (4) Locations of Possible Hide Sites around Objective Area. (a) Derelict houses or buildings. (b) Occupied houses. (friendlies) (c) Shops. (d) Public buildings. (e) Factories and warehouses. NOTE: Do not use schools, churches, cemeteries or religious sites. c. Area Routine Around Hide Site. (1) When and where do children play. Avoid if possible; sometimes used to seek out/compromise OPs. (2) Businesses/shops. When opened/closed, how busy and when. (3) Locations of meeting places. Bars, clubs parks, squares. (4) Workmen/construction. When and where; avoid/use to advantage. (5) Churches/religious shrines. Where, busy times, religious holidays. (6) Vehicle traffic. Type, where, when, rush hours, average speed. (7) Political situation/preference. Pro or anti host country government. (8) Flash points. Possible hot spots, could expect trouble, trouble in the past. (9) Area awareness of security force operations. Do they know how the security force operates. (10) Every day activity. 4. HIDE SITE RECONNAISSANCE. Reconnaissance can be conducted by aerial and vehicular means, but if it is absolutely essential that a foot reconnaissance be made in the AO, these ground reconnaissance patrols must be conducted so as NOT to compromise or draw attention to the OPs. If possible, a CI representative should accompany the team conducting the reconnaissance.
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a. Preliminary Reconnaissance. These are usually conducted via map and/or photos (ground or aerial) and/or confirmed through HUMINT sources. They are conducted so that prior to any ground reconnaissance or insertion of teams, you have established: (1) Tentative locations for suitable primary and alternate sites. (2) Tentative locations for primary and alternate staging areas, LCC, E&E routes, DARE's. (3) Land marks/terrain features used for navigational aids. (4) If possible, the prospective OPs should be viewed from a distance to determine their suitability. b. Detailed Reconnaissance. The success of an OP can be increased by a thorough detailed reconnaissance. A detailed reconnaissance is a physical survey of the tentative site and it's surrounding areas. The information obtained during the detailed reconnaissance of the exterior of hide site will include: (1) Approach routes. (2) Entry points. (3) Exit points. (4) Departure routes. (5) Cover, shadow, lights, and animals. (6) Condition of the ground. (7) Obstacles; entry, extract, vehicle hindrance. (8) Escape and evasion routes. c. If a leaders reconnaissance is conducted the following information should be obtained to assist the OP team on gaining access into the hide site. (1) Doors. Type, where located, type of handles, opens in or out, windows on doors, damaged. (2) Windows. Type, where located, how do they open, broken, curtains. (3) Windows and Doors. Type locks, squeaks/noises, stiff/stuck. (4) Tools that may be required. (Lock picks, bolt cutters, files, jimmies, glass cutters, screw drivers, hammers, etc.) (5) Other means of entry. (Sewer lines, vents, air ducts, etc.)
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d. The following specifics of the tentative primary and alternate sites, if possible, should be investigated: (1) Building construction. Masonry, bullet proof, weather proof. (2) Windows. Location, condition, type, size. (3) Doors. Location, condition, type, size. (4) Type of floor and noises. (5) Type of ceiling. Acoustics. (6) Type of walls. Sound, acoustics. (7) Stairs. Number and noises. (8) Furniture/fittings. Type and location. (9) Loopholes. Type and location. (10) Floor plans and photos. (11) Direction and distance to the target or target area. (12) Obstacles and vegetation. Between OP and target area. (13) Dead space. (Observation and direct fire) (14) Rubble and trash piles. Type, location. Possible firing position. (15) Vehicles and machinery. Type, location, condition, movable/static. (16) Buildings intended use. (17) Other considerations: (a) Signs of recent occupation. (b) Possible hiding places. (c) Tools, equipment, and materials for hide construction. (d) Lighting.
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(e) Location of animals and pets. (f) Location of alternate OP. (g) Location for back up force. (Possible LCC for assault force) (h) Mutual support between OP's. (i) Allow for comfort. (j) OP protection and intruder detection. (k) Security and back up plans. e. Security During the Reconnaissance. (1) When the OP site is physically reconnoitered, some type of security intrusion device can be left behind so that when the OP party arrives for occupation, they will be able to determine if any activity has taken place since the reconnaissance. Noted activity may warrant aborting the mission, placing the OP site under surveillance, or putting plans into effect for use of an alternate site. (2) Active and passive sensors can be used in this security role. The reconnaissance team can stage objects in and around the area that will identify any presence since their departure. All security devices must be able to withstand scrutiny. Consider using two devices independent of each other in case one is compromised. 5. PLANNING FOR INSERT METHODS. You should keep fore most in your mind that a stealthy insertion is preferred over any deception. Hostile parties will be surveillance conscious and take note of the troops and vehicles of our friendly forces. They will count heads as units enter and leave their areas or conduct their own searches upon completion of our operations. By now it should be clear that insertion of the OP teams is a very difficult phase of the operation. Inserting at night, during the late hours, will increase overall security, but must be practiced to overcome the difficulties of darkness. a. Foot Patrol. The problems and dangers are obvious. The team will be vulnerable as it patrols to the site through rural or urban terrain. In occupied or non-hostile areas, the team can be observed and the mission effectiveness reduced or negated. In addition, equipment transportation will be difficult if it must be concealed from the local populace. The team can be dropped off by a security patrol that is conducting normal patrolling activities. The team must not look different than the security patrol. Obtrusive OP equipment must be disguised or dropped off separately at a safer time. b. Military/Civilian Vehicle. Mobile patrols will fit in with the normal pattern of military operations and are ideal for moving in and out both men and equipment. Once again, the tactical situation dictates the extent to which military vehicles can be utilized. Careful thought must be given to the selection of drop off points (DOP) and pick up points (PUP) since the team may be observed in the street from a num-
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ber of vantage points. Civilian vehicles can also be used for missions requiring clandestine insertion, if they fit into the AO. This must be well planned and practiced to make it go smooth. c. Deception. A deception operation can be used to draw attention away from the insertion of the team; however, it can also draw attention to the area of the operation. Deceptions also require added resources and manpower. Some methods are: (1) Attack. Infantry attacks on enemy held terrain can be conducted to cover the insertion of a team which would "stay behind" after the attacking force withdraws. (2) Planned House Search. A neighborhood search for wanted persons, weapons, or compliance with regulations can cover a team's insert and conceal the noise of access into the site. OP equipment must be disguised. (3) Bomb Scare. A bomb scare or similar emergency can be conducted to clear the area of all persons. d. OP Equipment Selection. Once the form of transportation for insert has been designated, the team will select the minimum amount of equipment needed to conduct and maintain the OP, taking into account the transportation and weight restrictions. Enclosure (1) is a comprehensive list of OP equipment and clothing. e. Before departing friendly areas there are several tasks that need to be checked during final inspection. (1) All team members should have a good meal and make a long head call prior to departing. (2) To insure no foreign smells are carried in, all team members should stop shaving and showering at least 24 hours (minimum) before departure. This is dependent on the local culture. (3) All weapons, ammunition, observation and communications equipment must be checked to ensure proper functioning. (4) Equipment used to access the site must be checked and readily accessible. Reconnaissance of the site should give you an idea of entry points and gear needed to gain access to the OP site. 6. INSERTION OF THE URBAN OBSERVATION POST/HIDE. a. The insertion phase of the mission starts from the last secure position the team occupies prior to the actual access into the OP site itself. The team can depart from within a friendly perimeter, from a secure dwelling, from a ship, aircraft, or a motor vehicle. Regardless of the departure point, the movement to the OP site is dictated by the tactical environment surrounding the site.
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b. Security during the insertion is a critical part of the mission. Contact with hostile forces, either physical or visual, will certainly jeopardize the team's safety and its ability to carry on. Inserting into the urban OP is handled just like any other patrol with only minor changes. c. Considering the above situations, the technique of movement into the site must be compatible with the environment. It is always preferred that the team inserts clandestinely. In enemy controlled territory, the team must infiltrate using stealth, good intelligence, and possibly the aid of locals. (1) Deception. As stated earlier, a deception plan that will divert attention away from the OP party can be utilized. For example: Increased activity at other locations, dummy inserts, etc., but remember that the deception may draw attention to your AO. (2) Routes. Regardless of the insert mode, primary and alternate routes are selected. Routes should provide as much cover and concealment as possible. Check points and rally points are selected to aid in control and security. All team members must be familiar with the AO and all planned routes to the site. (3) Back up/Reaction Forces. To assist the team in security, an infantry squad or security platoon squad (+/depending on mode of insert) can escort the team on it’s insert. The squad may also help with equipment transfer, accessing the site, and construction if the situation permits. While the insert is taking place, a sparrow hawk reaction force is placed on stand by for immediate deployment in case the team makes physical contact. An emergency recovery vehicle is also placed on standby for extracting the team. Reaction forces and emergency recovery vehicles are kept on standby for the mission's entirety. (4) Weapons. During insertion, all team members will carry weapons suitable for personal defense. Weapons will be loaded, with a round in the chamber, and the safety on. The team leader will assign fields of fire to provide 360 degree security while moving and at halts. (5) Communications. Communication must be maintained with higher headquarters during insertion. Good comm checks must be made prior to departure. Comm must be kept to a minimum during insertion, an execution checklist must be utilized and encryption must be used. (6) Contact. There are two types of compromise that are considered under contact, they are active and passive. (a) Active Compromise. An active compromise can be defined as a positive contact with hostiles forces or locals. This contact can take place while conducting your insert, extract, or while in the OP site. Examples of an active compromise include: 1 While inserting, being approached and questioned by local nationals or hostile forces as to the nature of your business in the area. 2 While extracting, being approach and questioned by local nationals or hostile forces as to the nature of your business in the area, an attempt is made to apprehend your team or by being pursued or engaged by hostile forces.
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3 While in the OP, being visually seen by local nationals or hostile forces. This can be describe as someone on the outside of the OP looking at the hide site and pointing at it or it could be someone walking in on the OP site while it is occupied. 4 Physical contact with hostile forces during insertion will require an immediate extract for the team. The team will break contact by fire, close combat, and/or maneuver as per the Rules of Engagement. Extraction may be accomplished in the following ways: a Extraction by emergency recovery vehicle at or near the location of the contact. b Movement to a prearranged emergency PUP/LUP. c Initiation of the E&E plan and subsequent movement to a prearranged PUP/LUP, DARE, safe house, or the nearest friendly overt position. 5 At worst, the compromise will involve contact by small arms fire or an explosive device. There may be no indication of a successful compromise, so even if it is only suspected, appropriate action should be taken. (b) Passive Compromise. A passive compromise can be defined as observation of the team while it is inserting, extracting or operating within an OP but whoever observes the team pays little to no attention to them. Examples of a passive compromise include: 1 While inserting, the team is observed by a passing vehicle or pedestrian but they seem to pay no attention to them. 2 While extracting, the team is observed moving from the OP site to extract but are not engaged by hostile fire or pursued by nationals or hostile personnel. 3 While in the OP, and a passerby looks in the direction of the OP site but pays little to no attention and continues with their business. 4 Visual contact during insertion is a high probability of occurrence, but will not necessarily compromise the mission. The team leader will determine the extent of the contact and its effect on mission security. He can abort the mission with the approval of higher headquarters, if necessary. 7. GAINING ACCESS INTO THE URBAN OP/HIDE SITE. Gaining access to the OP site can range in difficulty and complexity. It is impossible to cover every entry situation, but as long as teams are trained in basic principles, then improvisation will go a long way in dealing with different situations. The team should be trained in obstacle negotiation and forcible entry techniques. Noise is a major consideration on the technique used for entry, and plans must be made to afford a quiet and unnoticeable entry. Entry will generally be made by removing parts of the structure or creating holes from adjoining structures. Here are some items to consider:
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a. Windows. Having to break a window quite obviously creates noise and could attract attention. If there is no alternate entry, then the window must be broken, using deception, long before entry to the building (say, in the reconnaissance phase) is effected. Many windows can quite easily be opened with practice using a putty knife or similar object. Teams must be wary of leaving telltale signs on the glass or frame and should wear gloves. Glass cutters and suction devices can be used, but they are generally more cumbersome to carry, and require practice to become proficient in their use. b. Doors. Breaking down a door is also quite obvious and noisy. Obtaining keys from locksmiths, landlords, or other sources is preferred. If the door must be forced open, damage should be kept to a minimum so that the door can still be used and entry remains unnoticed. There are a variety of tools that can be used to breach doors, ranging from screwdrivers to sledgehammers to hydraulics. Whatever is used, the techniques of usage must be rehearsed during the day and at night. The equipment must be both quiet and portable. If hanging locks need to be cut, use the bolt cutters as close to the base of the shackle as possible so that the shackle can be used to disguise entry. If keys or combinations are used, remember to turn over or receive them from the oncoming/ outgoing team. c. Exterior/Interior Walls. Removing sections of walls is time consuming and the operation may have to take place over more than one night. Intelligence on the site must be extremely good and security must be tight. Entering from adjoining rooms is possible in row-type housing and multilevel buildings. This is okay with sheetrock, but a no go with fire wall. This technique of insertion must be well planned, rehearsed, and coordinated. 8. OCCUPYING AN URBAN HIDE. a. Entry. Upon entry, several tasks are conducted simultaneously by pre-designated team members. (1) Post security. (2) Tactical clearance of the site. (3) Recover/reset intrusion devices. (4) Stage gear. (5) Disguise gear. Once you have gained entry, established security and searched the area; a sketch should be made of the area you are occupying, so that when you depart, it can be placed back as it was found. b. Op/Hide Layout. To ensure that the OP runs as efficiently as possible and facilitate rapid departure (OP compromised) when necessary, the OP should be laid out in an organized manner. The following areas should be planned for in your OP layout. (See figure 1) (1) Observation Area. This is where the observer watches the target. In the observation area should be the optics, op log, observation log, camera and sketch kit.
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(2) Radio Area. The radios, message books and comm logs are kept here and all comm work should be done here. (3) Eating Area. This area should be used for eating. There should not be any cooking in the OP. Remember that all the trash goes out with you. (4) Sleeping Area. This is your rest area. While you are in this area you should rest or occupy yourself with a book. But you should let your eyes rest as much as possible, and definitely NO walkmen or video games! As on a foot patrol, if you are not using it, it is packed away! (5) Head Area. In this area you do your thing into plastic bags. Make sure that you seal the bag good (zip lock bags seem to work the best) and then place it in another bag. Again, what goes in, will come out with you. c. You also need to plan for the following: (1) Observation times/shifts. (1-2 on/off) (2) Communications/reports. (burst, field exp ant) (3) Security. (booby traps, dead bolt, furniture, weapons) (4) Head calls. (where, how, take out with you) (5) Food/water. (pack in/out) (6) Medical. (pack in/out, where is close facility) 9. HIDE CONSTRUCTION. You have gained access to the hide site, have security established, your next priority of work will be to construct your hide. Knowing full well that you are not, in most cases, going to be able to hammer nails in the walls, modify walls or in most cases even rearrange the furniture. We need a system that will contain all our gear, conceal us from observation, ensure we can still observe and yet not alert the hostiles to changes in the surrounding areas. Enclosure (2) contains a list of tools, not meant to be all inclusive, or that you must take all the tools listed. This is a starting point. a. Types of Hides. Hides can be broken down into two categories which are the hasty and the detailed. (1) Hasty. A hasty hide is just that, something that does not take a lot of time and/or effort to put up. This can be as simple as a drape/curtain in front of you or a blackout drape behind you. It could even be as simple as standing to the side of a window that has a screen on it to obscure your outline. You may find yourself doing your observations from a hasty hide while the detailed hide site is being constructed. (2) Detailed. A detailed hide site is usually on more of a permanent level, you build one of these when you are going to occupy a hide for more than 24 hours, or it is a high traffic area and you need the
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additional concealment. There are several different types of detailed hides but we will just discuss two during this period of instruction. There are no "text book" answers when it comes to hides, you are just limited by the surroundings and your imagination. (a) Double Drape. A double drape is just that, a front drape set at approximately a 90 degree angle, with the second drape behind the first at a 60 degrees angle (if both drapes are hung from the same point) with the observer in between the drapes. These drapes are hung from the ceiling or a point above the viewing aperture to the floor. They can be attached to the ceiling by means of tacks, riggers tape, staple gun or hung on 550 cord. The bottom should also be attached to the deck to prevent tale-tale movement of your front drape. It should be tight with no wrinkles that might give away your position. (See figure 2) (b) PVC Frame. A PVC frame is mostly used when there can not be any noise made (cover for action) from hammer and nails. The frame is constructed out of the PVC pipe and fittings and is then covered with a front veil and blackout material. Ideally this should be constructed at night or during low traffic times. The frame should be sized so that the sides of the frame are not in the window/opening but extend past the sides and the top if possible. 1 Front Veil. The front veil should be of a shear type of material which will permit the observer to see out without the aid of optics (remember most optics will burn through minor haze) and break up the observers outline when viewed in. Mosquito netting is ideal for this as it can be spray painted either lighter or darker as the situation dictates. 2 Blackout Material. This material should not be light permeable, it can be either black cloth or cheese cloth. One attribute that cheese cloth has is it comes in a neutral color and could be dyed lighter or darker (done prior to the mission). A definite drawback to cheese cloth is that it weighs a lot for small sections. Note: When you are doing your rehearsals you must also practice constructing and disassembling your hide so that there is a minimum of excess noise or movement that could disclose your position. In creating your hide you are just limited by the tactical situation, materials on hand and your imagination. b. Hide Considerations. The following are a few things that you must keep in mind while you are establishing your hide. (1) Windows. Stay away from the windows! If at all possible, leave them exactly as they are and observe around curtains or through blinds. If this is not possible you may need to adjust your position or the curtains. Do so as little as possible. But always remember to make sure that it looks natural. (2) Furniture/equipment. If the furniture/equipment is located in view of the windows that the hostiles have always seen should they look that way, don't touch them. If it’s out of view, go ahead and rearrange it so that you'll be comfortable while observing.
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(3) Lighting. It's imperative that you control the lighting in your hide. If you allow light to filter in from behind you, it may result in you being silhouetted. In the evening you'll need light, make sure that you use a red lens flashlight and ensure that it remains away from the windows or opening. (4) Firing from behind walls/windows/doors. The designated marksman must ensure that he is well back from the window or open doorway and in the shadows and must be aware of his muzzle flash. His observer should also have an unimpeded view of the target and the surrounding area to ensure that another threat does not take them by surprise. (5) Firing from unprepared loopholes. An unprepared loophole is nothing more than a hole in the wall of a building to fire through. In this type of firing, the designated marksman is well back from the loophole to prevent muzzle blast from being detected. Ensure you allow enough room for the bullets path as the barrel of the rifle is located below the line of sight of the scope. (6) Firing from the peaks of a roof. The peak of a roof provides a vantage point for designated marksman to increase their field of vision and the range at which they engage their targets. When firing from a roof, the Hawkin position is the most preferred shooting position. Consideration must be taken not to silhouette yourself. You must use all available concealment i.e. pipe vents, roof vents, chimney, smokestack or any other object protruding from the roof as a hasty firing position. (7) Vents on attic level from sides of houses. Normally you would be constructing your hide and not need to worry about the background lighting or furniture. The main concern is to ensure you and your partner is not compromised in position. 10. OPERATION OF THE URBAN OP. There are many factors to be considered when operating in an urban OP. Mission requirements will vary the team's routine for every operation. The following guidelines on routine are applied as necessary. Once again, the type of mission will dictate the actions of the team. There are several different subroutines that the team conducts during the course of its stay in the urban OP. This section, although not all inclusive, will cover the routine of the OP party from the moment of accessing the site until the departure. (Four man team). a. OP Activated. Once the site is secured, team members will begin performing assigned tasks. (1) The OP party will separate into two teams of two men each. One two man team will be designated as the observation team and the other will be designated the security team. (a) The observation team is responsible for the sketch of the interior layout of the site for future use when vacating the OP, immediate observation of the target area, loophole construction, drawing up the range card, starting the observation log, and performing a communications check. A field sketch and photo log are also initiated. (b) The security team is responsible for the immediate security of the OP site while the observation team is conducting it's initial duties. One man will post as security at the entry point and listen for any signs of compromise or excessive noise by the OP party. The other man will install and activate perimeter security devices such as claymores, sensors, body traps, etc.
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(2) Once the security team completes its initial tasks, they will join the observation team. All gear will be packed and staged if not in use. The observation team will brief the other team members on its initial observations and any other information concerning loophole construction, communications, etc.
b. Security. (1) Security while in the OP site is similar to that used in a patrol base. Once the team enters the site, a tactical search is made to insure that the premises are secure. Entrances are sealed and Claymores can be emplaced. Electronic intrusion detection devices can be utilized inside and out of the site, if the situation permits. Security immediately after insert is maintained at 100%. It will take at least four men to operate a site for more than 24 hours; two to observe and provide security while two rest. (2) The primary security concern while operating the OP is compromise. The OP, the target, or the "tactic" being employed can be compromised. Compromise of an urban OP is not a frequent event, but it happens. After studying the routine of the target area, an OP should suspect compromise if the following occurs in the AO: (a) Increased local activity, or conversely, lack of activity. (b) Undue interest of locals in the immediate area of the OP. (c) Deliberate and systematic checking of streets and buildings. c. Observation Routine. (1) The OP team's primary mission is to gather information through observation of selected targets. Observation is maintained on the target by at least one member of the team around the clock. An observation log is maintained from which patterns can be identified and EEI's satisfied. Still and motion photography should be utilized. The first observer team on duty will draw a field sketch and designate the target area and targets by using a coding system (numbers, letters, colors, nicknames). A range card will also be drawn. (2) When reporting information over the radio it must be clear, concise, and accurate. Reporting formats will minimize traffic and make dissemination easier. Transmission MUST be made in a secure mode. Report only necessary traffic. d. Communications. It is mandatory that communications be maintained by the OP with the supporting unit (control). The team must use a covered net or codes and deception traffic to defeat unfriendly monitoring. Radio checks should be initiated by the OP, not the control station. Avoid communications patterns such as hourly radio checks, dependent on unit SOP's. If comm goes down, stay on the designated radio frequencies and wait for control to initiate lost comm procedures. Depending on the tactical situation, communications will be maintained in one of the following manners:
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(1) Live wire. All events are logged and reported as they happen. Maximum use of codes and encryption is necessary. (2) Semi-live wire. All events are logged and reported only if the information is unusual or as an EEI requiring immediate transmission. (3) Radio silence. All events are logged and the team stays on constant radio watch but doesn't transmit except for disguised radio checks or emergencies. e. Watch Schedule. (1) Approximately one to two hours after the site is entered and secured, the team will begin its observation routine. This will depend on how long it takes to obtain a viewing/shooting aperture. (2) With a four man team, the normal routine is two men on duty and two men resting. The two men on duty split so that one is observing and one is security. There are times when all members of the team are required to be on duty (entry, stand-to, suspected compromise). Conversely, one man may be sufficient during non-peak activity hours. During daylight, four to six hour shifts are recommended. At night, one to two hour shifts are recommended. Those operators not on duty should sleep and eat. It should be emphasized that sleeping is a duty. (3) The two men on duty will conduct the following tasks: (a) Continuous observation of the target/ area. (b) Security of the OP. (c) Maintain radio watch and comm log. (d) Maintain observation log (written/ recorded in duplicate). (e) Thoroughly brief oncoming watches. (f) Maintain and operate all observation/ surveillance equipment. f. Living routine. (1) Again, in many urban locations, existing household facilities may be utilized. If permitted, cooking should occur only once per day. A thermos should be filled with coffee for late night watch standing. (Coffee is diuretic, will cause dehydration and increase the need to urinate). All rubbish must be placed in a container, such as a plastic bag, and later taken out of the OP. Rubbish is never left behind. (2) If a lavatory is available and can be used without risk of compromise, it should be utilized. The alternative is plastic bags and bottles. A separate area is designated for waste storage. Waste will be taken out during extract.
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(3) Team members will become bored after prolonged periods of inactivity in an OP. Some form of recreation during off duty hours may be needed (books, cards, but NO radios or video games).
g. Actions on Compromise. (1) Undoubtedly, enemy compromise of the OP is the team’s greatest fear and concern. The first thing that must be done is report to higher HQ that you think that you have been compromised! All team member’s stand-to, and all gear is packed and ready for extract. The team should send precise information on the compromise, suspected or real. The control station will need to know the nature of the compromise, any other activity in the area, and whether the target has been extracted or not. This will be based on: (a) The nature of the compromise. (b) Current incidents and recent intel reports. (c) Past experiences in the area. (d) Known enemy reactions. (e) Reaction time of backup forces. (2) The ultimate decision to move must remain with higher HQ. (3) The safest action on compromise is generally to remain inside the OP until the emergency backup force arrives to cover the team's withdrawal. If the OP comes under attack, successful withdrawal will depend on the evacuation plan given in the patrol order. At a minimum, the plan will include: (a) Composition and orders for the emergency backup force. (b) Orders for opening fire. (ROE's) (c) The escape route for the OP team. (d) Location of the emergency DARE (E&E plan). (e) Casualty evacuation. (f) Destruction of equipment and materials. (g) Signals (passwords, short/long range recognition signals).
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(h) Cover story. (Only CI) You are US servicemen on a military operation. Cover stories will get you tried as a spy. h. Rules of Engagement. (1) When operating in an urban OP, it may be necessary to engage targets by fire. Serious consideration should be given to the consequences of such action and the effects on the overall mission. You must have compromise authority. Situations that may warrant shooting are when:
(a) Hostile personnel threaten the immediate security of the OP. (Self defense) (b) Hostile personnel threaten the security of friendly troops or personnel within the team's target area. (c) Hostile personnel that have a high tactical value are identified by the OP and no other means exist to affect their capture or reduction. (d) The team’s mission dictates that selected targets will be reduced. (2) Orders for engagement will be given in the patrol order. The OP, if at all possible, should inform the control station of the particular situation and request instructions. If time is limited, the ultimate decision rests with the OP team leader. All team members must be thoroughly briefed on target engagement procedures to avoid any confusion or mistakes. Even though the team may have no intention of shooting from the OP, preparations must still be made. When observation points are selected, consider their use as a firing point as well. The following points apply to shooting from the OP. (a) Orders for engagement. (b) Loophole construction and camouflage. (c) Flash and blast concealment. (d) Range determination/range cards. (e) Ballistics. 1 The effects of weather. 2 Angle firing. 3 Shooting through objects. 4 Shot placement.
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5 Penetration. (f) Target identification. (g) Compromise of the OP and extraction. i. Resupply. (1) Resupply should be sufficiently frequent to allow OP logs and film to be collected on a regular basis. It also gives the controlling unit the opportunity to update the OP without using the radio. By reviewing the OP's logs and photos, the controller will be able to assess and correct any camera or operating faults early in the operation vice waiting for an extended period and then discovering that the photos or information is of no value. Once received, information and photographs will be annotated by control and a copy sent back to the team to ensure maximum efficiency and morale within the OP. Any damaged equipment will be replaced on resupply. (2) Resupply will be planned for in the patrol order. Resupply will be activated either at set times or, preferably, remain on call for the OP team leader. The nature of the articles coming in or going out of the OP will dictate the system of resupply. Consider the following: (a) Small items can be passed through a ground floor window or a mail box by a foot patrol passing by. (b) Larger items can be put in a ruck sack or similar container and passed through a door, "roped" from adjacent windows, passed by a routine foot or vehicle patrol, or by any clandestine means (Trojan Horse). (c) Irrespective of the method chosen, the OP team and resupply unit must rehearse the resupply prior to the operation. j. Other Considerations. The events taking place in the OP are numerous and can be overwhelming. A well rehearsed and planned operation will overcome most hardships. Still, there will be some difficulties that are unavoidable and all team members must be aware of these problems so that they can be dealt with. (1) Fatigue. It is inevitable that all of the team members will become tired while on watch. Every precaution must be taken to ensure that no watch standers fall asleep while on duty. This may require rotating shifts every half hour or hour. The team leader must enforce sleep periods for team members. Boredom will also pose a problem. (2) Distractions. During observation, there are numerous distractions and elements that influence and distort ones awareness. 11. EXTRACTION OF THE URBAN OP. The extraction of the team can be a result of three situations; relief of the team, mission complete, and emergency. Security during extraction was covered earlier in this period of instruction. Generally, the same procedures as were used in insertion are used for extract. Preferably, the same team that escorted the OP team in , will take them out. If they can't, the new covering
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force must be briefed by the old one. The OP team leader must familiarize himself with the different extraction options. a. Security during Extraction. Security during the withdrawal from the OP is as important as in all of the other phases of the mission. The team has to avoid becoming relaxed and must maintain a high state of security until they are safely located within friendly positions. The value of the information may be lost if physical or visual contact is made during withdrawal. The best time for withdrawal is under the cover of darkness, during the late night or early morning hours. It is preferred that the security force that covered the insertion into the OP also cover the extraction. The PUP/LUP will be occupied by the security force and the withdrawal route checked for possible ambushes. The departing team will ensure the site is the same way they found it on arrival, disguising their presence, both inside and out. b. Relief of a Team. Relief should be avoided whenever possible as it adds to the chances of compromise. If a mission/operation is still ongoing and the team must be rotated out, it will require very detailed planning and rehearsals by the OP parties involved. The relieving team need only take into the OP sufficient equipment to continue the operation. All surveillance and communication equipment will be left behind by the outgoing team. The rotating team will conduct the following routines: (1) The outgoing team will prepare all of their equipment for extraction prior to last light, and when ready, the team leader leaves one man on observation duty and centralizes the rest of the team for departure. (2) The incoming team, on entry to the OP, will position one man as observer and have the rest of the team stand by in the rest area. (3) Both team leaders go over the operational hand-over and on completion, the teams change over. The new team will reset any protection devices after the outgoing team has departed. To ease the problem of relief, the incoming team leader can be inserted 24 hours before the rest of his team to become acquainted with the established OP routine and area activity. c. Mission Complete. When the team is ready to vacate the OP, they will notify control and await the arrival of the covering force. The team member who recorded the interior of the OP site during the insert will ensure that everything is left exactly as it was when the OP was first occupied. If the enemy discovers that they have been observed, they will take steps to cover up any information which may have been gained by the OP. All equipment not in use and the rubbish should be packed at last light. A final check of the OP should be conducted prior to departure. The best time for extract is under the cover of darkness. Make sure that the team has rehearsed extract. d. Emergency. Position compromised. e. Debrief. An initial debrief is conducted immediately after extract. A comprehensive debrief should be carried out after the team has had some rest. All notes, logs, photographs, and recordings are reviewed and/or developed. These will be put in a mission file for dissemination and for future use.
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OP EQUIPMENT LIST 1. CLOTHING. Utility Uniform Utility Cover/Field Cover T-Shirt Duty Gloves SAS Headover Web Belt Civilian Attire Rain Suit (Gortex)
Poncho Ghillie Suit with Accessories Wooly Pully or Night Shirt Long Underwear Socks Combat Boots Field Jacket with Liner
2. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT. LBE Large Pack with Frame First Aid Kit Ammunition Pouches Canteens with Covers Canteen Cup Water Purification Tablets E-Tool with Carrier Strobe Light with Filters Flashlight with Filters Lensatic Compass Pen Light with Filters Body Armor/Flak Jacket Sniper Veil Pocket Knife with Sheath Combat Knife with Sheath Sharpening Stone Lineman's Tool with Case Waterproof Wrist Watch Extra Cravats Pace Cord
550 Cord Sewing Kit Insect Repellent Small Signal Mirror Pen Flare with Flares Gas Mask with Carrier Poncho Liner Sleeping Bag Patrol Log SPIE Harness Camo Face Paint Riggers Tape Knee and Elbow Pads Map and Protractor Survival Kit Eye Glasses (Two Pair) Dog Tags (Silenced) Day/Night Flare ID Card Sling Rope (12-14 feet) Two Snap Links
3. WEAPONS AND ACCESSORIES. M40A1 with M118 Ammo Rifle Sling
Rifle Silencer/Suppressor Grenades (Frag/Wp/CS/Smoke)
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Heavy
Scope Tools Drag/Gun Bag Pistol Mags, Pouches, Holster
M18A1AP Mine with Test Kit M9 Pistol with STHP Ammo Pistol Silencer/Suppressor
4. SHOOTING EQUIPMENT. Rifle Bipods/Tripods/Support Rifle Wind Charts Range Estimation Chart Slope/Angle Fire Chart Moving Target Lead Chart Laser Range Finder Laser Designator
Data Book Collimeter Hearing Protection Eye Protection Sand Bags Dweyermeter Thermometer
5. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT. Spotting Scope with Stand Binoculars 7 X 50 AN/PVS 7 Goggles AN/PVS 4 Scope Pocket Binoculars Anti-Fog Compound for Optics
Sketching Kit Tape Recorder Range Cards 35mm Camera with Lens and Film Thermal Imager Dark Invader /2" Camcorder w/ Accessories Observation Log Writing Utensils
6. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. Radio, Long Range (HF/VHF/SAT) Shackle Sheets with Accessories and Extra Batteries (Including Extras) Handset Waterproofing Bags Radio, Short Range (Saber) Comm Wire with Whisper Mikes and Communications Log Headsets Reporting Formats Field Expedient Antennas Encryption Device for Radio CEOI Execution Checklist 7. ENTRY EQUIPMENT. Pry Bar Pliers Screwdriver Rubber Headed Hammer Rope, 120 Feet Ladders, Padded Glass Cutters Masonry Drill and Bits
Lock Picks Bolt Cutters Hacksaw, Handsaw Sledge Hammer Axe Rams Halligan Tool Rabbit Tool (Hydraulics)
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Cutting Shears Wood Drill and Bits Chisel Auger
Power Saw Tape Cutting Torch Shotgun/Explosives
8. GENERAL OP GEAR. Ghillie Nets Air Panels Radar Scatter Nets Luminous Tape 550 Cord Waterproofing Bags Spray Paint (Assorted Colors) Flex Cuffs Tape (Duct, Friction, Clear) Padlocks Blankets Food (MRE, LRRP) Large Gear Bags Reading Books Stethoscope Intrusion Detection System Defecation Gear (Bags, Bottles, Thermos Paper) Tape Measure Pocket Hand Warmer Booby Traps Photographs (Aerial, Panoramic Chem Lights Personnel) Maps (City and Military) Whistle Money
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URBAN ROUTE ANALYSIS INTRODUCTION: The detachment has been tasked to assist in the planning of the evacuation of American citizens. The detachment S2 pulls the country area study. Upon review they find that some of the planned evacuation routes are impossible to traverse. The Reconnaissance and Surveillance section has been tasked to develop alternate routes of extract. How do we do this? What must we be concerned with? 1. AREA OF OPERATION (AO). The area of operation that special operators may be required to operate in, can be broken down into three basic areas. Those areas are identified as follows: a. Permissive Environment. This condition envisions no resistance to operations and thus requires little to no displacement of combat forces to support movement. Host nation support can be expected and concurrence for operations is normally given. b. Semi-Permissive Environment. This environment envisions host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations, do not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended area or country of operations. c. Non-Permissive Environment. This condition envisions evacuation of personnel under conditions ranging from civil disorder, terrorist action, to full scale combat operations. 2. TYPES OF TERRAIN. a. Rural. This is the type of area all Operators train in and prepare for. Rural terrain is the same around the world with a few exceptions (i.e. mountains, desert, jungle or swamps). This area is sparsely populated, with domiciles spread out over the country side, possibly fenced in with cattle and or crops. It's the area we all train in and that we all complain about. But it's the area we feel the safest in. b.Suburban. This terrain is most likely the type of area that most people are from. It's characterized by a slightly denser population with homes that may share a common side or backyard. It's also noticeably harder to operate in due to the people who live here, as they are normally well known and take notice to strangers. This type of area or neighborhood is set up functional yet not overly crowded. Suburban areas are usually surrounded by rural areas and have a small to medium industrial area. Travel through these areas should only be conducted after thorough planning; to ensure a lower probability of detection while traveling along established routes. This type of environment normally has a main avenue of travel through the downtown area. There are usually quite a few streets that lead off the main avenue that will take you through the outlying neighborhoods. Travel on these smaller avenues is normally restricted and slow, and can be affected by times of day, season and festivals. Understanding that the only time we are employed, is when the country is in trouble, you can figure on the area being cluttered with debris. c. Urban. This is the area that the majority of the world is slowly changing into. Urban terrain has, in the U.S., been called the "Concrete Jungle", densely populated, heavy traffic, higher rate of crime, higher levels of pollution and a greater diversity of population. The more foreign ports you visit the more you
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will agree with this statement. This is the area we are going to discuss in greater detail. Most cities in the U.S. were developed with some sort of plan in mind as far as traffic flow, living areas, industrial and commercial areas. In overseas areas, this is not normally the case. They have grown over the years out of necessity more than by plan. When you visit Hong Kong you will notice that the roads near the water are wide and organized, but go a couple blocks inland and the streets narrow and become cluttered. The thought used when these roads were planned didn't take into account an increase in population (mid 1990 5.9 million) and likewise the increase in transportation required to move them. Travel on any streets other than the main roads is considered "Travel at your own risk". Korea has a similar road system in the smaller towns. Here, recently, they have attempted to correct this traffic problem with the construction of a major highway running north and south. But as with Hong Kong, Okinawa only labels it's main streets. These labels are normally not in English and are only placed on main intersections. 3. URBAN ROUTE PLANNING. a. As with all reconnaissance missions once you have received the mission, you start planning what you will need and how you’re going to get there. Normally you would draw a 1:50,000 military map from the S-2. This is usually good enough for rural operations but falls short of the requirements needed for a urban route. If the mission is for you to operate in support of a NEO, you can request an up to date Area Study. The Area Study is generated by the U.S. embassy (RSO) Regional Security Officer, which entails all of the key business, residence and meeting places used by U.S. Embassy staff or U.S. citizens residing in that country. This document establishes evacuation routes and evacuation sites. This document, when completed, is classified "Secret NO-FORN". If the mission is not in support of a NEO, you can still request information from the U.S. Embassy or possibly a NATO embassy located within your A.O. b. Initial Request For Information. You should submit a RFI (request for information) to the detachment S-2. In this RFI specifically request: (1) Area Study. (2) Embassy staff for debriefing. (3) Political situation. (4) Tentative time of operation. (5) Rules of engagement. (6) Map and Aerial Photographs. (a) Local maps of Area of Operation. (b) 1:25,000 scale maps of Area of Operation. (c) Aerial photographs of Area of Operation.
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(d) Road and Transit maps of Area of Operation. (7) Transportation Assets. (a) Number and type of vehicles available for use. (b) Local transportation system setups. (c) Local laws/customs on travel. (d) Number of personnel to be moved. (8) Enemy and friendly situation. (a) Local populace (disposition). (b) Safe areas (partisans, hospitals, military) (c) Known enemy strongholds. (d) Predetermined hostile areas. c. Initial Planning. Upon receipt of some of the above RFI's you can start your initial planning. (1) The first step in the initial planning is to conduct a map/aerial photo reconnaissance. When conducting this reconnaissance; compare the maps available with other maps and aerial photos and make any corrections that one may show and the others don't. NOTE: Ensure you reference the newest map or aerial photo, and use the newest one for making the corrections to the others. (a) Map Reconnaissance. 1 Check date of map(s). 2 Read legend (become familiar with symbols). 3 Look at start/ finish points. 4 Select tentative routes. 5 If various maps are available, compare information on each. (b) Aerial Photography.
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1 Check date of photo 2 Check time of photo (if noted). 3 If mosaic check for missing areas. (2) Commence Initial Route Planning. Start by tracing your primary/alternate route onto your map. Once you have done this, the route needs to be studied and troubleshot for possible problem areas along it's length. The following is a list of considerations that must be taken into account when doing this. (a) Choke points. Those areas where you are 100% predictable with the route selected, or can hinder/halt your travel. 1 Forward Staging Base (FSB). 2 Objective (OBJ). 3 Major road intersections. 4 Bridges. 5 Tunnels. 6 Overpasses/underpasses. 7 Known construction zones. (b) Vehicles. List the type of vehicles to be used by the Strike/Evacuation Forces on this route, the number and size will dictate possible changes to your initial route. 1 Cars. 2 Military vehicles. 3 Commercial vehicles. 4 Buses. (c) Key Terrain. Locations which can be used for possible check-points or possible overwatch locations. 1 Large buildings. 2 Bridges.
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3 Hills. 4 Large signs. 5 Radio communication towers. 6 Rotaries. (d) Sensitive Areas. Those areas that could result in tactical or political crisis. 1 School zones. 2 Colleges. 3 Religious areas (church, graveyards). 4 Playgrounds. 5 Parks. 6 Hospitals. (e) Time. When the route is to be tentatively traveled by the strike/evacuation forces. 1 Early morning (0500-1000). Morning rush hours, delivery of products to businesses. 2 Mid-day (1000-1500). Lunch breaks, heaviest business hours, lot's of pedestrian traffic. 3 Evening (1500-1900). School let's out, work day ends, dinner, businesses close, pedestrian traffic maximizes. 4 Early night (1900-2200). Traffic decreases, pedestrian traffic diminishes, the bars are full. 5 Late night (2200-0500). Local law enforcement increases, traffic diminishes, areas become silent or rarely traveled, and vehicles are scrutinized closely. (f) Special Events. Those events that is unique to only certain areas or cultures. 1 Local holidays and or festivals. Locations, Duration, Special restrictions placed on travel both foot and vehicle. 2 Parades, route, meeting/ending sites. 3 Harvest time.
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(3) Once this has been completed you may see that your originally selected route(s) may not be suitable for use or needs to be modified slightly. Once you have selected a tentative route(s) you feel will support the mission requirements, your initial plan will be refined into a detailed plan. This phase of the planning is the most difficult to do, as it concerns a multitude of variables that can never be fully planned for but must be addressed. The key is to not get too complicated with your route. d. Back-Up Plan. Always ensure that you plan that if your primary route is blocked, you have a plan(s) which will enable you to switch to the alternate route or to bypass any unforeseen situations i.e. (road construction, road blocks). This back up plan must take into account each leg of the route. 4. ROUTE BRIEFING. a. When you brief a urban route, like any other route you must have a visual aid to help SHOW your route. The method of showing your route can vary from following the route with your finger on the map, to the preferred method of developing some visual aids (time permitting). The visual aids will ensure the drivers will see the route before they drive it. As with any route planned, you must have check points planned and terrain features annotated. In rural terrain you were briefing streams, hill tops, valleys and draws. Urban areas will rely on buildings, road intersections, over/under passes, etc. b. When you brief your actual planned urban route you will present it in the same manner as you would a patrol brief. ROUTE BRIEF Troop SGT Orientation: Your name Area overview How you’re brief is to be presented PLEASE HOLD QUESTIONS TILL THE END Situation: Friendly locations Enemy location (known, suspected) Adjacent Forces (U.S., Multi-national) Mission: Overall mission of R&S Platoon Other teams operating in area Your team’s specific mission TM LDRS Name, Team#, Brief Tm Mission overview Execution: Primary Route: Start point: Grid/ Given name. Departure time: (tentative/known)
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Length of route: (miles/kilometers) Description of route: (primary/alternate) (a) Sectioned off from checkpoint to checkpoint. (b) All known/suspected choke points annotated and described. (c) All known/suspected sensitive areas. (d) Possible locations of HLZ's.(parking lots, parks, fields, parking garages, building roofs) Emergency Procedures: Switching from primary to alternate routes, preplanned and annotated on the map. Also a contingency plan for a short detour around the situation. Team SGT Admin & Log: Transportation: Number and type planned for use Medical: Location, enroute aid, etc. Personnel: Designated to conduct actual route, and those who planned the route. Maps: To be used, prepared for issue to drivers. Command & Control: Who, Where, What Communication: State comm plan No-Comm Plan Bump Plan Abort Criteria Go-No Go Criteria 5. DEBRIEF SEQUENCE. a. The detachment S2 will conduct a thorough de-briefing of the route that was just traveled. He will start the briefing by asking you to recount the route from start to finish as you remember it. All team members or drivers must be at the debriefing. b. The personnel who are recounting the route should pay particular attention to recounting the following information: Intersections: Traffic control Congestions Lighting (street lights)
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Turn only lanes Identifiable Landmarks Signs Along Route: Common rate of speed Congested Areas Rush hour times Pedestrians Un-controlled Crosswalks Large inclines/declines Residential Areas Business areas Industrial Areas Rural areas Police stations Fire stations Hospitals Military facilities Construction areas Bridges Traffic circles Overpasses/underpasses Areas of heavy roadside vegetation Types of vehicles common to different areas School zones/colleges Parking areas
6. ROUTE BRIEFING AIR. a. The Air Controller (ACE) cannot see street signs, and from altitude, even counting major roads and intersections gets extremely difficult. Add to that, poor weather/visibility and/or navigation at night in the city and the chance of a missed LZ is highly possible. The ACE has onboard some of its aircraft the GPS system. This system, when used properly, will enable them to pinpoint your position (+/- 50 meters). Keep in mind though, as with all electronic equipment when you need it the most it stops working. Therefore alternate methods must be planned and briefed prior to the mission commencing. Using the same basic ideas as we did in planning, and briefing the surface route by slightly modifying our view point, we can establish a reliable route that the ACE can follow. b. The following is a short list of considerations and requirements needed for supporting the ACE's route/HLZ requirements. (1) Cardinal direction of travel.
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(2) Lat/Longs, grid coordinates, of the objective (3) Prominent terrain features along the route. (Isolated hills, river, gravel pit, park in downtown area, lake). (4) Prominent structures along the route.(stadiums, extremely large building complexes, schools, major road intersections, shopping centers, smoke stacks, towers). (5) HLZ's at objective. (size, topography) (6) Alternate HLZ's enroute. (7) Obstacles (type, location, and height). (8) Visibility. (9) Lighting. (10) Avenues of approach. (11) Threat areas. (12) LZ Designation (smoke, flare, orange panel, tactical vehicles, engineer tape, strobe, chemlights). (13) Avenues of egress. c. The following is a example of how a brief might go: Traveling NORTH-EAST on a heading of 25 degrees magnetic from the ISB, at approximately 5 NM out you will see a long concrete pier (grid ) at 2:30. When you go feet dry you should be flying over a large warehouse with a large Coke-a-cola sign, grid ( ) (check point 1). Continue on the 25 degree azimuth until you arrive at the highway cloverleaf, grid ( ). Upon reaching this point turn to a heading of 45 degrees magnetic directly ahead you will see the stadium (grid ) at approximately 12:30. Wind direction is westerly at 12 knots. 30 foot goal post located at the north and south ends of the field. The upper rim of the stadium is ringed with spot lights on 20-40 foot poles generally located on the eastern and western rims. NOTE: The above is just an example that can be used as a guide line. Each unit (ACE) will probably have a slight variation to this that they use. NOTE: This is just a recommendation to the ACE. They will make the final determination on whether a route is to be used or not.
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LOG BOOK AND FIELD SKETCH 1. INTRODUCTION The primary mission of the scout and sniper team is to deliver precision fire on selected targets from concealed positions. Their secondary mission is that of collecting information for their S-2. To assist in that mission we use an observation log together with a field sketch. 2. PURPOSE: To provide information for the proper use of the observation log and how to create a field sketch. A field sketch is a large scale, free hand drawn map or picture of an area or route of travel, showing enough detail and having enough accuracy to satisfy special tactical or administrative requirements. Sketches are useful when maps are not available or the existing maps are not adequate, or to illustrate a reconnaissance patrol report. Scout Teams SWAT teams differ in how they perform their missions. The methods to complete a scouting mission also differ based on many factors: • Location: urban, rural, foliage, mountains • Weather and climate • Technology available: digital cameras, video, sketch pads • Overt or covert mission • Manpower available • Satellite mapping or air asset availability When possible, the scouting mission is done in pairs. The lead scout sketches, draws, or photographs while the other officer or cover officer focuses on protection of the scout. The scout team uses effective camouflage, cover, and concealment. When time is of the essence, use two scout teams. The scouting of SWAT objectives is a critical task that must be accomplished accurately and safely in the minimum amount of time necessary to accomplish the mission. The accurate determinations of construction and safe approaches to breach points have a major impact on the potential for mission success. RANGE CARD, OBSERVATION LOG, AND MILITARY SKETCH The scout team uses the scout range cards, observation logs, and military sketches to enable it to rapidly engage targets. These items also enable the scout to maintain a record of his employment during an operation. RANGE CARD The range card (Figure 1) represents the target area as seen from above with annotations indicating distances throughout the target area. It provides the scout team with a quick-range reference and a means to record target locations since it has preprinted range rings on it. These cards can be divided into sectors by using dashed lines (Figure 2). This break provides the team members with a quick reference when locating
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targets. A field-expedient range card can be prepared on any paper the team has available. The scout team position and distances to prominent objects and terrain features are drawn on the card. There is not a set maximum range on either range card, because the team may also label any indirect fire targets on its range card. Information contained on both range cards includes the— Scout member’s name and method of obtaining range. Left and right limits of engageable area. Major terrain features, roads, and structures. Ranges, elevation, and windage needed at various distances. Distances throughout the area. Temperature and wind. (Cross out previous entry whenever temperature, wind direction, or wind velocity changes.) Target reference points (azimuth, distance, and description). Relative locations of dominant objects and terrain features should be included. Examples include— Houses. Bridges. Groves. Hills. Crossroads.
Figure 1 Range Card The scout team will indicate the range to each object by estimating or measuring. All drawings on the 57
range card are from the perspective of the scout looking straight down on the observation area. The range card is a record of the scout’s area of responsibility. Its proper preparation and use provides a quick reference to key terrain features and targets. It also allows the scout team to quickly acquire new targets that come into their area of observation. The scout always uses the range card and the observation log in conjunction with each other.
Figure 2 Range Card showing sectored lines OBSERVATION LOG The observation log (Figure 3) is a factual, written, chronological record of all activities and events that take place in a scout team’s area, which will become a permanent source of operational information. It provides information to intelligence personnel, unit commanders, assault and other sniper teams, and for the original team itself. The log starts immediately upon infiltration. It is used with military sketches and range cards; this combination not only gives commanders and intelligence personnel information about the appearance of the area, but it also provides an accurate record of the activity in the area. Information in the observation log includes the— Grid coordinates of the scout team’s position. Observer’s name. Date and time of observation and visibility. Grid coordinates of OP Sheet number and number of total sheets. 58
Series number, time, and grid coordinates of each event. Events that have taken place. Action taken. .
Figure 3, Observation Log The scout log will always be used in conjunction with a military sketch. The sketch helps to serve as a pictorial reference to the written log. If the scout team is relieved in place, a new scout team can easily locate earlier sightings using these two documents as references. The observer’s log is a ready means of recording enemy activity, and if properly maintained, it enables the scout team to report all information required. Scout observation logs will be filled out using the key word SALUTE for enemy activity and OAKOC for terrain. When using these key words to fill out the logs, the scout should not use generalities; he should be very specific (for example, give the exact number of troops, the exact location, the dispersion location). • The key word SALUTE: S - Size. A - Activity. L - Location. U - Unit/Uniform. T - Time. 59
E - Equipment. • The key word OAKOC: O - Observation and fields of fire. A - Avenues of approach. K - Key terrain. O - Obstacles. C - Cover and concealment. MILITARY SKETCH The scout uses a military sketch (Figure 4) to record information about a general area, terrain features, or man-made structures that are not shown on a map. These sketches provide the intelligence sections a detailed, on-the-ground view of an area or object that is otherwise unobtainable. These sketches not only let the viewer see the area in different perspectives but also provide detail such as type of fences, number of telephone wires, present depth of streams, and other pertinent data. There are two types of military sketches: road or area sketches and field sketches. The scout should not include people in either of these sketches.
Figure 4 Military Sketch Road or Area Sketch This sketch is a panoramic representation of an area or object drawn to scale as seen from the scout team’s perspective. It shows details about a specific area or a man-made structure (Figure 5). Information considered in a road or area sketch includes—
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Grid coordinates of scout team’s position. Magnetic azimuth through the center of sketch. Sketch name and number. Scale of sketch. Remarks section. Name and rank. Date and time. Weather.
Figure 5 Area Sketch Field Sketches A field sketch is a topographic representation of an area drawn to scale as seen from above. It provides the scout team with a method for describing large areas while showing reliable distance and azimuths between major features. This type of sketch is useful in describing road systems, flow of streams and rivers, or locations of natural and man-made obstacles. The field sketch can also be used as an overlay on the range card. Information contained in a field sketch includes— Grid coordinates of the scout team’s position. Left and right limits with azimuths. Rear reference with azimuth and distance. Target reference points. 61
Sketch name and number. Name and rank. Date and time. Weather and visibility. The field sketch serves to reinforce the observation log. A military sketch is either panoramic or topographic.
EQUIPMENT Panoramic sketches can be made with no other equipment than paper and pencil. The following equipment, however, are valuable aids to the sketcher: a. Compass b. Binoculars c. Knife d. Eraser e. Sketch pad or notebook f. Several pencils g. Protractor A medium hard and medium soft pencil are desirable. A map of the terrain is useful if available. From it, names of towns, rivers, and mountains may be determined and ranges to prominent objects obtained. PANORAMIC SKETCH The panoramic sketch is a picture of the terrain in elevation and perspective as seen from one point of observation (Figure 6).
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Figure 6, Panoramic Sketch A panoramic sketch is a pictorial representation of the terrain in elevation and perspective as seen from one point of observation. It shows the horizon which is always of military importance, and intervening features such as crests, woods, structures, roads, fences, etc. It is an excellent means for target designation and may be effectively used for illustrating a reconnaissance, supplementing and clarifying written reports, and assigning objectives and sectors. Its great value lies in the rapidity with which it can be made and read. A trained panoramic sketch can quickly prepare a sketch which conveys information of military value that is easily read and understood. An understanding of the principles of perspective drawing may assist the sketcher, but is not a prerequisite to the drawing of a panoramic sketch. If a sketch were made looking through a window, keeping the eye stationary, and tracing on the window glass the outline of the objects exactly as they appear through it, the result would be a perspective drawing. TOPOGRAPHIC SKETCH The topographic sketch is similar to a map or pictorial representation from an overhead perspective. It is generally less desirable than the panoramic sketch because it is difficult to relate this type of sketch to the observer’s log. It is drawn in a fashion similar to the range card. Figure 7 represents a topographic sketch or an improvised range card. 63
Figure 7 Topographic Sketch GUIDELINES FOR DRAWING SKETCHES As with all drawings, artistic skill is an asset, but satisfactory sketches can be drawn by anyone with practice. The scout should use the following guidelines when drawing sketches: Work from the whole to the part. First determine the boundaries of the sketch. Then sketch the larger objects such as hills, mountains, or outlines of large buildings. After drawing the large objects in the sketch, start drawing the smaller details. Use common shapes to show common objects. Do not sketch each individual tree, hedgerow, or wood line exactly. Use common shapes to show these types of objects. Do not concentrate on the fine details unless they are of tactical importance. • Draw in perspective; use vanishing points. Try to draw sketches in perspective. To do this, recognize the vanishing points of the area to be sketched. Parallel lines on the ground that are horizontal vanish at a point on the horizon. Parallel lines on the ground that slope downward away from the observer vanish at a point below the horizon. Parallel lines on the ground that slope upward, away from the observer, vanish at a point above the horizon. Parallel lines that recede to the right vanish on the right and those that recede to the left vanish on the left (Figure 8).
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Figure 8 - Drawing vanishing points For the scout team to thoroughly and effectively observe its area of responsibility, it must be aware of the slightest change in the area. These otherwise insignificant changes could be an indicator of targets or enemy activity that needs to be reported. By constructing a panoramic sketch, the team has a basis for comparing small changes in the surrounding terrain. Updating data permits the team to better report intelligence and complete its mission. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SKETCHING The scout initiates the panoramic sketch only after the observer’s log and range card have been initiated and after the scout team has settled into the AO. The scout studies the terrain with the naked eye first to get an overall impression of the area. After he obtains his overall impression, he uses binoculars to further study those areas that attracted his attention before the first mark is made on a sketch pad. Too much detail is not desirable unless it is of tactical importance. If additional detail is required on a specific area, the scout can make subdrawings to supplement the main drawing. Principles of Perspective and Proportionality Sketches are drawn to perspective whenever possible. To be in perspective, the sketcher must remember that the farther away an object is, the smaller it will appear in the drawing. Vertical lines will remain vertical throughout the drawing; however, a series of vertical lines (such as telephone poles or a picket fence) will diminish in height as they approach the horizon. Proportionality is representing a larger object as larger than a smaller object. This gives depth along with perspective.
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Using Delineation to Portray Objects or Features of the Landscape The sketcher forms a horizontal line with the horizontal plane at the height of his eye. This is known as the eye-level line and the initial control line. The skyline or the horizon and crests, roads, and rivers form other “control lines” of the sketch. These areas are drawn first to form the framework within which the details can be placed. The sketcher should represent features with a few, rather than many, lines. He should create the effect of distance by making lines in the foreground heavy and making distance lines lighter as the distance increases. He can use a light “hatching” to distinguish wooded areas, but the hatching should follow the natural lines of the object (Figure 9).
Figure 9, Landscape sketch Using Conventional Methods to Portray Objects If possible, the sketcher should show the actual shape of all prominent features that may be readily selected as reference points. These features may be marked with an arrow and with a line to a description; for example, a prominent tree with a withered branch. The sketcher should also show— Rivers and roads as two lines that diminish in width to the vanishing point as they recede. Railroads in the foreground as a double line with small crosslines (which represent ties). The crosslines will distinguish them from roads. To portray railroads in the distance, a single line with vertical ticks to represent the telegraph poles is drawn. When rivers, roads, and railroads are all present in the same sketch, they may have to be labeled to show what they are. Trees in outline only, unless a particular tree is to be used as a reference point. If a particular tree is to be used as a reference point, the tree must be drawn in more detail to show why it was picked. Woods in the distance by outline only. If the woods are in the foreground, the tops of individual trees can be drawn. Churches in outline only, but it should be noted whether they have a tower or a spire. Towns and villages as definite rectangular shapes to denote houses. he also shows the locations of towers, factory chimneys, and prominent buildings in the sketch. Again, detail can be added in
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subdrawings or hatchings (Figure 10). Cuts, fills, depressions, swamps, and marshes are shown by using the usual topographic symbols.
Figure 10, rectangular shapes to represent objects Using a Legend to Label the Sketch The legend includes the title of the sketch, the date-time group, and the sketcher’s signature. It also includes an explanation of the topographic symbols used in the sketch. Building Sketching Basic Sectorization SIDES Most Special Operations elements use letter designations for tactical sectorization of each side of an objective. The designations start with the front of the objective where the main entrance is located.
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Figure 11 This side is designated as the A-side because it contains the main entrance. Moving clockwise to the left, the next side is designated as the B-side. Continuing clockwise, the rear of the objective is designated as the C-side. Finishing clockwise is the D-side.
Figure 12 LEVELS Levels of the objectives are numbered from the ground floor up. The ground floor is designated as level one. The next floor up would be two. This continues to the topmost floor.
Figure 13 If a basement with doors or windows is present, it can be considered level one also. This distinction is left to the team’s standard operating procedures. OPENINGS Numbering for openings starts right and goes left. Any opening that a suspect can see from or exit from is given a number designation. An opening can be manufactured, such as a door or window. It can be an opening made by damage to the building.
Numbering starts with the opening farthest right. Figure 14 Numbering System Sectorization uses a number-letter-number combination to designate windows or doors. Using the following diagram, we can see that 2A1 designates the following opening in the building. 68
Figure 15 The first number 2 designates the building’s level which is the 2nd level. The letter A represents the front side of the building due to the main entrance. The second number 1 designates the opening farthest to the right which is a window. The finished product includes as much detail as possible. The work must be legible and easily understood. Guesswork is not acceptable. Items to include • Composition of the objective (brick, frame, and so on) • Fortifications, burglar bars • Doors and locking mechanisms, hinge side, knob side • Windows: type, structure, and height off the ground • Fences, gates, and locks • Utilities • Exterior lighting • Cover and concealment • Animals • Potential primary and secondary breach points • Path to breach points • Overhead property diagram Doors • Size • Composition • Direction: in, out, sliding • Locks: quantity and location • Door braces • Floor braces • Hinges
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Figure 16, Examples of windows
KIM GAMES The name of the game comes from the book Kim by Rudyard Kipling. The story is about a young Indian boy who was trained to remember intelligence information during the British occupation of India. To assist some in remembering the name of the game, it has been misnamed—Keep in Mind (KIM). Scout operations encompass a much larger scope than hiding in the woods, spotting targets of opportunity, and engaging them. The scout must observe vast areas and accurately record any and all information. Because many situations occur suddenly and do not offer prolonged observation, scouts must learn to observe for short periods of time and extract the maximum amount of information from any situation. KIM games are a series of exercises that can help increase the scout’s abilities to both perceive reality and retain information. They can be conducted anywhere, in very little time, with a large return for the trainer’s investment of effort and imagination. Although the various time limits of viewing, waiting, and recording the objects are often not reflected in tactical reality, KIM games are designed to exercise the mind through overload (much the same as weight training overloads the muscles). Advancement in KIM games is measured by shortening the viewing and recording times and lengthening the waiting time. Greater results can be realized by gradually adding additional elements to increase confusion 70
and uncertainty. In the scout’s trade, the perception of reality often means penetrating the enemy’s deception measures. These measures may include, but are not limited to— Misdirection. Disguise. Exchange. There is a marked similarity between the above list and the principles of stage magic. Just as knowing how a magician performs a trick takes the “magic” from it, knowing how one is being deceived negates the deception. THE BASIC GAME The instructor will require a table, a cover, and an assortment of objects. He selects ten objects and randomly places them on the table. He should not place the objects in orderly rows, since studies have shown that objects placed in rows make memorization easier. He then covers the objects. The instructor briefs the students on the following rules before each iteration: No talking is allowed. Objects may not be touched. Students will not write until told to do so. SUMMARY: The information you gather may seem trivial and unimportant to you. However, a well kept observation log or a well drawn sketch just might provide that missing piece of information that your S2/G-2 was looking for.
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MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE 1. INTRODUCTION : We have taught you how to clear a Crisis Site, but that is only one phase of the operation. Before you can clear it, you must be able to get there without being compromised. 2. OVERVIEW: The purpose of this period of instruction is to teach the shooter what actions take place during movement to the objective. BODY 1. METHODS OF APPROACH. There are two ways in which we will approach the target, either hard or soft. a. Hard Approach. (1) A Hard Approach is just as the name sounds, you will come in aggressively to the target, either by helicopter or vehicle. Normally, the Hard Approach option is only chosen for the Emergency Assault. However, because of terrain, environment, and distance, you may have to choose the Hard Approach option for the Deliberate Assault as well. (2) If approaching by helicopter: (a) Air Crews should use terrain and weather to mask approach. (b) If the aircraft can land beside the objective, it is more preferred than if the FAST Roped. You can debark quicker from a landed helo than from a hovering one. (c) If your primary insert technique is to land the helo, regardless, all helos should be rigged for FAST Rope just in case the LZ's are fouled. (d) If using FAST Rope as the primary means of insert, consider using multiple FAST Rope points per aircraft. (e) If FAST Roping, all shooters must have the mindset for the FAST Rope. Do not be thinking ahead to the assault. Normally, this is how shooters end up getting hung on a FAST Rope and blocking the rest of the stick from exiting. They weren't thinking of what needed to be done to exit on the FAST Rope, and ended up getting their weapon or gear stuck. (f) Consider having the first man on the FAST Rope to be security personnel. As he lands, he immediately steps to the side of the FAST Rope and provides security for the remainder of the stick as they land and maneuver to the Breach Point. (g) Snipers/Designated Marksmen should begin engaging targets of opportunity when they feel that the noise of the inbound helo's have compromised the assault. They should cease firing if and as the Security Element is starting to provide inner perimeter security.
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(h) FAST Rope gloves should be attached to the wrist with 550 cord. When you clear the FAST Rope, straighten your hands out and throw your arms down in order to remove the gloves. (i) Hard Approach may dictate the type of Breaching Charge that you use. Breacher must develop some type of protective container for his breaching charge. Some good breaching charges to use when using the FAST Rope insert is the Slant, Water, and Slider Charges. These charges are easily transported, dependable, and can be placed on the Breach Point in a rapid manner. (3) The advantages of using the Hard Approach option are: (a) Less planning required on the part of the Strike Force. (b) Can react in a much faster manner prior to arriving at the objective. (c) Shooters will potentially be in a higher state of readiness, simply because they were not required to patrol for to the objective. (d) Allows for greater flexibility. (4) The disadvantages of using the Hard Approach option are: (a) Will be compromised at a minimum of approximately one minute before the breach can be initiated, thus, allowing for the adversary gain a presence of mind and fight you. (b) Allows the adversary more time to kill/injure some/all the precious cargo before you affect entry. (c) May have a higher rate of Strike Force casualties because of the early compromise; Allowing the enemy to engage you while you are on the FAST Rope. b. Soft Approach: (1) The Soft Approach, as the names suggest, is approaching the target in a surreptitious manner. Normally the soft approach is only chosen for a deliberate assault. (2) Advantages of a Soft Approach are: (a) Optimal use of surprise. You gain a phenomenal advantage by being able to sneak up to the Breach Point at 0200, quietly place the charge, and to initiate that charge while the adversary is sleeping. What you have achieved is shock. Imagine yourself on the receiving end. Your asleep and are awoken by a loud explosion 30 feet away. On top of that, all of these guys are charging into your house with automatic weapons blazing, flashbangs going off, screaming...What do you think that you would do? Most say that they would probably relieve themselves right there. That is what we are trying to achieve. By shock-
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ing, stunning, and scaring the adversaries, we are trying to keep him back stepping. Trying to prevent him from either gaining the presence of mind to fight us, or from shooting the hostages. (b) Allows you the flexibility of when to attack. (c) Because of the Surprise, coupled with speed and violence of action, there will possibly be a lower percentage of Strike Force casualties. (2) The Disadvantages of a Soft Approach are: (a) Requires more in-depth planning. (b) Higher chance for early compromise, in that you now have a large force maneuvering through unfamiliar terrain. (c) Assault element may be in a lower state of readiness in conducting the assault because of patrol movement. (d) Time. (e) Depending on what assets the TROOP has available and what assets are currently involved with the crisis, the TROOP may lose its Emergency Assault capability once the Strike Force inserts. Now that you understand the difference between a Soft and Hard Approach, let’s discuss some techniques used, as well as the sequence of events, for a soft approach by patrolling means. The following is not intended to teach anyone patrolling techniques, but to pass on some specific techniques that need mentioning. 2. ACTIONS AT THE INSERT POINT: a. The following actions need to occur at the insert point. (1) Immediately establish all around security. (2) Establish link-up with R&S Guides. (3) Receive data dump from R&S Guides. (4) Last minute check that all equipment is in place. (5) Assume order of movement. (6) Conduct radio checks and head counts.
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3. ACTIONS DURING MOVEMENT: a. Consider organization of movement to reflect Security Element personnel at the point, flanks, and rear, as that they have the big elephant guns. Have the Direct Action Troop and Strike Force Headquarters in the middle. b. Consider using saber radio communications to relay essential hand and arm signals and other commands. Remember, you may be maneuvering a 60 man force during total darkness. if the point man signaled to freeze with just his hand, how long would it take for the tail end charlie to receive that signal and freeze? Probably a long time. With the radio, there would be instant compliance. Do not go over board with the radio comm though. Only important information is passed over the net. Additionally, you cannot be on the same net as R&S as you are patrolling. c. During the planning phase, plan for a slow movement based on the size and experience level of the patrol. d. The point element must go slow, based on the size of the unit patrolling. The faster you go, the more it will sound like a herd of elephants out in the bush. e. Conduct repeated security halts and head counts. f. Strike Force Headquarters should maintain separate comm with R&S teams located at the Crisis Site. If the R&S teams can hear the Strike Force patrolling, they should immediately notify them of that fact. g. Recommend against patrolling with helmets on so as not restrict your hearing. Do not patrol with protecs on or goggles mounted on the helmet, they reflect badly in the moon light. 3. ACTIONS AT THE OBJECTIVE RALLY POINT (ORP): a. The ORP will usually be set up by R&S. This is where all R&S Teams send their information to. This, of course, will be situation dependent. b. The following actions take place: (1) 360 degree security is established. (2) Information update from R & S. (3) Dissemination of information to shooters.
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(4) Leaders Recon/5 Point Contingency Plan. (5) Communications check with Higher Headquarters. (6) Preparation of equipment. 4. RELEASE POINT(S): a. A Release Point is a location that you will split your forces to maneuver to their specific areas of interest. b. Should be a terrain feature known and recognized by all. c. May be the located at the ORP. d. Teams/Elements should release on a time line designed so that all individuals/teams/and elements arrive at their destination at the same time. You want to avoid having a Breach Team waiting on a Breach Point exposed and the other Breach Team isn't even near their Breach Point. This simply increases the chance for compromise. e. Teams/Elements that do release move to their respective LCC's and no further. Your final stop before moving to the Breach Point is the LCC. 5. ACTIONS AT THE LCC: a. The LCC is your last covered and concealed position prior to moving to your Breach Point. b. The following actions will take place at the LCC: (1) 360 degree security is established. (2) Final preparations for breach(es). (3) Last time to ask for Compromise Authority. (4) Final weapons and gear check. (5) MP5s are off safe if not already. (6) Balaclava on/eye pro on/Helmets on/ear plugs in. (7) Jackrabbit to R&S Freq on handheld comm. Communications check with R&S. (8) Updated information from R&S.
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(9) Final movement plan. (10) Sentry removal plan. (11) May be used as an assembly area if you have to do an Emergency Evacuation. (12) No one leaves the LCC until directed to do so by the Strike Force Commander. The final stop is your Breach Point(s). 6. MOVEMENT TO AND ACTIONS AT THE BREACH POINT. a. Movement to your Breach Point(s) will be determined by terrain and the situation. You prefer to have the minimum number of shooters depart the LCC and move to the Breach Point. the more shooters that are moving and exposed outside of the LCC, the greater chance for compromise. b. The size of the Breach Team will be dependent on the following: (1) Minimum number of shooters required to adequately place the breach and to provide security for those who are placing the breach. (2) The distance from LCC to Breach Point cannot cause a lull in dynamics. For example. If there was a five man Breach Team and the rest of the troop was 100 meters away in the LCC. Once the breach was fired, the Breach Team will make entry with a point man and two room entry teams. Now, right after that breach, the entry teams will be making entry into their rooms. The point man is now in the hallway, by himself, waiting for the rest of the troop to run the 100 meters to get inside the Crisis Site. As you can see, a lull has developed. With the same scenario, but the LCC is only 25 meters away, will there be the same lull? The answer is no, which is what you are trying to achieve. c. A good round number for a Breach Team is between six to eight shooters. Less than six and you may lose security somewhere. More than eight and you are taking the chance for compromise. d. Before the Breach Team can leave the LCC, they must first have authorization from the Strike Force Commander. e. Regardless of rank, the breacher is in charge of the Breach Team from the LCC to the Breach being fired. f. The Breach Team should utilize tactical formations when leaving the LCC, such as a wedge. g. The following responsibilities are based on a eight man Breach Team moving in a wedge formation. The shooter numbers are based on their stack position: (1) The point of the wedge is Far Side Security, the right wing is the Door Security, left wing is overhead security. The Flank Security is on the left rear wing and the Rear Security is on the right rear wing. The Blanket Man, Breacher, and Assistant Breacher are positioned in the middle of the wedge.
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(2) The speed of movement is very slow, so as not to attract attention and not to make noise. (3) The forward three shooters in the wedge should be equipped with sound suppressers on their primary weapon. (4) As the shooters arrive at the Breach Point, each moves to his specific position. (5) The Blanket Man will move to his stacking position. He will quietly unfold the blanket and position it. He will be the #1 shooter in the stack. Upon the initiation of the Breach, He will step outboard of the stack, dragging and dropping the blanket out of the way. He will be the #4 shooter on entry. (6) The Door Security will move to and take position on the Breach Point. He will position himself on the door knob side, but out of the way of the breacher. When signaled to stack, he will move to and stack in the #2 position. Upon the breach, he will be the first shooter to make entry, by-passing the blanket man. (7) Far Side Security, who lead the Breach Team to the Breach Point, will take a position just on the far side of the Breach Point. He should be within arms length distance from the Door Security. When signaled, he will move to and stack in the #3 position and will be the second shooter to make entry. (8) Overhead Security will take position in the stack as the #4 position. He must ensure that he leaves enough space for the Door Security and Far Side Security to stack between him and the Blanket Man. He will be the third shooter to make entry. (9) The Breacher will move directly to the breach point. He will place the charge, string out the shock tube, and stack and make entry in the #5 position. The Breacher will give the Count over the radio net and will initiate the Breach. (10) The Assistant Breacher will move directly to the Breach Point and assist the Breacher. He will hold the shock tube in place as the Breacher strings it out. When the Breacher signals, the A-Breacher will pull the Far Side and Door Security back to the stack. The A-Breacher will stack and make entry in the #6 position. The A-Breacher will also be armed with a M590 breaching shotgun. (11) The Flank Security will move to, stack, and make entry in the #7 position. He must ensure that he leaves space for the Breacher and A-Breacher to stack. He will be equipped with a sledge hammer. (12) Rear Security will move to, stack, and make entry in the #8 position. He will be equipped with a hooligan tool. h. Once the Breach is set and the Breach Team is stacked, the Breacher will begin the count. On the first "I HAVE CONTROL", all Shooters in the stack and in the LCC will remove the tape covering the light on their primary weapon. Once the Breach is fired, the Breach Team, followed by the rest of the troop, will make entry. The last man in the objective will grab the blast blanket and place it in the HHA. i. On the Breach, all personnel will move into position.
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A lot goes into approaching the Crisis Site. Probably one of the most important things that you can take from this class is not to compromise yourself early, to do so could cause death to you, your teammate, or the hostage. SUMMARY: Remember, to have a successful assault, you first must be able to get to the Breach Point(s) without compromise and all gear and weapons ready to fight. As you may see, this may be easier said then done.
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REACT TO SNIPER General: If the lead fire team/squad encounters sniper fire while moving down the street they will immediately return fire in the direction of the suspected location of the sniper and throws smoke for concealment. The lead team/squad then becomes the support element and continues to try and pinpoint the sniper’s location while suppressing. On the command of the Platoon/Squad Leader the trail squad/team breaks off and moves along an adjacent road or concealed route at a double time to set up a blocking position or positions to stop the sniper from exiting the building or hide site. A distance of approximately 3 buildings away from the suspected position of the sniper is sufficient in most cases to set up a good blocking position. Once the blocking position is in place the Platoon Leader commands his support team that first made contact to take the most direct route into the building that the fire came from and clear the building to neutralize the sniper. It is absolutely critical that the maneuver element in charge of setting up the blocking position moves as quickly as possible while moving into position. If this does not happen the unit will continue to fight the same sniper block after block as he egresses and sets up new positions along the route.
React To Sniper Diagram:
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Upon receiving fire from the enemy sniper, (represented by the circled "X"), the lead team/squad takes the following actions as described above. 1Lead team/squad throws smoke and returns fire. 2Lead team/squad seeks cover and continues to suppress the sniper. 3Trail team/squad moves at a double time to a blocking position. 4Trail team/squad blocks to prevent the sniper from moving to a new hide position. 5Lead team/squad (or a squad not in contact) moves to the building that the sniper is located in and executes enter and clear a building.
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ROOM CLEARING TECHNIQUES 1. INTRODUCTION: You have completed only 1/3 of your training up to this point, which is how to surgically shoot your weapon(s). The next portion of your training will require you to react, walk, talk, and apply your surgical shooting skills in enclosed spaces almost all at the same time, in close proximity of other shooters and living individuals. This section is designed to introduce you to room clearing techniques. BODY 1. DANGER AREAS. A danger area is any door or opening into an enclosure, or around a blind corner, such as a L-Shaped hallway. As the lead shooter approaches a danger area, the first thing that he is looking for is to see if it is an opened or closed door leading into the danger area. If the enclosure is an opening to the danger area, the lead shooter will stop short of that opening and establish a stacking position. 2. TAKING A POSITION IN A TEAM STACK: a. The "Stack" is a position in which two or more shooters will occupy prior to making entry into an enclosure. b. The lead shooter positions himself along a wall with his leading foot being closest to the wall. His head is up to observe the danger area, with his weapon at the low ready, oriented toward the danger area. He is completely responsible for maintaining security of that opening. c. The second shooter, (as well as all consecutive shooters), will "Stack" on the lead shooter by pressing into him, (without pushing him forward), and placing the feet in the same manner as the shooter in front of you. Except for the lead shooter, all other shooters will have their weapons at an exaggerated low ready with the muzzle pointed outboard. d. Remember to stay off of the wall, far enough so that your gear and weapon do not drag along it. They might know that you are in the crisis site, but they don't need to know that you are right outside the door. Additionally, the FBI conducted a study in the early 90's that found that bullets that were fired at walls from an angle would deflect and travel approximately 6 inches along the wall instead of penetrating, yet another reason to stay off of the walls in hallways. e. HEAD AND EYES ARE UP, LOOKING AT/FOR THE DANGER AREA/THREAT! 3. DIVERSIONARY DEVICES: a. Introduction to Diversionary Devices: (1) Before we make entry into any enclosure, we always want to shock that enclosure. By shocking the enclosure, we gain the advantage, according to some studies, approximately a 5 second advantage, which could be the determining factor on who wins the fight.
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(2) Upon ignition, the Flashbang will give a loud explosion, brilliant flash, and smoke. The explosion and flash work to stun and disorient any occupant within the enclosure, while the smoke aids in masking your movement within the enclosure. However, smoke will also make target identification more difficult. Flashbangs may also start fires within the Crisis Site, ie, carpets, couches, curtains, etc. (3) The Flashbang is deployed by gripping the body with the spoon depressed. With the opposite hand, pull and remove the pin. When thrown, the spoon will "fly" which ignites the fuse within the body. One second and a-half after the spoon has been released, the Flashbang will detonate. b. Deployment of a Diversionary Device: (1) The second man, or Number 2 man, will deploy the flashbang while the lead shooter maintains security on the opening. The flashbang man will grip the body of the flashbang with the outboard hand, (the hand furthest from the opening), ensuring that the spoon is depressed. Place the finger of the opposite hand in the ring. He will then step out of the stack position and observe for an opening, (to ensure that the opening is not obstructed). If the opening is good, the shooter pulls pin and throws the flashbang, below knee level, 3 to 5 feet into the enclosure. Once deploying the flashbang, the shooter immediately steps back into the stack, re-gripping his weapon, and all shooters stacked will turn their head inboard with his eyes closed. The shooter may relinquish control of his primary weapon to throw a flashbang if he needs to, ensure that the weapon is on safe. (2) The reason why you want to throw the flashbang with the outboard hand is that if you throw with the inboard hand/back handing it, there is a chance that you will hit the door frame and bang the hallway, and your teammates. When stepping out of the stack to observe, step out low and aggressively, but do not block the hallway with your body. The reason why you want to deploy the flashbang below the knees and three to five feet within the enclosure is to force any individual away from the entrance point of the room, verses toward to entrance point, thus, impeding your entry. (3) Prepping the flashbang. If you approach and stack on a lead shooter and THEN grasp a flashbang, by the time that you deploy it could be five seconds. Now, multiply that 5 seconds times 20 rooms. Those seconds add up. For that reason, we want to "prep" our flashbang enroute to the lead shooter. As you approach a lead shooter, you are grasping a flashbang with your outboard hand. Then, as you stack on the lead shooter, you immediately step out, look, pull, and throw. (4) Shooters may elect to carry two flashbangs on each little finger. In this manner, the shooter steps out, holding his weapon with the inboard hand. Identifies opening, reach with the outboard hand, grasping the flashbang on the inboard little finger. Pulls and deploys. This will allow the shooter to not have to relinquish control of his weapon. (5) When not to use Flashbangs: (a) Hazards. Drug labs, tanker vessels, doors with explosive/poison hazard symbols, etc. (b) Impractical. You have thrown so many flashbangs that the smoke has collected and is so thick that you cannot see.
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(c) Small Rooms, (Closets, bathrooms). By deploying a flashbang into a small enclosure could potentially cause serious harm to any hostages that may be present within that enclosure. (6) Improper use of a flashbang could cause serious injury and/or death. As you can see, Flashbangs can play a big part in the success of the assault. Now lets discuss how we are going to fight in a room. 4. ROOM ENTRY: a. The minimum shooters needed to enter a room is two. b. The idea is to get two guns in the room as close to simultaneously as possible. In order to do so, the first shooter must go slow, in order for both shooters to get in the room fast. The position of the stack will always be opposite of the hinge on the door. The flow left or right will vary depending on hinge position and door swing direction. The following descriptions and images explain the different positions. Hinged Left, Opens In: One man goes right, two man goes left, three man goes right, four man goes left. When the 4 man/breacher opens the door he position himself by the hinge, opens or battering rams the door and then while staying out of the way reaches out and pushes/holds the door open without entering the fatal funnel. Hinged Right, Opens In: One man goes left, two man goes right, three man goes left, four man goes right. 4Man/breacher take same action on opposite side. Hinged Left Opens Out: One man goes right, two man goes left, three man goes right, four man goes left. Hinged Right, Opens Out: One man goes right, two man goes left, three man goes right, four man
goes left. NOTE: The figures to the right represent the different stack positions relative to the way the door opens and the position of the hinge.
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c. Once the Flashbang has exploded, both shooters step to make entry into the enclosure. The lead shooter steps off with his outboard foot and then takes a side step into the room with the foot that is closest to the wall. As he is doing this he is clearing the thresh hold, which we will discuss shortly. At this point, the lead shooter has one foot in the enclosure and one foot in the passageway, he can now see his initial sector of fire, which is in the immediate corner. Next the shooter steps fully into the room and travels along the wall that he can see, or, the path of least resistance. d. The Number 2 Shooter steps off at the same time as the lead shooter. While the lead shooter is going straight, the Number 2 man will move in the opposite direction. In order to do this, as he approaches the opening, he will drive his outboard foot into the far side door jam, this will propel him in the opposite direction of his movement, the Button Hook. When he steps into the door jam he will button hook into the room and move in the opposite direction of the Number 1 Man. This begins the sector of fire for the Number 2 Man. Like the lead shooter, the Number 2 Man is also responsible for clearing the Tresh Hold. e. Thresh Hold. The Thesh Hold is the immediate area three to five feet inside the doorway. The Thresh Hold is where you want to place the Flash Bang, which upon exploding, will aid in clearing this area out. Each shooter is responsible for clearing the tresh hold as they are entering the room. This is normally done from outside the room as the shooter is stepping into the room. If an adversary is encountered here, the shooter may have to engage in the Weapons Retention, and should continue with his clear on the move. Clearing the Thresh Hold is done without looking deep into the room. You must imagine that there is an eight foot wall on the edge of the thresh hold that prevents you from looking deep into the room. Looking deep into the room at this point could cause problems. By looking deep and you see an adversary with a weapon, you will most likely stop, (blocking the door way) and engage, ignoring your initial corner, which could get you and your teammate killed.
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FATAL FUNNEL
3-5'
THRESH HOLD
fig. 1
fig. 2
f. Fatal Funnel. The Fatal Funnel is a cone of light inside the enclosure that extends from the doorway. Even in dark rooms, the area around the doorway may be slightly illuminated. It is also where the enemy will focus his fire. For those reasons it is important to move out of the fatal funnel when entering an enclosure. g. Behind Doors. As you are moving to your dominating position, is the door is not pressed against the wall, shoulder it to the wall. If it still does not close and you feel resistance, you have one of two choices that are open to you. (1) Stop where you are at and pin the door with your ankle and knee. Once your sector is clear, assume the underarm assault, open the door, and clear behind it. (2) Continue to move past the door to your dominating position. Once your sector is clear, check behind the door. You now know how we are going to effectively get into the room, now let's discuss how the room will influence how we do business. 5. SQUARE ROOM, CORNER OPEN DOOR: a. DOMINATING AND ELIMINATING: (1) Both shooters have made room entry, have cleared the thresh hold and are moving in opposite directions (2) The lead shooter, if confronted with an immediate corner, then he will turn that corner and move along the wall to the second, far corner and dominate. If, upon room entry, the lead shooter is confronted
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with a far corner, then he will move to that initial corner and dominate. The dominating position is a position within the room that a shooter can best fight and control from. (3) The Number 2 shooter is moving in the opposite direction from that of the lead shooter. The number 2 man, if confronted with an immediate corner, then he will turn that corner and move along the wall to the second, far corner and dominate. If, upon room entry, the number 2 man is confronted with a far corner, then he will move to that initial corner and dominate. One shooter should be in a near corner and one shooter should be in a far corner.
O
O
O
SHOOTER CONFRONTED WITH A NEAR CORNER
O
SHOOTER CONFRONTED WITH A FAR CORNER
OO
TWO SHOOTERS SQUARE ROOM, CORNER DOOR
O O
O
O
fig. 3 (4) You have heard me refer to both of the shooters moving along there walls. Do not let this confuse anyone. You should still remain approximately 6 to 8 inches off of the wall. Both shooters travel in "lanes". Because of the sectors of fire in the enclosure, which we will discuss shortly, it is important that both shooters travel along the walls. If a shooter moves out toward the center of the room, avoiding furniture or obstacles, could place himself in jeopardy of being engaged by his partner. Stay in your lane. (5) As the shooters enter the room and are moving toward there dominating position, they are also collapsing their sectors of fire, in the low ready, ELIMINATING. If a adversary presents itself, the shooter engages while on the move in his respective lane. The method of engagement for both shooters is a pair to the torso, (either full auto or semi-auto depending upon range and weapons system), low ready and continuing to collapse toward the opposing shooter. Each shooters collapse will stop one meter from the opposing shooter, (one meter off of his muzzle, off his shoulder, etc). Once the shooter has reached the one meter mark, he collapses back, re-engaging adversaries with a single brain shot, if they are still in the fight. Adversaries are identified as having any type of weapon in their hands. This is why it is critical that shooters collapse their sector in the low ready, so that you can make target identification. If you collapse with the weapon in the "on target" position, you may not be able to see the hands, you are more likely to accidentally engage a non-hostile, and additionally, you will lose your peripheral vision. NOTE: THE ONE METER RULE CANNOT BE VIOLATED AT ANYTIME. (6) Shooters should not be confused with moving and clearing the sector of fire. Do not keep your muzzle pointed at the corner until you reach it. Once an area is visibly cleared, immediately continue to collapse your sector of fire. Remember, above the hips are like a tank turret, turning left and right while you are moving.
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(7) The shooters Dominate from opposite corners, one has traveled up the long wall, and one has traveled up the short wall. The positions in the opposite corners are called textbook Dominating Positions. Once the shooter has reached his Textbook dominating position, he cannot move forward of that position until supplemental verbiage has been exchanged. This is where we can understand how important it is for predictability between shooters is so important. To continue discussing dominating positions, the rule of thumb is that as the shooter is collapsing his sector of fire and the next step that he takes would cause him to cross his feet, he should stop and become static at that point. That position the he stops at is now called his true dominating position. NOTE: Once a shooter stops in the room, he cannot move forward until supplemental verbiage has been exchanged between all shooters in that specific room, doing so could put himself in extreme danger of being engaged by the opposing shooter. Again, predictability between fellow shooters. The specific verbiage will be discussed shortly. (8) It is important that each shooter moves as close to his text book dominating position as possible so that he can clear more of the room.
o TEXT BOOK DOMINATING POSITIONS FOR A SQUARE ROOM, CORNER DOOR
o fig. 4 b. CONTROLLING THE ROOM: (1) As both shooters are moving to there dominating positions and collapsing their sectors of fire, they are identifying living individuals. Identifying only means target discrimination, ie, does it get shot or not...hands. If a living individual is not holding any type of weapon, then the shooters should give verbiage in order to control that living individual. the verbiage given is "DOWN, DOWN, DOWN, WE ARE AMERICANS;" pause for compliance, "DON'T MOVE". The verbiage should be delivered in a clear, concise voice. The tone should be loud and firm. Do not let you adrenaline level influence the verbiage, in other words speaking so rapidly that no one can understand what you are saying. As you collapse your sector and you identify a non-hostile living individual, your collapse does not stop. Continue to do your muzzle sweep, while giving the verbiage. If, while giving verbiage, you identify a threat, stop the verbiage, engage the threat, and then continue the verbiage. Continue giving verbiage until you have compliance. We will discuss what appropriate actions you would take if a non-hostile living individual is not compliant later in the course.
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c. MOVING IN THE ROOM: (1) Once the first three fundamental have been completed, it is now time to start moving in the room in order to complete the remaining fundamentals. The only verbiage required to move in a room is one shooter will sound of with "CLOSING", with the opposing shooter sounding off with "CLOSE" No shooter can move after stopping in the room during the initial clear until this verbiage has been exchanged. A shooter who sounds off with "CLOSING" and then steps off could be placing himself in jeopardy. The opposing shooter could still be in the fight. Again, the shooter who sounds off with "CLOSING" must wait for the reply of "CLOSE" from his partner. By a shooter sounding off with "CLOSING" means that he intends to maneuver in the room. The shooter who sounds off with "CLOSE" means that he will provide cover for the shooter who is "CLOSING". The cover man must not only provide security for the shooter who is closing, but for the entire room as well. Any time that a shooter wants to stop all movement in a room, use the verbiage of "HOLD". Upon hearing "HOLD", all shooters immediately stop what they are doing. Shooters should then resort to plain text to explain what is going on. Example. Shooter #1 is maneuvering in the room, shooter # 2 is providing cover. As shooter #1 is maneuvering, he fails to see a hidden danger area behind a counter and is getting ready to place his back to that uncleared area. Shooter # 2, the coverman, observes this and sound off with "HOLD"..."CHECK BEHIND THE COUNTER". d. DEAD CHECK: (1) A dead check is conducted on all those individuals who have been engaged. Before the dead check can be conducted the first three fundamentals must have already been completed. To initiate the dead check, one shooter, preferably the shooter closest to the engaged threat, sounds off with "CLOSING". His teammate sounds off with "CLOSE". The closing shooter now approaches the engaged threat in the low ready. As he comes within arms reach of the engaged threat, he assumes the under arm assault position, so as to better control his weapon should the adversary not be dead. The closing shooter first sweeps/removes the weapon away from the engaged threat. Next, he gives the engaged threat a thump to the eye with his support index finger. The purpose of the eye thump is to observe for a nervous reaction from the engaged threat. If the individual is unconscious and severely injured, but is still alive, you will observe a twitch from his eyes upon the eye thump. If the individual is playing possum, you will observe a twitch from the eyes upon the eye thump. If the individual is dead, you will observe no reaction upon the eye thump. After the closing shooter has removed the weapon and administered the eye thump, he will now announce to his teammate the condition of the engaged threat both verbally and physically. Verbally by giving an "UP" or "DOWN" and physically by giving a thumbs up, (alive), or thumbs down, (dead). Both shooters will continue with the same technique until all engaged threats have been dead checked. The two shooters may switch off Closing and Close duties, simply by announcing the intentions. Once all dead checks have been completed, both shooters will move to the next fundamental. e. SEARCH THE ROOM: Their are two types of searches that we conduct in every enclosure, the Detailed Search and the Hasty Search. The difference is obvious. For the detailed search, the entire enclosure is thoroughly searched, ie, in draws, in cabinets, anywhere that a 2 foot high man could hide is 89
what is searched. A hasty search is a quick search of the obvious, ie, behind the curtains, underneath the desk, underneath the bed. The type of search conducted will be dependent on whether or not trailer tactics are used. If the Direct Action Troop alone is clearing the objective, then the shooters must conduct a detailed search of the room before they depart. However, as you will find out during integration training, if trailers are used, then the Direct Action Troop member only conducts a hasty search, then calls in a trailer to conduct a deliberate search of the room, while the primary shooter departs to continue the dynamics of the clear. During this course, you will be required to conduct the Detailed Search in every space, since we are not using trailers. (1) Searching the Room. Once the dead checks have been conducted, the next fundamental is to conduct a Detailed Search of the enclosure. A shooter, preferably the shooter closest to any hidden danger areas that need to be searched, sounds off with "CLOSING". His teammate responds when ready with "CLOSE". The room is then thoroughly searched. (2) Fundamental 4 and 5 (Dead Check and Search the room) are the only two fundamentals that may be switched, and is only switched when necessary. The reason why you may need to switch these fundamentals in sequence is, for example, you are closing on an engaged individual to conduct a dead check, but between you and him is a desk that you have not cleared behind. In this instance, you should search behind the desk before conducting the dead check. You need not give any additionally verbiage to your teammate, unless you feel it necessary. f. SEARCH AND CUFF: (1) Just as with the Dead Check and the Search, two shooters are required to Search and Cuff any living individuals within the room, one shooter to cover, and one shooter to do the physical work. We will discuss more on this fundamental later in the course during hostage handling classes. g. DEPARTING THE ROOM: At this point we have Dominated, Eliminated, Controlled the room through verbiage, Dead Checked, Searched the room, and Searched and Cuffed the Living. You will attempt to conduct all of these six fundamentals in every enclosure that you enter. Now that we have completed the first six fundamentals in the room, we now need to leave the room and continue the clearing process. To leave the room, the first shooter who realizes that all six fundamentals have been completed in the room, announces "OUT", signaling for all shooters to depart the room. As the shooters move to the doorway, a shooter, preferably the last shooter to exit the room, will sound off with "I'LL MARK", signifying to others that he will mark the space. (1) As the first shooter approaches the doorway, he sounds off loudly from within the room, "COMING OUT", and steps out of the room, into the hallway, and looks for the next danger area or lone shooter. (2) As the last shooter approaches the doorway, he grasp and breaks a green chemlight and places it on the floor on the side of the door frame on the side opposite of the direction of movement. We mark all enclosures that we have cleared so that it serves as a indicator to all inside the Crisis Site that specific room has been cleared. We mark the room with a illuminated green chemlight, as SOP. The reason that we mark the door on the side of opposite the direction of movement is so that after the fight has finished
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and shooters are moving back through the objective to marshal, they will see the chemlight as they are approaching. If the chemlight was on the side of the direction of movement, then the shooter might have to get right on top of the door frame before he can see the chemlight. (3) As the last shooter is marking the room, he sounds off loudly with "LAST MAN OUT", letting all know that no other shooters are within that specific enclosure. The last shooter then exits into the hallway, looking for the next danger area and/or lone shooter. 6. SQUARE ROOM, CENTER OPEN DOOR: a. Most of everything that you have learned to this point remains the same, ie, stacking, deploying a flashbang, as well as the six fundamentals. Because of the room configuration with a center, open door, the manner in which we maneuver in the room will be altered. (1) As the two man team is stacked on the outside and upon making room entry, the lead shooter will move to his initial corner, turn up that corner and dominate approximately 1/4 of the way up the second wall. The number 2 shooter will button hook, move to his initial corner, turn that corner and dominate approximately 1/4 of the way up that second wall. Both shooters should now be abreast of each other on opposite walls. Nothing else changes. \
O TEXT BOOK DOMINATING POSITIONS SQUARE ROOM, CENTER DOOR
O fig. 5 Now that we know how to clear square rooms, lets move on to what we will do when we are confronted with a closed door. 7. CLOSED DOORS. As the lead shooter approaches the closed door, he is looking for two things; where the hinges are located and where the door knob is located. The location of the hinges will dictate how the two man team will enter the enclosure. If the shooter observes the hinges that means that the door opens outward. If you see no hinges, than the door opens inward. a. Inward Opening, Closed Door. As the lead shooter approaches and sees no hinges, he will automatically cross past the closed door, stacking on the opposite side of the closed door. The second shooter approaches the door and also observes for hinges and doorknob. The second shooter will not cross the closed door, but will stop short of it. Both shooters should now be facing each other on opposite sides of the closed door. The shooter who is on the door knob side of the door will now be considered the Number 2 Man for room entry. This shooter will be responsible for opening the door, and if using flashbangs, will 91
deploy the flashbang into the room. The shooter who is on the hinge side of the door will be considered the Number 1 Man for room entry and is responsible for security on the door. Both shooters are in position; the door knob side shooter will reach for the door knob, grasping it. Both shooters then make eye contact, look and nod to each other, signifying that both are ready to make room entry. The door knob shooter, on the down stroke of the nod, will turn the door knob and push it forcefully open. Once the door has opened, the door knob shooter will grasp a flashbang and deploy it properly into the room. On the explosion, the hinge side shooter steps off as the Number 1 Man, followed by the door knob shooter, the Number 2 Man. Interior room tactics will not change from what you have already been taught. The one advantage of this entry technique is that the second shooter to make room entry does not have to button hook, but simply enters the room and moves in the path of least resistance. b. Outward Opening, Closed Door. As the lead shooter approaches and sees hinges, he will stack on the door knob side of the door. The second shooter, will likewise, stack behind the lead shooter on the door knob side. (If the shooter(s) stack on the hinge side of the outward opening door, then when the door is opened, it would open in the face of the shooter stacked on the hinge side, blocking him from making entry). When ready to make entry, the number 2 man will grasp a flashbang and step slightly out, not yet pulling the pin; he is simply in the profile to deploy the flashbang. As the lead shooter sees, out of his peripheral vision, the Number 2 Man step out with the flashbang, he will reach and turn the door knob, forcefully pushing it open, and then re-gripping his primary weapon. Once the Number 2 Man has an opening, he will pull pin and deploy the flashbang into the room and re-grip his weapon. On the explosion, both shooters step off and make room entry. Note: If at any time a door closes after the flashbang has been deployed, wait for the flashbang to explode, re-open the door, and make room entry. 8. THREE MAN CLEAR, SQUARE ROOM: a. The Number 1 and 2 Men's responsibilities remain the same. b. The Number 3 Man, upon making room entry, like the Number 1 and 2 Man, is responsible for clearing the Thresh Hold. c. As the Number 3 Man steps in the room, he will move and dominate just inside the doorway, positioning himself slightly to the left or right of the fatal funnel. As you can see, by the Number 3 Man dominating in this manner, we have established a horseshoe between the three shooters. This horseshoe will allow all three shooters a greater degree in flexibility when collapsing their sectors of fire. It is important that the Number 3 Man does not over penetrate into the room, as this will limit the Number 1 and 2 Mans Sector and will place himself in danger of possibly being engaged by a teammate. d. The Number 3 Mans sector of fire is the same as the Number 1 and 2 shooters; one meter off of the nearest shooter. Preferably, his sector should start one meter off of the first shooter, (Number 1 Man), that made room entry. e. By adding the third man to the room entry team, allows the team a greater degree of security and protection.
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3 MAN CLEAR CENTER DOOR
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3 MAN CLEAR CORNER DOOR
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fig. 6 f. Working the room can be done in a more effective manner with a three man team. One man may be closing, while one man is specifically covering him. While the third shooter may be specifically covering the remainder of the room. You will not, however, allow two shooters to be closing while one shooter is covering both, he simply could not do a effective job at providing adequate security. g. As we just discussed, if a three man room entry team is better than a two man entry team, why not always have a three man team. What will dictate the size of the room entry team will be the size of the objective? If you have a 20 man troop and the objective has 20 rooms, how long will it take for you to get to that last room, they may contain the precious cargo? If the objective is small enough to allow for three man room entry teams, without losing our dynamics, then by all means, that is the way to go. h. The Number 3 Man must be aware that when beginning his sector of fire that the Number 1 and/or 2 Men may still be moving toward their dominating position. i. Once the first three fundamentals have been completed, and after the verbiage of Close and Closing has been exchanged, if the extra shooter is not needed in the room, then he sounds off with his last name and "LEAVING". He then moves to the door, announcing "COMING OUT', and he departs the room, (under no circumstance will the shooter mark the room while two other shooters are still completing fun-
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damentals in that room. Remember, the mark signifies that all fundamentals have been completed in that specific room and that there are no shooters in that room). j. If all shooters depart the room together, then the first shooter announces "COMING OUT" and the last shooter announces "LAST MAN OUT". The second, third, forth, etc shooters that are in the middle do not sound off with any verbiage. However, if there has been a lull between the first shooter to exit and the second shooter, than the second shooter should sound off with "COMING OUT". 9. FOUR MAN CLEAR, SQUARE ROOM: a. The Number 1 and 2 Men's responsibility remain the same. b. All shooters making room entry are responsible for clearing the Thresh Hold. c. The Number 3 Man will make entry and will offset to the side of the first shooter who made entry into the room. Specifically, he will offset just inside the doorway, approximately two to three paces, and out of the fatal funnel. His Sector of Fire should start directly to his front at 12 O'Clock and should collapse to one meter off of the shooter that first made entry into the room, then collapse in the other direction to one meter off of the nearest shooter. Once the sector is clear, go back and look for brains. d. The Number 4 Man will make entry and will offset to the side of the second shooter who made entry into the room. Specifically, he will offset just inside the doorway, approximately two to three paces, and out of the fatal funnel. The Number 4 Man's sector of fire will start directly to his front at 12 O'Clock in the room. It will then collapse to one meter off of the second shooter that made entry into the room, then collapsing in the other direction to one meter off of the nearest shooter. Once the sector is clear, go back and look for brains. e. At this point, the 3 and 4 Men should be abreast of each other. Like the three man clear, we still have the horseshoe established between the four shooters, which allows for the greatest degree of flexibility of sectors of fire. While the 3 and 4 Men are abreast of each other, they should not be standing shoulder to shoulder, as this will greatly reduce their sector of fire.
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4 MAN CLEAR CORNER DOOR
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fig. 7 f. Once the first three fundamentals have been completed, by introducing the forth shooter allows for the entry team to work in two, two man teams to complete fundamentals 4, 5, and 6. g. Before any shooter in the room can move, all shooters must pause and visually check to ensure that all shooting has ceased in the room before the verbiage of "CLOSE" and "CLOSING" is exchanged. Example is that shooters number 1, 2, and 3 have completed their engagements; shooter 1 announces "CLOSING" while shooter 2 responds with "CLOSE"; As this is happening, shooter 4 is pausing for a brain shot and is still in the fight. g. Just as with the three man clearing team, the size of the target will determine whether or not you can utilize a four man team concept. h. Both the 3 and 4 men must be aware when while collapsing their respective sectors of fire that either the 1 and/or 2 men may still be moving toward their dominating position. 10. L-SHAPED ROOM. Stacking, Deploying Flashbangs, Sectors of Fire, and the fundamentals remain the same. The only thing that does change is how you will maneuver in the room. a. 2-Man Clear without Support: It is safe to say that the chances of you getting your hands on a blueprint, and therefore knowing that an L-Shaped room exist within the Crisis Site is rare. Therefore, we should approach the L-Shaped Room as if we were clearing a square room, either with a corner or center door. While clearing that room, the L would appear while you are clearing your sector of fire, possibly while you are still moving to your dominating position. In other words, it would catch us by surprise. (1) Either the Number 1 or 2 Man will end up on the short wall of the L, dependent on the direction of approach. Both shooters sector of fire remain the same, however, once the man who is on the L, better known as the barricade, finishes the collapse of his sector of fire, he should immediately focus his attention on the barricade, as should the opposing shooter.
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(2) The first shooter to recognize the L immediately sounds off with "L-SHAPED RIGHT/LEFT" in order to warn the other shooter in the room. (3) Once the two shooters have dominated, eliminated and controlled in the main room, if the barricade shooter is not positioned on the barricade, he needs to announce "CLOSING" and after receiving the reply, moves up to and dominates on the barricade, ensuring that he does not expose himself to the uncleared L. (4) The Barricade Man then announces loudly "SUPPORT". If their are no engaged targets, no living individuals, no other danger areas or areas that would require a search, then the other shooter in the room moves to and stacks on the barricade man, deploys a flashbang into the L, and both shooters make entry on the explosion as if the L were a separate enclosure. (5) To make entry into an L, it is treated as a square room with a open corner door. The lead shooter goes to the wall that he sees and dominates. Te second shooter button hooks. Sectors of fire remain the same.
o o o o
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fig. 8 b. 2-Man Clear with Support: (1) When the shooter stacked on the L sounds off with "SUPPORT", if their is an engaged threat, living individuals, danger areas, or areas that require a search, then the second shooter cannot move to the barricaded shooter, but must maintain coverage of the room. Both shooters will continue sounding off with "SUPPORT". Shooters positioned in the hallway, upon hearing the verbiage of "SUPPORT" should move to your room to offer that support that is needed. (2) As the shooter in the hallway hears the verbiage "SUPPORT" coming from your room, he will announce "COMING THROUGH" as he enters the room and moves to the barricade shooter. (If the shooter that is entering the room to offer support is unsure of what is needed in the room, then he should enter the room, step to the side of the door, out of the fatal funnel. He then surveys the room and awaits to be directed to where the support is needed).
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(3) This new shooter will stack on the barricade man, deploy a flashbang, and on the explosion, both shooters will make entry into the L, treating it as a square room, corner open door. (4) The two shooters that just entered the L will conduct all six fundamentals in the L while the shooter in the main room maintains coverage. (5) Once the six fundamentals have been completed in the L, both shooters turn and move into the main room, being directed by the shooter that was maintaining coverage. (6) The remaining fundamentals are completed in the main room.
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fig. 9 c. 3-Man Clear. (1) The shooters make entry as if it were a square room. (2) As earlier mentioned, the first shooter to observe the L-Shaped announces it. If the shooter located on the L wall is not dominating on the barricade, then he should sound off with "CLOSING". Once he receives the reply, he, along with the Number 3 Man, moves up to and stacks on the barricade. The flashbang is deployed and the two shooters make entry into the L as discussed before. The entire room is handled as we previously discussed. d. 4-Man Clear. (1) The shooters make entry as if it were a square room, four man entry team. (2) The two shooters that are on the side of the L, once verbiage has been exchanged, will aggress the L. The two shooters that are in the main room, will complete the fundamentals in the main room, as the other two shooters are completing the fundamentals in the L.
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(3) As shooters are no longer needed, they sound off with the appropriate verbiage and depart the room. (4) Once the entire room has been completed, shooters mark and depart. 11. ADJOINING ROOM: a. 2-Man Clear without support: (1) As with the L-Shaped Room, we will probably not know that the adjoining room exist until we are clearing the initial room. Therefore, two men will make entry into the initial room, assuming that it is a single, square room. (2) Whichever shooter sees the adjoining room door first immediately sounds off with "OPEN/CLOSED DOOR RIGHT/LEFT/FRONT" to alert the other shooter in the room of the danger area. The shooter closest to the adjoin room door, once his sector is clear, immediately focuses on the door. If the adjoining room door is between the shooter and his dominating position, and is open, the shooter must stop short of it and dominate. If the door is closed, he may blow past it to his dominating position, but only if absolutely necessary. (3) Once the first three fundamentals have been completed in the initial room, the shooter closest to the adjoining room door, if not already dominating on it, sounds off with "CLOSING", and after receiving the reply, moves to and dominates on the adjoining room door. As he steps off he announces loudly "SUPPORT". (4) As with the L-Shaped Room scenario, if their are no engaged threats, living individuals, other danger areas or search problems in the initial room, then the second shooter may move to and stack on the shooter stacked on the adjoining room door. The door is closed, it is opened and a flashbang is deployed, and the two shooters make entry. They complete all six fundamentals in the adjoining room, mark the room, announce "COMING OUT" and "LAST MAN OUT" and re-enter the initial room. The two shooters will complete the remaining fundamentals in that room as well, marking the room, and announcing "COMING OUT" and "LAST MAN OUT". This tactic should be avoided if at all possible. The reason being is that by abandoning the initial room, the two shooters are separating themselves from the rest of the assault force, possibly becoming isolated.
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fig. 10 b. 2-Man Clear with Support. (1) When the shooter stacked on the adjoining room door sounds off with "SUPPORT" and the initial room contains an engaged threat, a living individual, other danger areas or search problems, then the second shooter cannot stack on the adjoining room door with the shooter that is already stacked on it. Instead, he must maintain security of the initial room. Both shooters will continue to sound off with "SUPPORT" until they receive compliance from shooters that are in the hallway. (2) As a shooter in the hallway hears "SUPPORT", he immediately moves to the door, sounding off with "COMING THROUGH", as he moves into the room. The supporting shooter moves to the adjoining room door, stacks, the flashbang is deployed, and both shooters make entry into the adjoining room, conducting all six fundamentals in that room. If the supporting shooter, upon entering the initial room, is unclear on where the support is needed at, then he dominates inside and to the side of the door, surveys the room and waits to be directed.
2 MAN CLEAR W/SUPPORT ADJOINING ROOM
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(3) While the two shooters are completing the six fundamentals in the adjoining room, the shooter that is maintaining security in the initial room should be surveying that room to decide on how best to finish the remaining fundamentals once the two shooters return into his room. (4) Once the fundamentals have been completed in the adjoining room, the first shooter to depart that room announces "COMING OUT", and steps out of the adjoining room and into the initial room, stepping just to the side of the door and awaits to be directed by the shooter that was containing the initial room. The containing shooter, upon seeing the first shooter coming out of the adjoining room should immediately start to direct him, ie, "CLOSE". As the second shooter marks the adjoining room, announcing "LAST MAN OUT", he also steps into the initial room, to the side of the door and surveys/awaits to be directed. If any shooter is not needed at this point, then he departs the room. Once all six fundamentals have been completed in the initial room, the shooters depart, marking the room. c. 3-Man Clear. The 3 Man clear is conducted as if the entry team was entering a square room, and during the initial clear, observed the adjoining room. Once the first three fundamentals have been completed, the shooter nearest the adjoining room door announces "CLOSING", and upon receiving a reply, closes on the door, along with the Number 3 Man. Both shooters enter the room, complete all six fundamentals in the adjoining room, re-enter the initial room, complete the fundamentals in that room as well, and then all three shooters depart.
d. 4-Man Clear. The four man clear is conducted as if it were a square room. Once the first three fundamentals have been completed, the two shooters nearest the adjoining room door will exchange the appropriate verbiage, close on and enter the adjoining room, where they will conduct all six fundamentals. As the two shooters make entry into the adjoining room, the two remaining shooters that are in the initial room, will begin to conduct the remaining fundamentals in that room. Regardless of which of the two rooms is completed first, at least one shooter will remain in the initial room until the shooters in the adjoining room have exited and marked that room. The initial room will not be marked until all fundamentals in both rooms have been completed and all shooters have departed both rooms. 12. T-SHAPED ROOMS: a. Unless we have been afforded blueprints, shooters will not know that a T-Shape exist until they are physically occupying it. Therefore, two shooters will make entry assuming that the room is a square room. Once either shooter realizes that there is a T, they will immediately sound off "T-Shaped Front". b. Regardless of where the text book dominating position is, both shooters should avoid exposing themselves to the actual T. c. The shooters should immediately sound off with "NEED THREE SHOOTERS", followed by "TSHAPE FRONT". The two shooters continue sounding off with this verbiage until they have compliance. Until then, the shooters contain the room, paying specific attention to the T. One of the two original shooters should position himself to contain the initial part of the room, and direct other shooters as they make entry. This shooter will not make entry into the T, but will contain the initial part of the room. In order to effectively assault a T-Shaped room, you will need a minimum of 5 shooters.
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d. As additional shooters enter the room, they should move to the area that they are directed to. Shooters should be positioned in two, two man stack teams, each stacking on their side of the T. the lead shooter of each stack should cross cover into the opposite leg of the T. Once their are two stacks, the Number 2 Man of each stack will look at each other and give a distinct nod and then deploy their flashbang around the inboard corners. Once the flashbangs have initiated, both two man teams will enter their respective portion of the T, treating it as a square room, corner door. e. While the two, two man teams are clearing the T, one of the initial shooters into the room is maintaining containment on the initial room. Once the shooters have completed all six fundamentals in their portion of the T, they will re-enter the main room where they will be directed by the shooter containing the room.
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fig. 12 13. U-SHAPED ROOMS: a. Just as with the previous scenarios, unless we are afforded blueprints, we will not know of the existence of the U-Shaped room. Therefore, two shooters will make entry in this room, assuming that it is a square room. Once they have entered the room, it will appear as if it is an L-Shaped room. The shooters should then take the appropriate action to assault the L, (calling "SUPPORT"), two shooters clear the L while one shooter contains the initial portion of the room. Once the two shooters have entered into the LShaped, they will observe the second L-Shape. Nothing changes. The two shooters take appropriate action in order to assault the second L-Shape. If needed, the shooter containing the initial portion of the room may relay verbiage in order to get more shooters into the room.
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fig. 14 14. SUCCESSIVE ROOMS: a. Successive rooms are a series of rooms that connect with each other. There are three types of successive rooms. (1) Rooms that connect to each other, as well as from the hallway. (2) Rooms that connect to each other, but not to the hallway. (3) Room that connect to each other, with some of those rooms connecting to the hallway. b. Unless you have the floor plans, you will not realize that you are in successive rooms until you are physically occupying them. Most likely, as you enter a room, you will see an adjoining room door, therefore, treating it as a adjoining room scenario. After you make entry into the adjoining room, you will see a door that leads to another adjoining room, and a door that leads to the hallway. You have now recognized the successive rooms. c. As a rule, if the successive rooms can be accessed from the hallway then they should always be cleared from the hallway in, not leap frogging from room to room. What is wrong with the leapfrogging technique is that you will most likely end up well forward of the point element that is in the hallway. Possibly being isolated from the assault force. 102
d. The proper way to assault successive rooms that access to the hallway is as follows: (1) As you and your teammate enter Room 2 from Room 1 and realize that you are in successive rooms, announce over the radio and out loud "SUCCESSIVE ROOMS". (2) Immediately challenge the door that leads to the hallway in order to stop shooters from the hallway from assaulting the room that you are currently occupying, which is Room 2. (3) After challenging and receiving the reply, open the door leading to hallway in Room 2 and mark it with a green chemlight. (4) Complete the fundamentals in the Room 2. (5) After the fundamentals have been completed, one shooter will move back into the initial room, Room 1, and complete the fundamentals for that room. The other shooter that entered the adjoining room will maintain a barricade position on the doorway between Room 1 & 2. He will provide cover on the opposing adjoining room door, the door that leads to Room 3. (6) A room entry team will make entry into Room 3 from the hallway. This two man team will be faced with a adjoining room door on both sides of the room, one door leading back into Room 2 and one door that leads into Room 4. The shooters will complete the first three fundamentals and will then challenge Room 2 and contain the room and the door to their left, which enters Room 4. (7) The shooters should receive a reply of the challenge from the shooter who is barricaded in the Room 2. Once this is done, that door between Rooms 2 & 3 is opened and marked. The shooter who was barricaded in Room 2 can now mark his doorway and depart back into the hallway from Room 1. (8) Now, the shooters who are containing Room 3 can now finish the fundamentals in Room 3, still providing cover on the doorway that leads into Room 4. Once done, both shooters move back into the hallway. One shooter continues with the flow, while the second shooter provides security on the doorway leading to Room 4. (9) Room 4 is entered into from the hallway. The same procedures are applied that we have just discussed until the end of the successive room scenario.
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fig. 15 e. Assault successive rooms that do not access the hallway: (1) You encounter a successive room scenario that has connecting rooms, but do not access into the hallway. In this scenario, you have no choice but to clear the rooms from within rooms. If it is obvious that you are in successive rooms, to get more shooters to assist, sound off with "CLEAR". All shooters should now flow through the rooms. (2) In the scenario of leapfrogging from room to room, the initial entry team will make entry and conduct the first three fundamentals. Once clear the two shooters will sound off with "CLEAR". The stack flows through, stacking on the initial shooter that is stacked on the danger area. (3) The first two shooters in this stack make entry into the next room and conduct the first three fundamentals. (4) The remaining original shooter in the initial room calls for "SUPPORT", getting a extra shooter from the rear of the stack. These two shooters will complete the remaining fundamentals in that initial room. (5) Once the second room has been completed of the first three fundamentals, one of the shooters in that room sounds off with "CLEAR", the stack flows through and the same procedures will continue as discussed, with each room being cleared in a like manner. Remember, first three fundamentals are complete, announce "CLEAR", stack flows through, complete remaining fundamentals.
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SUCCESSIVE ROOMS fig. 16
15. SMALL ROOMS: Small rooms are considered rooms that because of their size, will not fit two shooters. Almost all small room doors will be outward opening, ie, bathroom doors, closets, etc. a. The first shooter assumes a kneeling position, angled off of the door knob side of the door. b. The second shooter stacks on the hinge side of the door. c. The standing shooter grabs the door knob, looks and nods to the kneeling shooter. He then opens the door toward himself. The kneeling shooter clears the space from the knee, supported by the standing shooter. d. Remember, you can not stand up until directed to do so by a teammate. e. While conducting a normal room entry, and you enter a small room that will not fit you and your partner, sound off with "SMALL ROOM". This will signal to your teammate not to attempt to enter the room. 16. NON-FLASHBANG TACTICS: a. Non-Flashbang tactics are those tactics used to gain entry into an enclosure without the use of flashbangs to initiate entry. Instead of using the explosion of the flashbang to initiate entry, you will use physical action to initiate entry. b. Although you can incorporate flashbangs and non-flashbang tactics inside of the Crisis Site, you absolutely must not intermingle the two tactics, as this could induce confusion between shooters. Do not bump a shooter with a live flashbang in your hand.
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c. Physical Action, (BUMP & GO). The number 2 man, instead of deploying a flashbang, will bump the shooter in front of him with his knee. To bump, the rear shooter raises his outboard knee and strikes the forward shooter in the buttocks/hamstring area. The bump should be firm, not hard enough to injure the forward shooter, and not so soft that the forward shooter is unsure of what action to take. d. Both shooters step off to initiate room entry. e. The shooter conducting the bump should do so with the outboard knee, as this will facilitate the natural stepping motion to initiate room entry. By bumping with the inboard knee, the shooter will be off balance when stepping off and will be delayed slightly when making room entry. f. The shooter conducting the bump takes a full step into the bump, following through. Again, if the shooter bumps and then re-plants his outboard foot before stepping off, he will be slightly delayed making room entry, which places the lead shooter in the room temporarily by himself. g. The second method of gaining entry is when you encounter a closed, inward opening door. The shooter on the door knob side reaches and grabs the door knob. Both shooters then look at each other and nod, (ensuring that each shooter is ready to make entry), and on the down stroke of the nod, both shooters announce "TOGETHER" as the door knob shooter opens the door. On "TOGETHER," the shooter stacked on the hinge side of the door steps off, making room entry. h. For a Outward opening closed door, both shooters stack on the door knob side. The number 2 shooter reaches around the lead shooter, opens the door with his outboard hand and then bumps the lead shooter, who then steps off, initiating room entry.
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TROOP CLEARS
1. INTRODUCTION. In the realm of IHR/CQB, each shooter must be a thinker and a doer. Each must rely on the others initiative to win. The point man is the best thinker and doer. His fellow shooters are relying on him to keep a path clear forward and direct them to the next danger area. 2. OVERVIEW. This section is designed to introduce to the shooter, point man duties and how to clear and maneuver in hallways. The point man has a great responsibility, the shooters behind him are going to react off his actions and verbiage. Let us now talk about his duties. BODY 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF A POINT MAN: a. The point man is one of better thinkers in the troop. He can react quickly to any given situation and make rapid decisions. Adverse conditions or situations inside the crisis Site will have little effect on a good point man. b. The point man is also one of the better shooters in the troop. The reason for this is that he may have to take critical, long range shots down the hallway. If the pointman is not accurate and misses, that gives the adversary the advantage, potentially allowing him to engage the whole troop as they are in the hallway. c. The point man is preferably a smaller man. Someone who is agile and can move easily through breach points, over obstacles or through windows. 2. DUTIES OF THE POINT MAN. a. The point mans primary responsibility is frontal security for the troop. He owns anything that presents itself down the hallway. b. The point mans second responsibility is to announce danger areas to the troop. This simply gives troop members a heads up. However, it is the individual shooters responsibility on observing and picking up the danger areas. c. Because the point man may be confronted with taking long range shots in the hallway, his weapon is placed on semi-automatic. d. Because the point man is responsible for frontal security, he must ensure that at no time does he divert his attention from frontal security. He cannot turn his head and look behind him. His eyes absolutely, must remain to the front. e. The point man is the only one allowed to go past an uncleared door, or a set of doors, and only does so when it is absolutely necessary.
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f. Once the point man enters a hallway, he should remain point man for that specific hallway, never relinquish point. The reason is that he is the only one has seen everything in that hallway. He saw the bad guy go from one door to another down the hallway, whereas other shooters may not have. g. If the hallway configuration is large enough to accommodate, then you may elect to run a duel point. Duel point is preferred over a single point because you are afforded stronger security to the front. If running a duel point, both point men will work as one. They move at all times abreast of each other, calling out danger areas on there respective sides. If by running a duel point it interferes with entry teams making entry into rooms, then the duel point must either blow past that set of doors, or turn into a single point. h. The point man does not make entry into rooms unless he is faced with no more danger area forward of the last room, this includes windows and exits It might seem a easy task, but as you will see, one mistake could cause disaster or create a lull in the action to slow your dynamics. 3. ENTERING THE BREACH POINT: a. Keeping in mind that we always plan for worst case scenario, we probably do not have blue prints of the crisis site and know not what the floor plan is. b. Therefore, we must assume that the other side of the breach point is an enclosure. For that reason, once the breach has been initiated, we will immediately attempt to flood through the breach point with four shooters. These four shooters will clear the enclosure. The reason why we are conducting a four man clear is to ensure that we gain a foothold into the objective. The four shooters will conduct the first three fundamentals in the enclosure. Since this is the initial breach point, we must immediately continue the dynamics. So after the first three fundamentals, the initial four shooters will sound off with the verbiage "CLEAR", to get the troop to flow through the room and begin the clear of the crisis site. c. The first four, after announcing "CLEAR", remain in the room and complete the remaining fundamentals. If all four of the shooters are not needed, the ones not needed announce "LEAVING", depart, and rejoin the stack that is or have flowed through. It is extremely critical that we gain a foothold into the objective. Once we have gained that foothold, how are we going to maneuver? 4. ESTABLISHING THE POINT: a. Once the breach has been initiated, the first four shooters make entry in realize they have entered into a hallway. Once the four have cleared there sectors and they announce "CLEAR", the designated poin tman steps into the center of the hallway to show everyone that he has established point. Once clear has been given the troop flows through the Breach Point and receives supplemental verbiage from the point man. It is imperative that the shooter that will establish point is positive that all shooting has stopped before stepping into the middle of the hallway.
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FOUR MAN INITIAL CLEAR POINTMAN ESTABISHES POINT
fig. 1 b. Once the point man has established point and the troop starts to flow through the Breach Point, the point man will sound off with supplemental verbiage: (1) "DUEL POINT" - Means that the point man wants a second point to be established abreast of his position. The point man may or may not use this verbiage, depending upon size and configuration of the hallway. If the point man uses this verbiage, he must pause long enough for the second point man to take position before stepping off. (2) "SPLIT THE STACK" - Informs the troop to equally stack on each side of the hallway. (2) "STACK RIGHT" - Informs the troop to Stack the whole troop on the right side of the hallway. The point man would say stack right when he sees that there are doors on the right side of the hallway, and no doors on the left side. (3) "STACK LEFT" - Informs the troop to stack the whole troop on the left side of the hallway. The point man would say stack left when he sees that there are doors on the left side of the hallway and no doors on the right side. 5. RECOGNIZING AND REACTING TO OFFSET AND OPPOSING DOORS. a. Opposing doors: Opposing doors are those that are directly across from one another in a hallway. When confronted with opposing open or opposing closed doors, we want to attack both simultaneously. If one door is open and one is closed, the open door is assaulted first. Once the open door has been assaulted, the closed door is crossed, opened, and assaulted. b. Offset Doors: Offset doors are doors on opposite sides of the hallway that will allow a poin tman to be positioned between the two doors without being exposed in either opening. When confronted with offset doors, they are assaulted one at time. c. Offset Opposing Doors: Offset Opposing Doors are doors that are not opposing, but do not allow a point man to be positioned between the two without being exposed to one or both of the openings. If both doors are opened, attempt to assault both as simultaneously as possible. If one is open and one is closed, regardless of which is nearest, the open door gets assaulted first. If both offset opposing doors are closed, the nearest door is assaulted first. 109
OPPOSING
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fig. 2 d. The point man prefers to hold short of doors, however, if the point man holds short and his position would interfere with entry teams, i.e., flashbangs, he must move forward of that door. 6. POINT MAN MOVEMENTS: a. As mentioned earlier, one of the responsibilities of the point man is to announce dangers areas to the shooters who are in the stack. The pointman does this by both verbal and physical action. b. The verbal action is as we have already discussed, by sounding off with the location of the nearest danger area and the condition of that danger area, for instance, "OPEN DOOR RIGHT". c. The physical action is by his body movements. If the point man is faced with opposing open, opposing closed doors, or offset opposing open or closed doors, he will position himself in the center of the hallway. By staying in the middle, he telegraphs to the stacks that the next danger areas are on both the left and right side of the hallway. If the next danger area is on the right side of the hallway, then the point man would off set to the left side. Again, by placing himself on the left side telegraphs to other shooters that the next danger area is on the right side of the hallway. Finally, if the pointman is positioned on the right side of the hallway, that indicates that the next danger area is on the left.
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d. If the point man elects to offset to one side of the hallway to indicate where danger areas are, he must ensure that he is not to be confused as an entry man. e. If you are running a duel point, then point men will not be able to off set to indicate where danger areas are, because they must stay abreast of each other. f. Announcing danger areas to the troop is a secondary function of the point man. However, it is the ultimate responsibility of the shooters in the stack to observe where the next danger area is and to react to it. g. Shooters may move forward of the point mans position, to a degree, but are never allowed to cross in front of a point man. Shooters may only move forward of a point man position in order to assault an immediate danger area. h. The point man will move forward by three methods. He will move forward by verbal command, by physical contact, and by action. (1) Verbal Command. If shooters want the point man to move forward out of there way, or to move to the next danger area, the verbiage is "POINT MAN...MOVE". (2) Physical Contact. The lead shooter in the stack "bumps" or squeezes the point man. (3) Action. Upon a Flashbang exploding in a room, the point man may step off and move to the next danger area. The point man may only react to flashbangs if he is holding short on danger areas. If he has been blowing past doors and waiting for shooters to make entry, and on the "bang" stepping off again, he will eventually put an un-cleared door to his back without a shooter holding security on it. 7. SIMULTANEOUS ROOM ENTRY: a. When Using FlashBangs: (1) If shooters are confronted with opposing open or opposing closed doors, they should by attacked simultaneously. (2) Opposing Open Doors: (a) Both lead shooters are stacked on there respective open door. (b) The number two man of each stack then looks across at each other and gives a distinct nod. (c) On the nod, both Number 2 Men step out, identify the opening, pull pin, and deploy their flashbangs into their rooms. They re-grip, all head and eyes are inboard, and on the explosive, both entry teams step off. The remainder of both stacks move forward to the next danger area, with the exception of the cheater, (last man in each stack). (d) Flashbang men must ensure that they do not hook arms when deploying their flashbangs.
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(e) If one or both the Number 2 Men are having a brain melt down and do not look up, someone can prompt them with the verbiage of "TWO's...LOOK". (3) Opposing Closed Doors: (a) Both entry teams have executed a cross over stacking position. (b) Each entry team exchanges distinct nods between their team, signifying to one another that specific team that they are ready to make entry. (c) The flashbang men each grip their respective door knob. (d) The flashbang men then look across the hallway at each other and gives a distinct nod. (e) On the nod, they open the door, identify opening, pull pin, and deploy their flashbang into their respective room. On the explosion, both entry teams step off to make room entry. The stack blows by moving to the next danger area, with the exception of the cheater. b. When using verbiage tactics: (1) Opposing Open Doors: (a) The lead shooters are stacked on their respective open door. (b) The number two men move up and as they are stacking, look across the hallway at each other, nod, and sound off with "TOGETHER" as they are bumping their respective partner. On the bump and "TOGETHER", lead shooters step off to make room entry. (2) Opposing Closed Doors: (a) Both entry teams are in a cross over stacking position. (b) The entry teams look and nod at each other to signify that they are ready to make room entry. (c) The Number 2 Men reach and grip the door knob and look across at each other. Giving a distinct nod, they both open their respective doors simultaneously. (d) As the door is opening, both members of the entry team look across at each other, nod, and sound off with "TOGETHER". This is used as a prompt for both shooters to make room entry. NOTE: A technique, used to ensure each shooter understands in what order he will enter the room, is for one of the shooters to announce "I'M 1...YOUR 2". This will solve any possible confusion. Ensure that you do not yell this out, in that there is already enough noise and confusion, and besides, this verbiage is only used for the two shooters.
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8. RECOGNIZE AND REACTING TO HALLWAYS. a. The size of the hallway, and the location of doorways or openings, i.e. one side or both sides, determines whether to run a single or a dual point. If blueprints are not available the first 2 shooters through the breach need to make that decision. b. There are 4 types of hallways, straight, L-shape, T-shape and 4 way intersection. c. Hallway intersections are treated like open doorways except they extend to linear openings. d. Clearing a L-shape Hallway. (1) The point man positions himself at the inboard corner of the L, announcing "L-SHAPED HALLWAY, LEFT/RIGHT". (2) Before movement around any blind corner in a hallway, a minimum of two shooters are required. (3) The shooter stacked behind the point man will bump or bang and the two will make entry into the hallway, treating it as if it were an enclosure. The point man may elect to move straight across, or to button hook. The second shooter simply keys off of the point man and moves in the opposite direction. (4) Once the hallway has been cleared by the two shooters and all shooting has stopped, "CLEAR" is given, the point man will re-establish point, and the troop flows into the hallway. (5) There is one other option of clearing the L. Instead of the point man positioning him on the inboard corner, he instead, positions himself on the outboard side of the L. The advantage to this technique is that it allows the point man to view a deeper angle around the blind L. If the point man elects to use this technique, the first two shooters to position on the inboard wall of the L will be the two man clearing team around the blind corner. Upon initiation into the hallway and the "CLEAR" being given, the original point man will now fall into the rear of the stack. One of the first two shooters into the L hallway will now assume point.
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fig. 4 e. Clearing a T-Shaped Hallway: (1) Upon reaching the T-Shaped Hallway, the stack needs to split evenly along both walls, if running a single point. The first man in each stack is now a point man for his side. Upon both point men arriving at the T, they should cross cover. (2) A minimum of four shooters, to include the point man, are required in order to assault a TShaped, two men to turn each corner of the T. (3) In order to enter the T simultaneously, the Number 2 Man of each stack will either flashbang or bump to initiate entry, just as if assaulting opposing open doors. (4) Once the Flashbang/Bump has been initiated, both two man teams make entry into their specific hallway or L. Once their respective L's have been "CLEAR", the point man will re-establish point for his specific hallway, with the flow continuing. In this scenario, the troop is assaulting down both hallways, because both L's gave "CLEAR". However, what if the troop is not big enough to go dynamic in two different directions?
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T-SHAPED fig. 5 f. Holding a Hallway: (1) Depending upon the size and configuration of the objective, if, before entering the T, both point men realize that they will be spread too thin by attacking in both directions, then they make the decision immediately to only attack in one direction. The way in which this is relayed to the rest of the shooters is the point men sounding off with the verbiage of "HOLD RIGHT...CLEAR LEFT", or "HOLD LEFT...CLEAR RIGHT". In explaining this tactic, I will use the example of "HOLD RIGHT...CLEAR LEFT".
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(2) Both point men sound off with "HOLD RIGHT...CLEAR LEFT", before making entry into the TShaped Hallway. Based on that verbiage, only one shooter will stack behind the point man located on the right side of the hallway, all other shooters should stack left. (3) On the Flashbang/Bump, entry is made into both hallways. Once both hallways have been cleared, only the left side hallway team will sound off with "CLEAR". The right side team will say nothing. The stack will flow right. (4) The point man for the right, that is holding, will tell the his partner to turn in go, at which time that other shooter will rejoin the stack flowing left. The right side point man will then barricade on the corner. About once every 30 seconds, the barricaded point man will announce "HOLDING", so that other shooters joining the fight late will know in which direction to move, as well as to remind shooters that he is holding on a hot hallway. CLEARING
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fig. 6 (5) Once the left area of the Crisis Site has been cleared, then all shooters return and clear the right side of the Crisis Site. As the first shooter is returning to the barricaded point man holding the right side, ho directs the point man to "POINT MAN...TAKE POINT". g. Clearing a Four Way Intersection: (1) As in a T-Shaped intersection that stack needs to split into two stacks, along each side of the wall. However, the initial point man should position himself in the center of the hallway. Again, two shooters are required to turn any blind corner, so for a four way, a total of 5 shooters are required, two for each side and the initial point man for the front. (2) Once the Number 2 shooters in each wall stack initiates entry with the Flashbang/Bump, two shooters turn right and clear, two shooters turn left and clear and the point man pushes across the hallway. Once the verbiage of "CLEAR" has been given in the two L-Shaped hallways, the flow will continue. (3) In order to go dynamic in 3 directions, shooters alternate left, right, and forward.
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fig. 7 (4) As with the T-Shaped Intersection, if there are not enough shooters to assault in three different directions, then give verbiage to hold in one or two directions, and to clear in one or two directions. 9.
Clearing Stairwells
General: Stairwells add to the "fatal funnel" effect of doorways, by including additional levels in to the equation. This creates a " 3 dimensional " atmosphere. The movement of the squad/team will differ depending on direction of travel, and the layout of the stairwell. In any case the method follows a basic format. 1 2 3 4.
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The squad leader designates an assault element to clear the staircase. The squad/team maintains 360 degree/3 dimensional security in the immediate vicinity of the stair case. The squad leader then directs the assault team to locate, mark, bypass, and or clear any obsta cles/booby traps that may be blocking access to the staircase. The assault element moves up the stairs using either the fire team flow, or the Buddy team flow, providing overwatch for movement, up/down on the stairwell, to the degree possible. The three man team is the preferred method. a. Straight Staircase: The number 1 man scans and clears the stairwell for booby traps. The number 2 man scans forward and up the stairwell. The number 3 man scans directly up and to the rear to check the upper level. He does this by moving backwards, his back pressed to the backs of the number 1 and 2 men. (see figure next page) b. Split Flight of Stairs: The 1 man clears forward and up, the 2 man clears up to the next split level and the 3 man clears up and back as in figures below. A stun or fragmentary grenade may be employed to the upper/lower landing if the stairwell, struc ture, and ROE permit. (If clearing downward on a stairwell grenades may be employed before movement). No soldier’s head will crest the top of the stairs. Soldiers crouch lower to get as far up the stairs as possible. Simultaneously all three members crest the stairs above floor level clearing 360 degrees simultaneously. The squad leader determines when to rotate elements during movement and reports the clearing status to the platoon leader. The following actions will be, at a minimum, taken when enemy forces are encoun
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tered. a. The squad/team will assault to secure the landing/flight of stairs by fire and maneuver. b. Remain at the last covered and concealed position until the squad/team has gained fire superiority and is able to move up the staircase. Grenades and M203 rounds through win dows may be used to help achieve this. c. If fire superiority cannot be achieved the squad/team will request assistance.
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9. THE CHEATER. The Cheater is our safety valve. If we are conducting a two man clear and one of the shooters goes down, that leaves one shooter in the room to fight, by himself. That is a lot to put on one mans shoulders in CQB. Therefore, we use what is called the Cheater. As the stack comes to a Danger Area, two shooters make entry and the stack continues down the hallway. The last man in the stack, however, will stop at that room that was just entered, stack on it, and listen and "peek" in the room. If it is clear that the two shooters the made room entry do not need assistance, then the cheater continues down the hallway. If the two shooters do require assistance, then the cheater announces "COMING THROUGH" and moves into the room to render assistance. The word "peek" that I just used does not mean to stick your head into the room, but to look at the room from an angle. O CHEATER
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fig. 8 10. CHALLENGING A ROOM: Anytime that you come upon an unmarked room, this is known as a danger area. If you are catching up to the stack and come upon an unmarked room, then there is the possibility that the unmarked room is currently occupied by other shooters, involved in a room clear. If, at anytime, there is that possibility, then you should challenge the room. This is done as follows: a. Stack on the unmarked room. b. Listen for familiar teammate verbiage being exchanged within the room. c. If still unsure then bang on the door, (without placing your body in front of it), or the wall three times with your support fist, simultaneously giving the challenge three times. The school house challenge is "AMERICAN, AMERICAN, AMERICAN". d. If you happen to be in a room and are conducting the fundamentals and hear the challenge, you should immediately return the challenge " AMERICAN, AMERICAN, AMERICAN ", and move to the door and bang three times. If you do not, the room may be aggressed by another two man team. e. Upon receiving the challenge, ensure that the room does not require a cheater, and then continue to look for the Danger Area, Lone Shooter. f. If you issue the challenge and receive no reply, challenge a second time. If still no reply, sound off with "SUPPORT". Once a teammate stacks on you, the two of you will make a proper room entry. g. If you are in a room and are conducting the fundamentals and another team aggresses that room, the first hint will probably seeing the flashbang being deployed in the room. If you are getting ready to get flashbanged, close your eyes and attempt to place the flashbang at your back by turning your body. Once the bang goes off, immediately sound off with the challenge to alert the incoming entry team of your presence within that room. Whatever you do, do not point your weapon at the incoming entry team.
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If you ever have any doubt as to whether or not a room is occupied by other shooters, don't hesitate to challenge. 11. CONSOLIDATION: a. At this point, we have lead the troop on an assault. Refer back to the three rules of IBT; Look for the Danger Area, Lone Shooter, and if there are none, then establish choke points, enroute to the Hostage Holding Area. b. Once the last room has been made entry into, shooters may tend to gather in the hallway at this last room. Once the cheater on the outside is sure that the room is in fact the last room, (ensuring that their are not adjoining or successive rooms), he will sound off with "LAST ROOM", at which time all shooters turn about, moving toward the Hostage Holding Area, still looking for the Danger Area and Lone Shooters; if there are none, then shooters look for and establish chokepoints. c. Choke Points. A Choke Point is a physical location with the Crisis Site from which the troop will have to flow through to get back to the HHA. Choke Points are at hallway intersections, ladder well landings, and down long hallways. The purpose of establishing a Choke Point is to cover our movement back to the HHA. Even though by not having any more Danger Areas signifies that there is no more threat, we still provide continuous security. Just remember, Jason lives. One rule on Choke Points that you cannot forget is that a Danger Area, Lone Shooter, or hearings the verbiage “Support” all take precedence over establishing the Choke Point. If any of these have occurred after you have established the Choke Point, then abandon it, and let someone else pick it up.
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B.P. fig. 9
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d. Moving to Consolidation. Now the problem that we are faced with is how we are going to pull our choke point men back without losing some security? What will happen is that the shooter that comes out of the "Last Room" will grab the Point man in the hallway on the shoulder and tell him "Last Man". The point man now knows that he is the last man in that hallway. The point man should then sound off with "PICK ME UP...PICK ME UP". The choke point man closest to the point mans position, and covering in that direction, will respond with "POINT MAN, TURN AND GO", which the point man does. If the point man is walking right down your barrel, then direct the point man to "STAY TO YOUR LEFT/RIGHT", in order to get him to switch sides of the hallway. As the point man passes your choke point position, he should grab your shoulder and tell you "LAST MAN". Now you know that you are know the last man in that hallway. You should the start the verbiage "PICK ME UP...PICK ME UP", until the Choke Point behind you complies. The last shooter to enter the Hostage Holding Area should go directly to the HHA Controller and tell him "LAST MAN". The HHA Controller will most likely direct that shooter to obtain a shooter count.
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fig. 10 SUMMARY: As you can see, the point man responsibilities are second to none. Every shooter must obtain the skills needed for the troop to be effective. You know when you may be a point man.
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INTERIOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING
1. INTRODUCTION: It would be safe to say that you probably have a good idea on what it takes to effectively clear an objective, and you are feeling pretty confident on how smooth an assault can be. One thing that you will learn though, is a number of things can go wrong in Close Quarters Battle. Murphy is always hovering, trying to screw things up. However, by having solid SOP's and contingency plans, you can reduce the chance of an assault going bad. As long as you are prepared, problems will have a minimal effect. 2. OVERVIEW. This section is designed to introduce you to Interior Contingency Plans. BODY 1. GENERAL. This topic deals with a variety of contingency plans that you should have developed as SOP's within your troop. 2. DOWN SHOOTER: The down shooter scenario relates to how to handle any shooter that has been injured or killed inside of the Crisis Site. a. The SOP for a injured shooter is Self Aid, Buddy Aid, Combat Life Saver, medic and doctor, followed in that order. (1) Self Aid. If you become injured and can treat yourself, do so. If you can continue the fight, continue, if not, move to the HHA, informing the HHA Controller of your injuries. (2) Buddy Aid. If you cannot treat yourself, then your teammate will render assistance. If a shooter requires buddy aid, the teammate will first ensure that the injured mans primary weapon is on safe. He will then remove the primary weapon and either sling it or hand it off to another teammate. Next, he will ensure that the handgun safety is engaged and will then lock the thumb strap into place. If the injured shooter has any other weapons, ie M590, then ensure that it is on safe as well and remove it. Hand any breaching shotguns off to other shooters, it may be needed in the fight. If the injured shooter has any mechanical tools, they will be removed and handed off to other shooters. Once the actions that I have just discussed have been conducted, only then may a shooter move the injured individual back to the HHA. Common carries should be utilized, such as the Fireman’s Carry, Supportive Carry, Two Man Carry, or dragging the individual by the drag strap on the assault vest. In choosing a carry, type of injury that the shooter sustained should be taken in consideration. If the injured shooter is bleeding profusely, apply direct pressure, and then move him. Try to avoid doing stabilization in the fight. Move the individual to the HHA. (3) Medic Aid. All medic aid should preferably be done in the HHA, which will be better suited for stabilization. If you call for "MEDIC UP" while you are deep in the fight, by the time the corpsman finds you, you probably could have already had the injured shooter in the HHA.
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(4) MedEvac/Doctors Aid. Attempt to have one of your extraction points rigged for a medevac. The point should contain mounted litters, oxygen, mounted IV's, defibrillator, and other trauma items. It is recommended that the point contain two to three medics and one Medical Doctor. Your medical plan should not only include the objective, but during movement to and from the objective as well. 2. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES: a. An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is may be found on the Crisis Site. These devices can be constructed for either offensive or defensive placement. They can range from crude pipe bombs with a time fuse or trip wire for initiation to sophisticated devices that can be initiated by infrared beams, mercury switches, and pressure switches. b. During the planning phase, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel that are attached to the detachment, along with the detachment’s intelligence analyst, should analysis the possible explosive threat. (1) Does the involved organization have much of an explosive capability? (2) Do they have a past history of using IED's? (3) Are their explosives offensive or defensive in nature? (4) How sophisticated are they? (5) Where have they received their training from? (6) What type of explosive material do they have at their disposal? (7) What type of initiation systems have they used in the past? c. Actions taken upon encountering an IED: (1) Upon entering a room and observing what you believe is an IED, stop where you are at in the fundamentals and view the device as you are calling for EOD over the radio net. If the device does not appear to be a timed device and you feel that there is no immediate danger, place a mark in close proximity to the device and continue to complete the six fundamentals, ensuring that you are also observing for trip wires while maneuvering in the room. (2) Your troop should develop a codeword for announcing that you have found an IED and to get the EOD Techs to your location. The training codeword is "RED ROCKET". The mark is a Red Chemlight. (3) Once the fundamentals have been completed, and the device is marked, both shooters will exit the room. One shooter will continue in the fight while the other shooter stands outside the doorway, waving a red chemlight.
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(4) Once EOD hears "RED ROCKET" they will complete whatever task they are doing and then move to the IED, looking for a Red Chemlight being waved in the hallway. (5) Upon seeing the shooter with the red chemlight, the EOD Tech will move to him and receive a brief on the situation from the shooter. (6) Both the shooter and the EOD Tech will make room entry. The EOD Tech will move to the device while the shooter provides illumination and security. (7) The EOD Tech will attempt to determine if the device poses as a hazard to the Assault Force. If the device poses no hazard, the mark will be left at the device, and the EOD Tech and shooter will exit the room, marking it with a green and red chemlight. (8) If the device does pose a hazard, then the EOD Tech will either attempt to render safe the device or recommend a partial or emergency evacuation to the Assault Element Commander. (9) Only the Assault Element Commander can call for an Emergency Evacuation. The classroom code word for Emergency Evacuation is "LANDSLIDE". (10) If a hostage is wired to an IED, immediately stop the fundamentals. View the IED and question the wired hostage. If you feel that the device poises no immediate danger, call EOD and continue to complete the fundamentals. Ensure that you re-assure the wired hostage. Once all of the fundamentals have been completed, place a mark in close proximity to the IED and exit the room, leaving the wired hostage in place. At no time will you physically touch a wired hostage. One shooter will continue with the flow while the second shooter contains the room from the doorway, re-assuring the hostage, and waving a red chemlight. Once the EOD Tech arrives, briefed and assist him as previously discussed. (11) Common sense prevails. If at anytime before completing the fundamentals you feel that the IED poises a threat, immediately stop what you are doing, mark the device, and exit the room. One shooter will maintain security at the door way, waving a red chemlight, while the other shooter continues the flow. The same actions involving the EOD Tech will apply, with the addition of after the device has been safed, the EOD Tech and shooter will complete the remaining fundamentals in that room. I. EOD OPERATIONS IN THE TARGET (NON-HOSTAGE THREATENING): A. Confirm/Identify the presence and location of IED. B. Evacuate all nonessential personnel. Only the following personnel will be required to remain on station: 1. Two EOD technicians (one for security and one for Rendering Safe the IED) 2. The required number of shooters it will take in order to secure and control entrances into the target site (all shooters will position themselves behind cover if maintaining security will allow).
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C. Remove gloves. D. Scope the item and notify the Assault Force Commander of status. 1. If the enclosed item is suspect of having a timing device, advise the Assault Force Commander to evacuate the crisis site. Use a dearmer or other EOD tool/technique to Render Safe the IED in order to gain access or retrieve the “precious cargo”. Only 1 operator will remain behind to provide security. 2. If the item is not suspect of having a timing device and is not interfering with collection of precious cargo, mark the item, continue mission without disturbing the IED. Advise assault force commander to expedite and marshal either outside the crisis site, or in a room on the opposite side of the structure 3. If the item is not suspect of having a timing device but is impeding the mission, mark the item, circumvent it or perform a Render Safe the item utilizing an EOD tool or technique.
II. ON THE HOSTAGE: A. Confirm/Identify the presence and location of IED. B. Evacuate all nonessential personnel. Only the following personnel will be required to remain on station: 1. Two EOD technicians (one for security and one for Rendering Safe the IED. 2. The required number of shooters it will take in order to secure and control entrances into the target site (all shooters will position themselves behind cover if maintaining security will allow it). C. Remove gloves. D. Scope the item and notify the Assault Force Commander of status. 1. If the item is has a timing device, advise the Assault Force Commander to evacuate the crisis site. Render safe the IED by taking the following actions: (a) Evacuate all nonessential personnel. One shooter will remain behind to provide security. (b) Trace the IED circuit to identify the power source and triggering device(s). If you can positively identify the triggering device, disarm the device. (c) Place sturdy material under the item to defeat any possible anti-lift devices (if necessary). (d) Physically raise his/her arms and place their hands on their hand. This will be done one hand at a time and in an extremely slow manner. Ensure that there are no hidden trip wires or booby traps (secondary devices).
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(e) Ensuring to maintain its original posture, move the item a short distance to an area which will not impede the extraction of the hostage. (f) Ensure to check for secondary devices. (g) Ensuring to maintain its original posture, move the item a short distance to an area which will not impede the evacuation of the hostage. (h) If you can positively confirm the amount of time left on the IED, and it is not feasible to conduct a detailed search for secondary devices on the hostage, (two or three minutes left on the clock) or the hostage is secured in place, consider the option of moving the item to a safe distance from the hostage and rendering the item safe using an EOD tool or technique. 2. If the item is not ticking, advise the Assault Force Commander to assemble the assault force in an area which is a safe distance away from the IED. The distance should be relative to the size of the item. Render safe the IED by taking the following actions: (a) Post the required number of shooters it will take in order to secure and control entrances into the target site (all shooters will position themselves behind cover if maintaining security will allow it). (b) Question the hostage as to the item itself. Has it been moved? Does the hostage know of any secondary devices? Are there any additional devices in the room? Has the hostage moved his/her body at? (c) Trace the IED circuit to identify the power source and triggering device(s). If you can positively identify the triggering device, disarm the device. Use mirrors and “feel” to locate any possible secondary devices and/or booby traps stemming from the IED. Render Safe any secondary devices prior to proceeding. (d) Place sturdy material under the item to defeat any possible anti-lift devices (if necessary). (e) Physically raise his/her arms and place their hands on their hand. This will be done one hand at a time and in an extremely slow manner. Ensure that there are no hidden trip wires or booby traps (secondary devices). (f) Ensuring to maintain its original posture, move the item a short distance to an area which will not impede the extraction of the hostage. (g) Conduct a detailed search of hostages body. Check for any wires that may be along the hostage’s back. Using the 3nd EOD technician, have them SLOWLY lean forward, while observing for secondary devices (trip wires, anti-lift devices). Search the area under the hostages buttocks (if hostage is seated), in the same manner, ensuring the hostage stands up slowly. Insure that a detailed search is conducted of the area around the hostage for any type of firing devices that may be extraneously connected to the hostage.
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III. BOOBY TRAPS: A. TRIPWIRES: 1. Advise the assault force commander. 2. If it is feasible, mark the wire (if it can safely be stepped over) and allow the stack to pass, or advise assault force commander to circumvent and utilize a different route. 3. Conduct a detailed visual inspection of the wire, insuring that you trace it to both sides. 4. Conduct a visual inspection for secondary devices. 5. If the wire is slack, cut it and secure it out of the way insuring it will not impede the mission. 6. If it is taut, locate the firing device and insert the positive block. Once it is blocked, tape the pin in place. 7. Continue the mission. B. ANTI LIFT DEVICES 1. Advise the assault force commander. 2. Evacuate the area of all non essential personnel as per team SOP. 3. Utilizing a sturdy flat material (Plexiglas, sheet steel, MRE cardboard, etc.), slide the material under the anti-lift device and secure in place, maintaining the item attitude found, slowly and carefully remove item from the hostage. Move the item a short distance an set it in an area which will not impede the mission or the stack’s movement through the crisis site. 4. Continue the mission. C. REMOTE FIRED DEVICE: 1. Advice the assault force commander. 2. Evacuate the assault force as per SOP. Retain two EOD techs and the necessary number of shooters for security, (maximum of two) 3. If the precious cargo has not been recovered, or is in the room, cut the antenna near, but not at its source.
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4. Utilizing electricians tape as insulation, completely wrap the antenna insuring that no metal is exposed. 5. Utilizing suitable material, wrap in foil (WIF) the antenna, insuring that there is absolutely no metal to metal contact between the WIF’ing material and the antenna. 6. Once WIF is in place tape the entire antenna and WIF’ing material securely with electricians tape. 7. Continue the mission. D. BURNING TIME FUSE: 1. Advise the assault force commander. 2. Evacuate all non essential personnel as per team SOP. 3. Cut time fuse at the initiator, remembering that the burn is actually occurring farther toward the high explosive than the smoke indicates. 4. Remaining aware for anti withdrawal devices, remove initiator from high explosive. 5. Continue the mission. IV. LIKELY TARGETS FOR IED’S IN THE HOUSE A. Obvious entry points. Check recon and surveillance breaching report to identify which doors are frequently in use. The ones that are not may be booby trapped. B. The precious cargo may be booby trapped. C. The area directly adjacent to, or leading up to the precious cargo. (don’t allow anyone to disturb anything around you any more than is required). D. Any items targeted for recovery by assault force (classified materials, weapons caches, weapons components). E. Area directly adjacent to items targeted for recovery. V. LIKELY TARGETS FOR IED’S ON A Oil Platform A. Surface deck B. Production deck, good target if intent is to destroy the platform. C. Flight deck.
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D. Production lines. E. Boat landing VI. LIKELY TARGETS FOR IED’S ON A SHIP A. Cargo holds, if ships crew is not compliant and is hiding something B. Aft steering, near the screw, good target if the intent is to scuttle the ship 3. RE-CLEAR: A Re-Clear is conducted when there is an accountability problem. The Re-Clear will be ordered from the HHA. The only one authorized to call a Re-Clear is the Assault Element Commander. a. Reason for a Re-Clear are as follows: (1) Incorrect shooter count. The shooter count entering the objective was 28 and the shooter count taken in the HHA was 27. Before a Re-Clear is ordered the HHAC should get a second count to confirm. (2) Incorrect Hostage count. Intelligence is positive that 3 hostages are on target, but you have only recovered two. Before a Re-Clear is ordered, the HHAC conducts a second Hotel count to confirm and also questions recovered hostages on the where abouts of the missing hostage. (3) The Mission Statement said to specifically get terrorist X. Intelligence is positive that terrorist X is on target, but you do not have him in the HHA. b. To execute a Re-Clear, the Assault Element Commander will first task individual shooters to remain in the HHA to continue to perform task, (security for recovered hostages/Tangos, etc). He will then order the troop to assume a stack on the HHA's entrance point. On "RE-CLEAR, RE-CLEAR, RE-CLEAR", the troop assaults the objective. Do not re-throw flashbangs in rooms that are marked. If you come upon a unmarked room, deploy a flashbang into it before entering. c. For classroom purposes, do not re-engage targets on a Re-Clear. 4. LOCKED DOORS: a. Should an entry team encounter a locked door, they will immediately call for "BREACHER UP", and re-stack. Do not flag yourself in front of the locked door and keep your hands away from the door knob. b. Upon hearing "BREACHER UP" the nearest man carrying a shotgun and mechanical tool will advance to that door. c. The shotgun man will place his MP5 on safe and let it hand. He will then retrieve his shotgun. The shooter carrying the mechanical tool will do the same.
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d. The shotgun breacher will approach the door, looking first to ensure that there are two shooters stacked on the door, and then for the door knob. The Shotgun breacher will fire two lockbuster shells between the door knob and the door frame, defeating the locking mechanism. The breacher will take a downward angle on both shoots, firing one shell high and one low. Both shell holes should connect. The distance that he is firing these two shots is from 0 to 2" stand off. e. Once the shotgun breacher has fired his two shells he will immediately turn away from the door, placing the shotgun on safe, and re-loading two more shells. If no longer needed, he will stow his shotgun, regripping his primary weapon, he will return to the flow as a shooter. f. As the shotgun breacher is preparing to take his shots, the mechanical breacher stages to his rear with the sledge hammer poised. Once the shotgun breacher takes his shots, he will clear out of the way. the mechanical breacher will then step in an strike the door next to the door knob, knocking it open. The mechanical breacher must ensure that his momentum does not carry him into the room. Also, once the door is open, he should step clear of the door so as not to expose himself. g. Once the door is open, the flashbang will be deployed into the room and the shooters will make entry. h. If, after shotgun breaching the door it does not freely open, and there is no mechanical breacher staged, ensuring his shotgun is on safe, the shotgun breacher should then stiff arm the door, in attempt to open it. Again, the shotgun breacher must ensure that his momentum does not carry him into the room. i. If the mechanical breacher arrives at a locked door and there is not shotgun breacher present, then the mechanical breacher begins to mechanically breach the door. j. If after shooting the door twice with the lockbuster, and then hammering on the door with the sledge hammer, (prying the door with the hoologan), the shotgun breacher should watch the door, as it is being hammered, for where the resistance is. He should then call off the mechanical breacher, and shot the lockbuster at where he observed the resistance. If the door still does not open, consider attacking the hinges. 5. MOTEL SIX SCENARIO: a. A Motel 6 scenario is that the Crisis Site is a motel/hotel. On most any motel/hotel now a days, the doors are made to be self locking, so that when you exit and the door closes, it will automatically lock. For this type of scenario, you should have a dedicated breaching element. This element does not act as shooters, but as breachers. b. The breacher element will consist of a point man, two shotgun breachers and two mechanical breachers. In this scenario, you may want to consider having Trailers perform the duties of mechanical breachers.
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c. The point element will be positioned in the center of the hallway. The point man will be controlled by the shotgun breachers, ie, the point man will not move forward until he is directed to by the shotgun breacher. d. the breachers will not breach any door until there are two shooters stacked on it. e. As a two man team stacks on a door, they will not attempt to open. As the stack, the shotgun breacher will step up and breach the door, followed by the mechanical breacher. As the door opens, the flashbang is deployed and the shooters make entry. The flow will continue in this manner.
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COORDINATING SNIPER SUPPORT 1. INTRODUCTION: The mission of the Reconnaissance and Surveillance teams around the crisis site are two fold, one is to gather information on the crisis site and personnel, and report this information back to the Strike Force, and second, to take out targets of opportunity or targets that become a threat to the Strike Force. To accomplish this, planning and coordination must take place between all of the Strike Force elements. 2. OVERVIEW: This section is designed to introduce the shooter to the proper methods of sniper coordination and control. BODY 1. PREDICTABLE SNIPER TARGET AREAS: a. There are several things to consider when planning a sniper initiated assault, these are: (1) Weather. (2) Visibility/Target I.D. (3) Day/Night assault. (4) Compromise. (5) Over Penetration. (6) Distance from sniper to target. (7) Communication between sniper team to assault team. b. Targets inside the Crisis Site: (1) Targets on the inside of the crisis site will only be engaged by snipers prior to the assault team making entry. (2) Predictable target areas will be windows, doors, and openings. c. Targets outside of the Crisis Site: (1) Guard Towers/Shacks. (2) Roof Tops. (3) Targets coming from the inside to the outside.
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(4) Evacuation. (5) Avenues of Approach. (6) Target engagement on the outside must be coordinated with the assault element to determine whether the shot will compromise the assault prior to the breaches. 2. EMPLOYING FIRING COMMANDS: a. For all assaults, we use a verbal 5 to 1 second countdown to initiate actions taken by snipers and the assault element. b. The count begins once the assault element is ready to make entry, and is as follows: "I HAVE CONTROL, I HAVE CONTROL, I HAVE CONTROL, STANDBY...5...4...3...2...1...EXECUTE, EXECUTE, EXECUTE". The count is conducted by the primary breacher on target and will be delivered in a clear, concise, voice in cadence. The Breacher initiates the count with "I HAVE CONTROL" three times. This is used to prepare everyone that we are initiating the assault. Next he will state "STAND-BY" and will pause. The pause allows anyone who is not ready to commence the assault to come up on the radio net and stop the count. After the pause, the breacher will go into a 5 count countdown in cadence, with something happening on each count, which is broken down as follows: (1) Count w/Sniper, Diversion, & Breach: 5 - Nothing occurs 4 - Sniper takes any shots of opportunity 3 - Diversion is initiated 2 - Pause to allow diversion to take effect 1 - Breach (2) Count w/Sniper, Breach, and No Diversion: 5 - Nothing occurs 4 - Nothing Occurs 3 - Nothing Occurs 2 - Sniper takes any shots of opportunity 1 - Breach (3) Count w/Sniper as diversion and Breach: 5 - Nothing occurs 4 - Nothing occurs 3 - Sniper takes any shots of opportunity. If no shots are available, sniper will still take a shot to act as a diversion. Shot will be placed into the deck, tree, etc. 2 - Pause to allow diversion to take effect
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1 - Breach c. If snipers are not ready during the count, they will notify the assault element leader to stop the count during the pause. d. It is important that the breacher gives his count in cadence, consider the sniper that is taking up the slack in the trigger, trying to achieve a surprise break. 3. COORDINATION WITH THE SNIPER CONTROL: a. Coordination with the Sniper Control Center (SCC) is two fold. (1) Designated shooter(s) will make continuous coordination with the SCC to obtain current information on the Crisis Site to disseminate to the Strike Force for planning and execution. (2) Coordination is also done with the SCC to keep the R&S teams on target updated as to how and when the assault is to take place. 4. COORDINATION WITH R & S TEAMS FOR PRE-ASSAULT, ASSAULT, AND POST ASSAULT ACTIONS: a. PRE-ASSAULT COORDINATION: (1) Insertion (2) How many Teams? (3) Communications with SCC/Assault Elements. (4) Pre-determined R&S locations on target. (5) Emergency Assault Actions. (6) Establishing a ORP/Link-up with assault force. (7) Open air assault options. (8) Vehicle assault options. (9) Strong hold assault options. (10) Evacuation procedures. (11) Emergency evacuation procedures. (12) Extraction. (13) Key EEI's/OIR's. (14) Establishment of white side. (15) Target engagement. (16) The count. (17) Code words/execution checklist. (18) Compromise procedures. (19) Link-up procedures. (20) Description of Hotels and Tangos. (21) Confirmation brief. (22) Guiding and ITG procedures.
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b. ASSAULT COORDINATION: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avenues of approach. Target engagement. Communications with the assault force. Emergency evacuation procedures. Actions on reinforcements.
c. POST ASSAULT COORDINATION: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Target engagement. Evacuation procedures. Status report. Link-up. Extraction.
SUMMARY: As you can see, coordination can be quite in-depth. Lack of coordination can get someone killed. The R&S team can provide a lot of information and fire support only if there actions are properly coordinated, planned, and executed correctly.
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OPEN AIR/SNIPER INITIATED ASSAULT 1. INTRODUCTION: In order to rescue hostages, we will generally go inside a facility. But, what do we have to do if they are moving from a building to a vehicle or are staged in the open air somewhere? 2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this section is to teach you the proper method of an open air assault. BODY 1. OPEN AIR ASSAULT a. An open air assault is the most preferred and the safest method for hostage recovery. An open air assault is nothing more than engaging targets when they come outside a building to enter a vehicle, or when they are leaving a vehicle to go to an aircraft. 2. PREDICTABLE TARGET AREA (KILL ZONE) a. The predictable target area is the area between the building and the vehicle, or the area between a vehicle and an aircraft where targets are in the open and can be engaged. 3. SNIPER INITIATED ASSAULT a. A sniper initiated assault can be an extremely effective tactic if carried out with precision and if a high degree of individual discipline is maintained. b. Each sniper (along with his proficiency with long rifles) must be intimately familiar with every facet of tactics employed and all procedures used for target acquisition. c. In this critical scenario, any independent action by snipers or confusion regarding target selection procedures could easily result in disaster and/or hostages being placed in jeopardy. 4. NUMBER OF SNIPER TEAMS REQUIRED a. The number of sniper teams used can be determined by the number of targets to be engaged and the command of observation wielded on the target. It takes two sniper teams to engage one target. They should be placed in different locations around the target. 5. DEPLOYMENT a. The sniper teams can be deployed in many ways: (1) "L". (2) "Box".
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(3) On Line. (4) Oblique. b. These formations can be above, below or at the same level as the intended targets. Regardless of the formations, the snipers must be placed so that if one doesn't have a shot, another one will. 6. COMMAND a. Overall tactical command responsibility will rest with the Operation Commander, with the bulk of the tactical planning being accomplished by the Assault Team Leader and the Scout. b. The basic command structure is maintained until just prior to the actual assault. At this point, the Sniper Team Controller will assume control (command of the operation). Ideally this would occur only after the assault element is at the breaching point and the targets are preparing to move to, or are in, an area where they can be eliminated. c. At this point, all tactical elements (assault and sniper) must be on the same radio frequency. d. The Controller will advise, "I have control. I have control." Radio discipline now becomes extremely critical as the assault is imminent. Assault force and Snipers must now maintain radio silence unless observation is "compromised". e. Firing Commands. (1) In this type of assault the sniper teams must be proficient in simultaneous shooting. All shots have to be made at the same time to avoid disaster. The firing commands are simple. (a) Stand by. (b) Ready. (c) Fire. (2) On "stand by", the team brings their cross hairs on the given target, or are alerted that a target is coming into view. "Ready" is a preparatory command that lets the sniper teams know that in three to five seconds, the command "fire" will be given. If not given, the command "stand by" is repeated and the sequence is started over. (3) On the command "fire" all sniper teams that have a clear shot at their assigned targets will engage them. (4) All commands come from the sniper controller, who should be a school trained sniper. Once a controller is established, he should stay the controller throughout training. The reason for this is that all the teams will get familiar to the sniper controller's voice over the radio.
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(5) The command given by the Controller will be "snipers up" or "stand by". At this point the target selection process should begin. The next commands will be "Ready, Ready,.... Aim, Fire!" (6) Should a sniper or assault force member observe an immediate life threat to the hostages or tactical personnel, and if the operation is in fact compromised, "Compromise!, Compromise!" would be broadcast by the individual making the observation and an emergency assault would take place. Bear in mind, the risk of injury to assault force/hostages is maximized in any "emergency" assault. (7) Should a sniper observe a compromise situation he should simultaneously broadcast, "Compromise!, Compromise!" and fire at the hostile targets, knowing that as the first shot goes, the assault force moves in. (8) The controller should attempt to maintain a steady cadence in his commands and keep the snipers at the "ready" position only as is necessary. Also, snipers must shoot on the command "fire" and only on the command to "fire". These situations are extremely fluid and the command to "stand down" could be given at any time, even after the command "aim" is heard. f. Should a sniper misfire occur prior to the assault force reaching the breaching point, the Operation Commander must determine whether or not to begin an emergency assault. g. If the misfire occurs after the Sniper Team Controller has taken command, but the "ready, ready" sequence has not begun, he (controller) must decide whether to broadcast "compromise" and begin the assault or "stand down". Snipers must not fire simply because of a misfire. If the misfire occurs after the "ready, assault, assault" sequence has begun, the controller should broadcast "assault, assault" and begin the action. h. Once the assault has been initiated, the Sniper Team Controller becomes an observer and command reverts back to the original structure. 7. ASSIGNING TARGETS a. Assigning targets can be done one of two ways: (1) By actual identity, through clearly identifiable traits, i.e. sex, clothing, weapon, etc. (2) By order in which they leave or appear in the building. b. If two targets exit the building at the same time, they should be numbered from left to right. c. When targets appear simultaneously, the sniper controller must tell the snipers how to follow their targets. To avoid any chance of confusion, the Controller must decide which of the two tactics to use and verbally advise snipers to "lock on" or to "hold left to right". Command should be given in conjunction with the command to "stand by". If you, as an individual sniper, do not have a shot at your target, remember that the Controller will give the command to fire when he perceives the highest probability of success. If you do not have a shot at your target, your counterpart on the other sniper team probably will.
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SUMMARY: During this period of instruction we have covered target areas, employment of sniper teams, firing commands, and assigning targets. You must keep in mind that the teams and the Controller must train together and practice these techniques to become proficient.
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WINDOW ENTRIES 1. INTRODUCTION: Because we would like to make entry into a Crisis Site in a least obvious place, or to gain access to a specific room, a window entry can be used to accomplish this. 2. OVERVIEW: This section is designed to introduce you to window entry techniques. BODY 1. WHEN WINDOW ENTRIES ARE USED: a. When it is the only feasible entry point into the Crisis Site. b. When using multiple entry points. c. To gain access to a specific room or area that is known to contain precious cargo. d. As an alternate entry point. 2. TEAM STACK FOR WINDOW ENTRIES: a. The stack for a window entry is as follows: (1) Cover Man: Covers the window from the opposite side of the breacher. He will be the second man to enter. (2) Breacher: Conducts the window breach, by use of a window charge and/or break and rake method. Pulls out curtains or blinds if any. He will be the forth man to make entry. (3) Blanket Man: Once Breacher moves clear of the window, Blanket Man moves up and places ballistic blanket over the top of the window ledge and moves out of the way. He will be the third man to make entry. He is also equipped with a hooligan tool. (4) Ladder Man: Sets and holds the ladder for other shooters. Makes entry last, if used as a shooter and carries a sledge hammer. (5) Shooter: Is the 1st man to make entry.
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SHOOTER LADDER MAN BLANKET MAN BREACHER
(1) (5) (3) (4)
COVER MAN (2)
3. METHOD OF ENTRY: a. Once the breach has been initiated, the cover man will position himself where he can best cover the window as the breacher moves up, rakes out any glass remaining in the frame, and pulls out the curtains and/or blinds. Once the breacher is clear of the window, the blanket man will move up and place the blanket over the top of the window ledge. The ladder man will then place the ladder for the entry team. Then the shooter makes entry, followed by the cover man, blanket man, and breacher, in that order, and depending on the amount of shooters needed to make room entry. b. When making window entries, consider the first two shooters to be armed with pistols to provide easy access through the window. If the MP5N is used, go through the window in the under arm assault position. Weapons retention with the pistol. c. If the break and rake method is used, have the blanket man deploy a flashbang. d. If ladders are not available and the window is low enough, a shooter may act as a step for shooters making entry. He places his knees and hands on the ground, ensuring that his knees are positioned directly underneath hips. Shooters should step on the buttocks/lower back area, so as not to injure the ladder man. e. Depending on the type of window and its construction, a shotgun man may have to be incorporated to defeat the mullion. If a shotgun breacher is incorporated, he should be placed immediately behind the breacher. When using shotgun breaching, the shotgun should be pointed toward the ceiling or floor when engaging, as you will probably experience over-penetration with the lockbuster. Window Entry: The order of movement for a ground level window entry/breach is the same as for a door breach. Once the window to enter is identified the number four man from the lead fire team moves forward to become the window breach man. If the window needs to be breached then he takes necessary action to breach the window and clear the glass. Once the window is breached the number 4 man prepares to assist the rest of the team/squad in entering the window. There are two preferred methods for providing assistance: Kneeling on hands and knees: The number four man kneels down on his hands and knees and the rest of the squad/team uses his back as a step to enter the window.
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One knee support: The number 4 man kneels down with his inside knee on the ground for support. He keeps his right leg bent at a 90 degree angle, and he leans his head against the side of the building if possible to keep it out of the way. The rest of the squad/team uses his outside leg as a step to enter the window. nd
Ladder Entry: The collapsing foldable ladder should be used to gain access to 2 floor windows and low roofs. No more than two soldiers should be on the ladder. The 3 and 4 men will stabilize the ladder and secure the upper level windows by orienting their weapons up facing in opposite directions.
4. BREACHING HAZARDS: Expect to experience the following hazards when conducting a window entry using explosive breaching: a. High velocity glass fragments, primarily exterior of the window site. Glass from the window will normally fly out instead of in because of the over pressure created from the explosives. This over pressure has no where to escape because of the walls and roof of the room. Therefore, it will normally escape outward of the window, unless it is a large room, blowing the glass out. b. Mullion may still be present and may present itself as a obstacle. In this case, ballistic breaching may be required. c. Curtains and/or blinds may create a obstacle d. Curtains and/or blinds may catch on fire due to the explosion of the breach. e. Dense smoke may be experienced just inside the breach point, obstructing your vision.
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5. INTERIOR ROOM TACTICS: a. To determine sectors of fire, use the window as you would a center or corner door. b. When stepping from the ledge into the room, because of the height of normal window ledges above the floor, ensure that you do not "Jump" into the room, but instead, step down, plant your feet, and immediately pick up your sector of fire. c. Tactics in the room remain the same as discussed in the basic room clearing class. d. Expect anyone in the room to be deaf or even slightly injured, i.e. ear drum or fragmentation, due to the breach itself. e. If the Window is used to gain access to more rooms in the Crisis Site then just that initial room, then leap frogging tactics would be used. SUMMARY: The Window Entry is a valuable asset when conducted properly. It is especially useful when you know the exact location of a hostage and you can gain access to that location through a window. Just remember, unrehearsed, a window entry can take forever, increasing your chances of failure.
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VEHICLE ASSAULT
1. INTRODUCTION: . During introduction to CQB/IHR, we learned that our second preferred assault option is the vehicle assault. During this period of instruction we will talk about why and how they are conducted. 2. OVERVIEW. This section is designed to teach the shooter proper methods of vehicle preparation and vehicle assaults. If we are giving the vehicle(s) to the terrorist(s) there are several methods in which we can prepare them for an assault. BODY 1. VEHICLE PREPARATION. a. Sedans and Vans. (1) Disengage all locking mechanisms in door. (2) Roll all windows down, and disengage handles. (3) Remove all mirrors. (4) Leave the trunk lid up. (5) Ensure the gas tank is full. (6) Apply a command detonated explosives to the front or rear wheels depending on front or rear wheel drive. (7) Apply a device to be command controlled to turn off or prevent starting of the engine. (8) Apply a controlled diversionary device. b. Buses. All above mentioned methods can be applied to buses, as well as the following: (1) Apply small grain det cord, command detonated, to blow out colored/tinted windows and doors. (2) Disengage hydraulic or air controlled mechanisms for doors. (3) All Intercontinental buses must be equipped with a emergency door release button. These will not open the door, but release hydraulic or air pressure to allow you to open the door by hand. This button is usually located on the front of the bus, the drivers side, or in the forward portion of the wheel well on the front wheel.
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2. SEDAN ASSAULTS. a. Sedan assault team will be comprised of a minimum of six shooters, each shooter assigned a specific number which will correspond with specific task. The primary weapon should be a handgun. These six shooters will be in a duel stack formation with three shooters in each stack, as depicted in fig.1.
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fig. 1 b. Assault Team Configuration. The Sedan Assault Team will be configured as follows, as depicted in fig. 2: (1) Number 1 Man - Will lead stack to rear of vehicle. Takes position on rear, left bumper of sedan. If trunk is in the up position, closes trunk with support hand. His primary sector of fire is the left and middle rear seat. (2) Number 2 Man - Team Leader. Will lead stack to rear of vehicle. Takes position on rear, right bumper of sedan. If trunk is in the up position, closes trunk with support hand. His primary sector of fire is the right and middle rear seat. (3) Number 3 Man - Takes position on left, rear quarter panel of sedan and does not penetrate past the rear axle. His primary sector of fire is the rear, left seat. (4) Number 4 Man - Takes position on the right, rear quarter panel of the sedan and does not penetrate past the rear axle. His primary sector of fire is the rear, right seat. (5) Number 5 Man - Takes position abreast and to the outside of the Number 3 Man, and does not penetrate past the rear axle. His primary sector of fire is the front, left seat. (6) Number 6 Man - Takes position abreast and to the outside of the Number 4 Man, and does not penetrate past the rear axle. His primary sector of fire is the front, right seat.
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fig. 2 c. Sedan Assault: (1) Plan to initiate the assault with a diversion to the front of the vehicle. (2) When taking position on the vehicle, avoid penetrating forward of the rear wheel axle. (3) Always attempt to take a downward angle on shot placement, to minimize the chance of overpenetration. (4) The most likely body part that will be exposed for you to engage is the back of the brain. (5) Avoid placing the muzzle of your weapon past the plane of the window. (6) Once shots have been taken, punch out remaining glass with your support fist if it obstructs your view of the inside of the sedan. Recommend wearing of the Kevlar glove on the support hand. (7) Once your sector of fire is clear, collapse to and view other sectors, but observe the one meter rule. (8) Once target engagement has ceased, any shooter will initiate the following verbiage: PLACE YOUR HANDS ON THE SEAT IN FRONT OF YOUR/DASH BOARD...DON'T MOVE." (9) Once target engagement has ceased and verbiage has been issued, shooters will then announce their number and clear, ie, "1 CLEAR...2 CLEAR", etc. Once all shooters have announced their individual clear, the team leader will then announce "ALL CLEAR." Shooters will then remove the occupants from the sedan. d. Post Assault: Once the "ALL CLEAR" has been given, the following actions will occur, as depicted in fig. 3: (1) The Number 5 and 6 Men will take one step outboard, but still abreast of the Number 3 and 4 Men. and continue to cover the front seat of the sedan. (2) The Number 3 and 4 Men remain where they are at and continue to cover the rear seat of the sedan. (3) The Number 1 and 2 Men holster their weapons and move between the Number 3 and 5 Men and the Number 4 and 6 Men respectively. They will position themselves on both rear doors, and once ready, will open the rear doors and pull individuals out of the rear seat, placing them on the ground, face down beside the sedan, where the Number 3 and 4 Men will cover and issue further controlling verbiage.
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(4) Once the rear seat has been cleared of occupants, the 1 and 5 Men and the 2 and 6 Men will move forward to the front seats. The Number 5 and 6 Men providing coverage as the Number 1 and 2 Men remove occupants from the sedan and place them on the ground beside the sedan. (5) Once all occupants have been removed from the sedan, personnel handling and medical treatment will be administered.
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fig. 3 Now that we understand how to conduct Assault a Sedan, let’s now discuss the Van Assault. 3. VAN ASSAULT. a. Because of the different sizes of vans the number of shooters required to make up the assault team may vary, normally your will need a minimum of six shooters. A rule of thumb to go by is one shooter is dedicated per seat/section and two for rear. Each shooter's primary weapon should be a handgun. The shooter stack for a van assault is depicted in fig. 4.
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fig. 4 b. Assault Team Configuration. The Van Assault Team will be configured as follows, as depicted in fig. 5. (1) Number 1 Man - Will lead the stack to the rear of the van. Will move to and take position beside the front passenger/drivers side door. His primary sector of fire is the drivers compartment.
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(2) Number 2 Man - Will move to and take position on the first passenger section, which is also his primary sector of fire. (3) Number 3 Man - Will move to and take position on the second passenger section, which is also his primary sector of fire. (4) Number 4 Man - Team Leader. Will move to and take position on the rear cargo compartment/passenger section, which is also his primary sector of fire. (5) Number 5 Man - Will move to and take position at the rear door of the van. His sector of fire is straight ahead down the long axis of the van. (6) Number 6 Man - Will move abreast of the Number 1 Man and take position at the rear door of the van. His sector of fire is straight ahead down the long axis of the van.
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c. Van Assault: (1) Plan to initiate the assault with a diversion to the front of the vehicle, opposite side of the assault. (2) The most likely body part that will be exposed for you to engage is the brain. (3) Avoid placing the muzzle of your weapon past the plane of the window. (4) Once shots have been taken, punch out remaining glass with your support fist if it obstructs your view of the inside of the sedan. Recommend wearing of the kevlar glove on the support hand. (5) Once your sector of fire is clear, collapse to and view other sectors, but observe the one meter rule. (6) Once target engagement has ceased, any shooter will initiate the following verbiage: PLACE YOUR HANDS ON THE SEAT IN FRONT OF YOUR/DASH BOARD...DON'T MOVE."
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(7) Once target engagement has ceased and verbiage has been issued, shooters will then announce their number and clear, ie, "1 CLEAR...2 CLEAR", etc. Once all shooters have announced their individual clear, the team leader will then announce "ALL CLEAR." (8) Upon the team leader announcing "ALL CLEAR," Shooters Number 5 and 6 will then open the rear doors of the van and visually clear underneath the seats. Once underneath the seats are clear, the Number 5 or 6 Man announce "VAN ALL CLEAR." The van team will then start to remove the occupants from the van. d. Post Van Assault: (1) Once the verbiage of "VAN ALL CLEAR" has been given, the Number 5 and 6 Men will move to the forward side of the van. (2) As the Number 1 and 2 Men provide cover, the Number 5 and 6 Men remove occupants from those sections, and then move to and work the Number 3 and 4 Men sections, as depicted in fig. 6. (3) Once the van has been completely evacuated, the assault team will then begin personnel handling and medical treatment will be administered.
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4. BUS ASSAULT. a. Unlike the sedan or van, the bus assault will require a troop of shooters, roughly 19 shooters. Their weapons will vary between handguns and assault rifles/sub-machineguns. The assault formation is as depicted in fig. 7.
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(1) In fig. 7, the forward two blocks of the stack containing the letter S signify shooters. The right block of shooters are armed with MP5's, while the left block of shooters are armed with handguns. (2) The blocks containing the letters L, S, and C are three man teams. The L stands for ladder man, the S stands for shooter, and the C stands for coverman. The shooter is armed with a handgun while the coverman is armed with a MP5. b. Bus Assault: (Refer to fig. 8) (1) The left, forward block of shooters lead the stack along the long axis of the bus and take position at the forward bus door. Their sector of fire is the drivers compartment. (2) The ladder man leads his three man team to there assigned window and places the ladder, supporting it. (3) The cover man moves outboard of his team and provides coverage on the windows. The coverman is armed with a MP5. (4) Once the ladder has been placed, the shooter mounts the ladder and takes position in the window with his handgun. The ladder man may support the shooter by grabbing his pistol belt firmly. Once the shooter is positioned on the ladder, the cover man now assumes a supporting role, in that the shooter is now in his sector of fire. The shooters sector of fire will be a section of two seats, as depicted in fig. 9:
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fig. 9 (5) The block of shooters located at the right rear of the bus position themselves, covering the interior, long axis of the bus. They are armed with MP5's. (6) Once all shooting has ceased, all shooters of teams will announce their sectors clear. The team leader, located toward the rear of the bus, will then announce "ALL CLEAR". (7) Upon "ALL CLEAR," the two shooters located at the rear of the bus will move to the front door of the bus. (8) Upon "ALL CLEAR," the two shooters located at the drivers door will then open the door and make entry, positioning themselves to either side of the aisle. They will then initiate the following verbiage: "PLACE YOUR HANDS ON THE SEAT IN FRONT OF YOU...DO NOT MOVE...ARE THERE ANY TERRORIST SITTING BESIDE YOU...IS ANYONE WIRED WITH EXPLOSIVES OR ARE THERE ANY EXPLOSIVES ON THIS BUS...IS ANYONE HURT." (9) Upon completion of the verbiage, the second group of two shooters make entry onto the bus and assume a modified weapons retention. Both shooters begin moving to the rear of the bus, conducting dead checks enroute. Once at the rear of the bus, the rear emergency door is opened and both shooters position themselves in opposite rear seats. (10) Once the two shooters are positioned in the rear of the bus, the forward two shooters will then direct occupants, a seat at a time, to exit the rear of the bus. The verbiage that is used is as follows: "YOU...PLACE YOUR HANDS ON TOP OF YOUR HEAD, INTERLOCKING YOUR FINGERS...STAND AND FACE TO THE REAR...WALK TO THE EMERGENCY DOOR." (11) As the shooters on the bus are preparing to off load, covermen and extra shooters/trailers will form a corridor at the rear of the bus. (12) The corridor assist occupants off of the bus and maintain positive control over them, moving them into a H.H.A. (13) Once all living has been moved off of the bus, the dead are then removed. NOTE: If no ladders are available, then the ladder men will place their back against the skin of the bus, bending the knees, pushing against the body of the bus. The shooter will then step up onto the ladder 150
man's legs, placing his feet near the pelvis. The ladder man will grab the shooters pistol belt in order to support him. SUMMARY. Remember, the main advantage of the vehicle option, is that now you know where all the hostages and terrorist are. You don't have to go searching through a building. However, surgical shooting is even more important here, in that you have both hostages and terrorist in very close proximity to each other with potentially very little of the adversary exposed. You will always plan and rehearse for a vehicle assault anytime you are planning for a stronghold assault, you never know what might happen.
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HOSTAGE HOLDING AREA (HHA) MARSHALING PROCEDURES
1. INTRODUCTION: The President of the United States has given your troop Compromise Authority to execute an IHR. You have planned it, rehearsed it, and have executed it. After the Crisis Site was clear, your Troop Sergeant gave an inaccurate accountability of Hotels and Tangos. The reason is, because Cpl Benotz forgot to account for the two dead Tangos in his room. Because of the importance of one of the unaccounted Tangos, the NCA has ordered your troop to execute a "Re-Clear", causing your troop to remain on target for an extended period of time, with enemy re-enforcements on the way. 2. OVERVIEW: This section is designed to introduce the shooter to Marshaling Procedures. BODY: 1. HOSTAGE HOLDING AREA: a. The purpose of the HHA is to provide a secure location to gain accountability of all shooters, (DAP & Security Element), living Hostages, Unknowns, and Terrorist as well as to communicate that accountability to Higher Headquarters prior to the request for evacuation.
X T X cover
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Hostage Holding Area b. The HHA can be inside or outside of the Crisis Site, depending on if it is a permissive or nonpermissive environment. Primarily, it will be located inside of the Crisis Site. The speed in which the Marshaling Procedures take place is extremely important, but remember, do not sacrifice safety (security) for speed. c. Just like all aspects of an assault plan, the Marshaling Procedures, or actions in the HHA, must be rehearsed both for the best case scenario and the worst case scenario. Take the initiative, be deliberate, and your smoothness will equal speed.
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2. CONFIGURING THE HHA: a. The following is the criteria required in the selection of the HHA: (1) An area that is completely cleared following the first 6 fundamentals. (2) Be as close to the Breach Point as possible, and to be on the same deck. (3) Provide positive communications to Higher Headquarters. (4) An area that is obscured from outside visibility. (5) An area, or areas, that will accommodate all Strike force personnel interior of the Crisis Site, as well as predicted numbers of recovered individuals. b. The HHA is divided into the following pits: (1) Hostage Pit: This is only for the positively identified hostages. This pit is the location where a deliberate search is conducted on the hostages. (2) Unknown Pit: This is for anyone that has not been positively identified as a Hostage or Terrorist. This pit is the location where a deliberate search is conducted on any unknown persons. (3) Terrorist Pit: This is only for the positively identified terrorist. This pit is the location where a deliberate search is conducted on Terrorist. (4) Medical Pit: This pit is only for wounded Hostages, Unknowns, and Terrorist, and segregation of the three categories is required. The deliberate search is also done here. Injured shooters are not placed in this pit, but are kept with their respective troops. c. The configuration of the HHA is obviously site dependent. Actions in the HHA however, will remain standard. The following is a list of those standards: (1) All recovered living individuals will have had a cursory search and be Flex-Cuffed prior to entering the HHA. (2) Living individuals will be placed into their respective pits and the deliberate search will be initiated. (3) Only one man is needed to provide cover of individuals being searched. (4) All shooters not responsible for recovered personnel will line the outboard area of the HHA. (5) All shooters will be visible "at a glance" by the HHA Controller. (6) Only pertinent verbiage will be passed during Marshaling Procedures.
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(7) The HHA Controller is the only man who will physically count the H's, U's, and T's. (8) Any individual that is inside of the Crisis Site and is a member of the Strike Force will be accounted for in the HHA. (9) Only the HHA Controller will send the HUTS Report. (10) Only the HHA Controller will assign special duties. (11) The four pits will be clearly marked or verbally designated. (12) The entrance to the HHA will have physical security and be clearly marked, as per SOP. (13) The last security element or DAP member to enter the HHA will inform the HHA Controller, "Last Man". 3. TEAM MEMBER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE HHA: a. HHA CONTROLLER: (1) Selects a suitable area or areas for the HHA. (2) Clearly marks the entrance to the HHA. (3) Visually marks, or verbally designates, the four pits. (4) Designates security for the HHA entrance point. (5) Physically or verbally places all team members in desired location in the HHA. (6) Designates the "Last Man" in, to physically count all shooters. (7) Physically counts all recovered living individuals. (8) Physically counts the shooters fingers for the Tango deadcheck report. (9) Sends the HUTS Report to the Strike Force Commander/Higher Headquarters. (10) Request evacuation. (11) Designates the first (four) shooters to secure the Breach Point, (external). (12) Designates shooters for the Body Bunker, if used. (13) Designates the last man out of the Breach Point.
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(14) Stacks all other personnel to be used as the Hostage Corridor. b. HHA SECURITY PERSONNEL: (1) Provides security for team members entering the HHA. (2) Maintains covered or barricaded positions according to site configuration. (3) Ensure "Last Man" to enter the HHA sounds off "Last Man" to HHA Controller. (4) Provide a minimum of one shooter to maintain rear security during evacuation as per the HHA Controllers command "You, Last Man Out Of The Breach". c. PIT SECURITY PERSONNEL: (1) Provide security over living individuals within the pit. (2) Maintain segregation and control of pits. d. MEDICAL PIT PERSONNEL: (1) Provide medical care following the below listed priority: (a) Hostages. (b) Unknowns. (c) Terrorist. (2) Report to HHA Controller all pertinent medical information. (3) Request aid/litter teams through the HHA Controller. e. BODY BUNKER: (1) On command, provide a physical barrier around the precious cargo during evacuation. NOTE: The size of the bunker depends on the number of precious cargo that you have. Unknowns and terrorist may also rate a Body Bunker depending on the mission statement. f. FIRST FOUR OUT OF THE BREACH POINT: (1) The first four out are designed to establish immediate security outside of the Breach Point. The first four do this by establishing a 180 degree perimeter. Do not get hung up on only using four shooters.
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The situation may require only 2 or it may require 6. Bottom line, the situation on the ground will dictate the amount of shooters needed. (2) On command, provide a visual mark to notify R&S of impending evacuation. (3) On command, provide external Breach Point Security prior to the evacuation. (4) Once the first four establish security, each shooter announces over his saber radio his number and clear or not clear. Once the HHA Controller receives this word, he will proceed with the evacuation. g. HOSTAGE CORRIDOR PERSONNEL: (1) Provide a visual and/or a physical corridor from the Breach point to the extract vehicles or assembly area. This is done by shooters establishing two staggered columns from the Breach point to the extract platform. The living individuals are moved between these two columns. h. REAR SECURITY OR LAST MAN OUT OF THE BREACH POINT: (1) Visually and physically cover the Strike Force's evacuation from the Crisis Site. (2) Upon exit of the Breach Point, sound off "Last man Out", to trigger the collapse of the corridor. (if applicable). SUMMARY: The President of the United States had enough confidence in your abilities to allow you to conduct a IHR. Your well rehearsed and smooth operation of Marshaling Procedures will increase the chance that you never have to hear those possibly fatal words, "RECLEAR".
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PERSONNEL HANDLING 1. INTRODUCTION: There can not be discrimination between different living personnel as far as handling is concerned. Your job is to clear the Crisis Site and to take control of the situation. Discrimination can get you killed. 2. Overview: The purpose of this period of instruction is to teach the shooter in the proper techniques of handling living personnel. BODY 1. COVERING A LIVING INDIVIDUAL FOR A SEARCH: a. Once the first five fundamentals of CQB has been completed, the next step is to physically take control of living individuals in the room. To do this, we must split into a search and covering team. One shooter will announce "CLOSING", while the other shooter announces, or replies, "CLOSE". The search man can not move until he gets verbal confirmation that he is being covered. b. The cover man needs to position himself in a location that he can best cover the search man, without covering him with the muzzle of his weapon, or to interfere with the searching techniques. c. The cover mans responsibility is to take the shot, or to control the situation if the search man loses control. Before and during the searching process, there are three questions that must be asked to each living individual, they are: 2. QUESTION THE LIVING INDIVIDUALS: a. STEP 1 - The person to be searched should be in the prone position because of the verbiage that he/she has received. Before approaching the individual you must first ask "ARE YOU WIRED WITH EXPLOSIVES, OR ARE THERE ANY EXPLOSIVES IN THIS ROOM". If the reply is no, then you will continue with your other questions and the search. If the answer is yes, then immediately notify EOD. Never approach a living individual without first asking this question. When giving verbiage, use plain text, do not use naval terminology, such as deck, bulkhead, etc. b. STEP 2 - (The living individual is in the prone position) Instruct the individual to place his arms out to his sides, palms up. Once that you have received compliance, ensure that your weapon is on safe and sling it behind your back and announce to your teammate "SAFE AND SLUNG". Approach the individual, from the head, placing your weak side knee on his back, between the shoulder blades, (this places your secondary weapon away from the individual). Next, place his hands behind his back, grasping his thumbs with your support hand. Ask the remaining two questions: (1) "ARE THERE ANY OTHER HOSTAGES OR TERRORIST IN THIS AREA?" If the answer is yes, then you need to get into specifics.
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(2) "ARE YOU INJURED?" If the answer is yes, ask where. Ensure that the individual is flexcuffed, and searched and then start medical treatment. Additionally, use common sense when someone is injured on whether or not flex-cuffs need to be applied. c. Disseminate any pertinent information learned to other shooters. 3. FLEX-CUFF AND CURSORY SEARCH: The Flex-Cuf restraint is designed as a human restraint and is particularly useful in multiple arrests, raids, and civil disorders. The Flex-Cuf restraint has been utilized effectively as a supplement to handcuffs and also used as leg irons and restraining belts. It is important that you be thoroughly acquainted with policies regarding the application of plastic restraints, and secondly, be familiar with the various Flex-Cuf restraint techniques that may be used to immobilize your subject. Remember, all restraining devices are temporary, continued vigilance of the subject is a must for any restraining device to be successful and accomplish its purpose. Take nothing for granted, not age, sex, race or size, restrain every subject. Never forget, you are responsible for the subject's safety, as well as your own and others who may be involved. Properly used, restraints are one of the most valuable tools of your trade.
a. Take a Flex-Cuff from the lapel of your vest on your weak arm, sliding it down your arm, and over his hands, around his wrist. Tighten the Flex-Cuffs. When tightening the Flex-Cuffs, do not cut off the blood circulation to his hands. Allow two fingers space between the Flex-Cuff and the wrist. b. Now, search the his belt line of the back for weapons with a sweeping motion of your strong hand, maintaining control of his hands with your support hand. This is known as the cursory search. If at any time during the search you find a weapon on an individual, ensure the individual is appropriately restrained, alert your partner, and remove the weapon, placing it out of reach of the individual. c. After the cursory search is done, announce to both your cover man and the individual that you are going to roll him on his side. The cover man should position himself to the backside of the individual at the head. The search man will then roll the individual on his side, lowering his silhouette. d. With the living individual is on his side, instruct him to bring his knees to his chest, and that you are going to assist him in sitting up. Grasp the belt/waistband area with one hand and the collar with the other hand; roll the individual to a sitting position. e. Now instruct the individual, keeping his knees to his chest, feet flat on the ground to stand-up. As he is standing up, the search man should assist him by grasping his belt and collar and lift up and forward. Avoid lifting the individual by his hands, as you could cause an injury or severe discomfort to the individuals shoulders.
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f. Once the individual is standing move him to the door of the room, announcing "COMING OUT" and "HOTEL COMING THROUGH". Do not use the terminology of "Hostage" Coming through. (Remember that once the individual is flex-cuffed nothing he can do warrants "Deadly Force") g. If there are multiple living individuals in your room, call for "SUPPORT" or give a specific number of shooters needed to get shooters in the room to give assistance. In order to search anyone, a cover and search man is required. For example, there are two living individuals and three shooters. Two shooters can search and cover on one of the individuals while the third shooter covers the second individual. This is done so that control can be maintained. However, two shooters cannot search two individuals with only one cover man between them. In this scenario, the coverman cannot provide adequate security. Preferably, position the cover man between the living individuals and the exit of the room. Also, never position a living individual where he cannot be observed in a room. i. Infants will be searched but not Flex-Cuffed, and will be carried by either a shooter or trailer. If at all possible, keep the infant near its mother. Never leave a infant unattended. j. You will only use the amount of force necessary to control. Talk to the individuals to reassure them. This will assist you in the long run. Remember, you are the knights in shining armor, not the bad guys. Do not focus your aggression on the precious cargo. 4. DELIBERATE SEARCH: a. In the Hostage Holding Area deliberate searches are conducted on all living individuals. The living individuals will be segregated within the HHA, i.e., Hostages are separated from living terrorist. The deliberate search is a detailed, thorough search. b. In each pit in the HHA, a cover man will be required to maintain cover and control, regardless of the number of individuals in the pits. c. Once a living individual is brought into the HHA, he will receive a deliberate search. The search is conducted with a sweeping motion of the hands, do not pat: (1) Place the individual with his head against the wall, feet far enough back to where he can not stand vertically on his own. (2) Starting from his left or right side, you will begin by bi-secting the body in half, starting from head to toe. Once one side of the body is searched, conduct the same exact sequence on the opposite side of the body. The search is conducted in the following sequence: (a) Start out at the head and run your fingers through the head. Slide the hands down the front of the face and the rear of the neck. (b) Place your fingers inside the collar at the shoulder and sweep hands toward the throat and spine.
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(c) Place hands flat against the body at the throat and spine and sweep hands down to the belt line region across the chest and spine. (d) Sweep hands toward hips and sweep up to the armpit, along the ribs and chest muscle. (e) Sweep shoulders and then wrap hands around bicep/tricep muscle and sweep down to wrist. Check fingers. (f) Place hands flat at belt line at hips and sweep beltline to opposite hip. (g) Place hands flat above groin and buttocks and sweep groin and buttocks. (h) Place hands around upper leg at groin/buttocks and sweep down to ankles, (if your hands cannot reach completely around upper legs, then conduct two sweeps of that one leg). (i) Squeeze foot wear and feel for resistance. (3) Once you have completed one side, you will switch to his other side and complete the search. (4) Any articles that are found during the search, i.e., wallet, keys, etc., are removed from that individual and placed behind him in close proximity. C.I. will bag all articles. d. Once the deliberate search is complete, place the individual back into the kneeling position, with his legs crossed, and head against the wall. ( Flex-Cuffs will not be removed by shooters, the authorities involved in the turnover will make that decision.) e. Once the search has been completed, the HHA medic should physically observe each living individual. The corpsman is specifically ensuring that the individual is not injured and is not displaying signs of shock. f. Do not hesitate to reassure the individual, they most likely are stressed out at this point. Let them know what is going on. However, instruct the individual not to talk or move, it will be confusing enough in the HHA. If the individual is talkative, warn them that you are going to apply a gag. If they continue to be non-compliant, gag them, ensuring that you do not block their airway. SUMMARY: Always be thorough in you searches and use common sense. If the precious cargo is the ambassador, you have the ambassador, and he appears to be in control of his actions, do you really need to flex-cuff him? Probably not, however, if you do, you are in the right, and no one should question your judgment.
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CORRIDOR AND BODY BUNKER 1. INTRODUCTION: You have just successfully completed a hostage rescue. As you are moving to your extract point, a shot is fired and your hostage is down, your mission is a failure. 2. OVERVIEW. This section is designed to introduce you to Corridor and Body Bunker tactics. BODY 1. CORRIDOR: a. The Corridor is designed to provide a security barrier for precious cargo to moved through upon evacuation. b. The Corridor is established prior to the Assault Force evacuating the Crisis Site. c. The Corridor is simply two columns of operators facing outboard, using available cover. Preferably, the Corridor extends from the Breach Point to the extraction platform. d. Upon the Assault Force evacuating from the Crisis Site, precious cargo is moved through the Corridor to the extraction platform. The precious cargo will be physically escorted by a shooter. Once the precious cargo is evacuated, and the Crisis Site is abandoned, the Corridor is collapsed and the withdrawal process is continued. e. The Corridor is manned by the exterior security personnel, and is then augmented by shooters and trailers that are not otherwise tasked. f. If appropriate, always attempt to seek cover while manning the Corridor. Do not assume a position underneath a street lamp when you could take just as good a position from a nearby shaded area. Do not lay in the middle of a road when you could take position in the ditch beside the road. Common sense prevails. g. If the distance from the Breach Point to the extraction platform is so great that the corridor cannot be effectively manned without losing security and control, then you have two options open to you: (1) Floating Corridor. A normal Corridor is established. As the precious cargo is moved through the Corridor, they will not exceed the midway point. Once the last man out of the Crisis Site sounds off with "LAST MAN" then the command will be given to "UP AND MOVE". On that command, all of those manning the Corridor will stand and move, as one, the extraction platform. The front of the Corridor should form into a wedge and the rear should have a four man team that provides security by bounding. (2) If the distance to the extraction point is considerable, then at some point, the Corridor may not be tactically sound. Therefore, leaders must make the decision to assume normal patrol formations and conventional patrolling tactics.
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2. BODY BUNKER: a. The Body Bunker is designed to provide a "blanket" of protection on the precious cargo. b. The Body Bunker is simply surrounding the hostage with between four to six shooters. upon evacuation, the Body Bunker move's from the Crisis Site to the extraction platform. c. The Body Bunker may or may not be used in conjunction with the Corridor. d. The Body Bunker affords the best protection for precious cargo. However, the amount of hostages may dictate whether or not the Body Bunker can be utilized, ie, six hotels could require up to 20 shooters to provide adequate Body Bunker Protection, which would be unrealistic for us to be able to do. One scenario is that there are 5 Hostages, one being a VIP, such as the Ambassador. You could provide the Body Bunker on the VIP, and do one on one security through the Corridor with the remaining Hostages. e. As with the Corridor, if the extraction platform is not located in close proximity to the Crisis Site, then at some point the Body Bunker assumes conventional patrolling formations and techniques. As you can see, the Body Bunker does provide adequate protection to precious cargo. SUMMARY: During this period of instruction we have covered proper Corridor and Body Bunker procedures and the vital importance of these skills. Done properly, these skills are vital to the success of the overall mission.
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INNER AND OUTER PERIMETER SECURITY 1. INTRODUCTION: You are part of the troop at a staging area in country X. A Warning Order tasks you with providing security to include perimeter blocking positions, in support of the Assault Element. It is critical that this is done to ensure the success of the mission. This is a basic 360 degree security of the Crisis Site. Fanning out into two man teams to seal the Crisis Site and deny any hostile access to the Crisis Site. 2. OVERVIEW. This section is designed to introduce you to techniques used for perimeter security and blocking positions in support of a SOF CQB operation. BODY 1. INNER PERIMETER SECURITY. The mission of Inner Perimeter Security is to prevent individuals from escaping the Crisis Site, as well as to protect the assault element while it is maneuvering to the Breach Point from small arms fire coming from within the Crisis Site. a. Inner Perimeter Security can be provided by the following three elements: (1) Sniper/Designated Marksman from within the R&S team that are on the ground surrounding the objective. The advantage of these teams is that they have powerful optics and precision weapons that can take extremely surgical shots. The disadvantage is that if an individual escapes the Crisis Site as the assault element is clearing, the R&S Team would probably have a difficult time apprehending the escaped individual, simply because of the distance that R&S normally stands off of the target. (2) Sniper/Designated Marksman airborne in a sniper platform, ie, UH-1. This element is limited. The shooter does have powerful optics and precision weapons; however, it takes considerable training for the shooter to become proficient at taking shots. Additionally, the airborne platform can observe individuals escaping, but can not apprehend. The airborne platform does have other outstanding applications. (3) Security Element personnel on the ground. These Operators can immediately deploy, after the snipers/designated marksmen have taken their shots, and establish a tight inner security ring around the Crisis Site. The advantage is that these operators are right up on top of the target, so if anyone did try to escape, they will immediately be apprehended. Of the three elements, the Security Element will probably provide the best inner perimeter security. If the Security Element does provide inner perimeter security, the individual operator must do so from covered and concealed positions. 2. OUTER PERIMETER SECURITY: The mission of Outer Perimeter Security is isolate the Crisis Site, preventing anyone from coming into the Crisis Site. The requirements can range from keeping onlookers away in the permissive scenario, to preventing the enemy reinforcements from gaining access in the non-permissive scenario. The Outer Perimeter is maintained by Security Element Operators and is nothing more than a 360 degree perimeter formed around the Crisis Site. The ground situation will dictate tactics. Techniques that you choose in a rural area, may not work in a city. If you have a built up area to your West, and a swamp to your East, then your probably will focus more of your force on the side of the built up area. However, you still must position someone to secure the swamp side also.
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a. Within Outer Perimeter Security is what is known as Blocking Positions. A Blocking Position is normally made up of a team of Operators that will include a Machine-gun and possibly a AT-4, as well as explosives. Normally this position is located on a avenue of approach. The mission of a Blocking Position is primarily to prevent any vehicle mounted reinforcements from entering the Crisis Site. There are three basic levels of Blocking Positions. They are: (1) Level 1. A visual or physical deterrent to block access to the Crisis Site that will not cause injury to foreign national or damage to property. Examples are road blocks, barricades, local law enforcement, etc. (2) A physical deterrent to block access to the Crisis Site that will cause damage to property and possibly inflict injury to foreign nationals. Examples are nail boards, limited demolitions. (3) Level 3. Involves the use of Deadly Force to prevent access to the Crisis Site. Examples are employing Machine-guns, AT-4's, claymores, etc. 3. CROWD CONTROL: a. Use of local law enforcement in the permissive scenario would be ideal. However, do not depend on local law enforcement for your own security. Even with their support, you must still provide your own outer perimeter security. b. Physical presence of an armed operator may sometimes be enough of a deterrent. c. Flashbang thrown in front of a crowd to push them back so you may maintain your position. d. CS Gas/Riot Control Agents is a good deterrent, but difficult to obtain authorization for its use. SUMMARY: During this period of instruction, we have discussed how to establish both Inner and Outer Perimeter Security, the three levels of a Blocking Position, and Crowd Control. Properly providing exterior security is essential for mission success. It depends on every mans initiative and tactical knowledge.
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INTEGRATION 1. INTRODUCTION: Imagine that just the Direct Action Troop is going to conduct an assault on a 40 room objective. Can the troop handle this large of an objective? Sure they can. How long will it take them to get to the last room, though? Maybe so long that the terrorist in that last room gets the presence of mind to kill the hostage. There is nothing that you can really do to stop this from happening, except maybe by increasing your dynamics, you can get to that room before the terrorist gains the presence of mind and eliminate his thought process for him. 2. OVERVIEW. This section is designed to introduce you to integration between the Assault and Security Elements. BODY 1. GENERAL: In any fight, you always want to have an advantage over our opponent, to have the upper hand. This is one of the main reasons that we introduce trailers on to an objective. Because of our numbers, we want to be able to overwhelm our adversary. The purpose for the use of trailers is to increase and continue the dynamics of the fight when you are confronted with a Crisis Site, because of its size, may interfere with the speed at which the clear is conducted. In other words, our intention in the assault is to rapidly gain complete control of the objective. To be able to overwhelm the enemy and prevent him from fighting us or killing the precious cargo. If we can accomplish this by only entering with the Direct action team, then that is what should be done. However, if you cannot rapidly get to every room in the Crisis Site and fight, then you should introduce Trailers. 2. INTEGRATION: The following scenario has been developed to introduce integration. Upon the breach, the Direct Action Team enters the objective and is immediately confronted with a long hallway with doors on both the left and right side. The point is established with equal stacks on both sides of the hallway: a. The Trailers will enter behind the Direct Action Team. Trailers should be organized similar to the DAP. Instead of a point man, the Trailers will have what is called a "Traffic Cop". The Traffic Cop controls the flow of the Trailers. He will position himself in the center of the hallway and have his Trailers stack just as the Direct Action Team has. b. The Traffic Cop will ensure that there is a slight buffer between the Direct Action Team stack and his stack, any observer should be able to see two distinct formations. c. As two shooters make entry into a room, the shooter stack continues with the flow. d. The two shooters that enter the room will only conduct the first four fundamentals of CQB; DOMINATE, ELIMINATE, CONTROL THROUGH VERBIAGE, AND DEAD CHECK. Once these fundamentals have been done, both shooters will position themselves by the door. One shooter will contain the room while the other shooter breaks a green chemlight and waves it outside the door with his support hand, using the verbiage of "TRAILERS UP".
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NOTE: The verbiage "TRAILERS UP" should be the SOP to mean that you need two trailers. If you require more or less then instead give the verbiage of "I NEED TRAILERS". e. The Traffic Cop in the hallway sees the shooter waving the chemlight in the doorway and hears the verbiage of Trailers Up". He immediately turns to the stack of trailers that is on that side of the hallway and physically directs two trailers to move to that shooter. f. The two Trailers approach the door, announce "COMING THROUGH", and enter the room, stepping just to the sides of the door. g. The shooter waving the chemlight briefs the trailers on what has and has not been done in the room, while the other shooter maintains security. For example: "I have done the dead check on those two Tangos. We have not searched the room or that closet in the corner. Any questions"? This procedure is known as a turnover. h. Once the turnover has been completed, the shooters will announce "COMING OUT", but not 'LAST MAN OUT", since there trailers occupying the space. The shooters will continue with the flow of the assault. Additionally, the shooters will not mark the door. i. Once the shooters have left the room, the two trailers complete whatever fundamentals have not been done. Most likely these fundamentals will be to detail search the room and handle any living individuals. The shooters should do the Dead Checks and they should brief the trailers as to that fact. If at anytime, as a trailer, you are not sure if the Dead Check has been conducted, do one. However, only do if you are not sure; by doing a dead check, we may end up having a redundant count in the HHA. j. Once the trailers have completed all remaining fundamentals, the depart the room, announcing "COMING OUT" and "LAST MAN OUT", as they mark the doorway with a green chemlight. The trailers then rejoin their trailer stack. k. As the shooter stack moves, so should the trailer stack, to an extent. The Traffic Cop should avoid pulling his stack past rooms where the shooters are still inside fighting, hence the buffer. l. As the flow progresses, shooters will be exiting rooms, after the turnover, and the trailer stack will be forward of their position. For this reason it is important for the trailer to stay on the bulkheads and out of the center of the hallway. If the hallway is blocked by trailers and the shooter is trying to get though in order to rejoin the flow of the assault, then he should sound off with "SHOOTER COMING THROUGH". Upon hearing this verbiage, all trailers should make a hole. m. As I said earlier, the Traffic Cop maintains control of his stacks and directs trailers to move to rooms. However, if the Traffic Cops attention is diverted, a shooter is waving a chemlight forward and on the left, and he doesn't see this, then the two trailers on the left side should take initiative and move on their own to that shooter.
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n. If, because of the size, configuration, and set-up of the room, and the shooter feels that he a trailer is not needed in the room, then he will not call for the trailer, but will conduct all six fundamentals and then mark the room. For example: The room has no adjoining doors, minimal search problems, and no living individuals. o. As the shooters assault the last couple of rooms, they probably shouldn't call for any trailers if the fight is over with, but should complete all six fundamentals and then mark the room. p. As the fight is over with and it has been announce "LAST ROOM", all shooters and trailers turn about and move to the HHA, looking for the Danger Area, and Lone Shooter. If there are none, assume chokepoints. If a shooter is manning a chokepoint, the first trailer to reach his position should step beside the shooter, face in the same direction and state "SHOOTER, TURN AND GO". q. Any time a shooter has been injured and requires buddy aid, a trailer will perform this aid, not a shooter. The shooter must continue with the dynamic of the clear. r. The first four out should be Trailers simply because of their weapons system. s. Recommend shooters handling living individuals during evacuation and placing trailers on the corridor with security, simply because of their weapons system. t. The verbiage "SUPPORT" and "NEED SHOOTERS" means that a shooter needs the immediate assistance of another shooter. The verbiage "TRAILERS UP" means that specifically trailers are needed. u. What we are trying to work towards is for the Trailer to have a larger role in the assault. What we mean by this is that if a shooter is in a emergency situation in a room, and starts to sound off with "SUPPORT" repeatedly. A Trailer is stacked outside the room and hears this, and is watching for that support to come down the hallway. "SUPPORT" keeps being given, and the trailer sees no support coming, he may then announce "COMING THROUGH, make entry and assist the shooter in a shooter capacity. This technique should only be used as a last resort and only with the Assault Element Commanders authorization. SUMMARY: As you can see, quite a lot goes into integration. The more that you integrate, the more cohesive your force will become. To be successful in any assault, a lot depends on the individual operators initiative, to be able to take the ball and run with it.
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NIGHT OPERATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION: Night operations, especially night stalking, require detailed planning based on a thorough understanding of darkness and the advantages and disadvantages that come with it. All too often, night operations are planned with the same attitude as for daylight operations. It is important to note that the R&S Team will more often than not: a. b. c. d. e.
Be inserted at night into the area of operations (AO). Conduct movement to and form the objective in the dark. Select, construct, and occupy an OP under cover of darkness. Observe the AO and the enemy at night. Shoot during limited or reduced light conditions (BMNT/EENT).
2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this section is to instruct the R&S Team in planning, preparing, and conducting night operations. BODY 1. NIGHT OPERATIONS Night operations include all military activity (attack, defense, retrograde, movement, combat support, and combat service support) conducted at night. Operations in other conditions of reduced visibility require the use of many of the techniques of night operations. Night operations, regardless of the scale in which they are conducted, basically depend on the ability of the individual to perform his assigned task at night. In the past, night combat was treated as a special operation because of individual limitations; this is no longer true due to increased proficiency in the basic skills of all operators and technological advances in night vision devices. 2. NIGHT PLANNING a. Before departing on any assigned mission, the R&S team leader should always thoroughly plan for the mission. Planning for the R&S mission should be conducted to account for all events from departure of friendly lines or insertion to re-entry of friendly lines or extraction. The following principles of patrolling apply for day and night R&S missions and should be covered in the team leader's plan. (1) Planning. (2) Security. (3) Control. (4) Reconnaissance. b. Team leaders should have a checklist for night patrols and missions. Night planning requires close examination of the mission with respect to: (1) Route to be taken and terrain covered (KOCOA). (2) Navigation and navigational aids available. (3) Weather, illumination, and times of twilight.
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(4) Enemy Situation (SALUTE) and intrusion detection. (5) Distance and time to target, taking into consideration load weights. (6) Coordination, passage of lines, and other patrols. (7) Night observation devices. (8) Method of patrol control and communication. (9) Emergency actions on contact. (10) Identifiable objectives. 3. PREPARATION AND INSPECTIONS Regardless of what type of mission you are conducting, prior preparations, inspections, and rehearsals are paramount to success, especially for a night mission. The following should be taken into account: a. Uniform (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ghillie Suit or cammies. They should be comfortable. Night camouflage. Allow for weather requirements. They should cover you from head to toe.
b. Equipment (1) Silenced. (2) No shine. (3) It should rest comfortably. (4) Consider placement for easy access. (5) Maintain accountability. (6) Use dummy cords. (7) Operation by feel. (8) Cover all gear. (9) Inspect for serviceability and operability. c. Camouflage (1) Don't forget your face and hands. (2) No shine. (3) Utilize both natural and man-made. (4) Not restricting body or equipment functioning. (5) It should cover you from head to toe. d. Weapons (1) Swivels silenced. (2) Hand guards taped. (3) Camouflaged. (4) You must be able to operate weapon by feel. (5) Night sights.
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(6) Dummy cords. (7) Other weapons. e. Inspections. At least two full dress inspections, one being just prior to departure. Inspect for: (1) Serviceability. (2) Operability. (3) Sound. (4) Shine. (5) Smell. (6) Inspect from head to toe. f. Rehearsals. Simulates all actions conducted on the mission. Rehearse at day and night. Do not assume something will work until you rehearse it. Rehearse actions on the objective, immediate actions on contact, direct actions (DA), stalking and movement, everything! 4. NIGHT MOVEMENT AND STALKING Planning must be made for R&S team movement from insertion to SCC/ORP to OP to extract. During movement to the objective area, increased security/awareness and heightened sensitivity of hearing, sight, and smell is necessary. The following considerations on movement should be planned for and covered by the sniper team: a. Type of ground covered and type of movement. b. Proximity to the enemy. c. Load weights. d. Navigation and navigational aids available. e. Patrol control and communication. f. Enemy counter infiltration measures. g. Contact, all types. h. Gear going from and staying in the SCC/ORP along with the method of staging. i. Type of movement from OP after the mission. Should you pick up gear or make a trash OP? j. Time allowed to target/objective area. k. Physical fitness awareness and maintenance. l. Security Halts (1) Security. (2) Administrative. (3) Listening. (4) Relief. m. Supporting fires to mask movement. n. Weather used to cover movement. o. Attain night vision before departure. p. Night observation devices (NODs) to aid movement. 5. NIGHT ROUTINE IN FFP OR OP
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These considerations are included in your patrol order format. You must stress planning and rehearsals for everything at night. Once your team has made it to the team members must know exactly what to do and make no unnecessary movements, sounds, or actions that will compromise your position. Consider the following: a. Construction of OP. (1) Materials. (2) Tools. (3) Noise. (4) Will camouflage be good enough in daylight? b. Observation fan. c. Equipment placement/accessibility. d. Duration in position. e. Urination and defecation. f. Communication (1) Verbal. (2) Hand and arm signals. (3) Radio. g. Stand to, sleeping, and security. h. Can you operate all gear in the dark? Claymores, weapons. i. How and when will you depart OP? 6. NIGHT OBSERVATION AND AIDS a. The use of night operating aids during the hours of darkness will improve your tactical capabilities. These devices should be employed to best facilitate the accomplishment of your team’s mission. Leaders should consider the time required to attain night vision (30 min) and the employment of night vision devices. Night vision devices increase the effective range of the eye at night. The following capabilities should be noted: (1) Infrared light used to illuminate a target area normally cannot be detected by the unaided eye beyond ten meters from the light source. (2) Night vision devices can be used to detect the enemy's use of infrared light. (3) Night vision devices for weapons can be dismounted and hand held for other than weapon sighting purposes i.e. surveillance. (4) Night vision devices can be used to aid movement. b. With improper use, employment of some night vision devices can be detected. R&S teams using these devices must be thoroughly familiar with the techniques of operation and equipment limitations. Such detection by the enemy will disclose your position and compromise your mission. Some of the major limitations are listed below. (1) Infrared light can be detected and the source located by the enemy with night vision devices (active vs passive). (2) Infrared light is subject to countermeasures by physical means such as chemical smokes or by counter illumination. (3) Night vision devices are line of sight instruments. Dead spaces in surveillance, experienced during the day, are generally the same at night.
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(4) All night vision devices are adversely affected by bad weather conditions. If the objective lens gets fogged or wet, the image will be distorted. (5) Some night vision devices are adversely affected by bright light. (6) Prolonged use of night vision devices produces eye fatigue. 7. NIGHT SHOOTING To successfully engage targets at night will usually require artificial illumination or night vision devices. Shooting at night or under reduced/limited visibility must be practiced frequently for you to become proficient. Shots made during the twilight time zones (BMNT/EENT) will provide R&S teams with better security vice broad daylight shooting. Team leaders should consider the following when planning for night shooting operations: a. Natural Illumination Available (1) Moon. (2) Ambient light. b. Artificial Illumination Available (1) Lighting. (2) Pyro (ARTY). c. Night Vision Devices (1) On the sniper rifle. (2) On the spotter rifle. (3) Alone (a) PVS-2. (b) PVS-4. (c) PVS-5. (d) Litton. (e) Thermal. (f) IR active. d. Night vision devices must be zeroed on the selected weapon. e. Method of range estimation. f. Method of wind reading: Direction and speed. g. Method of target identification. h. Weapon Signature (1) Can it be reduced? (2) Will it compromise your position? (3) Utilizing supporting fires to mask shots. (4) Utilize diversions. 8. TRAINING FOR THE NIGHT OPERATION/RAID This is not really a how-to chapter on raids per se, but more a discussion of the incorporation of the night vision devices. There are also some good after-action comments, but the important part of this chapter is the understanding of all the elements involved in executing a night raid. It's a complex mission but routine for a Operator battalion. Also we'll be looking at some of the considerations related to using "own the night" equipment, along with a look at some of the tools and devices that go with this equipment.
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You will not succeed at night if you cannot hit targets at night. All the technology in the world cannot overcome this simple fact. To hit targets, you must ensure all your night vision systems are in good operating order, and that your weapons are zeroed. The following describes the process of zeroing night vision devices and puts out some sound practices to consider when zeroing any other time as well. Zeroing Techniques with Night Vision Devices The steps in preparing for zeroing are the following, in sequence: Modify the 25-meter zero target to help the firer determine center mass of the target and maintain a consistent aim point when zeroing. Use the tan side of a cardboard E-silhouette and stripe the full length and width of the cardboard with 3/4-inch black electrical tape. These stripes should divide the E-silhouette in half, vertically and horizontally. Center and staple the 25meter zero target at the intersection of these black stripes. Mark the correct bullet impact point on the 25-meter target. When zeroing an aiming light, the firer points the aiming light at the center mass of the 25-meter zero target silhouette. Bullets must then hit the target at a pre-determined point. Aiming light adjustments are made until the shot group is centered over this point. Make a transparency showing the appropriate shot-group size. This step is needed for two reasons. First, the four-centimeter circle marked on the 25-meter target is not centered over the bullet impact point for either aiming light. Second, firers cannot be as precise at night as during the day. Our research showed that the four-centimeter shot group is an unrealistic standard for night firing, given the reduced visual acuity at night through goggles and the difficulties in aiming consistently. A 5.5-centimeter criterion is better. To help trainers and firers apply this criterion, a laminated see-through or transparent training aid marked with a black 5.5-centimeter circle should be used. The actual zeroing procedure follows: Use the standard Army flashlight to light the target. The flashlight helps diffuse the bloom of the aiming light in the goggles and provides a more definitive aim point. Place the flashlight at the firer's position in a supported position such as a V-notched stake. The flashlight can be pointed directly at center mass of the target or slightly below the target, according to the firer's preference. If there is enough ambient light in the night sky, a flashlight may not be needed. Fire two, three-round shot groups before making any aiming light adjustments. This will give a much better indication of the firer's aim point than a single three-round shot group. This procedure will avoid premature adjustments and "chasing bullets" in the dark. Triangulate and number each shot group. Do not adjust the aiming light unless the firer is shooting consistently and the aim point can be determined.
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Aiming light knob adjustment guide shows movement of bullets with the M16A2 rifle when aiming light knobs are turned counterclockwise. (Bullets go in the opposite direction when the knobs are turned clockwise.) Center the shot-group size transparency (the 5.5-centimeter circle) over the bullet impact point to evaluate each shot group. All bullets should be within the circle and as close to the impact point as possible. Fire no more than four shot groups for each 25-meter zero target to accurately assess shot groups. The wide dispersion of bullets frequently makes it difficult to mark shot groups distinctly and can result in an incorrect adjustment. Put up a new 25-meter target after this point. Checklist The following checklist summarizes the steps that should be taken when zeroing an aiming light. It assumes that all training aids and target modifications have been made. Prepare for zeroing with aiming lights: Zero the M16A2 rifle for 300 meters during daylight hours. Use a striped E-silhouette. Use a 25-meter zero target marked with the correct bullet impact point. Center the 25-meter zero target on the stripes on the E-silhouette. Place the aiming light ruler and shot group size transparency at each 25-meter zero target
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Place the aiming light knob adjustment guide at each firer's position. Zeroing procedures at night with aiming lights: Be sure the rifle is set properly for zeroing at 25 meters, one click up from the 300meter setting. Shine a flashlight on the 25-meter zero target from the firer's position, as needed. Fire and mark two, three-round shot groups before making the first aiming light adjustment. Check the knob adjustment guide to ensure that adjustments are made in the correct direction. Use the shot-group size transparency to evaluate the size. Put up a new 25-meter target after firing four shot groups. When finished with these steps, move the elevation knob on the M16A2 down one click to ensure that sights are aligned for 300 meters. With the weapons zeroed, it is time to put them to use. Here's an excerpt detailing general concepts and observations that, when considered, can culminate in a night live-fire executed nearly entirely in the IR spectrum... Preparations for the Raid Achieving a "Trained" status in the IR spectrum has two essential components: the necessary equipment and extensive training and rehearsal. A unit cannot operate completely in the IR spectrum unless each soldier has night vision goggles (NVGs) mounted on his head. Furthermore, the goggles are of little value if he does not also have an aiming device on his weapon. The training and rehearsals for this mission are much the same as for any other mission or task. They must be gradual, progressing through the crawl, walk, run stages as outlined in FM 25101, Battle Focused Training. They must address the individual, leader, and collective tasks that support the terminal training objectives. Night Vision Equipment Although Operator resources differ from those of conventional infantry units, most of the equipment is the same. Teamsoften receive the latest weapons and equipment in the Army inventory, such as the M4 carbine, which is replacing the M16A2 in Operator units; and the Litton M845 and 937 night vision scopes, which augment the PVS-4. With new equipment come new challenges and the responsibility to develop TTPs for its use. A Operator company can outfit every soldier with NVGs, scope, and/or aiming laser. Like other units, Teamsare waiting for better equipment (such as replacing PVS-7As with PVS-7Ds), maintaining what they have, and relying on NCOs and their ingenuity to accomplish any mission they are given. To assist in fielding new night vision equipment and developing innovations for using what is already in the inventory, the 1st Operator Battalion formed a night vision committee at battalion level, made up of several NCOs, the platoon leaders, the headquarters company commander (who is the battalion force
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modernization officer), and the battalion commander. The committee's efforts have helped establish an SOP that spells out whom carry which NVDs. Night Vision Goggles. Every soldier on the battlefield, whether he has a night vision sight mounted on his weapon or not, must have NVGs. Without them, he is severely handicapped during movement, which results in a loss of control for the unit and a diminished ability to acquire and engage enemy targets. Aiming Devices, Pointers, and Illuminators. The best set of goggles will not do a shooter any good without an aiming laser, such as the AN/PAQ-4A or 4C, or an AIM-1 that is zeroed to his weapon. The PAQ-4C is much better than the 4A because the laser is stronger, eye-safe, and not intermittent. Mounting the PAQ-4C on the M4 has been one of our greatest challenges due to a shortage of mounting brackets. Although the M4 mounting bracket is noted as an additional authorized item in the PAQ-4C training manual, it is still not available in large quantities. Thanks to NCO ingenuity and resourcefulness, however, the battalion has progressed from electricians' tape to modified aim point mounts to finding a supplier. Another device used to direct or illuminate a target is the Maxibeam search light, which is a lightweight handheld, battery-operated IR or white light search light with an illumination of several million candlepower. Its beam can be narrowed to illuminate small targets such as a bunker or breach point or widened for large areas such as a portion of the objective. Teamshave used the Maxibeam from the support element with great success, particularly on nights with limited illumination. Markings. For the night live-fire raid, each Operator was marked with a two-inch strip of IRreflective tape on his arm and a one-inch square on his helmet. All cleared breach points, buildings, and bunkers were marked with either IR chemlights, or Phoenix beacons, as was the casualty collection point. The battalion also used IR strobe lights or Phoenix beacons to identify the flanks of assaulting elements. Landing and pickup zones were marked with either strobes or swinging IR chemlights. Using only IR sources for marking has an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that an enemy without night vision devices has a lot of trouble identifying the friendly locations and actions. The disadvantage is that friendly forces can get confused trying to navigate through an objective that is marked all in the same color and contains several blinking IR lights. The supporting attack helicopters also can have a hard time identifying the source of a laser (for example, telling a Phoenix beacon from an IR strobe light). CQB Lights. CQB lights mounted on individual weapon systems are the one exception to operating in total darkness. Although these lights come with IR filters, Operator experience indicates that the white light clearing of buildings is generally preferred. It increases peripheral vision, enhances target acquisition and control, and increases the speed of the room-clearing team. For those without CQB lights, the field-expedient flashlight taped to the handguard is a must. But the use of white light, even in roomclearing operations must depend upon the mission analysis. When clearing large open areas, the use of CQB lights, without IR filters, is not the preferred technique. Use of the CQB lights with IR filters also enhances EPW search operations.
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SUMMARY: The R&S team cannot afford to compromise any part of the mission by being unprepared for night operations. Diligence in training and planning is necessary for success, as well as for survival.
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EVACUATION FROM AN OBJECTIVE 1. INTRODUCTION: Your troop is ordered to execute an IHR. You plan it, rehearse and then execute it. The precious cargo has been recovered and during your evacuation of the crisis site the hostages are killed by members of an enemy reaction force. What measures can you take to preclude these disastrous events? 2. OVERVIEW: This section is designed to introduce the shooter to evacuation techniques from the objective. BODY 1. EVACUATION. Evacuation is the term that we use to describe departing or leaving the Crisis Site. 2. WITHDRAWAL. Withdrawal is the term that we use to describe departing or leaving the objective area. 3. THREE TYPES OF EVACUATIONS. The three types of evacuations are: Deliberate, Hasty Deliberate, and Emergency. All three must be planned and rehearsed. a. Deliberate. (Best Case Scenario) Actions on the objective went as anticipated and rehearsed. Your plan for evacuation is as briefed. b. Hasty-Deliberate. Actions on the objective went as anticipated and rehearsed however, something has physically happened that requires you to "speed up" your deliberate evacuation. Example: Reactionary enemy forces are enroute, a small fire on the objective is spreading... c. Emergency. (Worst Case Scenario) something physically has happened that warrants an immediate evacuation through the nearest opening. Example: A large amount of heavy explosives has been found armed with a timed device and the EOD technician advises the Assault Element Commander to execute an emergency evacuation. (1) Only Assault Element Commander or higher can call for an emergency evacuation. When calling a Emergency Evacuation, it is passed on all nets. Not only is it important for all of the shooters to know, but it is also important for R & S and security to know as well, so they do not engage us as we are screaming out of the Crisis Site. (2) Code Word. All ground personnel must be familiar with the code word that announces that an Emergency Assault has been initiated. The classroom code word is "Landslide". (3) Upon hearing "Landslide" all shooters will immediately stop where they are at in the clearing process and will immediately exit the nearest, safest possible exit. If there is a living individual in the room that you are in, regardless of where you are at in the fundamentals, you will take that individual out with you, maintaining control. Worry about searching and cuffing the individual when you get him outside.
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(4) Hasty marking signals to notify friendlies of intentions. Just prior to exiting, the shooter will throw the hasty mark outside of that exit point and then follow it out. Remember, there are security personnel on the exterior of the objective who make target ID the same way that you do. By jumping out of a window, holding a weapon, could get you into trouble. The classroom Mark is a Red Chemlight. Some troops have an SOP to wear the Emergency Evacuation mark around their neck on 550 cord. (5) Rally points. Upon an Emergency Evac, a rally point needs to be identified in the order so all shooters know where to move to once out of the Crisis Site. This is necessary for accountability, consolidation, and for the leaders to figure out what further appropriate action to take. Example: Upon exiting the building, all shooters will move to a point of 50 meters in front of the white side breach point. Upon arriving at the rally point, establish a 360. SUMMARY: It is not uncommon for a shooter, during the evacuation phase to become complacent. He is coming down from the adrenaline rush and has the feeling that he is home free. Nothing could be more further from the truth. Once the assault commenced, everyone knows that you are there. The fight may be over inside the objective, it could be just beginning on the outside. It’s not over until your feet touch the base camp.
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WATERPROOFING
1. INTRODUCTION: The mission order arrives! This order requires teams to be on the ground for 30 to 60 hours prior to the assault. Team leaders are ensuring that all equipment necessary for a successful operation is packed. The NCOIC arrives with last minute instructions and information. The latest weather report is passed and it calls for wet and windy weather, with the possibility of two to four inches of rain within the next 24 hours. How is this going to affect our mission and what can we do to overcome the problems associated with wet weather? 2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this section is to provide the student with the skills to waterproof their communications equipment. BODY 1. CATEGORIES OF WATERPROOFING Recognizing the necessity for waterproofing all electronic items of communication equipment to be operated or carried from shi-to-shore is of prime importance when planning for an amphibious operation. All electronic equipment required making a water movement or wet environment is vulnerable to water or possible immersion. Water corrodes (especially salt water)wires and contacts, rots insulation and leaves salt deposits in equipment, rendering it useless. There are two categories of waterproofing, operational and package. a. Operational Waterproofing. Operational waterproofing is the application of protective materials to communicate equipment in such a manner that is fully operable even though it is in a waterproofed condition. Operational waterproofing should be accomplished on the day prior to launching. Equipment to be used during a rehearsal landing should also be waterproofed. After the rehearsal, equipment should be opened and then re-sealed just before the landing. b. Package Waterproofing. Package waterproofing is the application of protective materials to communications equipment that does not have to be operated during movement, yet must withstand exposure to water and spray. Package waterproofing should be accomplished in garrison just prior to embarkation. Equipment will not normally be accessible once embarkation has been completed. 2. PREPARATION OF EQUIPMENT a. All electronic components must be checked and tested to ensure satisfactory operation. Jacks, plugs, cases, dials and knobs must be thoroughly cleaned so that waterproofing materials will properly adhere and affect an adequate seal. Sharp edges, clamps, screw heads and other projections must be covered to prevent damage to plastic waterproofing materials.
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b. Short or long vehicular kits, as required, must be installed under the direction of the unit motor transport officer. Instruction in fording procedures and sand driving should be accomplished for all drivers/operators prior to embarkation. 3. WATERPROOFING MATERIALS a. Waterproofing Paper. Used to wrap small items of communications equipment the same as a package received from the factory. b. Beeswax. Used for sealing packages wrapped with the waterproofing paper. Small items may also be dipped into melted beeswax. c. Desiccants. (1) May be used in package as well as operational waterproofing. (2) Packed in chest, radio sets and plastic bags before each is waterproofed for the purpose of absorbing moisture which may accumulate from condensation inside the plastic bag. (3) Desiccants are not necessary if equipment is to be waterproofed for a short time (less than 24 hours) but should be packed in equipment that will be stowed for long periods of time. (4) Desiccants will absorb from 15 to 35 percent of their weight in moisture, and can be reactivated and reused by drying them in a medium hot oven. d. Humidity Indicators (1) Used in conjunction with desiccants to indicate the presence of moisture and to indicate when desiccants have absorbed all the moisture they can. (2) Humidity indicators turn from blue to a pinkish color when exposed to moisture. (3) They can be dried out and reused. e. Tape (1) Chemically treated to resist water. Has a high adhesive quality. (2) Used for covering sharp edges, sealing pliofilm covers to cases and for sealing openings. (3) Normally available in two, three, four inch rolls. f. Field Expedients
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(1) Asphalt paper (tar paper), is used for wrapping and covering all types of communications equipment which need not be operated while waterproofing. (2) Ammunition cases may be utilized for packing small items such as batteries, message books and accessories. These vary in size and are adaptable to most any piece of communication equipment. (3) Waterproof plastic bags used in shipping cases must also be utilized in the absence of pliofilm covers. Their chief advantage is that they are normally larger than battery bags, and therefore somewhat easier to use on radio sets. SUMMARY: During this period of instruction we have covered the types of waterproofing, the preparation of equipment for waterproofing, and materials suitable to use for waterproofing. Remember, if your gear gets ruined due to water damage, you can't talk. If you can't talk, you're probably making no contribution to the successful completion of the mission. YOU WILL HAVE FAILED!
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MARKINGS AND SIGNALS Standard for marking and signaling: 1 2
3
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Entry Points. Entry points will be marked with two Wolf Tails flanking each side of the entry point. Cleared Rooms. Rooms cleared will be marked with the Wolf Tails ( minus the 9 volt batteries ) at the entrance of each room. Follow-on forces must not have to enter a room to determine that it has been cleared . Floor Clear. When a floor is clear it will be marked with a Wolf Tail marking device with the chemlight activated and the 9-volt batteries making contact shorting them out causing a heat signa ture that can be picked up easily by thermal sights. It will be hung from the windows facing the SBF and other follow on forces. This marking can also be used as a signal to shift fire from the floor immediately above or below (depending on the order of floors to be cleared) to the next floor in the clearance sequence. Building Clear. Buildings cleared will be marked by a Modified Wold Tail ( an orange VS17 panel with three IR chemlights taped together forming a triple long chemlight, with a two-foot length of 550 cord tied on to the end of it. At the end of the 550 cord there will be two 9 volt batteries taped together and attached to the 550 cord by a secure knot. ) The signaler will first twirl the signal ap proximately 6-10 times while in view of a window on the support side of the building. This en sures that the support element will be able to obtain the visual signal easily. He then secures the signal to the window frame where it will be in full view outside of the building.
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Construction of the Wolf Tail requires the following materials: 1 A 3 ft. length of engineer tape (brightly colored) 2 Approx. 5 ft. of 550 cord 3 A small weight such as a bolt or similar object 4 Duct tape/100mph tape 5 Chemlight ( colored and/or IR ) 6 Two 9-volt batteries CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODIFIED WOLF TAIL Constuction of the Modified Wolf Tail Requires The Following Materials:
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PHYSIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF GUNFIGHTS
1. INTRODUCTION: Have you ever been extremely scared or surprised and experienced unusual effects on your motor skills or mental capabilities? Studies have shown that profound changes take place in the human body and brain when a person is subjected to severe stress. As a gunfight is the most stressful situation that you could find yourself in we believe that it is well worth our time to study these effects on the body. This way, we will expect them and not let them hinder our performance under stress to the point where we lose a gunfight. 2. OVERVIEW: This section is designed to introduce you to the Physio-Psychological effects of the human body and brain caused by the stress induced by a gunfight. BODY 1. PHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS. Regardless of how much training one has, certain studies have shown that during a gunfight, one or more physiological changes will take place in an individuals body. On the other hand, proper training can minimize certain aspects of these effects. a. The following are examples of physiological effects you may experience during a gunfight or any other high stress situation: (1) Pulse and Breathing - As in any excitable situation, these two physiological aspects will always be effected. For example, your pulse speeds up, pumping more blood to your heart, which in turn, causes your breathing to increase, and possibly becoming shallow. Now couple this with wearing a Blaclava, constraining body armor, and extra gear. Now add that you are trying to pick-up your front sight on target rapidly, while the conditions that you are in are smoke filled, dark, with loud noises. You can see right away that you have a problem. (2) Adrenaline - understanding what we have just discussed, now throw in adrenaline. Adrenaline is nothing more than a hormone that stimulates involuntary nerve action. Depending on the amount of stress placed upon your body will depend on the amount of adrenaline released into the system. Adrenaline, as we know, can do some tremendous things to an individual, but how does this relate to shooting? Once again, in an excitable situation, adrenaline is released into the body, stimulating muscles (causing them to tighten) and depending on the individual and the situation, this is more than adequate to destroy an individuals lockup. Knowing all of this, add one more physiological factor, Coordination and Reflexes. Under stress, hand and eye coordination degrade severely (especially those of the fingers and hands). 2. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS. Under severe stress, the normal mental processes become extremely difficult and the mind resorts to its most basic processes. We will discuss why this is important later. The following are examples of psychological effects you may experience during a gunfight or any other high stress situation. a. Tunnel Vision - Under extreme stress, your attention will primarily be focused on the greatest source of danger. You may not actually be aware of the events taking place directly to your sides. People
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who have been through this experience relate this as looking directly through a tunnel, an actual pin like focus. b. Auditory Exclusion - As in tunnel vision where an individuals sight is focused on the greatest source of danger, so too may the shooter's ability to hear only certain sounds. Therefore the shooter may not hear actual commands being shouted directly at him. c. Mental Track - In most high stress situations, to include a life and death situation, a persons ability to keep track of things that are taking place around him become almost impossible. The classic metaphor is that the law enforcement officer, while being debriefed after the fact is asked, "How many rounds did you fire"? In most police cases, the individual does not remember. A case in point is reloading during a gunfight. Even in training, you are not going to be able to keep track of how many rounds that you have fired. Therefore, when you think that it is time to reload, "RELOAD", or if the situation permits, find cover and press check your weapon, and ensure that you are fully loaded. d. Time-Space Distortion (Tachy Psyche Effect) - Many times in high stress situations you will not be able to accurately judge speed and distance, and accurately balance the two. Also, you may experience a slowing down of time. In other words, everybody and everything will seem to move in slow motion. Believe it or not, you may even seem to move in slow motion. Now that you have a basic idea of the psychological and physiological changes that take place on the human body during a high stress situation, let’s put what we have learned into perspective. 3. TRAINING. We now know that during periods of high stress, certain mental and physical changes take place; therefore, your training is going to take over for you the majority of the time. So if training is going to take over during these periods, our training must reflect certain conditioned responses. a. If you train to perform task that require complicated and intricate maneuvers with your weapons system, it stands to reason that these maneuvers stand a good chance of failing during stress. On the same note, if you use tactics that require numerous verbal commands or complicated movements, the possibility of failure increases. b. It stands to reason that your training must be simple but sound and effective. Authorities in the field agree that these effects will take place in nearly everyone, despite how well the individual has prepared himself beforehand. Once again, good, sound training and the beforehand knowledge that physiological and psychological changes will take place can minimize their effect. SUMMARY: During this period of instruction we have covered the psychological and physiological effects on the human body during high stress situations. Remember, with a good understanding of these effects and the proper physical and mental training, you can minimize them and continue to solve the problem.
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RAPID PLANNING 1. INTRODUCTION: How long do you normally have to develop a detailed, solid patrol order? How fast can you generate one? How much information do you need to write that detailed, solid patrol order? As a member of the detachment, when activated, you will be required to develop a solid, detailed assault order in a very compressed amount of time, with little to no information available. In the conventional sense, failure is unacceptable, but it does happen. In the arena that you are stepping into, failure CANNOT happen, the word does not exist. So even though you have little time and information, the plan that you develop must lead to mission accomplishment. 2. Overview. This section is designed to introduce you to Rapid Planning Techniques. BODY 1. General. Rapid Planning is a process of planning for a mission in a compressed amount of time, with potentially little information available. It is the responsibility of all members of the detachment to be able to perform with little to no supervision in order for Rapid Planning to be successful. 2. Receive Alert Order. When an incident occurs that requires the detachment's involvement, JCS will task and prepare the detachment via means of an Alert Order. Upon receiving the Alert Order, the detachment will arrange to determine a course and close the distance to the target area. The detachment commander will call for the Battle Staff to assemble for whatever mission, ie, "Assemble the Battle Staff for IHR". The personnel from the detachment that will attend should be the Mission Commander and the Strike Force Commander. When the Battle Staff is called, the troops should immediately prepare their individual and organizational equipment for the impending mission, this will be discussed more in detail later during this period. When the Battle Staff is assembled, an Initial Staff Orientation is conducted and Commanders Guidance is given. a. Initial Staff Orientation. Orients the Battle Staff of the current situation, both on the intelligence and operational side. It also verifies for the detachment the current status of all elements who will be directly involved in conducting the mission, as well as other support personnel. The following is an example of the Initial Staff Orientation: (1) Conduct Roll Call (2) Conduct Staff Orientation (a) Operational Orientation/Situation (b) Intelligence Briefing (c) Mission Statement/Analysis (d) Maritime Status
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(e) Air Status (f) Comm Status (g) Logistical Status (h) Strike Force Status (i) Attachment Status (j) Rules of Engagement (k) Determine additional intelligence requirements (l) Produce RFI's in priority b. Commanders Guidance. This portion should orient the leaders of how they can best accomplish tasks. It should also focus your efforts, i.e., what infiltration assets are available, what not to use, what to specifically accomplish first, etc. Gain as mush information as possible prior to departing the detachment area. Commanders Guidance may include the following: (1) Mission Re-Statement, if necessary. (2) Specified and Implied tasks. (3) Assumptions/Previous Decisions/Restrictions. (4) Higher Command imposed restrictions. (5) Assessment of enemy strengths and weaknesses. (6) RFI Guidance. (7) Course of Action Guidance. (8) Phasing Instructions. (9) Alternate/Contingency Plans. (10) Sets timelines for briefs and Actions. c. Once Commanders Guidance has been given, the Strike Force Commander, along with his element leaders should coordinate and establish times, place, and points of contact for coordination meetings with higher, adjacent, and supporting units. A Standard Support Requirement List is submitted to higher Headquarters asking the following:
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(1) Isolation Area. (2) Rehearsal Area. (3) Time and place for receipt of ammunition and demolitions. (4) Time and place for receipt of special equipment. (5) Time and place for test firing of weapons. (6) Intelligence update on enemy, turn in RFI's, and focus on enemy capabilities vice suspected intentions. (7) CEOI/Code Words/No Comm Plan with HHQ's and supporting units. (8) Escape and Evasion Plan. (9) Fire Support assets available. (10) Attachments: Who/Why/When Effective. (11) Attempt to coordinate for Leaders Recon of the Objective, (if feasible, seldom is), gain photos, blueprints, sketches, etc, of the objective area and Crisis Site. d. When the Battle Staff is called, the troops immediately prepare their individual and organizational equipment. Shooters should dress out in their flightsuits. The equipment that the individual shooter will take on the mission is laid out in stick order, ie, Vest, gunbelts, weapons, hoods, helmet, hooligans, sledge hammers, chemlights, batteries, radios, etc. Once all the equipment is laid out, team leaders conduct inspections. 3. Warning Order. As you will learn, one of the keys to success in Rapid Planning is to have solid SOP's. You, as an element, should already have a generic warning order already prepared. Even though you do not have a situation and mission, you can prepare the General Instructions Paragraph based on SOP's. For instance, for an IHR, it would be a safe bet that for the Emergency Assault, your insertion platform is going to be air via Fast Rope, therefore you may want to set-up the general organization in stick order. Additionally, you already have an idea of what must be accomplished on the objective, as well as how to evacuate. From SOP's, you should break down into two to three elements that can work independent of one another. Each of these elements has a Breacher, Assistant Breacher, a shooter carry a hooligan, sledge hammer, bolt cutter, shotgun, suppressers, etc. The Troop Commander and Troop Sergeant should be split between elements. Special equipment is already assigned to shooters, such as the breaching tools, poleless litters, Radios, etc. All operators are already assigned a basic combat load. a. Key Personnel. Operators within the troops are assigned critical task, according to SOP's, and as outlined in the generic Warning Order:
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(1) The Troop Commander, Sergeant, and Tactical Wizard concentrate on Actions on the Objective in paragraph 3 of the order. (2) Team Leaders may be assigned to fill in Paragraphs 1, and 2 of the order. (3) The medic might be tasked with filling paragraph 4 of the order. (4) The troop communicator may be tasked with filling in paragraph 5 of the order. (5) A operator is assigned as the navigator and may be tasked with developing, or coordinating with the Air Control, on the routes, Load Plans, and Bump Plans. (6) A operator is may be tasked with developing the Escape and Evasion Plan. (7) A operator is assigned as the troop intelligence representative, and maintains continuous coordination with the detachment's S-2 and relays pertinent information to the leaders and individual operators. (8) Other operators are tasked with other duties, such as issuing radios, chemlights, breach tools, batteries, ammunition and flash bangs, etc. 4. 6-Hour String. The need for Rapid Planning is based on the requirement that the detachment must be able to respond, begin the execution phase of the Emergency Assault, within 6-Hours of being Alerted. The 6-Hour String does not mean that if at the 1 hour and 30 minute mark the Tangos start to execute Hotels, that you cannot be launched. The 6-Hour String is simply a realistic guideline that can be followed and still allows to be mission capable. 5. Course of Action. Each COA should be detailed enough so that the commander can "SEE" how the mission will be accomplished, but not so detailed that he is bogged down in each individual emplacement, exact routes, etc. Normally the commander will require the Strike Force to submit three different and distinct COA's. This allows the commander to select the one COA that he feels is the best, most likely to succeed COA. However, dependent on the mission, situation, assets available, and information, you may only be able to give one COA, better know as a Concept of Operations Brief. When planning the COA, as well as the follow on Emergency Assault and Deliberate Assault, the planning cell should consist of the Strike Force Commander, Element Commanders and their tactical wizards, the Air Controller, S-2, S-3, and key support leaders. These personnel in the planning cell only worry about their piece of the pie. Include the following in the Course of Action Brief: a. Concept of Operation: (1) Scheme of Maneuver. (2) Fire Support Concept.
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(3) Actions at the Objective. (4) Movement; Infiltration/Exfiltration. b. Task Organization: (1) Mission Commander. (2) Functional Groupings (leaders, Core Units, Size of Unit). (3) Reserve Force, if any. c. Contingency Plan. d. Deception Plan. e. Table of Equipment, (variations from standard equipment). f. Timing, (schedule of events). g. Advantages/Disadvantages. Once a Course of Action is selected, it then becomes the mission. Detailed planning begins immediately upon selection of a course of Action. 6. Emergency Assault Planning. Once a COA has been selected, The Troop breaks down into its planning cells and conducts Emergency Assault Planning. During planning, individual operators must leave the planners alone long enough for them to complete their planning; a planning cell that is continuously interrupted will get little done. The personnel that have been delegated task, such as the operators developing the E&E Plan, route, load and bump plans, receive guidance from the commander, complete the plan, and then present it back to the commander for his approval. Likewise, coordination with Air Controller and other support must be made to ensure the feasibility of the plan. a. Emergency Assault Order. Once the Emergency Assault Order has been completed, it is issued to the whole Strike Force, anyone who will be on the ground must be present during the order. Likewise, everyone attending should have note taking material, and maps should be distributed. b. Rehearsals. Once the order has been issued, rehearsals are conducted. The Strike Force should rehearse the Load Plans, Bump Plan, Actions on the Objective, Withdrawal and MACO, and Contingencies. It is not uncommon, especially for certain leaders who are tying up loose ends, to miss rehearsals. This is unacceptable. Anyone who will be on the ground must participate in rehearsals. c. Inspections. Once rehearsals have been completed, inspections are conducted. During inspections, leaders should conduct a brief back with individual shooters. Ensure that all shooters have the appropriate equipment, as well as being sterile, ie, no E&E Plan on their body.
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7. Deliberate Assault Planning. Once the Emergency Assault Order, Rehearsals, and Inspections have been completed, the Strike Force will begin Deliberate Assault Planning. Again, the commander may require three COA's to be submitted for the Deliberate Assault. The Deliberate Assault COA may be variations of the Emergency Assault. a. The difference between the Emergency Assault and the Deliberate Assault is: (1) That you should attempt a soft approach using stealth when planning for the Deliberate Assault. (2) More detailed planning is conducted because you are now afforded time, which means a better, more solid plan. (3) More intelligence is gained because R&S has probably inserted and National Assets have had time to react. b. Once a COA has been selected for the Deliberate Assault, planning is conducted in the same manner as with the Emergency Assault. Once the Deliberate Assault Order has been completed, it is issued; rehearsals are conducted, followed by inspections. 8. Confirmation Brief. a. The Confirmation Brief is conducted once all rehearsals for the Deliberate Assault have been completed, the plan has been finalized, and time allows. The Confirmation Brief is the commander’s tool to verify for himself that the plan is solid and everyone has thorough knowledge of all aspects of the plan. b. The Confirmation Brief is normally done for both the Emergency Assault and for the Deliberate Assault plan. c. The Confirmation Brief is exactly that, a confirmation of the plan. The Strike Force Commander chairs the brief. Element Commanders brief their respective missions. This is not an order. As an element leader briefs his portion of the brief, he is asking questions from members of his element, ie, "Sgt Smith, what is the visual signal to move to the link-up point". SUMMARY. There is much more to Rapid Planning then what we have discussed during this period of instruction. You will find, that when involved in Rapid Planning, stress on those involved is magnified, because of the pressure. Probably the only thing that will alleviate the stress is to have written in stone SOP's. This cannot be overstated. The potential missions that you are going to be exposed to can be extremely fast paced. Just remember, when the National Command Authority say's to execute, we go now, regardless of where we are in planning.
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ASSAULT ORDER I. SITUATION: a. WEATHER: BMNT SR SS H- LH- LWINDS
EENT
MR
MS
ILL% PRES% H- LH- L-
LAND/WATER CONDITION
TEMP
VISIBILITY
b. TERRORIST: TOTAL NUMBER NAME CLOTHES WPNS HAIR EYES WT HT COMP LANG (1) ORGANIZATION: (2) ANALYSIS OF THREAT: (3) WEAPONS SYSTEMS: (4) EXPLOSIVES CAPABILITIES: (5) CAPABILITIES/LIMITATIONS: (6) REACTION FORCE (TIME TO REACT): (7) COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES: (8) LOCATION OF SENTRIES: (c) HOSTAGES: NAME HAIR EYES HT WT COMP MEDICAL CLOTHES LANG LAST SPOTTED LOCATION OCCUPATION ISO PREP NAME HAIR EYES HT WT COMP MEDICAL CLOTHES LANG LAST SPOTTED LOCATION OCCUPATION ISO PREP NAME HAIR EYES HT WT COMP MEDICAL CLOTHES LANG LAST SPOTTED LOCATION OCCUPATION ISO PREP NAME HAIR EYES HT WT COMP MEDICAL CLOTHES LANG LAST SPOTTED LOCATION OCCUPATION ISO PREP NAME HAIR EYES HT WT COMP MEDICAL CLOTHES LANG LAST SPOTTED LOCATION OCCUPATION ISO PREP NAME HAIR EYES HT WT COMP MEDICAL CLOTHES LANG LAST SPOTTED LOCATION OCCUPATION ISO PREP
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H- L-
NAME HAIR EYES HT WT COMP MEDICAL CLOTHES LANG LAST SPOTTED LOCATION OCCUPATION ISO PREP NAME HAIR EYES HT WT COMP MEDICAL CLOTHES LANG LAST SPOTTED LOCATION OCCUPATION ISO PREP d. CRISIS SITE: (1) (2) (3) (4)
LOCATION: DESCRIPTION: NORMAL FUNCTION: OUTER PERIMETER DESCRIPTION: (LIGHTS, CCTV, FENCES, TERRAIN, GUARD SHACKS, ETC.) (5) PHONES/LOCATIONS: (6) POWER ON/OFF/HOW/WHERE: e. FRIENDLY FORCES: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MISSION OF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: MISSION OF ADJACENT UNITS: MISSION OF AIR UNITS: MISSION OF UNITS PROVIDING FIRE SUPPORT: MISSION OF HOST COUNTRY FORCES: (DOS, MILITARY, POLICE): (6) HOSTAGES RELEASED: II. MISSION: III. EXECUTION: a. COMMANDERS INTENT: b. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: c. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: (1) TIME SCHEDULE: WHO WHAT
WHEN
WHERE
(2) MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES AND ORDER OF MOVEMENT: (3) ROUTES: AZIMUTH/STREET
DISTANCE
TIME
CP
(4) LOAD PLAN: (5) BUMP PLAN:
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RP
REMARKS
(6) GO/NO GO PLAN: (7) ACTIONS AT INSERTION: (8) RALLY POINTS AND ACTIONS AT RALLY POINTS: (9) ACTIONS AT DANGER AREAS: (10) ACTIONS AT HALTS: (11) LINK UP W/FRIENDLY FORCES PLAN: (12) LOCATION OF & ACTIONS AT ORP: (13) FIRE SUPPORT PLAN: (14) COMPROMISE PLAN/AUTHORITY: (15) ACTIONS AT LCC: (16) ACTIONS AT FCL/BREACH POINT: (17) DIVERSION PLAN: (18) SNIPER ENGAGEMENT PLAN: (19) GAS PLAN: (20) HOSTAGE HANDLING PLAN: (21) TERRORIST HANDLING PLAN: (22) HOSTAGE HOLDING AREA PLAN: (23) SECURITY PLAN: (a) INNER/OUTER PERIMETER: (b) BLOCKING POSITIONS: (c) BODY BUNKER/CORRIDOR: (24) INTEL COLLECTION PLAN: (25) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: (READ DIRECTLY OFF OF ORDER) (26) STATUS REPORT: (27) EVACUATION PLAN: (28) ACCOUNTABILITY PLAN: (29) WITHDRAWAL PLAN: (30) E & E PLAN: TIMEFRAME LOCATION DISTANCE AZIMUTH DESCRIPTION SIGNAL (31) DEBRIEF: (32) INSPECTIONS & REHEARSALS: (33) ANNEX'S: (AIR/BOAT/VEHICLE) IV. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: a. RATIONS AND WATER: (IF CHANGED FROM W.O.) b. ARMS AND AMMUNITION: (IF CHANGED FROM W.O.) c. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT: (IF CHANGED FROM W.O.) d. METHOD OF HANDLING WOUNDED AND DEAD:
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V. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: a. FREQUENCIES AND CALL SIGNS: DAY NET FREQ TIME CHANGE USING UNITS CALL SIGN COVER b. PYROTECHNICS AND CHEMLIGHTS: TYPE COLOR MEANING TYPE COLOR MEANING c. NO COMM PLAN: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: WITH AIR UNITS: WITH ADJACENT UNITS: WITH SUB-ELEMENTS: OTHER:
d. CHALLENGE AND PASSWORDS: DAY CHALLENGE REPLY ALTERNATE e. CODE WORDS: CODEWORD MEANING
CODEWORD
f. CHAIN OF COMMAND: (1) HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: (2) MISSION COMMANDER: (3) RAID FORCE COMMANDER: (4) ASSAULT ELEMENT COMMANDER: (5) SECURITY ELEMENT COMMANDER: (6) HEAVY MACHINE GUN COMMANDER: (7) ALTERNATE COMMANDERS: g. LOCATION OF LEADERS: (1) HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: (2) MISSION COMMANDER: (3) RAID FORCE COMMANDER: (4) ASSAULT ELEMENT COMMANDER:
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RUNNING
MEANING
(5) SECURITY ELEMENT COMMANDER: (6) HEAVY MACHINE GUN COMMANDER: (7) ALTERNATE COMMANDERS:
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MARITIME OPERATIONS 1. INTRODUCTION: A Maritime Assault is nothing more than a Strong Hold Assault, except afloat. The one exception that unlike most strong holds, most Maritime Assaults will be against substantial targets. Vessels, even small ones, have numerous places to hide. Everyone's heard the statement "the better prepared that you are increases your chance of success". When tasked with a Maritime Assault, this statement is more important than normal. 2. OVERVIEW: This section is designed to introduce you to Maritime Operations. MARITIME OPERATION NOTES OF CONCERN Maritime operations have many different problems and environments then land operations. These difference most be given serious consideration during any planning and for sure during an actual assault. For starters, explosive breaching may not be a good option for many good reasons. The biggest one is the personnel risk from overpressure and fire hazard. Ships are generally airtight steel boxes filled with various chemicals, many of which are flammables. Ships are unique CQB environments that you don't find anywhere else... standard techniques that you use in a house don't work. The steel box is subdivided both by steel walls (ie. ricochet hazard) and partitions that are more like office cubicles (non watertight barriers that save weight... which provide no cover and marginal concealment). Everything is tighter and smaller. Walls are covered with pipes which might carry water, fuel, or superheated steam at 1200psi. Electrical cabling is everywhere. Breaching requires special gear and LOTS of practice. Doors on a ship range from non-core wood to reinforced steel with 6 or 8 dogs that have to be opened individually with a wrench. Many hatches in decks and ceilings won't fit a man wearing tactical gear. "Stairs" are usually open-backed ladders that are nearly vertical. The list and reasons for concern goes on and on. This is one operation that needs even more intelligence gathering, extensive previous training and very careful planning. BODY 1. SOF MARITIME OPERATIONS. There are three types of Maritime Operations that the SOF concentrates on, which are as follows: a. Reinforcement Operation. A Reinforcement Operation is conducted when there is a known or perceived threat against a ship. A Reinforcement Operation occurs when elements of the detachment are placed aboard the vessel in question with the intent of bolstering that ships defensive posture. An example of a Reinforcement Operation would be that of a U.S. flag ship carrying sensitive materials and is transiting through known hostile waters. b. Maritime Interdiction Operation. A Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) would occur when a ship is attempting to enter restricted waters or is carrying suspicious cargo and/or personnel. The intent of the MIO is to temporarily or permanently gain control of the ship in question through the use of force. In conducting a MIO, an actual assault will occur, although expect very strict Rules of Engagement. Although there may not be, always assume that you will encounter hostile personnel on the ship in question, and that they are potentially armed. Expect little to no compliance on the part of the ships crew. Do not become complacent in conducting a MIO, as the situation could turn volatile rapidly. An example of a
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MIO is when ships were trying to run the United Nations emplaced blockade on Iraq during Operation Desert Shield. c. Recover Operation. A Recovery Operation occurs when hostile forces have taken control of a ship. There may or may not be hostages present. The intent of the Recovery Operation is to regain control of the ship in questions through the use of force. Normal Rules of Engagement should apply. An example of a recovery Operation would be the taking of the cruise ship Achellie Laural. 2. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS: a. Intelligence Requirements. The following is a list of some intelligence that you would prefer to have prior to assaulting any vessel. Keep in mind; you may not have all of the answers when it is time to execute. (1) General Information: (a) Blueprint, photograph, type, and/or the name of the ship. (b) Size and draft of the ship. (c) Location of key spaces: Bridge Radio Room Engine Operating Station Aft Steering Halon Room Masters Cabin Armory/Magazine (d) Location of access points to key spaces/superstructure. (e) Ships maximum underway speed. (f) Ships freeboard. (g) Radar type and capability. (h) Ships navigational light pattern. (i) Type of cargo. (j) Ships main deck lighting, (dark/blind spots). (k) Location/type/description of ships emergency shut-down system.
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(l) Location/type/capability of water cannons and cranes. (2) Crew Information: (a) Size. (b) Nationality. (c) Languages. (d) Crew Schedule. (e) Uniform. (f) Description. (3) Self Defense Force: (a) All information that is in 2 above. (b) Weapons. (c) Level of training. (4) Helicopter Insertion Points: (a) Location of Landing Points. (b) Height of obstructions. (c) Routes to key spaces. (5) Surface Boarding Points: (a) Location of Climbing Points. (b) Low freeboard hatches. (Aft Refueling station, stern gate hatches). (c) Location and type of anchor chain. (d) Dimensions of Hawespipe and Anchor Chain. (6) Miscellaneous Information: (a) Ships current track and speed.
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(b) Type and location of hold accesses. (c) Hazardous cargo and special handling. (7) Weather and Light Data: (a) Winds. (b) Current. (c) Sea State. (d) Water and Air Temperature. (e) Illumination. (f) Visibility. (8) Breaching Information: (a) Type/composition of exterior hatches. (b) Type/composition of interior superstructure hatches. (c) Type/composition of interior below main deck hatches. (d) Locking mechanism/hinges of all. (e) What is the combustible threat? 3. THE FIVE KEY SPACES: a. In any assault on a ship, you must first control the ships function as soon as possible. In order to do that, there are five key spaces that must be controlled. Once these five key spaces are controlled, the ship is considered seized, but not yet secured. The five key spaces are: (1) Bridge. The bridge is the brains of the ship. This is where the ships command and most control is at. (2) Radio Room. The radio room is, of course, the mouth of the ship. The radio room is a key space because you want to prevent the ship from communicating to the world as to what you are doing. The major reason is to prevent a call for reinforcements.
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(3) Engine Operating Space. The engine room is the heart of the ship. It is where the ship is powered from. the intent is to not only gain control of the EOS, but to protect the engines from possible sabotage. (4) Aft Steering. Aft steering is only important if the ship is underway. It is a key space in that it serves as a secondary steering point for the ship. (5) Halon Room. Most new ships are outfitted with a halon fire fighting system, which removes oxygen from the air by overloading CO2. The halon system will only be effective in the holds/fuel cells, engine spaces, and other below main deck areas. As you can see, this area is important to control to prevent an adversary from harming the Strike Force. (6) There are other spaces that are of important, and should be controlled as soon as possible, if not at the same time as the five key spaces, then soon after. They are: (a) Masters Cabin. This cabin is only of importance on effort to control the ships master and to retrieve documentation not present on the bridge. (b) Ships Armory/Magazine. Self explanatory. On most ships, the armory/magazine will be located in the Masters Cabin. b. Once the ship has been seized, your next step is to secure the ship. This is done by conducting a through, detailed search of the entire ship. Securing the ship can be lengthy and time consuming. Additional forces may have to be brought aboard in order to assist the Strike Force with this task. 4. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS: The type of mission that you receive, MIO or Recovery, may dictate how you go about accomplishing that specific mission. One major difference is that for a MIO, the ship in questioned has probably already been warned; therefore they know that you are coming. Also, there probably will be no armed resistance. Because of these two facts, you will probably conduct a MIO during daylight, (a good time would be just as day is breaking). Yes, they can see you coming, but again, they are already expecting you to come. At least now, you can see them too. A Recovery Mission is a different mindset. Now you are going against armed personnel, who may be holding the ships crew as hostage. Therefore, we want to apply speed, surprise, and violence of action. For the recovery, we would probably want to hit it during darkness with no warning. Regardless of which type of mission that you receive, the following planning considerations support either operation: a. Task Organization: The entire strike force to include designated marksmen from the sniper element should be utilized when conducting Maritime Operations and should be broken down as follows: (1) Bridge Team: Composed of Direct Action Troops members and augmented by Trailers and a two to four man team. Responsible for Seizing the Bridge and Radio Room, as well as to provide cover fire on the main deck by designated operators. (2) Engine Room Team: Composed of Direct Action Troop members and augmented by Trailers. Responsible for seizing the Engine Spaces, Aft Steering, and the Halon Room.
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(3) Main Deck Team: Composed of Security Element. Responsible for clearing the main deck and securing exterior superstructure and main deck hatches. (4) Headquarters Team: Composed of Strike Force Commander, Radio Operators, Medic, Counter Intelligence, and Translators, as well as new boat crew (if necessary). Normally this team follows in trace of the bridge team and occupies the bridge once it has been cleared. (5) Covering Team: Composed of one or two UH-1's with a designated sniper and spotter in each helicopter. The sniper should be armed with an acceptable rifle w/scope or night optics. b. Insertion Options: (1) Helicopter Assault: (a) Plan for a diversion. A diversion will draw the attention of the adversaries away from your intended direction of approach. An example of a good diversion would be to utilize a aircraft firing across the ships bow, or to buzz the ship. (b) Plan for a covered approach. A covered approach is utilizing an airborne asset to provide covering fire for the assault force as the helicopters are inbound. An example of a covered approach is by utilizing designated marksmen or snipers positioned inside of UH-1's. The UH-1's will assume a hover to provide this fire support. When utilizing this type of fire support, ensure that landing FAST Rope points are restricted fire areas. Other helicopters should not be used to provide any type of fire support on the ship in that it would cause potential heavy collateral damage as well as a potential danger to the assault force. (c) Establish intervals between all air assets. (d) Plan to utilize as many landing/FAST Rope points as possible. (e) If a helicopter is primarily planning on landing, ensure FAST Ropes are still rigged in aircraft in case landing point is fouled. Look at using both the hell hole as well as the ramp when FAST Roping. (f) Try to land high so as to assume tactical advantage. (g) Utilize drop points as close to entry points as possible. (h) Analysis obstructions to determine length of FAST Rope that is required. Regardless, a good SOP is to always utilize 90 foot FAST Ropes. (i) Plan on jettisoning FAST Rope onto ships deck and utilizing it as a means of Emergency Extraction.
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(j) If assaulting during darkness, assess ships exterior lighting capability as it may have an effect on helicopter crews flying with NVG's. (k) If race tracks are to be conducted prior to egress, determine atmospheric conditions to ensure that helicopters are positioned as far enough away so as not to lose the element of surprise. (2) Surface Assault. Normally used for a Recovery Mission. Normally conducted on ships that are at anchor. (a) Use a surreptitious approach. Continue to use stealth until it is essential to go dynamic. (b) Analyze ships freeboard and climbing points to determine climbing capability. (c) Use multiple climbing poles/ladders if feasible. (d) Determine ships lighting capability and sky illumination for surface approach. In other words, do not plan the approach in a lit up area of the water. (e) Determine water current, sea conditions, and water and air temperature so as not to overload swimmers. (f) Determine shooters load for climbing purposes. Consider hoisting up heavy loads separately, ie, radios, medical kit. (g) It is preferable to approach from aft of the ship. Normally, climbing points are more approachable on the ships stern. Also, observation by the enemy is usually less likely from the stern. (h) Approach from the rear of the ship. Most ocean going vessels have sophisticated radar's that will pick up a single 360°. However, most ships will be blind, to a degree, to their direct rear and on the surface. (i) Consider using a intermediate support platform, such as a Zodiac, that can maneuver your force from support vessel closer to the target vessel.
(3) Combined Surface and Helicopter Assault: (a) This is a coordinated assault. The preferred method is to have the Direct Action Troop board the ship via surface using stealth. The Security Troop will be aboard helicopters positioned just out of hearing range of the ship. Once the Direct Action Troop initiates a dynamic assault, the Security Troop should be making its approach. c. Clearing Tactics:
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(1) Bridge Team. Normally, the bridge team lands first and immediately moves to and assaults the bridge as a whole. As the Bridge Team is clearing the bridge, the 2 or 4 designated operators should take up positions on the bridge wings and provide coverage of the Main Deck area. Once the bridge has been seized, trailers are left to maintain control while the remainder of the bridge team moves to the radio room. Because of the need to swiftly seize control of the four key spaces, you will not clear spaces between the bridge and the radio room. Instead, we will use speed as our security. The point will still flow down passageways and clear hallways as you have already been taught. The lead shooter in the stack will stop and hold security on a door until the whole stack has blown passed it, the shooter holding security will then be called back to rejoin the stack. Shooter will not commit to doors unless absolutely necessary. Once the stack arrives at the radio room, it is cleared, seized, and then barricaded. The radio room will then call up to the bridge announcing that the radio room has been seized. (2) Engine Room Team. The Engine Room Team will immediately move to the EOS in a similar manner as the bridge team. All doors will be by-passed unless absolutely necessary to assault. The Engine Room team will seize the Engine spaces, the Aft Steering, and the halon room. The team will move as one until they reach the first space. Once that space has been seized, security will be left in place to hold it, and the remainder of the team will move to the next key space. Again, once seized, security will be left in place to hold, while the remainder of the team moves to and seizes the last space. Once the individual space has been seized, that specific space will call up to the bridge and give a status report. (3) Main Deck Team. Will immediately clear the main deck area, starting from either the bow or stern, depending upon insertion point. The main deck should be cleared on line, using phase lines if possible. An example of phase lines for the main deck would be at the cranes, or catwalks that run from port to starboard. It is absolutely critical that the team members remain on line when clearing. Additionally, use designated marksmen that are positioned on the bridge wings. They can radio to you and direct you on phase lines, where living individuals are, and what obstacles or hidden danger areas that you are approaching. The team members should secure all hatches that they come upon, regardless of whether they go into the superstructure or into a hold. This way, we trap all the rats inside, where we can start to weed them out later. The main deck team, upon landing on the ship, should detach a single element of about 4 to 6 shooters to move to and secure all hatches exiting out of the superstructure, to include all levels above main deck. Flex-cuffs, welding rods, 550 cord work well to secure hatches. (4) Headquarters Team. Occupies the bridge once it has been seized. (5) Follow-On Forces. Depending upon the mission statement, follow-on forces may be required to either bolster the Strike Forces defenses, to relieve the Strike Force in place, or to assist in the securing phase of a maritime assault. SOP's must be developed for the employment of follow-on forces. Areas that need to be covered are as follows: (a) Turn-over procedures, if applicable. (b) Insertion points and guides at insertion points. (c) Clearing sequence. You should begin the securing phase in a logical sequence. Post security high on the exterior of the superstructure and on the main deck. All superstructure and main deck hatches
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should be secured by this time; therefore, anyone who has not been detained will be trapped below the main deck or in the superstructure. The key spaces have already been seized, are occupied, and barricaded. The securing phase of clearing should start from the interior top of the superstructure and work down to the main deck level. The Main Deck is thoroughly searched a second time, if necessary, (such as cargo containers positioned on the main deck.). Once the superstructure and main deck have been cleared, the forces reconsolidate and begin clearing the hull of the ship, fore to aft, deck by deck, until the entire ship has been secured. Any hatches, ladderwells, and escape trunks that lead below the deck that is being cleared should have security posted on the position, until the forces has cleared down to that deck and challenges are exchanged. DO NOT ALLOW A SECURITY LAPSE, where adversaries can come in behind your force. As hatches are cleared from below, that higher security position is relieved. Once the securing phase has been completed, U.S. naval or Coast Guard forces may begin any inspection or take over of the ship. (d) Do's and Don'ts on the ship. (6) Contingency Forces. Plan for a Sparrow Hawk and Bald Eagle, should the need arise. Ensure that you have established SOP's for the introduction of these forces. d. Fire Support Plan. Only designated marksmen and snipers should be used. As a last resort, for contingencies, automatic weapons on helicopters such as UH-1's should be used. Avoid using weapons above 7.62mm, as this could cause danger to shooters and heavy collateral damage. Landing/FAST Rope points should be listed as Restricted Fire Areas, (RFA's). Cranes and prominent structures may be used as Target Reference Points, (TRP's). The Fire Support Plan must ensure that fire is not directed into areas where shooters may be occupying. Ensure solid coordination is made and strong control is maintained between Air units, FAC, and ground maneuver forces. Ensure that air crews are briefed not to engage targets of opportunity, unless if absolutely necessary, because they could inadvertently be engaging friendly forces. e. Handling Living Individuals. Living individuals should be moved to a H.H.A. Depending upon the size of the ship and crew/passengers, this could poise a problem, in that you may not have enough personnel in the individual elements to safely move living individuals to the holding area and to control the spaces that you occupy. Depending upon these variables, you may have to contain living individuals in the space that you are occupying until either follow-on forces arrive to bolster your presence or until evacuation. Individuals that are encountered enroute to the key spaces must be flex cuffed and left in place or escorted with that element as they are moving to the spaces. Especially for MIO's, do not let living individuals interfere with your mission and do not lose control. Some countries book passage on their main deck for passengers or the crew may have their families on board. These people, as demonstrated on the MIO's during the Gulf War, can get very emotional. Non-lethel force must be considered, such as batons, pepper spray, etc, ROE's will dictate what you can and cannot do. Avoid allowing living individuals to slow your dynamics from quickly getting to the key spaces. f. H.H.A./Detainee Holding Area: The H.H.A. is just as you have already been taught. However, since you may have a large amount of living individuals to deal with, and most ships do not have large rooms, the H.H.A. may be on the outside of the ship. It may also be easier to control and locate exterior. The following are requirements when choosing a shipboard H.H.A.:
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(1) Easily secured. (2) Easy to locate by all members of the Strike Force. (3) Easy to control. (4) Should be marked. (5) Close proximity to the extraction point. g. Withdrawal, MACO, and Extraction: (1) Withdrawal. Withdrawal, each element leader must ensure that he knows where members of his element are, in that they may be separated while holding security. During withdrawal, each element should begin with the forward most team, pulling them back under coverage until the element is complete. Once the individual element is complete and has accountability, they should move to the assembly point, leap frogging their rear security. The assembly point should be located in close proximity to the extraction point. Ensure that 360 degree security is continuously maintained. (2) MACO. MACO is probably more important while during maritime operations then anywhere else. Because security may be spread out, coupled with potential communications problems, shooters can easily be left. (3) Extraction. At a minimum, always have some method of an immediate withdrawal platform available, from the time that the first shooters foot touches the deck, up until the planned extraction is called for. A good SOP is to have a LCU or RIB's station off of the stern of the ship. This can be the Emergency Evacuation platform, and/or the primary extraction platform.
h. Admin and Logistics: (1) Water. Hydrate prior to the assault. Bring plenty of water, whether you feel that you need to or not. You could end up on the ship, holding the engine room for hours, where temperatures are over 100 degrees. (2) Uniform and Equipment. If you are gaining access on the ship through climbing, you need to modify your equipment load. The load basically cuts down on the weight of the normal assault vest. If you as a shooter are swimming in, consider having Security FAST Rope all of the breaching tools. If you as a shooter are coming in by boat, consider climbing some, if not all of the tools. Even if you are FAST Roping on the ship, the same load is recommended:
QTY NOMENCLATURE 1 Assault Suit 1PR Booties/lightweight boots
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1 Helmet, protec 1 Hood, Nomex 1PR Gloves, Assault 1PR Gloves, FAST Rope (If applicable) 1 Vest, Ballistic, Wrap Around 1 Gun Belt 1 Holster w/dummy cord 1 Pouch, Magazine, pistol 1 Pouch, Magazine, Leg, MP5 1 Knife w/Day/Night Flare 1 Strobe Light 1 Drop Pouch 1 Canteen or Camel Back 1 Day Pack w/Trauma Kit and Radio 1 Climbing Harness w/Carabineer(If applicable) (3) Medical Plan. An emergency medevac can be difficult do conduct rapidly, especially if the ship has no platform that a bird can land on. Plan for a normal landing, main mount landing, or winching the wounded individual into the helicopter, or have the Zodiac perform as the medevac platform as a last resort. Whichever platform is used, recommend a doctor and medic be located on that platform. Additionally, plan for how you will get an injured individual with traumatic wounds and/or spinal injury from the Engine Room to the extraction point. There are no easy answers. (4) Ammunition, Pyrotechnics, and Breaching: (a) Ships, for the most part, are conducive to ricochets. The preferred ammunition is low velocity. MP5, .45/M9, and shotguns are the preferred weapons system. (b) Whether or not flashbangs can be employed will be dependent on the specific ship. If the ship has a combustible threat, such as a tanker, close consideration must be given in employing flashbangs. A general rule of thumb is that flashbangs are usually safe within the superstructure itself. Because of the metal confines of a ship, you can also expect an increased noise hazard that could affect shooters. If employing flashbangs, expect ships sprinkler system to be activated. (c) CS Agents may or may not be useful for employment on a ship. It could be worth while for a MIO. (d) When breaching aboard ship, besides consideration of a combustible and noise hazard, consideration must also be given to increased over-pressure. Additionally, if you have to go against the skin of the ship, or a zebra type hatch, heavier explosives will have to be used. For this scenario special breaching charges must be designed, and when and where to use them will need careful consideration. If shock tube is used do not cut it, the longer length will be needed for maximum stand off when dealing with the over-pressure. Have breachers carry your deigned charges and trailers carrying some heavy steel cutting charges.
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i. Communications: (1) Many handheld radio communications will fail interior of most ships because of all the steel. However, UHF radios such as the PRC 113 appears to work rather well inside of the ships skin. (2) Plan to use the ships internal comm as a back-up to your comm. Normal ships are equipped with redundant internal comm, to include sound powered phones that work well when status reports are given between spaces. SUMMARY: As I am sure that most of you will agree, whenever conducting a Maritime Assault, prepare for the worst. It is essential that you have established SOP's and solid contingency plans
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SOP for CQB Operations in a Potential WMD Environment I. Introduction This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) has been developed in accordance with published guidelines from federal agencies, and state and local emergency responder communities. It is a tool to assist commanders in the field in assessing options during the first two hours of an incident involving a potential Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) or Hazardous Material (HAZMAT). It is intended to augment existing response policies and not supersede local protocols. This SOP is general in nature and not intended to be a technical guide for emergency responders. The SOP has dual applicability in law enforcement and public safety communities. It is hoped that the principles and techniques shown here will be considered as appropriate for a standard “all hazards incident response”. Disclaimer Extensive and reasonable care has been exercised in the preparation of this document. Biological/chemical information, references and authorities were used to document the applicability of the information contained herein. This document is designed to function only as a guide to incident commanders and not to be used as a hard and fast set of rules. At the scene of any terrorist incident involving chemical/biological threat agents circumstances vary and are unpredictable. Incidents may require only the most rudimentary application of the suggestions made in this document, but may also require extremely complex intervention procedures that are beyond the scope of this document. II. The Threat (Tactics and Tools) Threat “Tools” or Weapons Firearms - Firearms remain by far the number one weapon of choice of terrorists. A responder to any type of incident needs to remain aware of this fact, and prepared to respond to this type of threat, possibly simultaneously with other, less frequently encountered threats. Explosives Improvised explosive devices range from small letter or pipe bombs, to large truck bombs which are realistically classified as weapons of mass destruction. • Chemical Agents 1 Nerve Agents (e.g., Sarin, Tabun, commercial hornet spray) 2 Blister Agents (e.g., Distilled Mustard, Lewisite) 3 Blood Agents (e.g., Cyanogen Chloride, Hydrogen Cyanide) 4 Choking Agents (e.g., Chlorine, Phosgene) 5 Irritating Agents (e.g., Tear Gas, Pepper Spray) Characteristics of Chemical Agents: 1 Can be found as a solid, liquid or gas 2 Symptoms caused by these agents vary from immediate to hours 3 The less volatile the agent, the more persistent 4 Effects of chemical threat agents are affected in complicated ways by: a) Temperature b) Humidity
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5 6
c) Precipitation d) wind speed e) nature of terrain and buildings Requires a dispersion device typically for aerosol generation Requires weaponization
The five classes of chemical threat agents all may produce death, serious injury, or incapacitation. Each victim may respond slightly differently to an exposure based on that person’s amount of exposure and their individual metabolism. Effects range from deadly to mild. Biological Agents 1 Bacteria (e.g., anthrax, plague) 2 Virus (e.g., smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers) 3 Toxins (e.g., ricin, botulism) Bacteria and Virus types are living organisms. They: 1 2 3
enter the body via inhalation, ingestion, or breaks in skin grow and reproduce can in some cases be contagious and cause an epidemic
Toxins are not living organisms. They: 1. 2.
are not contagious enter the body the same as pathogens (infectious organisms)
Characteristics: More deadly (toxic) by weight than chemicals agents and industrial chemicals Are not absorbed through intact skin Poses a possible inhalation hazard Are invisible to our senses Have a delayed effect ranging from several hours, to days, or weeks Requires a dispersion device typically for aerosol generation Are non-volatile (they don’t evaporate) Bacteria and Virus types are living organisms. They: Toxins are not living organisms. They: Enter the body via inhalation, ingestion, or breaks in skin • are not contagious Grow and reproduce• enter the body the same as pathogens (infectious Can in some cases be contagious and cause an epidemic organisms) Characteristics of Biological Agents: 1 More deadly (toxic) by weight than chemicals agents and industrial chemicals 2 Are not absorbed through intact skin 3 Poses a possible inhalation hazard 4 Are invisible to our senses
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5 6 7
Have a delayed effect ranging from several hours, to days, or weeks Requires a dispersion device typically for aerosol generation Are non-volatile (they don’t evaporate)
•Radiological Materials 1.Types Alpha particles: A positively charged particle made up of two neutrons and two protons, emitted by certain radioactive nuclei. Alpha particles can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, and pose no direct or external radiation threat; however, they can pose a serious health threat, if internalized (inhaled or ingested). Beta particles: An electron or positron emitted by an atomic nucleus during radioactive decay. Beta radiation can be harmful depending upon the dose and time of exposure; it is easily shielded by aluminum or many building materials. Gamma rays: High-energy electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei during a nuclear reaction. Gamma radiation requires thick layers of dense materials, such as lead, for shielding. Potentially lethal to humans, depending on the intensity of the field.. The effects of radiation include skin burns and lesions, and long term impact on the body’s immune system. 2. Characteristics Radioactive source material can be in the form of dust, smoke, or debris. It can be deposited on the surface (the ground, floor, or walls), or it could be suspended in the air. The potentially harmful radiation (Alpha, Beta, or Gamma) produced by the source material is invisible, odorless, tasteless. All three types of radiation are emitted by radioactive nuclei, and are hazardous if the source material is inhaled or ingested, or if the source material comes in contact with bare skin. All types of radiation require specialized equipment to detect or identify. Protection from all types of radiation is provided by shielding (placing appropriate materials between the material and the individual), distance (removing the radioactive material from the vicinity of the victim, or vice-versa), and time (radioactive materials naturally decay away over time, although some of materials do so extremely slowly). Decontamination procedures require physical removal of the radioactive source material (washing skin, rinsing surfaces, physical removal of contaminated soil). III. General Considerations and Recommendations For the safety of the responding law enforcement officers, ALWAYS : 1. Assess constantly, looking for evidence or signs of a WMD or HAZMAT incident [see pages 368369 and Guide Number 111 of the 2000 Emergency Response Guide for details]. Do not enter the scene if there is any indication of the presence of HAZMAT. Avoid physical contact with victims on-scene until it can be determined that they pose no HAZMAT threat. 2. When possible, approach the scene from upwind and uphill. 212
3. 4. 5. 6.
Don't touch any puddles or liquids in the vicinity of the scene. Use available Public Address (PA) systems for on-scene communications whenever feasible. Telephone communication is preferable to radio in the immediate vicinity of a suspected device. It is the responsibility of every responding officer to search the areas they are operating in for secondary devices. Even if it is just initially, perform a quick visual check, to be followed as soon as possible thereafter by a more detailed search . 7. Train to operate initially in one small section (quadrant) of an incident scene or in narrow “safe lanes”. This will limit exposure to a large percentage of any other threats that may be present on the scene. Think of it as if operating initially in a “minefield”. You do not want to go tramping without purpose through an uncharted minefield. 8. Consider the use of responder vehicles in forming barriers to potential threats or to form a “Safe Lane” to approach the core of the scene. Have a medical transport unit standing by on the scene during all operations in the contaminated area. Be thinking about the ability to conduct a “Hasty” or “Gross” Decontamination on victims or responders should it prove necessary. 9. Assure that all on-scene personnel have donned appropriate PPE prior to entering the warm or hot zone. Additionally, BEFORE RESPONDERS ARRIVE AT THE SCENE, commanders should insure first responders use the acronym AWARE (see below). It may be appropriate for Dispatch Personnel to go over this checklist with responders who are enroute to a scene as part of the SOP: (AWARE) Approach scene from upwind/upgrade Wear at least respiratory protection immediately Alert other first responders of potentially dangerous conditions Restrict entry to area Evaluate victims’ signs/symptoms and alert others Remember… the mission is to perform normal responsibilities in an abnormal environment. With proper protection/actions, you can operate in and around a WMD or HAZMAT contaminated environment. Remember that, by becoming a casualty, you become part of the problem, not part of the solution. If you are not properly trained or do not have the proper protective equipment on hand, DO NOT enter the area. Actions of all officers should be aimed at instilling calm and confidence in victims. This is particularly true when injuries are evident, or when a HAZMAT, chemical, or biological agent is suspected (since the effects of these weapons are frightening, even if victims only suspect they might have been exposed). At the same time, be prepared to exercise positive (physical) control ; expect unresponsive people in the affected area. Don’t be surprised by irrational or violent behavior, expect it from victims, family members, etc. Be prepared to “shelter” Responders in locked vehicles, if necessary, to prevent their contamination. An officer safety concern: a crowd in a frightened state surrounding an officer in a locked vehicle will do everything they can to get the officer out of the vehicle. This may include overturning the vehicle or causing damage to it. The officer should consider parking alongside a building or another parked car. Use of radios should be precluded within 100 feet of a suspected device, and minimized to a distance of 300 feet from the device.
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General incident objectives for responding to known or unknown potential biological or chemical threats: 1 Assess situation. 2 Avoid additional contamination. 3 Stabilize incident. 4 Be cognizant of possible secondary devices (these can be more deadly than the primary threat). 5 Remove people from harm’s way (evacuate upwind). Rescue, consider decontamination, triage, treat and transport victims. 6 Secure the perimeter, set up operation areas, and establish hazard control zones (i.e., hot, warm and cold zone). 7 Control and identify agents involved. Identification of the specific product involved may not be possible until more advanced resources arrive on the scene. The officer SHOULD NOT approach any substance to try and identify it, but should be able to recognize that this is a possible terrorist event. 8 Secure evidence and treat as a crime scene. 9 Maintain situational awareness (more difficult with protective equipment and an ongoing crisis situation). Commander’s Responsibilities: Before an incident, train officers to be aware of suspect site “casing” activities. Challenge individuals acting in a suspicious manner (using non-threatening “Can I help you?” approach). After an incident, be observant. Some people may be drawn to an incident by curiosity; some may be there to admire their handiwork. If available, use a “reverse 911” system (whereby citizens, businesses, etc. in a specified geographic area can be readily notified with warnings and instructions), along with available PA systems and Media announcements, to issue instructions and warn individuals away from the incident site. The actual or threatened use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a Federal crime and should be reported to the FBI as soon as possible. IV.General Response to a Terrorist Incident With Suspected Explosive, or Chemical/Biological Materials The General Terrorist Incident Response guidelines contained in this SOP are due in large measure to the procedures taught in the Win Against Terrorism program, developed by Total Security Services International, Inc., 26 Heatherleigh Court, Marietta, GA 30068, 770/509-8800. Used with permission. The following procedures describe the response to a call following an explosion or other visible dissemination of an unknown material, with reported casualties. Remember though that these suggestions also have applicability to response to any call when it comes to protecting the responders from possible additional threats.
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A. First Responder On-Scene (Responder #1) The role of the first officer to respond to a reported incident is to identify as rapidly as possibly what has happened and to begin to identify an initial plan of action to respond to the incident. Responder #1 becomes the defacto incident commander. Avoid being distracted from the primary role as First Responder. As he arrives on scene, he should approach (from upwind if possible) close enough to visually observe the scene, but should not approach so close as to risk contamination by contact with dispersed agent. Consider the use of binoculars to survey the scene from a safe distance. He should report his location, which will become the initial Contact Point for subsequent responders arriving on-scene. This will prevent "pile-on" of responders in the hazardous region. From his highly visible vantage point, Responder #1 should observe the situation, quickly get initial information from any witnesses nearby, and quickly report the situation. DO NOT TOUCH any witnesses. LONG RANGE SIGNS Dead animals, birds, or insects in unusual numbers Casualties on the ground or obviously unconscious Visible burns or lesions on the skin MID RANGE SIGNS Coughing, choking Pain in the eyes or on the skin Profuse sweating Loss of bladder or bowel control Twitching or convulsing SHORT RANGE SIGNS Pinpointed pupils In assessing the situation commanders should consider: 1 Exact location of incident (type of occupancy) 2 Types of injuries and symptoms presented and number of apparent victims (potentially none if a recent biological incident). Remember that, even though there may be no apparent signs of injury or symptoms, the area may still be contaminated, and there may still be a danger of an explosive device. 3 Information from witnesses' (what they saw and heard). 4. Indicators for potential use of Chemical or Biological Agents: a. Unexplained casualties (NOTE: Signs of illness and symptoms listed may occur quickly in some Chemical incidents and may not be present immediately following other Chemical incidents or biological agent exposure) . i. multiple victims with similar symptoms ii. serious illness iii. nausea, trouble breathing iv. blisters/rashes v. convulsions vi. definite casualty patterns b. Lack of insects, unusual numbers of dead or dying animals in the same area c. Unusual liquid, spray, powder, or vapor droplets, oily film, unexplained odors, low clouds/fog unrelated to weather d. Unexplained odors (when out of character with surroundings)
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e. Unscheduled and unusual spray being disseminated, especially if outdoors during periods of darkness f. Suspicious devices/packages, unusual metal debris (especially containing liquid), abandoned spray devices, unexplained munitions. 4 Isolating area and denying entry or exit 5 Weather conditions, wind direction, atmospheric conditions, and time of day. Plume direction (vapor/cloud movement) 6 A safe access route and staging area (include local cover and a plan for where to go if the responders are forced to evacuate or seek cover as the situation evolves) 7 Evacuating persons from the potential at-risk areas to minimize potential exposure. Note that, in some instances, “shelter in place” may offer more safety than evacuation, particularly if the only evacuation route may lead to increased chance of exposure to contamination or other hazard. 8 Nature of agent and type of exposure 9 Use of all available resources (such as bystanders to assist evacuation, treatment of casualties, etc.) Responder #1 assesses the situation as described above before he or anyone else advances to the core of the scene. This assessment should only take a few seconds. He/she then plans the best access route from the Contact Point to the scene of the incident (core zone), balancing speed of access with minimal exposure to potential secondary hazards. Try to operate in only one quadrant of the incident scene initially (preferably the uphill, upwind quadrant if it allows access). This minimizes potential vulnerability to secondary devices, and facilitates rapid clearing of the access lanes to the core zone. Responder #1 also selects the best safe areas in the vicinity of his command post, and near the selected access route (to collect witnesses and victims). If backup units are arriving quickly, Responder #1 should not enter the core zone. He should begin to seal off the perimeter with announcements over available PA systems and physically as appropriate, coordinating with Dispatch on arrival of follow on units and their routes and their perimeter security and traffic control points. Responder #1 will be responsible for establishing coordination with other units as they arrive, to include supporting fire department, EMS, HAZMAT, or special response units. Specific instructions for coordination and guidance to be given to other units as they arrive (remember to consider use of responder vehicles to provide protection from potential secondary devices. Circling the wagons or forming a “safe lane” to operate in are important considerations for all arriving units): 1
2
3
Fire/EMS – Point out known hazards, safe approach route. Direct them to visually search their area of operation for additional hazards. Instruct EMS to be aware of witness and vict tim injuries which might indicate their participation in the act. Additional police, or police from adjacent jurisdictions – Instruct them to assist in perime ter security and traffic control. Three traffic lanes are desirable for the route into a scene (1 inbound, 1 outbound, and 1 for parking and miscellaneous needs). Warn them to be alert for similar incidents in their jurisdictions. HAZMAT team – Deploy them as quickly as possible. Their priority is to initially sweep the hot zone for secondary devices, locate victims, and begin to mitigate the situation in the
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hot zone. They must be aware of the presence of evidence, and instructed to protect it as best they can. 4 EOD unit (bomb squad) – Mark any detected devices, and blockade any devices threatening the safe areas or responders. Secure the initial contact point. 5 Aviation unit – DO NOT LAND a helicopter any closer than a quarter mile from the core zone if there is any possibility that this is a chemical or biological incident, and then it should be UPWIND from the scene. Utilize them for traffic control or extended command and control. 6 Public Media – Refer public media to the PIO, to provide a consistent story to all media representatives. Do not speculate or make personal comments. Recognize the media’s right to ask questions, and provide information continuously (as it becomes available). In form, don’t alarm. Keep the PIO informed at all times. The PIO should consider the for mation of a Joint Information Center (JIC) as soon as possible. There will be many types of information being released, and a single PIO or agency does not have the knowledge or authority to release all the information needed. 7 Federal assets – Request additional resources from the local FBI Field Office (particularly from their WMD Coordinator). DoD assets are superbly equipped, but will generally take several hours to respond. FEMA has responsibility for Consequence Management. A note on reporting… Radio Communications – PRIORITY TO UNITS ON AN ACTIVE SCENE! Arriving units should minimize their radio calls, listen and report physically to the contact point. This is one of the functions of the contact point – to increase control and reduce the need to use and clutter the operational frequency/radio channel. Once these other units start arriving, the Incident Commander will need to set up his staff positions and delegate responsibilities as necessary to maintain a workable span of control. B. Second Responder On-Scene (Responder #2) The role of the second officer to respond to a reported incident is to augment and support Responder #1 who by now is all we have for “institutional memory” on this incident…even if it is only 2 minutes worth of assessment. Responder #2 will, in most cases, be the first to access the core of the scene. He/she will make continual observations, reporting to Responder #1 and to headquarters as he goes, as he approaches the core zone along the route selected by Responder #1. This may be either in his vehicle or on foot. There are advantages to approaching with the vehicle (PA system, a physical barrier, if necessary, from contaminated victims, and “cover” offered by the engine block and other parts of the vehicle). If there is any indication of chemical or biological contamination, Responder #2 should don available PPE (at a minimum, an appropriate respirator, preferably with full-face protection). Note that the responding officer is required to have the proper training before donning PPE to be in accordance with Federal regulations. The Incident Commander is responsible for adherence to these and other safety regulations. Responder #2 should be aware of the possibility of secondary devices at the scene. At about 100 yards from the core zone, Responder #2 will look for signs of chemical exposure symptoms in any bystanders. He will assess the situation before moving any closer. If visible symptoms or other ev-
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idence of contamination is evident [see 2000 Emergency Response Guide, pages 368-369], he should move no closer until special units arrive with appropriate PPE to retrieve victims safely. If no symptoms are evident at 100 yards, Responder #2 moves to within 50 yards of the core zone. Again, he looks for symptoms of chemical exposure or other evidence of contamination.. At this range, symptoms such as trembling, lacrimation (tears), and pain indications may be visible. If no symptoms or other indicators of hazard are apparent, Responder #2 can approach to within one to ten yards of the core zone. Remember that some forms of contamination are not visible and yet are still extremely dangerous. DO NOT TOUCH VICTIMS. Control the situation, observe the situation and report. Naturally, these distances may not be applicable in all cases but THE PRINCIPLES THEY HIGHLIGHT ARE! C. Third Responder On-Scene (Responder #3) The role of the third officer on scene (Responder #3) is to seal off the area around the incident, establishing a “rough” or “hasty” perimeter. He should make maximum use of any available PA system to quickly warn people to not approach the core zone. Responder #3 will initially be responsible for perimeter security, to include searches for any secondary devices. Responder #3 will initiate secondary searches for any additional devices, starting with the area presenting the greatest threat to witnesses or responders. Masking tape may be used to indicate which containers or locations have been searched. Consider using a grid system for searches. Masking Tape (or chalk, or spray paint) sample SOP… Tape applied “up and down” ( I ) indicates an area that has been initially “Cleared”. Tape applied “side to side” ( -- ) indicates an area that has been looked at but cannot be declared “Clear” due to obstructions to vision or other hindrances to the search. Tape applied in a diagonal ( / ) ( \) means there is a suspicious item at that location. Tape applied in an ( X ) indicates there is a secondary threat at that location Responder #3 will mark the safe lane approaching the core zone, as well as safe areas at the entry to the scene (possibly using yellow police tape. Another excellent marker for the safe lane is colored clothesline, held down with plastic tent stakes or a weight to keep it from blowing around). Responder #3 makes the call for specific special response teams (bomb squad, HAZMAT, special medical or decontamination teams), based on the situation assessment of Responder #1. These are necessary steps, but practical considerations may dictate that they may not be implemented until after the incident is under control. In any case, responders entering a scene should take as little equipment as necessary, primarily to minimize tainting the scene with items that are not evidence, but also to minimize the amount of subsequent hardware decontamination that is required. D. Additional Responders (4+) The mission of additional responders (after Responder #3) is to assist the mission of Responders 1 & 2. This includes the retrieval of additional victims (if the determination has been made that there is no contamination present), security of the perimeter of the scene, and initiation of crime scene investigations (to secure evidence until the formal forensics team can arrive). E. Handling Witnesses DO NOT TOUCH witnesses or victims until either a final determination has been made that there is no contamination present on-scene, or they have been properly decontaminated following prescribed proce-
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dures for the type of contamination to which they might have been exposed. Conscious victims or witnesses should be interviewed within 10 to 15 minutes. NOTE: Even though victims are conscious, they may still be contaminated. NO ONE should be touched before going through decontamination, or the officer will risk secondary contamination to himself or others. They represent the best information available on what happened, and can provide the best information on a fleeing perpetrator or the possible presence of other threats. Once witnesses have been decontaminated, conduct a rapid "witness triage". After reassuring each witness, ask each individual: 1 Their name 2 Where were they when the event occurred? 3 How do they feel (do they have any pain)? 4 Can they see? 5 Can they hear? 6 What happened? 7 Is there any person or item present, either now or before the event, that was unusual or “didn’t belong”? Categorize the witnesses by their ability to answer, then move on to the next one. It is a good practice, both for limiting possible secondary contamination and precluding witnesses comparing stories, to keep witnesses separated. V Response Actions for Biological Threats The most common form of biological threat encountered by local responders is the anthrax letter or package, ostensibly containing pathogenic anthrax spores and a means of disseminating the spores. Anthrax is a lethal bacteria, which in aerosol form can infect human beings through inhalation, and sometimes through physical contact with an open wound or the eyes. Even if you are exposed, you will probably be just fine if you follow the correct procedures. Symptoms of anthrax exposure can take as long as 24 to 48 hours to appear, and if you receive treatment after exposure (before symptoms appear), you will likely suffer minimal damage. Remember, too, that persons exposed to anthrax are not contagious. Anthrax spores form a fine dry powder, which looks something like whole wheat flour or brownish-yellow talcum powder. It also can be mixed with water or other liquid into a suspension of spore particles for ease of dissemination by a liquid spray device. The sections which follow outline response procedures for Law Enforcement and other Emergency Response personnel responding to the threatened use of biological, chemical, or radiological materials. 1 The first section covers preparation measures before a threat is made, which can reduce vulnerability of a facility. 2 The second section addresses threatened releases, where no actual material has been released, or where the suspect package/envelope has not been opened. 3 The third section covers response procedures for the case where a suspected dissemination device is detected, or an unknown material is present. The final section represents a set of additional guidelines for actions upon detection of a potential
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release of suspected material. A. Protective Measures to Take to Reduce the Threat The following steps are recommended for emergency planners and facility managers to prepare for a potential WMD threat. They represent basic steps to reduce the vulnerability to such an attack, and to provide some measure of preparedness. 1 Check the location and security of all fresh air intakes to the buildings ventilation system. 2 Prepare a map of the building to be used by response personnel if needed. 3. Assess the general security of the building: a) Operability and condition of any video surveillance system being used. b) Does the video surveillance system cover all the entry/exit points and air/water intakes. c) Accessibility of any person to unauthorized areas, such as utility or mechanical rooms. d) Operability of any public address systems 3 Inform all permanent tenants and/or employees of these guidelines. 4 Draft a sample alert statement that might be used during an event to get the word out. B. Response to Anonymous Caller or Letter Indicating a WMD Threat (no material present, or letter unopened) The following procedure provides response guidelines in the event of a WMD threat, to include anthrax threats, where there has NOT been an apparent release of any materials, or the package/envelope has not been opened. Note that these are general guidelines only, and specific information developed during the course of an investigation may necessitate an altered response. In all cases, a law enforcement response is required. The threatened use of WMD is a Federal crime and should be reported to the FBI as soon as possible. On-scene commanders and supervisors must be prepared to transition to a Unified Command or Incident Command System (ICS) multi-agency response structure with other local, county, state, or federal response elements. NOTE: ALL responders to a potential WMD event should consider the possibilities of secondary devices during the course of their investigation. On-Scene Assessment: Minimal protective equipment (at least respiratory protection) should be used. Try to keep barriers between responders and the threat. Decontamination and prophylaxis treatment should not be required unless specific hazards or risks are indicated. 1 Law enforcement response should be similar to a telephonic bomb threat, including local police and FBI agent(s). 2 Limited fire department and/or HAZMAT response is recommended unless device or sus picious material is present or individuals are symptomatic (notify Health Dept. as local Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) dictate). 3 Assess the situation 4 Did the threat come by telephone? By mail? 5 Is there a package/envelope present? 6 What type of package is it? 7 Did the threat specify a location or time of the release? 8 Is there any type of unknown material (powder or liquid) present? 9 Presence of any unknown materials dictates the use of at least respiratory protection when
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in the vicinity of the package/envelope. Response Strategy: Minimal Personal Protective equipment (at least respiratory protection) should be used. Decontamination, and/or prophylaxis treatment should not be required unless specific hazards or risks are indicated. Treat as routine law enforcement investigation (similar to a bomb threat). That means be alert to the possible presence of secondary, WMD, explosive and firearms threats during the response.
1 2.
Treat as a crime scene/law enforcement investigation. Investigative actions during this response may include: Information gathering at the scene (threat assessment to determine credibility of a threat). Building evacuation/search following local protocol. Included should be an assessment of the building ventilation system to rule out forced entry and tampering. Taking control of the building ventilation system may be warranted based upon investigative findings. Attention should be focused on appliances or devices foreign to the surroundings. 3 If package/envelope is present, screen package/envelope by Bomb Squad to ensure no dispersal mechanism/device inside. 4. Handle the package following FBI Evidence Response Team (ERT) protocols. Double bag the package/envelope and place in a suitable container such as evidence paint can. Triple bagging is recommended for suspected biological contamination. Control the material as evidence with documentation of "chain of custody" and follow the FBI plan for laboratory analysis through the local FBI office. 5 Search to confirm no substance or additional package/envelope is present. 6 Attention should be focused on appliances or devices foreign to the surroundings. 7 No medical attention/decontamination is necessary unless symptoms are present, al though local public health authorities should be notified. Hand washing is sufficient for those who have touched the package/envelope and letter. Decontamination or medical prophylaxis is not warranted. However, if subsequent testing of the evidence confirms the presence of biological contamination, medical prophylaxis should be considered. 8 Document Everyone! This will allow you to find people later should the analysis later proves the device did contain threat material and all persons exposed must be found. It also may get you a name of a perpetrator who was caught inside your perimeter. C. Response When Potential WMD Device is Located (either indoors or outdoors) The following procedure provides response guidelines in the event of a WMD threat, where a suspicious package/envelope/device has been located, and an unknown substance is present or released. Note that these are general guidelines only, and specific information developed during the course of an investigation may necessitate an altered response. In all cases, a law enforcement response is required. The threatened use of WMD is a Federal crime and should be reported to the FBI as soon as possible. On-scene com221
manders and supervisors must be prepared to transition to a Unified Command or Incident Command System (ICS) multi-agency response structure with other local, county, state, or federal response elements. NOTE: ALL responders to a potential WMD event should consider the possibilities of secondary devices during the course of their investigation. On-Scene Assessment: Suspicious material(s) with a threat of a chemical or biological device should initiate a public safety response, including the following notifications (according to local SOPs): 1 Local police, bomb technicians/squad, and local FBI field office 2 Fire, EMS, and HAZMAT units 3 Local and state health and environmental departments 4 Treat as a HAZMAT/crime scene Response Strategy: Suspicious material(s) with a threat of a biological agent should initiate a public safety response including notifications according to existing local SOP:
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Persons in the at-risk area should be rapidly evacuated and immediately evaluated by medi cal/public health professionals as appropriate. 2 Treat as a HAZMAT/crime scene. Control and isolate scene. 3 If possible, control the ventilation system of the building(s). In most cases, this entails shutting the system down. 4 Follow local protocols for evaluating risk regarding potential explosive device(s). 5 If an explosive device is not ruled out, coordinate efforts with local/regional Bomb Squad, and notify the FBI Bomb Data Center (BDC). 6 If an explosive device is ruled out, evaluate for potential chemical, biological, or radioac tive source material. NOTE: Only responders with appropriate protective equipment and training should participate in this evaluation process. 7 If radioactive source material appears to be present, follow FBI plans for requesting addi tional assistance. 8 If no hazardous materials appear to be present, response continues as a law enforcement investigation. 9 If device has potential chemical or biological filler or supplement: 10 Follow FBI Evidence Response Team (ERT) protocols for documentation of the crime scene, as modified for contaminated sites. 11 Contain the package following recommendations from a hazardous materials authority. As sure notification of FBI Hazardous Material Response Unit (HMRU), through local FBI. 12 Options include double bagging, steel cans, poly containment vessels, or utilization of a hazardous materials over-pack. Triple bagging is recommended for suspected biological contamination. 13 Control the material as evidence and follow FBI plan for laboratory analysis. 15 Establish perimeter security denying entry into the HAZMAT/crime scene. 16 If symptoms of exposure are evident, decontamination at the site should be considered for the individual(s) who came in direct physical contact /inhalation with the unknown sub 222
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stance. Establish decontamination capability and begin HAZMAT operations Evaluate need to evacuate or protect in place Alert hospitals as soon as possible regarding imminent mass casualties; consider use of field hospitals. Ensure the hospitals designated to receive patients are capable of receiving possibly contaminated or field-decontaminated patients. Coordinate control of personnel Conduct evacuation Estimate number of casualties Arrange for transportation Establish decontamination areas Separate decontamination sites for civilians and emergency response personnel Separate victims with symptoms at triage from those without symptoms Document Everyone! This will allow you to find people later, should analysis later proves the device contained threat material and all persons exposed must be found. It also may identify the name of a perpetrator who was caught inside your perimeter.
D. Additional measures if there is potential release of WMD material from a device 1 Control the ventilation system. 2 Follow protocols for a hazardous materials incident [see 2000 Emergency Response Guide pages 368-369 and Guide Number 111]. 3 Evaluate the extent of contamination. This will require the assistance of specially equipped and trained personnel. 4 Evacuation of affected areas and decontamination procedures should be selected on the basis of an incident and risk assessment. 5 Provide medical attention following the recommendations from the local/regional public health medical authority. 6 Control and or isolate the hazard. Aside from isolation of the scene, this will require the assistance of properly equipped and trained personnel. 7 Treat as a FBI hazardous materials crime scene. 8 Request assistance from FBI/HMRU through local FBI . VI. Biological Threat Management Guidelines (for Civilian Workers) The following information guidelines are intended for civilians, office workers, or other individuals (not First Responders) who might encounter a threatening letter or note involving potential use of biological agents. It provides procedures and guidelines to be followed prior to the arrival of Response Personnel. These guidelines should be given widest distribution in any organization. A. If You Receive A Threatening Letter Or Note RELAX AND REMAIN CALM - Although any threatened use of a biological must be treated as though it is real, experience has demonstrated that these are likely to be a HOAX. If the suspected biological agent is reported as Anthrax, be assured that it is not contagious, and that treatment is readily available if administered before the onset of symptoms.
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WHAT SHOULD YOU DO? 1) If it is a note that you happen to find, LEAVE IT ALONE. Notify authorities. 2) If it is a letter that you have opened, set it down gently at the location where you first read it. Or better yet, if your facility provides an explosion-proof container, carefully place the letter/package inside. Then retreat to an area a safe distance away that will minimize your exposure to others. Avoid contact with others when possible, and remain in this safe area. Public Safety officials will come to assist you. 3) Advise a coworker in the immediate area what has happened and request that they call 911. 4) Request that the buildings ventilation system is shut down and turn off any fans in the immediate area. 5) Do not allow others into the area. If anyone enters, they must stay until instructed to leave by Public Safety officials. 4) Remain calm. Exposure does not mean that you will become sick. Health officials will provide specific information and instructions about the symptoms and effective treatment to prevent illness. WHAT SHOULDN'T YOU DO? 1) Do not pass the letter or note to others. 2) Do not disturb any contents in the letter or note. Handling the object may only spread the substance and increase the chances of it getting into the air. 3) Do not ignore the threat. It must be treated as though it is real until properly evaluated. B. If You Receive A Phone Threat WHAT SHOULD YOU DO? 1) 2) 3)
Notify a coworker immediately to call 911. Do not use the same phone to make any calls. It may be possible to trace the call, and help a later investigation. Ensure that notification is made to have the building's ventilation system shut down. Remain calm; similar threats have almost always proven false and this is likely to be a hoax also.
WHAT SHOULDN'T YOU DO? 1) 2) 3)
Do not ignore the threat. It must be treated as though it is real until properly evaluated. Do not argue with, or antagonize the caller. You could make the situation worse. Listen carefully to the caller so you can recall the details when asked by Public Safety officials at a later time.
C. What You Can Expect From A Response By Public Safety Officials Fire, Law Enforcement, and Emergency Medical Services will manage the scene. People will be requested to cooperate by waiting in a safe area until an appropriate evaluation of the incident is made, and information will immediately be provided when it becomes available. 1) There is likely to be a decontamination (cleaning/washing) process performed. There is more than one way to accomplish decon. Generally this will be based upon the conditions present
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at the scene. 2) Personal contact information will be asked for by authorities in order to contact people after the incident, and provide them with follow-up information. This information will be kept confidential by public safety authorities.
VII. 911 Operator Checklist for Chem/Bio Incident Reporting The following information should be obtained by a 911 Operator or Dispatcher from a caller reporting a suspected chemical/biological or HAZMAT incident: 1 Location of the incident? 2 Approximate time of the incident? 3 Is anyone injured or sick? How many? 4 Is there a fire and/or explosion? 5 What kind of vehicle or container is involved? 6 Describe any markings/number/symbols on the vehicle, device or container? Request the caller to slowly and clearly spell the name(s) that appear. 7 Has anything spilled or been released? 8 Do/did you see smoke or a vapor cloud? 9 Do/did you hear any sounds (like hissing or a burst)? 10 Do/did you smell an unusual odor? 11. What are the local weather conditions? Sunny Cloudy Partly Cloudy Rain Sleet Snow Temperature:__________ Wind Direction:_____________ Humidity:_____________ Wind Speed:________________ 12 s there anyone at the scene that may have knowledge of the situation? Provide name and phone number. 13 At what location can the responding units meet with the person reporting the incident or that has knowledge about the incident? 14 Who is in charge now at the scene in your organization? Name, Phone, and Agency VIII. Notification/Telephone List The following list of telephone numbers is provided as suggested contacts for incident commanders. The toll free number to the National Response Center (NRC)* is for use after initial notifications are made, and for supplemental guidance. Local law enforcement __________________________ Local fire department (HAZMAT) __________________________ Local FBI field office __________________________ FBI Bomb Data Center (BDC) ____________________ Local Health Office __________________________ Poison Control __________________________
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Local Emergency Department _______________________ State Health Department __________________________ National Response Center* (800)-424-8802 or National Response Center (DC area) (202) 267-2675 Local hospital __________________________ Other local number __________________________ Other local number __________________________ Other local number __________________________ The National Response Center (NRC) provides direction to the first response community through the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit during suspected terrorist incidents. The WMDOU can initiate the appropriate federal assets in response to the potential WMD threat.
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